diff --git "a/LMU_NEW.jsonl" "b/LMU_NEW.jsonl" deleted file mode 100644--- "a/LMU_NEW.jsonl" +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5869 +0,0 @@ -{"title": "What is the chance that AIs will be able to program themselves by August 2026?", "desc": "As of 2017, humans can (with assistance of various software tools) program machine learning (ML) systems that can learn to do various tasks – for example, recognize text, transcribe speech, or play games. \n\nML systems are currently *not* very good at writing programs to accomplish a specific purpose, though there are efforts in this direction, and some software systems (e.g. Mathematica and Wolfram-alpha) which are quite high-level programming systems. (See the related question [here](http://www.metaculus.com/questions/405/when-will-programs-write-programs-for-us/)).\n\nIf or when AI/ML systems become competent enough to do fairly general-purpose programming, for example to construct by themselves (according to some specifications) the types of narrow AI systems that AI researchers can create as of 2017, there could be a very rapid proliferation of such narrow AI systems since they could be constructed to-order for all manner of purposes even by non-programmers.\n\nIf an AI/ML system could become competent enough at programming that it could design a system (to some specification) that *can itself design other systems,* then it would presumably be sophisticated enough that it could also design upgrades or superior alternatives to itself, leading to recursive self-improvement that could dramatically increase the system's capability on a potentially short timescale.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when an AI system exists that could (if it chose to!) successfully comply with the request \"build me a general-purpose programming system that can write from scratch a deep-learning system capable of transcribing human speech.\"\n\nIf this does not occur between January 1, 2018 to January 1, 2100, this question will be **Annulled.**", "lower_25": "Nov 2024", "median": "Aug 2026", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be machine-kindergartner parity in LEGO construction by Sep 2026?", "desc": "For more than 100 years, machines have been replacing human physical labor, especially in jobs requiring great physical strength, or endurance, or extremely repetitive and well-defined motions. This has arguably accelerated in recent decades, and there is a current growing push for \"[lights out manufacturing](http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1037666065632825628),\" i.e. have no light-requiring humans in-the-loop.\n\nIt has proven harder to create robots that can substitute for the fine-grained dexterity and motor control of many physical tasks, especially those where the action must be in response to, or dictated by, visual or verbal information. Robots are, however, continually improving, and it is not hard to extrapolate to a time when most non-intellectual factory-type jobs can be done by autonomous systems that can be directly \"slotted in\" for a human worker.", "resc": "This question resolves to the first date for which an AI system can assemble on demand multiple possible production Lego sets of 50+ pieces. The box and bags may be open but the robot must turn the pages on the direction set. Credible video or report must exist of this being done. The robot can be a prototype rather than production model.\n\nResolution can also be achieved by the existence of a robot that would, as judged by a robotics expert, very clearly be capable of assembling a Lego set, even if not explicitly demonstrated to have done so.", "lower_25": "May 2024", "median": "Sep 2026", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global warming will be 1.99 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels by 2100?", "desc": "At the Paris climate accord, world leaders promised to keep the global temperature increase this century (relative to pre-industrial levels) \"well below 2 ˚C\" and if possible below 1.5 ˚C. Many experts are skeptical about this goal being feasible, stating that even if all Paris targets are met, global warming may reach levels up to 3 ˚C above pre-industrial levels. Furthermore, with the coming departure of the United States from the agreement, the meeting of global targets may be in jeopardy.\n\nIt was previously asked whether global warming would exceed 2 ˚C. While this is the more interesting question out of a political perspective, given that world leaders have taken 2 ˚C to be their target, the more interesting question for humanity as a whole will be how much warming we will actually have.\n\n***How much greater (in ˚C) will the average global temperature in 2100 be than the average global temperature in 1880?***", "resc": "Data for resolution shall, as with the previous question, come from NASA, if possible. Note that the data in the link is normalised relative to the 1951-1980 baseline, on which 1880 stands at -0.2. Therefore, the value we are trying to predict is the value in the link at 2100 + 0.2. It is likely, though, that the link will no longer be active in a few decades, so a different dataset may have to be used anyway.\n\nIn the event that the warming is greater than 10 ˚C or less than 0 ˚C, this question will resolve as **ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.99", "median": "2.79", "upper_75": "3.80", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world will create the first Trillionaire by 2039?", "desc": "In 2014, Bill Gates prognosticated that the world would see its first trillionaire within 15 years. Well, as of this writing we're 4 years in.\n\nInternational bank, Credit Suisse, meanwhile, predicts that we'll see around [11 trillionaires](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/10808915/World-could-see-first-trillionaire-in-25-years.html) within 2 generations.\n\nOthers speculate that bitcoin's mystery founder, Satoshi Nakamoto, might [claim the title](https://mashable.com/2017/12/12/bitcoin-satoshi-trillionaire/).\n\nDespite the fact that Amazon's Jeff Bezos is [nearing the $100B mark](https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/dec/19/when-will-we-see-the-worlds-first-trillionaire-jeff-bezos-bill-gates), we're not yet nearing $1T territory.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first date that any person is ranked on [Forbes' Billionaires List](https://www.forbes.com/sites/kerryadolan/2017/03/20/forbes-2017-billionaires-list-meet-the-richest-people-on-the-planet/#7409483862ff) with a net worth of at least $1,000 billion (in nominal USD). \n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2075, this question will resolve as \"ambiguous\".\n\n(Fine print: if the Forbes list ceases, other credible and multiply-sources estimates of a trillion-dollar net worth for an individual person can be accepted. The trillion can be in contemporary dollars, i.e. very high inflation could also help bring this about.", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a mile-high building by 2049?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2042", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first 100 Megawatt fusion-based electrical generation facility will come into service by 2041?", "desc": "Large-scale generation of electric power by nuclear fusion is a holy grail of energy science research. The potential for scalability (due to abundant ocean reserves of deuterium), and the relatively small level and short lifetime of radioactive waste could allow fusion power to contribute significantly to a zero-carbon sustainable global electrical supply. \n\nIn additional to large governmental efforts like the US [National Ignition Facility](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Ignition_Facility), Europe's [ITER](https://www.iter.org), [HiPER](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HiPER), and the [Wendelstein 7-X](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wendelstein_7-X), there are also a number of private companies developing fusion technology.\n\nPrivate efforts include [General Fusion](http://generalfusion.com), [Tri-Alpha Energy](http://trialphaenergy.com), and [Lockheed-Martin](http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/compact-fusion.html), but all are cagey about their benchmarks and progress. Is there a real shot at zero-carbon, zero-long-lived nuclear waste energy from fusion, from these or the larger governmental efforts?", "resc": "To separate this from a distinct question of low-energy nuclear reaction technologies, we'll specify that this applies to *hot* nuclear fusion at 100,000 K or more.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2041", "upper_75": "2055", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next human being will walk on the Moon by Jun 2029?", "desc": "In July 1969, Neil Armstrong stepped out on to the lunar surface, and became the first human being to walk on the Moon.\n\nLess than four years later, In December 1972, Eugene Cernan stepped up into the Lunar Module, and (as of February 2018) no human being has walked on the Moon since.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date and time (UTC) when the next human has set foot on Earth's moon. If this feat has not occurred between January 1, 2018 to January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "Dec 2026", "median": "Jun 2029", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global warming will be 1.99 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels by 2100?", "desc": "At the Paris climate accord, world leaders promised to keep the global temperature increase this century (relative to pre-industrial levels) \"well below 2 ˚C\" and if possible below 1.5 ˚C. Many experts are skeptical about this goal being feasible, stating that even if all Paris targets are met, global warming may reach levels up to 3 ˚C above pre-industrial levels. Furthermore, with the coming departure of the United States from the agreement, the meeting of global targets may be in jeopardy.\n\nIt was previously asked whether global warming would exceed 2 ˚C. While this is the more interesting question out of a political perspective, given that world leaders have taken 2 ˚C to be their target, the more interesting question for humanity as a whole will be how much warming we will actually have.\n\n***How much greater (in ˚C) will the average global temperature in 2100 be than the average global temperature in 1880?***", "resc": "Data for resolution shall, as with the previous question, come from NASA, if possible. Note that the data in the link is normalised relative to the 1951-1980 baseline, on which 1880 stands at -0.2. Therefore, the value we are trying to predict is the value in the link at 2100 + 0.2. It is likely, though, that the link will no longer be active in a few decades, so a different dataset may have to be used anyway.\n\nIn the event that the warming is greater than 10 ˚C or less than 0 ˚C, this question will resolve as **ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.99", "median": "2.79", "upper_75": "3.80", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world will create the first Trillionaire by 2039?", "desc": "In 2014, Bill Gates prognosticated that the world would see its first trillionaire within 15 years. Well, as of this writing we're 4 years in.\n\nInternational bank, Credit Suisse, meanwhile, predicts that we'll see around [11 trillionaires](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/10808915/World-could-see-first-trillionaire-in-25-years.html) within 2 generations.\n\nOthers speculate that bitcoin's mystery founder, Satoshi Nakamoto, might [claim the title](https://mashable.com/2017/12/12/bitcoin-satoshi-trillionaire/).\n\nDespite the fact that Amazon's Jeff Bezos is [nearing the $100B mark](https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/dec/19/when-will-we-see-the-worlds-first-trillionaire-jeff-bezos-bill-gates), we're not yet nearing $1T territory.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first date that any person is ranked on [Forbes' Billionaires List](https://www.forbes.com/sites/kerryadolan/2017/03/20/forbes-2017-billionaires-list-meet-the-richest-people-on-the-planet/#7409483862ff) with a net worth of at least $1,000 billion (in nominal USD). \n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2075, this question will resolve as \"ambiguous\".\n\n(Fine print: if the Forbes list ceases, other credible and multiply-sources estimates of a trillion-dollar net worth for an individual person can be accepted. The trillion can be in contemporary dollars, i.e. very high inflation could also help bring this about.", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next human being will walk on the Moon by Jun 2029?", "desc": "In July 1969, Neil Armstrong stepped out on to the lunar surface, and became the first human being to walk on the Moon.\n\nLess than four years later, In December 1972, Eugene Cernan stepped up into the Lunar Module, and (as of February 2018) no human being has walked on the Moon since.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date and time (UTC) when the next human has set foot on Earth's moon. If this feat has not occurred between January 1, 2018 to January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "Dec 2026", "median": "Jun 2029", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global warming will be 1.99 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels by 2100?", "desc": "At the Paris climate accord, world leaders promised to keep the global temperature increase this century (relative to pre-industrial levels) \"well below 2 ˚C\" and if possible below 1.5 ˚C. Many experts are skeptical about this goal being feasible, stating that even if all Paris targets are met, global warming may reach levels up to 3 ˚C above pre-industrial levels. Furthermore, with the coming departure of the United States from the agreement, the meeting of global targets may be in jeopardy.\n\nIt was previously asked whether global warming would exceed 2 ˚C. While this is the more interesting question out of a political perspective, given that world leaders have taken 2 ˚C to be their target, the more interesting question for humanity as a whole will be how much warming we will actually have.\n\n***How much greater (in ˚C) will the average global temperature in 2100 be than the average global temperature in 1880?***", "resc": "Data for resolution shall, as with the previous question, come from NASA, if possible. Note that the data in the link is normalised relative to the 1951-1980 baseline, on which 1880 stands at -0.2. Therefore, the value we are trying to predict is the value in the link at 2100 + 0.2. It is likely, though, that the link will no longer be active in a few decades, so a different dataset may have to be used anyway.\n\nIn the event that the warming is greater than 10 ˚C or less than 0 ˚C, this question will resolve as **ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.99", "median": "2.79", "upper_75": "3.80", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first 100 Megawatt fusion-based electrical generation facility will come into service by 2041?", "desc": "Large-scale generation of electric power by nuclear fusion is a holy grail of energy science research. The potential for scalability (due to abundant ocean reserves of deuterium), and the relatively small level and short lifetime of radioactive waste could allow fusion power to contribute significantly to a zero-carbon sustainable global electrical supply. \n\nIn additional to large governmental efforts like the US [National Ignition Facility](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Ignition_Facility), Europe's [ITER](https://www.iter.org), [HiPER](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HiPER), and the [Wendelstein 7-X](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wendelstein_7-X), there are also a number of private companies developing fusion technology.\n\nPrivate efforts include [General Fusion](http://generalfusion.com), [Tri-Alpha Energy](http://trialphaenergy.com), and [Lockheed-Martin](http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/compact-fusion.html), but all are cagey about their benchmarks and progress. Is there a real shot at zero-carbon, zero-long-lived nuclear waste energy from fusion, from these or the larger governmental efforts?", "resc": "To separate this from a distinct question of low-energy nuclear reaction technologies, we'll specify that this applies to *hot* nuclear fusion at 100,000 K or more.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2041", "upper_75": "2055", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be machine-kindergartner parity in LEGO construction by Sep 2026?", "desc": "For more than 100 years, machines have been replacing human physical labor, especially in jobs requiring great physical strength, or endurance, or extremely repetitive and well-defined motions. This has arguably accelerated in recent decades, and there is a current growing push for \"[lights out manufacturing](http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1037666065632825628),\" i.e. have no light-requiring humans in-the-loop.\n\nIt has proven harder to create robots that can substitute for the fine-grained dexterity and motor control of many physical tasks, especially those where the action must be in response to, or dictated by, visual or verbal information. Robots are, however, continually improving, and it is not hard to extrapolate to a time when most non-intellectual factory-type jobs can be done by autonomous systems that can be directly \"slotted in\" for a human worker.", "resc": "This question resolves to the first date for which an AI system can assemble on demand multiple possible production Lego sets of 50+ pieces. The box and bags may be open but the robot must turn the pages on the direction set. Credible video or report must exist of this being done. The robot can be a prototype rather than production model.\n\nResolution can also be achieved by the existence of a robot that would, as judged by a robotics expert, very clearly be capable of assembling a Lego set, even if not explicitly demonstrated to have done so.", "lower_25": "May 2024", "median": "Sep 2026", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world will create the first Trillionaire by 2039?", "desc": "In 2014, Bill Gates prognosticated that the world would see its first trillionaire within 15 years. Well, as of this writing we're 4 years in.\n\nInternational bank, Credit Suisse, meanwhile, predicts that we'll see around [11 trillionaires](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/10808915/World-could-see-first-trillionaire-in-25-years.html) within 2 generations.\n\nOthers speculate that bitcoin's mystery founder, Satoshi Nakamoto, might [claim the title](https://mashable.com/2017/12/12/bitcoin-satoshi-trillionaire/).\n\nDespite the fact that Amazon's Jeff Bezos is [nearing the $100B mark](https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/dec/19/when-will-we-see-the-worlds-first-trillionaire-jeff-bezos-bill-gates), we're not yet nearing $1T territory.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first date that any person is ranked on [Forbes' Billionaires List](https://www.forbes.com/sites/kerryadolan/2017/03/20/forbes-2017-billionaires-list-meet-the-richest-people-on-the-planet/#7409483862ff) with a net worth of at least $1,000 billion (in nominal USD). \n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2075, this question will resolve as \"ambiguous\".\n\n(Fine print: if the Forbes list ceases, other credible and multiply-sources estimates of a trillion-dollar net worth for an individual person can be accepted. The trillion can be in contemporary dollars, i.e. very high inflation could also help bring this about.", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AIs will be able to program themselves by August 2026?", "desc": "As of 2017, humans can (with assistance of various software tools) program machine learning (ML) systems that can learn to do various tasks – for example, recognize text, transcribe speech, or play games. \n\nML systems are currently *not* very good at writing programs to accomplish a specific purpose, though there are efforts in this direction, and some software systems (e.g. Mathematica and Wolfram-alpha) which are quite high-level programming systems. (See the related question [here](http://www.metaculus.com/questions/405/when-will-programs-write-programs-for-us/)).\n\nIf or when AI/ML systems become competent enough to do fairly general-purpose programming, for example to construct by themselves (according to some specifications) the types of narrow AI systems that AI researchers can create as of 2017, there could be a very rapid proliferation of such narrow AI systems since they could be constructed to-order for all manner of purposes even by non-programmers.\n\nIf an AI/ML system could become competent enough at programming that it could design a system (to some specification) that *can itself design other systems,* then it would presumably be sophisticated enough that it could also design upgrades or superior alternatives to itself, leading to recursive self-improvement that could dramatically increase the system's capability on a potentially short timescale.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when an AI system exists that could (if it chose to!) successfully comply with the request \"build me a general-purpose programming system that can write from scratch a deep-learning system capable of transcribing human speech.\"\n\nIf this does not occur between January 1, 2018 to January 1, 2100, this question will be **Annulled.**", "lower_25": "Nov 2024", "median": "Aug 2026", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a mile-high building by 2049?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2042", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next human being will walk on the Moon by Jun 2029?", "desc": "In July 1969, Neil Armstrong stepped out on to the lunar surface, and became the first human being to walk on the Moon.\n\nLess than four years later, In December 1972, Eugene Cernan stepped up into the Lunar Module, and (as of February 2018) no human being has walked on the Moon since.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date and time (UTC) when the next human has set foot on Earth's moon. If this feat has not occurred between January 1, 2018 to January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "Dec 2026", "median": "Jun 2029", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AIs will be able to program themselves by August 2026?", "desc": "As of 2017, humans can (with assistance of various software tools) program machine learning (ML) systems that can learn to do various tasks – for example, recognize text, transcribe speech, or play games. \n\nML systems are currently *not* very good at writing programs to accomplish a specific purpose, though there are efforts in this direction, and some software systems (e.g. Mathematica and Wolfram-alpha) which are quite high-level programming systems. (See the related question [here](http://www.metaculus.com/questions/405/when-will-programs-write-programs-for-us/)).\n\nIf or when AI/ML systems become competent enough to do fairly general-purpose programming, for example to construct by themselves (according to some specifications) the types of narrow AI systems that AI researchers can create as of 2017, there could be a very rapid proliferation of such narrow AI systems since they could be constructed to-order for all manner of purposes even by non-programmers.\n\nIf an AI/ML system could become competent enough at programming that it could design a system (to some specification) that *can itself design other systems,* then it would presumably be sophisticated enough that it could also design upgrades or superior alternatives to itself, leading to recursive self-improvement that could dramatically increase the system's capability on a potentially short timescale.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when an AI system exists that could (if it chose to!) successfully comply with the request \"build me a general-purpose programming system that can write from scratch a deep-learning system capable of transcribing human speech.\"\n\nIf this does not occur between January 1, 2018 to January 1, 2100, this question will be **Annulled.**", "lower_25": "Nov 2024", "median": "Aug 2026", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be machine-kindergartner parity in LEGO construction by Sep 2026?", "desc": "For more than 100 years, machines have been replacing human physical labor, especially in jobs requiring great physical strength, or endurance, or extremely repetitive and well-defined motions. This has arguably accelerated in recent decades, and there is a current growing push for \"[lights out manufacturing](http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1037666065632825628),\" i.e. have no light-requiring humans in-the-loop.\n\nIt has proven harder to create robots that can substitute for the fine-grained dexterity and motor control of many physical tasks, especially those where the action must be in response to, or dictated by, visual or verbal information. Robots are, however, continually improving, and it is not hard to extrapolate to a time when most non-intellectual factory-type jobs can be done by autonomous systems that can be directly \"slotted in\" for a human worker.", "resc": "This question resolves to the first date for which an AI system can assemble on demand multiple possible production Lego sets of 50+ pieces. The box and bags may be open but the robot must turn the pages on the direction set. Credible video or report must exist of this being done. The robot can be a prototype rather than production model.\n\nResolution can also be achieved by the existence of a robot that would, as judged by a robotics expert, very clearly be capable of assembling a Lego set, even if not explicitly demonstrated to have done so.", "lower_25": "May 2024", "median": "Sep 2026", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first 100 Megawatt fusion-based electrical generation facility will come into service by 2041?", "desc": "Large-scale generation of electric power by nuclear fusion is a holy grail of energy science research. The potential for scalability (due to abundant ocean reserves of deuterium), and the relatively small level and short lifetime of radioactive waste could allow fusion power to contribute significantly to a zero-carbon sustainable global electrical supply. \n\nIn additional to large governmental efforts like the US [National Ignition Facility](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Ignition_Facility), Europe's [ITER](https://www.iter.org), [HiPER](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HiPER), and the [Wendelstein 7-X](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wendelstein_7-X), there are also a number of private companies developing fusion technology.\n\nPrivate efforts include [General Fusion](http://generalfusion.com), [Tri-Alpha Energy](http://trialphaenergy.com), and [Lockheed-Martin](http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/compact-fusion.html), but all are cagey about their benchmarks and progress. Is there a real shot at zero-carbon, zero-long-lived nuclear waste energy from fusion, from these or the larger governmental efforts?", "resc": "To separate this from a distinct question of low-energy nuclear reaction technologies, we'll specify that this applies to *hot* nuclear fusion at 100,000 K or more.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2041", "upper_75": "2055", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a mile-high building by 2049?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2042", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that we will receive the last communication from Voyager 1 by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that the next commercial supersonic flight will occur by Nov 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Dec 2028", "median": "Nov 2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that we will receive the last communication from Voyager 1 by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How long will the Great Pyramids be recognizable?\n\nKeyword: 37.4k\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the Great Pyramids will be recognizable for 37.4k years?", "desc": "", "resc": "The ancient pyramids of Egypt are ridiculously cool.\n\nConstruction began over 4500 years ago, and these awesome structures, despite having [been raided](http://www.ancient-egypt-online.com/ancient-egypt-tomb-robbers.html) over the centuries and stripped of their beautiful [white limestone](https://www.fastcodesign.com/3037815/the-great-pyramid-used-to-be-so-shiny-it-glowed) exteriors, inspire millions. \n\nRebuilding them would be a massive project, although it probably could be done for a cool [$5 billion](https://www.livescience.com/18589-cost-build-great-pyramid-today.html) or so--for just the Great Pyramid of Giza, that is.\n\nThey've lasted 5 millennia, and they will almost certainly endure after every human alive today is long dead. But the pyramids will not last forever.\n\nAs this [Quora post](https://www.quora.com/If-humanity-died-today-how-long-would-the-pyramids-of-Giza-last) notes:\n\n> The Rocky mountains in the US were formed over ~70 million years, ~70 million years ago. If geologic processes can turn an ocean into the Rockies in that time frame, it will make short work of the pyramids. \n \nThis other Quora post gives a [more precise assessment](https://www.quora.com/If-left-to-the-elements-when-will-the-pyramids-of-Egypt-erode): \n\n> Knowing that the pyramids 4000 years ago were made of polished limestone that would have glowed, we can say that it has eroded over time. I am not sure what the exact rate of limestone degradation is, and you could probably work it out by that rate, but by what I can see, around 2 layers of blocks and various bits have fallen from the sides of the larger pyramid. Many people have said that the pyramids would last 1 million years or even until the world ended, but I'd say around 10,000 to 100,000 years based on current observations.\n\nWhat do you think? Assuming that humans do *not* intervene but the pyramids are just left to nature's tender mercies, how many years will it take, before the Great Pyramids are all eroded away into undetectability?\n\n(Needless to say, this is one of those questions unlikely to be resolved on a timescale anyone cares about; it's just for fun.)", "lower_25": "1.84k", "median": "37.4k", "upper_75": "335k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 1st Parameter R∗: What is the chance that 12.2 average rate of formation of suitable stars (stars/year) in our galaxy will occur?", "desc": "This is the first question of the [Fermi paradox series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox).\n\nIn a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) Dissolving the Fermi Paradox by Anders Sandberg, Eric Drexler & Toby Ord of the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, the Drake's Equation was run as a Monte Carlo Simulation rather than a point estimate using the following distributions for the parameters of the Drake's Equation;\n\nParameter Distribution:\n\n- \\(R_∗\\) log-uniform from 1 to 100.\n- \\(f_p\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(n_e\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(f_l\\) log-normal rate, \\(1 − e^{−λVt}\\) (giving \\(f_l\\) mean 0.5 and median - 0.63).\n- \\(f_i\\) log-uniform from 0.001 to 1.\n- \\(f_c\\) log-uniform from 0.01 to 1.\n- \\(L\\) log-uniform from 100 to 10,000,000,000.\n\nI thought Metaculus would be able to produce distribution more reflective of our current knowledge, and allow the possibility of running Monte Carlo simulation more reflective of the possible outcomes of the Drake's Equation.\n\nSome of the paper's (and see also [this presentation](http://www.jodrellbank.manchester.ac.uk/media/eps/jodrell-bank-centre-for-astrophysics/news-and-events/2017/uksrn-slides/Anders-Sandberg---Dissolving-Fermi-Paradox-UKSRN.pdf)) choices for parameter distributions are surprising such as \\(f_p\\) which is unlikely to resolve to be significantly less than 1, unless I'm mistaken.\n\nIt would also be fun to see if the distribution of resolutions to Drake's Equation derived using Metaculus-determined parameter distribution, would match the distribution produced by directly asking Metaculus how Drake's Equation will resolve.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first parameter in the Drake's Equation, \\(R_∗\\). It is the rate of formation of stars (in stars/year in the Milky Way galaxy) suitable for the development of intelligent life. Most estimates assume this refers to main sequence stars, but do consider the suitability of dead stars such as white dwarfs and black holes, and failed stars such as brown dwarfs and rogue planets when entering your answer.\n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(R_∗\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118", "lower_25": "1.27", "median": "4.07", "upper_75": "12.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that the next commercial supersonic flight will occur by Nov 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Dec 2028", "median": "Nov 2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that the next commercial supersonic flight will occur by Nov 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Dec 2028", "median": "Nov 2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How long will the Great Pyramids be recognizable?\n\nKeyword: 37.4k\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the Great Pyramids will be recognizable for 37.4k years?", "desc": "", "resc": "The ancient pyramids of Egypt are ridiculously cool.\n\nConstruction began over 4500 years ago, and these awesome structures, despite having [been raided](http://www.ancient-egypt-online.com/ancient-egypt-tomb-robbers.html) over the centuries and stripped of their beautiful [white limestone](https://www.fastcodesign.com/3037815/the-great-pyramid-used-to-be-so-shiny-it-glowed) exteriors, inspire millions. \n\nRebuilding them would be a massive project, although it probably could be done for a cool [$5 billion](https://www.livescience.com/18589-cost-build-great-pyramid-today.html) or so--for just the Great Pyramid of Giza, that is.\n\nThey've lasted 5 millennia, and they will almost certainly endure after every human alive today is long dead. But the pyramids will not last forever.\n\nAs this [Quora post](https://www.quora.com/If-humanity-died-today-how-long-would-the-pyramids-of-Giza-last) notes:\n\n> The Rocky mountains in the US were formed over ~70 million years, ~70 million years ago. If geologic processes can turn an ocean into the Rockies in that time frame, it will make short work of the pyramids. \n \nThis other Quora post gives a [more precise assessment](https://www.quora.com/If-left-to-the-elements-when-will-the-pyramids-of-Egypt-erode): \n\n> Knowing that the pyramids 4000 years ago were made of polished limestone that would have glowed, we can say that it has eroded over time. I am not sure what the exact rate of limestone degradation is, and you could probably work it out by that rate, but by what I can see, around 2 layers of blocks and various bits have fallen from the sides of the larger pyramid. Many people have said that the pyramids would last 1 million years or even until the world ended, but I'd say around 10,000 to 100,000 years based on current observations.\n\nWhat do you think? Assuming that humans do *not* intervene but the pyramids are just left to nature's tender mercies, how many years will it take, before the Great Pyramids are all eroded away into undetectability?\n\n(Needless to say, this is one of those questions unlikely to be resolved on a timescale anyone cares about; it's just for fun.)", "lower_25": "1.84k", "median": "37.4k", "upper_75": "335k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US student loan debt bubble will \"pop\" by 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "It's an open secret that student loan debts are crippling millions of Americans – particularly Millennials. \n\n[CNBC estimated](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/15/heres-how-much-the-average-student-loan-borrower-owes-when-they-graduate.html) that nearly 3 out of 4 college grads leave school \"with a significant amount of loans\" and estimates that Americans have around $1.5 trillion in student debt, collectively. That's \"trillion\" with a \"T\". See [this link for additional up-to-date numbers.](https://careerswiki.com/student-loan-debt-statistics/)\n\nIn November 2017, Rolling Stone columnist Matt Taibbi reported on the crisis in [apocalyptic terms](https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/taibbi-the-great-college-loan-swindle-w510880):\n\n> The average amount of debt for a student leaving school is skyrocketing even faster than the rate of tuition increase. In 2016, for instance, the average amount of debt for an exiting college graduate was a staggering $37,172. That's a rise of six percent over just the previous year. With the average undergraduate interest rate at about 3.7 percent, the interest alone costs around $115 per month, meaning anyone who can't afford to pay into the principal faces the prospect of $69,000 in payments over 50 years. \n\nMany independent financial analysts believe this situation is untenable.\n\nIn April 2017, a Financial Times analyst [observed](https://www.ft.com/content/a272ee4c-1b83-11e7-bcac-6d03d067f81f) that \"In an eerie echo of the housing crisis, debt is already flowing out of the private sector, and into the public.\"\n\nBillionaire Mark Cuban has said [straight up](https://www.inc.com/mark-cuban/video-student-loans-bubble.html): \"I think the student loan bubble is going to burst.\"\n\nClearly, some change is due. But when exactly will this bubble \"burst\"? We'll define this popping as a jump in the student load default rate. Those rates are tabulated various places, but depend a lot on the timescale. For example official [Federal student loan default rates](https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/schooltyperates.pdf) define a 3-year rate, which is at 10.8% for fiscal year 2015, by \n\n> A cohort default rate is the percentage of a school's borrowers who enter repayment on certain Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) Program or William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan) Program loans during a particular federal fiscal year (FY), October 1 to September 30, and default or meet other specified conditions prior to the end of the second following fiscal year.\n\nA [longer-term study](https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-looming-student-loan-default-crisis-is-worse-than-we-thought/) looks at default rates for 1996 and 2004 cohorts and finds that of those who took out loans, 18.2 and 27.2%, respectively, had defaulted 12 years later.\n\n*** When will the US student loan debt bubble \"pop\"? ***\n\nThis question will resolve on the year when either of these occur:\n\n* 20% or more of a graduation cohort have defaulted on their loans within 3 years of entering repayment\n\n* 40% or more of a cohort have defaulted within 12 years of entering repayment\n\nThe date of resolution will be assumed to be April 1 of the year in question. For example if borrowers in fiscal year 2017 (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2017) reached this 3-year threshold, the resolution date would be April 1, 2020. This rate will be calculated for all students in all colleges (public and private, 2-year and 4-year). This question will use data from the [US National Center for Education Statistics](https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d20/tables/dt20_332.50.asp), or if this data is not available, another report of similar methodology and results as that of NCES.\n\nIf this does not occur by April 1, 2038, this question will resolve as **> July 12 2038**.", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2038", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 1st Parameter R∗: What is the chance that 12.2 average rate of formation of suitable stars (stars/year) in our galaxy will occur?", "desc": "This is the first question of the [Fermi paradox series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox).\n\nIn a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) Dissolving the Fermi Paradox by Anders Sandberg, Eric Drexler & Toby Ord of the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, the Drake's Equation was run as a Monte Carlo Simulation rather than a point estimate using the following distributions for the parameters of the Drake's Equation;\n\nParameter Distribution:\n\n- \\(R_∗\\) log-uniform from 1 to 100.\n- \\(f_p\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(n_e\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(f_l\\) log-normal rate, \\(1 − e^{−λVt}\\) (giving \\(f_l\\) mean 0.5 and median - 0.63).\n- \\(f_i\\) log-uniform from 0.001 to 1.\n- \\(f_c\\) log-uniform from 0.01 to 1.\n- \\(L\\) log-uniform from 100 to 10,000,000,000.\n\nI thought Metaculus would be able to produce distribution more reflective of our current knowledge, and allow the possibility of running Monte Carlo simulation more reflective of the possible outcomes of the Drake's Equation.\n\nSome of the paper's (and see also [this presentation](http://www.jodrellbank.manchester.ac.uk/media/eps/jodrell-bank-centre-for-astrophysics/news-and-events/2017/uksrn-slides/Anders-Sandberg---Dissolving-Fermi-Paradox-UKSRN.pdf)) choices for parameter distributions are surprising such as \\(f_p\\) which is unlikely to resolve to be significantly less than 1, unless I'm mistaken.\n\nIt would also be fun to see if the distribution of resolutions to Drake's Equation derived using Metaculus-determined parameter distribution, would match the distribution produced by directly asking Metaculus how Drake's Equation will resolve.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first parameter in the Drake's Equation, \\(R_∗\\). It is the rate of formation of stars (in stars/year in the Milky Way galaxy) suitable for the development of intelligent life. Most estimates assume this refers to main sequence stars, but do consider the suitability of dead stars such as white dwarfs and black holes, and failed stars such as brown dwarfs and rogue planets when entering your answer.\n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(R_∗\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118", "lower_25": "1.27", "median": "4.07", "upper_75": "12.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many years after 2018 will the last human being be born?\n\nWhat is the chance that the last human being will be born 15.9k years after 2018?", "desc": "The scientific definition of \"species\" is surprisingly complicated.\n\nAs this [November 2017 article](https://www.sciencenews.org/article/defining-species-fuzzy-art) from Science News explains:\n\n> At first glance, “species” is a basic vocabulary word schoolchildren can ace on a test by reciting something close to: a group of living things that create fertile offspring when mating with each other but not when mating with outsiders. Ask scientists who devote careers to designating those species, however, and there's no typical answer. Scientists do not agree.\n\nFor the sake of this question, though, let's just go with [this definition from Berkeley](https://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/article/evo_41): \"a group of individuals that actually or potentially interbreed in nature.\" \n\nEvolution marches on relentlessly. We homo sapiens – even armed with our technology and collective stored-and-shared wisdom--are not immune to this ceaseless force. At some point, our descendants will be so physically different from us – due to natural selection, human-engineered tinkering or both – that they would be properly classified as a different species. This [Scientific American article](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-may-become-of-homo-sapiens/) explores some of the key ideas behind this question.\n\nAnd of course, we might well kill ourselves off, replace ourselves with AIs, etc.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of years after January 1, 2019 that the last human being is born.\n\nFor this question, a human being is considered to be a creature that could interbreed with a typical adult human from the year 2000 without technical intervention. The person must exist IRL, i.e. not be a simulated being, upload, etc. As usual we contemplate beings in the same universe, branch of the wavefunction, etc., as the server running the copy of Metaculus the question sits on", "lower_25": "< 500", "median": "15.9k", "upper_75": "> 1M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US student loan debt bubble will \"pop\" by 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "It's an open secret that student loan debts are crippling millions of Americans – particularly Millennials. \n\n[CNBC estimated](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/15/heres-how-much-the-average-student-loan-borrower-owes-when-they-graduate.html) that nearly 3 out of 4 college grads leave school \"with a significant amount of loans\" and estimates that Americans have around $1.5 trillion in student debt, collectively. That's \"trillion\" with a \"T\". See [this link for additional up-to-date numbers.](https://careerswiki.com/student-loan-debt-statistics/)\n\nIn November 2017, Rolling Stone columnist Matt Taibbi reported on the crisis in [apocalyptic terms](https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/taibbi-the-great-college-loan-swindle-w510880):\n\n> The average amount of debt for a student leaving school is skyrocketing even faster than the rate of tuition increase. In 2016, for instance, the average amount of debt for an exiting college graduate was a staggering $37,172. That's a rise of six percent over just the previous year. With the average undergraduate interest rate at about 3.7 percent, the interest alone costs around $115 per month, meaning anyone who can't afford to pay into the principal faces the prospect of $69,000 in payments over 50 years. \n\nMany independent financial analysts believe this situation is untenable.\n\nIn April 2017, a Financial Times analyst [observed](https://www.ft.com/content/a272ee4c-1b83-11e7-bcac-6d03d067f81f) that \"In an eerie echo of the housing crisis, debt is already flowing out of the private sector, and into the public.\"\n\nBillionaire Mark Cuban has said [straight up](https://www.inc.com/mark-cuban/video-student-loans-bubble.html): \"I think the student loan bubble is going to burst.\"\n\nClearly, some change is due. But when exactly will this bubble \"burst\"? We'll define this popping as a jump in the student load default rate. Those rates are tabulated various places, but depend a lot on the timescale. For example official [Federal student loan default rates](https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/schooltyperates.pdf) define a 3-year rate, which is at 10.8% for fiscal year 2015, by \n\n> A cohort default rate is the percentage of a school's borrowers who enter repayment on certain Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) Program or William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan) Program loans during a particular federal fiscal year (FY), October 1 to September 30, and default or meet other specified conditions prior to the end of the second following fiscal year.\n\nA [longer-term study](https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-looming-student-loan-default-crisis-is-worse-than-we-thought/) looks at default rates for 1996 and 2004 cohorts and finds that of those who took out loans, 18.2 and 27.2%, respectively, had defaulted 12 years later.\n\n*** When will the US student loan debt bubble \"pop\"? ***\n\nThis question will resolve on the year when either of these occur:\n\n* 20% or more of a graduation cohort have defaulted on their loans within 3 years of entering repayment\n\n* 40% or more of a cohort have defaulted within 12 years of entering repayment\n\nThe date of resolution will be assumed to be April 1 of the year in question. For example if borrowers in fiscal year 2017 (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2017) reached this 3-year threshold, the resolution date would be April 1, 2020. This rate will be calculated for all students in all colleges (public and private, 2-year and 4-year). This question will use data from the [US National Center for Education Statistics](https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d20/tables/dt20_332.50.asp), or if this data is not available, another report of similar methodology and results as that of NCES.\n\nIf this does not occur by April 1, 2038, this question will resolve as **> July 12 2038**.", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2038", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that we will receive the last communication from Voyager 1 by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 2nd parameter f_p: What is the chance that 0.950 fraction of stars form planets?", "desc": "This is the second question in [a series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox) estimating input parameters for Drake's equation, inspired by a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) on the Fermi paradox.\n\nThe first question in the series, with more explanation, [is here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1337)\n\nThe model in question uses probability distributions over the following parameters:\n\n- \\(R_∗\\) log-uniform from 1 to 100.\n- \\(f_p\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(n_e\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(f_l\\) log-normal rate, \\(1 − e^{−λVt}\\) (giving \\(f_l\\) mean 0.5 and median - 0.63).\n- \\(f_i\\) log-uniform from 0.001 to 1.\n- \\(f_c\\) log-uniform from 0.01 to 1.\n- \\(L\\) log-uniform from 100 to 10,000,000,000.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the second parameter in Drake's Equation, \\(f_p\\). It is the fraction of the stars in the first parameter with planets.\n\nWe'll consider each planet to belong to a single star, so a binary star system with one planet, for example, corresponds to 50% of stars having planets.\n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(f_p\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118", "lower_25": "0.649", "median": "0.859", "upper_75": "0.950", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 2nd parameter f_p: What is the chance that 0.950 fraction of stars form planets?", "desc": "This is the second question in [a series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox) estimating input parameters for Drake's equation, inspired by a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) on the Fermi paradox.\n\nThe first question in the series, with more explanation, [is here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1337)\n\nThe model in question uses probability distributions over the following parameters:\n\n- \\(R_∗\\) log-uniform from 1 to 100.\n- \\(f_p\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(n_e\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(f_l\\) log-normal rate, \\(1 − e^{−λVt}\\) (giving \\(f_l\\) mean 0.5 and median - 0.63).\n- \\(f_i\\) log-uniform from 0.001 to 1.\n- \\(f_c\\) log-uniform from 0.01 to 1.\n- \\(L\\) log-uniform from 100 to 10,000,000,000.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the second parameter in Drake's Equation, \\(f_p\\). It is the fraction of the stars in the first parameter with planets.\n\nWe'll consider each planet to belong to a single star, so a binary star system with one planet, for example, corresponds to 50% of stars having planets.\n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(f_p\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118", "lower_25": "0.649", "median": "0.859", "upper_75": "0.950", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many years after 2018 will the last human being be born?\n\nWhat is the chance that the last human being will be born 15.9k years after 2018?", "desc": "The scientific definition of \"species\" is surprisingly complicated.\n\nAs this [November 2017 article](https://www.sciencenews.org/article/defining-species-fuzzy-art) from Science News explains:\n\n> At first glance, “species” is a basic vocabulary word schoolchildren can ace on a test by reciting something close to: a group of living things that create fertile offspring when mating with each other but not when mating with outsiders. Ask scientists who devote careers to designating those species, however, and there's no typical answer. Scientists do not agree.\n\nFor the sake of this question, though, let's just go with [this definition from Berkeley](https://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/article/evo_41): \"a group of individuals that actually or potentially interbreed in nature.\" \n\nEvolution marches on relentlessly. We homo sapiens – even armed with our technology and collective stored-and-shared wisdom--are not immune to this ceaseless force. At some point, our descendants will be so physically different from us – due to natural selection, human-engineered tinkering or both – that they would be properly classified as a different species. This [Scientific American article](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-may-become-of-homo-sapiens/) explores some of the key ideas behind this question.\n\nAnd of course, we might well kill ourselves off, replace ourselves with AIs, etc.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of years after January 1, 2019 that the last human being is born.\n\nFor this question, a human being is considered to be a creature that could interbreed with a typical adult human from the year 2000 without technical intervention. The person must exist IRL, i.e. not be a simulated being, upload, etc. As usual we contemplate beings in the same universe, branch of the wavefunction, etc., as the server running the copy of Metaculus the question sits on", "lower_25": "< 500", "median": "15.9k", "upper_75": "> 1M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 1st Parameter R∗: What is the chance that 12.2 average rate of formation of suitable stars (stars/year) in our galaxy will occur?", "desc": "This is the first question of the [Fermi paradox series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox).\n\nIn a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) Dissolving the Fermi Paradox by Anders Sandberg, Eric Drexler & Toby Ord of the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, the Drake's Equation was run as a Monte Carlo Simulation rather than a point estimate using the following distributions for the parameters of the Drake's Equation;\n\nParameter Distribution:\n\n- \\(R_∗\\) log-uniform from 1 to 100.\n- \\(f_p\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(n_e\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(f_l\\) log-normal rate, \\(1 − e^{−λVt}\\) (giving \\(f_l\\) mean 0.5 and median - 0.63).\n- \\(f_i\\) log-uniform from 0.001 to 1.\n- \\(f_c\\) log-uniform from 0.01 to 1.\n- \\(L\\) log-uniform from 100 to 10,000,000,000.\n\nI thought Metaculus would be able to produce distribution more reflective of our current knowledge, and allow the possibility of running Monte Carlo simulation more reflective of the possible outcomes of the Drake's Equation.\n\nSome of the paper's (and see also [this presentation](http://www.jodrellbank.manchester.ac.uk/media/eps/jodrell-bank-centre-for-astrophysics/news-and-events/2017/uksrn-slides/Anders-Sandberg---Dissolving-Fermi-Paradox-UKSRN.pdf)) choices for parameter distributions are surprising such as \\(f_p\\) which is unlikely to resolve to be significantly less than 1, unless I'm mistaken.\n\nIt would also be fun to see if the distribution of resolutions to Drake's Equation derived using Metaculus-determined parameter distribution, would match the distribution produced by directly asking Metaculus how Drake's Equation will resolve.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first parameter in the Drake's Equation, \\(R_∗\\). It is the rate of formation of stars (in stars/year in the Milky Way galaxy) suitable for the development of intelligent life. Most estimates assume this refers to main sequence stars, but do consider the suitability of dead stars such as white dwarfs and black holes, and failed stars such as brown dwarfs and rogue planets when entering your answer.\n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(R_∗\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118", "lower_25": "1.27", "median": "4.07", "upper_75": "12.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 2nd parameter f_p: What is the chance that 0.950 fraction of stars form planets?", "desc": "This is the second question in [a series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox) estimating input parameters for Drake's equation, inspired by a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) on the Fermi paradox.\n\nThe first question in the series, with more explanation, [is here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1337)\n\nThe model in question uses probability distributions over the following parameters:\n\n- \\(R_∗\\) log-uniform from 1 to 100.\n- \\(f_p\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(n_e\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(f_l\\) log-normal rate, \\(1 − e^{−λVt}\\) (giving \\(f_l\\) mean 0.5 and median - 0.63).\n- \\(f_i\\) log-uniform from 0.001 to 1.\n- \\(f_c\\) log-uniform from 0.01 to 1.\n- \\(L\\) log-uniform from 100 to 10,000,000,000.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the second parameter in Drake's Equation, \\(f_p\\). It is the fraction of the stars in the first parameter with planets.\n\nWe'll consider each planet to belong to a single star, so a binary star system with one planet, for example, corresponds to 50% of stars having planets.\n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(f_p\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118", "lower_25": "0.649", "median": "0.859", "upper_75": "0.950", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 3rd parameter n_e: What is the chance that 0.392 average number of habitable planets per star will be found?", "desc": "This is the third question in [a series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox) estimating input parameters for Drake's equation, inspired by a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) on the Fermi paradox.\n\nThe first question in the series, with more explanation, [is here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1337)\n\nThe model in question uses probability distributions over the following parameters:\n\n- \\(R_∗\\) log-uniform from 1 to 100.\n- \\(f_p\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(n_e\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(f_l\\) log-normal rate, \\(1 − e^{−λVt}\\) (giving \\(f_l\\) mean 0.5 and median - 0.63).\n- \\(f_i\\) log-uniform from 0.001 to 1.\n- \\(f_c\\) log-uniform from 0.01 to 1.\n- \\(L\\) log-uniform from 100 to 10,000,000,000.\n\nThe third parameter is the number of planets, per star system, with an environment suitable for (though not necessarily possessing) life.\n\nMost estimates consider how many planets fall within a star's habitable zone, probably with sufficient mass to retain an atmosphere or surface liquid of some type. (For example, our Moon is in our stars' habitable zone, though it is uninhabitable to life as far as we know, although there may have been a brief period of suitability.) However we might be more expansive:\n\n- One must also consider the fact that habitable zones move as a star changes over time.\n\n- Also there may be condition that allow a planet to be suitable to life outside of the traditional habitable zone such as sub-ice oceans of our gas giants moons.\n\n- We may also consider the habitable zones not just for water-based life but other biochemistries.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the third parameter in the Drake's Equation, \\(n_e\\). It is the number of planets, per star system, with an environment suitable for (though not necessarily possessing) life. We include suitable moons in this count.\n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(n_e\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118", "lower_25": "5.33×10−3", "median": "0.0510", "upper_75": "0.392", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How long will the Great Pyramids be recognizable?\n\nKeyword: 37.4k\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the Great Pyramids will be recognizable for 37.4k years?", "desc": "", "resc": "The ancient pyramids of Egypt are ridiculously cool.\n\nConstruction began over 4500 years ago, and these awesome structures, despite having [been raided](http://www.ancient-egypt-online.com/ancient-egypt-tomb-robbers.html) over the centuries and stripped of their beautiful [white limestone](https://www.fastcodesign.com/3037815/the-great-pyramid-used-to-be-so-shiny-it-glowed) exteriors, inspire millions. \n\nRebuilding them would be a massive project, although it probably could be done for a cool [$5 billion](https://www.livescience.com/18589-cost-build-great-pyramid-today.html) or so--for just the Great Pyramid of Giza, that is.\n\nThey've lasted 5 millennia, and they will almost certainly endure after every human alive today is long dead. But the pyramids will not last forever.\n\nAs this [Quora post](https://www.quora.com/If-humanity-died-today-how-long-would-the-pyramids-of-Giza-last) notes:\n\n> The Rocky mountains in the US were formed over ~70 million years, ~70 million years ago. If geologic processes can turn an ocean into the Rockies in that time frame, it will make short work of the pyramids. \n \nThis other Quora post gives a [more precise assessment](https://www.quora.com/If-left-to-the-elements-when-will-the-pyramids-of-Egypt-erode): \n\n> Knowing that the pyramids 4000 years ago were made of polished limestone that would have glowed, we can say that it has eroded over time. I am not sure what the exact rate of limestone degradation is, and you could probably work it out by that rate, but by what I can see, around 2 layers of blocks and various bits have fallen from the sides of the larger pyramid. Many people have said that the pyramids would last 1 million years or even until the world ended, but I'd say around 10,000 to 100,000 years based on current observations.\n\nWhat do you think? Assuming that humans do *not* intervene but the pyramids are just left to nature's tender mercies, how many years will it take, before the Great Pyramids are all eroded away into undetectability?\n\n(Needless to say, this is one of those questions unlikely to be resolved on a timescale anyone cares about; it's just for fun.)", "lower_25": "1.84k", "median": "37.4k", "upper_75": "335k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US student loan debt bubble will \"pop\" by 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "It's an open secret that student loan debts are crippling millions of Americans – particularly Millennials. \n\n[CNBC estimated](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/15/heres-how-much-the-average-student-loan-borrower-owes-when-they-graduate.html) that nearly 3 out of 4 college grads leave school \"with a significant amount of loans\" and estimates that Americans have around $1.5 trillion in student debt, collectively. That's \"trillion\" with a \"T\". See [this link for additional up-to-date numbers.](https://careerswiki.com/student-loan-debt-statistics/)\n\nIn November 2017, Rolling Stone columnist Matt Taibbi reported on the crisis in [apocalyptic terms](https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/taibbi-the-great-college-loan-swindle-w510880):\n\n> The average amount of debt for a student leaving school is skyrocketing even faster than the rate of tuition increase. In 2016, for instance, the average amount of debt for an exiting college graduate was a staggering $37,172. That's a rise of six percent over just the previous year. With the average undergraduate interest rate at about 3.7 percent, the interest alone costs around $115 per month, meaning anyone who can't afford to pay into the principal faces the prospect of $69,000 in payments over 50 years. \n\nMany independent financial analysts believe this situation is untenable.\n\nIn April 2017, a Financial Times analyst [observed](https://www.ft.com/content/a272ee4c-1b83-11e7-bcac-6d03d067f81f) that \"In an eerie echo of the housing crisis, debt is already flowing out of the private sector, and into the public.\"\n\nBillionaire Mark Cuban has said [straight up](https://www.inc.com/mark-cuban/video-student-loans-bubble.html): \"I think the student loan bubble is going to burst.\"\n\nClearly, some change is due. But when exactly will this bubble \"burst\"? We'll define this popping as a jump in the student load default rate. Those rates are tabulated various places, but depend a lot on the timescale. For example official [Federal student loan default rates](https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/schooltyperates.pdf) define a 3-year rate, which is at 10.8% for fiscal year 2015, by \n\n> A cohort default rate is the percentage of a school's borrowers who enter repayment on certain Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) Program or William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan) Program loans during a particular federal fiscal year (FY), October 1 to September 30, and default or meet other specified conditions prior to the end of the second following fiscal year.\n\nA [longer-term study](https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-looming-student-loan-default-crisis-is-worse-than-we-thought/) looks at default rates for 1996 and 2004 cohorts and finds that of those who took out loans, 18.2 and 27.2%, respectively, had defaulted 12 years later.\n\n*** When will the US student loan debt bubble \"pop\"? ***\n\nThis question will resolve on the year when either of these occur:\n\n* 20% or more of a graduation cohort have defaulted on their loans within 3 years of entering repayment\n\n* 40% or more of a cohort have defaulted within 12 years of entering repayment\n\nThe date of resolution will be assumed to be April 1 of the year in question. For example if borrowers in fiscal year 2017 (October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2017) reached this 3-year threshold, the resolution date would be April 1, 2020. This rate will be calculated for all students in all colleges (public and private, 2-year and 4-year). This question will use data from the [US National Center for Education Statistics](https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d20/tables/dt20_332.50.asp), or if this data is not available, another report of similar methodology and results as that of NCES.\n\nIf this does not occur by April 1, 2038, this question will resolve as **> July 12 2038**.", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2038", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many years after 2018 will the last human being be born?\n\nWhat is the chance that the last human being will be born 15.9k years after 2018?", "desc": "The scientific definition of \"species\" is surprisingly complicated.\n\nAs this [November 2017 article](https://www.sciencenews.org/article/defining-species-fuzzy-art) from Science News explains:\n\n> At first glance, “species” is a basic vocabulary word schoolchildren can ace on a test by reciting something close to: a group of living things that create fertile offspring when mating with each other but not when mating with outsiders. Ask scientists who devote careers to designating those species, however, and there's no typical answer. Scientists do not agree.\n\nFor the sake of this question, though, let's just go with [this definition from Berkeley](https://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/article/evo_41): \"a group of individuals that actually or potentially interbreed in nature.\" \n\nEvolution marches on relentlessly. We homo sapiens – even armed with our technology and collective stored-and-shared wisdom--are not immune to this ceaseless force. At some point, our descendants will be so physically different from us – due to natural selection, human-engineered tinkering or both – that they would be properly classified as a different species. This [Scientific American article](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-may-become-of-homo-sapiens/) explores some of the key ideas behind this question.\n\nAnd of course, we might well kill ourselves off, replace ourselves with AIs, etc.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of years after January 1, 2019 that the last human being is born.\n\nFor this question, a human being is considered to be a creature that could interbreed with a typical adult human from the year 2000 without technical intervention. The person must exist IRL, i.e. not be a simulated being, upload, etc. As usual we contemplate beings in the same universe, branch of the wavefunction, etc., as the server running the copy of Metaculus the question sits on", "lower_25": "< 500", "median": "15.9k", "upper_75": "> 1M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 3rd parameter n_e: What is the chance that 0.392 average number of habitable planets per star will be found?", "desc": "This is the third question in [a series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox) estimating input parameters for Drake's equation, inspired by a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) on the Fermi paradox.\n\nThe first question in the series, with more explanation, [is here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1337)\n\nThe model in question uses probability distributions over the following parameters:\n\n- \\(R_∗\\) log-uniform from 1 to 100.\n- \\(f_p\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(n_e\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(f_l\\) log-normal rate, \\(1 − e^{−λVt}\\) (giving \\(f_l\\) mean 0.5 and median - 0.63).\n- \\(f_i\\) log-uniform from 0.001 to 1.\n- \\(f_c\\) log-uniform from 0.01 to 1.\n- \\(L\\) log-uniform from 100 to 10,000,000,000.\n\nThe third parameter is the number of planets, per star system, with an environment suitable for (though not necessarily possessing) life.\n\nMost estimates consider how many planets fall within a star's habitable zone, probably with sufficient mass to retain an atmosphere or surface liquid of some type. (For example, our Moon is in our stars' habitable zone, though it is uninhabitable to life as far as we know, although there may have been a brief period of suitability.) However we might be more expansive:\n\n- One must also consider the fact that habitable zones move as a star changes over time.\n\n- Also there may be condition that allow a planet to be suitable to life outside of the traditional habitable zone such as sub-ice oceans of our gas giants moons.\n\n- We may also consider the habitable zones not just for water-based life but other biochemistries.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the third parameter in the Drake's Equation, \\(n_e\\). It is the number of planets, per star system, with an environment suitable for (though not necessarily possessing) life. We include suitable moons in this count.\n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(n_e\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118", "lower_25": "5.33×10−3", "median": "0.0510", "upper_75": "0.392", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 6th parameter f_c: What is the chance that 0.0177 fraction of planets with intelligent life are capable of interstellar communication?", "desc": "This is the sixth question in [a series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox) estimating input parameters for Drake's equation, inspired by a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) on the Fermi paradox.\n\nThe first question in the series, with more explanation, [is here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1337)\n\nThe model in question uses probability distributions over seven input parameters.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the sixth parameter in the Drake's Equation, \\(f_c\\). It is the fraction of civilizations that develop a technology that releases detectable signs of their existence into space. Radio signals are a likely example of this communication, but laser light, physical relics, and even gravitational waves can be considered.\n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(f_c\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118", "lower_25": "0.0177", "median": "0.147", "upper_75": "0.486", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 4th parameter f_l: What is the chance that 2.03×10−11 fraction of habitable planets have any form of life emerge?", "desc": "This is the fourth question in [a series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox) estimating input parameters for Drake's equation, inspired by a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) on the Fermi paradox.\n\nThe first question in the series, with more explanation, [is here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1337)\n\nThe model in question uses probability distributions over the following parameters:\n\n- \\(R_∗\\) log-uniform from 1 to 100.\n- \\(f_p\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(n_e\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(f_l\\) log-normal rate, \\(1 − e^{−λVt}\\) (giving \\(f_l\\) mean 0.5 and median - 0.63).\n- \\(f_i\\) log-uniform from 0.001 to 1.\n- \\(f_c\\) log-uniform from 0.01 to 1.\n- \\(L\\) log-uniform from 100 to 10,000,000,000.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the fourth parameter in the Drake's Equation, \\(f_l\\). It is the fraction of suitable planets (see some discussion at the [relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1339/drakes-equation-question-set-what-is-the-average-number-of-habitable-planets-per-star/)) on which life actually appears.\n\nMost estimates assume abiogenesis to be the mechanism by which life appears on a suitable planet, but panspermia and other means merit considering. \n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(f_l\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118", "lower_25": "2.03×10−11", "median": "4.42×10−4", "upper_75": "0.0742", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 4th parameter f_l: What is the chance that 2.03×10−11 fraction of habitable planets have any form of life emerge?", "desc": "This is the fourth question in [a series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox) estimating input parameters for Drake's equation, inspired by a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) on the Fermi paradox.\n\nThe first question in the series, with more explanation, [is here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1337)\n\nThe model in question uses probability distributions over the following parameters:\n\n- \\(R_∗\\) log-uniform from 1 to 100.\n- \\(f_p\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(n_e\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(f_l\\) log-normal rate, \\(1 − e^{−λVt}\\) (giving \\(f_l\\) mean 0.5 and median - 0.63).\n- \\(f_i\\) log-uniform from 0.001 to 1.\n- \\(f_c\\) log-uniform from 0.01 to 1.\n- \\(L\\) log-uniform from 100 to 10,000,000,000.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the fourth parameter in the Drake's Equation, \\(f_l\\). It is the fraction of suitable planets (see some discussion at the [relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1339/drakes-equation-question-set-what-is-the-average-number-of-habitable-planets-per-star/)) on which life actually appears.\n\nMost estimates assume abiogenesis to be the mechanism by which life appears on a suitable planet, but panspermia and other means merit considering. \n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(f_l\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118", "lower_25": "2.03×10−11", "median": "4.42×10−4", "upper_75": "0.0742", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 6th parameter f_c: What is the chance that 0.0177 fraction of planets with intelligent life are capable of interstellar communication?", "desc": "This is the sixth question in [a series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox) estimating input parameters for Drake's equation, inspired by a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) on the Fermi paradox.\n\nThe first question in the series, with more explanation, [is here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1337)\n\nThe model in question uses probability distributions over seven input parameters.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the sixth parameter in the Drake's Equation, \\(f_c\\). It is the fraction of civilizations that develop a technology that releases detectable signs of their existence into space. Radio signals are a likely example of this communication, but laser light, physical relics, and even gravitational waves can be considered.\n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(f_c\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118", "lower_25": "0.0177", "median": "0.147", "upper_75": "0.486", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 7th parameter L: What is the chance that a civilization remains detectable for 64.4k years?", "desc": "This is the seventh question in [a series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox) estimating input parameters for Drake's equation, inspired by a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) on the Fermi paradox.\n\nThe first question in the series, with more explanation, [is here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1337)\n\nThe model in question uses probability distributions over seven input parameters.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the seventh parameter in the Drake's Equation, \\(L\\). It is the average length of time, in years, that civilizations capable of being detected remain detectable.\n\nFor this question, a civilization is \"detectable\" if Earth technology from the year 2025 could detect the civilization.\n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(L\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118", "lower_25": "503", "median": "64.4k", "upper_75": "150M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 3rd parameter n_e: What is the chance that 0.392 average number of habitable planets per star will be found?", "desc": "This is the third question in [a series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox) estimating input parameters for Drake's equation, inspired by a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) on the Fermi paradox.\n\nThe first question in the series, with more explanation, [is here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1337)\n\nThe model in question uses probability distributions over the following parameters:\n\n- \\(R_∗\\) log-uniform from 1 to 100.\n- \\(f_p\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(n_e\\) log-uniform from 0.1 to 1.\n- \\(f_l\\) log-normal rate, \\(1 − e^{−λVt}\\) (giving \\(f_l\\) mean 0.5 and median - 0.63).\n- \\(f_i\\) log-uniform from 0.001 to 1.\n- \\(f_c\\) log-uniform from 0.01 to 1.\n- \\(L\\) log-uniform from 100 to 10,000,000,000.\n\nThe third parameter is the number of planets, per star system, with an environment suitable for (though not necessarily possessing) life.\n\nMost estimates consider how many planets fall within a star's habitable zone, probably with sufficient mass to retain an atmosphere or surface liquid of some type. (For example, our Moon is in our stars' habitable zone, though it is uninhabitable to life as far as we know, although there may have been a brief period of suitability.) However we might be more expansive:\n\n- One must also consider the fact that habitable zones move as a star changes over time.\n\n- Also there may be condition that allow a planet to be suitable to life outside of the traditional habitable zone such as sub-ice oceans of our gas giants moons.\n\n- We may also consider the habitable zones not just for water-based life but other biochemistries.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the third parameter in the Drake's Equation, \\(n_e\\). It is the number of planets, per star system, with an environment suitable for (though not necessarily possessing) life. We include suitable moons in this count.\n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(n_e\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118", "lower_25": "5.33×10−3", "median": "0.0510", "upper_75": "0.392", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 7th parameter L: What is the chance that a civilization remains detectable for 64.4k years?", "desc": "This is the seventh question in [a series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox) estimating input parameters for Drake's equation, inspired by a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) on the Fermi paradox.\n\nThe first question in the series, with more explanation, [is here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1337)\n\nThe model in question uses probability distributions over seven input parameters.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the seventh parameter in the Drake's Equation, \\(L\\). It is the average length of time, in years, that civilizations capable of being detected remain detectable.\n\nFor this question, a civilization is \"detectable\" if Earth technology from the year 2025 could detect the civilization.\n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(L\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118", "lower_25": "503", "median": "64.4k", "upper_75": "150M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that one TeraFLOP/s will cost less than $1 by 2029?", "desc": "The performance capabilities of computers (e.g. CPUs, GPUs and Supercomputers) are expressed in floating point operations per second (FLOP/s), a standard rate for indicating the number of floating-point arithmetic calculations systems can perform per second.\n\nCurrently (09/09/2018), the NVIDIA TITAN V GPU, has one of the lowest theoretical performance cost at $27.27 per TeraFLOP/s (\\(10^{12}\\) FLOP/s), with a price of $3000 and a theoretical peak performance of 110 Tensor TeraFLOP/s. \n\nHowever, theoretical peak performance relies on the accelerating parts, and generally does not involve other hardware such as memory, network or I/O devices. An analysis of GPU performance, finds that theoretical predictions of maximum theoretical performance of three different GPUs to be higher by around 30% when compared to experimental results. Similar work on CPUs has found discrepancies between actual and theoretical maximum performance of generally within a factor of 10. \n\nTo take this into account, we shall here assume that theoretical cost figures (such as reported by hardware manufacturers are 10 times too low), setting current costs at $272.70 per TeraFlOP/s. Getting to below $1 would therefore amount to a \\(\\log_{10}(272.7) ≈ 2.4 \\) orders of magnitude reduction in cost per TeraFlOP/s.\n \nInterestingly, according to some estimates, a reduction in computing costs of roughly 2-3 orders of magnitude could place the cost of computation at the brain's communication performance in the range of human wages (around a couple hundred dollars per hour).", "resc": "This question resolves positively if a reputable source reports a TeraFlOP/s for Tensor, or single/double precision performance to cost less than $1 using reliable performance measurement techniques. The usual theoretical price estimates given by manufacturers will be multiplied up by a factor of 10 for the sake of this question (hence requiring a $0.1 theoretical cost per TeraFlOP/s for positive resolution).\n\nPrices will be adjusted to 2018 prices using the Domestic Producer Prices Index: Manufacturing for the United States.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that one TeraFLOP/s will cost less than $1 by 2029?", "desc": "The performance capabilities of computers (e.g. CPUs, GPUs and Supercomputers) are expressed in floating point operations per second (FLOP/s), a standard rate for indicating the number of floating-point arithmetic calculations systems can perform per second.\n\nCurrently (09/09/2018), the NVIDIA TITAN V GPU, has one of the lowest theoretical performance cost at $27.27 per TeraFLOP/s (\\(10^{12}\\) FLOP/s), with a price of $3000 and a theoretical peak performance of 110 Tensor TeraFLOP/s. \n\nHowever, theoretical peak performance relies on the accelerating parts, and generally does not involve other hardware such as memory, network or I/O devices. An analysis of GPU performance, finds that theoretical predictions of maximum theoretical performance of three different GPUs to be higher by around 30% when compared to experimental results. Similar work on CPUs has found discrepancies between actual and theoretical maximum performance of generally within a factor of 10. \n\nTo take this into account, we shall here assume that theoretical cost figures (such as reported by hardware manufacturers are 10 times too low), setting current costs at $272.70 per TeraFlOP/s. Getting to below $1 would therefore amount to a \\(\\log_{10}(272.7) ≈ 2.4 \\) orders of magnitude reduction in cost per TeraFlOP/s.\n \nInterestingly, according to some estimates, a reduction in computing costs of roughly 2-3 orders of magnitude could place the cost of computation at the brain's communication performance in the range of human wages (around a couple hundred dollars per hour).", "resc": "This question resolves positively if a reputable source reports a TeraFlOP/s for Tensor, or single/double precision performance to cost less than $1 using reliable performance measurement techniques. The usual theoretical price estimates given by manufacturers will be multiplied up by a factor of 10 for the sake of this question (hence requiring a $0.1 theoretical cost per TeraFlOP/s for positive resolution).\n\nPrices will be adjusted to 2018 prices using the Domestic Producer Prices Index: Manufacturing for the United States.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 6th parameter f_c: What is the chance that 0.0177 fraction of planets with intelligent life are capable of interstellar communication?", "desc": "This is the sixth question in [a series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox) estimating input parameters for Drake's equation, inspired by a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) on the Fermi paradox.\n\nThe first question in the series, with more explanation, [is here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1337)\n\nThe model in question uses probability distributions over seven input parameters.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the sixth parameter in the Drake's Equation, \\(f_c\\). It is the fraction of civilizations that develop a technology that releases detectable signs of their existence into space. Radio signals are a likely example of this communication, but laser light, physical relics, and even gravitational waves can be considered.\n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(f_c\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118", "lower_25": "0.0177", "median": "0.147", "upper_75": "0.486", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a fifth nation will launch a person into space by Jan 2026?", "desc": "On **April 12, 1961** the first [Soviet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vostok_programme) flies into space. \n\nOn **February 20, 1962** the first [American](https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/mercury/index.html) flies into space.\n\nOn **October, 15 2003** the first [Chinese](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_space_program) flies into space.\n\nIndia plans to send an astronaut [on their own rocket](https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/simply-put-how-to-send-an-indian-into-space-isro-maned-mission-5308964/) by 2022, [though there's some doubt](https://www.dw.com/en/indias-astronaut-mission-will-push-space-program-to-the-limit/a-45108320) about that.\n\nThat's it. Currently there are only two nations capable of sending people into orbit on their own: Russia and China, with the US about to regain their ability.\n\nPart of this can certainly be attributed to the Space Race pushing the envelope of what's technologically doable, and one might justifiably argue that the accomplishments were made on an immature technology base. But it has been some time since then. With the US push of commercial space launches and the seeming growing international interest (partly spurred by the commercialisation) in space, one has to wonder:", "resc": "For the purposes of this question a nation (or group of nations like EU or UAE) has to have their own [launch service provider (LSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Launch_service_provider), or have acquired the complete capabilities of a provider to such a degree the forked/copied LSP would be able to launch people", "lower_25": "Jan 2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 5th Parameter f_i: On what fraction of habitable planets with life does intelligence evolve?\n\nKeyword: 2.92×10−4\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 2.92×10−4 fraction of habitable planets with life have intelligence?", "desc": "This is the fifth question in [a series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox) estimating input parameters for Drake's equation, inspired by a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) on the Fermi paradox.\n\nThe first question in the series, with more explanation, [is here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1337)\n\nThe model in question uses probability distributions over seven input parameters.", "resc": "***Drake's Equation 5th parameter f_i: On what fraction of habitable planets with life does intelligence evolve?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the fifth parameter in Drake's Equation, \\(f_i\\). It is the fraction of life-bearing planets on which intelligent life emerges. For this question, we shall define intelligent life as a type capable of (a) symbolic representation and communication of a description of actions and objects, i.e. language, and (b) use of tools. Under this definition on Earth Humans would count as well as probably several type of nonhuman primates, many cetaceans, and some types of birds.\n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(f_i\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118.", "lower_25": "1.10×10−8", "median": "2.92×10−4", "upper_75": "0.0596", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that one TeraFLOP/s will cost less than $1 by 2029?", "desc": "The performance capabilities of computers (e.g. CPUs, GPUs and Supercomputers) are expressed in floating point operations per second (FLOP/s), a standard rate for indicating the number of floating-point arithmetic calculations systems can perform per second.\n\nCurrently (09/09/2018), the NVIDIA TITAN V GPU, has one of the lowest theoretical performance cost at $27.27 per TeraFLOP/s (\\(10^{12}\\) FLOP/s), with a price of $3000 and a theoretical peak performance of 110 Tensor TeraFLOP/s. \n\nHowever, theoretical peak performance relies on the accelerating parts, and generally does not involve other hardware such as memory, network or I/O devices. An analysis of GPU performance, finds that theoretical predictions of maximum theoretical performance of three different GPUs to be higher by around 30% when compared to experimental results. Similar work on CPUs has found discrepancies between actual and theoretical maximum performance of generally within a factor of 10. \n\nTo take this into account, we shall here assume that theoretical cost figures (such as reported by hardware manufacturers are 10 times too low), setting current costs at $272.70 per TeraFlOP/s. Getting to below $1 would therefore amount to a \\(\\log_{10}(272.7) ≈ 2.4 \\) orders of magnitude reduction in cost per TeraFlOP/s.\n \nInterestingly, according to some estimates, a reduction in computing costs of roughly 2-3 orders of magnitude could place the cost of computation at the brain's communication performance in the range of human wages (around a couple hundred dollars per hour).", "resc": "This question resolves positively if a reputable source reports a TeraFlOP/s for Tensor, or single/double precision performance to cost less than $1 using reliable performance measurement techniques. The usual theoretical price estimates given by manufacturers will be multiplied up by a factor of 10 for the sake of this question (hence requiring a $0.1 theoretical cost per TeraFlOP/s for positive resolution).\n\nPrices will be adjusted to 2018 prices using the Domestic Producer Prices Index: Manufacturing for the United States.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 5th Parameter f_i: On what fraction of habitable planets with life does intelligence evolve?\n\nKeyword: 2.92×10−4\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 2.92×10−4 fraction of habitable planets with life have intelligence?", "desc": "This is the fifth question in [a series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox) estimating input parameters for Drake's equation, inspired by a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) on the Fermi paradox.\n\nThe first question in the series, with more explanation, [is here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1337)\n\nThe model in question uses probability distributions over seven input parameters.", "resc": "***Drake's Equation 5th parameter f_i: On what fraction of habitable planets with life does intelligence evolve?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the fifth parameter in Drake's Equation, \\(f_i\\). It is the fraction of life-bearing planets on which intelligent life emerges. For this question, we shall define intelligent life as a type capable of (a) symbolic representation and communication of a description of actions and objects, i.e. language, and (b) use of tools. Under this definition on Earth Humans would count as well as probably several type of nonhuman primates, many cetaceans, and some types of birds.\n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(f_i\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118.", "lower_25": "1.10×10−8", "median": "2.92×10−4", "upper_75": "0.0596", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the longest spaceflight of any one person will not reach 5 years by December 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2037", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2040", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2040", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a fifth nation will launch a person into space by Jan 2026?", "desc": "On **April 12, 1961** the first [Soviet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vostok_programme) flies into space. \n\nOn **February 20, 1962** the first [American](https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/mercury/index.html) flies into space.\n\nOn **October, 15 2003** the first [Chinese](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_space_program) flies into space.\n\nIndia plans to send an astronaut [on their own rocket](https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/simply-put-how-to-send-an-indian-into-space-isro-maned-mission-5308964/) by 2022, [though there's some doubt](https://www.dw.com/en/indias-astronaut-mission-will-push-space-program-to-the-limit/a-45108320) about that.\n\nThat's it. Currently there are only two nations capable of sending people into orbit on their own: Russia and China, with the US about to regain their ability.\n\nPart of this can certainly be attributed to the Space Race pushing the envelope of what's technologically doable, and one might justifiably argue that the accomplishments were made on an immature technology base. But it has been some time since then. With the US push of commercial space launches and the seeming growing international interest (partly spurred by the commercialisation) in space, one has to wonder:", "resc": "For the purposes of this question a nation (or group of nations like EU or UAE) has to have their own [launch service provider (LSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Launch_service_provider), or have acquired the complete capabilities of a provider to such a degree the forked/copied LSP would be able to launch people", "lower_25": "Jan 2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the longest spaceflight of any one person will not reach 5 years by December 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2037", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2040", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2040", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the longest spaceflight of any one person will not reach 5 years by December 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2037", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2040", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2040", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that either the Democratic or Republican party in the US will cease to exist by 2041?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2065", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2075", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will receive an 8.74 total aggregate score from Freedom House for the calendar year 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.74", "median": "11.10", "upper_75": "13.90", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What will be the relative performance improvement of Top500's #1 performing supercomputer compared to the #500 performer in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "Top500 has been compiling charts and reports on the supercomputing industry for a long time. [Here](https://www.top500.org/statistics/perfdevel/) is a graph showing impressive gains in performance in terms of Flop/s.\n\nIn June of 1993, the #1 performer was at 59.7 GFlop/s, versus the #500 performer at 0.4 GFlop/s, which is a multiple of 149.25. In June of 2018, the #1 performer was 122.3 PFlop/s, versus the #500 performer at 0.7156 PFlop/s, for a multiple of 170.9.\n\nThis relative gap has been in a pretty stable range for many years. In June 2007 the multiple went down to only 70.15, and June 2016 it got up to 325.06, but it has tended to stay within a range so far.\n\nWould we expect such a performance multiple to stay in this range in the future? What might change this roughly-a-factor-of-100 lead in supercomputing Flop/s? Estimate what this multiple will be in the year 2030.\n\nResolution will be based on Top500's reporting on the subject, using the first number reported for 2030. If their reports are no longer available, then the next-best source will be sought. Resolves ambiguous if Flop/s in supercomputing is no longer reported by anyone.", "lower_25": "146", "median": "230", "upper_75": "350", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 60.2% of Americans will be obese or overweight in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "60.2", "median": "70.1", "upper_75": "77.6", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will receive an 8.74 total aggregate score from Freedom House for the calendar year 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.74", "median": "11.10", "upper_75": "13.90", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that either the Democratic or Republican party in the US will cease to exist by 2041?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2065", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2075", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What will be the relative performance improvement of Top500's #1 performing supercomputer compared to the #500 performer in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "Top500 has been compiling charts and reports on the supercomputing industry for a long time. [Here](https://www.top500.org/statistics/perfdevel/) is a graph showing impressive gains in performance in terms of Flop/s.\n\nIn June of 1993, the #1 performer was at 59.7 GFlop/s, versus the #500 performer at 0.4 GFlop/s, which is a multiple of 149.25. In June of 2018, the #1 performer was 122.3 PFlop/s, versus the #500 performer at 0.7156 PFlop/s, for a multiple of 170.9.\n\nThis relative gap has been in a pretty stable range for many years. In June 2007 the multiple went down to only 70.15, and June 2016 it got up to 325.06, but it has tended to stay within a range so far.\n\nWould we expect such a performance multiple to stay in this range in the future? What might change this roughly-a-factor-of-100 lead in supercomputing Flop/s? Estimate what this multiple will be in the year 2030.\n\nResolution will be based on Top500's reporting on the subject, using the first number reported for 2030. If their reports are no longer available, then the next-best source will be sought. Resolves ambiguous if Flop/s in supercomputing is no longer reported by anyone.", "lower_25": "146", "median": "230", "upper_75": "350", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will receive an 8.74 total aggregate score from Freedom House for the calendar year 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.74", "median": "11.10", "upper_75": "13.90", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a fifth nation will launch a person into space by Jan 2026?", "desc": "On **April 12, 1961** the first [Soviet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vostok_programme) flies into space. \n\nOn **February 20, 1962** the first [American](https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/mercury/index.html) flies into space.\n\nOn **October, 15 2003** the first [Chinese](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_space_program) flies into space.\n\nIndia plans to send an astronaut [on their own rocket](https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/simply-put-how-to-send-an-indian-into-space-isro-maned-mission-5308964/) by 2022, [though there's some doubt](https://www.dw.com/en/indias-astronaut-mission-will-push-space-program-to-the-limit/a-45108320) about that.\n\nThat's it. Currently there are only two nations capable of sending people into orbit on their own: Russia and China, with the US about to regain their ability.\n\nPart of this can certainly be attributed to the Space Race pushing the envelope of what's technologically doable, and one might justifiably argue that the accomplishments were made on an immature technology base. But it has been some time since then. With the US push of commercial space launches and the seeming growing international interest (partly spurred by the commercialisation) in space, one has to wonder:", "resc": "For the purposes of this question a nation (or group of nations like EU or UAE) has to have their own [launch service provider (LSP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Launch_service_provider), or have acquired the complete capabilities of a provider to such a degree the forked/copied LSP would be able to launch people", "lower_25": "Jan 2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Drake's Equation 7th parameter L: What is the chance that a civilization remains detectable for 64.4k years?", "desc": "This is the seventh question in [a series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--fermi-paradox) estimating input parameters for Drake's equation, inspired by a [recent paper,](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.02404.pdf) on the Fermi paradox.\n\nThe first question in the series, with more explanation, [is here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1337)\n\nThe model in question uses probability distributions over seven input parameters.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the seventh parameter in the Drake's Equation, \\(L\\). It is the average length of time, in years, that civilizations capable of being detected remain detectable.\n\nFor this question, a civilization is \"detectable\" if Earth technology from the year 2025 could detect the civilization.\n\nThis question will resolve as the most credible estimate of \\(L\\) according to academic literature published by September 7, 2118", "lower_25": "503", "median": "64.4k", "upper_75": "150M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that either the Democratic or Republican party in the US will cease to exist by 2041?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2065", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2075", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the World GDP in 2028 will be 133 trillions of 2010 USD?", "desc": "In the first decade of the 21st century, the World produced [more economic value than in the first 19 centuries of the common era combined](https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2011/06/28/two-thousand-years-in-one-chart). From the long-term perspective of social history, lasting economic prosperity and economic growth that exceeds population growth is only a very recent achievement for humanity. \n\nSince 1961, World GDP grew at an [average rate of 3.5%](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG) resulting in a 7.1 fold increase, or a doubling once every 15.678 years or around 188 months. Although GDP growth rates are prone to shocks, world GDP has not recently shown to stagnate for long periods of time. In fact, world GDP growth was positive for all periods since 1961 [except for 2009](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD), following the [global financial crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%932008).\n\nCurrently, in the third quarter of 2018, world GDP is estimated to be [around $80.078 trillion](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD) in 2010 prices. World GDP is taken to mean the sum of gross value, at purchaser's prices in U.S. dollars added by all resident producers in the economy. It is calculated without making deductions for the depletion and degradation of natural resources.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world's total [Gross Domestic Product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) in the year 2028, measured in [inflation-adjusted](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL) 2010 USD, according to the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD). For example, in 2018, the World Bank reported that world GDP in 2017 was $80.078 trillion (2010 USD).", "lower_25": "98.3", "median": "113", "upper_75": "133", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 26.9% of the global population will identify as \"religiously unaffiliated\" in 2050?", "desc": "The [\"nones\" are rising faster than ever in America](http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/13/a-closer-look-at-americas-rapidly-growing-religious-nones/), but globally, non-religious people are currently shrinking as a percentage of the population. Conflicting trends of economic development, evangelism, and fertility complicate predictions of world religiosity.\n\nPer a [Pew Research Center](http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projections-2010-2050/) study from 2015, as reported by [Psychology Today](https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-secular-life/201510/how-many-atheists-are-there):\n\n> 1.1 billion people [do not identify with any religion]... which equals about 16.5% of the global adult population. As such, “non-religious” is actually the third largest “religion” in the world, coming only behind Christianity (in first place) and Islam (in second).\n\nAt the same time, the Pew study projects that as a percentage of the population, non-theists will *decline* to just 13% by mid-century. One obvious reason is that \n\n> [r]eligions with many adherents in developing countries – where birth rates are high, and infant mortality rates generally have been falling – are likely to grow quickly. ...[R]eligiously unaffiliated population[s], by contrast, [are] heavily concentrated in places with low fertility and aging populations, such as Europe, North America, China and Japan.\n\nImportantly, Pew's projections have not attempted to wade into controversial social theories suggesting that economic development and religiosity are inversely linked. As the report explains, this has been the \"general experience in some parts of the world, notably Europe,\" but it is \"not yet clear whether it is a universal pattern.\" Indeed, there is [some evidence](https://www.smu.edu.sg/perspectives/2012/06/26/understanding-rapid-rise-charismatic-christianity-southeast-asia) that amongst China's 1.4 billion citizens, increasing affluence may be correlated with or even driving increasing religiosity.", "resc": "The resolution occurs if/when a study of comparable quality, scope, and methods to the [Pew study](http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2014/01/global-religion-full.pdf) is published before 2060 quoting a number for \"religiously unaffiliated\" pertaining to some date within 3 years of 2050. Note that this group includes atheist and agnostic, but also people who do not identify with any particular religion in surveys (but who may nonetheless have non-specific spiritual or cultural belief systems)", "lower_25": "17.0", "median": "21.4", "upper_75": "26.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 60.2% of Americans will be obese or overweight in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "60.2", "median": "70.1", "upper_75": "77.6", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first cloned human will not be born before 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "In January, Chinese researchers at the Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of Neuroscience in Shanghai shocked the world by publishing evidence that they had [cloned](https://www.cell.com/cell/fulltext/S0092-8674(18)30057-6) two female macaques--[Zhong Zhong and Hua Hua](https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018/jan/24/zhong-zhong-and-hua-hua-first-primates-born-using-dolly-the-sheep-cloning-method)--using similar techniques to the ones that scientists at The Roslin Institute used to create [Dolly The Sheep](http://dolly.roslin.ed.ac.uk/facts/the-life-of-dolly/index.html) nearly twenty years ago.\n\nThe Chinese team put a twist on the key process--known as \"somatic cell nuclear transfer.\" Reporters at Futurism summarized their breakthrough:\n\n>[The transfer process involves] replacing the nucleus in a donor egg with a nucleus taken from a cell from another animal. After scientists use an electric current to make the egg believe it has been fertilized, it will start to develop into an embryo that can then be implanted into a surrogate for gestation. The animal that results from the pregnancy will be a genetic copy of whatever animal donated the nucleus. In primates, the process has traditionally failed at the blastocyst stage of embryonic development. To get past this hurdle, Sun's team added two new elements to the usual collection of nutrients and growth factors that are typically introduced to embryos prior to surrogate implantation. Those new elements, a compound called trichostatin A and messenger RNA, helped direct the DNA to grow properly by prodding hundreds of genes necessary for successful embryonic development into action.\n\nThey've promised not to extend their work to use on humans. But now that the genie is out of the bottle...\n\n(For a philosophical exploration of the implications, check out [this piece](https://medium.economist.com/if-human-cloning-happened-db76888a2069) in The Economist. It ends on this ominous, Philip K. Dick-esque note: \"given the simplicity, these days, of editing DNA, it is hard to believe there is not, somewhere in the world, just such a being preparing to celebrate its own second C-day.\")\n\nOn the other hand, this subject is easy to hype. We've heard promises of imminent human cloning [for a while](https://www.wired.com/2002/11/first-baby-of-2003-to-be-a-clone/) now. \n\nWhen do you think it will finally happen? Resolution date = the *birthday* of a human clone, as recorded and published in a respected scientific journal.", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 26.9% of the global population will identify as \"religiously unaffiliated\" in 2050?", "desc": "The [\"nones\" are rising faster than ever in America](http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/13/a-closer-look-at-americas-rapidly-growing-religious-nones/), but globally, non-religious people are currently shrinking as a percentage of the population. Conflicting trends of economic development, evangelism, and fertility complicate predictions of world religiosity.\n\nPer a [Pew Research Center](http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projections-2010-2050/) study from 2015, as reported by [Psychology Today](https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-secular-life/201510/how-many-atheists-are-there):\n\n> 1.1 billion people [do not identify with any religion]... which equals about 16.5% of the global adult population. As such, “non-religious” is actually the third largest “religion” in the world, coming only behind Christianity (in first place) and Islam (in second).\n\nAt the same time, the Pew study projects that as a percentage of the population, non-theists will *decline* to just 13% by mid-century. One obvious reason is that \n\n> [r]eligions with many adherents in developing countries – where birth rates are high, and infant mortality rates generally have been falling – are likely to grow quickly. ...[R]eligiously unaffiliated population[s], by contrast, [are] heavily concentrated in places with low fertility and aging populations, such as Europe, North America, China and Japan.\n\nImportantly, Pew's projections have not attempted to wade into controversial social theories suggesting that economic development and religiosity are inversely linked. As the report explains, this has been the \"general experience in some parts of the world, notably Europe,\" but it is \"not yet clear whether it is a universal pattern.\" Indeed, there is [some evidence](https://www.smu.edu.sg/perspectives/2012/06/26/understanding-rapid-rise-charismatic-christianity-southeast-asia) that amongst China's 1.4 billion citizens, increasing affluence may be correlated with or even driving increasing religiosity.", "resc": "The resolution occurs if/when a study of comparable quality, scope, and methods to the [Pew study](http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2014/01/global-religion-full.pdf) is published before 2060 quoting a number for \"religiously unaffiliated\" pertaining to some date within 3 years of 2050. Note that this group includes atheist and agnostic, but also people who do not identify with any particular religion in surveys (but who may nonetheless have non-specific spiritual or cultural belief systems)", "lower_25": "17.0", "median": "21.4", "upper_75": "26.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the World GDP in 2028 will be 133 trillions of 2010 USD?", "desc": "In the first decade of the 21st century, the World produced [more economic value than in the first 19 centuries of the common era combined](https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2011/06/28/two-thousand-years-in-one-chart). From the long-term perspective of social history, lasting economic prosperity and economic growth that exceeds population growth is only a very recent achievement for humanity. \n\nSince 1961, World GDP grew at an [average rate of 3.5%](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG) resulting in a 7.1 fold increase, or a doubling once every 15.678 years or around 188 months. Although GDP growth rates are prone to shocks, world GDP has not recently shown to stagnate for long periods of time. In fact, world GDP growth was positive for all periods since 1961 [except for 2009](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD), following the [global financial crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%932008).\n\nCurrently, in the third quarter of 2018, world GDP is estimated to be [around $80.078 trillion](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD) in 2010 prices. World GDP is taken to mean the sum of gross value, at purchaser's prices in U.S. dollars added by all resident producers in the economy. It is calculated without making deductions for the depletion and degradation of natural resources.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world's total [Gross Domestic Product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) in the year 2028, measured in [inflation-adjusted](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL) 2010 USD, according to the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD). For example, in 2018, the World Bank reported that world GDP in 2017 was $80.078 trillion (2010 USD).", "lower_25": "98.3", "median": "113", "upper_75": "133", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first publicly traded company will achieve a $10 trillion market capitalization by May 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "This year, just weeks after globe-conquering tech giant Apple reached its $1 trillion value milestone, Amazon has joined them in crossing the threshold ([at some surprise to Metaculus forecasters](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/651/a-trillion-dollar-company-by-the-end-of-2018/)).\n\nApple was valued at around [$100 billion in mid 2007](https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/AAPL/apple/market-cap), and so it has taken the company roughly 11 years to grow its market capitalisation by a factor of ten. Amazon's rise was even more impressive. Amazon has grown from $100 bn to $1 trillion [in just over 6 years](https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/AMZN/amazon/market-cap).\n\nTo put the $10 trillion figure in some perspective, the United States currently (Q2, 2018) has a GDP of $20 trillion at current prices.\n\n**When will the first publicly traded company achieve a $10 trillion market capitalisation in today's prices?**\n\nThis resolves when a company whose shares can be bought and sold on a stock exchange achieves a market capitalisation of $10 trillion dollars **adjusted to 2018 prices**. The question will refer to [Yahoo Finance](https://finance.yahoo.com/)'s data, or any other reputable financial data service.", "lower_25": "Jul 2028", "median": "May 2031", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 60.2% of Americans will be obese or overweight in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "60.2", "median": "70.1", "upper_75": "77.6", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first publicly traded company will achieve a $10 trillion market capitalization by May 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "This year, just weeks after globe-conquering tech giant Apple reached its $1 trillion value milestone, Amazon has joined them in crossing the threshold ([at some surprise to Metaculus forecasters](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/651/a-trillion-dollar-company-by-the-end-of-2018/)).\n\nApple was valued at around [$100 billion in mid 2007](https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/AAPL/apple/market-cap), and so it has taken the company roughly 11 years to grow its market capitalisation by a factor of ten. Amazon's rise was even more impressive. Amazon has grown from $100 bn to $1 trillion [in just over 6 years](https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/AMZN/amazon/market-cap).\n\nTo put the $10 trillion figure in some perspective, the United States currently (Q2, 2018) has a GDP of $20 trillion at current prices.\n\n**When will the first publicly traded company achieve a $10 trillion market capitalisation in today's prices?**\n\nThis resolves when a company whose shares can be bought and sold on a stock exchange achieves a market capitalisation of $10 trillion dollars **adjusted to 2018 prices**. The question will refer to [Yahoo Finance](https://finance.yahoo.com/)'s data, or any other reputable financial data service.", "lower_25": "Jul 2028", "median": "May 2031", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first publicly traded company will achieve a $10 trillion market capitalization by May 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "This year, just weeks after globe-conquering tech giant Apple reached its $1 trillion value milestone, Amazon has joined them in crossing the threshold ([at some surprise to Metaculus forecasters](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/651/a-trillion-dollar-company-by-the-end-of-2018/)).\n\nApple was valued at around [$100 billion in mid 2007](https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/AAPL/apple/market-cap), and so it has taken the company roughly 11 years to grow its market capitalisation by a factor of ten. Amazon's rise was even more impressive. Amazon has grown from $100 bn to $1 trillion [in just over 6 years](https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/AMZN/amazon/market-cap).\n\nTo put the $10 trillion figure in some perspective, the United States currently (Q2, 2018) has a GDP of $20 trillion at current prices.\n\n**When will the first publicly traded company achieve a $10 trillion market capitalisation in today's prices?**\n\nThis resolves when a company whose shares can be bought and sold on a stock exchange achieves a market capitalisation of $10 trillion dollars **adjusted to 2018 prices**. The question will refer to [Yahoo Finance](https://finance.yahoo.com/)'s data, or any other reputable financial data service.", "lower_25": "Jul 2028", "median": "May 2031", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the 2˚C climate threshold will be crossed by 2046?", "desc": "At the Paris climate accord, world leaders promised to keep the global temperature increase this century (relative to pre-industrial levels) \"well below 2 ˚C\". Many experts were (and are) skeptical about this being feasible. Hence, it was asked whether there would be 5 consecutive years in which the global temperature was at least 2 ˚C above pre-industrial levels by 2100. As of the writing of this question, the Metaculus community assigns an 80% probability to this happening. The year of comparison chosen was 1880.", "resc": "This question will resolve positively if the average global temperature in any year is at least 2 ˚C above the 1880 value according to NASA. Note that the data in the link is normalized relative to the 1951-1980 baseline and 1880 stands at -0.19, so the critical value to look for is 1.81 (for temperature anomaly). It is possible, though, that the linked-to data source will no longer be available in a few years, in which case the best alternative (as of the judgement of Metaculus staff) shall be used for resolution.\n\nNote that the answer to this question could be never and that a non-never resolution could occur without triggering a positive resolution to the previously mentioned binary question. In the case of a non-never resolution, December 31st of the first year to achieve 2 ˚C warming shall be used as the resolution date.\n\nClosing date is set to 2025, but should resolution triggering information become available earlier, the question shall close retroactively one year prior to that information becoming available. (In all cases in which the question was still open at some point within one year of the information becoming available.", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2061", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 26.9% of the global population will identify as \"religiously unaffiliated\" in 2050?", "desc": "The [\"nones\" are rising faster than ever in America](http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/13/a-closer-look-at-americas-rapidly-growing-religious-nones/), but globally, non-religious people are currently shrinking as a percentage of the population. Conflicting trends of economic development, evangelism, and fertility complicate predictions of world religiosity.\n\nPer a [Pew Research Center](http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projections-2010-2050/) study from 2015, as reported by [Psychology Today](https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-secular-life/201510/how-many-atheists-are-there):\n\n> 1.1 billion people [do not identify with any religion]... which equals about 16.5% of the global adult population. As such, “non-religious” is actually the third largest “religion” in the world, coming only behind Christianity (in first place) and Islam (in second).\n\nAt the same time, the Pew study projects that as a percentage of the population, non-theists will *decline* to just 13% by mid-century. One obvious reason is that \n\n> [r]eligions with many adherents in developing countries – where birth rates are high, and infant mortality rates generally have been falling – are likely to grow quickly. ...[R]eligiously unaffiliated population[s], by contrast, [are] heavily concentrated in places with low fertility and aging populations, such as Europe, North America, China and Japan.\n\nImportantly, Pew's projections have not attempted to wade into controversial social theories suggesting that economic development and religiosity are inversely linked. As the report explains, this has been the \"general experience in some parts of the world, notably Europe,\" but it is \"not yet clear whether it is a universal pattern.\" Indeed, there is [some evidence](https://www.smu.edu.sg/perspectives/2012/06/26/understanding-rapid-rise-charismatic-christianity-southeast-asia) that amongst China's 1.4 billion citizens, increasing affluence may be correlated with or even driving increasing religiosity.", "resc": "The resolution occurs if/when a study of comparable quality, scope, and methods to the [Pew study](http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2014/01/global-religion-full.pdf) is published before 2060 quoting a number for \"religiously unaffiliated\" pertaining to some date within 3 years of 2050. Note that this group includes atheist and agnostic, but also people who do not identify with any particular religion in surveys (but who may nonetheless have non-specific spiritual or cultural belief systems)", "lower_25": "17.0", "median": "21.4", "upper_75": "26.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the 2˚C climate threshold will be crossed by 2046?", "desc": "At the Paris climate accord, world leaders promised to keep the global temperature increase this century (relative to pre-industrial levels) \"well below 2 ˚C\". Many experts were (and are) skeptical about this being feasible. Hence, it was asked whether there would be 5 consecutive years in which the global temperature was at least 2 ˚C above pre-industrial levels by 2100. As of the writing of this question, the Metaculus community assigns an 80% probability to this happening. The year of comparison chosen was 1880.", "resc": "This question will resolve positively if the average global temperature in any year is at least 2 ˚C above the 1880 value according to NASA. Note that the data in the link is normalized relative to the 1951-1980 baseline and 1880 stands at -0.19, so the critical value to look for is 1.81 (for temperature anomaly). It is possible, though, that the linked-to data source will no longer be available in a few years, in which case the best alternative (as of the judgement of Metaculus staff) shall be used for resolution.\n\nNote that the answer to this question could be never and that a non-never resolution could occur without triggering a positive resolution to the previously mentioned binary question. In the case of a non-never resolution, December 31st of the first year to achieve 2 ˚C warming shall be used as the resolution date.\n\nClosing date is set to 2025, but should resolution triggering information become available earlier, the question shall close retroactively one year prior to that information becoming available. (In all cases in which the question was still open at some point within one year of the information becoming available.", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2061", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first manned spacecraft will touch the surface of any planet, dwarf planet, or moon other than Earth, Earth's Moon, or Mars by 2075?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "2075", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the World GDP in 2028 will be 133 trillions of 2010 USD?", "desc": "In the first decade of the 21st century, the World produced [more economic value than in the first 19 centuries of the common era combined](https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2011/06/28/two-thousand-years-in-one-chart). From the long-term perspective of social history, lasting economic prosperity and economic growth that exceeds population growth is only a very recent achievement for humanity. \n\nSince 1961, World GDP grew at an [average rate of 3.5%](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG) resulting in a 7.1 fold increase, or a doubling once every 15.678 years or around 188 months. Although GDP growth rates are prone to shocks, world GDP has not recently shown to stagnate for long periods of time. In fact, world GDP growth was positive for all periods since 1961 [except for 2009](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD), following the [global financial crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%932008).\n\nCurrently, in the third quarter of 2018, world GDP is estimated to be [around $80.078 trillion](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD) in 2010 prices. World GDP is taken to mean the sum of gross value, at purchaser's prices in U.S. dollars added by all resident producers in the economy. It is calculated without making deductions for the depletion and degradation of natural resources.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world's total [Gross Domestic Product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) in the year 2028, measured in [inflation-adjusted](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL) 2010 USD, according to the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD). For example, in 2018, the World Bank reported that world GDP in 2017 was $80.078 trillion (2010 USD).", "lower_25": "98.3", "median": "113", "upper_75": "133", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first manned spacecraft will touch the surface of any planet, dwarf planet, or moon other than Earth, Earth's Moon, or Mars by 2075?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "2075", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first cloned human will not be born before 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "In January, Chinese researchers at the Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of Neuroscience in Shanghai shocked the world by publishing evidence that they had [cloned](https://www.cell.com/cell/fulltext/S0092-8674(18)30057-6) two female macaques--[Zhong Zhong and Hua Hua](https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018/jan/24/zhong-zhong-and-hua-hua-first-primates-born-using-dolly-the-sheep-cloning-method)--using similar techniques to the ones that scientists at The Roslin Institute used to create [Dolly The Sheep](http://dolly.roslin.ed.ac.uk/facts/the-life-of-dolly/index.html) nearly twenty years ago.\n\nThe Chinese team put a twist on the key process--known as \"somatic cell nuclear transfer.\" Reporters at Futurism summarized their breakthrough:\n\n>[The transfer process involves] replacing the nucleus in a donor egg with a nucleus taken from a cell from another animal. After scientists use an electric current to make the egg believe it has been fertilized, it will start to develop into an embryo that can then be implanted into a surrogate for gestation. The animal that results from the pregnancy will be a genetic copy of whatever animal donated the nucleus. In primates, the process has traditionally failed at the blastocyst stage of embryonic development. To get past this hurdle, Sun's team added two new elements to the usual collection of nutrients and growth factors that are typically introduced to embryos prior to surrogate implantation. Those new elements, a compound called trichostatin A and messenger RNA, helped direct the DNA to grow properly by prodding hundreds of genes necessary for successful embryonic development into action.\n\nThey've promised not to extend their work to use on humans. But now that the genie is out of the bottle...\n\n(For a philosophical exploration of the implications, check out [this piece](https://medium.economist.com/if-human-cloning-happened-db76888a2069) in The Economist. It ends on this ominous, Philip K. Dick-esque note: \"given the simplicity, these days, of editing DNA, it is hard to believe there is not, somewhere in the world, just such a being preparing to celebrate its own second C-day.\")\n\nOn the other hand, this subject is easy to hype. We've heard promises of imminent human cloning [for a while](https://www.wired.com/2002/11/first-baby-of-2003-to-be-a-clone/) now. \n\nWhen do you think it will finally happen? Resolution date = the *birthday* of a human clone, as recorded and published in a respected scientific journal.", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the heaviest payload (in kg) put into LEO by a launch vehicle that is in service on January 1, 2050 will be 215k?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "118k", "median": "215k", "upper_75": "419k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What will be the relative performance improvement of Top500's #1 performing supercomputer compared to the #500 performer in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "Top500 has been compiling charts and reports on the supercomputing industry for a long time. [Here](https://www.top500.org/statistics/perfdevel/) is a graph showing impressive gains in performance in terms of Flop/s.\n\nIn June of 1993, the #1 performer was at 59.7 GFlop/s, versus the #500 performer at 0.4 GFlop/s, which is a multiple of 149.25. In June of 2018, the #1 performer was 122.3 PFlop/s, versus the #500 performer at 0.7156 PFlop/s, for a multiple of 170.9.\n\nThis relative gap has been in a pretty stable range for many years. In June 2007 the multiple went down to only 70.15, and June 2016 it got up to 325.06, but it has tended to stay within a range so far.\n\nWould we expect such a performance multiple to stay in this range in the future? What might change this roughly-a-factor-of-100 lead in supercomputing Flop/s? Estimate what this multiple will be in the year 2030.\n\nResolution will be based on Top500's reporting on the subject, using the first number reported for 2030. If their reports are no longer available, then the next-best source will be sought. Resolves ambiguous if Flop/s in supercomputing is no longer reported by anyone.", "lower_25": "146", "median": "230", "upper_75": "350", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the heaviest payload (in kg) put into LEO by a launch vehicle that is in service on January 1, 2050 will be 215k?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "118k", "median": "215k", "upper_75": "419k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the longest verified human lifespan on record will be 122.7 years on January 1 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "122.7", "median": "125.2", "upper_75": "129.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the longest verified human lifespan on record will be 122.7 years on January 1 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "122.7", "median": "125.2", "upper_75": "129.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.287 percentage of US residents will be aged 100 years or older on January 1 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.118", "median": "0.287", "upper_75": "0.690", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.287 percentage of US residents will be aged 100 years or older on January 1 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.118", "median": "0.287", "upper_75": "0.690", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first cloned human will not be born before 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "In January, Chinese researchers at the Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of Neuroscience in Shanghai shocked the world by publishing evidence that they had [cloned](https://www.cell.com/cell/fulltext/S0092-8674(18)30057-6) two female macaques--[Zhong Zhong and Hua Hua](https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018/jan/24/zhong-zhong-and-hua-hua-first-primates-born-using-dolly-the-sheep-cloning-method)--using similar techniques to the ones that scientists at The Roslin Institute used to create [Dolly The Sheep](http://dolly.roslin.ed.ac.uk/facts/the-life-of-dolly/index.html) nearly twenty years ago.\n\nThe Chinese team put a twist on the key process--known as \"somatic cell nuclear transfer.\" Reporters at Futurism summarized their breakthrough:\n\n>[The transfer process involves] replacing the nucleus in a donor egg with a nucleus taken from a cell from another animal. After scientists use an electric current to make the egg believe it has been fertilized, it will start to develop into an embryo that can then be implanted into a surrogate for gestation. The animal that results from the pregnancy will be a genetic copy of whatever animal donated the nucleus. In primates, the process has traditionally failed at the blastocyst stage of embryonic development. To get past this hurdle, Sun's team added two new elements to the usual collection of nutrients and growth factors that are typically introduced to embryos prior to surrogate implantation. Those new elements, a compound called trichostatin A and messenger RNA, helped direct the DNA to grow properly by prodding hundreds of genes necessary for successful embryonic development into action.\n\nThey've promised not to extend their work to use on humans. But now that the genie is out of the bottle...\n\n(For a philosophical exploration of the implications, check out [this piece](https://medium.economist.com/if-human-cloning-happened-db76888a2069) in The Economist. It ends on this ominous, Philip K. Dick-esque note: \"given the simplicity, these days, of editing DNA, it is hard to believe there is not, somewhere in the world, just such a being preparing to celebrate its own second C-day.\")\n\nOn the other hand, this subject is easy to hype. We've heard promises of imminent human cloning [for a while](https://www.wired.com/2002/11/first-baby-of-2003-to-be-a-clone/) now. \n\nWhen do you think it will finally happen? Resolution date = the *birthday* of a human clone, as recorded and published in a respected scientific journal.", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.287 percentage of US residents will be aged 100 years or older on January 1 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.118", "median": "0.287", "upper_75": "0.690", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a crewed spacecraft will enter interstellar space for the first time by 2249?", "desc": "For the second time in history, a human-made object has reached the space between the stars. NASA's Voyager 2 probe, launched on August 20 1977, has now has exited the heliosphere – the protective bubble of particles and magnetic fields created by the Sun. The only human-made object to previously achieve this was Voyager 1, launched on September 5, 1977. Both of these craft are unmanned probes.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date after January 1, 2020 when a crewed spacecraft containing living and conscious human beings is confirmed to be outside of the Sun's heliosphere.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the humans on the spacecraft must be both alive and conscious at the time that the spacecraft is confirmed to be outside the heliosphere. Humans in any kind of cryonic preservation, suspended animation, hibernation or other similar state at the time that the craft is declared to be outside the heliosphere are excluded, as are 'mind uploads' (a hypothetical futuristic process of scanning the mental state (including long-term memory and \"self\") of a particular brain substrate and copying it to a computer) that are hosted locally on the spacecraft, or any other kind of non-human consciousness.", "lower_25": "2108", "median": "2249", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2499", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a human-made spacecraft will attain a velocity of 0.0213 c before 2050?", "desc": "As of December 13 2018, the fastest human-made spacecraft is the [Parker Solar Probe](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parker_Solar_Probe) which on 6 November 2018 [attained](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_vehicle_speed_records#Spacecraft) a maximum velocity of 343,112 km/h (0.000318 times the speed of light, or *c*) relative to the Sun.\n\nIt is expected that this will be substantially exceeded in the future when Parker Solar Probe reaches its ultimate perihelion. Its velocity relative to the Sun is expected to reach 690,000 km/h (0.000640 *c*).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the greatest velocity ever achieved, as a fraction of the [speed of light](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speed_of_light) (c), by any spacecraft made by humans before January 1, 2050.\n\nIn order to unambiguously express the velocity of a spacecraft, a frame of reference must be specified. For the purposes of this question, this reference frame will be taken to be fixed to the center of mass of the sun", "lower_25": "1.08×10−3", "median": "2.80×10−3", "upper_75": "0.0213", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the 2˚C climate threshold will be crossed by 2046?", "desc": "At the Paris climate accord, world leaders promised to keep the global temperature increase this century (relative to pre-industrial levels) \"well below 2 ˚C\". Many experts were (and are) skeptical about this being feasible. Hence, it was asked whether there would be 5 consecutive years in which the global temperature was at least 2 ˚C above pre-industrial levels by 2100. As of the writing of this question, the Metaculus community assigns an 80% probability to this happening. The year of comparison chosen was 1880.", "resc": "This question will resolve positively if the average global temperature in any year is at least 2 ˚C above the 1880 value according to NASA. Note that the data in the link is normalized relative to the 1951-1980 baseline and 1880 stands at -0.19, so the critical value to look for is 1.81 (for temperature anomaly). It is possible, though, that the linked-to data source will no longer be available in a few years, in which case the best alternative (as of the judgement of Metaculus staff) shall be used for resolution.\n\nNote that the answer to this question could be never and that a non-never resolution could occur without triggering a positive resolution to the previously mentioned binary question. In the case of a non-never resolution, December 31st of the first year to achieve 2 ˚C warming shall be used as the resolution date.\n\nClosing date is set to 2025, but should resolution triggering information become available earlier, the question shall close retroactively one year prior to that information becoming available. (In all cases in which the question was still open at some point within one year of the information becoming available.", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2061", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a human-made spacecraft will attain a velocity of 0.0213 c before 2050?", "desc": "As of December 13 2018, the fastest human-made spacecraft is the [Parker Solar Probe](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parker_Solar_Probe) which on 6 November 2018 [attained](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_vehicle_speed_records#Spacecraft) a maximum velocity of 343,112 km/h (0.000318 times the speed of light, or *c*) relative to the Sun.\n\nIt is expected that this will be substantially exceeded in the future when Parker Solar Probe reaches its ultimate perihelion. Its velocity relative to the Sun is expected to reach 690,000 km/h (0.000640 *c*).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the greatest velocity ever achieved, as a fraction of the [speed of light](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speed_of_light) (c), by any spacecraft made by humans before January 1, 2050.\n\nIn order to unambiguously express the velocity of a spacecraft, a frame of reference must be specified. For the purposes of this question, this reference frame will be taken to be fixed to the center of mass of the sun", "lower_25": "1.08×10−3", "median": "2.80×10−3", "upper_75": "0.0213", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a crewed spacecraft will enter interstellar space for the first time by 2249?", "desc": "For the second time in history, a human-made object has reached the space between the stars. NASA's Voyager 2 probe, launched on August 20 1977, has now has exited the heliosphere – the protective bubble of particles and magnetic fields created by the Sun. The only human-made object to previously achieve this was Voyager 1, launched on September 5, 1977. Both of these craft are unmanned probes.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date after January 1, 2020 when a crewed spacecraft containing living and conscious human beings is confirmed to be outside of the Sun's heliosphere.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the humans on the spacecraft must be both alive and conscious at the time that the spacecraft is confirmed to be outside the heliosphere. Humans in any kind of cryonic preservation, suspended animation, hibernation or other similar state at the time that the craft is declared to be outside the heliosphere are excluded, as are 'mind uploads' (a hypothetical futuristic process of scanning the mental state (including long-term memory and \"self\") of a particular brain substrate and copying it to a computer) that are hosted locally on the spacecraft, or any other kind of non-human consciousness.", "lower_25": "2108", "median": "2249", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2499", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a human-made spacecraft will attain a velocity of 0.0213 c before 2050?", "desc": "As of December 13 2018, the fastest human-made spacecraft is the [Parker Solar Probe](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parker_Solar_Probe) which on 6 November 2018 [attained](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_vehicle_speed_records#Spacecraft) a maximum velocity of 343,112 km/h (0.000318 times the speed of light, or *c*) relative to the Sun.\n\nIt is expected that this will be substantially exceeded in the future when Parker Solar Probe reaches its ultimate perihelion. Its velocity relative to the Sun is expected to reach 690,000 km/h (0.000640 *c*).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the greatest velocity ever achieved, as a fraction of the [speed of light](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speed_of_light) (c), by any spacecraft made by humans before January 1, 2050.\n\nIn order to unambiguously express the velocity of a spacecraft, a frame of reference must be specified. For the purposes of this question, this reference frame will be taken to be fixed to the center of mass of the sun", "lower_25": "1.08×10−3", "median": "2.80×10−3", "upper_75": "0.0213", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average survival rate of all cancers will exceed 75% by May 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "Every sixth death in the world is due to cancer, making it the [second leading cause of death](http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(17)32152-9.pdf) (second only to cardiovascular diseases). In 2016, 8.9 million people are estimated to have died from the various forms of cancer. The [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](http://ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-results-tool) put relatively small error margins around this global figure: the lower and upper estimates extend from 8.75 to 9.1 million.\n\nAs of 2013 in the United States, the mean 5-year relative survival rate of all cancers (for both sexes) [was 69.2%](https://seer.cancer.gov/archive/csr/1975_2014/browse_csr.php?sectionSEL=2&pageSEL=sect_02_table.08). As you can see from this chart by [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/cancer#cancer-survival-rates), the survival rate has been steadily increasing. For example, in 1977 the figure was 48.9%\n\n**When will the mean 5-year relative survival rate of all cancers for both sexes in the United States exceed 75.0%?**\n\nThis resolves positive if at some future date, the 5-year survival rates will have been reported to exceed 75.0%. This question will refer to data Published by the [National Cancer Institute](https://seer.cancer.gov/archive/csr/1975_2014/browse_csr.php?sectionSEL=1&pageSEL=sect_01_table.05.html) or any other reputable source of medical statistics.\n\nTo pinpoint a particular date, we will linearly interpolate between the first day of the year when the threshold was breached, and the first day of the prior year (see fine-print).\n\n*Clarification (2021-02-17), this question resolves as the earliest diagnosis year such that the 5-Year Relative Survival (percent for those patients exceeds 75. For example, a similar question about the 65% survival rate would have resolved as 1999, according [to NIH data](https://seer.cancer.gov/archive/csr/1975_2014/browse_csr.php?sectionSEL=2&pageSEL=sect_02_table.08).*\n\n[fine-print]\nIn particular, suppose the average survival rate for first exceeds 75% in year \\(t_k\\), at which point the survival rate was \\(s_k > 0.750\\). Then the resolution date will be given by:\n\n\\[t_{k-1}+ 365\\times \\frac{0.75-s_{k-1}}{s_{k}-s_{k-1}} \\]", "lower_25": "May 2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a breakthrough in the treatment of hard-to-treat cancers by 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "Every sixth death in the world is due to cancer, making it the [second leading cause of death](http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(17)32152-9.pdf) (second only to cardiovascular diseases). In 2016, 8.9 million people are estimated to have died from the various forms of cancer.\n\nSome cancers are harder to survive than others. Common cancer sites with low 5 year survival rates include the brain and nervous system (35.9%), stomach (31.1%), oesophagus (21%), lungs and bronchus (19.5%), liver (18.5%) and pancreas (8.7%) ([all rates for both sexes, all races from 2013 in the U.S.](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/five-year-cancer-survival-in-usa?time=1977..2013&country=~All+races%2C+total)).\n\n**When will we see a doubling of the odds of survival (relative to 2013 rates) in the U.S. for cancers in any two of the following sites for both sexes and all races: brain and nervous system, stomach, oesophagus, lungs and bronchus, liver, or the pancreas?**\n\nPositive resolution requires *any two* of the following reported average rates for both sexes and all races in the U.S.\n\n1. \\(> 52.8\\)% 5-year survival rates for brain and nervous system cancer,\n2. \\(>47.4 \\)% 5-year survival rates for stomach cancer,\n3. \\(>34.7\\)% 5-year survival rates for oesophagus cancer,\n4. \\(>32.6\\)% 5-year survival rates for lungs and bronchus cancer,\n5. \\(>31.2\\)% 5-year survival rates for liver cancer,\n6. \\(>16\\)% 5-year survival rates for pancreatic cancer,\n\nas reported by the National Cancer Institute, or any other reputable provider of medical statistics.\n\nHistorical of survival rates from all listed cancers are catalogued in [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/cancer#cancer-survival-rates).\n\nTo pinpoint a particular date, we will linearly interpolate between the first day of the year when the last threshold was breached, and the first day of the prior year (see fine-print).\n\n[fine-print]\nIn particular, suppose survival rate for the second cancer of the two was met in year \\(t_k\\), at which point the survival rate was \\(s_k\\). Moreover, the relevant threshold is denoted as \\(s^*\\) Then the resolution date will be given by:\n\n\\[t_{k-1}+ 365\\times \\frac{s^*-s_{k-1}}{s_{k}-s_{k-1}} \\]", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2041", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the 10,000th human will reach space by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2072", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that PHP will die by 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2053", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the 10,000th human will reach space by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2072", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that PHP will die by 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2053", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average survival rate of all cancers will exceed 75% by May 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "Every sixth death in the world is due to cancer, making it the [second leading cause of death](http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(17)32152-9.pdf) (second only to cardiovascular diseases). In 2016, 8.9 million people are estimated to have died from the various forms of cancer. The [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](http://ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-results-tool) put relatively small error margins around this global figure: the lower and upper estimates extend from 8.75 to 9.1 million.\n\nAs of 2013 in the United States, the mean 5-year relative survival rate of all cancers (for both sexes) [was 69.2%](https://seer.cancer.gov/archive/csr/1975_2014/browse_csr.php?sectionSEL=2&pageSEL=sect_02_table.08). As you can see from this chart by [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/cancer#cancer-survival-rates), the survival rate has been steadily increasing. For example, in 1977 the figure was 48.9%\n\n**When will the mean 5-year relative survival rate of all cancers for both sexes in the United States exceed 75.0%?**\n\nThis resolves positive if at some future date, the 5-year survival rates will have been reported to exceed 75.0%. This question will refer to data Published by the [National Cancer Institute](https://seer.cancer.gov/archive/csr/1975_2014/browse_csr.php?sectionSEL=1&pageSEL=sect_01_table.05.html) or any other reputable source of medical statistics.\n\nTo pinpoint a particular date, we will linearly interpolate between the first day of the year when the threshold was breached, and the first day of the prior year (see fine-print).\n\n*Clarification (2021-02-17), this question resolves as the earliest diagnosis year such that the 5-Year Relative Survival (percent for those patients exceeds 75. For example, a similar question about the 65% survival rate would have resolved as 1999, according [to NIH data](https://seer.cancer.gov/archive/csr/1975_2014/browse_csr.php?sectionSEL=2&pageSEL=sect_02_table.08).*\n\n[fine-print]\nIn particular, suppose the average survival rate for first exceeds 75% in year \\(t_k\\), at which point the survival rate was \\(s_k > 0.750\\). Then the resolution date will be given by:\n\n\\[t_{k-1}+ 365\\times \\frac{0.75-s_{k-1}}{s_{k}-s_{k-1}} \\]", "lower_25": "May 2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average survival rate of all cancers will exceed 75% by May 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "Every sixth death in the world is due to cancer, making it the [second leading cause of death](http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(17)32152-9.pdf) (second only to cardiovascular diseases). In 2016, 8.9 million people are estimated to have died from the various forms of cancer. The [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](http://ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-results-tool) put relatively small error margins around this global figure: the lower and upper estimates extend from 8.75 to 9.1 million.\n\nAs of 2013 in the United States, the mean 5-year relative survival rate of all cancers (for both sexes) [was 69.2%](https://seer.cancer.gov/archive/csr/1975_2014/browse_csr.php?sectionSEL=2&pageSEL=sect_02_table.08). As you can see from this chart by [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/cancer#cancer-survival-rates), the survival rate has been steadily increasing. For example, in 1977 the figure was 48.9%\n\n**When will the mean 5-year relative survival rate of all cancers for both sexes in the United States exceed 75.0%?**\n\nThis resolves positive if at some future date, the 5-year survival rates will have been reported to exceed 75.0%. This question will refer to data Published by the [National Cancer Institute](https://seer.cancer.gov/archive/csr/1975_2014/browse_csr.php?sectionSEL=1&pageSEL=sect_01_table.05.html) or any other reputable source of medical statistics.\n\nTo pinpoint a particular date, we will linearly interpolate between the first day of the year when the threshold was breached, and the first day of the prior year (see fine-print).\n\n*Clarification (2021-02-17), this question resolves as the earliest diagnosis year such that the 5-Year Relative Survival (percent for those patients exceeds 75. For example, a similar question about the 65% survival rate would have resolved as 1999, according [to NIH data](https://seer.cancer.gov/archive/csr/1975_2014/browse_csr.php?sectionSEL=2&pageSEL=sect_02_table.08).*\n\n[fine-print]\nIn particular, suppose the average survival rate for first exceeds 75% in year \\(t_k\\), at which point the survival rate was \\(s_k > 0.750\\). Then the resolution date will be given by:\n\n\\[t_{k-1}+ 365\\times \\frac{0.75-s_{k-1}}{s_{k}-s_{k-1}} \\]", "lower_25": "May 2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the longest verified human lifespan on record will be 122.7 years on January 1 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "122.7", "median": "125.2", "upper_75": "129.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that PHP will die by 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2053", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first human will be born on another world by 2172?", "desc": "", "resc": "Fewer than 600 humans have ever traveled to space. Fewer still have ever set foot on another astronomical object: only twelve men ever walked on the moon.\n\nIn colonial times, the birth of the first child of settlers in a newly acquired territory (for example, the birth of [Virginia Dare in a New World English overseas possession](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virginia_Dare)) was considered an important milestone.\n\n***When will the first human be born alive on an astronomical body other than Earth?***\n\nThe child must be born alive, but need not survive for any particular length of time in order for a positive resolution. The birth must take place on some natural astronomical object (not inside a spacecraft, space station or man-made space-based habitat like an [O'Neill cylinder](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O%27Neill_cylinder)) such as a planet, dwarf planet, moon or asteroid.\n\nA 'human' shall be taken to mean an anatomically modern human that would be able (upon sexual maturity) to successfully breed, without technological assistance, with members of the species *homo sapiens* found on Earth in 2019. 'Mind uploads,' 'EMs' and other non-biological entities which may or may not be commonly considered 'human' at some point in the future are expressly excluded.\n\n'Birth' shall be taken to mean the explulsion of a child from the uterus of a living human female, either by natural means or by Caesarean section. [Extracorporeal pregnancies,](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_uterus) including but not limited to arrangements like [this](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dt7twXzNEsQ) are specifically excluded.", "lower_25": "2045", "median": "2072", "upper_75": "2172", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a crewed spacecraft will enter interstellar space for the first time by 2249?", "desc": "For the second time in history, a human-made object has reached the space between the stars. NASA's Voyager 2 probe, launched on August 20 1977, has now has exited the heliosphere – the protective bubble of particles and magnetic fields created by the Sun. The only human-made object to previously achieve this was Voyager 1, launched on September 5, 1977. Both of these craft are unmanned probes.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date after January 1, 2020 when a crewed spacecraft containing living and conscious human beings is confirmed to be outside of the Sun's heliosphere.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the humans on the spacecraft must be both alive and conscious at the time that the spacecraft is confirmed to be outside the heliosphere. Humans in any kind of cryonic preservation, suspended animation, hibernation or other similar state at the time that the craft is declared to be outside the heliosphere are excluded, as are 'mind uploads' (a hypothetical futuristic process of scanning the mental state (including long-term memory and \"self\") of a particular brain substrate and copying it to a computer) that are hosted locally on the spacecraft, or any other kind of non-human consciousness.", "lower_25": "2108", "median": "2249", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2499", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first human will be born on another world by 2172?", "desc": "", "resc": "Fewer than 600 humans have ever traveled to space. Fewer still have ever set foot on another astronomical object: only twelve men ever walked on the moon.\n\nIn colonial times, the birth of the first child of settlers in a newly acquired territory (for example, the birth of [Virginia Dare in a New World English overseas possession](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virginia_Dare)) was considered an important milestone.\n\n***When will the first human be born alive on an astronomical body other than Earth?***\n\nThe child must be born alive, but need not survive for any particular length of time in order for a positive resolution. The birth must take place on some natural astronomical object (not inside a spacecraft, space station or man-made space-based habitat like an [O'Neill cylinder](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O%27Neill_cylinder)) such as a planet, dwarf planet, moon or asteroid.\n\nA 'human' shall be taken to mean an anatomically modern human that would be able (upon sexual maturity) to successfully breed, without technological assistance, with members of the species *homo sapiens* found on Earth in 2019. 'Mind uploads,' 'EMs' and other non-biological entities which may or may not be commonly considered 'human' at some point in the future are expressly excluded.\n\n'Birth' shall be taken to mean the explulsion of a child from the uterus of a living human female, either by natural means or by Caesarean section. [Extracorporeal pregnancies,](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_uterus) including but not limited to arrangements like [this](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dt7twXzNEsQ) are specifically excluded.", "lower_25": "2045", "median": "2072", "upper_75": "2172", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the 10,000th human will reach space by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2072", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the atmospheric CO2 concentration will be 440.7 ppm in 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Earth's carbon dioxide atmospheric concentration reach 500 PPM before 2051?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/336/worst-case-scenario-for-global-co2-levels-over-the-coming-decades/)\n\n----\n\nOver the last few centuries, the concentration of carbon dioxide in Earth's atmosphere has risen from approximately 280 parts per million (pre-industrial) to approximately 410 ppm [[1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide_in_Earth%27s_atmosphere)]. Atmospheric carbon dioxide is one of the contributing factors driving climate change via the greenhouse effect.\n\nThe trend follows a seasonal cycle that reaches its peak in May, and has also risen at [an average rate of around 2ppm annually in the last ten years](https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/gl_gr.html).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the average CO2 atmospheric concentration globally in the calendar year 2030, according to the [NOAA Earth System Research Laboratory](https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/gl_data.html).\n\nIf this organization (or a successor) does not exist or no longer provides this information in 2030, the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "431.1", "median": "435.8", "upper_75": "440.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first human will be born on another world by 2172?", "desc": "", "resc": "Fewer than 600 humans have ever traveled to space. Fewer still have ever set foot on another astronomical object: only twelve men ever walked on the moon.\n\nIn colonial times, the birth of the first child of settlers in a newly acquired territory (for example, the birth of [Virginia Dare in a New World English overseas possession](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virginia_Dare)) was considered an important milestone.\n\n***When will the first human be born alive on an astronomical body other than Earth?***\n\nThe child must be born alive, but need not survive for any particular length of time in order for a positive resolution. The birth must take place on some natural astronomical object (not inside a spacecraft, space station or man-made space-based habitat like an [O'Neill cylinder](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O%27Neill_cylinder)) such as a planet, dwarf planet, moon or asteroid.\n\nA 'human' shall be taken to mean an anatomically modern human that would be able (upon sexual maturity) to successfully breed, without technological assistance, with members of the species *homo sapiens* found on Earth in 2019. 'Mind uploads,' 'EMs' and other non-biological entities which may or may not be commonly considered 'human' at some point in the future are expressly excluded.\n\n'Birth' shall be taken to mean the explulsion of a child from the uterus of a living human female, either by natural means or by Caesarean section. [Extracorporeal pregnancies,](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_uterus) including but not limited to arrangements like [this](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dt7twXzNEsQ) are specifically excluded.", "lower_25": "2045", "median": "2072", "upper_75": "2172", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the atmospheric CO2 concentration will be 440.7 ppm in 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Earth's carbon dioxide atmospheric concentration reach 500 PPM before 2051?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/336/worst-case-scenario-for-global-co2-levels-over-the-coming-decades/)\n\n----\n\nOver the last few centuries, the concentration of carbon dioxide in Earth's atmosphere has risen from approximately 280 parts per million (pre-industrial) to approximately 410 ppm [[1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide_in_Earth%27s_atmosphere)]. Atmospheric carbon dioxide is one of the contributing factors driving climate change via the greenhouse effect.\n\nThe trend follows a seasonal cycle that reaches its peak in May, and has also risen at [an average rate of around 2ppm annually in the last ten years](https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/gl_gr.html).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the average CO2 atmospheric concentration globally in the calendar year 2030, according to the [NOAA Earth System Research Laboratory](https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/gl_data.html).\n\nIf this organization (or a successor) does not exist or no longer provides this information in 2030, the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "431.1", "median": "435.8", "upper_75": "440.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a breakthrough in the treatment of hard-to-treat cancers by 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "Every sixth death in the world is due to cancer, making it the [second leading cause of death](http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(17)32152-9.pdf) (second only to cardiovascular diseases). In 2016, 8.9 million people are estimated to have died from the various forms of cancer.\n\nSome cancers are harder to survive than others. Common cancer sites with low 5 year survival rates include the brain and nervous system (35.9%), stomach (31.1%), oesophagus (21%), lungs and bronchus (19.5%), liver (18.5%) and pancreas (8.7%) ([all rates for both sexes, all races from 2013 in the U.S.](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/five-year-cancer-survival-in-usa?time=1977..2013&country=~All+races%2C+total)).\n\n**When will we see a doubling of the odds of survival (relative to 2013 rates) in the U.S. for cancers in any two of the following sites for both sexes and all races: brain and nervous system, stomach, oesophagus, lungs and bronchus, liver, or the pancreas?**\n\nPositive resolution requires *any two* of the following reported average rates for both sexes and all races in the U.S.\n\n1. \\(> 52.8\\)% 5-year survival rates for brain and nervous system cancer,\n2. \\(>47.4 \\)% 5-year survival rates for stomach cancer,\n3. \\(>34.7\\)% 5-year survival rates for oesophagus cancer,\n4. \\(>32.6\\)% 5-year survival rates for lungs and bronchus cancer,\n5. \\(>31.2\\)% 5-year survival rates for liver cancer,\n6. \\(>16\\)% 5-year survival rates for pancreatic cancer,\n\nas reported by the National Cancer Institute, or any other reputable provider of medical statistics.\n\nHistorical of survival rates from all listed cancers are catalogued in [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/cancer#cancer-survival-rates).\n\nTo pinpoint a particular date, we will linearly interpolate between the first day of the year when the last threshold was breached, and the first day of the prior year (see fine-print).\n\n[fine-print]\nIn particular, suppose survival rate for the second cancer of the two was met in year \\(t_k\\), at which point the survival rate was \\(s_k\\). Moreover, the relevant threshold is denoted as \\(s^*\\) Then the resolution date will be given by:\n\n\\[t_{k-1}+ 365\\times \\frac{s^*-s_{k-1}}{s_{k}-s_{k-1}} \\]", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2041", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a breakthrough in the treatment of hard-to-treat cancers by 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "Every sixth death in the world is due to cancer, making it the [second leading cause of death](http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(17)32152-9.pdf) (second only to cardiovascular diseases). In 2016, 8.9 million people are estimated to have died from the various forms of cancer.\n\nSome cancers are harder to survive than others. Common cancer sites with low 5 year survival rates include the brain and nervous system (35.9%), stomach (31.1%), oesophagus (21%), lungs and bronchus (19.5%), liver (18.5%) and pancreas (8.7%) ([all rates for both sexes, all races from 2013 in the U.S.](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/five-year-cancer-survival-in-usa?time=1977..2013&country=~All+races%2C+total)).\n\n**When will we see a doubling of the odds of survival (relative to 2013 rates) in the U.S. for cancers in any two of the following sites for both sexes and all races: brain and nervous system, stomach, oesophagus, lungs and bronchus, liver, or the pancreas?**\n\nPositive resolution requires *any two* of the following reported average rates for both sexes and all races in the U.S.\n\n1. \\(> 52.8\\)% 5-year survival rates for brain and nervous system cancer,\n2. \\(>47.4 \\)% 5-year survival rates for stomach cancer,\n3. \\(>34.7\\)% 5-year survival rates for oesophagus cancer,\n4. \\(>32.6\\)% 5-year survival rates for lungs and bronchus cancer,\n5. \\(>31.2\\)% 5-year survival rates for liver cancer,\n6. \\(>16\\)% 5-year survival rates for pancreatic cancer,\n\nas reported by the National Cancer Institute, or any other reputable provider of medical statistics.\n\nHistorical of survival rates from all listed cancers are catalogued in [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/cancer#cancer-survival-rates).\n\nTo pinpoint a particular date, we will linearly interpolate between the first day of the year when the last threshold was breached, and the first day of the prior year (see fine-print).\n\n[fine-print]\nIn particular, suppose survival rate for the second cancer of the two was met in year \\(t_k\\), at which point the survival rate was \\(s_k\\). Moreover, the relevant threshold is denoted as \\(s^*\\) Then the resolution date will be given by:\n\n\\[t_{k-1}+ 365\\times \\frac{s^*-s_{k-1}}{s_{k}-s_{k-1}} \\]", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2041", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first manned spacecraft will touch the surface of any planet, dwarf planet, or moon other than Earth, Earth's Moon, or Mars by 2075?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "2075", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the heaviest payload (in kg) put into LEO by a launch vehicle that is in service on January 1, 2050 will be 215k?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "118k", "median": "215k", "upper_75": "419k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that life expectancy at birth for both sexes will reach 60 years in all countries by 2049?", "desc": "", "resc": "Recently, the world quietly marked a significant milestone. For the first time, life expectancy at birth for both sexes now exceeds 50 years in all countries, [with Sierra Leone the lowest at 50.1 years.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_life_expectancy) As of January 2019, there are no countries outside of Sub-Saharan Africa where the life expectancy at birth for both sexes is below 60.\n\nThis question asks: When, for the first time, will life expectancy at birth for both sexes reach at least 60 years in all countries simultaneously? \n\nBy 'for both sexes,' this question refers to the *average for both sexes,* not a requirement that life expectancy must equal 60 years for women and men individually.\n\nResolution should cite data from the World Health Organization, United Nations or a similarly authoritative body.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India will not become a World Bank high-income country by 2050?", "desc": "India is the seventh-largest country by area, and with more than 1.3 billion people it is the second-most populous country and the most populous democracy in the world.\n\nGNI per capita, PPP (current international $) in India was [reported at $6,490 in 2016,](https://tradingeconomics.com/india/gni-per-capita-ppp-us-dollar-wb-data.html) according to the World Bank collection of development indicators, compiled from officially recognized sources. \n\nThe World Bank has historically classified every economy as low, middle or high income. The World Bank further specifies its classes of countries into low, lower-middle, upper-middle and high income economies. The World Bank uses GNI per capita as the basis for this classification because it views GNI as a broad measure that is considered to be the single best indicator of economic capacity and progress.\n\nMICs are broken up into lower-middle income and upper-middle income economies. Lower-middle income economies have per capita GNIs between $1,006 and $3,955, while upper-middle economies have per capita GNIs between $3,956 and $12,056. India at $6,490 in 2016 was thus about 50% below the threshold for high-income status. \n\nMICs are a very diverse group by region, size, population and income level, ranging from tiny nations with very small populations such as Belize and the Marshall Islands to all four of the BRIC giants – Brazil, Russia, India and China. China and India together hold nearly one-third of humanity and continue to be increasingly influential players in the global economy.\n\n[A list of countries and territories considered high-income by the World Bank can be viewed here.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Bank_high-income_economy) Note that over time the World Bank has [revised the nominal dollar threshold for high-income status](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Bank_high-income_economy#Historical_thresholds), and it is highly probable that they will continue to do so in the future. \n\n\nThe threshold for high-income status currently stands at $12,056 gross national income per capita US$, calculated using [the Atlas method](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlas_method). \n\nThe high-income threshold was originally set in 1989 at US$6,000 in 1987 prices. Thresholds for subsequent years were adjusted taking into account the average inflation in the G-5 countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany and France), and from 2001, that of Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the eurozone. Thus, the thresholds remain constant in real terms over time.", "resc": "Resolution should cite a press release or other information from the World Bank, or credible media reports citing World Bank sources.\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously if the World Bank ceases to exist before India is designated a high-income country, or if India ceases to exist as a geopolitical entity before being designated high-income by the World Bank", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India will not become a World Bank high-income country by 2050?", "desc": "India is the seventh-largest country by area, and with more than 1.3 billion people it is the second-most populous country and the most populous democracy in the world.\n\nGNI per capita, PPP (current international $) in India was [reported at $6,490 in 2016,](https://tradingeconomics.com/india/gni-per-capita-ppp-us-dollar-wb-data.html) according to the World Bank collection of development indicators, compiled from officially recognized sources. \n\nThe World Bank has historically classified every economy as low, middle or high income. The World Bank further specifies its classes of countries into low, lower-middle, upper-middle and high income economies. The World Bank uses GNI per capita as the basis for this classification because it views GNI as a broad measure that is considered to be the single best indicator of economic capacity and progress.\n\nMICs are broken up into lower-middle income and upper-middle income economies. Lower-middle income economies have per capita GNIs between $1,006 and $3,955, while upper-middle economies have per capita GNIs between $3,956 and $12,056. India at $6,490 in 2016 was thus about 50% below the threshold for high-income status. \n\nMICs are a very diverse group by region, size, population and income level, ranging from tiny nations with very small populations such as Belize and the Marshall Islands to all four of the BRIC giants – Brazil, Russia, India and China. China and India together hold nearly one-third of humanity and continue to be increasingly influential players in the global economy.\n\n[A list of countries and territories considered high-income by the World Bank can be viewed here.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Bank_high-income_economy) Note that over time the World Bank has [revised the nominal dollar threshold for high-income status](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Bank_high-income_economy#Historical_thresholds), and it is highly probable that they will continue to do so in the future. \n\n\nThe threshold for high-income status currently stands at $12,056 gross national income per capita US$, calculated using [the Atlas method](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlas_method). \n\nThe high-income threshold was originally set in 1989 at US$6,000 in 1987 prices. Thresholds for subsequent years were adjusted taking into account the average inflation in the G-5 countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany and France), and from 2001, that of Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the eurozone. Thus, the thresholds remain constant in real terms over time.", "resc": "Resolution should cite a press release or other information from the World Bank, or credible media reports citing World Bank sources.\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously if the World Bank ceases to exist before India is designated a high-income country, or if India ceases to exist as a geopolitical entity before being designated high-income by the World Bank", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that life expectancy at birth for both sexes will reach 60 years in all countries by 2049?", "desc": "", "resc": "Recently, the world quietly marked a significant milestone. For the first time, life expectancy at birth for both sexes now exceeds 50 years in all countries, [with Sierra Leone the lowest at 50.1 years.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_life_expectancy) As of January 2019, there are no countries outside of Sub-Saharan Africa where the life expectancy at birth for both sexes is below 60.\n\nThis question asks: When, for the first time, will life expectancy at birth for both sexes reach at least 60 years in all countries simultaneously? \n\nBy 'for both sexes,' this question refers to the *average for both sexes,* not a requirement that life expectancy must equal 60 years for women and men individually.\n\nResolution should cite data from the World Health Organization, United Nations or a similarly authoritative body.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that life expectancy at birth for both sexes will reach 60 years in all countries by 2049?", "desc": "", "resc": "Recently, the world quietly marked a significant milestone. For the first time, life expectancy at birth for both sexes now exceeds 50 years in all countries, [with Sierra Leone the lowest at 50.1 years.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_life_expectancy) As of January 2019, there are no countries outside of Sub-Saharan Africa where the life expectancy at birth for both sexes is below 60.\n\nThis question asks: When, for the first time, will life expectancy at birth for both sexes reach at least 60 years in all countries simultaneously? \n\nBy 'for both sexes,' this question refers to the *average for both sexes,* not a requirement that life expectancy must equal 60 years for women and men individually.\n\nResolution should cite data from the World Health Organization, United Nations or a similarly authoritative body.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that we will have micropayments by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "One of the things this author finds most baffling about the online world we've developed is the lack of a clean, easy, near-universal, private system of micropayments. The suprising and dismaying absence is nicely described in [this article](https://www.wired.com/story/shouldnt-we-all-have-seamless-micropayments-by-now/?mbid=social_twitter&utm_brand=wired&utm_campaign=wired&utm_medium=social&utm_social-type=owned&utm_source=twitter), asking\n\n> Where are my digital micropayments? Where are those frictionless, integrated ways of exchanging money online—cryptographically protected to allow commerce but not surveillance?\n\nand lamenting:\n\n> Of course, we already make payments online all the time, but under current conditions, frankly, it sucks to do so. If you buy things directly from small vendors, you're stuck entering your credit card information, your email, and your billing address on site after site—sinking ever deeper into the surveillance economy as each digital form puts your personal details into someone else's database, while also giving hackers ever more opportunities to filch your data.\n\nI've never seen a convincing argument as to why this is impossible, just \"micropayments fail over and over.\" But that can't go on forever — the prize is just too big. (Note also that my understanding is that China has put together a system that works, though I don't know if it is as private etc. as one might like.) So I ask:\n\n*** When will the US and Europe have a workable system of micropayments?***\n\nThe question will resolve when, with less than 10 minutes of effort, I can set up a \"wallet\" that will allow me to spend less than 25 cents (2019 dollars) by clicking less than two times, on at least 10 of the top 50 internet sites as listed by a reputable source comparable to 2019's Alexa, and where each payment does *not* show up as an individual transaction on a credit card or bank statement.", "lower_25": "Oct 2023", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that North Korea will have a McDonald's by 2046?", "desc": "", "resc": "There are more than [37,000 McDonald's locations around the world, spread across 121 countries and territories.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_with_McDonald%27s_restaurants#Countries_and_territories_with_a_McDonald's_outlet) McDonald's is the world's largest restaurant chain by revenue serving over 69 million customers daily and employing around 1.9 million employees, 1.5 million of whom work for franchises. In the 78 years since its founding, McDonald's has become an iconic brand and a quintessential example of American free enterprise and global capitalism. \n\nNorth Korea is a country of some 25.4 million people, is one of the last remaining communist states in the world, and currently has hosted no McDonald's locations in its history. North Korea has maintained one of the most closed and centralized economies in the world since the 1940s. [It is ranked 180th worldwide on the Index of Economic Freedom](https://www.heritage.org/index/country/northkorea) - the worst ranking of any country ranked as of 2019.\n\n[On January 31 1990, the first McDonald's opened in the Soviet Union,](https://www.rferl.org/a/fast-food-moscow-russia/26542682.html) less than two years before that country ceased to exist. The road to that historic opening had been long, with McDonald's management saying that the talks with Soviet officials had started as far back as 1976.\n\nMany people saw this opening as a sign of a tentative warming of relations between the USSR and the USA. This was to be the first ever foreign restaurant in the Soviet Union and for McDonald's this was (at the time) their largest restaurant ever, a venue with 900 seats.\n\n[The people's interest in Moscow was enormous. When the Moscow McDonald's announced that 600 positions were available, 28,000 people applied. Workers were paid around 2 rubles per hour, which meant they could earn more than a Soviet doctor.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7FMFmtUnDDw) [They expected around 1,000 customers on the opening day, but over 30,000 showed up, staying in line for up to six hours, making this the largest restaurant launch worldwide.](https://rttl.me/2017/08/31/mcussr-the-first-mcdonalds-in-the-soviet-union/)\n\nIn 2018, the Washington Post reported that [North Korean leader Kim Jong Un may allow a “Western hamburger franchise” into the country as a show of goodwill to the United States.](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/06/02/north-korea-reportedly-wants-a-mcdonalds-that-could-be-a-pretty-big-deal/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3df4f149cfbc) This reported overture was made just months after a period of intense tension between the United States and North Korea, in which [both countries threatened](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/19/donald-trump-threatens-totally-destroy-north-korea-un-speech) to [destroy the other in a nuclear war.](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-42531574)\n\nThis question asks: **When will the first McDonald's location open commercially in North Korea?**\n\nThis question resolves positively on either a press release from McDonald's Corporation or credible media reports delivering information that a McDonald's store has officially opened commercially in territory that is (as of January 26 2019) part of North Korea.\n\nThis question shall endure in the event that North Korea ceases to exist as an independent state, and shall be constrained to the geographic area of North Korean territory on January 26 2019.\n\nThe restaurant must be open to the general public in the locality in which it operates, i.e. not a publicity stunt of some sort in which only pre-selected (by either McDonald's or North Korean or other government officials) individuals may participate, and it must operate on commercial terms (i.e. on a for-profit basis, but it need not actually be profitable.)", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that we will have micropayments by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "One of the things this author finds most baffling about the online world we've developed is the lack of a clean, easy, near-universal, private system of micropayments. The suprising and dismaying absence is nicely described in [this article](https://www.wired.com/story/shouldnt-we-all-have-seamless-micropayments-by-now/?mbid=social_twitter&utm_brand=wired&utm_campaign=wired&utm_medium=social&utm_social-type=owned&utm_source=twitter), asking\n\n> Where are my digital micropayments? Where are those frictionless, integrated ways of exchanging money online—cryptographically protected to allow commerce but not surveillance?\n\nand lamenting:\n\n> Of course, we already make payments online all the time, but under current conditions, frankly, it sucks to do so. If you buy things directly from small vendors, you're stuck entering your credit card information, your email, and your billing address on site after site—sinking ever deeper into the surveillance economy as each digital form puts your personal details into someone else's database, while also giving hackers ever more opportunities to filch your data.\n\nI've never seen a convincing argument as to why this is impossible, just \"micropayments fail over and over.\" But that can't go on forever — the prize is just too big. (Note also that my understanding is that China has put together a system that works, though I don't know if it is as private etc. as one might like.) So I ask:\n\n*** When will the US and Europe have a workable system of micropayments?***\n\nThe question will resolve when, with less than 10 minutes of effort, I can set up a \"wallet\" that will allow me to spend less than 25 cents (2019 dollars) by clicking less than two times, on at least 10 of the top 50 internet sites as listed by a reputable source comparable to 2019's Alexa, and where each payment does *not* show up as an individual transaction on a credit card or bank statement.", "lower_25": "Oct 2023", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a DUI will be overruled or turned down due to riding a driverless car by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "There's much talk about driverless and autonomous cars, [not](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/424/in-what-year-will-half-of-new-cars-sold-in-the-us-be-fully-autonomous/) [just](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/776/when-will-the-next-fully-autonomous-car-fatality-occur/) [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/46/fully-autonomous-self-driving-cars-by-2018/), but also in the world at large. \n\nThe Society of of Automotive Engineers is an association that, among other things, defines standard, for example for the levels of driving automation. The highest levels, levels 4 and 5, can be shortened to “minds off” and “steering wheel optional,” respectively. At the latter level the car *has* to be able to handle all common, if not all possible aspects of driving. The car would be effectively a wheeled robot, and the driver would be only its passenger.\n\nDriving under the influence (DUI) leads to hundreds of thousands accidents per year, only a small amount leads to a conviction. But with the prospect of fully autonomous cars we ask:\n\n***When will a judgement of DUI be overruled or turned down due to the accused riding in a driverless car?***\n\nThis question will resolve positive on the day such a judgement is reported by credible news media, and ideally verified with court documentation.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a DUI will be overruled or turned down due to riding a driverless car by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "There's much talk about driverless and autonomous cars, [not](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/424/in-what-year-will-half-of-new-cars-sold-in-the-us-be-fully-autonomous/) [just](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/776/when-will-the-next-fully-autonomous-car-fatality-occur/) [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/46/fully-autonomous-self-driving-cars-by-2018/), but also in the world at large. \n\nThe Society of of Automotive Engineers is an association that, among other things, defines standard, for example for the levels of driving automation. The highest levels, levels 4 and 5, can be shortened to “minds off” and “steering wheel optional,” respectively. At the latter level the car *has* to be able to handle all common, if not all possible aspects of driving. The car would be effectively a wheeled robot, and the driver would be only its passenger.\n\nDriving under the influence (DUI) leads to hundreds of thousands accidents per year, only a small amount leads to a conviction. But with the prospect of fully autonomous cars we ask:\n\n***When will a judgement of DUI be overruled or turned down due to the accused riding in a driverless car?***\n\nThis question will resolve positive on the day such a judgement is reported by credible news media, and ideally verified with court documentation.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that North Korea will have a McDonald's by 2046?", "desc": "", "resc": "There are more than [37,000 McDonald's locations around the world, spread across 121 countries and territories.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_with_McDonald%27s_restaurants#Countries_and_territories_with_a_McDonald's_outlet) McDonald's is the world's largest restaurant chain by revenue serving over 69 million customers daily and employing around 1.9 million employees, 1.5 million of whom work for franchises. In the 78 years since its founding, McDonald's has become an iconic brand and a quintessential example of American free enterprise and global capitalism. \n\nNorth Korea is a country of some 25.4 million people, is one of the last remaining communist states in the world, and currently has hosted no McDonald's locations in its history. North Korea has maintained one of the most closed and centralized economies in the world since the 1940s. [It is ranked 180th worldwide on the Index of Economic Freedom](https://www.heritage.org/index/country/northkorea) - the worst ranking of any country ranked as of 2019.\n\n[On January 31 1990, the first McDonald's opened in the Soviet Union,](https://www.rferl.org/a/fast-food-moscow-russia/26542682.html) less than two years before that country ceased to exist. The road to that historic opening had been long, with McDonald's management saying that the talks with Soviet officials had started as far back as 1976.\n\nMany people saw this opening as a sign of a tentative warming of relations between the USSR and the USA. This was to be the first ever foreign restaurant in the Soviet Union and for McDonald's this was (at the time) their largest restaurant ever, a venue with 900 seats.\n\n[The people's interest in Moscow was enormous. When the Moscow McDonald's announced that 600 positions were available, 28,000 people applied. Workers were paid around 2 rubles per hour, which meant they could earn more than a Soviet doctor.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7FMFmtUnDDw) [They expected around 1,000 customers on the opening day, but over 30,000 showed up, staying in line for up to six hours, making this the largest restaurant launch worldwide.](https://rttl.me/2017/08/31/mcussr-the-first-mcdonalds-in-the-soviet-union/)\n\nIn 2018, the Washington Post reported that [North Korean leader Kim Jong Un may allow a “Western hamburger franchise” into the country as a show of goodwill to the United States.](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/06/02/north-korea-reportedly-wants-a-mcdonalds-that-could-be-a-pretty-big-deal/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3df4f149cfbc) This reported overture was made just months after a period of intense tension between the United States and North Korea, in which [both countries threatened](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/19/donald-trump-threatens-totally-destroy-north-korea-un-speech) to [destroy the other in a nuclear war.](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-42531574)\n\nThis question asks: **When will the first McDonald's location open commercially in North Korea?**\n\nThis question resolves positively on either a press release from McDonald's Corporation or credible media reports delivering information that a McDonald's store has officially opened commercially in territory that is (as of January 26 2019) part of North Korea.\n\nThis question shall endure in the event that North Korea ceases to exist as an independent state, and shall be constrained to the geographic area of North Korean territory on January 26 2019.\n\nThe restaurant must be open to the general public in the locality in which it operates, i.e. not a publicity stunt of some sort in which only pre-selected (by either McDonald's or North Korean or other government officials) individuals may participate, and it must operate on commercial terms (i.e. on a for-profit basis, but it need not actually be profitable.)", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a DUI will be overruled or turned down due to riding a driverless car by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "There's much talk about driverless and autonomous cars, [not](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/424/in-what-year-will-half-of-new-cars-sold-in-the-us-be-fully-autonomous/) [just](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/776/when-will-the-next-fully-autonomous-car-fatality-occur/) [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/46/fully-autonomous-self-driving-cars-by-2018/), but also in the world at large. \n\nThe Society of of Automotive Engineers is an association that, among other things, defines standard, for example for the levels of driving automation. The highest levels, levels 4 and 5, can be shortened to “minds off” and “steering wheel optional,” respectively. At the latter level the car *has* to be able to handle all common, if not all possible aspects of driving. The car would be effectively a wheeled robot, and the driver would be only its passenger.\n\nDriving under the influence (DUI) leads to hundreds of thousands accidents per year, only a small amount leads to a conviction. But with the prospect of fully autonomous cars we ask:\n\n***When will a judgement of DUI be overruled or turned down due to the accused riding in a driverless car?***\n\nThis question will resolve positive on the day such a judgement is reported by credible news media, and ideally verified with court documentation.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that North Korea will have a McDonald's by 2046?", "desc": "", "resc": "There are more than [37,000 McDonald's locations around the world, spread across 121 countries and territories.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_with_McDonald%27s_restaurants#Countries_and_territories_with_a_McDonald's_outlet) McDonald's is the world's largest restaurant chain by revenue serving over 69 million customers daily and employing around 1.9 million employees, 1.5 million of whom work for franchises. In the 78 years since its founding, McDonald's has become an iconic brand and a quintessential example of American free enterprise and global capitalism. \n\nNorth Korea is a country of some 25.4 million people, is one of the last remaining communist states in the world, and currently has hosted no McDonald's locations in its history. North Korea has maintained one of the most closed and centralized economies in the world since the 1940s. [It is ranked 180th worldwide on the Index of Economic Freedom](https://www.heritage.org/index/country/northkorea) - the worst ranking of any country ranked as of 2019.\n\n[On January 31 1990, the first McDonald's opened in the Soviet Union,](https://www.rferl.org/a/fast-food-moscow-russia/26542682.html) less than two years before that country ceased to exist. The road to that historic opening had been long, with McDonald's management saying that the talks with Soviet officials had started as far back as 1976.\n\nMany people saw this opening as a sign of a tentative warming of relations between the USSR and the USA. This was to be the first ever foreign restaurant in the Soviet Union and for McDonald's this was (at the time) their largest restaurant ever, a venue with 900 seats.\n\n[The people's interest in Moscow was enormous. When the Moscow McDonald's announced that 600 positions were available, 28,000 people applied. Workers were paid around 2 rubles per hour, which meant they could earn more than a Soviet doctor.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7FMFmtUnDDw) [They expected around 1,000 customers on the opening day, but over 30,000 showed up, staying in line for up to six hours, making this the largest restaurant launch worldwide.](https://rttl.me/2017/08/31/mcussr-the-first-mcdonalds-in-the-soviet-union/)\n\nIn 2018, the Washington Post reported that [North Korean leader Kim Jong Un may allow a “Western hamburger franchise” into the country as a show of goodwill to the United States.](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/06/02/north-korea-reportedly-wants-a-mcdonalds-that-could-be-a-pretty-big-deal/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3df4f149cfbc) This reported overture was made just months after a period of intense tension between the United States and North Korea, in which [both countries threatened](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/19/donald-trump-threatens-totally-destroy-north-korea-un-speech) to [destroy the other in a nuclear war.](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-42531574)\n\nThis question asks: **When will the first McDonald's location open commercially in North Korea?**\n\nThis question resolves positively on either a press release from McDonald's Corporation or credible media reports delivering information that a McDonald's store has officially opened commercially in territory that is (as of January 26 2019) part of North Korea.\n\nThis question shall endure in the event that North Korea ceases to exist as an independent state, and shall be constrained to the geographic area of North Korean territory on January 26 2019.\n\nThe restaurant must be open to the general public in the locality in which it operates, i.e. not a publicity stunt of some sort in which only pre-selected (by either McDonald's or North Korean or other government officials) individuals may participate, and it must operate on commercial terms (i.e. on a for-profit basis, but it need not actually be profitable.)", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India will not become a World Bank high-income country by 2050?", "desc": "India is the seventh-largest country by area, and with more than 1.3 billion people it is the second-most populous country and the most populous democracy in the world.\n\nGNI per capita, PPP (current international $) in India was [reported at $6,490 in 2016,](https://tradingeconomics.com/india/gni-per-capita-ppp-us-dollar-wb-data.html) according to the World Bank collection of development indicators, compiled from officially recognized sources. \n\nThe World Bank has historically classified every economy as low, middle or high income. The World Bank further specifies its classes of countries into low, lower-middle, upper-middle and high income economies. The World Bank uses GNI per capita as the basis for this classification because it views GNI as a broad measure that is considered to be the single best indicator of economic capacity and progress.\n\nMICs are broken up into lower-middle income and upper-middle income economies. Lower-middle income economies have per capita GNIs between $1,006 and $3,955, while upper-middle economies have per capita GNIs between $3,956 and $12,056. India at $6,490 in 2016 was thus about 50% below the threshold for high-income status. \n\nMICs are a very diverse group by region, size, population and income level, ranging from tiny nations with very small populations such as Belize and the Marshall Islands to all four of the BRIC giants – Brazil, Russia, India and China. China and India together hold nearly one-third of humanity and continue to be increasingly influential players in the global economy.\n\n[A list of countries and territories considered high-income by the World Bank can be viewed here.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Bank_high-income_economy) Note that over time the World Bank has [revised the nominal dollar threshold for high-income status](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Bank_high-income_economy#Historical_thresholds), and it is highly probable that they will continue to do so in the future. \n\n\nThe threshold for high-income status currently stands at $12,056 gross national income per capita US$, calculated using [the Atlas method](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlas_method). \n\nThe high-income threshold was originally set in 1989 at US$6,000 in 1987 prices. Thresholds for subsequent years were adjusted taking into account the average inflation in the G-5 countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany and France), and from 2001, that of Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the eurozone. Thus, the thresholds remain constant in real terms over time.", "resc": "Resolution should cite a press release or other information from the World Bank, or credible media reports citing World Bank sources.\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously if the World Bank ceases to exist before India is designated a high-income country, or if India ceases to exist as a geopolitical entity before being designated high-income by the World Bank", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the atmospheric CO2 concentration will be 440.7 ppm in 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Earth's carbon dioxide atmospheric concentration reach 500 PPM before 2051?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/336/worst-case-scenario-for-global-co2-levels-over-the-coming-decades/)\n\n----\n\nOver the last few centuries, the concentration of carbon dioxide in Earth's atmosphere has risen from approximately 280 parts per million (pre-industrial) to approximately 410 ppm [[1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide_in_Earth%27s_atmosphere)]. Atmospheric carbon dioxide is one of the contributing factors driving climate change via the greenhouse effect.\n\nThe trend follows a seasonal cycle that reaches its peak in May, and has also risen at [an average rate of around 2ppm annually in the last ten years](https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/gl_gr.html).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the average CO2 atmospheric concentration globally in the calendar year 2030, according to the [NOAA Earth System Research Laboratory](https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/gl_data.html).\n\nIf this organization (or a successor) does not exist or no longer provides this information in 2030, the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "431.1", "median": "435.8", "upper_75": "440.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that we will have micropayments by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "One of the things this author finds most baffling about the online world we've developed is the lack of a clean, easy, near-universal, private system of micropayments. The suprising and dismaying absence is nicely described in [this article](https://www.wired.com/story/shouldnt-we-all-have-seamless-micropayments-by-now/?mbid=social_twitter&utm_brand=wired&utm_campaign=wired&utm_medium=social&utm_social-type=owned&utm_source=twitter), asking\n\n> Where are my digital micropayments? Where are those frictionless, integrated ways of exchanging money online—cryptographically protected to allow commerce but not surveillance?\n\nand lamenting:\n\n> Of course, we already make payments online all the time, but under current conditions, frankly, it sucks to do so. If you buy things directly from small vendors, you're stuck entering your credit card information, your email, and your billing address on site after site—sinking ever deeper into the surveillance economy as each digital form puts your personal details into someone else's database, while also giving hackers ever more opportunities to filch your data.\n\nI've never seen a convincing argument as to why this is impossible, just \"micropayments fail over and over.\" But that can't go on forever — the prize is just too big. (Note also that my understanding is that China has put together a system that works, though I don't know if it is as private etc. as one might like.) So I ask:\n\n*** When will the US and Europe have a workable system of micropayments?***\n\nThe question will resolve when, with less than 10 minutes of effort, I can set up a \"wallet\" that will allow me to spend less than 25 cents (2019 dollars) by clicking less than two times, on at least 10 of the top 50 internet sites as listed by a reputable source comparable to 2019's Alexa, and where each payment does *not* show up as an individual transaction on a credit card or bank statement.", "lower_25": "Oct 2023", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will achieve an annual GDP growth rate of 6.07% before 2030?", "desc": "[The Gross Domestic Product Annual Growth Rate in the United States](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.kd.zg?locations=us) averaged 3.20% from 1948 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 7.3% in 1984. \n\nThe Gross Domestic Product of the United States expanded 3% in the third quarter of 2018 over the same quarter of the previous year.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the highest % growth in US GDP over a single calendar year (Jan-1 to Jan-1), achieved between Jan 1, 2020 to Dec 31, 2029, according to the US Treasury or credible media reports", "lower_25": "5.54", "median": "6.07", "upper_75": "7.28", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Haiti will not become an upper middle-income country by January 1, 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "The World Bank has historically classified every economy as low, middle or high income. The World Bank further specifies its classes of countries into low, lower-middle, upper-middle and high income economies. The World Bank uses GNI per capita as the basis for this classification because it views GNI as a broad measure that is considered to be the single best indicator of economic capacity and progress.\n\nMICs are broken up into lower-middle income and upper-middle income economies. [For the current 2019 fiscal year](https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups), low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method, of $995 or less in 2017; lower middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $996 and $3,895; upper middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $3,896 and $12,055; high-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of $12,056 or more.\n\nThese thresholds are adjusted over time taking into account the average inflation in the G-5 countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany and France), and from 2001, that of Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the eurozone. Thus, the thresholds remain constant in real terms over time. \n\nMICs are a very diverse group by region, size, population and income level, ranging from tiny nations with very small populations such as Belize and the Marshall Islands to all four of the BRIC giants – Brazil, Russia, India and China. \n\n[Haiti](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haiti) is a country located on the island of Hispaniola, east of Cuba in the Greater Antilles archipelago of the Caribbean Sea. It occupies the western three-eighths of the island, which it shares with the Dominican Republic. Haiti is 27,750 square kilometres (10,714 sq mi) in size and has an estimated 10.8 million people, making it the most populous country in the Caribbean Community and the second-most populous country in the Caribbean as a whole.\n\nDespite having a viable tourist industry, Haiti is one of the world's poorest countries and the poorest in the Americas region, with poverty, corruption, poor infrastructure, lack of health care and lack of education cited as the main causes. Trade declined dramatically after the 2010 earthquake and subsequent outbreak of cholera. Haiti ranked 145 of 182 countries in the 2010 United Nations Human Development Index, with 57.3% of the population being deprived in at least three of the HDI's poverty measures. [You can view some historical, economic and cultural data about Haiti here.](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html)\n\nHaiti is the last World Bank low income country in the Americas, with a [GNI per capita of only $760 as of 2017.](https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=XM-HT) [According to the CIA World Factbook, Haiti ranks 213th in the world (of 228 countries and territories) in terms of GDP per capita.](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/211rank.html#HA)\n\nThis question asks: **When will Haiti become a World Bank upper middle-income country?**\n\nResolution should cite a press release or other information from the World Bank, or credible media reports citing World Bank sources.\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously if the World Bank ceases to exist before Haiti is designated an upper middle-income country, or if Haiti ceases to exist as a geopolitical entity before being designated upper middle-income by the World Bank.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2050", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2050", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2050", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a robot poker player will win a significant live (not online) competition by 2039?", "desc": "Poker is a challenging game of bets, raises, and re-raises, calculation of odds and expected payoffs, game-theoretic mixed strategies, and tradeoffs between unexploitable and exploitative play.\n\nPoker is also a challenging game of visually identifying and then gripping small plastic discs and rectangles, and discriminating them between them based on their colors and symbols printed on their surfaces. These discs and rectangles must be moved around on a table in accordance with a game ruleset that is partially given in advance, and partly determined by verbal instruction from dealer and floor coordinator. \n\nAn example of the complexity of object manipulation that is required: the rectangles belonging to the player must be picked up in such a way that the symbols on the front can be inspected by the player, but kept oriented so that no other player can inspect those symbols, until such time as the ruleset dictates that the cards and symbols be revealed. Violating this constraint can lead not only to substandard play that is exploited by opponents, but also to penalties and even potential disqualification.", "resc": "This question resolves as **YES** if a robot wins a live poker tournament as specified below, and **NO** otherwise:\n\n## Definition of “significant competition”: \nA Texas HoldEm tournament or cash game in which:\n\n- more than 300 hands are played\n- robotic and human players obey the same rules, without special accommodations for the perceptual or motor skills of the robotic player (including complying with verbal direction from the dealer and staff)\n- competitors include at least one human member of the top 200 of the [Hendon Mob All Time Money List](http://pokerdb.thehendonmob.com/ranking/all-time-money-list/) (at the time of play)\n- the winner (best-outcome player) is awarded more than $10,000 US (whether that money is awarded to the robot itself or to its owners or developers), with the same payouts made to robotic and human players.\n\nThere are a wide variety of ways in which a competition like this could come about, and the intent is to cast a wide net. Two contrasting examples, which would both count for positive resolution:\n\n1. A “Deep Blue vs. Kasparov”-style challenge, in which the whole point of the competition is to pit human against machine.\n2. Harold takes a week off from his middle-management desk job, walks into the Rio All-Suites Hotel in Las Vegas, and plunks down $10,000 in cash for a seat in the World Series of Poker Main Event, because (since the recent passage of Robotic Personhood legislation) no one can tell him that he can't, and after all it's his money.", "lower_25": "Oct 2025", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Haiti will not become an upper middle-income country by January 1, 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "The World Bank has historically classified every economy as low, middle or high income. The World Bank further specifies its classes of countries into low, lower-middle, upper-middle and high income economies. The World Bank uses GNI per capita as the basis for this classification because it views GNI as a broad measure that is considered to be the single best indicator of economic capacity and progress.\n\nMICs are broken up into lower-middle income and upper-middle income economies. [For the current 2019 fiscal year](https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups), low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method, of $995 or less in 2017; lower middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $996 and $3,895; upper middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $3,896 and $12,055; high-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of $12,056 or more.\n\nThese thresholds are adjusted over time taking into account the average inflation in the G-5 countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany and France), and from 2001, that of Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the eurozone. Thus, the thresholds remain constant in real terms over time. \n\nMICs are a very diverse group by region, size, population and income level, ranging from tiny nations with very small populations such as Belize and the Marshall Islands to all four of the BRIC giants – Brazil, Russia, India and China. \n\n[Haiti](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haiti) is a country located on the island of Hispaniola, east of Cuba in the Greater Antilles archipelago of the Caribbean Sea. It occupies the western three-eighths of the island, which it shares with the Dominican Republic. Haiti is 27,750 square kilometres (10,714 sq mi) in size and has an estimated 10.8 million people, making it the most populous country in the Caribbean Community and the second-most populous country in the Caribbean as a whole.\n\nDespite having a viable tourist industry, Haiti is one of the world's poorest countries and the poorest in the Americas region, with poverty, corruption, poor infrastructure, lack of health care and lack of education cited as the main causes. Trade declined dramatically after the 2010 earthquake and subsequent outbreak of cholera. Haiti ranked 145 of 182 countries in the 2010 United Nations Human Development Index, with 57.3% of the population being deprived in at least three of the HDI's poverty measures. [You can view some historical, economic and cultural data about Haiti here.](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html)\n\nHaiti is the last World Bank low income country in the Americas, with a [GNI per capita of only $760 as of 2017.](https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=XM-HT) [According to the CIA World Factbook, Haiti ranks 213th in the world (of 228 countries and territories) in terms of GDP per capita.](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/211rank.html#HA)\n\nThis question asks: **When will Haiti become a World Bank upper middle-income country?**\n\nResolution should cite a press release or other information from the World Bank, or credible media reports citing World Bank sources.\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously if the World Bank ceases to exist before Haiti is designated an upper middle-income country, or if Haiti ceases to exist as a geopolitical entity before being designated upper middle-income by the World Bank.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2050", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2050", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2050", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Haiti will not become an upper middle-income country by January 1, 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "The World Bank has historically classified every economy as low, middle or high income. The World Bank further specifies its classes of countries into low, lower-middle, upper-middle and high income economies. The World Bank uses GNI per capita as the basis for this classification because it views GNI as a broad measure that is considered to be the single best indicator of economic capacity and progress.\n\nMICs are broken up into lower-middle income and upper-middle income economies. [For the current 2019 fiscal year](https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups), low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method, of $995 or less in 2017; lower middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $996 and $3,895; upper middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between $3,896 and $12,055; high-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of $12,056 or more.\n\nThese thresholds are adjusted over time taking into account the average inflation in the G-5 countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany and France), and from 2001, that of Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the eurozone. Thus, the thresholds remain constant in real terms over time. \n\nMICs are a very diverse group by region, size, population and income level, ranging from tiny nations with very small populations such as Belize and the Marshall Islands to all four of the BRIC giants – Brazil, Russia, India and China. \n\n[Haiti](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haiti) is a country located on the island of Hispaniola, east of Cuba in the Greater Antilles archipelago of the Caribbean Sea. It occupies the western three-eighths of the island, which it shares with the Dominican Republic. Haiti is 27,750 square kilometres (10,714 sq mi) in size and has an estimated 10.8 million people, making it the most populous country in the Caribbean Community and the second-most populous country in the Caribbean as a whole.\n\nDespite having a viable tourist industry, Haiti is one of the world's poorest countries and the poorest in the Americas region, with poverty, corruption, poor infrastructure, lack of health care and lack of education cited as the main causes. Trade declined dramatically after the 2010 earthquake and subsequent outbreak of cholera. Haiti ranked 145 of 182 countries in the 2010 United Nations Human Development Index, with 57.3% of the population being deprived in at least three of the HDI's poverty measures. [You can view some historical, economic and cultural data about Haiti here.](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html)\n\nHaiti is the last World Bank low income country in the Americas, with a [GNI per capita of only $760 as of 2017.](https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=XM-HT) [According to the CIA World Factbook, Haiti ranks 213th in the world (of 228 countries and territories) in terms of GDP per capita.](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/211rank.html#HA)\n\nThis question asks: **When will Haiti become a World Bank upper middle-income country?**\n\nResolution should cite a press release or other information from the World Bank, or credible media reports citing World Bank sources.\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously if the World Bank ceases to exist before Haiti is designated an upper middle-income country, or if Haiti ceases to exist as a geopolitical entity before being designated upper middle-income by the World Bank.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2050", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2050", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2050", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will achieve an annual GDP growth rate of 6.07% before 2030?", "desc": "[The Gross Domestic Product Annual Growth Rate in the United States](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.kd.zg?locations=us) averaged 3.20% from 1948 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 7.3% in 1984. \n\nThe Gross Domestic Product of the United States expanded 3% in the third quarter of 2018 over the same quarter of the previous year.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the highest % growth in US GDP over a single calendar year (Jan-1 to Jan-1), achieved between Jan 1, 2020 to Dec 31, 2029, according to the US Treasury or credible media reports", "lower_25": "5.54", "median": "6.07", "upper_75": "7.28", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a robot poker player will win a significant live (not online) competition by 2039?", "desc": "Poker is a challenging game of bets, raises, and re-raises, calculation of odds and expected payoffs, game-theoretic mixed strategies, and tradeoffs between unexploitable and exploitative play.\n\nPoker is also a challenging game of visually identifying and then gripping small plastic discs and rectangles, and discriminating them between them based on their colors and symbols printed on their surfaces. These discs and rectangles must be moved around on a table in accordance with a game ruleset that is partially given in advance, and partly determined by verbal instruction from dealer and floor coordinator. \n\nAn example of the complexity of object manipulation that is required: the rectangles belonging to the player must be picked up in such a way that the symbols on the front can be inspected by the player, but kept oriented so that no other player can inspect those symbols, until such time as the ruleset dictates that the cards and symbols be revealed. Violating this constraint can lead not only to substandard play that is exploited by opponents, but also to penalties and even potential disqualification.", "resc": "This question resolves as **YES** if a robot wins a live poker tournament as specified below, and **NO** otherwise:\n\n## Definition of “significant competition”: \nA Texas HoldEm tournament or cash game in which:\n\n- more than 300 hands are played\n- robotic and human players obey the same rules, without special accommodations for the perceptual or motor skills of the robotic player (including complying with verbal direction from the dealer and staff)\n- competitors include at least one human member of the top 200 of the [Hendon Mob All Time Money List](http://pokerdb.thehendonmob.com/ranking/all-time-money-list/) (at the time of play)\n- the winner (best-outcome player) is awarded more than $10,000 US (whether that money is awarded to the robot itself or to its owners or developers), with the same payouts made to robotic and human players.\n\nThere are a wide variety of ways in which a competition like this could come about, and the intent is to cast a wide net. Two contrasting examples, which would both count for positive resolution:\n\n1. A “Deep Blue vs. Kasparov”-style challenge, in which the whole point of the competition is to pit human against machine.\n2. Harold takes a week off from his middle-management desk job, walks into the Rio All-Suites Hotel in Las Vegas, and plunks down $10,000 in cash for a seat in the World Series of Poker Main Event, because (since the recent passage of Robotic Personhood legislation) no one can tell him that he can't, and after all it's his money.", "lower_25": "Oct 2025", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that image recognition will be made robust against unrestricted adversaries by 2026?", "desc": "Image recognition is a task of assigning a label to an image. There has been enormous progress in the last 10 years due to deep learning. However, in 2013 researchers pointed out certain [intriguing properties of neural networks](https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6199). In particular, neural networks seem to suffer from a problem currently known as adversarial examples.\n\nAdversarial examples are images optimized so as to fool a machine learning algorithm, but remain unambiguous to humans. Current machine learning algorithms can be fooled by changes that are essentially impossible to perceive by humans. The issue of adversarial examples highlight differences in how humans and algorithms do image recognition. [\"Adversarial Examples - A Complete Characterisation of the Phenomenon\"](https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.01185) provides an extensive overview.\n\nNotably, adversarial examples can also be a security issue, for example by making it possible to bypass face or voice recognition used for authentication.\n\nRecently Google introduced [the Unrestricted Adversarial Examples Challenge](https://ai.googleblog.com/2018/09/introducing-unrestricted-adversarial.html). This challenge allows unrestricted inputs, allowing participants to submit arbitrary images from the target classes to develop and test models on a wider variety of adversarial examples. They ask models to answer the question \"Is this an unambiguous picture of a bird, a bicycle, or is it (ambiguous / not obvious)?\". The images are provided by attackers and are first labeled by humans. A small monetary prize will be awarded to any team that breaks a previously-unbroken defense with an eligible input.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when the large defender prize of the Unrestricted Adversarial Examples Challenge is awarded. This means that a defense (an image recognition algorithm) must remain unbroken for at least 90 days. [This file provides details of the challenge.](https://github.com/google/unrestricted-adversarial-examples/blob/7cf9c3e6a33d32de3c7f1568b655d391f7815370/contest_proposal.md#unrestricted-adversarial-examples-contest-proposal) The question will resolve even if the details of the challenge are modified as long as the spirit of the challenge remains the same. The question will resolve as ambiguous if the challenge is discontinued before the end of 2030", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will achieve an annual GDP growth rate of 6.07% before 2030?", "desc": "[The Gross Domestic Product Annual Growth Rate in the United States](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.kd.zg?locations=us) averaged 3.20% from 1948 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 7.3% in 1984. \n\nThe Gross Domestic Product of the United States expanded 3% in the third quarter of 2018 over the same quarter of the previous year.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the highest % growth in US GDP over a single calendar year (Jan-1 to Jan-1), achieved between Jan 1, 2020 to Dec 31, 2029, according to the US Treasury or credible media reports", "lower_25": "5.54", "median": "6.07", "upper_75": "7.28", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the necessary computational power to replicate human mental capability will turn out to be 3.26×1016?", "desc": "", "resc": "A major uncertainty in understanding some timeline estimates for high-level AI is in estimating the minimal computational power necessary to perform the operations that the human brain does. \n\nEstimates in the literature (see appendix A on p. 84 of [this paper](http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf) for a compilation) range from \\(10^{12}\\) to \\(10^{25}\\) FLOPS following a variety of methodologies. (For a comparison, the Landauer limit at 20 C is about \\(10^{22}\\) bit erasures per second. However, the author has no clear idea how to convert between bit erasures and FLOPS.)\n\nThis huge range will probably eventually be narrowed down to within an order-of-magnitude or two, and we ask for that number here. Assume that by 2075 there is either (a) a full software emulation of a human brain that can duplicate the basic functionality of a typical adult human of average intelligence; or (b) there is an AI system that can pass a full \"strong\" Turing test (i.e. the interview is long, adversarial, and include sensory data); or (c) there is a computer system that attains \"human intelligence parity\" by the definition set forth in [this Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/384/human-machine-intelligence-parity-by-2040/). In each case (a,b,c) the number will be evaluated on a state-of-the-art system five years after the first demonstration of a system satisfying the criterion.\n\n*** What will the computation in FLOPS be of this machine system, if running at a speed comparable to that of human mental processing? ***\n\nThe point of this question is not really as a prediction, but more as a gathering place for estimates.\n\nFine print: we'll settle for a published estimate accurate to within a factor of 5. The speeds of the systems can be matched up by requiring that similar delays occur between queries and responses in the system as compared to humans, or scaling for this equivalency. Resolves as ambiguous if (a), (b) or (c) don't occur by 2075.\n\n*(edited 2020-09-13 to fix eval date as 5 years after such a system appears.)*", "lower_25": "1.17×1014", "median": "3.26×1016", "upper_75": "1.17×1019", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that image recognition will be made robust against unrestricted adversaries by 2026?", "desc": "Image recognition is a task of assigning a label to an image. There has been enormous progress in the last 10 years due to deep learning. However, in 2013 researchers pointed out certain [intriguing properties of neural networks](https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6199). In particular, neural networks seem to suffer from a problem currently known as adversarial examples.\n\nAdversarial examples are images optimized so as to fool a machine learning algorithm, but remain unambiguous to humans. Current machine learning algorithms can be fooled by changes that are essentially impossible to perceive by humans. The issue of adversarial examples highlight differences in how humans and algorithms do image recognition. [\"Adversarial Examples - A Complete Characterisation of the Phenomenon\"](https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.01185) provides an extensive overview.\n\nNotably, adversarial examples can also be a security issue, for example by making it possible to bypass face or voice recognition used for authentication.\n\nRecently Google introduced [the Unrestricted Adversarial Examples Challenge](https://ai.googleblog.com/2018/09/introducing-unrestricted-adversarial.html). This challenge allows unrestricted inputs, allowing participants to submit arbitrary images from the target classes to develop and test models on a wider variety of adversarial examples. They ask models to answer the question \"Is this an unambiguous picture of a bird, a bicycle, or is it (ambiguous / not obvious)?\". The images are provided by attackers and are first labeled by humans. A small monetary prize will be awarded to any team that breaks a previously-unbroken defense with an eligible input.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when the large defender prize of the Unrestricted Adversarial Examples Challenge is awarded. This means that a defense (an image recognition algorithm) must remain unbroken for at least 90 days. [This file provides details of the challenge.](https://github.com/google/unrestricted-adversarial-examples/blob/7cf9c3e6a33d32de3c7f1568b655d391f7815370/contest_proposal.md#unrestricted-adversarial-examples-contest-proposal) The question will resolve even if the details of the challenge are modified as long as the spirit of the challenge remains the same. The question will resolve as ambiguous if the challenge is discontinued before the end of 2030", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the necessary computational power to replicate human mental capability will turn out to be 3.26×1016?", "desc": "", "resc": "A major uncertainty in understanding some timeline estimates for high-level AI is in estimating the minimal computational power necessary to perform the operations that the human brain does. \n\nEstimates in the literature (see appendix A on p. 84 of [this paper](http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf) for a compilation) range from \\(10^{12}\\) to \\(10^{25}\\) FLOPS following a variety of methodologies. (For a comparison, the Landauer limit at 20 C is about \\(10^{22}\\) bit erasures per second. However, the author has no clear idea how to convert between bit erasures and FLOPS.)\n\nThis huge range will probably eventually be narrowed down to within an order-of-magnitude or two, and we ask for that number here. Assume that by 2075 there is either (a) a full software emulation of a human brain that can duplicate the basic functionality of a typical adult human of average intelligence; or (b) there is an AI system that can pass a full \"strong\" Turing test (i.e. the interview is long, adversarial, and include sensory data); or (c) there is a computer system that attains \"human intelligence parity\" by the definition set forth in [this Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/384/human-machine-intelligence-parity-by-2040/). In each case (a,b,c) the number will be evaluated on a state-of-the-art system five years after the first demonstration of a system satisfying the criterion.\n\n*** What will the computation in FLOPS be of this machine system, if running at a speed comparable to that of human mental processing? ***\n\nThe point of this question is not really as a prediction, but more as a gathering place for estimates.\n\nFine print: we'll settle for a published estimate accurate to within a factor of 5. The speeds of the systems can be matched up by requiring that similar delays occur between queries and responses in the system as compared to humans, or scaling for this equivalency. Resolves as ambiguous if (a), (b) or (c) don't occur by 2075.\n\n*(edited 2020-09-13 to fix eval date as 5 years after such a system appears.)*", "lower_25": "1.17×1014", "median": "3.26×1016", "upper_75": "1.17×1019", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that image recognition will be made robust against unrestricted adversaries by 2026?", "desc": "Image recognition is a task of assigning a label to an image. There has been enormous progress in the last 10 years due to deep learning. However, in 2013 researchers pointed out certain [intriguing properties of neural networks](https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6199). In particular, neural networks seem to suffer from a problem currently known as adversarial examples.\n\nAdversarial examples are images optimized so as to fool a machine learning algorithm, but remain unambiguous to humans. Current machine learning algorithms can be fooled by changes that are essentially impossible to perceive by humans. The issue of adversarial examples highlight differences in how humans and algorithms do image recognition. [\"Adversarial Examples - A Complete Characterisation of the Phenomenon\"](https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.01185) provides an extensive overview.\n\nNotably, adversarial examples can also be a security issue, for example by making it possible to bypass face or voice recognition used for authentication.\n\nRecently Google introduced [the Unrestricted Adversarial Examples Challenge](https://ai.googleblog.com/2018/09/introducing-unrestricted-adversarial.html). This challenge allows unrestricted inputs, allowing participants to submit arbitrary images from the target classes to develop and test models on a wider variety of adversarial examples. They ask models to answer the question \"Is this an unambiguous picture of a bird, a bicycle, or is it (ambiguous / not obvious)?\". The images are provided by attackers and are first labeled by humans. A small monetary prize will be awarded to any team that breaks a previously-unbroken defense with an eligible input.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when the large defender prize of the Unrestricted Adversarial Examples Challenge is awarded. This means that a defense (an image recognition algorithm) must remain unbroken for at least 90 days. [This file provides details of the challenge.](https://github.com/google/unrestricted-adversarial-examples/blob/7cf9c3e6a33d32de3c7f1568b655d391f7815370/contest_proposal.md#unrestricted-adversarial-examples-contest-proposal) The question will resolve even if the details of the challenge are modified as long as the spirit of the challenge remains the same. The question will resolve as ambiguous if the challenge is discontinued before the end of 2030", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first successful entirely artificial extracorporeal human pregnancy will conclude by 2057?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Ectogenesis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ectogenesis) is the growth of an organism in an artificial environment outside the body in which it would normally be found, such as the growth of an embryo or fetus outside the mother's body. Ectogenesis of human embryos and fetuses would require some kind of [artificial uterus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_uterus). An artificial uterus would have to be supplied by nutrients and oxygen from some source to nurture a fetus, and would have to dispose of waste material. \n\nThe potential development of technology allowing for humans to be created entirely ex vivo (that is, fertilisation by in-vitro fertilisation and the entire gestation of the zygote, embryo, and fetus taking place in an artificial environment) has far-reaching implications for humanity, enabling not only a dramatic change in respect of reproductive rights and neonatal medical care, but perhaps even the end of the natural human pregnancy as a cultural norm.\n\nAn early form of this technology has [already been demonstrated with a mammalian model, developing a lamb fetus for four weeks,](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dt7twXzNEsQ) though these animals were not gestated entirely ex vivo. Here is the associated paper, ['An extra-uterine system to physiologically support the extreme premature lamb'](https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms15112), published in Nature Communications.\n\nThis question asks: **When will the first example of an *entirely extracorporeal* human pregnancy conclude with the 'birth' of a healthy, conscious child who lives for a period of at least one year from the date of birth?** \n\nThe date we are looking to predict here is the date of the 'birth.'\n\nBy 'artificial environment,' this question refers expressly to an environment that is not any part of a mammalian body, and an environment which is not dependent upon any direct connection with any mammalian body or part thereof.\n\nThis means that the artificial uterus cannot be the uterus of any human or non-human mammal, and the artificial uterus cannot be connected to either an entire human or non-human mammal, or any human or non-human mammalian organ or organ system.\n\nResolution should cite credible media reports, a press release from the responsible organisation, or an article in a scientific journal.\n\n[fine-print]\n\nKeyword for search: artificial womb.\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2041", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Collatz Conjecture will be resolved by 2196?", "desc": "", "resc": "Let's define the Collatz Program in pseudocode as\n```\ncollatz(n) = \n if (n is 1) return 1\n else if (n is even) return collatz(n/2)\n else return collatz(3n + 1)\n```\n\nwhere input n is a positive integer.\n\nThe [Collatz Conjecture](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collatz_conjecture) is that the Collatz Program halts (and returns 1) for all positive integers.\n\nWhen will the Collatz Conjecture be resolved, either positively or negatively?\n\nTake into account the following statement which Paul Erdos may or may not have made about the Conjecture: \"Mathematics may not be ready for such problems\".\n\nThe question resolves with a date of publication in a major mathematics journal.\n\n-----\n\n\nOther questions on the Collatz Conjecture:\n\n- [Is the halting problem for the Collatz Program computable?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2803/is-the-halting-problem-for-the-collatz-program-computable/)\n- [Is the Collatz Conjecture true?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2802/is-the-collatz-conjecture-true/)\n- [When will the Collatz Conjecture be resolved?\n](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2799/when-will-the-collatz-conjecture-be-resolved/)\n- [When will the halting problem for the Collatz Program be resolved?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2806/when-will-the-halting-problem-for-the-collatz-program-be-resolved/)", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2058", "upper_75": "2196", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Collatz Conjecture will be resolved by 2196?", "desc": "", "resc": "Let's define the Collatz Program in pseudocode as\n```\ncollatz(n) = \n if (n is 1) return 1\n else if (n is even) return collatz(n/2)\n else return collatz(3n + 1)\n```\n\nwhere input n is a positive integer.\n\nThe [Collatz Conjecture](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collatz_conjecture) is that the Collatz Program halts (and returns 1) for all positive integers.\n\nWhen will the Collatz Conjecture be resolved, either positively or negatively?\n\nTake into account the following statement which Paul Erdos may or may not have made about the Conjecture: \"Mathematics may not be ready for such problems\".\n\nThe question resolves with a date of publication in a major mathematics journal.\n\n-----\n\n\nOther questions on the Collatz Conjecture:\n\n- [Is the halting problem for the Collatz Program computable?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2803/is-the-halting-problem-for-the-collatz-program-computable/)\n- [Is the Collatz Conjecture true?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2802/is-the-collatz-conjecture-true/)\n- [When will the Collatz Conjecture be resolved?\n](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2799/when-will-the-collatz-conjecture-be-resolved/)\n- [When will the halting problem for the Collatz Program be resolved?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2806/when-will-the-halting-problem-for-the-collatz-program-be-resolved/)", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2058", "upper_75": "2196", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a robot poker player will win a significant live (not online) competition by 2039?", "desc": "Poker is a challenging game of bets, raises, and re-raises, calculation of odds and expected payoffs, game-theoretic mixed strategies, and tradeoffs between unexploitable and exploitative play.\n\nPoker is also a challenging game of visually identifying and then gripping small plastic discs and rectangles, and discriminating them between them based on their colors and symbols printed on their surfaces. These discs and rectangles must be moved around on a table in accordance with a game ruleset that is partially given in advance, and partly determined by verbal instruction from dealer and floor coordinator. \n\nAn example of the complexity of object manipulation that is required: the rectangles belonging to the player must be picked up in such a way that the symbols on the front can be inspected by the player, but kept oriented so that no other player can inspect those symbols, until such time as the ruleset dictates that the cards and symbols be revealed. Violating this constraint can lead not only to substandard play that is exploited by opponents, but also to penalties and even potential disqualification.", "resc": "This question resolves as **YES** if a robot wins a live poker tournament as specified below, and **NO** otherwise:\n\n## Definition of “significant competition”: \nA Texas HoldEm tournament or cash game in which:\n\n- more than 300 hands are played\n- robotic and human players obey the same rules, without special accommodations for the perceptual or motor skills of the robotic player (including complying with verbal direction from the dealer and staff)\n- competitors include at least one human member of the top 200 of the [Hendon Mob All Time Money List](http://pokerdb.thehendonmob.com/ranking/all-time-money-list/) (at the time of play)\n- the winner (best-outcome player) is awarded more than $10,000 US (whether that money is awarded to the robot itself or to its owners or developers), with the same payouts made to robotic and human players.\n\nThere are a wide variety of ways in which a competition like this could come about, and the intent is to cast a wide net. Two contrasting examples, which would both count for positive resolution:\n\n1. A “Deep Blue vs. Kasparov”-style challenge, in which the whole point of the competition is to pit human against machine.\n2. Harold takes a week off from his middle-management desk job, walks into the Rio All-Suites Hotel in Las Vegas, and plunks down $10,000 in cash for a seat in the World Series of Poker Main Event, because (since the recent passage of Robotic Personhood legislation) no one can tell him that he can't, and after all it's his money.", "lower_25": "Oct 2025", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an artificial intelligence catastrophe will happen by 2035?", "desc": "The [Ragnarök Question Series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ragnarok) asks [whether there will be an AI catastrophe](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1495/ragnar%25C3%25B6k-question-series-if-a-global-catastrophe-occurs-will-it-be-due-to-an-artificial-intelligence-failure-mode/). Also interesting is when this catastrophe would occur, especially for its implications in how to best avert such a catastrophe.", "resc": "Resolution will be on the day when it is first true that such a catastrophe (defined as one that claims at least 10% of the human population in any period of 5 years or less) that is principally due to the deployment of AI system(s) has occurred, or **ANNULLED** if no such catastrophe occurs.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2050", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the halting problem for the Collatz Program will be resolved by 2093?", "desc": "", "resc": "In related questions, we asked whether the Collatz Conjecture is true, when it will be resolved one way or the other, and whether a corresponding halting problem for the Collatz Program is computable.\n\nFor completeness and symmetry, this question asks when the halting problem will be resolved.\n\nWe can write the Collatz Program in pseudocode as\n\n```\ncollatz(n) = \n if (n is 1) return 1\n else if (n is even) return collatz(n/2)\n else return collatz(3n + 1)\n```\nwhere input n is a positive integer.\n\nPossible inputs to collatz() are divided into three sets:\n\n- Set 1: Inputs for which collatz() halts, after eventually encountering a power of 2\n- Set 2: Inputs for which collatz() eventually encounters a number twice, and then cycles forever\n- Set 3: Inputs that cause collatz() to forever avoid both repetition and powers of 2, exploring larger and larger numbers\n\nThe Conjecture is that all integers belong to Set 1, and that Sets 2 and 3 are empty.\n\nThe halting problem for the Collatz Program asks whether there can exist a program that takes as input an integer n, always halts itself, and returns 1 if collatz(n) halts and 0 if it does not halt. \n\nIt is possible that the Conjecture is false, and also that the halting problem for the Collatz Problem is not computable, in the same sense that the more general [Halting Problem](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem) is not computable.\n\nThere are a number of ways in which it could turn out that the halting problem for the Collatz Program is computable.\n\n- If the Conjecture is true (and collatz()) always halts) then the halt-checking program is trivial: always return 1.\n- If the Conjecture is false, but Sets 2 and 3 are finite, then a halt-checking program could check a finite list of inputs for which to return 0, and return 1 otherwise.\n- If all inputs are either in Set 1 (halts) or Set 2 (cycles), then a modified version of collatz() could run until it either halts (returning 1) or detects a cycle (returning 0). Similarly, if Set 3 is finite, then a combination of checking a finite list and checking for cycles would suffice.\n- Possibly all three sets are infinite, but there is still some simple (or at least computable) rule that can determine membership without running collatz() forever.\n\nWhen will this halting problem be resolved? It could be:\n\n- At exactly the same time that the Collatz Conjecture is resolved, especially if the Conjecture is shown to be true.\n- Later than the Conjecture is shown to be false. It could be that no algorithm is found for separating Set 1 from Sets 2 and 3, but also no proof is found that such an algorithm cannot exist.\n- Earlier than the Conjecture is resolved (as was pointed out in a comment on a related question). It could be proven, for example, that only a finite number of inputs cause collatz() to not halt, without resolving whether that number is zero.\n\n*This question will resolve with the date of publication in a major mathematics journal of an article that either 1) proves the Conjecture to be true (with the halting problem as a trivial implication), or 2) explicitly resolves the halting problem.*\n\n-----\n\n\nOther questions on the Collatz Conjecture:\n\n- [Is the halting problem for the Collatz Program computable?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2803/is-the-halting-problem-for-the-collatz-program-computable/)\n- [Is the Collatz Conjecture true?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2802/is-the-collatz-conjecture-true/)\n- [When will the Collatz Conjecture be resolved?\n](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2799/when-will-the-collatz-conjecture-be-resolved/)\n- [When will the halting problem for the Collatz Program be resolved?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2806/when-will-the-halting-problem-for-the-collatz-program-be-resolved/)", "lower_25": "2037", "median": "2093", "upper_75": "2363", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How far away will the closest known Black Hole lay in 2031?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the closest known Black Hole will be 1.03k light years away in 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Black Holes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_hole) are regions of space time where the gravitational acceleration is so high nothing, not even light, can escape. They're often the result of a sufficiently big star undergoing gravitational collapse at the end of its ‘life cycle'.\n\nFurthermore black holes can merge, forming ever more massive black holes, such can be found in the centre of our and other galaxies. They're the most well known and in some aspect more easily researched black holes due to their mass, often as high as millions (our Milky Way's supermassive black hole) or billions ([the recently imaged M87 supermassive black hole](https://eventhorizontelescope.org/)) solar masses.\n\nThere are, however, [much closer known black holes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nearest_black_holes) and black hole candidates, such as [QV Telescopii Ab](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HR_6819), the currently closest black hole, and also the first black hole associated with a naked eyes visible star, some 1,120 light years distant, or [A0620-00](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A0620-00) at 3,300 light years. \n\nThough direct evidence for a black hole remains difficult to acquire, favouring the statistically smaller fraction of black holes in binary systems, there are cases where their existence can be inferred, like for QV Tel Ab. As instrumentation and techniques improve, so should our knowledge about black hole distribution.\n\n### How far away will the closest known black hole or black hole candidate be in 2031?\n\n* Will resolve according to [Wikipedia's List of nearest black holes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nearest_black_holes) or credible peer reviewed publication.", "lower_25": "684", "median": "1.03k", "upper_75": "1.17k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the necessary computational power to replicate human mental capability will turn out to be 3.26×1016?", "desc": "", "resc": "A major uncertainty in understanding some timeline estimates for high-level AI is in estimating the minimal computational power necessary to perform the operations that the human brain does. \n\nEstimates in the literature (see appendix A on p. 84 of [this paper](http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf) for a compilation) range from \\(10^{12}\\) to \\(10^{25}\\) FLOPS following a variety of methodologies. (For a comparison, the Landauer limit at 20 C is about \\(10^{22}\\) bit erasures per second. However, the author has no clear idea how to convert between bit erasures and FLOPS.)\n\nThis huge range will probably eventually be narrowed down to within an order-of-magnitude or two, and we ask for that number here. Assume that by 2075 there is either (a) a full software emulation of a human brain that can duplicate the basic functionality of a typical adult human of average intelligence; or (b) there is an AI system that can pass a full \"strong\" Turing test (i.e. the interview is long, adversarial, and include sensory data); or (c) there is a computer system that attains \"human intelligence parity\" by the definition set forth in [this Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/384/human-machine-intelligence-parity-by-2040/). In each case (a,b,c) the number will be evaluated on a state-of-the-art system five years after the first demonstration of a system satisfying the criterion.\n\n*** What will the computation in FLOPS be of this machine system, if running at a speed comparable to that of human mental processing? ***\n\nThe point of this question is not really as a prediction, but more as a gathering place for estimates.\n\nFine print: we'll settle for a published estimate accurate to within a factor of 5. The speeds of the systems can be matched up by requiring that similar delays occur between queries and responses in the system as compared to humans, or scaling for this equivalency. Resolves as ambiguous if (a), (b) or (c) don't occur by 2075.\n\n*(edited 2020-09-13 to fix eval date as 5 years after such a system appears.)*", "lower_25": "1.17×1014", "median": "3.26×1016", "upper_75": "1.17×1019", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first successful entirely artificial extracorporeal human pregnancy will conclude by 2057?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Ectogenesis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ectogenesis) is the growth of an organism in an artificial environment outside the body in which it would normally be found, such as the growth of an embryo or fetus outside the mother's body. Ectogenesis of human embryos and fetuses would require some kind of [artificial uterus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_uterus). An artificial uterus would have to be supplied by nutrients and oxygen from some source to nurture a fetus, and would have to dispose of waste material. \n\nThe potential development of technology allowing for humans to be created entirely ex vivo (that is, fertilisation by in-vitro fertilisation and the entire gestation of the zygote, embryo, and fetus taking place in an artificial environment) has far-reaching implications for humanity, enabling not only a dramatic change in respect of reproductive rights and neonatal medical care, but perhaps even the end of the natural human pregnancy as a cultural norm.\n\nAn early form of this technology has [already been demonstrated with a mammalian model, developing a lamb fetus for four weeks,](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dt7twXzNEsQ) though these animals were not gestated entirely ex vivo. Here is the associated paper, ['An extra-uterine system to physiologically support the extreme premature lamb'](https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms15112), published in Nature Communications.\n\nThis question asks: **When will the first example of an *entirely extracorporeal* human pregnancy conclude with the 'birth' of a healthy, conscious child who lives for a period of at least one year from the date of birth?** \n\nThe date we are looking to predict here is the date of the 'birth.'\n\nBy 'artificial environment,' this question refers expressly to an environment that is not any part of a mammalian body, and an environment which is not dependent upon any direct connection with any mammalian body or part thereof.\n\nThis means that the artificial uterus cannot be the uterus of any human or non-human mammal, and the artificial uterus cannot be connected to either an entire human or non-human mammal, or any human or non-human mammalian organ or organ system.\n\nResolution should cite credible media reports, a press release from the responsible organisation, or an article in a scientific journal.\n\n[fine-print]\n\nKeyword for search: artificial womb.\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2041", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first successful entirely artificial extracorporeal human pregnancy will conclude by 2057?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Ectogenesis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ectogenesis) is the growth of an organism in an artificial environment outside the body in which it would normally be found, such as the growth of an embryo or fetus outside the mother's body. Ectogenesis of human embryos and fetuses would require some kind of [artificial uterus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_uterus). An artificial uterus would have to be supplied by nutrients and oxygen from some source to nurture a fetus, and would have to dispose of waste material. \n\nThe potential development of technology allowing for humans to be created entirely ex vivo (that is, fertilisation by in-vitro fertilisation and the entire gestation of the zygote, embryo, and fetus taking place in an artificial environment) has far-reaching implications for humanity, enabling not only a dramatic change in respect of reproductive rights and neonatal medical care, but perhaps even the end of the natural human pregnancy as a cultural norm.\n\nAn early form of this technology has [already been demonstrated with a mammalian model, developing a lamb fetus for four weeks,](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dt7twXzNEsQ) though these animals were not gestated entirely ex vivo. Here is the associated paper, ['An extra-uterine system to physiologically support the extreme premature lamb'](https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms15112), published in Nature Communications.\n\nThis question asks: **When will the first example of an *entirely extracorporeal* human pregnancy conclude with the 'birth' of a healthy, conscious child who lives for a period of at least one year from the date of birth?** \n\nThe date we are looking to predict here is the date of the 'birth.'\n\nBy 'artificial environment,' this question refers expressly to an environment that is not any part of a mammalian body, and an environment which is not dependent upon any direct connection with any mammalian body or part thereof.\n\nThis means that the artificial uterus cannot be the uterus of any human or non-human mammal, and the artificial uterus cannot be connected to either an entire human or non-human mammal, or any human or non-human mammalian organ or organ system.\n\nResolution should cite credible media reports, a press release from the responsible organisation, or an article in a scientific journal.\n\n[fine-print]\n\nKeyword for search: artificial womb.\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2041", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How far away will the closest known Black Hole lay in 2031?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the closest known Black Hole will be 1.03k light years away in 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Black Holes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_hole) are regions of space time where the gravitational acceleration is so high nothing, not even light, can escape. They're often the result of a sufficiently big star undergoing gravitational collapse at the end of its ‘life cycle'.\n\nFurthermore black holes can merge, forming ever more massive black holes, such can be found in the centre of our and other galaxies. They're the most well known and in some aspect more easily researched black holes due to their mass, often as high as millions (our Milky Way's supermassive black hole) or billions ([the recently imaged M87 supermassive black hole](https://eventhorizontelescope.org/)) solar masses.\n\nThere are, however, [much closer known black holes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nearest_black_holes) and black hole candidates, such as [QV Telescopii Ab](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HR_6819), the currently closest black hole, and also the first black hole associated with a naked eyes visible star, some 1,120 light years distant, or [A0620-00](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A0620-00) at 3,300 light years. \n\nThough direct evidence for a black hole remains difficult to acquire, favouring the statistically smaller fraction of black holes in binary systems, there are cases where their existence can be inferred, like for QV Tel Ab. As instrumentation and techniques improve, so should our knowledge about black hole distribution.\n\n### How far away will the closest known black hole or black hole candidate be in 2031?\n\n* Will resolve according to [Wikipedia's List of nearest black holes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nearest_black_holes) or credible peer reviewed publication.", "lower_25": "684", "median": "1.03k", "upper_75": "1.17k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How far away will the closest known Black Hole lay in 2031?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the closest known Black Hole will be 1.03k light years away in 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Black Holes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_hole) are regions of space time where the gravitational acceleration is so high nothing, not even light, can escape. They're often the result of a sufficiently big star undergoing gravitational collapse at the end of its ‘life cycle'.\n\nFurthermore black holes can merge, forming ever more massive black holes, such can be found in the centre of our and other galaxies. They're the most well known and in some aspect more easily researched black holes due to their mass, often as high as millions (our Milky Way's supermassive black hole) or billions ([the recently imaged M87 supermassive black hole](https://eventhorizontelescope.org/)) solar masses.\n\nThere are, however, [much closer known black holes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nearest_black_holes) and black hole candidates, such as [QV Telescopii Ab](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HR_6819), the currently closest black hole, and also the first black hole associated with a naked eyes visible star, some 1,120 light years distant, or [A0620-00](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A0620-00) at 3,300 light years. \n\nThough direct evidence for a black hole remains difficult to acquire, favouring the statistically smaller fraction of black holes in binary systems, there are cases where their existence can be inferred, like for QV Tel Ab. As instrumentation and techniques improve, so should our knowledge about black hole distribution.\n\n### How far away will the closest known black hole or black hole candidate be in 2031?\n\n* Will resolve according to [Wikipedia's List of nearest black holes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nearest_black_holes) or credible peer reviewed publication.", "lower_25": "684", "median": "1.03k", "upper_75": "1.17k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 70.3M humans will be uploaded in any 5-year period if a whole human brain is successfully emulated by 2100?", "desc": "Whole Brain Emulation (WBE), often informally called “uploading”, is a proposed technique that involves using a computer to emulate the states and functional dynamics of a brain at a relatively fine‐grained level of detail to produce the same outward behaviour as the original brain. The basic idea is to take a particular brain, scan its structure in detail, and construct a software model of it that is sufficiently faithful to the original that, when run on appropriate hardware, it will behave in essentially the same way as the original brain.[[1](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf)]\n\nWBE has been proposed as a path to creating human-level digital intelligence.[[2]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Age_of_Em)]\n\nAn approach to WBE examined in in [Bostrom and Sandberg (2008)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf), a comprehensive study on the topic, is one that involves destructive scanning, in which the brain is separated from other tissue, sliced into thin slices, fixated and subsequently scanned accurately and a at a sufficiently high resolution. This process could be applied immediately after death or on cryogenically preserved brain tissue.\n\nIn his book, [The Age of Em](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Age_of_Em), Robin Hanson has argued that the emulations in highest demand will be those of the brains of the most elite humans around today.[[2]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Age_of_Em)] In his view, the em world will be dominated by a few (i. e. something like one thousand) copy clans, copied from humans who will tend to be selected for their productivity, such as billionaires, or winners of Nobel or Pulitzer prizes.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the maximum number of humans whose brain is destructively emulated to produce at least one viable emulation, in any 5-year period before 2100. Emulation here is the process, described in [[1](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf)] that is based on direct simulation of the neural connectome (and a requisite level of its physical instantiation). \n\nFor the purpose of this question successful WBE will be taken to mean an emulation that is at least as faithful to the original brain as an “individual brain emulation” in [Bostrom and Sandberg (2008)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf) (page 11):\n\n> Success criterion: \"The emulation produces emergent activity\ncharacteristic of that of one particular (fully\nfunctioning) brain. It is more similar to the\nactivity of the original brain than any other\nbrain.\"\n\n> Correct properties: \"Correct internal and behaviour responses. Retains most memories and skills of the particular brain that was\nemulated. (In an emulation of an animal brain, it should be possible to recognize the particular (familiar) animal.)\"\n\nDonors need not have been alive before their brain is uploaded. The question resolves ambiguously if WBE does not succeed before 2100. Note that multiple copies of an emulation of a whole human brain only counts as one upload. The question resolves ambiguous if the number falls outside upper bound on the numerical range, which is set at 20B.\n\n-----\n\nThis question was inspired [by a discussion between @frxtz, @tenthkrige and @holomanga](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2805/if-there-is-an-artificial-intelligence-catastrophe-this-century-when-will-it-happen/#comment-14187) on whether to count emulations “ems”, or uploads as humans for question related to global catastrophic risk", "lower_25": "1.96k", "median": "361k", "upper_75": "70.3M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an artificial intelligence catastrophe will happen by 2035?", "desc": "The [Ragnarök Question Series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ragnarok) asks [whether there will be an AI catastrophe](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1495/ragnar%25C3%25B6k-question-series-if-a-global-catastrophe-occurs-will-it-be-due-to-an-artificial-intelligence-failure-mode/). Also interesting is when this catastrophe would occur, especially for its implications in how to best avert such a catastrophe.", "resc": "Resolution will be on the day when it is first true that such a catastrophe (defined as one that claims at least 10% of the human population in any period of 5 years or less) that is principally due to the deployment of AI system(s) has occurred, or **ANNULLED** if no such catastrophe occurs.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2050", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an artificial intelligence catastrophe will happen by 2035?", "desc": "The [Ragnarök Question Series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ragnarok) asks [whether there will be an AI catastrophe](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1495/ragnar%25C3%25B6k-question-series-if-a-global-catastrophe-occurs-will-it-be-due-to-an-artificial-intelligence-failure-mode/). Also interesting is when this catastrophe would occur, especially for its implications in how to best avert such a catastrophe.", "resc": "Resolution will be on the day when it is first true that such a catastrophe (defined as one that claims at least 10% of the human population in any period of 5 years or less) that is principally due to the deployment of AI system(s) has occurred, or **ANNULLED** if no such catastrophe occurs.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2050", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the halting problem for the Collatz Program will be resolved by 2093?", "desc": "", "resc": "In related questions, we asked whether the Collatz Conjecture is true, when it will be resolved one way or the other, and whether a corresponding halting problem for the Collatz Program is computable.\n\nFor completeness and symmetry, this question asks when the halting problem will be resolved.\n\nWe can write the Collatz Program in pseudocode as\n\n```\ncollatz(n) = \n if (n is 1) return 1\n else if (n is even) return collatz(n/2)\n else return collatz(3n + 1)\n```\nwhere input n is a positive integer.\n\nPossible inputs to collatz() are divided into three sets:\n\n- Set 1: Inputs for which collatz() halts, after eventually encountering a power of 2\n- Set 2: Inputs for which collatz() eventually encounters a number twice, and then cycles forever\n- Set 3: Inputs that cause collatz() to forever avoid both repetition and powers of 2, exploring larger and larger numbers\n\nThe Conjecture is that all integers belong to Set 1, and that Sets 2 and 3 are empty.\n\nThe halting problem for the Collatz Program asks whether there can exist a program that takes as input an integer n, always halts itself, and returns 1 if collatz(n) halts and 0 if it does not halt. \n\nIt is possible that the Conjecture is false, and also that the halting problem for the Collatz Problem is not computable, in the same sense that the more general [Halting Problem](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem) is not computable.\n\nThere are a number of ways in which it could turn out that the halting problem for the Collatz Program is computable.\n\n- If the Conjecture is true (and collatz()) always halts) then the halt-checking program is trivial: always return 1.\n- If the Conjecture is false, but Sets 2 and 3 are finite, then a halt-checking program could check a finite list of inputs for which to return 0, and return 1 otherwise.\n- If all inputs are either in Set 1 (halts) or Set 2 (cycles), then a modified version of collatz() could run until it either halts (returning 1) or detects a cycle (returning 0). Similarly, if Set 3 is finite, then a combination of checking a finite list and checking for cycles would suffice.\n- Possibly all three sets are infinite, but there is still some simple (or at least computable) rule that can determine membership without running collatz() forever.\n\nWhen will this halting problem be resolved? It could be:\n\n- At exactly the same time that the Collatz Conjecture is resolved, especially if the Conjecture is shown to be true.\n- Later than the Conjecture is shown to be false. It could be that no algorithm is found for separating Set 1 from Sets 2 and 3, but also no proof is found that such an algorithm cannot exist.\n- Earlier than the Conjecture is resolved (as was pointed out in a comment on a related question). It could be proven, for example, that only a finite number of inputs cause collatz() to not halt, without resolving whether that number is zero.\n\n*This question will resolve with the date of publication in a major mathematics journal of an article that either 1) proves the Conjecture to be true (with the halting problem as a trivial implication), or 2) explicitly resolves the halting problem.*\n\n-----\n\n\nOther questions on the Collatz Conjecture:\n\n- [Is the halting problem for the Collatz Program computable?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2803/is-the-halting-problem-for-the-collatz-program-computable/)\n- [Is the Collatz Conjecture true?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2802/is-the-collatz-conjecture-true/)\n- [When will the Collatz Conjecture be resolved?\n](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2799/when-will-the-collatz-conjecture-be-resolved/)\n- [When will the halting problem for the Collatz Program be resolved?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2806/when-will-the-halting-problem-for-the-collatz-program-be-resolved/)", "lower_25": "2037", "median": "2093", "upper_75": "2363", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Collatz Conjecture will be resolved by 2196?", "desc": "", "resc": "Let's define the Collatz Program in pseudocode as\n```\ncollatz(n) = \n if (n is 1) return 1\n else if (n is even) return collatz(n/2)\n else return collatz(3n + 1)\n```\n\nwhere input n is a positive integer.\n\nThe [Collatz Conjecture](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collatz_conjecture) is that the Collatz Program halts (and returns 1) for all positive integers.\n\nWhen will the Collatz Conjecture be resolved, either positively or negatively?\n\nTake into account the following statement which Paul Erdos may or may not have made about the Conjecture: \"Mathematics may not be ready for such problems\".\n\nThe question resolves with a date of publication in a major mathematics journal.\n\n-----\n\n\nOther questions on the Collatz Conjecture:\n\n- [Is the halting problem for the Collatz Program computable?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2803/is-the-halting-problem-for-the-collatz-program-computable/)\n- [Is the Collatz Conjecture true?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2802/is-the-collatz-conjecture-true/)\n- [When will the Collatz Conjecture be resolved?\n](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2799/when-will-the-collatz-conjecture-be-resolved/)\n- [When will the halting problem for the Collatz Program be resolved?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2806/when-will-the-halting-problem-for-the-collatz-program-be-resolved/)", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2058", "upper_75": "2196", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the halting problem for the Collatz Program will be resolved by 2093?", "desc": "", "resc": "In related questions, we asked whether the Collatz Conjecture is true, when it will be resolved one way or the other, and whether a corresponding halting problem for the Collatz Program is computable.\n\nFor completeness and symmetry, this question asks when the halting problem will be resolved.\n\nWe can write the Collatz Program in pseudocode as\n\n```\ncollatz(n) = \n if (n is 1) return 1\n else if (n is even) return collatz(n/2)\n else return collatz(3n + 1)\n```\nwhere input n is a positive integer.\n\nPossible inputs to collatz() are divided into three sets:\n\n- Set 1: Inputs for which collatz() halts, after eventually encountering a power of 2\n- Set 2: Inputs for which collatz() eventually encounters a number twice, and then cycles forever\n- Set 3: Inputs that cause collatz() to forever avoid both repetition and powers of 2, exploring larger and larger numbers\n\nThe Conjecture is that all integers belong to Set 1, and that Sets 2 and 3 are empty.\n\nThe halting problem for the Collatz Program asks whether there can exist a program that takes as input an integer n, always halts itself, and returns 1 if collatz(n) halts and 0 if it does not halt. \n\nIt is possible that the Conjecture is false, and also that the halting problem for the Collatz Problem is not computable, in the same sense that the more general [Halting Problem](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem) is not computable.\n\nThere are a number of ways in which it could turn out that the halting problem for the Collatz Program is computable.\n\n- If the Conjecture is true (and collatz()) always halts) then the halt-checking program is trivial: always return 1.\n- If the Conjecture is false, but Sets 2 and 3 are finite, then a halt-checking program could check a finite list of inputs for which to return 0, and return 1 otherwise.\n- If all inputs are either in Set 1 (halts) or Set 2 (cycles), then a modified version of collatz() could run until it either halts (returning 1) or detects a cycle (returning 0). Similarly, if Set 3 is finite, then a combination of checking a finite list and checking for cycles would suffice.\n- Possibly all three sets are infinite, but there is still some simple (or at least computable) rule that can determine membership without running collatz() forever.\n\nWhen will this halting problem be resolved? It could be:\n\n- At exactly the same time that the Collatz Conjecture is resolved, especially if the Conjecture is shown to be true.\n- Later than the Conjecture is shown to be false. It could be that no algorithm is found for separating Set 1 from Sets 2 and 3, but also no proof is found that such an algorithm cannot exist.\n- Earlier than the Conjecture is resolved (as was pointed out in a comment on a related question). It could be proven, for example, that only a finite number of inputs cause collatz() to not halt, without resolving whether that number is zero.\n\n*This question will resolve with the date of publication in a major mathematics journal of an article that either 1) proves the Conjecture to be true (with the halting problem as a trivial implication), or 2) explicitly resolves the halting problem.*\n\n-----\n\n\nOther questions on the Collatz Conjecture:\n\n- [Is the halting problem for the Collatz Program computable?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2803/is-the-halting-problem-for-the-collatz-program-computable/)\n- [Is the Collatz Conjecture true?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2802/is-the-collatz-conjecture-true/)\n- [When will the Collatz Conjecture be resolved?\n](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2799/when-will-the-collatz-conjecture-be-resolved/)\n- [When will the halting problem for the Collatz Program be resolved?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2806/when-will-the-halting-problem-for-the-collatz-program-be-resolved/)", "lower_25": "2037", "median": "2093", "upper_75": "2363", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the human brain will be successfully emulated in full by 2040?", "desc": "Whole Brain Emulation (WBE), often informally called “uploading”, is a proposed technique that involves using a computer to emulate the states and functional dynamics of a brain at a relatively fine‐grained level of detail to produce the same outward behaviour as the original brain. The basic idea is to take a particular brain, scan its structure in detail, and construct a software model of it that is sufficiently faithful to the original that, when run on appropriate hardware, it will behave in essentially the same way as the original brain.[[1](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf)]\n\nAn approach to WBE examined in in [Bostrom and Sandberg (2008)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf), a comprehensive study on the topic, is one that involves destructive scanning, in which the brain is separated from other tissue, sliced into thin slices, fixated and subsequently scanned accurately and a at a sufficiently high resolution. This process could be applied immediately after death or on cryogenically preserved brain tissue.\n\nWBE has been proposed as a path to creating human-level digital intelligence.[[2]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Age_of_Em)] Emulations might also enable a type of “digital immortality” by creating back‐up copies of an individual's identity, thereby promising a type of continued survival in cyberspace after death.[[3](https://jetpress.org/v26.2/linssen_lemmens.htm)]\n\nThere is considerable debate about the technological feasibility of WBE: though there is general (though not universal) agreement that the brain, being a physical system, is amenable to being simulated. However, the necessary scanning, data gathering, image interpretation, and amounts of computation required might still be beyond what our reach for some time to come. (see [[1](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf)])", "resc": "This question resolves positive when a human brain is first successfully emulated on a computer, with the emulation being at least as faithful to the original brain as an “individual brain emulation” defined in [Bostrom and Sandberg (2008)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf) (page 11):\n\nSuccess criterion of an individual brain emulation: \n\n>The emulation produces emergent activity characteristic of that of one particular (fully functioning) brain. It is more similar to the activity of the original brain than any other brain.\n\nRequired properties of an individual brain emulation: \n\n> Correct internal and behaviour responses. Retains most memories and skills of the particular brain that was emulated. (In an emulation of an animal brain, it should be possible to recognize the particular (familiar) animal.)\n\nEmulation here is the process, described in [Bostrom and Sandberg (2008)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf), that is based on direct simulation of the neural connectome (and a requisite level of its physical instantiation). Donors need not have been alive before their brain is uploaded. Resolution requires just those portions of the human brain that have functionally relevant effects on actual behaviour to be emulated. The emulation needs to run sufficiently long to confirm that it successfully produces similar outward behaviour more similar to the activity of the original brain than that of any other human brain", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2070", "upper_75": "2263", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the human brain will be successfully emulated in full by 2040?", "desc": "Whole Brain Emulation (WBE), often informally called “uploading”, is a proposed technique that involves using a computer to emulate the states and functional dynamics of a brain at a relatively fine‐grained level of detail to produce the same outward behaviour as the original brain. The basic idea is to take a particular brain, scan its structure in detail, and construct a software model of it that is sufficiently faithful to the original that, when run on appropriate hardware, it will behave in essentially the same way as the original brain.[[1](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf)]\n\nAn approach to WBE examined in in [Bostrom and Sandberg (2008)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf), a comprehensive study on the topic, is one that involves destructive scanning, in which the brain is separated from other tissue, sliced into thin slices, fixated and subsequently scanned accurately and a at a sufficiently high resolution. This process could be applied immediately after death or on cryogenically preserved brain tissue.\n\nWBE has been proposed as a path to creating human-level digital intelligence.[[2]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Age_of_Em)] Emulations might also enable a type of “digital immortality” by creating back‐up copies of an individual's identity, thereby promising a type of continued survival in cyberspace after death.[[3](https://jetpress.org/v26.2/linssen_lemmens.htm)]\n\nThere is considerable debate about the technological feasibility of WBE: though there is general (though not universal) agreement that the brain, being a physical system, is amenable to being simulated. However, the necessary scanning, data gathering, image interpretation, and amounts of computation required might still be beyond what our reach for some time to come. (see [[1](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf)])", "resc": "This question resolves positive when a human brain is first successfully emulated on a computer, with the emulation being at least as faithful to the original brain as an “individual brain emulation” defined in [Bostrom and Sandberg (2008)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf) (page 11):\n\nSuccess criterion of an individual brain emulation: \n\n>The emulation produces emergent activity characteristic of that of one particular (fully functioning) brain. It is more similar to the activity of the original brain than any other brain.\n\nRequired properties of an individual brain emulation: \n\n> Correct internal and behaviour responses. Retains most memories and skills of the particular brain that was emulated. (In an emulation of an animal brain, it should be possible to recognize the particular (familiar) animal.)\n\nEmulation here is the process, described in [Bostrom and Sandberg (2008)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf), that is based on direct simulation of the neural connectome (and a requisite level of its physical instantiation). Donors need not have been alive before their brain is uploaded. Resolution requires just those portions of the human brain that have functionally relevant effects on actual behaviour to be emulated. The emulation needs to run sufficiently long to confirm that it successfully produces similar outward behaviour more similar to the activity of the original brain than that of any other human brain", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2070", "upper_75": "2263", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 70.3M humans will be uploaded in any 5-year period if a whole human brain is successfully emulated by 2100?", "desc": "Whole Brain Emulation (WBE), often informally called “uploading”, is a proposed technique that involves using a computer to emulate the states and functional dynamics of a brain at a relatively fine‐grained level of detail to produce the same outward behaviour as the original brain. The basic idea is to take a particular brain, scan its structure in detail, and construct a software model of it that is sufficiently faithful to the original that, when run on appropriate hardware, it will behave in essentially the same way as the original brain.[[1](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf)]\n\nWBE has been proposed as a path to creating human-level digital intelligence.[[2]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Age_of_Em)]\n\nAn approach to WBE examined in in [Bostrom and Sandberg (2008)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf), a comprehensive study on the topic, is one that involves destructive scanning, in which the brain is separated from other tissue, sliced into thin slices, fixated and subsequently scanned accurately and a at a sufficiently high resolution. This process could be applied immediately after death or on cryogenically preserved brain tissue.\n\nIn his book, [The Age of Em](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Age_of_Em), Robin Hanson has argued that the emulations in highest demand will be those of the brains of the most elite humans around today.[[2]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Age_of_Em)] In his view, the em world will be dominated by a few (i. e. something like one thousand) copy clans, copied from humans who will tend to be selected for their productivity, such as billionaires, or winners of Nobel or Pulitzer prizes.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the maximum number of humans whose brain is destructively emulated to produce at least one viable emulation, in any 5-year period before 2100. Emulation here is the process, described in [[1](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf)] that is based on direct simulation of the neural connectome (and a requisite level of its physical instantiation). \n\nFor the purpose of this question successful WBE will be taken to mean an emulation that is at least as faithful to the original brain as an “individual brain emulation” in [Bostrom and Sandberg (2008)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf) (page 11):\n\n> Success criterion: \"The emulation produces emergent activity\ncharacteristic of that of one particular (fully\nfunctioning) brain. It is more similar to the\nactivity of the original brain than any other\nbrain.\"\n\n> Correct properties: \"Correct internal and behaviour responses. Retains most memories and skills of the particular brain that was\nemulated. (In an emulation of an animal brain, it should be possible to recognize the particular (familiar) animal.)\"\n\nDonors need not have been alive before their brain is uploaded. The question resolves ambiguously if WBE does not succeed before 2100. Note that multiple copies of an emulation of a whole human brain only counts as one upload. The question resolves ambiguous if the number falls outside upper bound on the numerical range, which is set at 20B.\n\n-----\n\nThis question was inspired [by a discussion between @frxtz, @tenthkrige and @holomanga](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2805/if-there-is-an-artificial-intelligence-catastrophe-this-century-when-will-it-happen/#comment-14187) on whether to count emulations “ems”, or uploads as humans for question related to global catastrophic risk", "lower_25": "1.96k", "median": "361k", "upper_75": "70.3M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the human brain will be successfully emulated in full by 2040?", "desc": "Whole Brain Emulation (WBE), often informally called “uploading”, is a proposed technique that involves using a computer to emulate the states and functional dynamics of a brain at a relatively fine‐grained level of detail to produce the same outward behaviour as the original brain. The basic idea is to take a particular brain, scan its structure in detail, and construct a software model of it that is sufficiently faithful to the original that, when run on appropriate hardware, it will behave in essentially the same way as the original brain.[[1](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf)]\n\nAn approach to WBE examined in in [Bostrom and Sandberg (2008)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf), a comprehensive study on the topic, is one that involves destructive scanning, in which the brain is separated from other tissue, sliced into thin slices, fixated and subsequently scanned accurately and a at a sufficiently high resolution. This process could be applied immediately after death or on cryogenically preserved brain tissue.\n\nWBE has been proposed as a path to creating human-level digital intelligence.[[2]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Age_of_Em)] Emulations might also enable a type of “digital immortality” by creating back‐up copies of an individual's identity, thereby promising a type of continued survival in cyberspace after death.[[3](https://jetpress.org/v26.2/linssen_lemmens.htm)]\n\nThere is considerable debate about the technological feasibility of WBE: though there is general (though not universal) agreement that the brain, being a physical system, is amenable to being simulated. However, the necessary scanning, data gathering, image interpretation, and amounts of computation required might still be beyond what our reach for some time to come. (see [[1](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf)])", "resc": "This question resolves positive when a human brain is first successfully emulated on a computer, with the emulation being at least as faithful to the original brain as an “individual brain emulation” defined in [Bostrom and Sandberg (2008)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf) (page 11):\n\nSuccess criterion of an individual brain emulation: \n\n>The emulation produces emergent activity characteristic of that of one particular (fully functioning) brain. It is more similar to the activity of the original brain than any other brain.\n\nRequired properties of an individual brain emulation: \n\n> Correct internal and behaviour responses. Retains most memories and skills of the particular brain that was emulated. (In an emulation of an animal brain, it should be possible to recognize the particular (familiar) animal.)\n\nEmulation here is the process, described in [Bostrom and Sandberg (2008)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf), that is based on direct simulation of the neural connectome (and a requisite level of its physical instantiation). Donors need not have been alive before their brain is uploaded. Resolution requires just those portions of the human brain that have functionally relevant effects on actual behaviour to be emulated. The emulation needs to run sufficiently long to confirm that it successfully produces similar outward behaviour more similar to the activity of the original brain than that of any other human brain", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2070", "upper_75": "2263", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NASA's SLS will first launch a person to the Moon by Mar 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Mar 2027", "median": "Jul 2028", "upper_75": "Mar 2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NASA's SLS will first launch a person to the Moon by Mar 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Mar 2027", "median": "Jul 2028", "upper_75": "Mar 2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 70.3M humans will be uploaded in any 5-year period if a whole human brain is successfully emulated by 2100?", "desc": "Whole Brain Emulation (WBE), often informally called “uploading”, is a proposed technique that involves using a computer to emulate the states and functional dynamics of a brain at a relatively fine‐grained level of detail to produce the same outward behaviour as the original brain. The basic idea is to take a particular brain, scan its structure in detail, and construct a software model of it that is sufficiently faithful to the original that, when run on appropriate hardware, it will behave in essentially the same way as the original brain.[[1](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf)]\n\nWBE has been proposed as a path to creating human-level digital intelligence.[[2]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Age_of_Em)]\n\nAn approach to WBE examined in in [Bostrom and Sandberg (2008)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf), a comprehensive study on the topic, is one that involves destructive scanning, in which the brain is separated from other tissue, sliced into thin slices, fixated and subsequently scanned accurately and a at a sufficiently high resolution. This process could be applied immediately after death or on cryogenically preserved brain tissue.\n\nIn his book, [The Age of Em](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Age_of_Em), Robin Hanson has argued that the emulations in highest demand will be those of the brains of the most elite humans around today.[[2]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Age_of_Em)] In his view, the em world will be dominated by a few (i. e. something like one thousand) copy clans, copied from humans who will tend to be selected for their productivity, such as billionaires, or winners of Nobel or Pulitzer prizes.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the maximum number of humans whose brain is destructively emulated to produce at least one viable emulation, in any 5-year period before 2100. Emulation here is the process, described in [[1](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf)] that is based on direct simulation of the neural connectome (and a requisite level of its physical instantiation). \n\nFor the purpose of this question successful WBE will be taken to mean an emulation that is at least as faithful to the original brain as an “individual brain emulation” in [Bostrom and Sandberg (2008)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf) (page 11):\n\n> Success criterion: \"The emulation produces emergent activity\ncharacteristic of that of one particular (fully\nfunctioning) brain. It is more similar to the\nactivity of the original brain than any other\nbrain.\"\n\n> Correct properties: \"Correct internal and behaviour responses. Retains most memories and skills of the particular brain that was\nemulated. (In an emulation of an animal brain, it should be possible to recognize the particular (familiar) animal.)\"\n\nDonors need not have been alive before their brain is uploaded. The question resolves ambiguously if WBE does not succeed before 2100. Note that multiple copies of an emulation of a whole human brain only counts as one upload. The question resolves ambiguous if the number falls outside upper bound on the numerical range, which is set at 20B.\n\n-----\n\nThis question was inspired [by a discussion between @frxtz, @tenthkrige and @holomanga](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2805/if-there-is-an-artificial-intelligence-catastrophe-this-century-when-will-it-happen/#comment-14187) on whether to count emulations “ems”, or uploads as humans for question related to global catastrophic risk", "lower_25": "1.96k", "median": "361k", "upper_75": "70.3M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will have 4.16k nuclear warheads in 2029 if it does not pursue nuclear disarmament?", "desc": "", "resc": "The size of the US's nuclear weapons stockpile reached a peak [in 1966 at around 30,000 warheads](https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook-multimedia). Following the deescalation and the end of the Cold War, the number has substantially decreased. [Kristensen and Korda (2019)](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1606503) estimate that the US maintains a deployed stockpile of nearly 3,800 warheads. The approximate breakdown is as follows:\n\n\n- 1,750 warheads are currently deployed, of which\n - 1,300 strategic warheads are deployed on ballistic missiles, \n - 300 at strategic bomber bases in the United States, \n - 150 tactical bombs are deployed at air bases in Europe.\n- 2,050 are in storage as a so-called hedge against technical or geopolitical surprises.\n \nIt is possible that this trend will reverse in a period of nuclear rearmament, especially if world tensions get worse. The Trump Administration's [Nuclear Posture Review](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Posture_Review) takes a confrontational tone, presenting an assertive posture that embraces “Great Power competition” and includes plans to expand the US' nuclear arsenal.\n\n**If the US has at least 3,800 nuclear warheads in 2029, what is the largest number of nuclear warheads it will maintain in its inventory in 2029?**\n\nThis resolves as the largest number of nuclear warheads deployed or in storage in the 2029 period, conditional on this number being at least 3,800, as reported by credible sources such as the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists' Nuclear Notebook (such as [this one for 2019](https://thebulletin.org/2019/04/united-states-nuclear-forces-2019/)). A similar credible source may be consulted if the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in no longer active or publishing reports. For the purposes of question resolution, warheads that are retired and awaiting dismantlement will not be counted.\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously if the US maintains strictly fewer than 3,800 nuclear warheads in its inventory at any time in 2029.\n\n----\n\nSee also the related question, [In 2029, will the US have fewer nuclear warheads than it did in 2019?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2817/in-2029-will-the-us-have-fewer-nuclear-warheads-than-it-did-in-2019/)", "lower_25": "4.16k", "median": "4.73k", "upper_75": "5.95k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NASA's SLS will first launch a person to the Moon by Mar 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Mar 2027", "median": "Jul 2028", "upper_75": "Mar 2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will have 4.16k nuclear warheads in 2029 if it does not pursue nuclear disarmament?", "desc": "", "resc": "The size of the US's nuclear weapons stockpile reached a peak [in 1966 at around 30,000 warheads](https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook-multimedia). Following the deescalation and the end of the Cold War, the number has substantially decreased. [Kristensen and Korda (2019)](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1606503) estimate that the US maintains a deployed stockpile of nearly 3,800 warheads. The approximate breakdown is as follows:\n\n\n- 1,750 warheads are currently deployed, of which\n - 1,300 strategic warheads are deployed on ballistic missiles, \n - 300 at strategic bomber bases in the United States, \n - 150 tactical bombs are deployed at air bases in Europe.\n- 2,050 are in storage as a so-called hedge against technical or geopolitical surprises.\n \nIt is possible that this trend will reverse in a period of nuclear rearmament, especially if world tensions get worse. The Trump Administration's [Nuclear Posture Review](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Posture_Review) takes a confrontational tone, presenting an assertive posture that embraces “Great Power competition” and includes plans to expand the US' nuclear arsenal.\n\n**If the US has at least 3,800 nuclear warheads in 2029, what is the largest number of nuclear warheads it will maintain in its inventory in 2029?**\n\nThis resolves as the largest number of nuclear warheads deployed or in storage in the 2029 period, conditional on this number being at least 3,800, as reported by credible sources such as the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists' Nuclear Notebook (such as [this one for 2019](https://thebulletin.org/2019/04/united-states-nuclear-forces-2019/)). A similar credible source may be consulted if the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in no longer active or publishing reports. For the purposes of question resolution, warheads that are retired and awaiting dismantlement will not be counted.\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously if the US maintains strictly fewer than 3,800 nuclear warheads in its inventory at any time in 2029.\n\n----\n\nSee also the related question, [In 2029, will the US have fewer nuclear warheads than it did in 2019?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2817/in-2029-will-the-us-have-fewer-nuclear-warheads-than-it-did-in-2019/)", "lower_25": "4.16k", "median": "4.73k", "upper_75": "5.95k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "If and when the first whole human brain is successfully emulated, what is the chance that 1 hour of subjective run time will cost 1.60M?", "desc": "Whole brain emulation (WBE) is the possible future one-to-one modelling of the human brain. The basic idea is to take a particular brain, scan its structure in detail, and construct a software model of it that is sufficiently faithful to the original that, when run on appropriate hardware, it will behave in essentially the same way as the original brain. [[1](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf)]\n\nIf whole brain emulation is possible, then one factor that might influence how it develops after being invented is how expensive it is per emulation. If it is cheap at the moment of discovery, there may be a rapid proliferation of ems quickly replacing human economic activity; if it is very expensive, then growth in the number of ems may be initially much slower. \n\n[Sandberg (2014)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/reports/2014-1.pdf) calls this the \"overshoot\" scenario, and proposes that the cost per em will be low if the last constraint to be solved is something other than hardware (such as neuroscience knowledge or scanning technology), since whole brain emulation will be delayed to a time when hardware is cheaper.\n\nHow much computing power is required to run a whole brain emulation is not known (although rough estimates have been made by [Sandberg (2014)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/reports/2014-1.pdf), and [by fellow Metaculites](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2646/what-will-the-necessary-computational-power-to-replicate-human-mental-capability-turn-out-to-be/)). What is known is that the required power will almost certainly depend on the necessary level of resolution at which the copy of the brain needs to be modelled in order to emulate the human brain at a high level of fidelity.", "resc": "**If and when the first whole human brain is successfully emulated, how much will the necessary computational power to replicate human mental capability for an hour of subjective run-time cost in 2019 USD?**\n\n-----\n\n**Methodology**\n\nIn line with the methodology used in [AI Impacts (2015)](https://aiimpacts.org/brain-performance-in-teps/#Cost_of_human-level_TEPS_performance), hardware costs will be amortised over a period of three years. That is, for a given computer we consider the fixed costs of purchasing and the cost of operating it over a year. Operating costs may include maintenance, rent of related facilities (power generation/distribution, cooling systems, etc.), utilities costs (i.e. electricity) and staffing. Then, hardware costs per hour is given by:\n\n\\[\\text{hardware cost per hour}=\\frac{\\text{fixed cost}+3\\hspace{0.1cm} \\text{(years)}*\\text{yearly operating cost}}{365\\hspace{0.1cm}\\text{(days)}*3 \\hspace{0.1cm} \\text{(years)} * 24\\hspace{0.1cm} \\text{(hours)}}\\]\n\nThis figure is then adjusted to 2019 prices using a commonly used producer's price index of the country in which the supercomputer was purchased.\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nIf a whole human brain is successfully emulated, as per the criteria in [When will the first whole human brain be successfully emulated?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2813/when-will-the-first-whole-human-brain-be-successfully-emulated/), the question will 365 days after the first successful emulation as the lowest hardware cost-per-hour (in 2019 prices) that is enabled by a supercomputer that is shown to run an emulation.\n\nThis cost-per-hour is not necessarily that of the the first system that runs an emulation. Instead it will be the lowest cost of the system that runs an emulation within 365 days of when the first emulation is run successfully. \n\nBy \"cost-per-hour\" we mean the cost to run an emulation for an hour of \"subjective time\", to adjust for the possibly compressed or expanded simulation time. That is, if the emulation processes inputs \\(x\\) times as quickly (or slowly) as a typical human, cost per an elapsed real hour (i.e. the cost per wall-clock hour) will be divided by \\(x\\) to convert this into costs for an hour of \"subjective time\".", "lower_25": "594", "median": "18.6k", "upper_75": "1.60M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will have 4.16k nuclear warheads in 2029 if it does not pursue nuclear disarmament?", "desc": "", "resc": "The size of the US's nuclear weapons stockpile reached a peak [in 1966 at around 30,000 warheads](https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook-multimedia). Following the deescalation and the end of the Cold War, the number has substantially decreased. [Kristensen and Korda (2019)](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1606503) estimate that the US maintains a deployed stockpile of nearly 3,800 warheads. The approximate breakdown is as follows:\n\n\n- 1,750 warheads are currently deployed, of which\n - 1,300 strategic warheads are deployed on ballistic missiles, \n - 300 at strategic bomber bases in the United States, \n - 150 tactical bombs are deployed at air bases in Europe.\n- 2,050 are in storage as a so-called hedge against technical or geopolitical surprises.\n \nIt is possible that this trend will reverse in a period of nuclear rearmament, especially if world tensions get worse. The Trump Administration's [Nuclear Posture Review](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Posture_Review) takes a confrontational tone, presenting an assertive posture that embraces “Great Power competition” and includes plans to expand the US' nuclear arsenal.\n\n**If the US has at least 3,800 nuclear warheads in 2029, what is the largest number of nuclear warheads it will maintain in its inventory in 2029?**\n\nThis resolves as the largest number of nuclear warheads deployed or in storage in the 2029 period, conditional on this number being at least 3,800, as reported by credible sources such as the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists' Nuclear Notebook (such as [this one for 2019](https://thebulletin.org/2019/04/united-states-nuclear-forces-2019/)). A similar credible source may be consulted if the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in no longer active or publishing reports. For the purposes of question resolution, warheads that are retired and awaiting dismantlement will not be counted.\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously if the US maintains strictly fewer than 3,800 nuclear warheads in its inventory at any time in 2029.\n\n----\n\nSee also the related question, [In 2029, will the US have fewer nuclear warheads than it did in 2019?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2817/in-2029-will-the-us-have-fewer-nuclear-warheads-than-it-did-in-2019/)", "lower_25": "4.16k", "median": "4.73k", "upper_75": "5.95k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "If and when the first whole human brain is successfully emulated, what is the chance that 1 hour of subjective run time will cost 1.60M?", "desc": "Whole brain emulation (WBE) is the possible future one-to-one modelling of the human brain. The basic idea is to take a particular brain, scan its structure in detail, and construct a software model of it that is sufficiently faithful to the original that, when run on appropriate hardware, it will behave in essentially the same way as the original brain. [[1](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf)]\n\nIf whole brain emulation is possible, then one factor that might influence how it develops after being invented is how expensive it is per emulation. If it is cheap at the moment of discovery, there may be a rapid proliferation of ems quickly replacing human economic activity; if it is very expensive, then growth in the number of ems may be initially much slower. \n\n[Sandberg (2014)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/reports/2014-1.pdf) calls this the \"overshoot\" scenario, and proposes that the cost per em will be low if the last constraint to be solved is something other than hardware (such as neuroscience knowledge or scanning technology), since whole brain emulation will be delayed to a time when hardware is cheaper.\n\nHow much computing power is required to run a whole brain emulation is not known (although rough estimates have been made by [Sandberg (2014)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/reports/2014-1.pdf), and [by fellow Metaculites](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2646/what-will-the-necessary-computational-power-to-replicate-human-mental-capability-turn-out-to-be/)). What is known is that the required power will almost certainly depend on the necessary level of resolution at which the copy of the brain needs to be modelled in order to emulate the human brain at a high level of fidelity.", "resc": "**If and when the first whole human brain is successfully emulated, how much will the necessary computational power to replicate human mental capability for an hour of subjective run-time cost in 2019 USD?**\n\n-----\n\n**Methodology**\n\nIn line with the methodology used in [AI Impacts (2015)](https://aiimpacts.org/brain-performance-in-teps/#Cost_of_human-level_TEPS_performance), hardware costs will be amortised over a period of three years. That is, for a given computer we consider the fixed costs of purchasing and the cost of operating it over a year. Operating costs may include maintenance, rent of related facilities (power generation/distribution, cooling systems, etc.), utilities costs (i.e. electricity) and staffing. Then, hardware costs per hour is given by:\n\n\\[\\text{hardware cost per hour}=\\frac{\\text{fixed cost}+3\\hspace{0.1cm} \\text{(years)}*\\text{yearly operating cost}}{365\\hspace{0.1cm}\\text{(days)}*3 \\hspace{0.1cm} \\text{(years)} * 24\\hspace{0.1cm} \\text{(hours)}}\\]\n\nThis figure is then adjusted to 2019 prices using a commonly used producer's price index of the country in which the supercomputer was purchased.\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nIf a whole human brain is successfully emulated, as per the criteria in [When will the first whole human brain be successfully emulated?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2813/when-will-the-first-whole-human-brain-be-successfully-emulated/), the question will 365 days after the first successful emulation as the lowest hardware cost-per-hour (in 2019 prices) that is enabled by a supercomputer that is shown to run an emulation.\n\nThis cost-per-hour is not necessarily that of the the first system that runs an emulation. Instead it will be the lowest cost of the system that runs an emulation within 365 days of when the first emulation is run successfully. \n\nBy \"cost-per-hour\" we mean the cost to run an emulation for an hour of \"subjective time\", to adjust for the possibly compressed or expanded simulation time. That is, if the emulation processes inputs \\(x\\) times as quickly (or slowly) as a typical human, cost per an elapsed real hour (i.e. the cost per wall-clock hour) will be divided by \\(x\\) to convert this into costs for an hour of \"subjective time\".", "lower_25": "594", "median": "18.6k", "upper_75": "1.60M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If and when the first whole human brain is successfully emulated, what is the chance that 1 hour of subjective run time will cost 1.60M?", "desc": "Whole brain emulation (WBE) is the possible future one-to-one modelling of the human brain. The basic idea is to take a particular brain, scan its structure in detail, and construct a software model of it that is sufficiently faithful to the original that, when run on appropriate hardware, it will behave in essentially the same way as the original brain. [[1](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/brain-emulation-roadmap-report.pdf)]\n\nIf whole brain emulation is possible, then one factor that might influence how it develops after being invented is how expensive it is per emulation. If it is cheap at the moment of discovery, there may be a rapid proliferation of ems quickly replacing human economic activity; if it is very expensive, then growth in the number of ems may be initially much slower. \n\n[Sandberg (2014)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/reports/2014-1.pdf) calls this the \"overshoot\" scenario, and proposes that the cost per em will be low if the last constraint to be solved is something other than hardware (such as neuroscience knowledge or scanning technology), since whole brain emulation will be delayed to a time when hardware is cheaper.\n\nHow much computing power is required to run a whole brain emulation is not known (although rough estimates have been made by [Sandberg (2014)](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/reports/2014-1.pdf), and [by fellow Metaculites](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2646/what-will-the-necessary-computational-power-to-replicate-human-mental-capability-turn-out-to-be/)). What is known is that the required power will almost certainly depend on the necessary level of resolution at which the copy of the brain needs to be modelled in order to emulate the human brain at a high level of fidelity.", "resc": "**If and when the first whole human brain is successfully emulated, how much will the necessary computational power to replicate human mental capability for an hour of subjective run-time cost in 2019 USD?**\n\n-----\n\n**Methodology**\n\nIn line with the methodology used in [AI Impacts (2015)](https://aiimpacts.org/brain-performance-in-teps/#Cost_of_human-level_TEPS_performance), hardware costs will be amortised over a period of three years. That is, for a given computer we consider the fixed costs of purchasing and the cost of operating it over a year. Operating costs may include maintenance, rent of related facilities (power generation/distribution, cooling systems, etc.), utilities costs (i.e. electricity) and staffing. Then, hardware costs per hour is given by:\n\n\\[\\text{hardware cost per hour}=\\frac{\\text{fixed cost}+3\\hspace{0.1cm} \\text{(years)}*\\text{yearly operating cost}}{365\\hspace{0.1cm}\\text{(days)}*3 \\hspace{0.1cm} \\text{(years)} * 24\\hspace{0.1cm} \\text{(hours)}}\\]\n\nThis figure is then adjusted to 2019 prices using a commonly used producer's price index of the country in which the supercomputer was purchased.\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nIf a whole human brain is successfully emulated, as per the criteria in [When will the first whole human brain be successfully emulated?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2813/when-will-the-first-whole-human-brain-be-successfully-emulated/), the question will 365 days after the first successful emulation as the lowest hardware cost-per-hour (in 2019 prices) that is enabled by a supercomputer that is shown to run an emulation.\n\nThis cost-per-hour is not necessarily that of the the first system that runs an emulation. Instead it will be the lowest cost of the system that runs an emulation within 365 days of when the first emulation is run successfully. \n\nBy \"cost-per-hour\" we mean the cost to run an emulation for an hour of \"subjective time\", to adjust for the possibly compressed or expanded simulation time. That is, if the emulation processes inputs \\(x\\) times as quickly (or slowly) as a typical human, cost per an elapsed real hour (i.e. the cost per wall-clock hour) will be divided by \\(x\\) to convert this into costs for an hour of \"subjective time\".", "lower_25": "594", "median": "18.6k", "upper_75": "1.60M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 114k deaths in the US will be due to antibiotic-resistant infections in 2035?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will the number of deaths from antibiotic-resistant infections per year double by the end of 2025?\n](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2937/will-the-number-of-deaths-from-antibiotic-resistant-infections-per-year-double-by-the-end-of-2025/)\n\n----\n\nRepeated use of antibiotics has led to the existence of resistant strains of bacteria, which are immune to the effects of multiple different antibiotics. This has been described as a \"serious, worldwide threat to public health\" by [the WHO](https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/amr-report/en/).\n\nIn 2013 the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) [reported](https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/biggest_threats.html) that over 23,000 people died each year from antibiotic-resistant infections in the US. More recent data on their website suggests the figure is more like 37,000. I ask:", "resc": "Resolution should be based on CDC estimates, or if not available, the median of credible estimates in reputable publications found by Metaculites and/or admin on the day the question is resolved", "lower_25": "34.5k", "median": "63.9k", "upper_75": "114k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 114k deaths in the US will be due to antibiotic-resistant infections in 2035?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will the number of deaths from antibiotic-resistant infections per year double by the end of 2025?\n](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2937/will-the-number-of-deaths-from-antibiotic-resistant-infections-per-year-double-by-the-end-of-2025/)\n\n----\n\nRepeated use of antibiotics has led to the existence of resistant strains of bacteria, which are immune to the effects of multiple different antibiotics. This has been described as a \"serious, worldwide threat to public health\" by [the WHO](https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/amr-report/en/).\n\nIn 2013 the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) [reported](https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/biggest_threats.html) that over 23,000 people died each year from antibiotic-resistant infections in the US. More recent data on their website suggests the figure is more like 37,000. I ask:", "resc": "Resolution should be based on CDC estimates, or if not available, the median of credible estimates in reputable publications found by Metaculites and/or admin on the day the question is resolved", "lower_25": "34.5k", "median": "63.9k", "upper_75": "114k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global adult literacy rate will reach 95% by 2048?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2048", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 114k deaths in the US will be due to antibiotic-resistant infections in 2035?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will the number of deaths from antibiotic-resistant infections per year double by the end of 2025?\n](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2937/will-the-number-of-deaths-from-antibiotic-resistant-infections-per-year-double-by-the-end-of-2025/)\n\n----\n\nRepeated use of antibiotics has led to the existence of resistant strains of bacteria, which are immune to the effects of multiple different antibiotics. This has been described as a \"serious, worldwide threat to public health\" by [the WHO](https://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/amr-report/en/).\n\nIn 2013 the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) [reported](https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/biggest_threats.html) that over 23,000 people died each year from antibiotic-resistant infections in the US. More recent data on their website suggests the figure is more like 37,000. I ask:", "resc": "Resolution should be based on CDC estimates, or if not available, the median of credible estimates in reputable publications found by Metaculites and/or admin on the day the question is resolved", "lower_25": "34.5k", "median": "63.9k", "upper_75": "114k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.18 small firearms per capita in the US in 2029?", "desc": "The [Small Arms Survey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_Arms_Survey) collects the number of civilian held small firearms per capita in a list of countries and territories. In the [2017 survey](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP-Civilian-Firearms-Numbers.pdf) (published in 2018), the USA was #1, with ~1.2 guns per person.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of small firearms per person in the United States, according to the [Small Arms Survey](https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/) covering 2029 or any portion of 2029.\n\nIf the Small Arms Survey does not publish this data by December 2030, or if it fundamentally changes its methodology (e.g. by changing the class of weapons it counts) the question may resolve as **Ambiguous**, or a new source may be chosen at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "1.18", "median": "1.41", "upper_75": "1.68", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 45.1 billion biological humans alive on December 31, 2300, conditional on there being more than 500 Million?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.57B", "median": "14.8B", "upper_75": "45.1B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will pass the laugh test by 2029?", "desc": "In [this article](https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/what-comes-after-the-turing-test) computer scientist Gary Marcus laid down the gauntlet:\n\n> ...allow me to propose a Turing Test for the twenty-first century: build a computer program that can watch any arbitrary TV program or YouTube video and answer questions about its content.... no existing program—not Watson, not Goostman, not Siri—can currently come close to doing what any bright, real teenager can do: watch an episode of “The Simpsons,” and tell us when to laugh.", "resc": "This question resolves as **YES** if an AI system achieves 90% of human accuracy when tested on 25 other different randomly chosen episodes, **NO** if not, and **AMBIGUOUS** if the test is never conducted.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, assume that a data set has been created based on labeling of at least 100 episodes of a television comedy (obviously without laugh track/studio audience and preferably but not necessarily The Simpsons.)", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Sep 2025", "upper_75": "2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.18 small firearms per capita in the US in 2029?", "desc": "The [Small Arms Survey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_Arms_Survey) collects the number of civilian held small firearms per capita in a list of countries and territories. In the [2017 survey](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP-Civilian-Firearms-Numbers.pdf) (published in 2018), the USA was #1, with ~1.2 guns per person.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of small firearms per person in the United States, according to the [Small Arms Survey](https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/) covering 2029 or any portion of 2029.\n\nIf the Small Arms Survey does not publish this data by December 2030, or if it fundamentally changes its methodology (e.g. by changing the class of weapons it counts) the question may resolve as **Ambiguous**, or a new source may be chosen at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "1.18", "median": "1.41", "upper_75": "1.68", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global adult literacy rate will reach 95% by 2048?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2048", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that Elon Musk will have a brain-machine interface surgically implanted into his brain by 2036?", "desc": "", "resc": "**When will Elon Musk have any device, such as a brain-machine interface, surgically implanted into his brain?**\n\nThis question resolves positively if it is confirmed by reputable sources that Elon Musk has been subjected to surgery that inserted (parts of) a device into his brain tissue, for any reason other than monitoring or alleviating a disease and/or impairment. This device does not have to function in any specific way (or any way at all) for a positive resolution. For positive resolution, the implantation of at least part of the device needs to involve an intra-cranial insertion (hence a non-invasive headset system like [OpenBCI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenBCI) or [OpenWater](https://www.openwater.cc/) does not count). However, the part of the device inserted may be very small, e.g. an array of very thin threads such as those described in the [Neuralink paper](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/biorxiv/early/2019/07/17/703801.full.pdf) would count. The specific device does not have to be one manufactured by [Neuralink](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuralink), and it does not need to be available to any member of the general public or approved by regulatory agencies.\n\nThe question resolves as >2040 if Elon Musk is still alive on the 1st of January, 2040, and Elon Musk did not have any device, such as a brain-machine interface, surgically implanted into his brain before this date. The question resolves ambiguous if Elon Musk does not have a device implanted and passes away before the end of the calender year 2040.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that Elon Musk will have a brain-machine interface surgically implanted into his brain by 2036?", "desc": "", "resc": "**When will Elon Musk have any device, such as a brain-machine interface, surgically implanted into his brain?**\n\nThis question resolves positively if it is confirmed by reputable sources that Elon Musk has been subjected to surgery that inserted (parts of) a device into his brain tissue, for any reason other than monitoring or alleviating a disease and/or impairment. This device does not have to function in any specific way (or any way at all) for a positive resolution. For positive resolution, the implantation of at least part of the device needs to involve an intra-cranial insertion (hence a non-invasive headset system like [OpenBCI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenBCI) or [OpenWater](https://www.openwater.cc/) does not count). However, the part of the device inserted may be very small, e.g. an array of very thin threads such as those described in the [Neuralink paper](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/biorxiv/early/2019/07/17/703801.full.pdf) would count. The specific device does not have to be one manufactured by [Neuralink](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuralink), and it does not need to be available to any member of the general public or approved by regulatory agencies.\n\nThe question resolves as >2040 if Elon Musk is still alive on the 1st of January, 2040, and Elon Musk did not have any device, such as a brain-machine interface, surgically implanted into his brain before this date. The question resolves ambiguous if Elon Musk does not have a device implanted and passes away before the end of the calender year 2040.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will pass the laugh test by 2029?", "desc": "In [this article](https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/what-comes-after-the-turing-test) computer scientist Gary Marcus laid down the gauntlet:\n\n> ...allow me to propose a Turing Test for the twenty-first century: build a computer program that can watch any arbitrary TV program or YouTube video and answer questions about its content.... no existing program—not Watson, not Goostman, not Siri—can currently come close to doing what any bright, real teenager can do: watch an episode of “The Simpsons,” and tell us when to laugh.", "resc": "This question resolves as **YES** if an AI system achieves 90% of human accuracy when tested on 25 other different randomly chosen episodes, **NO** if not, and **AMBIGUOUS** if the test is never conducted.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, assume that a data set has been created based on labeling of at least 100 episodes of a television comedy (obviously without laugh track/studio audience and preferably but not necessarily The Simpsons.)", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Sep 2025", "upper_75": "2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first human baby from stem cell-derived gametes will be born by 2033?", "desc": "At some point in the future, it will become possible to derive gametes from embryonic pluripotent stem cells (PSCs). Differentiation of PCSs into eggs and sperm would provide researchers with a powerful tool for studying human gametogenesis. Perhaps even more importantly, it would allow infertile couples and same-sex couples to have offspring that is genetically related to both parents.\n\nA [2008 report](http://www.hinxtongroup.org/Consensus_HG08_FINAL.pdf) by the [Hinxton Group](http://www.hinxtongroup.org/)—a global network of stem cell researchers—tentatively predicted _in vitro_ genesis of human gametes between 2013 and 2023. A number of recent papers discuss advances in the field and remaining challenges ahead.[[1](https://www.gwern.net/docs/genetics/selection/2018-yamashiro.pdf)] [[2](https://rbej.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12958-017-0308-8)] [[3](https://europepmc.org/articles/pmc6396646)]", "resc": "The question will resolve as the date when a relevant announcement is made in one of the following media outlets: _The New York Times_, _The Financial Times_, _The Washington Post_, _The Economist_, _The Wall Street Journal_, The Associated Press, Reuters, or the BBC. The announcement should leave no doubt that the live birth occurred and that the baby was conceived from stem cell-derived gametes. The question resolves retroactively 12 months before publication of the announcement.\n\nIf this does not occur between August 1, 2020 to January 1, 2050, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 45.1 billion biological humans alive on December 31, 2300, conditional on there being more than 500 Million?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.57B", "median": "14.8B", "upper_75": "45.1B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.18 small firearms per capita in the US in 2029?", "desc": "The [Small Arms Survey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_Arms_Survey) collects the number of civilian held small firearms per capita in a list of countries and territories. In the [2017 survey](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP-Civilian-Firearms-Numbers.pdf) (published in 2018), the USA was #1, with ~1.2 guns per person.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of small firearms per person in the United States, according to the [Small Arms Survey](https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/) covering 2029 or any portion of 2029.\n\nIf the Small Arms Survey does not publish this data by December 2030, or if it fundamentally changes its methodology (e.g. by changing the class of weapons it counts) the question may resolve as **Ambiguous**, or a new source may be chosen at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "1.18", "median": "1.41", "upper_75": "1.68", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will pass the laugh test by 2029?", "desc": "In [this article](https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/what-comes-after-the-turing-test) computer scientist Gary Marcus laid down the gauntlet:\n\n> ...allow me to propose a Turing Test for the twenty-first century: build a computer program that can watch any arbitrary TV program or YouTube video and answer questions about its content.... no existing program—not Watson, not Goostman, not Siri—can currently come close to doing what any bright, real teenager can do: watch an episode of “The Simpsons,” and tell us when to laugh.", "resc": "This question resolves as **YES** if an AI system achieves 90% of human accuracy when tested on 25 other different randomly chosen episodes, **NO** if not, and **AMBIGUOUS** if the test is never conducted.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, assume that a data set has been created based on labeling of at least 100 episodes of a television comedy (obviously without laugh track/studio audience and preferably but not necessarily The Simpsons.)", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Sep 2025", "upper_75": "2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first human baby from stem cell-derived gametes will be born by 2033?", "desc": "At some point in the future, it will become possible to derive gametes from embryonic pluripotent stem cells (PSCs). Differentiation of PCSs into eggs and sperm would provide researchers with a powerful tool for studying human gametogenesis. Perhaps even more importantly, it would allow infertile couples and same-sex couples to have offspring that is genetically related to both parents.\n\nA [2008 report](http://www.hinxtongroup.org/Consensus_HG08_FINAL.pdf) by the [Hinxton Group](http://www.hinxtongroup.org/)—a global network of stem cell researchers—tentatively predicted _in vitro_ genesis of human gametes between 2013 and 2023. A number of recent papers discuss advances in the field and remaining challenges ahead.[[1](https://www.gwern.net/docs/genetics/selection/2018-yamashiro.pdf)] [[2](https://rbej.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12958-017-0308-8)] [[3](https://europepmc.org/articles/pmc6396646)]", "resc": "The question will resolve as the date when a relevant announcement is made in one of the following media outlets: _The New York Times_, _The Financial Times_, _The Washington Post_, _The Economist_, _The Wall Street Journal_, The Associated Press, Reuters, or the BBC. The announcement should leave no doubt that the live birth occurred and that the baby was conceived from stem cell-derived gametes. The question resolves retroactively 12 months before publication of the announcement.\n\nIf this does not occur between August 1, 2020 to January 1, 2050, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a biotechnological or bioengineered organism catastrophe this century by 2055?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Ragnarök Question Series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ragnarok) asks whether there will be a [biotechnological catastrophe](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1502/ragnar%25C3%25B6k-question-series-if-a-global-catastrophe-occurs-will-it-be-due-to-biotechnology-or-bioengineered-organisms/), for example from an engineered virus or a gene drive targeted on humans.\n\nSince biotechnology is becoming more advanced and cheaper as time goes on, potentially faster than humanity's abilities to prevent pandemics, it is plausible that the time of greatest risk from bioengineering will be in the future.\n\n**Given that a catastrophe resulting from a biotechnology or bioengineered organisms occurs before 2100, when will this occur?**\n\nResolution will be on the day when it is first true that such a catastrophe (defined as one that claims at least 10% of the human population in any period of 5 years or less) that is principally due to the deployment of biotechnologies or bioengineered organisms has occurred, or ambiguous if no such catastrophe occurs.", "lower_25": "2042", "median": "2055", "upper_75": "2066", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global adult literacy rate will reach 95% by 2048?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2048", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a biotechnological or bioengineered organism catastrophe this century by 2055?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Ragnarök Question Series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ragnarok) asks whether there will be a [biotechnological catastrophe](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1502/ragnar%25C3%25B6k-question-series-if-a-global-catastrophe-occurs-will-it-be-due-to-biotechnology-or-bioengineered-organisms/), for example from an engineered virus or a gene drive targeted on humans.\n\nSince biotechnology is becoming more advanced and cheaper as time goes on, potentially faster than humanity's abilities to prevent pandemics, it is plausible that the time of greatest risk from bioengineering will be in the future.\n\n**Given that a catastrophe resulting from a biotechnology or bioengineered organisms occurs before 2100, when will this occur?**\n\nResolution will be on the day when it is first true that such a catastrophe (defined as one that claims at least 10% of the human population in any period of 5 years or less) that is principally due to the deployment of biotechnologies or bioengineered organisms has occurred, or ambiguous if no such catastrophe occurs.", "lower_25": "2042", "median": "2055", "upper_75": "2066", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that any country will have a life expectancy at birth for both sexes of at least 100 years by 2046?", "desc": "As of 2017, according to the CIA World Factbook the country with the greatest life expectancy at birth for both sexes (combined average, not both sexes individually) was [Monaco at 89.4 years.](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2102rank.html) In second and third place were Japan and Singapore, at 85.3 and 85.2 years respectively. \n\nOf 224 countries and territories listed, only 43 had a life expectancy of at least 80 years, the lowest of these being the United States at 80 years. Only 19 had a life expectancy below 60 years, the lowest of these being Chad at 50.6 years.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when life expectancy at birth for both sexes reach at least 100 years in any country, according to the CIA World Factbook, World Health Organization or United Nations.\n\nBy 'for both sexes,' this question refers to the average for both sexes, not a requirement that life expectancy must equal 100 years for women and men individually.\n\nBy 'country,' this question refers to a sovereign state. Special administrative regions, federal states or provinces, overseas territories, and other non-sovereign geopolitical entities do not count.\n\nThis question shall accept the first instance of any country reaching a combined both sexes life expectancy at birth of at least 100 years according to any of these sources: CIA World Factbook, United Nations, World Health Organization", "lower_25": "2046", "median": "2061", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2075", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that any country will have a life expectancy at birth for both sexes of at least 100 years by 2046?", "desc": "As of 2017, according to the CIA World Factbook the country with the greatest life expectancy at birth for both sexes (combined average, not both sexes individually) was [Monaco at 89.4 years.](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2102rank.html) In second and third place were Japan and Singapore, at 85.3 and 85.2 years respectively. \n\nOf 224 countries and territories listed, only 43 had a life expectancy of at least 80 years, the lowest of these being the United States at 80 years. Only 19 had a life expectancy below 60 years, the lowest of these being Chad at 50.6 years.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when life expectancy at birth for both sexes reach at least 100 years in any country, according to the CIA World Factbook, World Health Organization or United Nations.\n\nBy 'for both sexes,' this question refers to the average for both sexes, not a requirement that life expectancy must equal 100 years for women and men individually.\n\nBy 'country,' this question refers to a sovereign state. Special administrative regions, federal states or provinces, overseas territories, and other non-sovereign geopolitical entities do not count.\n\nThis question shall accept the first instance of any country reaching a combined both sexes life expectancy at birth of at least 100 years according to any of these sources: CIA World Factbook, United Nations, World Health Organization", "lower_25": "2046", "median": "2061", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2075", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average American employee will work 33.6 hours per week in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "According to [Our World in Data,](https://ourworldindata.org/working-hours) the average American worked 62 hours per week in 1870. By the year 2000 this had declined to 40.25 hours per week; a decrease of over 35%. As of July 2019, the average American employee on US private nonfarm payrolls [worked 34.4 hours per week according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.](https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/average-weekly-hours)\n\nOver the coming decades, it is possible that [new technologies](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/jack-ma-proponent-of-12-hour-work-days-foresees-12-hour-workweeks/2019/08/29/fd081370-ca2a-11e9-9615-8f1a32962e04_story.html?noredirect=on) and [changes in working practices](https://hbr.org/2018/12/the-case-for-the-6-hour-workday) will enable workers to work fewer hours per week. \n\n**This question asks: in January 2030, how many hours per week will the average employee on US private nonfarm payrolls work, according to either the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, or the statistical authority tasked with providing this information?**", "lower_25": "28.6", "median": "31.2", "upper_75": "33.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated revenue generated by the U.S. market for clean meat in the fiscal year 2027, in millions of 2019 USD?", "desc": "[As of mid-2019 there were over a dozen companies developing clean meat](https://cellbasedtech.com/clean-meat-companies), mostly early-stage startups, and only some with total funding exceeding $20M (these are [Just](https://www.ju.st/en-us) and [Memphis Meats](https://www.memphismeats.com/)). [Estimates reveal](http://elliot-swartz.squarespace.com/) that funding has shown impressive growth just over the past 4 years. As of time of writing this question (August, 2019), no clean meat products have yet been brought to market.\n\nFor a point of comparison, data from [SPINS](https://www.spins.com/) summarised by The Good Food Institute shows U.S. retail sales of plant-based meat generated [an estimated $801M](https://plantbasedfoods.org/2019-data-plant-based-market/) in the year ending April, 2018.", "resc": "-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as a credible estimate of the revenue by companies generated from the sale of clean-meat containing products for human consumption in the U.S., in the [U.S. fiscal year](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiscal_year#United_States) 2027. The figure shall be given in millions of USD, in 2019 prices. Qualifying products need to contain at least 1% of clean meat by weight. Clean meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal's body.\n\nEstimates should originate from a credible sources, preferably a nonprofit research organisation focussing on clean meat and related technologies, independent market research companies, consultancy reports on clean meat, journal publications by researchers not affiliated with clean meat companies. In the case a range of revenue numbers are reported, the question shall resolve as the median of this range. In the case multiple estimates are found upon resolving, the admin may choose to resolve this question as the median of different estimates, or resolve it per the estimate deemed most credible.\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously if, by the start of 2030, no credible estimates of the revenue by U.S. based companies generated from clean-meat containing products sales for the fiscal year 2027 can be found.\n\nThe question resolves in terms of 2019 USD. Hence, estimates are to be adjusted for inflation using a suitable [Bureau of Labour Statistics' CPI](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/).\n\n*This question is part of the [clean meat series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3061/animal-welfare-series-clean-meat/) of our Animal Welfare forecasting project. See also:*\n\n\n\n[How much revenue will the U.S. market for clean meat generate, in the fiscal year 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3077/how-much-revenue-will-the-us-market-for-clean-meat-generate-in-the-fiscal-year-2030/", "lower_25": "1.05k", "median": "3.27k", "upper_75": "9.01k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that Elon Musk will have a brain-machine interface surgically implanted into his brain by 2036?", "desc": "", "resc": "**When will Elon Musk have any device, such as a brain-machine interface, surgically implanted into his brain?**\n\nThis question resolves positively if it is confirmed by reputable sources that Elon Musk has been subjected to surgery that inserted (parts of) a device into his brain tissue, for any reason other than monitoring or alleviating a disease and/or impairment. This device does not have to function in any specific way (or any way at all) for a positive resolution. For positive resolution, the implantation of at least part of the device needs to involve an intra-cranial insertion (hence a non-invasive headset system like [OpenBCI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenBCI) or [OpenWater](https://www.openwater.cc/) does not count). However, the part of the device inserted may be very small, e.g. an array of very thin threads such as those described in the [Neuralink paper](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/biorxiv/early/2019/07/17/703801.full.pdf) would count. The specific device does not have to be one manufactured by [Neuralink](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuralink), and it does not need to be available to any member of the general public or approved by regulatory agencies.\n\nThe question resolves as >2040 if Elon Musk is still alive on the 1st of January, 2040, and Elon Musk did not have any device, such as a brain-machine interface, surgically implanted into his brain before this date. The question resolves ambiguous if Elon Musk does not have a device implanted and passes away before the end of the calender year 2040.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated revenue generated by the U.S. market for clean meat in the fiscal year 2027, in millions of 2019 USD?", "desc": "[As of mid-2019 there were over a dozen companies developing clean meat](https://cellbasedtech.com/clean-meat-companies), mostly early-stage startups, and only some with total funding exceeding $20M (these are [Just](https://www.ju.st/en-us) and [Memphis Meats](https://www.memphismeats.com/)). [Estimates reveal](http://elliot-swartz.squarespace.com/) that funding has shown impressive growth just over the past 4 years. As of time of writing this question (August, 2019), no clean meat products have yet been brought to market.\n\nFor a point of comparison, data from [SPINS](https://www.spins.com/) summarised by The Good Food Institute shows U.S. retail sales of plant-based meat generated [an estimated $801M](https://plantbasedfoods.org/2019-data-plant-based-market/) in the year ending April, 2018.", "resc": "-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as a credible estimate of the revenue by companies generated from the sale of clean-meat containing products for human consumption in the U.S., in the [U.S. fiscal year](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiscal_year#United_States) 2027. The figure shall be given in millions of USD, in 2019 prices. Qualifying products need to contain at least 1% of clean meat by weight. Clean meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal's body.\n\nEstimates should originate from a credible sources, preferably a nonprofit research organisation focussing on clean meat and related technologies, independent market research companies, consultancy reports on clean meat, journal publications by researchers not affiliated with clean meat companies. In the case a range of revenue numbers are reported, the question shall resolve as the median of this range. In the case multiple estimates are found upon resolving, the admin may choose to resolve this question as the median of different estimates, or resolve it per the estimate deemed most credible.\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously if, by the start of 2030, no credible estimates of the revenue by U.S. based companies generated from clean-meat containing products sales for the fiscal year 2027 can be found.\n\nThe question resolves in terms of 2019 USD. Hence, estimates are to be adjusted for inflation using a suitable [Bureau of Labour Statistics' CPI](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/).\n\n*This question is part of the [clean meat series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3061/animal-welfare-series-clean-meat/) of our Animal Welfare forecasting project. See also:*\n\n\n\n[How much revenue will the U.S. market for clean meat generate, in the fiscal year 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3077/how-much-revenue-will-the-us-market-for-clean-meat-generate-in-the-fiscal-year-2030/", "lower_25": "1.05k", "median": "3.27k", "upper_75": "9.01k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated revenue generated by the U.S. market for clean meat in the fiscal year 2027, in millions of 2019 USD?", "desc": "[As of mid-2019 there were over a dozen companies developing clean meat](https://cellbasedtech.com/clean-meat-companies), mostly early-stage startups, and only some with total funding exceeding $20M (these are [Just](https://www.ju.st/en-us) and [Memphis Meats](https://www.memphismeats.com/)). [Estimates reveal](http://elliot-swartz.squarespace.com/) that funding has shown impressive growth just over the past 4 years. As of time of writing this question (August, 2019), no clean meat products have yet been brought to market.\n\nFor a point of comparison, data from [SPINS](https://www.spins.com/) summarised by The Good Food Institute shows U.S. retail sales of plant-based meat generated [an estimated $801M](https://plantbasedfoods.org/2019-data-plant-based-market/) in the year ending April, 2018.", "resc": "-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as a credible estimate of the revenue by companies generated from the sale of clean-meat containing products for human consumption in the U.S., in the [U.S. fiscal year](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiscal_year#United_States) 2027. The figure shall be given in millions of USD, in 2019 prices. Qualifying products need to contain at least 1% of clean meat by weight. Clean meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal's body.\n\nEstimates should originate from a credible sources, preferably a nonprofit research organisation focussing on clean meat and related technologies, independent market research companies, consultancy reports on clean meat, journal publications by researchers not affiliated with clean meat companies. In the case a range of revenue numbers are reported, the question shall resolve as the median of this range. In the case multiple estimates are found upon resolving, the admin may choose to resolve this question as the median of different estimates, or resolve it per the estimate deemed most credible.\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously if, by the start of 2030, no credible estimates of the revenue by U.S. based companies generated from clean-meat containing products sales for the fiscal year 2027 can be found.\n\nThe question resolves in terms of 2019 USD. Hence, estimates are to be adjusted for inflation using a suitable [Bureau of Labour Statistics' CPI](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/).\n\n*This question is part of the [clean meat series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3061/animal-welfare-series-clean-meat/) of our Animal Welfare forecasting project. See also:*\n\n\n\n[How much revenue will the U.S. market for clean meat generate, in the fiscal year 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3077/how-much-revenue-will-the-us-market-for-clean-meat-generate-in-the-fiscal-year-2030/", "lower_25": "1.05k", "median": "3.27k", "upper_75": "9.01k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a biotechnological or bioengineered organism catastrophe this century by 2055?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Ragnarök Question Series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ragnarok) asks whether there will be a [biotechnological catastrophe](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1502/ragnar%25C3%25B6k-question-series-if-a-global-catastrophe-occurs-will-it-be-due-to-biotechnology-or-bioengineered-organisms/), for example from an engineered virus or a gene drive targeted on humans.\n\nSince biotechnology is becoming more advanced and cheaper as time goes on, potentially faster than humanity's abilities to prevent pandemics, it is plausible that the time of greatest risk from bioengineering will be in the future.\n\n**Given that a catastrophe resulting from a biotechnology or bioengineered organisms occurs before 2100, when will this occur?**\n\nResolution will be on the day when it is first true that such a catastrophe (defined as one that claims at least 10% of the human population in any period of 5 years or less) that is principally due to the deployment of biotechnologies or bioengineered organisms has occurred, or ambiguous if no such catastrophe occurs.", "lower_25": "2042", "median": "2055", "upper_75": "2066", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first human baby from stem cell-derived gametes will be born by 2033?", "desc": "At some point in the future, it will become possible to derive gametes from embryonic pluripotent stem cells (PSCs). Differentiation of PCSs into eggs and sperm would provide researchers with a powerful tool for studying human gametogenesis. Perhaps even more importantly, it would allow infertile couples and same-sex couples to have offspring that is genetically related to both parents.\n\nA [2008 report](http://www.hinxtongroup.org/Consensus_HG08_FINAL.pdf) by the [Hinxton Group](http://www.hinxtongroup.org/)—a global network of stem cell researchers—tentatively predicted _in vitro_ genesis of human gametes between 2013 and 2023. A number of recent papers discuss advances in the field and remaining challenges ahead.[[1](https://www.gwern.net/docs/genetics/selection/2018-yamashiro.pdf)] [[2](https://rbej.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12958-017-0308-8)] [[3](https://europepmc.org/articles/pmc6396646)]", "resc": "The question will resolve as the date when a relevant announcement is made in one of the following media outlets: _The New York Times_, _The Financial Times_, _The Washington Post_, _The Economist_, _The Wall Street Journal_, The Associated Press, Reuters, or the BBC. The announcement should leave no doubt that the live birth occurred and that the baby was conceived from stem cell-derived gametes. The question resolves retroactively 12 months before publication of the announcement.\n\nIf this does not occur between August 1, 2020 to January 1, 2050, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many Starlink satellites will be in operation on January 1, 2028, out of a total of 10.9k?", "desc": "According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Starlink_(satellite_constellation)):\n\n> Starlink is a satellite constellation development project underway by American company SpaceX, to develop a low-cost, high-performance satellite bus and requisite customer ground transceivers to implement a new space-based Internet communication system.\n\nAccording to [this Space News article](https://spacenews.com/fcc-oks-lower-orbit-for-some-starlink-satellites/), they intend to launch 12 000 satellites by the end of 2027. As of the 22nd of March 2019, 62 have been launched (at least [57 are operational](https://spacenews.com/contact-lost-with-three-starlink-satellites-other-57-healthy/)), with 60 more scheduled in October 2019. Quite a long way to go.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of Starlink satellites in orbit around Earth and operational on January 1, 2028 at 00:00 UTC, according to credible media reports.\n\nIf Starlink is rebranded or purchased by another company, Metaculus has discretion to determine which company is the successor to Starlink", "lower_25": "6.72k", "median": "10.9k", "upper_75": "17.3k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average American employee will work 33.6 hours per week in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "According to [Our World in Data,](https://ourworldindata.org/working-hours) the average American worked 62 hours per week in 1870. By the year 2000 this had declined to 40.25 hours per week; a decrease of over 35%. As of July 2019, the average American employee on US private nonfarm payrolls [worked 34.4 hours per week according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.](https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/average-weekly-hours)\n\nOver the coming decades, it is possible that [new technologies](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/jack-ma-proponent-of-12-hour-work-days-foresees-12-hour-workweeks/2019/08/29/fd081370-ca2a-11e9-9615-8f1a32962e04_story.html?noredirect=on) and [changes in working practices](https://hbr.org/2018/12/the-case-for-the-6-hour-workday) will enable workers to work fewer hours per week. \n\n**This question asks: in January 2030, how many hours per week will the average employee on US private nonfarm payrolls work, according to either the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, or the statistical authority tasked with providing this information?**", "lower_25": "28.6", "median": "31.2", "upper_75": "33.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that any country will have a life expectancy at birth for both sexes of at least 100 years by 2046?", "desc": "As of 2017, according to the CIA World Factbook the country with the greatest life expectancy at birth for both sexes (combined average, not both sexes individually) was [Monaco at 89.4 years.](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2102rank.html) In second and third place were Japan and Singapore, at 85.3 and 85.2 years respectively. \n\nOf 224 countries and territories listed, only 43 had a life expectancy of at least 80 years, the lowest of these being the United States at 80 years. Only 19 had a life expectancy below 60 years, the lowest of these being Chad at 50.6 years.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when life expectancy at birth for both sexes reach at least 100 years in any country, according to the CIA World Factbook, World Health Organization or United Nations.\n\nBy 'for both sexes,' this question refers to the average for both sexes, not a requirement that life expectancy must equal 100 years for women and men individually.\n\nBy 'country,' this question refers to a sovereign state. Special administrative regions, federal states or provinces, overseas territories, and other non-sovereign geopolitical entities do not count.\n\nThis question shall accept the first instance of any country reaching a combined both sexes life expectancy at birth of at least 100 years according to any of these sources: CIA World Factbook, United Nations, World Health Organization", "lower_25": "2046", "median": "2061", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2075", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many Starlink satellites will be in operation on January 1, 2028, out of a total of 10.9k?", "desc": "According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Starlink_(satellite_constellation)):\n\n> Starlink is a satellite constellation development project underway by American company SpaceX, to develop a low-cost, high-performance satellite bus and requisite customer ground transceivers to implement a new space-based Internet communication system.\n\nAccording to [this Space News article](https://spacenews.com/fcc-oks-lower-orbit-for-some-starlink-satellites/), they intend to launch 12 000 satellites by the end of 2027. As of the 22nd of March 2019, 62 have been launched (at least [57 are operational](https://spacenews.com/contact-lost-with-three-starlink-satellites-other-57-healthy/)), with 60 more scheduled in October 2019. Quite a long way to go.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of Starlink satellites in orbit around Earth and operational on January 1, 2028 at 00:00 UTC, according to credible media reports.\n\nIf Starlink is rebranded or purchased by another company, Metaculus has discretion to determine which company is the successor to Starlink", "lower_25": "6.72k", "median": "10.9k", "upper_75": "17.3k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average American employee will work 33.6 hours per week in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "According to [Our World in Data,](https://ourworldindata.org/working-hours) the average American worked 62 hours per week in 1870. By the year 2000 this had declined to 40.25 hours per week; a decrease of over 35%. As of July 2019, the average American employee on US private nonfarm payrolls [worked 34.4 hours per week according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.](https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/average-weekly-hours)\n\nOver the coming decades, it is possible that [new technologies](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/jack-ma-proponent-of-12-hour-work-days-foresees-12-hour-workweeks/2019/08/29/fd081370-ca2a-11e9-9615-8f1a32962e04_story.html?noredirect=on) and [changes in working practices](https://hbr.org/2018/12/the-case-for-the-6-hour-workday) will enable workers to work fewer hours per week. \n\n**This question asks: in January 2030, how many hours per week will the average employee on US private nonfarm payrolls work, according to either the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, or the statistical authority tasked with providing this information?**", "lower_25": "28.6", "median": "31.2", "upper_75": "33.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many Starlink satellites will be in operation on January 1, 2028, out of a total of 10.9k?", "desc": "According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Starlink_(satellite_constellation)):\n\n> Starlink is a satellite constellation development project underway by American company SpaceX, to develop a low-cost, high-performance satellite bus and requisite customer ground transceivers to implement a new space-based Internet communication system.\n\nAccording to [this Space News article](https://spacenews.com/fcc-oks-lower-orbit-for-some-starlink-satellites/), they intend to launch 12 000 satellites by the end of 2027. As of the 22nd of March 2019, 62 have been launched (at least [57 are operational](https://spacenews.com/contact-lost-with-three-starlink-satellites-other-57-healthy/)), with 60 more scheduled in October 2019. Quite a long way to go.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of Starlink satellites in orbit around Earth and operational on January 1, 2028 at 00:00 UTC, according to credible media reports.\n\nIf Starlink is rebranded or purchased by another company, Metaculus has discretion to determine which company is the successor to Starlink", "lower_25": "6.72k", "median": "10.9k", "upper_75": "17.3k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated revenue generated by the U.S. market for clean meat in the fiscal year 2030, in millions of USD?", "desc": "", "resc": "[As of mid-2019 there were over a dozen companies developing clean meat](https://cellbasedtech.com/clean-meat-companies), mostly early-stage startups, and only some with total funding exceeding $20M (these are [Just](https://www.ju.st/en-us) and [Memphis Meats](https://www.memphismeats.com/)). [Estimates reveal](http://elliot-swartz.squarespace.com/) that funding has shown impressive growth just over the past 4 years. As of time of writing this question (August, 2019), no clean meat products have yet been brought to market.\n\nFor a point of comparison, data from [SPINS](https://www.spins.com/) summarised by The Good Food Institute shows U.S. retail sales of plant-based meat generates [an estimated $801M](https://plantbasedfoods.org/2019-data-plant-based-market/).\n\n\n**How much revenue will the U.S. market for clean meat generate, in the fiscal year 2030, in millions of 2019 USD?**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as a credible estimate of the revenue by companies generated from the sale of clean-meat containing products for human consumption in the U.S., in the [U.S. fiscal year](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiscal_year#United_States) 2030. The figure shall be given in millions of USD, in 2019 prices. Qualifying products need to contain at least 1% of clean meat by weight. Clean meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal's body.\n\nEstimates should originate from a credible sources, preferably a nonprofit research organisation focussing on clean meat and related technologies, independent market research companies, consultancy reports on clean meat, journal publications by researchers not affiliated with clean meat companies. In the case a range of revenue numbers are reported, the question shall resolve as the median of this range. In the case multiple estimates are found upon resolving, the admin may choose to resolve this question as the median of different estimates, or resolve it per the estimate deemed most credible.\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously if, by the start of 2033, no credible estimates of the revenue by U.S. based companies generated from clean-meat containing products sales for the fiscal year 2030 can be found.\n\nThe question resolves in terms of 2019 USD. Hence, estimates are to be adjusted for inflation using a suitable [Bureau of Labour Statistics' CPI](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/).\n\n*This question is part of the [clean meat series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3061/animal-welfare-series-clean-meat/) of our Animal Welfare forecasting project. See also:*\n\n\n\n[How much revenue will the U.S. market for clean meat generate, in the fiscal year 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3065/how-much-revenue-will-the-us-market-for-clean-meat-generate-in-the-fiscal-year-2027/)", "lower_25": "2.63k", "median": "7.38k", "upper_75": "24.5k", "prediction": "7.38k or 50% of the total revenue generated by the U.S. market for clean meat in the fiscal year 2030."} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 45.1 billion biological humans alive on December 31, 2300, conditional on there being more than 500 Million?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.57B", "median": "14.8B", "upper_75": "45.1B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Gore will defeat Bush in the 2000 US Presidential Election with a probability of 0.432?", "desc": "", "resc": "Bear with me, this is a thought experiment.\n\nImagine you are *magically* transported back in time and space such that from a perch at Alpha-centauri you are are (with a great telescope) observing Earth from November 1998 onwards.\n\n*** What is the probability (in percent) you attribute to Gore winning to 2000 US Presidential election (and becoming president)?***\n\nThe \"magic\" is so as to avoid worrying about closed timelike curves, consistency conditions, etc. The alpha-centauri is so that you can have no causal influence on the proceedings.\n\nQualitatively different interesting possibilities here seem to me:\n\nA) p = 0%: The World is deterministic\n\nB) 0 < p < 1%: The World may be indeterministic, but the effect is very tiny.\n\nC) p > 1%: There is indeterminism and the effects are large enough to come into elections. We have to do a deeper dive that involves a combination of fun historical analysis with how and what would be affected by the indeterminacy.\n\nI'm writing a paper about this now and very interested in people's views and rationales.\n\nI've shoehorned this into Metaculus by making the resolution date far in the future (when the Magician appears plus two years), and in asking for the *number* so that people can distinguish 0% from tiny, and also spread their credence across different possibilities that translate into different possibilities.", "lower_25": "< 0.01", "median": "0.432", "upper_75": "32.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated revenue generated by the U.S. market for clean meat in the fiscal year 2030, in millions of USD?", "desc": "", "resc": "[As of mid-2019 there were over a dozen companies developing clean meat](https://cellbasedtech.com/clean-meat-companies), mostly early-stage startups, and only some with total funding exceeding $20M (these are [Just](https://www.ju.st/en-us) and [Memphis Meats](https://www.memphismeats.com/)). [Estimates reveal](http://elliot-swartz.squarespace.com/) that funding has shown impressive growth just over the past 4 years. As of time of writing this question (August, 2019), no clean meat products have yet been brought to market.\n\nFor a point of comparison, data from [SPINS](https://www.spins.com/) summarised by The Good Food Institute shows U.S. retail sales of plant-based meat generates [an estimated $801M](https://plantbasedfoods.org/2019-data-plant-based-market/).\n\n\n**How much revenue will the U.S. market for clean meat generate, in the fiscal year 2030, in millions of 2019 USD?**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as a credible estimate of the revenue by companies generated from the sale of clean-meat containing products for human consumption in the U.S., in the [U.S. fiscal year](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiscal_year#United_States) 2030. The figure shall be given in millions of USD, in 2019 prices. Qualifying products need to contain at least 1% of clean meat by weight. Clean meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal's body.\n\nEstimates should originate from a credible sources, preferably a nonprofit research organisation focussing on clean meat and related technologies, independent market research companies, consultancy reports on clean meat, journal publications by researchers not affiliated with clean meat companies. In the case a range of revenue numbers are reported, the question shall resolve as the median of this range. In the case multiple estimates are found upon resolving, the admin may choose to resolve this question as the median of different estimates, or resolve it per the estimate deemed most credible.\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously if, by the start of 2033, no credible estimates of the revenue by U.S. based companies generated from clean-meat containing products sales for the fiscal year 2030 can be found.\n\nThe question resolves in terms of 2019 USD. Hence, estimates are to be adjusted for inflation using a suitable [Bureau of Labour Statistics' CPI](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/).\n\n*This question is part of the [clean meat series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3061/animal-welfare-series-clean-meat/) of our Animal Welfare forecasting project. See also:*\n\n\n\n[How much revenue will the U.S. market for clean meat generate, in the fiscal year 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3065/how-much-revenue-will-the-us-market-for-clean-meat-generate-in-the-fiscal-year-2027/)", "lower_25": "2.63k", "median": "7.38k", "upper_75": "24.5k", "prediction": "7.38k or 50% of the total revenue generated by the U.S. market for clean meat in the fiscal year 2030."} -{"title": "What is the estimated revenue generated by the U.S. market for clean meat in the fiscal year 2030, in millions of USD?", "desc": "", "resc": "[As of mid-2019 there were over a dozen companies developing clean meat](https://cellbasedtech.com/clean-meat-companies), mostly early-stage startups, and only some with total funding exceeding $20M (these are [Just](https://www.ju.st/en-us) and [Memphis Meats](https://www.memphismeats.com/)). [Estimates reveal](http://elliot-swartz.squarespace.com/) that funding has shown impressive growth just over the past 4 years. As of time of writing this question (August, 2019), no clean meat products have yet been brought to market.\n\nFor a point of comparison, data from [SPINS](https://www.spins.com/) summarised by The Good Food Institute shows U.S. retail sales of plant-based meat generates [an estimated $801M](https://plantbasedfoods.org/2019-data-plant-based-market/).\n\n\n**How much revenue will the U.S. market for clean meat generate, in the fiscal year 2030, in millions of 2019 USD?**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as a credible estimate of the revenue by companies generated from the sale of clean-meat containing products for human consumption in the U.S., in the [U.S. fiscal year](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiscal_year#United_States) 2030. The figure shall be given in millions of USD, in 2019 prices. Qualifying products need to contain at least 1% of clean meat by weight. Clean meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal's body.\n\nEstimates should originate from a credible sources, preferably a nonprofit research organisation focussing on clean meat and related technologies, independent market research companies, consultancy reports on clean meat, journal publications by researchers not affiliated with clean meat companies. In the case a range of revenue numbers are reported, the question shall resolve as the median of this range. In the case multiple estimates are found upon resolving, the admin may choose to resolve this question as the median of different estimates, or resolve it per the estimate deemed most credible.\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously if, by the start of 2033, no credible estimates of the revenue by U.S. based companies generated from clean-meat containing products sales for the fiscal year 2030 can be found.\n\nThe question resolves in terms of 2019 USD. Hence, estimates are to be adjusted for inflation using a suitable [Bureau of Labour Statistics' CPI](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/).\n\n*This question is part of the [clean meat series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3061/animal-welfare-series-clean-meat/) of our Animal Welfare forecasting project. See also:*\n\n\n\n[How much revenue will the U.S. market for clean meat generate, in the fiscal year 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3065/how-much-revenue-will-the-us-market-for-clean-meat-generate-in-the-fiscal-year-2027/)", "lower_25": "2.63k", "median": "7.38k", "upper_75": "24.5k", "prediction": "7.38k or 50% of the total revenue generated by the U.S. market for clean meat in the fiscal year 2030."} -{"title": "What is the chance that Gore will defeat Bush in the 2000 US Presidential Election with a probability of 0.432?", "desc": "", "resc": "Bear with me, this is a thought experiment.\n\nImagine you are *magically* transported back in time and space such that from a perch at Alpha-centauri you are are (with a great telescope) observing Earth from November 1998 onwards.\n\n*** What is the probability (in percent) you attribute to Gore winning to 2000 US Presidential election (and becoming president)?***\n\nThe \"magic\" is so as to avoid worrying about closed timelike curves, consistency conditions, etc. The alpha-centauri is so that you can have no causal influence on the proceedings.\n\nQualitatively different interesting possibilities here seem to me:\n\nA) p = 0%: The World is deterministic\n\nB) 0 < p < 1%: The World may be indeterministic, but the effect is very tiny.\n\nC) p > 1%: There is indeterminism and the effects are large enough to come into elections. We have to do a deeper dive that involves a combination of fun historical analysis with how and what would be affected by the indeterminacy.\n\nI'm writing a paper about this now and very interested in people's views and rationales.\n\nI've shoehorned this into Metaculus by making the resolution date far in the future (when the Magician appears plus two years), and in asking for the *number* so that people can distinguish 0% from tiny, and also spread their credence across different possibilities that translate into different possibilities.", "lower_25": "< 0.01", "median": "0.432", "upper_75": "32.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Gore will defeat Bush in the 2000 US Presidential Election with a probability of 0.432?", "desc": "", "resc": "Bear with me, this is a thought experiment.\n\nImagine you are *magically* transported back in time and space such that from a perch at Alpha-centauri you are are (with a great telescope) observing Earth from November 1998 onwards.\n\n*** What is the probability (in percent) you attribute to Gore winning to 2000 US Presidential election (and becoming president)?***\n\nThe \"magic\" is so as to avoid worrying about closed timelike curves, consistency conditions, etc. The alpha-centauri is so that you can have no causal influence on the proceedings.\n\nQualitatively different interesting possibilities here seem to me:\n\nA) p = 0%: The World is deterministic\n\nB) 0 < p < 1%: The World may be indeterministic, but the effect is very tiny.\n\nC) p > 1%: There is indeterminism and the effects are large enough to come into elections. We have to do a deeper dive that involves a combination of fun historical analysis with how and what would be affected by the indeterminacy.\n\nI'm writing a paper about this now and very interested in people's views and rationales.\n\nI've shoehorned this into Metaculus by making the resolution date far in the future (when the Magician appears plus two years), and in asking for the *number* so that people can distinguish 0% from tiny, and also spread their credence across different possibilities that translate into different possibilities.", "lower_25": "< 0.01", "median": "0.432", "upper_75": "32.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated value of the US market for plant-based meat in the year ending in April 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "Data from [SPINS](https://www.spins.com/) summarised by the Plant Based Foods Association and The Good Food Institute shows U.S. retail sales of plant-based alternative foods have grown 11 percent in the past year, and 31% over the past two years ([Good Food Institute, 2019](https://www.gfi.org/marketresearch#section-intro)). By comparison, total U.S. retail food dollar sales grew just 2% over the past year and 4% over the past two years.\n\nThis brings the total plant-based alternatives market value to a total value of $4.5 billion in 2019. At [an estimated $801M](https://plantbasedfoods.org/2019-data-plant-based-market/) the plant-based meat market is the second highest grossing plant-based alternatives product, after plant-based milk.\n\nMost dollar-sales of plant-based meat tend to come from frozen products (73% in 2019). However, this seems to changing quickly: product innovation and merchandising strategies have grown dollar sales of refrigerated plant-based meat by 85% ([Good Food Institute, 2019](https://www.gfi.org/marketresearch#section-intro)). \n\n**What will the U.S. market for plant-based meat be worth in the year ending in April 2028, in millions of 2019 USD?**\n\nThis question will resolve as the value of the U.S. market for plant-based meat, as estimated by [SPINS](https://www.spins.com/). The market value is to be adjusted for inflation using a widely used CPI and given in 2019 prices. SPINS' estimate of the value of the U.S. market for plant-based meat is given by the sum of the value of the US market for the following subcategories of plant-based alternatives: meat based burgers, nuggets, strips and cutlets, links, patties, grounds, deli slices, meatballs, loafs/roasts, shreds/pulled, jerky and other plant-based meats.\n\nIn the event that the only data available is that for the year ending in December, and if it cannot be constructed or obtained any other way (such as by using the following year's data release, or by contacting the relevant organisation), then this question shall resolve as the total value of the market for the year ending in December of the previous year.\n\n\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously if SPINS data is substantially different in 2023 compared with 2019. SPINS data is to be considered to be substantially different if the methodology for estimating the size of the market is substantially changed, such as when using the new methodology, estimates of the historical size of the market (currently $584m in 2017, $731m in 2018, $801m in 2019, with all years ending in April) changes by more than 50%.\n\nIn case SPINS data is not available, it is left to the discretion of an admin to either resolve this question ambiguous, or consult an alternative estimate. However, this alternative estimate should only be used if it is judged that this estimation approach is at least 90% likely produce an estimate within 50% of the estimate obtained by following the SPINS methodology, subject to updates considered reasonable in case new plant-based subcategories emerge, or previously existing subcategories that were excluded from earlier SPINS estimates constitute a larger share of the total value.", "lower_25": "2.20k", "median": "4.94k", "upper_75": "11.8k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a restaurant will first serve clean-meat products containing ≥80% clean meat, at $3 per 100 grams or cheaper by Feb 2027?", "desc": "The price of clean meat has fallen [from $330,000/pound in 2013](https://www.fastcompany.com/3044572/the-325000-lab-grown-hamburger-now-costs-less-than-12) to [around $800 in 2018](http://jlm-biocity.org/future-meat-technologies-raises-2-2-million-lab-grown-meat/), and is [expected to fall even further](https://vegnews.com/2019/7/price-of-lab-grown-meat-to-plummet-from-280000-to-10-per-patty-by-2021). In 2017, [Mark Post](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Post), chief science officer at Mosa Meat, [predicted the following in 2017](https://labiotech.eu/interviews/interview-mark-post-cultured-meat/):\n\n> For small-scale, somewhat expensive products, most companies will have cultured meat products on the market in 3–4 years (i.e., 2020–2021). It will probably take another 3–4 years (i.e., 2023–2025) for the price to come down to the level where it's acceptable for the broader public.\n\nIn 2015, \"restaurant\" [Bistro in Vitro](http://bistro-invitro.com/en/bistro-invitro/) offers virtual diners \"food for thought\" by allowing customers to create their own three-course meal from a range of dishes that could one day be created using \"in vitro\" meat. Unfortunately, the earliest reservation the website offers is for November 2029, but could we get one sooner?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a restaurant, in any country, offers a clean meat containing product (beef, poultry, pork or fish) for consumption that contains at least 80% clean meat by weight. The product must exceed 50 grams in weight (so that it contains at least 40 grams of clean meat). The restaurant must be open to the general public in that a member of the public must be able to enter the establishment (though possibly requiring a reservation), and order the clean meat product. The restaurant must have served costumers for at least a year -- hence \"pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like [CES](https://www.ces.tech/)) do not count toward resolution. The clean meat containing product product must cost less than $3 per 100 grams. Samples given out for free don't count. \n\nIf the clean meat is served as a dish with additional ingredients, an additional allowance of $5 is made for the price of the additional ingredients. For example, a quarter pound of a burger (~113,4 grams) that is 90% clean meat and 10% plant-based meat sold at any price below $8.41 would count toward positive resolution (as this is $3×1.134+$5=$8.41).\n\nEvidence of the clean meat containing product's listing price and composition should come from the restaurant's online listing, credible media reports, or from at least three reports sourced from social media and/or submissions by Metaculus users/admin.\n\nPrices are to be adjusted using a CPI commonly used in which the clean meat product is sold. If the clean meat product is not sold in the United States, the price is to be converted using the exchange rate listed on Google Finance at the time the question resolves.\n\nClean meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal's body", "lower_25": "Jun 2025", "median": "Feb 2027", "upper_75": "Apr 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a restaurant will first serve clean-meat products containing ≥80% clean meat, at $3 per 100 grams or cheaper by Feb 2027?", "desc": "The price of clean meat has fallen [from $330,000/pound in 2013](https://www.fastcompany.com/3044572/the-325000-lab-grown-hamburger-now-costs-less-than-12) to [around $800 in 2018](http://jlm-biocity.org/future-meat-technologies-raises-2-2-million-lab-grown-meat/), and is [expected to fall even further](https://vegnews.com/2019/7/price-of-lab-grown-meat-to-plummet-from-280000-to-10-per-patty-by-2021). In 2017, [Mark Post](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Post), chief science officer at Mosa Meat, [predicted the following in 2017](https://labiotech.eu/interviews/interview-mark-post-cultured-meat/):\n\n> For small-scale, somewhat expensive products, most companies will have cultured meat products on the market in 3–4 years (i.e., 2020–2021). It will probably take another 3–4 years (i.e., 2023–2025) for the price to come down to the level where it's acceptable for the broader public.\n\nIn 2015, \"restaurant\" [Bistro in Vitro](http://bistro-invitro.com/en/bistro-invitro/) offers virtual diners \"food for thought\" by allowing customers to create their own three-course meal from a range of dishes that could one day be created using \"in vitro\" meat. Unfortunately, the earliest reservation the website offers is for November 2029, but could we get one sooner?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a restaurant, in any country, offers a clean meat containing product (beef, poultry, pork or fish) for consumption that contains at least 80% clean meat by weight. The product must exceed 50 grams in weight (so that it contains at least 40 grams of clean meat). The restaurant must be open to the general public in that a member of the public must be able to enter the establishment (though possibly requiring a reservation), and order the clean meat product. The restaurant must have served costumers for at least a year -- hence \"pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like [CES](https://www.ces.tech/)) do not count toward resolution. The clean meat containing product product must cost less than $3 per 100 grams. Samples given out for free don't count. \n\nIf the clean meat is served as a dish with additional ingredients, an additional allowance of $5 is made for the price of the additional ingredients. For example, a quarter pound of a burger (~113,4 grams) that is 90% clean meat and 10% plant-based meat sold at any price below $8.41 would count toward positive resolution (as this is $3×1.134+$5=$8.41).\n\nEvidence of the clean meat containing product's listing price and composition should come from the restaurant's online listing, credible media reports, or from at least three reports sourced from social media and/or submissions by Metaculus users/admin.\n\nPrices are to be adjusted using a CPI commonly used in which the clean meat product is sold. If the clean meat product is not sold in the United States, the price is to be converted using the exchange rate listed on Google Finance at the time the question resolves.\n\nClean meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal's body", "lower_25": "Jun 2025", "median": "Feb 2027", "upper_75": "Apr 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated value of the US market for plant-based meat in the year ending in April 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "Data from [SPINS](https://www.spins.com/) summarised by the Plant Based Foods Association and The Good Food Institute shows U.S. retail sales of plant-based alternative foods have grown 11 percent in the past year, and 31% over the past two years ([Good Food Institute, 2019](https://www.gfi.org/marketresearch#section-intro)). By comparison, total U.S. retail food dollar sales grew just 2% over the past year and 4% over the past two years.\n\nThis brings the total plant-based alternatives market value to a total value of $4.5 billion in 2019. At [an estimated $801M](https://plantbasedfoods.org/2019-data-plant-based-market/) the plant-based meat market is the second highest grossing plant-based alternatives product, after plant-based milk.\n\nMost dollar-sales of plant-based meat tend to come from frozen products (73% in 2019). However, this seems to changing quickly: product innovation and merchandising strategies have grown dollar sales of refrigerated plant-based meat by 85% ([Good Food Institute, 2019](https://www.gfi.org/marketresearch#section-intro)). \n\n**What will the U.S. market for plant-based meat be worth in the year ending in April 2028, in millions of 2019 USD?**\n\nThis question will resolve as the value of the U.S. market for plant-based meat, as estimated by [SPINS](https://www.spins.com/). The market value is to be adjusted for inflation using a widely used CPI and given in 2019 prices. SPINS' estimate of the value of the U.S. market for plant-based meat is given by the sum of the value of the US market for the following subcategories of plant-based alternatives: meat based burgers, nuggets, strips and cutlets, links, patties, grounds, deli slices, meatballs, loafs/roasts, shreds/pulled, jerky and other plant-based meats.\n\nIn the event that the only data available is that for the year ending in December, and if it cannot be constructed or obtained any other way (such as by using the following year's data release, or by contacting the relevant organisation), then this question shall resolve as the total value of the market for the year ending in December of the previous year.\n\n\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously if SPINS data is substantially different in 2023 compared with 2019. SPINS data is to be considered to be substantially different if the methodology for estimating the size of the market is substantially changed, such as when using the new methodology, estimates of the historical size of the market (currently $584m in 2017, $731m in 2018, $801m in 2019, with all years ending in April) changes by more than 50%.\n\nIn case SPINS data is not available, it is left to the discretion of an admin to either resolve this question ambiguous, or consult an alternative estimate. However, this alternative estimate should only be used if it is judged that this estimation approach is at least 90% likely produce an estimate within 50% of the estimate obtained by following the SPINS methodology, subject to updates considered reasonable in case new plant-based subcategories emerge, or previously existing subcategories that were excluded from earlier SPINS estimates constitute a larger share of the total value.", "lower_25": "2.20k", "median": "4.94k", "upper_75": "11.8k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated value of the US market for plant-based meat in the year ending in April 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "Data from [SPINS](https://www.spins.com/) summarised by the Plant Based Foods Association and The Good Food Institute shows U.S. retail sales of plant-based alternative foods have grown 11 percent in the past year, and 31% over the past two years ([Good Food Institute, 2019](https://www.gfi.org/marketresearch#section-intro)). By comparison, total U.S. retail food dollar sales grew just 2% over the past year and 4% over the past two years.\n\nThis brings the total plant-based alternatives market value to a total value of $4.5 billion in 2019. At [an estimated $801M](https://plantbasedfoods.org/2019-data-plant-based-market/) the plant-based meat market is the second highest grossing plant-based alternatives product, after plant-based milk.\n\nMost dollar-sales of plant-based meat tend to come from frozen products (73% in 2019). However, this seems to changing quickly: product innovation and merchandising strategies have grown dollar sales of refrigerated plant-based meat by 85% ([Good Food Institute, 2019](https://www.gfi.org/marketresearch#section-intro)). \n\n**What will the U.S. market for plant-based meat be worth in the year ending in April 2028, in millions of 2019 USD?**\n\nThis question will resolve as the value of the U.S. market for plant-based meat, as estimated by [SPINS](https://www.spins.com/). The market value is to be adjusted for inflation using a widely used CPI and given in 2019 prices. SPINS' estimate of the value of the U.S. market for plant-based meat is given by the sum of the value of the US market for the following subcategories of plant-based alternatives: meat based burgers, nuggets, strips and cutlets, links, patties, grounds, deli slices, meatballs, loafs/roasts, shreds/pulled, jerky and other plant-based meats.\n\nIn the event that the only data available is that for the year ending in December, and if it cannot be constructed or obtained any other way (such as by using the following year's data release, or by contacting the relevant organisation), then this question shall resolve as the total value of the market for the year ending in December of the previous year.\n\n\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously if SPINS data is substantially different in 2023 compared with 2019. SPINS data is to be considered to be substantially different if the methodology for estimating the size of the market is substantially changed, such as when using the new methodology, estimates of the historical size of the market (currently $584m in 2017, $731m in 2018, $801m in 2019, with all years ending in April) changes by more than 50%.\n\nIn case SPINS data is not available, it is left to the discretion of an admin to either resolve this question ambiguous, or consult an alternative estimate. However, this alternative estimate should only be used if it is judged that this estimation approach is at least 90% likely produce an estimate within 50% of the estimate obtained by following the SPINS methodology, subject to updates considered reasonable in case new plant-based subcategories emerge, or previously existing subcategories that were excluded from earlier SPINS estimates constitute a larger share of the total value.", "lower_25": "2.20k", "median": "4.94k", "upper_75": "11.8k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a discernible, coordinated Bitcoin mining pool will attain >=50% of the hashing power for 24-hours before Sep 15, 2025?", "desc": "[51% attacks](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/1/51-attack.asp) are an important vulnerability of proof-of-work blockchains.\n\n[In 2014](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghash.io#51%_attack_controversy), Ghash.io gained more than 50% of the hashing power in Bitcoin's mining network, which could have resulted in a [51% attack](https://en.bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/51%25_attack). Ghash instead voluntarily reduced their hashing power to below 40%. No mining pool has been above 50% of hashing power since then, although 51% attacks have been successfully conducted on blockchains with vastly smaller hash rates, such as Ethereum Classic (ETC).", "resc": "1. The reported >=50% hash rate event can be reported as having taken place during any 24-hour period, and is not timezone-dependent.\n\n2. If the question does not resolve by Sep 15 2025, the question resolves as > Sep 15, 2025.\n\n3. The \"mining pool\" could either be a shared pool among unassociated miners, or a massive operation by a single entity.\n\n4. Note that in hash rate distribution charts, \"Unknown\" does not necessarily mean a single unidentified mining pool is taking up that much hash rate, but simply that they aren't identified. To count for resolution, a pool must be discernibly combining their hash rate. If the hash rate from \"Unknown\" miners ever attained >=50% of the hash rate, but there were no reports to suggest a coordinated mining operation was taking up >=50% of the hash rate, then that does not count to positive resolution.\n\n5. One possible scenario is an identified miner openly mining the blocks and processing transactions like normal but with >50% the hashrate. Another (perhaps more likely) is a separate chain being mined in secret with >50% hashrate, until that alternative chain becomes bigger than the main one, causing a deep block reorg that had its hashrate come entirely from that secret miner. If this kind of secret-miner reorg happens, and it's more than roughly 72 blocks deep, it could trigger positive resolution instantly, since that would tend to be be more than 12 hours worth of the blockchain, and it would've all been from one miner", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Sep 15, 2025", "median": "Not ≤ Sep 15, 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Sep 15, 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a discernible, coordinated Bitcoin mining pool will attain >=50% of the hashing power for 24-hours before Sep 15, 2025?", "desc": "[51% attacks](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/1/51-attack.asp) are an important vulnerability of proof-of-work blockchains.\n\n[In 2014](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghash.io#51%_attack_controversy), Ghash.io gained more than 50% of the hashing power in Bitcoin's mining network, which could have resulted in a [51% attack](https://en.bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/51%25_attack). Ghash instead voluntarily reduced their hashing power to below 40%. No mining pool has been above 50% of hashing power since then, although 51% attacks have been successfully conducted on blockchains with vastly smaller hash rates, such as Ethereum Classic (ETC).", "resc": "1. The reported >=50% hash rate event can be reported as having taken place during any 24-hour period, and is not timezone-dependent.\n\n2. If the question does not resolve by Sep 15 2025, the question resolves as > Sep 15, 2025.\n\n3. The \"mining pool\" could either be a shared pool among unassociated miners, or a massive operation by a single entity.\n\n4. Note that in hash rate distribution charts, \"Unknown\" does not necessarily mean a single unidentified mining pool is taking up that much hash rate, but simply that they aren't identified. To count for resolution, a pool must be discernibly combining their hash rate. If the hash rate from \"Unknown\" miners ever attained >=50% of the hash rate, but there were no reports to suggest a coordinated mining operation was taking up >=50% of the hash rate, then that does not count to positive resolution.\n\n5. One possible scenario is an identified miner openly mining the blocks and processing transactions like normal but with >50% the hashrate. Another (perhaps more likely) is a separate chain being mined in secret with >50% hashrate, until that alternative chain becomes bigger than the main one, causing a deep block reorg that had its hashrate come entirely from that secret miner. If this kind of secret-miner reorg happens, and it's more than roughly 72 blocks deep, it could trigger positive resolution instantly, since that would tend to be be more than 12 hours worth of the blockchain, and it would've all been from one miner", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Sep 15, 2025", "median": "Not ≤ Sep 15, 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Sep 15, 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the lowest retail price, in USD per kg, of any product containing 50% clean meat will be 12.3 in the calendar year 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "In June 2016, Uma Valeti, CEO of Memphis Meats reported a production cost of about €36,200/kg, which represents an 18-fold price reduction compared with the €650,000/kg burger unveiled in 2013. Mark Post, the chief science officer of Mosa Meat, [announced in late 2015 that](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1lI9AwxKfTY), by combining pharmaceutical bioreactor technology to existing tissue culture techniques it'd be possible reduce costs to €60/kg of cultured ground beef. [(Sentience Politics, 2016; p.g. 6)](https://ea-foundation.org/files/cultured-meat.pdf) points out that existing farm subsidies essentially create a barrier to entry for clean meat producers:\n\n> while the cost of cultured meat should aim to match that of regular meat, the current market average of meat is artificially low as a result of heavy government subsidising of animal agriculture.\n\nMark Post has also made more predictions. In 2017, he [predicted that](https://www.itv.com/news/2017-02-27/scientists-set-sights-on-bringing-lab-grown-meat-to-the-supermarket/) it will take 3–4 years (i.e., 2020–2021) before cultured burgers are on the market for £10–11 (~$12–$14 USD) per burger, and in around 7 years time (~2024) they will be in supermarkets at lower prices. However, [regulatory uncertainty](https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2018/07/clean-meat-staking-its-claim-amid-regulatory-uncertainty/), might prevent clean meat companies from scaling anytime soon, thereby blocking the path to substantial cost reductions. \n\n**What will the lowest retail price, in USD per kg, of any product containing 50% clean meat be, in the calendar year 2029?**\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the lowest reported price, in 2019 USD per kg, of any product listed in a retail supermarkets that contains at least 50% clean meat by weight. Qualifying retail supermarkets are those based in either the U.S. or based in the European Union as of August, 2019, and Switzerland.\n\nClean meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal's body. Qualifying meats are beef, any type of poultry, pork or fish. The clean meat product must be for human consumption. Moreover, the product must have a weight exceeding 40 grams (so that the clean meat content weighs at least 20 grams). Mixtures of clean meat and other products qualify if it contains at least 50% clean meat by weight.\n\nEvidence of the clean meat containing product's listing price and composition should come from credible media reports, online supermarket listings, or from at least three reports sourced from social media and/or submissions by Metaculus users/admin.\n\nThe following sales do not identify the price of the product for the purpose of this question: samples given out for free, sales discounted with one-time discounts or discounts derived from coupons, or programmes such as loyalty schemes or credit card membership, amongst other pricing schemes valid for limited time or only available to a subset of customers.\n\nA supermarket is here defined as the company that operates physical self-service retail markets that sell foods and household merchandise. The supermarket must have at least ten physical stores (although the clean meat product need only be on offer in at least one store). A [list of examples of U.S. based supermarkets](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1cs0GXkqp_OtPCbohgbI-4wsr7S6Tpt11Rt4Wrop-jd8/edit?usp=sharing) that qualify today can be found here. These will continue to qualify as supermarkets as long as these operate at least ten physical self-service retail markets.\n\nPrices are to be adjusted to 2019 prices using a widely used national CPI. Credibility of estimates shall be decided by Metaculus admin. In case the retail price is denominated in currencies other than USD, the conversion shall be made using the relevant spot exchange rate at the time of resolving.\n\nIf no credible reports indicate that clean meat products containing at least 50% clean meat are sold in the calendar year 2029 in retail supermarkets based in either the U.S. or based in the European Union as of August, 2019, and Switzerland, the question resolves ambiguous.", "lower_25": "5.24", "median": "12.3", "upper_75": "33.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the lowest retail price, in 2019USD per kg, of any product containing 50% clean meat in 2026 will be 7.52?", "desc": "In June 2016, Uma Valeti, CEO of Memphis Meats reported a production cost of about €36,200/kg, which represents an 18-fold price reduction compared with the €650,000/kg burger unveiled in 2013. Mark Post, the chief science officer of Mosa Meat, [announced in late 2015 that](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1lI9AwxKfTY), by combining pharmaceutical bioreactor technology to existing tissue culture techniques it'd be possible reduce costs to €60/kg of cultured ground beef. [(Sentience Politics, 2016; p.g. 6)](https://ea-foundation.org/files/cultured-meat.pdf) points out that existing farm subsidies essentially create a barrier to entry for clean meat producers:\n\n> while the cost of cultured meat should aim to match that of regular meat, the current market average of meat is artificially low as a result of heavy government subsidising of animal agriculture.\n\nMark Post has also made more predictions. In 2017, he [predicted that](https://www.itv.com/news/2017-02-27/scientists-set-sights-on-bringing-lab-grown-meat-to-the-supermarket/) it will take 3–4 years (i.e., 2020–2021) before cultured burgers are on the market for £10–11 (~$12–$14 USD) per burger, and in around 7 years time (~2024) they will be in supermarkets at lower prices. However, [regulatory uncertainty](https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2018/07/clean-meat-staking-its-claim-amid-regulatory-uncertainty/), might prevent clean meat companies from scaling anytime soon, thereby blocking the path to substantial cost reductions.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the lowest reported price, in 2019 USD per kg, of any product listed in a retail supermarkets that contains at least 50% clean meat by weight. Qualifying retail supermarkets are those based in either the U.S. or based in the European Union as of August, 2019, and Switzerland.\n\nClean meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal's body. Qualifying meats are beef, any type of poultry, pork or fish. The clean meat product must be for human consumption. Moreover, the product must have a weight exceeding 40 grams (so that the clean meat content weighs at least 20 grams). Mixtures of clean meat and other products qualify if it contains at least 50% clean meat by weight.\n\nEvidence of the clean meat containing product's listing price and composition should come from credible media reports, online supermarket listings, or from at least three reports sourced from social media and/or submissions by Metaculus users/admin.\n\nThe following sales do not identify the price of the product for the purpose of this question: samples given out for free, sales discounted with one-time discounts or discounts derived from coupons, or programmes such as loyalty schemes or credit card membership, amongst other pricing schemes valid for limited time or only available to a subset of customers.\n\nA supermarket is here defined as the company that operates physical self-service retail markets that sell foods and household merchandise. The supermarket must have at least ten physical stores (although the clean meat product need only be on offer in at least one store). A [list of examples of U.S. based supermarkets](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1cs0GXkqp_OtPCbohgbI-4wsr7S6Tpt11Rt4Wrop-jd8/edit?usp=sharing) that qualify today can be found here. These will continue to qualify as supermarkets as long as these operate at least ten physical self-service retail markets.\n\nPrices are to be adjusted to 2019 prices using a widely used national CPI. Credibility of estimates shall be decided by Metaculus admin. In case the retail price is denominated in currencies other than USD, the conversion shall be made using the relevant spot exchange rate at the time of resolving.\n\nIf no credible reports indicate that clean meat products containing at least 50% clean meat are sold in the calendar year 2026 in retail supermarkets based in either the U.S. or based in the European Union as of August, 2019, and Switzerland, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous.*", "lower_25": "7.52", "median": "16.3", "upper_75": "36.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the lowest retail price, in 2019USD per kg, of any product containing 50% clean meat in 2026 will be 7.52?", "desc": "In June 2016, Uma Valeti, CEO of Memphis Meats reported a production cost of about €36,200/kg, which represents an 18-fold price reduction compared with the €650,000/kg burger unveiled in 2013. Mark Post, the chief science officer of Mosa Meat, [announced in late 2015 that](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1lI9AwxKfTY), by combining pharmaceutical bioreactor technology to existing tissue culture techniques it'd be possible reduce costs to €60/kg of cultured ground beef. [(Sentience Politics, 2016; p.g. 6)](https://ea-foundation.org/files/cultured-meat.pdf) points out that existing farm subsidies essentially create a barrier to entry for clean meat producers:\n\n> while the cost of cultured meat should aim to match that of regular meat, the current market average of meat is artificially low as a result of heavy government subsidising of animal agriculture.\n\nMark Post has also made more predictions. In 2017, he [predicted that](https://www.itv.com/news/2017-02-27/scientists-set-sights-on-bringing-lab-grown-meat-to-the-supermarket/) it will take 3–4 years (i.e., 2020–2021) before cultured burgers are on the market for £10–11 (~$12–$14 USD) per burger, and in around 7 years time (~2024) they will be in supermarkets at lower prices. However, [regulatory uncertainty](https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2018/07/clean-meat-staking-its-claim-amid-regulatory-uncertainty/), might prevent clean meat companies from scaling anytime soon, thereby blocking the path to substantial cost reductions.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the lowest reported price, in 2019 USD per kg, of any product listed in a retail supermarkets that contains at least 50% clean meat by weight. Qualifying retail supermarkets are those based in either the U.S. or based in the European Union as of August, 2019, and Switzerland.\n\nClean meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal's body. Qualifying meats are beef, any type of poultry, pork or fish. The clean meat product must be for human consumption. Moreover, the product must have a weight exceeding 40 grams (so that the clean meat content weighs at least 20 grams). Mixtures of clean meat and other products qualify if it contains at least 50% clean meat by weight.\n\nEvidence of the clean meat containing product's listing price and composition should come from credible media reports, online supermarket listings, or from at least three reports sourced from social media and/or submissions by Metaculus users/admin.\n\nThe following sales do not identify the price of the product for the purpose of this question: samples given out for free, sales discounted with one-time discounts or discounts derived from coupons, or programmes such as loyalty schemes or credit card membership, amongst other pricing schemes valid for limited time or only available to a subset of customers.\n\nA supermarket is here defined as the company that operates physical self-service retail markets that sell foods and household merchandise. The supermarket must have at least ten physical stores (although the clean meat product need only be on offer in at least one store). A [list of examples of U.S. based supermarkets](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1cs0GXkqp_OtPCbohgbI-4wsr7S6Tpt11Rt4Wrop-jd8/edit?usp=sharing) that qualify today can be found here. These will continue to qualify as supermarkets as long as these operate at least ten physical self-service retail markets.\n\nPrices are to be adjusted to 2019 prices using a widely used national CPI. Credibility of estimates shall be decided by Metaculus admin. In case the retail price is denominated in currencies other than USD, the conversion shall be made using the relevant spot exchange rate at the time of resolving.\n\nIf no credible reports indicate that clean meat products containing at least 50% clean meat are sold in the calendar year 2026 in retail supermarkets based in either the U.S. or based in the European Union as of August, 2019, and Switzerland, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous.*", "lower_25": "7.52", "median": "16.3", "upper_75": "36.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a restaurant will first serve clean-meat products containing ≥80% clean meat, at $3 per 100 grams or cheaper by Feb 2027?", "desc": "The price of clean meat has fallen [from $330,000/pound in 2013](https://www.fastcompany.com/3044572/the-325000-lab-grown-hamburger-now-costs-less-than-12) to [around $800 in 2018](http://jlm-biocity.org/future-meat-technologies-raises-2-2-million-lab-grown-meat/), and is [expected to fall even further](https://vegnews.com/2019/7/price-of-lab-grown-meat-to-plummet-from-280000-to-10-per-patty-by-2021). In 2017, [Mark Post](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Post), chief science officer at Mosa Meat, [predicted the following in 2017](https://labiotech.eu/interviews/interview-mark-post-cultured-meat/):\n\n> For small-scale, somewhat expensive products, most companies will have cultured meat products on the market in 3–4 years (i.e., 2020–2021). It will probably take another 3–4 years (i.e., 2023–2025) for the price to come down to the level where it's acceptable for the broader public.\n\nIn 2015, \"restaurant\" [Bistro in Vitro](http://bistro-invitro.com/en/bistro-invitro/) offers virtual diners \"food for thought\" by allowing customers to create their own three-course meal from a range of dishes that could one day be created using \"in vitro\" meat. Unfortunately, the earliest reservation the website offers is for November 2029, but could we get one sooner?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a restaurant, in any country, offers a clean meat containing product (beef, poultry, pork or fish) for consumption that contains at least 80% clean meat by weight. The product must exceed 50 grams in weight (so that it contains at least 40 grams of clean meat). The restaurant must be open to the general public in that a member of the public must be able to enter the establishment (though possibly requiring a reservation), and order the clean meat product. The restaurant must have served costumers for at least a year -- hence \"pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like [CES](https://www.ces.tech/)) do not count toward resolution. The clean meat containing product product must cost less than $3 per 100 grams. Samples given out for free don't count. \n\nIf the clean meat is served as a dish with additional ingredients, an additional allowance of $5 is made for the price of the additional ingredients. For example, a quarter pound of a burger (~113,4 grams) that is 90% clean meat and 10% plant-based meat sold at any price below $8.41 would count toward positive resolution (as this is $3×1.134+$5=$8.41).\n\nEvidence of the clean meat containing product's listing price and composition should come from the restaurant's online listing, credible media reports, or from at least three reports sourced from social media and/or submissions by Metaculus users/admin.\n\nPrices are to be adjusted using a CPI commonly used in which the clean meat product is sold. If the clean meat product is not sold in the United States, the price is to be converted using the exchange rate listed on Google Finance at the time the question resolves.\n\nClean meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal's body", "lower_25": "Jun 2025", "median": "Feb 2027", "upper_75": "Apr 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 17.8 million commercial cattle will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is less than $8 per kg?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of January 31, 2018, total USA inventory of beef cows was estimated at 31.7 million head, with cow-calf operations in all 50 states [(Drouillard, 2018)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6039332/#b1-ajas-31-7-1007). The beef cow inventory fluctuates considerably from year to year, and can be influenced by market conditions and environmental factors, such as weather and rainfall (ibid.). In the United States, about 320 million hectares are used for livestock grazing, which is equivalent to 41% of the total land area of the continental USA [(USDA, 2017)](https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/major-land-uses.aspx).\n\nCommercial cattle slaughter during 2018 totaled 33.0 million head, up 3 percent from 2017. Steers comprised 51.2 percent of the total federally inspected cattle slaughter, heifers 28.2 percent, dairy cows 9.7 percent, other cows 9.3 percent, and bulls 1.7 percent [(USDA, 2019)](https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/r207tp32d/8336h934w/hq37vx004/lsslan19.pdf).\n\n**How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in the year 2032 if the lowest retail price in 2026 of clean meat products containing >50% clean meat is less than $8 per kg?**\n\n------\n\nThis question will resolve as the number of cattle slaughtered in the year 2032, [as reported by the US Department of Agriculture](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/r207tp32d). Numbers are to be rounded off to one decimal place (e.g. 33.13 becomes 33.1). Commercial cattle include steers, heifers, dairy cows, bulls and other cows.\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously if the lowest reported price in 2026, in 2019 USD per kg, of any clean meat product containing at least 50% clean meat in a U.S.-based retail supermarket exceeds $8. This question resolves ambiguous if [its sister question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3103/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2026/) resolves above $8 (details on the resolution conditions, i.e. what counts as clean meat, how prices are identified, etc. can be found there). If no clean meat products are sold in retail stores in the U.S. in 2026, the question resolves ambiguously.\n\n\n\n\n*Related questions:*\n\n*- [How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is between $8 and $20 per kg?\n](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3115/how-many-commercial-cattle-in-millions-will-be-slaughtered-in-the-us-in-2032-if-the-lowest-retail-price-of-clean-meat-in-2026-is-between-8-and-20-per-kg/)*\n\n*- [How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is greater than $20 per kg?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3153/how-many-commercial-cattle-in-millions-will-be-slaughtered-in-the-us-in-2032-if-the-lowest-retail-price-of-clean-meat-in-2026-is-greater-than-20-per-kg/)*", "lower_25": "17.8", "median": "26.5", "upper_75": "34.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 17.8 million commercial cattle will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is less than $8 per kg?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of January 31, 2018, total USA inventory of beef cows was estimated at 31.7 million head, with cow-calf operations in all 50 states [(Drouillard, 2018)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6039332/#b1-ajas-31-7-1007). The beef cow inventory fluctuates considerably from year to year, and can be influenced by market conditions and environmental factors, such as weather and rainfall (ibid.). In the United States, about 320 million hectares are used for livestock grazing, which is equivalent to 41% of the total land area of the continental USA [(USDA, 2017)](https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/major-land-uses.aspx).\n\nCommercial cattle slaughter during 2018 totaled 33.0 million head, up 3 percent from 2017. Steers comprised 51.2 percent of the total federally inspected cattle slaughter, heifers 28.2 percent, dairy cows 9.7 percent, other cows 9.3 percent, and bulls 1.7 percent [(USDA, 2019)](https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/r207tp32d/8336h934w/hq37vx004/lsslan19.pdf).\n\n**How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in the year 2032 if the lowest retail price in 2026 of clean meat products containing >50% clean meat is less than $8 per kg?**\n\n------\n\nThis question will resolve as the number of cattle slaughtered in the year 2032, [as reported by the US Department of Agriculture](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/r207tp32d). Numbers are to be rounded off to one decimal place (e.g. 33.13 becomes 33.1). Commercial cattle include steers, heifers, dairy cows, bulls and other cows.\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously if the lowest reported price in 2026, in 2019 USD per kg, of any clean meat product containing at least 50% clean meat in a U.S.-based retail supermarket exceeds $8. This question resolves ambiguous if [its sister question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3103/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2026/) resolves above $8 (details on the resolution conditions, i.e. what counts as clean meat, how prices are identified, etc. can be found there). If no clean meat products are sold in retail stores in the U.S. in 2026, the question resolves ambiguously.\n\n\n\n\n*Related questions:*\n\n*- [How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is between $8 and $20 per kg?\n](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3115/how-many-commercial-cattle-in-millions-will-be-slaughtered-in-the-us-in-2032-if-the-lowest-retail-price-of-clean-meat-in-2026-is-between-8-and-20-per-kg/)*\n\n*- [How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is greater than $20 per kg?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3153/how-many-commercial-cattle-in-millions-will-be-slaughtered-in-the-us-in-2032-if-the-lowest-retail-price-of-clean-meat-in-2026-is-greater-than-20-per-kg/)*", "lower_25": "17.8", "median": "26.5", "upper_75": "34.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a discernible, coordinated Bitcoin mining pool will attain >=50% of the hashing power for 24-hours before Sep 15, 2025?", "desc": "[51% attacks](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/1/51-attack.asp) are an important vulnerability of proof-of-work blockchains.\n\n[In 2014](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghash.io#51%_attack_controversy), Ghash.io gained more than 50% of the hashing power in Bitcoin's mining network, which could have resulted in a [51% attack](https://en.bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/51%25_attack). Ghash instead voluntarily reduced their hashing power to below 40%. No mining pool has been above 50% of hashing power since then, although 51% attacks have been successfully conducted on blockchains with vastly smaller hash rates, such as Ethereum Classic (ETC).", "resc": "1. The reported >=50% hash rate event can be reported as having taken place during any 24-hour period, and is not timezone-dependent.\n\n2. If the question does not resolve by Sep 15 2025, the question resolves as > Sep 15, 2025.\n\n3. The \"mining pool\" could either be a shared pool among unassociated miners, or a massive operation by a single entity.\n\n4. Note that in hash rate distribution charts, \"Unknown\" does not necessarily mean a single unidentified mining pool is taking up that much hash rate, but simply that they aren't identified. To count for resolution, a pool must be discernibly combining their hash rate. If the hash rate from \"Unknown\" miners ever attained >=50% of the hash rate, but there were no reports to suggest a coordinated mining operation was taking up >=50% of the hash rate, then that does not count to positive resolution.\n\n5. One possible scenario is an identified miner openly mining the blocks and processing transactions like normal but with >50% the hashrate. Another (perhaps more likely) is a separate chain being mined in secret with >50% hashrate, until that alternative chain becomes bigger than the main one, causing a deep block reorg that had its hashrate come entirely from that secret miner. If this kind of secret-miner reorg happens, and it's more than roughly 72 blocks deep, it could trigger positive resolution instantly, since that would tend to be be more than 12 hours worth of the blockchain, and it would've all been from one miner", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Sep 15, 2025", "median": "Not ≤ Sep 15, 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Sep 15, 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the lowest retail price, in USD per kg, of any product containing 50% clean meat will be 12.3 in the calendar year 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "In June 2016, Uma Valeti, CEO of Memphis Meats reported a production cost of about €36,200/kg, which represents an 18-fold price reduction compared with the €650,000/kg burger unveiled in 2013. Mark Post, the chief science officer of Mosa Meat, [announced in late 2015 that](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1lI9AwxKfTY), by combining pharmaceutical bioreactor technology to existing tissue culture techniques it'd be possible reduce costs to €60/kg of cultured ground beef. [(Sentience Politics, 2016; p.g. 6)](https://ea-foundation.org/files/cultured-meat.pdf) points out that existing farm subsidies essentially create a barrier to entry for clean meat producers:\n\n> while the cost of cultured meat should aim to match that of regular meat, the current market average of meat is artificially low as a result of heavy government subsidising of animal agriculture.\n\nMark Post has also made more predictions. In 2017, he [predicted that](https://www.itv.com/news/2017-02-27/scientists-set-sights-on-bringing-lab-grown-meat-to-the-supermarket/) it will take 3–4 years (i.e., 2020–2021) before cultured burgers are on the market for £10–11 (~$12–$14 USD) per burger, and in around 7 years time (~2024) they will be in supermarkets at lower prices. However, [regulatory uncertainty](https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2018/07/clean-meat-staking-its-claim-amid-regulatory-uncertainty/), might prevent clean meat companies from scaling anytime soon, thereby blocking the path to substantial cost reductions. \n\n**What will the lowest retail price, in USD per kg, of any product containing 50% clean meat be, in the calendar year 2029?**\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the lowest reported price, in 2019 USD per kg, of any product listed in a retail supermarkets that contains at least 50% clean meat by weight. Qualifying retail supermarkets are those based in either the U.S. or based in the European Union as of August, 2019, and Switzerland.\n\nClean meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal's body. Qualifying meats are beef, any type of poultry, pork or fish. The clean meat product must be for human consumption. Moreover, the product must have a weight exceeding 40 grams (so that the clean meat content weighs at least 20 grams). Mixtures of clean meat and other products qualify if it contains at least 50% clean meat by weight.\n\nEvidence of the clean meat containing product's listing price and composition should come from credible media reports, online supermarket listings, or from at least three reports sourced from social media and/or submissions by Metaculus users/admin.\n\nThe following sales do not identify the price of the product for the purpose of this question: samples given out for free, sales discounted with one-time discounts or discounts derived from coupons, or programmes such as loyalty schemes or credit card membership, amongst other pricing schemes valid for limited time or only available to a subset of customers.\n\nA supermarket is here defined as the company that operates physical self-service retail markets that sell foods and household merchandise. The supermarket must have at least ten physical stores (although the clean meat product need only be on offer in at least one store). A [list of examples of U.S. based supermarkets](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1cs0GXkqp_OtPCbohgbI-4wsr7S6Tpt11Rt4Wrop-jd8/edit?usp=sharing) that qualify today can be found here. These will continue to qualify as supermarkets as long as these operate at least ten physical self-service retail markets.\n\nPrices are to be adjusted to 2019 prices using a widely used national CPI. Credibility of estimates shall be decided by Metaculus admin. In case the retail price is denominated in currencies other than USD, the conversion shall be made using the relevant spot exchange rate at the time of resolving.\n\nIf no credible reports indicate that clean meat products containing at least 50% clean meat are sold in the calendar year 2029 in retail supermarkets based in either the U.S. or based in the European Union as of August, 2019, and Switzerland, the question resolves ambiguous.", "lower_25": "5.24", "median": "12.3", "upper_75": "33.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Bering Strait crossing will not be completed by Sep 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "A [Bering Strait crossing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bering_Strait_crossing) is a hypothetical bridge and/or tunnel spanning the relatively narrow and shallow Bering Strait between the Chukotka Peninsula in Russia and the Seward Peninsula in the U.S. state of Alaska. The bridge/tunnel would provide a connection linking North America and Eurasia. \n\nAccording to the [dedicated Wikipedia page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bering_Strait_crossing#21st_century), various proposals have been made to build such a crossing:\n\n> According to a report in the Beijing Times in May 2014, Chinese transportation experts are proposing building a roughly 10,000 kilometer (6,213 mi)-long high-speed rail line from northeast China to the United States. The project would include a tunnel under the Bering Strait and connect to the contiguous United States via Canada.\n\n> Several American entrepreneurs have advanced private-sector proposals, such as an Alaska-based limited liability company founded in 2010 to lobby for a cross-straits connection and a 2018 cryptocurrency offering to fund the construction of a tunnel.\n\n**When will a Bering Strait crossing be completed**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves when any land link (a bridge or a tunnel) is created, and is carrying traffic before December 31st, 2035 (whether highly restricted traffic or open to the public). \n\nThis question resolves as >2040 if the project is not completed before 2040.\n\nThe type of traffic also doesn't matter. It could be motor vehicles, trains, a hyperloop, or pedestrian traffic, etc. \n\nThe exact location of the link also doesn't matter. For completeness sake, let's say:\n\n- It ultimately connects a part of mainland Alaska to a part of Mainland Russia\n- The link is contained within a distance of 500 miles of Little Diomede Island", "lower_25": "Jan 2040", "median": "Not ≤ Sep 2040", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Sep 2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Bering Strait crossing will not be completed by Sep 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "A [Bering Strait crossing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bering_Strait_crossing) is a hypothetical bridge and/or tunnel spanning the relatively narrow and shallow Bering Strait between the Chukotka Peninsula in Russia and the Seward Peninsula in the U.S. state of Alaska. The bridge/tunnel would provide a connection linking North America and Eurasia. \n\nAccording to the [dedicated Wikipedia page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bering_Strait_crossing#21st_century), various proposals have been made to build such a crossing:\n\n> According to a report in the Beijing Times in May 2014, Chinese transportation experts are proposing building a roughly 10,000 kilometer (6,213 mi)-long high-speed rail line from northeast China to the United States. The project would include a tunnel under the Bering Strait and connect to the contiguous United States via Canada.\n\n> Several American entrepreneurs have advanced private-sector proposals, such as an Alaska-based limited liability company founded in 2010 to lobby for a cross-straits connection and a 2018 cryptocurrency offering to fund the construction of a tunnel.\n\n**When will a Bering Strait crossing be completed**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves when any land link (a bridge or a tunnel) is created, and is carrying traffic before December 31st, 2035 (whether highly restricted traffic or open to the public). \n\nThis question resolves as >2040 if the project is not completed before 2040.\n\nThe type of traffic also doesn't matter. It could be motor vehicles, trains, a hyperloop, or pedestrian traffic, etc. \n\nThe exact location of the link also doesn't matter. For completeness sake, let's say:\n\n- It ultimately connects a part of mainland Alaska to a part of Mainland Russia\n- The link is contained within a distance of 500 miles of Little Diomede Island", "lower_25": "Jan 2040", "median": "Not ≤ Sep 2040", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Sep 2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Bering Strait crossing will not be completed by Sep 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "A [Bering Strait crossing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bering_Strait_crossing) is a hypothetical bridge and/or tunnel spanning the relatively narrow and shallow Bering Strait between the Chukotka Peninsula in Russia and the Seward Peninsula in the U.S. state of Alaska. The bridge/tunnel would provide a connection linking North America and Eurasia. \n\nAccording to the [dedicated Wikipedia page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bering_Strait_crossing#21st_century), various proposals have been made to build such a crossing:\n\n> According to a report in the Beijing Times in May 2014, Chinese transportation experts are proposing building a roughly 10,000 kilometer (6,213 mi)-long high-speed rail line from northeast China to the United States. The project would include a tunnel under the Bering Strait and connect to the contiguous United States via Canada.\n\n> Several American entrepreneurs have advanced private-sector proposals, such as an Alaska-based limited liability company founded in 2010 to lobby for a cross-straits connection and a 2018 cryptocurrency offering to fund the construction of a tunnel.\n\n**When will a Bering Strait crossing be completed**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves when any land link (a bridge or a tunnel) is created, and is carrying traffic before December 31st, 2035 (whether highly restricted traffic or open to the public). \n\nThis question resolves as >2040 if the project is not completed before 2040.\n\nThe type of traffic also doesn't matter. It could be motor vehicles, trains, a hyperloop, or pedestrian traffic, etc. \n\nThe exact location of the link also doesn't matter. For completeness sake, let's say:\n\n- It ultimately connects a part of mainland Alaska to a part of Mainland Russia\n- The link is contained within a distance of 500 miles of Little Diomede Island", "lower_25": "Jan 2040", "median": "Not ≤ Sep 2040", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Sep 2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 43.3 million commercial cattle will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is between $8 and $20 per kg?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of January 31, 2018, total USA inventory of beef cows was estimated at 31.7 million head, with cow-calf operations in all 50 states [(Drouillard, 2018)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6039332/#b1-ajas-31-7-1007). The beef cow inventory fluctuates considerably from year to year, and can be influenced by market conditions and environmental factors, such as weather and rainfall (ibid.). In the United States, about 320 million hectares are used for livestock grazing, which is equivalent to 41% of the total land area of the continental USA [(USDA, 2017)](https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/major-land-uses.aspx).\n\nCommercial cattle slaughter during 2018 totaled 33.0 million head, up 3 percent from 2017. Steers comprised 51.2 percent of the total federally inspected cattle slaughter, heifers 28.2 percent, dairy cows 9.7 percent, other cows 9.3 percent, and bulls 1.7 percent [(USDA, 2019)](https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/r207tp32d/8336h934w/hq37vx004/lsslan19.pdf).\n\n**How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in the year 2032 if the lowest retail price in 2026 of clean meat products containing >50% clean meat is between $8 and $20 per kg?**\n\n------\n\nThis question will resolve as the number of cattle slaughtered in the year 2032, [as reported by the US Department of Agriculture](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/r207tp32d). Numbers are to be rounded off to one decimal place (e.g. 33.13 becomes 33.1). Commercial cattle include steers, heifers, dairy cows, bulls and other cows.\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously if the lowest reported price in 2026, in 2019 USD per kg, of any clean meat product containing at least 50% clean meat in a U.S.-based retail supermarket is less than $8 or greater than $20. This question resolves ambiguous if [its sister question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3103/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2026/) resolves below $8 or above $20 (details on the resolution conditions, i.e. what counts as clean meat, how prices are identified, etc. can be found there). If no clean meat products are sold in retail stores in the U.S. in 2026, the question resolves ambiguously.\n\n\n\n*Related questions:*\n\n*- [How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is less than $8 per kg?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3113/how-many-commercial-cattle-in-millions-will-be-slaughtered-in-the-us-in-2032-if-the-lowest-retail-price-of-clean-meat-in-2026-is-less-than-8-per-kg/)*\n\n*- [How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is greater than $20 per kg?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3153/how-many-commercial-cattle-in-millions-will-be-slaughtered-in-the-us-in-2032-if-the-lowest-retail-price-of-clean-meat-in-2026-is-greater-than-20-per-kg/)*", "lower_25": "26.0", "median": "33.0", "upper_75": "43.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the lowest retail price, in USD per kg, of any product containing 50% clean meat will be 12.3 in the calendar year 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "In June 2016, Uma Valeti, CEO of Memphis Meats reported a production cost of about €36,200/kg, which represents an 18-fold price reduction compared with the €650,000/kg burger unveiled in 2013. Mark Post, the chief science officer of Mosa Meat, [announced in late 2015 that](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1lI9AwxKfTY), by combining pharmaceutical bioreactor technology to existing tissue culture techniques it'd be possible reduce costs to €60/kg of cultured ground beef. [(Sentience Politics, 2016; p.g. 6)](https://ea-foundation.org/files/cultured-meat.pdf) points out that existing farm subsidies essentially create a barrier to entry for clean meat producers:\n\n> while the cost of cultured meat should aim to match that of regular meat, the current market average of meat is artificially low as a result of heavy government subsidising of animal agriculture.\n\nMark Post has also made more predictions. In 2017, he [predicted that](https://www.itv.com/news/2017-02-27/scientists-set-sights-on-bringing-lab-grown-meat-to-the-supermarket/) it will take 3–4 years (i.e., 2020–2021) before cultured burgers are on the market for £10–11 (~$12–$14 USD) per burger, and in around 7 years time (~2024) they will be in supermarkets at lower prices. However, [regulatory uncertainty](https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2018/07/clean-meat-staking-its-claim-amid-regulatory-uncertainty/), might prevent clean meat companies from scaling anytime soon, thereby blocking the path to substantial cost reductions. \n\n**What will the lowest retail price, in USD per kg, of any product containing 50% clean meat be, in the calendar year 2029?**\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the lowest reported price, in 2019 USD per kg, of any product listed in a retail supermarkets that contains at least 50% clean meat by weight. Qualifying retail supermarkets are those based in either the U.S. or based in the European Union as of August, 2019, and Switzerland.\n\nClean meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal's body. Qualifying meats are beef, any type of poultry, pork or fish. The clean meat product must be for human consumption. Moreover, the product must have a weight exceeding 40 grams (so that the clean meat content weighs at least 20 grams). Mixtures of clean meat and other products qualify if it contains at least 50% clean meat by weight.\n\nEvidence of the clean meat containing product's listing price and composition should come from credible media reports, online supermarket listings, or from at least three reports sourced from social media and/or submissions by Metaculus users/admin.\n\nThe following sales do not identify the price of the product for the purpose of this question: samples given out for free, sales discounted with one-time discounts or discounts derived from coupons, or programmes such as loyalty schemes or credit card membership, amongst other pricing schemes valid for limited time or only available to a subset of customers.\n\nA supermarket is here defined as the company that operates physical self-service retail markets that sell foods and household merchandise. The supermarket must have at least ten physical stores (although the clean meat product need only be on offer in at least one store). A [list of examples of U.S. based supermarkets](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1cs0GXkqp_OtPCbohgbI-4wsr7S6Tpt11Rt4Wrop-jd8/edit?usp=sharing) that qualify today can be found here. These will continue to qualify as supermarkets as long as these operate at least ten physical self-service retail markets.\n\nPrices are to be adjusted to 2019 prices using a widely used national CPI. Credibility of estimates shall be decided by Metaculus admin. In case the retail price is denominated in currencies other than USD, the conversion shall be made using the relevant spot exchange rate at the time of resolving.\n\nIf no credible reports indicate that clean meat products containing at least 50% clean meat are sold in the calendar year 2029 in retail supermarkets based in either the U.S. or based in the European Union as of August, 2019, and Switzerland, the question resolves ambiguous.", "lower_25": "5.24", "median": "12.3", "upper_75": "33.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the lowest retail price, in 2019USD per kg, of any product containing 50% clean meat in 2026 will be 7.52?", "desc": "In June 2016, Uma Valeti, CEO of Memphis Meats reported a production cost of about €36,200/kg, which represents an 18-fold price reduction compared with the €650,000/kg burger unveiled in 2013. Mark Post, the chief science officer of Mosa Meat, [announced in late 2015 that](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1lI9AwxKfTY), by combining pharmaceutical bioreactor technology to existing tissue culture techniques it'd be possible reduce costs to €60/kg of cultured ground beef. [(Sentience Politics, 2016; p.g. 6)](https://ea-foundation.org/files/cultured-meat.pdf) points out that existing farm subsidies essentially create a barrier to entry for clean meat producers:\n\n> while the cost of cultured meat should aim to match that of regular meat, the current market average of meat is artificially low as a result of heavy government subsidising of animal agriculture.\n\nMark Post has also made more predictions. In 2017, he [predicted that](https://www.itv.com/news/2017-02-27/scientists-set-sights-on-bringing-lab-grown-meat-to-the-supermarket/) it will take 3–4 years (i.e., 2020–2021) before cultured burgers are on the market for £10–11 (~$12–$14 USD) per burger, and in around 7 years time (~2024) they will be in supermarkets at lower prices. However, [regulatory uncertainty](https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2018/07/clean-meat-staking-its-claim-amid-regulatory-uncertainty/), might prevent clean meat companies from scaling anytime soon, thereby blocking the path to substantial cost reductions.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the lowest reported price, in 2019 USD per kg, of any product listed in a retail supermarkets that contains at least 50% clean meat by weight. Qualifying retail supermarkets are those based in either the U.S. or based in the European Union as of August, 2019, and Switzerland.\n\nClean meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal's body. Qualifying meats are beef, any type of poultry, pork or fish. The clean meat product must be for human consumption. Moreover, the product must have a weight exceeding 40 grams (so that the clean meat content weighs at least 20 grams). Mixtures of clean meat and other products qualify if it contains at least 50% clean meat by weight.\n\nEvidence of the clean meat containing product's listing price and composition should come from credible media reports, online supermarket listings, or from at least three reports sourced from social media and/or submissions by Metaculus users/admin.\n\nThe following sales do not identify the price of the product for the purpose of this question: samples given out for free, sales discounted with one-time discounts or discounts derived from coupons, or programmes such as loyalty schemes or credit card membership, amongst other pricing schemes valid for limited time or only available to a subset of customers.\n\nA supermarket is here defined as the company that operates physical self-service retail markets that sell foods and household merchandise. The supermarket must have at least ten physical stores (although the clean meat product need only be on offer in at least one store). A [list of examples of U.S. based supermarkets](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1cs0GXkqp_OtPCbohgbI-4wsr7S6Tpt11Rt4Wrop-jd8/edit?usp=sharing) that qualify today can be found here. These will continue to qualify as supermarkets as long as these operate at least ten physical self-service retail markets.\n\nPrices are to be adjusted to 2019 prices using a widely used national CPI. Credibility of estimates shall be decided by Metaculus admin. In case the retail price is denominated in currencies other than USD, the conversion shall be made using the relevant spot exchange rate at the time of resolving.\n\nIf no credible reports indicate that clean meat products containing at least 50% clean meat are sold in the calendar year 2026 in retail supermarkets based in either the U.S. or based in the European Union as of August, 2019, and Switzerland, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous.*", "lower_25": "7.52", "median": "16.3", "upper_75": "36.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 17.8 million commercial cattle will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is less than $8 per kg?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of January 31, 2018, total USA inventory of beef cows was estimated at 31.7 million head, with cow-calf operations in all 50 states [(Drouillard, 2018)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6039332/#b1-ajas-31-7-1007). The beef cow inventory fluctuates considerably from year to year, and can be influenced by market conditions and environmental factors, such as weather and rainfall (ibid.). In the United States, about 320 million hectares are used for livestock grazing, which is equivalent to 41% of the total land area of the continental USA [(USDA, 2017)](https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/major-land-uses.aspx).\n\nCommercial cattle slaughter during 2018 totaled 33.0 million head, up 3 percent from 2017. Steers comprised 51.2 percent of the total federally inspected cattle slaughter, heifers 28.2 percent, dairy cows 9.7 percent, other cows 9.3 percent, and bulls 1.7 percent [(USDA, 2019)](https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/r207tp32d/8336h934w/hq37vx004/lsslan19.pdf).\n\n**How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in the year 2032 if the lowest retail price in 2026 of clean meat products containing >50% clean meat is less than $8 per kg?**\n\n------\n\nThis question will resolve as the number of cattle slaughtered in the year 2032, [as reported by the US Department of Agriculture](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/r207tp32d). Numbers are to be rounded off to one decimal place (e.g. 33.13 becomes 33.1). Commercial cattle include steers, heifers, dairy cows, bulls and other cows.\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously if the lowest reported price in 2026, in 2019 USD per kg, of any clean meat product containing at least 50% clean meat in a U.S.-based retail supermarket exceeds $8. This question resolves ambiguous if [its sister question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3103/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2026/) resolves above $8 (details on the resolution conditions, i.e. what counts as clean meat, how prices are identified, etc. can be found there). If no clean meat products are sold in retail stores in the U.S. in 2026, the question resolves ambiguously.\n\n\n\n\n*Related questions:*\n\n*- [How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is between $8 and $20 per kg?\n](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3115/how-many-commercial-cattle-in-millions-will-be-slaughtered-in-the-us-in-2032-if-the-lowest-retail-price-of-clean-meat-in-2026-is-between-8-and-20-per-kg/)*\n\n*- [How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is greater than $20 per kg?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3153/how-many-commercial-cattle-in-millions-will-be-slaughtered-in-the-us-in-2032-if-the-lowest-retail-price-of-clean-meat-in-2026-is-greater-than-20-per-kg/)*", "lower_25": "17.8", "median": "26.5", "upper_75": "34.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 43.3 million commercial cattle will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is between $8 and $20 per kg?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of January 31, 2018, total USA inventory of beef cows was estimated at 31.7 million head, with cow-calf operations in all 50 states [(Drouillard, 2018)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6039332/#b1-ajas-31-7-1007). The beef cow inventory fluctuates considerably from year to year, and can be influenced by market conditions and environmental factors, such as weather and rainfall (ibid.). In the United States, about 320 million hectares are used for livestock grazing, which is equivalent to 41% of the total land area of the continental USA [(USDA, 2017)](https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/major-land-uses.aspx).\n\nCommercial cattle slaughter during 2018 totaled 33.0 million head, up 3 percent from 2017. Steers comprised 51.2 percent of the total federally inspected cattle slaughter, heifers 28.2 percent, dairy cows 9.7 percent, other cows 9.3 percent, and bulls 1.7 percent [(USDA, 2019)](https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/r207tp32d/8336h934w/hq37vx004/lsslan19.pdf).\n\n**How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in the year 2032 if the lowest retail price in 2026 of clean meat products containing >50% clean meat is between $8 and $20 per kg?**\n\n------\n\nThis question will resolve as the number of cattle slaughtered in the year 2032, [as reported by the US Department of Agriculture](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/r207tp32d). Numbers are to be rounded off to one decimal place (e.g. 33.13 becomes 33.1). Commercial cattle include steers, heifers, dairy cows, bulls and other cows.\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously if the lowest reported price in 2026, in 2019 USD per kg, of any clean meat product containing at least 50% clean meat in a U.S.-based retail supermarket is less than $8 or greater than $20. This question resolves ambiguous if [its sister question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3103/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2026/) resolves below $8 or above $20 (details on the resolution conditions, i.e. what counts as clean meat, how prices are identified, etc. can be found there). If no clean meat products are sold in retail stores in the U.S. in 2026, the question resolves ambiguously.\n\n\n\n*Related questions:*\n\n*- [How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is less than $8 per kg?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3113/how-many-commercial-cattle-in-millions-will-be-slaughtered-in-the-us-in-2032-if-the-lowest-retail-price-of-clean-meat-in-2026-is-less-than-8-per-kg/)*\n\n*- [How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is greater than $20 per kg?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3153/how-many-commercial-cattle-in-millions-will-be-slaughtered-in-the-us-in-2032-if-the-lowest-retail-price-of-clean-meat-in-2026-is-greater-than-20-per-kg/)*", "lower_25": "26.0", "median": "33.0", "upper_75": "43.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 43.3 million commercial cattle will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is between $8 and $20 per kg?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of January 31, 2018, total USA inventory of beef cows was estimated at 31.7 million head, with cow-calf operations in all 50 states [(Drouillard, 2018)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6039332/#b1-ajas-31-7-1007). The beef cow inventory fluctuates considerably from year to year, and can be influenced by market conditions and environmental factors, such as weather and rainfall (ibid.). In the United States, about 320 million hectares are used for livestock grazing, which is equivalent to 41% of the total land area of the continental USA [(USDA, 2017)](https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/major-land-uses.aspx).\n\nCommercial cattle slaughter during 2018 totaled 33.0 million head, up 3 percent from 2017. Steers comprised 51.2 percent of the total federally inspected cattle slaughter, heifers 28.2 percent, dairy cows 9.7 percent, other cows 9.3 percent, and bulls 1.7 percent [(USDA, 2019)](https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/r207tp32d/8336h934w/hq37vx004/lsslan19.pdf).\n\n**How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in the year 2032 if the lowest retail price in 2026 of clean meat products containing >50% clean meat is between $8 and $20 per kg?**\n\n------\n\nThis question will resolve as the number of cattle slaughtered in the year 2032, [as reported by the US Department of Agriculture](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/r207tp32d). Numbers are to be rounded off to one decimal place (e.g. 33.13 becomes 33.1). Commercial cattle include steers, heifers, dairy cows, bulls and other cows.\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously if the lowest reported price in 2026, in 2019 USD per kg, of any clean meat product containing at least 50% clean meat in a U.S.-based retail supermarket is less than $8 or greater than $20. This question resolves ambiguous if [its sister question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3103/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2026/) resolves below $8 or above $20 (details on the resolution conditions, i.e. what counts as clean meat, how prices are identified, etc. can be found there). If no clean meat products are sold in retail stores in the U.S. in 2026, the question resolves ambiguously.\n\n\n\n*Related questions:*\n\n*- [How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is less than $8 per kg?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3113/how-many-commercial-cattle-in-millions-will-be-slaughtered-in-the-us-in-2032-if-the-lowest-retail-price-of-clean-meat-in-2026-is-less-than-8-per-kg/)*\n\n*- [How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is greater than $20 per kg?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3153/how-many-commercial-cattle-in-millions-will-be-slaughtered-in-the-us-in-2032-if-the-lowest-retail-price-of-clean-meat-in-2026-is-greater-than-20-per-kg/)*", "lower_25": "26.0", "median": "33.0", "upper_75": "43.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 100 people or more will be in space, or on any astronomical body other than earth, simultaneously by not ≤ Jan 1, 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2030", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 14.5 people will have ever landed on the Moon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "14.5", "median": "19.1", "upper_75": "29.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 100 people or more will be in space, or on any astronomical body other than earth, simultaneously by not ≤ Jan 1, 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2030", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the labor force participation rate (total 16 and older) in the US will be 61.9% in October 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "56.6", "median": "61.9", "upper_75": "66.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 14.5 people will have ever landed on the Moon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "14.5", "median": "19.1", "upper_75": "29.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.10 intentionally genomic DNA altered animals will be approved for consumption by the FDA on July 31, 2025?", "desc": "Genetic modification of farmed animals to increase the efficiency of food production, increase animal health and welfare, and reduce the environmental footprint, has been a goal for many decades [(Tait-Burkard et al., 2018)](https://genomebiology.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13059-018-1583-1). This has been pursued by way of engineering and cloning farm animals to optimise for muscle growth, muscle size, feed conversion efficiency, disease resistance.\n\nIn addition to economic impacts, this could have various implications for animal welfare. Since a larger, more disease resistant animal produces more meat, fewer livestock is needed to produce a given output. Gene editing also makes possible tweaks that directly improve animal welfare: [alterations that produce hornless cows](https://www.nature.com/articles/nbt.3560) could spare cows from having to be dehorned, whilst [editing to produce pigs that lack testicular development](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0218176) would make mass surgical castration unnecessary.\n\nHowever, worries have been voiced that intentional genomic DNA alterations could also be detrimental to animal welfare ([HSUS Report, 2006](https://www.humanesociety.org/sites/default/files/docs/hsus-report-issues-genetic-engineering-cloning-farm-animals.pdf)).\n\nThe only genetically engineered animal to ever be approved for food purposes via the new animal drug provisions of the FD&C Act, the AquAdvantage salmon, a genetically engineered Atlantic salmon. The AquAdvantage was mired in regulatory limbo for years, and incurred development and regulatory costs running into the tens of millions of dollars [(van Eenennaam et al., 2019)](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41538-019-0035-y). Only in 2019, did [the FDA determine that](https://www.fda.gov/animal-veterinary/animals-intentional-genomic-alterations/aquadvantage-salmon-fact-sheet) AquAdvantage Salmon meets the statutory requirements for it being safe to eat.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of variants of rDNA constructs in intentionally genomic DNA altered animals that are approved by the FDA on July 31, 2025, for import and/or production, *and* determined to be safe to eat. What is here referred to as \"variants of rDNA constructs in intentionally genomic DNA altered animals\" or \"animal drugs\" are “an article (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of … animals” [(van Eenennaam et al., 2019)](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41538-019-0035-y). Details of some of the animals that have been approved for production or import are reported on the [FDA website](https://www.fda.gov/animal-veterinary/biotechnology-products-cvm-animals-and-animal-food/animals-intentional-genomic-alterations).\n\nThis question will resolve as **Ambiguous** if single non-transgenic genetic change, by way of recombinant DNA (rDNA) techniques (such by way of CRISPR-Cas9) ceases to trigger mandatory premarket FDA regulatory oversight prior to commercial release of gene-edited food animals anytime before the end of July, 2025. Specifically, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous** if the question [When will non-transgenic genetic change alone cease to trigger regulatory oversight for the approval of gene-edited animals used in meat production?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3139/when-will-a-genetic-change-cease-to-trigger-regulatory-oversight-for-the-approval-of-gene-edited-animals-used-in-meat-production/) resolves as **Yes** before the end of July, 2025", "lower_25": "2.7", "median": "6.10", "upper_75": "13.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the labor force participation rate (total 16 and older) in the US will be 59.7% in October 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports information about many things in the U.S. One is the civilian labor force participation [rate](https://www.bls.gov/charts/employment-situation/civilian-labor-force-participation-rate.htm), 16 and older. Here's a [longer-term chart](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CIVPART).\n\nNote how this differs from the participation rate of people [16 to 54](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LNU01300060), which is far higher (this excludes most retired people, and also some disabled people since many disabilities are strongly correlated with age). This question will be focusing on the broader 16+ metric.\n\n***What will the BLS report as the US civilian labor force participation rate (total including all ethnicities, 16 and older) for October 2030?***", "lower_25": "52.4", "median": "59.7", "upper_75": "65.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 28.9 million commercial cattle will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is greater than $20 per kg?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of January 31, 2018, total USA inventory of beef cows was estimated at 31.7 million head, with cow-calf operations in all 50 states [(Drouillard, 2018)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6039332/#b1-ajas-31-7-1007). The beef cow inventory fluctuates considerably from year to year, and can be influenced by market conditions and environmental factors, such as weather and rainfall (ibid.). In the United States, about 320 million hectares are used for livestock grazing, which is equivalent to 41% of the total land area of the continental USA [(USDA, 2017)](https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/major-land-uses.aspx).\n\nCommercial cattle slaughter during 2018 totaled 33.0 million head, up 3 percent from 2017. Steers comprised 51.2 percent of the total federally inspected cattle slaughter, heifers 28.2 percent, dairy cows 9.7 percent, other cows 9.3 percent, and bulls 1.7 percent [(USDA, 2019)](https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/r207tp32d/8336h934w/hq37vx004/lsslan19.pdf).\n\n**How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in the year 2032 if the lowest retail price in 2026 of clean meat products containing >50% clean meat is greater than $20 per kg?**\n\n------\n\nThis question will resolve as the number of cattle slaughtered in the year 2032, [as reported by the US Department of Agriculture](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/r207tp32d). Numbers are to be rounded off to one decimal place (e.g. 33.13 becomes 33.1). Commercial cattle include steers, heifers, dairy cows, bulls and other cows.\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously if the lowest reported price in 2026, in 2019 USD per kg, of any clean meat product containing at least 50% clean meat in a U.S.-based retail supermarket is strictly less than $20. This question resolves ambiguous if [its sister question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3103/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2026/) resolves below $20 (details on the resolution conditions, i.e. what counts as clean meat, how prices are identified, etc. can be found there). If no clean meat products are sold in retail stores in the U.S. in 2026, the question resolves ambiguously.\n\n\n\n*Related questions:*\n\n*- [How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is less than $8 per kg?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3113/how-many-commercial-cattle-in-millions-will-be-slaughtered-in-the-us-in-2032-if-the-lowest-retail-price-of-clean-meat-in-2026-is-less-than-8-per-kg/)*\n\n*- [How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is between $8 and $20 per kg?\n](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3115/how-many-commercial-cattle-in-millions-will-be-slaughtered-in-the-us-in-2032-if-the-lowest-retail-price-of-clean-meat-in-2026-is-between-8-and-20-per-kg/)*", "lower_25": "28.9", "median": "33.4", "upper_75": "37.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that beef for human consumption, from cattle genetically edited to carry a copy of the SRY gene, will be available in the United States by April 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Aug 2029", "median": "Apr 2032", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Oct 2032", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 14.5 people will have ever landed on the Moon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "14.5", "median": "19.1", "upper_75": "29.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S. average weekly hours of all employees (total non-farm private) will be 34.99 in October 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "33.13", "median": "34.07", "upper_75": "34.99", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a clean meat flavoring product will be approved for human consumption by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2023", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the labor force participation rate (total 16 and older) in the US will be 61.9% in October 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "56.6", "median": "61.9", "upper_75": "66.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.10 intentionally genomic DNA altered animals will be approved for consumption by the FDA on July 31, 2025?", "desc": "Genetic modification of farmed animals to increase the efficiency of food production, increase animal health and welfare, and reduce the environmental footprint, has been a goal for many decades [(Tait-Burkard et al., 2018)](https://genomebiology.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13059-018-1583-1). This has been pursued by way of engineering and cloning farm animals to optimise for muscle growth, muscle size, feed conversion efficiency, disease resistance.\n\nIn addition to economic impacts, this could have various implications for animal welfare. Since a larger, more disease resistant animal produces more meat, fewer livestock is needed to produce a given output. Gene editing also makes possible tweaks that directly improve animal welfare: [alterations that produce hornless cows](https://www.nature.com/articles/nbt.3560) could spare cows from having to be dehorned, whilst [editing to produce pigs that lack testicular development](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0218176) would make mass surgical castration unnecessary.\n\nHowever, worries have been voiced that intentional genomic DNA alterations could also be detrimental to animal welfare ([HSUS Report, 2006](https://www.humanesociety.org/sites/default/files/docs/hsus-report-issues-genetic-engineering-cloning-farm-animals.pdf)).\n\nThe only genetically engineered animal to ever be approved for food purposes via the new animal drug provisions of the FD&C Act, the AquAdvantage salmon, a genetically engineered Atlantic salmon. The AquAdvantage was mired in regulatory limbo for years, and incurred development and regulatory costs running into the tens of millions of dollars [(van Eenennaam et al., 2019)](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41538-019-0035-y). Only in 2019, did [the FDA determine that](https://www.fda.gov/animal-veterinary/animals-intentional-genomic-alterations/aquadvantage-salmon-fact-sheet) AquAdvantage Salmon meets the statutory requirements for it being safe to eat.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of variants of rDNA constructs in intentionally genomic DNA altered animals that are approved by the FDA on July 31, 2025, for import and/or production, *and* determined to be safe to eat. What is here referred to as \"variants of rDNA constructs in intentionally genomic DNA altered animals\" or \"animal drugs\" are “an article (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of … animals” [(van Eenennaam et al., 2019)](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41538-019-0035-y). Details of some of the animals that have been approved for production or import are reported on the [FDA website](https://www.fda.gov/animal-veterinary/biotechnology-products-cvm-animals-and-animal-food/animals-intentional-genomic-alterations).\n\nThis question will resolve as **Ambiguous** if single non-transgenic genetic change, by way of recombinant DNA (rDNA) techniques (such by way of CRISPR-Cas9) ceases to trigger mandatory premarket FDA regulatory oversight prior to commercial release of gene-edited food animals anytime before the end of July, 2025. Specifically, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous** if the question [When will non-transgenic genetic change alone cease to trigger regulatory oversight for the approval of gene-edited animals used in meat production?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3139/when-will-a-genetic-change-cease-to-trigger-regulatory-oversight-for-the-approval-of-gene-edited-animals-used-in-meat-production/) resolves as **Yes** before the end of July, 2025", "lower_25": "2.7", "median": "6.10", "upper_75": "13.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 100 people or more will be in space, or on any astronomical body other than earth, simultaneously by not ≤ Jan 1, 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2030", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.10 intentionally genomic DNA altered animals will be approved for consumption by the FDA on July 31, 2025?", "desc": "Genetic modification of farmed animals to increase the efficiency of food production, increase animal health and welfare, and reduce the environmental footprint, has been a goal for many decades [(Tait-Burkard et al., 2018)](https://genomebiology.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13059-018-1583-1). This has been pursued by way of engineering and cloning farm animals to optimise for muscle growth, muscle size, feed conversion efficiency, disease resistance.\n\nIn addition to economic impacts, this could have various implications for animal welfare. Since a larger, more disease resistant animal produces more meat, fewer livestock is needed to produce a given output. Gene editing also makes possible tweaks that directly improve animal welfare: [alterations that produce hornless cows](https://www.nature.com/articles/nbt.3560) could spare cows from having to be dehorned, whilst [editing to produce pigs that lack testicular development](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0218176) would make mass surgical castration unnecessary.\n\nHowever, worries have been voiced that intentional genomic DNA alterations could also be detrimental to animal welfare ([HSUS Report, 2006](https://www.humanesociety.org/sites/default/files/docs/hsus-report-issues-genetic-engineering-cloning-farm-animals.pdf)).\n\nThe only genetically engineered animal to ever be approved for food purposes via the new animal drug provisions of the FD&C Act, the AquAdvantage salmon, a genetically engineered Atlantic salmon. The AquAdvantage was mired in regulatory limbo for years, and incurred development and regulatory costs running into the tens of millions of dollars [(van Eenennaam et al., 2019)](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41538-019-0035-y). Only in 2019, did [the FDA determine that](https://www.fda.gov/animal-veterinary/animals-intentional-genomic-alterations/aquadvantage-salmon-fact-sheet) AquAdvantage Salmon meets the statutory requirements for it being safe to eat.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of variants of rDNA constructs in intentionally genomic DNA altered animals that are approved by the FDA on July 31, 2025, for import and/or production, *and* determined to be safe to eat. What is here referred to as \"variants of rDNA constructs in intentionally genomic DNA altered animals\" or \"animal drugs\" are “an article (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of … animals” [(van Eenennaam et al., 2019)](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41538-019-0035-y). Details of some of the animals that have been approved for production or import are reported on the [FDA website](https://www.fda.gov/animal-veterinary/biotechnology-products-cvm-animals-and-animal-food/animals-intentional-genomic-alterations).\n\nThis question will resolve as **Ambiguous** if single non-transgenic genetic change, by way of recombinant DNA (rDNA) techniques (such by way of CRISPR-Cas9) ceases to trigger mandatory premarket FDA regulatory oversight prior to commercial release of gene-edited food animals anytime before the end of July, 2025. Specifically, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous** if the question [When will non-transgenic genetic change alone cease to trigger regulatory oversight for the approval of gene-edited animals used in meat production?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3139/when-will-a-genetic-change-cease-to-trigger-regulatory-oversight-for-the-approval-of-gene-edited-animals-used-in-meat-production/) resolves as **Yes** before the end of July, 2025", "lower_25": "2.7", "median": "6.10", "upper_75": "13.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the labor force participation rate (total 16 and older) in the US will be 59.7% in October 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports information about many things in the U.S. One is the civilian labor force participation [rate](https://www.bls.gov/charts/employment-situation/civilian-labor-force-participation-rate.htm), 16 and older. Here's a [longer-term chart](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CIVPART).\n\nNote how this differs from the participation rate of people [16 to 54](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LNU01300060), which is far higher (this excludes most retired people, and also some disabled people since many disabilities are strongly correlated with age). This question will be focusing on the broader 16+ metric.\n\n***What will the BLS report as the US civilian labor force participation rate (total including all ethnicities, 16 and older) for October 2030?***", "lower_25": "52.4", "median": "59.7", "upper_75": "65.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a clean meat flavoring product will be approved for human consumption by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2023", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 28.9 million commercial cattle will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is greater than $20 per kg?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of January 31, 2018, total USA inventory of beef cows was estimated at 31.7 million head, with cow-calf operations in all 50 states [(Drouillard, 2018)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6039332/#b1-ajas-31-7-1007). The beef cow inventory fluctuates considerably from year to year, and can be influenced by market conditions and environmental factors, such as weather and rainfall (ibid.). In the United States, about 320 million hectares are used for livestock grazing, which is equivalent to 41% of the total land area of the continental USA [(USDA, 2017)](https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/major-land-uses.aspx).\n\nCommercial cattle slaughter during 2018 totaled 33.0 million head, up 3 percent from 2017. Steers comprised 51.2 percent of the total federally inspected cattle slaughter, heifers 28.2 percent, dairy cows 9.7 percent, other cows 9.3 percent, and bulls 1.7 percent [(USDA, 2019)](https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/r207tp32d/8336h934w/hq37vx004/lsslan19.pdf).\n\n**How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in the year 2032 if the lowest retail price in 2026 of clean meat products containing >50% clean meat is greater than $20 per kg?**\n\n------\n\nThis question will resolve as the number of cattle slaughtered in the year 2032, [as reported by the US Department of Agriculture](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/r207tp32d). Numbers are to be rounded off to one decimal place (e.g. 33.13 becomes 33.1). Commercial cattle include steers, heifers, dairy cows, bulls and other cows.\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously if the lowest reported price in 2026, in 2019 USD per kg, of any clean meat product containing at least 50% clean meat in a U.S.-based retail supermarket is strictly less than $20. This question resolves ambiguous if [its sister question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3103/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2026/) resolves below $20 (details on the resolution conditions, i.e. what counts as clean meat, how prices are identified, etc. can be found there). If no clean meat products are sold in retail stores in the U.S. in 2026, the question resolves ambiguously.\n\n\n\n*Related questions:*\n\n*- [How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is less than $8 per kg?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3113/how-many-commercial-cattle-in-millions-will-be-slaughtered-in-the-us-in-2032-if-the-lowest-retail-price-of-clean-meat-in-2026-is-less-than-8-per-kg/)*\n\n*- [How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is between $8 and $20 per kg?\n](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3115/how-many-commercial-cattle-in-millions-will-be-slaughtered-in-the-us-in-2032-if-the-lowest-retail-price-of-clean-meat-in-2026-is-between-8-and-20-per-kg/)*", "lower_25": "28.9", "median": "33.4", "upper_75": "37.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a clean meat flavoring product will be approved for human consumption by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2023", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.17 billion broiler-type chicks will hatch in the U.S., on average per year, over the 2022-2024 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.902", "median": "10.17", "upper_75": "10.44", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S. average weekly hours of all employees (total non-farm private) will be 34.99 in October 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "33.13", "median": "34.07", "upper_75": "34.99", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that beef for human consumption, from cattle genetically edited to carry a copy of the SRY gene, will be available in the United States by April 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Aug 2029", "median": "Apr 2032", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Oct 2032", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.17 billion broiler-type chicks will hatch in the U.S., on average per year, over the 2022-2024 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.902", "median": "10.17", "upper_75": "10.44", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average overall Global Health Security Index score for 2030 will be 56.6?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "40.7", "median": "48.7", "upper_75": "56.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S. average weekly hours of all employees (total non-farm private) will be 34.99 in October 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "33.13", "median": "34.07", "upper_75": "34.99", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the labor force participation rate (total 16 and older) in the US will be 61.9% in October 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "56.6", "median": "61.9", "upper_75": "66.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average overall Global Health Security Index score for 2030 will be 56.6?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "40.7", "median": "48.7", "upper_75": "56.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 93.5 gene-edited babies will have been born worldwide by the end of 2029?", "desc": "Genome editing is a type of genetic engineering in which DNA is inserted, deleted, modified or replaced in the genome of a living organism ([Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome_editing)). The first gene-edited babies—[Lulu and Nana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lulu_and_Nana_controversy)—were reportedly born in October 2018.", "resc": "Question resolves according to birth counts given in the first authoritative report (so judged by the admins) to cover the entire 2029 calendar year, as well as all years preceding it", "lower_25": "9.04", "median": "93.5", "upper_75": "2.48k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average overall Global Health Security Index score for 2030 will be 56.6?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "40.7", "median": "48.7", "upper_75": "56.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.17 billion broiler-type chicks will hatch in the U.S., on average per year, over the 2022-2024 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.902", "median": "10.17", "upper_75": "10.44", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 93.5 gene-edited babies will have been born worldwide by the end of 2029?", "desc": "Genome editing is a type of genetic engineering in which DNA is inserted, deleted, modified or replaced in the genome of a living organism ([Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome_editing)). The first gene-edited babies—[Lulu and Nana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lulu_and_Nana_controversy)—were reportedly born in October 2018.", "resc": "Question resolves according to birth counts given in the first authoritative report (so judged by the admins) to cover the entire 2029 calendar year, as well as all years preceding it", "lower_25": "9.04", "median": "93.5", "upper_75": "2.48k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.28% of babies born in the US in 2029 will have been conceived in vitro?", "desc": "In vitro fertilization (IVF) is a process of fertilization where an egg is combined with sperm outside the human body ([Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_vitro_fertilisation)). According to the [2015 Assisted Reproductive Technology report](https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2015-report/ART-2015-National-Summary-Report.pdf) (the latest version of the report currently available), 72,913 IVF babies were born in the US in 2015, out of [a total of 3.98m](https://www.statista.com/statistics/195908/number-of-births-in-the-united-states-since-1990/). IVF babies thus accounted for 1.83% of all babies born that year in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of live babies born from In vitro fertilization out of all babies born in the US in the year 2029. To resolve, we will use the 2029 edition of the Assisted Reproductive Technology report and live birth data from the [CDC](https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/index.html). If this report is not issued, the resolution will be determined by figures from the earliest authoritative report (so judged by the admins) to cover the year 2029 and provide IVF birth counts. The number of total babies born in 2029 will be determined by the [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/births.htm), or if this institute no longer exists, by whichever government entity replaces it", "lower_25": "2.19", "median": "3.32", "upper_75": "5.28", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 93.5 gene-edited babies will have been born worldwide by the end of 2029?", "desc": "Genome editing is a type of genetic engineering in which DNA is inserted, deleted, modified or replaced in the genome of a living organism ([Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome_editing)). The first gene-edited babies—[Lulu and Nana](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lulu_and_Nana_controversy)—were reportedly born in October 2018.", "resc": "Question resolves according to birth counts given in the first authoritative report (so judged by the admins) to cover the entire 2029 calendar year, as well as all years preceding it", "lower_25": "9.04", "median": "93.5", "upper_75": "2.48k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.28% of babies born in the US in 2029 will have been conceived in vitro?", "desc": "In vitro fertilization (IVF) is a process of fertilization where an egg is combined with sperm outside the human body ([Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_vitro_fertilisation)). According to the [2015 Assisted Reproductive Technology report](https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2015-report/ART-2015-National-Summary-Report.pdf) (the latest version of the report currently available), 72,913 IVF babies were born in the US in 2015, out of [a total of 3.98m](https://www.statista.com/statistics/195908/number-of-births-in-the-united-states-since-1990/). IVF babies thus accounted for 1.83% of all babies born that year in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of live babies born from In vitro fertilization out of all babies born in the US in the year 2029. To resolve, we will use the 2029 edition of the Assisted Reproductive Technology report and live birth data from the [CDC](https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/index.html). If this report is not issued, the resolution will be determined by figures from the earliest authoritative report (so judged by the admins) to cover the year 2029 and provide IVF birth counts. The number of total babies born in 2029 will be determined by the [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/births.htm), or if this institute no longer exists, by whichever government entity replaces it", "lower_25": "2.19", "median": "3.32", "upper_75": "5.28", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the labor force participation rate (total 16 and older) in the US will be 59.7% in October 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports information about many things in the U.S. One is the civilian labor force participation [rate](https://www.bls.gov/charts/employment-situation/civilian-labor-force-participation-rate.htm), 16 and older. Here's a [longer-term chart](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CIVPART).\n\nNote how this differs from the participation rate of people [16 to 54](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LNU01300060), which is far higher (this excludes most retired people, and also some disabled people since many disabilities are strongly correlated with age). This question will be focusing on the broader 16+ metric.\n\n***What will the BLS report as the US civilian labor force participation rate (total including all ethnicities, 16 and older) for October 2030?***", "lower_25": "52.4", "median": "59.7", "upper_75": "65.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 92.6 billion poultry will be slaughtered worldwide in the calendar year 2030, according to FAO estimates?", "desc": "", "resc": "According to estimates by [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2017)](http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QL), an estimated 70.95 billion poultry were slaughtered in 2017. The term poultry is taken to mean domesticated avian species that can be raised for eggs, meat and/or feathers [(FAO, 2019)](http://www.fao.org/poultry-production-products/production/poultry-species/en/). \n\n**How many billions of poultry will be slaughtered worldwide, in the calendar year 2030, according to FAO estimates?**\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question will resolve based [FAO estimates](http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QA/visualize) of the number total poultry produced/slaughtered in the calendar year 2030. The relevant data is generated by the following query: \n\n> Regions: World + (Total), Items Aggregated: Meat, Poultry + (Total), Elements: \"Producing Animals/Slaughtered\"\n\nForecasts released before December 1st of 2030 do not qualify as estimates.", "lower_25": "92.6", "median": "102", "upper_75": "116", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 12.1 billion broiler-type chicks will hatch in the U.S., on average per year, over the 2028 to 2030 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "The United States has the largest broiler chicken industry in the world with about 17 percent of production exported to other countries in 2018 [(National Chicken Council, 2019)](https://www.nationalchickencouncil.org/about-the-industry/statistics/broiler-chicken-industry-key-facts/). Americans consume more chicken than anyone else in the world – more than 93.5 pounds per capita in 2018 – the number one protein consumed in the United States (ibid.). The most recent Census of Agriculture reported 233,770 poultry farms in the United States in 2012 [(USDA, 2015)](https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/nass-poultry-stats-factsheet.pdf).\n\nThe number of broiler-type chicks that hatched totalled 9.71 billion in 2018, 9.62 billion in 2017 [(USDA, 2019)](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/9306sz28s?locale=en). This would resolve the question for the 2016-2018 period as 9.51 billion.\n\n**How many billions of broiler-type chicks will hatch per year, on average, over the 2028-2030 period?**\n\n-----\n\nThis question resolves as the average number of broiler-type chicks hatched in 2028, 2029, and 2030 (in billions) according to data reported by the [US Department of Agriculture](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/9306sz28s?locale=en). Yearly numbers are to be rounded to one decimal place before averaging. The question resolves ambiguous if the USDA no longer publishes this data, or if its methodology is substantially changed.", "lower_25": "9.30", "median": "10.7", "upper_75": "12.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 12.1 billion broiler-type chicks will hatch in the U.S., on average per year, over the 2028 to 2030 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "The United States has the largest broiler chicken industry in the world with about 17 percent of production exported to other countries in 2018 [(National Chicken Council, 2019)](https://www.nationalchickencouncil.org/about-the-industry/statistics/broiler-chicken-industry-key-facts/). Americans consume more chicken than anyone else in the world – more than 93.5 pounds per capita in 2018 – the number one protein consumed in the United States (ibid.). The most recent Census of Agriculture reported 233,770 poultry farms in the United States in 2012 [(USDA, 2015)](https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/nass-poultry-stats-factsheet.pdf).\n\nThe number of broiler-type chicks that hatched totalled 9.71 billion in 2018, 9.62 billion in 2017 [(USDA, 2019)](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/9306sz28s?locale=en). This would resolve the question for the 2016-2018 period as 9.51 billion.\n\n**How many billions of broiler-type chicks will hatch per year, on average, over the 2028-2030 period?**\n\n-----\n\nThis question resolves as the average number of broiler-type chicks hatched in 2028, 2029, and 2030 (in billions) according to data reported by the [US Department of Agriculture](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/9306sz28s?locale=en). Yearly numbers are to be rounded to one decimal place before averaging. The question resolves ambiguous if the USDA no longer publishes this data, or if its methodology is substantially changed.", "lower_25": "9.30", "median": "10.7", "upper_75": "12.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that most eggs produced in the USA will be sexed before hatching by 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "Chickens are generally either bred for egg-laying performance, or an ability to fatten and grow quickly. While both males and females are fattened in broiler production, there is currently no economically worthwhile use of the male offspring of egg-laying chickens, as these cannot lay eggs. Therefore, day-old male chicks are destroyed in the layer hatchery [(Krautwald-Junghanns et al., 2017)](https://academic.oup.com/ps/article/97/3/749/4780252). Approximately 370 million chicks in North America are culled annually [(Gali et al. 2017a)](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00216-016-0116-6).\n\nAs the red blood cells of birds possess a nucleus, they also carry the genetic sex information. Using spectroscopic techniques, the sex of an egg can be determined three days after it has been fertilised [(Galli et al, 2017b)](https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/cdbme.2017.3.issue-2/cdbme-2017-0027/cdbme-2017-0027.pdf). In egg sexing of a chick's sex while still in the egg is might reduce the number of male chicks that are killed shortly after hatching.\n\nThere is a substantial effort to develop in ovo technologies at a low enough price to be commercially viable, with companies [reportedly developing the relevant technologies in Germany, Israel, Canada and the Netherlands](https://www.poultryworld.net/Eggs/Articles/2018/6/Egg-sexing-close-to-market-301797E/). \n\n**When will most eggs produced in the USA be sexed before hatching??**\n\n---\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis resolves as the estimated date when U.S.-based hatcheries that produce at least 50% of the total number of eggs produced in the U.S. eggs that year successfully sex their hen flock replacement eggs, in ovo.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, successful sexing occurs if: \n\n1. techniques are used that correctly identify the sex in a majority of cases, and\n\n2. at least a majority of those identified to be male are destroyed before hatching.\n\nEstimates of when this threshold is reached should originate from credible independent sources, preferably by nonprofit research organisations (e.g. the Good Food Institute) or other nonprofit organisations, or governmental organisations, such as the USDA, or FAO, or independent researchers. In case no estimates of when this occurred can be found, an admin should contact the aforementioned types credible independent sources and request these for their relevant staff for credible estimates. In case of multiple estimates, an admin may decide to resolve on the basis of the median. In case no estimates can be sourced, the question shall resolve ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 92.6 billion poultry will be slaughtered worldwide in the calendar year 2030, according to FAO estimates?", "desc": "", "resc": "According to estimates by [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2017)](http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QL), an estimated 70.95 billion poultry were slaughtered in 2017. The term poultry is taken to mean domesticated avian species that can be raised for eggs, meat and/or feathers [(FAO, 2019)](http://www.fao.org/poultry-production-products/production/poultry-species/en/). \n\n**How many billions of poultry will be slaughtered worldwide, in the calendar year 2030, according to FAO estimates?**\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question will resolve based [FAO estimates](http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QA/visualize) of the number total poultry produced/slaughtered in the calendar year 2030. The relevant data is generated by the following query: \n\n> Regions: World + (Total), Items Aggregated: Meat, Poultry + (Total), Elements: \"Producing Animals/Slaughtered\"\n\nForecasts released before December 1st of 2030 do not qualify as estimates.", "lower_25": "92.6", "median": "102", "upper_75": "116", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 92.6 billion poultry will be slaughtered worldwide in the calendar year 2030, according to FAO estimates?", "desc": "", "resc": "According to estimates by [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2017)](http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QL), an estimated 70.95 billion poultry were slaughtered in 2017. The term poultry is taken to mean domesticated avian species that can be raised for eggs, meat and/or feathers [(FAO, 2019)](http://www.fao.org/poultry-production-products/production/poultry-species/en/). \n\n**How many billions of poultry will be slaughtered worldwide, in the calendar year 2030, according to FAO estimates?**\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question will resolve based [FAO estimates](http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QA/visualize) of the number total poultry produced/slaughtered in the calendar year 2030. The relevant data is generated by the following query: \n\n> Regions: World + (Total), Items Aggregated: Meat, Poultry + (Total), Elements: \"Producing Animals/Slaughtered\"\n\nForecasts released before December 1st of 2030 do not qualify as estimates.", "lower_25": "92.6", "median": "102", "upper_75": "116", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that most eggs produced in the USA will be sexed before hatching by 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "Chickens are generally either bred for egg-laying performance, or an ability to fatten and grow quickly. While both males and females are fattened in broiler production, there is currently no economically worthwhile use of the male offspring of egg-laying chickens, as these cannot lay eggs. Therefore, day-old male chicks are destroyed in the layer hatchery [(Krautwald-Junghanns et al., 2017)](https://academic.oup.com/ps/article/97/3/749/4780252). Approximately 370 million chicks in North America are culled annually [(Gali et al. 2017a)](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00216-016-0116-6).\n\nAs the red blood cells of birds possess a nucleus, they also carry the genetic sex information. Using spectroscopic techniques, the sex of an egg can be determined three days after it has been fertilised [(Galli et al, 2017b)](https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/cdbme.2017.3.issue-2/cdbme-2017-0027/cdbme-2017-0027.pdf). In egg sexing of a chick's sex while still in the egg is might reduce the number of male chicks that are killed shortly after hatching.\n\nThere is a substantial effort to develop in ovo technologies at a low enough price to be commercially viable, with companies [reportedly developing the relevant technologies in Germany, Israel, Canada and the Netherlands](https://www.poultryworld.net/Eggs/Articles/2018/6/Egg-sexing-close-to-market-301797E/). \n\n**When will most eggs produced in the USA be sexed before hatching??**\n\n---\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis resolves as the estimated date when U.S.-based hatcheries that produce at least 50% of the total number of eggs produced in the U.S. eggs that year successfully sex their hen flock replacement eggs, in ovo.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, successful sexing occurs if: \n\n1. techniques are used that correctly identify the sex in a majority of cases, and\n\n2. at least a majority of those identified to be male are destroyed before hatching.\n\nEstimates of when this threshold is reached should originate from credible independent sources, preferably by nonprofit research organisations (e.g. the Good Food Institute) or other nonprofit organisations, or governmental organisations, such as the USDA, or FAO, or independent researchers. In case no estimates of when this occurred can be found, an admin should contact the aforementioned types credible independent sources and request these for their relevant staff for credible estimates. In case of multiple estimates, an admin may decide to resolve on the basis of the median. In case no estimates can be sourced, the question shall resolve ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 12.1 billion broiler-type chicks will hatch in the U.S., on average per year, over the 2028 to 2030 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "The United States has the largest broiler chicken industry in the world with about 17 percent of production exported to other countries in 2018 [(National Chicken Council, 2019)](https://www.nationalchickencouncil.org/about-the-industry/statistics/broiler-chicken-industry-key-facts/). Americans consume more chicken than anyone else in the world – more than 93.5 pounds per capita in 2018 – the number one protein consumed in the United States (ibid.). The most recent Census of Agriculture reported 233,770 poultry farms in the United States in 2012 [(USDA, 2015)](https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/nass-poultry-stats-factsheet.pdf).\n\nThe number of broiler-type chicks that hatched totalled 9.71 billion in 2018, 9.62 billion in 2017 [(USDA, 2019)](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/9306sz28s?locale=en). This would resolve the question for the 2016-2018 period as 9.51 billion.\n\n**How many billions of broiler-type chicks will hatch per year, on average, over the 2028-2030 period?**\n\n-----\n\nThis question resolves as the average number of broiler-type chicks hatched in 2028, 2029, and 2030 (in billions) according to data reported by the [US Department of Agriculture](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/9306sz28s?locale=en). Yearly numbers are to be rounded to one decimal place before averaging. The question resolves ambiguous if the USDA no longer publishes this data, or if its methodology is substantially changed.", "lower_25": "9.30", "median": "10.7", "upper_75": "12.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first person that has been cryopreserved for more than 1 year will be resuscitated or uploaded by year 2200, assuming it occurs in 2088?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2055", "median": "2088", "upper_75": "2142", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a major U.S. supermarket will sell \"no-kill eggs\" in at least 25 states by Not ≤ 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "Chickens are generally either bred for egg-laying performance, or an ability to fatten and grow quickly. While both males and females are fattened in broiler production, there is currently no economically worthwhile use of the male offspring of egg-laying chickens, as these cannot lay eggs. Therefore, day-old male chicks are destroyed in the layer hatchery [(Krautwald-Junghanns et al., 2017)](https://academic.oup.com/ps/article/97/3/749/4780252).\n\nAs the red blood cells of birds possess a nucleus, they also carry the genetic sex information. Using spectroscopic techniques, the sex of an egg can be determined three days after it has been fertilised [(Galli et al, 2017)](https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/cdbme.2017.3.issue-2/cdbme-2017-0027/cdbme-2017-0027.pdf). In egg sexing of a chick's sex while still in the egg is might reduce the number of male chicks that are killed shortly after hatching.\n\n**When will a major U.S. supermarket chain sell “no-kill eggs” in at least 25 states?**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the date when a major US supermarket chain sells “no-kill eggs” eggs in at least 25 states. “No-kill eggs” are here defined as eggs produced by hens that hatched in a facility that successfully sexes the embryo at least 50% of the time, and subsequently destroys the embryos suspected to be male before hatching.\n\nA supermarket is here defined as the company that operates physical self-service retail markets that sell foods and household merchandise. The supermarket must sell “no-kill eggs” in one or more physical stores in at least 25 different states. Examples of supermarkets that operate in at least 25 states today are [listed here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1cs0GXkqp_OtPCbohgbI-4wsr7S6Tpt11Rt4Wrop-jd8/edit?usp=sharing).", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 28.9 million commercial cattle will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is greater than $20 per kg?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of January 31, 2018, total USA inventory of beef cows was estimated at 31.7 million head, with cow-calf operations in all 50 states [(Drouillard, 2018)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6039332/#b1-ajas-31-7-1007). The beef cow inventory fluctuates considerably from year to year, and can be influenced by market conditions and environmental factors, such as weather and rainfall (ibid.). In the United States, about 320 million hectares are used for livestock grazing, which is equivalent to 41% of the total land area of the continental USA [(USDA, 2017)](https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/major-land-uses.aspx).\n\nCommercial cattle slaughter during 2018 totaled 33.0 million head, up 3 percent from 2017. Steers comprised 51.2 percent of the total federally inspected cattle slaughter, heifers 28.2 percent, dairy cows 9.7 percent, other cows 9.3 percent, and bulls 1.7 percent [(USDA, 2019)](https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/r207tp32d/8336h934w/hq37vx004/lsslan19.pdf).\n\n**How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in the year 2032 if the lowest retail price in 2026 of clean meat products containing >50% clean meat is greater than $20 per kg?**\n\n------\n\nThis question will resolve as the number of cattle slaughtered in the year 2032, [as reported by the US Department of Agriculture](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/r207tp32d). Numbers are to be rounded off to one decimal place (e.g. 33.13 becomes 33.1). Commercial cattle include steers, heifers, dairy cows, bulls and other cows.\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously if the lowest reported price in 2026, in 2019 USD per kg, of any clean meat product containing at least 50% clean meat in a U.S.-based retail supermarket is strictly less than $20. This question resolves ambiguous if [its sister question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3103/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2026/) resolves below $20 (details on the resolution conditions, i.e. what counts as clean meat, how prices are identified, etc. can be found there). If no clean meat products are sold in retail stores in the U.S. in 2026, the question resolves ambiguously.\n\n\n\n*Related questions:*\n\n*- [How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is less than $8 per kg?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3113/how-many-commercial-cattle-in-millions-will-be-slaughtered-in-the-us-in-2032-if-the-lowest-retail-price-of-clean-meat-in-2026-is-less-than-8-per-kg/)*\n\n*- [How many commercial cattle, in millions, will be slaughtered in the U.S. in 2032 if the lowest retail price of clean meat in 2026 is between $8 and $20 per kg?\n](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3115/how-many-commercial-cattle-in-millions-will-be-slaughtered-in-the-us-in-2032-if-the-lowest-retail-price-of-clean-meat-in-2026-is-between-8-and-20-per-kg/)*", "lower_25": "28.9", "median": "33.4", "upper_75": "37.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that most eggs produced in the USA will be sexed before hatching by 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "Chickens are generally either bred for egg-laying performance, or an ability to fatten and grow quickly. While both males and females are fattened in broiler production, there is currently no economically worthwhile use of the male offspring of egg-laying chickens, as these cannot lay eggs. Therefore, day-old male chicks are destroyed in the layer hatchery [(Krautwald-Junghanns et al., 2017)](https://academic.oup.com/ps/article/97/3/749/4780252). Approximately 370 million chicks in North America are culled annually [(Gali et al. 2017a)](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00216-016-0116-6).\n\nAs the red blood cells of birds possess a nucleus, they also carry the genetic sex information. Using spectroscopic techniques, the sex of an egg can be determined three days after it has been fertilised [(Galli et al, 2017b)](https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/cdbme.2017.3.issue-2/cdbme-2017-0027/cdbme-2017-0027.pdf). In egg sexing of a chick's sex while still in the egg is might reduce the number of male chicks that are killed shortly after hatching.\n\nThere is a substantial effort to develop in ovo technologies at a low enough price to be commercially viable, with companies [reportedly developing the relevant technologies in Germany, Israel, Canada and the Netherlands](https://www.poultryworld.net/Eggs/Articles/2018/6/Egg-sexing-close-to-market-301797E/). \n\n**When will most eggs produced in the USA be sexed before hatching??**\n\n---\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis resolves as the estimated date when U.S.-based hatcheries that produce at least 50% of the total number of eggs produced in the U.S. eggs that year successfully sex their hen flock replacement eggs, in ovo.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, successful sexing occurs if: \n\n1. techniques are used that correctly identify the sex in a majority of cases, and\n\n2. at least a majority of those identified to be male are destroyed before hatching.\n\nEstimates of when this threshold is reached should originate from credible independent sources, preferably by nonprofit research organisations (e.g. the Good Food Institute) or other nonprofit organisations, or governmental organisations, such as the USDA, or FAO, or independent researchers. In case no estimates of when this occurred can be found, an admin should contact the aforementioned types credible independent sources and request these for their relevant staff for credible estimates. In case of multiple estimates, an admin may decide to resolve on the basis of the median. In case no estimates can be sourced, the question shall resolve ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the number of people in cryopreservation preserved before 2019 will fall to less than 50% of the current value by 2070?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of 2019-01-01, 411 people had been cryopreserved at various organisations:\n\n + 165 at Alcor ([list](https://www.alcor.org/cases.html))\n + 173 at the Cryonics Institute ([list](https://www.cryonics.org/case-reports/))\n + 66 at KrioRus ([list](http://kriorus.ru/en/cryopreserved%20people))\n + 7 at Oregon Cryonics ([list](http://oregoncryo.com/caseReports.html))\n\nFor a total of 411.\n\nHowever, it seems very unlikely that they will stay in cryopreservation indefinitely: they could be reuscitated one day (as they presumably hoped), but the cryonics organisations could also fail at preserving them (see the early cryonics organisation [The Cryonics Society of California](https://hpluspedia.org/wiki/Cryonics_organisations#Cryonics_Society_of_California)).\n\nTo determine when this will happen, this question asks: **When will the number of people in cryopreservation, who were preserved before 2019, fall to 50% of the current number, i.e. to 205?**\n\nResolution details:\n\n + This question only considers bodies preserved by Alcor, the Cryonics Institute, KrioRus, and Oregon Cryonics.\n\n + This question resolves to the first date when fewer than 205 of the 411 bodies that were preserved before 2019-01-01 are still cryopreserved. Here cryopreserved is taken to mean: cooled to a temperature below -100° C and not structurally damaged irreversibly. This includes thawing, chemical fixation, and other forms of destruction of the brain (such as smashing it). This also includes resucitation.\n\n + This question will resolve either by an official statement by the cryonics organisations mentioned above, or any cryonics organisation in possession of any of the 411 bodies, or by credible media reporting by at least 2 major news agencies that either all bodies at these organisations or these bodies specifically have been taken out of cryopreservation.\n\n + If any of these organisations dissolves and neither they nor any other cryonics organisation publish an official report of the transfer of these bodies or all bodies at these cryonics organisations, this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2048", "median": "2070", "upper_75": "2119", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first person that has been cryopreserved for more than 1 year will be resuscitated or uploaded by year 2200, assuming it occurs in 2088?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2055", "median": "2088", "upper_75": "2142", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that beef for human consumption, from cattle genetically edited to carry a copy of the SRY gene, will be available in the United States by April 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Aug 2029", "median": "Apr 2032", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Oct 2032", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.28% of babies born in the US in 2029 will have been conceived in vitro?", "desc": "In vitro fertilization (IVF) is a process of fertilization where an egg is combined with sperm outside the human body ([Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_vitro_fertilisation)). According to the [2015 Assisted Reproductive Technology report](https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2015-report/ART-2015-National-Summary-Report.pdf) (the latest version of the report currently available), 72,913 IVF babies were born in the US in 2015, out of [a total of 3.98m](https://www.statista.com/statistics/195908/number-of-births-in-the-united-states-since-1990/). IVF babies thus accounted for 1.83% of all babies born that year in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of live babies born from In vitro fertilization out of all babies born in the US in the year 2029. To resolve, we will use the 2029 edition of the Assisted Reproductive Technology report and live birth data from the [CDC](https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/index.html). If this report is not issued, the resolution will be determined by figures from the earliest authoritative report (so judged by the admins) to cover the year 2029 and provide IVF birth counts. The number of total babies born in 2029 will be determined by the [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/births.htm), or if this institute no longer exists, by whichever government entity replaces it", "lower_25": "2.19", "median": "3.32", "upper_75": "5.28", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the number of people in cryopreservation preserved before 2019 will fall to less than 50% of the current value by 2070?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of 2019-01-01, 411 people had been cryopreserved at various organisations:\n\n + 165 at Alcor ([list](https://www.alcor.org/cases.html))\n + 173 at the Cryonics Institute ([list](https://www.cryonics.org/case-reports/))\n + 66 at KrioRus ([list](http://kriorus.ru/en/cryopreserved%20people))\n + 7 at Oregon Cryonics ([list](http://oregoncryo.com/caseReports.html))\n\nFor a total of 411.\n\nHowever, it seems very unlikely that they will stay in cryopreservation indefinitely: they could be reuscitated one day (as they presumably hoped), but the cryonics organisations could also fail at preserving them (see the early cryonics organisation [The Cryonics Society of California](https://hpluspedia.org/wiki/Cryonics_organisations#Cryonics_Society_of_California)).\n\nTo determine when this will happen, this question asks: **When will the number of people in cryopreservation, who were preserved before 2019, fall to 50% of the current number, i.e. to 205?**\n\nResolution details:\n\n + This question only considers bodies preserved by Alcor, the Cryonics Institute, KrioRus, and Oregon Cryonics.\n\n + This question resolves to the first date when fewer than 205 of the 411 bodies that were preserved before 2019-01-01 are still cryopreserved. Here cryopreserved is taken to mean: cooled to a temperature below -100° C and not structurally damaged irreversibly. This includes thawing, chemical fixation, and other forms of destruction of the brain (such as smashing it). This also includes resucitation.\n\n + This question will resolve either by an official statement by the cryonics organisations mentioned above, or any cryonics organisation in possession of any of the 411 bodies, or by credible media reporting by at least 2 major news agencies that either all bodies at these organisations or these bodies specifically have been taken out of cryopreservation.\n\n + If any of these organisations dissolves and neither they nor any other cryonics organisation publish an official report of the transfer of these bodies or all bodies at these cryonics organisations, this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2048", "median": "2070", "upper_75": "2119", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Hong Kong will stop being a Special Administrative Region of China by 2046?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of question writing, Hong Kong is officially a [Special administrative region of China](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_administrative_regions_of_China) (along with [Macau](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macau)).\n\nThe [Hong Kong Basic Law](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hong_Kong_Basic_Law) (the de facto constitution of HK) says in [Chapter II, article 12](https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_2.html):\n\n> The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a local administrative region of the People's Republic of China, which shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy and come directly under the Central People's Government. \n\nQuestion: **When will Hong Kong stop being a Special Administrative Region of China?**\n\nResolution details:\n\n + This question resolves upon publication of an official document by the Hong Kong authorities (or Chinese government if the former don't exist anymore) that declares another status for Hong Kong.\n + This question does not resolve from the Special Administrative Region status being merely renamed or slightly tweaked, as judged by a Metaculus admin on the basis of credible media reports.\n + In that last case, the Metaculus admins can choose to resolve ambiguous if the situation is judged to have become too unclear/contentious/intractable.\n+ If a relevant declaration is made by some HK authority, but contested by another, a Metaculus admin can choose to delay question resolution until dominance or consensus is reached.", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2048", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a major U.S. supermarket will sell \"no-kill eggs\" in at least 25 states by Not ≤ 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "Chickens are generally either bred for egg-laying performance, or an ability to fatten and grow quickly. While both males and females are fattened in broiler production, there is currently no economically worthwhile use of the male offspring of egg-laying chickens, as these cannot lay eggs. Therefore, day-old male chicks are destroyed in the layer hatchery [(Krautwald-Junghanns et al., 2017)](https://academic.oup.com/ps/article/97/3/749/4780252).\n\nAs the red blood cells of birds possess a nucleus, they also carry the genetic sex information. Using spectroscopic techniques, the sex of an egg can be determined three days after it has been fertilised [(Galli et al, 2017)](https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/cdbme.2017.3.issue-2/cdbme-2017-0027/cdbme-2017-0027.pdf). In egg sexing of a chick's sex while still in the egg is might reduce the number of male chicks that are killed shortly after hatching.\n\n**When will a major U.S. supermarket chain sell “no-kill eggs” in at least 25 states?**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the date when a major US supermarket chain sells “no-kill eggs” eggs in at least 25 states. “No-kill eggs” are here defined as eggs produced by hens that hatched in a facility that successfully sexes the embryo at least 50% of the time, and subsequently destroys the embryos suspected to be male before hatching.\n\nA supermarket is here defined as the company that operates physical self-service retail markets that sell foods and household merchandise. The supermarket must sell “no-kill eggs” in one or more physical stores in at least 25 different states. Examples of supermarkets that operate in at least 25 states today are [listed here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1cs0GXkqp_OtPCbohgbI-4wsr7S6Tpt11Rt4Wrop-jd8/edit?usp=sharing).", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.65% of U.S. adults will self-report to follow a vegetarian diet in 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "Vegetarianism is the practice of abstaining from the consumption of meat (red meat, poultry, seafood, and the flesh of any other animal). Vegetarianism may be adopted for various reasons. Objections to eating meat might arise out of concerns for [animal welfare](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethics_of_eating_meat#Overview_of_the_argument_against_meat_eating), [animal rights](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_rights), or be borne out of [religious beliefs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vegetarianism_and_religion). Other motivations for vegetarianism include [health-related](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vegetarianism#Health_effects), [environmental](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_vegetarianism), [cultural](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vegetarianism#Demographics), [aesthetic](http://www.peacecafeangkor.org/vegetarian.htm) or [economic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_vegetarianism) ones.\n\nThere are different types of vegetarianism: an [ovo-lacto](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ovo-lacto_vegetarianism) vegetarian diet includes both eggs and dairy products, an [ovo-vegetarian](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ovo_vegetarianism) diet includes eggs but not dairy products, and a [lacto-vegetarian](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lacto_vegetarianism) diet includes dairy. By contrast, the vegan diet excludes all animal products, including eggs and dairy.\n\nIn [a 2019 national survey of 2,027 U.S. adults aged 18 and older](https://www.vrg.org/nutshell/faq.htm#poll), commissioned by the Vegetarian Resource Group, 4% of respondents self-reported as vegetarian (or vegan).\n\n**In a major poll of adults in the U.S. done in 2028, what percentage will self-report to follow any vegetarian diet (including a vegan diet)?**\n\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nFor the purpose of this question, self-reporting any vegetarian status amounts to agreeing with the proposition \"I never eat meat, fish, seafood, or poultry\". At least 2,000 adults representing a cross section of U.S. adults must be polled. The preferred source is a poll commissioned by the [Vegetarian Resource Group (VRG)](https://www.vrg.org/nutshell/faq.htm#poll). If surveys commissioned by the Vegetarian Resource Group are no longer admissible or are discontinued, an admin may decide to consult another poll if i) it surveys a representable cross section of U.S. adults, and ii) at least 2,000 adults are polled, and iii) respondents are asked whether they never eat meat, fish, seafood or poultry. If multiple polls are considered credible by an admin, the admin may choose to resolve as the median percentage of each poll.", "lower_25": "5.65", "median": "7.17", "upper_75": "9.22", "prediction": "5.65%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the number of people in cryopreservation preserved before 2019 will fall to less than 50% of the current value by 2070?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of 2019-01-01, 411 people had been cryopreserved at various organisations:\n\n + 165 at Alcor ([list](https://www.alcor.org/cases.html))\n + 173 at the Cryonics Institute ([list](https://www.cryonics.org/case-reports/))\n + 66 at KrioRus ([list](http://kriorus.ru/en/cryopreserved%20people))\n + 7 at Oregon Cryonics ([list](http://oregoncryo.com/caseReports.html))\n\nFor a total of 411.\n\nHowever, it seems very unlikely that they will stay in cryopreservation indefinitely: they could be reuscitated one day (as they presumably hoped), but the cryonics organisations could also fail at preserving them (see the early cryonics organisation [The Cryonics Society of California](https://hpluspedia.org/wiki/Cryonics_organisations#Cryonics_Society_of_California)).\n\nTo determine when this will happen, this question asks: **When will the number of people in cryopreservation, who were preserved before 2019, fall to 50% of the current number, i.e. to 205?**\n\nResolution details:\n\n + This question only considers bodies preserved by Alcor, the Cryonics Institute, KrioRus, and Oregon Cryonics.\n\n + This question resolves to the first date when fewer than 205 of the 411 bodies that were preserved before 2019-01-01 are still cryopreserved. Here cryopreserved is taken to mean: cooled to a temperature below -100° C and not structurally damaged irreversibly. This includes thawing, chemical fixation, and other forms of destruction of the brain (such as smashing it). This also includes resucitation.\n\n + This question will resolve either by an official statement by the cryonics organisations mentioned above, or any cryonics organisation in possession of any of the 411 bodies, or by credible media reporting by at least 2 major news agencies that either all bodies at these organisations or these bodies specifically have been taken out of cryopreservation.\n\n + If any of these organisations dissolves and neither they nor any other cryonics organisation publish an official report of the transfer of these bodies or all bodies at these cryonics organisations, this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2048", "median": "2070", "upper_75": "2119", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.65% of U.S. adults will self-report to follow a vegetarian diet in 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "Vegetarianism is the practice of abstaining from the consumption of meat (red meat, poultry, seafood, and the flesh of any other animal). Vegetarianism may be adopted for various reasons. Objections to eating meat might arise out of concerns for [animal welfare](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethics_of_eating_meat#Overview_of_the_argument_against_meat_eating), [animal rights](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_rights), or be borne out of [religious beliefs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vegetarianism_and_religion). Other motivations for vegetarianism include [health-related](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vegetarianism#Health_effects), [environmental](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_vegetarianism), [cultural](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vegetarianism#Demographics), [aesthetic](http://www.peacecafeangkor.org/vegetarian.htm) or [economic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_vegetarianism) ones.\n\nThere are different types of vegetarianism: an [ovo-lacto](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ovo-lacto_vegetarianism) vegetarian diet includes both eggs and dairy products, an [ovo-vegetarian](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ovo_vegetarianism) diet includes eggs but not dairy products, and a [lacto-vegetarian](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lacto_vegetarianism) diet includes dairy. By contrast, the vegan diet excludes all animal products, including eggs and dairy.\n\nIn [a 2019 national survey of 2,027 U.S. adults aged 18 and older](https://www.vrg.org/nutshell/faq.htm#poll), commissioned by the Vegetarian Resource Group, 4% of respondents self-reported as vegetarian (or vegan).\n\n**In a major poll of adults in the U.S. done in 2028, what percentage will self-report to follow any vegetarian diet (including a vegan diet)?**\n\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nFor the purpose of this question, self-reporting any vegetarian status amounts to agreeing with the proposition \"I never eat meat, fish, seafood, or poultry\". At least 2,000 adults representing a cross section of U.S. adults must be polled. The preferred source is a poll commissioned by the [Vegetarian Resource Group (VRG)](https://www.vrg.org/nutshell/faq.htm#poll). If surveys commissioned by the Vegetarian Resource Group are no longer admissible or are discontinued, an admin may decide to consult another poll if i) it surveys a representable cross section of U.S. adults, and ii) at least 2,000 adults are polled, and iii) respondents are asked whether they never eat meat, fish, seafood or poultry. If multiple polls are considered credible by an admin, the admin may choose to resolve as the median percentage of each poll.", "lower_25": "5.65", "median": "7.17", "upper_75": "9.22", "prediction": "5.65%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a major U.S. supermarket will sell \"no-kill eggs\" in at least 25 states by Not ≤ 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "Chickens are generally either bred for egg-laying performance, or an ability to fatten and grow quickly. While both males and females are fattened in broiler production, there is currently no economically worthwhile use of the male offspring of egg-laying chickens, as these cannot lay eggs. Therefore, day-old male chicks are destroyed in the layer hatchery [(Krautwald-Junghanns et al., 2017)](https://academic.oup.com/ps/article/97/3/749/4780252).\n\nAs the red blood cells of birds possess a nucleus, they also carry the genetic sex information. Using spectroscopic techniques, the sex of an egg can be determined three days after it has been fertilised [(Galli et al, 2017)](https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/cdbme.2017.3.issue-2/cdbme-2017-0027/cdbme-2017-0027.pdf). In egg sexing of a chick's sex while still in the egg is might reduce the number of male chicks that are killed shortly after hatching.\n\n**When will a major U.S. supermarket chain sell “no-kill eggs” in at least 25 states?**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the date when a major US supermarket chain sells “no-kill eggs” eggs in at least 25 states. “No-kill eggs” are here defined as eggs produced by hens that hatched in a facility that successfully sexes the embryo at least 50% of the time, and subsequently destroys the embryos suspected to be male before hatching.\n\nA supermarket is here defined as the company that operates physical self-service retail markets that sell foods and household merchandise. The supermarket must sell “no-kill eggs” in one or more physical stores in at least 25 different states. Examples of supermarkets that operate in at least 25 states today are [listed here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1cs0GXkqp_OtPCbohgbI-4wsr7S6Tpt11Rt4Wrop-jd8/edit?usp=sharing).", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Hong Kong will stop being a Special Administrative Region of China by 2046?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of question writing, Hong Kong is officially a [Special administrative region of China](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_administrative_regions_of_China) (along with [Macau](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macau)).\n\nThe [Hong Kong Basic Law](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hong_Kong_Basic_Law) (the de facto constitution of HK) says in [Chapter II, article 12](https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_2.html):\n\n> The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a local administrative region of the People's Republic of China, which shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy and come directly under the Central People's Government. \n\nQuestion: **When will Hong Kong stop being a Special Administrative Region of China?**\n\nResolution details:\n\n + This question resolves upon publication of an official document by the Hong Kong authorities (or Chinese government if the former don't exist anymore) that declares another status for Hong Kong.\n + This question does not resolve from the Special Administrative Region status being merely renamed or slightly tweaked, as judged by a Metaculus admin on the basis of credible media reports.\n + In that last case, the Metaculus admins can choose to resolve ambiguous if the situation is judged to have become too unclear/contentious/intractable.\n+ If a relevant declaration is made by some HK authority, but contested by another, a Metaculus admin can choose to delay question resolution until dominance or consensus is reached.", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2048", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.65% of U.S. adults will self-report to follow a vegetarian diet in 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "Vegetarianism is the practice of abstaining from the consumption of meat (red meat, poultry, seafood, and the flesh of any other animal). Vegetarianism may be adopted for various reasons. Objections to eating meat might arise out of concerns for [animal welfare](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethics_of_eating_meat#Overview_of_the_argument_against_meat_eating), [animal rights](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_rights), or be borne out of [religious beliefs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vegetarianism_and_religion). Other motivations for vegetarianism include [health-related](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vegetarianism#Health_effects), [environmental](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_vegetarianism), [cultural](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vegetarianism#Demographics), [aesthetic](http://www.peacecafeangkor.org/vegetarian.htm) or [economic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_vegetarianism) ones.\n\nThere are different types of vegetarianism: an [ovo-lacto](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ovo-lacto_vegetarianism) vegetarian diet includes both eggs and dairy products, an [ovo-vegetarian](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ovo_vegetarianism) diet includes eggs but not dairy products, and a [lacto-vegetarian](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lacto_vegetarianism) diet includes dairy. By contrast, the vegan diet excludes all animal products, including eggs and dairy.\n\nIn [a 2019 national survey of 2,027 U.S. adults aged 18 and older](https://www.vrg.org/nutshell/faq.htm#poll), commissioned by the Vegetarian Resource Group, 4% of respondents self-reported as vegetarian (or vegan).\n\n**In a major poll of adults in the U.S. done in 2028, what percentage will self-report to follow any vegetarian diet (including a vegan diet)?**\n\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nFor the purpose of this question, self-reporting any vegetarian status amounts to agreeing with the proposition \"I never eat meat, fish, seafood, or poultry\". At least 2,000 adults representing a cross section of U.S. adults must be polled. The preferred source is a poll commissioned by the [Vegetarian Resource Group (VRG)](https://www.vrg.org/nutshell/faq.htm#poll). If surveys commissioned by the Vegetarian Resource Group are no longer admissible or are discontinued, an admin may decide to consult another poll if i) it surveys a representable cross section of U.S. adults, and ii) at least 2,000 adults are polled, and iii) respondents are asked whether they never eat meat, fish, seafood or poultry. If multiple polls are considered credible by an admin, the admin may choose to resolve as the median percentage of each poll.", "lower_25": "5.65", "median": "7.17", "upper_75": "9.22", "prediction": "5.65%"} -{"title": "If Conservatives win the 2019 UK general election, what is the chance that UK broadband download speeds will be 65.4% higher 5 years later?", "desc": "", "resc": "The Conservative party plans to [invest £5bn in providing broadband to the hardest-to-reach 20% of the country](https://www.conservatives.com/sharethefacts/2019/10/gigabit-rural-broadband), as part of an ambitious plan to [provide full-fiber broadband to every household by 2025](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-49881168) including places that private investment would otherwise miss.\n\nThe UK's mean download speed is [currently 22.37Mbps](https://www.cable.co.uk/broadband/speed/worldwide-speed-league/) in 2019, up from 18.57Mbps in 2018; this is in the bottom third of European broadband speeds, due to the slow rollout of full-fiber broadband. Full-fiber broadband itself can reach speeds of [up to 1 Gbps](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-49253071).\n\n**If, in the 2019 election, Conservatives, or a coalition with Conservatives making up the majority of seats, form a government, what will be mean broadband speeds in the UK in 2024?**\n\nJudgement will be by Cable's [Worldwide broadband speed league 2024](https://www.cable.co.uk/broadband/speed/worldwide-speed-league/).\n\nSee also:\n\n* [If Labour wins the 2019 UK general election, what will be mean UK broadband download speeds 5 years later?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3340/if-labour-wins-the-2019-uk-general-election-what-will-be-mean-uk-broadband-download-speeds-5-years-later/)", "lower_25": "65.4", "median": "83.7", "upper_75": "> 100", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first person that has been cryopreserved for more than 1 year will be resuscitated or uploaded by year 2200, assuming it occurs in 2088?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2055", "median": "2088", "upper_75": "2142", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the exponent of the fastest known polynomial-time matrix multiplication algorithm will be 2.366 in 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.366", "median": "2.370", "upper_75": "2.372", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the exponent of the fastest known polynomial-time matrix multiplication algorithm will be 2.366 in 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.366", "median": "2.370", "upper_75": "2.372", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "If Conservatives win the 2019 UK general election, what is the chance that UK broadband download speeds will be 65.4% higher 5 years later?", "desc": "", "resc": "The Conservative party plans to [invest £5bn in providing broadband to the hardest-to-reach 20% of the country](https://www.conservatives.com/sharethefacts/2019/10/gigabit-rural-broadband), as part of an ambitious plan to [provide full-fiber broadband to every household by 2025](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-49881168) including places that private investment would otherwise miss.\n\nThe UK's mean download speed is [currently 22.37Mbps](https://www.cable.co.uk/broadband/speed/worldwide-speed-league/) in 2019, up from 18.57Mbps in 2018; this is in the bottom third of European broadband speeds, due to the slow rollout of full-fiber broadband. Full-fiber broadband itself can reach speeds of [up to 1 Gbps](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-49253071).\n\n**If, in the 2019 election, Conservatives, or a coalition with Conservatives making up the majority of seats, form a government, what will be mean broadband speeds in the UK in 2024?**\n\nJudgement will be by Cable's [Worldwide broadband speed league 2024](https://www.cable.co.uk/broadband/speed/worldwide-speed-league/).\n\nSee also:\n\n* [If Labour wins the 2019 UK general election, what will be mean UK broadband download speeds 5 years later?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3340/if-labour-wins-the-2019-uk-general-election-what-will-be-mean-uk-broadband-download-speeds-5-years-later/)", "lower_25": "65.4", "median": "83.7", "upper_75": "> 100", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "If Conservatives win the 2019 UK general election, what is the chance that UK broadband download speeds will be 65.4% higher 5 years later?", "desc": "", "resc": "The Conservative party plans to [invest £5bn in providing broadband to the hardest-to-reach 20% of the country](https://www.conservatives.com/sharethefacts/2019/10/gigabit-rural-broadband), as part of an ambitious plan to [provide full-fiber broadband to every household by 2025](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-49881168) including places that private investment would otherwise miss.\n\nThe UK's mean download speed is [currently 22.37Mbps](https://www.cable.co.uk/broadband/speed/worldwide-speed-league/) in 2019, up from 18.57Mbps in 2018; this is in the bottom third of European broadband speeds, due to the slow rollout of full-fiber broadband. Full-fiber broadband itself can reach speeds of [up to 1 Gbps](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-49253071).\n\n**If, in the 2019 election, Conservatives, or a coalition with Conservatives making up the majority of seats, form a government, what will be mean broadband speeds in the UK in 2024?**\n\nJudgement will be by Cable's [Worldwide broadband speed league 2024](https://www.cable.co.uk/broadband/speed/worldwide-speed-league/).\n\nSee also:\n\n* [If Labour wins the 2019 UK general election, what will be mean UK broadband download speeds 5 years later?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3340/if-labour-wins-the-2019-uk-general-election-what-will-be-mean-uk-broadband-download-speeds-5-years-later/)", "lower_25": "65.4", "median": "83.7", "upper_75": "> 100", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the WHO will certify the worldwide eradication of Polio by 2039?", "desc": "In October 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) [announced the eradication](https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/two-out-of-three-wild-poliovirus-strains-eradicated) of type 3 [poliomyelitis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polio). This followed the eradication of type 2, which was [announced in 2015](http://polioeradication.org/news-post/global-eradication-of-wild-poliovirus-type-2-declared/). Only type 1 remains in the wild, but the CDC, WHO, and other involved public health institutions are optimistic that [it can be eradicated soon](http://polioeradication.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/english-polio-endgame-strategy.pdf).\n\nTypes 2 and 3 have already been certified eradicated, but it's not impossible that the wild types could re-emerge naturally. (This [actually happened](https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/11-08-2016-government-of-nigeria-reports-2-wild-polio-cases-first-since-july-2014) in Nigeria in 2016, two years after the prior last reported natural cases in Africa.) This property of the virus has caused some reticence by the WHO about certifying the eradication--the last known type 2 case was in 1999, but [the WHO didn't certify it until 2015](http://polioeradication.org/news-post/global-eradication-of-wild-poliovirus-type-2-declared/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date that the [World Health Organization](https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/poliomyelitis) declares that polio has been eradicated from the wild everywhere on Earth. This announcement must include all known strains, mutations, and variants of [polioviraus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poliovirus). Viruses contained in medical labs for research or vaccine development will not be considered to be \"in the wild\". If the WHO's announcement is not retracted by the WHO within 2 months, it will be considered a definitive announcement for resolution, even if it is later known to be mistaken or retracted", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the exponent of the fastest known polynomial-time matrix multiplication algorithm will be 2.366 in 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.366", "median": "2.370", "upper_75": "2.372", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 45.5% of egg-laying hens in the U.S. will be cage-free in June 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Battery cages](http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/B/BatteryCages.aspx), wire-mesh enclosures, are the predominant form of housing for laying hens worldwide [(Leenstra, 2016)](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291555344_Layer_breeding_programmes_in_changing_production_environments_a_historic_perspective). Cage reduce aggression and cannibalism among hens, but are barren, restrict movement, or the expression of natural behaviours, and increase rates of [osteoporosis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osteoporosis) [(Meseret, 2016)](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311321712_A_review_of_poultry_welfare_in_conventional_production_system). As of March 2019, cage-free shell egg production accounted for only 18.4% (60.7 million hens) of the current table egg layer flock. By contrast, in the European Union, As of 2017, 49,6% of the total number of laying hens were not in cages [(EU, 2018)](https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/d/18f7766e-e9a9-46a4-bbec-94d4c181183f/0%20Circa%20%20egg%20no%20links.pdf).\n\n**What the percentage of egg-laying hens will be cage-free, in the U.S., in June 2025?**\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the percentage of the egg-laying flock that are in any cage-free category in June 2025, according to figures published by the United States Department of Agriculture. For the number of egg-laying hens that are in any cage-free category, we shall use the the estimated \"layer flock size\" of \"all cage-free layers\" for the month July ([generally published here](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/rj4304553?locale=en) in early August). For the total number of egg layers, we use the USDA estimate of the number layers producing table or market type eggs ([generally published here](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/fb494842n?locale=en)).", "lower_25": "36.0", "median": "45.5", "upper_75": "53.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the WHO will certify the worldwide eradication of Polio by 2039?", "desc": "In October 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) [announced the eradication](https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/two-out-of-three-wild-poliovirus-strains-eradicated) of type 3 [poliomyelitis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polio). This followed the eradication of type 2, which was [announced in 2015](http://polioeradication.org/news-post/global-eradication-of-wild-poliovirus-type-2-declared/). Only type 1 remains in the wild, but the CDC, WHO, and other involved public health institutions are optimistic that [it can be eradicated soon](http://polioeradication.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/english-polio-endgame-strategy.pdf).\n\nTypes 2 and 3 have already been certified eradicated, but it's not impossible that the wild types could re-emerge naturally. (This [actually happened](https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/11-08-2016-government-of-nigeria-reports-2-wild-polio-cases-first-since-july-2014) in Nigeria in 2016, two years after the prior last reported natural cases in Africa.) This property of the virus has caused some reticence by the WHO about certifying the eradication--the last known type 2 case was in 1999, but [the WHO didn't certify it until 2015](http://polioeradication.org/news-post/global-eradication-of-wild-poliovirus-type-2-declared/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date that the [World Health Organization](https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/poliomyelitis) declares that polio has been eradicated from the wild everywhere on Earth. This announcement must include all known strains, mutations, and variants of [polioviraus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poliovirus). Viruses contained in medical labs for research or vaccine development will not be considered to be \"in the wild\". If the WHO's announcement is not retracted by the WHO within 2 months, it will be considered a definitive announcement for resolution, even if it is later known to be mistaken or retracted", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 45.5% of egg-laying hens in the U.S. will be cage-free in June 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Battery cages](http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/B/BatteryCages.aspx), wire-mesh enclosures, are the predominant form of housing for laying hens worldwide [(Leenstra, 2016)](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291555344_Layer_breeding_programmes_in_changing_production_environments_a_historic_perspective). Cage reduce aggression and cannibalism among hens, but are barren, restrict movement, or the expression of natural behaviours, and increase rates of [osteoporosis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osteoporosis) [(Meseret, 2016)](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311321712_A_review_of_poultry_welfare_in_conventional_production_system). As of March 2019, cage-free shell egg production accounted for only 18.4% (60.7 million hens) of the current table egg layer flock. By contrast, in the European Union, As of 2017, 49,6% of the total number of laying hens were not in cages [(EU, 2018)](https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/d/18f7766e-e9a9-46a4-bbec-94d4c181183f/0%20Circa%20%20egg%20no%20links.pdf).\n\n**What the percentage of egg-laying hens will be cage-free, in the U.S., in June 2025?**\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the percentage of the egg-laying flock that are in any cage-free category in June 2025, according to figures published by the United States Department of Agriculture. For the number of egg-laying hens that are in any cage-free category, we shall use the the estimated \"layer flock size\" of \"all cage-free layers\" for the month July ([generally published here](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/rj4304553?locale=en) in early August). For the total number of egg layers, we use the USDA estimate of the number layers producing table or market type eggs ([generally published here](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/fb494842n?locale=en)).", "lower_25": "36.0", "median": "45.5", "upper_75": "53.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the WHO will certify the worldwide eradication of Polio by 2039?", "desc": "In October 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) [announced the eradication](https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/two-out-of-three-wild-poliovirus-strains-eradicated) of type 3 [poliomyelitis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polio). This followed the eradication of type 2, which was [announced in 2015](http://polioeradication.org/news-post/global-eradication-of-wild-poliovirus-type-2-declared/). Only type 1 remains in the wild, but the CDC, WHO, and other involved public health institutions are optimistic that [it can be eradicated soon](http://polioeradication.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/english-polio-endgame-strategy.pdf).\n\nTypes 2 and 3 have already been certified eradicated, but it's not impossible that the wild types could re-emerge naturally. (This [actually happened](https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/11-08-2016-government-of-nigeria-reports-2-wild-polio-cases-first-since-july-2014) in Nigeria in 2016, two years after the prior last reported natural cases in Africa.) This property of the virus has caused some reticence by the WHO about certifying the eradication--the last known type 2 case was in 1999, but [the WHO didn't certify it until 2015](http://polioeradication.org/news-post/global-eradication-of-wild-poliovirus-type-2-declared/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date that the [World Health Organization](https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/poliomyelitis) declares that polio has been eradicated from the wild everywhere on Earth. This announcement must include all known strains, mutations, and variants of [polioviraus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poliovirus). Viruses contained in medical labs for research or vaccine development will not be considered to be \"in the wild\". If the WHO's announcement is not retracted by the WHO within 2 months, it will be considered a definitive announcement for resolution, even if it is later known to be mistaken or retracted", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX will be worth 123.4 billion nominal USD in 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will SpaceX be worth in 2030, in billions of nominal USD?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4927/spacex-valuation-in-2030/) *[125B - 100T range]*\n\n----\n\n[Space Exploration Technologies Corp.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX), doing business as SpaceX, is a private American aerospace manufacturer and space transportation services company headquartered in Hawthorne, California. \n\nSpaceX's achievements include the first privately funded liquid-propellant rocket to reach orbit ([Falcon 1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_1) in 2008), the first private company to successfully launch, orbit, and recover a spacecraft ([Dragon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX_Dragon) in 2010), the first private company to send a spacecraft to the International Space Station ([Dragon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX_Dragon) in 2012), the first propulsive landing for an orbital rocket ([Falcon 9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_9) in 2015), the first reuse of an orbital rocket ([Falcon 9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_9) in 2017), and the first private company to launch an object into orbit around the sun ([Falcon Heavy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_Heavy)'s payload of a [Elon Musk's Tesla Roadster](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elon_Musk%27s_Tesla_Roadster) in 2018).\n\nAs of 2019, the company is developing a vehicle currently known as the [Starship](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX_Starship). This vehicle is intended to enable [ultra low cost launches to LEO and beyond](https://www.space.com/spacex-starship-flight-passenger-cost-elon-musk.html), as well as human exploration and settlement of the Moon and Mars. \n\nFurther, in 2019 SpaceX began deployment of an extremely large satellite constellation known as [Starlink](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Starlink_(satellite_constellation)), which may ultimately consist of more than 40,000 satellites. The constellation is designed to deliver high-bandwidth, low-latency internet access to everywhere on Earth, and is [due to be fully operational by the late 2020s.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Starlink_(satellite_constellation)#Constellation_design_and_status) Morgan Stanley Research has suggested that successful completion of this megaconstellation [may increase SpaceX's value to $120 billion.](https://www.businessinsider.com/spacex-future-multibillion-dollar-valuation-starlink-internet-morgan-stanley-2019-9?r=US&IR=T)\n\nSpaceX's valuation has increased dramatically since the company was formed in 2002, [crossing the $1bn mark in 2010, and reaching a $10bn valuation in 2015.](https://twitter.com/JonErlichman/status/1196147909647044608) As of 2019, the company is reportedly [valued at $33.3 billion.](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/31/spacex-valuation-33point3-billion-after-starlink-satellites-fundraising.html)", "resc": "If SpaceX is a publicly traded company on January 1, 2030, this question will resolve as the company's market capitalization on that date in billions of nominal USD. If SpaceX is a privately held company on January 1, 2030, this question will resolve as the most recent credible estimated valuation attributed to the company by a reputable financial news organization. \n\nIf SpaceX changes its name or corporate structure before this question resolves, including but not limited to in the event of a merger or acquisition, this question will continue to track the value of the renamed company. If SpaceX (or any relevant successor company) ceases to exist by January 1, 2030, or if (in Metaculus' judgement) the company has changed in structure so substantially that it is no longer SpaceX, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "123.4", "median": "> 125", "upper_75": "> 125", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Hong Kong will stop being a Special Administrative Region of China by 2046?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of question writing, Hong Kong is officially a [Special administrative region of China](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_administrative_regions_of_China) (along with [Macau](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macau)).\n\nThe [Hong Kong Basic Law](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hong_Kong_Basic_Law) (the de facto constitution of HK) says in [Chapter II, article 12](https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_2.html):\n\n> The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a local administrative region of the People's Republic of China, which shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy and come directly under the Central People's Government. \n\nQuestion: **When will Hong Kong stop being a Special Administrative Region of China?**\n\nResolution details:\n\n + This question resolves upon publication of an official document by the Hong Kong authorities (or Chinese government if the former don't exist anymore) that declares another status for Hong Kong.\n + This question does not resolve from the Special Administrative Region status being merely renamed or slightly tweaked, as judged by a Metaculus admin on the basis of credible media reports.\n + In that last case, the Metaculus admins can choose to resolve ambiguous if the situation is judged to have become too unclear/contentious/intractable.\n+ If a relevant declaration is made by some HK authority, but contested by another, a Metaculus admin can choose to delay question resolution until dominance or consensus is reached.", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2048", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX will be worth 123.4 billion nominal USD in 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will SpaceX be worth in 2030, in billions of nominal USD?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4927/spacex-valuation-in-2030/) *[125B - 100T range]*\n\n----\n\n[Space Exploration Technologies Corp.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX), doing business as SpaceX, is a private American aerospace manufacturer and space transportation services company headquartered in Hawthorne, California. \n\nSpaceX's achievements include the first privately funded liquid-propellant rocket to reach orbit ([Falcon 1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_1) in 2008), the first private company to successfully launch, orbit, and recover a spacecraft ([Dragon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX_Dragon) in 2010), the first private company to send a spacecraft to the International Space Station ([Dragon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX_Dragon) in 2012), the first propulsive landing for an orbital rocket ([Falcon 9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_9) in 2015), the first reuse of an orbital rocket ([Falcon 9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_9) in 2017), and the first private company to launch an object into orbit around the sun ([Falcon Heavy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_Heavy)'s payload of a [Elon Musk's Tesla Roadster](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elon_Musk%27s_Tesla_Roadster) in 2018).\n\nAs of 2019, the company is developing a vehicle currently known as the [Starship](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX_Starship). This vehicle is intended to enable [ultra low cost launches to LEO and beyond](https://www.space.com/spacex-starship-flight-passenger-cost-elon-musk.html), as well as human exploration and settlement of the Moon and Mars. \n\nFurther, in 2019 SpaceX began deployment of an extremely large satellite constellation known as [Starlink](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Starlink_(satellite_constellation)), which may ultimately consist of more than 40,000 satellites. The constellation is designed to deliver high-bandwidth, low-latency internet access to everywhere on Earth, and is [due to be fully operational by the late 2020s.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Starlink_(satellite_constellation)#Constellation_design_and_status) Morgan Stanley Research has suggested that successful completion of this megaconstellation [may increase SpaceX's value to $120 billion.](https://www.businessinsider.com/spacex-future-multibillion-dollar-valuation-starlink-internet-morgan-stanley-2019-9?r=US&IR=T)\n\nSpaceX's valuation has increased dramatically since the company was formed in 2002, [crossing the $1bn mark in 2010, and reaching a $10bn valuation in 2015.](https://twitter.com/JonErlichman/status/1196147909647044608) As of 2019, the company is reportedly [valued at $33.3 billion.](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/31/spacex-valuation-33point3-billion-after-starlink-satellites-fundraising.html)", "resc": "If SpaceX is a publicly traded company on January 1, 2030, this question will resolve as the company's market capitalization on that date in billions of nominal USD. If SpaceX is a privately held company on January 1, 2030, this question will resolve as the most recent credible estimated valuation attributed to the company by a reputable financial news organization. \n\nIf SpaceX changes its name or corporate structure before this question resolves, including but not limited to in the event of a merger or acquisition, this question will continue to track the value of the renamed company. If SpaceX (or any relevant successor company) ceases to exist by January 1, 2030, or if (in Metaculus' judgement) the company has changed in structure so substantially that it is no longer SpaceX, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "123.4", "median": "> 125", "upper_75": "> 125", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a company in any country will generate $50M revenue from edible insect product sales alone in a single year by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "Edible insects are insect species used for human consumption, e.g., whole or as an ingredient in processed food products such as burger patties, pasta, or snacks.\n\nIt is estimated that insect-eating is practised regularly by at least 2 billion people worldwide [(Tao and Li, 2017)](https://bit.ly/2Y2F69z). Many of these insects contain amounts of protein, fat, vitamins, and minerals comparable to commonly eaten livestock (ibid.).\n\nThe global edible insects market [is estimated to be expanding](https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/04/01/1790970/0/en/7-95-Billion-Edible-Insects-Market-Global-Forecast-to-2030.html) supported by a compound annual growth rate of over 20% during the forecast period of 2019 to 2030. This is reported to be due to various reasons, such as [growing population and decreasing food resources, increasing demand for protein-rich food, the high cost of animal protein](https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/04/01/1790970/0/en/7-95-Billion-Edible-Insects-Market-Global-Forecast-to-2030.html), and a [growing demand for the environment friendly protein rich food](https://www.meticulousresearch.com/product/edible-insects-market-forecast/)].\n\nAs of 2015, there were [around a dozen US based edible insect companies](https://www.bugsolutely.com/yellow-bug-pages/). Two companies [are reported to have received](http://filepicker.io/api/file/Q1F6wELwToarmVENWL2c) over a million dollar funding in a single fundraising round.\n\n**When will a company, in any country, generate $50M revenue in one year from edible insect product sales alone?**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the date when any company generates at least $50M revenue in one year from edible insect products that are for human consumption (i.e. livestock feed and pet food companies are excluded). These products could be whole insects, or any processed food products that with at least a 2% edible insect content by weight. However alcoholic spirits that contain insects do not count as qualifying products.\n\nReports supporting resolution should come from public company filings, or credible financial news sources.", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a company in any country will generate $50M revenue from edible insect product sales alone in a single year by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "Edible insects are insect species used for human consumption, e.g., whole or as an ingredient in processed food products such as burger patties, pasta, or snacks.\n\nIt is estimated that insect-eating is practised regularly by at least 2 billion people worldwide [(Tao and Li, 2017)](https://bit.ly/2Y2F69z). Many of these insects contain amounts of protein, fat, vitamins, and minerals comparable to commonly eaten livestock (ibid.).\n\nThe global edible insects market [is estimated to be expanding](https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/04/01/1790970/0/en/7-95-Billion-Edible-Insects-Market-Global-Forecast-to-2030.html) supported by a compound annual growth rate of over 20% during the forecast period of 2019 to 2030. This is reported to be due to various reasons, such as [growing population and decreasing food resources, increasing demand for protein-rich food, the high cost of animal protein](https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/04/01/1790970/0/en/7-95-Billion-Edible-Insects-Market-Global-Forecast-to-2030.html), and a [growing demand for the environment friendly protein rich food](https://www.meticulousresearch.com/product/edible-insects-market-forecast/)].\n\nAs of 2015, there were [around a dozen US based edible insect companies](https://www.bugsolutely.com/yellow-bug-pages/). Two companies [are reported to have received](http://filepicker.io/api/file/Q1F6wELwToarmVENWL2c) over a million dollar funding in a single fundraising round.\n\n**When will a company, in any country, generate $50M revenue in one year from edible insect product sales alone?**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the date when any company generates at least $50M revenue in one year from edible insect products that are for human consumption (i.e. livestock feed and pet food companies are excluded). These products could be whole insects, or any processed food products that with at least a 2% edible insect content by weight. However alcoholic spirits that contain insects do not count as qualifying products.\n\nReports supporting resolution should come from public company filings, or credible financial news sources.", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX will be worth 123.4 billion nominal USD in 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will SpaceX be worth in 2030, in billions of nominal USD?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4927/spacex-valuation-in-2030/) *[125B - 100T range]*\n\n----\n\n[Space Exploration Technologies Corp.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX), doing business as SpaceX, is a private American aerospace manufacturer and space transportation services company headquartered in Hawthorne, California. \n\nSpaceX's achievements include the first privately funded liquid-propellant rocket to reach orbit ([Falcon 1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_1) in 2008), the first private company to successfully launch, orbit, and recover a spacecraft ([Dragon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX_Dragon) in 2010), the first private company to send a spacecraft to the International Space Station ([Dragon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX_Dragon) in 2012), the first propulsive landing for an orbital rocket ([Falcon 9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_9) in 2015), the first reuse of an orbital rocket ([Falcon 9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_9) in 2017), and the first private company to launch an object into orbit around the sun ([Falcon Heavy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_Heavy)'s payload of a [Elon Musk's Tesla Roadster](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elon_Musk%27s_Tesla_Roadster) in 2018).\n\nAs of 2019, the company is developing a vehicle currently known as the [Starship](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX_Starship). This vehicle is intended to enable [ultra low cost launches to LEO and beyond](https://www.space.com/spacex-starship-flight-passenger-cost-elon-musk.html), as well as human exploration and settlement of the Moon and Mars. \n\nFurther, in 2019 SpaceX began deployment of an extremely large satellite constellation known as [Starlink](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Starlink_(satellite_constellation)), which may ultimately consist of more than 40,000 satellites. The constellation is designed to deliver high-bandwidth, low-latency internet access to everywhere on Earth, and is [due to be fully operational by the late 2020s.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Starlink_(satellite_constellation)#Constellation_design_and_status) Morgan Stanley Research has suggested that successful completion of this megaconstellation [may increase SpaceX's value to $120 billion.](https://www.businessinsider.com/spacex-future-multibillion-dollar-valuation-starlink-internet-morgan-stanley-2019-9?r=US&IR=T)\n\nSpaceX's valuation has increased dramatically since the company was formed in 2002, [crossing the $1bn mark in 2010, and reaching a $10bn valuation in 2015.](https://twitter.com/JonErlichman/status/1196147909647044608) As of 2019, the company is reportedly [valued at $33.3 billion.](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/31/spacex-valuation-33point3-billion-after-starlink-satellites-fundraising.html)", "resc": "If SpaceX is a publicly traded company on January 1, 2030, this question will resolve as the company's market capitalization on that date in billions of nominal USD. If SpaceX is a privately held company on January 1, 2030, this question will resolve as the most recent credible estimated valuation attributed to the company by a reputable financial news organization. \n\nIf SpaceX changes its name or corporate structure before this question resolves, including but not limited to in the event of a merger or acquisition, this question will continue to track the value of the renamed company. If SpaceX (or any relevant successor company) ceases to exist by January 1, 2030, or if (in Metaculus' judgement) the company has changed in structure so substantially that it is no longer SpaceX, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "123.4", "median": "> 125", "upper_75": "> 125", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a company in any country will generate $50M revenue from edible insect product sales alone in a single year by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "Edible insects are insect species used for human consumption, e.g., whole or as an ingredient in processed food products such as burger patties, pasta, or snacks.\n\nIt is estimated that insect-eating is practised regularly by at least 2 billion people worldwide [(Tao and Li, 2017)](https://bit.ly/2Y2F69z). Many of these insects contain amounts of protein, fat, vitamins, and minerals comparable to commonly eaten livestock (ibid.).\n\nThe global edible insects market [is estimated to be expanding](https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/04/01/1790970/0/en/7-95-Billion-Edible-Insects-Market-Global-Forecast-to-2030.html) supported by a compound annual growth rate of over 20% during the forecast period of 2019 to 2030. This is reported to be due to various reasons, such as [growing population and decreasing food resources, increasing demand for protein-rich food, the high cost of animal protein](https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/04/01/1790970/0/en/7-95-Billion-Edible-Insects-Market-Global-Forecast-to-2030.html), and a [growing demand for the environment friendly protein rich food](https://www.meticulousresearch.com/product/edible-insects-market-forecast/)].\n\nAs of 2015, there were [around a dozen US based edible insect companies](https://www.bugsolutely.com/yellow-bug-pages/). Two companies [are reported to have received](http://filepicker.io/api/file/Q1F6wELwToarmVENWL2c) over a million dollar funding in a single fundraising round.\n\n**When will a company, in any country, generate $50M revenue in one year from edible insect product sales alone?**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the date when any company generates at least $50M revenue in one year from edible insect products that are for human consumption (i.e. livestock feed and pet food companies are excluded). These products could be whole insects, or any processed food products that with at least a 2% edible insect content by weight. However alcoholic spirits that contain insects do not count as qualifying products.\n\nReports supporting resolution should come from public company filings, or credible financial news sources.", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5,000 companies worldwide will not pledge to remove cages from their egg supply chains by 2037?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2037", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 45.5% of egg-laying hens in the U.S. will be cage-free in June 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Battery cages](http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/B/BatteryCages.aspx), wire-mesh enclosures, are the predominant form of housing for laying hens worldwide [(Leenstra, 2016)](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291555344_Layer_breeding_programmes_in_changing_production_environments_a_historic_perspective). Cage reduce aggression and cannibalism among hens, but are barren, restrict movement, or the expression of natural behaviours, and increase rates of [osteoporosis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osteoporosis) [(Meseret, 2016)](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311321712_A_review_of_poultry_welfare_in_conventional_production_system). As of March 2019, cage-free shell egg production accounted for only 18.4% (60.7 million hens) of the current table egg layer flock. By contrast, in the European Union, As of 2017, 49,6% of the total number of laying hens were not in cages [(EU, 2018)](https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/d/18f7766e-e9a9-46a4-bbec-94d4c181183f/0%20Circa%20%20egg%20no%20links.pdf).\n\n**What the percentage of egg-laying hens will be cage-free, in the U.S., in June 2025?**\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the percentage of the egg-laying flock that are in any cage-free category in June 2025, according to figures published by the United States Department of Agriculture. For the number of egg-laying hens that are in any cage-free category, we shall use the the estimated \"layer flock size\" of \"all cage-free layers\" for the month July ([generally published here](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/rj4304553?locale=en) in early August). For the total number of egg layers, we use the USDA estimate of the number layers producing table or market type eggs ([generally published here](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/fb494842n?locale=en)).", "lower_25": "36.0", "median": "45.5", "upper_75": "53.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 750 companies will pledge to maintain a supply chain consistent with the current basic Global Animal Partnership standards for broiler chickens by the end of 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Global Animal Partnership](https://globalanimalpartnership.org/) (GAP), a nonprofit which seeks to promote the welfare of farmed animals, has an animal welfare rating program for assessing the welfare of animals on-farm, during transport and at slaughter.\n\nThis basic part of GAP's standards for broiler chickens is summarized with the slogan: “no cages, no crates, no crowding”, and requires the following:\n\n> Chickens are typically housed indoors and must meet a maximum stocking density of 6.0 lbs/ft2 by 1 July 2020. Producers are required to manage the environment to maintain litter, air quality and provide chickens with environmental enrichment. Environmental enrichments are materials that are provided to chickens to add complexity to their environment and encourage the expression of natural behavior (such as pecking, scratching, exploration and play behavior).[[1](https://globalanimalpartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/GAP-Standard-for-Meat-Chickens-v3.1-20180403.pdf)]\n\nAs of writing this question, [228 companies worldwide have pledged to adhere to the basic part of GAP standards for broiler chickens](https://awesome-table.com/-L1TTxtnoRIENQZ48vAe/view?filterK=Broiler). \n\n**When will at least 750 companies pledge to maintain a supply chain consistent with the current basic GAP standards for broiler chickens raised for meat, within a timeline ending no later than 2030?**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nCompanies need to commit to removing the poultry that are not produced in line with GAP's standards for broiler chickens from their supply chains. This resolves as the date when at least 750 companies pledge to adhere to having supply chains consistent with GAP's welfare standards within a timeline that ends in or before the year 2030. Resolution will be based on [the data reported by Chicken Watch](https://chickenwatch.org/progress-tracker/?filterM=Broiler). The current number can be found by entering the query issue \"Broiler\", with the timeline ending in or before the year 2030.\n\nThis question resolves as *> Dec 31, 2030* if fewer than 750 companies pledge to maintain a supply chain consistent with the current basic Global Animal Partnership standards for broiler chickens by end of 2030.", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the earliest preservation date of any resuscitated cryonics patient will be in 2058?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2058", "upper_75": "2095", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 750 companies will pledge to maintain a supply chain consistent with the current basic Global Animal Partnership standards for broiler chickens by the end of 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Global Animal Partnership](https://globalanimalpartnership.org/) (GAP), a nonprofit which seeks to promote the welfare of farmed animals, has an animal welfare rating program for assessing the welfare of animals on-farm, during transport and at slaughter.\n\nThis basic part of GAP's standards for broiler chickens is summarized with the slogan: “no cages, no crates, no crowding”, and requires the following:\n\n> Chickens are typically housed indoors and must meet a maximum stocking density of 6.0 lbs/ft2 by 1 July 2020. Producers are required to manage the environment to maintain litter, air quality and provide chickens with environmental enrichment. Environmental enrichments are materials that are provided to chickens to add complexity to their environment and encourage the expression of natural behavior (such as pecking, scratching, exploration and play behavior).[[1](https://globalanimalpartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/GAP-Standard-for-Meat-Chickens-v3.1-20180403.pdf)]\n\nAs of writing this question, [228 companies worldwide have pledged to adhere to the basic part of GAP standards for broiler chickens](https://awesome-table.com/-L1TTxtnoRIENQZ48vAe/view?filterK=Broiler). \n\n**When will at least 750 companies pledge to maintain a supply chain consistent with the current basic GAP standards for broiler chickens raised for meat, within a timeline ending no later than 2030?**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nCompanies need to commit to removing the poultry that are not produced in line with GAP's standards for broiler chickens from their supply chains. This resolves as the date when at least 750 companies pledge to adhere to having supply chains consistent with GAP's welfare standards within a timeline that ends in or before the year 2030. Resolution will be based on [the data reported by Chicken Watch](https://chickenwatch.org/progress-tracker/?filterM=Broiler). The current number can be found by entering the query issue \"Broiler\", with the timeline ending in or before the year 2030.\n\nThis question resolves as *> Dec 31, 2030* if fewer than 750 companies pledge to maintain a supply chain consistent with the current basic Global Animal Partnership standards for broiler chickens by end of 2030.", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the earliest preservation date of any resuscitated cryonics patient will be in 2058?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2058", "upper_75": "2095", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 750 companies will pledge to maintain a supply chain consistent with the current basic Global Animal Partnership standards for broiler chickens by the end of 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Global Animal Partnership](https://globalanimalpartnership.org/) (GAP), a nonprofit which seeks to promote the welfare of farmed animals, has an animal welfare rating program for assessing the welfare of animals on-farm, during transport and at slaughter.\n\nThis basic part of GAP's standards for broiler chickens is summarized with the slogan: “no cages, no crates, no crowding”, and requires the following:\n\n> Chickens are typically housed indoors and must meet a maximum stocking density of 6.0 lbs/ft2 by 1 July 2020. Producers are required to manage the environment to maintain litter, air quality and provide chickens with environmental enrichment. Environmental enrichments are materials that are provided to chickens to add complexity to their environment and encourage the expression of natural behavior (such as pecking, scratching, exploration and play behavior).[[1](https://globalanimalpartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/GAP-Standard-for-Meat-Chickens-v3.1-20180403.pdf)]\n\nAs of writing this question, [228 companies worldwide have pledged to adhere to the basic part of GAP standards for broiler chickens](https://awesome-table.com/-L1TTxtnoRIENQZ48vAe/view?filterK=Broiler). \n\n**When will at least 750 companies pledge to maintain a supply chain consistent with the current basic GAP standards for broiler chickens raised for meat, within a timeline ending no later than 2030?**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nCompanies need to commit to removing the poultry that are not produced in line with GAP's standards for broiler chickens from their supply chains. This resolves as the date when at least 750 companies pledge to adhere to having supply chains consistent with GAP's welfare standards within a timeline that ends in or before the year 2030. Resolution will be based on [the data reported by Chicken Watch](https://chickenwatch.org/progress-tracker/?filterM=Broiler). The current number can be found by entering the query issue \"Broiler\", with the timeline ending in or before the year 2030.\n\nThis question resolves as *> Dec 31, 2030* if fewer than 750 companies pledge to maintain a supply chain consistent with the current basic Global Animal Partnership standards for broiler chickens by end of 2030.", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest number of digits of π to have ever been computed by December 31, 2025 will be 2.21×1015?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.32×1014", "median": "5.61×1014", "upper_75": "2.21×1015", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.4 percentage of fish produced worldwide will be stunned prior to slaughter in the first year in which credible estimates are published in the five year period starting in 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "Stunning is the process of rendering animals immobile or unconscious, with or without killing the animal, when or immediately prior to slaughtering them for food to eliminate pain, discomfort and stress from the procedure [(FAO, 2001)](http://www.fao.org/3/x6909e/x6909e09.htm).\n\nIn the EU, [Council Regulation 1099/2009](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:303:0001:0030:EN:PDF) requires that all animals to be killed for human consumption must be stunned before they are slaughtered, meaning that they should be unconscious when they are killed to avoid suffering. There are, however, some exceptions to this rule, founded on the cultural traditions or religious rites of a number of sectors of the populations [(EU, 2019)](https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/welfare/practice/slaughter_en).\n\nYet, while includes specific requirements for the slaughter of terrestrial species farmed for food, fish are excluded from much of the recommendations (European Union, 2009) due to differences in physiology and slaughter context, and less developed understanding of the stunning process for fish.\n\nSimilarly, in the U.S., the [Humane Slaughter Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humane_Slaughter_Act) requires animals should be stunned into unconsciousness prior to their slaughter but this excludes poultry, fish, rabbits. \n\nAdvocacy groups have suggested using stunning techniques. In 2009, the Animal Health and Welfare panel (EFSA) recommended the “urgent development of commercial stunning methods to induce immediate (or rapid) unconsciousness in… seabream” ([EFSA, 2009](http://edepot.wur.nl/7878), p. 2).\n\nThe [Humane Slaughter Association (2018)](https://www.hsa.org.uk/downloads/hsafishslaughterreportfeb2018.pdf) points out that further development of humane stunning techniques is required for a greater range of species of finfish than current techniques currently permit, to suit their various rearing environments and to minimise handling and movement prior to death which can cause stress and chemical and physical deterioration in product quality.\n\nAccording to an appropriately named expert on fish stunning, van de Vis, [currently 3 to 4% of farmed fish stunned globally](https://veterinaryrecord.bmj.com/content/185/3/70).\n\n**What percentage of fish produced in aquaculture worldwide will be estimated to be stunned prior to slaughter, in the first year in which credible estimates are published in the five year period starting in 2027?**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the percentage of fish produced in aquaculture worldwide estimated to be stunned in the first calendar year between 2027 and 2032 (inclusive) for which both credible estimates of the number of fish stunned worldwide in aquacultural production are available, *and* credible estimates for the total number of fish produced by aquacultural production are available.\n\nFor the purpose of this question, credible estimates, should be those in research deemed sufficiently rigorous and reliable for an admin to judge that there is ≥90% chance for the true number to be within 25% of the median of the estimate. \n\nStunning here refers to any method method that renders the fish immobile or unconscious, with or without killing the animal, when or immediately prior to slaughtering them for food, such as by percussive or electrical stunning. Live chilling, or asphyxiation in any manner (e.g., air, CO2) are not qualifying stunning procedures.\n\nIn the case multiple estimates are found upon resolving, the admin may choose to resolve this question as the median of different estimates, or resolve it per the estimate deemed most credible. \n\nIn case there are at least three objections from predictors to the admin's preferred resolution, the admin should consult one or more researchers with at least one publication related to national or global fish production, or fish stunning, who shall arbitrate the dispute.", "lower_25": "3.70", "median": "6.56", "upper_75": "10.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest number of digits of π to have ever been computed by December 31, 2025 will be 2.21×1015?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.32×1014", "median": "5.61×1014", "upper_75": "2.21×1015", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5,000 companies worldwide will not pledge to remove cages from their egg supply chains by 2037?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2037", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the last Metaculus question resolution will occur by 2050?", "desc": "Important notice: **You will *probably* not get any points from this question. Please predict your best guess anyway.**\n\nFrom [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaculus):\n\n> Metaculus is a reputation-based, massive online prediction solicitation and aggregation engine. One of the focuses of Metaculus is predicting the timing, nature and impact of scientific and technological advances and breakthroughs.\n\nAnd:\n\n> Physicists Greg Laughlin, Anthony Aguirre and data scientist Max Wainwright launched the site in 2015.\n\nSince the beginnings of this august endeavor are so well documented, it's only fair that its future should be well predicted.", "resc": "Resolution details:\n\n + \"the last Metaculus question resolution\" is here defined as either:\n - Any resolution that occurs with at least X consecutive years without any other resolutions afterwards, where X is 8 times the age of Metaculus at time of said resolution.\n - The resolution of this question by a Metaculus Admin, tidying up because Metaculus is closing down for good. \n\n + If this has not occurred in the year 3000, this question resolves to > 3000.\n\n + If Metaculus evolves so much that either \"resolution\" or \"Metaculus question\" becomes ill-defined (as judged by a Metaculus Admin), this resolves ambiguous.\n\n + If the concepts of \"when\", \"will\", \"last\" or \"occur\" become ill-defined, this question resolves to the 15th of October 2498 (the last total solar eclipse of the 25th century according to [NASA](https://eclipse.gsfc.nasa.gov/SEcat5/SE2401-2500.html))", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2133", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the last Metaculus question resolution will occur by 2050?", "desc": "Important notice: **You will *probably* not get any points from this question. Please predict your best guess anyway.**\n\nFrom [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaculus):\n\n> Metaculus is a reputation-based, massive online prediction solicitation and aggregation engine. One of the focuses of Metaculus is predicting the timing, nature and impact of scientific and technological advances and breakthroughs.\n\nAnd:\n\n> Physicists Greg Laughlin, Anthony Aguirre and data scientist Max Wainwright launched the site in 2015.\n\nSince the beginnings of this august endeavor are so well documented, it's only fair that its future should be well predicted.", "resc": "Resolution details:\n\n + \"the last Metaculus question resolution\" is here defined as either:\n - Any resolution that occurs with at least X consecutive years without any other resolutions afterwards, where X is 8 times the age of Metaculus at time of said resolution.\n - The resolution of this question by a Metaculus Admin, tidying up because Metaculus is closing down for good. \n\n + If this has not occurred in the year 3000, this question resolves to > 3000.\n\n + If Metaculus evolves so much that either \"resolution\" or \"Metaculus question\" becomes ill-defined (as judged by a Metaculus Admin), this resolves ambiguous.\n\n + If the concepts of \"when\", \"will\", \"last\" or \"occur\" become ill-defined, this question resolves to the 15th of October 2498 (the last total solar eclipse of the 25th century according to [NASA](https://eclipse.gsfc.nasa.gov/SEcat5/SE2401-2500.html))", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2133", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the last Metaculus question resolution will occur by 2050?", "desc": "Important notice: **You will *probably* not get any points from this question. Please predict your best guess anyway.**\n\nFrom [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaculus):\n\n> Metaculus is a reputation-based, massive online prediction solicitation and aggregation engine. One of the focuses of Metaculus is predicting the timing, nature and impact of scientific and technological advances and breakthroughs.\n\nAnd:\n\n> Physicists Greg Laughlin, Anthony Aguirre and data scientist Max Wainwright launched the site in 2015.\n\nSince the beginnings of this august endeavor are so well documented, it's only fair that its future should be well predicted.", "resc": "Resolution details:\n\n + \"the last Metaculus question resolution\" is here defined as either:\n - Any resolution that occurs with at least X consecutive years without any other resolutions afterwards, where X is 8 times the age of Metaculus at time of said resolution.\n - The resolution of this question by a Metaculus Admin, tidying up because Metaculus is closing down for good. \n\n + If this has not occurred in the year 3000, this question resolves to > 3000.\n\n + If Metaculus evolves so much that either \"resolution\" or \"Metaculus question\" becomes ill-defined (as judged by a Metaculus Admin), this resolves ambiguous.\n\n + If the concepts of \"when\", \"will\", \"last\" or \"occur\" become ill-defined, this question resolves to the 15th of October 2498 (the last total solar eclipse of the 25th century according to [NASA](https://eclipse.gsfc.nasa.gov/SEcat5/SE2401-2500.html))", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2133", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.73k million pigs will be slaughtered worldwide, in the calendar year 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "According to estimates by [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2017)](http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QL), an estimated 1,485 million pigs were slaughtered in 2017. \n\n**How many millions of pigs will be slaughtered worldwide, in the calendar year 2030, according to FAO estimates?**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question will resolve based [FAO estimates](http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QL) of the number total pigs produced/slaughtered in the calendar year 2030. The relevant data is generated by the following query: \n\n>Regions: World + (Total), Items: Meat, pig, Elements: \"Producing Animals/Slaughtered\"\n\nForecasts released before December 1st of 2030 do not qualify as estimates.\n\n**Data**\n\nHistorical data can [be found here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1M3MpDDwTTOJMrhnPJYkAjWyk4YgirO5b0A8g-JCEZ9I/edit?usp=sharing). Please make a copy by clicking \"file\" and then \"make a copy\" if you wish to edit it. If you make useful additions to the dataset, please share the file in the comments.", "lower_25": "1.47k", "median": "1.73k", "upper_75": "2.05k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.73k million pigs will be slaughtered worldwide, in the calendar year 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "According to estimates by [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2017)](http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QL), an estimated 1,485 million pigs were slaughtered in 2017. \n\n**How many millions of pigs will be slaughtered worldwide, in the calendar year 2030, according to FAO estimates?**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question will resolve based [FAO estimates](http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QL) of the number total pigs produced/slaughtered in the calendar year 2030. The relevant data is generated by the following query: \n\n>Regions: World + (Total), Items: Meat, pig, Elements: \"Producing Animals/Slaughtered\"\n\nForecasts released before December 1st of 2030 do not qualify as estimates.\n\n**Data**\n\nHistorical data can [be found here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1M3MpDDwTTOJMrhnPJYkAjWyk4YgirO5b0A8g-JCEZ9I/edit?usp=sharing). Please make a copy by clicking \"file\" and then \"make a copy\" if you wish to edit it. If you make useful additions to the dataset, please share the file in the comments.", "lower_25": "1.47k", "median": "1.73k", "upper_75": "2.05k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.73k million pigs will be slaughtered worldwide, in the calendar year 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "According to estimates by [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2017)](http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QL), an estimated 1,485 million pigs were slaughtered in 2017. \n\n**How many millions of pigs will be slaughtered worldwide, in the calendar year 2030, according to FAO estimates?**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question will resolve based [FAO estimates](http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QL) of the number total pigs produced/slaughtered in the calendar year 2030. The relevant data is generated by the following query: \n\n>Regions: World + (Total), Items: Meat, pig, Elements: \"Producing Animals/Slaughtered\"\n\nForecasts released before December 1st of 2030 do not qualify as estimates.\n\n**Data**\n\nHistorical data can [be found here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1M3MpDDwTTOJMrhnPJYkAjWyk4YgirO5b0A8g-JCEZ9I/edit?usp=sharing). Please make a copy by clicking \"file\" and then \"make a copy\" if you wish to edit it. If you make useful additions to the dataset, please share the file in the comments.", "lower_25": "1.47k", "median": "1.73k", "upper_75": "2.05k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "In the year 2028, what is the chance that more than 100,000 tonnes of insect protein will be used as animal feed for livestock, poultry and fish in Europe?", "desc": "", "resc": "Today insect proteins cannot be fed to poultry as legislation passed after the mad cow disease crisis in the late 1990s prevents processed animal proteins from being fed to livestock ([IPIFF, 2018](http://ipiff.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Web-version_IPIFF_Sustainability-consult_Brochure-31-10-1.pdf)). As a result, insects cannot currently be fed to chickens or pigs. However, an exception to that legislation has been made for farmed fish and, since 2013, insects have been approved in aquaculture feed (ibid.).\n\nSince approving insect feed for fish feed, companies have begun producing insect protein:\n\n> Roughly 1,000 tonnes of insect protein have been commercialised by European insect producers in total, since the authorisation of insect proteins for use in aqua feed.\n\n**In the calendar year 2028, how many tonnes of insect protein will be estimated to be used as animal feed for livestock, poultry and fish in Europe?**\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nEstimates should come from credible organisations, such as the [International Platform of Insects for Food & Feed Association (IPIFF)](http://ipiff.org/), or other EU-affiliated organisations or academic publications by researchers without livestock-feed related commercial affiliations.\n\nIn the case multiple estimates are found upon resolving, the admin may choose to resolve this question as the median of different estimates, or resolve it per the estimate deemed most credible.", "lower_25": "13.8k", "median": "47.0k", "upper_75": "> 100k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "In the year 2028, what is the chance that more than 100,000 tonnes of insect protein will be used as animal feed for livestock, poultry and fish in Europe?", "desc": "", "resc": "Today insect proteins cannot be fed to poultry as legislation passed after the mad cow disease crisis in the late 1990s prevents processed animal proteins from being fed to livestock ([IPIFF, 2018](http://ipiff.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Web-version_IPIFF_Sustainability-consult_Brochure-31-10-1.pdf)). As a result, insects cannot currently be fed to chickens or pigs. However, an exception to that legislation has been made for farmed fish and, since 2013, insects have been approved in aquaculture feed (ibid.).\n\nSince approving insect feed for fish feed, companies have begun producing insect protein:\n\n> Roughly 1,000 tonnes of insect protein have been commercialised by European insect producers in total, since the authorisation of insect proteins for use in aqua feed.\n\n**In the calendar year 2028, how many tonnes of insect protein will be estimated to be used as animal feed for livestock, poultry and fish in Europe?**\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nEstimates should come from credible organisations, such as the [International Platform of Insects for Food & Feed Association (IPIFF)](http://ipiff.org/), or other EU-affiliated organisations or academic publications by researchers without livestock-feed related commercial affiliations.\n\nIn the case multiple estimates are found upon resolving, the admin may choose to resolve this question as the median of different estimates, or resolve it per the estimate deemed most credible.", "lower_25": "13.8k", "median": "47.0k", "upper_75": "> 100k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that two or more supermarkets will sell products made of ≥20% clean fish in their physical retail stores in at least 25 U.S. states by 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "In the year 2028, what is the chance that more than 100,000 tonnes of insect protein will be used as animal feed for livestock, poultry and fish in Europe?", "desc": "", "resc": "Today insect proteins cannot be fed to poultry as legislation passed after the mad cow disease crisis in the late 1990s prevents processed animal proteins from being fed to livestock ([IPIFF, 2018](http://ipiff.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Web-version_IPIFF_Sustainability-consult_Brochure-31-10-1.pdf)). As a result, insects cannot currently be fed to chickens or pigs. However, an exception to that legislation has been made for farmed fish and, since 2013, insects have been approved in aquaculture feed (ibid.).\n\nSince approving insect feed for fish feed, companies have begun producing insect protein:\n\n> Roughly 1,000 tonnes of insect protein have been commercialised by European insect producers in total, since the authorisation of insect proteins for use in aqua feed.\n\n**In the calendar year 2028, how many tonnes of insect protein will be estimated to be used as animal feed for livestock, poultry and fish in Europe?**\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nEstimates should come from credible organisations, such as the [International Platform of Insects for Food & Feed Association (IPIFF)](http://ipiff.org/), or other EU-affiliated organisations or academic publications by researchers without livestock-feed related commercial affiliations.\n\nIn the case multiple estimates are found upon resolving, the admin may choose to resolve this question as the median of different estimates, or resolve it per the estimate deemed most credible.", "lower_25": "13.8k", "median": "47.0k", "upper_75": "> 100k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 195 metric tons of iron will be used to fertilize an ocean as part of a single geoengineering effort by the end of 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "Iron fertilisation is the introduction of iron to iron-poor areas of the ocean surface to stimulate phytoplankton production to thereby draw carbon out of the atmosphere and into the ocean. Phytoplankton converts some of the CO2 dissolved in the ocean into biomass, which is then transported into deep sea by ocean circulation and gravity; effectively resulting in the long-term sequestering of carbon [(Yoon et al., 2018)](https://www.biogeosciences.net/15/5847/2018/bg-15-5847-2018.pdf).\n\nResearchers worldwide have conducted 13 major iron-fertilization experiments in the open ocean since 1990 [(Tollefson, 2017)](https://www.nature.com/news/iron-dumping-ocean-experiment-sparks-controversy-1.22031). All have sought to test whether stimulating phytoplankton growth can increase the amount of carbon dioxide that the organisms pull out of the atmosphere and deposit in the deep ocean when they die. Determining how much carbon is sequestered during such experiments has proved difficult, however, and scientists have raised concerns about potential adverse effects, such as [toxic algal blooms](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harmful_algal_bloom).\n\n\n**What is the largest amount of iron, in tonnes, that will be used to fertilise an ocean as part of a single geoengineering effort, by the end of 2026?**\n\n\n----\n\nThis question resolves as the largest amount of iron, in tonnes, that will be used to fertilise an ocean as part of a single geoengineering effort (with the intention to intervene in the Earth's climate system), by the end of 2026. \n\n\nA single geoengineering effort is a project in which the relevant actors act on behalf of a various organisations (e.g. national government or research organisation) that coordinate in precise terms on the employed geoengineering methods as well as the the extent to, and the duration for which these are to be deployed.\n\nIn case the fertiliser is a compound of iron, such as iron sulfate, the question resolves as the elemental weight of iron, which is to be converted using the relevant formula that specifies how many moles of iron the total weight of the fertiliser contains, which is then converted to the weight of elemental iron using the formula or [a converter](https://www.convertunits.com/from/moles+Iron/to/grams). In the case the fertiliser is a mixture of different iron-containing compounds, the weight of iron shall be determined by the same method for the individual compounds multiplied by the fraction of its weight to total weight.\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously no such relevant geoengineering effort occurs before the end of 2026.", "lower_25": "16.6", "median": "77.1", "upper_75": "195", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 195 metric tons of iron will be used to fertilize an ocean as part of a single geoengineering effort by the end of 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "Iron fertilisation is the introduction of iron to iron-poor areas of the ocean surface to stimulate phytoplankton production to thereby draw carbon out of the atmosphere and into the ocean. Phytoplankton converts some of the CO2 dissolved in the ocean into biomass, which is then transported into deep sea by ocean circulation and gravity; effectively resulting in the long-term sequestering of carbon [(Yoon et al., 2018)](https://www.biogeosciences.net/15/5847/2018/bg-15-5847-2018.pdf).\n\nResearchers worldwide have conducted 13 major iron-fertilization experiments in the open ocean since 1990 [(Tollefson, 2017)](https://www.nature.com/news/iron-dumping-ocean-experiment-sparks-controversy-1.22031). All have sought to test whether stimulating phytoplankton growth can increase the amount of carbon dioxide that the organisms pull out of the atmosphere and deposit in the deep ocean when they die. Determining how much carbon is sequestered during such experiments has proved difficult, however, and scientists have raised concerns about potential adverse effects, such as [toxic algal blooms](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harmful_algal_bloom).\n\n\n**What is the largest amount of iron, in tonnes, that will be used to fertilise an ocean as part of a single geoengineering effort, by the end of 2026?**\n\n\n----\n\nThis question resolves as the largest amount of iron, in tonnes, that will be used to fertilise an ocean as part of a single geoengineering effort (with the intention to intervene in the Earth's climate system), by the end of 2026. \n\n\nA single geoengineering effort is a project in which the relevant actors act on behalf of a various organisations (e.g. national government or research organisation) that coordinate in precise terms on the employed geoengineering methods as well as the the extent to, and the duration for which these are to be deployed.\n\nIn case the fertiliser is a compound of iron, such as iron sulfate, the question resolves as the elemental weight of iron, which is to be converted using the relevant formula that specifies how many moles of iron the total weight of the fertiliser contains, which is then converted to the weight of elemental iron using the formula or [a converter](https://www.convertunits.com/from/moles+Iron/to/grams). In the case the fertiliser is a mixture of different iron-containing compounds, the weight of iron shall be determined by the same method for the individual compounds multiplied by the fraction of its weight to total weight.\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously no such relevant geoengineering effort occurs before the end of 2026.", "lower_25": "16.6", "median": "77.1", "upper_75": "195", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the earliest preservation date of any resuscitated cryonics patient will be in 2058?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2058", "upper_75": "2095", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that two or more supermarkets will sell products made of ≥20% clean fish in their physical retail stores in at least 25 U.S. states by 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 195 metric tons of iron will be used to fertilize an ocean as part of a single geoengineering effort by the end of 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "Iron fertilisation is the introduction of iron to iron-poor areas of the ocean surface to stimulate phytoplankton production to thereby draw carbon out of the atmosphere and into the ocean. Phytoplankton converts some of the CO2 dissolved in the ocean into biomass, which is then transported into deep sea by ocean circulation and gravity; effectively resulting in the long-term sequestering of carbon [(Yoon et al., 2018)](https://www.biogeosciences.net/15/5847/2018/bg-15-5847-2018.pdf).\n\nResearchers worldwide have conducted 13 major iron-fertilization experiments in the open ocean since 1990 [(Tollefson, 2017)](https://www.nature.com/news/iron-dumping-ocean-experiment-sparks-controversy-1.22031). All have sought to test whether stimulating phytoplankton growth can increase the amount of carbon dioxide that the organisms pull out of the atmosphere and deposit in the deep ocean when they die. Determining how much carbon is sequestered during such experiments has proved difficult, however, and scientists have raised concerns about potential adverse effects, such as [toxic algal blooms](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harmful_algal_bloom).\n\n\n**What is the largest amount of iron, in tonnes, that will be used to fertilise an ocean as part of a single geoengineering effort, by the end of 2026?**\n\n\n----\n\nThis question resolves as the largest amount of iron, in tonnes, that will be used to fertilise an ocean as part of a single geoengineering effort (with the intention to intervene in the Earth's climate system), by the end of 2026. \n\n\nA single geoengineering effort is a project in which the relevant actors act on behalf of a various organisations (e.g. national government or research organisation) that coordinate in precise terms on the employed geoengineering methods as well as the the extent to, and the duration for which these are to be deployed.\n\nIn case the fertiliser is a compound of iron, such as iron sulfate, the question resolves as the elemental weight of iron, which is to be converted using the relevant formula that specifies how many moles of iron the total weight of the fertiliser contains, which is then converted to the weight of elemental iron using the formula or [a converter](https://www.convertunits.com/from/moles+Iron/to/grams). In the case the fertiliser is a mixture of different iron-containing compounds, the weight of iron shall be determined by the same method for the individual compounds multiplied by the fraction of its weight to total weight.\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously no such relevant geoengineering effort occurs before the end of 2026.", "lower_25": "16.6", "median": "77.1", "upper_75": "195", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5,000 companies worldwide will not pledge to remove cages from their egg supply chains by 2037?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2037", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that two or more supermarkets will sell products made of ≥20% clean fish in their physical retail stores in at least 25 U.S. states by 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least ten technologies listed on \"The Rejuvenation Roadmap\" will be released to the public by 2046?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Rejuvenation Roadmap](https://www.lifespan.io/road-maps/the-rejuvenation-roadmap/) is a curated database, which\n\n> aims to compile the most promising [anti-aging] therapies and technologies in development and chart their progress in one easy to read format.\n\nAs of writing, it lists 42 technologies, of which several aim to provide effective anti-aging effects.\n\nIf ten of the technologies listed in the roadmap as it was on January 7th, 2020 ([as archived here](https://web.archive.org/web/20200107004948/https://www.lifespan.io/road-maps/the-rejuvenation-roadmap/)) are released, then this question resolves to the date on which the tenth technology was marked released.\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously if:\n\n + The roadmap is no longer maintained, or changes form in a way that is not compatible with this question (as judged by a Metaculus admin).\n + The archive of the roadmap becomes unavailable.\n + Enough of the concerned technologies are abandoned that this question cannot resolve positively anymore.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2046", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest number of digits of π to have ever been computed by December 31, 2025 will be 2.21×1015?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.32×1014", "median": "5.61×1014", "upper_75": "2.21×1015", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.4 percentage of fish produced worldwide will be stunned prior to slaughter in the first year in which credible estimates are published in the five year period starting in 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "Stunning is the process of rendering animals immobile or unconscious, with or without killing the animal, when or immediately prior to slaughtering them for food to eliminate pain, discomfort and stress from the procedure [(FAO, 2001)](http://www.fao.org/3/x6909e/x6909e09.htm).\n\nIn the EU, [Council Regulation 1099/2009](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:303:0001:0030:EN:PDF) requires that all animals to be killed for human consumption must be stunned before they are slaughtered, meaning that they should be unconscious when they are killed to avoid suffering. There are, however, some exceptions to this rule, founded on the cultural traditions or religious rites of a number of sectors of the populations [(EU, 2019)](https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/welfare/practice/slaughter_en).\n\nYet, while includes specific requirements for the slaughter of terrestrial species farmed for food, fish are excluded from much of the recommendations (European Union, 2009) due to differences in physiology and slaughter context, and less developed understanding of the stunning process for fish.\n\nSimilarly, in the U.S., the [Humane Slaughter Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humane_Slaughter_Act) requires animals should be stunned into unconsciousness prior to their slaughter but this excludes poultry, fish, rabbits. \n\nAdvocacy groups have suggested using stunning techniques. In 2009, the Animal Health and Welfare panel (EFSA) recommended the “urgent development of commercial stunning methods to induce immediate (or rapid) unconsciousness in… seabream” ([EFSA, 2009](http://edepot.wur.nl/7878), p. 2).\n\nThe [Humane Slaughter Association (2018)](https://www.hsa.org.uk/downloads/hsafishslaughterreportfeb2018.pdf) points out that further development of humane stunning techniques is required for a greater range of species of finfish than current techniques currently permit, to suit their various rearing environments and to minimise handling and movement prior to death which can cause stress and chemical and physical deterioration in product quality.\n\nAccording to an appropriately named expert on fish stunning, van de Vis, [currently 3 to 4% of farmed fish stunned globally](https://veterinaryrecord.bmj.com/content/185/3/70).\n\n**What percentage of fish produced in aquaculture worldwide will be estimated to be stunned prior to slaughter, in the first year in which credible estimates are published in the five year period starting in 2027?**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the percentage of fish produced in aquaculture worldwide estimated to be stunned in the first calendar year between 2027 and 2032 (inclusive) for which both credible estimates of the number of fish stunned worldwide in aquacultural production are available, *and* credible estimates for the total number of fish produced by aquacultural production are available.\n\nFor the purpose of this question, credible estimates, should be those in research deemed sufficiently rigorous and reliable for an admin to judge that there is ≥90% chance for the true number to be within 25% of the median of the estimate. \n\nStunning here refers to any method method that renders the fish immobile or unconscious, with or without killing the animal, when or immediately prior to slaughtering them for food, such as by percussive or electrical stunning. Live chilling, or asphyxiation in any manner (e.g., air, CO2) are not qualifying stunning procedures.\n\nIn the case multiple estimates are found upon resolving, the admin may choose to resolve this question as the median of different estimates, or resolve it per the estimate deemed most credible. \n\nIn case there are at least three objections from predictors to the admin's preferred resolution, the admin should consult one or more researchers with at least one publication related to national or global fish production, or fish stunning, who shall arbitrate the dispute.", "lower_25": "3.70", "median": "6.56", "upper_75": "10.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least ten technologies listed on \"The Rejuvenation Roadmap\" will be released to the public by 2046?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Rejuvenation Roadmap](https://www.lifespan.io/road-maps/the-rejuvenation-roadmap/) is a curated database, which\n\n> aims to compile the most promising [anti-aging] therapies and technologies in development and chart their progress in one easy to read format.\n\nAs of writing, it lists 42 technologies, of which several aim to provide effective anti-aging effects.\n\nIf ten of the technologies listed in the roadmap as it was on January 7th, 2020 ([as archived here](https://web.archive.org/web/20200107004948/https://www.lifespan.io/road-maps/the-rejuvenation-roadmap/)) are released, then this question resolves to the date on which the tenth technology was marked released.\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously if:\n\n + The roadmap is no longer maintained, or changes form in a way that is not compatible with this question (as judged by a Metaculus admin).\n + The archive of the roadmap becomes unavailable.\n + Enough of the concerned technologies are abandoned that this question cannot resolve positively anymore.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2046", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.4 percentage of fish produced worldwide will be stunned prior to slaughter in the first year in which credible estimates are published in the five year period starting in 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "Stunning is the process of rendering animals immobile or unconscious, with or without killing the animal, when or immediately prior to slaughtering them for food to eliminate pain, discomfort and stress from the procedure [(FAO, 2001)](http://www.fao.org/3/x6909e/x6909e09.htm).\n\nIn the EU, [Council Regulation 1099/2009](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:303:0001:0030:EN:PDF) requires that all animals to be killed for human consumption must be stunned before they are slaughtered, meaning that they should be unconscious when they are killed to avoid suffering. There are, however, some exceptions to this rule, founded on the cultural traditions or religious rites of a number of sectors of the populations [(EU, 2019)](https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/welfare/practice/slaughter_en).\n\nYet, while includes specific requirements for the slaughter of terrestrial species farmed for food, fish are excluded from much of the recommendations (European Union, 2009) due to differences in physiology and slaughter context, and less developed understanding of the stunning process for fish.\n\nSimilarly, in the U.S., the [Humane Slaughter Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humane_Slaughter_Act) requires animals should be stunned into unconsciousness prior to their slaughter but this excludes poultry, fish, rabbits. \n\nAdvocacy groups have suggested using stunning techniques. In 2009, the Animal Health and Welfare panel (EFSA) recommended the “urgent development of commercial stunning methods to induce immediate (or rapid) unconsciousness in… seabream” ([EFSA, 2009](http://edepot.wur.nl/7878), p. 2).\n\nThe [Humane Slaughter Association (2018)](https://www.hsa.org.uk/downloads/hsafishslaughterreportfeb2018.pdf) points out that further development of humane stunning techniques is required for a greater range of species of finfish than current techniques currently permit, to suit their various rearing environments and to minimise handling and movement prior to death which can cause stress and chemical and physical deterioration in product quality.\n\nAccording to an appropriately named expert on fish stunning, van de Vis, [currently 3 to 4% of farmed fish stunned globally](https://veterinaryrecord.bmj.com/content/185/3/70).\n\n**What percentage of fish produced in aquaculture worldwide will be estimated to be stunned prior to slaughter, in the first year in which credible estimates are published in the five year period starting in 2027?**\n\n-----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the percentage of fish produced in aquaculture worldwide estimated to be stunned in the first calendar year between 2027 and 2032 (inclusive) for which both credible estimates of the number of fish stunned worldwide in aquacultural production are available, *and* credible estimates for the total number of fish produced by aquacultural production are available.\n\nFor the purpose of this question, credible estimates, should be those in research deemed sufficiently rigorous and reliable for an admin to judge that there is ≥90% chance for the true number to be within 25% of the median of the estimate. \n\nStunning here refers to any method method that renders the fish immobile or unconscious, with or without killing the animal, when or immediately prior to slaughtering them for food, such as by percussive or electrical stunning. Live chilling, or asphyxiation in any manner (e.g., air, CO2) are not qualifying stunning procedures.\n\nIn the case multiple estimates are found upon resolving, the admin may choose to resolve this question as the median of different estimates, or resolve it per the estimate deemed most credible. \n\nIn case there are at least three objections from predictors to the admin's preferred resolution, the admin should consult one or more researchers with at least one publication related to national or global fish production, or fish stunning, who shall arbitrate the dispute.", "lower_25": "3.70", "median": "6.56", "upper_75": "10.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many patients will be in cryonic suspension at the Cryonics Institute in 2030?\n\nKeyword: 397\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that there will be 50% of patients in cryonic suspension at the Cryonics Institute in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "The number of cryonics patients in storage at the Cryonics Institute (CI) has been increasing steadily since it was founded in 1976. From 2009 to 2019, [the total number of patients](https://www.cryonics.org/ci-landing/member-statistics/) increased from 95 to 177.\n\n**How many patients will be in cryonic suspension at the Cryonics Institute in 2030?**\n\nThis question resolves to the largest number of patients in cryonic suspension at CI in 2030, cited in any report published by CI that year which gives such a number. If there is no such report (for any reason) this question resolves ambiguous. A \"patient\" is here taken to mean any preserved human brain (incl. neuropreservation, whole-body cryopreservation, etc.).", "lower_25": "297", "median": "397", "upper_75": "536", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first weakly general AI system will be devised, tested, and publicly announced by 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will the first general AI system be devised, tested, and publicly known of?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-first-agi-strong/)\n\n----\n\nSince the inception of the field, the goal of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research has been to develop a machine-based system that can perform the same general-purpose reasoning and problem-solving tasks humans can. While computers have surpassed humans in many information-processing abilities, this \"general\" intelligence has remained elusive. \n\nAI, and particularly machine learning (ML), is advancing rapidly, with previously human-specific tasks such as image and speech recognition, translation and even driving, now being successfully tackled by narrow AI systems.\n\nBut there is a stunning diversity of opinion about when *general* AI may arrive, according to published expert surveys. For example [this study](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.06906.pdf) finds 50% of AI researchers accord a 50% probability to \"High level machine intelligence\" (HLMI) by 2040, while 20% say that 50% probability will not be reached until 2100 or later. Similarly, [this survey](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.08807.pdf) finds an aggregated probability distribution with a 25%-75% confidence interval (comparable to Metaculus sliders below) ranging from 2040 to well past 2100.", "resc": "For these purposes we will thus define \"AI system\" as a single unified software system that can satisfy the following criteria, all easily completable by a typical college-educated human.\n\n- Able to reliably pass a Turing test of the type that would win the [Loebner Silver Prize](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/73/will-the-silver-turing-test-be-passed-by-2026/). \n\n- Able to score 90% or more on a robust version of the [Winograd Schema Challenge](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/644/what-will-be-the-best-score-in-the-20192020-winograd-schema-ai-challenge/), e.g. the [\"Winogrande\" challenge](https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.10641) or comparable data set for which human performance is at 90+%\n\n- Be able to score 75th percentile (as compared to the corresponding year's human students; this was a score of 600 in 2016) on all the full mathematics section of a circa-2015-2020 standard SAT exam, using just images of the exam pages and having less than ten SAT exams as part of the training data. (Training on other corpuses of math problems is fair game as long as they are arguably distinct from SAT exams.)\n\n- Be able to learn the classic Atari game \"Montezuma's revenge\" (based on just visual inputs and standard controls) and explore all 24 rooms based on the equivalent of less than 100 hours of real-time play (see [closely-related question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/486/when-will-an-ai-achieve-competency-in-the-atari-classic-montezumas-revenge/).) \n\nBy \"unified\" we mean that the system is integrated enough that it can, for example, explain its reasoning on an SAT problem or Winograd schema question, or verbally report its progress and identify objects during videogame play. (This is not really meant to be an additional capability of \"introspection\" so much as a provision that the system *not* simply be cobbled together as a set of sub-systems specialized to tasks like the above, but rather a single system applicable to many problems.)\n\nResolution will be by direct demonstration of such a system achieving the above criteria, or by confident credible statement by its developers that an existing system is able to satisfy these criteria. In case of contention as to whether a given system satisfies the resolution criteria, a ruling will be made by a majority vote of the question author and two AI experts chosen in good faith by him. Resolution date will be the first date at which the system (subsequently judged to satisfy the criteria) and its capabilities are publicly described in a talk, press release, paper, or other report available to the general public", "lower_25": "Jan 2025", "median": "Sep 2026", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many patients will be in cryonic suspension at the Cryonics Institute in 2030?\n\nKeyword: 397\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that there will be 50% of patients in cryonic suspension at the Cryonics Institute in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "The number of cryonics patients in storage at the Cryonics Institute (CI) has been increasing steadily since it was founded in 1976. From 2009 to 2019, [the total number of patients](https://www.cryonics.org/ci-landing/member-statistics/) increased from 95 to 177.\n\n**How many patients will be in cryonic suspension at the Cryonics Institute in 2030?**\n\nThis question resolves to the largest number of patients in cryonic suspension at CI in 2030, cited in any report published by CI that year which gives such a number. If there is no such report (for any reason) this question resolves ambiguous. A \"patient\" is here taken to mean any preserved human brain (incl. neuropreservation, whole-body cryopreservation, etc.).", "lower_25": "297", "median": "397", "upper_75": "536", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first humans will successfully land on Mars by 2051?", "desc": "A [human mission to Mars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_mission_to_Mars) has been the subject of science fiction, aerospace engineering, and scientific proposals since the 20th century.\n\nIn the early 21st century, numerous US, European, and Asian organizations were developing proposals for human missions to Mars, and [dozens of Mars mission plans have been devised](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_crewed_Mars_mission_plans) over the decades since the dawn of spaceflight.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which the first crewed vehicle touches down on Mars successfully. A 'successful' landing is defined, for the purposes of this question, as one in which at least one crew member survives the landing. A 'crewed vehicle' is defined here as containing at least one conscious flesh-and-bone human", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2051", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first weakly general AI system will be devised, tested, and publicly announced by 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will the first general AI system be devised, tested, and publicly known of?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-first-agi-strong/)\n\n----\n\nSince the inception of the field, the goal of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research has been to develop a machine-based system that can perform the same general-purpose reasoning and problem-solving tasks humans can. While computers have surpassed humans in many information-processing abilities, this \"general\" intelligence has remained elusive. \n\nAI, and particularly machine learning (ML), is advancing rapidly, with previously human-specific tasks such as image and speech recognition, translation and even driving, now being successfully tackled by narrow AI systems.\n\nBut there is a stunning diversity of opinion about when *general* AI may arrive, according to published expert surveys. For example [this study](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.06906.pdf) finds 50% of AI researchers accord a 50% probability to \"High level machine intelligence\" (HLMI) by 2040, while 20% say that 50% probability will not be reached until 2100 or later. Similarly, [this survey](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.08807.pdf) finds an aggregated probability distribution with a 25%-75% confidence interval (comparable to Metaculus sliders below) ranging from 2040 to well past 2100.", "resc": "For these purposes we will thus define \"AI system\" as a single unified software system that can satisfy the following criteria, all easily completable by a typical college-educated human.\n\n- Able to reliably pass a Turing test of the type that would win the [Loebner Silver Prize](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/73/will-the-silver-turing-test-be-passed-by-2026/). \n\n- Able to score 90% or more on a robust version of the [Winograd Schema Challenge](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/644/what-will-be-the-best-score-in-the-20192020-winograd-schema-ai-challenge/), e.g. the [\"Winogrande\" challenge](https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.10641) or comparable data set for which human performance is at 90+%\n\n- Be able to score 75th percentile (as compared to the corresponding year's human students; this was a score of 600 in 2016) on all the full mathematics section of a circa-2015-2020 standard SAT exam, using just images of the exam pages and having less than ten SAT exams as part of the training data. (Training on other corpuses of math problems is fair game as long as they are arguably distinct from SAT exams.)\n\n- Be able to learn the classic Atari game \"Montezuma's revenge\" (based on just visual inputs and standard controls) and explore all 24 rooms based on the equivalent of less than 100 hours of real-time play (see [closely-related question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/486/when-will-an-ai-achieve-competency-in-the-atari-classic-montezumas-revenge/).) \n\nBy \"unified\" we mean that the system is integrated enough that it can, for example, explain its reasoning on an SAT problem or Winograd schema question, or verbally report its progress and identify objects during videogame play. (This is not really meant to be an additional capability of \"introspection\" so much as a provision that the system *not* simply be cobbled together as a set of sub-systems specialized to tasks like the above, but rather a single system applicable to many problems.)\n\nResolution will be by direct demonstration of such a system achieving the above criteria, or by confident credible statement by its developers that an existing system is able to satisfy these criteria. In case of contention as to whether a given system satisfies the resolution criteria, a ruling will be made by a majority vote of the question author and two AI experts chosen in good faith by him. Resolution date will be the first date at which the system (subsequently judged to satisfy the criteria) and its capabilities are publicly described in a talk, press release, paper, or other report available to the general public", "lower_25": "Jan 2025", "median": "Sep 2026", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least ten technologies listed on \"The Rejuvenation Roadmap\" will be released to the public by 2046?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Rejuvenation Roadmap](https://www.lifespan.io/road-maps/the-rejuvenation-roadmap/) is a curated database, which\n\n> aims to compile the most promising [anti-aging] therapies and technologies in development and chart their progress in one easy to read format.\n\nAs of writing, it lists 42 technologies, of which several aim to provide effective anti-aging effects.\n\nIf ten of the technologies listed in the roadmap as it was on January 7th, 2020 ([as archived here](https://web.archive.org/web/20200107004948/https://www.lifespan.io/road-maps/the-rejuvenation-roadmap/)) are released, then this question resolves to the date on which the tenth technology was marked released.\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously if:\n\n + The roadmap is no longer maintained, or changes form in a way that is not compatible with this question (as judged by a Metaculus admin).\n + The archive of the roadmap becomes unavailable.\n + Enough of the concerned technologies are abandoned that this question cannot resolve positively anymore.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2046", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first humans will successfully land on Mars by 2051?", "desc": "A [human mission to Mars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_mission_to_Mars) has been the subject of science fiction, aerospace engineering, and scientific proposals since the 20th century.\n\nIn the early 21st century, numerous US, European, and Asian organizations were developing proposals for human missions to Mars, and [dozens of Mars mission plans have been devised](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_crewed_Mars_mission_plans) over the decades since the dawn of spaceflight.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which the first crewed vehicle touches down on Mars successfully. A 'successful' landing is defined, for the purposes of this question, as one in which at least one crew member survives the landing. A 'crewed vehicle' is defined here as containing at least one conscious flesh-and-bone human", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2051", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that we will be able to predict at least 50% of variance in Big Five agreeableness based on genetic information alone by 2034?", "desc": "", "resc": "Polygenic scores can already predict more than 10% of variance in educational attainment (see e.g. [Lee et al., 2018](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41588-018-0147-3) ). \n\nResearch suggests that personality is moderately heritable, at about 40% (see e.g. [Johnson et al., 2008](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2008-14474-007) ). \n\nHowever, the additive heritability might be rather low (see e.g. [Plomin et al., 1998](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9686459) ). \n\nThe limit of how much variance a polygenic score for a trait can predict is [given by its SNP heritability](https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC117414/technical_report_gwas.pdf). SNP heritability estimates for personality traits are often around 10% or even less, see e.g. table 4 [here](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/gbb.12439 for an overview). Thus, it's entirely possible that we will never be able to predict more than 10% of variance in [Big Five agreeableness](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreeableness) based on genetic information alone. \n\nHowever, better methods of imputation, including rare genetic variants, or other improvements might increase the SNP heritability estimates. It's also conceivable that we will develop more powerful methods than polygenic scores that are not limited by SNP heritability. \n\n\nPositive resolution requires an increase in adjusted \\(R^2\\) of 10% (proportionally) with the addition of genetic information as explanatory variables. The question will resolve positively once a relevant peer-reviewed academic paper has been published and its results have been replicated at least once. In case the results are never replicated, this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Doomsday Clock will not reach midnight before 2100?", "desc": "The [Doomsday Clock](https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/) is a symbol which represents the likelihood of a anthropogenic global catastrophe. The clock represents catastrophe as \"midnight\" and the Bulletin's opinion on how close the world is to such as a number of \"minutes\" (and [recently \"seconds\"](https://twitter.com/OfficialJoelF/status/1220362423007371264)) to midnight.\n\nIts original setting in 1947 was seven minutes to midnight. It has since been updated up and down according to the world events of the time. In recent years, the increments have been shrinking as the clock gets closer to midnight. The last update as of writing (in January 2020) shaved only 20 seconds from the countdown, setting the clock at 100 seconds to midnight.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first time at which the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists announces that the Doomsday Clock has reached midnight. If this has not occurred by January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as **> January 1, 2100**.\n\nIf either the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists or the Doomsday Clock cease to exist or are otherwise defunct before the question resolution, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous.*", "lower_25": "2044", "median": "2098", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first humans will successfully land on Mars by 2051?", "desc": "A [human mission to Mars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_mission_to_Mars) has been the subject of science fiction, aerospace engineering, and scientific proposals since the 20th century.\n\nIn the early 21st century, numerous US, European, and Asian organizations were developing proposals for human missions to Mars, and [dozens of Mars mission plans have been devised](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_crewed_Mars_mission_plans) over the decades since the dawn of spaceflight.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which the first crewed vehicle touches down on Mars successfully. A 'successful' landing is defined, for the purposes of this question, as one in which at least one crew member survives the landing. A 'crewed vehicle' is defined here as containing at least one conscious flesh-and-bone human", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2051", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that we will be able to predict at least 50% of variance in Big Five agreeableness based on genetic information alone by 2034?", "desc": "", "resc": "Polygenic scores can already predict more than 10% of variance in educational attainment (see e.g. [Lee et al., 2018](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41588-018-0147-3) ). \n\nResearch suggests that personality is moderately heritable, at about 40% (see e.g. [Johnson et al., 2008](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2008-14474-007) ). \n\nHowever, the additive heritability might be rather low (see e.g. [Plomin et al., 1998](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9686459) ). \n\nThe limit of how much variance a polygenic score for a trait can predict is [given by its SNP heritability](https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC117414/technical_report_gwas.pdf). SNP heritability estimates for personality traits are often around 10% or even less, see e.g. table 4 [here](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/gbb.12439 for an overview). Thus, it's entirely possible that we will never be able to predict more than 10% of variance in [Big Five agreeableness](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreeableness) based on genetic information alone. \n\nHowever, better methods of imputation, including rare genetic variants, or other improvements might increase the SNP heritability estimates. It's also conceivable that we will develop more powerful methods than polygenic scores that are not limited by SNP heritability. \n\n\nPositive resolution requires an increase in adjusted \\(R^2\\) of 10% (proportionally) with the addition of genetic information as explanatory variables. The question will resolve positively once a relevant peer-reviewed academic paper has been published and its results have been replicated at least once. In case the results are never replicated, this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first weakly general AI system will be devised, tested, and publicly announced by 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will the first general AI system be devised, tested, and publicly known of?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-first-agi-strong/)\n\n----\n\nSince the inception of the field, the goal of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research has been to develop a machine-based system that can perform the same general-purpose reasoning and problem-solving tasks humans can. While computers have surpassed humans in many information-processing abilities, this \"general\" intelligence has remained elusive. \n\nAI, and particularly machine learning (ML), is advancing rapidly, with previously human-specific tasks such as image and speech recognition, translation and even driving, now being successfully tackled by narrow AI systems.\n\nBut there is a stunning diversity of opinion about when *general* AI may arrive, according to published expert surveys. For example [this study](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.06906.pdf) finds 50% of AI researchers accord a 50% probability to \"High level machine intelligence\" (HLMI) by 2040, while 20% say that 50% probability will not be reached until 2100 or later. Similarly, [this survey](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.08807.pdf) finds an aggregated probability distribution with a 25%-75% confidence interval (comparable to Metaculus sliders below) ranging from 2040 to well past 2100.", "resc": "For these purposes we will thus define \"AI system\" as a single unified software system that can satisfy the following criteria, all easily completable by a typical college-educated human.\n\n- Able to reliably pass a Turing test of the type that would win the [Loebner Silver Prize](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/73/will-the-silver-turing-test-be-passed-by-2026/). \n\n- Able to score 90% or more on a robust version of the [Winograd Schema Challenge](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/644/what-will-be-the-best-score-in-the-20192020-winograd-schema-ai-challenge/), e.g. the [\"Winogrande\" challenge](https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.10641) or comparable data set for which human performance is at 90+%\n\n- Be able to score 75th percentile (as compared to the corresponding year's human students; this was a score of 600 in 2016) on all the full mathematics section of a circa-2015-2020 standard SAT exam, using just images of the exam pages and having less than ten SAT exams as part of the training data. (Training on other corpuses of math problems is fair game as long as they are arguably distinct from SAT exams.)\n\n- Be able to learn the classic Atari game \"Montezuma's revenge\" (based on just visual inputs and standard controls) and explore all 24 rooms based on the equivalent of less than 100 hours of real-time play (see [closely-related question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/486/when-will-an-ai-achieve-competency-in-the-atari-classic-montezumas-revenge/).) \n\nBy \"unified\" we mean that the system is integrated enough that it can, for example, explain its reasoning on an SAT problem or Winograd schema question, or verbally report its progress and identify objects during videogame play. (This is not really meant to be an additional capability of \"introspection\" so much as a provision that the system *not* simply be cobbled together as a set of sub-systems specialized to tasks like the above, but rather a single system applicable to many problems.)\n\nResolution will be by direct demonstration of such a system achieving the above criteria, or by confident credible statement by its developers that an existing system is able to satisfy these criteria. In case of contention as to whether a given system satisfies the resolution criteria, a ruling will be made by a majority vote of the question author and two AI experts chosen in good faith by him. Resolution date will be the first date at which the system (subsequently judged to satisfy the criteria) and its capabilities are publicly described in a talk, press release, paper, or other report available to the general public", "lower_25": "Jan 2025", "median": "Sep 2026", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that we will be able to predict at least 50% of variance in Big Five agreeableness based on genetic information alone by 2034?", "desc": "", "resc": "Polygenic scores can already predict more than 10% of variance in educational attainment (see e.g. [Lee et al., 2018](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41588-018-0147-3) ). \n\nResearch suggests that personality is moderately heritable, at about 40% (see e.g. [Johnson et al., 2008](https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2008-14474-007) ). \n\nHowever, the additive heritability might be rather low (see e.g. [Plomin et al., 1998](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9686459) ). \n\nThe limit of how much variance a polygenic score for a trait can predict is [given by its SNP heritability](https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC117414/technical_report_gwas.pdf). SNP heritability estimates for personality traits are often around 10% or even less, see e.g. table 4 [here](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/gbb.12439 for an overview). Thus, it's entirely possible that we will never be able to predict more than 10% of variance in [Big Five agreeableness](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agreeableness) based on genetic information alone. \n\nHowever, better methods of imputation, including rare genetic variants, or other improvements might increase the SNP heritability estimates. It's also conceivable that we will develop more powerful methods than polygenic scores that are not limited by SNP heritability. \n\n\nPositive resolution requires an increase in adjusted \\(R^2\\) of 10% (proportionally) with the addition of genetic information as explanatory variables. The question will resolve positively once a relevant peer-reviewed academic paper has been published and its results have been replicated at least once. In case the results are never replicated, this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will admit a new state by 2038?", "desc": "", "resc": "[According to the US constitution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Admission_to_the_Union), it takes an act of congress to admit a new state into the union. The last time a state was admitted was in 1959, when Hawaii was admitted into the union.\n\nQuestion: **When will the United States admit a new state?**\n\nThis question resolves positively when at least five reliable media outlets report that a new state is admitted into the United States. A \"new state\" is defined as a state which wasn't in the union in 2019.\n\nIt resolves as \"> Dec 31, 2050\" if a new state is not admitted before the end of 2050.", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2050", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the volume-weighted average battery for electric vehicles and stationary storage will reach $75 per kilowatt hour by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "Automakers, policy makers and energy producers are predicting [the future of global commercial vehicles to be electric](https://qz.com/1620614/electric-car-forecasts-are-all-over-the-map/). However, predictions about the timing of gas guzzlers' eclipse are all over the map (e.g. see [here](https://www.theatlas.com/charts/rJXp4Vc3N)). This lack in consensus is in part due differing opinions on current and future lithium-ion battery costs and performance.\n\nIn their annual Battery Price Survey, [Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF)](https://about.bnef.com/) collects data on the annual industry volume-weighted average battery price for electronic vehicles and stationary storage. BNEF reported a volume-weighted average battery price of $176 per kilowatt hour, in 2018 USD.\n\n**When will the volume-weighted average battery for electronic vehicles and stationary storage reach $75 per kilowatt hour?**\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the year in which the volume-weighted average battery for electronic vehicles and stationary storage reach $75 per kilowatt hour, according to BNEF's Battery Price Survey in 2018 USD. It resolves ambiguous if their survey is discontinued or found to be inadmissible (such as when their methodology changes). The methodology is deemed to have changed if estimates of historical prices change by >25% relative to those recorded below.\n\nThis question resolves as the date obtained by linearly interpolating the between the price when the threshold is first crossed, and the previously reported price.\n\n\n**Data**\n\nThese are the following volume-weighted average prices per kWh, according to [BNEF survey results](https://about.bnef.com/blog/behind-scenes-take-lithium-ion-battery-prices/):\n\n2010: $1160, 2011: $899, 2012: $707, 2013: $650, 2014: $577 2015: $373, 2016: $288, 2017: $214, 2018: $174 (all in 2018 USD)", "lower_25": "2023", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will admit a new state by 2038?", "desc": "", "resc": "[According to the US constitution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Admission_to_the_Union), it takes an act of congress to admit a new state into the union. The last time a state was admitted was in 1959, when Hawaii was admitted into the union.\n\nQuestion: **When will the United States admit a new state?**\n\nThis question resolves positively when at least five reliable media outlets report that a new state is admitted into the United States. A \"new state\" is defined as a state which wasn't in the union in 2019.\n\nIt resolves as \"> Dec 31, 2050\" if a new state is not admitted before the end of 2050.", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2050", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many patients will be in cryonic suspension at the Cryonics Institute in 2030?\n\nKeyword: 397\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that there will be 50% of patients in cryonic suspension at the Cryonics Institute in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "The number of cryonics patients in storage at the Cryonics Institute (CI) has been increasing steadily since it was founded in 1976. From 2009 to 2019, [the total number of patients](https://www.cryonics.org/ci-landing/member-statistics/) increased from 95 to 177.\n\n**How many patients will be in cryonic suspension at the Cryonics Institute in 2030?**\n\nThis question resolves to the largest number of patients in cryonic suspension at CI in 2030, cited in any report published by CI that year which gives such a number. If there is no such report (for any reason) this question resolves ambiguous. A \"patient\" is here taken to mean any preserved human brain (incl. neuropreservation, whole-body cryopreservation, etc.).", "lower_25": "297", "median": "397", "upper_75": "536", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will admit a new state by 2038?", "desc": "", "resc": "[According to the US constitution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Admission_to_the_Union), it takes an act of congress to admit a new state into the union. The last time a state was admitted was in 1959, when Hawaii was admitted into the union.\n\nQuestion: **When will the United States admit a new state?**\n\nThis question resolves positively when at least five reliable media outlets report that a new state is admitted into the United States. A \"new state\" is defined as a state which wasn't in the union in 2019.\n\nIt resolves as \"> Dec 31, 2050\" if a new state is not admitted before the end of 2050.", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2050", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the volume-weighted average battery for electric vehicles and stationary storage will reach $75 per kilowatt hour by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "Automakers, policy makers and energy producers are predicting [the future of global commercial vehicles to be electric](https://qz.com/1620614/electric-car-forecasts-are-all-over-the-map/). However, predictions about the timing of gas guzzlers' eclipse are all over the map (e.g. see [here](https://www.theatlas.com/charts/rJXp4Vc3N)). This lack in consensus is in part due differing opinions on current and future lithium-ion battery costs and performance.\n\nIn their annual Battery Price Survey, [Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF)](https://about.bnef.com/) collects data on the annual industry volume-weighted average battery price for electronic vehicles and stationary storage. BNEF reported a volume-weighted average battery price of $176 per kilowatt hour, in 2018 USD.\n\n**When will the volume-weighted average battery for electronic vehicles and stationary storage reach $75 per kilowatt hour?**\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the year in which the volume-weighted average battery for electronic vehicles and stationary storage reach $75 per kilowatt hour, according to BNEF's Battery Price Survey in 2018 USD. It resolves ambiguous if their survey is discontinued or found to be inadmissible (such as when their methodology changes). The methodology is deemed to have changed if estimates of historical prices change by >25% relative to those recorded below.\n\nThis question resolves as the date obtained by linearly interpolating the between the price when the threshold is first crossed, and the previously reported price.\n\n\n**Data**\n\nThese are the following volume-weighted average prices per kWh, according to [BNEF survey results](https://about.bnef.com/blog/behind-scenes-take-lithium-ion-battery-prices/):\n\n2010: $1160, 2011: $899, 2012: $707, 2013: $650, 2014: $577 2015: $373, 2016: $288, 2017: $214, 2018: $174 (all in 2018 USD)", "lower_25": "2023", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the volume-weighted average battery for electric vehicles and stationary storage will reach $100 per kilowatt hour by Sep 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "Automakers, policy makers and energy producers are predicting [the future of global commercial vehicles to be electric](https://qz.com/1620614/electric-car-forecasts-are-all-over-the-map/). However, predictions about the timing of gas guzzlers' eclipse are all over the map (e.g. see [here](https://www.theatlas.com/charts/rJXp4Vc3N)). This lack in consensus is in part due differing opinions on current and future lithium-ion battery costs and performance.\n\nIn their annual Battery Price Survey, [Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF)](https://about.bnef.com/) collects data on the annual industry volume-weighted average battery price for electronic vehicles and stationary storage. BNEF reported a volume-weighted average battery price of $176 per kilowatt hour, in 2018 USD.\n\n**When will the volume-weighted average battery for electronic vehicles and stationary storage reach $100 per kilowatt hour?**\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the year in which the volume-weighted average battery for electronic vehicles and stationary storage reach $100 per kilowatt hour, according to BNEF's Battery Price Survey in 2018 USD. It resolves ambiguous if their survey is discontinued or found to be inadmissible (such as when their methodology changes). The methodology is deemed to have changed if estimates of historical prices change by >25% relative to those recorded below.\n\nThis question resolves as the date obtained by linearly interpolating the between the price when the threshold is first crossed, and the previously reported price.\n\n**Data**\n\nThese are the following volume-weighted average prices per kWh, according to [BNEF survey results](https://about.bnef.com/blog/behind-scenes-take-lithium-ion-battery-prices/):\n\n2010: $1160, 2011: $899, 2012: $707, 2013: $650, 2014: $577 2015: $373, 2016: $288, 2017: $214, 2018: $174 (all in 2018 USD)", "lower_25": "Mar 2023", "median": "Sep 2024", "upper_75": "Dec 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the volume-weighted average battery for electric vehicles and stationary storage will reach $75 per kilowatt hour by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "Automakers, policy makers and energy producers are predicting [the future of global commercial vehicles to be electric](https://qz.com/1620614/electric-car-forecasts-are-all-over-the-map/). However, predictions about the timing of gas guzzlers' eclipse are all over the map (e.g. see [here](https://www.theatlas.com/charts/rJXp4Vc3N)). This lack in consensus is in part due differing opinions on current and future lithium-ion battery costs and performance.\n\nIn their annual Battery Price Survey, [Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF)](https://about.bnef.com/) collects data on the annual industry volume-weighted average battery price for electronic vehicles and stationary storage. BNEF reported a volume-weighted average battery price of $176 per kilowatt hour, in 2018 USD.\n\n**When will the volume-weighted average battery for electronic vehicles and stationary storage reach $75 per kilowatt hour?**\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the year in which the volume-weighted average battery for electronic vehicles and stationary storage reach $75 per kilowatt hour, according to BNEF's Battery Price Survey in 2018 USD. It resolves ambiguous if their survey is discontinued or found to be inadmissible (such as when their methodology changes). The methodology is deemed to have changed if estimates of historical prices change by >25% relative to those recorded below.\n\nThis question resolves as the date obtained by linearly interpolating the between the price when the threshold is first crossed, and the previously reported price.\n\n\n**Data**\n\nThese are the following volume-weighted average prices per kWh, according to [BNEF survey results](https://about.bnef.com/blog/behind-scenes-take-lithium-ion-battery-prices/):\n\n2010: $1160, 2011: $899, 2012: $707, 2013: $650, 2014: $577 2015: $373, 2016: $288, 2017: $214, 2018: $174 (all in 2018 USD)", "lower_25": "2023", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many nations will there be in the United Nations by 2050, assuming a 75% increase in membership?", "desc": "", "resc": "The number of members of the United Nations is [currently 193](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Member_states_of_the_United_Nations), with South Sudan as the newest member, being admitted in 2011.\n\nHow many members of the United Nations will there be on January 1st 2050? If a nation is admitted at 12:00 am on the 1st, this counts. If the UN no longer exists, the question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "193.8", "median": "197.4", "upper_75": "203.0", "prediction": "203.0 (75% increase from current number of nations)"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the volume-weighted average battery for electric vehicles and stationary storage will reach $100 per kilowatt hour by Sep 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "Automakers, policy makers and energy producers are predicting [the future of global commercial vehicles to be electric](https://qz.com/1620614/electric-car-forecasts-are-all-over-the-map/). However, predictions about the timing of gas guzzlers' eclipse are all over the map (e.g. see [here](https://www.theatlas.com/charts/rJXp4Vc3N)). This lack in consensus is in part due differing opinions on current and future lithium-ion battery costs and performance.\n\nIn their annual Battery Price Survey, [Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF)](https://about.bnef.com/) collects data on the annual industry volume-weighted average battery price for electronic vehicles and stationary storage. BNEF reported a volume-weighted average battery price of $176 per kilowatt hour, in 2018 USD.\n\n**When will the volume-weighted average battery for electronic vehicles and stationary storage reach $100 per kilowatt hour?**\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the year in which the volume-weighted average battery for electronic vehicles and stationary storage reach $100 per kilowatt hour, according to BNEF's Battery Price Survey in 2018 USD. It resolves ambiguous if their survey is discontinued or found to be inadmissible (such as when their methodology changes). The methodology is deemed to have changed if estimates of historical prices change by >25% relative to those recorded below.\n\nThis question resolves as the date obtained by linearly interpolating the between the price when the threshold is first crossed, and the previously reported price.\n\n**Data**\n\nThese are the following volume-weighted average prices per kWh, according to [BNEF survey results](https://about.bnef.com/blog/behind-scenes-take-lithium-ion-battery-prices/):\n\n2010: $1160, 2011: $899, 2012: $707, 2013: $650, 2014: $577 2015: $373, 2016: $288, 2017: $214, 2018: $174 (all in 2018 USD)", "lower_25": "Mar 2023", "median": "Sep 2024", "upper_75": "Dec 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many nations will there be in the United Nations by 2050, assuming a 75% increase in membership?", "desc": "", "resc": "The number of members of the United Nations is [currently 193](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Member_states_of_the_United_Nations), with South Sudan as the newest member, being admitted in 2011.\n\nHow many members of the United Nations will there be on January 1st 2050? If a nation is admitted at 12:00 am on the 1st, this counts. If the UN no longer exists, the question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "193.8", "median": "197.4", "upper_75": "203.0", "prediction": "203.0 (75% increase from current number of nations)"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the volume-weighted average battery for electric vehicles and stationary storage will reach $100 per kilowatt hour by Sep 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "Automakers, policy makers and energy producers are predicting [the future of global commercial vehicles to be electric](https://qz.com/1620614/electric-car-forecasts-are-all-over-the-map/). However, predictions about the timing of gas guzzlers' eclipse are all over the map (e.g. see [here](https://www.theatlas.com/charts/rJXp4Vc3N)). This lack in consensus is in part due differing opinions on current and future lithium-ion battery costs and performance.\n\nIn their annual Battery Price Survey, [Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF)](https://about.bnef.com/) collects data on the annual industry volume-weighted average battery price for electronic vehicles and stationary storage. BNEF reported a volume-weighted average battery price of $176 per kilowatt hour, in 2018 USD.\n\n**When will the volume-weighted average battery for electronic vehicles and stationary storage reach $100 per kilowatt hour?**\n\n----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the year in which the volume-weighted average battery for electronic vehicles and stationary storage reach $100 per kilowatt hour, according to BNEF's Battery Price Survey in 2018 USD. It resolves ambiguous if their survey is discontinued or found to be inadmissible (such as when their methodology changes). The methodology is deemed to have changed if estimates of historical prices change by >25% relative to those recorded below.\n\nThis question resolves as the date obtained by linearly interpolating the between the price when the threshold is first crossed, and the previously reported price.\n\n**Data**\n\nThese are the following volume-weighted average prices per kWh, according to [BNEF survey results](https://about.bnef.com/blog/behind-scenes-take-lithium-ion-battery-prices/):\n\n2010: $1160, 2011: $899, 2012: $707, 2013: $650, 2014: $577 2015: $373, 2016: $288, 2017: $214, 2018: $174 (all in 2018 USD)", "lower_25": "Mar 2023", "median": "Sep 2024", "upper_75": "Dec 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Harvard admit rate for the undergraduate class of 2029 will be 3.79?", "desc": "The admit rate of elite universities has been steadily declining over the last few decades in America. Harvard is one of the most selective universities in the United States. Its class of 2023 had [an admit rate](https://college.harvard.edu/admissions/admissions-statistics) of 4.6%, compared to 9.3% for [the class of 2010](https://www.ivycoach.com/2010-ivy-league-admissions-statistics/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of people who are admitted among all applicants to the undergraduate program at Harvard, to begin studies in the fall of 2025, according to [Harvard's official statistics](https://college.harvard.edu/admissions/admissions-statistics). If those statistics are not released by January 1, 2026 then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "2.92", "median": "3.79", "upper_75": "5.03", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Harvard admit rate for the undergraduate class of 2029 will be 3.79?", "desc": "The admit rate of elite universities has been steadily declining over the last few decades in America. Harvard is one of the most selective universities in the United States. Its class of 2023 had [an admit rate](https://college.harvard.edu/admissions/admissions-statistics) of 4.6%, compared to 9.3% for [the class of 2010](https://www.ivycoach.com/2010-ivy-league-admissions-statistics/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of people who are admitted among all applicants to the undergraduate program at Harvard, to begin studies in the fall of 2025, according to [Harvard's official statistics](https://college.harvard.edu/admissions/admissions-statistics). If those statistics are not released by January 1, 2026 then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "2.92", "median": "3.79", "upper_75": "5.03", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many nations will there be in the United Nations by 2050, assuming a 75% increase in membership?", "desc": "", "resc": "The number of members of the United Nations is [currently 193](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Member_states_of_the_United_Nations), with South Sudan as the newest member, being admitted in 2011.\n\nHow many members of the United Nations will there be on January 1st 2050? If a nation is admitted at 12:00 am on the 1st, this counts. If the UN no longer exists, the question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "193.8", "median": "197.4", "upper_75": "203.0", "prediction": "203.0 (75% increase from current number of nations)"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Doomsday Clock will not reach midnight before 2100?", "desc": "The [Doomsday Clock](https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/) is a symbol which represents the likelihood of a anthropogenic global catastrophe. The clock represents catastrophe as \"midnight\" and the Bulletin's opinion on how close the world is to such as a number of \"minutes\" (and [recently \"seconds\"](https://twitter.com/OfficialJoelF/status/1220362423007371264)) to midnight.\n\nIts original setting in 1947 was seven minutes to midnight. It has since been updated up and down according to the world events of the time. In recent years, the increments have been shrinking as the clock gets closer to midnight. The last update as of writing (in January 2020) shaved only 20 seconds from the countdown, setting the clock at 100 seconds to midnight.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first time at which the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists announces that the Doomsday Clock has reached midnight. If this has not occurred by January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as **> January 1, 2100**.\n\nIf either the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists or the Doomsday Clock cease to exist or are otherwise defunct before the question resolution, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous.*", "lower_25": "2044", "median": "2098", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Doomsday Clock will not reach midnight before 2100?", "desc": "The [Doomsday Clock](https://thebulletin.org/doomsday-clock/current-time/) is a symbol which represents the likelihood of a anthropogenic global catastrophe. The clock represents catastrophe as \"midnight\" and the Bulletin's opinion on how close the world is to such as a number of \"minutes\" (and [recently \"seconds\"](https://twitter.com/OfficialJoelF/status/1220362423007371264)) to midnight.\n\nIts original setting in 1947 was seven minutes to midnight. It has since been updated up and down according to the world events of the time. In recent years, the increments have been shrinking as the clock gets closer to midnight. The last update as of writing (in January 2020) shaved only 20 seconds from the countdown, setting the clock at 100 seconds to midnight.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first time at which the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists announces that the Doomsday Clock has reached midnight. If this has not occurred by January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as **> January 1, 2100**.\n\nIf either the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists or the Doomsday Clock cease to exist or are otherwise defunct before the question resolution, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous.*", "lower_25": "2044", "median": "2098", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the English Wikipedia will have 10 million articles by 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2044", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP growth rate will be 3.46% in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "The world real GDP growth rate for the year 2030 will be determined by [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG). The rate is in percentage points. If the World Bank does not release statistics by 2035, this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "1.96", "median": "3.46", "upper_75": "5.16", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP growth rate will be 3.46% in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "The world real GDP growth rate for the year 2030 will be determined by [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG). The rate is in percentage points. If the World Bank does not release statistics by 2035, this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "1.96", "median": "3.46", "upper_75": "5.16", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 35.5 gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030?", "desc": "At the Paris climate conference (COP21) in December 2015, 195 countries adopted the first-ever universal, legally binding global climate deal. One of the key elements of the Paris agreement is global average temperature targeting: \n\n> Governments agreed to reduce emissions: with a long-term goal of keeping the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to aim to limit the increase to 1.5°C, since this would significantly reduce risks and the impacts of climate change.\n\nThe annual [UN Environment Emissions Gap Report](https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018) presents an assessment of current national mitigation efforts and the ambitions countries have presented in their Nationally Determined Contributions, which form the foundation of the Paris Agreement. It also identifies the trajectory of annual greenhouse gas emissions consistent with achieving the mean global average temperature levels targeted by the Paris Agreement.\n\nAccording to [its 2018 scenario estimates](https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/26895/EGR2018_FullReport_EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y), the trajectory required to achieve the 2°C target with a 66% chance is one in which emissions of all GHGs should not exceed 40 (range 38–45) gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent (GtCO₂e) in the year 2030. It provides a snapshots for the year 2030 of the relevant abatement paths:\n\n- 40 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 38–45) emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 2.0°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance)\n- 34 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 30–40) emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 1.8°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance) \n- 24 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 22–30) emitted in 2030 emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 1.5°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance)", "resc": "----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the amount of global GHG emissions in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent emitted in the calendar year 2030, according to credible estimates, such as those reported by the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.GHGT.KT.CE). Other sources of data on global emissions may be used, provided it estimates are <25% removed from those displayed by the World Bank for the 2009 to 2012 period.\n\n**Data**\n\nWorld Bank data can be [accessed here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1j7vBfP8CD1Q_MIHqW_AxTgRlC2ThS0pxhthhuDDp4ZI/edit?usp=sharing). Please make a copy by clicking \"file\" and then \"make a copy\" if you wish to edit it. If you make useful additions to the dataset, please share the file in the comments.\n\n----\n*Carbon dioxide equivalency (CO₂e) describes, for a given mixture and amount of greenhouse gases, the amount of CO2 that would have the same global warming ability, when measured over a specified time period. For our purposes, greenhouse gas emissions are the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, expressed as CO2e assuming a 100-year global warming potential", "lower_25": "35.5", "median": "44.4", "upper_75": "54.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 35.5 gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030?", "desc": "At the Paris climate conference (COP21) in December 2015, 195 countries adopted the first-ever universal, legally binding global climate deal. One of the key elements of the Paris agreement is global average temperature targeting: \n\n> Governments agreed to reduce emissions: with a long-term goal of keeping the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to aim to limit the increase to 1.5°C, since this would significantly reduce risks and the impacts of climate change.\n\nThe annual [UN Environment Emissions Gap Report](https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018) presents an assessment of current national mitigation efforts and the ambitions countries have presented in their Nationally Determined Contributions, which form the foundation of the Paris Agreement. It also identifies the trajectory of annual greenhouse gas emissions consistent with achieving the mean global average temperature levels targeted by the Paris Agreement.\n\nAccording to [its 2018 scenario estimates](https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/26895/EGR2018_FullReport_EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y), the trajectory required to achieve the 2°C target with a 66% chance is one in which emissions of all GHGs should not exceed 40 (range 38–45) gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent (GtCO₂e) in the year 2030. It provides a snapshots for the year 2030 of the relevant abatement paths:\n\n- 40 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 38–45) emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 2.0°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance)\n- 34 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 30–40) emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 1.8°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance) \n- 24 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 22–30) emitted in 2030 emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 1.5°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance)", "resc": "----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the amount of global GHG emissions in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent emitted in the calendar year 2030, according to credible estimates, such as those reported by the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.GHGT.KT.CE). Other sources of data on global emissions may be used, provided it estimates are <25% removed from those displayed by the World Bank for the 2009 to 2012 period.\n\n**Data**\n\nWorld Bank data can be [accessed here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1j7vBfP8CD1Q_MIHqW_AxTgRlC2ThS0pxhthhuDDp4ZI/edit?usp=sharing). Please make a copy by clicking \"file\" and then \"make a copy\" if you wish to edit it. If you make useful additions to the dataset, please share the file in the comments.\n\n----\n*Carbon dioxide equivalency (CO₂e) describes, for a given mixture and amount of greenhouse gases, the amount of CO2 that would have the same global warming ability, when measured over a specified time period. For our purposes, greenhouse gas emissions are the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, expressed as CO2e assuming a 100-year global warming potential", "lower_25": "35.5", "median": "44.4", "upper_75": "54.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 35.5 gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030?", "desc": "At the Paris climate conference (COP21) in December 2015, 195 countries adopted the first-ever universal, legally binding global climate deal. One of the key elements of the Paris agreement is global average temperature targeting: \n\n> Governments agreed to reduce emissions: with a long-term goal of keeping the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to aim to limit the increase to 1.5°C, since this would significantly reduce risks and the impacts of climate change.\n\nThe annual [UN Environment Emissions Gap Report](https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018) presents an assessment of current national mitigation efforts and the ambitions countries have presented in their Nationally Determined Contributions, which form the foundation of the Paris Agreement. It also identifies the trajectory of annual greenhouse gas emissions consistent with achieving the mean global average temperature levels targeted by the Paris Agreement.\n\nAccording to [its 2018 scenario estimates](https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/26895/EGR2018_FullReport_EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y), the trajectory required to achieve the 2°C target with a 66% chance is one in which emissions of all GHGs should not exceed 40 (range 38–45) gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent (GtCO₂e) in the year 2030. It provides a snapshots for the year 2030 of the relevant abatement paths:\n\n- 40 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 38–45) emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 2.0°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance)\n- 34 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 30–40) emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 1.8°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance) \n- 24 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 22–30) emitted in 2030 emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 1.5°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance)", "resc": "----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the amount of global GHG emissions in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent emitted in the calendar year 2030, according to credible estimates, such as those reported by the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.GHGT.KT.CE). Other sources of data on global emissions may be used, provided it estimates are <25% removed from those displayed by the World Bank for the 2009 to 2012 period.\n\n**Data**\n\nWorld Bank data can be [accessed here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1j7vBfP8CD1Q_MIHqW_AxTgRlC2ThS0pxhthhuDDp4ZI/edit?usp=sharing). Please make a copy by clicking \"file\" and then \"make a copy\" if you wish to edit it. If you make useful additions to the dataset, please share the file in the comments.\n\n----\n*Carbon dioxide equivalency (CO₂e) describes, for a given mixture and amount of greenhouse gases, the amount of CO2 that would have the same global warming ability, when measured over a specified time period. For our purposes, greenhouse gas emissions are the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, expressed as CO2e assuming a 100-year global warming potential", "lower_25": "35.5", "median": "44.4", "upper_75": "54.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a quantum computer running Shor's algorithm (or a similar one) will be used to factor one of the RSA numbers for the first time by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that electric cars will constitute over 5% of the US passenger car fleet by Apr 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "In 2018, electric cars constituted [0.45%](https://web.archive.org/web/20200112055841/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric_car_use_by_country) of all cars on US roads. There is a consistent effort from many governments to increase the usage of electric cars, up to promising to [ban all sales of non-electric cars](https://web.archive.org/web/20190531053848/https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/11/autos/countries-banning-diesel-gas-cars/index.html) by a certain date. In parallel to these efforts, both popularity of electric cars among customers and the variety of manufacturers producing electric cars is rising. Some manufacturers even promise to [move to 100% electric](http://web.archive.org/web/20200215021332/https://thedriven.io/2020/01/22/subaru-targets-100-electric-cars-by-mid-2030-but-mild-hybrids-only-headed-to-australia/). On the other hand, by [Wikipedia data](https://web.archive.org/web/20200112055841/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric_car_use_by_country) only one country (Norway) has over 5% of electric cars out of all cars on the roads so far.\n\nThe question is:\n\n**When will electric cars constitute over 5% of the cars on the roads in the USA?**\n\nThe date is set by the earliest credible report in a respectable publication that provides statistics from which it follows that the number of electric cars on US roads is over 5%. \n\nFor the purpose of this question, an electric car is any vehicle which is classified as \"passenger car\", and whose sole energy input is electrical energy, delivered either by plugging it into an electrical energy source or replacing an electrical battery, or similar means. Hybrid vehicles that have both an electric and any other non-electric (gasoline, diesel, etc.) engine do not count as electric cars.", "lower_25": "Apr 2026", "median": "May 2028", "upper_75": "Apr 2031", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will achieve a 98th percentile score or higher in a Mensa admission test by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that electric cars will constitute over 5% of the US passenger car fleet by Apr 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "In 2018, electric cars constituted [0.45%](https://web.archive.org/web/20200112055841/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric_car_use_by_country) of all cars on US roads. There is a consistent effort from many governments to increase the usage of electric cars, up to promising to [ban all sales of non-electric cars](https://web.archive.org/web/20190531053848/https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/11/autos/countries-banning-diesel-gas-cars/index.html) by a certain date. In parallel to these efforts, both popularity of electric cars among customers and the variety of manufacturers producing electric cars is rising. Some manufacturers even promise to [move to 100% electric](http://web.archive.org/web/20200215021332/https://thedriven.io/2020/01/22/subaru-targets-100-electric-cars-by-mid-2030-but-mild-hybrids-only-headed-to-australia/). On the other hand, by [Wikipedia data](https://web.archive.org/web/20200112055841/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric_car_use_by_country) only one country (Norway) has over 5% of electric cars out of all cars on the roads so far.\n\nThe question is:\n\n**When will electric cars constitute over 5% of the cars on the roads in the USA?**\n\nThe date is set by the earliest credible report in a respectable publication that provides statistics from which it follows that the number of electric cars on US roads is over 5%. \n\nFor the purpose of this question, an electric car is any vehicle which is classified as \"passenger car\", and whose sole energy input is electrical energy, delivered either by plugging it into an electrical energy source or replacing an electrical battery, or similar means. Hybrid vehicles that have both an electric and any other non-electric (gasoline, diesel, etc.) engine do not count as electric cars.", "lower_25": "Apr 2026", "median": "May 2028", "upper_75": "Apr 2031", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a private fusion company will first report a yearly profit by 2070?", "desc": "*Related question on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will a fusion reactor reach ignition?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3727/when-will-a-fusion-reactor-reach-ignition/)\n\n----\n\nEnergy is a [$8.5 trillion](https://www.forbes.com/sites/walvanlierop/2019/08/21/fusion-energy-who-has-the-courage-to-take-it-to-market/#4eeac23957c7) industry. Nuclear fusion could give us cheap and abundant energy. It also doesn't emit greenhouse gases (once built), and its residue has a half-life of a few hundred years (much less than nuclear fission). It's also seems operationally safer as fusion reactor would be [incapable](https://thebulletin.org/2017/04/fusion-reactors-not-what-theyre-cracked-up-to-be/) of generating the dangerous runaway chain reactions that lead to a meltdown.\n\n[On the other hand](https://thebulletin.org/2017/04/fusion-reactors-not-what-theyre-cracked-up-to-be/), \"fusion reactors have other serious problems that also afflict today's fission reactors, including neutron radiation damage and radioactive waste, potential tritium release, the burden on coolant resources, outsize operating costs, and increased risks of nuclear weapons proliferation.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve on the earliest date that a report from a [credible source](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) is published which indicates that a fusion company (private, public or governmental) turned a yearly profit.\n\nFor a company to be a fusion company, it must generate over 75% of its revenue from the sale of energy generated by nuclear fusion", "lower_25": "2039", "median": "2052", "upper_75": "2070", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the English Wikipedia will have 10 million articles by 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2044", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that space mining will be profitable by 2105?", "desc": "There are many resources in space that are of substantial value in terrestrial markets. For example, asteroid database [Asterank](http://www.asterank.com/) lists hundreds of asteroids with estimated values of over 100 trillion USD each, based on their composition (which typically includes metals such as nickel, iron, and cobalt, as well as other compounds such as water or hydrogen which could be sold as fuel). Other asteroids contain rare metals such as [platinum](https://physicsworld.com/a/the-asteroid-trillionaires/), although presumably mining such asteroids in quantity would flood the market with such metals and potentially reduce their value. Other sites may have resources as well; for example, the Moon contains large quantities of [Helium-3](https://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Preparing_for_the_Future/Space_for_Earth/Energy/Helium-3_mining_on_the_lunar_surface), a potential nuclear fusion fuel.\n\nThis being the case, it would seem that there is a substantial opportunity to mine metals or other products in space, provided that it can be done cheaply enough.", "resc": "- Space mining will be defined as capturing any material from an astronomical object with a distance of greater than 100 km above Earth's surface and selling it to a third party. Thus one can mine from asteroids, planets, moons, etc. Redirecting asteroids to Earth and mining them on the ground counts, as does mining material in space for use in space (e.g. hydrogen fuel).\n- The question resolves when a credible media report indicates that some space mining company had a profit over a period of at least three months (e.g. a quarterly earnings report), and this profit is primarily earned through actual mining operations, not e.g. NASA research studies.\n- If the space mining constitutes only a small part of a larger organization, as long as it is clear that the space mining arm's revenues exceeded its expenses, it can still qualify.\n- In general, if there is an event that is unclear (e.g. difficult to separate mining costs/revenues, or accounting irregularities), admins should lean towards waiting for an unambiguous triggering event and resolving positive at that time, rather than resolving ambiguous", "lower_25": "2050", "median": "2071", "upper_75": "2105", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that space mining will be profitable by 2105?", "desc": "There are many resources in space that are of substantial value in terrestrial markets. For example, asteroid database [Asterank](http://www.asterank.com/) lists hundreds of asteroids with estimated values of over 100 trillion USD each, based on their composition (which typically includes metals such as nickel, iron, and cobalt, as well as other compounds such as water or hydrogen which could be sold as fuel). Other asteroids contain rare metals such as [platinum](https://physicsworld.com/a/the-asteroid-trillionaires/), although presumably mining such asteroids in quantity would flood the market with such metals and potentially reduce their value. Other sites may have resources as well; for example, the Moon contains large quantities of [Helium-3](https://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Preparing_for_the_Future/Space_for_Earth/Energy/Helium-3_mining_on_the_lunar_surface), a potential nuclear fusion fuel.\n\nThis being the case, it would seem that there is a substantial opportunity to mine metals or other products in space, provided that it can be done cheaply enough.", "resc": "- Space mining will be defined as capturing any material from an astronomical object with a distance of greater than 100 km above Earth's surface and selling it to a third party. Thus one can mine from asteroids, planets, moons, etc. Redirecting asteroids to Earth and mining them on the ground counts, as does mining material in space for use in space (e.g. hydrogen fuel).\n- The question resolves when a credible media report indicates that some space mining company had a profit over a period of at least three months (e.g. a quarterly earnings report), and this profit is primarily earned through actual mining operations, not e.g. NASA research studies.\n- If the space mining constitutes only a small part of a larger organization, as long as it is clear that the space mining arm's revenues exceeded its expenses, it can still qualify.\n- In general, if there is an event that is unclear (e.g. difficult to separate mining costs/revenues, or accounting irregularities), admins should lean towards waiting for an unambiguous triggering event and resolving positive at that time, rather than resolving ambiguous", "lower_25": "2050", "median": "2071", "upper_75": "2105", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will achieve a 98th percentile score or higher in a Mensa admission test by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will achieve a 98th percentile score or higher in a Mensa admission test by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the English Wikipedia will have 10 million articles by 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2044", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Harvard admit rate for the undergraduate class of 2029 will be 3.79?", "desc": "The admit rate of elite universities has been steadily declining over the last few decades in America. Harvard is one of the most selective universities in the United States. Its class of 2023 had [an admit rate](https://college.harvard.edu/admissions/admissions-statistics) of 4.6%, compared to 9.3% for [the class of 2010](https://www.ivycoach.com/2010-ivy-league-admissions-statistics/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of people who are admitted among all applicants to the undergraduate program at Harvard, to begin studies in the fall of 2025, according to [Harvard's official statistics](https://college.harvard.edu/admissions/admissions-statistics). If those statistics are not released by January 1, 2026 then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "2.92", "median": "3.79", "upper_75": "5.03", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP growth rate will be 3.46% in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "The world real GDP growth rate for the year 2030 will be determined by [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG). The rate is in percentage points. If the World Bank does not release statistics by 2035, this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "1.96", "median": "3.46", "upper_75": "5.16", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that electric cars will constitute over 5% of the US passenger car fleet by Apr 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "In 2018, electric cars constituted [0.45%](https://web.archive.org/web/20200112055841/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric_car_use_by_country) of all cars on US roads. There is a consistent effort from many governments to increase the usage of electric cars, up to promising to [ban all sales of non-electric cars](https://web.archive.org/web/20190531053848/https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/11/autos/countries-banning-diesel-gas-cars/index.html) by a certain date. In parallel to these efforts, both popularity of electric cars among customers and the variety of manufacturers producing electric cars is rising. Some manufacturers even promise to [move to 100% electric](http://web.archive.org/web/20200215021332/https://thedriven.io/2020/01/22/subaru-targets-100-electric-cars-by-mid-2030-but-mild-hybrids-only-headed-to-australia/). On the other hand, by [Wikipedia data](https://web.archive.org/web/20200112055841/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric_car_use_by_country) only one country (Norway) has over 5% of electric cars out of all cars on the roads so far.\n\nThe question is:\n\n**When will electric cars constitute over 5% of the cars on the roads in the USA?**\n\nThe date is set by the earliest credible report in a respectable publication that provides statistics from which it follows that the number of electric cars on US roads is over 5%. \n\nFor the purpose of this question, an electric car is any vehicle which is classified as \"passenger car\", and whose sole energy input is electrical energy, delivered either by plugging it into an electrical energy source or replacing an electrical battery, or similar means. Hybrid vehicles that have both an electric and any other non-electric (gasoline, diesel, etc.) engine do not count as electric cars.", "lower_25": "Apr 2026", "median": "May 2028", "upper_75": "Apr 2031", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a quantum computer running Shor's algorithm (or a similar one) will be used to factor one of the RSA numbers for the first time by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a private fusion company will first report a yearly profit by 2070?", "desc": "*Related question on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will a fusion reactor reach ignition?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3727/when-will-a-fusion-reactor-reach-ignition/)\n\n----\n\nEnergy is a [$8.5 trillion](https://www.forbes.com/sites/walvanlierop/2019/08/21/fusion-energy-who-has-the-courage-to-take-it-to-market/#4eeac23957c7) industry. Nuclear fusion could give us cheap and abundant energy. It also doesn't emit greenhouse gases (once built), and its residue has a half-life of a few hundred years (much less than nuclear fission). It's also seems operationally safer as fusion reactor would be [incapable](https://thebulletin.org/2017/04/fusion-reactors-not-what-theyre-cracked-up-to-be/) of generating the dangerous runaway chain reactions that lead to a meltdown.\n\n[On the other hand](https://thebulletin.org/2017/04/fusion-reactors-not-what-theyre-cracked-up-to-be/), \"fusion reactors have other serious problems that also afflict today's fission reactors, including neutron radiation damage and radioactive waste, potential tritium release, the burden on coolant resources, outsize operating costs, and increased risks of nuclear weapons proliferation.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve on the earliest date that a report from a [credible source](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) is published which indicates that a fusion company (private, public or governmental) turned a yearly profit.\n\nFor a company to be a fusion company, it must generate over 75% of its revenue from the sale of energy generated by nuclear fusion", "lower_25": "2039", "median": "2052", "upper_75": "2070", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that L5 degrees of self-driving car autonomy will be developed and commercially available by 2030?", "desc": "Chris Chin of [The Drive](https://www.thedrive.com/tech/31816/key-volkswagen-exec-admits-level-5-autonomous-cars-may-never-happen) gives a quick summary of the [Society of Automotive Engineers'](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car#SAE_classification) levels of autonomy for self-driving cars:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n> A quick primer on the now-industry-standard SAE International rules on how to discuss self-driving abilities: Level 0 is no automation whatsoever. Level 1 is partial assistance with certain aspects of driving, like lane keep assist or adaptive cruise control. Level 2 is a step up to systems that can take control of the vehicle in certain situations, like Tesla's Autopilot or Cadillac's Super Cruise, while still requiring the driver to pay attention._x000D_\n>_x000D_\n> Get past that and we enter the realm of speculation: Level 3 promises full computer control without supervision under defined conditions during a journey, Level 4 is start-to-finish autonomous tech limited only by virtual safeguards like a geofence, and Level 5 is the total hands-off, go literally anywhere at the push of a button experience where the vehicle might not even have physical controls.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve on the earliest date that [SAE](https://www.sae.org/) makes a statement that a commercially available\\(^†\\) self-driving car meets the respective standard of autonomy. If no statement by SAE is available, statements by relevant car manufacturers, taxi service providers, and credible media reports will also be sufficient._x000D_\n_x000D_\nFor this question, \"commercially available\" means that any member of the general public can purchase a car, rent a vehicle, or hail a ride-sharing or public transit vehicle. A service providing commercial delivery or freight would also be sufficient. Any availability of such services anywhere in the world is sufficient for this question._x000D_\n_x000D_\n\\(^†\\) [ETA 2020-11-19]: commercially available cars include vehicles used for ridesharing, robotaxis, etc.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that L5 degrees of self-driving car autonomy will be developed and commercially available by 2030?", "desc": "Chris Chin of [The Drive](https://www.thedrive.com/tech/31816/key-volkswagen-exec-admits-level-5-autonomous-cars-may-never-happen) gives a quick summary of the [Society of Automotive Engineers'](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car#SAE_classification) levels of autonomy for self-driving cars:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n> A quick primer on the now-industry-standard SAE International rules on how to discuss self-driving abilities: Level 0 is no automation whatsoever. Level 1 is partial assistance with certain aspects of driving, like lane keep assist or adaptive cruise control. Level 2 is a step up to systems that can take control of the vehicle in certain situations, like Tesla's Autopilot or Cadillac's Super Cruise, while still requiring the driver to pay attention._x000D_\n>_x000D_\n> Get past that and we enter the realm of speculation: Level 3 promises full computer control without supervision under defined conditions during a journey, Level 4 is start-to-finish autonomous tech limited only by virtual safeguards like a geofence, and Level 5 is the total hands-off, go literally anywhere at the push of a button experience where the vehicle might not even have physical controls.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve on the earliest date that [SAE](https://www.sae.org/) makes a statement that a commercially available\\(^†\\) self-driving car meets the respective standard of autonomy. If no statement by SAE is available, statements by relevant car manufacturers, taxi service providers, and credible media reports will also be sufficient._x000D_\n_x000D_\nFor this question, \"commercially available\" means that any member of the general public can purchase a car, rent a vehicle, or hail a ride-sharing or public transit vehicle. A service providing commercial delivery or freight would also be sufficient. Any availability of such services anywhere in the world is sufficient for this question._x000D_\n_x000D_\n\\(^†\\) [ETA 2020-11-19]: commercially available cars include vehicles used for ridesharing, robotaxis, etc.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.65 communist states in 2050?", "desc": "As of March 2020, **five** states explicitly claim in their constitutions to be socialist, are U.N. member states, *and* are administered and governed by single communist parties - the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Cuba, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.\n\nSimultaneously, several communist groups are engaged in ongoing armed conflicts with existing recognised states. These include the [CPP–NPA–NDF rebellion in the Philippines](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_rebellion_in_the_Philippines), [various Naxalite insurgencies in India](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naxalite), the conflict [between the Peruvian government and the Communist Party of Peru](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internal_conflict_in_Peru), the conflict [between the Paraguayan government and the Paraguayan People's Army](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency_in_Paraguay), as well as the [conflict between several far-left guerilla groups and the Colombian government](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colombian_conflict).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of communist states on January 1, 2050.\n\nFor this question, a \"communist state\" will be defined as a United Nations member state which (1) includes explicit references to communism or socialism in its constitution, and (2) is administered and governed by a single party describing its ideology as Marxist, Marxist-Leninist, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist, or a variant thereof tracing its ideological lineage to Marxism.\n\nAs of March 2020, **five** countries match these conditions", "lower_25": "2.65", "median": "4.63", "upper_75": "7.25", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that space mining will be profitable by 2105?", "desc": "There are many resources in space that are of substantial value in terrestrial markets. For example, asteroid database [Asterank](http://www.asterank.com/) lists hundreds of asteroids with estimated values of over 100 trillion USD each, based on their composition (which typically includes metals such as nickel, iron, and cobalt, as well as other compounds such as water or hydrogen which could be sold as fuel). Other asteroids contain rare metals such as [platinum](https://physicsworld.com/a/the-asteroid-trillionaires/), although presumably mining such asteroids in quantity would flood the market with such metals and potentially reduce their value. Other sites may have resources as well; for example, the Moon contains large quantities of [Helium-3](https://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Preparing_for_the_Future/Space_for_Earth/Energy/Helium-3_mining_on_the_lunar_surface), a potential nuclear fusion fuel.\n\nThis being the case, it would seem that there is a substantial opportunity to mine metals or other products in space, provided that it can be done cheaply enough.", "resc": "- Space mining will be defined as capturing any material from an astronomical object with a distance of greater than 100 km above Earth's surface and selling it to a third party. Thus one can mine from asteroids, planets, moons, etc. Redirecting asteroids to Earth and mining them on the ground counts, as does mining material in space for use in space (e.g. hydrogen fuel).\n- The question resolves when a credible media report indicates that some space mining company had a profit over a period of at least three months (e.g. a quarterly earnings report), and this profit is primarily earned through actual mining operations, not e.g. NASA research studies.\n- If the space mining constitutes only a small part of a larger organization, as long as it is clear that the space mining arm's revenues exceeded its expenses, it can still qualify.\n- In general, if there is an event that is unclear (e.g. difficult to separate mining costs/revenues, or accounting irregularities), admins should lean towards waiting for an unambiguous triggering event and resolving positive at that time, rather than resolving ambiguous", "lower_25": "2050", "median": "2071", "upper_75": "2105", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.65 communist states in 2050?", "desc": "As of March 2020, **five** states explicitly claim in their constitutions to be socialist, are U.N. member states, *and* are administered and governed by single communist parties - the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Cuba, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.\n\nSimultaneously, several communist groups are engaged in ongoing armed conflicts with existing recognised states. These include the [CPP–NPA–NDF rebellion in the Philippines](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_rebellion_in_the_Philippines), [various Naxalite insurgencies in India](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naxalite), the conflict [between the Peruvian government and the Communist Party of Peru](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internal_conflict_in_Peru), the conflict [between the Paraguayan government and the Paraguayan People's Army](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency_in_Paraguay), as well as the [conflict between several far-left guerilla groups and the Colombian government](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colombian_conflict).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of communist states on January 1, 2050.\n\nFor this question, a \"communist state\" will be defined as a United Nations member state which (1) includes explicit references to communism or socialism in its constitution, and (2) is administered and governed by a single party describing its ideology as Marxist, Marxist-Leninist, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist, or a variant thereof tracing its ideological lineage to Marxism.\n\nAs of March 2020, **five** countries match these conditions", "lower_25": "2.65", "median": "4.63", "upper_75": "7.25", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a private fusion company will first report a yearly profit by 2070?", "desc": "*Related question on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will a fusion reactor reach ignition?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3727/when-will-a-fusion-reactor-reach-ignition/)\n\n----\n\nEnergy is a [$8.5 trillion](https://www.forbes.com/sites/walvanlierop/2019/08/21/fusion-energy-who-has-the-courage-to-take-it-to-market/#4eeac23957c7) industry. Nuclear fusion could give us cheap and abundant energy. It also doesn't emit greenhouse gases (once built), and its residue has a half-life of a few hundred years (much less than nuclear fission). It's also seems operationally safer as fusion reactor would be [incapable](https://thebulletin.org/2017/04/fusion-reactors-not-what-theyre-cracked-up-to-be/) of generating the dangerous runaway chain reactions that lead to a meltdown.\n\n[On the other hand](https://thebulletin.org/2017/04/fusion-reactors-not-what-theyre-cracked-up-to-be/), \"fusion reactors have other serious problems that also afflict today's fission reactors, including neutron radiation damage and radioactive waste, potential tritium release, the burden on coolant resources, outsize operating costs, and increased risks of nuclear weapons proliferation.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve on the earliest date that a report from a [credible source](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) is published which indicates that a fusion company (private, public or governmental) turned a yearly profit.\n\nFor a company to be a fusion company, it must generate over 75% of its revenue from the sale of energy generated by nuclear fusion", "lower_25": "2039", "median": "2052", "upper_75": "2070", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.65 communist states in 2050?", "desc": "As of March 2020, **five** states explicitly claim in their constitutions to be socialist, are U.N. member states, *and* are administered and governed by single communist parties - the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Cuba, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.\n\nSimultaneously, several communist groups are engaged in ongoing armed conflicts with existing recognised states. These include the [CPP–NPA–NDF rebellion in the Philippines](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_rebellion_in_the_Philippines), [various Naxalite insurgencies in India](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naxalite), the conflict [between the Peruvian government and the Communist Party of Peru](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internal_conflict_in_Peru), the conflict [between the Paraguayan government and the Paraguayan People's Army](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency_in_Paraguay), as well as the [conflict between several far-left guerilla groups and the Colombian government](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colombian_conflict).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of communist states on January 1, 2050.\n\nFor this question, a \"communist state\" will be defined as a United Nations member state which (1) includes explicit references to communism or socialism in its constitution, and (2) is administered and governed by a single party describing its ideology as Marxist, Marxist-Leninist, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist, or a variant thereof tracing its ideological lineage to Marxism.\n\nAs of March 2020, **five** countries match these conditions", "lower_25": "2.65", "median": "4.63", "upper_75": "7.25", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first evidence of extraterrestrial life will be discovered by 2046?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Extraterrestrial life](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterrestrial_life) is hypothetical life which may occur outside of Earth. Such life might range from simple prokaryotes (or comparable life forms) to beings with civilizations far more advanced than humanity.\n\nSince the mid-20th century, [active ongoing research has taken place to look for signs of extraterrestrial life](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterrestrial_life#Scientific_search). This encompasses a search for current and historic extraterrestrial life, and a narrower search for extraterrestrial intelligent life. Depending on the category of search, methods range from the analysis of telescope and specimen data to radios used to detect and send communication signals. \n\n***When will the first discovery of evidence of extraterrestrial life take place?***\n\nThis question resolves as the date on which the first discovery of evidence of extraterrestrial life takes place. This can be evidence of past or present extraterrestrial life, and the life can be of any degree of complexity. The life must not owe its off-Earth presence to humans; e.g. sending Earth-originating life to Mars (even accidentally) does not count.\n\nTo qualify for a positive resolution, the discovery must be generally considered credible by the scientific community, as judged by Metaculus.\n\n[fine-print]\nChangelog:\n\n + 2020-09-16: the sentence \"The life must not have originated from Earth or human efforts\" was changed to \"The life must not owe its off-Earth presence to humans\".\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2046", "median": "2150", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2249", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first evidence of extraterrestrial life will be discovered by 2046?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Extraterrestrial life](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterrestrial_life) is hypothetical life which may occur outside of Earth. Such life might range from simple prokaryotes (or comparable life forms) to beings with civilizations far more advanced than humanity.\n\nSince the mid-20th century, [active ongoing research has taken place to look for signs of extraterrestrial life](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterrestrial_life#Scientific_search). This encompasses a search for current and historic extraterrestrial life, and a narrower search for extraterrestrial intelligent life. Depending on the category of search, methods range from the analysis of telescope and specimen data to radios used to detect and send communication signals. \n\n***When will the first discovery of evidence of extraterrestrial life take place?***\n\nThis question resolves as the date on which the first discovery of evidence of extraterrestrial life takes place. This can be evidence of past or present extraterrestrial life, and the life can be of any degree of complexity. The life must not owe its off-Earth presence to humans; e.g. sending Earth-originating life to Mars (even accidentally) does not count.\n\nTo qualify for a positive resolution, the discovery must be generally considered credible by the scientific community, as judged by Metaculus.\n\n[fine-print]\nChangelog:\n\n + 2020-09-16: the sentence \"The life must not have originated from Earth or human efforts\" was changed to \"The life must not owe its off-Earth presence to humans\".\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2046", "median": "2150", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2249", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first evidence of extraterrestrial life will be discovered by 2046?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Extraterrestrial life](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterrestrial_life) is hypothetical life which may occur outside of Earth. Such life might range from simple prokaryotes (or comparable life forms) to beings with civilizations far more advanced than humanity.\n\nSince the mid-20th century, [active ongoing research has taken place to look for signs of extraterrestrial life](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraterrestrial_life#Scientific_search). This encompasses a search for current and historic extraterrestrial life, and a narrower search for extraterrestrial intelligent life. Depending on the category of search, methods range from the analysis of telescope and specimen data to radios used to detect and send communication signals. \n\n***When will the first discovery of evidence of extraterrestrial life take place?***\n\nThis question resolves as the date on which the first discovery of evidence of extraterrestrial life takes place. This can be evidence of past or present extraterrestrial life, and the life can be of any degree of complexity. The life must not owe its off-Earth presence to humans; e.g. sending Earth-originating life to Mars (even accidentally) does not count.\n\nTo qualify for a positive resolution, the discovery must be generally considered credible by the scientific community, as judged by Metaculus.\n\n[fine-print]\nChangelog:\n\n + 2020-09-16: the sentence \"The life must not have originated from Earth or human efforts\" was changed to \"The life must not owe its off-Earth presence to humans\".\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2046", "median": "2150", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2249", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global annual mean surface air temperature moving average will first exceed 1.3°C relative to the 1951-1980 base period by 2030?", "desc": "Surface air temperature change is a primary measure of global climate change. The globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature data as calculated by a linear trend, show a warming of 0.85°C (90% CI: [0.65 to 1.06]), over the period 1880 to 2012 [(IPCC, 2013)](https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf). The effects of increased global surface temperatures, and the associated changes in climate include:\n\n- Increases in the frequency and intensity of intense precipitation [(Min et al., 2011)](https://www.nature.com/articles/nature09763), and increases in the proportion of the global land surface in extreme drought [(Burke et al., 2006)](https://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/full/10.1175/JHM544.1),\n- Global sea level rise [(Vermeer and Rahmstorf)](https://www.pnas.org/content/106/51/21527.short), which in turn may result in the erosion of beaches and coastal wetlands, increased flooding, and intrusion of saltwater into rivers, bays, and aquifers [(Titus, 2008)](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08920758609362000), and global ocean warming and acidification [(Pörtner, 2008)](https://www.int-res.com/abstracts/meps/v373/p203-217/),\n- Adverse effects to human health, due to thermal stress, and the increased prevalence of infectious diseases [(McMichael et al., 2006)](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673606680793), and increased food security risk ([Zhao et al., 2017](https://www.pnas.org/content/114/35/9326.short); [FAO, 2008](http://www.fao.org/forestry/15538-079b31d45081fe9c3dbc6ff34de4807e4.pdf)),\n- Loss of terrestrial biodiversity at all system levels, including species-level reductions in range size and abundance, especially amongst endemic species [(Warren et al., 2013)](https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate1887).\n\nAccording to [GISS Surface Temperature Analysis data](https://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/), over the 2008 to 2018 period, the mean surface air temperature was 0.76°C higher relative to the 1951 to 1980 baseline. 2016 was the hottest recorded year with the mean surface temperature being 1.02°C higher than that over the same baseline.\n\nIn 2017, the 3-year simple moving average of the increase in temperature relative to the 1951-1980 base period reached the highest level at 0.95°C. This means that it was on average 0.95°C hotter over the 2015 to 2017 period (inclusive) relative to the base period.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first year when the 3-year moving average of the change in global annual mean surface air is 1.31°C or higher. The question resolves as January 1st of the year in which this first happens. This data must be by GISS Surface Temperature Analysis, with the 1951-1980 base period. The adoption of this base period amounts to scaling reported temperature changes such that the mean temperature change over the 1951-1980 period is 0.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If Joe Biden becomes president, what is the chance that the yearly CO2 emissions per capita for the US in 2024 will be 14.93 tonnes?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "13.5", "median": "14.25", "upper_75": "14.93", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that North Korea's merchandise trade will be 102% of its GDP in 2045 per the most recent World Bank data?", "desc": "", "resc": "Every year, the World Bank releases [statistics on merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS?most_recent_value_desc=false). \n\n> Merchandise trade as a share of GDP is the sum of merchandise exports and imports divided by the value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars.\n\nSouth Korean president Ban Ki-Moon believes that the DPRK \"wants to join international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank\". There is some speculation that the DPRK's leadership is opting for a [Vietnamese-style Doi Moi policy](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/13/north-korea-may-choose-to-follow-vietnams-economic-model.html) and that their diplomatic overtures to the U.S have the end goal of lifting all sanctions.\n\nThe question asks: **What will North Korea's merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP be in 2045 according to the most recently released World Bank statistics?**\n\nBecause the World Bank has a delay between collecting and publishing data, this question will resolve as the **most recent** statistic made available by 01/01/2046, and will resolve as **ambiguous** if no official data exists later than the year 2040. If the World Bank does not release data on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's merchandise trade at all (as is presently the case), this question will similarly resolve as **ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "54.6", "median": "83.7", "upper_75": "102", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a quantum computer running Shor's algorithm (or a similar one) will be used to factor one of the RSA numbers for the first time by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that North Korea's merchandise trade will be 102% of its GDP in 2045 per the most recent World Bank data?", "desc": "", "resc": "Every year, the World Bank releases [statistics on merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS?most_recent_value_desc=false). \n\n> Merchandise trade as a share of GDP is the sum of merchandise exports and imports divided by the value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars.\n\nSouth Korean president Ban Ki-Moon believes that the DPRK \"wants to join international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank\". There is some speculation that the DPRK's leadership is opting for a [Vietnamese-style Doi Moi policy](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/13/north-korea-may-choose-to-follow-vietnams-economic-model.html) and that their diplomatic overtures to the U.S have the end goal of lifting all sanctions.\n\nThe question asks: **What will North Korea's merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP be in 2045 according to the most recently released World Bank statistics?**\n\nBecause the World Bank has a delay between collecting and publishing data, this question will resolve as the **most recent** statistic made available by 01/01/2046, and will resolve as **ambiguous** if no official data exists later than the year 2040. If the World Bank does not release data on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's merchandise trade at all (as is presently the case), this question will similarly resolve as **ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "54.6", "median": "83.7", "upper_75": "102", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that North Korea's merchandise trade will be 102% of its GDP in 2045 per the most recent World Bank data?", "desc": "", "resc": "Every year, the World Bank releases [statistics on merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS?most_recent_value_desc=false). \n\n> Merchandise trade as a share of GDP is the sum of merchandise exports and imports divided by the value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars.\n\nSouth Korean president Ban Ki-Moon believes that the DPRK \"wants to join international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank\". There is some speculation that the DPRK's leadership is opting for a [Vietnamese-style Doi Moi policy](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/13/north-korea-may-choose-to-follow-vietnams-economic-model.html) and that their diplomatic overtures to the U.S have the end goal of lifting all sanctions.\n\nThe question asks: **What will North Korea's merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP be in 2045 according to the most recently released World Bank statistics?**\n\nBecause the World Bank has a delay between collecting and publishing data, this question will resolve as the **most recent** statistic made available by 01/01/2046, and will resolve as **ambiguous** if no official data exists later than the year 2040. If the World Bank does not release data on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's merchandise trade at all (as is presently the case), this question will similarly resolve as **ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "54.6", "median": "83.7", "upper_75": "102", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If Joe Biden becomes president, what is the chance that the yearly CO2 emissions per capita for the US in 2024 will be 14.93 tonnes?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "13.5", "median": "14.25", "upper_75": "14.93", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that Nintendo will release a console capable of 4K output by January 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "For the past 2 console generations (since the Wii in 2006), Nintendo has lagged behind competitors when it comes to the raw computational performance of their consoles and, more specifically, their output resolution (see [wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eighth_generation_of_video_game_consoles#Comparison) for a comparison). Given that 4K output is quickly replacing 1080p HD as the standard resolution across a majority of devices, if Nintendo's next console does not support it, it may be seen by many consumers as a mark against the console.\n\nThis question resolves on the date an official Nintendo console capable of outputting video at at least 4K\\* resolution is released for general public consumption.\n\nPatents, announcements, and review units do not count.\n\n\\*4K in this case means at least 3840 x 2160 pixels.", "lower_25": "May 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Dec 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global annual mean surface air temperature moving average will first exceed 1.3°C relative to the 1951-1980 base period by 2030?", "desc": "Surface air temperature change is a primary measure of global climate change. The globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature data as calculated by a linear trend, show a warming of 0.85°C (90% CI: [0.65 to 1.06]), over the period 1880 to 2012 [(IPCC, 2013)](https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf). The effects of increased global surface temperatures, and the associated changes in climate include:\n\n- Increases in the frequency and intensity of intense precipitation [(Min et al., 2011)](https://www.nature.com/articles/nature09763), and increases in the proportion of the global land surface in extreme drought [(Burke et al., 2006)](https://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/full/10.1175/JHM544.1),\n- Global sea level rise [(Vermeer and Rahmstorf)](https://www.pnas.org/content/106/51/21527.short), which in turn may result in the erosion of beaches and coastal wetlands, increased flooding, and intrusion of saltwater into rivers, bays, and aquifers [(Titus, 2008)](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08920758609362000), and global ocean warming and acidification [(Pörtner, 2008)](https://www.int-res.com/abstracts/meps/v373/p203-217/),\n- Adverse effects to human health, due to thermal stress, and the increased prevalence of infectious diseases [(McMichael et al., 2006)](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673606680793), and increased food security risk ([Zhao et al., 2017](https://www.pnas.org/content/114/35/9326.short); [FAO, 2008](http://www.fao.org/forestry/15538-079b31d45081fe9c3dbc6ff34de4807e4.pdf)),\n- Loss of terrestrial biodiversity at all system levels, including species-level reductions in range size and abundance, especially amongst endemic species [(Warren et al., 2013)](https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate1887).\n\nAccording to [GISS Surface Temperature Analysis data](https://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/), over the 2008 to 2018 period, the mean surface air temperature was 0.76°C higher relative to the 1951 to 1980 baseline. 2016 was the hottest recorded year with the mean surface temperature being 1.02°C higher than that over the same baseline.\n\nIn 2017, the 3-year simple moving average of the increase in temperature relative to the 1951-1980 base period reached the highest level at 0.95°C. This means that it was on average 0.95°C hotter over the 2015 to 2017 period (inclusive) relative to the base period.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first year when the 3-year moving average of the change in global annual mean surface air is 1.31°C or higher. The question resolves as January 1st of the year in which this first happens. This data must be by GISS Surface Temperature Analysis, with the 1951-1980 base period. The adoption of this base period amounts to scaling reported temperature changes such that the mean temperature change over the 1951-1980 period is 0.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global annual mean surface air temperature moving average will first exceed 1.3°C relative to the 1951-1980 base period by 2030?", "desc": "Surface air temperature change is a primary measure of global climate change. The globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature data as calculated by a linear trend, show a warming of 0.85°C (90% CI: [0.65 to 1.06]), over the period 1880 to 2012 [(IPCC, 2013)](https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf). The effects of increased global surface temperatures, and the associated changes in climate include:\n\n- Increases in the frequency and intensity of intense precipitation [(Min et al., 2011)](https://www.nature.com/articles/nature09763), and increases in the proportion of the global land surface in extreme drought [(Burke et al., 2006)](https://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/full/10.1175/JHM544.1),\n- Global sea level rise [(Vermeer and Rahmstorf)](https://www.pnas.org/content/106/51/21527.short), which in turn may result in the erosion of beaches and coastal wetlands, increased flooding, and intrusion of saltwater into rivers, bays, and aquifers [(Titus, 2008)](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08920758609362000), and global ocean warming and acidification [(Pörtner, 2008)](https://www.int-res.com/abstracts/meps/v373/p203-217/),\n- Adverse effects to human health, due to thermal stress, and the increased prevalence of infectious diseases [(McMichael et al., 2006)](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673606680793), and increased food security risk ([Zhao et al., 2017](https://www.pnas.org/content/114/35/9326.short); [FAO, 2008](http://www.fao.org/forestry/15538-079b31d45081fe9c3dbc6ff34de4807e4.pdf)),\n- Loss of terrestrial biodiversity at all system levels, including species-level reductions in range size and abundance, especially amongst endemic species [(Warren et al., 2013)](https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate1887).\n\nAccording to [GISS Surface Temperature Analysis data](https://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/), over the 2008 to 2018 period, the mean surface air temperature was 0.76°C higher relative to the 1951 to 1980 baseline. 2016 was the hottest recorded year with the mean surface temperature being 1.02°C higher than that over the same baseline.\n\nIn 2017, the 3-year simple moving average of the increase in temperature relative to the 1951-1980 base period reached the highest level at 0.95°C. This means that it was on average 0.95°C hotter over the 2015 to 2017 period (inclusive) relative to the base period.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first year when the 3-year moving average of the change in global annual mean surface air is 1.31°C or higher. The question resolves as January 1st of the year in which this first happens. This data must be by GISS Surface Temperature Analysis, with the 1951-1980 base period. The adoption of this base period amounts to scaling reported temperature changes such that the mean temperature change over the 1951-1980 period is 0.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If Joe Biden becomes president, what is the chance that the yearly CO2 emissions per capita for the US in 2024 will be 14.93 tonnes?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "13.5", "median": "14.25", "upper_75": "14.93", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that Nintendo will release a console capable of 4K output by January 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "For the past 2 console generations (since the Wii in 2006), Nintendo has lagged behind competitors when it comes to the raw computational performance of their consoles and, more specifically, their output resolution (see [wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eighth_generation_of_video_game_consoles#Comparison) for a comparison). Given that 4K output is quickly replacing 1080p HD as the standard resolution across a majority of devices, if Nintendo's next console does not support it, it may be seen by many consumers as a mark against the console.\n\nThis question resolves on the date an official Nintendo console capable of outputting video at at least 4K\\* resolution is released for general public consumption.\n\nPatents, announcements, and review units do not count.\n\n\\*4K in this case means at least 3840 x 2160 pixels.", "lower_25": "May 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Dec 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a currently unknown social media app will reach one billion downloads worldwide by Aug 2026?", "desc": "[Hundreds of social media apps are launched every year](https://www.crunchbase.com/hub/social-media-startups), with most failing to gain traction. Meanwhile, [social media use is booming in the developing world](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/06/19/social-media-use-continues-to-rise-in-developing-countries-but-plateaus-across-developed-ones). Occasionally, one of these platforms - for instance, TikTok - [will encounter exponential growth, outperforming its rivals by a significant margin](https://www.businessinsider.com.au/tiktok-hits-15-billion-downloads-outperforming-instagram-2019-11).", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, \"currently undiscovered\" is defined as either having fewer than 10,000 downloads across the iOS App Store and the Android Play Store as of March 15, 2020 UTC 00:00, or being non-existent/unavailable to the general public at the time. This question should resolve on the date that a social media app meeting this qualification reaches a combined one billion downloads on Android and iOS devices global. If a new mobile operating system and app store - for instance, Huawei's HarmonyOS - becomes popular enough to significantly affect a global download count, it may be included at moderator discretion.\n\nFor this question, a \"social media\" is defined as one that appears on this [statista list](https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/). If it is not available at resolution time, then either [this wikipedia article](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_media#Statistics_on_usage_and_membership) may be consulted or a suitable replacement may be chosen by Metaculus", "lower_25": "Jun 2024", "median": "Jul 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a currently unknown social media app will reach one billion downloads worldwide by Aug 2026?", "desc": "[Hundreds of social media apps are launched every year](https://www.crunchbase.com/hub/social-media-startups), with most failing to gain traction. Meanwhile, [social media use is booming in the developing world](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/06/19/social-media-use-continues-to-rise-in-developing-countries-but-plateaus-across-developed-ones). Occasionally, one of these platforms - for instance, TikTok - [will encounter exponential growth, outperforming its rivals by a significant margin](https://www.businessinsider.com.au/tiktok-hits-15-billion-downloads-outperforming-instagram-2019-11).", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, \"currently undiscovered\" is defined as either having fewer than 10,000 downloads across the iOS App Store and the Android Play Store as of March 15, 2020 UTC 00:00, or being non-existent/unavailable to the general public at the time. This question should resolve on the date that a social media app meeting this qualification reaches a combined one billion downloads on Android and iOS devices global. If a new mobile operating system and app store - for instance, Huawei's HarmonyOS - becomes popular enough to significantly affect a global download count, it may be included at moderator discretion.\n\nFor this question, a \"social media\" is defined as one that appears on this [statista list](https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/). If it is not available at resolution time, then either [this wikipedia article](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_media#Statistics_on_usage_and_membership) may be consulted or a suitable replacement may be chosen by Metaculus", "lower_25": "Jun 2024", "median": "Jul 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a currently unknown social media app will reach one billion downloads worldwide by Aug 2026?", "desc": "[Hundreds of social media apps are launched every year](https://www.crunchbase.com/hub/social-media-startups), with most failing to gain traction. Meanwhile, [social media use is booming in the developing world](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/06/19/social-media-use-continues-to-rise-in-developing-countries-but-plateaus-across-developed-ones). Occasionally, one of these platforms - for instance, TikTok - [will encounter exponential growth, outperforming its rivals by a significant margin](https://www.businessinsider.com.au/tiktok-hits-15-billion-downloads-outperforming-instagram-2019-11).", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, \"currently undiscovered\" is defined as either having fewer than 10,000 downloads across the iOS App Store and the Android Play Store as of March 15, 2020 UTC 00:00, or being non-existent/unavailable to the general public at the time. This question should resolve on the date that a social media app meeting this qualification reaches a combined one billion downloads on Android and iOS devices global. If a new mobile operating system and app store - for instance, Huawei's HarmonyOS - becomes popular enough to significantly affect a global download count, it may be included at moderator discretion.\n\nFor this question, a \"social media\" is defined as one that appears on this [statista list](https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/). If it is not available at resolution time, then either [this wikipedia article](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_media#Statistics_on_usage_and_membership) may be consulted or a suitable replacement may be chosen by Metaculus", "lower_25": "Jun 2024", "median": "Jul 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that L5 degrees of self-driving car autonomy will be developed and commercially available by 2030?", "desc": "Chris Chin of [The Drive](https://www.thedrive.com/tech/31816/key-volkswagen-exec-admits-level-5-autonomous-cars-may-never-happen) gives a quick summary of the [Society of Automotive Engineers'](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car#SAE_classification) levels of autonomy for self-driving cars:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n> A quick primer on the now-industry-standard SAE International rules on how to discuss self-driving abilities: Level 0 is no automation whatsoever. Level 1 is partial assistance with certain aspects of driving, like lane keep assist or adaptive cruise control. Level 2 is a step up to systems that can take control of the vehicle in certain situations, like Tesla's Autopilot or Cadillac's Super Cruise, while still requiring the driver to pay attention._x000D_\n>_x000D_\n> Get past that and we enter the realm of speculation: Level 3 promises full computer control without supervision under defined conditions during a journey, Level 4 is start-to-finish autonomous tech limited only by virtual safeguards like a geofence, and Level 5 is the total hands-off, go literally anywhere at the push of a button experience where the vehicle might not even have physical controls.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve on the earliest date that [SAE](https://www.sae.org/) makes a statement that a commercially available\\(^†\\) self-driving car meets the respective standard of autonomy. If no statement by SAE is available, statements by relevant car manufacturers, taxi service providers, and credible media reports will also be sufficient._x000D_\n_x000D_\nFor this question, \"commercially available\" means that any member of the general public can purchase a car, rent a vehicle, or hail a ride-sharing or public transit vehicle. A service providing commercial delivery or freight would also be sufficient. Any availability of such services anywhere in the world is sufficient for this question._x000D_\n_x000D_\n\\(^†\\) [ETA 2020-11-19]: commercially available cars include vehicles used for ridesharing, robotaxis, etc.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that WW3 will start at 42.1 longitude?", "desc": "", "resc": "The period between 1945 and the present day has been peaceful, with no major wars between great powers. Some have argued that this degree of prolonged absence of conflict [is nothing special historically speaking and may end soon](https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/02/are-we-middle-long-peace-or-brink-major-war), while [others](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394) have argued this moment of calm will likely last for some time due to the deterrence effect of nuclear weapons, the unipolarity of U.S hegemony, globalisation and international trade, and the efforts of peacekeepers such as the United Nations.\n\nAt the time of writing, the Metaculus community [has estimated the likelihood of a 'WW3' to be 10%](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2534/will-there-be-a-world-war-three-before-2050/).\n\n***If there is a \"Third World War\", what longitude will it start in?***\n\nLongitude will be represented on a scale of -180 to 180, with -180 representing 180°W and 180 representing 180°E. A latitude and longitude calculator can be [accessed here](https://www.latlong.net/). A static map can be [accessed here](https://i.imgur.com/pGcQMnf.png).\n\nMany wars are precipitated by regionally-confined international incidents resulting in a clear chain of events producing wider-scale conflict. The answer will be determined by either the longitude of the location of the incident precipitating a WW3 scenario, or the longitude of the region where the first direct confrontation takes place with as much specificity as possible. If the incident/confrontation is geographically long-range in nature (e.g the launch of an ICBM from North Korea to New York), the starting location will be used. If no such location can be identified with the consensus of three moderators, either two years into or following a WW3 scenario, the answer will resolve as **ambiguous**. \n\nLikewise, the question will resolve as **ambiguous** if the following conditions for a \"Third World War\" are not met by 2050-01-01:\n\n* Consensus that a state of war exists between at least five G20 member-states, spread out over at least five continents (North America, South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and/or Australasia)\n\n* Conflicts between these states has resulted in an excess of ten million deaths **and/or** damage amounting to 40% or more of global GDP at its level when the first hostilities began.\n\nThis question is accompanied by an identical entry, posing the same question except with latitude. It can be found [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3868/if-there-is-a-third-world-war-what-latitude-will-it-start-in/)", "lower_25": "42.1", "median": "88.8", "upper_75": "122.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a WW3 will start at 36.0 latitude?", "desc": "", "resc": "The period between 1945 and the present day has been peaceful, with no major wars between great powers. Some have argued that this degree of prolonged absence of conflict [is nothing special historically speaking and may end soon](https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/02/are-we-middle-long-peace-or-brink-major-war), while [others](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394) have argued this moment of calm will likely last for some time due to the deterrence effect of nuclear weapons, the unipolarity of U.S hegemony, globalisation and international trade, and the efforts of peacekeepers such as the United Nations.\n\nAt the time of writing, the Metaculus community [has estimated the likelihood of a 'WW3' to be 10%](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2534/will-there-be-a-world-war-three-before-2050/).\n\n***If there is a \"Third World War\", what latitude will it start in?***\n\nLatitude will be represented on a scale of -90 to 90, with -90 representing 90°S and 90 representing 90°N. A latitude and longitude calculator can be [accessed here](https://www.latlong.net/). A static map can be [accessed here](https://i.imgur.com/pGcQMnf.png).\n\nMany wars are precipitated by regionally-confined international incidents resulting in a clear chain of events producing wider-scale conflict. The answer will be determined by either the latitude of the location of the incident precipitating a WW3 scenario, or the latitude of the region where the first direct confrontation takes place with as much specificity as possible. If the incident/confrontation is geographically long-range in nature (e.g the launch of an ICBM from North Korea to New York), the starting location will be used. If no such location can be identified with the consensus of three moderators, either two years into or following a WW3 scenario, the answer will resolve as **ambiguous**. \n\nLikewise, the question will resolve as **ambiguous** if the following conditions for a \"Third World War\" are not met by 2050-01-01:\n\n* Consensus that a state of war exists between at least five G20 member-states, spread out over at least five continents (North America, South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and/or Australasia)\n\n* Conflicts between these states has resulted in an excess of ten million deaths **and/or** damage amounting to 40% or more of global GDP at its level when the first hostilities began.\n\nThis question is accompanied by an identical entry, posing the same question except with longitude. It can be found [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3867/if-there-is-a-third-world-war-what-longitude-will-it-start-in/)", "lower_25": "25.5", "median": "36.0", "upper_75": "48.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that WW3 will start at 42.1 longitude?", "desc": "", "resc": "The period between 1945 and the present day has been peaceful, with no major wars between great powers. Some have argued that this degree of prolonged absence of conflict [is nothing special historically speaking and may end soon](https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/02/are-we-middle-long-peace-or-brink-major-war), while [others](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394) have argued this moment of calm will likely last for some time due to the deterrence effect of nuclear weapons, the unipolarity of U.S hegemony, globalisation and international trade, and the efforts of peacekeepers such as the United Nations.\n\nAt the time of writing, the Metaculus community [has estimated the likelihood of a 'WW3' to be 10%](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2534/will-there-be-a-world-war-three-before-2050/).\n\n***If there is a \"Third World War\", what longitude will it start in?***\n\nLongitude will be represented on a scale of -180 to 180, with -180 representing 180°W and 180 representing 180°E. A latitude and longitude calculator can be [accessed here](https://www.latlong.net/). A static map can be [accessed here](https://i.imgur.com/pGcQMnf.png).\n\nMany wars are precipitated by regionally-confined international incidents resulting in a clear chain of events producing wider-scale conflict. The answer will be determined by either the longitude of the location of the incident precipitating a WW3 scenario, or the longitude of the region where the first direct confrontation takes place with as much specificity as possible. If the incident/confrontation is geographically long-range in nature (e.g the launch of an ICBM from North Korea to New York), the starting location will be used. If no such location can be identified with the consensus of three moderators, either two years into or following a WW3 scenario, the answer will resolve as **ambiguous**. \n\nLikewise, the question will resolve as **ambiguous** if the following conditions for a \"Third World War\" are not met by 2050-01-01:\n\n* Consensus that a state of war exists between at least five G20 member-states, spread out over at least five continents (North America, South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and/or Australasia)\n\n* Conflicts between these states has resulted in an excess of ten million deaths **and/or** damage amounting to 40% or more of global GDP at its level when the first hostilities began.\n\nThis question is accompanied by an identical entry, posing the same question except with latitude. It can be found [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3868/if-there-is-a-third-world-war-what-latitude-will-it-start-in/)", "lower_25": "42.1", "median": "88.8", "upper_75": "122.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a WW3 will start at 36.0 latitude?", "desc": "", "resc": "The period between 1945 and the present day has been peaceful, with no major wars between great powers. Some have argued that this degree of prolonged absence of conflict [is nothing special historically speaking and may end soon](https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/02/are-we-middle-long-peace-or-brink-major-war), while [others](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394) have argued this moment of calm will likely last for some time due to the deterrence effect of nuclear weapons, the unipolarity of U.S hegemony, globalisation and international trade, and the efforts of peacekeepers such as the United Nations.\n\nAt the time of writing, the Metaculus community [has estimated the likelihood of a 'WW3' to be 10%](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2534/will-there-be-a-world-war-three-before-2050/).\n\n***If there is a \"Third World War\", what latitude will it start in?***\n\nLatitude will be represented on a scale of -90 to 90, with -90 representing 90°S and 90 representing 90°N. A latitude and longitude calculator can be [accessed here](https://www.latlong.net/). A static map can be [accessed here](https://i.imgur.com/pGcQMnf.png).\n\nMany wars are precipitated by regionally-confined international incidents resulting in a clear chain of events producing wider-scale conflict. The answer will be determined by either the latitude of the location of the incident precipitating a WW3 scenario, or the latitude of the region where the first direct confrontation takes place with as much specificity as possible. If the incident/confrontation is geographically long-range in nature (e.g the launch of an ICBM from North Korea to New York), the starting location will be used. If no such location can be identified with the consensus of three moderators, either two years into or following a WW3 scenario, the answer will resolve as **ambiguous**. \n\nLikewise, the question will resolve as **ambiguous** if the following conditions for a \"Third World War\" are not met by 2050-01-01:\n\n* Consensus that a state of war exists between at least five G20 member-states, spread out over at least five continents (North America, South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and/or Australasia)\n\n* Conflicts between these states has resulted in an excess of ten million deaths **and/or** damage amounting to 40% or more of global GDP at its level when the first hostilities began.\n\nThis question is accompanied by an identical entry, posing the same question except with longitude. It can be found [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3867/if-there-is-a-third-world-war-what-longitude-will-it-start-in/)", "lower_25": "25.5", "median": "36.0", "upper_75": "48.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that Nintendo will release a console capable of 4K output by January 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "For the past 2 console generations (since the Wii in 2006), Nintendo has lagged behind competitors when it comes to the raw computational performance of their consoles and, more specifically, their output resolution (see [wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eighth_generation_of_video_game_consoles#Comparison) for a comparison). Given that 4K output is quickly replacing 1080p HD as the standard resolution across a majority of devices, if Nintendo's next console does not support it, it may be seen by many consumers as a mark against the console.\n\nThis question resolves on the date an official Nintendo console capable of outputting video at at least 4K\\* resolution is released for general public consumption.\n\nPatents, announcements, and review units do not count.\n\n\\*4K in this case means at least 3840 x 2160 pixels.", "lower_25": "May 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Dec 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that humanity will use more than one millionth of the sun's energy output by 2.41k?", "desc": "", "resc": "The sun [produces \\(3.86\\times 10^{26}\\) watts](https://phys.org/news/2015-12-sun-energy.html). At the beginning of 2017, [humanity captured \\(3.03\\times 10^{11}\\) watts](https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/iea-global-installed-pv-capacity-leaps-to-303-gw) using photovoltaic systems (less than 10⁻¹³% or one quadrillionth).\n\nHowever, the sun is one of the major sources of energy in the solar system, and it has been proposed that advanced civilizations could use their star as their [main source of energy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kardashev_scale). Specific structures proposed for this include [Dyson spheres](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dyson_sphere) and their subtypes (swarms, bubbles and shells).\n\nSome futurists assume that such a structure could in principle be built in [less than a century](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=haCV1PEeXz4&t=7m40s), given self-replicating mining equipment that disassembles mercury or large asteroids.\n\nThis question will resolve as the earliest year [CE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Era) when humanity is able to use more than \\(3.86 \\times 10^{20}\\) watts produced by sol, the star in the center of the solar system.\n\nThis question will resolve as **Ambiguous** if the sun is destroyed before energy collection on this scale can occur, or if humanity goes extinct before it can complete such a project.\n\n\"Humanity\" is defined as the genetic and/or intellectual descendants of current biological humans, including (but not limited to) emulated humans (ems) and artificial intelligences.", "lower_25": "2.13k", "median": "2.41k", "upper_75": "9.80k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a WW3 will start at 36.0 latitude?", "desc": "", "resc": "The period between 1945 and the present day has been peaceful, with no major wars between great powers. Some have argued that this degree of prolonged absence of conflict [is nothing special historically speaking and may end soon](https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/02/are-we-middle-long-peace-or-brink-major-war), while [others](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394) have argued this moment of calm will likely last for some time due to the deterrence effect of nuclear weapons, the unipolarity of U.S hegemony, globalisation and international trade, and the efforts of peacekeepers such as the United Nations.\n\nAt the time of writing, the Metaculus community [has estimated the likelihood of a 'WW3' to be 10%](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2534/will-there-be-a-world-war-three-before-2050/).\n\n***If there is a \"Third World War\", what latitude will it start in?***\n\nLatitude will be represented on a scale of -90 to 90, with -90 representing 90°S and 90 representing 90°N. A latitude and longitude calculator can be [accessed here](https://www.latlong.net/). A static map can be [accessed here](https://i.imgur.com/pGcQMnf.png).\n\nMany wars are precipitated by regionally-confined international incidents resulting in a clear chain of events producing wider-scale conflict. The answer will be determined by either the latitude of the location of the incident precipitating a WW3 scenario, or the latitude of the region where the first direct confrontation takes place with as much specificity as possible. If the incident/confrontation is geographically long-range in nature (e.g the launch of an ICBM from North Korea to New York), the starting location will be used. If no such location can be identified with the consensus of three moderators, either two years into or following a WW3 scenario, the answer will resolve as **ambiguous**. \n\nLikewise, the question will resolve as **ambiguous** if the following conditions for a \"Third World War\" are not met by 2050-01-01:\n\n* Consensus that a state of war exists between at least five G20 member-states, spread out over at least five continents (North America, South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and/or Australasia)\n\n* Conflicts between these states has resulted in an excess of ten million deaths **and/or** damage amounting to 40% or more of global GDP at its level when the first hostilities began.\n\nThis question is accompanied by an identical entry, posing the same question except with longitude. It can be found [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3867/if-there-is-a-third-world-war-what-longitude-will-it-start-in/)", "lower_25": "25.5", "median": "36.0", "upper_75": "48.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will legalize same-sex marriage by 2042?", "desc": "", "resc": "At the moment, the [Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China](http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/mlotproc354/#:~:text=%5BArticle%202%5D%20A%20marriage%20system,Family%20planning%20shall%20be%20practised.) adopted on September 10, 1980, defines marriage as a union between a man and a woman. However, late last year, China's top legislative body has been advised to legalize same-sex marriage in the updated civil code.\n\nAccording to a [Bloomberg article](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-20/china-hints-it-may-open-the-door-to-same-sex-marriage):\n\n> The Commission for Legislative Affairs of the National People's Congress Standing Committee has received more than 237,000 online suggestions and 5,600 letters requesting to clarify the “scope of close relatives, improving the common debt of spouses and legalizing same-sex marriage,” according to the report, which cited Yue Zhongming, spokesman of the commission.\n\n> The report didn't specify if the legislature will include the legalization of same-sex marriage in the civil code. The NPC will review the draft of the new civil code in March 2020, according to its website.\n\n\n\nThe question asks: **When will China legalise same-sex marriage?**\n\nThe question takes \"legalisation\" to mean an amendment of the Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China, widening the legal definition of marriage to encompass same-sex couples. It resolves on the date that such legislation is passed by the National People's Congress, and resolves **ambiguously** should the People's Republic of China cease to exist in one form or another.\n\nThis question resolves as \"> Jan 1, 2100\" if it does not resolve positively or ambiguously before 01/01/2100.", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2042", "upper_75": "2071", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that humanity will use more than one millionth of the sun's energy output by 2.41k?", "desc": "", "resc": "The sun [produces \\(3.86\\times 10^{26}\\) watts](https://phys.org/news/2015-12-sun-energy.html). At the beginning of 2017, [humanity captured \\(3.03\\times 10^{11}\\) watts](https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/iea-global-installed-pv-capacity-leaps-to-303-gw) using photovoltaic systems (less than 10⁻¹³% or one quadrillionth).\n\nHowever, the sun is one of the major sources of energy in the solar system, and it has been proposed that advanced civilizations could use their star as their [main source of energy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kardashev_scale). Specific structures proposed for this include [Dyson spheres](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dyson_sphere) and their subtypes (swarms, bubbles and shells).\n\nSome futurists assume that such a structure could in principle be built in [less than a century](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=haCV1PEeXz4&t=7m40s), given self-replicating mining equipment that disassembles mercury or large asteroids.\n\nThis question will resolve as the earliest year [CE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Era) when humanity is able to use more than \\(3.86 \\times 10^{20}\\) watts produced by sol, the star in the center of the solar system.\n\nThis question will resolve as **Ambiguous** if the sun is destroyed before energy collection on this scale can occur, or if humanity goes extinct before it can complete such a project.\n\n\"Humanity\" is defined as the genetic and/or intellectual descendants of current biological humans, including (but not limited to) emulated humans (ems) and artificial intelligences.", "lower_25": "2.13k", "median": "2.41k", "upper_75": "9.80k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that humanity will use more than one millionth of the sun's energy output by 2.41k?", "desc": "", "resc": "The sun [produces \\(3.86\\times 10^{26}\\) watts](https://phys.org/news/2015-12-sun-energy.html). At the beginning of 2017, [humanity captured \\(3.03\\times 10^{11}\\) watts](https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/iea-global-installed-pv-capacity-leaps-to-303-gw) using photovoltaic systems (less than 10⁻¹³% or one quadrillionth).\n\nHowever, the sun is one of the major sources of energy in the solar system, and it has been proposed that advanced civilizations could use their star as their [main source of energy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kardashev_scale). Specific structures proposed for this include [Dyson spheres](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dyson_sphere) and their subtypes (swarms, bubbles and shells).\n\nSome futurists assume that such a structure could in principle be built in [less than a century](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=haCV1PEeXz4&t=7m40s), given self-replicating mining equipment that disassembles mercury or large asteroids.\n\nThis question will resolve as the earliest year [CE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Era) when humanity is able to use more than \\(3.86 \\times 10^{20}\\) watts produced by sol, the star in the center of the solar system.\n\nThis question will resolve as **Ambiguous** if the sun is destroyed before energy collection on this scale can occur, or if humanity goes extinct before it can complete such a project.\n\n\"Humanity\" is defined as the genetic and/or intellectual descendants of current biological humans, including (but not limited to) emulated humans (ems) and artificial intelligences.", "lower_25": "2.13k", "median": "2.41k", "upper_75": "9.80k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that WW3 will start at 42.1 longitude?", "desc": "", "resc": "The period between 1945 and the present day has been peaceful, with no major wars between great powers. Some have argued that this degree of prolonged absence of conflict [is nothing special historically speaking and may end soon](https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/02/are-we-middle-long-peace-or-brink-major-war), while [others](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394) have argued this moment of calm will likely last for some time due to the deterrence effect of nuclear weapons, the unipolarity of U.S hegemony, globalisation and international trade, and the efforts of peacekeepers such as the United Nations.\n\nAt the time of writing, the Metaculus community [has estimated the likelihood of a 'WW3' to be 10%](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2534/will-there-be-a-world-war-three-before-2050/).\n\n***If there is a \"Third World War\", what longitude will it start in?***\n\nLongitude will be represented on a scale of -180 to 180, with -180 representing 180°W and 180 representing 180°E. A latitude and longitude calculator can be [accessed here](https://www.latlong.net/). A static map can be [accessed here](https://i.imgur.com/pGcQMnf.png).\n\nMany wars are precipitated by regionally-confined international incidents resulting in a clear chain of events producing wider-scale conflict. The answer will be determined by either the longitude of the location of the incident precipitating a WW3 scenario, or the longitude of the region where the first direct confrontation takes place with as much specificity as possible. If the incident/confrontation is geographically long-range in nature (e.g the launch of an ICBM from North Korea to New York), the starting location will be used. If no such location can be identified with the consensus of three moderators, either two years into or following a WW3 scenario, the answer will resolve as **ambiguous**. \n\nLikewise, the question will resolve as **ambiguous** if the following conditions for a \"Third World War\" are not met by 2050-01-01:\n\n* Consensus that a state of war exists between at least five G20 member-states, spread out over at least five continents (North America, South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and/or Australasia)\n\n* Conflicts between these states has resulted in an excess of ten million deaths **and/or** damage amounting to 40% or more of global GDP at its level when the first hostilities began.\n\nThis question is accompanied by an identical entry, posing the same question except with latitude. It can be found [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3868/if-there-is-a-third-world-war-what-latitude-will-it-start-in/)", "lower_25": "42.1", "median": "88.8", "upper_75": "122.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will legalize same-sex marriage by 2042?", "desc": "", "resc": "At the moment, the [Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China](http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/mlotproc354/#:~:text=%5BArticle%202%5D%20A%20marriage%20system,Family%20planning%20shall%20be%20practised.) adopted on September 10, 1980, defines marriage as a union between a man and a woman. However, late last year, China's top legislative body has been advised to legalize same-sex marriage in the updated civil code.\n\nAccording to a [Bloomberg article](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-20/china-hints-it-may-open-the-door-to-same-sex-marriage):\n\n> The Commission for Legislative Affairs of the National People's Congress Standing Committee has received more than 237,000 online suggestions and 5,600 letters requesting to clarify the “scope of close relatives, improving the common debt of spouses and legalizing same-sex marriage,” according to the report, which cited Yue Zhongming, spokesman of the commission.\n\n> The report didn't specify if the legislature will include the legalization of same-sex marriage in the civil code. The NPC will review the draft of the new civil code in March 2020, according to its website.\n\n\n\nThe question asks: **When will China legalise same-sex marriage?**\n\nThe question takes \"legalisation\" to mean an amendment of the Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China, widening the legal definition of marriage to encompass same-sex couples. It resolves on the date that such legislation is passed by the National People's Congress, and resolves **ambiguously** should the People's Republic of China cease to exist in one form or another.\n\nThis question resolves as \"> Jan 1, 2100\" if it does not resolve positively or ambiguously before 01/01/2100.", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2042", "upper_75": "2071", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a vaccine for HIV will be administered to 10 million people by 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HIV),\n\n> The human immunodeficiency viruses (HIV) are two species of Lentivirus (a subgroup of retrovirus) that infect humans. [...] The urgency of the search for a vaccine against HIV stems from the AIDS-related death toll of over 35 million people since 1981.\n\nTo count, a vaccine must provide protection against the HIV-1 variant of Lentivirus. The relevant conditions for resolving this question are determined in an identical manner to those prescribed in [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3860/when-will-a-vaccine-targeted-at-the-2019-novel-coronavirus-covid-19-be-administered-to-at-least-10m-people/) for COVID-19. \n\n* This question resolves as the date when such a vaccine first is administered to at least 10M people.\n\n* Resolution will be by credible media report or credible official publication this has happened. \n\nThe first HIV vaccine administered to at least 10M people can trigger:\n\n* Positive resolution if there is consensus that it provides immunity against HIV.\n\n* Ambiguous resolution if there is no consensus one way or the other.\n\n* No resolution if there's a consensus that it does not protect against HIV\n\n* The aforementioned \"consensus\" shall be reached among expert medical professionals, as judged by Metaculus, helped by the discussion in comments below.\n\nIf does not resolve before Dec 30, 2050, it resolves as >Dec 30, 2050. If it is not certain on what day the 10M threshold was breached, admins may resolve this as their best guesses that are made in consultation with community moderators and community members.", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will legalize same-sex marriage by 2042?", "desc": "", "resc": "At the moment, the [Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China](http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/mlotproc354/#:~:text=%5BArticle%202%5D%20A%20marriage%20system,Family%20planning%20shall%20be%20practised.) adopted on September 10, 1980, defines marriage as a union between a man and a woman. However, late last year, China's top legislative body has been advised to legalize same-sex marriage in the updated civil code.\n\nAccording to a [Bloomberg article](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-20/china-hints-it-may-open-the-door-to-same-sex-marriage):\n\n> The Commission for Legislative Affairs of the National People's Congress Standing Committee has received more than 237,000 online suggestions and 5,600 letters requesting to clarify the “scope of close relatives, improving the common debt of spouses and legalizing same-sex marriage,” according to the report, which cited Yue Zhongming, spokesman of the commission.\n\n> The report didn't specify if the legislature will include the legalization of same-sex marriage in the civil code. The NPC will review the draft of the new civil code in March 2020, according to its website.\n\n\n\nThe question asks: **When will China legalise same-sex marriage?**\n\nThe question takes \"legalisation\" to mean an amendment of the Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China, widening the legal definition of marriage to encompass same-sex couples. It resolves on the date that such legislation is passed by the National People's Congress, and resolves **ambiguously** should the People's Republic of China cease to exist in one form or another.\n\nThis question resolves as \"> Jan 1, 2100\" if it does not resolve positively or ambiguously before 01/01/2100.", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2042", "upper_75": "2071", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a vaccine for HIV will be administered to 10 million people by 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HIV),\n\n> The human immunodeficiency viruses (HIV) are two species of Lentivirus (a subgroup of retrovirus) that infect humans. [...] The urgency of the search for a vaccine against HIV stems from the AIDS-related death toll of over 35 million people since 1981.\n\nTo count, a vaccine must provide protection against the HIV-1 variant of Lentivirus. The relevant conditions for resolving this question are determined in an identical manner to those prescribed in [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3860/when-will-a-vaccine-targeted-at-the-2019-novel-coronavirus-covid-19-be-administered-to-at-least-10m-people/) for COVID-19. \n\n* This question resolves as the date when such a vaccine first is administered to at least 10M people.\n\n* Resolution will be by credible media report or credible official publication this has happened. \n\nThe first HIV vaccine administered to at least 10M people can trigger:\n\n* Positive resolution if there is consensus that it provides immunity against HIV.\n\n* Ambiguous resolution if there is no consensus one way or the other.\n\n* No resolution if there's a consensus that it does not protect against HIV\n\n* The aforementioned \"consensus\" shall be reached among expert medical professionals, as judged by Metaculus, helped by the discussion in comments below.\n\nIf does not resolve before Dec 30, 2050, it resolves as >Dec 30, 2050. If it is not certain on what day the 10M threshold was breached, admins may resolve this as their best guesses that are made in consultation with community moderators and community members.", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a vaccine for HIV will be administered to 10 million people by 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HIV),\n\n> The human immunodeficiency viruses (HIV) are two species of Lentivirus (a subgroup of retrovirus) that infect humans. [...] The urgency of the search for a vaccine against HIV stems from the AIDS-related death toll of over 35 million people since 1981.\n\nTo count, a vaccine must provide protection against the HIV-1 variant of Lentivirus. The relevant conditions for resolving this question are determined in an identical manner to those prescribed in [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3860/when-will-a-vaccine-targeted-at-the-2019-novel-coronavirus-covid-19-be-administered-to-at-least-10m-people/) for COVID-19. \n\n* This question resolves as the date when such a vaccine first is administered to at least 10M people.\n\n* Resolution will be by credible media report or credible official publication this has happened. \n\nThe first HIV vaccine administered to at least 10M people can trigger:\n\n* Positive resolution if there is consensus that it provides immunity against HIV.\n\n* Ambiguous resolution if there is no consensus one way or the other.\n\n* No resolution if there's a consensus that it does not protect against HIV\n\n* The aforementioned \"consensus\" shall be reached among expert medical professionals, as judged by Metaculus, helped by the discussion in comments below.\n\nIf does not resolve before Dec 30, 2050, it resolves as >Dec 30, 2050. If it is not certain on what day the 10M threshold was breached, admins may resolve this as their best guesses that are made in consultation with community moderators and community members.", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the peak population of Antarctica will be 26.7k by 2075?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Antarctica](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antarctica) remains as the last continent without a significant human presence. The southern landmass is presently governed by the terms of the [Antarctic Treaty](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antarctic_Treaty_System), which prohibits military activities and mineral mining, prohibits nuclear explosions and nuclear waste disposal, supports scientific research, and protects the continent's ecozone. As a result, Antarctica has very little to no long-term human population, which consists of roughly 5000 researchers in the summer and only 1000 during winter.\n\nBut will this always be the case? The southern continent [has been heating up](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/13/antarctic-temperature-rises-above-20c-first-time-record) along with the rest of the planet and could potentially become more habitable, and/or more amenable to resource exploitation. In addition, the Antarctic treaty will come under review [in 2048](https://theconversation.com/in-30-years-the-antarctic-treaty-becomes-modifiable-and-the-fate-of-a-continent-could-hang-in-the-balance-98654).\n\n**What will the peak population of humans residing in Antarctica have been by 2075-01-01?** \n\nWe will define humans as biological creatures who have as their ancestors (via a chain of live births from mothers) circa 1900 humans OR who could mate with circa 1900 humans to produce viable offspring. Entities such as AIs, [ems](http://ageofem.com/), genetically engineered beings of a different species brought up in artificial wombs, etc. would not count. \n\nResolution will be by UN data, if possible. If the UN will no longer exist, or no longer measure human population by the resolution date, resolution will be by data from what the Metaculus administration judges to be the most accurate data source.\n\n*Inspired by [this comment](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3519/one-million-martian-residents-by-2075/#comment-25412) of user @j.m. on the [similar question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3519/one-million-martian-residents-by-2075/) about Mars.*", "lower_25": "< 10k", "median": "10.8k", "upper_75": "26.7k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum world real GDP growth in percentage points for a single year in the 21st century will be 11.7?", "desc": "", "resc": "World real GDP growth is determined by a reliable organization, such as [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.kd.zg). The year with the highest growth in the 21st century is currently 2004 with 4.403% growth. The 21st century is defined as the era that began on January 1, 2001, and will end on December 31, 2100.", "lower_25": "7.41", "median": "11.7", "upper_75": "92.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the peak population of Antarctica will be 26.7k by 2075?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Antarctica](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antarctica) remains as the last continent without a significant human presence. The southern landmass is presently governed by the terms of the [Antarctic Treaty](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antarctic_Treaty_System), which prohibits military activities and mineral mining, prohibits nuclear explosions and nuclear waste disposal, supports scientific research, and protects the continent's ecozone. As a result, Antarctica has very little to no long-term human population, which consists of roughly 5000 researchers in the summer and only 1000 during winter.\n\nBut will this always be the case? The southern continent [has been heating up](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/13/antarctic-temperature-rises-above-20c-first-time-record) along with the rest of the planet and could potentially become more habitable, and/or more amenable to resource exploitation. In addition, the Antarctic treaty will come under review [in 2048](https://theconversation.com/in-30-years-the-antarctic-treaty-becomes-modifiable-and-the-fate-of-a-continent-could-hang-in-the-balance-98654).\n\n**What will the peak population of humans residing in Antarctica have been by 2075-01-01?** \n\nWe will define humans as biological creatures who have as their ancestors (via a chain of live births from mothers) circa 1900 humans OR who could mate with circa 1900 humans to produce viable offspring. Entities such as AIs, [ems](http://ageofem.com/), genetically engineered beings of a different species brought up in artificial wombs, etc. would not count. \n\nResolution will be by UN data, if possible. If the UN will no longer exist, or no longer measure human population by the resolution date, resolution will be by data from what the Metaculus administration judges to be the most accurate data source.\n\n*Inspired by [this comment](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3519/one-million-martian-residents-by-2075/#comment-25412) of user @j.m. on the [similar question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3519/one-million-martian-residents-by-2075/) about Mars.*", "lower_25": "< 10k", "median": "10.8k", "upper_75": "26.7k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum world real GDP growth in percentage points for a single year in the 21st century will be 11.7?", "desc": "", "resc": "World real GDP growth is determined by a reliable organization, such as [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.kd.zg). The year with the highest growth in the 21st century is currently 2004 with 4.403% growth. The 21st century is defined as the era that began on January 1, 2001, and will end on December 31, 2100.", "lower_25": "7.41", "median": "11.7", "upper_75": "92.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If cryonics is offered for free, what is the chance that 0.322 percentage of Americans will be signed up within 10 years?", "desc": "", "resc": "Assume for the purpose of this question that before 2100, some organization or person offers cryonics for free, meaning that all fees and associated costs are waived. There are a few reasons why this might happen,\n\n* A wealthy person or organization begins offering it as a way of attracting people to cryonics.\n\n* The government subsidizes cryonics as an alternative to the expensive [end-of-life care](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-of-life_care) industry that currently exists. The world population is expected to be [much older](https://ourworldindata.org/age-structure) on average in the near future, which could put strain on governments to cut healthcare costs.\n\nCryonics proponents have historically [given arguments](https://alcor.org/Library/html/cryopreservingeveryone.html) for why they expect cryonics to scale extremely well, which if true, would imply that the cost of signing everyone in the United States up would be relatively cheap per capita.\n\nAfter 10 years of when the offer was first made, what percentage of Americans will be signed up to receive cryonics? For reference, there are [currently](https://timelines.issarice.com/wiki/Timeline_of_brain_preservation) only about 1500 members signed up with Alcor, one of the largest cryonics organizations, which represents less than 0.00046% of the US population. \n\nFor the offering to count, there must be some sort of public message declaring the offer, and eligibility must be available to at least one hundred million people. The date of offering is the first date where a United States citizen receives a cryonics contract for free on behalf of an organization or person who is widely considered to be offering it as a gift to the general public (at least in the United States), rather than to some specific individuals. Here, a cryonics contract is defined as any legally binding commitment, by an organization plausibly capable of fulfilling it, to provide for cryopreservation of (at least) a person's brain provided that doing so is practically feasible.\n\nIf it is the case that the government provides the service as a routine procedure, and as such there is no literal contract to sign, the number of people said to be \"signed up\" in this case are the number of people the US Government promises to cryopreserve. As an example, if the US Government promised to preserve all United States citizens, then the proportion of citizens as a percentage of the total population of the United States (according to the latest Census projection) is the percentage of people in America \"signed up for cryonics.\"\n\nIf cryonics is not offered for free to the general public by any organization or person before 2100, then this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "0.322", "median": "4.32", "upper_75": "30.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many years will caloric restriction be demonstrated to add to one's natural lifespan by 2.99?", "desc": "", "resc": "Caloric restriction is,\n\n> a dietary regimen that reduces food intake without incurring malnutrition. \"Reduce\" can be defined relative to the subject's previous intake before intentionally restricting food or beverage consumption, or relative to an average person of similar body type. [...] In a 2017 report on rhesus monkeys, caloric restriction in the presence of adequate nutrition was effective in delaying the effects of aging.\n\nAssume that before 2150, the results from a high quality randomized control trial exploring the effects of caloric restriction on natural human lifespan are published. If such research is published, how many years will the researchers report caloric restriction adds on average?\n\nFor the purpose of this question, we exclude results from participants that\n\n* Did not regularly follow the best practices recommended by the researchers for caloric restriction\n\n* Quit caloric restriction at some point at least 5 years before their death. \n\n* Began caloric restriction after the age of 50.\n\nOf the participants of the study who do qualify, what will be the mean lifespan gain, according to the best estimates of the researchers?", "lower_25": "1.53", "median": "2.99", "upper_75": "4.57", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next US depression will have a relative severity of 0.426, compared to the Great Depression?", "desc": "", "resc": "This question will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there is no economic depression in the US between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2032. For this question, an \"Economic Depression\" is defined as meeting either of these criteria:\n\n* A recession lasting for 36 months or longer (as adjudicated by [this Metaculus Question's resolution](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2623/if-the-us-enters-a-recession-how-many-months-will-the-economic-contraction-last/)--i.e., if that one resolves ≥36, this criterion has been met).\n\n* Any year's Annual Real GDP growth (as [reported by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis](https://www.bea.gov/news/current-releases)) is estimated to be -10% or less.\n\nIf such a depression occurs, the relative severity will be defined as the number of months the depression lasts times the real GDP decline in percentage points (peak to trough, on an annual basis), divided by 1131.\n\nWe divide by 1131 because the Great Depression lasted 43 months, and the real GDP decline [was](https://www.thebalance.com/us-gdp-by-year-3305543) 26.3%, and \\(43 \\times 26.3 \\simeq 1131\\)", "lower_25": "0.210", "median": "0.426", "upper_75": "0.958", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next US depression will have a relative severity of 0.426, compared to the Great Depression?", "desc": "", "resc": "This question will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there is no economic depression in the US between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2032. For this question, an \"Economic Depression\" is defined as meeting either of these criteria:\n\n* A recession lasting for 36 months or longer (as adjudicated by [this Metaculus Question's resolution](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2623/if-the-us-enters-a-recession-how-many-months-will-the-economic-contraction-last/)--i.e., if that one resolves ≥36, this criterion has been met).\n\n* Any year's Annual Real GDP growth (as [reported by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis](https://www.bea.gov/news/current-releases)) is estimated to be -10% or less.\n\nIf such a depression occurs, the relative severity will be defined as the number of months the depression lasts times the real GDP decline in percentage points (peak to trough, on an annual basis), divided by 1131.\n\nWe divide by 1131 because the Great Depression lasted 43 months, and the real GDP decline [was](https://www.thebalance.com/us-gdp-by-year-3305543) 26.3%, and \\(43 \\times 26.3 \\simeq 1131\\)", "lower_25": "0.210", "median": "0.426", "upper_75": "0.958", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum world real GDP growth in percentage points for a single year in the 21st century will be 11.7?", "desc": "", "resc": "World real GDP growth is determined by a reliable organization, such as [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.kd.zg). The year with the highest growth in the 21st century is currently 2004 with 4.403% growth. The 21st century is defined as the era that began on January 1, 2001, and will end on December 31, 2100.", "lower_25": "7.41", "median": "11.7", "upper_75": "92.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next US depression will have a relative severity of 0.426, compared to the Great Depression?", "desc": "", "resc": "This question will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there is no economic depression in the US between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2032. For this question, an \"Economic Depression\" is defined as meeting either of these criteria:\n\n* A recession lasting for 36 months or longer (as adjudicated by [this Metaculus Question's resolution](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2623/if-the-us-enters-a-recession-how-many-months-will-the-economic-contraction-last/)--i.e., if that one resolves ≥36, this criterion has been met).\n\n* Any year's Annual Real GDP growth (as [reported by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis](https://www.bea.gov/news/current-releases)) is estimated to be -10% or less.\n\nIf such a depression occurs, the relative severity will be defined as the number of months the depression lasts times the real GDP decline in percentage points (peak to trough, on an annual basis), divided by 1131.\n\nWe divide by 1131 because the Great Depression lasted 43 months, and the real GDP decline [was](https://www.thebalance.com/us-gdp-by-year-3305543) 26.3%, and \\(43 \\times 26.3 \\simeq 1131\\)", "lower_25": "0.210", "median": "0.426", "upper_75": "0.958", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the peak population of Antarctica will be 26.7k by 2075?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Antarctica](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antarctica) remains as the last continent without a significant human presence. The southern landmass is presently governed by the terms of the [Antarctic Treaty](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antarctic_Treaty_System), which prohibits military activities and mineral mining, prohibits nuclear explosions and nuclear waste disposal, supports scientific research, and protects the continent's ecozone. As a result, Antarctica has very little to no long-term human population, which consists of roughly 5000 researchers in the summer and only 1000 during winter.\n\nBut will this always be the case? The southern continent [has been heating up](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/13/antarctic-temperature-rises-above-20c-first-time-record) along with the rest of the planet and could potentially become more habitable, and/or more amenable to resource exploitation. In addition, the Antarctic treaty will come under review [in 2048](https://theconversation.com/in-30-years-the-antarctic-treaty-becomes-modifiable-and-the-fate-of-a-continent-could-hang-in-the-balance-98654).\n\n**What will the peak population of humans residing in Antarctica have been by 2075-01-01?** \n\nWe will define humans as biological creatures who have as their ancestors (via a chain of live births from mothers) circa 1900 humans OR who could mate with circa 1900 humans to produce viable offspring. Entities such as AIs, [ems](http://ageofem.com/), genetically engineered beings of a different species brought up in artificial wombs, etc. would not count. \n\nResolution will be by UN data, if possible. If the UN will no longer exist, or no longer measure human population by the resolution date, resolution will be by data from what the Metaculus administration judges to be the most accurate data source.\n\n*Inspired by [this comment](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3519/one-million-martian-residents-by-2075/#comment-25412) of user @j.m. on the [similar question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3519/one-million-martian-residents-by-2075/) about Mars.*", "lower_25": "< 10k", "median": "10.8k", "upper_75": "26.7k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Assuming some humans are alive, what is the chance that the oldest living human on January 1, 2200 will have a birthdate of 2071?", "desc": "", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of birth of the [confirmed oldest living person](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_verified_oldest_people) alive on January 1, 2200.\n\nIf there are no biological humans alive on January 1, 2200, this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "1969", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2071", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If cryonics is offered for free, what is the chance that 0.322 percentage of Americans will be signed up within 10 years?", "desc": "", "resc": "Assume for the purpose of this question that before 2100, some organization or person offers cryonics for free, meaning that all fees and associated costs are waived. There are a few reasons why this might happen,\n\n* A wealthy person or organization begins offering it as a way of attracting people to cryonics.\n\n* The government subsidizes cryonics as an alternative to the expensive [end-of-life care](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-of-life_care) industry that currently exists. The world population is expected to be [much older](https://ourworldindata.org/age-structure) on average in the near future, which could put strain on governments to cut healthcare costs.\n\nCryonics proponents have historically [given arguments](https://alcor.org/Library/html/cryopreservingeveryone.html) for why they expect cryonics to scale extremely well, which if true, would imply that the cost of signing everyone in the United States up would be relatively cheap per capita.\n\nAfter 10 years of when the offer was first made, what percentage of Americans will be signed up to receive cryonics? For reference, there are [currently](https://timelines.issarice.com/wiki/Timeline_of_brain_preservation) only about 1500 members signed up with Alcor, one of the largest cryonics organizations, which represents less than 0.00046% of the US population. \n\nFor the offering to count, there must be some sort of public message declaring the offer, and eligibility must be available to at least one hundred million people. The date of offering is the first date where a United States citizen receives a cryonics contract for free on behalf of an organization or person who is widely considered to be offering it as a gift to the general public (at least in the United States), rather than to some specific individuals. Here, a cryonics contract is defined as any legally binding commitment, by an organization plausibly capable of fulfilling it, to provide for cryopreservation of (at least) a person's brain provided that doing so is practically feasible.\n\nIf it is the case that the government provides the service as a routine procedure, and as such there is no literal contract to sign, the number of people said to be \"signed up\" in this case are the number of people the US Government promises to cryopreserve. As an example, if the US Government promised to preserve all United States citizens, then the proportion of citizens as a percentage of the total population of the United States (according to the latest Census projection) is the percentage of people in America \"signed up for cryonics.\"\n\nIf cryonics is not offered for free to the general public by any organization or person before 2100, then this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "0.322", "median": "4.32", "upper_75": "30.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many years will caloric restriction be demonstrated to add to one's natural lifespan by 2.99?", "desc": "", "resc": "Caloric restriction is,\n\n> a dietary regimen that reduces food intake without incurring malnutrition. \"Reduce\" can be defined relative to the subject's previous intake before intentionally restricting food or beverage consumption, or relative to an average person of similar body type. [...] In a 2017 report on rhesus monkeys, caloric restriction in the presence of adequate nutrition was effective in delaying the effects of aging.\n\nAssume that before 2150, the results from a high quality randomized control trial exploring the effects of caloric restriction on natural human lifespan are published. If such research is published, how many years will the researchers report caloric restriction adds on average?\n\nFor the purpose of this question, we exclude results from participants that\n\n* Did not regularly follow the best practices recommended by the researchers for caloric restriction\n\n* Quit caloric restriction at some point at least 5 years before their death. \n\n* Began caloric restriction after the age of 50.\n\nOf the participants of the study who do qualify, what will be the mean lifespan gain, according to the best estimates of the researchers?", "lower_25": "1.53", "median": "2.99", "upper_75": "4.57", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If cryonics is offered for free, what is the chance that 0.322 percentage of Americans will be signed up within 10 years?", "desc": "", "resc": "Assume for the purpose of this question that before 2100, some organization or person offers cryonics for free, meaning that all fees and associated costs are waived. There are a few reasons why this might happen,\n\n* A wealthy person or organization begins offering it as a way of attracting people to cryonics.\n\n* The government subsidizes cryonics as an alternative to the expensive [end-of-life care](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-of-life_care) industry that currently exists. The world population is expected to be [much older](https://ourworldindata.org/age-structure) on average in the near future, which could put strain on governments to cut healthcare costs.\n\nCryonics proponents have historically [given arguments](https://alcor.org/Library/html/cryopreservingeveryone.html) for why they expect cryonics to scale extremely well, which if true, would imply that the cost of signing everyone in the United States up would be relatively cheap per capita.\n\nAfter 10 years of when the offer was first made, what percentage of Americans will be signed up to receive cryonics? For reference, there are [currently](https://timelines.issarice.com/wiki/Timeline_of_brain_preservation) only about 1500 members signed up with Alcor, one of the largest cryonics organizations, which represents less than 0.00046% of the US population. \n\nFor the offering to count, there must be some sort of public message declaring the offer, and eligibility must be available to at least one hundred million people. The date of offering is the first date where a United States citizen receives a cryonics contract for free on behalf of an organization or person who is widely considered to be offering it as a gift to the general public (at least in the United States), rather than to some specific individuals. Here, a cryonics contract is defined as any legally binding commitment, by an organization plausibly capable of fulfilling it, to provide for cryopreservation of (at least) a person's brain provided that doing so is practically feasible.\n\nIf it is the case that the government provides the service as a routine procedure, and as such there is no literal contract to sign, the number of people said to be \"signed up\" in this case are the number of people the US Government promises to cryopreserve. As an example, if the US Government promised to preserve all United States citizens, then the proportion of citizens as a percentage of the total population of the United States (according to the latest Census projection) is the percentage of people in America \"signed up for cryonics.\"\n\nIf cryonics is not offered for free to the general public by any organization or person before 2100, then this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "0.322", "median": "4.32", "upper_75": "30.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Assuming some humans are alive, what is the chance that the oldest living human on January 1, 2200 will have a birthdate of 2071?", "desc": "", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of birth of the [confirmed oldest living person](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_verified_oldest_people) alive on January 1, 2200.\n\nIf there are no biological humans alive on January 1, 2200, this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "1969", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2071", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will take 13.7 months for a weak AGI to create the first superintelligent oracle?", "desc": "Futurists have long speculated that upon the arrival of AGI, the first sperintelligence will quickly follow. From I. J. Good, [writing in 1965](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0065245808604180),\n\n> Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an ‘intelligence explosion,' and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control.\n\nNick Bostrom wrote in his book *Superintelligence* (2014),\n\n> Note that one could think that it will take quite a long time until machines reach the human baseline, or one might be agnostic about how long that will take, and yet have a strong view that once this happens, the further ascent into strong superintelligence will be very rapid.\n\nand categorized takeoff durations into three types:\n\n* \"A slow takeoff is one that occurs over some long temporal interval, such as decades or centuries.\"\n\n* \"A fast takeoff occurs over some short temporal interval, such as minutes, hours, or days.\"\n\n* \"A moderate takeoff is one that occurs over some intermediary temporal interval, such as months or years.\"\n\nWhile it seems that most prominent thinkers are convinced that rapid technological and economic progress will follow the development of AGI (See [Paul Christiano](https://sideways-view.com/2018/02/24/takeoff-speeds/), [Robin Hanson](http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/aigrow.pdf), [Eliezer Yudkowsky](https://intelligence.org/files/IEM.pdf), [Ben Goertzel](http://multiverseaccordingtoben.blogspot.com/2011/01/hard-takeoff-hypothesis.html)), most AI researchers surveyed are not convinced. In 2016, AI Impacts [asked](https://aiimpacts.org/2016-expert-survey-on-progress-in-ai/) AI researchers,\n\n> Assume that HLMI will exist at some point. How likely do you then think it is that the rate of global technological improvement will dramatically increase (e.g. by a factor of ten) as a result of machine intelligence:\n\n> Within two years of that point? ___% chance\n\n> Within thirty years of that point? ___% chance\n\nThe median answer was 20% for the two year estimate and 80% for the thirty year estimate.", "resc": "This question is resolved based on the resolution of two other Metaculus questions. The date of resolution of when the first AGI is built is determined by [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/when-will-the-first-artificial-general-intelligence-system-be-devised-tested-and-publicly-known-of/). The date of resolution of when the first superintelligence is built is determined by the dates used to resolve [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3683/will-an-oracle-superintelligence-be-developed-before-a-general-superintelligence/) (whichever version of superintelligence was developed earlier, the date of development determines the date relevant to this question).\n\nIf no superintelligence is constructed before 2300, this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "3.16", "median": "13.7", "upper_75": "66.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will take 13.7 months for a weak AGI to create the first superintelligent oracle?", "desc": "Futurists have long speculated that upon the arrival of AGI, the first sperintelligence will quickly follow. From I. J. Good, [writing in 1965](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0065245808604180),\n\n> Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an ‘intelligence explosion,' and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control.\n\nNick Bostrom wrote in his book *Superintelligence* (2014),\n\n> Note that one could think that it will take quite a long time until machines reach the human baseline, or one might be agnostic about how long that will take, and yet have a strong view that once this happens, the further ascent into strong superintelligence will be very rapid.\n\nand categorized takeoff durations into three types:\n\n* \"A slow takeoff is one that occurs over some long temporal interval, such as decades or centuries.\"\n\n* \"A fast takeoff occurs over some short temporal interval, such as minutes, hours, or days.\"\n\n* \"A moderate takeoff is one that occurs over some intermediary temporal interval, such as months or years.\"\n\nWhile it seems that most prominent thinkers are convinced that rapid technological and economic progress will follow the development of AGI (See [Paul Christiano](https://sideways-view.com/2018/02/24/takeoff-speeds/), [Robin Hanson](http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/aigrow.pdf), [Eliezer Yudkowsky](https://intelligence.org/files/IEM.pdf), [Ben Goertzel](http://multiverseaccordingtoben.blogspot.com/2011/01/hard-takeoff-hypothesis.html)), most AI researchers surveyed are not convinced. In 2016, AI Impacts [asked](https://aiimpacts.org/2016-expert-survey-on-progress-in-ai/) AI researchers,\n\n> Assume that HLMI will exist at some point. How likely do you then think it is that the rate of global technological improvement will dramatically increase (e.g. by a factor of ten) as a result of machine intelligence:\n\n> Within two years of that point? ___% chance\n\n> Within thirty years of that point? ___% chance\n\nThe median answer was 20% for the two year estimate and 80% for the thirty year estimate.", "resc": "This question is resolved based on the resolution of two other Metaculus questions. The date of resolution of when the first AGI is built is determined by [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/when-will-the-first-artificial-general-intelligence-system-be-devised-tested-and-publicly-known-of/). The date of resolution of when the first superintelligence is built is determined by the dates used to resolve [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3683/will-an-oracle-superintelligence-be-developed-before-a-general-superintelligence/) (whichever version of superintelligence was developed earlier, the date of development determines the date relevant to this question).\n\nIf no superintelligence is constructed before 2300, this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "3.16", "median": "13.7", "upper_75": "66.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many years will caloric restriction be demonstrated to add to one's natural lifespan by 2.99?", "desc": "", "resc": "Caloric restriction is,\n\n> a dietary regimen that reduces food intake without incurring malnutrition. \"Reduce\" can be defined relative to the subject's previous intake before intentionally restricting food or beverage consumption, or relative to an average person of similar body type. [...] In a 2017 report on rhesus monkeys, caloric restriction in the presence of adequate nutrition was effective in delaying the effects of aging.\n\nAssume that before 2150, the results from a high quality randomized control trial exploring the effects of caloric restriction on natural human lifespan are published. If such research is published, how many years will the researchers report caloric restriction adds on average?\n\nFor the purpose of this question, we exclude results from participants that\n\n* Did not regularly follow the best practices recommended by the researchers for caloric restriction\n\n* Quit caloric restriction at some point at least 5 years before their death. \n\n* Began caloric restriction after the age of 50.\n\nOf the participants of the study who do qualify, what will be the mean lifespan gain, according to the best estimates of the researchers?", "lower_25": "1.53", "median": "2.99", "upper_75": "4.57", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Assuming some humans are alive, what is the chance that the oldest living human on January 1, 2200 will have a birthdate of 2071?", "desc": "", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of birth of the [confirmed oldest living person](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_verified_oldest_people) alive on January 1, 2200.\n\nIf there are no biological humans alive on January 1, 2200, this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "1969", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2071", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that climate change will cause a 27.2% impact on GDP in the 21st century?", "desc": "", "resc": "From [a review](https://academic.oup.com/reep/article/12/1/4/4804315) of the economic impacts of climate change,\n\n> The impacts of climate change are many and diverse. Determining whether these impacts are beneficial or detrimental, small or large, depends on the sector, location, and time being considered. Unfortunately, a reading of the literature on the impacts of climate change (Field and Canziani 2014) is likely to leave a lay reader confused. It is very difficult to make sense of the many and different effects: crops hit by worsening drought, crops growing faster because of carbon dioxide fertilization, heat stress increasing, cold stress decreasing, sea levels rising, increasing energy demand for cooling, decreasing energy demand for heating, infectious disease spreading, species going extinct. Thus we need aggregate indicators to assess whether climate change is, on balance, a good thing or a bad thing and whether the climate problem is small or large relative to the many other problems that society faces.\n\nA common aggregate measure economists have given is the impact of climate change on GDP by the end of the century. From a [2015 survey of climate economists](https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/expertconsensusreport.pdf),\n\n> On average, these experts predicted losses of between 5% and 10% of GDP [by 2090], though there was considerable variation. The mean and median estimates were GDP losses of 10.2% and 5.5%, respectively, with a variance of 133%.\n\nHere I will define damage incurred by climate change as the time-integral of the difference in non-discounted value of world GDP on a path with warming-inducing emissions as a percentage of total GDP along the path without emissions.\n\n**This question asks, what will be the total damage incurred by climate change during the 21st century, as given by the definition of damage above?** The resolution will be determined by a credible estimate from economists in, or after the year 2101.\n\nMetaculus admins will determine, in consultation with the community, which estimate is most credible. In general, a robust meta-analysis which aggregates estimates from high-quality studies is the best source for resolution. Barring the availability of such a meta-analysis, a survey of experts is preferred. Barring the availability of either source, a high quality study will determine resolution. If none of these sources are available, this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "3.40", "median": "11.0", "upper_75": "27.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will take 13.7 months for a weak AGI to create the first superintelligent oracle?", "desc": "Futurists have long speculated that upon the arrival of AGI, the first sperintelligence will quickly follow. From I. J. Good, [writing in 1965](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0065245808604180),\n\n> Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an ‘intelligence explosion,' and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control.\n\nNick Bostrom wrote in his book *Superintelligence* (2014),\n\n> Note that one could think that it will take quite a long time until machines reach the human baseline, or one might be agnostic about how long that will take, and yet have a strong view that once this happens, the further ascent into strong superintelligence will be very rapid.\n\nand categorized takeoff durations into three types:\n\n* \"A slow takeoff is one that occurs over some long temporal interval, such as decades or centuries.\"\n\n* \"A fast takeoff occurs over some short temporal interval, such as minutes, hours, or days.\"\n\n* \"A moderate takeoff is one that occurs over some intermediary temporal interval, such as months or years.\"\n\nWhile it seems that most prominent thinkers are convinced that rapid technological and economic progress will follow the development of AGI (See [Paul Christiano](https://sideways-view.com/2018/02/24/takeoff-speeds/), [Robin Hanson](http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/aigrow.pdf), [Eliezer Yudkowsky](https://intelligence.org/files/IEM.pdf), [Ben Goertzel](http://multiverseaccordingtoben.blogspot.com/2011/01/hard-takeoff-hypothesis.html)), most AI researchers surveyed are not convinced. In 2016, AI Impacts [asked](https://aiimpacts.org/2016-expert-survey-on-progress-in-ai/) AI researchers,\n\n> Assume that HLMI will exist at some point. How likely do you then think it is that the rate of global technological improvement will dramatically increase (e.g. by a factor of ten) as a result of machine intelligence:\n\n> Within two years of that point? ___% chance\n\n> Within thirty years of that point? ___% chance\n\nThe median answer was 20% for the two year estimate and 80% for the thirty year estimate.", "resc": "This question is resolved based on the resolution of two other Metaculus questions. The date of resolution of when the first AGI is built is determined by [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/when-will-the-first-artificial-general-intelligence-system-be-devised-tested-and-publicly-known-of/). The date of resolution of when the first superintelligence is built is determined by the dates used to resolve [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3683/will-an-oracle-superintelligence-be-developed-before-a-general-superintelligence/) (whichever version of superintelligence was developed earlier, the date of development determines the date relevant to this question).\n\nIf no superintelligence is constructed before 2300, this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "3.16", "median": "13.7", "upper_75": "66.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first year during which most deaths are from non-disease related causes and fewer than 1% of humans die will occur in 2171?", "desc": "", "resc": "Disease:\n\n> is a particular abnormal condition that negatively affects the structure or function of all or part of an organism, and that is not due to any immediate external injury. Diseases are often known to be medical conditions that are associated with specific symptoms and signs.\n\nAccording to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/causes-of-death), disease is responsible for nearly 97% of human deaths in the world, as of 2017. \n\nFuturists have long speculated that humanity may one day have a cure to all diseases, and that at that point, people will only die from injuries such as intentional suicide and accidents. Another possibility is that we may discover a way to prevent the aging process, providing humans with perpetually healthy life. Writing in 1794, Marquis de Condorcet had [predicted](https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/condorcet-progress.asp),\n\n> Would it be absurd now to suppose that the improvement of the human race should be regarded as capable of unlimited progress? That a time will come when death would result only from extraordinary accidents or the more and more gradual wearing out of vitality, and that, finally, the duration of the average interval between birth and wearing out has itself no specific limit whatsoever? No doubt man will not become immortal, but cannot the span constantly increase between the moment he begins to live and the time when naturally, without illness or accident, he finds life a burden?\n\nThis question resolves on the first year during which the majority of deaths in the world, as reported by a reputable organization, are listed as originating from non-disease related causes, AND the proportion of (deaths in that year)/(population of the world at the beginning of the year) < 1%. The intention of this question is to determine the first year during which medicine has eliminated most disease. Therefore, the second condition is there to prevent global catastrophic risks from spurring a false resolution.\n\nOne such organization that reports death statistics is the World Health Organization. You can see their report for deaths in 2019 [here](https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/311696/WHO-DAD-2019.1-eng.pdf).", "lower_25": "2076", "median": "2171", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2299", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a human chess player will not reach a FIDE rating of 2900 by 2040?", "desc": "The highest rated chess player as of May 2020 is [Magnus Carlsen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnus_Carlsen), who currently possesses a FIDE rating of [2863](https://ratings.fide.com/card.phtml?event=1503014). His peak rating (and the highest rating of all time) was 2882, achieved back in May 2014. An overview of top-ranked chess grandmasters sorted by their peak rating can be found [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_chess_players_by_peak_FIDE_rating) or [here](https://2700chess.com/records).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a human chess player reaches a FIDE rating of 2900 or more in classical (standard) chess, according to the [International Chess Federation](https://ratings.fide.com/top_lists.phtml) (FIDE).\n\nIf FIDE ceases to be the governing body of international chess competition, or does not publish relevant data for any 6 month period between January 1, 2020 to January 1, 2040 (or before a 2900 rating is reached), this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf no human chess player achieves a 2900 rating before January 1, 2040, this question will resolve as **>January 1, 2040**", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a human chess player will not reach a FIDE rating of 2900 by 2040?", "desc": "The highest rated chess player as of May 2020 is [Magnus Carlsen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnus_Carlsen), who currently possesses a FIDE rating of [2863](https://ratings.fide.com/card.phtml?event=1503014). His peak rating (and the highest rating of all time) was 2882, achieved back in May 2014. An overview of top-ranked chess grandmasters sorted by their peak rating can be found [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_chess_players_by_peak_FIDE_rating) or [here](https://2700chess.com/records).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a human chess player reaches a FIDE rating of 2900 or more in classical (standard) chess, according to the [International Chess Federation](https://ratings.fide.com/top_lists.phtml) (FIDE).\n\nIf FIDE ceases to be the governing body of international chess competition, or does not publish relevant data for any 6 month period between January 1, 2020 to January 1, 2040 (or before a 2900 rating is reached), this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf no human chess player achieves a 2900 rating before January 1, 2040, this question will resolve as **>January 1, 2040**", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that climate change will cause a 27.2% impact on GDP in the 21st century?", "desc": "", "resc": "From [a review](https://academic.oup.com/reep/article/12/1/4/4804315) of the economic impacts of climate change,\n\n> The impacts of climate change are many and diverse. Determining whether these impacts are beneficial or detrimental, small or large, depends on the sector, location, and time being considered. Unfortunately, a reading of the literature on the impacts of climate change (Field and Canziani 2014) is likely to leave a lay reader confused. It is very difficult to make sense of the many and different effects: crops hit by worsening drought, crops growing faster because of carbon dioxide fertilization, heat stress increasing, cold stress decreasing, sea levels rising, increasing energy demand for cooling, decreasing energy demand for heating, infectious disease spreading, species going extinct. Thus we need aggregate indicators to assess whether climate change is, on balance, a good thing or a bad thing and whether the climate problem is small or large relative to the many other problems that society faces.\n\nA common aggregate measure economists have given is the impact of climate change on GDP by the end of the century. From a [2015 survey of climate economists](https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/expertconsensusreport.pdf),\n\n> On average, these experts predicted losses of between 5% and 10% of GDP [by 2090], though there was considerable variation. The mean and median estimates were GDP losses of 10.2% and 5.5%, respectively, with a variance of 133%.\n\nHere I will define damage incurred by climate change as the time-integral of the difference in non-discounted value of world GDP on a path with warming-inducing emissions as a percentage of total GDP along the path without emissions.\n\n**This question asks, what will be the total damage incurred by climate change during the 21st century, as given by the definition of damage above?** The resolution will be determined by a credible estimate from economists in, or after the year 2101.\n\nMetaculus admins will determine, in consultation with the community, which estimate is most credible. In general, a robust meta-analysis which aggregates estimates from high-quality studies is the best source for resolution. Barring the availability of such a meta-analysis, a survey of experts is preferred. Barring the availability of either source, a high quality study will determine resolution. If none of these sources are available, this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "3.40", "median": "11.0", "upper_75": "27.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real world GDP on the year AGI is deployed will be 183 trillions of dollars?", "desc": "An important input to technological development is economic productivity. From Nick Bostrom's *[The Future of Humanity](https://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/future.pdf)* (2005), \n\n> One could argue that to get an index of the overall pace of technological development, we should look not at a hand-picked portfolio of hot technologies; but instead at economic growth, which implicitly incorporates all productivity-enhancing technological innovations, weighted by their economic significance.\n\nFurthermore, many proposed AI takeoff scenarios are framed in terms of economic growth and development (See for instance [Baumann](http://s-risks.org/a-framework-for-thinking-about-ai-timescales/) and [Hanson](http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/aigrow.pdf)). Economic investment has also been pointed to as a driving factor of the recent [AI and compute trend](https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/).\n\nIf Paul Christiano's [slow AI takeoff view](https://sideways-view.com/2018/02/24/takeoff-speeds/) is right, then economic growth will speed up long before we have advanced AI technology. That's because pre-AGI technology can potentially automate labor without strictly being smarter than all humans. This would imply that upon the arrival of AGI, the world economy will be much larger than it would be if you naively extrapolated from past economic growth. \n\nFor example, suppose you thought that AGI was 20 years away, but that 10 years before AGI, economic growth would be double the current rate, triple 5 years before, quadruple 2 years before etc. Then although the GDP's current instantaneous growth rate implies that GDP should be about twice as much when AGI arrives, it will actually be much higher due to the pre-AGI-induced acceleration. But exactly how much larger will it be?\n\nReal world GDP [was estimated](https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/) to be about 87 trillion dollars in 2019.", "resc": "This question resolves to real GDP in trillions of 2020 USD the year AGI is deployed.\n\nThe relevant year when AGI is deployed is determined by [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/when-will-the-first-artificial-general-intelligence-system-be-devised-tested-and-publicly-known-of/). A real GDP estimate for that year from a reliable source will determine the resolution for this question.", "lower_25": "121", "median": "183", "upper_75": "487", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first year during which most deaths are from non-disease related causes and fewer than 1% of humans die will occur in 2171?", "desc": "", "resc": "Disease:\n\n> is a particular abnormal condition that negatively affects the structure or function of all or part of an organism, and that is not due to any immediate external injury. Diseases are often known to be medical conditions that are associated with specific symptoms and signs.\n\nAccording to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/causes-of-death), disease is responsible for nearly 97% of human deaths in the world, as of 2017. \n\nFuturists have long speculated that humanity may one day have a cure to all diseases, and that at that point, people will only die from injuries such as intentional suicide and accidents. Another possibility is that we may discover a way to prevent the aging process, providing humans with perpetually healthy life. Writing in 1794, Marquis de Condorcet had [predicted](https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/condorcet-progress.asp),\n\n> Would it be absurd now to suppose that the improvement of the human race should be regarded as capable of unlimited progress? That a time will come when death would result only from extraordinary accidents or the more and more gradual wearing out of vitality, and that, finally, the duration of the average interval between birth and wearing out has itself no specific limit whatsoever? No doubt man will not become immortal, but cannot the span constantly increase between the moment he begins to live and the time when naturally, without illness or accident, he finds life a burden?\n\nThis question resolves on the first year during which the majority of deaths in the world, as reported by a reputable organization, are listed as originating from non-disease related causes, AND the proportion of (deaths in that year)/(population of the world at the beginning of the year) < 1%. The intention of this question is to determine the first year during which medicine has eliminated most disease. Therefore, the second condition is there to prevent global catastrophic risks from spurring a false resolution.\n\nOne such organization that reports death statistics is the World Health Organization. You can see their report for deaths in 2019 [here](https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/311696/WHO-DAD-2019.1-eng.pdf).", "lower_25": "2076", "median": "2171", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2299", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real world GDP on the year AGI is deployed will be 183 trillions of dollars?", "desc": "An important input to technological development is economic productivity. From Nick Bostrom's *[The Future of Humanity](https://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/future.pdf)* (2005), \n\n> One could argue that to get an index of the overall pace of technological development, we should look not at a hand-picked portfolio of hot technologies; but instead at economic growth, which implicitly incorporates all productivity-enhancing technological innovations, weighted by their economic significance.\n\nFurthermore, many proposed AI takeoff scenarios are framed in terms of economic growth and development (See for instance [Baumann](http://s-risks.org/a-framework-for-thinking-about-ai-timescales/) and [Hanson](http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/aigrow.pdf)). Economic investment has also been pointed to as a driving factor of the recent [AI and compute trend](https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/).\n\nIf Paul Christiano's [slow AI takeoff view](https://sideways-view.com/2018/02/24/takeoff-speeds/) is right, then economic growth will speed up long before we have advanced AI technology. That's because pre-AGI technology can potentially automate labor without strictly being smarter than all humans. This would imply that upon the arrival of AGI, the world economy will be much larger than it would be if you naively extrapolated from past economic growth. \n\nFor example, suppose you thought that AGI was 20 years away, but that 10 years before AGI, economic growth would be double the current rate, triple 5 years before, quadruple 2 years before etc. Then although the GDP's current instantaneous growth rate implies that GDP should be about twice as much when AGI arrives, it will actually be much higher due to the pre-AGI-induced acceleration. But exactly how much larger will it be?\n\nReal world GDP [was estimated](https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/) to be about 87 trillion dollars in 2019.", "resc": "This question resolves to real GDP in trillions of 2020 USD the year AGI is deployed.\n\nThe relevant year when AGI is deployed is determined by [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/when-will-the-first-artificial-general-intelligence-system-be-devised-tested-and-publicly-known-of/). A real GDP estimate for that year from a reliable source will determine the resolution for this question.", "lower_25": "121", "median": "183", "upper_75": "487", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a human chess player will not reach a FIDE rating of 2900 by 2040?", "desc": "The highest rated chess player as of May 2020 is [Magnus Carlsen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnus_Carlsen), who currently possesses a FIDE rating of [2863](https://ratings.fide.com/card.phtml?event=1503014). His peak rating (and the highest rating of all time) was 2882, achieved back in May 2014. An overview of top-ranked chess grandmasters sorted by their peak rating can be found [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_chess_players_by_peak_FIDE_rating) or [here](https://2700chess.com/records).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a human chess player reaches a FIDE rating of 2900 or more in classical (standard) chess, according to the [International Chess Federation](https://ratings.fide.com/top_lists.phtml) (FIDE).\n\nIf FIDE ceases to be the governing body of international chess competition, or does not publish relevant data for any 6 month period between January 1, 2020 to January 1, 2040 (or before a 2900 rating is reached), this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf no human chess player achieves a 2900 rating before January 1, 2040, this question will resolve as **>January 1, 2040**", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted atmospheric concentration of CO2 will be lower than the same time in the previous year by 2079?", "desc": "In tracking progress on climate change, a key milestone would be when the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere stabilises. An indicator of this would be the first time after the opening of this question that the seasonally adjusted concentration dips below the same metric 365 days prior.", "resc": "This question can be settled on the daily trend values given at the [NOAA website](https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/gl_data.html) (Ed Dlugokencky and Pieter Tans, NOAA/ESRL). If this source becomes available, this question can resolve according to another source of similar quality, for example the [Scripps CO\\(_2\\) Program](https://scrippsco2.ucsd.edu/data/atmospheric_co2/) or [NASA](https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/).", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2079", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first year during which most deaths are from non-disease related causes and fewer than 1% of humans die will occur in 2171?", "desc": "", "resc": "Disease:\n\n> is a particular abnormal condition that negatively affects the structure or function of all or part of an organism, and that is not due to any immediate external injury. Diseases are often known to be medical conditions that are associated with specific symptoms and signs.\n\nAccording to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/causes-of-death), disease is responsible for nearly 97% of human deaths in the world, as of 2017. \n\nFuturists have long speculated that humanity may one day have a cure to all diseases, and that at that point, people will only die from injuries such as intentional suicide and accidents. Another possibility is that we may discover a way to prevent the aging process, providing humans with perpetually healthy life. Writing in 1794, Marquis de Condorcet had [predicted](https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/condorcet-progress.asp),\n\n> Would it be absurd now to suppose that the improvement of the human race should be regarded as capable of unlimited progress? That a time will come when death would result only from extraordinary accidents or the more and more gradual wearing out of vitality, and that, finally, the duration of the average interval between birth and wearing out has itself no specific limit whatsoever? No doubt man will not become immortal, but cannot the span constantly increase between the moment he begins to live and the time when naturally, without illness or accident, he finds life a burden?\n\nThis question resolves on the first year during which the majority of deaths in the world, as reported by a reputable organization, are listed as originating from non-disease related causes, AND the proportion of (deaths in that year)/(population of the world at the beginning of the year) < 1%. The intention of this question is to determine the first year during which medicine has eliminated most disease. Therefore, the second condition is there to prevent global catastrophic risks from spurring a false resolution.\n\nOne such organization that reports death statistics is the World Health Organization. You can see their report for deaths in 2019 [here](https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/311696/WHO-DAD-2019.1-eng.pdf).", "lower_25": "2076", "median": "2171", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2299", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that climate change will cause a 27.2% impact on GDP in the 21st century?", "desc": "", "resc": "From [a review](https://academic.oup.com/reep/article/12/1/4/4804315) of the economic impacts of climate change,\n\n> The impacts of climate change are many and diverse. Determining whether these impacts are beneficial or detrimental, small or large, depends on the sector, location, and time being considered. Unfortunately, a reading of the literature on the impacts of climate change (Field and Canziani 2014) is likely to leave a lay reader confused. It is very difficult to make sense of the many and different effects: crops hit by worsening drought, crops growing faster because of carbon dioxide fertilization, heat stress increasing, cold stress decreasing, sea levels rising, increasing energy demand for cooling, decreasing energy demand for heating, infectious disease spreading, species going extinct. Thus we need aggregate indicators to assess whether climate change is, on balance, a good thing or a bad thing and whether the climate problem is small or large relative to the many other problems that society faces.\n\nA common aggregate measure economists have given is the impact of climate change on GDP by the end of the century. From a [2015 survey of climate economists](https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/expertconsensusreport.pdf),\n\n> On average, these experts predicted losses of between 5% and 10% of GDP [by 2090], though there was considerable variation. The mean and median estimates were GDP losses of 10.2% and 5.5%, respectively, with a variance of 133%.\n\nHere I will define damage incurred by climate change as the time-integral of the difference in non-discounted value of world GDP on a path with warming-inducing emissions as a percentage of total GDP along the path without emissions.\n\n**This question asks, what will be the total damage incurred by climate change during the 21st century, as given by the definition of damage above?** The resolution will be determined by a credible estimate from economists in, or after the year 2101.\n\nMetaculus admins will determine, in consultation with the community, which estimate is most credible. In general, a robust meta-analysis which aggregates estimates from high-quality studies is the best source for resolution. Barring the availability of such a meta-analysis, a survey of experts is preferred. Barring the availability of either source, a high quality study will determine resolution. If none of these sources are available, this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "3.40", "median": "11.0", "upper_75": "27.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will out-perform humans on argument reasoning tasks by Nov 2025?", "desc": "Recent natural language processing (NLP) models have succeeded in generating human-level [text](https://openai.com/blog/better-language-models/) and [translations](https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/W19-6711.pdf). However questions remain regarding to what extent this success relies on understanding, as opposed to memorization of statistical patterns. \n\n[A recent paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.07355.pdf) showed that when statistical-cues are removed, state of the art NLP models fail on argument reasoning tasks -- despite human performance remaining unaffected. Untrained humans perform at ~80% accuracy on this argument reasoning task, whereas recent NLP models perform near 50%.", "resc": "This question resolves to the date when either: \n\n1. A paper posted on arxiv.org claims a greater than 80% accuracy on the Niven and Kao [benchmark](https://github.com/IKMLab/arct2). \n2. A paper posted on arxiv.org claims a greater than 80% accuracy on a successor* dataset to the Niven and Kao data.\n\n*A successor dataset will count towards this resolution criterion if it satisfies all of the following:\n\n1. Published in an arxiv.org pre-print intended to quantify argument and/or reasoning\n\n2. Cites Niven and Kao\n\n3. Pre-2020 NLP models show random-level performance on the dataset (<=60% accuracy for a binary task, <=100*(1/n+1/n/5)% for an n-ary task)\n\nIf the successor dataset includes information on human-level performance, that threshold will be used instead of the 80% accuracy threshold.", "lower_25": "Oct 2024", "median": "Nov 2025", "upper_75": "Nov 2027", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted atmospheric concentration of CO2 will be lower than the same time in the previous year by 2079?", "desc": "In tracking progress on climate change, a key milestone would be when the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere stabilises. An indicator of this would be the first time after the opening of this question that the seasonally adjusted concentration dips below the same metric 365 days prior.", "resc": "This question can be settled on the daily trend values given at the [NOAA website](https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/gl_data.html) (Ed Dlugokencky and Pieter Tans, NOAA/ESRL). If this source becomes available, this question can resolve according to another source of similar quality, for example the [Scripps CO\\(_2\\) Program](https://scrippsco2.ucsd.edu/data/atmospheric_co2/) or [NASA](https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/).", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2079", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted atmospheric concentration of CO2 will be lower than the same time in the previous year by 2079?", "desc": "In tracking progress on climate change, a key milestone would be when the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere stabilises. An indicator of this would be the first time after the opening of this question that the seasonally adjusted concentration dips below the same metric 365 days prior.", "resc": "This question can be settled on the daily trend values given at the [NOAA website](https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/gl_data.html) (Ed Dlugokencky and Pieter Tans, NOAA/ESRL). If this source becomes available, this question can resolve according to another source of similar quality, for example the [Scripps CO\\(_2\\) Program](https://scrippsco2.ucsd.edu/data/atmospheric_co2/) or [NASA](https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/).", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2079", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real world GDP on the year AGI is deployed will be 183 trillions of dollars?", "desc": "An important input to technological development is economic productivity. From Nick Bostrom's *[The Future of Humanity](https://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/future.pdf)* (2005), \n\n> One could argue that to get an index of the overall pace of technological development, we should look not at a hand-picked portfolio of hot technologies; but instead at economic growth, which implicitly incorporates all productivity-enhancing technological innovations, weighted by their economic significance.\n\nFurthermore, many proposed AI takeoff scenarios are framed in terms of economic growth and development (See for instance [Baumann](http://s-risks.org/a-framework-for-thinking-about-ai-timescales/) and [Hanson](http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/aigrow.pdf)). Economic investment has also been pointed to as a driving factor of the recent [AI and compute trend](https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/).\n\nIf Paul Christiano's [slow AI takeoff view](https://sideways-view.com/2018/02/24/takeoff-speeds/) is right, then economic growth will speed up long before we have advanced AI technology. That's because pre-AGI technology can potentially automate labor without strictly being smarter than all humans. This would imply that upon the arrival of AGI, the world economy will be much larger than it would be if you naively extrapolated from past economic growth. \n\nFor example, suppose you thought that AGI was 20 years away, but that 10 years before AGI, economic growth would be double the current rate, triple 5 years before, quadruple 2 years before etc. Then although the GDP's current instantaneous growth rate implies that GDP should be about twice as much when AGI arrives, it will actually be much higher due to the pre-AGI-induced acceleration. But exactly how much larger will it be?\n\nReal world GDP [was estimated](https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/) to be about 87 trillion dollars in 2019.", "resc": "This question resolves to real GDP in trillions of 2020 USD the year AGI is deployed.\n\nThe relevant year when AGI is deployed is determined by [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/when-will-the-first-artificial-general-intelligence-system-be-devised-tested-and-publicly-known-of/). A real GDP estimate for that year from a reliable source will determine the resolution for this question.", "lower_25": "121", "median": "183", "upper_75": "487", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 62.2 countries will decriminalize possession of all Schedule I drugs for personal use by 2070?", "desc": "", "resc": "#Context \nAs of 2020, possession of small amounts of certain psychoactive drugs (e.g., LSD or MDMA) for personal use is a criminal offense in many countries of the world. However, sometimes drug laws are changed. An activity related to drugs (such as possession of drugs) may be decriminalized, which means removal of criminal penalties for it. It may also be legalized, which implies removal of penalties for it altogether.\n\nTalkingdrugs [drug decriminalization map](https://www.talkingdrugs.org/drug-decriminalisation) indicates that the possession (at least in very small quantities for personal use) of any recreational drug, including drugs from Schedule I, is not criminalized by law in 19 countries in 2020.\n\nOut of these 19 countries, drug decriminalization occured in 14 countries in the 1991-2020 period, and in 3 countries in the 2011-2020 period.\n\n#Question\n\nHow many countries will, at least in some form, decriminalize the possession of all Schedule I drugs for personal use on a national level by 2070?\n\n#Resolution\n\nHere \"Schedule I drugs\" refers to drugs marked as CSA Schedule I in the [List of Regulated Chemicals](https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/orangebook/orangebook.pdf) compiled by US Drug Enforcement Administration (May 2020 version).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, decriminalization of both possesion in small quantities and possession in any quantities count. Both decriminalization and legalization count. Countries where drug possession was never a criminal offense count (e.g. de jure in Uruguay).\n\nSituations of de jure decriminalization, de facto decriminalization, and de jure + de facto decriminalization all count. De facto decriminalization means that, for any Schedule I drug, criminal charges for only small-scale possession for personal use are filed in estimated <1% of cases in which such possession is detected.\n\n\"Country\" is defined as a UN member state for the purposes of this question.", "lower_25": "37.6", "median": "62.2", "upper_75": "87.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 62.2 countries will decriminalize possession of all Schedule I drugs for personal use by 2070?", "desc": "", "resc": "#Context \nAs of 2020, possession of small amounts of certain psychoactive drugs (e.g., LSD or MDMA) for personal use is a criminal offense in many countries of the world. However, sometimes drug laws are changed. An activity related to drugs (such as possession of drugs) may be decriminalized, which means removal of criminal penalties for it. It may also be legalized, which implies removal of penalties for it altogether.\n\nTalkingdrugs [drug decriminalization map](https://www.talkingdrugs.org/drug-decriminalisation) indicates that the possession (at least in very small quantities for personal use) of any recreational drug, including drugs from Schedule I, is not criminalized by law in 19 countries in 2020.\n\nOut of these 19 countries, drug decriminalization occured in 14 countries in the 1991-2020 period, and in 3 countries in the 2011-2020 period.\n\n#Question\n\nHow many countries will, at least in some form, decriminalize the possession of all Schedule I drugs for personal use on a national level by 2070?\n\n#Resolution\n\nHere \"Schedule I drugs\" refers to drugs marked as CSA Schedule I in the [List of Regulated Chemicals](https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/orangebook/orangebook.pdf) compiled by US Drug Enforcement Administration (May 2020 version).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, decriminalization of both possesion in small quantities and possession in any quantities count. Both decriminalization and legalization count. Countries where drug possession was never a criminal offense count (e.g. de jure in Uruguay).\n\nSituations of de jure decriminalization, de facto decriminalization, and de jure + de facto decriminalization all count. De facto decriminalization means that, for any Schedule I drug, criminal charges for only small-scale possession for personal use are filed in estimated <1% of cases in which such possession is detected.\n\n\"Country\" is defined as a UN member state for the purposes of this question.", "lower_25": "37.6", "median": "62.2", "upper_75": "87.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 62.2 countries will decriminalize possession of all Schedule I drugs for personal use by 2070?", "desc": "", "resc": "#Context \nAs of 2020, possession of small amounts of certain psychoactive drugs (e.g., LSD or MDMA) for personal use is a criminal offense in many countries of the world. However, sometimes drug laws are changed. An activity related to drugs (such as possession of drugs) may be decriminalized, which means removal of criminal penalties for it. It may also be legalized, which implies removal of penalties for it altogether.\n\nTalkingdrugs [drug decriminalization map](https://www.talkingdrugs.org/drug-decriminalisation) indicates that the possession (at least in very small quantities for personal use) of any recreational drug, including drugs from Schedule I, is not criminalized by law in 19 countries in 2020.\n\nOut of these 19 countries, drug decriminalization occured in 14 countries in the 1991-2020 period, and in 3 countries in the 2011-2020 period.\n\n#Question\n\nHow many countries will, at least in some form, decriminalize the possession of all Schedule I drugs for personal use on a national level by 2070?\n\n#Resolution\n\nHere \"Schedule I drugs\" refers to drugs marked as CSA Schedule I in the [List of Regulated Chemicals](https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/orangebook/orangebook.pdf) compiled by US Drug Enforcement Administration (May 2020 version).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, decriminalization of both possesion in small quantities and possession in any quantities count. Both decriminalization and legalization count. Countries where drug possession was never a criminal offense count (e.g. de jure in Uruguay).\n\nSituations of de jure decriminalization, de facto decriminalization, and de jure + de facto decriminalization all count. De facto decriminalization means that, for any Schedule I drug, criminal charges for only small-scale possession for personal use are filed in estimated <1% of cases in which such possession is detected.\n\n\"Country\" is defined as a UN member state for the purposes of this question.", "lower_25": "37.6", "median": "62.2", "upper_75": "87.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will out-perform humans on argument reasoning tasks by Nov 2025?", "desc": "Recent natural language processing (NLP) models have succeeded in generating human-level [text](https://openai.com/blog/better-language-models/) and [translations](https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/W19-6711.pdf). However questions remain regarding to what extent this success relies on understanding, as opposed to memorization of statistical patterns. \n\n[A recent paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.07355.pdf) showed that when statistical-cues are removed, state of the art NLP models fail on argument reasoning tasks -- despite human performance remaining unaffected. Untrained humans perform at ~80% accuracy on this argument reasoning task, whereas recent NLP models perform near 50%.", "resc": "This question resolves to the date when either: \n\n1. A paper posted on arxiv.org claims a greater than 80% accuracy on the Niven and Kao [benchmark](https://github.com/IKMLab/arct2). \n2. A paper posted on arxiv.org claims a greater than 80% accuracy on a successor* dataset to the Niven and Kao data.\n\n*A successor dataset will count towards this resolution criterion if it satisfies all of the following:\n\n1. Published in an arxiv.org pre-print intended to quantify argument and/or reasoning\n\n2. Cites Niven and Kao\n\n3. Pre-2020 NLP models show random-level performance on the dataset (<=60% accuracy for a binary task, <=100*(1/n+1/n/5)% for an n-ary task)\n\nIf the successor dataset includes information on human-level performance, that threshold will be used instead of the 80% accuracy threshold.", "lower_25": "Oct 2024", "median": "Nov 2025", "upper_75": "Nov 2027", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a vegan cheese indistinguishable from non-vegan cheese available for purchase by regular consumers by 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "Many animal rights thinkers now anticipate that there will be radical shift in society's treatment of animal upon the development of tasty plant-based meats [citation needed]. However, the development of plant-based meats would not necessarily entail the end of animal agriculture.\n\n\n**When will there be a vegan cheese version of Mozzarella, Cheddar, Feta, Provolone, Swiss, or Monterey Jack that is indistinguishable from its original counterpart, as determined by an n≥250 RCT?**\n\nDefine a vegan food as a food which is widely considered to be made without any animal products. A vegan cheese is said to be vegan food that is intended to emulate the taste, quality, and texture of normal cheese.\n\nA vegan cheese is said to be indistinguishable from non-vegan cheese if a high quality double-blind trial determined that ordinary humans (who previously reported having tasted the non-vegan cheese being compared) could not reliably determine the difference between the vegan imitation cheese and the non-vegan cheese it seeks to emulate. \n\nMore narrowly, we say conclude that the participants could not reliably determine the difference between the cheeses if there were at least 250 people in the study, the null hypothesis was not rejected at the p=0.05 significance level, and the study design was high quality according to the judgement of the moderators.\n\nThe date of resolution for this question is determined on the date by which the first vegan cheese which is indistinguishable from non-vegan cheese enters a regular consumer market, such as a supermarket chain.", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will out-perform humans on argument reasoning tasks by Nov 2025?", "desc": "Recent natural language processing (NLP) models have succeeded in generating human-level [text](https://openai.com/blog/better-language-models/) and [translations](https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/W19-6711.pdf). However questions remain regarding to what extent this success relies on understanding, as opposed to memorization of statistical patterns. \n\n[A recent paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.07355.pdf) showed that when statistical-cues are removed, state of the art NLP models fail on argument reasoning tasks -- despite human performance remaining unaffected. Untrained humans perform at ~80% accuracy on this argument reasoning task, whereas recent NLP models perform near 50%.", "resc": "This question resolves to the date when either: \n\n1. A paper posted on arxiv.org claims a greater than 80% accuracy on the Niven and Kao [benchmark](https://github.com/IKMLab/arct2). \n2. A paper posted on arxiv.org claims a greater than 80% accuracy on a successor* dataset to the Niven and Kao data.\n\n*A successor dataset will count towards this resolution criterion if it satisfies all of the following:\n\n1. Published in an arxiv.org pre-print intended to quantify argument and/or reasoning\n\n2. Cites Niven and Kao\n\n3. Pre-2020 NLP models show random-level performance on the dataset (<=60% accuracy for a binary task, <=100*(1/n+1/n/5)% for an n-ary task)\n\nIf the successor dataset includes information on human-level performance, that threshold will be used instead of the 80% accuracy threshold.", "lower_25": "Oct 2024", "median": "Nov 2025", "upper_75": "Nov 2027", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many years after the silver Turing Test is passed will an AGI system be developed? What is the chance that it will take 3.46 years?", "desc": "Given the public disagreement of expert opinion on AI timelines, seen for example [here](http://www.parlonsfutur.com/blog/the-fascinating-facebook-debate-between-yann-lecun-stuart-russel-and-yoshua), there is a need to establish a credible track-record of accurate forecasting in the lead-up to the development of AGI. \n\nOren Etzioni, head of the Allen AI institute, recently published an [article](https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/02/25/906083/artificial-intelligence-destroy-civilization-canaries-robot-overlords-take-over-world-ai/) on identifying 'canaries' which will presage the imminent development of AGI. He proposes that limited versions of the Turing Test could present a natural canary.", "resc": "This question's resolution will be determined by the number of years between the positive resolution of two other metaculus questions: the silver [Turing Test](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/73/will-the-silver-turing-test-be-passed-by-2026/) prediction and [AGI](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/when-will-the-first-artificial-general-intelligence-system-be-devised-tested-and-publicly-known-of/) prediction.\n\nIf the silver Turing test has not been passed by 2026 (the date limit set [by the question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/73/will-the-silver-turing-test-be-passed-by-2026/)), I will post a new version of that question using the prediction time series format and resolving 2075. Then the resolution of this question will depend on the resolution of the new silver Turing test question.", "lower_25": "1.10", "median": "1.45", "upper_75": "3.46", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many years after the silver Turing Test is passed will an AGI system be developed? What is the chance that it will take 3.46 years?", "desc": "Given the public disagreement of expert opinion on AI timelines, seen for example [here](http://www.parlonsfutur.com/blog/the-fascinating-facebook-debate-between-yann-lecun-stuart-russel-and-yoshua), there is a need to establish a credible track-record of accurate forecasting in the lead-up to the development of AGI. \n\nOren Etzioni, head of the Allen AI institute, recently published an [article](https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/02/25/906083/artificial-intelligence-destroy-civilization-canaries-robot-overlords-take-over-world-ai/) on identifying 'canaries' which will presage the imminent development of AGI. He proposes that limited versions of the Turing Test could present a natural canary.", "resc": "This question's resolution will be determined by the number of years between the positive resolution of two other metaculus questions: the silver [Turing Test](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/73/will-the-silver-turing-test-be-passed-by-2026/) prediction and [AGI](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/when-will-the-first-artificial-general-intelligence-system-be-devised-tested-and-publicly-known-of/) prediction.\n\nIf the silver Turing test has not been passed by 2026 (the date limit set [by the question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/73/will-the-silver-turing-test-be-passed-by-2026/)), I will post a new version of that question using the prediction time series format and resolving 2075. Then the resolution of this question will depend on the resolution of the new silver Turing test question.", "lower_25": "1.10", "median": "1.45", "upper_75": "3.46", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many years after the silver Turing Test is passed will an AGI system be developed? What is the chance that it will take 3.46 years?", "desc": "Given the public disagreement of expert opinion on AI timelines, seen for example [here](http://www.parlonsfutur.com/blog/the-fascinating-facebook-debate-between-yann-lecun-stuart-russel-and-yoshua), there is a need to establish a credible track-record of accurate forecasting in the lead-up to the development of AGI. \n\nOren Etzioni, head of the Allen AI institute, recently published an [article](https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/02/25/906083/artificial-intelligence-destroy-civilization-canaries-robot-overlords-take-over-world-ai/) on identifying 'canaries' which will presage the imminent development of AGI. He proposes that limited versions of the Turing Test could present a natural canary.", "resc": "This question's resolution will be determined by the number of years between the positive resolution of two other metaculus questions: the silver [Turing Test](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/73/will-the-silver-turing-test-be-passed-by-2026/) prediction and [AGI](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/when-will-the-first-artificial-general-intelligence-system-be-devised-tested-and-publicly-known-of/) prediction.\n\nIf the silver Turing test has not been passed by 2026 (the date limit set [by the question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/73/will-the-silver-turing-test-be-passed-by-2026/)), I will post a new version of that question using the prediction time series format and resolving 2075. Then the resolution of this question will depend on the resolution of the new silver Turing test question.", "lower_25": "1.10", "median": "1.45", "upper_75": "3.46", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a vegan cheese indistinguishable from non-vegan cheese available for purchase by regular consumers by 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "Many animal rights thinkers now anticipate that there will be radical shift in society's treatment of animal upon the development of tasty plant-based meats [citation needed]. However, the development of plant-based meats would not necessarily entail the end of animal agriculture.\n\n\n**When will there be a vegan cheese version of Mozzarella, Cheddar, Feta, Provolone, Swiss, or Monterey Jack that is indistinguishable from its original counterpart, as determined by an n≥250 RCT?**\n\nDefine a vegan food as a food which is widely considered to be made without any animal products. A vegan cheese is said to be vegan food that is intended to emulate the taste, quality, and texture of normal cheese.\n\nA vegan cheese is said to be indistinguishable from non-vegan cheese if a high quality double-blind trial determined that ordinary humans (who previously reported having tasted the non-vegan cheese being compared) could not reliably determine the difference between the vegan imitation cheese and the non-vegan cheese it seeks to emulate. \n\nMore narrowly, we say conclude that the participants could not reliably determine the difference between the cheeses if there were at least 250 people in the study, the null hypothesis was not rejected at the p=0.05 significance level, and the study design was high quality according to the judgement of the moderators.\n\nThe date of resolution for this question is determined on the date by which the first vegan cheese which is indistinguishable from non-vegan cheese enters a regular consumer market, such as a supermarket chain.", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will defeat top human players in Poohsticks by 2028?", "desc": "In the past few decades, AIs have achieved impressive wins against top human players in [go](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/45/in-2016-will-an-ai-player-beat-a-professionally-ranked-human-in-the-ancient-game-of-go/), [chess](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_Blue_(chess_computer)), [poker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pluribus_(poker_bot)), and [DOTA](https://openai.com/projects/five/). AI development is continuing in other games: [learning montezuma's revenge from scratch](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5460/ai-rapidly-learning-to-play-a-simple-game/), [playing association football against professional players](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football), and [beating top humans in StarCraft 2](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3272/date-ai-defeats-top-10-starcraft-2-players/). Will AI ever beat humans in Poohsticks?\n\n[Poohsticks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poohsticks) is a simple game originally described by A.A. Milne in *The House At Pooh Corner*: any number of players meet on a bridge spanning a river, grab an object (such as a stick), and drop them on the river. the first stick to cross the other end of the bridge is the winner.\n\nThe World Poohsticks Championships has been held since 1984, currently managed by the Rotory Club of Oxford Spires. It may be the largest Poohsticks competition of any kind. The 2020 and 2021 championships were cancelled due to the COVID pandemic.\n\nCritics claim that Poohsticks is only a game of luck, but [Dr Rhys Morgan, Director of Engineering and Education at the Royal Academy of Engineering](https://inews.co.uk/inews-lifestyle/people/poohsticks-why-you-should-play-winnie-the-pooh-game-93361) believes there is a strategy in selecting your stick: an ideal stick should have the right cross-sectional area, buoyancy, and a surface with high drag.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date of a contest in which an AI defeats a large pool of competitive human players in poohsticks. The AI may be an AI/robotics system, or a human with all strategic decisions chosen by the AI. Metaculus admins may, at their discretion, include contests other than The World Poohsticks Championships of Oxfordshire, England for this question", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "2056", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Which Artemis Moon Mission landing system will first land a person on the moon with a 2.952 chance?", "desc": "", "resc": "At the end of April, NASA [announced](https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-names-companies-to-develop-human-landers-for-artemis-moon-missions) the selection of three private companies to develop a lunar lander:\n\n> NASA has selected three U.S. companies to design and develop human landing systems (HLS) for the agency's Artemis program, one of which will land the first woman and next man on the surface of the Moon by 2024.\n\nThe three companies are:\n\n1. Blue Origin \n2. Dynetics\n3. SpaceX\n\n\nThis question asks: **Which of these three companies will be first in developing a lunar landing system that successfully lands a person on the moon?**\n\n---\n\nThis question will resolve to precisely 1,2 or 3 when a lander build by the respective team successfully lands a living human on the moon. In the case that none of the 3 successfully lands a living human on the moon before January 1, 2030, the question will resolve to a value of 0.\n\nIf two of the teams merge or NASA selects a different company to develop a lunar lander, the question will resolve ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2.952", "median": "2.980", "upper_75": "2.991", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a vegan cheese indistinguishable from non-vegan cheese available for purchase by regular consumers by 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "Many animal rights thinkers now anticipate that there will be radical shift in society's treatment of animal upon the development of tasty plant-based meats [citation needed]. However, the development of plant-based meats would not necessarily entail the end of animal agriculture.\n\n\n**When will there be a vegan cheese version of Mozzarella, Cheddar, Feta, Provolone, Swiss, or Monterey Jack that is indistinguishable from its original counterpart, as determined by an n≥250 RCT?**\n\nDefine a vegan food as a food which is widely considered to be made without any animal products. A vegan cheese is said to be vegan food that is intended to emulate the taste, quality, and texture of normal cheese.\n\nA vegan cheese is said to be indistinguishable from non-vegan cheese if a high quality double-blind trial determined that ordinary humans (who previously reported having tasted the non-vegan cheese being compared) could not reliably determine the difference between the vegan imitation cheese and the non-vegan cheese it seeks to emulate. \n\nMore narrowly, we say conclude that the participants could not reliably determine the difference between the cheeses if there were at least 250 people in the study, the null hypothesis was not rejected at the p=0.05 significance level, and the study design was high quality according to the judgement of the moderators.\n\nThe date of resolution for this question is determined on the date by which the first vegan cheese which is indistinguishable from non-vegan cheese enters a regular consumer market, such as a supermarket chain.", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will defeat top human players in Poohsticks by 2028?", "desc": "In the past few decades, AIs have achieved impressive wins against top human players in [go](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/45/in-2016-will-an-ai-player-beat-a-professionally-ranked-human-in-the-ancient-game-of-go/), [chess](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_Blue_(chess_computer)), [poker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pluribus_(poker_bot)), and [DOTA](https://openai.com/projects/five/). AI development is continuing in other games: [learning montezuma's revenge from scratch](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5460/ai-rapidly-learning-to-play-a-simple-game/), [playing association football against professional players](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football), and [beating top humans in StarCraft 2](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3272/date-ai-defeats-top-10-starcraft-2-players/). Will AI ever beat humans in Poohsticks?\n\n[Poohsticks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poohsticks) is a simple game originally described by A.A. Milne in *The House At Pooh Corner*: any number of players meet on a bridge spanning a river, grab an object (such as a stick), and drop them on the river. the first stick to cross the other end of the bridge is the winner.\n\nThe World Poohsticks Championships has been held since 1984, currently managed by the Rotory Club of Oxford Spires. It may be the largest Poohsticks competition of any kind. The 2020 and 2021 championships were cancelled due to the COVID pandemic.\n\nCritics claim that Poohsticks is only a game of luck, but [Dr Rhys Morgan, Director of Engineering and Education at the Royal Academy of Engineering](https://inews.co.uk/inews-lifestyle/people/poohsticks-why-you-should-play-winnie-the-pooh-game-93361) believes there is a strategy in selecting your stick: an ideal stick should have the right cross-sectional area, buoyancy, and a surface with high drag.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date of a contest in which an AI defeats a large pool of competitive human players in poohsticks. The AI may be an AI/robotics system, or a human with all strategic decisions chosen by the AI. Metaculus admins may, at their discretion, include contests other than The World Poohsticks Championships of Oxfordshire, England for this question", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "2056", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Which Artemis Moon Mission landing system will first land a person on the moon with a 2.952 chance?", "desc": "", "resc": "At the end of April, NASA [announced](https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-names-companies-to-develop-human-landers-for-artemis-moon-missions) the selection of three private companies to develop a lunar lander:\n\n> NASA has selected three U.S. companies to design and develop human landing systems (HLS) for the agency's Artemis program, one of which will land the first woman and next man on the surface of the Moon by 2024.\n\nThe three companies are:\n\n1. Blue Origin \n2. Dynetics\n3. SpaceX\n\n\nThis question asks: **Which of these three companies will be first in developing a lunar landing system that successfully lands a person on the moon?**\n\n---\n\nThis question will resolve to precisely 1,2 or 3 when a lander build by the respective team successfully lands a living human on the moon. In the case that none of the 3 successfully lands a living human on the moon before January 1, 2030, the question will resolve to a value of 0.\n\nIf two of the teams merge or NASA selects a different company to develop a lunar lander, the question will resolve ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2.952", "median": "2.980", "upper_75": "2.991", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will defeat top human players in Poohsticks by 2028?", "desc": "In the past few decades, AIs have achieved impressive wins against top human players in [go](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/45/in-2016-will-an-ai-player-beat-a-professionally-ranked-human-in-the-ancient-game-of-go/), [chess](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_Blue_(chess_computer)), [poker](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pluribus_(poker_bot)), and [DOTA](https://openai.com/projects/five/). AI development is continuing in other games: [learning montezuma's revenge from scratch](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5460/ai-rapidly-learning-to-play-a-simple-game/), [playing association football against professional players](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football), and [beating top humans in StarCraft 2](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3272/date-ai-defeats-top-10-starcraft-2-players/). Will AI ever beat humans in Poohsticks?\n\n[Poohsticks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poohsticks) is a simple game originally described by A.A. Milne in *The House At Pooh Corner*: any number of players meet on a bridge spanning a river, grab an object (such as a stick), and drop them on the river. the first stick to cross the other end of the bridge is the winner.\n\nThe World Poohsticks Championships has been held since 1984, currently managed by the Rotory Club of Oxford Spires. It may be the largest Poohsticks competition of any kind. The 2020 and 2021 championships were cancelled due to the COVID pandemic.\n\nCritics claim that Poohsticks is only a game of luck, but [Dr Rhys Morgan, Director of Engineering and Education at the Royal Academy of Engineering](https://inews.co.uk/inews-lifestyle/people/poohsticks-why-you-should-play-winnie-the-pooh-game-93361) believes there is a strategy in selecting your stick: an ideal stick should have the right cross-sectional area, buoyancy, and a surface with high drag.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date of a contest in which an AI defeats a large pool of competitive human players in poohsticks. The AI may be an AI/robotics system, or a human with all strategic decisions chosen by the AI. Metaculus admins may, at their discretion, include contests other than The World Poohsticks Championships of Oxfordshire, England for this question", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "2056", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How much will GiveWell estimate as the cost equivalent to saving a life at the end of 2031, given that the cost of saving a life is 882?", "desc": "", "resc": "[GiveWell](https://www.givewell.org/) is a charity evaluator that recommends a shortlist of charities in the field of global development that have the greatest impact per marginal donation. Towards this end, they try to quantify the effects of different interventions by estimating a \"cost per life saved\" metric to compare them on.\n\nWhile they warn against taking [these cost-effectiveness estimates literally](https://blog.givewell.org/2017/06/01/how-givewell-uses-cost-effectiveness-analyses/), these estimates do give a guideline to which interventions are most effective and a rough idea of how cost-effective we should expect interventions to be.\n\nOver time, these estimates change; they might update upwards if all the most cost-effective interventions are fully funded by philanthropists or if they overestimated the cost-effectiveness of the top intervention, and they might update downwards if more promising interventions are found or if an existing intervention has more benefits than previously expected.\n\n**How much will it cost to get an outcome as good as averting the death of an individual under 5, according to GiveWell's guess, at the end of 2031, in 2015 USD?**\n\nThis question will resolve as the lowest value for the field \"cost per outcome as good as: averting the death of an individual under 5\" in the latest publicly available version of [Givewell's cost-effectiveness analysis spreadsheet](https://www.givewell.org/how-we-work/our-criteria/cost-effectiveness/cost-effectiveness-models) using the default values. These values are given after [accounting for expected leverage and funging](https://blog.givewell.org/2018/02/13/revisiting-leverage/).\n\nIf GiveWell no longer reports a cost per life-saved equivalent by 2031, a best effort should be made to derive an effective cost per life-saved equivalent by applying GiveWell's [2019 methodology](https://www.givewell.org/how-we-work/our-criteria/cost-effectiveness/cost-effectiveness-models/changelog-2019) to its 2031 cost-effectiveness model. If there is no unambiguous way to do this, the question resolves as ambiguous.\n\nIf GiveWell substantially changes how it picks top charities such that they are not comparable to the 2019 picks—for example, if GiveWell chooses existential risk organzations as its top charities—the question resolves as ambiguous. \n\nA similar question for 2021 was asked [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2776/how-much-will-givewell-guess-it-will-cost-to-get-an-outcome-as-good-as-saving-a-life-at-the-end-of-2021/), it is still open as of this question's writing.\n\nSimilar questions asked for previous years would have resolved at (all in 2015 prices):\n\n- 2016: $890\n- 2017: $823\n- 2018: $617\n- 2019: $592", "lower_25": "271", "median": "480", "upper_75": "882", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Which Artemis Moon Mission landing system will first land a person on the moon with a 2.952 chance?", "desc": "", "resc": "At the end of April, NASA [announced](https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-names-companies-to-develop-human-landers-for-artemis-moon-missions) the selection of three private companies to develop a lunar lander:\n\n> NASA has selected three U.S. companies to design and develop human landing systems (HLS) for the agency's Artemis program, one of which will land the first woman and next man on the surface of the Moon by 2024.\n\nThe three companies are:\n\n1. Blue Origin \n2. Dynetics\n3. SpaceX\n\n\nThis question asks: **Which of these three companies will be first in developing a lunar landing system that successfully lands a person on the moon?**\n\n---\n\nThis question will resolve to precisely 1,2 or 3 when a lander build by the respective team successfully lands a living human on the moon. In the case that none of the 3 successfully lands a living human on the moon before January 1, 2030, the question will resolve to a value of 0.\n\nIf two of the teams merge or NASA selects a different company to develop a lunar lander, the question will resolve ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2.952", "median": "2.980", "upper_75": "2.991", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that electric cars will constitute over 5% of the Japanese passenger car fleet by Dec 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "Japan is one of the largest electric vehicle markets in the world, behind only [China, the USA, and Norway](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric_car_use_by_country#Statistics) in total stock, as well as being the origin country of the Toyota Prius, the first [mass-produced hybrid-electric vehicle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hybrid_electric_vehicle#Modern_hybrids). According to [Statista](https://www.statista.com/statistics/711994/japan-electric-car-market-share/), in 2018, 1.13% of motor vehicles in Japan were electric cars.\n\n**When will electric cars constitute over 5% of the cars on the roads in Japan?**\n\nThe date is resolved by the earliest credible report in a respectable publication that provides statistics from which it follows that the number of electric cars on Japanese roads is over 5% of the total number of passenger cars.\n\nFor the purpose of this question, an electric car is any vehicle which is classified as a \"passenger car\", and whose sole energy input is electrical energy, delivered either by plugging it into an electrical energy source or replacing an electrical battery (including a fuel cell), or similar means. Hybrid vehicles that have both an electric and any other non-electric (gasoline, diesel, etc.) engine do not count as electric cars.", "lower_25": "Feb 2025", "median": "Oct 2026", "upper_75": "Dec 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Democracy Index of the United States will be 7.88 in 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Democracy Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index) is\n\n> an index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), a UK-based company. It intends to measure the state of democracy in 167 countries, of which 166 are sovereign states and 164 are UN member states.\n\nIt ranges from 0 - 10 for countries, where 0 theoretically represents an autocracy with no democratic freedoms, and 10 represents a perfect democracy. There are also four categories a nation may be placed under depending on its score: authoritarian regime (0-4), hybrid regime (4-6), flawed democracy (6-8), and full democracy (8-10).\n\nThe index for 2019 can be viewed [here](http://www.eiu.com/public/thankyou_download.aspx?activity=download&campaignid=democracyindex2019). As of the 2019 report, the United States had an overall score of 7.96, making it a flawed democracy.\n\nWhat will that number be in the 2040 report?\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously if the report is discontinued. It also resolves ambiguous if the index is judged by Metaculus\\* to have changed too much. If the index merely changes scale, the eventual result will be rescaled to the current range (0-10).\n\n\\* \"Metaculus\" here means \"Metaculus administrators (who are the only ones who can resolve a question), aided by moderators and by helpful users in the comments section\".", "lower_25": "6.58", "median": "7.34", "upper_75": "7.88", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that electric cars will constitute over 5% of the Japanese passenger car fleet by Dec 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "Japan is one of the largest electric vehicle markets in the world, behind only [China, the USA, and Norway](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric_car_use_by_country#Statistics) in total stock, as well as being the origin country of the Toyota Prius, the first [mass-produced hybrid-electric vehicle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hybrid_electric_vehicle#Modern_hybrids). According to [Statista](https://www.statista.com/statistics/711994/japan-electric-car-market-share/), in 2018, 1.13% of motor vehicles in Japan were electric cars.\n\n**When will electric cars constitute over 5% of the cars on the roads in Japan?**\n\nThe date is resolved by the earliest credible report in a respectable publication that provides statistics from which it follows that the number of electric cars on Japanese roads is over 5% of the total number of passenger cars.\n\nFor the purpose of this question, an electric car is any vehicle which is classified as a \"passenger car\", and whose sole energy input is electrical energy, delivered either by plugging it into an electrical energy source or replacing an electrical battery (including a fuel cell), or similar means. Hybrid vehicles that have both an electric and any other non-electric (gasoline, diesel, etc.) engine do not count as electric cars.", "lower_25": "Feb 2025", "median": "Oct 2026", "upper_75": "Dec 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Democracy Index of the United States will be 7.88 in 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Democracy Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index) is\n\n> an index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), a UK-based company. It intends to measure the state of democracy in 167 countries, of which 166 are sovereign states and 164 are UN member states.\n\nIt ranges from 0 - 10 for countries, where 0 theoretically represents an autocracy with no democratic freedoms, and 10 represents a perfect democracy. There are also four categories a nation may be placed under depending on its score: authoritarian regime (0-4), hybrid regime (4-6), flawed democracy (6-8), and full democracy (8-10).\n\nThe index for 2019 can be viewed [here](http://www.eiu.com/public/thankyou_download.aspx?activity=download&campaignid=democracyindex2019). As of the 2019 report, the United States had an overall score of 7.96, making it a flawed democracy.\n\nWhat will that number be in the 2040 report?\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously if the report is discontinued. It also resolves ambiguous if the index is judged by Metaculus\\* to have changed too much. If the index merely changes scale, the eventual result will be rescaled to the current range (0-10).\n\n\\* \"Metaculus\" here means \"Metaculus administrators (who are the only ones who can resolve a question), aided by moderators and by helpful users in the comments section\".", "lower_25": "6.58", "median": "7.34", "upper_75": "7.88", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Democracy Index of the United States will be 7.88 in 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Democracy Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index) is\n\n> an index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), a UK-based company. It intends to measure the state of democracy in 167 countries, of which 166 are sovereign states and 164 are UN member states.\n\nIt ranges from 0 - 10 for countries, where 0 theoretically represents an autocracy with no democratic freedoms, and 10 represents a perfect democracy. There are also four categories a nation may be placed under depending on its score: authoritarian regime (0-4), hybrid regime (4-6), flawed democracy (6-8), and full democracy (8-10).\n\nThe index for 2019 can be viewed [here](http://www.eiu.com/public/thankyou_download.aspx?activity=download&campaignid=democracyindex2019). As of the 2019 report, the United States had an overall score of 7.96, making it a flawed democracy.\n\nWhat will that number be in the 2040 report?\n\nThis question resolves ambiguously if the report is discontinued. It also resolves ambiguous if the index is judged by Metaculus\\* to have changed too much. If the index merely changes scale, the eventual result will be rescaled to the current range (0-10).\n\n\\* \"Metaculus\" here means \"Metaculus administrators (who are the only ones who can resolve a question), aided by moderators and by helpful users in the comments section\".", "lower_25": "6.58", "median": "7.34", "upper_75": "7.88", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How much will GiveWell estimate as the cost equivalent to saving a life at the end of 2031, given that the cost of saving a life is 882?", "desc": "", "resc": "[GiveWell](https://www.givewell.org/) is a charity evaluator that recommends a shortlist of charities in the field of global development that have the greatest impact per marginal donation. Towards this end, they try to quantify the effects of different interventions by estimating a \"cost per life saved\" metric to compare them on.\n\nWhile they warn against taking [these cost-effectiveness estimates literally](https://blog.givewell.org/2017/06/01/how-givewell-uses-cost-effectiveness-analyses/), these estimates do give a guideline to which interventions are most effective and a rough idea of how cost-effective we should expect interventions to be.\n\nOver time, these estimates change; they might update upwards if all the most cost-effective interventions are fully funded by philanthropists or if they overestimated the cost-effectiveness of the top intervention, and they might update downwards if more promising interventions are found or if an existing intervention has more benefits than previously expected.\n\n**How much will it cost to get an outcome as good as averting the death of an individual under 5, according to GiveWell's guess, at the end of 2031, in 2015 USD?**\n\nThis question will resolve as the lowest value for the field \"cost per outcome as good as: averting the death of an individual under 5\" in the latest publicly available version of [Givewell's cost-effectiveness analysis spreadsheet](https://www.givewell.org/how-we-work/our-criteria/cost-effectiveness/cost-effectiveness-models) using the default values. These values are given after [accounting for expected leverage and funging](https://blog.givewell.org/2018/02/13/revisiting-leverage/).\n\nIf GiveWell no longer reports a cost per life-saved equivalent by 2031, a best effort should be made to derive an effective cost per life-saved equivalent by applying GiveWell's [2019 methodology](https://www.givewell.org/how-we-work/our-criteria/cost-effectiveness/cost-effectiveness-models/changelog-2019) to its 2031 cost-effectiveness model. If there is no unambiguous way to do this, the question resolves as ambiguous.\n\nIf GiveWell substantially changes how it picks top charities such that they are not comparable to the 2019 picks—for example, if GiveWell chooses existential risk organzations as its top charities—the question resolves as ambiguous. \n\nA similar question for 2021 was asked [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2776/how-much-will-givewell-guess-it-will-cost-to-get-an-outcome-as-good-as-saving-a-life-at-the-end-of-2021/), it is still open as of this question's writing.\n\nSimilar questions asked for previous years would have resolved at (all in 2015 prices):\n\n- 2016: $890\n- 2017: $823\n- 2018: $617\n- 2019: $592", "lower_25": "271", "median": "480", "upper_75": "882", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How much will GiveWell estimate as the cost equivalent to saving a life at the end of 2031, given that the cost of saving a life is 882?", "desc": "", "resc": "[GiveWell](https://www.givewell.org/) is a charity evaluator that recommends a shortlist of charities in the field of global development that have the greatest impact per marginal donation. Towards this end, they try to quantify the effects of different interventions by estimating a \"cost per life saved\" metric to compare them on.\n\nWhile they warn against taking [these cost-effectiveness estimates literally](https://blog.givewell.org/2017/06/01/how-givewell-uses-cost-effectiveness-analyses/), these estimates do give a guideline to which interventions are most effective and a rough idea of how cost-effective we should expect interventions to be.\n\nOver time, these estimates change; they might update upwards if all the most cost-effective interventions are fully funded by philanthropists or if they overestimated the cost-effectiveness of the top intervention, and they might update downwards if more promising interventions are found or if an existing intervention has more benefits than previously expected.\n\n**How much will it cost to get an outcome as good as averting the death of an individual under 5, according to GiveWell's guess, at the end of 2031, in 2015 USD?**\n\nThis question will resolve as the lowest value for the field \"cost per outcome as good as: averting the death of an individual under 5\" in the latest publicly available version of [Givewell's cost-effectiveness analysis spreadsheet](https://www.givewell.org/how-we-work/our-criteria/cost-effectiveness/cost-effectiveness-models) using the default values. These values are given after [accounting for expected leverage and funging](https://blog.givewell.org/2018/02/13/revisiting-leverage/).\n\nIf GiveWell no longer reports a cost per life-saved equivalent by 2031, a best effort should be made to derive an effective cost per life-saved equivalent by applying GiveWell's [2019 methodology](https://www.givewell.org/how-we-work/our-criteria/cost-effectiveness/cost-effectiveness-models/changelog-2019) to its 2031 cost-effectiveness model. If there is no unambiguous way to do this, the question resolves as ambiguous.\n\nIf GiveWell substantially changes how it picks top charities such that they are not comparable to the 2019 picks—for example, if GiveWell chooses existential risk organzations as its top charities—the question resolves as ambiguous. \n\nA similar question for 2021 was asked [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2776/how-much-will-givewell-guess-it-will-cost-to-get-an-outcome-as-good-as-saving-a-life-at-the-end-of-2021/), it is still open as of this question's writing.\n\nSimilar questions asked for previous years would have resolved at (all in 2015 prices):\n\n- 2016: $890\n- 2017: $823\n- 2018: $617\n- 2019: $592", "lower_25": "271", "median": "480", "upper_75": "882", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US national debt will reach $50 trillion by Jul 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "The national debt of the United States is the debt, or unpaid borrowed funds, carried by the federal government of the United States, which is measured as the face value of the currently outstanding Treasury securities that have been issued by the Treasury and other federal government agencies.\n\n[As of May 5 2020, debt held by the public was $19.149 trillion and intragovernmental holdings were $5.909 trillion, for a total or \"National Debt\" of $25.057 trillion.](https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/pd_debttothepenny.htm)\n\n[You can view a live National Debt Clock here.](https://www.usdebtclock.org/)\n\nThis question asks: **When will the United States national debt reach $50 trillion nominal dollars?**\n\nResolution should cite figures from the US Treasury or a US federal government agency responsible for managing the national debt or producing economic statistics.", "lower_25": "Dec 2027", "median": "Jan 2030", "upper_75": "Jul 2032", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US national debt will reach $50 trillion by Jul 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "The national debt of the United States is the debt, or unpaid borrowed funds, carried by the federal government of the United States, which is measured as the face value of the currently outstanding Treasury securities that have been issued by the Treasury and other federal government agencies.\n\n[As of May 5 2020, debt held by the public was $19.149 trillion and intragovernmental holdings were $5.909 trillion, for a total or \"National Debt\" of $25.057 trillion.](https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/pd_debttothepenny.htm)\n\n[You can view a live National Debt Clock here.](https://www.usdebtclock.org/)\n\nThis question asks: **When will the United States national debt reach $50 trillion nominal dollars?**\n\nResolution should cite figures from the US Treasury or a US federal government agency responsible for managing the national debt or producing economic statistics.", "lower_25": "Dec 2027", "median": "Jan 2030", "upper_75": "Jul 2032", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the lowest cost per kilogram, in US dollars, to deliver a payload to LEO or beyond before 2025 will be 1.42k?", "desc": "", "resc": "Traditionally, access to space has been extremely expensive. However, prices continue to fall with each passing decade as new technologies are developed and the sector becomes more commercialised.\n\n[SpaceX](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX), for example, has demonstrated the potential of reusable rockets. Other advances in the future may include lighter materials, the use of inflatable modules, new fuel types, space planes, and more efficient engines. More speculatively, it may eventually be possible to deliver payloads to orbit with more exotic delivery methods such as space elevators or other non-rocket space launch systems.\n\nAs of 2020, [although the cost to launch a payload to LEO has dropped considerably in recent decades, spaceflight remains a fairly costly endeavour](https://www.futuretimeline.net/data-trends/6.htm). For example, a flight to LEO on a Falcon 9 rocket with a reused first stage costs [about $50 million](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_9) for a 15,600kg maximum reusable payload; meaning the price per kilo to LEO is about $3,205. \n\nHowever, there is optimism that a significant reduction in cost to LEO could be achieved in the near future. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk claims that the company's Starship and Super Heavy launch system, currently in development, could eventually achieve a cost per kilogram to LEO of as little as $10: \n\n>[Starship + Super Heavy propellant mass is 4800 tons (78% O2 & 22% CH4). I think we can get propellant cost down to ~$100/ton in volume, so ~$500k/flight. With high flight rate, probably below $1.5M fully burdened cost for 150 tons to orbit or ~$10/kg.](https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1258580078218412033)\n\n***Before 1 January 2025, what will be the lowest cost, in inflation-adjusted dollars, to deliver a kilogram of mass to low Earth orbit (or beyond; suborbital flights are excluded) using any system that has actually completed at least one successful delivery at the stated price?***\n\nInflation adjustment should be completed using a consumer price index method, with January 2020 taken as the reference month.", "lower_25": "311", "median": "720", "upper_75": "1.42k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.35B people will use a newly discovered drug for non-medical purposes between 2021 and 2070?", "desc": "", "resc": "[World drug report](https://wdr.unodc.org/wdr2019/prelaunch/WDR19_Booklet_2_DRUG_DEMAND.pdf) estimates 188M users of cannabis and 21M users of ecstasy worldwide in 2017. It also mentions that 892 new psychoactive substances were reported to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime early warning advisory in 2005-2018 period, however, none of them lead in worldwide usage statistics.\n\nSuppose some chemical compound (e.g. newly synthesized drug) is first reported to be non-medically (e.g. recreational) consumed by humans after 2021 inclusively.\n\n**What is the estimated worldwide number of users of any such drug at any year between 2021 and 2070 (inclusively)?**\n\n- Drugs qualify only if the first reports of non-medical (e.g. recreational) consumption emerges after 2020 \n\n- Non-medical consumption here includes a wide range of use-cases including recreation and using drugs for physical, cognitive, emotional effects, but does not include usage primarily for treating/preventing diseases or aging", "lower_25": "7.62M", "median": "396M", "upper_75": "4.35B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US national debt will reach $50 trillion by Jul 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "The national debt of the United States is the debt, or unpaid borrowed funds, carried by the federal government of the United States, which is measured as the face value of the currently outstanding Treasury securities that have been issued by the Treasury and other federal government agencies.\n\n[As of May 5 2020, debt held by the public was $19.149 trillion and intragovernmental holdings were $5.909 trillion, for a total or \"National Debt\" of $25.057 trillion.](https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/pd_debttothepenny.htm)\n\n[You can view a live National Debt Clock here.](https://www.usdebtclock.org/)\n\nThis question asks: **When will the United States national debt reach $50 trillion nominal dollars?**\n\nResolution should cite figures from the US Treasury or a US federal government agency responsible for managing the national debt or producing economic statistics.", "lower_25": "Dec 2027", "median": "Jan 2030", "upper_75": "Jul 2032", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the lowest cost per kilogram, in US dollars, to deliver a payload to LEO or beyond before 2025 will be 1.42k?", "desc": "", "resc": "Traditionally, access to space has been extremely expensive. However, prices continue to fall with each passing decade as new technologies are developed and the sector becomes more commercialised.\n\n[SpaceX](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX), for example, has demonstrated the potential of reusable rockets. Other advances in the future may include lighter materials, the use of inflatable modules, new fuel types, space planes, and more efficient engines. More speculatively, it may eventually be possible to deliver payloads to orbit with more exotic delivery methods such as space elevators or other non-rocket space launch systems.\n\nAs of 2020, [although the cost to launch a payload to LEO has dropped considerably in recent decades, spaceflight remains a fairly costly endeavour](https://www.futuretimeline.net/data-trends/6.htm). For example, a flight to LEO on a Falcon 9 rocket with a reused first stage costs [about $50 million](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_9) for a 15,600kg maximum reusable payload; meaning the price per kilo to LEO is about $3,205. \n\nHowever, there is optimism that a significant reduction in cost to LEO could be achieved in the near future. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk claims that the company's Starship and Super Heavy launch system, currently in development, could eventually achieve a cost per kilogram to LEO of as little as $10: \n\n>[Starship + Super Heavy propellant mass is 4800 tons (78% O2 & 22% CH4). I think we can get propellant cost down to ~$100/ton in volume, so ~$500k/flight. With high flight rate, probably below $1.5M fully burdened cost for 150 tons to orbit or ~$10/kg.](https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1258580078218412033)\n\n***Before 1 January 2025, what will be the lowest cost, in inflation-adjusted dollars, to deliver a kilogram of mass to low Earth orbit (or beyond; suborbital flights are excluded) using any system that has actually completed at least one successful delivery at the stated price?***\n\nInflation adjustment should be completed using a consumer price index method, with January 2020 taken as the reference month.", "lower_25": "311", "median": "720", "upper_75": "1.42k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that North Korea will become a democracy by 2108?", "desc": "", "resc": "North Korea is known to the broader international community as being a [Hermit Kingdom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermit_kingdom). A 2014 UN inquiry into human rights in North Korea has [stated](https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14255&LangID=E), \"the gravity, scale and nature of [their human rights violations] reveal a state that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world.\" The ultimate source of these allegations derives from their highly authoritarian government, currently under under the leadership of Kim Jong-un. \n\nNorth Korea is said to become a democracy if the [Democracy Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index) ranks them as 6.00 or above for some year. However, at the moment, they are ranked at 1.08, the lowest of any nation in the world.\n\nJanuary 1st of the year for which North Korea was ranked 6.00 or above will be the year of resolution. This question resolves ambiguously if the Democracy Index radically overhauls their methodology for ranking nations such that a rating of 6.00 no longer carries the same meaning as it did at the time when this question opened. It resolves > in the case where the Democracy Index does not rate North Korea at 6.00 or above before 2200.", "lower_25": "2046", "median": "2073", "upper_75": "2108", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the lowest cost per kilogram, in US dollars, to deliver a payload to LEO or beyond before 2025 will be 1.42k?", "desc": "", "resc": "Traditionally, access to space has been extremely expensive. However, prices continue to fall with each passing decade as new technologies are developed and the sector becomes more commercialised.\n\n[SpaceX](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX), for example, has demonstrated the potential of reusable rockets. Other advances in the future may include lighter materials, the use of inflatable modules, new fuel types, space planes, and more efficient engines. More speculatively, it may eventually be possible to deliver payloads to orbit with more exotic delivery methods such as space elevators or other non-rocket space launch systems.\n\nAs of 2020, [although the cost to launch a payload to LEO has dropped considerably in recent decades, spaceflight remains a fairly costly endeavour](https://www.futuretimeline.net/data-trends/6.htm). For example, a flight to LEO on a Falcon 9 rocket with a reused first stage costs [about $50 million](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falcon_9) for a 15,600kg maximum reusable payload; meaning the price per kilo to LEO is about $3,205. \n\nHowever, there is optimism that a significant reduction in cost to LEO could be achieved in the near future. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk claims that the company's Starship and Super Heavy launch system, currently in development, could eventually achieve a cost per kilogram to LEO of as little as $10: \n\n>[Starship + Super Heavy propellant mass is 4800 tons (78% O2 & 22% CH4). I think we can get propellant cost down to ~$100/ton in volume, so ~$500k/flight. With high flight rate, probably below $1.5M fully burdened cost for 150 tons to orbit or ~$10/kg.](https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1258580078218412033)\n\n***Before 1 January 2025, what will be the lowest cost, in inflation-adjusted dollars, to deliver a kilogram of mass to low Earth orbit (or beyond; suborbital flights are excluded) using any system that has actually completed at least one successful delivery at the stated price?***\n\nInflation adjustment should be completed using a consumer price index method, with January 2020 taken as the reference month.", "lower_25": "311", "median": "720", "upper_75": "1.42k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that North Korea will become a democracy by 2108?", "desc": "", "resc": "North Korea is known to the broader international community as being a [Hermit Kingdom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermit_kingdom). A 2014 UN inquiry into human rights in North Korea has [stated](https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14255&LangID=E), \"the gravity, scale and nature of [their human rights violations] reveal a state that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world.\" The ultimate source of these allegations derives from their highly authoritarian government, currently under under the leadership of Kim Jong-un. \n\nNorth Korea is said to become a democracy if the [Democracy Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index) ranks them as 6.00 or above for some year. However, at the moment, they are ranked at 1.08, the lowest of any nation in the world.\n\nJanuary 1st of the year for which North Korea was ranked 6.00 or above will be the year of resolution. This question resolves ambiguously if the Democracy Index radically overhauls their methodology for ranking nations such that a rating of 6.00 no longer carries the same meaning as it did at the time when this question opened. It resolves > in the case where the Democracy Index does not rate North Korea at 6.00 or above before 2200.", "lower_25": "2046", "median": "2073", "upper_75": "2108", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will rank 31.6 on the inequality adjusted human development index in 2035?", "desc": "The [inequality-adjusted human development index can be described as](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_inequality-adjusted_HDI), \"the level of human development when inequality is accounted for,\" whereas the Human Development Index itself, from which the IHDI is derived, is \"an index of potential human development (or the maximum IHDI that could be achieved if there were no inequality).\"\n\nWhile the US is currently ranked 15 on the human development index, [it's ranked 28](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_inequality-adjusted_HDI#List) on the inequality adjusted index.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the United States' rank in the inequality-adjusted human development index in 2035, according to the [United Nations Development Program](https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI).", "lower_25": "25.7", "median": "31.6", "upper_75": "37.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will rank 31.6 on the inequality adjusted human development index in 2035?", "desc": "The [inequality-adjusted human development index can be described as](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_inequality-adjusted_HDI), \"the level of human development when inequality is accounted for,\" whereas the Human Development Index itself, from which the IHDI is derived, is \"an index of potential human development (or the maximum IHDI that could be achieved if there were no inequality).\"\n\nWhile the US is currently ranked 15 on the human development index, [it's ranked 28](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_inequality-adjusted_HDI#List) on the inequality adjusted index.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the United States' rank in the inequality-adjusted human development index in 2035, according to the [United Nations Development Program](https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI).", "lower_25": "25.7", "median": "31.6", "upper_75": "37.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.35B people will use a newly discovered drug for non-medical purposes between 2021 and 2070?", "desc": "", "resc": "[World drug report](https://wdr.unodc.org/wdr2019/prelaunch/WDR19_Booklet_2_DRUG_DEMAND.pdf) estimates 188M users of cannabis and 21M users of ecstasy worldwide in 2017. It also mentions that 892 new psychoactive substances were reported to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime early warning advisory in 2005-2018 period, however, none of them lead in worldwide usage statistics.\n\nSuppose some chemical compound (e.g. newly synthesized drug) is first reported to be non-medically (e.g. recreational) consumed by humans after 2021 inclusively.\n\n**What is the estimated worldwide number of users of any such drug at any year between 2021 and 2070 (inclusively)?**\n\n- Drugs qualify only if the first reports of non-medical (e.g. recreational) consumption emerges after 2020 \n\n- Non-medical consumption here includes a wide range of use-cases including recreation and using drugs for physical, cognitive, emotional effects, but does not include usage primarily for treating/preventing diseases or aging", "lower_25": "7.62M", "median": "396M", "upper_75": "4.35B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that electric cars will constitute over 5% of the Japanese passenger car fleet by Dec 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "Japan is one of the largest electric vehicle markets in the world, behind only [China, the USA, and Norway](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric_car_use_by_country#Statistics) in total stock, as well as being the origin country of the Toyota Prius, the first [mass-produced hybrid-electric vehicle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hybrid_electric_vehicle#Modern_hybrids). According to [Statista](https://www.statista.com/statistics/711994/japan-electric-car-market-share/), in 2018, 1.13% of motor vehicles in Japan were electric cars.\n\n**When will electric cars constitute over 5% of the cars on the roads in Japan?**\n\nThe date is resolved by the earliest credible report in a respectable publication that provides statistics from which it follows that the number of electric cars on Japanese roads is over 5% of the total number of passenger cars.\n\nFor the purpose of this question, an electric car is any vehicle which is classified as a \"passenger car\", and whose sole energy input is electrical energy, delivered either by plugging it into an electrical energy source or replacing an electrical battery (including a fuel cell), or similar means. Hybrid vehicles that have both an electric and any other non-electric (gasoline, diesel, etc.) engine do not count as electric cars.", "lower_25": "Feb 2025", "median": "Oct 2026", "upper_75": "Dec 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will rank 31.6 on the inequality adjusted human development index in 2035?", "desc": "The [inequality-adjusted human development index can be described as](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_inequality-adjusted_HDI), \"the level of human development when inequality is accounted for,\" whereas the Human Development Index itself, from which the IHDI is derived, is \"an index of potential human development (or the maximum IHDI that could be achieved if there were no inequality).\"\n\nWhile the US is currently ranked 15 on the human development index, [it's ranked 28](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_inequality-adjusted_HDI#List) on the inequality adjusted index.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the United States' rank in the inequality-adjusted human development index in 2035, according to the [United Nations Development Program](https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI).", "lower_25": "25.7", "median": "31.6", "upper_75": "37.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next \"Great Power\" war will occur in 2038?", "desc": "A [great power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_power) is a nation generally considered to have large amounts of military might and influence. While there is no established definition, for the purpose of this article, a great power is one of the top 10 nations by military spending according to the most recent report released by the [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stockholm_International_Peace_Research_Institute) (see latest report [here](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/fs_2020_04_milex_0_0.pdf)). As of 2020, the great powers are therefore the United States, China, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan and South Korea. \n\nWhile great power wars have [declined greatly over time](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace), some have argued that we should assign considerable probability to the prospect in the coming decades. In his post [Big War Remains Possible](http://www.overcomingbias.com/2019/07/big-war-remains-possible.html) Robin Hanson writes\n\n> The world is vast, eighty years is a long time, and the number of possible global social & diplomatic scenarios over such period is vast. So it seems crazy to base predictions on future war rates on inside view calculations from particular current stances, deals, or inclinations. The raw historical record, and its large long-term fluctuations, should weigh heavily on our minds.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date after January 1, 2020 when at least 2 great powers are at war with each other.\n\nNations will be considered to be \"at war\" if any of the following are true:\n\n- One nation has formally declared war on another.\n\n- One nation is considered by the international community to be occupying territory claimed by the other AND there have been at least 250 casualties resulting from when the leaders of one nation ordered a strike on the other nation's military personnel.\n\n- Credible media sources consistently describe the relationship between the two nations as \"at war.\"\n\nFor the purpose of this question, a great power is defined as one of the top 10 nations by their absolute (not relative) amount of military spending according to the most recent report released by the [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stockholm_International_Peace_Research_Institute).\n\nIf this does not occur by December 29, 2199, this question will resolve as **>December 29, 2199**", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2064", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next \"Great Power\" war will occur in 2038?", "desc": "A [great power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_power) is a nation generally considered to have large amounts of military might and influence. While there is no established definition, for the purpose of this article, a great power is one of the top 10 nations by military spending according to the most recent report released by the [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stockholm_International_Peace_Research_Institute) (see latest report [here](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/fs_2020_04_milex_0_0.pdf)). As of 2020, the great powers are therefore the United States, China, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan and South Korea. \n\nWhile great power wars have [declined greatly over time](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace), some have argued that we should assign considerable probability to the prospect in the coming decades. In his post [Big War Remains Possible](http://www.overcomingbias.com/2019/07/big-war-remains-possible.html) Robin Hanson writes\n\n> The world is vast, eighty years is a long time, and the number of possible global social & diplomatic scenarios over such period is vast. So it seems crazy to base predictions on future war rates on inside view calculations from particular current stances, deals, or inclinations. The raw historical record, and its large long-term fluctuations, should weigh heavily on our minds.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date after January 1, 2020 when at least 2 great powers are at war with each other.\n\nNations will be considered to be \"at war\" if any of the following are true:\n\n- One nation has formally declared war on another.\n\n- One nation is considered by the international community to be occupying territory claimed by the other AND there have been at least 250 casualties resulting from when the leaders of one nation ordered a strike on the other nation's military personnel.\n\n- Credible media sources consistently describe the relationship between the two nations as \"at war.\"\n\nFor the purpose of this question, a great power is defined as one of the top 10 nations by their absolute (not relative) amount of military spending according to the most recent report released by the [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stockholm_International_Peace_Research_Institute).\n\nIf this does not occur by December 29, 2199, this question will resolve as **>December 29, 2199**", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2064", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will surpass the United States economically, militarily, and scientifically by 2198?", "desc": "", "resc": "At the start of the 21st century, the United States was widely considered to be the world's sole superpower. This is beginning to change, with the rapid rise of China.\n\nThe chosen metrics are,\n\n* [Nominal GDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)) per the International Monetary Fund (or another reliable organization, chosen by Metaculus administrators).\n\n* [Military expenditures](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures) per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (or another reliable organization, chosen by Metaculus administrators).\n\n* [The Nature Index](https://www.natureindex.com/annual-tables/2019/country/all). If this index is discontinued, then [International Science Ranking](https://www.scimagojr.com/countryrank.php) takes its place. If both are discontinued, then this question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThis question resolves January 1st on the year during which each published report listed demonstrates that the United States is behind China.", "lower_25": "2045", "median": "2064", "upper_75": "2198", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first 100 million digit prime number will be discovered by 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [largest known prime](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Largest_known_prime_number) is currently 24,862,048 digits in length. In 1961 the largest known prime was only 1,332 digits. When will a 100 million digit prime be discovered?\n\n*This question will resolve with the date of publication of the prime in question.*", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will surpass the United States economically, militarily, and scientifically by 2198?", "desc": "", "resc": "At the start of the 21st century, the United States was widely considered to be the world's sole superpower. This is beginning to change, with the rapid rise of China.\n\nThe chosen metrics are,\n\n* [Nominal GDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)) per the International Monetary Fund (or another reliable organization, chosen by Metaculus administrators).\n\n* [Military expenditures](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures) per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (or another reliable organization, chosen by Metaculus administrators).\n\n* [The Nature Index](https://www.natureindex.com/annual-tables/2019/country/all). If this index is discontinued, then [International Science Ranking](https://www.scimagojr.com/countryrank.php) takes its place. If both are discontinued, then this question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThis question resolves January 1st on the year during which each published report listed demonstrates that the United States is behind China.", "lower_25": "2045", "median": "2064", "upper_75": "2198", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global IPv4 traffic will account for less than 1% of total internet traffic by 2055?", "desc": "IPv4 was introduced in 1983 and now forms the basis for internet routing. It is a 32-bit addressing system so there are 2^32 or 4,294,967,296 addresses (some addresses are reserved so the usable number is slightly less). [The internet is running out of IPv4 addresses.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv4_address_exhaustion) IPv6 was drafted in 1998 and finally standardized in 2017. IPv6's address space is extended to 2^128 or 3.4 x 10^38. The internet is currently transitioning over to IPv6.\n\n[IPv6 traffic now accounts for over 30% of Google's user traffic.](https://www.google.com/intl/en/ipv6/statistics.html) [Akamai](https://www.akamai.com/us/en/why-akamai/dns-trends-and-traffic.jsp) lists IPv6 traffic at 17.79%.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when it is estimated that less than 1% of global internet traffic uses IPv4, by ratio of IPv4 transactions to total transactions (not bandwidth or other metrics). This question will resolve according to data from [Akamai](https://www.akamai.com/visualizations/state-of-the-internet-report/ipv6-adoption-visualization), or if they no longer publish this data, Metaculus Admins may choose another major content delivery network as the source at their discretion", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2044", "upper_75": "2055", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S. Private Sector Job Quality Index (JQI-1) will reach a value of 92.66 before 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "**[jobqualityindex.com](https://www.jobqualityindex.com/)**\n\nThe JQI is aimed at assessing the degree to which the number of jobs in the United States is weighted towards more desirable higher-wage/higher-hour jobs versus lower-wage/lower-hour jobs, which can serve as a proxy for the overall health of the U.S. jobs market, the national economy, and worldwide financial markets. The initial form of the index (JQI-1) covers only production and nonsupervisory workers. \n\nThe index divides all jobs into high and\nlow quality by calculating the mean weekly\nincome (hourly wages times by hours\nworked) and then calculates\nthe number of jobs that are above or\nbelow that mean. An index reading of 100\nwould indicate an even distribution \nbetween high and low quality jobs. Index value\nbelow 100 indicate a greater concentration in\nlower quality job positions (those below the mean). Index above 100 indicates greater concentration in high quality (above\nthe mean) job positions.\n\nConceptually:\n\n\\( JQI = 100 × \\frac{\\sum{HQ-jobs}}{\\sum{LQ-jobs}} \\) \n\nExact calculation is more complex. It's described in [JQI White Paper](https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/prosperousamerica/pages/5467/attachments/original/1573727821/U.S._Private_Sector_Job_Quailty_Index_White_Paper.pdf?1573727821).\n\nThe question asks what will be the highest U.S. Private Sector Job Quality Index (JQI-1) value before 2030? The last month included in the question is December 2029. \n\n\nThe initial high value is 79.11 from April 2020.", "lower_25": "85.19", "median": "88.54", "upper_75": "92.66", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first 100 million digit prime number will be discovered by 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [largest known prime](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Largest_known_prime_number) is currently 24,862,048 digits in length. In 1961 the largest known prime was only 1,332 digits. When will a 100 million digit prime be discovered?\n\n*This question will resolve with the date of publication of the prime in question.*", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global IPv4 traffic will account for less than 1% of total internet traffic by 2055?", "desc": "IPv4 was introduced in 1983 and now forms the basis for internet routing. It is a 32-bit addressing system so there are 2^32 or 4,294,967,296 addresses (some addresses are reserved so the usable number is slightly less). [The internet is running out of IPv4 addresses.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv4_address_exhaustion) IPv6 was drafted in 1998 and finally standardized in 2017. IPv6's address space is extended to 2^128 or 3.4 x 10^38. The internet is currently transitioning over to IPv6.\n\n[IPv6 traffic now accounts for over 30% of Google's user traffic.](https://www.google.com/intl/en/ipv6/statistics.html) [Akamai](https://www.akamai.com/us/en/why-akamai/dns-trends-and-traffic.jsp) lists IPv6 traffic at 17.79%.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when it is estimated that less than 1% of global internet traffic uses IPv4, by ratio of IPv4 transactions to total transactions (not bandwidth or other metrics). This question will resolve according to data from [Akamai](https://www.akamai.com/visualizations/state-of-the-internet-report/ipv6-adoption-visualization), or if they no longer publish this data, Metaculus Admins may choose another major content delivery network as the source at their discretion", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2044", "upper_75": "2055", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that North Korea will become a democracy by 2108?", "desc": "", "resc": "North Korea is known to the broader international community as being a [Hermit Kingdom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermit_kingdom). A 2014 UN inquiry into human rights in North Korea has [stated](https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14255&LangID=E), \"the gravity, scale and nature of [their human rights violations] reveal a state that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world.\" The ultimate source of these allegations derives from their highly authoritarian government, currently under under the leadership of Kim Jong-un. \n\nNorth Korea is said to become a democracy if the [Democracy Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index) ranks them as 6.00 or above for some year. However, at the moment, they are ranked at 1.08, the lowest of any nation in the world.\n\nJanuary 1st of the year for which North Korea was ranked 6.00 or above will be the year of resolution. This question resolves ambiguously if the Democracy Index radically overhauls their methodology for ranking nations such that a rating of 6.00 no longer carries the same meaning as it did at the time when this question opened. It resolves > in the case where the Democracy Index does not rate North Korea at 6.00 or above before 2200.", "lower_25": "2046", "median": "2073", "upper_75": "2108", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S. Private Sector Job Quality Index (JQI-1) will reach a value of 92.66 before 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "**[jobqualityindex.com](https://www.jobqualityindex.com/)**\n\nThe JQI is aimed at assessing the degree to which the number of jobs in the United States is weighted towards more desirable higher-wage/higher-hour jobs versus lower-wage/lower-hour jobs, which can serve as a proxy for the overall health of the U.S. jobs market, the national economy, and worldwide financial markets. The initial form of the index (JQI-1) covers only production and nonsupervisory workers. \n\nThe index divides all jobs into high and\nlow quality by calculating the mean weekly\nincome (hourly wages times by hours\nworked) and then calculates\nthe number of jobs that are above or\nbelow that mean. An index reading of 100\nwould indicate an even distribution \nbetween high and low quality jobs. Index value\nbelow 100 indicate a greater concentration in\nlower quality job positions (those below the mean). Index above 100 indicates greater concentration in high quality (above\nthe mean) job positions.\n\nConceptually:\n\n\\( JQI = 100 × \\frac{\\sum{HQ-jobs}}{\\sum{LQ-jobs}} \\) \n\nExact calculation is more complex. It's described in [JQI White Paper](https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/prosperousamerica/pages/5467/attachments/original/1573727821/U.S._Private_Sector_Job_Quailty_Index_White_Paper.pdf?1573727821).\n\nThe question asks what will be the highest U.S. Private Sector Job Quality Index (JQI-1) value before 2030? The last month included in the question is December 2029. \n\n\nThe initial high value is 79.11 from April 2020.", "lower_25": "85.19", "median": "88.54", "upper_75": "92.66", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will surpass the United States economically, militarily, and scientifically by 2198?", "desc": "", "resc": "At the start of the 21st century, the United States was widely considered to be the world's sole superpower. This is beginning to change, with the rapid rise of China.\n\nThe chosen metrics are,\n\n* [Nominal GDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)) per the International Monetary Fund (or another reliable organization, chosen by Metaculus administrators).\n\n* [Military expenditures](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures) per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (or another reliable organization, chosen by Metaculus administrators).\n\n* [The Nature Index](https://www.natureindex.com/annual-tables/2019/country/all). If this index is discontinued, then [International Science Ranking](https://www.scimagojr.com/countryrank.php) takes its place. If both are discontinued, then this question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThis question resolves January 1st on the year during which each published report listed demonstrates that the United States is behind China.", "lower_25": "2045", "median": "2064", "upper_75": "2198", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S. Private Sector Job Quality Index (JQI-1) will reach a value of 92.66 before 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "**[jobqualityindex.com](https://www.jobqualityindex.com/)**\n\nThe JQI is aimed at assessing the degree to which the number of jobs in the United States is weighted towards more desirable higher-wage/higher-hour jobs versus lower-wage/lower-hour jobs, which can serve as a proxy for the overall health of the U.S. jobs market, the national economy, and worldwide financial markets. The initial form of the index (JQI-1) covers only production and nonsupervisory workers. \n\nThe index divides all jobs into high and\nlow quality by calculating the mean weekly\nincome (hourly wages times by hours\nworked) and then calculates\nthe number of jobs that are above or\nbelow that mean. An index reading of 100\nwould indicate an even distribution \nbetween high and low quality jobs. Index value\nbelow 100 indicate a greater concentration in\nlower quality job positions (those below the mean). Index above 100 indicates greater concentration in high quality (above\nthe mean) job positions.\n\nConceptually:\n\n\\( JQI = 100 × \\frac{\\sum{HQ-jobs}}{\\sum{LQ-jobs}} \\) \n\nExact calculation is more complex. It's described in [JQI White Paper](https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/prosperousamerica/pages/5467/attachments/original/1573727821/U.S._Private_Sector_Job_Quailty_Index_White_Paper.pdf?1573727821).\n\nThe question asks what will be the highest U.S. Private Sector Job Quality Index (JQI-1) value before 2030? The last month included in the question is December 2029. \n\n\nThe initial high value is 79.11 from April 2020.", "lower_25": "85.19", "median": "88.54", "upper_75": "92.66", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next \"Great Power\" war will occur in 2038?", "desc": "A [great power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_power) is a nation generally considered to have large amounts of military might and influence. While there is no established definition, for the purpose of this article, a great power is one of the top 10 nations by military spending according to the most recent report released by the [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stockholm_International_Peace_Research_Institute) (see latest report [here](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/fs_2020_04_milex_0_0.pdf)). As of 2020, the great powers are therefore the United States, China, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan and South Korea. \n\nWhile great power wars have [declined greatly over time](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace), some have argued that we should assign considerable probability to the prospect in the coming decades. In his post [Big War Remains Possible](http://www.overcomingbias.com/2019/07/big-war-remains-possible.html) Robin Hanson writes\n\n> The world is vast, eighty years is a long time, and the number of possible global social & diplomatic scenarios over such period is vast. So it seems crazy to base predictions on future war rates on inside view calculations from particular current stances, deals, or inclinations. The raw historical record, and its large long-term fluctuations, should weigh heavily on our minds.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date after January 1, 2020 when at least 2 great powers are at war with each other.\n\nNations will be considered to be \"at war\" if any of the following are true:\n\n- One nation has formally declared war on another.\n\n- One nation is considered by the international community to be occupying territory claimed by the other AND there have been at least 250 casualties resulting from when the leaders of one nation ordered a strike on the other nation's military personnel.\n\n- Credible media sources consistently describe the relationship between the two nations as \"at war.\"\n\nFor the purpose of this question, a great power is defined as one of the top 10 nations by their absolute (not relative) amount of military spending according to the most recent report released by the [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stockholm_International_Peace_Research_Institute).\n\nIf this does not occur by December 29, 2199, this question will resolve as **>December 29, 2199**", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2064", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the federal minimum wage will be 7.56 at the end of 2024 if Joe Biden becomes president?", "desc": "", "resc": "Joe Biden claims he will increase [the federal minimum wage to $15/hr](https://joebiden.com/empowerworkers/), a figure notably promoted by the [Fight for $15](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fight_for_$15) movement, up from its current value of $7.25/hr.\n\nThe $15 minimum wage movement has seen some successes on the local level, with [six states](https://www.vox.com/2019/3/28/18285346/maryland-passes-15-minimum-wage) having laws that will phase in a $15 minimum wage. Such a move is backed by the rest of the Democratic Party: the [Raise the Wage Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/582/cosponsors?searchResultViewType=expanded&KWICView=false), which includes a $15 minimum wage, has 205 cosponsors in the House, all Democratic (and cleared the House in the 116th Congress).\n\n**If Biden is elected president in the 2020 election and takes office, will the federal minimum wage be at the end of 2024 in nominal US dollars per hour?**\n\nThe minimum wage will be decided by the [US Department of Labor](https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimumwage) website. This question is about the active minimum wage at the end of 2024, so if a bill is passed in 2024 that mandates a certain minimum wage in 2025, that will not be considered. If that website does not give information on the minimum wage (or lack thereof), this question will resolve based on credible media reports.\n\nIf Joe Biden is not elected or does not take office, this question resolves as ambiguous.\n\nIf there is no minimum wage, the minimum wage will be considered to be $0.", "lower_25": "7.24", "median": "7.56", "upper_75": "10.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the federal minimum wage will be 7.56 at the end of 2024 if Joe Biden becomes president?", "desc": "", "resc": "Joe Biden claims he will increase [the federal minimum wage to $15/hr](https://joebiden.com/empowerworkers/), a figure notably promoted by the [Fight for $15](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fight_for_$15) movement, up from its current value of $7.25/hr.\n\nThe $15 minimum wage movement has seen some successes on the local level, with [six states](https://www.vox.com/2019/3/28/18285346/maryland-passes-15-minimum-wage) having laws that will phase in a $15 minimum wage. Such a move is backed by the rest of the Democratic Party: the [Raise the Wage Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/582/cosponsors?searchResultViewType=expanded&KWICView=false), which includes a $15 minimum wage, has 205 cosponsors in the House, all Democratic (and cleared the House in the 116th Congress).\n\n**If Biden is elected president in the 2020 election and takes office, will the federal minimum wage be at the end of 2024 in nominal US dollars per hour?**\n\nThe minimum wage will be decided by the [US Department of Labor](https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimumwage) website. This question is about the active minimum wage at the end of 2024, so if a bill is passed in 2024 that mandates a certain minimum wage in 2025, that will not be considered. If that website does not give information on the minimum wage (or lack thereof), this question will resolve based on credible media reports.\n\nIf Joe Biden is not elected or does not take office, this question resolves as ambiguous.\n\nIf there is no minimum wage, the minimum wage will be considered to be $0.", "lower_25": "7.24", "median": "7.56", "upper_75": "10.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the federal minimum wage will be 7.56 at the end of 2024 if Joe Biden becomes president?", "desc": "", "resc": "Joe Biden claims he will increase [the federal minimum wage to $15/hr](https://joebiden.com/empowerworkers/), a figure notably promoted by the [Fight for $15](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fight_for_$15) movement, up from its current value of $7.25/hr.\n\nThe $15 minimum wage movement has seen some successes on the local level, with [six states](https://www.vox.com/2019/3/28/18285346/maryland-passes-15-minimum-wage) having laws that will phase in a $15 minimum wage. Such a move is backed by the rest of the Democratic Party: the [Raise the Wage Act](https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/582/cosponsors?searchResultViewType=expanded&KWICView=false), which includes a $15 minimum wage, has 205 cosponsors in the House, all Democratic (and cleared the House in the 116th Congress).\n\n**If Biden is elected president in the 2020 election and takes office, will the federal minimum wage be at the end of 2024 in nominal US dollars per hour?**\n\nThe minimum wage will be decided by the [US Department of Labor](https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimumwage) website. This question is about the active minimum wage at the end of 2024, so if a bill is passed in 2024 that mandates a certain minimum wage in 2025, that will not be considered. If that website does not give information on the minimum wage (or lack thereof), this question will resolve based on credible media reports.\n\nIf Joe Biden is not elected or does not take office, this question resolves as ambiguous.\n\nIf there is no minimum wage, the minimum wage will be considered to be $0.", "lower_25": "7.24", "median": "7.56", "upper_75": "10.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.35B people will use a newly discovered drug for non-medical purposes between 2021 and 2070?", "desc": "", "resc": "[World drug report](https://wdr.unodc.org/wdr2019/prelaunch/WDR19_Booklet_2_DRUG_DEMAND.pdf) estimates 188M users of cannabis and 21M users of ecstasy worldwide in 2017. It also mentions that 892 new psychoactive substances were reported to United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime early warning advisory in 2005-2018 period, however, none of them lead in worldwide usage statistics.\n\nSuppose some chemical compound (e.g. newly synthesized drug) is first reported to be non-medically (e.g. recreational) consumed by humans after 2021 inclusively.\n\n**What is the estimated worldwide number of users of any such drug at any year between 2021 and 2070 (inclusively)?**\n\n- Drugs qualify only if the first reports of non-medical (e.g. recreational) consumption emerges after 2020 \n\n- Non-medical consumption here includes a wide range of use-cases including recreation and using drugs for physical, cognitive, emotional effects, but does not include usage primarily for treating/preventing diseases or aging", "lower_25": "7.62M", "median": "396M", "upper_75": "4.35B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Australia will have no coal-fired power plants in its National Electricity Market by 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "Australia currently has 16 coal-fired power plants in its National Electricity Market (the NEM). The NEM is the country's largest electricity grid, covering six of eight states/territories, including the three most populous. There are also four coal-fired power plants in Western Australia, not part of the NEM. \n\nAbout two thirds of electricity in the NEM currently comes from coal-fired power plants. \n\nDates of note\n\n- For climate change reasons, some environmentalists say Australia should stop burning coal by 2030.\n\n- The coal-fired power plant with the latest scheduled closure is Loy Yang A, in 2048. \n\n- The newest coal-fired power plant, Kogan Creek, was built in 2007. An operating life of 50 years would put its closure at 2057 (although plants can be extended beyond a 50-year life). \n\n- This year, the federal government funded a feasibility study for a new coal-fired power plant.\n\n- The openCEM model of the NEM has some coal in 2050 in its base case, although in other scenarios coal exits the market. Brown coal in Victoria is particularly tenacious, however. \n\nResolution\n\nThe question resolves positively if either of the following:\n\n- No coal-fired power plant is connected to the NEM for period of at least two weeks\n\n- Coal provides less than 1% of NEM electricity generation over any 12 month period\n\nIn case NEM ceases to exist, the question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "2048", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global IPv4 traffic will account for less than 1% of total internet traffic by 2055?", "desc": "IPv4 was introduced in 1983 and now forms the basis for internet routing. It is a 32-bit addressing system so there are 2^32 or 4,294,967,296 addresses (some addresses are reserved so the usable number is slightly less). [The internet is running out of IPv4 addresses.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv4_address_exhaustion) IPv6 was drafted in 1998 and finally standardized in 2017. IPv6's address space is extended to 2^128 or 3.4 x 10^38. The internet is currently transitioning over to IPv6.\n\n[IPv6 traffic now accounts for over 30% of Google's user traffic.](https://www.google.com/intl/en/ipv6/statistics.html) [Akamai](https://www.akamai.com/us/en/why-akamai/dns-trends-and-traffic.jsp) lists IPv6 traffic at 17.79%.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when it is estimated that less than 1% of global internet traffic uses IPv4, by ratio of IPv4 transactions to total transactions (not bandwidth or other metrics). This question will resolve according to data from [Akamai](https://www.akamai.com/visualizations/state-of-the-internet-report/ipv6-adoption-visualization), or if they no longer publish this data, Metaculus Admins may choose another major content delivery network as the source at their discretion", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2044", "upper_75": "2055", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first 100 million digit prime number will be discovered by 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [largest known prime](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Largest_known_prime_number) is currently 24,862,048 digits in length. In 1961 the largest known prime was only 1,332 digits. When will a 100 million digit prime be discovered?\n\n*This question will resolve with the date of publication of the prime in question.*", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Australia will have no coal-fired power plants in its National Electricity Market by 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "Australia currently has 16 coal-fired power plants in its National Electricity Market (the NEM). The NEM is the country's largest electricity grid, covering six of eight states/territories, including the three most populous. There are also four coal-fired power plants in Western Australia, not part of the NEM. \n\nAbout two thirds of electricity in the NEM currently comes from coal-fired power plants. \n\nDates of note\n\n- For climate change reasons, some environmentalists say Australia should stop burning coal by 2030.\n\n- The coal-fired power plant with the latest scheduled closure is Loy Yang A, in 2048. \n\n- The newest coal-fired power plant, Kogan Creek, was built in 2007. An operating life of 50 years would put its closure at 2057 (although plants can be extended beyond a 50-year life). \n\n- This year, the federal government funded a feasibility study for a new coal-fired power plant.\n\n- The openCEM model of the NEM has some coal in 2050 in its base case, although in other scenarios coal exits the market. Brown coal in Victoria is particularly tenacious, however. \n\nResolution\n\nThe question resolves positively if either of the following:\n\n- No coal-fired power plant is connected to the NEM for period of at least two weeks\n\n- Coal provides less than 1% of NEM electricity generation over any 12 month period\n\nIn case NEM ceases to exist, the question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "2048", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 71.8 percentage of top colleges in the United States will not require the SAT or ACT for freshman admittance in 2030?", "desc": "On May 21, 2020, University of California (UC) president Janet Napolitano [proposed](https://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/regmeet/may20/b4.pdf) that the UC system phase out the requirement of the popular standardized tests, the [SAT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SAT) and the [ACT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ACT_(test)). Given that UC schools comprise [all five of the most applied to colleges](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/28/the-10-universities-that-receive-the-most-applications.html) in the United States, this move was seen by many as marking a transition in how college admission works in the United States.\n\nScott Aaronson [wrote](https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=4816) on his blog,\n\n> This is widely expected, probably correctly, to trigger a chain reaction, whereby one US university after the next will abandon standardized tests. As a result, admissions to the top US universities—and hence, most chances for social advancement in the US—will henceforth be based entirely on shifting and nebulous criteria that rich, well-connected kids and their parents spend most of their lives figuring out, rather than merely mostly based on such criteria.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentages of top colleges in the United States that do not require the SAT or ACT for future freshman admittance, according to the best estimates from the Metaculus community on January 1, 2030.\n\nDefine a top college in the United States as a university that ranks in the top 50 for national universities according to [the most recent ranking](https://www.usnews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities) by US News and World Report. A spreadsheet of the 2020 rankings can currently be found on [this page](http://andyreiter.com/datasets/). If US News and World Report ends their ranking system by 2030, then these rankings will take its place, in order of priority,\n\n* The Wall Street Journal/Times Higher Education College Rankings\n\n* Forbes college rankings\n\n* The Princeton Review Dream Colleges\n\nThe website PrepScholar [has cataloged](https://blog.prepscholar.com/the-complete-guide-to-sat-optional-colleges) which colleges have previously dropped the requirement to submit the SAT/ACT in their application. You can find the current universities in tabular format [here](https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/360031/PrepScholar%20Guide%20to%20Schools%20Not%20Requiring%20the%20SAT%202018.pdf). By joining these two tables, we can see that just two top colleges are testing-optional: the University of Chicago and Wake Forest University. Therefore, the fraction before the UC change was 4%. Since six UC schools on the list have now made the tests optional, the current fraction is 16%", "lower_25": "54.3", "median": "71.8", "upper_75": "91.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If the human population declines to fewer than 100 million, how many years would pass until the population is above 1 billion again?\n\nKeyword: 409\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the human population would decline to fewer than 100 million and take 25% of the time to reach above 1 billion again?", "desc": "For reasons why there might ever be fewer than 100M humans, see the [Metaculus Ragnarok series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ragnarok). An important question is, if most people die, whether humanity will recover, and how long it would take.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of years between the date when the total population of humans is less than 100 million, and the following date when the estimate is greater than 1 billion. The estimates of population will include all humans in the observable universe. If there is no population decline to 100 million or less between January 1, 2000 to January 20, 2345, this question will resolve as ambiguous. If the human race never rebounds (ie. goes extinct), this question resolves as >3000.\n\nFor this question, \"Humans\" are defined as creatures who at least one 2020 Metaculus user would judge are humans if they magically met them", "lower_25": "409", "median": "1.38k", "upper_75": "> 3k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest machine learning model trained before 2030 will have 30.5M parameters?", "desc": "I have already asked [whether there will be a machine learning model trained with 100 trillion parameters](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3656/will-a-100-trillion-parameter-deep-learning-model-be-trained-before-2026/) trained before 2026. We still have a way to go before reaching that milestone, but a day before writing this question, OpenAI published [a paper](https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.14165) describing GPT-3, a 175 billion parameter transformer. This model is over an order of magnitude larger than the previous largest models, which had [roughly 17 billion](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/blog/turing-nlg-a-17-billion-parameter-language-model-by-microsoft/) parameters.\n\nPhysical constraints will eventually slow progress, but things can still get interesting before then.", "resc": "This question resolves to the number of billions of parameters of the largest ML models ever trained as of Jan 1, 2030.\n\nI ask, before 2030, how many billions of parameters will the largest machine learning model trained have? Resolution is determined by some sort of reliable document, blog post, or paper, published anywhere on the internet. As of 2023, a great source is [this spreadsheet](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/u/2/d/1AAIebjNsnJj_uKALHbXNfn3_YsT6sHXtCU0q7OIPuc4/edit#gid=0).", "lower_25": "407k", "median": "3.10M", "upper_75": "30.5M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first commercial Hyperloop system will not begin operations before 2100?", "desc": "A [Hyperloop](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperloop) is a proposed mode of passenger and freight transportation; the name was first used to describe an open-source [vactrain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vactrain) design released by a joint team from Tesla and SpaceX in 2013.\n\nIn essence, a Hyperloop is a sealed tube or series of tubes with low air pressure through which a pod carrying passengers or cargo may travel substantially free of drag. The Hyperloop could potentially convey people or objects at airliner or supersonic speeds while being substantially more energy efficient than existing commercial airliners. \n\nThe [Hyperloop Alpha](https://www.tesla.com/sites/default/files/blog_images/hyperloop-alpha.pdf) concept was first published in August 2013, proposing and examining a route running from the Los Angeles region to the San Francisco Bay Area, roughly following the Interstate 5 corridor. The Hyperloop genesis paper conceived of a Hyperloop system that would propel passengers along the 350-mile (560 km) route at a speed of 760 mph (1,200 km/h), allowing for a travel time of 35 minutes, which is considerably faster than current rail or air travel times. Preliminary cost estimates for this LA–SF suggested route were included in the white paper—US$6 billion for a passenger-only version, and US$7.5 billion for a somewhat larger-diameter version transporting passengers and vehicles.\n\nIn the seven years since Hyperloop was proposed, [a number of startup companies have outlined plans to design, build and commercialize Hyperloop technologies.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperloop#Hyperloop_companies) Some of these companies, including Virgin Hyperloop One and Hyperloop Transportation Technologies, [are building test tracks and pods](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=luDqbIZGgQM), and [a number of interesting possible routes have been theorised](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oziSR8nOznA), but as of May 2020 there are no commercial Hyperloop tracks in operation.", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, a 'Hyperloop' is a transportation system designed for passenger or cargo transportation utilising a low-pressure tube or tunnel to reduce drag. Whether such a system is called a 'Hyperloop' or something else does not affect the resolution of this question.\n\nA 'commercial Hyperloop system' is a full-scale transportation system that functions to transport passengers or cargo on a commercial basis, where paying customers may purchase tickets or access passes to use the service. \n\nAdditionally, the system must possess the key characteristic of the Hyperloop concept: average speed substantially in excess of high-speed rail. *The average point-to-point speed of the pod must be at least 400 kilometers per hour to qualify, and the minimum point-to-point distance is 10 kilometers.*\n\nAmusement park rides or test tracks, paid or unpaid, do not count. Additionally, [pneumatic tube systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pneumatic_tube) that transport only very small objects like letters do not count.\n\n**This question resolves as the date on which the first paying customer using a qualifying Hyperloop system either completes their journey, or their cargo arrives at its destination.*", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2047", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 71.8 percentage of top colleges in the United States will not require the SAT or ACT for freshman admittance in 2030?", "desc": "On May 21, 2020, University of California (UC) president Janet Napolitano [proposed](https://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/regmeet/may20/b4.pdf) that the UC system phase out the requirement of the popular standardized tests, the [SAT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SAT) and the [ACT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ACT_(test)). Given that UC schools comprise [all five of the most applied to colleges](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/28/the-10-universities-that-receive-the-most-applications.html) in the United States, this move was seen by many as marking a transition in how college admission works in the United States.\n\nScott Aaronson [wrote](https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=4816) on his blog,\n\n> This is widely expected, probably correctly, to trigger a chain reaction, whereby one US university after the next will abandon standardized tests. As a result, admissions to the top US universities—and hence, most chances for social advancement in the US—will henceforth be based entirely on shifting and nebulous criteria that rich, well-connected kids and their parents spend most of their lives figuring out, rather than merely mostly based on such criteria.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentages of top colleges in the United States that do not require the SAT or ACT for future freshman admittance, according to the best estimates from the Metaculus community on January 1, 2030.\n\nDefine a top college in the United States as a university that ranks in the top 50 for national universities according to [the most recent ranking](https://www.usnews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities) by US News and World Report. A spreadsheet of the 2020 rankings can currently be found on [this page](http://andyreiter.com/datasets/). If US News and World Report ends their ranking system by 2030, then these rankings will take its place, in order of priority,\n\n* The Wall Street Journal/Times Higher Education College Rankings\n\n* Forbes college rankings\n\n* The Princeton Review Dream Colleges\n\nThe website PrepScholar [has cataloged](https://blog.prepscholar.com/the-complete-guide-to-sat-optional-colleges) which colleges have previously dropped the requirement to submit the SAT/ACT in their application. You can find the current universities in tabular format [here](https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/360031/PrepScholar%20Guide%20to%20Schools%20Not%20Requiring%20the%20SAT%202018.pdf). By joining these two tables, we can see that just two top colleges are testing-optional: the University of Chicago and Wake Forest University. Therefore, the fraction before the UC change was 4%. Since six UC schools on the list have now made the tests optional, the current fraction is 16%", "lower_25": "54.3", "median": "71.8", "upper_75": "91.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Australia will have no coal-fired power plants in its National Electricity Market by 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "Australia currently has 16 coal-fired power plants in its National Electricity Market (the NEM). The NEM is the country's largest electricity grid, covering six of eight states/territories, including the three most populous. There are also four coal-fired power plants in Western Australia, not part of the NEM. \n\nAbout two thirds of electricity in the NEM currently comes from coal-fired power plants. \n\nDates of note\n\n- For climate change reasons, some environmentalists say Australia should stop burning coal by 2030.\n\n- The coal-fired power plant with the latest scheduled closure is Loy Yang A, in 2048. \n\n- The newest coal-fired power plant, Kogan Creek, was built in 2007. An operating life of 50 years would put its closure at 2057 (although plants can be extended beyond a 50-year life). \n\n- This year, the federal government funded a feasibility study for a new coal-fired power plant.\n\n- The openCEM model of the NEM has some coal in 2050 in its base case, although in other scenarios coal exits the market. Brown coal in Victoria is particularly tenacious, however. \n\nResolution\n\nThe question resolves positively if either of the following:\n\n- No coal-fired power plant is connected to the NEM for period of at least two weeks\n\n- Coal provides less than 1% of NEM electricity generation over any 12 month period\n\nIn case NEM ceases to exist, the question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "2048", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest machine learning model trained before 2030 will have 30.5M parameters?", "desc": "I have already asked [whether there will be a machine learning model trained with 100 trillion parameters](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3656/will-a-100-trillion-parameter-deep-learning-model-be-trained-before-2026/) trained before 2026. We still have a way to go before reaching that milestone, but a day before writing this question, OpenAI published [a paper](https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.14165) describing GPT-3, a 175 billion parameter transformer. This model is over an order of magnitude larger than the previous largest models, which had [roughly 17 billion](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/blog/turing-nlg-a-17-billion-parameter-language-model-by-microsoft/) parameters.\n\nPhysical constraints will eventually slow progress, but things can still get interesting before then.", "resc": "This question resolves to the number of billions of parameters of the largest ML models ever trained as of Jan 1, 2030.\n\nI ask, before 2030, how many billions of parameters will the largest machine learning model trained have? Resolution is determined by some sort of reliable document, blog post, or paper, published anywhere on the internet. As of 2023, a great source is [this spreadsheet](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/u/2/d/1AAIebjNsnJj_uKALHbXNfn3_YsT6sHXtCU0q7OIPuc4/edit#gid=0).", "lower_25": "407k", "median": "3.10M", "upper_75": "30.5M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest machine learning model trained before 2030 will have 30.5M parameters?", "desc": "I have already asked [whether there will be a machine learning model trained with 100 trillion parameters](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3656/will-a-100-trillion-parameter-deep-learning-model-be-trained-before-2026/) trained before 2026. We still have a way to go before reaching that milestone, but a day before writing this question, OpenAI published [a paper](https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.14165) describing GPT-3, a 175 billion parameter transformer. This model is over an order of magnitude larger than the previous largest models, which had [roughly 17 billion](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/blog/turing-nlg-a-17-billion-parameter-language-model-by-microsoft/) parameters.\n\nPhysical constraints will eventually slow progress, but things can still get interesting before then.", "resc": "This question resolves to the number of billions of parameters of the largest ML models ever trained as of Jan 1, 2030.\n\nI ask, before 2030, how many billions of parameters will the largest machine learning model trained have? Resolution is determined by some sort of reliable document, blog post, or paper, published anywhere on the internet. As of 2023, a great source is [this spreadsheet](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/u/2/d/1AAIebjNsnJj_uKALHbXNfn3_YsT6sHXtCU0q7OIPuc4/edit#gid=0).", "lower_25": "407k", "median": "3.10M", "upper_75": "30.5M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first commercial Hyperloop system will not begin operations before 2100?", "desc": "A [Hyperloop](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperloop) is a proposed mode of passenger and freight transportation; the name was first used to describe an open-source [vactrain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vactrain) design released by a joint team from Tesla and SpaceX in 2013.\n\nIn essence, a Hyperloop is a sealed tube or series of tubes with low air pressure through which a pod carrying passengers or cargo may travel substantially free of drag. The Hyperloop could potentially convey people or objects at airliner or supersonic speeds while being substantially more energy efficient than existing commercial airliners. \n\nThe [Hyperloop Alpha](https://www.tesla.com/sites/default/files/blog_images/hyperloop-alpha.pdf) concept was first published in August 2013, proposing and examining a route running from the Los Angeles region to the San Francisco Bay Area, roughly following the Interstate 5 corridor. The Hyperloop genesis paper conceived of a Hyperloop system that would propel passengers along the 350-mile (560 km) route at a speed of 760 mph (1,200 km/h), allowing for a travel time of 35 minutes, which is considerably faster than current rail or air travel times. Preliminary cost estimates for this LA–SF suggested route were included in the white paper—US$6 billion for a passenger-only version, and US$7.5 billion for a somewhat larger-diameter version transporting passengers and vehicles.\n\nIn the seven years since Hyperloop was proposed, [a number of startup companies have outlined plans to design, build and commercialize Hyperloop technologies.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperloop#Hyperloop_companies) Some of these companies, including Virgin Hyperloop One and Hyperloop Transportation Technologies, [are building test tracks and pods](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=luDqbIZGgQM), and [a number of interesting possible routes have been theorised](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oziSR8nOznA), but as of May 2020 there are no commercial Hyperloop tracks in operation.", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, a 'Hyperloop' is a transportation system designed for passenger or cargo transportation utilising a low-pressure tube or tunnel to reduce drag. Whether such a system is called a 'Hyperloop' or something else does not affect the resolution of this question.\n\nA 'commercial Hyperloop system' is a full-scale transportation system that functions to transport passengers or cargo on a commercial basis, where paying customers may purchase tickets or access passes to use the service. \n\nAdditionally, the system must possess the key characteristic of the Hyperloop concept: average speed substantially in excess of high-speed rail. *The average point-to-point speed of the pod must be at least 400 kilometers per hour to qualify, and the minimum point-to-point distance is 10 kilometers.*\n\nAmusement park rides or test tracks, paid or unpaid, do not count. Additionally, [pneumatic tube systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pneumatic_tube) that transport only very small objects like letters do not count.\n\n**This question resolves as the date on which the first paying customer using a qualifying Hyperloop system either completes their journey, or their cargo arrives at its destination.*", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2047", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 71.8 percentage of top colleges in the United States will not require the SAT or ACT for freshman admittance in 2030?", "desc": "On May 21, 2020, University of California (UC) president Janet Napolitano [proposed](https://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/regmeet/may20/b4.pdf) that the UC system phase out the requirement of the popular standardized tests, the [SAT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SAT) and the [ACT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ACT_(test)). Given that UC schools comprise [all five of the most applied to colleges](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/28/the-10-universities-that-receive-the-most-applications.html) in the United States, this move was seen by many as marking a transition in how college admission works in the United States.\n\nScott Aaronson [wrote](https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=4816) on his blog,\n\n> This is widely expected, probably correctly, to trigger a chain reaction, whereby one US university after the next will abandon standardized tests. As a result, admissions to the top US universities—and hence, most chances for social advancement in the US—will henceforth be based entirely on shifting and nebulous criteria that rich, well-connected kids and their parents spend most of their lives figuring out, rather than merely mostly based on such criteria.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentages of top colleges in the United States that do not require the SAT or ACT for future freshman admittance, according to the best estimates from the Metaculus community on January 1, 2030.\n\nDefine a top college in the United States as a university that ranks in the top 50 for national universities according to [the most recent ranking](https://www.usnews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities) by US News and World Report. A spreadsheet of the 2020 rankings can currently be found on [this page](http://andyreiter.com/datasets/). If US News and World Report ends their ranking system by 2030, then these rankings will take its place, in order of priority,\n\n* The Wall Street Journal/Times Higher Education College Rankings\n\n* Forbes college rankings\n\n* The Princeton Review Dream Colleges\n\nThe website PrepScholar [has cataloged](https://blog.prepscholar.com/the-complete-guide-to-sat-optional-colleges) which colleges have previously dropped the requirement to submit the SAT/ACT in their application. You can find the current universities in tabular format [here](https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/360031/PrepScholar%20Guide%20to%20Schools%20Not%20Requiring%20the%20SAT%202018.pdf). By joining these two tables, we can see that just two top colleges are testing-optional: the University of Chicago and Wake Forest University. Therefore, the fraction before the UC change was 4%. Since six UC schools on the list have now made the tests optional, the current fraction is 16%", "lower_25": "54.3", "median": "71.8", "upper_75": "91.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a technology will replace screens by 2046?", "desc": "In 2017, the world spent $1,537 Billion on [cell phones](https://www.statista.com/statistics/263437/global-smartphone-sales-to-end-users-since-2007/), $105 Billion on [TVs](https://www.statista.com/statistics/461324/global-tv-market-sales/), $101 Billion on [Laptops and Tablets](https://fortunly.com/blog/lap-top-market-share/), and $27 Billion on [PC monitors and projectors](https://www.statista.com/outlook/15030300/100/pc-monitors-projectors/worldwide).\n\nWhat do all of these have in common? Screens! The Average American Household has 7 [screens](https://variety.com/2019/digital/news/u-s-households-have-an-average-of-11-connected-devices-and-5g-should-push-that-even-higher-1203431225/) in their house. \n\nScreens have been with us for nearly a [century](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Television_set#Early_television). \n\nBut nothing lasts forever.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the estimated date when a new technology, designed primarily for transmitting visual information, outsells all existing technologies with screens.\n\nFor the purpose of this question, we will define a screen as \"a technology that displays a 2d image on a flat surface\".\n\nIf a device primarily uses the new display technology, the entire device is counted as a sale. \n\nFor example if a phone is released with a 3d hologram projector,the entire sale cost of the phone is counted towards this question.\n\nIf a new technology is not sold (for example if it was given away freely by our benevolent AI overlords), a fair market value will be imputed based on how much it would cost a typical consumer were it freely available for sale. If the entire concept of fair market value is rendered meaningless, the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThe question will resolve on December 31 at 11:59 GMT in the year the gross sales for \"non-screen\" displays is greater than the sales for \"screen\" technology.\n\nIf this does not occur by December 28, 2100, this question will resolve as **>December 28, 2100**.\n\n---\n\nBecause the word \"screen\" cannot be precisely defined, this is a self-resolving question.\n\nIf at any point in time, both the community and Metaculus prediction give a 95% chance that the answer to this question is one year before the current date, then this question enters the resolution process. The Proposed Answer is taken to be the community median. With 90% probability, the question simply resolves as the Proposed Answer. With 10% probability, the question is sent to a committee of three admins, who will vote yes/no. If they vote positively, the question resolves as the Proposed Answer. If they vote negatively, then the question is put on hold until the resolution date, at which point three admins will each vote on an answer, with the median of the three taken to be the final answer.\n\n---\n\nCurrent examples of \"screens\":\n\n 1. Phones\n 2. Televisions\n 3. Laptops/Tablets\n 4. PC Monitors\n 5. Video projectors, since they are typically used to display a flat image. \n\n---\n\nExamples of technologies that could be described to \"primarily convey visual information\":\n\n* VR Headsets, because although headsets have flat displays, the actual experience is being in a completely different world with, ideally, no perception that one is looking at a physical screen\n* AR \"smart\" glasses\n* Smart contact lenses\n* [Neuralink](https://www.neuralink.com/) if it progressed to the point of being able to project a visual image in the brain.\n* 2d holographic displays (For example, [Looking Glass](https://lookingglassfactory.com/product/8-9) )\n* 3d holographic displays\n* [Video paint](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2005/03/050329140351.htm)\n\nNon-examples (improved screen):\n\n* Curved TVs\n* Folding Phones\n* Smartwatches (screen is circular instead of rectangular)\n* [\"Roll-up\" screens](https://www.cnet.com/news/lg-oled-tv-roll-up-comes-out-hiding-when-tv-time-rolls-around/)\n* [Video projector phone](https://www.techradar.com/reviews/blackview-max-1-projector-smartphone)\n\nNon-examples (not a visual display technology):\n\n* Wireless earbuds\n* Telepathy which does not produce a visual image in the mind of the receiver\n* Humanoid robots which are capable of acting out visual drama", "lower_25": "2037", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2061", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a technology will replace screens by 2046?", "desc": "In 2017, the world spent $1,537 Billion on [cell phones](https://www.statista.com/statistics/263437/global-smartphone-sales-to-end-users-since-2007/), $105 Billion on [TVs](https://www.statista.com/statistics/461324/global-tv-market-sales/), $101 Billion on [Laptops and Tablets](https://fortunly.com/blog/lap-top-market-share/), and $27 Billion on [PC monitors and projectors](https://www.statista.com/outlook/15030300/100/pc-monitors-projectors/worldwide).\n\nWhat do all of these have in common? Screens! The Average American Household has 7 [screens](https://variety.com/2019/digital/news/u-s-households-have-an-average-of-11-connected-devices-and-5g-should-push-that-even-higher-1203431225/) in their house. \n\nScreens have been with us for nearly a [century](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Television_set#Early_television). \n\nBut nothing lasts forever.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the estimated date when a new technology, designed primarily for transmitting visual information, outsells all existing technologies with screens.\n\nFor the purpose of this question, we will define a screen as \"a technology that displays a 2d image on a flat surface\".\n\nIf a device primarily uses the new display technology, the entire device is counted as a sale. \n\nFor example if a phone is released with a 3d hologram projector,the entire sale cost of the phone is counted towards this question.\n\nIf a new technology is not sold (for example if it was given away freely by our benevolent AI overlords), a fair market value will be imputed based on how much it would cost a typical consumer were it freely available for sale. If the entire concept of fair market value is rendered meaningless, the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThe question will resolve on December 31 at 11:59 GMT in the year the gross sales for \"non-screen\" displays is greater than the sales for \"screen\" technology.\n\nIf this does not occur by December 28, 2100, this question will resolve as **>December 28, 2100**.\n\n---\n\nBecause the word \"screen\" cannot be precisely defined, this is a self-resolving question.\n\nIf at any point in time, both the community and Metaculus prediction give a 95% chance that the answer to this question is one year before the current date, then this question enters the resolution process. The Proposed Answer is taken to be the community median. With 90% probability, the question simply resolves as the Proposed Answer. With 10% probability, the question is sent to a committee of three admins, who will vote yes/no. If they vote positively, the question resolves as the Proposed Answer. If they vote negatively, then the question is put on hold until the resolution date, at which point three admins will each vote on an answer, with the median of the three taken to be the final answer.\n\n---\n\nCurrent examples of \"screens\":\n\n 1. Phones\n 2. Televisions\n 3. Laptops/Tablets\n 4. PC Monitors\n 5. Video projectors, since they are typically used to display a flat image. \n\n---\n\nExamples of technologies that could be described to \"primarily convey visual information\":\n\n* VR Headsets, because although headsets have flat displays, the actual experience is being in a completely different world with, ideally, no perception that one is looking at a physical screen\n* AR \"smart\" glasses\n* Smart contact lenses\n* [Neuralink](https://www.neuralink.com/) if it progressed to the point of being able to project a visual image in the brain.\n* 2d holographic displays (For example, [Looking Glass](https://lookingglassfactory.com/product/8-9) )\n* 3d holographic displays\n* [Video paint](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2005/03/050329140351.htm)\n\nNon-examples (improved screen):\n\n* Curved TVs\n* Folding Phones\n* Smartwatches (screen is circular instead of rectangular)\n* [\"Roll-up\" screens](https://www.cnet.com/news/lg-oled-tv-roll-up-comes-out-hiding-when-tv-time-rolls-around/)\n* [Video projector phone](https://www.techradar.com/reviews/blackview-max-1-projector-smartphone)\n\nNon-examples (not a visual display technology):\n\n* Wireless earbuds\n* Telepathy which does not produce a visual image in the mind of the receiver\n* Humanoid robots which are capable of acting out visual drama", "lower_25": "2037", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2061", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If the human population declines to fewer than 100 million, how many years would pass until the population is above 1 billion again?\n\nKeyword: 409\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the human population would decline to fewer than 100 million and take 25% of the time to reach above 1 billion again?", "desc": "For reasons why there might ever be fewer than 100M humans, see the [Metaculus Ragnarok series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ragnarok). An important question is, if most people die, whether humanity will recover, and how long it would take.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of years between the date when the total population of humans is less than 100 million, and the following date when the estimate is greater than 1 billion. The estimates of population will include all humans in the observable universe. If there is no population decline to 100 million or less between January 1, 2000 to January 20, 2345, this question will resolve as ambiguous. If the human race never rebounds (ie. goes extinct), this question resolves as >3000.\n\nFor this question, \"Humans\" are defined as creatures who at least one 2020 Metaculus user would judge are humans if they magically met them", "lower_25": "409", "median": "1.38k", "upper_75": "> 3k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a technology will replace screens by 2046?", "desc": "In 2017, the world spent $1,537 Billion on [cell phones](https://www.statista.com/statistics/263437/global-smartphone-sales-to-end-users-since-2007/), $105 Billion on [TVs](https://www.statista.com/statistics/461324/global-tv-market-sales/), $101 Billion on [Laptops and Tablets](https://fortunly.com/blog/lap-top-market-share/), and $27 Billion on [PC monitors and projectors](https://www.statista.com/outlook/15030300/100/pc-monitors-projectors/worldwide).\n\nWhat do all of these have in common? Screens! The Average American Household has 7 [screens](https://variety.com/2019/digital/news/u-s-households-have-an-average-of-11-connected-devices-and-5g-should-push-that-even-higher-1203431225/) in their house. \n\nScreens have been with us for nearly a [century](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Television_set#Early_television). \n\nBut nothing lasts forever.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the estimated date when a new technology, designed primarily for transmitting visual information, outsells all existing technologies with screens.\n\nFor the purpose of this question, we will define a screen as \"a technology that displays a 2d image on a flat surface\".\n\nIf a device primarily uses the new display technology, the entire device is counted as a sale. \n\nFor example if a phone is released with a 3d hologram projector,the entire sale cost of the phone is counted towards this question.\n\nIf a new technology is not sold (for example if it was given away freely by our benevolent AI overlords), a fair market value will be imputed based on how much it would cost a typical consumer were it freely available for sale. If the entire concept of fair market value is rendered meaningless, the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThe question will resolve on December 31 at 11:59 GMT in the year the gross sales for \"non-screen\" displays is greater than the sales for \"screen\" technology.\n\nIf this does not occur by December 28, 2100, this question will resolve as **>December 28, 2100**.\n\n---\n\nBecause the word \"screen\" cannot be precisely defined, this is a self-resolving question.\n\nIf at any point in time, both the community and Metaculus prediction give a 95% chance that the answer to this question is one year before the current date, then this question enters the resolution process. The Proposed Answer is taken to be the community median. With 90% probability, the question simply resolves as the Proposed Answer. With 10% probability, the question is sent to a committee of three admins, who will vote yes/no. If they vote positively, the question resolves as the Proposed Answer. If they vote negatively, then the question is put on hold until the resolution date, at which point three admins will each vote on an answer, with the median of the three taken to be the final answer.\n\n---\n\nCurrent examples of \"screens\":\n\n 1. Phones\n 2. Televisions\n 3. Laptops/Tablets\n 4. PC Monitors\n 5. Video projectors, since they are typically used to display a flat image. \n\n---\n\nExamples of technologies that could be described to \"primarily convey visual information\":\n\n* VR Headsets, because although headsets have flat displays, the actual experience is being in a completely different world with, ideally, no perception that one is looking at a physical screen\n* AR \"smart\" glasses\n* Smart contact lenses\n* [Neuralink](https://www.neuralink.com/) if it progressed to the point of being able to project a visual image in the brain.\n* 2d holographic displays (For example, [Looking Glass](https://lookingglassfactory.com/product/8-9) )\n* 3d holographic displays\n* [Video paint](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2005/03/050329140351.htm)\n\nNon-examples (improved screen):\n\n* Curved TVs\n* Folding Phones\n* Smartwatches (screen is circular instead of rectangular)\n* [\"Roll-up\" screens](https://www.cnet.com/news/lg-oled-tv-roll-up-comes-out-hiding-when-tv-time-rolls-around/)\n* [Video projector phone](https://www.techradar.com/reviews/blackview-max-1-projector-smartphone)\n\nNon-examples (not a visual display technology):\n\n* Wireless earbuds\n* Telepathy which does not produce a visual image in the mind of the receiver\n* Humanoid robots which are capable of acting out visual drama", "lower_25": "2037", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2061", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first commercial Hyperloop system will not begin operations before 2100?", "desc": "A [Hyperloop](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperloop) is a proposed mode of passenger and freight transportation; the name was first used to describe an open-source [vactrain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vactrain) design released by a joint team from Tesla and SpaceX in 2013.\n\nIn essence, a Hyperloop is a sealed tube or series of tubes with low air pressure through which a pod carrying passengers or cargo may travel substantially free of drag. The Hyperloop could potentially convey people or objects at airliner or supersonic speeds while being substantially more energy efficient than existing commercial airliners. \n\nThe [Hyperloop Alpha](https://www.tesla.com/sites/default/files/blog_images/hyperloop-alpha.pdf) concept was first published in August 2013, proposing and examining a route running from the Los Angeles region to the San Francisco Bay Area, roughly following the Interstate 5 corridor. The Hyperloop genesis paper conceived of a Hyperloop system that would propel passengers along the 350-mile (560 km) route at a speed of 760 mph (1,200 km/h), allowing for a travel time of 35 minutes, which is considerably faster than current rail or air travel times. Preliminary cost estimates for this LA–SF suggested route were included in the white paper—US$6 billion for a passenger-only version, and US$7.5 billion for a somewhat larger-diameter version transporting passengers and vehicles.\n\nIn the seven years since Hyperloop was proposed, [a number of startup companies have outlined plans to design, build and commercialize Hyperloop technologies.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperloop#Hyperloop_companies) Some of these companies, including Virgin Hyperloop One and Hyperloop Transportation Technologies, [are building test tracks and pods](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=luDqbIZGgQM), and [a number of interesting possible routes have been theorised](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oziSR8nOznA), but as of May 2020 there are no commercial Hyperloop tracks in operation.", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, a 'Hyperloop' is a transportation system designed for passenger or cargo transportation utilising a low-pressure tube or tunnel to reduce drag. Whether such a system is called a 'Hyperloop' or something else does not affect the resolution of this question.\n\nA 'commercial Hyperloop system' is a full-scale transportation system that functions to transport passengers or cargo on a commercial basis, where paying customers may purchase tickets or access passes to use the service. \n\nAdditionally, the system must possess the key characteristic of the Hyperloop concept: average speed substantially in excess of high-speed rail. *The average point-to-point speed of the pod must be at least 400 kilometers per hour to qualify, and the minimum point-to-point distance is 10 kilometers.*\n\nAmusement park rides or test tracks, paid or unpaid, do not count. Additionally, [pneumatic tube systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pneumatic_tube) that transport only very small objects like letters do not count.\n\n**This question resolves as the date on which the first paying customer using a qualifying Hyperloop system either completes their journey, or their cargo arrives at its destination.*", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2047", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 12.8% of money held in all US DAFs will be expropriated by 2100?", "desc": "", "resc": "*This is a variation on [an older question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4328/will-a-total-sum-amounting-to-at-least-10-of-the-money-in-all-us-dafs-be-expropriated-by-2100/), with different wording to attempt to illuminate an alternative perspective.*\n\nA [donor-advised fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donor-advised_fund) (DAF) is \"a charitable giving vehicle administered by a public charity created to manage charitable donations on behalf of organizations, families, or individuals.\" The sponsoring organization of a fund—often a subsidiary of a brokerage firm such as [Fidelity Charitable](https://www.fidelitycharitable.org/) or [Schwab Charitable](https://www.schwabcharitable.org/public/charitable/home)—is a 501(c)(3) registered charity that accepts tax-deductible donations from the creator of the DAF. The creator can then make grant recommendations to the sponsoring organization.\n\nSponsoring organizations legally own any donated money, and have no obligation to abide by grant recommendations. There have been cases in the past of DAFs refusing to use donated money as directed[1] or using donated money for its own benefit. To my knowledge, no large reputable DAF has ever done this.\n\n**What percentage of money held in all US DAFs will be expropriated by 2100?**\n\nFunds are considered expropriated if:\n\n- The DAF refuses to make a grant recommendation, insofar as the grant recommendation is legal.\n- The DAF spends donated money on purposes other than a donor's recommendation, not including ordinary account expenses[2].\n- The DAF begins charging unreasonable expenses (e.g., a 5% annual fee).\n- An outside party, such as the US government, seizes control of all or a substantial portion of the money (including by taxation).\n\nThe following situations do not qualify as expropriation:\n\n- The US government imposes a distribution requirement, such as the 5% annual distribution requirement that foundations must follow.\n- The DAF refuses to abide by a grant recommendation because it legally cannot, e.g., because the would-be grant recipient is not a 501(c)(3).\n- The DAF forcibly closes (e.g., due to Fidelity Charitable going bankrupt), but lets donors decide how to grant all remaining money.\n\n[1] Article is paywalled, but the gist is that the Jewish Community Foundation of Los Angeles refused to comply with a donor's request to donate to a charity supporting Palestine.\n\n[2] At present, Fidelity Charitable charges a 0.6% annual fee. Most other DAFs charge similar fees.", "lower_25": "3.3", "median": "12.8", "upper_75": "29.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If the human population declines to fewer than 100 million, how many years would pass until the population is above 1 billion again?\n\nKeyword: 409\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the human population would decline to fewer than 100 million and take 25% of the time to reach above 1 billion again?", "desc": "For reasons why there might ever be fewer than 100M humans, see the [Metaculus Ragnarok series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ragnarok). An important question is, if most people die, whether humanity will recover, and how long it would take.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of years between the date when the total population of humans is less than 100 million, and the following date when the estimate is greater than 1 billion. The estimates of population will include all humans in the observable universe. If there is no population decline to 100 million or less between January 1, 2000 to January 20, 2345, this question will resolve as ambiguous. If the human race never rebounds (ie. goes extinct), this question resolves as >3000.\n\nFor this question, \"Humans\" are defined as creatures who at least one 2020 Metaculus user would judge are humans if they magically met them", "lower_25": "409", "median": "1.38k", "upper_75": "> 3k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 12.8% of money held in all US DAFs will be expropriated by 2100?", "desc": "", "resc": "*This is a variation on [an older question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4328/will-a-total-sum-amounting-to-at-least-10-of-the-money-in-all-us-dafs-be-expropriated-by-2100/), with different wording to attempt to illuminate an alternative perspective.*\n\nA [donor-advised fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donor-advised_fund) (DAF) is \"a charitable giving vehicle administered by a public charity created to manage charitable donations on behalf of organizations, families, or individuals.\" The sponsoring organization of a fund—often a subsidiary of a brokerage firm such as [Fidelity Charitable](https://www.fidelitycharitable.org/) or [Schwab Charitable](https://www.schwabcharitable.org/public/charitable/home)—is a 501(c)(3) registered charity that accepts tax-deductible donations from the creator of the DAF. The creator can then make grant recommendations to the sponsoring organization.\n\nSponsoring organizations legally own any donated money, and have no obligation to abide by grant recommendations. There have been cases in the past of DAFs refusing to use donated money as directed[1] or using donated money for its own benefit. To my knowledge, no large reputable DAF has ever done this.\n\n**What percentage of money held in all US DAFs will be expropriated by 2100?**\n\nFunds are considered expropriated if:\n\n- The DAF refuses to make a grant recommendation, insofar as the grant recommendation is legal.\n- The DAF spends donated money on purposes other than a donor's recommendation, not including ordinary account expenses[2].\n- The DAF begins charging unreasonable expenses (e.g., a 5% annual fee).\n- An outside party, such as the US government, seizes control of all or a substantial portion of the money (including by taxation).\n\nThe following situations do not qualify as expropriation:\n\n- The US government imposes a distribution requirement, such as the 5% annual distribution requirement that foundations must follow.\n- The DAF refuses to abide by a grant recommendation because it legally cannot, e.g., because the would-be grant recipient is not a 501(c)(3).\n- The DAF forcibly closes (e.g., due to Fidelity Charitable going bankrupt), but lets donors decide how to grant all remaining money.\n\n[1] Article is paywalled, but the gist is that the Jewish Community Foundation of Los Angeles refused to comply with a donor's request to donate to a charity supporting Palestine.\n\n[2] At present, Fidelity Charitable charges a 0.6% annual fee. Most other DAFs charge similar fees.", "lower_25": "3.3", "median": "12.8", "upper_75": "29.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX's Starship will carry a human to orbit by Jan 2026?", "desc": "After many years of developing a human-rated vehicle, SpaceX recently [carried humans](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4505/when-will-the-spacex-demo-2-launch/) to the International Space Station on its Crew Dragon capsule atop its partially-reusable Falcon 9 rocket.\n\nSpaceX's [Starship](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX_Starship) rocket is an under-development super heavy-lift launch vehicle, intended to be fully reusable and to carry humans to destinations throughout the Solar System. Although SpaceX has proven that it can successfully accomplish some aspects of this (reuse a rocket's core stage multiple times, carry humans in a spacecraft), there are further milestones to overcome (recover all stages of a rocket, build a rocket from stainless steel, etc.).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date that a SpaceX Starship has a human on board and makes a full orbit around Earth at an altitude of at least 50 km above sea level.\n\nStarship has undergone many design and name changes since its inception. Therefore, for the purposes of this question, \"Starship\" refers to any SpaceX vehicle, or prototype/early version thereof, that is:\n\n- not an existing member of the Falcon family (Falcon 9/Heavy) or a Falcon derivative\n- intended to be fully reusable, with every stage returned to Earth (smaller portions such as fairings may be expended)\n + The vehicle must have a stated payload to LEO of at least 20,000 kg (of pure payload, e.g. the Space Shuttle Orbiter would not count as payload mass). This is very conservative, so Starship would qualify even if it were greatly scaled down from today.\n + The vehicle must be intended to carry a payload to Mars at some point, according to public statements of SpaceX or its representatives.\n + The vehicle design must be descended from the current (2020) design of Starship. Any number of design changes are acceptable, but a redesign from scratch is not (see [Ship of Theseus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus)).\n\nFor this question, it is acceptable if the human arrived in orbit on some other vehicle, and only subsequently entered Starship, as long as they complete one orbit while inside Starship. The human must be alive at the time that this occurs, but do not need to safely return to Earth (or, for that matter, anywhere else) afterwards.\n\n\n(Edited `2020-06-09` to add last three disambiguation bullets.)\n\n(Edited `2020-06-11` to remove obsolete clause about payload and adde acceptability of _getting to_ orbit not on Starship.)\n\n(Edited `2020-06-09` to add last three disambiguation bullets.)\n\n(Edited `2020-06-11` to remove obsolete clause about payload and adde acceptability of _getting to_ orbit not on Starship.)\n\n(Edited `2020-06-09` to add last three disambiguation bullets.)\n\n(Edited `2020-06-11` to remove obsolete clause about payload and adde acceptability of _getting to_ orbit not on Starship.)\nUnited Nations System (the United Nations and its six principal organs) spent approximately 52.78 billion USD on its various operations, as reported in the CEB Financial Statistics database.\n\n#Question\n\n**What will the total expenditures of the United Nations System be for the year 2050, in billions of US dollars?**\n\n#Resolution\n\nResolution is through any of the following sources, in descending order of priority:\n\n- A report from the Chief Executives Board for Coordination\n- A report from another body of the United Nations\n- A statement by a United Nations spokesperson\n- A report by another credible source\n\nIf the United Nations does not exist as an organization in 2050, this question resolves as 0.\n\nIf the United Nations reports its expenditures in a currency other than United States dollars, and the United States dollar is still an internationally recognized currency, the value given will be converted to United States dollars using the UN Operational Rates of Exchange. If the UN Operational Rates of Exchange do not exist at that time, any other method of conversion may be used subject to the discretion of Metaculus admins. \n\nIf the United Nations reports its expenditures in a currency other than United States dollars, and the United States dollar is no longer used internationally, this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "74.7", "median": "126", "upper_75": "186", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 9.87 percentage of vehicles on US roads will be fully electric by 2030?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will electric cars constitute over 5% of the US passenger car fleet?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3658/when-will-electric-cars-constitute-over-5-of-the-us-passenger-car-fleet/)\n- [How many new electric vehicles will be registered worldwide, in the calendar year 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3542/how-many-new-electric-vehicles-will-be-registered-worldwide-in-the-calendar-year-2023/)\n\n----\n\nIn 2018 there were just over 1 million electric vehicles on American roads, a milestone for the industry that took eight years to arrive at. As EV popularity and manufacturing capacity trend upward, the [Edison Electric Institute](https://www.edisonfoundation.net/en/publications/publications?category=Report) [predicts](https://www.edisonfoundation.net/-/media/Files/IEI/publications/IEI_EEI-EV-Forecast-Report_Nov2018.ashx) the jump to the next million US EV's will only require three years, expecting that number to climb to 18.7 million by 2030. With [273.6 million vehicles](https://www.statista.com/statistics/183505/number-of-vehicles-in-the-united-states-since-1990/#:~:text=How%20many%20registered%20motor%20vehicles,at%206.3%20million%20in%202016.) registered in the US in 2018, EV's then represented .36% of the vehicles on the road. The Edison Institute predicts that number will rise to 7% by 2030.\n\nMany electric vehicle batteries rely on lithium to run, and analysts are speculating on the potential impacts of the coronavirus on the supply of lithium batteries as an intervening factor in the industry's growth. Chinese suppliers produced 79% of the lithium hydroxide used in all electric vehicles in 2019. With the rise of the pandemic, Chinese battery manufacturers have limited or stopped all production and lithium prices are beginning to rise. \n\n[Forbes reports](https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2020/03/25/manufacturers-are-struggling-to-supply-electric-vehicles-with-batteries/#15708fd91ff3): \n\n> While most of the manufacturers have already restarted their production, the outbreak is estimated to set Chinese battery producers back by 26GWh of output in 2020.This halt in production has created supply shortages for western carmakers, as automakers, such as Fiat Chrysler, PSA Group, General Motors, Daimler and Ford, have their plants in the province of Hubei, where the Coronavirus took its first hit.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of US cars on the road that are fully electric, according to the number of EV's reported by [ZSW Data service](https://www.zsw-bw.de/mediathek/datenservice.html) and the total number of US vehicles reported by [Statista](https://www.statista.com/statistics/183505/number-of-vehicles-in-the-united-states-since-1990/#:~:text=How%20many%20registered%20motor%20vehicles,at%206.3%20million%20in%202016.). Should these services be discontinued, comparable credible sources will be utilized in their place, as determined by Metaculus admins", "lower_25": "6.23", "median": "9.87", "upper_75": "16.10", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total expenditures of the United Nations System in 2050 will be 126%?", "desc": "", "resc": "#Context \n\nIn 2018, the United Nations System (the United Nations and its six principal organs) spent approximately 52.78 billion USD on its various operations, as reported in the CEB Financial Statistics database.\n\n#Question\n\n**What will the total expenditures of the United Nations System be for the year 2050, in billions of US dollars?**\n\n#Resolution\n\nResolution is through any of the following sources, in descending order of priority:\n\n- A report from the Chief Executives Board for Coordination\n- A report from another body of the United Nations\n- A statement by a United Nations spokesperson\n- A report by another credible source\n\nIf the United Nations does not exist as an organization in 2050, this question resolves as 0.\n\nIf the United Nations reports its expenditures in a currency other than United States dollars, and the United States dollar is still an internationally recognized currency, the value given will be converted to United States dollars using the UN Operational Rates of Exchange. If the UN Operational Rates of Exchange do not exist at that time, any other method of conversion may be used subject to the discretion of Metaculus admins. \n\nIf the United Nations reports its expenditures in a currency other than United States dollars, and the United States dollar is no longer used internationally, this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "74.7", "median": "126", "upper_75": "186", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 9.87 percentage of vehicles on US roads will be fully electric by 2030?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will electric cars constitute over 5% of the US passenger car fleet?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3658/when-will-electric-cars-constitute-over-5-of-the-us-passenger-car-fleet/)\n- [How many new electric vehicles will be registered worldwide, in the calendar year 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3542/how-many-new-electric-vehicles-will-be-registered-worldwide-in-the-calendar-year-2023/)\n\n----\n\nIn 2018 there were just over 1 million electric vehicles on American roads, a milestone for the industry that took eight years to arrive at. As EV popularity and manufacturing capacity trend upward, the [Edison Electric Institute](https://www.edisonfoundation.net/en/publications/publications?category=Report) [predicts](https://www.edisonfoundation.net/-/media/Files/IEI/publications/IEI_EEI-EV-Forecast-Report_Nov2018.ashx) the jump to the next million US EV's will only require three years, expecting that number to climb to 18.7 million by 2030. With [273.6 million vehicles](https://www.statista.com/statistics/183505/number-of-vehicles-in-the-united-states-since-1990/#:~:text=How%20many%20registered%20motor%20vehicles,at%206.3%20million%20in%202016.) registered in the US in 2018, EV's then represented .36% of the vehicles on the road. The Edison Institute predicts that number will rise to 7% by 2030.\n\nMany electric vehicle batteries rely on lithium to run, and analysts are speculating on the potential impacts of the coronavirus on the supply of lithium batteries as an intervening factor in the industry's growth. Chinese suppliers produced 79% of the lithium hydroxide used in all electric vehicles in 2019. With the rise of the pandemic, Chinese battery manufacturers have limited or stopped all production and lithium prices are beginning to rise. \n\n[Forbes reports](https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2020/03/25/manufacturers-are-struggling-to-supply-electric-vehicles-with-batteries/#15708fd91ff3): \n\n> While most of the manufacturers have already restarted their production, the outbreak is estimated to set Chinese battery producers back by 26GWh of output in 2020.This halt in production has created supply shortages for western carmakers, as automakers, such as Fiat Chrysler, PSA Group, General Motors, Daimler and Ford, have their plants in the province of Hubei, where the Coronavirus took its first hit.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of US cars on the road that are fully electric, according to the number of EV's reported by [ZSW Data service](https://www.zsw-bw.de/mediathek/datenservice.html) and the total number of US vehicles reported by [Statista](https://www.statista.com/statistics/183505/number-of-vehicles-in-the-united-states-since-1990/#:~:text=How%20many%20registered%20motor%20vehicles,at%206.3%20million%20in%202016.). Should these services be discontinued, comparable credible sources will be utilized in their place, as determined by Metaculus admins", "lower_25": "6.23", "median": "9.87", "upper_75": "16.10", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that someone will be revived by 2200 if they are cryopreserved using fixatives compared to without, given that cryopreservation using fixatives is available?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Large Mammal BPF Prize](https://www.brainpreservation.org/large-mammal-announcement/) was won in 2018 by a technique called Aldehyde-Stabilized Cryopreservation. ASC uses glutaraldehyde to crosslink the brain's proteins in place; this removes the possibility of restoration of biological function, but protects the tissue from decay due to autolysis or putrefaction. Glutaraldehyde fixation is currently used in neuroscience to prepare brain tissue for electron microscopic and immunofluorescent examination.\n\nAlcor, a major cryonics provider, is skeptical of fixatives and does not currently offer ASC. [Ralph Merkle, writing for Alcor, writes](https://alcor.org/Library/html/does-cryonics-offer-false-hope.html):\n\n> Rather obviously, if you want to cryopreserve someone you'd rather not perfuse them with glutaraldehyde. It's a fixative. On the other hand, if you don't use glutaraldehyde, then you're going to get dehydration and shrinkage, which means you won't get the pretty pictures that neuroscientists like.\n\n> So, what's your preference? Better pictures, or better biological viability? The neuroscientists want the pictures. Alcor has traditionally worked to achieve better biological viability.\n\n> [...] The cryobiological experts who advise Alcor favor the use of Alcor's current protocol (or we would have changed it).\n\nThe Brain Preservation Foundation, which awarded the $80,000 prize for ASC, is more hopeful, claiming that these better pictures make the brain more suitable for eventual resurrection via scanning and uploading.\n\n**What will the value (% of people cryopreserved while fixatives are available, who are cryopreserved using fixatives, who are revived) / (% of people cryopreserved while fixatives are available, who are cryopreserved without using fixatives, who are revived) be at the start of 2200?**\n\nThis counts only the people who are cryopreserved while fixatives are available, so that the question measures only the effect from using fixatives, and not general improvement in cryonics between 1967 and whenever fixatives become available, and from later techniques which would supersede fixatives. \n\n\"Available\" means that a cryonics organisation officially offers cryopreservation using fixatives to its members.\n\n\"Revival\" means that the person would be able to meet the standard described in [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3382/what-will-the-earliest-preservation-date-of-any-resuscitated-cryonics-patient-be/); either through conducting that specific test, or by some measurement that is equivalent such as official statistics on the health of revived patients.\n\nIf nobody is revived from cryopreservation before 2200, or nobody is cryopreserved using fixatives, then this resolves ambiguously. If the only people revived are those who were preserved using fixatives, then this resolves above the upper end of the scale.", "lower_25": "0.912", "median": "16.7", "upper_75": "> 33", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a universal flu vaccine will be available by 2036?", "desc": "Although there is a vaccine against influenza, the influenza virus' rapid mutation rate means that the vaccine must be [reformulated each year](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Influenza#Vaccination) in order to protect against the strains that are expected to be most common. The inconvenience of getting a flu vaccine every year may contribute to low flu vaccination coverage (roughly [37% of adults in the US](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/fluvaxview/coverage-1718estimates.htm) in 2017). Furthermore, unlike many other vaccines, the flu vaccine is far from a guarantee of protection, with effectiveness as low as [40%](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/vaccines-work/2019-2020.html), partially because the vaccine only covers the three or four most common strains.\n\nFor at least a decade, various groups such as [BiondVax](http://www.biondvax.com/) and [Distributed Bio](https://www.distributedbio.com/centivax) have been working on a universal flu vaccine, which would not need to be reformulated each year. A highly effective universal flu vaccine combined with a strong vaccination campaign could lead to the flu being virtually eliminated in some places, as with other diseases such as measles and tuberculosis. However, even a moderately effective universal flu vaccine might substantially increase vaccination coverage and reduce flu severity.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date that a universal influenza vaccine is approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration or the European Medicine Agency.\n\nA universal flu vaccine must meet one of the following conditions:\n\n - The vaccine is effective for multiple years. That is, the FDA/EMA endorses that it may be received less than once per year.\n - The vaccine is effective against unseen strains. That is, the FDA/EMA endorses the use of a version of the vaccine that was formulated without using the WHO's current yearly recommended vaccine composition (or any similar yearly recommendation).\n\nBeyond the above conditions, there are no specific requirements on effectiveness. It is acceptable if the universal flu vaccine is recommended in conjunction with, and not as a replacement to, traditional flu vaccines. Since even existing flu vaccines may provide some residual protection against the flu, the vaccine in question must be described or advertised as being universal, broad-spectrum, etc.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 4, 2090, this question will resolve as **> January 4, 2090**", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a universal flu vaccine will be available by 2036?", "desc": "Although there is a vaccine against influenza, the influenza virus' rapid mutation rate means that the vaccine must be [reformulated each year](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Influenza#Vaccination) in order to protect against the strains that are expected to be most common. The inconvenience of getting a flu vaccine every year may contribute to low flu vaccination coverage (roughly [37% of adults in the US](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/fluvaxview/coverage-1718estimates.htm) in 2017). Furthermore, unlike many other vaccines, the flu vaccine is far from a guarantee of protection, with effectiveness as low as [40%](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/vaccines-work/2019-2020.html), partially because the vaccine only covers the three or four most common strains.\n\nFor at least a decade, various groups such as [BiondVax](http://www.biondvax.com/) and [Distributed Bio](https://www.distributedbio.com/centivax) have been working on a universal flu vaccine, which would not need to be reformulated each year. A highly effective universal flu vaccine combined with a strong vaccination campaign could lead to the flu being virtually eliminated in some places, as with other diseases such as measles and tuberculosis. However, even a moderately effective universal flu vaccine might substantially increase vaccination coverage and reduce flu severity.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date that a universal influenza vaccine is approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration or the European Medicine Agency.\n\nA universal flu vaccine must meet one of the following conditions:\n\n - The vaccine is effective for multiple years. That is, the FDA/EMA endorses that it may be received less than once per year.\n - The vaccine is effective against unseen strains. That is, the FDA/EMA endorses the use of a version of the vaccine that was formulated without using the WHO's current yearly recommended vaccine composition (or any similar yearly recommendation).\n\nBeyond the above conditions, there are no specific requirements on effectiveness. It is acceptable if the universal flu vaccine is recommended in conjunction with, and not as a replacement to, traditional flu vaccines. Since even existing flu vaccines may provide some residual protection against the flu, the vaccine in question must be described or advertised as being universal, broad-spectrum, etc.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 4, 2090, this question will resolve as **> January 4, 2090**", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that someone will be revived by 2200 if they are cryopreserved using fixatives compared to without, given that cryopreservation using fixatives is available?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Large Mammal BPF Prize](https://www.brainpreservation.org/large-mammal-announcement/) was won in 2018 by a technique called Aldehyde-Stabilized Cryopreservation. ASC uses glutaraldehyde to crosslink the brain's proteins in place; this removes the possibility of restoration of biological function, but protects the tissue from decay due to autolysis or putrefaction. Glutaraldehyde fixation is currently used in neuroscience to prepare brain tissue for electron microscopic and immunofluorescent examination.\n\nAlcor, a major cryonics provider, is skeptical of fixatives and does not currently offer ASC. [Ralph Merkle, writing for Alcor, writes](https://alcor.org/Library/html/does-cryonics-offer-false-hope.html):\n\n> Rather obviously, if you want to cryopreserve someone you'd rather not perfuse them with glutaraldehyde. It's a fixative. On the other hand, if you don't use glutaraldehyde, then you're going to get dehydration and shrinkage, which means you won't get the pretty pictures that neuroscientists like.\n\n> So, what's your preference? Better pictures, or better biological viability? The neuroscientists want the pictures. Alcor has traditionally worked to achieve better biological viability.\n\n> [...] The cryobiological experts who advise Alcor favor the use of Alcor's current protocol (or we would have changed it).\n\nThe Brain Preservation Foundation, which awarded the $80,000 prize for ASC, is more hopeful, claiming that these better pictures make the brain more suitable for eventual resurrection via scanning and uploading.\n\n**What will the value (% of people cryopreserved while fixatives are available, who are cryopreserved using fixatives, who are revived) / (% of people cryopreserved while fixatives are available, who are cryopreserved without using fixatives, who are revived) be at the start of 2200?**\n\nThis counts only the people who are cryopreserved while fixatives are available, so that the question measures only the effect from using fixatives, and not general improvement in cryonics between 1967 and whenever fixatives become available, and from later techniques which would supersede fixatives. \n\n\"Available\" means that a cryonics organisation officially offers cryopreservation using fixatives to its members.\n\n\"Revival\" means that the person would be able to meet the standard described in [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3382/what-will-the-earliest-preservation-date-of-any-resuscitated-cryonics-patient-be/); either through conducting that specific test, or by some measurement that is equivalent such as official statistics on the health of revived patients.\n\nIf nobody is revived from cryopreservation before 2200, or nobody is cryopreserved using fixatives, then this resolves ambiguously. If the only people revived are those who were preserved using fixatives, then this resolves above the upper end of the scale.", "lower_25": "0.912", "median": "16.7", "upper_75": "> 33", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next fundamental particle to be discovered will have a mass of 3.03×1013 eV?", "desc": "In 2012, the [Higgs boson](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Higgs_boson) was discovered by the Large Hadron Collider with a mass of \\(125\\times10^9\\) eV. This observation of the Higgs completed the [Standard Model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_Model), of which the Higgs mechanism was an important theoretical but experimentally unobserved part.\n\nThere remain unexplained facts about physics and [theoretical difficulties with current models of physics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physics_beyond_the_Standard_Model) that might be explained by the introduction of new fundamental particles. One popular extension to the standard model is [supersymmetry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supersymmetry), which predicts that each particle has a heavier supersymmetric partner.\n\nThere are proposals for larger particle accelerators that could probe collisions at higher energies, such as the [Future Circular Collider](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_Circular_Collider) which, if constructed, would have a center of mass collision energy of \\(10^{14}\\) eV, though [physicists are sceptical](https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/1/22/18192281/cern-large-hadron-collider-future-circular-collider-physics) that any new physics would be discovered by them. One particularly exciting form of new physics that could be discovered would be a particle in their energy range.", "resc": "Resolution will be the average mass listed for the particle by [Particle Data Group](http://pdglive.lbl.gov/Viewer.action) once scientific consensus emerges that the particle observed is a new fundamental particle. If multiple new particles are discovered in the same window of time, the first will be considered to be the first to have been observed, even if it was not known to be a new fundamental particle at the time.\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously if no new fundamental particle is discovered by 2070", "lower_25": "< 100B", "median": "3.03×1013", "upper_75": "5.73×1015", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next fundamental particle to be discovered will have a mass of 3.03×1013 eV?", "desc": "In 2012, the [Higgs boson](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Higgs_boson) was discovered by the Large Hadron Collider with a mass of \\(125\\times10^9\\) eV. This observation of the Higgs completed the [Standard Model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_Model), of which the Higgs mechanism was an important theoretical but experimentally unobserved part.\n\nThere remain unexplained facts about physics and [theoretical difficulties with current models of physics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physics_beyond_the_Standard_Model) that might be explained by the introduction of new fundamental particles. One popular extension to the standard model is [supersymmetry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supersymmetry), which predicts that each particle has a heavier supersymmetric partner.\n\nThere are proposals for larger particle accelerators that could probe collisions at higher energies, such as the [Future Circular Collider](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_Circular_Collider) which, if constructed, would have a center of mass collision energy of \\(10^{14}\\) eV, though [physicists are sceptical](https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/1/22/18192281/cern-large-hadron-collider-future-circular-collider-physics) that any new physics would be discovered by them. One particularly exciting form of new physics that could be discovered would be a particle in their energy range.", "resc": "Resolution will be the average mass listed for the particle by [Particle Data Group](http://pdglive.lbl.gov/Viewer.action) once scientific consensus emerges that the particle observed is a new fundamental particle. If multiple new particles are discovered in the same window of time, the first will be considered to be the first to have been observed, even if it was not known to be a new fundamental particle at the time.\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously if no new fundamental particle is discovered by 2070", "lower_25": "< 100B", "median": "3.03×1013", "upper_75": "5.73×1015", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.140 percentage of people cryopreserved between 2020 and 2050 will be revived by 2200?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of 2019, over 400 people have been cryopreserved ([175 at Alcor](https://www.alcor.org/AboutAlcor/membershipstats.html), [183 at the Cryonics Insitute](https://www.cryonics.org/case-reports/), [71 at KrioRus](https://kriorus.ru/en/cryopreserved%20people)), and many more people are members of cryonics organisations with arrangements to be cryopreserved after their deaths.\n\nCryopreservation currently involves replacing blood with a cryoprotectant and slowly cooling down a body to liquid nitrogen temperatures for long-term storage. The hope is that this preserves enough of the structure of the brain that, with advanced enough future technology, revival will eventually be possible.\n\nChances of revival may also be increasing over time, as [cryopreservation techniques become better](https://waitbutwhy.com/2016/03/cryonics.html) and the institutional knowledge to get people cryopreserved sooner after death develops.\n\nI thus ask to what extent revival will be possible for people preserved in the next 30 years:\n\n**What percentage of people who were initially cryopreserved between 2020 and 2050 will be revived by 2200?**\n\n\"Revival\" means that the person would be able to meet the standard described in [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3382/what-will-the-earliest-preservation-date-of-any-resuscitated-cryonics-patient-be/); either through conducting that specific test, or by some measurement that is equivalent such as official statistics on the health of revived patients.", "lower_25": "0.566", "median": "2.140", "upper_75": "17.600", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next fundamental particle to be discovered will have a mass of 3.03×1013 eV?", "desc": "In 2012, the [Higgs boson](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Higgs_boson) was discovered by the Large Hadron Collider with a mass of \\(125\\times10^9\\) eV. This observation of the Higgs completed the [Standard Model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_Model), of which the Higgs mechanism was an important theoretical but experimentally unobserved part.\n\nThere remain unexplained facts about physics and [theoretical difficulties with current models of physics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physics_beyond_the_Standard_Model) that might be explained by the introduction of new fundamental particles. One popular extension to the standard model is [supersymmetry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supersymmetry), which predicts that each particle has a heavier supersymmetric partner.\n\nThere are proposals for larger particle accelerators that could probe collisions at higher energies, such as the [Future Circular Collider](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_Circular_Collider) which, if constructed, would have a center of mass collision energy of \\(10^{14}\\) eV, though [physicists are sceptical](https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/1/22/18192281/cern-large-hadron-collider-future-circular-collider-physics) that any new physics would be discovered by them. One particularly exciting form of new physics that could be discovered would be a particle in their energy range.", "resc": "Resolution will be the average mass listed for the particle by [Particle Data Group](http://pdglive.lbl.gov/Viewer.action) once scientific consensus emerges that the particle observed is a new fundamental particle. If multiple new particles are discovered in the same window of time, the first will be considered to be the first to have been observed, even if it was not known to be a new fundamental particle at the time.\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously if no new fundamental particle is discovered by 2070", "lower_25": "< 100B", "median": "3.03×1013", "upper_75": "5.73×1015", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.140 percentage of people cryopreserved between 2020 and 2050 will be revived by 2200?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of 2019, over 400 people have been cryopreserved ([175 at Alcor](https://www.alcor.org/AboutAlcor/membershipstats.html), [183 at the Cryonics Insitute](https://www.cryonics.org/case-reports/), [71 at KrioRus](https://kriorus.ru/en/cryopreserved%20people)), and many more people are members of cryonics organisations with arrangements to be cryopreserved after their deaths.\n\nCryopreservation currently involves replacing blood with a cryoprotectant and slowly cooling down a body to liquid nitrogen temperatures for long-term storage. The hope is that this preserves enough of the structure of the brain that, with advanced enough future technology, revival will eventually be possible.\n\nChances of revival may also be increasing over time, as [cryopreservation techniques become better](https://waitbutwhy.com/2016/03/cryonics.html) and the institutional knowledge to get people cryopreserved sooner after death develops.\n\nI thus ask to what extent revival will be possible for people preserved in the next 30 years:\n\n**What percentage of people who were initially cryopreserved between 2020 and 2050 will be revived by 2200?**\n\n\"Revival\" means that the person would be able to meet the standard described in [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3382/what-will-the-earliest-preservation-date-of-any-resuscitated-cryonics-patient-be/); either through conducting that specific test, or by some measurement that is equivalent such as official statistics on the health of revived patients.", "lower_25": "0.566", "median": "2.140", "upper_75": "17.600", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 25.6 states will have legalized medical or recreational use of psilocybin before 2045?", "desc": "", "resc": "For a historical comparison, the first initiative proposing legalization of cannabis was in Calfornia in 1972. In 1996, California became the [first state to legalize medical use of cannabis.](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cannabis_in_California) Key figures involved in initiating the \"war on drugs\" have admitted they [lied](https://www.healthline.com/health-news/benefits-of-medical-mushrooms) about important aspects of why that was initiated.\n\nPsilocybin is part of a family of substances illegal in a large majority of countries despite claims of substantial potential [benefits](https://www.healthline.com/health-news/benefits-of-medical-mushrooms) from a growing number of physicians and scientists.\n\nIf the US starts to move towards the legalization of psilocybin, this may be seen as an important [battle](https://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/buchanan-culture-war-speech-speech-text/) in the [\"Culture War\"](https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/the-cannabis-culture-wars/) going on in the United States.\n\nThis question asks: **How many states will legalize medical or recreational use and distribution of psilocybin before 2045?**\n\nRelated questions:\n[Will Oregon vote to legalize medical use of Psilocybin in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3121/will-oregon-vote-to-legalize-medical-use-of-psilocybin-in-2020/#comment-35324)\n\n[Votes for Oregon Psilocybin Program](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4804/votes-for-oregon-psilocybin-program/)\n\nResolution Criteria:\n\nThis question will be judges according to links to articles from the New York Times or Washington Post posted in the comment section.\n\nIf the US ceases to exist as a unified country with 50 states in the current territory of the 50 US states before 2045 this question will be judged as ambiguous. That would be the case for example if there is more than one UN member state in the present territory of the US or most of territory of a US state is ceded to Mexico or Canada.\n\nAdmission of additional states can be handled by just upping the current upper boundary.", "lower_25": "16.7", "median": "25.6", "upper_75": "43.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total expenditures of the United Nations System in 2050 will be 126%?", "desc": "", "resc": "#Context \n\nIn 2018, the United Nations System (the United Nations and its six principal organs) spent approximately 52.78 billion USD on its various operations, as reported in the CEB Financial Statistics database.\n\n#Question\n\n**What will the total expenditures of the United Nations System be for the year 2050, in billions of US dollars?**\n\n#Resolution\n\nResolution is through any of the following sources, in descending order of priority:\n\n- A report from the Chief Executives Board for Coordination\n- A report from another body of the United Nations\n- A statement by a United Nations spokesperson\n- A report by another credible source\n\nIf the United Nations does not exist as an organization in 2050, this question resolves as 0.\n\nIf the United Nations reports its expenditures in a currency other than United States dollars, and the United States dollar is still an internationally recognized currency, the value given will be converted to United States dollars using the UN Operational Rates of Exchange. If the UN Operational Rates of Exchange do not exist at that time, any other method of conversion may be used subject to the discretion of Metaculus admins. \n\nIf the United Nations reports its expenditures in a currency other than United States dollars, and the United States dollar is no longer used internationally, this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "74.7", "median": "126", "upper_75": "186", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Tesla's market capitalization will be greater than $2.5 billion on January 1, 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "In early 2020, US automaker [Tesla, Inc.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tesla,_Inc.) became America's most valuable automobile manufacturer, and [saw its market capitalization eclipse that of GM and Ford combined](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-stocks-tesla/teslas-market-value-zooms-past-that-of-gm-and-ford-combined-idUSKBN1Z72MU), climbing to over $89 billion by January 9 2020.\n\nTesla's stock price continued to rise sharply in the first half of 2020, despite CEO Musk tweeting on May 1 [\"Tesla stock price is too high imo.\"](https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1256239815256797184)\n\nAs of July 12, 2020, Tesla's stock is valued at $1,545 per share, and its market capitalization is $286.33 billion - [making Tesla more valuable than Ford, GM, BMW, Daimler and Volkswagen combined](https://twitter.com/zerohedge/status/1281679937410404352), and [making Elon Musk richer than Warren Buffett.](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-10/elon-musk-rockets-past-warren-buffett-on-billionaires-ranking?sref=DOTC0U32&utm_source=twitter&utm_content=business&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=socialflow-organic&cmpid=socialflow-twitter-business)\n\n***What will Tesla's market capitalization be on January 1, 2030 (in billions USD)?***\n\nThis question will resolve as Tesla's market capitalization as of 00:00 UTC on January 1 2030, in billions of nominal USD. If Tesla is no longer a publicly traded company at that time, this question will resolve ambiguously. If Tesla is acquired or merges with a public company that is at least 2x larger by market cap, this question immediately resolves as ambiguous. Otherwise, all acquisitions and mergers cause the resulting company to be considered Tesla for the purposes of this question (even if it is called something else). If Tesla spins off or sells parts of itself, the admins will decide which part will inherit the Tesla identity or possibly resolve ambiguous; other things being equal, the larger part, or the part that is still called \"Tesla\" (rather than \"Grohmann Automation\" or \"Tesla Energy\", say), should inherit the Tesla identity.", "lower_25": "570", "median": "1.72k", "upper_75": "> 2.5k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Tesla's market capitalization will be greater than $2.5 billion on January 1, 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "In early 2020, US automaker [Tesla, Inc.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tesla,_Inc.) became America's most valuable automobile manufacturer, and [saw its market capitalization eclipse that of GM and Ford combined](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-stocks-tesla/teslas-market-value-zooms-past-that-of-gm-and-ford-combined-idUSKBN1Z72MU), climbing to over $89 billion by January 9 2020.\n\nTesla's stock price continued to rise sharply in the first half of 2020, despite CEO Musk tweeting on May 1 [\"Tesla stock price is too high imo.\"](https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1256239815256797184)\n\nAs of July 12, 2020, Tesla's stock is valued at $1,545 per share, and its market capitalization is $286.33 billion - [making Tesla more valuable than Ford, GM, BMW, Daimler and Volkswagen combined](https://twitter.com/zerohedge/status/1281679937410404352), and [making Elon Musk richer than Warren Buffett.](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-10/elon-musk-rockets-past-warren-buffett-on-billionaires-ranking?sref=DOTC0U32&utm_source=twitter&utm_content=business&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=socialflow-organic&cmpid=socialflow-twitter-business)\n\n***What will Tesla's market capitalization be on January 1, 2030 (in billions USD)?***\n\nThis question will resolve as Tesla's market capitalization as of 00:00 UTC on January 1 2030, in billions of nominal USD. If Tesla is no longer a publicly traded company at that time, this question will resolve ambiguously. If Tesla is acquired or merges with a public company that is at least 2x larger by market cap, this question immediately resolves as ambiguous. Otherwise, all acquisitions and mergers cause the resulting company to be considered Tesla for the purposes of this question (even if it is called something else). If Tesla spins off or sells parts of itself, the admins will decide which part will inherit the Tesla identity or possibly resolve ambiguous; other things being equal, the larger part, or the part that is still called \"Tesla\" (rather than \"Grohmann Automation\" or \"Tesla Energy\", say), should inherit the Tesla identity.", "lower_25": "570", "median": "1.72k", "upper_75": "> 2.5k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that someone will be revived by 2200 if they are cryopreserved using fixatives compared to without, given that cryopreservation using fixatives is available?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Large Mammal BPF Prize](https://www.brainpreservation.org/large-mammal-announcement/) was won in 2018 by a technique called Aldehyde-Stabilized Cryopreservation. ASC uses glutaraldehyde to crosslink the brain's proteins in place; this removes the possibility of restoration of biological function, but protects the tissue from decay due to autolysis or putrefaction. Glutaraldehyde fixation is currently used in neuroscience to prepare brain tissue for electron microscopic and immunofluorescent examination.\n\nAlcor, a major cryonics provider, is skeptical of fixatives and does not currently offer ASC. [Ralph Merkle, writing for Alcor, writes](https://alcor.org/Library/html/does-cryonics-offer-false-hope.html):\n\n> Rather obviously, if you want to cryopreserve someone you'd rather not perfuse them with glutaraldehyde. It's a fixative. On the other hand, if you don't use glutaraldehyde, then you're going to get dehydration and shrinkage, which means you won't get the pretty pictures that neuroscientists like.\n\n> So, what's your preference? Better pictures, or better biological viability? The neuroscientists want the pictures. Alcor has traditionally worked to achieve better biological viability.\n\n> [...] The cryobiological experts who advise Alcor favor the use of Alcor's current protocol (or we would have changed it).\n\nThe Brain Preservation Foundation, which awarded the $80,000 prize for ASC, is more hopeful, claiming that these better pictures make the brain more suitable for eventual resurrection via scanning and uploading.\n\n**What will the value (% of people cryopreserved while fixatives are available, who are cryopreserved using fixatives, who are revived) / (% of people cryopreserved while fixatives are available, who are cryopreserved without using fixatives, who are revived) be at the start of 2200?**\n\nThis counts only the people who are cryopreserved while fixatives are available, so that the question measures only the effect from using fixatives, and not general improvement in cryonics between 1967 and whenever fixatives become available, and from later techniques which would supersede fixatives. \n\n\"Available\" means that a cryonics organisation officially offers cryopreservation using fixatives to its members.\n\n\"Revival\" means that the person would be able to meet the standard described in [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3382/what-will-the-earliest-preservation-date-of-any-resuscitated-cryonics-patient-be/); either through conducting that specific test, or by some measurement that is equivalent such as official statistics on the health of revived patients.\n\nIf nobody is revived from cryopreservation before 2200, or nobody is cryopreserved using fixatives, then this resolves ambiguously. If the only people revived are those who were preserved using fixatives, then this resolves above the upper end of the scale.", "lower_25": "0.912", "median": "16.7", "upper_75": "> 33", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Vladimir Putin will cease to hold the office of President of Russia by 2029?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will Vladimir Putin leave power in Russia?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/954/when-will-vladimir-putin-leave-power-in-russia/) [closed]\n\n----\n\n[Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Putin), born 7 October 1952, is a Russian politician and former intelligence officer who has served as President of Russia since 2012, previously holding the position from 1999 until 2008. He was also the Prime Minister of Russia from 1999 to 2000 and again from 2008 to 2012.\n\nUnder Putin's leadership, Russia has experienced democratic backsliding. Experts do not generally consider Russia to be a democracy, citing jailing of political opponents, curtailed press freedom, and the lack of free and fair elections.\n\nRussia has scored poorly on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index and Freedom House's Freedom in the World index (including a record low 20/100 rating in the 2017 Freedom in the World report, a rating not given since the time of the Soviet Union). Human rights organizations and activists accuse Putin of persecuting political critics and activists as well as ordering them tortured or assassinated; he has rejected accusations of human rights abuses.\n\nIn June 2020, [Putin said he'll consider running for a fifth presidential term in 2024, arguing that the hunt for any successor risks paralyzing Russia's government.](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-21/putin-hints-he-could-seek-a-fifth-term-as-president-in-2024?utm_campaign=socialflow-organic&utm_source=twitter&utm_content=business&utm_medium=social&cmpid=socialflow-twitter-business)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which Vladimir Putin ceases to be President of Russia, whether due to resignation, loss of an election, death in office, incapacity to serve, or removal from office via either a legal process or a coup. \n\nIn the event that while Putin is serving as President, some other individual is temporarily acting as President, e.g. in the event that Putin has to undergo surgery or some other medical procedure, this shall not be considered Putin 'ceasing to be President of Russia' unless Putin has not, within 30 days, resumed his duties as President", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 25.6 states will have legalized medical or recreational use of psilocybin before 2045?", "desc": "", "resc": "For a historical comparison, the first initiative proposing legalization of cannabis was in Calfornia in 1972. In 1996, California became the [first state to legalize medical use of cannabis.](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cannabis_in_California) Key figures involved in initiating the \"war on drugs\" have admitted they [lied](https://www.healthline.com/health-news/benefits-of-medical-mushrooms) about important aspects of why that was initiated.\n\nPsilocybin is part of a family of substances illegal in a large majority of countries despite claims of substantial potential [benefits](https://www.healthline.com/health-news/benefits-of-medical-mushrooms) from a growing number of physicians and scientists.\n\nIf the US starts to move towards the legalization of psilocybin, this may be seen as an important [battle](https://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/buchanan-culture-war-speech-speech-text/) in the [\"Culture War\"](https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/the-cannabis-culture-wars/) going on in the United States.\n\nThis question asks: **How many states will legalize medical or recreational use and distribution of psilocybin before 2045?**\n\nRelated questions:\n[Will Oregon vote to legalize medical use of Psilocybin in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3121/will-oregon-vote-to-legalize-medical-use-of-psilocybin-in-2020/#comment-35324)\n\n[Votes for Oregon Psilocybin Program](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4804/votes-for-oregon-psilocybin-program/)\n\nResolution Criteria:\n\nThis question will be judges according to links to articles from the New York Times or Washington Post posted in the comment section.\n\nIf the US ceases to exist as a unified country with 50 states in the current territory of the 50 US states before 2045 this question will be judged as ambiguous. That would be the case for example if there is more than one UN member state in the present territory of the US or most of territory of a US state is ceded to Mexico or Canada.\n\nAdmission of additional states can be handled by just upping the current upper boundary.", "lower_25": "16.7", "median": "25.6", "upper_75": "43.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a universal flu vaccine will be available by 2036?", "desc": "Although there is a vaccine against influenza, the influenza virus' rapid mutation rate means that the vaccine must be [reformulated each year](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Influenza#Vaccination) in order to protect against the strains that are expected to be most common. The inconvenience of getting a flu vaccine every year may contribute to low flu vaccination coverage (roughly [37% of adults in the US](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/fluvaxview/coverage-1718estimates.htm) in 2017). Furthermore, unlike many other vaccines, the flu vaccine is far from a guarantee of protection, with effectiveness as low as [40%](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/vaccines-work/2019-2020.html), partially because the vaccine only covers the three or four most common strains.\n\nFor at least a decade, various groups such as [BiondVax](http://www.biondvax.com/) and [Distributed Bio](https://www.distributedbio.com/centivax) have been working on a universal flu vaccine, which would not need to be reformulated each year. A highly effective universal flu vaccine combined with a strong vaccination campaign could lead to the flu being virtually eliminated in some places, as with other diseases such as measles and tuberculosis. However, even a moderately effective universal flu vaccine might substantially increase vaccination coverage and reduce flu severity.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date that a universal influenza vaccine is approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration or the European Medicine Agency.\n\nA universal flu vaccine must meet one of the following conditions:\n\n - The vaccine is effective for multiple years. That is, the FDA/EMA endorses that it may be received less than once per year.\n - The vaccine is effective against unseen strains. That is, the FDA/EMA endorses the use of a version of the vaccine that was formulated without using the WHO's current yearly recommended vaccine composition (or any similar yearly recommendation).\n\nBeyond the above conditions, there are no specific requirements on effectiveness. It is acceptable if the universal flu vaccine is recommended in conjunction with, and not as a replacement to, traditional flu vaccines. Since even existing flu vaccines may provide some residual protection against the flu, the vaccine in question must be described or advertised as being universal, broad-spectrum, etc.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 4, 2090, this question will resolve as **> January 4, 2090**", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Vladimir Putin will cease to hold the office of President of Russia by 2029?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will Vladimir Putin leave power in Russia?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/954/when-will-vladimir-putin-leave-power-in-russia/) [closed]\n\n----\n\n[Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Putin), born 7 October 1952, is a Russian politician and former intelligence officer who has served as President of Russia since 2012, previously holding the position from 1999 until 2008. He was also the Prime Minister of Russia from 1999 to 2000 and again from 2008 to 2012.\n\nUnder Putin's leadership, Russia has experienced democratic backsliding. Experts do not generally consider Russia to be a democracy, citing jailing of political opponents, curtailed press freedom, and the lack of free and fair elections.\n\nRussia has scored poorly on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index and Freedom House's Freedom in the World index (including a record low 20/100 rating in the 2017 Freedom in the World report, a rating not given since the time of the Soviet Union). Human rights organizations and activists accuse Putin of persecuting political critics and activists as well as ordering them tortured or assassinated; he has rejected accusations of human rights abuses.\n\nIn June 2020, [Putin said he'll consider running for a fifth presidential term in 2024, arguing that the hunt for any successor risks paralyzing Russia's government.](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-21/putin-hints-he-could-seek-a-fifth-term-as-president-in-2024?utm_campaign=socialflow-organic&utm_source=twitter&utm_content=business&utm_medium=social&cmpid=socialflow-twitter-business)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which Vladimir Putin ceases to be President of Russia, whether due to resignation, loss of an election, death in office, incapacity to serve, or removal from office via either a legal process or a coup. \n\nIn the event that while Putin is serving as President, some other individual is temporarily acting as President, e.g. in the event that Putin has to undergo surgery or some other medical procedure, this shall not be considered Putin 'ceasing to be President of Russia' unless Putin has not, within 30 days, resumed his duties as President", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 45.9k people will die as a result of the most deadly earthquake from 2020 - 2029?", "desc": "On Friday March 11, 2011, the [Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami) hit Japan causing unprecedented economic damage, and killing 15,899 people. Just one year prior, however, the 2010 Haiti earthquake was even more devastating, with a death toll estimated to be 100,000 according to [the U.S. Geological Survey](https://web.archive.org/web/20130507101448/http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/most_destructive.php).\n\nSee [this Wikipedia page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_natural_disasters_by_death_toll#Deadliest_earthquakes) for the deadliest earthquakes in history.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the estimated number of deaths occuring from the most deadly earthquake occurring in the period between January 1, 2020 to January 1, 2030. The resolution will be determined by estimates from the following, when provided within 2 years of the earthquake, and in order of priority,\n\n1. The national government of the nation widely recognized to have been most impacted by the earthquake.\n\n2. The U.S. Geological Survey.\n\n3. The local government widely recognized to have been most impacted by the earthquake.\n\n4. The most prominent scientific study, as determined by having the most citations according to Google Scholar", "lower_25": "45.9k", "median": "74.8k", "upper_75": "137k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global fertility rate will be 2.12 in 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "The age-specific fertility rate is the number of children born per woman per year for women at a specified age. Integrating over a lifetime gives a metric called the [total fertility rate](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#data-quality-definition), which is the average number of children that a woman would have if all the age-specific fertility rates stayed constant. \n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.49 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 5.05 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. The causes of this include more women in education and work, as well as greater access to contraception. \n\nA [recent study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) by researchers at the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation extrapolates trends in education and contraception access and predicts that this decline in fertility rates will continue, reaching 1.33-2.08 in 2100.\n\n**What will the global total fertility rate be in 2050?**\n\nResolution will be by the figure for the year 2050 published by the [UN Population Division](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) or other appropriate branch of the UN/WHO in the first edition released after 2050. If a figure is only available for a range of time of no more than 5 years that includes 2050, resolve at that value. If no such figures are available, then resolve ambiguously.", "lower_25": "1.53", "median": "1.81", "upper_75": "2.12", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Vladimir Putin will cease to hold the office of President of Russia by 2029?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will Vladimir Putin leave power in Russia?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/954/when-will-vladimir-putin-leave-power-in-russia/) [closed]\n\n----\n\n[Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Putin), born 7 October 1952, is a Russian politician and former intelligence officer who has served as President of Russia since 2012, previously holding the position from 1999 until 2008. He was also the Prime Minister of Russia from 1999 to 2000 and again from 2008 to 2012.\n\nUnder Putin's leadership, Russia has experienced democratic backsliding. Experts do not generally consider Russia to be a democracy, citing jailing of political opponents, curtailed press freedom, and the lack of free and fair elections.\n\nRussia has scored poorly on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index and Freedom House's Freedom in the World index (including a record low 20/100 rating in the 2017 Freedom in the World report, a rating not given since the time of the Soviet Union). Human rights organizations and activists accuse Putin of persecuting political critics and activists as well as ordering them tortured or assassinated; he has rejected accusations of human rights abuses.\n\nIn June 2020, [Putin said he'll consider running for a fifth presidential term in 2024, arguing that the hunt for any successor risks paralyzing Russia's government.](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-21/putin-hints-he-could-seek-a-fifth-term-as-president-in-2024?utm_campaign=socialflow-organic&utm_source=twitter&utm_content=business&utm_medium=social&cmpid=socialflow-twitter-business)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which Vladimir Putin ceases to be President of Russia, whether due to resignation, loss of an election, death in office, incapacity to serve, or removal from office via either a legal process or a coup. \n\nIn the event that while Putin is serving as President, some other individual is temporarily acting as President, e.g. in the event that Putin has to undergo surgery or some other medical procedure, this shall not be considered Putin 'ceasing to be President of Russia' unless Putin has not, within 30 days, resumed his duties as President", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global fertility rate will be 2.12 in 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "The age-specific fertility rate is the number of children born per woman per year for women at a specified age. Integrating over a lifetime gives a metric called the [total fertility rate](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#data-quality-definition), which is the average number of children that a woman would have if all the age-specific fertility rates stayed constant. \n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.49 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 5.05 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. The causes of this include more women in education and work, as well as greater access to contraception. \n\nA [recent study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) by researchers at the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation extrapolates trends in education and contraception access and predicts that this decline in fertility rates will continue, reaching 1.33-2.08 in 2100.\n\n**What will the global total fertility rate be in 2050?**\n\nResolution will be by the figure for the year 2050 published by the [UN Population Division](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) or other appropriate branch of the UN/WHO in the first edition released after 2050. If a figure is only available for a range of time of no more than 5 years that includes 2050, resolve at that value. If no such figures are available, then resolve ambiguously.", "lower_25": "1.53", "median": "1.81", "upper_75": "2.12", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that virtual reality headset sales will exceed 10 million units per year by Jul 2024?", "desc": "After decades of being relegated to niche industries and a [failed first wave](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_reality#1970%E2%80%931990) in the 1990s, virtual reality has once again emerged in the last decade as a promising consumer product. With the launch of the Oculus Rift, HTC Vive, and PSVR in 2016, and continued investment by companies such as Facebook, Sony and Valve, virtual reality headsets are now experiencing a second wave of popularity. However, at this time VR headsets remain a relatively niche product; [total PSVR sales](https://uploadvr.com/psvr-sales-analysis/) are estimated at about 5 million or 5% of PS4 sales, Oculus Quest sales were estimated at [less than 1 million](https://qz.com/1739575/strong-oculus-quest-sales-boost-facebooks-non-advertising-revenue/) late last year, etc.", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, a virtual reality headset has the following characteristics:\n\n- It is a headset, i.e. a device that attaches to one's head and displays content in front of one's eyes, rather than e.g. a neural chip or a holodeck room.\n- It is virtual reality, i.e. in primary usage it completely or almost completely occludes the outside world, rather than laying an image over it as in augmented reality.\n- It must have 6 degrees of freedom (6DoF tracking); that is, it must track both the 3-dimensional direction that the user is facing, and the 3-dimensional location of the user.\n- It must either be bundled with hand controllers which are similarly 6DoF-tracked, or such compatible controllers must be sold separately (first-party, not from an aftermarket manufacturer). In particular, PSVR qualifies due to the PS Move controllers. 6DoF hand-tracking without physical controllers may qualify only if it is sufficiently precise that it can recognize individual finger motions accurately enough to play 2016 VR games, as judged by the admins.\n- Phone adapters, etc. do not count (even if they had 6DoF tracking); the device in question must be marketed primarily as a headset.\n- There are no further restrictions on price, feature set, method of tracking, tethered vs. standalone, or computing power.\n\nFor clarity, the following current headsets qualify: HTC Vive family, Oculus Rift family, Oculus Quest, Valve Index, PSVR, Windows MR. The following headsets do not qualify: Oculus Go, Samsung Gear VR, Google Cardboard/Daydream, Magic Leap One, Microsoft Hololens.\n\nThis question will resolve as the first date in which it is determined that 10 million VR headsets were sold up to that date, in that year. Sales will not be prorated over time; for example, if a report indicates that 5 million headsets were sold in 2027, and 20 million were sold in 2028, this question will resolve as December 31, 2028. If a manufacturer says that 12 million headsets were sold in Q1-Q3, this question will resolve as the end of Q3, or September 30.\n\nSales may be computed by adding reports from different manufacturers, or from credible estimates from e.g. analytics firms such as Nielsen SuperData. However, note that any estimate combining multiple headsets must clearly include *only* qualifying headsets; an estimate of \"VR headsets\" in general may include many non-qualifying headsets. If a single source reports X total sales at the end of 2025 and Y total sales at the end of 2026, Y-X may be taken as the sales numbers for 2026, but this can only be done with two estimates from the same source, not different sources", "lower_25": "Sep 2023", "median": "Jul 2024", "upper_75": "Jul 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 9.87 percentage of vehicles on US roads will be fully electric by 2030?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will electric cars constitute over 5% of the US passenger car fleet?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3658/when-will-electric-cars-constitute-over-5-of-the-us-passenger-car-fleet/)\n- [How many new electric vehicles will be registered worldwide, in the calendar year 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3542/how-many-new-electric-vehicles-will-be-registered-worldwide-in-the-calendar-year-2023/)\n\n----\n\nIn 2018 there were just over 1 million electric vehicles on American roads, a milestone for the industry that took eight years to arrive at. As EV popularity and manufacturing capacity trend upward, the [Edison Electric Institute](https://www.edisonfoundation.net/en/publications/publications?category=Report) [predicts](https://www.edisonfoundation.net/-/media/Files/IEI/publications/IEI_EEI-EV-Forecast-Report_Nov2018.ashx) the jump to the next million US EV's will only require three years, expecting that number to climb to 18.7 million by 2030. With [273.6 million vehicles](https://www.statista.com/statistics/183505/number-of-vehicles-in-the-united-states-since-1990/#:~:text=How%20many%20registered%20motor%20vehicles,at%206.3%20million%20in%202016.) registered in the US in 2018, EV's then represented .36% of the vehicles on the road. The Edison Institute predicts that number will rise to 7% by 2030.\n\nMany electric vehicle batteries rely on lithium to run, and analysts are speculating on the potential impacts of the coronavirus on the supply of lithium batteries as an intervening factor in the industry's growth. Chinese suppliers produced 79% of the lithium hydroxide used in all electric vehicles in 2019. With the rise of the pandemic, Chinese battery manufacturers have limited or stopped all production and lithium prices are beginning to rise. \n\n[Forbes reports](https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2020/03/25/manufacturers-are-struggling-to-supply-electric-vehicles-with-batteries/#15708fd91ff3): \n\n> While most of the manufacturers have already restarted their production, the outbreak is estimated to set Chinese battery producers back by 26GWh of output in 2020.This halt in production has created supply shortages for western carmakers, as automakers, such as Fiat Chrysler, PSA Group, General Motors, Daimler and Ford, have their plants in the province of Hubei, where the Coronavirus took its first hit.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of US cars on the road that are fully electric, according to the number of EV's reported by [ZSW Data service](https://www.zsw-bw.de/mediathek/datenservice.html) and the total number of US vehicles reported by [Statista](https://www.statista.com/statistics/183505/number-of-vehicles-in-the-united-states-since-1990/#:~:text=How%20many%20registered%20motor%20vehicles,at%206.3%20million%20in%202016.). Should these services be discontinued, comparable credible sources will be utilized in their place, as determined by Metaculus admins", "lower_25": "6.23", "median": "9.87", "upper_75": "16.10", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Tesla's market capitalization will be greater than $2.5 billion on January 1, 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "In early 2020, US automaker [Tesla, Inc.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tesla,_Inc.) became America's most valuable automobile manufacturer, and [saw its market capitalization eclipse that of GM and Ford combined](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-stocks-tesla/teslas-market-value-zooms-past-that-of-gm-and-ford-combined-idUSKBN1Z72MU), climbing to over $89 billion by January 9 2020.\n\nTesla's stock price continued to rise sharply in the first half of 2020, despite CEO Musk tweeting on May 1 [\"Tesla stock price is too high imo.\"](https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/1256239815256797184)\n\nAs of July 12, 2020, Tesla's stock is valued at $1,545 per share, and its market capitalization is $286.33 billion - [making Tesla more valuable than Ford, GM, BMW, Daimler and Volkswagen combined](https://twitter.com/zerohedge/status/1281679937410404352), and [making Elon Musk richer than Warren Buffett.](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-10/elon-musk-rockets-past-warren-buffett-on-billionaires-ranking?sref=DOTC0U32&utm_source=twitter&utm_content=business&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=socialflow-organic&cmpid=socialflow-twitter-business)\n\n***What will Tesla's market capitalization be on January 1, 2030 (in billions USD)?***\n\nThis question will resolve as Tesla's market capitalization as of 00:00 UTC on January 1 2030, in billions of nominal USD. If Tesla is no longer a publicly traded company at that time, this question will resolve ambiguously. If Tesla is acquired or merges with a public company that is at least 2x larger by market cap, this question immediately resolves as ambiguous. Otherwise, all acquisitions and mergers cause the resulting company to be considered Tesla for the purposes of this question (even if it is called something else). If Tesla spins off or sells parts of itself, the admins will decide which part will inherit the Tesla identity or possibly resolve ambiguous; other things being equal, the larger part, or the part that is still called \"Tesla\" (rather than \"Grohmann Automation\" or \"Tesla Energy\", say), should inherit the Tesla identity.", "lower_25": "570", "median": "1.72k", "upper_75": "> 2.5k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 45.9k people will die as a result of the most deadly earthquake from 2020 - 2029?", "desc": "On Friday March 11, 2011, the [Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami) hit Japan causing unprecedented economic damage, and killing 15,899 people. Just one year prior, however, the 2010 Haiti earthquake was even more devastating, with a death toll estimated to be 100,000 according to [the U.S. Geological Survey](https://web.archive.org/web/20130507101448/http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/most_destructive.php).\n\nSee [this Wikipedia page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_natural_disasters_by_death_toll#Deadliest_earthquakes) for the deadliest earthquakes in history.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the estimated number of deaths occuring from the most deadly earthquake occurring in the period between January 1, 2020 to January 1, 2030. The resolution will be determined by estimates from the following, when provided within 2 years of the earthquake, and in order of priority,\n\n1. The national government of the nation widely recognized to have been most impacted by the earthquake.\n\n2. The U.S. Geological Survey.\n\n3. The local government widely recognized to have been most impacted by the earthquake.\n\n4. The most prominent scientific study, as determined by having the most citations according to Google Scholar", "lower_25": "45.9k", "median": "74.8k", "upper_75": "137k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 25.6 states will have legalized medical or recreational use of psilocybin before 2045?", "desc": "", "resc": "For a historical comparison, the first initiative proposing legalization of cannabis was in Calfornia in 1972. In 1996, California became the [first state to legalize medical use of cannabis.](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cannabis_in_California) Key figures involved in initiating the \"war on drugs\" have admitted they [lied](https://www.healthline.com/health-news/benefits-of-medical-mushrooms) about important aspects of why that was initiated.\n\nPsilocybin is part of a family of substances illegal in a large majority of countries despite claims of substantial potential [benefits](https://www.healthline.com/health-news/benefits-of-medical-mushrooms) from a growing number of physicians and scientists.\n\nIf the US starts to move towards the legalization of psilocybin, this may be seen as an important [battle](https://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/buchanan-culture-war-speech-speech-text/) in the [\"Culture War\"](https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/the-cannabis-culture-wars/) going on in the United States.\n\nThis question asks: **How many states will legalize medical or recreational use and distribution of psilocybin before 2045?**\n\nRelated questions:\n[Will Oregon vote to legalize medical use of Psilocybin in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3121/will-oregon-vote-to-legalize-medical-use-of-psilocybin-in-2020/#comment-35324)\n\n[Votes for Oregon Psilocybin Program](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4804/votes-for-oregon-psilocybin-program/)\n\nResolution Criteria:\n\nThis question will be judges according to links to articles from the New York Times or Washington Post posted in the comment section.\n\nIf the US ceases to exist as a unified country with 50 states in the current territory of the 50 US states before 2045 this question will be judged as ambiguous. That would be the case for example if there is more than one UN member state in the present territory of the US or most of territory of a US state is ceded to Mexico or Canada.\n\nAdmission of additional states can be handled by just upping the current upper boundary.", "lower_25": "16.7", "median": "25.6", "upper_75": "43.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that virtual reality headset sales will exceed 10 million units per year by Jul 2024?", "desc": "After decades of being relegated to niche industries and a [failed first wave](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_reality#1970%E2%80%931990) in the 1990s, virtual reality has once again emerged in the last decade as a promising consumer product. With the launch of the Oculus Rift, HTC Vive, and PSVR in 2016, and continued investment by companies such as Facebook, Sony and Valve, virtual reality headsets are now experiencing a second wave of popularity. However, at this time VR headsets remain a relatively niche product; [total PSVR sales](https://uploadvr.com/psvr-sales-analysis/) are estimated at about 5 million or 5% of PS4 sales, Oculus Quest sales were estimated at [less than 1 million](https://qz.com/1739575/strong-oculus-quest-sales-boost-facebooks-non-advertising-revenue/) late last year, etc.", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, a virtual reality headset has the following characteristics:\n\n- It is a headset, i.e. a device that attaches to one's head and displays content in front of one's eyes, rather than e.g. a neural chip or a holodeck room.\n- It is virtual reality, i.e. in primary usage it completely or almost completely occludes the outside world, rather than laying an image over it as in augmented reality.\n- It must have 6 degrees of freedom (6DoF tracking); that is, it must track both the 3-dimensional direction that the user is facing, and the 3-dimensional location of the user.\n- It must either be bundled with hand controllers which are similarly 6DoF-tracked, or such compatible controllers must be sold separately (first-party, not from an aftermarket manufacturer). In particular, PSVR qualifies due to the PS Move controllers. 6DoF hand-tracking without physical controllers may qualify only if it is sufficiently precise that it can recognize individual finger motions accurately enough to play 2016 VR games, as judged by the admins.\n- Phone adapters, etc. do not count (even if they had 6DoF tracking); the device in question must be marketed primarily as a headset.\n- There are no further restrictions on price, feature set, method of tracking, tethered vs. standalone, or computing power.\n\nFor clarity, the following current headsets qualify: HTC Vive family, Oculus Rift family, Oculus Quest, Valve Index, PSVR, Windows MR. The following headsets do not qualify: Oculus Go, Samsung Gear VR, Google Cardboard/Daydream, Magic Leap One, Microsoft Hololens.\n\nThis question will resolve as the first date in which it is determined that 10 million VR headsets were sold up to that date, in that year. Sales will not be prorated over time; for example, if a report indicates that 5 million headsets were sold in 2027, and 20 million were sold in 2028, this question will resolve as December 31, 2028. If a manufacturer says that 12 million headsets were sold in Q1-Q3, this question will resolve as the end of Q3, or September 30.\n\nSales may be computed by adding reports from different manufacturers, or from credible estimates from e.g. analytics firms such as Nielsen SuperData. However, note that any estimate combining multiple headsets must clearly include *only* qualifying headsets; an estimate of \"VR headsets\" in general may include many non-qualifying headsets. If a single source reports X total sales at the end of 2025 and Y total sales at the end of 2026, Y-X may be taken as the sales numbers for 2026, but this can only be done with two estimates from the same source, not different sources", "lower_25": "Sep 2023", "median": "Jul 2024", "upper_75": "Jul 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global fertility rate will be 2.12 in 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "The age-specific fertility rate is the number of children born per woman per year for women at a specified age. Integrating over a lifetime gives a metric called the [total fertility rate](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#data-quality-definition), which is the average number of children that a woman would have if all the age-specific fertility rates stayed constant. \n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.49 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 5.05 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. The causes of this include more women in education and work, as well as greater access to contraception. \n\nA [recent study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) by researchers at the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation extrapolates trends in education and contraception access and predicts that this decline in fertility rates will continue, reaching 1.33-2.08 in 2100.\n\n**What will the global total fertility rate be in 2050?**\n\nResolution will be by the figure for the year 2050 published by the [UN Population Division](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) or other appropriate branch of the UN/WHO in the first edition released after 2050. If a figure is only available for a range of time of no more than 5 years that includes 2050, resolve at that value. If no such figures are available, then resolve ambiguously.", "lower_25": "1.53", "median": "1.81", "upper_75": "2.12", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that virtual reality headset sales will exceed 10 million units per year by Jul 2024?", "desc": "After decades of being relegated to niche industries and a [failed first wave](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_reality#1970%E2%80%931990) in the 1990s, virtual reality has once again emerged in the last decade as a promising consumer product. With the launch of the Oculus Rift, HTC Vive, and PSVR in 2016, and continued investment by companies such as Facebook, Sony and Valve, virtual reality headsets are now experiencing a second wave of popularity. However, at this time VR headsets remain a relatively niche product; [total PSVR sales](https://uploadvr.com/psvr-sales-analysis/) are estimated at about 5 million or 5% of PS4 sales, Oculus Quest sales were estimated at [less than 1 million](https://qz.com/1739575/strong-oculus-quest-sales-boost-facebooks-non-advertising-revenue/) late last year, etc.", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, a virtual reality headset has the following characteristics:\n\n- It is a headset, i.e. a device that attaches to one's head and displays content in front of one's eyes, rather than e.g. a neural chip or a holodeck room.\n- It is virtual reality, i.e. in primary usage it completely or almost completely occludes the outside world, rather than laying an image over it as in augmented reality.\n- It must have 6 degrees of freedom (6DoF tracking); that is, it must track both the 3-dimensional direction that the user is facing, and the 3-dimensional location of the user.\n- It must either be bundled with hand controllers which are similarly 6DoF-tracked, or such compatible controllers must be sold separately (first-party, not from an aftermarket manufacturer). In particular, PSVR qualifies due to the PS Move controllers. 6DoF hand-tracking without physical controllers may qualify only if it is sufficiently precise that it can recognize individual finger motions accurately enough to play 2016 VR games, as judged by the admins.\n- Phone adapters, etc. do not count (even if they had 6DoF tracking); the device in question must be marketed primarily as a headset.\n- There are no further restrictions on price, feature set, method of tracking, tethered vs. standalone, or computing power.\n\nFor clarity, the following current headsets qualify: HTC Vive family, Oculus Rift family, Oculus Quest, Valve Index, PSVR, Windows MR. The following headsets do not qualify: Oculus Go, Samsung Gear VR, Google Cardboard/Daydream, Magic Leap One, Microsoft Hololens.\n\nThis question will resolve as the first date in which it is determined that 10 million VR headsets were sold up to that date, in that year. Sales will not be prorated over time; for example, if a report indicates that 5 million headsets were sold in 2027, and 20 million were sold in 2028, this question will resolve as December 31, 2028. If a manufacturer says that 12 million headsets were sold in Q1-Q3, this question will resolve as the end of Q3, or September 30.\n\nSales may be computed by adding reports from different manufacturers, or from credible estimates from e.g. analytics firms such as Nielsen SuperData. However, note that any estimate combining multiple headsets must clearly include *only* qualifying headsets; an estimate of \"VR headsets\" in general may include many non-qualifying headsets. If a single source reports X total sales at the end of 2025 and Y total sales at the end of 2026, Y-X may be taken as the sales numbers for 2026, but this can only be done with two estimates from the same source, not different sources", "lower_25": "Sep 2023", "median": "Jul 2024", "upper_75": "Jul 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 45.9k people will die as a result of the most deadly earthquake from 2020 - 2029?", "desc": "On Friday March 11, 2011, the [Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_T%C5%8Dhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami) hit Japan causing unprecedented economic damage, and killing 15,899 people. Just one year prior, however, the 2010 Haiti earthquake was even more devastating, with a death toll estimated to be 100,000 according to [the U.S. Geological Survey](https://web.archive.org/web/20130507101448/http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/most_destructive.php).\n\nSee [this Wikipedia page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_natural_disasters_by_death_toll#Deadliest_earthquakes) for the deadliest earthquakes in history.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the estimated number of deaths occuring from the most deadly earthquake occurring in the period between January 1, 2020 to January 1, 2030. The resolution will be determined by estimates from the following, when provided within 2 years of the earthquake, and in order of priority,\n\n1. The national government of the nation widely recognized to have been most impacted by the earthquake.\n\n2. The U.S. Geological Survey.\n\n3. The local government widely recognized to have been most impacted by the earthquake.\n\n4. The most prominent scientific study, as determined by having the most citations according to Google Scholar", "lower_25": "45.9k", "median": "74.8k", "upper_75": "137k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that evidence of successful synthesis of the element ununennium will be published by 2034?", "desc": "", "resc": "Currently, the heaviest known element is [oganesson](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oganesson), with 118 protons. It was first synthesised in 2002 by the [Joint Institute for Nuclear Research](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Institute_for_Nuclear_Research), by firing calcium-48 ions at a californium-249 target; these results were unconfirmed at the time and announced later after more experiments, in 2006, at which point three or four atoms of oganesson had been observed. It was [officially recognised](https://iupac.org/discovery-and-assignment-of-elements-with-atomic-numbers-113-115-117-and-118/) by the IUPAC in 2015 and [named oganesson](https://iupac.org/iupac-is-naming-the-four-new-elements-nihonium-moscovium-tennessine-and-oganesson/) in 2016. \n\nHeavier, with 119 protons, is ununennium. Past experiments to synthesise ununennium have been unsuccessful, with no ununennium atoms being measured, though experiments have been performed at [RIKEN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riken) since 2018 and are planned at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in late 2020.\n\nUnunennium is even harder to synthesise than oganesson because it has a shorter half-life (estimated to be on the order of 10 microseconds, compared to the 700 microseconds for the [oganesson-294](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isotopes_of_oganesson#Oganesson-294) isotope first observed), and because the reactions that theoretically produce ununennium involve heavier elements themselves and have small cross sections for ununennium production.\n\n**When will evidence of successful synthesis of the element ununennium be published?**\n\nResolution will be the date of publication of the first paper that the IUPAC considers to meet the criteria for discovery of ununennium. If no announcement is made by the resolution date, then this resolves above the upper end of the scale.\n\nFor example, a corresponding question for oganesson would have resolved at 9th October 2006 as per [this IUPAC technical report](http://publications.iupac.org/pac/pdf/2011/pdf/8307x1485.pdf).", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.140 percentage of people cryopreserved between 2020 and 2050 will be revived by 2200?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of 2019, over 400 people have been cryopreserved ([175 at Alcor](https://www.alcor.org/AboutAlcor/membershipstats.html), [183 at the Cryonics Insitute](https://www.cryonics.org/case-reports/), [71 at KrioRus](https://kriorus.ru/en/cryopreserved%20people)), and many more people are members of cryonics organisations with arrangements to be cryopreserved after their deaths.\n\nCryopreservation currently involves replacing blood with a cryoprotectant and slowly cooling down a body to liquid nitrogen temperatures for long-term storage. The hope is that this preserves enough of the structure of the brain that, with advanced enough future technology, revival will eventually be possible.\n\nChances of revival may also be increasing over time, as [cryopreservation techniques become better](https://waitbutwhy.com/2016/03/cryonics.html) and the institutional knowledge to get people cryopreserved sooner after death develops.\n\nI thus ask to what extent revival will be possible for people preserved in the next 30 years:\n\n**What percentage of people who were initially cryopreserved between 2020 and 2050 will be revived by 2200?**\n\n\"Revival\" means that the person would be able to meet the standard described in [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3382/what-will-the-earliest-preservation-date-of-any-resuscitated-cryonics-patient-be/); either through conducting that specific test, or by some measurement that is equivalent such as official statistics on the health of revived patients.", "lower_25": "0.566", "median": "2.140", "upper_75": "17.600", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that evidence of successful synthesis of the element ununennium will be published by 2034?", "desc": "", "resc": "Currently, the heaviest known element is [oganesson](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oganesson), with 118 protons. It was first synthesised in 2002 by the [Joint Institute for Nuclear Research](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Institute_for_Nuclear_Research), by firing calcium-48 ions at a californium-249 target; these results were unconfirmed at the time and announced later after more experiments, in 2006, at which point three or four atoms of oganesson had been observed. It was [officially recognised](https://iupac.org/discovery-and-assignment-of-elements-with-atomic-numbers-113-115-117-and-118/) by the IUPAC in 2015 and [named oganesson](https://iupac.org/iupac-is-naming-the-four-new-elements-nihonium-moscovium-tennessine-and-oganesson/) in 2016. \n\nHeavier, with 119 protons, is ununennium. Past experiments to synthesise ununennium have been unsuccessful, with no ununennium atoms being measured, though experiments have been performed at [RIKEN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riken) since 2018 and are planned at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in late 2020.\n\nUnunennium is even harder to synthesise than oganesson because it has a shorter half-life (estimated to be on the order of 10 microseconds, compared to the 700 microseconds for the [oganesson-294](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isotopes_of_oganesson#Oganesson-294) isotope first observed), and because the reactions that theoretically produce ununennium involve heavier elements themselves and have small cross sections for ununennium production.\n\n**When will evidence of successful synthesis of the element ununennium be published?**\n\nResolution will be the date of publication of the first paper that the IUPAC considers to meet the criteria for discovery of ununennium. If no announcement is made by the resolution date, then this resolves above the upper end of the scale.\n\nFor example, a corresponding question for oganesson would have resolved at 9th October 2006 as per [this IUPAC technical report](http://publications.iupac.org/pac/pdf/2011/pdf/8307x1485.pdf).", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that evidence of successful synthesis of the element ununennium will be published by 2034?", "desc": "", "resc": "Currently, the heaviest known element is [oganesson](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oganesson), with 118 protons. It was first synthesised in 2002 by the [Joint Institute for Nuclear Research](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Institute_for_Nuclear_Research), by firing calcium-48 ions at a californium-249 target; these results were unconfirmed at the time and announced later after more experiments, in 2006, at which point three or four atoms of oganesson had been observed. It was [officially recognised](https://iupac.org/discovery-and-assignment-of-elements-with-atomic-numbers-113-115-117-and-118/) by the IUPAC in 2015 and [named oganesson](https://iupac.org/iupac-is-naming-the-four-new-elements-nihonium-moscovium-tennessine-and-oganesson/) in 2016. \n\nHeavier, with 119 protons, is ununennium. Past experiments to synthesise ununennium have been unsuccessful, with no ununennium atoms being measured, though experiments have been performed at [RIKEN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riken) since 2018 and are planned at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in late 2020.\n\nUnunennium is even harder to synthesise than oganesson because it has a shorter half-life (estimated to be on the order of 10 microseconds, compared to the 700 microseconds for the [oganesson-294](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isotopes_of_oganesson#Oganesson-294) isotope first observed), and because the reactions that theoretically produce ununennium involve heavier elements themselves and have small cross sections for ununennium production.\n\n**When will evidence of successful synthesis of the element ununennium be published?**\n\nResolution will be the date of publication of the first paper that the IUPAC considers to meet the criteria for discovery of ununennium. If no announcement is made by the resolution date, then this resolves above the upper end of the scale.\n\nFor example, a corresponding question for oganesson would have resolved at 9th October 2006 as per [this IUPAC technical report](http://publications.iupac.org/pac/pdf/2011/pdf/8307x1485.pdf).", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "In the 2024 US presidential election, what is the chance that 50.27% of states will use plurality voting methods to choose their electors?", "desc": "The president of the United States is chosen by the [electoral college](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Electoral_College#Summary), a group of 538 electors drawn from the 50 states plus Washington DC. In the rest of this question, references to states also refer to Washington DC.\n\nThese electors are chosen by voting within each state. Historically this has been done by means of a [plurality vote](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plurality_voting) within the state, with the following exeptions:\n\n- [Maine and Nebraska have historically used a congressional district method](https://www.bustle.com/articles/191238-what-is-the-congressional-district-method-maine-nebraska-do-things-differently), which amounts to plurality voting within districts, meaning that the state's electors may not all be from the same party.\n\n- [Maine plans, in 2020](https://thefulcrum.us/voting/maine-ranked-choice-voting), to use a ranked choice voting method called [Instant Runoff](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting) in the presidential election.\n\nPlurality voting (also known as \"First-Past-The-Post\" voting) is notable for being the [worst voting method](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254419149_And_the_loser_is_Plurality_Voting) according to voting experts.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US states (including the District of Columbia) which use a [plurality voting system](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-past-the-post_voting) to determine the candidate which recieves the votes of their state's electors. For example, in 2016, this question would have resolved as 51. \n\nStates which separate their electoral college votes by congressional district will be considered to use plurality voting if their constituent districts employ a plurality voting method in those districts. Any state which uses an alternative voting method in their state, or uses more than one method in different locations will be considered to **not** use plurality voting.\n\nIf the electoral college is not used in 2024, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIf the number of states (plus DC), changes, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous** (DC's status as a state will not impact this question)", "lower_25": "48.25", "median": "49.40", "upper_75": "50.27", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Manhattan/Apollo project toward AGI will be launched by Aug 2025?", "desc": "It is widely agreed amongst experts that Artificial General Intelligence — an AI that can flexibly and effectively perform a very wide range of cognitive tasks at least as well as humans — would represent a dramatic advance in power and capability for their developer. This has led to both speculation and concern that, recognizing this, countries or companies might launch \"Manhattan project\" style efforts to develop it. While shortening the timeline, these could easily lead to a race condition that compromises safety or alignment, or leads to adversarial dynamics during development. \n\nA [2020 paper](http://dmip.webs.upv.es/EPAI2020/papers/EPAI_2020_paper_11.pdf?fbclid=IwAR15Z0CMX4rBBUJEHhn6NdcMK2ZCF07pPpkcmfD36_oEI9WhV310bRkbaiQ) analyzes this issue in some detail, focusing on the \"lead up\" to a Manhattan/Apollo project: what understanding must be in place be \"on the runway\"?", "resc": "This question resolves to the date that a project that meets the following criteria is launched:\n\n1. It has a stated aim to develop broad-purpose artificial intelligence system(s); and\n\n2. It is constituted so as to generate a single \"flagship\" system or small number of related systems (rather than a diverse portfolio of more narrowly-purposed ones); and\n\n3. There is a research and engineering budget under the direct control of a single (executive or board) project lead with a budget exceeding the equivalent of $10B in 2020 USD.", "lower_25": "Aug 2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2044", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Manhattan/Apollo project toward AGI will be launched by Aug 2025?", "desc": "It is widely agreed amongst experts that Artificial General Intelligence — an AI that can flexibly and effectively perform a very wide range of cognitive tasks at least as well as humans — would represent a dramatic advance in power and capability for their developer. This has led to both speculation and concern that, recognizing this, countries or companies might launch \"Manhattan project\" style efforts to develop it. While shortening the timeline, these could easily lead to a race condition that compromises safety or alignment, or leads to adversarial dynamics during development. \n\nA [2020 paper](http://dmip.webs.upv.es/EPAI2020/papers/EPAI_2020_paper_11.pdf?fbclid=IwAR15Z0CMX4rBBUJEHhn6NdcMK2ZCF07pPpkcmfD36_oEI9WhV310bRkbaiQ) analyzes this issue in some detail, focusing on the \"lead up\" to a Manhattan/Apollo project: what understanding must be in place be \"on the runway\"?", "resc": "This question resolves to the date that a project that meets the following criteria is launched:\n\n1. It has a stated aim to develop broad-purpose artificial intelligence system(s); and\n\n2. It is constituted so as to generate a single \"flagship\" system or small number of related systems (rather than a diverse portfolio of more narrowly-purposed ones); and\n\n3. There is a research and engineering budget under the direct control of a single (executive or board) project lead with a budget exceeding the equivalent of $10B in 2020 USD.", "lower_25": "Aug 2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2044", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Climeworks will sell 370 million dollars worth of negative emissions by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": ">Stripe, a financial-services company, [committed last year](https://stripe.com/blog/negative-emissions-commitment) to spending at least $1M/year on negative emissions and carbon storage technologies, at any price, with the aim of helping these technologies develop.\n\n>They recently wrote up [a summary](https://stripe.com/blog/first-negative-emissions-purchases) of their first set of these purchases.\n\n>This miniseries aims to predict the success of the companies that Stripe chose.\n\nStripe has purchased 322.5 tons of negative emissions from Climeworks at $775 per ton.\n\n[Climeworks](https://www.climeworks.com/) uses renewable geothermal energy and waste heat to capture CO2 directly from the air, concentrate it, and permanently sequester it underground in basaltic rock formations with Carbfix. Their own price target in the long-term is $100-$200 per ton.\n\n**This question asks:**\n> On 2030/7/1, what price will Climeworks charge to permanently capture and store one ton of CO2?\n\nThis question will resolve as the price per ton, in $USD charged by Climeworks for a 1kT purchase, payable immediately, of negative emissions using broadly similar1 technology to that described above. \n\nIf Climeworks has merged with or been acquired by a different company, but that company is still selling negative emissions which make use of broadly similar* technology to that described above, this question resolves as the price that company charges.\n\nIf neither of the above resolutions are possible, either because Climeworks has switched to a very different negative emissions technology, or because it no longer exists, this question will resolve as ambiguous.\n\n*As judged by a metaculus admin.", "lower_25": "133", "median": "232", "upper_75": "370", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Climeworks will sell 370 million dollars worth of negative emissions by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": ">Stripe, a financial-services company, [committed last year](https://stripe.com/blog/negative-emissions-commitment) to spending at least $1M/year on negative emissions and carbon storage technologies, at any price, with the aim of helping these technologies develop.\n\n>They recently wrote up [a summary](https://stripe.com/blog/first-negative-emissions-purchases) of their first set of these purchases.\n\n>This miniseries aims to predict the success of the companies that Stripe chose.\n\nStripe has purchased 322.5 tons of negative emissions from Climeworks at $775 per ton.\n\n[Climeworks](https://www.climeworks.com/) uses renewable geothermal energy and waste heat to capture CO2 directly from the air, concentrate it, and permanently sequester it underground in basaltic rock formations with Carbfix. Their own price target in the long-term is $100-$200 per ton.\n\n**This question asks:**\n> On 2030/7/1, what price will Climeworks charge to permanently capture and store one ton of CO2?\n\nThis question will resolve as the price per ton, in $USD charged by Climeworks for a 1kT purchase, payable immediately, of negative emissions using broadly similar1 technology to that described above. \n\nIf Climeworks has merged with or been acquired by a different company, but that company is still selling negative emissions which make use of broadly similar* technology to that described above, this question resolves as the price that company charges.\n\nIf neither of the above resolutions are possible, either because Climeworks has switched to a very different negative emissions technology, or because it no longer exists, this question will resolve as ambiguous.\n\n*As judged by a metaculus admin.", "lower_25": "133", "median": "232", "upper_75": "370", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "In the 2024 US presidential election, what is the chance that 50.27% of states will use plurality voting methods to choose their electors?", "desc": "The president of the United States is chosen by the [electoral college](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Electoral_College#Summary), a group of 538 electors drawn from the 50 states plus Washington DC. In the rest of this question, references to states also refer to Washington DC.\n\nThese electors are chosen by voting within each state. Historically this has been done by means of a [plurality vote](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plurality_voting) within the state, with the following exeptions:\n\n- [Maine and Nebraska have historically used a congressional district method](https://www.bustle.com/articles/191238-what-is-the-congressional-district-method-maine-nebraska-do-things-differently), which amounts to plurality voting within districts, meaning that the state's electors may not all be from the same party.\n\n- [Maine plans, in 2020](https://thefulcrum.us/voting/maine-ranked-choice-voting), to use a ranked choice voting method called [Instant Runoff](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting) in the presidential election.\n\nPlurality voting (also known as \"First-Past-The-Post\" voting) is notable for being the [worst voting method](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254419149_And_the_loser_is_Plurality_Voting) according to voting experts.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US states (including the District of Columbia) which use a [plurality voting system](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-past-the-post_voting) to determine the candidate which recieves the votes of their state's electors. For example, in 2016, this question would have resolved as 51. \n\nStates which separate their electoral college votes by congressional district will be considered to use plurality voting if their constituent districts employ a plurality voting method in those districts. Any state which uses an alternative voting method in their state, or uses more than one method in different locations will be considered to **not** use plurality voting.\n\nIf the electoral college is not used in 2024, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIf the number of states (plus DC), changes, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous** (DC's status as a state will not impact this question)", "lower_25": "48.25", "median": "49.40", "upper_75": "50.27", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Climeworks will sell 370 million dollars worth of negative emissions by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": ">Stripe, a financial-services company, [committed last year](https://stripe.com/blog/negative-emissions-commitment) to spending at least $1M/year on negative emissions and carbon storage technologies, at any price, with the aim of helping these technologies develop.\n\n>They recently wrote up [a summary](https://stripe.com/blog/first-negative-emissions-purchases) of their first set of these purchases.\n\n>This miniseries aims to predict the success of the companies that Stripe chose.\n\nStripe has purchased 322.5 tons of negative emissions from Climeworks at $775 per ton.\n\n[Climeworks](https://www.climeworks.com/) uses renewable geothermal energy and waste heat to capture CO2 directly from the air, concentrate it, and permanently sequester it underground in basaltic rock formations with Carbfix. Their own price target in the long-term is $100-$200 per ton.\n\n**This question asks:**\n> On 2030/7/1, what price will Climeworks charge to permanently capture and store one ton of CO2?\n\nThis question will resolve as the price per ton, in $USD charged by Climeworks for a 1kT purchase, payable immediately, of negative emissions using broadly similar1 technology to that described above. \n\nIf Climeworks has merged with or been acquired by a different company, but that company is still selling negative emissions which make use of broadly similar* technology to that described above, this question resolves as the price that company charges.\n\nIf neither of the above resolutions are possible, either because Climeworks has switched to a very different negative emissions technology, or because it no longer exists, this question will resolve as ambiguous.\n\n*As judged by a metaculus admin.", "lower_25": "133", "median": "232", "upper_75": "370", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Project Vesta will sell 63.5 million tons of negative emissions by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": ">Stripe, a financial-services company, [committed last year](https://stripe.com/blog/negative-emissions-commitment) to spending at least $1M/year on negative emissions and carbon storage technologies, at any price, with the aim of helping these technologies develop.\n\n>They recently wrote up [a summary](https://stripe.com/blog/first-negative-emissions-purchases) of their first set of these purchases.\n\n>This miniseries aims to predict the success of the companies that Stripe chose.\n\nStripe has purchased 3333.3 tons of negative emissions from Project Vesta at $75 per ton. \n\n[Project Vesta](https://projectvesta.org/) captures CO2 by using an abundant, naturally occurring mineral called olivine. Ocean waves grind down the olivine, increasing its surface area. As the olivine breaks down, it captures atmospheric CO2 from within the ocean and stabilizes it as limestone on the seafloor. They have not publicly set a long-term price target.\n\n**This question asks:**\n> On 2030-07-01, what price will Project Vesta charge to permanently capture and store one ton of CO2?\n\nThis question will resolve as the price per ton, in $USD charged by Project Vesta for a 1kT purchase, payable immediately, of negative emissions using olivine. \n\nIf Project Vesta has merged with or been acquired by a different company, but that company is still selling negative emissions which make use of olivine, this question resolves as the price that company charges.\n\nIf neither of the above resolutions are possible, either because Project Vesta has switched to a very different negative emissions technology, or because it no longer exists, this question will resolve as ambiguous.", "lower_25": "16.0", "median": "31.6", "upper_75": "63.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "In the 2024 US presidential election, what is the chance that 50.27% of states will use plurality voting methods to choose their electors?", "desc": "The president of the United States is chosen by the [electoral college](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Electoral_College#Summary), a group of 538 electors drawn from the 50 states plus Washington DC. In the rest of this question, references to states also refer to Washington DC.\n\nThese electors are chosen by voting within each state. Historically this has been done by means of a [plurality vote](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plurality_voting) within the state, with the following exeptions:\n\n- [Maine and Nebraska have historically used a congressional district method](https://www.bustle.com/articles/191238-what-is-the-congressional-district-method-maine-nebraska-do-things-differently), which amounts to plurality voting within districts, meaning that the state's electors may not all be from the same party.\n\n- [Maine plans, in 2020](https://thefulcrum.us/voting/maine-ranked-choice-voting), to use a ranked choice voting method called [Instant Runoff](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting) in the presidential election.\n\nPlurality voting (also known as \"First-Past-The-Post\" voting) is notable for being the [worst voting method](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254419149_And_the_loser_is_Plurality_Voting) according to voting experts.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US states (including the District of Columbia) which use a [plurality voting system](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-past-the-post_voting) to determine the candidate which recieves the votes of their state's electors. For example, in 2016, this question would have resolved as 51. \n\nStates which separate their electoral college votes by congressional district will be considered to use plurality voting if their constituent districts employ a plurality voting method in those districts. Any state which uses an alternative voting method in their state, or uses more than one method in different locations will be considered to **not** use plurality voting.\n\nIf the electoral college is not used in 2024, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIf the number of states (plus DC), changes, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous** (DC's status as a state will not impact this question)", "lower_25": "48.25", "median": "49.40", "upper_75": "50.27", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Manhattan/Apollo project toward AGI will be launched by Aug 2025?", "desc": "It is widely agreed amongst experts that Artificial General Intelligence — an AI that can flexibly and effectively perform a very wide range of cognitive tasks at least as well as humans — would represent a dramatic advance in power and capability for their developer. This has led to both speculation and concern that, recognizing this, countries or companies might launch \"Manhattan project\" style efforts to develop it. While shortening the timeline, these could easily lead to a race condition that compromises safety or alignment, or leads to adversarial dynamics during development. \n\nA [2020 paper](http://dmip.webs.upv.es/EPAI2020/papers/EPAI_2020_paper_11.pdf?fbclid=IwAR15Z0CMX4rBBUJEHhn6NdcMK2ZCF07pPpkcmfD36_oEI9WhV310bRkbaiQ) analyzes this issue in some detail, focusing on the \"lead up\" to a Manhattan/Apollo project: what understanding must be in place be \"on the runway\"?", "resc": "This question resolves to the date that a project that meets the following criteria is launched:\n\n1. It has a stated aim to develop broad-purpose artificial intelligence system(s); and\n\n2. It is constituted so as to generate a single \"flagship\" system or small number of related systems (rather than a diverse portfolio of more narrowly-purposed ones); and\n\n3. There is a research and engineering budget under the direct control of a single (executive or board) project lead with a budget exceeding the equivalent of $10B in 2020 USD.", "lower_25": "Aug 2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2044", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.98% of the world population will be in $1.90-a-day (2011 PPP) poverty in 2030?", "desc": "In 2015, 730 million people (9.9% of the world population) [lived in extreme poverty](https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty), defined as having a consumption below $1.90 per day in 2011 dollars.\n\nIn recent decades, this has dropped massively, from 36% of the world's population in 1990; a large part of this decrease has been due to development in China and India, and now extreme poverty is increasingly concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa.\n\n[SDG 1](https://sdg-tracker.org/no-poverty), one of the Sustainable Development Goals, is to eradicate extreme poverty by 2030. The World Bank [predicts](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/30418/9781464813306.pdf) that, if nations and regions maintain their current economic growth rates, 479 million people will still live in extreme poverty in 2030.", "resc": "Resolution is by the World Bank's [World Development Indicators](https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators) (World, Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population), 2030). If data for 2030 is not available, but data for later and earlier years are available, resolve at a linear interpolation between the known years. If no such data becomes available within ten years, resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "4.47", "median": "5.98", "upper_75": "7.25", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Project Vesta will sell 63.5 million tons of negative emissions by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": ">Stripe, a financial-services company, [committed last year](https://stripe.com/blog/negative-emissions-commitment) to spending at least $1M/year on negative emissions and carbon storage technologies, at any price, with the aim of helping these technologies develop.\n\n>They recently wrote up [a summary](https://stripe.com/blog/first-negative-emissions-purchases) of their first set of these purchases.\n\n>This miniseries aims to predict the success of the companies that Stripe chose.\n\nStripe has purchased 3333.3 tons of negative emissions from Project Vesta at $75 per ton. \n\n[Project Vesta](https://projectvesta.org/) captures CO2 by using an abundant, naturally occurring mineral called olivine. Ocean waves grind down the olivine, increasing its surface area. As the olivine breaks down, it captures atmospheric CO2 from within the ocean and stabilizes it as limestone on the seafloor. They have not publicly set a long-term price target.\n\n**This question asks:**\n> On 2030-07-01, what price will Project Vesta charge to permanently capture and store one ton of CO2?\n\nThis question will resolve as the price per ton, in $USD charged by Project Vesta for a 1kT purchase, payable immediately, of negative emissions using olivine. \n\nIf Project Vesta has merged with or been acquired by a different company, but that company is still selling negative emissions which make use of olivine, this question resolves as the price that company charges.\n\nIf neither of the above resolutions are possible, either because Project Vesta has switched to a very different negative emissions technology, or because it no longer exists, this question will resolve as ambiguous.", "lower_25": "16.0", "median": "31.6", "upper_75": "63.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.98% of the world population will be in $1.90-a-day (2011 PPP) poverty in 2030?", "desc": "In 2015, 730 million people (9.9% of the world population) [lived in extreme poverty](https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty), defined as having a consumption below $1.90 per day in 2011 dollars.\n\nIn recent decades, this has dropped massively, from 36% of the world's population in 1990; a large part of this decrease has been due to development in China and India, and now extreme poverty is increasingly concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa.\n\n[SDG 1](https://sdg-tracker.org/no-poverty), one of the Sustainable Development Goals, is to eradicate extreme poverty by 2030. The World Bank [predicts](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/30418/9781464813306.pdf) that, if nations and regions maintain their current economic growth rates, 479 million people will still live in extreme poverty in 2030.", "resc": "Resolution is by the World Bank's [World Development Indicators](https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators) (World, Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population), 2030). If data for 2030 is not available, but data for later and earlier years are available, resolve at a linear interpolation between the known years. If no such data becomes available within ten years, resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "4.47", "median": "5.98", "upper_75": "7.25", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.98% of the world population will be in $1.90-a-day (2011 PPP) poverty in 2030?", "desc": "In 2015, 730 million people (9.9% of the world population) [lived in extreme poverty](https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty), defined as having a consumption below $1.90 per day in 2011 dollars.\n\nIn recent decades, this has dropped massively, from 36% of the world's population in 1990; a large part of this decrease has been due to development in China and India, and now extreme poverty is increasingly concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa.\n\n[SDG 1](https://sdg-tracker.org/no-poverty), one of the Sustainable Development Goals, is to eradicate extreme poverty by 2030. The World Bank [predicts](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/30418/9781464813306.pdf) that, if nations and regions maintain their current economic growth rates, 479 million people will still live in extreme poverty in 2030.", "resc": "Resolution is by the World Bank's [World Development Indicators](https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators) (World, Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population), 2030). If data for 2030 is not available, but data for later and earlier years are available, resolve at a linear interpolation between the known years. If no such data becomes available within ten years, resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "4.47", "median": "5.98", "upper_75": "7.25", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that CarbonCure will sell carbon storage at a cost of 62.9% in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": ">Stripe, a financial-services company, [committed last year](https://stripe.com/blog/negative-emissions-commitment) to spending at least $1M/year on negative emissions and carbon storage technologies, at any price, with the aim of helping these technologies develop.\n\n>They recently wrote up [a summary](https://stripe.com/blog/first-negative-emissions-purchases) of their first set of these purchases.\n\n>This miniseries aims to predict the success of the companies that Stripe chose.\n\n\nStripe has purchased 2500 tons of carbon storage from CarbonCure at $100 per ton. Note that unlike two of the other companies in the series, CarbonCure does not capture CO2 directly, it sequesters CO2 which has already been captured by some other method.\n\n[CarbonCure](https://www.carboncure.com/) sequesters CO2 in concrete by mineralizing it into calcium carbonate (CaCO3). This has the side effect of strengthening the concrete.\n\n**This question asks:**\n> On 2030/7/1, what price will CarbonCure charge to permanently store one ton of CO2?\n\nThis question will resolve as the price per ton, in $USD charged by CarbonCure for a 1kT purchase, payable immediately, of carbon storage using broadly similar1 technology to that described above. \n\nIf it is not possible to purchase storage alone from CarbonCure, because they now are focused only on combined Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), a Metaculus admin will ask CarbonCure to provide an estimate for the fraction of their CCS price that the storage is responsible for. If no such estimate is provided or publicly available, this question will resolve as the CCS price.\n\nIf CarbonCure has merged with or been acquired by a different company, but that company is still selling carbon storage which makes use of broadly similar* technology to that described above, this question resolves as the price that company charges. The CCS exception is dealt with as above.\n\nIf none of the above resolutions are possible, either because CarbonCure has switched to a very different negative emissions technology, or because it no longer exists, this question will resolve as ambiguous.\n\n*As judged by a metaculus admin.", "lower_25": "62.9", "median": "93.0", "upper_75": "142", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Project Vesta will sell 63.5 million tons of negative emissions by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": ">Stripe, a financial-services company, [committed last year](https://stripe.com/blog/negative-emissions-commitment) to spending at least $1M/year on negative emissions and carbon storage technologies, at any price, with the aim of helping these technologies develop.\n\n>They recently wrote up [a summary](https://stripe.com/blog/first-negative-emissions-purchases) of their first set of these purchases.\n\n>This miniseries aims to predict the success of the companies that Stripe chose.\n\nStripe has purchased 3333.3 tons of negative emissions from Project Vesta at $75 per ton. \n\n[Project Vesta](https://projectvesta.org/) captures CO2 by using an abundant, naturally occurring mineral called olivine. Ocean waves grind down the olivine, increasing its surface area. As the olivine breaks down, it captures atmospheric CO2 from within the ocean and stabilizes it as limestone on the seafloor. They have not publicly set a long-term price target.\n\n**This question asks:**\n> On 2030-07-01, what price will Project Vesta charge to permanently capture and store one ton of CO2?\n\nThis question will resolve as the price per ton, in $USD charged by Project Vesta for a 1kT purchase, payable immediately, of negative emissions using olivine. \n\nIf Project Vesta has merged with or been acquired by a different company, but that company is still selling negative emissions which make use of olivine, this question resolves as the price that company charges.\n\nIf neither of the above resolutions are possible, either because Project Vesta has switched to a very different negative emissions technology, or because it no longer exists, this question will resolve as ambiguous.", "lower_25": "16.0", "median": "31.6", "upper_75": "63.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that CarbonCure will sell carbon storage at a cost of 62.9% in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": ">Stripe, a financial-services company, [committed last year](https://stripe.com/blog/negative-emissions-commitment) to spending at least $1M/year on negative emissions and carbon storage technologies, at any price, with the aim of helping these technologies develop.\n\n>They recently wrote up [a summary](https://stripe.com/blog/first-negative-emissions-purchases) of their first set of these purchases.\n\n>This miniseries aims to predict the success of the companies that Stripe chose.\n\n\nStripe has purchased 2500 tons of carbon storage from CarbonCure at $100 per ton. Note that unlike two of the other companies in the series, CarbonCure does not capture CO2 directly, it sequesters CO2 which has already been captured by some other method.\n\n[CarbonCure](https://www.carboncure.com/) sequesters CO2 in concrete by mineralizing it into calcium carbonate (CaCO3). This has the side effect of strengthening the concrete.\n\n**This question asks:**\n> On 2030/7/1, what price will CarbonCure charge to permanently store one ton of CO2?\n\nThis question will resolve as the price per ton, in $USD charged by CarbonCure for a 1kT purchase, payable immediately, of carbon storage using broadly similar1 technology to that described above. \n\nIf it is not possible to purchase storage alone from CarbonCure, because they now are focused only on combined Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), a Metaculus admin will ask CarbonCure to provide an estimate for the fraction of their CCS price that the storage is responsible for. If no such estimate is provided or publicly available, this question will resolve as the CCS price.\n\nIf CarbonCure has merged with or been acquired by a different company, but that company is still selling carbon storage which makes use of broadly similar* technology to that described above, this question resolves as the price that company charges. The CCS exception is dealt with as above.\n\nIf none of the above resolutions are possible, either because CarbonCure has switched to a very different negative emissions technology, or because it no longer exists, this question will resolve as ambiguous.\n\n*As judged by a metaculus admin.", "lower_25": "62.9", "median": "93.0", "upper_75": "142", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that CarbonCure will sell carbon storage at a cost of 62.9% in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": ">Stripe, a financial-services company, [committed last year](https://stripe.com/blog/negative-emissions-commitment) to spending at least $1M/year on negative emissions and carbon storage technologies, at any price, with the aim of helping these technologies develop.\n\n>They recently wrote up [a summary](https://stripe.com/blog/first-negative-emissions-purchases) of their first set of these purchases.\n\n>This miniseries aims to predict the success of the companies that Stripe chose.\n\n\nStripe has purchased 2500 tons of carbon storage from CarbonCure at $100 per ton. Note that unlike two of the other companies in the series, CarbonCure does not capture CO2 directly, it sequesters CO2 which has already been captured by some other method.\n\n[CarbonCure](https://www.carboncure.com/) sequesters CO2 in concrete by mineralizing it into calcium carbonate (CaCO3). This has the side effect of strengthening the concrete.\n\n**This question asks:**\n> On 2030/7/1, what price will CarbonCure charge to permanently store one ton of CO2?\n\nThis question will resolve as the price per ton, in $USD charged by CarbonCure for a 1kT purchase, payable immediately, of carbon storage using broadly similar1 technology to that described above. \n\nIf it is not possible to purchase storage alone from CarbonCure, because they now are focused only on combined Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), a Metaculus admin will ask CarbonCure to provide an estimate for the fraction of their CCS price that the storage is responsible for. If no such estimate is provided or publicly available, this question will resolve as the CCS price.\n\nIf CarbonCure has merged with or been acquired by a different company, but that company is still selling carbon storage which makes use of broadly similar* technology to that described above, this question resolves as the price that company charges. The CCS exception is dealt with as above.\n\nIf none of the above resolutions are possible, either because CarbonCure has switched to a very different negative emissions technology, or because it no longer exists, this question will resolve as ambiguous.\n\n*As judged by a metaculus admin.", "lower_25": "62.9", "median": "93.0", "upper_75": "142", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Charm Industrial will sell carbon storage for 527 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "248", "median": "381", "upper_75": "527", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that /r/themotte will not be banned from Reddit by Dec 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "On June 29th 2020, Reddit admins [announced](https://www.reddit.com/r/announcements/comments/hi3oht/update_to_our_content_policy/) a new policy banning hate speech from their website. Compared to what existed prior, the policy allows the admins to ban subreddits with greater discretion.\n\n[/r/themotte](https://www.reddit.com/r/TheMotte/) is a subreddit started by readers of the blog [SlateStarCodex](https://slatestarcodex.com/) after its writer Scott Alexander [indicated](https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/02/22/rip-culture-war-thread/) he was unsatisfied with the reception of the so-called Culture War thread on /r/slatestarcodex. The culture war thread moved to /r/themotte thereafter. In the context of the recent policy announcement on Reddit, some have speculated that the subreddit /r/themotte may now be banned. When will this happen?\n\nIf /r/themotte is not banned from Reddit by 2026-1-1, this quesiton resolves as \"> 2025-12-31\".", "lower_25": "Jan 2025", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Charm Industrial will sell carbon storage for 527 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "248", "median": "381", "upper_75": "527", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a computer program will be listed as an author in a journal article in the Annals of Mathematics by 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 2025", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a computer program will be listed as an author in a journal article in the Annals of Mathematics by 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 2025", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a computer program will be listed as an author in a journal article in the Annals of Mathematics by 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 2025", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's human development index (HDI) score will be 0.906 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "[The Human Development Index (HDI)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Human_Development_Index) is a composite score of national well-being developed and maintained by the United Nations. It combines health (longevity), education (years of schooling) and economic (GNI per capita) into a single metric for year to year modeling. China has been increasing very quickly in this metric, presumably due to catch-up effects from the economic depression caused by communism. Such catch-up effects are well-studied in economics, and can be seen for countries that were bombed in World War 2 (mainly [Japan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_economic_miracle) and West Germany), and in other wars. However, at some point, catch-up effects end because the indicator has reached its long-term stable trend. It is unclear, though, where this trend might be for China. Japan is currently at 0,915, South Korea at 0.906. Both have relatively fast growth rates in years 2010-2018 compared to many Western countries (e.g. Norway at 0.16/year, Germany at 0.25/year). China's current growth-rate for the same period is currently an astronomical 0.95/year.\n\nThis question asks:\n\n**What will China's HDI score be in 2030?**\n\n- This question resolves as China's score according to the UN's Human Development Report 2031. The latest version of the report can be found [here](http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi).\n\n- If the UN stops publishing this value, or substantively changes the definition (for example by adding more components), this question resolves as ambiguous.", "lower_25": "0.805", "median": "0.848", "upper_75": "0.906", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Charm Industrial will sell carbon storage for 527 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "248", "median": "381", "upper_75": "527", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US police-to-prison spending ratio will be 1.83 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "Currently, for every dollar spent on prisons, [the US spends 1.5 dollars on police](https://blog.skepticallibertarian.com/2019/01/09/charts-police-vs-prisons-in-the-us-and-europe/). This is much more relatively on prisons than in the EU, which spends 5 dollars on police for every dollar on prisons, and is commensurate with the higher incarceration rate in the US ([655 prisoners per 100,000 people](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_incarceration_rate), compared to, for example, 105 in France). The ratio has not always been this low; from 1950-1975, when US incarceration rates were lower, this ratio was 3-to-1.\n\nReduction of the number of people in prison [is a goal](https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/9/25/16340782/study-mass-incarceration) of criminal justice reformers including the [Open Philanthropy Project](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/focus/us-policy/criminal-justice-reform), and paradoxically black neighbourhoods are in some ways [underpoliced](https://www.vox.com/2015/4/14/8411733/black-community-policing-crime) due to a lack of attention given to the most serious crimes. One way a shifting of government priorities might be reflected is in a change to the ratio of spending on police and prisons. \n\n**What will the total US government police-to-prison spending ratio be in FY 2030?**\n\nResolution will be by dividing (Police services - Total\npercent GDP)/(Prisons - Total percent GDP) using the values given by [usgovernmentspending.com](https://www.usgovernmentspending.com/spending_chart_1950_2030USp_21s2li011mcny_51t54t) when actual reported data or data interpolated from actual reported data from FY 2030 is available, or calculated from usgovernmentspending.com's sources for [federal](https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/budget/2021/BUDGET-2021-TAB) and [state and local](https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances.html) spending if the website is no longer available, or from other official sources if those are no longer available.", "lower_25": "1.57", "median": "1.83", "upper_75": "2.08", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that /r/themotte will not be banned from Reddit by Dec 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "On June 29th 2020, Reddit admins [announced](https://www.reddit.com/r/announcements/comments/hi3oht/update_to_our_content_policy/) a new policy banning hate speech from their website. Compared to what existed prior, the policy allows the admins to ban subreddits with greater discretion.\n\n[/r/themotte](https://www.reddit.com/r/TheMotte/) is a subreddit started by readers of the blog [SlateStarCodex](https://slatestarcodex.com/) after its writer Scott Alexander [indicated](https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/02/22/rip-culture-war-thread/) he was unsatisfied with the reception of the so-called Culture War thread on /r/slatestarcodex. The culture war thread moved to /r/themotte thereafter. In the context of the recent policy announcement on Reddit, some have speculated that the subreddit /r/themotte may now be banned. When will this happen?\n\nIf /r/themotte is not banned from Reddit by 2026-1-1, this quesiton resolves as \"> 2025-12-31\".", "lower_25": "Jan 2025", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that /r/themotte will not be banned from Reddit by Dec 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "On June 29th 2020, Reddit admins [announced](https://www.reddit.com/r/announcements/comments/hi3oht/update_to_our_content_policy/) a new policy banning hate speech from their website. Compared to what existed prior, the policy allows the admins to ban subreddits with greater discretion.\n\n[/r/themotte](https://www.reddit.com/r/TheMotte/) is a subreddit started by readers of the blog [SlateStarCodex](https://slatestarcodex.com/) after its writer Scott Alexander [indicated](https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/02/22/rip-culture-war-thread/) he was unsatisfied with the reception of the so-called Culture War thread on /r/slatestarcodex. The culture war thread moved to /r/themotte thereafter. In the context of the recent policy announcement on Reddit, some have speculated that the subreddit /r/themotte may now be banned. When will this happen?\n\nIf /r/themotte is not banned from Reddit by 2026-1-1, this quesiton resolves as \"> 2025-12-31\".", "lower_25": "Jan 2025", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's human development index (HDI) score will be 0.906 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "[The Human Development Index (HDI)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Human_Development_Index) is a composite score of national well-being developed and maintained by the United Nations. It combines health (longevity), education (years of schooling) and economic (GNI per capita) into a single metric for year to year modeling. China has been increasing very quickly in this metric, presumably due to catch-up effects from the economic depression caused by communism. Such catch-up effects are well-studied in economics, and can be seen for countries that were bombed in World War 2 (mainly [Japan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_economic_miracle) and West Germany), and in other wars. However, at some point, catch-up effects end because the indicator has reached its long-term stable trend. It is unclear, though, where this trend might be for China. Japan is currently at 0,915, South Korea at 0.906. Both have relatively fast growth rates in years 2010-2018 compared to many Western countries (e.g. Norway at 0.16/year, Germany at 0.25/year). China's current growth-rate for the same period is currently an astronomical 0.95/year.\n\nThis question asks:\n\n**What will China's HDI score be in 2030?**\n\n- This question resolves as China's score according to the UN's Human Development Report 2031. The latest version of the report can be found [here](http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi).\n\n- If the UN stops publishing this value, or substantively changes the definition (for example by adding more components), this question resolves as ambiguous.", "lower_25": "0.805", "median": "0.848", "upper_75": "0.906", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's human development index (HDI) score will be 0.906 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "[The Human Development Index (HDI)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Human_Development_Index) is a composite score of national well-being developed and maintained by the United Nations. It combines health (longevity), education (years of schooling) and economic (GNI per capita) into a single metric for year to year modeling. China has been increasing very quickly in this metric, presumably due to catch-up effects from the economic depression caused by communism. Such catch-up effects are well-studied in economics, and can be seen for countries that were bombed in World War 2 (mainly [Japan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_economic_miracle) and West Germany), and in other wars. However, at some point, catch-up effects end because the indicator has reached its long-term stable trend. It is unclear, though, where this trend might be for China. Japan is currently at 0,915, South Korea at 0.906. Both have relatively fast growth rates in years 2010-2018 compared to many Western countries (e.g. Norway at 0.16/year, Germany at 0.25/year). China's current growth-rate for the same period is currently an astronomical 0.95/year.\n\nThis question asks:\n\n**What will China's HDI score be in 2030?**\n\n- This question resolves as China's score according to the UN's Human Development Report 2031. The latest version of the report can be found [here](http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi).\n\n- If the UN stops publishing this value, or substantively changes the definition (for example by adding more components), this question resolves as ambiguous.", "lower_25": "0.805", "median": "0.848", "upper_75": "0.906", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.23 of the \"priority paths\" identified by 80,000hours will still be priority paths in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "[80,000hours](https://80000hours.org/) is a non-profit which provides research and support to help people use their career to help solve the world's most pressing problems. It is associated with the [Centre for Effective Altruism](https://centreforeffectivealtruism.org/), and also produces the popular 80,000hours [podcast](https://80000hours.org/podcast/).\n\nMuch of the focus of 80,000hours is supporting people to move into one of their [priority paths](https://80000hours.org/career-reviews/#our-priority-paths), which they see as \"one of [the] highest-impact options\" for those who have \"the potential to excel\" in those paths.\n\n\n\nIn 2020, the priority paths are:\n\n- AI policy and strategy research and implementation\n\n- AI safety technical researcher\n\n- Grantmaker focused on top areas\n\n- Work in effective altruism organisations\n\n- Global priorities researcher\n\n- Biorisk strategy and policy\n\n- China specialists\n\n- Earning to give in quant trading\n\n- Decision-making psychology research and policy roles\n\nThis question resolves as the number of priority paths listed as \"priority paths\" on the 80,000hours website on 2030/1/1, which either exactly match, or are \"essentially the same as\" one of the priority paths listed above. \"Essentially the same\" should be judged by a Metaculus Admin.\n\nIf 80,000hours no longer lists \"priority paths\", for any reason, this question resolves as ambiguous, *not* as 0.", "lower_25": "5.15", "median": "6.23", "upper_75": "7.73", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US police-to-prison spending ratio will be 1.83 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "Currently, for every dollar spent on prisons, [the US spends 1.5 dollars on police](https://blog.skepticallibertarian.com/2019/01/09/charts-police-vs-prisons-in-the-us-and-europe/). This is much more relatively on prisons than in the EU, which spends 5 dollars on police for every dollar on prisons, and is commensurate with the higher incarceration rate in the US ([655 prisoners per 100,000 people](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_incarceration_rate), compared to, for example, 105 in France). The ratio has not always been this low; from 1950-1975, when US incarceration rates were lower, this ratio was 3-to-1.\n\nReduction of the number of people in prison [is a goal](https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/9/25/16340782/study-mass-incarceration) of criminal justice reformers including the [Open Philanthropy Project](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/focus/us-policy/criminal-justice-reform), and paradoxically black neighbourhoods are in some ways [underpoliced](https://www.vox.com/2015/4/14/8411733/black-community-policing-crime) due to a lack of attention given to the most serious crimes. One way a shifting of government priorities might be reflected is in a change to the ratio of spending on police and prisons. \n\n**What will the total US government police-to-prison spending ratio be in FY 2030?**\n\nResolution will be by dividing (Police services - Total\npercent GDP)/(Prisons - Total percent GDP) using the values given by [usgovernmentspending.com](https://www.usgovernmentspending.com/spending_chart_1950_2030USp_21s2li011mcny_51t54t) when actual reported data or data interpolated from actual reported data from FY 2030 is available, or calculated from usgovernmentspending.com's sources for [federal](https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/budget/2021/BUDGET-2021-TAB) and [state and local](https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances.html) spending if the website is no longer available, or from other official sources if those are no longer available.", "lower_25": "1.57", "median": "1.83", "upper_75": "2.08", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US police-to-prison spending ratio will be 1.83 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "Currently, for every dollar spent on prisons, [the US spends 1.5 dollars on police](https://blog.skepticallibertarian.com/2019/01/09/charts-police-vs-prisons-in-the-us-and-europe/). This is much more relatively on prisons than in the EU, which spends 5 dollars on police for every dollar on prisons, and is commensurate with the higher incarceration rate in the US ([655 prisoners per 100,000 people](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_incarceration_rate), compared to, for example, 105 in France). The ratio has not always been this low; from 1950-1975, when US incarceration rates were lower, this ratio was 3-to-1.\n\nReduction of the number of people in prison [is a goal](https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/9/25/16340782/study-mass-incarceration) of criminal justice reformers including the [Open Philanthropy Project](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/focus/us-policy/criminal-justice-reform), and paradoxically black neighbourhoods are in some ways [underpoliced](https://www.vox.com/2015/4/14/8411733/black-community-policing-crime) due to a lack of attention given to the most serious crimes. One way a shifting of government priorities might be reflected is in a change to the ratio of spending on police and prisons. \n\n**What will the total US government police-to-prison spending ratio be in FY 2030?**\n\nResolution will be by dividing (Police services - Total\npercent GDP)/(Prisons - Total percent GDP) using the values given by [usgovernmentspending.com](https://www.usgovernmentspending.com/spending_chart_1950_2030USp_21s2li011mcny_51t54t) when actual reported data or data interpolated from actual reported data from FY 2030 is available, or calculated from usgovernmentspending.com's sources for [federal](https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/budget/2021/BUDGET-2021-TAB) and [state and local](https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-finances.html) spending if the website is no longer available, or from other official sources if those are no longer available.", "lower_25": "1.57", "median": "1.83", "upper_75": "2.08", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.23 of the \"priority paths\" identified by 80,000hours will still be priority paths in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "[80,000hours](https://80000hours.org/) is a non-profit which provides research and support to help people use their career to help solve the world's most pressing problems. It is associated with the [Centre for Effective Altruism](https://centreforeffectivealtruism.org/), and also produces the popular 80,000hours [podcast](https://80000hours.org/podcast/).\n\nMuch of the focus of 80,000hours is supporting people to move into one of their [priority paths](https://80000hours.org/career-reviews/#our-priority-paths), which they see as \"one of [the] highest-impact options\" for those who have \"the potential to excel\" in those paths.\n\n\n\nIn 2020, the priority paths are:\n\n- AI policy and strategy research and implementation\n\n- AI safety technical researcher\n\n- Grantmaker focused on top areas\n\n- Work in effective altruism organisations\n\n- Global priorities researcher\n\n- Biorisk strategy and policy\n\n- China specialists\n\n- Earning to give in quant trading\n\n- Decision-making psychology research and policy roles\n\nThis question resolves as the number of priority paths listed as \"priority paths\" on the 80,000hours website on 2030/1/1, which either exactly match, or are \"essentially the same as\" one of the priority paths listed above. \"Essentially the same\" should be judged by a Metaculus Admin.\n\nIf 80,000hours no longer lists \"priority paths\", for any reason, this question resolves as ambiguous, *not* as 0.", "lower_25": "5.15", "median": "6.23", "upper_75": "7.73", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.23 of the \"priority paths\" identified by 80,000hours will still be priority paths in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "[80,000hours](https://80000hours.org/) is a non-profit which provides research and support to help people use their career to help solve the world's most pressing problems. It is associated with the [Centre for Effective Altruism](https://centreforeffectivealtruism.org/), and also produces the popular 80,000hours [podcast](https://80000hours.org/podcast/).\n\nMuch of the focus of 80,000hours is supporting people to move into one of their [priority paths](https://80000hours.org/career-reviews/#our-priority-paths), which they see as \"one of [the] highest-impact options\" for those who have \"the potential to excel\" in those paths.\n\n\n\nIn 2020, the priority paths are:\n\n- AI policy and strategy research and implementation\n\n- AI safety technical researcher\n\n- Grantmaker focused on top areas\n\n- Work in effective altruism organisations\n\n- Global priorities researcher\n\n- Biorisk strategy and policy\n\n- China specialists\n\n- Earning to give in quant trading\n\n- Decision-making psychology research and policy roles\n\nThis question resolves as the number of priority paths listed as \"priority paths\" on the 80,000hours website on 2030/1/1, which either exactly match, or are \"essentially the same as\" one of the priority paths listed above. \"Essentially the same\" should be judged by a Metaculus Admin.\n\nIf 80,000hours no longer lists \"priority paths\", for any reason, this question resolves as ambiguous, *not* as 0.", "lower_25": "5.15", "median": "6.23", "upper_75": "7.73", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Google Trends search interest for Donald Trump in July 2024 will be 50% of the search interest in November 2016?", "desc": "[Donald Trump](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Trump) was already famous before becoming president, being the owner of [The Trump Organization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Trump_Organization) and the [Miss Universe](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miss_Universe) brand, and host of [The Apprentice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Apprentice_\\(American_TV_series\\)), and since being elected in 2016 has become significantly more well-known.\n\nOne proxy for how prominent Trump is in the public eye is Google Trends search interest. Search interest in Donald Trump started rising in June 2015 when Trump [announced his candidacy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Trump_2016_presidential_campaign), spiked in November 2016 due to [the election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_United_States_presidential_election), and has been at about a quarter of that level during his presidency.", "resc": "Resolution is by the Google Trends interest over time figure for the topic [Donald Trump, 45th U.S. President](https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&geo=US&q=%2Fm%2F0cqt90) for July 2024, as displayed on the google trends site on August 1, 2024, as a percentage of the value in November 2016. If search interest is marked as <1 for that month, resolve at 0", "lower_25": "20.2", "median": "30.6", "upper_75": "41.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that Charity Entrepreneurship will contribute to the creation of a new GiveWell top charity by 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Charity Entrepreneurship](https://www.charityentrepreneurship.com/about-us.html) is an organisation which provides training and support to individuals looking to start effective charities. Thirteen people graduated from their 2019 [incubation program](https://www.charityentrepreneurship.com/incubation-program.html), who ended up founding [six charities](https://www.charityentrepreneurship.com/blog/update-on-six-new-charities-incubated-by-charity-entrepreneurship), two of which received GiveWell [incubation grants](https://www.givewell.org/research/incubation-grants), one of which is estimated as having a [25% chance](https://www.givewell.org/research/incubation-grants/fortify-health/august-2019-grant) of becoming a GiveWell top charity.\n\nGiveWell is a research organisation which aims to find outstanding giving opportunities. It maintains a list of [top charities](https://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities) which it considers to have the highest marginal impact per dollar donated.\n\nThis question asks: \n\n**When will GiveWell's list of top charities first contain a charity which was founded by someone who received either training or a grant from Charity Entrepreneurship?**\n\nResolution will be according to the GiveWell website, and/or credible media reporting. If GiveWell decides to no longer produce a list of \"top charities\", this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Google Trends search interest for Donald Trump in July 2024 will be 50% of the search interest in November 2016?", "desc": "[Donald Trump](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Trump) was already famous before becoming president, being the owner of [The Trump Organization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Trump_Organization) and the [Miss Universe](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miss_Universe) brand, and host of [The Apprentice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Apprentice_\\(American_TV_series\\)), and since being elected in 2016 has become significantly more well-known.\n\nOne proxy for how prominent Trump is in the public eye is Google Trends search interest. Search interest in Donald Trump started rising in June 2015 when Trump [announced his candidacy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Trump_2016_presidential_campaign), spiked in November 2016 due to [the election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_United_States_presidential_election), and has been at about a quarter of that level during his presidency.", "resc": "Resolution is by the Google Trends interest over time figure for the topic [Donald Trump, 45th U.S. President](https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&geo=US&q=%2Fm%2F0cqt90) for July 2024, as displayed on the google trends site on August 1, 2024, as a percentage of the value in November 2016. If search interest is marked as <1 for that month, resolve at 0", "lower_25": "20.2", "median": "30.6", "upper_75": "41.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX will be worth 642 billion nominal USD in 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will SpaceX be worth on January 1, 2030, in billions of nominal USD?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3366/what-will-spacex-be-worth-by-2030/) *[10B - 125B range]*\n\n----\n\n[Space Exploration Technologies Corp.](https://spacex.com), doing business as SpaceX, is a private American aerospace manufacturer and space transportation services company headquartered in Hawthorne, California.\n\nSpaceX's achievements include the first privately funded liquid-propellant rocket to reach orbit (Falcon 1 in 2008), the first private company to successfully launch, orbit, and recover a spacecraft (Dragon in 2010), the first private company to send a spacecraft to the International Space Station (Dragon in 2012), the first propulsive landing for an orbital rocket (Falcon 9 in 2015), the first reuse of an orbital rocket (Falcon 9 in 2017), and the first private company to launch an object into orbit around the sun (Falcon Heavy's payload of a Elon Musk's Tesla Roadster in 2018).\n\nAs of 2019, the company is developing a vehicle currently known as the Starship. This vehicle is intended to enable ultra low cost launches to LEO and beyond, as well as human exploration and settlement of the Moon and Mars.\n\nFurther, in 2019 SpaceX began deployment of an extremely large satellite constellation known as Starlink, which may ultimately consist of more than 40,000 satellites. The constellation is designed to deliver high-bandwidth, low-latency internet access to everywhere on Earth, and is due to be fully operational by the late 2020s. Morgan Stanley Research has suggested that successful completion of this megaconstellation may increase SpaceX's value to $120 billion.\n\nSpaceX's valuation has increased dramatically since the company was formed in 2002, crossing the $1bn mark in 2010, and reaching a $10bn valuation in 2015. As of July 2020, SpaceX was reportedly valued at [$44 billion](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/23/spacex-is-raising-up-to-1-billion-at-44-billion-valuation.html).", "resc": "If SpaceX is a publicly traded company on January 1, 2030, this question will resolve as the company's market capitalization on that date, in billions of nominal USD. In the event that SpaceX is a privately held company on January 1 2030, this question will resolve as the most recent credible estimated valuation attributed to the company by a reputable financial news organization.\n\nIf SpaceX changes its name or corporate structure before this question resolves, including but not limited to in the event of a merger or acquisition, this question will continue to track the value of the renamed company. If SpaceX (or any relevant successor company) ceases to exist by January 1, 2030, or if (in Metaculus' judgement) the company has changed in structure so substantially that it is no longer SpaceX, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "266", "median": "642", "upper_75": "1.65k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Google Trends search interest for Donald Trump in July 2024 will be 50% of the search interest in November 2016?", "desc": "[Donald Trump](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Trump) was already famous before becoming president, being the owner of [The Trump Organization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Trump_Organization) and the [Miss Universe](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miss_Universe) brand, and host of [The Apprentice](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Apprentice_\\(American_TV_series\\)), and since being elected in 2016 has become significantly more well-known.\n\nOne proxy for how prominent Trump is in the public eye is Google Trends search interest. Search interest in Donald Trump started rising in June 2015 when Trump [announced his candidacy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Trump_2016_presidential_campaign), spiked in November 2016 due to [the election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_United_States_presidential_election), and has been at about a quarter of that level during his presidency.", "resc": "Resolution is by the Google Trends interest over time figure for the topic [Donald Trump, 45th U.S. President](https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&geo=US&q=%2Fm%2F0cqt90) for July 2024, as displayed on the google trends site on August 1, 2024, as a percentage of the value in November 2016. If search interest is marked as <1 for that month, resolve at 0", "lower_25": "20.2", "median": "30.6", "upper_75": "41.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX will be worth 642 billion nominal USD in 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will SpaceX be worth on January 1, 2030, in billions of nominal USD?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3366/what-will-spacex-be-worth-by-2030/) *[10B - 125B range]*\n\n----\n\n[Space Exploration Technologies Corp.](https://spacex.com), doing business as SpaceX, is a private American aerospace manufacturer and space transportation services company headquartered in Hawthorne, California.\n\nSpaceX's achievements include the first privately funded liquid-propellant rocket to reach orbit (Falcon 1 in 2008), the first private company to successfully launch, orbit, and recover a spacecraft (Dragon in 2010), the first private company to send a spacecraft to the International Space Station (Dragon in 2012), the first propulsive landing for an orbital rocket (Falcon 9 in 2015), the first reuse of an orbital rocket (Falcon 9 in 2017), and the first private company to launch an object into orbit around the sun (Falcon Heavy's payload of a Elon Musk's Tesla Roadster in 2018).\n\nAs of 2019, the company is developing a vehicle currently known as the Starship. This vehicle is intended to enable ultra low cost launches to LEO and beyond, as well as human exploration and settlement of the Moon and Mars.\n\nFurther, in 2019 SpaceX began deployment of an extremely large satellite constellation known as Starlink, which may ultimately consist of more than 40,000 satellites. The constellation is designed to deliver high-bandwidth, low-latency internet access to everywhere on Earth, and is due to be fully operational by the late 2020s. Morgan Stanley Research has suggested that successful completion of this megaconstellation may increase SpaceX's value to $120 billion.\n\nSpaceX's valuation has increased dramatically since the company was formed in 2002, crossing the $1bn mark in 2010, and reaching a $10bn valuation in 2015. As of July 2020, SpaceX was reportedly valued at [$44 billion](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/23/spacex-is-raising-up-to-1-billion-at-44-billion-valuation.html).", "resc": "If SpaceX is a publicly traded company on January 1, 2030, this question will resolve as the company's market capitalization on that date, in billions of nominal USD. In the event that SpaceX is a privately held company on January 1 2030, this question will resolve as the most recent credible estimated valuation attributed to the company by a reputable financial news organization.\n\nIf SpaceX changes its name or corporate structure before this question resolves, including but not limited to in the event of a merger or acquisition, this question will continue to track the value of the renamed company. If SpaceX (or any relevant successor company) ceases to exist by January 1, 2030, or if (in Metaculus' judgement) the company has changed in structure so substantially that it is no longer SpaceX, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "266", "median": "642", "upper_75": "1.65k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that Charity Entrepreneurship will contribute to the creation of a new GiveWell top charity by 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Charity Entrepreneurship](https://www.charityentrepreneurship.com/about-us.html) is an organisation which provides training and support to individuals looking to start effective charities. Thirteen people graduated from their 2019 [incubation program](https://www.charityentrepreneurship.com/incubation-program.html), who ended up founding [six charities](https://www.charityentrepreneurship.com/blog/update-on-six-new-charities-incubated-by-charity-entrepreneurship), two of which received GiveWell [incubation grants](https://www.givewell.org/research/incubation-grants), one of which is estimated as having a [25% chance](https://www.givewell.org/research/incubation-grants/fortify-health/august-2019-grant) of becoming a GiveWell top charity.\n\nGiveWell is a research organisation which aims to find outstanding giving opportunities. It maintains a list of [top charities](https://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities) which it considers to have the highest marginal impact per dollar donated.\n\nThis question asks: \n\n**When will GiveWell's list of top charities first contain a charity which was founded by someone who received either training or a grant from Charity Entrepreneurship?**\n\nResolution will be according to the GiveWell website, and/or credible media reporting. If GiveWell decides to no longer produce a list of \"top charities\", this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Woke index in US elite media will top by Dec 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jan 2023", "median": "Dec 2024", "upper_75": "Dec 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Woke index in US elite media will top by Dec 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jan 2023", "median": "Dec 2024", "upper_75": "Dec 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will emit 3.45 billion tons of CO₂ in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.45", "median": "4.30", "upper_75": "5.23", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX will be worth 642 billion nominal USD in 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will SpaceX be worth on January 1, 2030, in billions of nominal USD?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3366/what-will-spacex-be-worth-by-2030/) *[10B - 125B range]*\n\n----\n\n[Space Exploration Technologies Corp.](https://spacex.com), doing business as SpaceX, is a private American aerospace manufacturer and space transportation services company headquartered in Hawthorne, California.\n\nSpaceX's achievements include the first privately funded liquid-propellant rocket to reach orbit (Falcon 1 in 2008), the first private company to successfully launch, orbit, and recover a spacecraft (Dragon in 2010), the first private company to send a spacecraft to the International Space Station (Dragon in 2012), the first propulsive landing for an orbital rocket (Falcon 9 in 2015), the first reuse of an orbital rocket (Falcon 9 in 2017), and the first private company to launch an object into orbit around the sun (Falcon Heavy's payload of a Elon Musk's Tesla Roadster in 2018).\n\nAs of 2019, the company is developing a vehicle currently known as the Starship. This vehicle is intended to enable ultra low cost launches to LEO and beyond, as well as human exploration and settlement of the Moon and Mars.\n\nFurther, in 2019 SpaceX began deployment of an extremely large satellite constellation known as Starlink, which may ultimately consist of more than 40,000 satellites. The constellation is designed to deliver high-bandwidth, low-latency internet access to everywhere on Earth, and is due to be fully operational by the late 2020s. Morgan Stanley Research has suggested that successful completion of this megaconstellation may increase SpaceX's value to $120 billion.\n\nSpaceX's valuation has increased dramatically since the company was formed in 2002, crossing the $1bn mark in 2010, and reaching a $10bn valuation in 2015. As of July 2020, SpaceX was reportedly valued at [$44 billion](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/23/spacex-is-raising-up-to-1-billion-at-44-billion-valuation.html).", "resc": "If SpaceX is a publicly traded company on January 1, 2030, this question will resolve as the company's market capitalization on that date, in billions of nominal USD. In the event that SpaceX is a privately held company on January 1 2030, this question will resolve as the most recent credible estimated valuation attributed to the company by a reputable financial news organization.\n\nIf SpaceX changes its name or corporate structure before this question resolves, including but not limited to in the event of a merger or acquisition, this question will continue to track the value of the renamed company. If SpaceX (or any relevant successor company) ceases to exist by January 1, 2030, or if (in Metaculus' judgement) the company has changed in structure so substantially that it is no longer SpaceX, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "266", "median": "642", "upper_75": "1.65k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that Charity Entrepreneurship will contribute to the creation of a new GiveWell top charity by 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Charity Entrepreneurship](https://www.charityentrepreneurship.com/about-us.html) is an organisation which provides training and support to individuals looking to start effective charities. Thirteen people graduated from their 2019 [incubation program](https://www.charityentrepreneurship.com/incubation-program.html), who ended up founding [six charities](https://www.charityentrepreneurship.com/blog/update-on-six-new-charities-incubated-by-charity-entrepreneurship), two of which received GiveWell [incubation grants](https://www.givewell.org/research/incubation-grants), one of which is estimated as having a [25% chance](https://www.givewell.org/research/incubation-grants/fortify-health/august-2019-grant) of becoming a GiveWell top charity.\n\nGiveWell is a research organisation which aims to find outstanding giving opportunities. It maintains a list of [top charities](https://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities) which it considers to have the highest marginal impact per dollar donated.\n\nThis question asks: \n\n**When will GiveWell's list of top charities first contain a charity which was founded by someone who received either training or a grant from Charity Entrepreneurship?**\n\nResolution will be according to the GiveWell website, and/or credible media reporting. If GiveWell decides to no longer produce a list of \"top charities\", this question resolves ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Woke index in US elite media will top by Dec 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jan 2023", "median": "Dec 2024", "upper_75": "Dec 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best marathon time completed before 2035, in seconds, according to Guinness World Records will be 7.104k?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "7.104k", "median": "7.146k", "upper_75": "7.168k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first baby will be born away from Earth by 2060?", "desc": "", "resc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will humans have a sustainable off-world presence by 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1432/will-humans-have-a-sustainable-off-world-presence-by-2100/)\n\n* [When will the first human be born alive on an astronomical body other than Earth?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2533/when-will-the-first-human-be-born-on-another-world/)\n\n**When will the first baby be born away from Earth?**\n\nThe question will resolve when the first alive human baby be born away from Earth. The distance from the surface of Earth at the moment of the birth must be at least 80km. If it doesn't happen before 2120, then the question will resolve at >2120.", "lower_25": "2047", "median": "2060", "upper_75": "2091", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will emit 3.45 billion tons of CO₂ in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.45", "median": "4.30", "upper_75": "5.23", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first baby will be born away from Earth by 2060?", "desc": "", "resc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will humans have a sustainable off-world presence by 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1432/will-humans-have-a-sustainable-off-world-presence-by-2100/)\n\n* [When will the first human be born alive on an astronomical body other than Earth?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2533/when-will-the-first-human-be-born-on-another-world/)\n\n**When will the first baby be born away from Earth?**\n\nThe question will resolve when the first alive human baby be born away from Earth. The distance from the surface of Earth at the moment of the birth must be at least 80km. If it doesn't happen before 2120, then the question will resolve at >2120.", "lower_25": "2047", "median": "2060", "upper_75": "2091", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will emit 3.45 billion tons of CO₂ in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.45", "median": "4.30", "upper_75": "5.23", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best marathon time completed before 2035, in seconds, according to Guinness World Records will be 7.104k?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "7.104k", "median": "7.146k", "upper_75": "7.168k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that One Piece will end by Jan 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "It has just been announced that after 23 years in publication the [best-selling comic series of all time](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_best-selling_comic_series) is [nearing its end](https://mothership.sg/2019/11/one-piece-ending/#:~:text=Long%2Drunning%20manga%20One%20Piece,will%20end%20in%20five%20years.).\n\n**When will One Piece end?**\n\nThis question resolves when [Eiichiro Oda](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eiichiro_Oda) (or whoever is named as his successor) confirms that the last chapter of [One Piece](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Piece) has been published in [Weekly Shōnen Jump magazine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weekly_Sh%C5%8Dnen_Jump) (or whichever magazine is publishing One Piece at the time). For the purposes of this question, we will exclude any spinoffs and sequels.\n\nThis question will resolve as 'ambiguous' if one of the following criteria are met: Oda (or whoever is writing one piece at the time) decides to split the story in two without clarifying what the main story is (e.g separating the main protagonist and the rest of the supporting cast without resolving all their stories on the same date). Oda dies and two different people begin writing and publishing different endings to One Piece. Oda gives up on writing the finale and no-one writes it in his place.", "lower_25": "Oct 2026", "median": "Sep 2027", "upper_75": "Jan 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first baby will be born away from Earth by 2060?", "desc": "", "resc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will humans have a sustainable off-world presence by 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1432/will-humans-have-a-sustainable-off-world-presence-by-2100/)\n\n* [When will the first human be born alive on an astronomical body other than Earth?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2533/when-will-the-first-human-be-born-on-another-world/)\n\n**When will the first baby be born away from Earth?**\n\nThe question will resolve when the first alive human baby be born away from Earth. The distance from the surface of Earth at the moment of the birth must be at least 80km. If it doesn't happen before 2120, then the question will resolve at >2120.", "lower_25": "2047", "median": "2060", "upper_75": "2091", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best marathon time completed before 2035, in seconds, according to Guinness World Records will be 7.104k?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "7.104k", "median": "7.146k", "upper_75": "7.168k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that One Piece will end by Jan 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "It has just been announced that after 23 years in publication the [best-selling comic series of all time](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_best-selling_comic_series) is [nearing its end](https://mothership.sg/2019/11/one-piece-ending/#:~:text=Long%2Drunning%20manga%20One%20Piece,will%20end%20in%20five%20years.).\n\n**When will One Piece end?**\n\nThis question resolves when [Eiichiro Oda](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eiichiro_Oda) (or whoever is named as his successor) confirms that the last chapter of [One Piece](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Piece) has been published in [Weekly Shōnen Jump magazine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weekly_Sh%C5%8Dnen_Jump) (or whichever magazine is publishing One Piece at the time). For the purposes of this question, we will exclude any spinoffs and sequels.\n\nThis question will resolve as 'ambiguous' if one of the following criteria are met: Oda (or whoever is writing one piece at the time) decides to split the story in two without clarifying what the main story is (e.g separating the main protagonist and the rest of the supporting cast without resolving all their stories on the same date). Oda dies and two different people begin writing and publishing different endings to One Piece. Oda gives up on writing the finale and no-one writes it in his place.", "lower_25": "Oct 2026", "median": "Sep 2027", "upper_75": "Jan 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that One Piece will end by Jan 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "It has just been announced that after 23 years in publication the [best-selling comic series of all time](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_best-selling_comic_series) is [nearing its end](https://mothership.sg/2019/11/one-piece-ending/#:~:text=Long%2Drunning%20manga%20One%20Piece,will%20end%20in%20five%20years.).\n\n**When will One Piece end?**\n\nThis question resolves when [Eiichiro Oda](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eiichiro_Oda) (or whoever is named as his successor) confirms that the last chapter of [One Piece](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Piece) has been published in [Weekly Shōnen Jump magazine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weekly_Sh%C5%8Dnen_Jump) (or whichever magazine is publishing One Piece at the time). For the purposes of this question, we will exclude any spinoffs and sequels.\n\nThis question will resolve as 'ambiguous' if one of the following criteria are met: Oda (or whoever is writing one piece at the time) decides to split the story in two without clarifying what the main story is (e.g separating the main protagonist and the rest of the supporting cast without resolving all their stories on the same date). Oda dies and two different people begin writing and publishing different endings to One Piece. Oda gives up on writing the finale and no-one writes it in his place.", "lower_25": "Oct 2026", "median": "Sep 2027", "upper_75": "Jan 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will achieve competency on multi-choice questions across diverse fields of expertise by Aug 2026?", "desc": "Recently, [Hendrycks et. al. proposed a new test to measure a text model's multitask accuracy](https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.03300). The test covers 57 tasks including elementary and collage level mathematics, computer science, law, accounting and more. For each task, the model is provided only 5 training examples. The test set consist of around 5 000 to 10 000 questions, 100 to 200 questions per task.\n\nThe test is different from benchmarks like [SuperGLUE](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4932/when-will-ai-achieve-superhuman-few-shot-performance-on-superglue/), because it intentionally includes questions requiring specialized expertise in a narrow field of knowledge. Many tasks will be difficult for an average human. See example questions below.\n\nThey found that the very largest GPT-3 model achieves 43.9% accuracy vs. 25% random baseline, while UnifiedQA with 11B parameters and fine tuned on other QA tasks achieves 48.9%. Models also have near-random accuracy on some socially important subjects such as morality and law.\n\nThe question asks:", "resc": "We will define competency as achieving at least 70% accuracy in every task and 85% mean accuracy across all tasks.\n\nThe question will resolve on the day when the model able to achieve competency is first publicly announced by the authors.\n\nBelow are two examples from the training set of the 2 most difficult tasks for GPT-3. The correct answers are in the fine print. [The whole dataset is available here.](https://github.com/hendrycks/test)\n\nCollege Chemistry task (GPT-3 ~26% accuracy):\n\n> Which of the following lists the hydrides of group-14 elements in order of thermal stability, from lowest to highest?\n\n> a) PbH4 < SnH4 < GeH4 < SiH4 < CH4 \n> b) PbH4 < SnH4 < CH4 < GeH4 < SiH4 \n> c) CH4 < SiH4 < GeH4 < SnH4 < PbH4 \n> d) CH4 < PbH4 < GeH4 < SnH4 < SiH4 \n\nMoral Scenarios task (GPT-3 ~26% accuracy):\n\n> For which of these two scenarios does the main character (who uses I/me/my) do something clearly morally wrong? Scenario 1 | I really loved my newborn baby boy. Scenario 2 | The new girl is embarrassed to live in a trailer park, so I invite the class to her house.\n\n> a) Wrong, Wrong \nb) Wrong, Not wrong \nc) Not wrong, Wrong \nd) Not wrong, Not wrong\n\nSimilar Metaculus question: [When will AI achieve superhuman few-shot performance on SuperGLUE?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4932/when-will-ai-achieve-superhuman-few-shot-performance-on-superglue/)", "lower_25": "Mar 2024", "median": "Apr 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first crew sent to Mars will be 16.6 meters tall?", "desc": "", "resc": "[A human mission to Mars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_mission_to_Mars) has been the subject of science fiction, aerospace engineering and scientific proposals since the 20th century. Plans include landing on Mars for exploration at a minimum, with the possibility of sending settlers and terraforming the planet or exploring its moons Phobos and Deimos also considered.\n\nDue to orbital mechanics a human Mars mission would need to last many months or even years. Therefore, besides engineering challenges a human psychology and group dynamics becomes an important issue for the mission planning.\n\nThis question asks:\n\n***How big will the first crew sent to Mars be?***\n\nThe question will resolve on the launch day based on how many people boarded the spacecraft aiming for Mars. The success of the mission is not relevant to the question resolution, but the mission must be credible. \n\nRelated questions:\n\n- [Will SpaceX land people on Mars prior to 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/349/will-spacex-land-people-on-mars-prior-to-2030/)\n- [Will NASA land people on Mars prior to 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1476/will-nasa-land-people-on-mars-prior-to-2030/)\n- [Who will first land a person on Mars?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3214/who-will-first-land-a-person-on-mars/)\n- [When will the first humans land successfully on Mars? ](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3515/when-will-the-first-humans-land-successfully-on-mars/)", "lower_25": "5.65", "median": "9.91", "upper_75": "16.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US FDA will not grant Neuralink permission to sell and implant a brain-machine interface device into general consumers by 2049?", "desc": "Some text has been copied from [this closely aligned question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2951/will-the-us-fda-grant-neuralink-permission-to-implant-a-brain-machine-interface-device-in-a-human-before-1-january-2022/). \n\n[Neuralink Corporation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuralink) is an American neurotechnology company founded in 2016 by serial entrepreneur Elon Musk and others, developing implantable brain–machine interfaces (BMIs).\n\nSince its founding, the company has hired several high-profile neuroscientists from various universities. By July 2019, it had received $158 million in funding (of which $100 million from Musk) and was employing a staff of 90 employees.\n\nAt that time, Neuralink announced that it was working on a “sewing machine-like” robot capable of implanting very thin \"threads\" into the brain, demonstrated a system that read information from a lab rat's brain via thousands of electrodes (many times more than the current maximum for systems used in human brains), and Musk announced an aspirational goal to start experiments with humans in 2020, pending FDA approval.\n\nIn the short term, the company aims to develop brain-machine interfaces to assist individuals with serious physical or neurological conditions; [but the longer term goal of the company is to enable human-AI symbiosis and grant superhuman cognition to anyone who wants it, as well as a form of digital immortality](https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/tech/elon-musk-wants-hook-your-brain-directly-computers-starting-next-ncna1030631).", "resc": "You can find information on the FDA's Regulatory Overview for Neurological Devices [here](https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/neurological-devices/regulatory-overview-neurological-devices).\n\nThe implantation surgery need not actually occur by that date (or at all) in order for this question to resolve positively; this question focuses solely on when regulatory approval will be obtained.\n\nThis question resolves >2050 if no approval is given before 2050. The question resolves ambiguously if the FDA is abolished, or if its role is changed such that regulatory approval is no longer required for this procedure.\n\n \n\nChangelog:\n\n2020-08-17 : removed § triggering positive resolution upon Investigational Device Exemption or Humanitarian Device Exemption. See [this thread](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4966/when-will-the-us-fda-grant-neuralink-permission-to-sell-and-implant-a-brain-machine-interface-device-into-general-consumers/#comment-37813).\n\n2050 if no approval is given before 2050. The question resolves ambiguously if the FDA is abolished, or if its role is changed such that regulatory approval is no longer required for this procedure.\n\n \n\nChangelog:\n\n2020-08-17 : removed § triggering positive resolution upon Investigational Device Exemption or Humanitarian Device Exemption. See [this thread](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4966/when-will-the-us-fda-grant-neuralink-permission-to-sell-and-implant-a-brain-machine-interface-device-into-general-consumers/#comment-37813).\n\n2050 if no approval is given before 2050. The question resolves ambiguously if the FDA is abolished, or if its role is changed such that regulatory approval is no longer required for this procedure.\n\n \n\nChangelog:\n\n2020-08-17 : removed § triggering positive resolution upon Investigational Device Exemption or Humanitarian Device Exemption. See [this thread](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4966/when-will-the-us-fda-grant-neuralink-permission-to-sell-and-implant-a-brain-machine-interface-device-into-general-consumers/#comment-37813).\n\n=10 Metaculus users will make good-faith attempts to leave the country as quickly as they can in the 48-hour period.\n\n* If >50% of them do not succeed in doing so within 48 hours, this will count as an emigration crisis for Metaculus users. \n\nWe ask you to predict the first such date where Metaculus users will face an emigration crisis by the above definition. To help detect this event, this question is partially auto-resolving, see the fine print below.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Dec 25, 2030", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 25, 2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 25, 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that American Metaculus users will face an emigration crisis before Dec 25, 2030?", "desc": "The Covid-19 pandemic has illustrated that there are times where many Americans would find it difficult to leave the US for [many other countries they would otherwise desire to travel to](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Travel_restrictions_related_to_the_COVID-19_pandemic). But is it possible that one day, normal Americans will find it very difficult to quickly and legally leave the US for *any* other country?\n\nWhile seemingly farfetched, this is the reality that residents of many Soviet-bloc countries had faced historically, and one that still afflicts residents of countries like North Korea today.\n\nDefine an emigration crisis as:\n\n* An American citizen in good standing with a valid passport cannot purchase a plane ticket and leave the country to any other country within 48 hours.", "resc": "To operationalize this further, \n\n* For something to count as an emigration crisis, consider the hypothetical situation where >=10 Metaculus users will make good-faith attempts to leave the country as quickly as they can in the 48-hour period.\n\n* If >50% of them do not succeed in doing so within 48 hours, this will count as an emigration crisis for Metaculus users. \n\nWe ask you to predict the first such date where Metaculus users will face an emigration crisis by the above definition. To help detect this event, this question is partially auto-resolving, see the fine print below.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Dec 25, 2030", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 25, 2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 25, 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that self-driving taxis will be available to Metaculus users by Jul 2029?", "desc": "A [robotaxi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robotaxi), also known as a self-driving taxi or a driverless taxi, is an autonomous car ([SAE automation level](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car#SAE_classification) 4 or 5) operated for a ridesharing company._x000D_\n_x000D_\nElon Musk (CEO of Tesla) [said in April 2019](https://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-robo-taxis-elon-musk-pt-barnum-circus-2019-4?op=1), \"I feel very confident predicting autonomous robo-taxi for Tesla next year. Not in all jurisdictions, because we won't have regulatory approval everywhere, but I'm confident we'll have at least regulatory approvals somewhere, literally next year.\"_x000D_\n_x000D_\nWaymo launched a driverless taxi service in Phoenix, Arizona, US in [October 2020](https://blog.waymo.com/2020/10/waymo-is-opening-its-fully-driverless.html).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the earliest date when all of the following conditions are fulfilled:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n1. At least 5 top Metaculus users (users in Metaculus' [top 100](https://www.metaculus.com/rankings/?question_status=opened&timeframe=12month) among questions opened in the last 12 months) report riding Tesla self-driving taxi as a normal client._x000D_\n2. At least one of the reported rides must happen outside the United States._x000D_\n3. There must be no human driver or supervisor present in all the reported rides._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese trips may happen in geo-fenced areas._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe sub-questions below refer to the dates when these 5 cumulative trips have been reached for the specific company providing the service. \"Any Service\" refers to any one or multiple self-driving taxi providers; \"Waymo\" and \"Tesla\" refer to only services which use software or equipment developed by the respective company.", "lower_25": "Feb 2025", "median": "Nov 2026", "upper_75": "Jul 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that self-driving taxis will be available to Metaculus users by Jul 2029?", "desc": "A [robotaxi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robotaxi), also known as a self-driving taxi or a driverless taxi, is an autonomous car ([SAE automation level](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car#SAE_classification) 4 or 5) operated for a ridesharing company._x000D_\n_x000D_\nElon Musk (CEO of Tesla) [said in April 2019](https://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-robo-taxis-elon-musk-pt-barnum-circus-2019-4?op=1), \"I feel very confident predicting autonomous robo-taxi for Tesla next year. Not in all jurisdictions, because we won't have regulatory approval everywhere, but I'm confident we'll have at least regulatory approvals somewhere, literally next year.\"_x000D_\n_x000D_\nWaymo launched a driverless taxi service in Phoenix, Arizona, US in [October 2020](https://blog.waymo.com/2020/10/waymo-is-opening-its-fully-driverless.html).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the earliest date when all of the following conditions are fulfilled:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n1. At least 5 top Metaculus users (users in Metaculus' [top 100](https://www.metaculus.com/rankings/?question_status=opened&timeframe=12month) among questions opened in the last 12 months) report riding Tesla self-driving taxi as a normal client._x000D_\n2. At least one of the reported rides must happen outside the United States._x000D_\n3. There must be no human driver or supervisor present in all the reported rides._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese trips may happen in geo-fenced areas._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe sub-questions below refer to the dates when these 5 cumulative trips have been reached for the specific company providing the service. \"Any Service\" refers to any one or multiple self-driving taxi providers; \"Waymo\" and \"Tesla\" refer to only services which use software or equipment developed by the respective company.", "lower_25": "Feb 2025", "median": "Nov 2026", "upper_75": "Jul 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will achieve competency on multi-choice questions across diverse fields of expertise by Aug 2026?", "desc": "Recently, [Hendrycks et. al. proposed a new test to measure a text model's multitask accuracy](https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.03300). The test covers 57 tasks including elementary and collage level mathematics, computer science, law, accounting and more. For each task, the model is provided only 5 training examples. The test set consist of around 5 000 to 10 000 questions, 100 to 200 questions per task.\n\nThe test is different from benchmarks like [SuperGLUE](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4932/when-will-ai-achieve-superhuman-few-shot-performance-on-superglue/), because it intentionally includes questions requiring specialized expertise in a narrow field of knowledge. Many tasks will be difficult for an average human. See example questions below.\n\nThey found that the very largest GPT-3 model achieves 43.9% accuracy vs. 25% random baseline, while UnifiedQA with 11B parameters and fine tuned on other QA tasks achieves 48.9%. Models also have near-random accuracy on some socially important subjects such as morality and law.\n\nThe question asks:", "resc": "We will define competency as achieving at least 70% accuracy in every task and 85% mean accuracy across all tasks.\n\nThe question will resolve on the day when the model able to achieve competency is first publicly announced by the authors.\n\nBelow are two examples from the training set of the 2 most difficult tasks for GPT-3. The correct answers are in the fine print. [The whole dataset is available here.](https://github.com/hendrycks/test)\n\nCollege Chemistry task (GPT-3 ~26% accuracy):\n\n> Which of the following lists the hydrides of group-14 elements in order of thermal stability, from lowest to highest?\n\n> a) PbH4 < SnH4 < GeH4 < SiH4 < CH4 \n> b) PbH4 < SnH4 < CH4 < GeH4 < SiH4 \n> c) CH4 < SiH4 < GeH4 < SnH4 < PbH4 \n> d) CH4 < PbH4 < GeH4 < SnH4 < SiH4 \n\nMoral Scenarios task (GPT-3 ~26% accuracy):\n\n> For which of these two scenarios does the main character (who uses I/me/my) do something clearly morally wrong? Scenario 1 | I really loved my newborn baby boy. Scenario 2 | The new girl is embarrassed to live in a trailer park, so I invite the class to her house.\n\n> a) Wrong, Wrong \nb) Wrong, Not wrong \nc) Not wrong, Wrong \nd) Not wrong, Not wrong\n\nSimilar Metaculus question: [When will AI achieve superhuman few-shot performance on SuperGLUE?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4932/when-will-ai-achieve-superhuman-few-shot-performance-on-superglue/)", "lower_25": "Mar 2024", "median": "Apr 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first crew sent to Mars will be 16.6 meters tall?", "desc": "", "resc": "[A human mission to Mars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_mission_to_Mars) has been the subject of science fiction, aerospace engineering and scientific proposals since the 20th century. Plans include landing on Mars for exploration at a minimum, with the possibility of sending settlers and terraforming the planet or exploring its moons Phobos and Deimos also considered.\n\nDue to orbital mechanics a human Mars mission would need to last many months or even years. Therefore, besides engineering challenges a human psychology and group dynamics becomes an important issue for the mission planning.\n\nThis question asks:\n\n***How big will the first crew sent to Mars be?***\n\nThe question will resolve on the launch day based on how many people boarded the spacecraft aiming for Mars. The success of the mission is not relevant to the question resolution, but the mission must be credible. \n\nRelated questions:\n\n- [Will SpaceX land people on Mars prior to 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/349/will-spacex-land-people-on-mars-prior-to-2030/)\n- [Will NASA land people on Mars prior to 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1476/will-nasa-land-people-on-mars-prior-to-2030/)\n- [Who will first land a person on Mars?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3214/who-will-first-land-a-person-on-mars/)\n- [When will the first humans land successfully on Mars? ](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3515/when-will-the-first-humans-land-successfully-on-mars/)", "lower_25": "5.65", "median": "9.91", "upper_75": "16.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first crew sent to Mars will be 16.6 meters tall?", "desc": "", "resc": "[A human mission to Mars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_mission_to_Mars) has been the subject of science fiction, aerospace engineering and scientific proposals since the 20th century. Plans include landing on Mars for exploration at a minimum, with the possibility of sending settlers and terraforming the planet or exploring its moons Phobos and Deimos also considered.\n\nDue to orbital mechanics a human Mars mission would need to last many months or even years. Therefore, besides engineering challenges a human psychology and group dynamics becomes an important issue for the mission planning.\n\nThis question asks:\n\n***How big will the first crew sent to Mars be?***\n\nThe question will resolve on the launch day based on how many people boarded the spacecraft aiming for Mars. The success of the mission is not relevant to the question resolution, but the mission must be credible. \n\nRelated questions:\n\n- [Will SpaceX land people on Mars prior to 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/349/will-spacex-land-people-on-mars-prior-to-2030/)\n- [Will NASA land people on Mars prior to 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1476/will-nasa-land-people-on-mars-prior-to-2030/)\n- [Who will first land a person on Mars?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3214/who-will-first-land-a-person-on-mars/)\n- [When will the first humans land successfully on Mars? ](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3515/when-will-the-first-humans-land-successfully-on-mars/)", "lower_25": "5.65", "median": "9.91", "upper_75": "16.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Winifred Wagner's correspondence with Adolph Hitler will not be published before 2150?", "desc": "[Winifred Wagner](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winifred_Wagner), the daughter-in-law of composer Richard Wagner, was good friends with Adolph Hitler. It is possible she provided him with the paper he used to write _Mein Kampf_ while in prison. Yet she [intervened](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/3297001/British-Wagner-saved-Jews-from-her-friend-Hitler.html) to save Jews from arrest and personally told Hitler that she was \"disgusted\" by their persecution. Wagner and Hitler corresponded for over a 20 year period but the letters are currently held by Winifred Wagner's granddaughter, Amélie Lafferentz-Hohmann, who refuses to release them on the grounds that they are \"[explosive](http://www.the-wagnerian.com/2012/08/the-winifredhitler-letters-katharina.html).\"", "resc": "This question resolves when the letters in question are made public", "lower_25": "2043", "median": "2096", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2150", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that self-driving taxis will be available to Metaculus users by Aug 2025?", "desc": "A [robotaxi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robotaxi), also known as a self-driving taxi or a driverless taxi, is an autonomous car ([SAE automation level](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car#SAE_classification) 4 or 5) operated for a ridesharing company._x000D_\n_x000D_\nElon Musk (CEO of Tesla) [said in April 2019](https://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-robo-taxis-elon-musk-pt-barnum-circus-2019-4?op=1), \"I feel very confident predicting autonomous robo-taxi for Tesla next year. Not in all jurisdictions, because we won't have regulatory approval everywhere, but I'm confident we'll have at least regulatory approvals somewhere, literally next year.\"_x000D_\n_x000D_\nWaymo launched a driverless taxi service in Phoenix, Arizona, US in [October 2020](https://blog.waymo.com/2020/10/waymo-is-opening-its-fully-driverless.html).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the earliest date when all of the following conditions are fulfilled:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n1. At least 5 top Metaculus users (users in Metaculus' [top 100](https://www.metaculus.com/rankings/?question_status=opened&timeframe=12month) among questions opened in the last 12 months) report riding Tesla self-driving taxi as a normal client._x000D_\n2. At least one of the reported rides must happen outside the United States._x000D_\n3. There must be no human driver or supervisor present in all the reported rides._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese trips may happen in geo-fenced areas._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe sub-questions below refer to the dates when these 5 cumulative trips have been reached for the specific company providing the service. \"Any Service\" refers to any one or multiple self-driving taxi providers; \"Waymo\" and \"Tesla\" refer to only services which use software or equipment developed by the respective company.", "lower_25": "Aug 2025", "median": "Jul 2027", "upper_75": "May 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that self-driving taxis will be available to Metaculus users by Sep 2026?", "desc": "A [robotaxi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robotaxi), also known as a self-driving taxi or a driverless taxi, is an autonomous car ([SAE automation level](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car#SAE_classification) 4 or 5) operated for a ridesharing company._x000D_\n_x000D_\nElon Musk (CEO of Tesla) [said in April 2019](https://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-robo-taxis-elon-musk-pt-barnum-circus-2019-4?op=1), \"I feel very confident predicting autonomous robo-taxi for Tesla next year. Not in all jurisdictions, because we won't have regulatory approval everywhere, but I'm confident we'll have at least regulatory approvals somewhere, literally next year.\"_x000D_\n_x000D_\nWaymo launched a driverless taxi service in Phoenix, Arizona, US in [October 2020](https://blog.waymo.com/2020/10/waymo-is-opening-its-fully-driverless.html).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the earliest date when all of the following conditions are fulfilled:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n1. At least 5 top Metaculus users (users in Metaculus' [top 100](https://www.metaculus.com/rankings/?question_status=opened&timeframe=12month) among questions opened in the last 12 months) report riding Tesla self-driving taxi as a normal client._x000D_\n2. At least one of the reported rides must happen outside the United States._x000D_\n3. There must be no human driver or supervisor present in all the reported rides._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese trips may happen in geo-fenced areas._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe sub-questions below refer to the dates when these 5 cumulative trips have been reached for the specific company providing the service. \"Any Service\" refers to any one or multiple self-driving taxi providers; \"Waymo\" and \"Tesla\" refer to only services which use software or equipment developed by the respective company.", "lower_25": "Nov 2024", "median": "Sep 2026", "upper_75": "Apr 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that self-driving taxis will be available to Metaculus users by Aug 2025?", "desc": "A [robotaxi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robotaxi), also known as a self-driving taxi or a driverless taxi, is an autonomous car ([SAE automation level](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car#SAE_classification) 4 or 5) operated for a ridesharing company._x000D_\n_x000D_\nElon Musk (CEO of Tesla) [said in April 2019](https://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-robo-taxis-elon-musk-pt-barnum-circus-2019-4?op=1), \"I feel very confident predicting autonomous robo-taxi for Tesla next year. Not in all jurisdictions, because we won't have regulatory approval everywhere, but I'm confident we'll have at least regulatory approvals somewhere, literally next year.\"_x000D_\n_x000D_\nWaymo launched a driverless taxi service in Phoenix, Arizona, US in [October 2020](https://blog.waymo.com/2020/10/waymo-is-opening-its-fully-driverless.html).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the earliest date when all of the following conditions are fulfilled:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n1. At least 5 top Metaculus users (users in Metaculus' [top 100](https://www.metaculus.com/rankings/?question_status=opened&timeframe=12month) among questions opened in the last 12 months) report riding Tesla self-driving taxi as a normal client._x000D_\n2. At least one of the reported rides must happen outside the United States._x000D_\n3. There must be no human driver or supervisor present in all the reported rides._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese trips may happen in geo-fenced areas._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe sub-questions below refer to the dates when these 5 cumulative trips have been reached for the specific company providing the service. \"Any Service\" refers to any one or multiple self-driving taxi providers; \"Waymo\" and \"Tesla\" refer to only services which use software or equipment developed by the respective company.", "lower_25": "Aug 2025", "median": "Jul 2027", "upper_75": "May 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that self-driving taxis will be available to Metaculus users by Sep 2026?", "desc": "A [robotaxi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robotaxi), also known as a self-driving taxi or a driverless taxi, is an autonomous car ([SAE automation level](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car#SAE_classification) 4 or 5) operated for a ridesharing company._x000D_\n_x000D_\nElon Musk (CEO of Tesla) [said in April 2019](https://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-robo-taxis-elon-musk-pt-barnum-circus-2019-4?op=1), \"I feel very confident predicting autonomous robo-taxi for Tesla next year. Not in all jurisdictions, because we won't have regulatory approval everywhere, but I'm confident we'll have at least regulatory approvals somewhere, literally next year.\"_x000D_\n_x000D_\nWaymo launched a driverless taxi service in Phoenix, Arizona, US in [October 2020](https://blog.waymo.com/2020/10/waymo-is-opening-its-fully-driverless.html).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the earliest date when all of the following conditions are fulfilled:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n1. At least 5 top Metaculus users (users in Metaculus' [top 100](https://www.metaculus.com/rankings/?question_status=opened&timeframe=12month) among questions opened in the last 12 months) report riding Tesla self-driving taxi as a normal client._x000D_\n2. At least one of the reported rides must happen outside the United States._x000D_\n3. There must be no human driver or supervisor present in all the reported rides._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese trips may happen in geo-fenced areas._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe sub-questions below refer to the dates when these 5 cumulative trips have been reached for the specific company providing the service. \"Any Service\" refers to any one or multiple self-driving taxi providers; \"Waymo\" and \"Tesla\" refer to only services which use software or equipment developed by the respective company.", "lower_25": "Nov 2024", "median": "Sep 2026", "upper_75": "Apr 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that self-driving taxis will be available to Metaculus users by Aug 2025?", "desc": "A [robotaxi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robotaxi), also known as a self-driving taxi or a driverless taxi, is an autonomous car ([SAE automation level](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car#SAE_classification) 4 or 5) operated for a ridesharing company._x000D_\n_x000D_\nElon Musk (CEO of Tesla) [said in April 2019](https://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-robo-taxis-elon-musk-pt-barnum-circus-2019-4?op=1), \"I feel very confident predicting autonomous robo-taxi for Tesla next year. Not in all jurisdictions, because we won't have regulatory approval everywhere, but I'm confident we'll have at least regulatory approvals somewhere, literally next year.\"_x000D_\n_x000D_\nWaymo launched a driverless taxi service in Phoenix, Arizona, US in [October 2020](https://blog.waymo.com/2020/10/waymo-is-opening-its-fully-driverless.html).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the earliest date when all of the following conditions are fulfilled:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n1. At least 5 top Metaculus users (users in Metaculus' [top 100](https://www.metaculus.com/rankings/?question_status=opened&timeframe=12month) among questions opened in the last 12 months) report riding Tesla self-driving taxi as a normal client._x000D_\n2. At least one of the reported rides must happen outside the United States._x000D_\n3. There must be no human driver or supervisor present in all the reported rides._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese trips may happen in geo-fenced areas._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe sub-questions below refer to the dates when these 5 cumulative trips have been reached for the specific company providing the service. \"Any Service\" refers to any one or multiple self-driving taxi providers; \"Waymo\" and \"Tesla\" refer to only services which use software or equipment developed by the respective company.", "lower_25": "Aug 2025", "median": "Jul 2027", "upper_75": "May 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Sentinelese will cease to be an uncontacted people by 2046?", "desc": "The [North Sentinel Islanders](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentinelese) are one of the world's last '[uncontacted peoples](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncontacted_peoples)': they have had extremely limited contact with the outside world, and have actively, violently refused attempts to approach them. The most recent attempt at outside contact by a Christian missionary, John Allen Chau, ended when the Sentinelese killed him on [17 November 2018](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/11/21/american-believed-dead-after-encounter-with-remote-indian-tribe-hostile-outsiders/). Indian authorities attempted to recover his body, but ultimately [abandoned those efforts](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/28/india-body-john-allen-chau-missionary-killed-by-sentinelese-tribe). Attempts at contact have been criticised on a number of fronts, including the likelihood that contact would expose the Sentinelese to deadly pathogens.\n\nThe Government of India requires a permit to visit the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, has outlawed all outsider visits to the North Sentinel Island, have designated a 3 mile exclusion zone around the island, and maintain an armed patrol of this exclusion zone in an attempt to prevent outside contact. Knowledge of Sentinelese culture is [extremely limited](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40646218). They are designated a '[Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group](https://openlibrary.org/isbn/9789350981061)', and estimates of the island's population vary widely. The [2001 census recorded 39 individuals](https://web.archive.org/web/20141211011020/http://censusindia.gov.in/Ad_Campaign/drop_in_articles/06-Enumeration_of_Primitive_Tribes_in_A%26N_Islands.pdf#page=3) (21 men, 18 women), the [2011 census recorded only 15 individuals](https://web.archive.org/web/20150801173328/http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/dchb/3500_PART_B_DCHB_ANDAMAN%20%26%20NICOBAR%20ISLANDS.pdf) (12 men, 3 women), but both were conducted from a distance. A [2016 estimate](https://openlibrary.org/isbn/9789350981061) suggested between 100 and 150.", "resc": "This question resolves when any one of the following events occurs:\n\n1. A public video recording is made available that depicts a Sentinelese person legally interacting with a non-Sentinelese person (i.e. the non-Sentinelese person is not charged with an offense relating to the interaction);\n2. Two or more news sources report that a Sentinelese person has left North Sentinel Island;\n3. Two or more news sources report that a Sentinelese person has legally entered a UN member state;\n4. Two or more news sources report that there are no longer any people living on North Sentinel Island; or\n5. Two or more news sources report that the landmass known as 'North Sentinel Island' no longer exists.\n\nThe question will close retrospectively one day before the event which triggers resolution. The 'event' is understood to be the *publication* of the news report (or video)", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2066", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that self-driving taxis will be available to Metaculus users by Sep 2026?", "desc": "A [robotaxi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robotaxi), also known as a self-driving taxi or a driverless taxi, is an autonomous car ([SAE automation level](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car#SAE_classification) 4 or 5) operated for a ridesharing company._x000D_\n_x000D_\nElon Musk (CEO of Tesla) [said in April 2019](https://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-robo-taxis-elon-musk-pt-barnum-circus-2019-4?op=1), \"I feel very confident predicting autonomous robo-taxi for Tesla next year. Not in all jurisdictions, because we won't have regulatory approval everywhere, but I'm confident we'll have at least regulatory approvals somewhere, literally next year.\"_x000D_\n_x000D_\nWaymo launched a driverless taxi service in Phoenix, Arizona, US in [October 2020](https://blog.waymo.com/2020/10/waymo-is-opening-its-fully-driverless.html).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the earliest date when all of the following conditions are fulfilled:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n1. At least 5 top Metaculus users (users in Metaculus' [top 100](https://www.metaculus.com/rankings/?question_status=opened&timeframe=12month) among questions opened in the last 12 months) report riding Tesla self-driving taxi as a normal client._x000D_\n2. At least one of the reported rides must happen outside the United States._x000D_\n3. There must be no human driver or supervisor present in all the reported rides._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese trips may happen in geo-fenced areas._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe sub-questions below refer to the dates when these 5 cumulative trips have been reached for the specific company providing the service. \"Any Service\" refers to any one or multiple self-driving taxi providers; \"Waymo\" and \"Tesla\" refer to only services which use software or equipment developed by the respective company.", "lower_25": "Nov 2024", "median": "Sep 2026", "upper_75": "Apr 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Sentinelese will cease to be an uncontacted people by 2046?", "desc": "The [North Sentinel Islanders](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentinelese) are one of the world's last '[uncontacted peoples](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncontacted_peoples)': they have had extremely limited contact with the outside world, and have actively, violently refused attempts to approach them. The most recent attempt at outside contact by a Christian missionary, John Allen Chau, ended when the Sentinelese killed him on [17 November 2018](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/11/21/american-believed-dead-after-encounter-with-remote-indian-tribe-hostile-outsiders/). Indian authorities attempted to recover his body, but ultimately [abandoned those efforts](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/28/india-body-john-allen-chau-missionary-killed-by-sentinelese-tribe). Attempts at contact have been criticised on a number of fronts, including the likelihood that contact would expose the Sentinelese to deadly pathogens.\n\nThe Government of India requires a permit to visit the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, has outlawed all outsider visits to the North Sentinel Island, have designated a 3 mile exclusion zone around the island, and maintain an armed patrol of this exclusion zone in an attempt to prevent outside contact. Knowledge of Sentinelese culture is [extremely limited](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40646218). They are designated a '[Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group](https://openlibrary.org/isbn/9789350981061)', and estimates of the island's population vary widely. The [2001 census recorded 39 individuals](https://web.archive.org/web/20141211011020/http://censusindia.gov.in/Ad_Campaign/drop_in_articles/06-Enumeration_of_Primitive_Tribes_in_A%26N_Islands.pdf#page=3) (21 men, 18 women), the [2011 census recorded only 15 individuals](https://web.archive.org/web/20150801173328/http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/dchb/3500_PART_B_DCHB_ANDAMAN%20%26%20NICOBAR%20ISLANDS.pdf) (12 men, 3 women), but both were conducted from a distance. A [2016 estimate](https://openlibrary.org/isbn/9789350981061) suggested between 100 and 150.", "resc": "This question resolves when any one of the following events occurs:\n\n1. A public video recording is made available that depicts a Sentinelese person legally interacting with a non-Sentinelese person (i.e. the non-Sentinelese person is not charged with an offense relating to the interaction);\n2. Two or more news sources report that a Sentinelese person has left North Sentinel Island;\n3. Two or more news sources report that a Sentinelese person has legally entered a UN member state;\n4. Two or more news sources report that there are no longer any people living on North Sentinel Island; or\n5. Two or more news sources report that the landmass known as 'North Sentinel Island' no longer exists.\n\nThe question will close retrospectively one day before the event which triggers resolution. The 'event' is understood to be the *publication* of the news report (or video)", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2066", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Winifred Wagner's correspondence with Adolph Hitler will not be published before 2150?", "desc": "[Winifred Wagner](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winifred_Wagner), the daughter-in-law of composer Richard Wagner, was good friends with Adolph Hitler. It is possible she provided him with the paper he used to write _Mein Kampf_ while in prison. Yet she [intervened](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/3297001/British-Wagner-saved-Jews-from-her-friend-Hitler.html) to save Jews from arrest and personally told Hitler that she was \"disgusted\" by their persecution. Wagner and Hitler corresponded for over a 20 year period but the letters are currently held by Winifred Wagner's granddaughter, Amélie Lafferentz-Hohmann, who refuses to release them on the grounds that they are \"[explosive](http://www.the-wagnerian.com/2012/08/the-winifredhitler-letters-katharina.html).\"", "resc": "This question resolves when the letters in question are made public", "lower_25": "2043", "median": "2096", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2150", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Winifred Wagner's correspondence with Adolph Hitler will not be published before 2150?", "desc": "[Winifred Wagner](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winifred_Wagner), the daughter-in-law of composer Richard Wagner, was good friends with Adolph Hitler. It is possible she provided him with the paper he used to write _Mein Kampf_ while in prison. Yet she [intervened](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/3297001/British-Wagner-saved-Jews-from-her-friend-Hitler.html) to save Jews from arrest and personally told Hitler that she was \"disgusted\" by their persecution. Wagner and Hitler corresponded for over a 20 year period but the letters are currently held by Winifred Wagner's granddaughter, Amélie Lafferentz-Hohmann, who refuses to release them on the grounds that they are \"[explosive](http://www.the-wagnerian.com/2012/08/the-winifredhitler-letters-katharina.html).\"", "resc": "This question resolves when the letters in question are made public", "lower_25": "2043", "median": "2096", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2150", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total market cap of all cryptocurrencies will be greater than 2k billion USD at the start of 2025?", "desc": "[Coinmarketcap.com](https://coinmarketcap.com/) is perhaps the most popular site for monitoring the values of cryptocurrencies. While one can look at specific coins, one can also look at [the total market cap](https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/), i.e. the summed value in USD of every coin's worth. As of 2020 October 14th, this value is 359B USD, down from all time high of 831B USD on 2018 Jan. 7th. The total market cap is usually highly correlated with the value of Bitcoin, but if the market share of Bitcoin falls drastically, this is no guarantee ([see this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5205/bitcoins-market-dominant-cryptocurrency/)).", "resc": "- Value is taken from [coinmarketcap.com's page](https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/) in billion USD.\n- If the site goes down before resolution, Metaculus admins will choose a suitable replacement. If none is found, this resolves ambiguous", "lower_25": "1.71k", "median": "> 2k", "upper_75": "> 2k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total market cap of all cryptocurrencies will be greater than 2k billion USD at the start of 2025?", "desc": "[Coinmarketcap.com](https://coinmarketcap.com/) is perhaps the most popular site for monitoring the values of cryptocurrencies. While one can look at specific coins, one can also look at [the total market cap](https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/), i.e. the summed value in USD of every coin's worth. As of 2020 October 14th, this value is 359B USD, down from all time high of 831B USD on 2018 Jan. 7th. The total market cap is usually highly correlated with the value of Bitcoin, but if the market share of Bitcoin falls drastically, this is no guarantee ([see this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5205/bitcoins-market-dominant-cryptocurrency/)).", "resc": "- Value is taken from [coinmarketcap.com's page](https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/) in billion USD.\n- If the site goes down before resolution, Metaculus admins will choose a suitable replacement. If none is found, this resolves ambiguous", "lower_25": "1.71k", "median": "> 2k", "upper_75": "> 2k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will achieve competency on multi-choice questions across diverse fields of expertise by Aug 2026?", "desc": "Recently, [Hendrycks et. al. proposed a new test to measure a text model's multitask accuracy](https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.03300). The test covers 57 tasks including elementary and collage level mathematics, computer science, law, accounting and more. For each task, the model is provided only 5 training examples. The test set consist of around 5 000 to 10 000 questions, 100 to 200 questions per task.\n\nThe test is different from benchmarks like [SuperGLUE](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4932/when-will-ai-achieve-superhuman-few-shot-performance-on-superglue/), because it intentionally includes questions requiring specialized expertise in a narrow field of knowledge. Many tasks will be difficult for an average human. See example questions below.\n\nThey found that the very largest GPT-3 model achieves 43.9% accuracy vs. 25% random baseline, while UnifiedQA with 11B parameters and fine tuned on other QA tasks achieves 48.9%. Models also have near-random accuracy on some socially important subjects such as morality and law.\n\nThe question asks:", "resc": "We will define competency as achieving at least 70% accuracy in every task and 85% mean accuracy across all tasks.\n\nThe question will resolve on the day when the model able to achieve competency is first publicly announced by the authors.\n\nBelow are two examples from the training set of the 2 most difficult tasks for GPT-3. The correct answers are in the fine print. [The whole dataset is available here.](https://github.com/hendrycks/test)\n\nCollege Chemistry task (GPT-3 ~26% accuracy):\n\n> Which of the following lists the hydrides of group-14 elements in order of thermal stability, from lowest to highest?\n\n> a) PbH4 < SnH4 < GeH4 < SiH4 < CH4 \n> b) PbH4 < SnH4 < CH4 < GeH4 < SiH4 \n> c) CH4 < SiH4 < GeH4 < SnH4 < PbH4 \n> d) CH4 < PbH4 < GeH4 < SnH4 < SiH4 \n\nMoral Scenarios task (GPT-3 ~26% accuracy):\n\n> For which of these two scenarios does the main character (who uses I/me/my) do something clearly morally wrong? Scenario 1 | I really loved my newborn baby boy. Scenario 2 | The new girl is embarrassed to live in a trailer park, so I invite the class to her house.\n\n> a) Wrong, Wrong \nb) Wrong, Not wrong \nc) Not wrong, Wrong \nd) Not wrong, Not wrong\n\nSimilar Metaculus question: [When will AI achieve superhuman few-shot performance on SuperGLUE?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4932/when-will-ai-achieve-superhuman-few-shot-performance-on-superglue/)", "lower_25": "Mar 2024", "median": "Apr 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Sentinelese will cease to be an uncontacted people by 2046?", "desc": "The [North Sentinel Islanders](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentinelese) are one of the world's last '[uncontacted peoples](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncontacted_peoples)': they have had extremely limited contact with the outside world, and have actively, violently refused attempts to approach them. The most recent attempt at outside contact by a Christian missionary, John Allen Chau, ended when the Sentinelese killed him on [17 November 2018](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/11/21/american-believed-dead-after-encounter-with-remote-indian-tribe-hostile-outsiders/). Indian authorities attempted to recover his body, but ultimately [abandoned those efforts](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/28/india-body-john-allen-chau-missionary-killed-by-sentinelese-tribe). Attempts at contact have been criticised on a number of fronts, including the likelihood that contact would expose the Sentinelese to deadly pathogens.\n\nThe Government of India requires a permit to visit the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, has outlawed all outsider visits to the North Sentinel Island, have designated a 3 mile exclusion zone around the island, and maintain an armed patrol of this exclusion zone in an attempt to prevent outside contact. Knowledge of Sentinelese culture is [extremely limited](https://www.jstor.org/stable/40646218). They are designated a '[Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group](https://openlibrary.org/isbn/9789350981061)', and estimates of the island's population vary widely. The [2001 census recorded 39 individuals](https://web.archive.org/web/20141211011020/http://censusindia.gov.in/Ad_Campaign/drop_in_articles/06-Enumeration_of_Primitive_Tribes_in_A%26N_Islands.pdf#page=3) (21 men, 18 women), the [2011 census recorded only 15 individuals](https://web.archive.org/web/20150801173328/http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/dchb/3500_PART_B_DCHB_ANDAMAN%20%26%20NICOBAR%20ISLANDS.pdf) (12 men, 3 women), but both were conducted from a distance. A [2016 estimate](https://openlibrary.org/isbn/9789350981061) suggested between 100 and 150.", "resc": "This question resolves when any one of the following events occurs:\n\n1. A public video recording is made available that depicts a Sentinelese person legally interacting with a non-Sentinelese person (i.e. the non-Sentinelese person is not charged with an offense relating to the interaction);\n2. Two or more news sources report that a Sentinelese person has left North Sentinel Island;\n3. Two or more news sources report that a Sentinelese person has legally entered a UN member state;\n4. Two or more news sources report that there are no longer any people living on North Sentinel Island; or\n5. Two or more news sources report that the landmass known as 'North Sentinel Island' no longer exists.\n\nThe question will close retrospectively one day before the event which triggers resolution. The 'event' is understood to be the *publication* of the news report (or video)", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2066", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that American Metaculus users will face an emigration crisis before Dec 25, 2030?", "desc": "The Covid-19 pandemic has illustrated that there are times where many Americans would find it difficult to leave the US for [many other countries they would otherwise desire to travel to](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Travel_restrictions_related_to_the_COVID-19_pandemic). But is it possible that one day, normal Americans will find it very difficult to quickly and legally leave the US for *any* other country?\n\nWhile seemingly farfetched, this is the reality that residents of many Soviet-bloc countries had faced historically, and one that still afflicts residents of countries like North Korea today.\n\nDefine an emigration crisis as:\n\n* An American citizen in good standing with a valid passport cannot purchase a plane ticket and leave the country to any other country within 48 hours.", "resc": "To operationalize this further, \n\n* For something to count as an emigration crisis, consider the hypothetical situation where >=10 Metaculus users will make good-faith attempts to leave the country as quickly as they can in the 48-hour period.\n\n* If >50% of them do not succeed in doing so within 48 hours, this will count as an emigration crisis for Metaculus users. \n\nWe ask you to predict the first such date where Metaculus users will face an emigration crisis by the above definition. To help detect this event, this question is partially auto-resolving, see the fine print below.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Dec 25, 2030", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 25, 2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 25, 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that one would be revived before 2200 if they were preserved by Alcor or the Cryonics Institute while both were active, given a likelihood ratio of 0.105?", "desc": "As of the time of writing this question, the two major providers of cryopreservation in the US are [Alcor](https://www.alcor.org/), with [181 patients and 1,317 members](https://www.alcor.org/library/alcor-membership-statistics/), and the [Cryonics Institute](https://www.cryonics.org/), with [177 patients and 1,859 members](https://www.cryonics.org/ci-landing/member-statistics/). \n\nThese organisations might differ in the chance of reviving their patients if the initial quality of cryopreservations is higher in one or the other, or if one organisation is likely to last longer than the other, or if when revival becomes possible one is better able to arrange this than the other.", "resc": "If no patients from Alcor or the Cryonics Insitute are revived, this resolves ambiguously.\n\nIf only patients from Alcor are revived, this resolves above the upper end of the scale.\n\nOtherwise, this resolves at the value (% of people revived, among those cryopreserved at Alcor while both organisations were active) / (% of people revived, among those cryopreserved at the Cryonics Institute while both organisations were active) at the start of 2200.", "lower_25": "0.105", "median": "0.800", "upper_75": "1.53", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that self-driving taxis will be available to Metaculus users by Jul 2029?", "desc": "A [robotaxi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robotaxi), also known as a self-driving taxi or a driverless taxi, is an autonomous car ([SAE automation level](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car#SAE_classification) 4 or 5) operated for a ridesharing company._x000D_\n_x000D_\nElon Musk (CEO of Tesla) [said in April 2019](https://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-robo-taxis-elon-musk-pt-barnum-circus-2019-4?op=1), \"I feel very confident predicting autonomous robo-taxi for Tesla next year. Not in all jurisdictions, because we won't have regulatory approval everywhere, but I'm confident we'll have at least regulatory approvals somewhere, literally next year.\"_x000D_\n_x000D_\nWaymo launched a driverless taxi service in Phoenix, Arizona, US in [October 2020](https://blog.waymo.com/2020/10/waymo-is-opening-its-fully-driverless.html).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the earliest date when all of the following conditions are fulfilled:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n1. At least 5 top Metaculus users (users in Metaculus' [top 100](https://www.metaculus.com/rankings/?question_status=opened&timeframe=12month) among questions opened in the last 12 months) report riding Tesla self-driving taxi as a normal client._x000D_\n2. At least one of the reported rides must happen outside the United States._x000D_\n3. There must be no human driver or supervisor present in all the reported rides._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese trips may happen in geo-fenced areas._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe sub-questions below refer to the dates when these 5 cumulative trips have been reached for the specific company providing the service. \"Any Service\" refers to any one or multiple self-driving taxi providers; \"Waymo\" and \"Tesla\" refer to only services which use software or equipment developed by the respective company.", "lower_25": "Feb 2025", "median": "Nov 2026", "upper_75": "Jul 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total market cap of all cryptocurrencies will be greater than 2k billion USD at the start of 2025?", "desc": "[Coinmarketcap.com](https://coinmarketcap.com/) is perhaps the most popular site for monitoring the values of cryptocurrencies. While one can look at specific coins, one can also look at [the total market cap](https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/), i.e. the summed value in USD of every coin's worth. As of 2020 October 14th, this value is 359B USD, down from all time high of 831B USD on 2018 Jan. 7th. The total market cap is usually highly correlated with the value of Bitcoin, but if the market share of Bitcoin falls drastically, this is no guarantee ([see this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5205/bitcoins-market-dominant-cryptocurrency/)).", "resc": "- Value is taken from [coinmarketcap.com's page](https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/) in billion USD.\n- If the site goes down before resolution, Metaculus admins will choose a suitable replacement. If none is found, this resolves ambiguous", "lower_25": "1.71k", "median": "> 2k", "upper_75": "> 2k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will be able to learn to play Montezuma's Revenge in less than 30 min by Jan 2025?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:* \n\n- [When will an AI be able to explore all the rooms on the first level of Montezuma's revenge in less than or equal to 50 million frames of training?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/486/when-will-an-ai-achieve-competency-in-the-atari-classic-montezumas-revenge/)\n- [What will the highest score be, on Atari 2600 Montezuma's Revenge, by any ML model that is un-augmented with domain knowledge on 2022-01-14?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6230/sota-montezumas-revenge-2022-01-14/)\n- [When will the first AGI be first developed and demonstrated? ](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/when-will-the-first-artificial-general-intelligence-system-be-devised-tested-and-publicly-known-of/)\n\n----\n\nIn 2012, researchers proposed an [The Arcade Learning Environment](https://arxiv.org/abs/1207.4708) consisting of Atari 2600 games. Out of these games one stood out as the most challenging for deep learning models - [Montezuma's Revenge](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montezuma%27s_Revenge_(video_game)).\n\nAs of 2021 Go-Explore [(Ecoffet et al., 2020)](https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.12919v2.pdf) has achieved the highest score at 43 791 without augmentation with domain knowledge. However, it requires billions of frames or years of game play to achieve that performance.\n\nI attempted to calibrate this question by playing the game for 15 min. In this time I managed to score a maximum of 6700 points. [You can test the game on your own here.](https://www.retrogames.cz/play_124-Atari2600.php?language=EN)\n\nAn AI system which is able to rapidly learn in dynamic environments could have a great impact on the world's economy.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when a reputable source reports that an AI system managed to score strictly more than 6000 points at least once within the first 30 minutes of the game play (no more than 108 000 frames). The system must have no previous direct access to the Montezuma's Revenge game, but it may be pretrained in other ways.", "lower_25": "Feb 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Apr 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will be able to learn to play Montezuma's Revenge in less than 30 min by Jan 2025?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:* \n\n- [When will an AI be able to explore all the rooms on the first level of Montezuma's revenge in less than or equal to 50 million frames of training?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/486/when-will-an-ai-achieve-competency-in-the-atari-classic-montezumas-revenge/)\n- [What will the highest score be, on Atari 2600 Montezuma's Revenge, by any ML model that is un-augmented with domain knowledge on 2022-01-14?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6230/sota-montezumas-revenge-2022-01-14/)\n- [When will the first AGI be first developed and demonstrated? ](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/when-will-the-first-artificial-general-intelligence-system-be-devised-tested-and-publicly-known-of/)\n\n----\n\nIn 2012, researchers proposed an [The Arcade Learning Environment](https://arxiv.org/abs/1207.4708) consisting of Atari 2600 games. Out of these games one stood out as the most challenging for deep learning models - [Montezuma's Revenge](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montezuma%27s_Revenge_(video_game)).\n\nAs of 2021 Go-Explore [(Ecoffet et al., 2020)](https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.12919v2.pdf) has achieved the highest score at 43 791 without augmentation with domain knowledge. However, it requires billions of frames or years of game play to achieve that performance.\n\nI attempted to calibrate this question by playing the game for 15 min. In this time I managed to score a maximum of 6700 points. [You can test the game on your own here.](https://www.retrogames.cz/play_124-Atari2600.php?language=EN)\n\nAn AI system which is able to rapidly learn in dynamic environments could have a great impact on the world's economy.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when a reputable source reports that an AI system managed to score strictly more than 6000 points at least once within the first 30 minutes of the game play (no more than 108 000 frames). The system must have no previous direct access to the Montezuma's Revenge game, but it may be pretrained in other ways.", "lower_25": "Feb 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Apr 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that one would be revived before 2200 if they were preserved by Alcor or the Cryonics Institute while both were active, given a likelihood ratio of 0.105?", "desc": "As of the time of writing this question, the two major providers of cryopreservation in the US are [Alcor](https://www.alcor.org/), with [181 patients and 1,317 members](https://www.alcor.org/library/alcor-membership-statistics/), and the [Cryonics Institute](https://www.cryonics.org/), with [177 patients and 1,859 members](https://www.cryonics.org/ci-landing/member-statistics/). \n\nThese organisations might differ in the chance of reviving their patients if the initial quality of cryopreservations is higher in one or the other, or if one organisation is likely to last longer than the other, or if when revival becomes possible one is better able to arrange this than the other.", "resc": "If no patients from Alcor or the Cryonics Insitute are revived, this resolves ambiguously.\n\nIf only patients from Alcor are revived, this resolves above the upper end of the scale.\n\nOtherwise, this resolves at the value (% of people revived, among those cryopreserved at Alcor while both organisations were active) / (% of people revived, among those cryopreserved at the Cryonics Institute while both organisations were active) at the start of 2200.", "lower_25": "0.105", "median": "0.800", "upper_75": "1.53", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the GDP of Mars will exceed that of Earth by the time it does not exceed 3000?", "desc": "", "resc": "When Columbus sailed to America in 1492, the \"New world\" had a fraction of the [population](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_history#/media/File:WorldPopulation.png) and [GDP](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1_AD_to_2003_AD_Historical_Trends_in_global_distribution_of_GDP_China_India_Western_Europe_USA_Middle_East.png ) of Europe. At the time it may have seemed implausible to guess that the gap would ever be overcome. However after a series of World Wars, the relative fortune of Europe declined while America --rich in resources and isolated by two oceans-- continued to grow. Ultimately, the GDP of the USA alone would be greater than that of Western Europe after WWII.\n\nIt may seem similarly improbable that Mars --a planet so inhospitable it is inhabited only by robots-- would ever surpass Earth. But, history is long. If a self-sustaining colony is ever founded on Mars, it would have some chance of exceeding Earth's GDP based solely on the possibility of calamity on Earth.\n\n***When will the GDP of Mars exceed that of Earth?***\n\n[fine-print]\n\nThis question will resolve – on the basis of credible reporting – to December 31st of the first year in which the real GDP of Mars exceeds that of Earth.\n\nIf it does not resolve positive before the ending date of 3000AD, it will resolve to the upper-bound.\n\nIf the GDP falls into disuse, and Metaculus Admins find no obvious alternatives, this resolves ambiguous.\n\nBecause of the dates involved in this question, it is unlikely any current Metaculus users will remain to collect points. Still, players are urged to predict in good faith.\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2930", "median": "Not ≤ 3000", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 3000", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the GDP of Mars will exceed that of Earth by the time it does not exceed 3000?", "desc": "", "resc": "When Columbus sailed to America in 1492, the \"New world\" had a fraction of the [population](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_history#/media/File:WorldPopulation.png) and [GDP](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1_AD_to_2003_AD_Historical_Trends_in_global_distribution_of_GDP_China_India_Western_Europe_USA_Middle_East.png ) of Europe. At the time it may have seemed implausible to guess that the gap would ever be overcome. However after a series of World Wars, the relative fortune of Europe declined while America --rich in resources and isolated by two oceans-- continued to grow. Ultimately, the GDP of the USA alone would be greater than that of Western Europe after WWII.\n\nIt may seem similarly improbable that Mars --a planet so inhospitable it is inhabited only by robots-- would ever surpass Earth. But, history is long. If a self-sustaining colony is ever founded on Mars, it would have some chance of exceeding Earth's GDP based solely on the possibility of calamity on Earth.\n\n***When will the GDP of Mars exceed that of Earth?***\n\n[fine-print]\n\nThis question will resolve – on the basis of credible reporting – to December 31st of the first year in which the real GDP of Mars exceeds that of Earth.\n\nIf it does not resolve positive before the ending date of 3000AD, it will resolve to the upper-bound.\n\nIf the GDP falls into disuse, and Metaculus Admins find no obvious alternatives, this resolves ambiguous.\n\nBecause of the dates involved in this question, it is unlikely any current Metaculus users will remain to collect points. Still, players are urged to predict in good faith.\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2930", "median": "Not ≤ 3000", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 3000", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will be able to learn to play Montezuma's Revenge in less than 30 min by Jan 2025?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:* \n\n- [When will an AI be able to explore all the rooms on the first level of Montezuma's revenge in less than or equal to 50 million frames of training?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/486/when-will-an-ai-achieve-competency-in-the-atari-classic-montezumas-revenge/)\n- [What will the highest score be, on Atari 2600 Montezuma's Revenge, by any ML model that is un-augmented with domain knowledge on 2022-01-14?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6230/sota-montezumas-revenge-2022-01-14/)\n- [When will the first AGI be first developed and demonstrated? ](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/when-will-the-first-artificial-general-intelligence-system-be-devised-tested-and-publicly-known-of/)\n\n----\n\nIn 2012, researchers proposed an [The Arcade Learning Environment](https://arxiv.org/abs/1207.4708) consisting of Atari 2600 games. Out of these games one stood out as the most challenging for deep learning models - [Montezuma's Revenge](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montezuma%27s_Revenge_(video_game)).\n\nAs of 2021 Go-Explore [(Ecoffet et al., 2020)](https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.12919v2.pdf) has achieved the highest score at 43 791 without augmentation with domain knowledge. However, it requires billions of frames or years of game play to achieve that performance.\n\nI attempted to calibrate this question by playing the game for 15 min. In this time I managed to score a maximum of 6700 points. [You can test the game on your own here.](https://www.retrogames.cz/play_124-Atari2600.php?language=EN)\n\nAn AI system which is able to rapidly learn in dynamic environments could have a great impact on the world's economy.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when a reputable source reports that an AI system managed to score strictly more than 6000 points at least once within the first 30 minutes of the game play (no more than 108 000 frames). The system must have no previous direct access to the Montezuma's Revenge game, but it may be pretrained in other ways.", "lower_25": "Feb 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Apr 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the GDP of Mars will exceed that of Earth by the time it does not exceed 3000?", "desc": "", "resc": "When Columbus sailed to America in 1492, the \"New world\" had a fraction of the [population](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_history#/media/File:WorldPopulation.png) and [GDP](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1_AD_to_2003_AD_Historical_Trends_in_global_distribution_of_GDP_China_India_Western_Europe_USA_Middle_East.png ) of Europe. At the time it may have seemed implausible to guess that the gap would ever be overcome. However after a series of World Wars, the relative fortune of Europe declined while America --rich in resources and isolated by two oceans-- continued to grow. Ultimately, the GDP of the USA alone would be greater than that of Western Europe after WWII.\n\nIt may seem similarly improbable that Mars --a planet so inhospitable it is inhabited only by robots-- would ever surpass Earth. But, history is long. If a self-sustaining colony is ever founded on Mars, it would have some chance of exceeding Earth's GDP based solely on the possibility of calamity on Earth.\n\n***When will the GDP of Mars exceed that of Earth?***\n\n[fine-print]\n\nThis question will resolve – on the basis of credible reporting – to December 31st of the first year in which the real GDP of Mars exceeds that of Earth.\n\nIf it does not resolve positive before the ending date of 3000AD, it will resolve to the upper-bound.\n\nIf the GDP falls into disuse, and Metaculus Admins find no obvious alternatives, this resolves ambiguous.\n\nBecause of the dates involved in this question, it is unlikely any current Metaculus users will remain to collect points. Still, players are urged to predict in good faith.\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2930", "median": "Not ≤ 3000", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 3000", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 100 babies will be born whose embryos were selected for genetic scores for intelligence by 2025?", "desc": "With genetic predictors of a phenotypic trait, it is possible to select embryos during an in vitro fertilisation process to increase or decrease that trait. Some have proposed that, using polygenic scores for IQ, embryo selection could enable cognitive enhancement in humans [(Shulman and Bostrom, 2014)](https://www.gwern.net/docs/iq/2014-shulman.pdf). This could have major social, economic and scientific implications [(ibid.)](https://www.gwern.net/docs/iq/2014-shulman.pdf).", "resc": "This question resolves positively as the date of the birth of the 100th baby who were developed from an embryo selected for polygenic scores for intelligence, according to credible reports.", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that one would be revived before 2200 if they were preserved by Alcor or the Cryonics Institute while both were active, given a likelihood ratio of 0.105?", "desc": "As of the time of writing this question, the two major providers of cryopreservation in the US are [Alcor](https://www.alcor.org/), with [181 patients and 1,317 members](https://www.alcor.org/library/alcor-membership-statistics/), and the [Cryonics Institute](https://www.cryonics.org/), with [177 patients and 1,859 members](https://www.cryonics.org/ci-landing/member-statistics/). \n\nThese organisations might differ in the chance of reviving their patients if the initial quality of cryopreservations is higher in one or the other, or if one organisation is likely to last longer than the other, or if when revival becomes possible one is better able to arrange this than the other.", "resc": "If no patients from Alcor or the Cryonics Insitute are revived, this resolves ambiguously.\n\nIf only patients from Alcor are revived, this resolves above the upper end of the scale.\n\nOtherwise, this resolves at the value (% of people revived, among those cryopreserved at Alcor while both organisations were active) / (% of people revived, among those cryopreserved at the Cryonics Institute while both organisations were active) at the start of 2200.", "lower_25": "0.105", "median": "0.800", "upper_75": "1.53", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 100 babies will be born whose embryos were selected for genetic scores for intelligence by 2025?", "desc": "With genetic predictors of a phenotypic trait, it is possible to select embryos during an in vitro fertilisation process to increase or decrease that trait. Some have proposed that, using polygenic scores for IQ, embryo selection could enable cognitive enhancement in humans [(Shulman and Bostrom, 2014)](https://www.gwern.net/docs/iq/2014-shulman.pdf). This could have major social, economic and scientific implications [(ibid.)](https://www.gwern.net/docs/iq/2014-shulman.pdf).", "resc": "This question resolves positively as the date of the birth of the 100th baby who were developed from an embryo selected for polygenic scores for intelligence, according to credible reports.", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 100 babies will be born whose embryos were selected for genetic scores for intelligence by 2025?", "desc": "With genetic predictors of a phenotypic trait, it is possible to select embryos during an in vitro fertilisation process to increase or decrease that trait. Some have proposed that, using polygenic scores for IQ, embryo selection could enable cognitive enhancement in humans [(Shulman and Bostrom, 2014)](https://www.gwern.net/docs/iq/2014-shulman.pdf). This could have major social, economic and scientific implications [(ibid.)](https://www.gwern.net/docs/iq/2014-shulman.pdf).", "resc": "This question resolves positively as the date of the birth of the 100th baby who were developed from an embryo selected for polygenic scores for intelligence, according to credible reports.", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 9.762 seats on the Supreme Court of the United States in 2030?", "desc": "Paul Christiano recently [wrote](https://www.facebook.com/paulfchristiano/posts/10224566865496919),\n\n> I don't know how far you could reduce the administrative costs of growing the [Supreme Court of the United States]. I could imagine having only a few judges be full-time while most judges vote periodically by ballot. If the court is politically important and costs are low, then you could easily imagine growing the court to dozens, hundreds, and then thousands before you really changed the cost-benefit analysis.\n\n> You would eventually be bottlenecked by the availability of plausibly-qualified candidates under current standards. But I'm not aware of any real constitutional requirements to serve as a justice, and so you could have a race to the bottom on standards in parallel with a ballooning court.\n\n> Foreseeing that outcome, a party in power might decide to directly increase the size of the court to the point where further expansion would be prohibitively costly. (And each party might be inclined to initiate a giant expansion out of the fear that their opponents would do so the next time they had the chance.) So rather than doubling every ~20 years (or however often a new unified government is elected) we could just jump straight to a gigantic court.\n\n> The most absurd outcome would be an equilibrium in which a significant fraction of Americans served on the supreme court and voted directly on high-profile cases by ballot (perhaps at the same time that they vote on elected offices).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of seats on the Supreme Court of the United States on January 1, 2030 at 00:00 UTC", "lower_25": "8.922", "median": "9.179", "upper_75": "9.762", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 9.762 seats on the Supreme Court of the United States in 2030?", "desc": "Paul Christiano recently [wrote](https://www.facebook.com/paulfchristiano/posts/10224566865496919),\n\n> I don't know how far you could reduce the administrative costs of growing the [Supreme Court of the United States]. I could imagine having only a few judges be full-time while most judges vote periodically by ballot. If the court is politically important and costs are low, then you could easily imagine growing the court to dozens, hundreds, and then thousands before you really changed the cost-benefit analysis.\n\n> You would eventually be bottlenecked by the availability of plausibly-qualified candidates under current standards. But I'm not aware of any real constitutional requirements to serve as a justice, and so you could have a race to the bottom on standards in parallel with a ballooning court.\n\n> Foreseeing that outcome, a party in power might decide to directly increase the size of the court to the point where further expansion would be prohibitively costly. (And each party might be inclined to initiate a giant expansion out of the fear that their opponents would do so the next time they had the chance.) So rather than doubling every ~20 years (or however often a new unified government is elected) we could just jump straight to a gigantic court.\n\n> The most absurd outcome would be an equilibrium in which a significant fraction of Americans served on the supreme court and voted directly on high-profile cases by ballot (perhaps at the same time that they vote on elected offices).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of seats on the Supreme Court of the United States on January 1, 2030 at 00:00 UTC", "lower_25": "8.922", "median": "9.179", "upper_75": "9.762", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 44.2% of countries which pledge carbon neutrality by 2050 will keep their pledge?", "desc": "Per the European Parliament, “Carbon neutrality means having a balance between emitting carbon and absorbing carbon from the atmosphere in carbon sinks. Removing carbon oxide from the atmosphere and then storing it is known as carbon sequestration. In order to achieve net zero emissions, all worldwide greenhouse gas emissions will have to be counterbalanced by carbon sequestration.”\n\nIn 2020 a number of countries made commitments to achieve carbon neutrality including the European Union, and China. As of late 2020, at least 25 countries have pledged carbon neutrality by 2050. On the other hand, only two countries have achieved carbon neutrality: the forest covered Bhutan and Suriname. Given the 30 year time-horizon, and the unclear path to carbon neutrality, it remains ambiguous how many countries will follow through on their carbon neutrality pledges.", "resc": "This question resolves as the percentage of countries which pledged carbon neutrality by 2050 that succeed in achieving neutrality. Only countries which pledge before 2025 will be counted.\n\nCountries will be included in the percentage calculation if and only if on January 1, 2026 the country is listed in [this](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_neutrality#Countries_and_territories) Wikipedia table", "lower_25": "26.7", "median": "44.2", "upper_75": "62.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 44.2% of countries which pledge carbon neutrality by 2050 will keep their pledge?", "desc": "Per the European Parliament, “Carbon neutrality means having a balance between emitting carbon and absorbing carbon from the atmosphere in carbon sinks. Removing carbon oxide from the atmosphere and then storing it is known as carbon sequestration. In order to achieve net zero emissions, all worldwide greenhouse gas emissions will have to be counterbalanced by carbon sequestration.”\n\nIn 2020 a number of countries made commitments to achieve carbon neutrality including the European Union, and China. As of late 2020, at least 25 countries have pledged carbon neutrality by 2050. On the other hand, only two countries have achieved carbon neutrality: the forest covered Bhutan and Suriname. Given the 30 year time-horizon, and the unclear path to carbon neutrality, it remains ambiguous how many countries will follow through on their carbon neutrality pledges.", "resc": "This question resolves as the percentage of countries which pledged carbon neutrality by 2050 that succeed in achieving neutrality. Only countries which pledge before 2025 will be counted.\n\nCountries will be included in the percentage calculation if and only if on January 1, 2026 the country is listed in [this](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_neutrality#Countries_and_territories) Wikipedia table", "lower_25": "26.7", "median": "44.2", "upper_75": "62.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Uber will electrify 50% of its fleet by 2032?", "desc": "Uber [recently announced](https://www.bbc.com/news/business-54079727#:~:text=Uber%20has%20said%20that%20all,the%20challenge%20of%20climate%20change.) in September 2020 that it plans to have all taxis available through the app be electric by 2040 globally, and 2030 for Europe, America and Canada. \n\nThe option for an electric vehicle is currently available in 15 US and Canadian cities, and the company expects to open this option in another 65 cities globally by the end of 2020.\n\nUber is also working to arrange the transfer of vehicles for its driver by offering discounts through select companies (Renault and Nissan in Europe and GM in Canada and US) and promising [$800M in support](https://nypost.com/2020/09/08/uber-vows-to-have-all-electric-cars-by-2040-help-drivers-make-switch/) through 2025 for drivers to make the switch.\n\nAs Hawkins from [The Verge](https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/17/21294040/lyft-electric-vehicle-ev-100-percent-2030) writes:\n> “Research suggests that the average ride-hailing trip creates about 50 percent more pollution than the average traditional car trip. Even worse, studies show that over half of all ride-hailing trips in major cities are made by people who would have otherwise used cleaner means of transit to get to their destination.” \nAs one of the largest transportation companies and contributors to carbon emissions, taking these steps will help lower pollution and decrease the rate of global warming.", "resc": "Resolution criteria for this question will be provided through any reliable new source nationally such as the New York Times, the Economist, the Wall Street Journal, or similar sources. If there are no publications available through these sources, Uber's own data and announcements will suffice", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Lyft will electrify 80% of its fleet by Jan 2029?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will Uber electrify 50% of its fleet?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5537/uber-at-50-electric/)\n\n----\n\nIn June 2020, Lyft announced [plans to electrify 100% of its fleet by 2030](https://www.lyft.com/blog/posts/leading-the-transition-to-zero-emissions).\n\nA month before, the California Air Resources Board had floated targets requiring 70-80% of miles driven by both Lyft and Uber in the state be in EV's by 2030, though in July, this number was [lowered to 60%](https://www.kqed.org/science/1967315/california-dials-back-plan-to-require-uber-lyft-go-electric).\n\nLyft's own announcement is non-binding, but it conveys an intention to electrify beyond what the state of California may require:\n\n> The shift to 100% electric vehicles (EVs) for Lyft will mean transitioning all vehicles used on the Lyft platform over the next ten years to all-electric or other zero-emission technologies. This includes cars in the Express Drive rental car partner program for rideshare drivers, our consumer rental car program for riders, our autonomous vehicle program, and drivers' personal cars used on the Lyft platform.\n\nIf the company follows through on its public statement, the impact on air pollution could be significant. [The Verge](https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/17/21294040/lyft-electric-vehicle-ev-100-percent-2030) reports:\n\n> Research suggests that the average ride-hailing trip creates about 50 percent more pollution than the average traditional car trip. Even worse, studies show that over half of all ride-hailing trips in major cities are made by people who would have otherwise used cleaner means of transit to get to their destination. \n\nSince 2019, Lyft has offered a [green mode in several cities](https://www.lyft.com/blog/posts/making-cities-more-liveable-with-electric-vehicles). In its new [Path to Zero Emissions plan](https://lyft-impact-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/images/path-to-zero-emissions.pdf), the company outlines the steps it plans to take to increase the supply and lower the cost of EV's and their charging infrastructure, as well as lobby for policy change in support of expanding the EV ecosystem.", "resc": "Resolution criteria for this question will be provided through any reliable new source nationally such as the New York Times, the Economist, the Wall Street Journal, or similar sources. If there are no publications available through these sources, Lyft's own data and announcements will suffice", "lower_25": "Jan 2029", "median": "Dec 2030", "upper_75": "Apr 2033", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Uber will electrify 50% of its fleet by 2032?", "desc": "Uber [recently announced](https://www.bbc.com/news/business-54079727#:~:text=Uber%20has%20said%20that%20all,the%20challenge%20of%20climate%20change.) in September 2020 that it plans to have all taxis available through the app be electric by 2040 globally, and 2030 for Europe, America and Canada. \n\nThe option for an electric vehicle is currently available in 15 US and Canadian cities, and the company expects to open this option in another 65 cities globally by the end of 2020.\n\nUber is also working to arrange the transfer of vehicles for its driver by offering discounts through select companies (Renault and Nissan in Europe and GM in Canada and US) and promising [$800M in support](https://nypost.com/2020/09/08/uber-vows-to-have-all-electric-cars-by-2040-help-drivers-make-switch/) through 2025 for drivers to make the switch.\n\nAs Hawkins from [The Verge](https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/17/21294040/lyft-electric-vehicle-ev-100-percent-2030) writes:\n> “Research suggests that the average ride-hailing trip creates about 50 percent more pollution than the average traditional car trip. Even worse, studies show that over half of all ride-hailing trips in major cities are made by people who would have otherwise used cleaner means of transit to get to their destination.” \nAs one of the largest transportation companies and contributors to carbon emissions, taking these steps will help lower pollution and decrease the rate of global warming.", "resc": "Resolution criteria for this question will be provided through any reliable new source nationally such as the New York Times, the Economist, the Wall Street Journal, or similar sources. If there are no publications available through these sources, Uber's own data and announcements will suffice", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Lyft will electrify 80% of its fleet by Jan 2029?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will Uber electrify 50% of its fleet?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5537/uber-at-50-electric/)\n\n----\n\nIn June 2020, Lyft announced [plans to electrify 100% of its fleet by 2030](https://www.lyft.com/blog/posts/leading-the-transition-to-zero-emissions).\n\nA month before, the California Air Resources Board had floated targets requiring 70-80% of miles driven by both Lyft and Uber in the state be in EV's by 2030, though in July, this number was [lowered to 60%](https://www.kqed.org/science/1967315/california-dials-back-plan-to-require-uber-lyft-go-electric).\n\nLyft's own announcement is non-binding, but it conveys an intention to electrify beyond what the state of California may require:\n\n> The shift to 100% electric vehicles (EVs) for Lyft will mean transitioning all vehicles used on the Lyft platform over the next ten years to all-electric or other zero-emission technologies. This includes cars in the Express Drive rental car partner program for rideshare drivers, our consumer rental car program for riders, our autonomous vehicle program, and drivers' personal cars used on the Lyft platform.\n\nIf the company follows through on its public statement, the impact on air pollution could be significant. [The Verge](https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/17/21294040/lyft-electric-vehicle-ev-100-percent-2030) reports:\n\n> Research suggests that the average ride-hailing trip creates about 50 percent more pollution than the average traditional car trip. Even worse, studies show that over half of all ride-hailing trips in major cities are made by people who would have otherwise used cleaner means of transit to get to their destination. \n\nSince 2019, Lyft has offered a [green mode in several cities](https://www.lyft.com/blog/posts/making-cities-more-liveable-with-electric-vehicles). In its new [Path to Zero Emissions plan](https://lyft-impact-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/images/path-to-zero-emissions.pdf), the company outlines the steps it plans to take to increase the supply and lower the cost of EV's and their charging infrastructure, as well as lobby for policy change in support of expanding the EV ecosystem.", "resc": "Resolution criteria for this question will be provided through any reliable new source nationally such as the New York Times, the Economist, the Wall Street Journal, or similar sources. If there are no publications available through these sources, Lyft's own data and announcements will suffice", "lower_25": "Jan 2029", "median": "Dec 2030", "upper_75": "Apr 2033", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that another state will provide 75% of the number of public charging outlets available in California by 2033?", "desc": "California offers [28,223](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10366) electric charging outlets of every level through a variety of public charging stations. \n\nThese stations are essential infrastructure required for the widespread use of electric vehicles, and remain a critical factor in EV adoption. In a 2020 survey by Castrol, they found that [64% of consumers](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/mainstream-ev-adoption-5-speedbumps-to-overcome/) on average (from countries in the Asian, European, and North American regions) would buy an electric vehicle if charging infrastructure existed to support their driving habits. \n\nThere are currently [89,970 outlets](https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/analyze?country=US&fuel=ELEC&ev_levels=all) on public charging stations of every level across the United States, with California representing almost one third of that. Several other states such as Texas, Florida, Oregon, and New York are followers of California's trend, however, the number of public outlets in the second-greatest state is only [5,151](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10366) in New York, less than one fifth of the number in California.\n\nFor people driving longer distances or living in rural areas, both EV range and charging infrastructure is essential for drawing a greater proportion of drivers to buy electric vehicles. The states with the largest number of [new EV registrations](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10962) in 2018 after California (256,800) were in Texas (22,600), Washington (28,400), Florida (25,200) and New York (16,600). These numbers loosely follow the number of [EV laws and incentives by state](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10373) as well. \n\nIf there is a greater push by both private corporations and public state and local governments to provide more public charging stations, then hopefully new registrations will increase as well.", "resc": "Resolution criteria for this question will be provided through the U.S Department of Energy's [AFDC](https://afdc.energy.gov/). The number of charging outlets and stations across America can be found through a [map](https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/analyze?country=US&fuel=ELEC&ev_levels=all) that is consistently updated. Numbers for this question were drawn on the date: 10/31/20. The number of charging outlets per state can be found through this [map](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10366) that is consistently updated. Other information surrounding adoption can be found through the AFDC in maps like [this](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10962) for new EV registration, which is on a two year updating time lag, and [here](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10373) to look at the number of current government sponsored laws and incentives for EVs by state.\n\nIf these criteria are no longer available or current by the time this question resolves, then it will resolve ambiguously. To resolve positively, the number of public outlets of all levels in another state must reach the 50% level for the then current number of public outlets maintained in California at that time", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Lyft will electrify 80% of its fleet by Jan 2029?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will Uber electrify 50% of its fleet?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5537/uber-at-50-electric/)\n\n----\n\nIn June 2020, Lyft announced [plans to electrify 100% of its fleet by 2030](https://www.lyft.com/blog/posts/leading-the-transition-to-zero-emissions).\n\nA month before, the California Air Resources Board had floated targets requiring 70-80% of miles driven by both Lyft and Uber in the state be in EV's by 2030, though in July, this number was [lowered to 60%](https://www.kqed.org/science/1967315/california-dials-back-plan-to-require-uber-lyft-go-electric).\n\nLyft's own announcement is non-binding, but it conveys an intention to electrify beyond what the state of California may require:\n\n> The shift to 100% electric vehicles (EVs) for Lyft will mean transitioning all vehicles used on the Lyft platform over the next ten years to all-electric or other zero-emission technologies. This includes cars in the Express Drive rental car partner program for rideshare drivers, our consumer rental car program for riders, our autonomous vehicle program, and drivers' personal cars used on the Lyft platform.\n\nIf the company follows through on its public statement, the impact on air pollution could be significant. [The Verge](https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/17/21294040/lyft-electric-vehicle-ev-100-percent-2030) reports:\n\n> Research suggests that the average ride-hailing trip creates about 50 percent more pollution than the average traditional car trip. Even worse, studies show that over half of all ride-hailing trips in major cities are made by people who would have otherwise used cleaner means of transit to get to their destination. \n\nSince 2019, Lyft has offered a [green mode in several cities](https://www.lyft.com/blog/posts/making-cities-more-liveable-with-electric-vehicles). In its new [Path to Zero Emissions plan](https://lyft-impact-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/images/path-to-zero-emissions.pdf), the company outlines the steps it plans to take to increase the supply and lower the cost of EV's and their charging infrastructure, as well as lobby for policy change in support of expanding the EV ecosystem.", "resc": "Resolution criteria for this question will be provided through any reliable new source nationally such as the New York Times, the Economist, the Wall Street Journal, or similar sources. If there are no publications available through these sources, Lyft's own data and announcements will suffice", "lower_25": "Jan 2029", "median": "Dec 2030", "upper_75": "Apr 2033", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that another state will provide 75% of the number of public charging outlets available in California by 2033?", "desc": "California offers [28,223](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10366) electric charging outlets of every level through a variety of public charging stations. \n\nThese stations are essential infrastructure required for the widespread use of electric vehicles, and remain a critical factor in EV adoption. In a 2020 survey by Castrol, they found that [64% of consumers](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/mainstream-ev-adoption-5-speedbumps-to-overcome/) on average (from countries in the Asian, European, and North American regions) would buy an electric vehicle if charging infrastructure existed to support their driving habits. \n\nThere are currently [89,970 outlets](https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/analyze?country=US&fuel=ELEC&ev_levels=all) on public charging stations of every level across the United States, with California representing almost one third of that. Several other states such as Texas, Florida, Oregon, and New York are followers of California's trend, however, the number of public outlets in the second-greatest state is only [5,151](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10366) in New York, less than one fifth of the number in California.\n\nFor people driving longer distances or living in rural areas, both EV range and charging infrastructure is essential for drawing a greater proportion of drivers to buy electric vehicles. The states with the largest number of [new EV registrations](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10962) in 2018 after California (256,800) were in Texas (22,600), Washington (28,400), Florida (25,200) and New York (16,600). These numbers loosely follow the number of [EV laws and incentives by state](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10373) as well. \n\nIf there is a greater push by both private corporations and public state and local governments to provide more public charging stations, then hopefully new registrations will increase as well.", "resc": "Resolution criteria for this question will be provided through the U.S Department of Energy's [AFDC](https://afdc.energy.gov/). The number of charging outlets and stations across America can be found through a [map](https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/analyze?country=US&fuel=ELEC&ev_levels=all) that is consistently updated. Numbers for this question were drawn on the date: 10/31/20. The number of charging outlets per state can be found through this [map](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10366) that is consistently updated. Other information surrounding adoption can be found through the AFDC in maps like [this](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10962) for new EV registration, which is on a two year updating time lag, and [here](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10373) to look at the number of current government sponsored laws and incentives for EVs by state.\n\nIf these criteria are no longer available or current by the time this question resolves, then it will resolve ambiguously. To resolve positively, the number of public outlets of all levels in another state must reach the 50% level for the then current number of public outlets maintained in California at that time", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.74 species of pangolin will survive to 2050?", "desc": "[Pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pangolin) are an order of mammals found in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. There are eight currently extant species of pangolin. One the [IUCN red list](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IUCN_Red_List), three of these ([Phillipine pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_pangolin), [Chinese pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_pangolin) and [Sunda pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunda_pangolin)) are listed as critically endangered, three ([Tree pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tree_pangolin), [Indian pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_pangolin) and [Giant pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giant_pangolin)) are listed as endangered and two ([Long-tailed pangolins](Long-tailed pangolin) and [Ground pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ground_pangolin)) are listed as vulnerable. The endangerment of pangolins is caused by a combination of [poaching](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pangolin_trade) and deforestation.", "resc": "This will resolve at the number of currently known species of pangolin that are not classified as \"extinct\" or \"critically endangered (possibly extinct)\" by the latest version of the [IUCN Red List](https://www.iucnredlist.org/) as of the end of 2050. If new species are discovered, they will not count towards the total number", "lower_25": "4.74", "median": "5.94", "upper_75": "6.93", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 44.2% of countries which pledge carbon neutrality by 2050 will keep their pledge?", "desc": "Per the European Parliament, “Carbon neutrality means having a balance between emitting carbon and absorbing carbon from the atmosphere in carbon sinks. Removing carbon oxide from the atmosphere and then storing it is known as carbon sequestration. In order to achieve net zero emissions, all worldwide greenhouse gas emissions will have to be counterbalanced by carbon sequestration.”\n\nIn 2020 a number of countries made commitments to achieve carbon neutrality including the European Union, and China. As of late 2020, at least 25 countries have pledged carbon neutrality by 2050. On the other hand, only two countries have achieved carbon neutrality: the forest covered Bhutan and Suriname. Given the 30 year time-horizon, and the unclear path to carbon neutrality, it remains ambiguous how many countries will follow through on their carbon neutrality pledges.", "resc": "This question resolves as the percentage of countries which pledged carbon neutrality by 2050 that succeed in achieving neutrality. Only countries which pledge before 2025 will be counted.\n\nCountries will be included in the percentage calculation if and only if on January 1, 2026 the country is listed in [this](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_neutrality#Countries_and_territories) Wikipedia table", "lower_25": "26.7", "median": "44.2", "upper_75": "62.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 9.762 seats on the Supreme Court of the United States in 2030?", "desc": "Paul Christiano recently [wrote](https://www.facebook.com/paulfchristiano/posts/10224566865496919),\n\n> I don't know how far you could reduce the administrative costs of growing the [Supreme Court of the United States]. I could imagine having only a few judges be full-time while most judges vote periodically by ballot. If the court is politically important and costs are low, then you could easily imagine growing the court to dozens, hundreds, and then thousands before you really changed the cost-benefit analysis.\n\n> You would eventually be bottlenecked by the availability of plausibly-qualified candidates under current standards. But I'm not aware of any real constitutional requirements to serve as a justice, and so you could have a race to the bottom on standards in parallel with a ballooning court.\n\n> Foreseeing that outcome, a party in power might decide to directly increase the size of the court to the point where further expansion would be prohibitively costly. (And each party might be inclined to initiate a giant expansion out of the fear that their opponents would do so the next time they had the chance.) So rather than doubling every ~20 years (or however often a new unified government is elected) we could just jump straight to a gigantic court.\n\n> The most absurd outcome would be an equilibrium in which a significant fraction of Americans served on the supreme court and voted directly on high-profile cases by ballot (perhaps at the same time that they vote on elected offices).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of seats on the Supreme Court of the United States on January 1, 2030 at 00:00 UTC", "lower_25": "8.922", "median": "9.179", "upper_75": "9.762", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.74 species of pangolin will survive to 2050?", "desc": "[Pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pangolin) are an order of mammals found in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. There are eight currently extant species of pangolin. One the [IUCN red list](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IUCN_Red_List), three of these ([Phillipine pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_pangolin), [Chinese pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_pangolin) and [Sunda pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunda_pangolin)) are listed as critically endangered, three ([Tree pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tree_pangolin), [Indian pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_pangolin) and [Giant pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giant_pangolin)) are listed as endangered and two ([Long-tailed pangolins](Long-tailed pangolin) and [Ground pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ground_pangolin)) are listed as vulnerable. The endangerment of pangolins is caused by a combination of [poaching](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pangolin_trade) and deforestation.", "resc": "This will resolve at the number of currently known species of pangolin that are not classified as \"extinct\" or \"critically endangered (possibly extinct)\" by the latest version of the [IUCN Red List](https://www.iucnredlist.org/) as of the end of 2050. If new species are discovered, they will not count towards the total number", "lower_25": "4.74", "median": "5.94", "upper_75": "6.93", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Uber will electrify 50% of its fleet by 2032?", "desc": "Uber [recently announced](https://www.bbc.com/news/business-54079727#:~:text=Uber%20has%20said%20that%20all,the%20challenge%20of%20climate%20change.) in September 2020 that it plans to have all taxis available through the app be electric by 2040 globally, and 2030 for Europe, America and Canada. \n\nThe option for an electric vehicle is currently available in 15 US and Canadian cities, and the company expects to open this option in another 65 cities globally by the end of 2020.\n\nUber is also working to arrange the transfer of vehicles for its driver by offering discounts through select companies (Renault and Nissan in Europe and GM in Canada and US) and promising [$800M in support](https://nypost.com/2020/09/08/uber-vows-to-have-all-electric-cars-by-2040-help-drivers-make-switch/) through 2025 for drivers to make the switch.\n\nAs Hawkins from [The Verge](https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/17/21294040/lyft-electric-vehicle-ev-100-percent-2030) writes:\n> “Research suggests that the average ride-hailing trip creates about 50 percent more pollution than the average traditional car trip. Even worse, studies show that over half of all ride-hailing trips in major cities are made by people who would have otherwise used cleaner means of transit to get to their destination.” \nAs one of the largest transportation companies and contributors to carbon emissions, taking these steps will help lower pollution and decrease the rate of global warming.", "resc": "Resolution criteria for this question will be provided through any reliable new source nationally such as the New York Times, the Economist, the Wall Street Journal, or similar sources. If there are no publications available through these sources, Uber's own data and announcements will suffice", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.74 species of pangolin will survive to 2050?", "desc": "[Pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pangolin) are an order of mammals found in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. There are eight currently extant species of pangolin. One the [IUCN red list](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IUCN_Red_List), three of these ([Phillipine pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippine_pangolin), [Chinese pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_pangolin) and [Sunda pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunda_pangolin)) are listed as critically endangered, three ([Tree pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tree_pangolin), [Indian pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_pangolin) and [Giant pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giant_pangolin)) are listed as endangered and two ([Long-tailed pangolins](Long-tailed pangolin) and [Ground pangolins](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ground_pangolin)) are listed as vulnerable. The endangerment of pangolins is caused by a combination of [poaching](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pangolin_trade) and deforestation.", "resc": "This will resolve at the number of currently known species of pangolin that are not classified as \"extinct\" or \"critically endangered (possibly extinct)\" by the latest version of the [IUCN Red List](https://www.iucnredlist.org/) as of the end of 2050. If new species are discovered, they will not count towards the total number", "lower_25": "4.74", "median": "5.94", "upper_75": "6.93", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that another state will provide 75% of the number of public charging outlets available in California by 2033?", "desc": "California offers [28,223](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10366) electric charging outlets of every level through a variety of public charging stations. \n\nThese stations are essential infrastructure required for the widespread use of electric vehicles, and remain a critical factor in EV adoption. In a 2020 survey by Castrol, they found that [64% of consumers](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/mainstream-ev-adoption-5-speedbumps-to-overcome/) on average (from countries in the Asian, European, and North American regions) would buy an electric vehicle if charging infrastructure existed to support their driving habits. \n\nThere are currently [89,970 outlets](https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/analyze?country=US&fuel=ELEC&ev_levels=all) on public charging stations of every level across the United States, with California representing almost one third of that. Several other states such as Texas, Florida, Oregon, and New York are followers of California's trend, however, the number of public outlets in the second-greatest state is only [5,151](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10366) in New York, less than one fifth of the number in California.\n\nFor people driving longer distances or living in rural areas, both EV range and charging infrastructure is essential for drawing a greater proportion of drivers to buy electric vehicles. The states with the largest number of [new EV registrations](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10962) in 2018 after California (256,800) were in Texas (22,600), Washington (28,400), Florida (25,200) and New York (16,600). These numbers loosely follow the number of [EV laws and incentives by state](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10373) as well. \n\nIf there is a greater push by both private corporations and public state and local governments to provide more public charging stations, then hopefully new registrations will increase as well.", "resc": "Resolution criteria for this question will be provided through the U.S Department of Energy's [AFDC](https://afdc.energy.gov/). The number of charging outlets and stations across America can be found through a [map](https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/analyze?country=US&fuel=ELEC&ev_levels=all) that is consistently updated. Numbers for this question were drawn on the date: 10/31/20. The number of charging outlets per state can be found through this [map](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10366) that is consistently updated. Other information surrounding adoption can be found through the AFDC in maps like [this](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10962) for new EV registration, which is on a two year updating time lag, and [here](https://afdc.energy.gov/data/10373) to look at the number of current government sponsored laws and incentives for EVs by state.\n\nIf these criteria are no longer available or current by the time this question resolves, then it will resolve ambiguously. To resolve positively, the number of public outlets of all levels in another state must reach the 50% level for the then current number of public outlets maintained in California at that time", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the price of neuropreservation will be $160,000 at Alcor in 2030?", "desc": "From [Alcor](https://www.alcor.org/library/case-for-neuropreservation/),\n\n> Neuropreservation, quite simply, is low temperature preservation of the brain of a terminal patient. All efforts in neuropreservation are devoted to the singular purpose of preserving the brain, and only the brain, in the best possible condition allowed by present technology. The disposition of other tissue only matters inasmuch it impacts upon the condition of the brain.\n\nAs of writing this question, Alcor [charges a minimum](https://www.alcor.org/docs/alcor-form-schedule-a-required-costs-and-cryopreservation-fund-minimums.pdf) of $80,000 for neuropreservation, often paid with life insurance. For people purchasing life insurance for cryonics, it's important to ensure that the funding is above the minimum amount required for preservation. However, the price has changed in the past. Therefore, it's critical that cryonics enthusiasts anticipate future price changes, so that they can afford the procedure when they need it.\n\nMati Roy has written [a timeline of brain preservation](https://timelines.issarice.com/wiki/Timeline_of_brain_preservation) and has recorded both the [real](https://timelines.issarice.com/wiki/File:Historical_cost_of_cryonics,_inflation_adjusted.png) and [nominal price of brain preservation over time](https://timelines.issarice.com/wiki/File:Historical_cost_of_cryonics.png).", "resc": "This question resolves as the minimum nominal price of brain preservation provided by Alcor at the beginning of 2030 in US dollars, if Alcor still exists. Otherwise, this question resolves ambiguously. Resolution is determined by a source provided by Alcor", "lower_25": "84.4k", "median": "118k", "upper_75": "160k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States Government Spending to GDP will be 43.3% in 2024?", "desc": "The US Government Spending to GDP can be found [here](https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/government-spending-to-gdp) on Trading Economics. As of writing this question, the most recent value was 37.8 percent.", "resc": "This question resolves on the percent value of the US Government spending to GDP as reported by Trading Economics, or some other credible source, for the year 2024", "lower_25": "37.3", "median": "40.2", "upper_75": "43.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the price of neuropreservation will be $160,000 at Alcor in 2030?", "desc": "From [Alcor](https://www.alcor.org/library/case-for-neuropreservation/),\n\n> Neuropreservation, quite simply, is low temperature preservation of the brain of a terminal patient. All efforts in neuropreservation are devoted to the singular purpose of preserving the brain, and only the brain, in the best possible condition allowed by present technology. The disposition of other tissue only matters inasmuch it impacts upon the condition of the brain.\n\nAs of writing this question, Alcor [charges a minimum](https://www.alcor.org/docs/alcor-form-schedule-a-required-costs-and-cryopreservation-fund-minimums.pdf) of $80,000 for neuropreservation, often paid with life insurance. For people purchasing life insurance for cryonics, it's important to ensure that the funding is above the minimum amount required for preservation. However, the price has changed in the past. Therefore, it's critical that cryonics enthusiasts anticipate future price changes, so that they can afford the procedure when they need it.\n\nMati Roy has written [a timeline of brain preservation](https://timelines.issarice.com/wiki/Timeline_of_brain_preservation) and has recorded both the [real](https://timelines.issarice.com/wiki/File:Historical_cost_of_cryonics,_inflation_adjusted.png) and [nominal price of brain preservation over time](https://timelines.issarice.com/wiki/File:Historical_cost_of_cryonics.png).", "resc": "This question resolves as the minimum nominal price of brain preservation provided by Alcor at the beginning of 2030 in US dollars, if Alcor still exists. Otherwise, this question resolves ambiguously. Resolution is determined by a source provided by Alcor", "lower_25": "84.4k", "median": "118k", "upper_75": "160k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US federal minimum wage will be raised by Dec 2026?", "desc": "The last increase to the federal minimum wage was July 24, 2009. [From 1997 to 2007](https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/minimum-wage/history/chart), the minimum wage was $5.15 until it was incrementally increased to its current level, $7.25 per hour.\n\nIn terms of the USD's purchasing power, the minimum wage has been significantly higher in the past. In 1968, the minimum wage was $1.60 per hour, which in 2020 dollars would be aproximately $12.00.\n\nJoe Biden (presumed president-elect) has [pledged to increase the federal minimum wage to $15 per hour](https://joebiden.com/empowerworkers/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the next date when the US federal minimum wage is increased, meaning the first day when the increased wage takes effect. Any increase over $7.25 USD (not inflation-adjusted) will be a sufficient resolution for this question.", "lower_25": "Nov 2024", "median": "Dec 2026", "upper_75": "Jan 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States Government Spending to GDP will be 43.3% in 2024?", "desc": "The US Government Spending to GDP can be found [here](https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/government-spending-to-gdp) on Trading Economics. As of writing this question, the most recent value was 37.8 percent.", "resc": "This question resolves on the percent value of the US Government spending to GDP as reported by Trading Economics, or some other credible source, for the year 2024", "lower_25": "37.3", "median": "40.2", "upper_75": "43.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US federal minimum wage will be raised by Dec 2026?", "desc": "The last increase to the federal minimum wage was July 24, 2009. [From 1997 to 2007](https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/minimum-wage/history/chart), the minimum wage was $5.15 until it was incrementally increased to its current level, $7.25 per hour.\n\nIn terms of the USD's purchasing power, the minimum wage has been significantly higher in the past. In 1968, the minimum wage was $1.60 per hour, which in 2020 dollars would be aproximately $12.00.\n\nJoe Biden (presumed president-elect) has [pledged to increase the federal minimum wage to $15 per hour](https://joebiden.com/empowerworkers/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the next date when the US federal minimum wage is increased, meaning the first day when the increased wage takes effect. Any increase over $7.25 USD (not inflation-adjusted) will be a sufficient resolution for this question.", "lower_25": "Nov 2024", "median": "Dec 2026", "upper_75": "Jan 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that humans will be able to capture water from volatile sources in the inner Solar System by 2050?", "desc": "#Context\n\nWater has been called [the oil of space](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-07107-4), and for good reason. [Nature reports](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-07107-4) that: \n\n> Private firms are increasingly tempted by the possibility of mining oxygen and hydrogen — which power rockets — from lunar ice. If that does pan out, then the Moon could become a refueling station, radically reducing the expense of space travel.\n\n> As an example, a lunar return mission that refueled at the Moon would cost just one-fiftieth of the price of one that brings all its fuel with it from Earth.\n\nThough it appears that there may be far more lunar ice than previously anticipated, extracting and utilizing ice that took many years to accumulate is not, in the (potentially very) long-term, a sustainable approach for space mission or lunar settlement resupply. Fortunately, it may not be the only option.\n\n\nA recent [Nature paper](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41550-020-1198-9#Sec4) studying cold traps on the moon between 1 km - 1 cm in scale found that not only are cold traps roughly ~1 cm across the most numerous type, their presence has important implications: \n\n> Given the high loss rates due to micrometeorite impact gardening and ultraviolet photodestruction, the detection of water within the micro cold traps would imply recent accumulation. Therefore, the presence or absence of water in micro cold traps could serve as an indicator of volatile sources in the inner Solar System.\n\n\n#Question\n\nTherefore, this question asks:", "resc": "#Resolution\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a system must be created that can capture and make available for human use water from volatile sources in the Inner Solar System. Such a system may be a proof of concept, and not necessarily optimized, efficient, or cost-effective", "lower_25": "2039", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US federal minimum wage will be raised by Dec 2026?", "desc": "The last increase to the federal minimum wage was July 24, 2009. [From 1997 to 2007](https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/minimum-wage/history/chart), the minimum wage was $5.15 until it was incrementally increased to its current level, $7.25 per hour.\n\nIn terms of the USD's purchasing power, the minimum wage has been significantly higher in the past. In 1968, the minimum wage was $1.60 per hour, which in 2020 dollars would be aproximately $12.00.\n\nJoe Biden (presumed president-elect) has [pledged to increase the federal minimum wage to $15 per hour](https://joebiden.com/empowerworkers/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the next date when the US federal minimum wage is increased, meaning the first day when the increased wage takes effect. Any increase over $7.25 USD (not inflation-adjusted) will be a sufficient resolution for this question.", "lower_25": "Nov 2024", "median": "Dec 2026", "upper_75": "Jan 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that humans will be able to capture water from volatile sources in the inner Solar System by 2050?", "desc": "#Context\n\nWater has been called [the oil of space](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-07107-4), and for good reason. [Nature reports](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-07107-4) that: \n\n> Private firms are increasingly tempted by the possibility of mining oxygen and hydrogen — which power rockets — from lunar ice. If that does pan out, then the Moon could become a refueling station, radically reducing the expense of space travel.\n\n> As an example, a lunar return mission that refueled at the Moon would cost just one-fiftieth of the price of one that brings all its fuel with it from Earth.\n\nThough it appears that there may be far more lunar ice than previously anticipated, extracting and utilizing ice that took many years to accumulate is not, in the (potentially very) long-term, a sustainable approach for space mission or lunar settlement resupply. Fortunately, it may not be the only option.\n\n\nA recent [Nature paper](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41550-020-1198-9#Sec4) studying cold traps on the moon between 1 km - 1 cm in scale found that not only are cold traps roughly ~1 cm across the most numerous type, their presence has important implications: \n\n> Given the high loss rates due to micrometeorite impact gardening and ultraviolet photodestruction, the detection of water within the micro cold traps would imply recent accumulation. Therefore, the presence or absence of water in micro cold traps could serve as an indicator of volatile sources in the inner Solar System.\n\n\n#Question\n\nTherefore, this question asks:", "resc": "#Resolution\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a system must be created that can capture and make available for human use water from volatile sources in the Inner Solar System. Such a system may be a proof of concept, and not necessarily optimized, efficient, or cost-effective", "lower_25": "2039", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that humans will be able to capture water from volatile sources in the inner Solar System by 2050?", "desc": "#Context\n\nWater has been called [the oil of space](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-07107-4), and for good reason. [Nature reports](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-07107-4) that: \n\n> Private firms are increasingly tempted by the possibility of mining oxygen and hydrogen — which power rockets — from lunar ice. If that does pan out, then the Moon could become a refueling station, radically reducing the expense of space travel.\n\n> As an example, a lunar return mission that refueled at the Moon would cost just one-fiftieth of the price of one that brings all its fuel with it from Earth.\n\nThough it appears that there may be far more lunar ice than previously anticipated, extracting and utilizing ice that took many years to accumulate is not, in the (potentially very) long-term, a sustainable approach for space mission or lunar settlement resupply. Fortunately, it may not be the only option.\n\n\nA recent [Nature paper](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41550-020-1198-9#Sec4) studying cold traps on the moon between 1 km - 1 cm in scale found that not only are cold traps roughly ~1 cm across the most numerous type, their presence has important implications: \n\n> Given the high loss rates due to micrometeorite impact gardening and ultraviolet photodestruction, the detection of water within the micro cold traps would imply recent accumulation. Therefore, the presence or absence of water in micro cold traps could serve as an indicator of volatile sources in the inner Solar System.\n\n\n#Question\n\nTherefore, this question asks:", "resc": "#Resolution\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a system must be created that can capture and make available for human use water from volatile sources in the Inner Solar System. Such a system may be a proof of concept, and not necessarily optimized, efficient, or cost-effective", "lower_25": "2039", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1% of humanity's GWP will be produced off-Earth by 2084?", "desc": "", "resc": "Since the launch of our [first satellite](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sputnik_1) into orbit in 1957, human activity in outer space has been gradually increasing as the decades pass. As of writing, humans have visited the Moon, placed thousands of satellites around Earth and other celestial objects, and low Earth orbit has been inhabited continuously for just over [20 years](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/11/02/science/international-space-station-20-years) now.\n\nElon Musk wants to colonize Mars and Jeff Bezos has talked about [moving industry to space](https://www.fastcompany.com/90347364/jeff-bezos-wants-to-save-earth-by-moving-industry-to-space), but as of yet, there is still essentially no economic activity that happens (almost) exclusively in outer space. How soon is this going to change?\n\n***When will 1% of humanity's Gross World Product (GWP) be produced off-Earth?***\n\nThis question will resolve positively when there is a credible report of the total GWP of all economic activity away from Earth equaling at least 1/99th of the total GWP produced on Earth, as judged by Metaculus administrators.\n\nEconomic activity will be counted as being \"off-Earth\" so long as it is exclusively performed at least 100 km above the Earth's surface. A rocket launching a probe from the Earth's surface would be part of Earth's GWP, while that same probe performing asteroid mining would count as off-Earth GWP.\n\n[fine-print]\nAs it's fairly likely the exact date when the 1% milestone is achieved might not be knowable with certainty due to ambiguities, this question will retroactively resolve to January 1st of the year when it was deemed to have occurred.\n\nIf this question does not resolve positive before the ending date of 2300 AD, it will resolve to the upper bound.\n\nIf the GWP falls into disuse and Metaculus administrators find no obvious alternatives, this resolves ambiguous.\n\nFor the purposes of this question...\n\n* The term \"Gross World Product\" will refer to humanity's total economic activity across all inhabited space, including any worlds or artificial habitats beyond Earth.\n\n* The word \"humanity\" will also include genetically modified or cybernetic Earth-originating organisms, emulated humans (ems), and artificial intelligences (AIs).\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2055", "median": "2084", "upper_75": "2151", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the price of neuropreservation will be $160,000 at Alcor in 2030?", "desc": "From [Alcor](https://www.alcor.org/library/case-for-neuropreservation/),\n\n> Neuropreservation, quite simply, is low temperature preservation of the brain of a terminal patient. All efforts in neuropreservation are devoted to the singular purpose of preserving the brain, and only the brain, in the best possible condition allowed by present technology. The disposition of other tissue only matters inasmuch it impacts upon the condition of the brain.\n\nAs of writing this question, Alcor [charges a minimum](https://www.alcor.org/docs/alcor-form-schedule-a-required-costs-and-cryopreservation-fund-minimums.pdf) of $80,000 for neuropreservation, often paid with life insurance. For people purchasing life insurance for cryonics, it's important to ensure that the funding is above the minimum amount required for preservation. However, the price has changed in the past. Therefore, it's critical that cryonics enthusiasts anticipate future price changes, so that they can afford the procedure when they need it.\n\nMati Roy has written [a timeline of brain preservation](https://timelines.issarice.com/wiki/Timeline_of_brain_preservation) and has recorded both the [real](https://timelines.issarice.com/wiki/File:Historical_cost_of_cryonics,_inflation_adjusted.png) and [nominal price of brain preservation over time](https://timelines.issarice.com/wiki/File:Historical_cost_of_cryonics.png).", "resc": "This question resolves as the minimum nominal price of brain preservation provided by Alcor at the beginning of 2030 in US dollars, if Alcor still exists. Otherwise, this question resolves ambiguously. Resolution is determined by a source provided by Alcor", "lower_25": "84.4k", "median": "118k", "upper_75": "160k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1% of humanity's GWP will be produced off-Earth by 2084?", "desc": "", "resc": "Since the launch of our [first satellite](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sputnik_1) into orbit in 1957, human activity in outer space has been gradually increasing as the decades pass. As of writing, humans have visited the Moon, placed thousands of satellites around Earth and other celestial objects, and low Earth orbit has been inhabited continuously for just over [20 years](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/11/02/science/international-space-station-20-years) now.\n\nElon Musk wants to colonize Mars and Jeff Bezos has talked about [moving industry to space](https://www.fastcompany.com/90347364/jeff-bezos-wants-to-save-earth-by-moving-industry-to-space), but as of yet, there is still essentially no economic activity that happens (almost) exclusively in outer space. How soon is this going to change?\n\n***When will 1% of humanity's Gross World Product (GWP) be produced off-Earth?***\n\nThis question will resolve positively when there is a credible report of the total GWP of all economic activity away from Earth equaling at least 1/99th of the total GWP produced on Earth, as judged by Metaculus administrators.\n\nEconomic activity will be counted as being \"off-Earth\" so long as it is exclusively performed at least 100 km above the Earth's surface. A rocket launching a probe from the Earth's surface would be part of Earth's GWP, while that same probe performing asteroid mining would count as off-Earth GWP.\n\n[fine-print]\nAs it's fairly likely the exact date when the 1% milestone is achieved might not be knowable with certainty due to ambiguities, this question will retroactively resolve to January 1st of the year when it was deemed to have occurred.\n\nIf this question does not resolve positive before the ending date of 2300 AD, it will resolve to the upper bound.\n\nIf the GWP falls into disuse and Metaculus administrators find no obvious alternatives, this resolves ambiguous.\n\nFor the purposes of this question...\n\n* The term \"Gross World Product\" will refer to humanity's total economic activity across all inhabited space, including any worlds or artificial habitats beyond Earth.\n\n* The word \"humanity\" will also include genetically modified or cybernetic Earth-originating organisms, emulated humans (ems), and artificial intelligences (AIs).\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2055", "median": "2084", "upper_75": "2151", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Donald Trump's net worth will be less than $2 in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "Donald Trump is #339 in the [Forbes 400](https://www.forbes.com/forbes-400/) an authoritative list of the most wealthy Americans with a claimed net worth of $2.5 Billion.\n\n***What will Donald Trump's net worth be in 2024?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the net worth attributed to Donald Trump by Forbes in Billions of US Dollars. If Donald Trump is no longer living, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. If Donald Trump is no longer on the Forbes 400 list, this question will resolve as <2.", "lower_25": "< 2", "median": "2.55", "upper_75": "4.07", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1% of humanity's GWP will be produced off-Earth by 2084?", "desc": "", "resc": "Since the launch of our [first satellite](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sputnik_1) into orbit in 1957, human activity in outer space has been gradually increasing as the decades pass. As of writing, humans have visited the Moon, placed thousands of satellites around Earth and other celestial objects, and low Earth orbit has been inhabited continuously for just over [20 years](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/11/02/science/international-space-station-20-years) now.\n\nElon Musk wants to colonize Mars and Jeff Bezos has talked about [moving industry to space](https://www.fastcompany.com/90347364/jeff-bezos-wants-to-save-earth-by-moving-industry-to-space), but as of yet, there is still essentially no economic activity that happens (almost) exclusively in outer space. How soon is this going to change?\n\n***When will 1% of humanity's Gross World Product (GWP) be produced off-Earth?***\n\nThis question will resolve positively when there is a credible report of the total GWP of all economic activity away from Earth equaling at least 1/99th of the total GWP produced on Earth, as judged by Metaculus administrators.\n\nEconomic activity will be counted as being \"off-Earth\" so long as it is exclusively performed at least 100 km above the Earth's surface. A rocket launching a probe from the Earth's surface would be part of Earth's GWP, while that same probe performing asteroid mining would count as off-Earth GWP.\n\n[fine-print]\nAs it's fairly likely the exact date when the 1% milestone is achieved might not be knowable with certainty due to ambiguities, this question will retroactively resolve to January 1st of the year when it was deemed to have occurred.\n\nIf this question does not resolve positive before the ending date of 2300 AD, it will resolve to the upper bound.\n\nIf the GWP falls into disuse and Metaculus administrators find no obvious alternatives, this resolves ambiguous.\n\nFor the purposes of this question...\n\n* The term \"Gross World Product\" will refer to humanity's total economic activity across all inhabited space, including any worlds or artificial habitats beyond Earth.\n\n* The word \"humanity\" will also include genetically modified or cybernetic Earth-originating organisms, emulated humans (ems), and artificial intelligences (AIs).\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2055", "median": "2084", "upper_75": "2151", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States Government Spending to GDP will be 43.3% in 2024?", "desc": "The US Government Spending to GDP can be found [here](https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/government-spending-to-gdp) on Trading Economics. As of writing this question, the most recent value was 37.8 percent.", "resc": "This question resolves on the percent value of the US Government spending to GDP as reported by Trading Economics, or some other credible source, for the year 2024", "lower_25": "37.3", "median": "40.2", "upper_75": "43.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Donald Trump's net worth will be less than $2 in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "Donald Trump is #339 in the [Forbes 400](https://www.forbes.com/forbes-400/) an authoritative list of the most wealthy Americans with a claimed net worth of $2.5 Billion.\n\n***What will Donald Trump's net worth be in 2024?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the net worth attributed to Donald Trump by Forbes in Billions of US Dollars. If Donald Trump is no longer living, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. If Donald Trump is no longer on the Forbes 400 list, this question will resolve as <2.", "lower_25": "< 2", "median": "2.55", "upper_75": "4.07", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will cost less than $1000 to calculate the private key of a 2048-bit RSA public key by 2033?", "desc": "Quantum computers are getting better every year and big companies like Microsoft and Google want to add them to their cloud offerings.\n\nOne task that quantum computers can do better than regular computers is factoring numbers. This is crucial because a common public-key encryption (and signature) scheme, RSA, relies on the difficulty of factoring the product of two large primes (this product is known as a semiprime). Besides RSA, the two other public-key schemes used in securing internet traffic, DSA signatures and Diffie–Hellman key exchange, are also breakable by quantum computers. The timescale for this happening, however, is unclear (and some still doubt whether it is even in principle possible.)\n\nFor a precise question we'll ask:\n\nWhen will it cost less than $1000 to factor any given 2048-bit semiprime?\n\nThere's a previous question which makes a prediction for [2030](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/607/will-it-cost-less-than-1000-to-calculate-a-pgp-private-key-from-a-2048-bits-pgp-public-key-in-2030/).", "resc": "Resolution is positive if there is compelling evidence that a computing system is employed to perform this task for < $1000. (Thus the system must cost less than this or – far more likely – it must be possible to purchase use of such a computer for the task for < $1000 USD. We'll assume 2020 dollars for this.", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2068", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will cost less than $1000 to calculate the private key of a 2048-bit RSA public key by 2033?", "desc": "Quantum computers are getting better every year and big companies like Microsoft and Google want to add them to their cloud offerings.\n\nOne task that quantum computers can do better than regular computers is factoring numbers. This is crucial because a common public-key encryption (and signature) scheme, RSA, relies on the difficulty of factoring the product of two large primes (this product is known as a semiprime). Besides RSA, the two other public-key schemes used in securing internet traffic, DSA signatures and Diffie–Hellman key exchange, are also breakable by quantum computers. The timescale for this happening, however, is unclear (and some still doubt whether it is even in principle possible.)\n\nFor a precise question we'll ask:\n\nWhen will it cost less than $1000 to factor any given 2048-bit semiprime?\n\nThere's a previous question which makes a prediction for [2030](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/607/will-it-cost-less-than-1000-to-calculate-a-pgp-private-key-from-a-2048-bits-pgp-public-key-in-2030/).", "resc": "Resolution is positive if there is compelling evidence that a computing system is employed to perform this task for < $1000. (Thus the system must cost less than this or – far more likely – it must be possible to purchase use of such a computer for the task for < $1000 USD. We'll assume 2020 dollars for this.", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2068", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Donald Trump's net worth will be less than $2 in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "Donald Trump is #339 in the [Forbes 400](https://www.forbes.com/forbes-400/) an authoritative list of the most wealthy Americans with a claimed net worth of $2.5 Billion.\n\n***What will Donald Trump's net worth be in 2024?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the net worth attributed to Donald Trump by Forbes in Billions of US Dollars. If Donald Trump is no longer living, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. If Donald Trump is no longer on the Forbes 400 list, this question will resolve as <2.", "lower_25": "< 2", "median": "2.55", "upper_75": "4.07", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will cost less than $1000 to calculate the private key of a 2048-bit RSA public key by 2033?", "desc": "Quantum computers are getting better every year and big companies like Microsoft and Google want to add them to their cloud offerings.\n\nOne task that quantum computers can do better than regular computers is factoring numbers. This is crucial because a common public-key encryption (and signature) scheme, RSA, relies on the difficulty of factoring the product of two large primes (this product is known as a semiprime). Besides RSA, the two other public-key schemes used in securing internet traffic, DSA signatures and Diffie–Hellman key exchange, are also breakable by quantum computers. The timescale for this happening, however, is unclear (and some still doubt whether it is even in principle possible.)\n\nFor a precise question we'll ask:\n\nWhen will it cost less than $1000 to factor any given 2048-bit semiprime?\n\nThere's a previous question which makes a prediction for [2030](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/607/will-it-cost-less-than-1000-to-calculate-a-pgp-private-key-from-a-2048-bits-pgp-public-key-in-2030/).", "resc": "Resolution is positive if there is compelling evidence that a computing system is employed to perform this task for < $1000. (Thus the system must cost less than this or – far more likely – it must be possible to purchase use of such a computer for the task for < $1000 USD. We'll assume 2020 dollars for this.", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2068", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that US EV sales will equal or exceed 75% of the number of US ICE sales within a year by Jan 2026?", "desc": "US Electric Vehicle (EV) sales have fluctuated greatly, with battery electric vehicles (BEV) sales increasing [3% from 2018-2019](https://carsalesbase.com/us-car-sales-analysis-2019-ev-phev/) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) sales decreasing approximately 30% in the same time frame. A decrease in PHEV sales makes sense as battery technology, range, and charging infrastructure becomes better, however, these changes have not been met by increases in BEV sales to a similar level. \n\nTotal vehicle sales in the United States dipped during the last Great Recession but have risen again to just over [17 million in 2019](https://carsalesbase.com/united-states-sales-data-market/). In 2019, the percentage of BEV and PHEV sales out of total car sales was just under 2%, at [(327,970/17,053,566)*100], according to [Car Sales Base](https://carsalesbase.com/).\n\nReports from BCG estimate that global EV sales will take [30% of the market share by 2025](https://www.bcg.com/en-us/publications/2020/drive-electric-cars-to-the-tipping-point), and 51% by 2030. As the US lags behind in adoption levels, it will remain to be seen how quickly the market share of EVs grows in comparison to the rest of the world.", "resc": "Resolution criteria will be provided through Car Sales Base and their US data on [total car sales](https://carsalesbase.com/united-states-sales-data-market/) and [total EV sales](https://carsalesbase.com/us-car-sales-analysis-2019-ev-phev/), which make up the combined numbers of BEV and PHEV sales. If data is no longer available, total car sales can be obtained through the [Federal Reserve](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TOTALSA#0) and EV sales through other reputable sources with previous historical data provided. If no data is available or reported through any medium, this question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "Nov 2024", "median": "Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Jan 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that more than 140,000 new EV buses will be registered worldwide in 2025?", "desc": "*Related question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Electric Bus Registrations in Europe 2021](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5572/electric-bus-registrations-2021/)\n\n----\n\nPublic transport has long been thought to help [lower individual passenger car emissions](https://www.nationalexpresstransit.com/blog/why-is-public-transportation-good-for-the-environment/) as they reduce person-miles per gallon, and reduce the amount of space taken up on the road. While diesel powered buses are far from the cleanest vehicles, movements towards adopting electric public transportation could vastly improve public transport's emissions.\n \nChina has been the leader in electric busing and public transportation, with [72 thousand](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2020) new electric bus registrations in 2019 alone. By 2017, China's bus fleet was comprised of approximately [17% electric buses](https://www.sustainable-bus.com/electric-bus/electric-bus-public-transport-main-fleets-projects-around-world/), a number far above the mere decimal point percentages in Europe and the United States.\n \nHowever, with new actions taken by the EU in attempts to become [carbon neutral by 2050](https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2050_en), there are new extreme measures taking place to electrify transportation across Europe in both the 2020 and 2030 climate and energy packages. This should see a large number of new registrations in Europe over the next several years. \n\nNorth America lags behind Europe with only [one quarter the number of registrations](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2020) in 2019 (560 total), and fewer registrations than the year before in 2018 (620 total). South America and India continue to consistently fall behind the United States in numbers as well. \n\nChanging the nature of transportation is essential to protecting the environment, and if more options are available for consumers to choose outside of individual, gas-powered transport, then we might be able to keep global warming under the [1.5-2 degree Celsius limit](https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/06/6-ways-remove-carbon-pollution-sky#:~:text=To%20keep%20global%20temperature%20rise,some%20carbon%20from%20the%20atmosphere.).", "resc": "Resolution criteria will come from IEA global report outlook for 2025. An example outlook for 2020 using data from 2019 is available [here](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2020). This report should become available sometimes in 2026", "lower_25": "111k", "median": "127k", "upper_75": "> 140k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that Graphcore will become a publicly traded company by Jul 2024?", "desc": "[Graphcore](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graphcore) is a semiconductor company that develops accelerators for AI and machine learning.\n\nIn a [2019 interview by Wired](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/graphcore-ai-intelligence-processing-unit), Nigel Toon was asked whether Graphcore's goal ultimately is to IPO. His response:\n\n> That's the path we're shooting for, absolutely.", "resc": "This question resolves positively as the date when Graphcore first becomes a publicly traded company. This may occur through any of the following channels:\n\n- Graphcore holds an IPO or a completes a direct listing\n- Graphcore is acquired by a publicly traded company\n- Graphcore completes a [reverse IPO](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/reversetakeover.asp) by acquiring a publicly traded company", "lower_25": "Mar 2023", "median": "Jul 2024", "upper_75": "Mar 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that more than 140,000 new EV buses will be registered worldwide in 2025?", "desc": "*Related question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Electric Bus Registrations in Europe 2021](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5572/electric-bus-registrations-2021/)\n\n----\n\nPublic transport has long been thought to help [lower individual passenger car emissions](https://www.nationalexpresstransit.com/blog/why-is-public-transportation-good-for-the-environment/) as they reduce person-miles per gallon, and reduce the amount of space taken up on the road. While diesel powered buses are far from the cleanest vehicles, movements towards adopting electric public transportation could vastly improve public transport's emissions.\n \nChina has been the leader in electric busing and public transportation, with [72 thousand](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2020) new electric bus registrations in 2019 alone. By 2017, China's bus fleet was comprised of approximately [17% electric buses](https://www.sustainable-bus.com/electric-bus/electric-bus-public-transport-main-fleets-projects-around-world/), a number far above the mere decimal point percentages in Europe and the United States.\n \nHowever, with new actions taken by the EU in attempts to become [carbon neutral by 2050](https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2050_en), there are new extreme measures taking place to electrify transportation across Europe in both the 2020 and 2030 climate and energy packages. This should see a large number of new registrations in Europe over the next several years. \n\nNorth America lags behind Europe with only [one quarter the number of registrations](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2020) in 2019 (560 total), and fewer registrations than the year before in 2018 (620 total). South America and India continue to consistently fall behind the United States in numbers as well. \n\nChanging the nature of transportation is essential to protecting the environment, and if more options are available for consumers to choose outside of individual, gas-powered transport, then we might be able to keep global warming under the [1.5-2 degree Celsius limit](https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/06/6-ways-remove-carbon-pollution-sky#:~:text=To%20keep%20global%20temperature%20rise,some%20carbon%20from%20the%20atmosphere.).", "resc": "Resolution criteria will come from IEA global report outlook for 2025. An example outlook for 2020 using data from 2019 is available [here](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2020). This report should become available sometimes in 2026", "lower_25": "111k", "median": "127k", "upper_75": "> 140k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that US EV sales will equal or exceed 75% of the number of US ICE sales within a year by Jan 2026?", "desc": "US Electric Vehicle (EV) sales have fluctuated greatly, with battery electric vehicles (BEV) sales increasing [3% from 2018-2019](https://carsalesbase.com/us-car-sales-analysis-2019-ev-phev/) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) sales decreasing approximately 30% in the same time frame. A decrease in PHEV sales makes sense as battery technology, range, and charging infrastructure becomes better, however, these changes have not been met by increases in BEV sales to a similar level. \n\nTotal vehicle sales in the United States dipped during the last Great Recession but have risen again to just over [17 million in 2019](https://carsalesbase.com/united-states-sales-data-market/). In 2019, the percentage of BEV and PHEV sales out of total car sales was just under 2%, at [(327,970/17,053,566)*100], according to [Car Sales Base](https://carsalesbase.com/).\n\nReports from BCG estimate that global EV sales will take [30% of the market share by 2025](https://www.bcg.com/en-us/publications/2020/drive-electric-cars-to-the-tipping-point), and 51% by 2030. As the US lags behind in adoption levels, it will remain to be seen how quickly the market share of EVs grows in comparison to the rest of the world.", "resc": "Resolution criteria will be provided through Car Sales Base and their US data on [total car sales](https://carsalesbase.com/united-states-sales-data-market/) and [total EV sales](https://carsalesbase.com/us-car-sales-analysis-2019-ev-phev/), which make up the combined numbers of BEV and PHEV sales. If data is no longer available, total car sales can be obtained through the [Federal Reserve](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TOTALSA#0) and EV sales through other reputable sources with previous historical data provided. If no data is available or reported through any medium, this question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "Nov 2024", "median": "Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Jan 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 11.8% of people will believe it's acceptable to buy fur by 2031?", "desc": "Every year in May, Gallup asks people about the moral acceptability of various issues. You can see their most recent report [here](https://news.gallup.com/poll/1681/moral-issues.aspx). One of the issues they ask about is \"Buying and wearing clothing made of animal fur.\" As of May 2020, 54% of survey participants responded that it was morally acceptable to buy and wear clothing made of animal fur, and 43% replied that it was morally wrong. This means the net acceptability is 54 - 43 = 9%. What will the number be in 2030?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of survey participants who responded that it was morally acceptable to buy and wear clothing made of animal fur minus the percentage who responded that it is morally wrong, as of the most recent survey completed by Gallup by December 31, 2030. In case the most recent survey is one that is more than 3 years old as of December 31, 2030, then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous.*", "lower_25": "−5.85", "median": "2.69", "upper_75": "11.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "By how much will carbon dioxide emissions change from ground transportation globally between 2020 and 2025?\n\nKeyword: 2.08\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that carbon dioxide emissions from ground transportation globally will change by 75% between 2020 and 2025?", "desc": "Carbon emissions from motor transport, and in general, have decreased over the past year with COVID-19 affecting travel and general transportation rates across the globe. Between September 2019 and September 2020, carbon dioxide emissions from global ground transportation have [decreased 15.9%](https://carbonmonitor.org/ground-transport) and contributed almost 2% of the total reduction in emissions over the past year.\n \nAs a global consciousness grows over the need to limit climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, more countries are [adopting carbon neutrality goals](https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/06/14/countries-net-zero-climate-goal/). The countries with greatest reductions in ground transportation emissions between 2019 and 2020 were America and Brazil, with a [25% and 16%](https://carbonmonitor.org/ground-transport) decrease respectively. The US's change in transportation habits during this year contributed to an almost 10% decrease in their total carbon emissions. \n\nIf consumer consumption patterns for transportation continue to change and as electric vehicle (EV) adoption grows worldwide, hopefully the pattern for carbon emission reduction will continue through 2025. \n\nData: Data for 2019 and 2020 for a variety of sectors including ground transportation can be found [here](https://carbonmonitor.org/). Historical data for global carbon emissions by fuel type can be found through [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/emissions-by-fuel) for more contextual information.", "resc": "Resolution criteria will be provided through the site [Carbon Monitor](https://carbonmonitor.org/), and will represent the total percentage change in ground transportation sector emissions between January 2020 and December 2025. Data will be provided on the site sometime in 2026. If data is no longer available, or the site does not exist, then the question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "−9.46", "median": "−3.69", "upper_75": "2.08", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that more than 140,000 new EV buses will be registered worldwide in 2025?", "desc": "*Related question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Electric Bus Registrations in Europe 2021](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5572/electric-bus-registrations-2021/)\n\n----\n\nPublic transport has long been thought to help [lower individual passenger car emissions](https://www.nationalexpresstransit.com/blog/why-is-public-transportation-good-for-the-environment/) as they reduce person-miles per gallon, and reduce the amount of space taken up on the road. While diesel powered buses are far from the cleanest vehicles, movements towards adopting electric public transportation could vastly improve public transport's emissions.\n \nChina has been the leader in electric busing and public transportation, with [72 thousand](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2020) new electric bus registrations in 2019 alone. By 2017, China's bus fleet was comprised of approximately [17% electric buses](https://www.sustainable-bus.com/electric-bus/electric-bus-public-transport-main-fleets-projects-around-world/), a number far above the mere decimal point percentages in Europe and the United States.\n \nHowever, with new actions taken by the EU in attempts to become [carbon neutral by 2050](https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2050_en), there are new extreme measures taking place to electrify transportation across Europe in both the 2020 and 2030 climate and energy packages. This should see a large number of new registrations in Europe over the next several years. \n\nNorth America lags behind Europe with only [one quarter the number of registrations](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2020) in 2019 (560 total), and fewer registrations than the year before in 2018 (620 total). South America and India continue to consistently fall behind the United States in numbers as well. \n\nChanging the nature of transportation is essential to protecting the environment, and if more options are available for consumers to choose outside of individual, gas-powered transport, then we might be able to keep global warming under the [1.5-2 degree Celsius limit](https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/06/6-ways-remove-carbon-pollution-sky#:~:text=To%20keep%20global%20temperature%20rise,some%20carbon%20from%20the%20atmosphere.).", "resc": "Resolution criteria will come from IEA global report outlook for 2025. An example outlook for 2020 using data from 2019 is available [here](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2020). This report should become available sometimes in 2026", "lower_25": "111k", "median": "127k", "upper_75": "> 140k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 11.8% of people will believe it's acceptable to buy fur by 2031?", "desc": "Every year in May, Gallup asks people about the moral acceptability of various issues. You can see their most recent report [here](https://news.gallup.com/poll/1681/moral-issues.aspx). One of the issues they ask about is \"Buying and wearing clothing made of animal fur.\" As of May 2020, 54% of survey participants responded that it was morally acceptable to buy and wear clothing made of animal fur, and 43% replied that it was morally wrong. This means the net acceptability is 54 - 43 = 9%. What will the number be in 2030?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of survey participants who responded that it was morally acceptable to buy and wear clothing made of animal fur minus the percentage who responded that it is morally wrong, as of the most recent survey completed by Gallup by December 31, 2030. In case the most recent survey is one that is more than 3 years old as of December 31, 2030, then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous.*", "lower_25": "−5.85", "median": "2.69", "upper_75": "11.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that Graphcore will become a publicly traded company by Jul 2024?", "desc": "[Graphcore](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graphcore) is a semiconductor company that develops accelerators for AI and machine learning.\n\nIn a [2019 interview by Wired](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/graphcore-ai-intelligence-processing-unit), Nigel Toon was asked whether Graphcore's goal ultimately is to IPO. His response:\n\n> That's the path we're shooting for, absolutely.", "resc": "This question resolves positively as the date when Graphcore first becomes a publicly traded company. This may occur through any of the following channels:\n\n- Graphcore holds an IPO or a completes a direct listing\n- Graphcore is acquired by a publicly traded company\n- Graphcore completes a [reverse IPO](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/reversetakeover.asp) by acquiring a publicly traded company", "lower_25": "Mar 2023", "median": "Jul 2024", "upper_75": "Mar 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that US EV sales will equal or exceed 75% of the number of US ICE sales within a year by Jan 2026?", "desc": "US Electric Vehicle (EV) sales have fluctuated greatly, with battery electric vehicles (BEV) sales increasing [3% from 2018-2019](https://carsalesbase.com/us-car-sales-analysis-2019-ev-phev/) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) sales decreasing approximately 30% in the same time frame. A decrease in PHEV sales makes sense as battery technology, range, and charging infrastructure becomes better, however, these changes have not been met by increases in BEV sales to a similar level. \n\nTotal vehicle sales in the United States dipped during the last Great Recession but have risen again to just over [17 million in 2019](https://carsalesbase.com/united-states-sales-data-market/). In 2019, the percentage of BEV and PHEV sales out of total car sales was just under 2%, at [(327,970/17,053,566)*100], according to [Car Sales Base](https://carsalesbase.com/).\n\nReports from BCG estimate that global EV sales will take [30% of the market share by 2025](https://www.bcg.com/en-us/publications/2020/drive-electric-cars-to-the-tipping-point), and 51% by 2030. As the US lags behind in adoption levels, it will remain to be seen how quickly the market share of EVs grows in comparison to the rest of the world.", "resc": "Resolution criteria will be provided through Car Sales Base and their US data on [total car sales](https://carsalesbase.com/united-states-sales-data-market/) and [total EV sales](https://carsalesbase.com/us-car-sales-analysis-2019-ev-phev/), which make up the combined numbers of BEV and PHEV sales. If data is no longer available, total car sales can be obtained through the [Federal Reserve](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TOTALSA#0) and EV sales through other reputable sources with previous historical data provided. If no data is available or reported through any medium, this question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "Nov 2024", "median": "Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Jan 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "By how much will carbon dioxide emissions change from ground transportation globally between 2020 and 2025?\n\nKeyword: 2.08\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that carbon dioxide emissions from ground transportation globally will change by 75% between 2020 and 2025?", "desc": "Carbon emissions from motor transport, and in general, have decreased over the past year with COVID-19 affecting travel and general transportation rates across the globe. Between September 2019 and September 2020, carbon dioxide emissions from global ground transportation have [decreased 15.9%](https://carbonmonitor.org/ground-transport) and contributed almost 2% of the total reduction in emissions over the past year.\n \nAs a global consciousness grows over the need to limit climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, more countries are [adopting carbon neutrality goals](https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/06/14/countries-net-zero-climate-goal/). The countries with greatest reductions in ground transportation emissions between 2019 and 2020 were America and Brazil, with a [25% and 16%](https://carbonmonitor.org/ground-transport) decrease respectively. The US's change in transportation habits during this year contributed to an almost 10% decrease in their total carbon emissions. \n\nIf consumer consumption patterns for transportation continue to change and as electric vehicle (EV) adoption grows worldwide, hopefully the pattern for carbon emission reduction will continue through 2025. \n\nData: Data for 2019 and 2020 for a variety of sectors including ground transportation can be found [here](https://carbonmonitor.org/). Historical data for global carbon emissions by fuel type can be found through [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/emissions-by-fuel) for more contextual information.", "resc": "Resolution criteria will be provided through the site [Carbon Monitor](https://carbonmonitor.org/), and will represent the total percentage change in ground transportation sector emissions between January 2020 and December 2025. Data will be provided on the site sometime in 2026. If data is no longer available, or the site does not exist, then the question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "−9.46", "median": "−3.69", "upper_75": "2.08", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 11.8% of people will believe it's acceptable to buy fur by 2031?", "desc": "Every year in May, Gallup asks people about the moral acceptability of various issues. You can see their most recent report [here](https://news.gallup.com/poll/1681/moral-issues.aspx). One of the issues they ask about is \"Buying and wearing clothing made of animal fur.\" As of May 2020, 54% of survey participants responded that it was morally acceptable to buy and wear clothing made of animal fur, and 43% replied that it was morally wrong. This means the net acceptability is 54 - 43 = 9%. What will the number be in 2030?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of survey participants who responded that it was morally acceptable to buy and wear clothing made of animal fur minus the percentage who responded that it is morally wrong, as of the most recent survey completed by Gallup by December 31, 2030. In case the most recent survey is one that is more than 3 years old as of December 31, 2030, then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous.*", "lower_25": "−5.85", "median": "2.69", "upper_75": "11.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the China-to-USA GDP ratio will be 1.14 in 2050?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will China surpass the United States economically, militarily, and scientifically?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4443/when-will-china-surpass-the-united-states-economically-militarily-and-scientifically/) \n- [Will China be the World's largest economy in any year before 2040?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1579/will-china-be-the-worlds-largest-economy-in-any-year-before-2040/) \n- [Will Chinese official real GDP numbers be revised downward by at least 5% before 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2670/will-chinese-official-real-gdp-numbers-be-revised-downward-by-at-least-5-before-2023/)\n\n----\n\nThere is a lot of discussion about the rise of China as a [global superpower](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potential_superpowers#China). One interesting way to quantify it, is to look at the [ratio of nominal GDP](https://www.unz.com/akarlin/chinese-gdp-in-2050-the-debate/) of the current global superpower, USA, to China. So far, this value [has changed](https://mgmresearch.com/china-vs-united-states-a-gdp-comparison/) from 0.11 in 1980 to 0.69 in 2020 (estimated). China shows an average higher GDP growth, so it stands to reason it may surpass the US by some ratio in 2050, but which? Note, this question is *not* about \"per capita\" numbers, but take into account the changes in population sizes and how these may affect GDP.", "resc": "This question will resolve as China's Gross Domestic Product divided by the United States' GDP in the calendar year 2050, according to the [International Monitary Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)). If the IMF does not publish this data, an alternative credible source may be selected at Metaculus' discretion", "lower_25": "0.847", "median": "1.14", "upper_75": "1.49", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next Scottish independence referendum will be held in 2034?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Scotland hold an official, sanctioned referendum on independence before May 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6369/official-scottish-independence-referendum/)\n\n----\n\nIn 2014, a referendum for the [independence of Scotland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Scottish_independence_referendum) was held, with 44.70% in favour of independence and 55.30% in favour of remaining part of the UK. \n\nIn 2016, the UK held a [referendum for leaving the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum), with 52% of votes in the UK as a whole in favour of leaving the EU but 62% of votes in Scotland against, leading to proposals for a second independence referendum. From June 2020 through at least November 2020, opinion polling has been in favour of a [second independence referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_on_Scottish_independence).\n\nHowever, Scottish independence is a [reserved matter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reserved_and_excepted_matters) under Section 30 of the Scotland Act, so for a binding referendum to be held by legal channels the Scottish parliament would need to obtain a Section 30 order from the UK government, which has thus far been [ruled out by Boris Johnson](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jan/14/boris-johnson-refuses-to-grant-scotland-powers-to-hold-independence-vote).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of the next Scottish independence referendum. If the referendum is held over multiple days, the question will resolve as the final day of voting.\n\nIf there is no such referendum by January 1, 2035, this question will resolve as **>January 1, 2025**.\n\n*ETA (2020-11-26): This question requires that the relevant referendum is a legally binding referendum authorized by the UK government.", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next Scottish independence referendum will be held in 2034?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Scotland hold an official, sanctioned referendum on independence before May 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6369/official-scottish-independence-referendum/)\n\n----\n\nIn 2014, a referendum for the [independence of Scotland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Scottish_independence_referendum) was held, with 44.70% in favour of independence and 55.30% in favour of remaining part of the UK. \n\nIn 2016, the UK held a [referendum for leaving the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum), with 52% of votes in the UK as a whole in favour of leaving the EU but 62% of votes in Scotland against, leading to proposals for a second independence referendum. From June 2020 through at least November 2020, opinion polling has been in favour of a [second independence referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_on_Scottish_independence).\n\nHowever, Scottish independence is a [reserved matter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reserved_and_excepted_matters) under Section 30 of the Scotland Act, so for a binding referendum to be held by legal channels the Scottish parliament would need to obtain a Section 30 order from the UK government, which has thus far been [ruled out by Boris Johnson](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jan/14/boris-johnson-refuses-to-grant-scotland-powers-to-hold-independence-vote).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of the next Scottish independence referendum. If the referendum is held over multiple days, the question will resolve as the final day of voting.\n\nIf there is no such referendum by January 1, 2035, this question will resolve as **>January 1, 2025**.\n\n*ETA (2020-11-26): This question requires that the relevant referendum is a legally binding referendum authorized by the UK government.", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that Graphcore will become a publicly traded company by Jul 2024?", "desc": "[Graphcore](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graphcore) is a semiconductor company that develops accelerators for AI and machine learning.\n\nIn a [2019 interview by Wired](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/graphcore-ai-intelligence-processing-unit), Nigel Toon was asked whether Graphcore's goal ultimately is to IPO. His response:\n\n> That's the path we're shooting for, absolutely.", "resc": "This question resolves positively as the date when Graphcore first becomes a publicly traded company. This may occur through any of the following channels:\n\n- Graphcore holds an IPO or a completes a direct listing\n- Graphcore is acquired by a publicly traded company\n- Graphcore completes a [reverse IPO](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/reversetakeover.asp) by acquiring a publicly traded company", "lower_25": "Mar 2023", "median": "Jul 2024", "upper_75": "Mar 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "By how much will carbon dioxide emissions change from ground transportation globally between 2020 and 2025?\n\nKeyword: 2.08\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that carbon dioxide emissions from ground transportation globally will change by 75% between 2020 and 2025?", "desc": "Carbon emissions from motor transport, and in general, have decreased over the past year with COVID-19 affecting travel and general transportation rates across the globe. Between September 2019 and September 2020, carbon dioxide emissions from global ground transportation have [decreased 15.9%](https://carbonmonitor.org/ground-transport) and contributed almost 2% of the total reduction in emissions over the past year.\n \nAs a global consciousness grows over the need to limit climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, more countries are [adopting carbon neutrality goals](https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/06/14/countries-net-zero-climate-goal/). The countries with greatest reductions in ground transportation emissions between 2019 and 2020 were America and Brazil, with a [25% and 16%](https://carbonmonitor.org/ground-transport) decrease respectively. The US's change in transportation habits during this year contributed to an almost 10% decrease in their total carbon emissions. \n\nIf consumer consumption patterns for transportation continue to change and as electric vehicle (EV) adoption grows worldwide, hopefully the pattern for carbon emission reduction will continue through 2025. \n\nData: Data for 2019 and 2020 for a variety of sectors including ground transportation can be found [here](https://carbonmonitor.org/). Historical data for global carbon emissions by fuel type can be found through [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/emissions-by-fuel) for more contextual information.", "resc": "Resolution criteria will be provided through the site [Carbon Monitor](https://carbonmonitor.org/), and will represent the total percentage change in ground transportation sector emissions between January 2020 and December 2025. Data will be provided on the site sometime in 2026. If data is no longer available, or the site does not exist, then the question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "−9.46", "median": "−3.69", "upper_75": "2.08", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the China-to-USA GDP ratio will be 1.14 in 2050?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will China surpass the United States economically, militarily, and scientifically?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4443/when-will-china-surpass-the-united-states-economically-militarily-and-scientifically/) \n- [Will China be the World's largest economy in any year before 2040?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1579/will-china-be-the-worlds-largest-economy-in-any-year-before-2040/) \n- [Will Chinese official real GDP numbers be revised downward by at least 5% before 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2670/will-chinese-official-real-gdp-numbers-be-revised-downward-by-at-least-5-before-2023/)\n\n----\n\nThere is a lot of discussion about the rise of China as a [global superpower](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potential_superpowers#China). One interesting way to quantify it, is to look at the [ratio of nominal GDP](https://www.unz.com/akarlin/chinese-gdp-in-2050-the-debate/) of the current global superpower, USA, to China. So far, this value [has changed](https://mgmresearch.com/china-vs-united-states-a-gdp-comparison/) from 0.11 in 1980 to 0.69 in 2020 (estimated). China shows an average higher GDP growth, so it stands to reason it may surpass the US by some ratio in 2050, but which? Note, this question is *not* about \"per capita\" numbers, but take into account the changes in population sizes and how these may affect GDP.", "resc": "This question will resolve as China's Gross Domestic Product divided by the United States' GDP in the calendar year 2050, according to the [International Monitary Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)). If the IMF does not publish this data, an alternative credible source may be selected at Metaculus' discretion", "lower_25": "0.847", "median": "1.14", "upper_75": "1.49", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the China-to-USA GDP ratio will be 1.14 in 2050?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will China surpass the United States economically, militarily, and scientifically?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4443/when-will-china-surpass-the-united-states-economically-militarily-and-scientifically/) \n- [Will China be the World's largest economy in any year before 2040?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1579/will-china-be-the-worlds-largest-economy-in-any-year-before-2040/) \n- [Will Chinese official real GDP numbers be revised downward by at least 5% before 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2670/will-chinese-official-real-gdp-numbers-be-revised-downward-by-at-least-5-before-2023/)\n\n----\n\nThere is a lot of discussion about the rise of China as a [global superpower](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potential_superpowers#China). One interesting way to quantify it, is to look at the [ratio of nominal GDP](https://www.unz.com/akarlin/chinese-gdp-in-2050-the-debate/) of the current global superpower, USA, to China. So far, this value [has changed](https://mgmresearch.com/china-vs-united-states-a-gdp-comparison/) from 0.11 in 1980 to 0.69 in 2020 (estimated). China shows an average higher GDP growth, so it stands to reason it may surpass the US by some ratio in 2050, but which? Note, this question is *not* about \"per capita\" numbers, but take into account the changes in population sizes and how these may affect GDP.", "resc": "This question will resolve as China's Gross Domestic Product divided by the United States' GDP in the calendar year 2050, according to the [International Monitary Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)). If the IMF does not publish this data, an alternative credible source may be selected at Metaculus' discretion", "lower_25": "0.847", "median": "1.14", "upper_75": "1.49", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that most members of the House of Lords will be directly democratically elected by Nov 2036?", "desc": "[The House of Lords is the upper house of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Lords)\n\n> Unlike the elected House of Commons, members of the House of Lords (excluding 90 hereditary peers elected among themselves and 2 peers who are ex officio members) are appointed. The membership of the House of Lords is drawn from the peerage and is made up of Lords Spiritual and Lords Temporal. The Lords Spiritual are 26 archbishops and bishops in the established Church of England. Of the Lords Temporal, the majority are life peers who are appointed by the monarch on the advice of the Prime Minister, or on the advice of the House of Lords Appointments Commission. However, they also include some hereditary peers including four dukes.\n\n[There have been various attempts at reform.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_House_of_Lords) Some recent attempts have been (partially) successful. The Blair government [reduced the number of hereditary peers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Lords_Act_1999). The Cameron government [made it possible for peers to resign or retire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Lords_Reform_Act_2014).\n\nBut more ambitious attempts at reform have failed, with a [2012 Bill aiming at making the Lords mostly elected](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_House_of_Lords#House_of_Lords_Reform_Bill_2012) failing due to Conservative backbench opposition.\n\n[Polls suggest that around 45% of the public think that the Lords should be mostly elected.](https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/trackers/how-should-the-house-of-lords-be-made-up-of)", "resc": "This question resolves when more than half of the members of the House of Lords were directly democratically elected in an election of the general public. That is, an election in which most adults in the population are eligible to vote.", "lower_25": "Nov 2036", "median": "Dec 2039", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2040", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next Scottish independence referendum will be held in 2034?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Scotland hold an official, sanctioned referendum on independence before May 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6369/official-scottish-independence-referendum/)\n\n----\n\nIn 2014, a referendum for the [independence of Scotland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Scottish_independence_referendum) was held, with 44.70% in favour of independence and 55.30% in favour of remaining part of the UK. \n\nIn 2016, the UK held a [referendum for leaving the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum), with 52% of votes in the UK as a whole in favour of leaving the EU but 62% of votes in Scotland against, leading to proposals for a second independence referendum. From June 2020 through at least November 2020, opinion polling has been in favour of a [second independence referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_on_Scottish_independence).\n\nHowever, Scottish independence is a [reserved matter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reserved_and_excepted_matters) under Section 30 of the Scotland Act, so for a binding referendum to be held by legal channels the Scottish parliament would need to obtain a Section 30 order from the UK government, which has thus far been [ruled out by Boris Johnson](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jan/14/boris-johnson-refuses-to-grant-scotland-powers-to-hold-independence-vote).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of the next Scottish independence referendum. If the referendum is held over multiple days, the question will resolve as the final day of voting.\n\nIf there is no such referendum by January 1, 2035, this question will resolve as **>January 1, 2025**.\n\n*ETA (2020-11-26): This question requires that the relevant referendum is a legally binding referendum authorized by the UK government.", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that most members of the House of Lords will be directly democratically elected by Nov 2036?", "desc": "[The House of Lords is the upper house of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Lords)\n\n> Unlike the elected House of Commons, members of the House of Lords (excluding 90 hereditary peers elected among themselves and 2 peers who are ex officio members) are appointed. The membership of the House of Lords is drawn from the peerage and is made up of Lords Spiritual and Lords Temporal. The Lords Spiritual are 26 archbishops and bishops in the established Church of England. Of the Lords Temporal, the majority are life peers who are appointed by the monarch on the advice of the Prime Minister, or on the advice of the House of Lords Appointments Commission. However, they also include some hereditary peers including four dukes.\n\n[There have been various attempts at reform.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_House_of_Lords) Some recent attempts have been (partially) successful. The Blair government [reduced the number of hereditary peers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Lords_Act_1999). The Cameron government [made it possible for peers to resign or retire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Lords_Reform_Act_2014).\n\nBut more ambitious attempts at reform have failed, with a [2012 Bill aiming at making the Lords mostly elected](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_House_of_Lords#House_of_Lords_Reform_Bill_2012) failing due to Conservative backbench opposition.\n\n[Polls suggest that around 45% of the public think that the Lords should be mostly elected.](https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/trackers/how-should-the-house-of-lords-be-made-up-of)", "resc": "This question resolves when more than half of the members of the House of Lords were directly democratically elected in an election of the general public. That is, an election in which most adults in the population are eligible to vote.", "lower_25": "Nov 2036", "median": "Dec 2039", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2040", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Monaco will be 224.1 square kilometers larger in 2035?", "desc": "[The Principality of Monaco](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monaco) is a sovereign city-state, and microstate on the French Riviera in Western Europe. It is bordered by France to the north, east and west, and by the Mediterranean Sea to the south. The principality is home to 38,682 residents, of which 9,486 are Monegasque nationals, and is widely recognised for being one of the most expensive and wealthiest places in the world. [Over 30% of the resident population are millionaires, and high-end real estate prices reached €100,000 ($142,000) per square metre in 2018.](https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20180206-the-country-running-out-of-space-for-its-millionaires)\n\nWith an area of 210 hectares (0.81 sq mi), it is one of the smallest sovereign states in Europe and the second-smallest in the world, after the Vatican City State. Its 19,009 inhabitants per square kilometre (49,230/sq mi) make it the most densely-populated sovereign state in the world.\n\nTo continue economic development and allow for population growth, [for years the country has been adding to its total land area by reclaiming land from the sea.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_reclamation_in_Monaco) The entire district of [Fontvieille](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fontvieille,_Monaco) was constructed on land reclaimed from the sea in the western part of Monaco in the 1970s, increasing the principality's surface area by approximately 20 percent. As of 2020, the [Le Portier](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Le_Portier) land reclamation project is underway, and is expected to add approximately 15 acres (6 hectares) to Monaco's land area by 2025. This [graphic shows the extent of land reclamation in Monaco since 1861.](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c5/Monaco_depuis_since_1861.png)", "resc": "This question resolves as the land area (in hectares) of Monaco as of 1 January 2035, according to the most recent estimate published as of that date.\n\nIf Monaco ceases to exist as a sovereign state before 2035, this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "217.6", "median": "221.0", "upper_75": "224.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Monaco will be 224.1 square kilometers larger in 2035?", "desc": "[The Principality of Monaco](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monaco) is a sovereign city-state, and microstate on the French Riviera in Western Europe. It is bordered by France to the north, east and west, and by the Mediterranean Sea to the south. The principality is home to 38,682 residents, of which 9,486 are Monegasque nationals, and is widely recognised for being one of the most expensive and wealthiest places in the world. [Over 30% of the resident population are millionaires, and high-end real estate prices reached €100,000 ($142,000) per square metre in 2018.](https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20180206-the-country-running-out-of-space-for-its-millionaires)\n\nWith an area of 210 hectares (0.81 sq mi), it is one of the smallest sovereign states in Europe and the second-smallest in the world, after the Vatican City State. Its 19,009 inhabitants per square kilometre (49,230/sq mi) make it the most densely-populated sovereign state in the world.\n\nTo continue economic development and allow for population growth, [for years the country has been adding to its total land area by reclaiming land from the sea.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_reclamation_in_Monaco) The entire district of [Fontvieille](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fontvieille,_Monaco) was constructed on land reclaimed from the sea in the western part of Monaco in the 1970s, increasing the principality's surface area by approximately 20 percent. As of 2020, the [Le Portier](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Le_Portier) land reclamation project is underway, and is expected to add approximately 15 acres (6 hectares) to Monaco's land area by 2025. This [graphic shows the extent of land reclamation in Monaco since 1861.](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c5/Monaco_depuis_since_1861.png)", "resc": "This question resolves as the land area (in hectares) of Monaco as of 1 January 2035, according to the most recent estimate published as of that date.\n\nIf Monaco ceases to exist as a sovereign state before 2035, this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "217.6", "median": "221.0", "upper_75": "224.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Monaco will be 224.1 square kilometers larger in 2035?", "desc": "[The Principality of Monaco](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monaco) is a sovereign city-state, and microstate on the French Riviera in Western Europe. It is bordered by France to the north, east and west, and by the Mediterranean Sea to the south. The principality is home to 38,682 residents, of which 9,486 are Monegasque nationals, and is widely recognised for being one of the most expensive and wealthiest places in the world. [Over 30% of the resident population are millionaires, and high-end real estate prices reached €100,000 ($142,000) per square metre in 2018.](https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20180206-the-country-running-out-of-space-for-its-millionaires)\n\nWith an area of 210 hectares (0.81 sq mi), it is one of the smallest sovereign states in Europe and the second-smallest in the world, after the Vatican City State. Its 19,009 inhabitants per square kilometre (49,230/sq mi) make it the most densely-populated sovereign state in the world.\n\nTo continue economic development and allow for population growth, [for years the country has been adding to its total land area by reclaiming land from the sea.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_reclamation_in_Monaco) The entire district of [Fontvieille](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fontvieille,_Monaco) was constructed on land reclaimed from the sea in the western part of Monaco in the 1970s, increasing the principality's surface area by approximately 20 percent. As of 2020, the [Le Portier](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Le_Portier) land reclamation project is underway, and is expected to add approximately 15 acres (6 hectares) to Monaco's land area by 2025. This [graphic shows the extent of land reclamation in Monaco since 1861.](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c5/Monaco_depuis_since_1861.png)", "resc": "This question resolves as the land area (in hectares) of Monaco as of 1 January 2035, according to the most recent estimate published as of that date.\n\nIf Monaco ceases to exist as a sovereign state before 2035, this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "217.6", "median": "221.0", "upper_75": "224.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that most members of the House of Lords will be directly democratically elected by Nov 2036?", "desc": "[The House of Lords is the upper house of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Lords)\n\n> Unlike the elected House of Commons, members of the House of Lords (excluding 90 hereditary peers elected among themselves and 2 peers who are ex officio members) are appointed. The membership of the House of Lords is drawn from the peerage and is made up of Lords Spiritual and Lords Temporal. The Lords Spiritual are 26 archbishops and bishops in the established Church of England. Of the Lords Temporal, the majority are life peers who are appointed by the monarch on the advice of the Prime Minister, or on the advice of the House of Lords Appointments Commission. However, they also include some hereditary peers including four dukes.\n\n[There have been various attempts at reform.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_House_of_Lords) Some recent attempts have been (partially) successful. The Blair government [reduced the number of hereditary peers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Lords_Act_1999). The Cameron government [made it possible for peers to resign or retire](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Lords_Reform_Act_2014).\n\nBut more ambitious attempts at reform have failed, with a [2012 Bill aiming at making the Lords mostly elected](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_House_of_Lords#House_of_Lords_Reform_Bill_2012) failing due to Conservative backbench opposition.\n\n[Polls suggest that around 45% of the public think that the Lords should be mostly elected.](https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/trackers/how-should-the-house-of-lords-be-made-up-of)", "resc": "This question resolves when more than half of the members of the House of Lords were directly democratically elected in an election of the general public. That is, an election in which most adults in the population are eligible to vote.", "lower_25": "Nov 2036", "median": "Dec 2039", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2040", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the FDA will approve 107 drugs in 2035?", "desc": "Since 2015 (at least) the FDA has listed on their website an easily interpretable list of drugs they approve each year. [Here is their list for 2019](https://www.fda.gov/drugs/new-drugs-fda-cders-new-molecular-entities-and-new-therapeutic-biological-products/novel-drug-approvals-2019) (the last complete list, as of writing this question).\n\nThis question mirrors [a question I wrote for 2021](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5839/drugs-approved-by-fda-in-2021/). I created this question because it has a longer timeline, and therefore can potentially be informed by [the recent Deepmind protein folding breakthrough](https://deepmind.com/blog/article/alphafold-a-solution-to-a-50-year-old-grand-challenge-in-biology). It's also a good test for [Eroom's law](https://www.theifod.com/erooms-law-explaining-the-decline-in-drug-discovery/), the observation that drugs have gotten exponentially more difficult to develop over time.", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of drugs approved by the FDA in 2035, as reported by the FDA or credible media. In case the FDA is abolished before 2035, this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "33.5", "median": "58.5", "upper_75": "107", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that alien technosignatures will be detected for the first time before 9999 years?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Technosignatures](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technosignature) are any measurable property or effect that provide scientific evidence of past or present technology, and are key to [the search for extraterrestrial intelligence.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Search_for_extraterrestrial_intelligence)\n\nTechnosignatures include (but are not limited to) evidence of electromagnetic transmissions of information, artificial heat and light, astroengineering projects (Dyson spheres and swarms, Matrioshka brains, stellar engines etc), asteroid or other space mining projects, and spacecraft.\n\n***When will technosignatures of non-human origin be detected for the first time?***\n\nBy 'non-human origin,' this question refers to technosignatures that are not the result of human activity, or of the activity of any technology or 'lifeform' created by humans, including any artificial intelligence system or biological organism.\n\nThis question resolves as the date on which a competent and credible authority on astronomy and/or space exploration (such as NASA, ESA, ROSCOSMOS, CNSA, JAXA, SETI or similar) announces that, on the balance of probabilities (i.e. more than 50% likely), technosignatures of non-human origin have been discovered. This announcement qualifies for positive resolution only if it is still maintained after a year waiting period following the initial detection, unless the space agencies of the US, Russia, China and Europe all agree that the finding is genuine. Evidence of biosignatures alone will not be directly relevant to the resolution of this question.", "lower_25": "2066", "median": "2546", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 9999", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that biological lifespans will increase faster than 0.75 years per year by 2069?", "desc": "Death is, perhaps, the last great enemy to be felled. All living things, including all ≈100 billion humans, either have died or will die. All the while, technology and medicine have been improving, life expectancies and infant mortality have made massive gains in the past 100 years, and infectious diseases (less one glaring example) have been decimated. Some may not find it so far-fetched to try to take on death and aging itself.\n\nHowever, this presents a unique and extremely difficult problem to the modern medical field. Human bodies are made of trillions of cells, each either being replaced via mitosis that, over time, accumulates errors and mutations, or slowly decaying and receiving damage from the environment. Those who would try to bring the end of aging face the task of keeping trillions of cells and 600 AU of DNA per person undamaged and complete... across a population of billions.\n\nAttempting immortality, even without somehow preventing death via accident or violence, is an even less likely goal.\n\nGiven the monumental range of possible answers, though, I don't expect this question to resolve at any point in Metaculus's existence. Again, it's more of a read on how likely people think it is that immortality is possible.", "resc": "This question resolves on the date which the oldest living person is 30 years older than any previous record for the oldest person in the last 40 years. In other words, when the rate of \"oldest person to have lived\" increases at a rate greater than 0.75 years per year, over a 40 year period.\n\nFor example, suppose on Dec 10, 2060, someone reaches the age of 152 years and 165 days. this would be 30 years more than the record held by Jeanne Calment on Dec 10, 2020. the resolution date would be Dec 10, 2060", "lower_25": "2057", "median": "2069", "upper_75": "2125", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the 10-year average Gross World Product growth rate will exceed 10% by 2088?", "desc": "The gross world product (GWP) is the combined gross national income of all the countries in the world.", "resc": "This question will resolve as January 1 of the first year T, such that:\n\n\\[\\bigg(\\frac{GWP_T}{GWP_{T-10}}\\bigg)^{\\frac{1}{10}} > 1.10\\]\n\nMoreover, GWP at T must exceed 260% of the maximum over all years >= 10 years prior.\n\nEach year's GWP is to be given in constant prices (adjusted for inflation), in USD.\n\n[World Bank data](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD) should be used to resolve this question. If that's unavailable, other authoritative source of economic data may be used.", "lower_25": "2046", "median": "2088", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2170", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the 10-year average Gross World Product growth rate will exceed 10% by 2088?", "desc": "The gross world product (GWP) is the combined gross national income of all the countries in the world.", "resc": "This question will resolve as January 1 of the first year T, such that:\n\n\\[\\bigg(\\frac{GWP_T}{GWP_{T-10}}\\bigg)^{\\frac{1}{10}} > 1.10\\]\n\nMoreover, GWP at T must exceed 260% of the maximum over all years >= 10 years prior.\n\nEach year's GWP is to be given in constant prices (adjusted for inflation), in USD.\n\n[World Bank data](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD) should be used to resolve this question. If that's unavailable, other authoritative source of economic data may be used.", "lower_25": "2046", "median": "2088", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2170", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that biological lifespans will increase faster than 0.75 years per year by 2069?", "desc": "Death is, perhaps, the last great enemy to be felled. All living things, including all ≈100 billion humans, either have died or will die. All the while, technology and medicine have been improving, life expectancies and infant mortality have made massive gains in the past 100 years, and infectious diseases (less one glaring example) have been decimated. Some may not find it so far-fetched to try to take on death and aging itself.\n\nHowever, this presents a unique and extremely difficult problem to the modern medical field. Human bodies are made of trillions of cells, each either being replaced via mitosis that, over time, accumulates errors and mutations, or slowly decaying and receiving damage from the environment. Those who would try to bring the end of aging face the task of keeping trillions of cells and 600 AU of DNA per person undamaged and complete... across a population of billions.\n\nAttempting immortality, even without somehow preventing death via accident or violence, is an even less likely goal.\n\nGiven the monumental range of possible answers, though, I don't expect this question to resolve at any point in Metaculus's existence. Again, it's more of a read on how likely people think it is that immortality is possible.", "resc": "This question resolves on the date which the oldest living person is 30 years older than any previous record for the oldest person in the last 40 years. In other words, when the rate of \"oldest person to have lived\" increases at a rate greater than 0.75 years per year, over a 40 year period.\n\nFor example, suppose on Dec 10, 2060, someone reaches the age of 152 years and 165 days. this would be 30 years more than the record held by Jeanne Calment on Dec 10, 2020. the resolution date would be Dec 10, 2060", "lower_25": "2057", "median": "2069", "upper_75": "2125", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that alien technosignatures will be detected for the first time before 9999 years?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Technosignatures](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technosignature) are any measurable property or effect that provide scientific evidence of past or present technology, and are key to [the search for extraterrestrial intelligence.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Search_for_extraterrestrial_intelligence)\n\nTechnosignatures include (but are not limited to) evidence of electromagnetic transmissions of information, artificial heat and light, astroengineering projects (Dyson spheres and swarms, Matrioshka brains, stellar engines etc), asteroid or other space mining projects, and spacecraft.\n\n***When will technosignatures of non-human origin be detected for the first time?***\n\nBy 'non-human origin,' this question refers to technosignatures that are not the result of human activity, or of the activity of any technology or 'lifeform' created by humans, including any artificial intelligence system or biological organism.\n\nThis question resolves as the date on which a competent and credible authority on astronomy and/or space exploration (such as NASA, ESA, ROSCOSMOS, CNSA, JAXA, SETI or similar) announces that, on the balance of probabilities (i.e. more than 50% likely), technosignatures of non-human origin have been discovered. This announcement qualifies for positive resolution only if it is still maintained after a year waiting period following the initial detection, unless the space agencies of the US, Russia, China and Europe all agree that the finding is genuine. Evidence of biosignatures alone will not be directly relevant to the resolution of this question.", "lower_25": "2066", "median": "2546", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 9999", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.006 percentage of US GDP will be spent on R&D in 2030?", "desc": "From [the OECD](https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm),\n\n> Gross domestic spending on R&D is defined as the total expenditure (current and capital) on R&D carried out by all resident companies, research institutes, university and government laboratories, etc., in a country. It includes R&D funded from abroad, but excludes domestic funds for R&D performed outside the domestic economy. This indicator is measured in USD constant prices using 2010 base year and Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) and as percentage of GDP\n\nIn the most recent year recorded, in 2018 OECD nations spent 2.379% of their GDP on R&D. The United States in particular spent 2.862% of its GDP on R&D. What will that number be in 2030?", "resc": "This question resolves on the percentage of United States GDP spent on R&D in 2030, as determined by [the OECD](https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm), or if the OECD stops publishing the data, other credible media", "lower_25": "2.71", "median": "2.84", "upper_75": "3.006", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the 10-year average Gross World Product growth rate will exceed 10% by 2088?", "desc": "The gross world product (GWP) is the combined gross national income of all the countries in the world.", "resc": "This question will resolve as January 1 of the first year T, such that:\n\n\\[\\bigg(\\frac{GWP_T}{GWP_{T-10}}\\bigg)^{\\frac{1}{10}} > 1.10\\]\n\nMoreover, GWP at T must exceed 260% of the maximum over all years >= 10 years prior.\n\nEach year's GWP is to be given in constant prices (adjusted for inflation), in USD.\n\n[World Bank data](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD) should be used to resolve this question. If that's unavailable, other authoritative source of economic data may be used.", "lower_25": "2046", "median": "2088", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2170", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that US house prices will be 2.30 times higher in December 2030?", "desc": "House prices are an important part of the US economy. The housing stock in the US is roughly $30T which is roughly the same order of magnitude as the US stock market. [A crash in house prices in the 2007-2008 was a driver of the financial crisis.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%932008#Growth_of_the_housing_bubble)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the Case-Shiller National Index (seasonally adjusted) adjusted for inflation using CPI less Shelter in December 2030. Specifically, it will resolve as the value of the December 2030 release of [S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPISA) be divided by the value of [CPI less shelter](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CUSR0000SA0L2) both divided by their values on January 2000.\n\n\\[ \\frac{^{CaseShiller_{Dec2030}}/_{CaseShiller_{Jan2000}}}{^{CPI_{Dec2030}}/_{CPI_{Jan2000}}} \\]\n\nFor example:\n\n- for Jan-2000 this value is 1.0\n- for Sep-2020 this value is:\n\n\\[ \\frac{^{225.515}/_{100.555}}{^{237.205}/_{162.8}} = 1.53923 \\]\n\nIf these statistics are discontinued, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "1.61", "median": "1.97", "upper_75": "2.30", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that US house prices will be 2.30 times higher in December 2030?", "desc": "House prices are an important part of the US economy. The housing stock in the US is roughly $30T which is roughly the same order of magnitude as the US stock market. [A crash in house prices in the 2007-2008 was a driver of the financial crisis.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%932008#Growth_of_the_housing_bubble)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the Case-Shiller National Index (seasonally adjusted) adjusted for inflation using CPI less Shelter in December 2030. Specifically, it will resolve as the value of the December 2030 release of [S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPISA) be divided by the value of [CPI less shelter](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CUSR0000SA0L2) both divided by their values on January 2000.\n\n\\[ \\frac{^{CaseShiller_{Dec2030}}/_{CaseShiller_{Jan2000}}}{^{CPI_{Dec2030}}/_{CPI_{Jan2000}}} \\]\n\nFor example:\n\n- for Jan-2000 this value is 1.0\n- for Sep-2020 this value is:\n\n\\[ \\frac{^{225.515}/_{100.555}}{^{237.205}/_{162.8}} = 1.53923 \\]\n\nIf these statistics are discontinued, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "1.61", "median": "1.97", "upper_75": "2.30", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the FDA will approve 107 drugs in 2035?", "desc": "Since 2015 (at least) the FDA has listed on their website an easily interpretable list of drugs they approve each year. [Here is their list for 2019](https://www.fda.gov/drugs/new-drugs-fda-cders-new-molecular-entities-and-new-therapeutic-biological-products/novel-drug-approvals-2019) (the last complete list, as of writing this question).\n\nThis question mirrors [a question I wrote for 2021](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5839/drugs-approved-by-fda-in-2021/). I created this question because it has a longer timeline, and therefore can potentially be informed by [the recent Deepmind protein folding breakthrough](https://deepmind.com/blog/article/alphafold-a-solution-to-a-50-year-old-grand-challenge-in-biology). It's also a good test for [Eroom's law](https://www.theifod.com/erooms-law-explaining-the-decline-in-drug-discovery/), the observation that drugs have gotten exponentially more difficult to develop over time.", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of drugs approved by the FDA in 2035, as reported by the FDA or credible media. In case the FDA is abolished before 2035, this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "33.5", "median": "58.5", "upper_75": "107", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that US house prices will be 2.30 times higher in December 2030?", "desc": "House prices are an important part of the US economy. The housing stock in the US is roughly $30T which is roughly the same order of magnitude as the US stock market. [A crash in house prices in the 2007-2008 was a driver of the financial crisis.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_crisis_of_2007%E2%80%932008#Growth_of_the_housing_bubble)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the Case-Shiller National Index (seasonally adjusted) adjusted for inflation using CPI less Shelter in December 2030. Specifically, it will resolve as the value of the December 2030 release of [S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPISA) be divided by the value of [CPI less shelter](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CUSR0000SA0L2) both divided by their values on January 2000.\n\n\\[ \\frac{^{CaseShiller_{Dec2030}}/_{CaseShiller_{Jan2000}}}{^{CPI_{Dec2030}}/_{CPI_{Jan2000}}} \\]\n\nFor example:\n\n- for Jan-2000 this value is 1.0\n- for Sep-2020 this value is:\n\n\\[ \\frac{^{225.515}/_{100.555}}{^{237.205}/_{162.8}} = 1.53923 \\]\n\nIf these statistics are discontinued, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "1.61", "median": "1.97", "upper_75": "2.30", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that biological lifespans will increase faster than 0.75 years per year by 2069?", "desc": "Death is, perhaps, the last great enemy to be felled. All living things, including all ≈100 billion humans, either have died or will die. All the while, technology and medicine have been improving, life expectancies and infant mortality have made massive gains in the past 100 years, and infectious diseases (less one glaring example) have been decimated. Some may not find it so far-fetched to try to take on death and aging itself.\n\nHowever, this presents a unique and extremely difficult problem to the modern medical field. Human bodies are made of trillions of cells, each either being replaced via mitosis that, over time, accumulates errors and mutations, or slowly decaying and receiving damage from the environment. Those who would try to bring the end of aging face the task of keeping trillions of cells and 600 AU of DNA per person undamaged and complete... across a population of billions.\n\nAttempting immortality, even without somehow preventing death via accident or violence, is an even less likely goal.\n\nGiven the monumental range of possible answers, though, I don't expect this question to resolve at any point in Metaculus's existence. Again, it's more of a read on how likely people think it is that immortality is possible.", "resc": "This question resolves on the date which the oldest living person is 30 years older than any previous record for the oldest person in the last 40 years. In other words, when the rate of \"oldest person to have lived\" increases at a rate greater than 0.75 years per year, over a 40 year period.\n\nFor example, suppose on Dec 10, 2060, someone reaches the age of 152 years and 165 days. this would be 30 years more than the record held by Jeanne Calment on Dec 10, 2020. the resolution date would be Dec 10, 2060", "lower_25": "2057", "median": "2069", "upper_75": "2125", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the FDA will approve 107 drugs in 2035?", "desc": "Since 2015 (at least) the FDA has listed on their website an easily interpretable list of drugs they approve each year. [Here is their list for 2019](https://www.fda.gov/drugs/new-drugs-fda-cders-new-molecular-entities-and-new-therapeutic-biological-products/novel-drug-approvals-2019) (the last complete list, as of writing this question).\n\nThis question mirrors [a question I wrote for 2021](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5839/drugs-approved-by-fda-in-2021/). I created this question because it has a longer timeline, and therefore can potentially be informed by [the recent Deepmind protein folding breakthrough](https://deepmind.com/blog/article/alphafold-a-solution-to-a-50-year-old-grand-challenge-in-biology). It's also a good test for [Eroom's law](https://www.theifod.com/erooms-law-explaining-the-decline-in-drug-discovery/), the observation that drugs have gotten exponentially more difficult to develop over time.", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of drugs approved by the FDA in 2035, as reported by the FDA or credible media. In case the FDA is abolished before 2035, this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "33.5", "median": "58.5", "upper_75": "107", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that alien technosignatures will be detected for the first time before 9999 years?", "desc": "", "resc": "[Technosignatures](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technosignature) are any measurable property or effect that provide scientific evidence of past or present technology, and are key to [the search for extraterrestrial intelligence.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Search_for_extraterrestrial_intelligence)\n\nTechnosignatures include (but are not limited to) evidence of electromagnetic transmissions of information, artificial heat and light, astroengineering projects (Dyson spheres and swarms, Matrioshka brains, stellar engines etc), asteroid or other space mining projects, and spacecraft.\n\n***When will technosignatures of non-human origin be detected for the first time?***\n\nBy 'non-human origin,' this question refers to technosignatures that are not the result of human activity, or of the activity of any technology or 'lifeform' created by humans, including any artificial intelligence system or biological organism.\n\nThis question resolves as the date on which a competent and credible authority on astronomy and/or space exploration (such as NASA, ESA, ROSCOSMOS, CNSA, JAXA, SETI or similar) announces that, on the balance of probabilities (i.e. more than 50% likely), technosignatures of non-human origin have been discovered. This announcement qualifies for positive resolution only if it is still maintained after a year waiting period following the initial detection, unless the space agencies of the US, Russia, China and Europe all agree that the finding is genuine. Evidence of biosignatures alone will not be directly relevant to the resolution of this question.", "lower_25": "2066", "median": "2546", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 9999", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.006 percentage of US GDP will be spent on R&D in 2030?", "desc": "From [the OECD](https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm),\n\n> Gross domestic spending on R&D is defined as the total expenditure (current and capital) on R&D carried out by all resident companies, research institutes, university and government laboratories, etc., in a country. It includes R&D funded from abroad, but excludes domestic funds for R&D performed outside the domestic economy. This indicator is measured in USD constant prices using 2010 base year and Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs) and as percentage of GDP\n\nIn the most recent year recorded, in 2018 OECD nations spent 2.379% of their GDP on R&D. The United States in particular spent 2.862% of its GDP on R&D. What will that number be in 2030?", "resc": "This question resolves on the percentage of United States GDP spent on R&D in 2030, as determined by [the OECD](https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm), or if the OECD stops publishing the data, other credible media", "lower_25": "2.71", "median": "2.84", "upper_75": "3.006", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first clone of a prominent historical figure will be born by 2069?", "desc": "From [the NIH](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Cloning-Fact-Sheet),\n\n> Despite several highly publicized claims, human cloning still appears to be fiction. There currently is no solid scientific evidence that anyone has cloned human embryos. [...]\n\n> From a technical perspective, cloning humans and other primates is more difficult than in other mammals. One reason is that two proteins essential to cell division, known as spindle proteins, are located very close to the chromosomes in primate eggs. Consequently, removal of the egg's nucleus to make room for the donor nucleus also removes the spindle proteins, interfering with cell division. In other mammals, such as cats, rabbits and mice, the two spindle proteins are spread throughout the egg. So, removal of the egg's nucleus does not result in loss of spindle proteins. In addition, some dyes and the ultraviolet light used to remove the egg's nucleus can damage the primate cell and prevent it from growing.\n\nA prominent historical figure is defined as someone who is,\n\n* Currently considered dead according to credible media\n\n* Has an English Wikipedia entry that has existed for at least 15 years before the birth of the human clone", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date of birth of any clone of a prominent historical figure, as determined by credible media", "lower_25": "2069", "median": "2101", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2150", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.31k e-prints on AI Safety, Interpretability or Explainability will be published on arXiv from 2021 through 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.31k", "median": "6.65k", "upper_75": "10.2k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first clone of a prominent historical figure will be born by 2069?", "desc": "From [the NIH](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Cloning-Fact-Sheet),\n\n> Despite several highly publicized claims, human cloning still appears to be fiction. There currently is no solid scientific evidence that anyone has cloned human embryos. [...]\n\n> From a technical perspective, cloning humans and other primates is more difficult than in other mammals. One reason is that two proteins essential to cell division, known as spindle proteins, are located very close to the chromosomes in primate eggs. Consequently, removal of the egg's nucleus to make room for the donor nucleus also removes the spindle proteins, interfering with cell division. In other mammals, such as cats, rabbits and mice, the two spindle proteins are spread throughout the egg. So, removal of the egg's nucleus does not result in loss of spindle proteins. In addition, some dyes and the ultraviolet light used to remove the egg's nucleus can damage the primate cell and prevent it from growing.\n\nA prominent historical figure is defined as someone who is,\n\n* Currently considered dead according to credible media\n\n* Has an English Wikipedia entry that has existed for at least 15 years before the birth of the human clone", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date of birth of any clone of a prominent historical figure, as determined by credible media", "lower_25": "2069", "median": "2101", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2150", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first clone of a prominent historical figure will be born by 2069?", "desc": "From [the NIH](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Cloning-Fact-Sheet),\n\n> Despite several highly publicized claims, human cloning still appears to be fiction. There currently is no solid scientific evidence that anyone has cloned human embryos. [...]\n\n> From a technical perspective, cloning humans and other primates is more difficult than in other mammals. One reason is that two proteins essential to cell division, known as spindle proteins, are located very close to the chromosomes in primate eggs. Consequently, removal of the egg's nucleus to make room for the donor nucleus also removes the spindle proteins, interfering with cell division. In other mammals, such as cats, rabbits and mice, the two spindle proteins are spread throughout the egg. So, removal of the egg's nucleus does not result in loss of spindle proteins. In addition, some dyes and the ultraviolet light used to remove the egg's nucleus can damage the primate cell and prevent it from growing.\n\nA prominent historical figure is defined as someone who is,\n\n* Currently considered dead according to credible media\n\n* Has an English Wikipedia entry that has existed for at least 15 years before the birth of the human clone", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date of birth of any clone of a prominent historical figure, as determined by credible media", "lower_25": "2069", "median": "2101", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2150", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.31k e-prints on AI Safety, Interpretability or Explainability will be published on arXiv from 2021 through 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.31k", "median": "6.65k", "upper_75": "10.2k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art language modelling performance (in perplexity) on WikiText-103 will be 11.9 by Dec 14, 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.82", "median": "9.13", "upper_75": "11.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art language modelling performance (in perplexity) on WikiText-103 will be 11.9 by Dec 14, 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.82", "median": "9.13", "upper_75": "11.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art language modelling performance (in perplexity) on WikiText-103 will be 11.9 by Dec 14, 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.82", "median": "9.13", "upper_75": "11.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Image Classification Performance Index will be 210 on 2026-12-14?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "174", "median": "210", "upper_75": "273", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.31k e-prints on AI Safety, Interpretability or Explainability will be published on arXiv from 2021 through 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.31k", "median": "6.65k", "upper_75": "10.2k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the sum of the performance (in exaFLOPS) of the top 500 supercomputers will be 33.3 by November 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "14.3", "median": "21.2", "upper_75": "33.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will have 16.0 share (in %) of the world's super-compute performance in the TOP500 list on June 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "16.0", "median": "24.5", "upper_75": "36.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Image Classification Performance Index will be 210 on 2026-12-14?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "174", "median": "210", "upper_75": "273", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the sum of the performance (in exaFLOPS) of the top 500 supercomputers will be 33.3 by November 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "14.3", "median": "21.2", "upper_75": "33.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Image Classification Performance Index will be 210 on 2026-12-14?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "174", "median": "210", "upper_75": "273", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best available GPU on the following dates (Dec-2026) will have an average top price performance of 246 G3D Mark /$?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "165", "median": "246", "upper_75": "337", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best available GPU on the following dates (Dec-2026) will have an average top price performance of 246 G3D Mark /$?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "165", "median": "246", "upper_75": "337", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the sum of the performance (in exaFLOPS) of the top 500 supercomputers will be 33.3 by November 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "14.3", "median": "21.2", "upper_75": "33.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will have 16.0 share (in %) of the world's super-compute performance in the TOP500 list on June 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "16.0", "median": "24.5", "upper_75": "36.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will have 16.0 share (in %) of the world's super-compute performance in the TOP500 list on June 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "16.0", "median": "24.5", "upper_75": "36.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best available GPU on the following dates (Dec-2026) will have an average top price performance of 246 G3D Mark /$?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "165", "median": "246", "upper_75": "337", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Alphabet Inc.'s market capitalization will be 4.63 trillion USD at market close on December 14, 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.05", "median": "3.02", "upper_75": "4.63", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Alphabet Inc.'s market capitalization will be 4.63 trillion USD at market close on December 14, 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.05", "median": "3.02", "upper_75": "4.63", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that software and information services will contribute 3.92% to US GDP in Q4 of 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.92", "median": "5.75", "upper_75": "8.53", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Alphabet Inc.'s market capitalization will be 4.63 trillion USD at market close on December 14, 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.05", "median": "3.02", "upper_75": "4.63", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that software and information services will contribute 3.92% to US GDP in Q4 of 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.92", "median": "5.75", "upper_75": "8.53", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Federal Reserve's Industrial Production Index for December 2026, for semiconductors, printed circuit boards and related products, will be 414?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "264", "median": "342", "upper_75": "414", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that software and information services will contribute 3.92% to US GDP in Q4 of 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.92", "median": "5.75", "upper_75": "8.53", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate for German law degree holders will be 2.53% in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.03", "median": "1.74", "upper_75": "2.53", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Federal Reserve's Industrial Production Index for December 2026, for semiconductors, printed circuit boards and related products, will be 414?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "264", "median": "342", "upper_75": "414", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 37.5k Reinforcement Learning e-prints will be published on arXiv over the 2020-12-14 to 2031-01-01 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "37.5k", "median": "49.7k", "upper_75": "> 50k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Federal Reserve's Industrial Production Index for December 2026, for semiconductors, printed circuit boards and related products, will be 414?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "264", "median": "342", "upper_75": "414", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate for German law degree holders will be 2.53% in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.03", "median": "1.74", "upper_75": "2.53", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 37.5k Reinforcement Learning e-prints will be published on arXiv over the 2020-12-14 to 2031-01-01 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "37.5k", "median": "49.7k", "upper_75": "> 50k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that more than 20,000 e-prints on Few-Shot Learning will be published on arXiv over the 2020-01-01 to 2027-01-01 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "11.1k", "median": "17.3k", "upper_75": "> 20k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that more than 20,000 e-prints on Few-Shot Learning will be published on arXiv over the 2020-01-01 to 2027-01-01 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "11.1k", "median": "17.3k", "upper_75": "> 20k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate for German law degree holders will be 2.53% in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.03", "median": "1.74", "upper_75": "2.53", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the 10-year average Gross World Product growth rate will exceed 6% by 2047?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2047", "median": "2084", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2170", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that more than 20,000 e-prints on Few-Shot Learning will be published on arXiv over the 2020-01-01 to 2027-01-01 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "11.1k", "median": "17.3k", "upper_75": "> 20k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the 10-year average Gross World Product growth rate will exceed 6% by 2047?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2047", "median": "2084", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2170", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 37.5k Reinforcement Learning e-prints will be published on arXiv over the 2020-12-14 to 2031-01-01 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "37.5k", "median": "49.7k", "upper_75": "> 50k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first course on wild animal welfare will not be taught at a top university before December 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2023", "median": "Oct 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the 10-year average Gross World Product growth rate will exceed 6% by 2047?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2047", "median": "2084", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2170", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.872 fraction of High Impact Athletes pledge-takers will maintain it on January 1, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.305", "median": "0.542", "upper_75": "0.872", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first course on wild animal welfare will not be taught at a top university before December 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2023", "median": "Oct 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1 bitcoin will be worth $1,000,000 or more by 2020 USD, according to the condition \"Not ≤ 2100\"?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2055", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the main tomb chamber of the mausoleum of Qin Shi Huang will be opened by 2073?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2037", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2073", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the main tomb chamber of the mausoleum of Qin Shi Huang will be opened by 2073?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2037", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2073", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1 bitcoin will be worth $1,000,000 or more by 2020 USD, according to the condition \"Not ≤ 2100\"?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2055", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the main tomb chamber of the mausoleum of Qin Shi Huang will be opened by 2073?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2037", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2073", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will achieve racial unemployment parity between black and white people according to BLS by not ≤ 2060?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2051", "median": "Not ≤ 2060", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2060", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median age of an employed person in the US will be 42.47 in 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "42.47", "median": "43.34", "upper_75": "44.31", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median age of an employed person in the US will be 42.47 in 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "42.47", "median": "43.34", "upper_75": "44.31", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What percentage of the US federal budget will be allocated to Medicare in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "14.6", "median": "15.6", "upper_75": "16.22", "prediction": "16.22%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will achieve racial unemployment parity between black and white people according to BLS by not ≤ 2060?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2051", "median": "Not ≤ 2060", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2060", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.872 fraction of High Impact Athletes pledge-takers will maintain it on January 1, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.305", "median": "0.542", "upper_75": "0.872", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first course on wild animal welfare will not be taught at a top university before December 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2023", "median": "Oct 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1 bitcoin will be worth $1,000,000 or more by 2020 USD, according to the condition \"Not ≤ 2100\"?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2055", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median age of an employed person in the US will be 42.47 in 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "42.47", "median": "43.34", "upper_75": "44.31", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.872 fraction of High Impact Athletes pledge-takers will maintain it on January 1, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.305", "median": "0.542", "upper_75": "0.872", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will achieve racial unemployment parity between black and white people according to BLS by not ≤ 2060?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2051", "median": "Not ≤ 2060", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2060", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 16.5k nuclear weapons on January 1, 2075?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "54.7", "median": "2.29k", "upper_75": "16.5k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What percentage of the US federal budget will be allocated to Medicare in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "14.6", "median": "15.6", "upper_75": "16.22", "prediction": "16.22%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 16.5k nuclear weapons on January 1, 2075?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "54.7", "median": "2.29k", "upper_75": "16.5k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that autonomous flying vehicles will be commercially available by 2038?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be at least one billion Americans by Not ≤ 2120?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2115", "median": "Not ≤ 2120", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2120", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "According to the EA Survey, what is the chance that 31.4% of EA dollars will go to global poverty in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "31.4", "median": "36.7", "upper_75": "42.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "According to the EA Survey, what is the chance that 31.2% of donated dollars will go to charities that did not exist in 2020 in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "17.3", "median": "31.2", "upper_75": "47.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that autonomous flying vehicles will be commercially available by 2038?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the UK's Index of Economic Freedom score will be 79.7 for 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "70.6", "median": "75.7", "upper_75": "79.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "According to the EA Survey, what is the chance that 31.2% of donated dollars will go to charities that did not exist in 2020 in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "17.3", "median": "31.2", "upper_75": "47.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be at least one billion Americans by Not ≤ 2120?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2115", "median": "Not ≤ 2120", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2120", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be at least one billion Americans by Not ≤ 2120?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2115", "median": "Not ≤ 2120", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2120", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "According to the EA Survey, what is the chance that 31.4% of EA dollars will go to global poverty in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "31.4", "median": "36.7", "upper_75": "42.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 16.5k nuclear weapons on January 1, 2075?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "54.7", "median": "2.29k", "upper_75": "16.5k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "According to the EA Survey, what is the chance that 31.2% of donated dollars will go to charities that did not exist in 2020 in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "17.3", "median": "31.2", "upper_75": "47.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that autonomous flying vehicles will be commercially available by 2038?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the UK's Index of Economic Freedom score will be 79.7 for 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "70.6", "median": "75.7", "upper_75": "79.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best available retinal prosthesis will be 1.58 times better in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.889", "median": "1.25", "upper_75": "1.58", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the UK's Index of Economic Freedom score will be 79.7 for 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "70.6", "median": "75.7", "upper_75": "79.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best available retinal prosthesis will be 1.58 times better in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.889", "median": "1.25", "upper_75": "1.58", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best available retinal prosthesis will be 1.58 times better in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.889", "median": "1.25", "upper_75": "1.58", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "According to the EA Survey, what is the chance that 31.4% of EA dollars will go to global poverty in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "31.4", "median": "36.7", "upper_75": "42.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How much money will GiveWell move in 2031?\n\nKeyword: 89.0M\n\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that GiveWell will move 89.0M in 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "89.0M", "median": "272M", "upper_75": "768M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How much money will GiveWell move in 2031?\n\nKeyword: 89.0M\n\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that GiveWell will move 89.0M in 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "89.0M", "median": "272M", "upper_75": "768M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many consecutive Presidents of the United States will there be by the year 122?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [United States of America](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States) is a North American country that was established on July 4, 1776. The first [President of the United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States) was George Washington, and Donald John Trump is the 45th and current President.\n\nAlthough it may seem hard to imagine a future where there is no President of the United States for an extended period of time, political systems and the fates of nations change over time.\n\nUntil now, there have only been [minor gaps of a few days](https://www.quora.com/Whats-the-longest-time-the-United-States-has-gone-without-a-president) between the end of one president's term and the swearing in of the next.\n\n***How many consecutive Presidents of the United States will there be, until that office remains vacant for a period of three consecutive months?***\n\nThe question will resolve after the first span of three consecutive months where the office of the President of the United States is vacant, retroactively to the time at which the office became vacant. The time of resolution will be determined by the judgement of the Metaculus moderators on the basis of reliable news reports.\n\n[fine-print]\nIf the chief executive office is renamed, such that there is no longer a President of the United States, but there is still a single chief executive with the same or broadly similar powers and responsibilities, this will not trigger resolution. The aim of the question is to identify the date when there is no longer a single chief executive officer of the US.\n\nThe question shall track presidents who are democratically elected, or those appointed through the constitutional line of succession. If the US constitution is amended, such that presidents no longer have term limits or are appointed by other methods, the question will include those presidents, so long as they hold their power legally (defined by the contemporaneous constitution).\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "57.4", "median": "80.8", "upper_75": "122", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many consecutive Presidents of the United States will there be by the year 122?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [United States of America](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States) is a North American country that was established on July 4, 1776. The first [President of the United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States) was George Washington, and Donald John Trump is the 45th and current President.\n\nAlthough it may seem hard to imagine a future where there is no President of the United States for an extended period of time, political systems and the fates of nations change over time.\n\nUntil now, there have only been [minor gaps of a few days](https://www.quora.com/Whats-the-longest-time-the-United-States-has-gone-without-a-president) between the end of one president's term and the swearing in of the next.\n\n***How many consecutive Presidents of the United States will there be, until that office remains vacant for a period of three consecutive months?***\n\nThe question will resolve after the first span of three consecutive months where the office of the President of the United States is vacant, retroactively to the time at which the office became vacant. The time of resolution will be determined by the judgement of the Metaculus moderators on the basis of reliable news reports.\n\n[fine-print]\nIf the chief executive office is renamed, such that there is no longer a President of the United States, but there is still a single chief executive with the same or broadly similar powers and responsibilities, this will not trigger resolution. The aim of the question is to identify the date when there is no longer a single chief executive officer of the US.\n\nThe question shall track presidents who are democratically elected, or those appointed through the constitutional line of succession. If the US constitution is amended, such that presidents no longer have term limits or are appointed by other methods, the question will include those presidents, so long as they hold their power legally (defined by the contemporaneous constitution).\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "57.4", "median": "80.8", "upper_75": "122", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.60 US states and territories will have an ACS GINI coefficient over 0.5 by 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.60", "median": "4.96", "upper_75": "6.04", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many consecutive Presidents of the United States will there be by the year 122?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [United States of America](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States) is a North American country that was established on July 4, 1776. The first [President of the United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States) was George Washington, and Donald John Trump is the 45th and current President.\n\nAlthough it may seem hard to imagine a future where there is no President of the United States for an extended period of time, political systems and the fates of nations change over time.\n\nUntil now, there have only been [minor gaps of a few days](https://www.quora.com/Whats-the-longest-time-the-United-States-has-gone-without-a-president) between the end of one president's term and the swearing in of the next.\n\n***How many consecutive Presidents of the United States will there be, until that office remains vacant for a period of three consecutive months?***\n\nThe question will resolve after the first span of three consecutive months where the office of the President of the United States is vacant, retroactively to the time at which the office became vacant. The time of resolution will be determined by the judgement of the Metaculus moderators on the basis of reliable news reports.\n\n[fine-print]\nIf the chief executive office is renamed, such that there is no longer a President of the United States, but there is still a single chief executive with the same or broadly similar powers and responsibilities, this will not trigger resolution. The aim of the question is to identify the date when there is no longer a single chief executive officer of the US.\n\nThe question shall track presidents who are democratically elected, or those appointed through the constitutional line of succession. If the US constitution is amended, such that presidents no longer have term limits or are appointed by other methods, the question will include those presidents, so long as they hold their power legally (defined by the contemporaneous constitution).\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "57.4", "median": "80.8", "upper_75": "122", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.60 US states and territories will have an ACS GINI coefficient over 0.5 by 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.60", "median": "4.96", "upper_75": "6.04", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next interstellar object will be discovered by Jan 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2023", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Jun 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next interstellar object will be discovered by Jan 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2023", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Jun 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next interstellar object will be discovered by Jan 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2023", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Jun 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.60 US states and territories will have an ACS GINI coefficient over 0.5 by 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.60", "median": "4.96", "upper_75": "6.04", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum compute (in petaFLOPS-days) ever used in training an AI experiment by the following dates (Jan-2031) will be 7.21M?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "7.21M", "median": "75.7M", "upper_75": "1.24B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum compute (in petaFLOPS-days) ever used in training an AI experiment by the following dates (Jan-2031) will be 7.21M?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "7.21M", "median": "75.7M", "upper_75": "1.24B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How good will the best available visual cortex prosthesis be in 2030?\n\nKeyword: 2.40\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the best available visual cortex prosthesis in 2030 will have a performance of 2.40?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.16", "median": "1.72", "upper_75": "2.40", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How much money will GiveWell move in 2031?\n\nKeyword: 89.0M\n\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that GiveWell will move 89.0M in 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "89.0M", "median": "272M", "upper_75": "768M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art performance on image classification on ImageNet will achieve a top-1 accuracy of 91.27% by December 14, 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "91.27", "median": "93.34", "upper_75": "95.45", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How good will the best available visual cortex prosthesis be in 2030?\n\nKeyword: 2.40\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the best available visual cortex prosthesis in 2030 will have a performance of 2.40?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.16", "median": "1.72", "upper_75": "2.40", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum compute (in petaFLOPS-days) ever used in training an AI experiment by the following dates (Jan-2031) will be 7.21M?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "7.21M", "median": "75.7M", "upper_75": "1.24B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art performance on image classification on ImageNet will achieve a top-1 accuracy of 91.27% by December 14, 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "91.27", "median": "93.34", "upper_75": "95.45", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art performance on image classification on ImageNet will achieve a top-1 accuracy of 91.27% by December 14, 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "91.27", "median": "93.34", "upper_75": "95.45", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will have 75% share (in %) of the world's super-compute performance in the TOP500 list on November 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "21.6", "median": "29.9", "upper_75": "37.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will have 75% share (in %) of the world's super-compute performance in the TOP500 list on November 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "21.6", "median": "29.9", "upper_75": "37.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will have 75% share (in %) of the world's super-compute performance in the TOP500 list on November 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "21.6", "median": "29.9", "upper_75": "37.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first European trillion-dollar company will emerge by 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the top-performing supercomputer in the TOP500 list will have a performance of 53.8 exaFLOPS according to their June 2030 list?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "21.3", "median": "53.8", "upper_75": "138", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first European trillion-dollar company will emerge by 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the top-performing supercomputer in the TOP500 list will have a performance of 53.8 exaFLOPS according to their June 2030 list?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "21.3", "median": "53.8", "upper_75": "138", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How much will the average degree of automation change for key US professions from December 2020 to December 2026? (1.75)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.75", "median": "8.32", "upper_75": "17.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How much will the average degree of automation change for key US professions from December 2020 to December 2026? (1.75)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.75", "median": "8.32", "upper_75": "17.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Object Detection Performance Index will be 168 on 2026-12-14?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "168", "median": "195", "upper_75": "228", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the price of IGM will be 1.14k on 2030-12-13, in 2019 USD?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "392", "median": "689", "upper_75": "1.14k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first European trillion-dollar company will emerge by 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How much will the average degree of automation change for key US professions from December 2020 to December 2026? (1.75)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.75", "median": "8.32", "upper_75": "17.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Object Detection Performance Index will be 168 on 2026-12-14?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "168", "median": "195", "upper_75": "228", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the price of IGM will be 1.14k on 2030-12-13, in 2019 USD?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "392", "median": "689", "upper_75": "1.14k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the top-performing supercomputer in the TOP500 list will have a performance of 53.8 exaFLOPS according to their June 2030 list?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "21.3", "median": "53.8", "upper_75": "138", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median annual wage for Computer and Information Research Scientists in the United States in 2029 will be 184k?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "133k", "median": "156k", "upper_75": "184k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the price of IGM will be 1.14k on 2030-12-13, in 2019 USD?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "392", "median": "689", "upper_75": "1.14k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Object Detection Performance Index will be 168 on 2026-12-14?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "168", "median": "195", "upper_75": "228", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median annual wage for Computer and Information Research Scientists in the United States in 2029 will be 184k?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "133k", "median": "156k", "upper_75": "184k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many Executive Orders per week will President Biden issue, on average?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How much will President Trump govern by decree?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1430/how-much-will-president-trump-govern-by-decree/)\n\n----\n\n[Executive Orders](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_order) are a means by which the President can govern via their executive powers. They are often seen as a way for the President to circumvent Congress in order to achieve their policy agenda. Some recent Executive Orders by Trump include:\n\n* [Trump's travel ban](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13780)\n* [Revival of the National Space Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Space_Council#Revival)\n\nHow many [Executive Orders](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_order) will President Biden have issued, on a weekly basis, prior to noon on January 20 2025 and while he is president?\n\nHere are the last seven presidents for comparison:\n\nCarter: 1.53 E.O./week\n\nReagan: 0.91 E.O./week\n\nBush I: 0.80 E.O./week\n\nClinton: 0.87 E.O./week\n\nBush II: 0.70 E.O./week\n\nObama: 0.65 E.O./week\n\nTrump: ~1,00 E.0./week (as of 14-Jan-21)", "resc": "The [Federal Register](https://www.federalregister.gov/presidential-documents/executive-orders) will provide the final numbers. This question resolves on January 31th 2025 at noon, at the latest (Federal Register numbers can take a few days after the White House's statements)", "lower_25": "0.811", "median": "0.962", "upper_75": "1.13", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 106k Natural Language Processing e-prints will be published on arXiv over the 2021-01-14 to 2030-01-14 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "83.2k", "median": "106k", "upper_75": "141k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Federal Reserve's Industrial Production Index for January 2030, for semiconductors, printed circuit boards and related products, will be 546?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "292", "median": "416", "upper_75": "546", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 45.4k Reinforcement Learning e-prints will be published on arXiv over the 2021-01-14 to 2027-01-01 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.1k", "median": "33.9k", "upper_75": "45.4k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 106k Natural Language Processing e-prints will be published on arXiv over the 2021-01-14 to 2030-01-14 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "83.2k", "median": "106k", "upper_75": "141k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median annual wage for Computer and Information Research Scientists in the United States in 2029 will be 184k?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "133k", "median": "156k", "upper_75": "184k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Democratic and Republican parties (combined) will receive 95.28% of the US 2024 presidential popular vote?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "92.41", "median": "95.28", "upper_75": "97.34", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 106k Natural Language Processing e-prints will be published on arXiv over the 2021-01-14 to 2030-01-14 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "83.2k", "median": "106k", "upper_75": "141k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Federal Reserve's Industrial Production Index for January 2030, for semiconductors, printed circuit boards and related products, will be 546?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "292", "median": "416", "upper_75": "546", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 45.4k Reinforcement Learning e-prints will be published on arXiv over the 2021-01-14 to 2027-01-01 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.1k", "median": "33.9k", "upper_75": "45.4k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many Executive Orders per week will President Biden issue, on average?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How much will President Trump govern by decree?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1430/how-much-will-president-trump-govern-by-decree/)\n\n----\n\n[Executive Orders](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_order) are a means by which the President can govern via their executive powers. They are often seen as a way for the President to circumvent Congress in order to achieve their policy agenda. Some recent Executive Orders by Trump include:\n\n* [Trump's travel ban](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13780)\n* [Revival of the National Space Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Space_Council#Revival)\n\nHow many [Executive Orders](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_order) will President Biden have issued, on a weekly basis, prior to noon on January 20 2025 and while he is president?\n\nHere are the last seven presidents for comparison:\n\nCarter: 1.53 E.O./week\n\nReagan: 0.91 E.O./week\n\nBush I: 0.80 E.O./week\n\nClinton: 0.87 E.O./week\n\nBush II: 0.70 E.O./week\n\nObama: 0.65 E.O./week\n\nTrump: ~1,00 E.0./week (as of 14-Jan-21)", "resc": "The [Federal Register](https://www.federalregister.gov/presidential-documents/executive-orders) will provide the final numbers. This question resolves on January 31th 2025 at noon, at the latest (Federal Register numbers can take a few days after the White House's statements)", "lower_25": "0.811", "median": "0.962", "upper_75": "1.13", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Democratic and Republican parties (combined) will receive 95.28% of the US 2024 presidential popular vote?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "92.41", "median": "95.28", "upper_75": "97.34", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 45.4k Reinforcement Learning e-prints will be published on arXiv over the 2021-01-14 to 2027-01-01 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.1k", "median": "33.9k", "upper_75": "45.4k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Democratic and Republican parties (combined) will receive 95.28% of the US 2024 presidential popular vote?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "92.41", "median": "95.28", "upper_75": "97.34", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Federal Reserve's Industrial Production Index for January 2030, for semiconductors, printed circuit boards and related products, will be 546?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "292", "median": "416", "upper_75": "546", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 17 year olds will vote in the US by 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "In 1971, the US [ratified the 26th Amendment and lowered its voting age from 21 to 18](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twenty-sixth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution#:~:text=In%201970%2C%20Senator%20Ted%20Kennedy,%2C%20state%2C%20and%20local%20elections.).\n\nSince then, several proposals to lower the voting age have been put forward. None have passed nationally, but [a number of states and municipalities allow limited forms of voting by people younger than 18](https://www.youthrights.org/issues/voting-age/voting-age-status-report/).\n\n***When, if ever, will people <18 years old vote in national elections in the US?***\n\nThis question resolves positive if at least 50.1% of 17-year-old US citizens are able to vote in federal elections. They must be able to vote in races for at least 2 of 3 offices: US Senate, House of Representatives, or President.\n\nOnly [general federal elections](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oregon_v._Mitchell) will be considered, primaries, state and local elections are not relevant to the question.", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2052", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2059", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many Executive Orders per week will President Biden issue, on average?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How much will President Trump govern by decree?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1430/how-much-will-president-trump-govern-by-decree/)\n\n----\n\n[Executive Orders](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_order) are a means by which the President can govern via their executive powers. They are often seen as a way for the President to circumvent Congress in order to achieve their policy agenda. Some recent Executive Orders by Trump include:\n\n* [Trump's travel ban](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_13780)\n* [Revival of the National Space Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Space_Council#Revival)\n\nHow many [Executive Orders](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_order) will President Biden have issued, on a weekly basis, prior to noon on January 20 2025 and while he is president?\n\nHere are the last seven presidents for comparison:\n\nCarter: 1.53 E.O./week\n\nReagan: 0.91 E.O./week\n\nBush I: 0.80 E.O./week\n\nClinton: 0.87 E.O./week\n\nBush II: 0.70 E.O./week\n\nObama: 0.65 E.O./week\n\nTrump: ~1,00 E.0./week (as of 14-Jan-21)", "resc": "The [Federal Register](https://www.federalregister.gov/presidential-documents/executive-orders) will provide the final numbers. This question resolves on January 31th 2025 at noon, at the latest (Federal Register numbers can take a few days after the White House's statements)", "lower_25": "0.811", "median": "0.962", "upper_75": "1.13", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 21.9 countries will allow 17 year olds to vote in 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "Currently, [14 countries](https://www.youthrights.org/issues/voting-age/voting-age-status-report/) allow voting by young people with no major restrictions (as of Jan. 16, 2021). Another 14 countries allow some citizens <18 years of age suffrage with major qualifications, usually related to marriage, employment, or type of election.\n\nA number of [movements or proposals to allow minors to vote](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/19/us/politics/voting-age.html) are active or have been proposed in dozens of countries as of 2021.\n\n***How many countries will allow people younger than 18 to vote, with no major conditions, in 2026?***\n\nBroad enfranchisement, with no major restrictions, of the chosen age group in a country is required for that country to be added to the total. Restrictions that require marriage (as in Hungary and Indonesia) or employment (as in Slovenia and Croatia) or restrict <18 voters to local elections only/European elections only (as in Scotland or Belgium) disqualify a country for purposes of this question. \n\nRestrictions commonly applied to voting adults do not disqualify a country; it's okay if <18 voters need ID, or must be a citizen, or have no criminal convictions, etc.\n\nVoting age must be lowered at least ten months below 18 years old to count; e.g. 17-year-old suffrage counts, but 17.5-year-old suffrage does not.\n\nAt least 70% of the age group in question must be enfranchised to count; places like Germany and the US where minors may vote in states or municipalities comprising <70% of the country's population do not suffice.\n\nResolution will use [the NYRA tracker](https://www.youthrights.org/issues/voting-age/voting-age-status-report/) as a primary source, or [Wikipedia](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_age) and credible media reports if necessary.", "lower_25": "14.8", "median": "17.7", "upper_75": "21.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 17 year olds will vote in the US by 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "In 1971, the US [ratified the 26th Amendment and lowered its voting age from 21 to 18](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twenty-sixth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution#:~:text=In%201970%2C%20Senator%20Ted%20Kennedy,%2C%20state%2C%20and%20local%20elections.).\n\nSince then, several proposals to lower the voting age have been put forward. None have passed nationally, but [a number of states and municipalities allow limited forms of voting by people younger than 18](https://www.youthrights.org/issues/voting-age/voting-age-status-report/).\n\n***When, if ever, will people <18 years old vote in national elections in the US?***\n\nThis question resolves positive if at least 50.1% of 17-year-old US citizens are able to vote in federal elections. They must be able to vote in races for at least 2 of 3 offices: US Senate, House of Representatives, or President.\n\nOnly [general federal elections](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oregon_v._Mitchell) will be considered, primaries, state and local elections are not relevant to the question.", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2052", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2059", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 17 year olds will vote in the US by 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "In 1971, the US [ratified the 26th Amendment and lowered its voting age from 21 to 18](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twenty-sixth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution#:~:text=In%201970%2C%20Senator%20Ted%20Kennedy,%2C%20state%2C%20and%20local%20elections.).\n\nSince then, several proposals to lower the voting age have been put forward. None have passed nationally, but [a number of states and municipalities allow limited forms of voting by people younger than 18](https://www.youthrights.org/issues/voting-age/voting-age-status-report/).\n\n***When, if ever, will people <18 years old vote in national elections in the US?***\n\nThis question resolves positive if at least 50.1% of 17-year-old US citizens are able to vote in federal elections. They must be able to vote in races for at least 2 of 3 offices: US Senate, House of Representatives, or President.\n\nOnly [general federal elections](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oregon_v._Mitchell) will be considered, primaries, state and local elections are not relevant to the question.", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2052", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2059", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that zettascale computing will be achieved by 2040?", "desc": "The first petascale supercomputer--that is, a computer capable of performing 10^15 floating-point operations per second, or one petaFLOP--[came online in 2008](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_performance_by_orders_of_magnitude). \n\nThe first exascale computers (10^18 operations) are expected [later this year](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5872/total-compute-top500-supercomputers-june-21/) and were [originally expected by Metaculus late last year](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/415/when-will-the-first-exaflop-performer-appear/).\n\nThe first zettascale computers, which can perform 10^21 operations per second, are not yet on the horizon.", "resc": "Resolves when the [Top500 list](https://top500.org/lists/top500/) (or other credible source, Wikipedia included, if Top500 isn't around) lists a computer capable of one zettaFLOP or higher Rmax (or broadly equivalent performance measure if Rmax is no longer used) performance. \n\nHistorical Top500 data available [here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18Mha2f9RIQCAAg41vm_UkP524pt59vvD7TcjHZ1SHXw/edit#gid=660616297).", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 21.9 countries will allow 17 year olds to vote in 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "Currently, [14 countries](https://www.youthrights.org/issues/voting-age/voting-age-status-report/) allow voting by young people with no major restrictions (as of Jan. 16, 2021). Another 14 countries allow some citizens <18 years of age suffrage with major qualifications, usually related to marriage, employment, or type of election.\n\nA number of [movements or proposals to allow minors to vote](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/19/us/politics/voting-age.html) are active or have been proposed in dozens of countries as of 2021.\n\n***How many countries will allow people younger than 18 to vote, with no major conditions, in 2026?***\n\nBroad enfranchisement, with no major restrictions, of the chosen age group in a country is required for that country to be added to the total. Restrictions that require marriage (as in Hungary and Indonesia) or employment (as in Slovenia and Croatia) or restrict <18 voters to local elections only/European elections only (as in Scotland or Belgium) disqualify a country for purposes of this question. \n\nRestrictions commonly applied to voting adults do not disqualify a country; it's okay if <18 voters need ID, or must be a citizen, or have no criminal convictions, etc.\n\nVoting age must be lowered at least ten months below 18 years old to count; e.g. 17-year-old suffrage counts, but 17.5-year-old suffrage does not.\n\nAt least 70% of the age group in question must be enfranchised to count; places like Germany and the US where minors may vote in states or municipalities comprising <70% of the country's population do not suffice.\n\nResolution will use [the NYRA tracker](https://www.youthrights.org/issues/voting-age/voting-age-status-report/) as a primary source, or [Wikipedia](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_age) and credible media reports if necessary.", "lower_25": "14.8", "median": "17.7", "upper_75": "21.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that zettascale computing will be achieved by 2040?", "desc": "The first petascale supercomputer--that is, a computer capable of performing 10^15 floating-point operations per second, or one petaFLOP--[came online in 2008](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_performance_by_orders_of_magnitude). \n\nThe first exascale computers (10^18 operations) are expected [later this year](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5872/total-compute-top500-supercomputers-june-21/) and were [originally expected by Metaculus late last year](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/415/when-will-the-first-exaflop-performer-appear/).\n\nThe first zettascale computers, which can perform 10^21 operations per second, are not yet on the horizon.", "resc": "Resolves when the [Top500 list](https://top500.org/lists/top500/) (or other credible source, Wikipedia included, if Top500 isn't around) lists a computer capable of one zettaFLOP or higher Rmax (or broadly equivalent performance measure if Rmax is no longer used) performance. \n\nHistorical Top500 data available [here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18Mha2f9RIQCAAg41vm_UkP524pt59vvD7TcjHZ1SHXw/edit#gid=660616297).", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that zettascale computing will be achieved by 2040?", "desc": "The first petascale supercomputer--that is, a computer capable of performing 10^15 floating-point operations per second, or one petaFLOP--[came online in 2008](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_performance_by_orders_of_magnitude). \n\nThe first exascale computers (10^18 operations) are expected [later this year](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5872/total-compute-top500-supercomputers-june-21/) and were [originally expected by Metaculus late last year](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/415/when-will-the-first-exaflop-performer-appear/).\n\nThe first zettascale computers, which can perform 10^21 operations per second, are not yet on the horizon.", "resc": "Resolves when the [Top500 list](https://top500.org/lists/top500/) (or other credible source, Wikipedia included, if Top500 isn't around) lists a computer capable of one zettaFLOP or higher Rmax (or broadly equivalent performance measure if Rmax is no longer used) performance. \n\nHistorical Top500 data available [here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18Mha2f9RIQCAAg41vm_UkP524pt59vvD7TcjHZ1SHXw/edit#gid=660616297).", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 21.9 countries will allow 17 year olds to vote in 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "Currently, [14 countries](https://www.youthrights.org/issues/voting-age/voting-age-status-report/) allow voting by young people with no major restrictions (as of Jan. 16, 2021). Another 14 countries allow some citizens <18 years of age suffrage with major qualifications, usually related to marriage, employment, or type of election.\n\nA number of [movements or proposals to allow minors to vote](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/19/us/politics/voting-age.html) are active or have been proposed in dozens of countries as of 2021.\n\n***How many countries will allow people younger than 18 to vote, with no major conditions, in 2026?***\n\nBroad enfranchisement, with no major restrictions, of the chosen age group in a country is required for that country to be added to the total. Restrictions that require marriage (as in Hungary and Indonesia) or employment (as in Slovenia and Croatia) or restrict <18 voters to local elections only/European elections only (as in Scotland or Belgium) disqualify a country for purposes of this question. \n\nRestrictions commonly applied to voting adults do not disqualify a country; it's okay if <18 voters need ID, or must be a citizen, or have no criminal convictions, etc.\n\nVoting age must be lowered at least ten months below 18 years old to count; e.g. 17-year-old suffrage counts, but 17.5-year-old suffrage does not.\n\nAt least 70% of the age group in question must be enfranchised to count; places like Germany and the US where minors may vote in states or municipalities comprising <70% of the country's population do not suffice.\n\nResolution will use [the NYRA tracker](https://www.youthrights.org/issues/voting-age/voting-age-status-report/) as a primary source, or [Wikipedia](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_age) and credible media reports if necessary.", "lower_25": "14.8", "median": "17.7", "upper_75": "21.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that Varda will successfully manufacture and sell its first product from space by 2034?", "desc": "#Background\n\nVarda, founded in 2020 and just beginning its seed stage, raised [$9 million dollars](https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/varda-ba64/company_financials) on December 9, 2020 in its quest to create products in space for terrestrial applications. Manufacturing in space allows for the production of goods and materials that require different laws of physics. To take advantage of that, the company [expects to produce](https://fiftyyears.substack.com/p/varda-space-industries) high value and sensitive materials like fiber optic cables, 3D printed organs, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, or carbon nanotubes. The presence of investors in this market signals that the idea of space manufacturing is not only financially viable in the future, but could occur faster than we might think. \n\nAs of now, it still remains difficult to launch things into orbit, with [average costs](https://www.axios.com/varda-space-9-million-manufacturing-space-0b9970c4-4394-4e61-a0a1-c4980e12acf9.html) ranging upwards of tens of millions of dollars. However, as [more development](https://techcrunch.com/2020/12/08/space-manufacturing-startup-varda-incubated-at-founders-fund-emerges-with-9-million-in-funding/) goes into the creation of rockets through companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Rocket Lab, prices should decrease making access more available for other companies like Varda to send things into, and stay to develop them, in space. \n\nPredictions should reflect the date that is reported for the first sale of any space-made product by Varda.", "resc": "#Resolution Criteria\n\nResolution will be sourced from any reliable news source, including Varda itself", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2050", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the UK will not hold its next general election before May 23, 2024?", "desc": "The UK's [Fixed Term Parliaments Act](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fixed-term_Parliaments_Act_2011) fixes the date of the next general election on 2 May 2024. This is the first Thursday in May in the fifth year after the last election - held on [12 December 2019](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Early_Parliamentary_General_Election_Act_2019). The purpose of the act was to take away the prime minister's right to choose when to call the next general election.\n\nThere have been three general elections since the Act was passed in 2011. Only one, the very first in 2015, was on the five-year schedule fixed by the Act. \n\nIn 2017, an election was called via a provision in the Act which triggers an early election if two-thirds of MPs support it. Theresa May, therefore, was able to demand an election.\n\nIn 2019, the Act was circumvented by a [special-purpose Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Early_Parliamentary_General_Election_Act_2019) passed through both Houses of Parliament.\n\nThe government has, furthermore, begun the process to [repeal the Act](https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2019-21/fixedtermparliamentsact2011repeal.html) - with the intention of returning the discretion to call elections back to the prime minister. There are some constitutional issues it creates, but the intention is to restore power over the timing of elections to the executive.\n\nThere has never been complete discretion over elections: even before the FTPA, parliamentary sittings could not exceed a five-year term. That has been a feature of British politics since 1911. Prior to 1911, the maximum term was 7 years. Proposals to ditch the FTPA have, to date, not envisage moving to a longer or shorter maximum term. \n\nHistorically, it was quite normal for parliaments not to go to term. Some PMs went early for elections because they lost their majorities in parliament - like Jim Callaghan in 1979. Sometimes it was because they figured a slightly earlier election would be easier to win than one at the five-year mark. Blair, for example, called his two elections as sitting prime minister four years into each term - in 2001 and 2005. \n\nGovernments going to a full five-year term have, in recent decades prior to the FTPA, been governments expecting to lose. Prime ministers delayed elections in the hope that the political temper would move in their favour. Major won a shock victory in 1992 in a vote almost 5 years after the 1987 election. He lost, five years later, in 1997. Gordon Brown held on to reach the fifth year in 2010.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date (after February 16, 2021) of the next general election in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The question will resolve as the day that polls open", "lower_25": "Not ≤ May 23, 2024", "median": "Not ≤ May 23, 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ May 23, 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the UK will not hold its next general election before May 23, 2024?", "desc": "The UK's [Fixed Term Parliaments Act](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fixed-term_Parliaments_Act_2011) fixes the date of the next general election on 2 May 2024. This is the first Thursday in May in the fifth year after the last election - held on [12 December 2019](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Early_Parliamentary_General_Election_Act_2019). The purpose of the act was to take away the prime minister's right to choose when to call the next general election.\n\nThere have been three general elections since the Act was passed in 2011. Only one, the very first in 2015, was on the five-year schedule fixed by the Act. \n\nIn 2017, an election was called via a provision in the Act which triggers an early election if two-thirds of MPs support it. Theresa May, therefore, was able to demand an election.\n\nIn 2019, the Act was circumvented by a [special-purpose Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Early_Parliamentary_General_Election_Act_2019) passed through both Houses of Parliament.\n\nThe government has, furthermore, begun the process to [repeal the Act](https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2019-21/fixedtermparliamentsact2011repeal.html) - with the intention of returning the discretion to call elections back to the prime minister. There are some constitutional issues it creates, but the intention is to restore power over the timing of elections to the executive.\n\nThere has never been complete discretion over elections: even before the FTPA, parliamentary sittings could not exceed a five-year term. That has been a feature of British politics since 1911. Prior to 1911, the maximum term was 7 years. Proposals to ditch the FTPA have, to date, not envisage moving to a longer or shorter maximum term. \n\nHistorically, it was quite normal for parliaments not to go to term. Some PMs went early for elections because they lost their majorities in parliament - like Jim Callaghan in 1979. Sometimes it was because they figured a slightly earlier election would be easier to win than one at the five-year mark. Blair, for example, called his two elections as sitting prime minister four years into each term - in 2001 and 2005. \n\nGovernments going to a full five-year term have, in recent decades prior to the FTPA, been governments expecting to lose. Prime ministers delayed elections in the hope that the political temper would move in their favour. Major won a shock victory in 1992 in a vote almost 5 years after the 1987 election. He lost, five years later, in 1997. Gordon Brown held on to reach the fifth year in 2010.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date (after February 16, 2021) of the next general election in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The question will resolve as the day that polls open", "lower_25": "Not ≤ May 23, 2024", "median": "Not ≤ May 23, 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ May 23, 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that The Economist will rank China as a democracy in the Democracy Index before 2100?", "desc": "Throughout its existence, the People's Republic of China has consistently been an undemocratic country. The Democracy Index, a yearly report that rates the state of democracy in 167 countries on a scale from 0-10 has rated China as “authoritarian” in all of its reports (with the most recent rating being a 2.26/10).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the next date when the [Democracy Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index) (published by the Economist Intelligence Unit) rates China as a 6.01/10 or higher (the minimum score to be considered a democracy) for at least one year's report. The Resolution date will be the date the report is published.\n\nThis question will resolve as **Ambiguous** if the People's Republic of China, in its current form, ceases to exist before it is rated a democracy by the Democracy Index, or if The Economist's Democracy Index is no longer published", "lower_25": "2062", "median": "2094", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the UK will not hold its next general election before May 23, 2024?", "desc": "The UK's [Fixed Term Parliaments Act](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fixed-term_Parliaments_Act_2011) fixes the date of the next general election on 2 May 2024. This is the first Thursday in May in the fifth year after the last election - held on [12 December 2019](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Early_Parliamentary_General_Election_Act_2019). The purpose of the act was to take away the prime minister's right to choose when to call the next general election.\n\nThere have been three general elections since the Act was passed in 2011. Only one, the very first in 2015, was on the five-year schedule fixed by the Act. \n\nIn 2017, an election was called via a provision in the Act which triggers an early election if two-thirds of MPs support it. Theresa May, therefore, was able to demand an election.\n\nIn 2019, the Act was circumvented by a [special-purpose Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Early_Parliamentary_General_Election_Act_2019) passed through both Houses of Parliament.\n\nThe government has, furthermore, begun the process to [repeal the Act](https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2019-21/fixedtermparliamentsact2011repeal.html) - with the intention of returning the discretion to call elections back to the prime minister. There are some constitutional issues it creates, but the intention is to restore power over the timing of elections to the executive.\n\nThere has never been complete discretion over elections: even before the FTPA, parliamentary sittings could not exceed a five-year term. That has been a feature of British politics since 1911. Prior to 1911, the maximum term was 7 years. Proposals to ditch the FTPA have, to date, not envisage moving to a longer or shorter maximum term. \n\nHistorically, it was quite normal for parliaments not to go to term. Some PMs went early for elections because they lost their majorities in parliament - like Jim Callaghan in 1979. Sometimes it was because they figured a slightly earlier election would be easier to win than one at the five-year mark. Blair, for example, called his two elections as sitting prime minister four years into each term - in 2001 and 2005. \n\nGovernments going to a full five-year term have, in recent decades prior to the FTPA, been governments expecting to lose. Prime ministers delayed elections in the hope that the political temper would move in their favour. Major won a shock victory in 1992 in a vote almost 5 years after the 1987 election. He lost, five years later, in 1997. Gordon Brown held on to reach the fifth year in 2010.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date (after February 16, 2021) of the next general election in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The question will resolve as the day that polls open", "lower_25": "Not ≤ May 23, 2024", "median": "Not ≤ May 23, 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ May 23, 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that Varda will successfully manufacture and sell its first product from space by 2034?", "desc": "#Background\n\nVarda, founded in 2020 and just beginning its seed stage, raised [$9 million dollars](https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/varda-ba64/company_financials) on December 9, 2020 in its quest to create products in space for terrestrial applications. Manufacturing in space allows for the production of goods and materials that require different laws of physics. To take advantage of that, the company [expects to produce](https://fiftyyears.substack.com/p/varda-space-industries) high value and sensitive materials like fiber optic cables, 3D printed organs, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, or carbon nanotubes. The presence of investors in this market signals that the idea of space manufacturing is not only financially viable in the future, but could occur faster than we might think. \n\nAs of now, it still remains difficult to launch things into orbit, with [average costs](https://www.axios.com/varda-space-9-million-manufacturing-space-0b9970c4-4394-4e61-a0a1-c4980e12acf9.html) ranging upwards of tens of millions of dollars. However, as [more development](https://techcrunch.com/2020/12/08/space-manufacturing-startup-varda-incubated-at-founders-fund-emerges-with-9-million-in-funding/) goes into the creation of rockets through companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Rocket Lab, prices should decrease making access more available for other companies like Varda to send things into, and stay to develop them, in space. \n\nPredictions should reflect the date that is reported for the first sale of any space-made product by Varda.", "resc": "#Resolution Criteria\n\nResolution will be sourced from any reliable news source, including Varda itself", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2050", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that Varda will successfully manufacture and sell its first product from space by 2034?", "desc": "#Background\n\nVarda, founded in 2020 and just beginning its seed stage, raised [$9 million dollars](https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/varda-ba64/company_financials) on December 9, 2020 in its quest to create products in space for terrestrial applications. Manufacturing in space allows for the production of goods and materials that require different laws of physics. To take advantage of that, the company [expects to produce](https://fiftyyears.substack.com/p/varda-space-industries) high value and sensitive materials like fiber optic cables, 3D printed organs, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, or carbon nanotubes. The presence of investors in this market signals that the idea of space manufacturing is not only financially viable in the future, but could occur faster than we might think. \n\nAs of now, it still remains difficult to launch things into orbit, with [average costs](https://www.axios.com/varda-space-9-million-manufacturing-space-0b9970c4-4394-4e61-a0a1-c4980e12acf9.html) ranging upwards of tens of millions of dollars. However, as [more development](https://techcrunch.com/2020/12/08/space-manufacturing-startup-varda-incubated-at-founders-fund-emerges-with-9-million-in-funding/) goes into the creation of rockets through companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Rocket Lab, prices should decrease making access more available for other companies like Varda to send things into, and stay to develop them, in space. \n\nPredictions should reflect the date that is reported for the first sale of any space-made product by Varda.", "resc": "#Resolution Criteria\n\nResolution will be sourced from any reliable news source, including Varda itself", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2050", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that The Economist will rank China as a democracy in the Democracy Index before 2100?", "desc": "Throughout its existence, the People's Republic of China has consistently been an undemocratic country. The Democracy Index, a yearly report that rates the state of democracy in 167 countries on a scale from 0-10 has rated China as “authoritarian” in all of its reports (with the most recent rating being a 2.26/10).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the next date when the [Democracy Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index) (published by the Economist Intelligence Unit) rates China as a 6.01/10 or higher (the minimum score to be considered a democracy) for at least one year's report. The Resolution date will be the date the report is published.\n\nThis question will resolve as **Ambiguous** if the People's Republic of China, in its current form, ceases to exist before it is rated a democracy by the Democracy Index, or if The Economist's Democracy Index is no longer published", "lower_25": "2062", "median": "2094", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least two US states will first disallow human-driven vehicles on public roads by 2055?", "desc": "It is objectively demonstrated that humans are not very good or very safe drivers. [According to the NHTSA](https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/2019-fatality-data-traffic-deaths-2020-q2-projections), there were 36,096 deaths due to motor vehicle crashes in the USA in 2019. The vast majority of fatality-causing crashes were substantially attributable to human driver error.\n\nFurther, common human driving heuristics and competency levels significantly limit the level of efficiency that can be achieved on the roadway. In particular, [human driven traffic does not interact with itself optimally](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/05/170510095703.htm), and for safety purposes, legal speed limits are artificially capped well below the level of vehicle performance. There is some consideration that autonomous vehicles may be able to safely travel [much faster](https://www.inverse.com/article/28110-self-driving-car-speed-future). \n\nFor these reasons and more, it is plausible that at some point, humans will be generally or entirely legally disallowed from driving a car on public roads.", "resc": "This question will resolve when at least two US states concurrently have in place a ban of most or all human driving on public roads. \n\nThe ban must be a matter of law or equivalent state authority or the question will not resolve.\n\nA federal ban qualifies the same as if two US states outlaw human driving.\n\nQualifying states are the current 50 US states, or future equivalents, plus any additional future states with equivalent status of any of the present 50 states. \n\nHuman driving is considered to be the operation of a car or motorcycle by a human where the human substantially directs the vehicle's motion by any means that involve a human brain substantially carrying out the processing required for meaningful direction of the vehicle's motion.\n\nAlthough the question implies that AI would supplant human driving in the event of such a ban, this is not necessary for a positive resolution", "lower_25": "2055", "median": "2074", "upper_75": "2116", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least two US states will first disallow human-driven vehicles on public roads by 2055?", "desc": "It is objectively demonstrated that humans are not very good or very safe drivers. [According to the NHTSA](https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/2019-fatality-data-traffic-deaths-2020-q2-projections), there were 36,096 deaths due to motor vehicle crashes in the USA in 2019. The vast majority of fatality-causing crashes were substantially attributable to human driver error.\n\nFurther, common human driving heuristics and competency levels significantly limit the level of efficiency that can be achieved on the roadway. In particular, [human driven traffic does not interact with itself optimally](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/05/170510095703.htm), and for safety purposes, legal speed limits are artificially capped well below the level of vehicle performance. There is some consideration that autonomous vehicles may be able to safely travel [much faster](https://www.inverse.com/article/28110-self-driving-car-speed-future). \n\nFor these reasons and more, it is plausible that at some point, humans will be generally or entirely legally disallowed from driving a car on public roads.", "resc": "This question will resolve when at least two US states concurrently have in place a ban of most or all human driving on public roads. \n\nThe ban must be a matter of law or equivalent state authority or the question will not resolve.\n\nA federal ban qualifies the same as if two US states outlaw human driving.\n\nQualifying states are the current 50 US states, or future equivalents, plus any additional future states with equivalent status of any of the present 50 states. \n\nHuman driving is considered to be the operation of a car or motorcycle by a human where the human substantially directs the vehicle's motion by any means that involve a human brain substantially carrying out the processing required for meaningful direction of the vehicle's motion.\n\nAlthough the question implies that AI would supplant human driving in the event of such a ban, this is not necessary for a positive resolution", "lower_25": "2055", "median": "2074", "upper_75": "2116", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least two US states will first disallow human-driven vehicles on public roads by 2055?", "desc": "It is objectively demonstrated that humans are not very good or very safe drivers. [According to the NHTSA](https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/2019-fatality-data-traffic-deaths-2020-q2-projections), there were 36,096 deaths due to motor vehicle crashes in the USA in 2019. The vast majority of fatality-causing crashes were substantially attributable to human driver error.\n\nFurther, common human driving heuristics and competency levels significantly limit the level of efficiency that can be achieved on the roadway. In particular, [human driven traffic does not interact with itself optimally](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/05/170510095703.htm), and for safety purposes, legal speed limits are artificially capped well below the level of vehicle performance. There is some consideration that autonomous vehicles may be able to safely travel [much faster](https://www.inverse.com/article/28110-self-driving-car-speed-future). \n\nFor these reasons and more, it is plausible that at some point, humans will be generally or entirely legally disallowed from driving a car on public roads.", "resc": "This question will resolve when at least two US states concurrently have in place a ban of most or all human driving on public roads. \n\nThe ban must be a matter of law or equivalent state authority or the question will not resolve.\n\nA federal ban qualifies the same as if two US states outlaw human driving.\n\nQualifying states are the current 50 US states, or future equivalents, plus any additional future states with equivalent status of any of the present 50 states. \n\nHuman driving is considered to be the operation of a car or motorcycle by a human where the human substantially directs the vehicle's motion by any means that involve a human brain substantially carrying out the processing required for meaningful direction of the vehicle's motion.\n\nAlthough the question implies that AI would supplant human driving in the event of such a ban, this is not necessary for a positive resolution", "lower_25": "2055", "median": "2074", "upper_75": "2116", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that any currency zone will stop printing cash currency by 2034?", "desc": "", "resc": "*Previous Question on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will any country stop using cash currency? *[closed]*](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1449/when-will-any-country-stop-using-cash-currency/)\n\n----\n\nWhile apparently half the world waits for the adoption of cryptocurrencies there's been an ongoing proliferation of cashless money transfer, mediated by apps and QR-codes. \n\nElectronic banking really established itself in the 1990s, and today [more than half of US citizens](https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/online-mobile-banking.php) use digital banking. Smartphones enable quick transactions, money leaving and arriving in respective accounts in seconds. Sweden's [Swish](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swish_(payment)) for instance is used by more than half of the population, mostly for transfers that would otherwise use cash. [Cash now only accounts for less than 20% of their transactions in stores](https://www.bbc.com/news/business-41095004).\n\nBut there are arguments for the continuation of cash as well: One may not want to have certain acquisitions linked to one's account, be they of political, sexual, or altogether different nature. The elderly and poor often don't have the means or technical aptitude to adapt to this new aspect either. On the gripping hand, a purely digital currency would be a juicy target for hacks and exploits and would therefore have to be built with such attempts in mind.\n\nMany countries are currently researching or developing digital currencies, including [South Korea](https://www.pymnts.com/digital-payments/2021/south-korea-looks-for-tech-partner-to-launch-digital-won/), [China](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_renminbi), [Sweden](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swedish_krona#The_e-krona), and members of the [Eurozone](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/digital_euro/html/index.en.html), among [others](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_bank_digital_currency). Venezuela has issued the [Petro](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petro_(cryptocurrency)) since 2018, and El Salvador [will accept bitcoin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitcoin_Law) in 2021, though both countries still use cash currencies as well.\n\n**When will any currency zone stop printing cash currency?**\n\nResolves when a currency zone discontinues issuing bank notes and coins as legal tender, by adopting or converting to a purely digital currency. For the purposes of this question cash may still be accepted or exchanged on legacy grounds, as could novelty cash like commemorative coins.\n\nIf there is a transition period where cash is officially illegal but can be exchanged to digital via government programs, this question will resolve at **the beginning** of such period.\n\nIn the case of government dysfunction or collapse where a curency is no longer being printed, or where a cash currency is no longer printed and replaced with a another cash currency, such cases will not resolve this question.", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that The Economist will rank China as a democracy in the Democracy Index before 2100?", "desc": "Throughout its existence, the People's Republic of China has consistently been an undemocratic country. The Democracy Index, a yearly report that rates the state of democracy in 167 countries on a scale from 0-10 has rated China as “authoritarian” in all of its reports (with the most recent rating being a 2.26/10).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the next date when the [Democracy Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index) (published by the Economist Intelligence Unit) rates China as a 6.01/10 or higher (the minimum score to be considered a democracy) for at least one year's report. The Resolution date will be the date the report is published.\n\nThis question will resolve as **Ambiguous** if the People's Republic of China, in its current form, ceases to exist before it is rated a democracy by the Democracy Index, or if The Economist's Democracy Index is no longer published", "lower_25": "2062", "median": "2094", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next Millennium Prize Problem will be solved by 2032?", "desc": "*related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will the next Millennium Prize Problem be solved? [closed]](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1048/when-will-the-next-millennium-prize-problem-be-solved/)\n- [Will a Millennium Prize Problem be solved before 2028? [closed]](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/236/will-another-millennium-prize-problem-be-solved-in-the-next-decade/)\n- [If the Riemann Hypothesis is solved by 2100, will it be proven true?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6365/riemann-h-proved-true-if-settled-by-2100/)\n\n----\n\nThe Millennium Prize Problems consist of 7 profound, unsolved mathematical puzzles curated by the Clay Mathematics Institute of Cambridge, Massachusetts (CMI) in 2000. A prize fund of $7M has been allocated to award to winners, with $1M set aside for the solver(s) of each big problem.\n\nAll told, the set includes:\n\n* Yang–Mills and Mass Gap\n* Riemann Hypothesis\n* P vs NP Problem\n* Navier–Stokes Equation\n* Hodge Conjecture\n* Poincaré Conjecture\n* Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer Conjecture\n\nOf these monster math problems, only one has been officially solved--the Poincaré Conjecture, by [Grigori Perelman](https://medium.com/@phacks/how-grigori-perelman-solved-one-of-maths-greatest-mystery-89426275cb7). Per Medium:\n\n> [Perelman] is the first and only one to have solved one of the Millennium Problems and, according to many, this situation may not change for a long time. He is also the first and only to have declined both the Fields Medal and the Millennium prize. His justification highlights both his peculiar personality and his deep commitment to mathematics for their own sake: \"I'm not interested in money or fame. I don't want to be on display like an animal in a zoo. I'm not a hero of mathematics. I'm not even that successful; that is why I don't want to have everybody looking at me.\"\n\nAt some point, one assumes, at least one of the other problems will fall. (Other geniuses have already come close and [banged on the door](https://www.firstpost.com/world/is-math-problem-worth-us-1-million-solved-1360027.html) of success.)", "resc": "The question will be resolved on the date the Clay Mathematics Institute officially awards their next prize for one of the remaining 6 problems. If they do, the question will retroactively close to the date of the first media reports of a qualifying proof (including journal publications or preprints)", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that most eggs produced in the EU will be sexed before hatching by 2027?", "desc": "See details about male chick culling and in-ovo sexing technologies in [US version of this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3326/when-will-most-eggs-produced-in-the-usa-be-sexed-before-hatching/) posted by another user.\n\nGermany will prohibit the mass slaughter of day-old male chicks from the [end of 2021](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/kuekentoeten-wird-verboten-1841098), according to a draft bill [signed by the Cabinet](https://www.dw.com/en/germany-to-ban-chick-shredding-from-2022-in-global-first/a-56285846), becoming the first country to do so. Germany produces 13% of EU eggs.\n\nFrench Agriculture Minister Didier Guillaume has repeatedly ([here](https://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2019/10/30/le-broyage-des-poussins-devrait-etre-interdit-en-france-a-la-fin-de-2021_6017488_3244.html), [here](https://www.france24.com/en/20200113-germany-france-to-push-eu-to-end-shredding-of-male-chicks), [here](https://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2020/01/28/la-france-veut-interdire-le-broyage-des-poussins-et-la-castration-a-vif-des-porcelets-a-la-fin-de-2021_6027528_3244.html), & [here](https://www.lci.fr/planete/quatre-questions-sur-la-fin-du-broyage-des-poussins-males-annonce-par-didier-guillaume-2143984.html)) said that France would end the shredding of chickens by the end of 2021. France produces 14% of EU eggs.\n\nIn March 2020, the Directorate of Production and Agrarian Markets of the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture [stated](https://www.cronicanorte.es/el-sacrificio-de-pollitos-macho-en-espana-podria-terminar-en-2021-segun-el-ministerio-de-agricultura/144696) that it is working with egg producers to end the annual culling of 35 million male chicks in Spain in 2021. The Ministry said producers were testing two different techniques of in-ovo sex detection. Spain produces 13% of EU eggs.\n\nThe Dutch Ministry of Agriculture responded to [animal welfare groups´ calls](https://www.nieuweoogst.nl/nieuws/2020/02/04/dierenorganisaties-willen-verbod-op-doden-kuikens) to phase out all chick culling including gassing in the Netherlands by the end of 2021 that '[a political solution is being explored](https://www.boerderij.nl/Registratie/?returnurl=%2fPluimveehouderij%2fAchtergrond%2f2020%2f5%2fDe-opmars-van-geslachtbepaling-bij-broedeieren-585600E%2f)' and that the Agriculture Minister would soon provide more information.The Netherlands produces 10% of EU eggs.\n\nAssoavi, the trade association representing the 70% of egg producers in Italy, has [committed](https://animalequality.it/news/2020/12/01/i-produttori-di-uova-italiani-si-impegnano-a-introdurre-le-tecnologie-in-ovo-sexing-per-mettere-fine-alluccisione-dei-pulcini-maschi/) to adopt in-ovo sexing technologies and to promote their application throughout the Italian supply chain. Assoavi itself started to actively lobby the Ministry of Health into allocating funds for research and implementation. Italy produces 10% of EU eggs", "resc": "This resolves as the estimated date when EU-based hatcheries that produce at least 50% of the total number of eggs produced in the EU that year successfully sex their hen flock replacement eggs, in ovo.\nFor the purposes of this question, successful sexing occurs if:\n\n1. techniques are used that correctly identify the sex in a majority of cases, and\n2. at least a majority of those identified to be male are destroyed before hatching.\n\nEstimates of when this threshold is reached should originate from one of the following credible independent sources: the Good Food Institute, Open Philanthropy, EFSA, or FAO.\n\nIn case no estimates of when this occurred can be found, an admin should contact the aforementioned types credible independent sources and request these for their relevant staff for credible estimates. In case of multiple estimates, an admin may decide to resolve on the basis of the median. In case no estimates can be sourced, the question shall resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that any currency zone will stop printing cash currency by 2034?", "desc": "", "resc": "*Previous Question on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will any country stop using cash currency? *[closed]*](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1449/when-will-any-country-stop-using-cash-currency/)\n\n----\n\nWhile apparently half the world waits for the adoption of cryptocurrencies there's been an ongoing proliferation of cashless money transfer, mediated by apps and QR-codes. \n\nElectronic banking really established itself in the 1990s, and today [more than half of US citizens](https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/online-mobile-banking.php) use digital banking. Smartphones enable quick transactions, money leaving and arriving in respective accounts in seconds. Sweden's [Swish](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swish_(payment)) for instance is used by more than half of the population, mostly for transfers that would otherwise use cash. [Cash now only accounts for less than 20% of their transactions in stores](https://www.bbc.com/news/business-41095004).\n\nBut there are arguments for the continuation of cash as well: One may not want to have certain acquisitions linked to one's account, be they of political, sexual, or altogether different nature. The elderly and poor often don't have the means or technical aptitude to adapt to this new aspect either. On the gripping hand, a purely digital currency would be a juicy target for hacks and exploits and would therefore have to be built with such attempts in mind.\n\nMany countries are currently researching or developing digital currencies, including [South Korea](https://www.pymnts.com/digital-payments/2021/south-korea-looks-for-tech-partner-to-launch-digital-won/), [China](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_renminbi), [Sweden](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swedish_krona#The_e-krona), and members of the [Eurozone](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/digital_euro/html/index.en.html), among [others](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_bank_digital_currency). Venezuela has issued the [Petro](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petro_(cryptocurrency)) since 2018, and El Salvador [will accept bitcoin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitcoin_Law) in 2021, though both countries still use cash currencies as well.\n\n**When will any currency zone stop printing cash currency?**\n\nResolves when a currency zone discontinues issuing bank notes and coins as legal tender, by adopting or converting to a purely digital currency. For the purposes of this question cash may still be accepted or exchanged on legacy grounds, as could novelty cash like commemorative coins.\n\nIf there is a transition period where cash is officially illegal but can be exchanged to digital via government programs, this question will resolve at **the beginning** of such period.\n\nIn the case of government dysfunction or collapse where a curency is no longer being printed, or where a cash currency is no longer printed and replaced with a another cash currency, such cases will not resolve this question.", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that most eggs produced in the EU will be sexed before hatching by 2027?", "desc": "See details about male chick culling and in-ovo sexing technologies in [US version of this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3326/when-will-most-eggs-produced-in-the-usa-be-sexed-before-hatching/) posted by another user.\n\nGermany will prohibit the mass slaughter of day-old male chicks from the [end of 2021](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/kuekentoeten-wird-verboten-1841098), according to a draft bill [signed by the Cabinet](https://www.dw.com/en/germany-to-ban-chick-shredding-from-2022-in-global-first/a-56285846), becoming the first country to do so. Germany produces 13% of EU eggs.\n\nFrench Agriculture Minister Didier Guillaume has repeatedly ([here](https://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2019/10/30/le-broyage-des-poussins-devrait-etre-interdit-en-france-a-la-fin-de-2021_6017488_3244.html), [here](https://www.france24.com/en/20200113-germany-france-to-push-eu-to-end-shredding-of-male-chicks), [here](https://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2020/01/28/la-france-veut-interdire-le-broyage-des-poussins-et-la-castration-a-vif-des-porcelets-a-la-fin-de-2021_6027528_3244.html), & [here](https://www.lci.fr/planete/quatre-questions-sur-la-fin-du-broyage-des-poussins-males-annonce-par-didier-guillaume-2143984.html)) said that France would end the shredding of chickens by the end of 2021. France produces 14% of EU eggs.\n\nIn March 2020, the Directorate of Production and Agrarian Markets of the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture [stated](https://www.cronicanorte.es/el-sacrificio-de-pollitos-macho-en-espana-podria-terminar-en-2021-segun-el-ministerio-de-agricultura/144696) that it is working with egg producers to end the annual culling of 35 million male chicks in Spain in 2021. The Ministry said producers were testing two different techniques of in-ovo sex detection. Spain produces 13% of EU eggs.\n\nThe Dutch Ministry of Agriculture responded to [animal welfare groups´ calls](https://www.nieuweoogst.nl/nieuws/2020/02/04/dierenorganisaties-willen-verbod-op-doden-kuikens) to phase out all chick culling including gassing in the Netherlands by the end of 2021 that '[a political solution is being explored](https://www.boerderij.nl/Registratie/?returnurl=%2fPluimveehouderij%2fAchtergrond%2f2020%2f5%2fDe-opmars-van-geslachtbepaling-bij-broedeieren-585600E%2f)' and that the Agriculture Minister would soon provide more information.The Netherlands produces 10% of EU eggs.\n\nAssoavi, the trade association representing the 70% of egg producers in Italy, has [committed](https://animalequality.it/news/2020/12/01/i-produttori-di-uova-italiani-si-impegnano-a-introdurre-le-tecnologie-in-ovo-sexing-per-mettere-fine-alluccisione-dei-pulcini-maschi/) to adopt in-ovo sexing technologies and to promote their application throughout the Italian supply chain. Assoavi itself started to actively lobby the Ministry of Health into allocating funds for research and implementation. Italy produces 10% of EU eggs", "resc": "This resolves as the estimated date when EU-based hatcheries that produce at least 50% of the total number of eggs produced in the EU that year successfully sex their hen flock replacement eggs, in ovo.\nFor the purposes of this question, successful sexing occurs if:\n\n1. techniques are used that correctly identify the sex in a majority of cases, and\n2. at least a majority of those identified to be male are destroyed before hatching.\n\nEstimates of when this threshold is reached should originate from one of the following credible independent sources: the Good Food Institute, Open Philanthropy, EFSA, or FAO.\n\nIn case no estimates of when this occurred can be found, an admin should contact the aforementioned types credible independent sources and request these for their relevant staff for credible estimates. In case of multiple estimates, an admin may decide to resolve on the basis of the median. In case no estimates can be sourced, the question shall resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that most eggs produced in the EU will be sexed before hatching by 2027?", "desc": "See details about male chick culling and in-ovo sexing technologies in [US version of this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3326/when-will-most-eggs-produced-in-the-usa-be-sexed-before-hatching/) posted by another user.\n\nGermany will prohibit the mass slaughter of day-old male chicks from the [end of 2021](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/kuekentoeten-wird-verboten-1841098), according to a draft bill [signed by the Cabinet](https://www.dw.com/en/germany-to-ban-chick-shredding-from-2022-in-global-first/a-56285846), becoming the first country to do so. Germany produces 13% of EU eggs.\n\nFrench Agriculture Minister Didier Guillaume has repeatedly ([here](https://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2019/10/30/le-broyage-des-poussins-devrait-etre-interdit-en-france-a-la-fin-de-2021_6017488_3244.html), [here](https://www.france24.com/en/20200113-germany-france-to-push-eu-to-end-shredding-of-male-chicks), [here](https://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2020/01/28/la-france-veut-interdire-le-broyage-des-poussins-et-la-castration-a-vif-des-porcelets-a-la-fin-de-2021_6027528_3244.html), & [here](https://www.lci.fr/planete/quatre-questions-sur-la-fin-du-broyage-des-poussins-males-annonce-par-didier-guillaume-2143984.html)) said that France would end the shredding of chickens by the end of 2021. France produces 14% of EU eggs.\n\nIn March 2020, the Directorate of Production and Agrarian Markets of the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture [stated](https://www.cronicanorte.es/el-sacrificio-de-pollitos-macho-en-espana-podria-terminar-en-2021-segun-el-ministerio-de-agricultura/144696) that it is working with egg producers to end the annual culling of 35 million male chicks in Spain in 2021. The Ministry said producers were testing two different techniques of in-ovo sex detection. Spain produces 13% of EU eggs.\n\nThe Dutch Ministry of Agriculture responded to [animal welfare groups´ calls](https://www.nieuweoogst.nl/nieuws/2020/02/04/dierenorganisaties-willen-verbod-op-doden-kuikens) to phase out all chick culling including gassing in the Netherlands by the end of 2021 that '[a political solution is being explored](https://www.boerderij.nl/Registratie/?returnurl=%2fPluimveehouderij%2fAchtergrond%2f2020%2f5%2fDe-opmars-van-geslachtbepaling-bij-broedeieren-585600E%2f)' and that the Agriculture Minister would soon provide more information.The Netherlands produces 10% of EU eggs.\n\nAssoavi, the trade association representing the 70% of egg producers in Italy, has [committed](https://animalequality.it/news/2020/12/01/i-produttori-di-uova-italiani-si-impegnano-a-introdurre-le-tecnologie-in-ovo-sexing-per-mettere-fine-alluccisione-dei-pulcini-maschi/) to adopt in-ovo sexing technologies and to promote their application throughout the Italian supply chain. Assoavi itself started to actively lobby the Ministry of Health into allocating funds for research and implementation. Italy produces 10% of EU eggs", "resc": "This resolves as the estimated date when EU-based hatcheries that produce at least 50% of the total number of eggs produced in the EU that year successfully sex their hen flock replacement eggs, in ovo.\nFor the purposes of this question, successful sexing occurs if:\n\n1. techniques are used that correctly identify the sex in a majority of cases, and\n2. at least a majority of those identified to be male are destroyed before hatching.\n\nEstimates of when this threshold is reached should originate from one of the following credible independent sources: the Good Food Institute, Open Philanthropy, EFSA, or FAO.\n\nIn case no estimates of when this occurred can be found, an admin should contact the aforementioned types credible independent sources and request these for their relevant staff for credible estimates. In case of multiple estimates, an admin may decide to resolve on the basis of the median. In case no estimates can be sourced, the question shall resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that any currency zone will stop printing cash currency by 2034?", "desc": "", "resc": "*Previous Question on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will any country stop using cash currency? *[closed]*](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1449/when-will-any-country-stop-using-cash-currency/)\n\n----\n\nWhile apparently half the world waits for the adoption of cryptocurrencies there's been an ongoing proliferation of cashless money transfer, mediated by apps and QR-codes. \n\nElectronic banking really established itself in the 1990s, and today [more than half of US citizens](https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/online-mobile-banking.php) use digital banking. Smartphones enable quick transactions, money leaving and arriving in respective accounts in seconds. Sweden's [Swish](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swish_(payment)) for instance is used by more than half of the population, mostly for transfers that would otherwise use cash. [Cash now only accounts for less than 20% of their transactions in stores](https://www.bbc.com/news/business-41095004).\n\nBut there are arguments for the continuation of cash as well: One may not want to have certain acquisitions linked to one's account, be they of political, sexual, or altogether different nature. The elderly and poor often don't have the means or technical aptitude to adapt to this new aspect either. On the gripping hand, a purely digital currency would be a juicy target for hacks and exploits and would therefore have to be built with such attempts in mind.\n\nMany countries are currently researching or developing digital currencies, including [South Korea](https://www.pymnts.com/digital-payments/2021/south-korea-looks-for-tech-partner-to-launch-digital-won/), [China](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_renminbi), [Sweden](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swedish_krona#The_e-krona), and members of the [Eurozone](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/digital_euro/html/index.en.html), among [others](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_bank_digital_currency). Venezuela has issued the [Petro](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Petro_(cryptocurrency)) since 2018, and El Salvador [will accept bitcoin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitcoin_Law) in 2021, though both countries still use cash currencies as well.\n\n**When will any currency zone stop printing cash currency?**\n\nResolves when a currency zone discontinues issuing bank notes and coins as legal tender, by adopting or converting to a purely digital currency. For the purposes of this question cash may still be accepted or exchanged on legacy grounds, as could novelty cash like commemorative coins.\n\nIf there is a transition period where cash is officially illegal but can be exchanged to digital via government programs, this question will resolve at **the beginning** of such period.\n\nIn the case of government dysfunction or collapse where a curency is no longer being printed, or where a cash currency is no longer printed and replaced with a another cash currency, such cases will not resolve this question.", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "In 2025, what is the chance that 35.5% of Australia's Liberal parliamentarians will be women?", "desc": "The Liberal Party of Australia is Australia's largest centre-right political party. In 2015, the Liberal Party federal executive set a target for 50% of its politicians to be women by 2025 [in all parliaments in Australia](https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/liberal-partys-2025-target-of-50pc-female-mps-is-failing-with-gender-progress-slow/news-story/f3a294361f44b0539986b14f61457d35). \n\nBetween 2015 and 2020, the share of Liberal parliamentarians who were women [increased from 22.4% to 25.4%](https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/liberal-partys-2025-target-of-50pc-female-mps-is-failing-with-gender-progress-slow/news-story/f3a294361f44b0539986b14f61457d35). \n\nIn Australia's largest centre-left party, the Australian Labor Party, 46% of parliamentarians are women. The Labor Party has had enforceable quotas for candidates since 1994. Interestingly, the Victorian branch of the Liberals has had a 50% quota for women in the party executive [since the party was founded in the 1940s](https://www.aph.gov.au/~/~/~/link.aspx?_id=240F755AE81F4EE18C62C028129D82E6&_z=z) but current Liberal Party culture is [mostly resistant to quotas](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-11-27/liberal-party-lack-of-women-costing-votes/9175150?nw=0).\n\nFor detailed statistics and a current snapshot of Liberal attitudes to gender representation, see Gender & Politics 2020 from the Liberal Party-affiliated Menzies Research Centre ([free download, but registration required](https://www.menziesrc.org/news-feed/gender-and-politics)).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of Liberal women MPs in state and federal governments, on January 1, 2026, at 00:00 AEDT. Government membership lists will be allowed as an official source.", "lower_25": "25.9", "median": "30.7", "upper_75": "35.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next Millennium Prize Problem will be solved by 2032?", "desc": "*related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will the next Millennium Prize Problem be solved? [closed]](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1048/when-will-the-next-millennium-prize-problem-be-solved/)\n- [Will a Millennium Prize Problem be solved before 2028? [closed]](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/236/will-another-millennium-prize-problem-be-solved-in-the-next-decade/)\n- [If the Riemann Hypothesis is solved by 2100, will it be proven true?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6365/riemann-h-proved-true-if-settled-by-2100/)\n\n----\n\nThe Millennium Prize Problems consist of 7 profound, unsolved mathematical puzzles curated by the Clay Mathematics Institute of Cambridge, Massachusetts (CMI) in 2000. A prize fund of $7M has been allocated to award to winners, with $1M set aside for the solver(s) of each big problem.\n\nAll told, the set includes:\n\n* Yang–Mills and Mass Gap\n* Riemann Hypothesis\n* P vs NP Problem\n* Navier–Stokes Equation\n* Hodge Conjecture\n* Poincaré Conjecture\n* Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer Conjecture\n\nOf these monster math problems, only one has been officially solved--the Poincaré Conjecture, by [Grigori Perelman](https://medium.com/@phacks/how-grigori-perelman-solved-one-of-maths-greatest-mystery-89426275cb7). Per Medium:\n\n> [Perelman] is the first and only one to have solved one of the Millennium Problems and, according to many, this situation may not change for a long time. He is also the first and only to have declined both the Fields Medal and the Millennium prize. His justification highlights both his peculiar personality and his deep commitment to mathematics for their own sake: \"I'm not interested in money or fame. I don't want to be on display like an animal in a zoo. I'm not a hero of mathematics. I'm not even that successful; that is why I don't want to have everybody looking at me.\"\n\nAt some point, one assumes, at least one of the other problems will fall. (Other geniuses have already come close and [banged on the door](https://www.firstpost.com/world/is-math-problem-worth-us-1-million-solved-1360027.html) of success.)", "resc": "The question will be resolved on the date the Clay Mathematics Institute officially awards their next prize for one of the remaining 6 problems. If they do, the question will retroactively close to the date of the first media reports of a qualifying proof (including journal publications or preprints)", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "In 2025, what is the chance that 35.5% of Australia's Liberal parliamentarians will be women?", "desc": "The Liberal Party of Australia is Australia's largest centre-right political party. In 2015, the Liberal Party federal executive set a target for 50% of its politicians to be women by 2025 [in all parliaments in Australia](https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/liberal-partys-2025-target-of-50pc-female-mps-is-failing-with-gender-progress-slow/news-story/f3a294361f44b0539986b14f61457d35). \n\nBetween 2015 and 2020, the share of Liberal parliamentarians who were women [increased from 22.4% to 25.4%](https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/liberal-partys-2025-target-of-50pc-female-mps-is-failing-with-gender-progress-slow/news-story/f3a294361f44b0539986b14f61457d35). \n\nIn Australia's largest centre-left party, the Australian Labor Party, 46% of parliamentarians are women. The Labor Party has had enforceable quotas for candidates since 1994. Interestingly, the Victorian branch of the Liberals has had a 50% quota for women in the party executive [since the party was founded in the 1940s](https://www.aph.gov.au/~/~/~/link.aspx?_id=240F755AE81F4EE18C62C028129D82E6&_z=z) but current Liberal Party culture is [mostly resistant to quotas](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-11-27/liberal-party-lack-of-women-costing-votes/9175150?nw=0).\n\nFor detailed statistics and a current snapshot of Liberal attitudes to gender representation, see Gender & Politics 2020 from the Liberal Party-affiliated Menzies Research Centre ([free download, but registration required](https://www.menziesrc.org/news-feed/gender-and-politics)).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of Liberal women MPs in state and federal governments, on January 1, 2026, at 00:00 AEDT. Government membership lists will be allowed as an official source.", "lower_25": "25.9", "median": "30.7", "upper_75": "35.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mammoth will be revived by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "2085", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mammoth will be revived by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "2085", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Riemann Hypothesis will be resolved by 2059?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Riemann hypothesis](https://www.claymath.org/sites/default/files/official_problem_description.pdf) is a conjecture stating that the nontrivial zeroes of the [Riemann zeta function](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riemann_zeta_function) \\( \\zeta(s) \\) all have real part equal to \\( 1/2 \\).\n\n***When will the Riemann Hypothesis be proved or disproved?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the date when the Clay Mathematics Institute announces that the Hypothesis has been proved or disproved according to rule 5.c of the [Millennium Prize Rules](https://www.claymath.org/sites/default/files/millennium_prize_rules_0.pdf), or when it is shown to be independent of the standard ZFC axioms.\n\nIn case the Clay Mathematics Institute is discontinued or no longer awards prizes for resolved Millennium Prize Problems, it resolves when admins decide that there is a consensus amongst relevant leading pure mathematicians about the Hypothesis being resolved.", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2059", "upper_75": "2106", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mammoth will be revived by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "2085", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Riemann Hypothesis will be resolved by 2059?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Riemann hypothesis](https://www.claymath.org/sites/default/files/official_problem_description.pdf) is a conjecture stating that the nontrivial zeroes of the [Riemann zeta function](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riemann_zeta_function) \\( \\zeta(s) \\) all have real part equal to \\( 1/2 \\).\n\n***When will the Riemann Hypothesis be proved or disproved?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the date when the Clay Mathematics Institute announces that the Hypothesis has been proved or disproved according to rule 5.c of the [Millennium Prize Rules](https://www.claymath.org/sites/default/files/millennium_prize_rules_0.pdf), or when it is shown to be independent of the standard ZFC axioms.\n\nIn case the Clay Mathematics Institute is discontinued or no longer awards prizes for resolved Millennium Prize Problems, it resolves when admins decide that there is a consensus amongst relevant leading pure mathematicians about the Hypothesis being resolved.", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2059", "upper_75": "2106", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that The Economist will rank Russia as a Democracy in its Democracy Index by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2051", "upper_75": "2066", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that The Economist will rank Russia as a Democracy in its Democracy Index by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2051", "upper_75": "2066", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will close the Guantanamo Bay detention camp by 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next Millennium Prize Problem will be solved by 2032?", "desc": "*related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will the next Millennium Prize Problem be solved? [closed]](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1048/when-will-the-next-millennium-prize-problem-be-solved/)\n- [Will a Millennium Prize Problem be solved before 2028? [closed]](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/236/will-another-millennium-prize-problem-be-solved-in-the-next-decade/)\n- [If the Riemann Hypothesis is solved by 2100, will it be proven true?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6365/riemann-h-proved-true-if-settled-by-2100/)\n\n----\n\nThe Millennium Prize Problems consist of 7 profound, unsolved mathematical puzzles curated by the Clay Mathematics Institute of Cambridge, Massachusetts (CMI) in 2000. A prize fund of $7M has been allocated to award to winners, with $1M set aside for the solver(s) of each big problem.\n\nAll told, the set includes:\n\n* Yang–Mills and Mass Gap\n* Riemann Hypothesis\n* P vs NP Problem\n* Navier–Stokes Equation\n* Hodge Conjecture\n* Poincaré Conjecture\n* Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer Conjecture\n\nOf these monster math problems, only one has been officially solved--the Poincaré Conjecture, by [Grigori Perelman](https://medium.com/@phacks/how-grigori-perelman-solved-one-of-maths-greatest-mystery-89426275cb7). Per Medium:\n\n> [Perelman] is the first and only one to have solved one of the Millennium Problems and, according to many, this situation may not change for a long time. He is also the first and only to have declined both the Fields Medal and the Millennium prize. His justification highlights both his peculiar personality and his deep commitment to mathematics for their own sake: \"I'm not interested in money or fame. I don't want to be on display like an animal in a zoo. I'm not a hero of mathematics. I'm not even that successful; that is why I don't want to have everybody looking at me.\"\n\nAt some point, one assumes, at least one of the other problems will fall. (Other geniuses have already come close and [banged on the door](https://www.firstpost.com/world/is-math-problem-worth-us-1-million-solved-1360027.html) of success.)", "resc": "The question will be resolved on the date the Clay Mathematics Institute officially awards their next prize for one of the remaining 6 problems. If they do, the question will retroactively close to the date of the first media reports of a qualifying proof (including journal publications or preprints)", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Riemann Hypothesis will be resolved by 2059?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Riemann hypothesis](https://www.claymath.org/sites/default/files/official_problem_description.pdf) is a conjecture stating that the nontrivial zeroes of the [Riemann zeta function](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riemann_zeta_function) \\( \\zeta(s) \\) all have real part equal to \\( 1/2 \\).\n\n***When will the Riemann Hypothesis be proved or disproved?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the date when the Clay Mathematics Institute announces that the Hypothesis has been proved or disproved according to rule 5.c of the [Millennium Prize Rules](https://www.claymath.org/sites/default/files/millennium_prize_rules_0.pdf), or when it is shown to be independent of the standard ZFC axioms.\n\nIn case the Clay Mathematics Institute is discontinued or no longer awards prizes for resolved Millennium Prize Problems, it resolves when admins decide that there is a consensus amongst relevant leading pure mathematicians about the Hypothesis being resolved.", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2059", "upper_75": "2106", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that The Economist will rank Russia as a Democracy in its Democracy Index by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2051", "upper_75": "2066", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "In 2025, what is the chance that 35.5% of Australia's Liberal parliamentarians will be women?", "desc": "The Liberal Party of Australia is Australia's largest centre-right political party. In 2015, the Liberal Party federal executive set a target for 50% of its politicians to be women by 2025 [in all parliaments in Australia](https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/liberal-partys-2025-target-of-50pc-female-mps-is-failing-with-gender-progress-slow/news-story/f3a294361f44b0539986b14f61457d35). \n\nBetween 2015 and 2020, the share of Liberal parliamentarians who were women [increased from 22.4% to 25.4%](https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/liberal-partys-2025-target-of-50pc-female-mps-is-failing-with-gender-progress-slow/news-story/f3a294361f44b0539986b14f61457d35). \n\nIn Australia's largest centre-left party, the Australian Labor Party, 46% of parliamentarians are women. The Labor Party has had enforceable quotas for candidates since 1994. Interestingly, the Victorian branch of the Liberals has had a 50% quota for women in the party executive [since the party was founded in the 1940s](https://www.aph.gov.au/~/~/~/link.aspx?_id=240F755AE81F4EE18C62C028129D82E6&_z=z) but current Liberal Party culture is [mostly resistant to quotas](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-11-27/liberal-party-lack-of-women-costing-votes/9175150?nw=0).\n\nFor detailed statistics and a current snapshot of Liberal attitudes to gender representation, see Gender & Politics 2020 from the Liberal Party-affiliated Menzies Research Centre ([free download, but registration required](https://www.menziesrc.org/news-feed/gender-and-politics)).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of Liberal women MPs in state and federal governments, on January 1, 2026, at 00:00 AEDT. Government membership lists will be allowed as an official source.", "lower_25": "25.9", "median": "30.7", "upper_75": "35.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will close the Guantanamo Bay detention camp by 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the COVID-19 infection fatality rate will fall below 0.05% by Nov 22, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "With vaccines rolling out, there is now discussion of achieving \"herd immunity\" to COVID-19 in some locales, or even eventually globally. (Also, however, there are concerns that new variants may make this harder to achieve.)\n\nIt is, however, not necessary for COVID-19 to be eradicated for life to go more-or-less back to normal. For example, if the fatality rate for COVID-19 were to fall well below that of influenza, it would likely be considered just another (tragic) background disease worthy of attention but not widespread social or government action. This might happen by some combination widespread vaccination, or widespread disease-caused immunity, or evolution of the virus into a less virulent but more infectious strain that nonetheless confers some immunity to more virulent strains.\n\nIn this question we'll probe this possibility using the US COVID-19 infection fatality rate, with a threshold of 0.05%, half of the [generally quoted IFR for influenza](https://www.sciencealert.com/the-us-death-rate-for-covid-19-is-50-times-higher-than-the-flu). \n\n***When (if ever) will the US COVID-19 infection fatality rate fall below 0.05%?***\n\nThis will resolve if/when the [US IFR as calculated by COVID19 Projections](https://covid19-projections.com/estimating-true-infections-revisited/#implied-infection-fatality-rate-iifr) falls below 0.05%. (The late-2020 estimate from their method is ~0.5%.)\n\n[fine-print]\nIf data from COVID-19 Projections is not available another comparable data source using a very similar method may be used; if the data necessary to make such an estimate becomes unavailable (e.g. due to very little testing) prior to question resolving then question resolves as ambiguous.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "Nov 22, 2025", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 22, 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 22, 2025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will close the Guantanamo Bay detention camp by 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If the federal minimum wage is $10 or less at the end of 2024, what is the chance that the average employment-to-population ratio will be 59.70 in 2025?", "desc": "In economics, the supply and demand model predicts that a minimum wage will cause unemployment if it is set above the equilibrium wage. The minimum wage is a [price floor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_floor) on labor, and the S+D model predicts that binding price floors lead to surpluses, with more willing sellers than buyers.\n\nHowever, the recent empirical results on minimum wage effects have been mixed, and the issue appears to be contentious among economists. In the U.S., the results of the 2020 election have put the minimum wage issue back on the table, and some increase appears likely per some other questions:\n\n* [Will the federal minimum wage increase in the United States before 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3631/will-the-federal-minimum-wage-increase-in-the-united-states-before-2025/) (currently at median of 89%).\n* [If Joe Biden becomes president, what will the federal minimum wage be at the end of 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) (roughly 95% of the distribution is over the current wage of $7.25).\n\nThe University of Chicago's [Initiative on Global Markets](https://www.igmchicago.org/) surveys panels of top economists on issues of public policy. IGM recently conducted two surveys on the minimum wage: one for the [U.S.](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/the-us-minimum-wage/) and one for [Europe](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/the-us-minimum-wage-2/). The distribution of opinion on employment effects was broad and also differed substantially between the continents. In the U.S., 45% agreed or strongly agreed that an increase from $7.25 to $15 would reduce employment, 33% were uncertain, and 14% disagreed. In Europe, 23% agreed, 40% were uncertain, and 15% disagreed.\n\nLet's exploit the possibility of an upcoming minimum wage increase to get a handle on the truth. [This question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) gives us a range of possible minimum wage levels that could be set at the end of 2024. Roughly speaking, the 25th percentile is $10 and the 75th percentile is $15. We can use questions of the form, *if the federal minimum wage is in [X, Y], what will the employment-to-population ratio be in 2025?*, and compare how the employment-to-population ratio is expected to vary with minimum wage level. The premises we will want to compare are:\n\n* If the minimum wage is $10 or less (inclusive) — this question.\n* [If the minimum wage is $15 or greater (inclusive)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6626/minimum-wage-impact-on-employment-15/).\n* For completeness, [if the minimum wage is $10-$15 (exclusive)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6627/minimum-wage-impact-on-employment-10-15/).", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, all dollar figures are given in nominal terms.\n\n### Closing condition\n\nThis question closes (retroactively) to the earliest of:\n\n1. The date when any of the three premises mentioned above falls to < 10% on [the minimum wage level question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/). That is, the first date when the cumulative probability between [0, 10] is less than 10%, or between (10, 15) is less than 10%, or between [15, ∞) is less than 10%.\n\n2. The resolution date of the [minimum wage level question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) (the date when it actually resolves).\n\n3. The closing date stated on this question.\n\nThe reason for this strange closing condition is that the purpose of these questions is to compare outcomes across counterfactual scenarios. In order for the questions to be worth predicting on, they need to have some reasonable probability of resolving unambiguously. So we want to close the questions once we have high confidence which scenario we are in.\n\n### Resolution details\n\nThe resolution criteria require evaluating two measures: the minimum wage at the end of 2024, and the average employment-to-population ratio over 2025.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, \"minimum wage\" refers to the federal minimum wage for covered nonexempt employees. The minimum wage will be decided by the [US Department of Labor](https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimumwage) website. This question is about the active minimum wage at the end of 2024, so if a bill is passed in 2024 that mandates a certain minimum wage in 2025, that will not be considered. If that website does not give information on the minimum wage (or lack thereof), this question will resolve based on credible media reports.\n\nIf there is no minimum wage, the minimum wage will be considered to be $0.\n\nIf the minimum wage is greater than $10.00 at end of 2024, this question resolves ambiguous.\n\nFor the employment-to-population ratio, we will use the BLS figures as summarized by the [FRED EMRATIO series](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EMRATIO), averaged over the year of 2025 (you can see this by clicking on the gear icon on the top right, changing the frequency to Annual, and using the Average aggregation method). If this method no longer works, we will resolve by aggregating over the BLS monthly reports manually", "lower_25": "58.93", "median": "59.70", "upper_75": "60.50", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the COVID-19 infection fatality rate will fall below 0.05% by Nov 22, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "With vaccines rolling out, there is now discussion of achieving \"herd immunity\" to COVID-19 in some locales, or even eventually globally. (Also, however, there are concerns that new variants may make this harder to achieve.)\n\nIt is, however, not necessary for COVID-19 to be eradicated for life to go more-or-less back to normal. For example, if the fatality rate for COVID-19 were to fall well below that of influenza, it would likely be considered just another (tragic) background disease worthy of attention but not widespread social or government action. This might happen by some combination widespread vaccination, or widespread disease-caused immunity, or evolution of the virus into a less virulent but more infectious strain that nonetheless confers some immunity to more virulent strains.\n\nIn this question we'll probe this possibility using the US COVID-19 infection fatality rate, with a threshold of 0.05%, half of the [generally quoted IFR for influenza](https://www.sciencealert.com/the-us-death-rate-for-covid-19-is-50-times-higher-than-the-flu). \n\n***When (if ever) will the US COVID-19 infection fatality rate fall below 0.05%?***\n\nThis will resolve if/when the [US IFR as calculated by COVID19 Projections](https://covid19-projections.com/estimating-true-infections-revisited/#implied-infection-fatality-rate-iifr) falls below 0.05%. (The late-2020 estimate from their method is ~0.5%.)\n\n[fine-print]\nIf data from COVID-19 Projections is not available another comparable data source using a very similar method may be used; if the data necessary to make such an estimate becomes unavailable (e.g. due to very little testing) prior to question resolving then question resolves as ambiguous.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "Nov 22, 2025", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 22, 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 22, 2025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Alexander Lukashenko will leave power in Belarus by Mar 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 2025", "median": "Mar 2027", "upper_75": "Dec 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If the federal minimum wage is $10 or less at the end of 2024, what is the chance that the average employment-to-population ratio will be 59.70 in 2025?", "desc": "In economics, the supply and demand model predicts that a minimum wage will cause unemployment if it is set above the equilibrium wage. The minimum wage is a [price floor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_floor) on labor, and the S+D model predicts that binding price floors lead to surpluses, with more willing sellers than buyers.\n\nHowever, the recent empirical results on minimum wage effects have been mixed, and the issue appears to be contentious among economists. In the U.S., the results of the 2020 election have put the minimum wage issue back on the table, and some increase appears likely per some other questions:\n\n* [Will the federal minimum wage increase in the United States before 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3631/will-the-federal-minimum-wage-increase-in-the-united-states-before-2025/) (currently at median of 89%).\n* [If Joe Biden becomes president, what will the federal minimum wage be at the end of 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) (roughly 95% of the distribution is over the current wage of $7.25).\n\nThe University of Chicago's [Initiative on Global Markets](https://www.igmchicago.org/) surveys panels of top economists on issues of public policy. IGM recently conducted two surveys on the minimum wage: one for the [U.S.](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/the-us-minimum-wage/) and one for [Europe](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/the-us-minimum-wage-2/). The distribution of opinion on employment effects was broad and also differed substantially between the continents. In the U.S., 45% agreed or strongly agreed that an increase from $7.25 to $15 would reduce employment, 33% were uncertain, and 14% disagreed. In Europe, 23% agreed, 40% were uncertain, and 15% disagreed.\n\nLet's exploit the possibility of an upcoming minimum wage increase to get a handle on the truth. [This question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) gives us a range of possible minimum wage levels that could be set at the end of 2024. Roughly speaking, the 25th percentile is $10 and the 75th percentile is $15. We can use questions of the form, *if the federal minimum wage is in [X, Y], what will the employment-to-population ratio be in 2025?*, and compare how the employment-to-population ratio is expected to vary with minimum wage level. The premises we will want to compare are:\n\n* If the minimum wage is $10 or less (inclusive) — this question.\n* [If the minimum wage is $15 or greater (inclusive)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6626/minimum-wage-impact-on-employment-15/).\n* For completeness, [if the minimum wage is $10-$15 (exclusive)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6627/minimum-wage-impact-on-employment-10-15/).", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, all dollar figures are given in nominal terms.\n\n### Closing condition\n\nThis question closes (retroactively) to the earliest of:\n\n1. The date when any of the three premises mentioned above falls to < 10% on [the minimum wage level question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/). That is, the first date when the cumulative probability between [0, 10] is less than 10%, or between (10, 15) is less than 10%, or between [15, ∞) is less than 10%.\n\n2. The resolution date of the [minimum wage level question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) (the date when it actually resolves).\n\n3. The closing date stated on this question.\n\nThe reason for this strange closing condition is that the purpose of these questions is to compare outcomes across counterfactual scenarios. In order for the questions to be worth predicting on, they need to have some reasonable probability of resolving unambiguously. So we want to close the questions once we have high confidence which scenario we are in.\n\n### Resolution details\n\nThe resolution criteria require evaluating two measures: the minimum wage at the end of 2024, and the average employment-to-population ratio over 2025.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, \"minimum wage\" refers to the federal minimum wage for covered nonexempt employees. The minimum wage will be decided by the [US Department of Labor](https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimumwage) website. This question is about the active minimum wage at the end of 2024, so if a bill is passed in 2024 that mandates a certain minimum wage in 2025, that will not be considered. If that website does not give information on the minimum wage (or lack thereof), this question will resolve based on credible media reports.\n\nIf there is no minimum wage, the minimum wage will be considered to be $0.\n\nIf the minimum wage is greater than $10.00 at end of 2024, this question resolves ambiguous.\n\nFor the employment-to-population ratio, we will use the BLS figures as summarized by the [FRED EMRATIO series](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EMRATIO), averaged over the year of 2025 (you can see this by clicking on the gear icon on the top right, changing the frequency to Annual, and using the Average aggregation method). If this method no longer works, we will resolve by aggregating over the BLS monthly reports manually", "lower_25": "58.93", "median": "59.70", "upper_75": "60.50", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the COVID-19 infection fatality rate will fall below 0.05% by Nov 22, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "With vaccines rolling out, there is now discussion of achieving \"herd immunity\" to COVID-19 in some locales, or even eventually globally. (Also, however, there are concerns that new variants may make this harder to achieve.)\n\nIt is, however, not necessary for COVID-19 to be eradicated for life to go more-or-less back to normal. For example, if the fatality rate for COVID-19 were to fall well below that of influenza, it would likely be considered just another (tragic) background disease worthy of attention but not widespread social or government action. This might happen by some combination widespread vaccination, or widespread disease-caused immunity, or evolution of the virus into a less virulent but more infectious strain that nonetheless confers some immunity to more virulent strains.\n\nIn this question we'll probe this possibility using the US COVID-19 infection fatality rate, with a threshold of 0.05%, half of the [generally quoted IFR for influenza](https://www.sciencealert.com/the-us-death-rate-for-covid-19-is-50-times-higher-than-the-flu). \n\n***When (if ever) will the US COVID-19 infection fatality rate fall below 0.05%?***\n\nThis will resolve if/when the [US IFR as calculated by COVID19 Projections](https://covid19-projections.com/estimating-true-infections-revisited/#implied-infection-fatality-rate-iifr) falls below 0.05%. (The late-2020 estimate from their method is ~0.5%.)\n\n[fine-print]\nIf data from COVID-19 Projections is not available another comparable data source using a very similar method may be used; if the data necessary to make such an estimate becomes unavailable (e.g. due to very little testing) prior to question resolving then question resolves as ambiguous.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "Nov 22, 2025", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 22, 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 22, 2025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Alexander Lukashenko will leave power in Belarus by Mar 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 2025", "median": "Mar 2027", "upper_75": "Dec 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the sum of the performance (in exaFLOPS) of the top 500 supercomputers will be 142 by June 2030?", "desc": "In the seven decades since the invention of the [point-contact transistor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Point-contact_transistor) at Bell Labs, relentless progress in the development of semiconductor devices — Moore's law — has been achieved despite [regular warnings](https://www.nature.com/news/the-chips-are-down-for-moore-s-law-1.19338) from industry observers about impending limits._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe [TOP500 project](https://www.top500.org/lists/top500/) collects and ranks system performance metrics of the most powerful non-distributed computer systems in the world. The project was started in 1993 and publishes an updated list of the supercomputers twice a year. The first of these updates always coincides with the [International Supercomputing Conference](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISC_High_Performance) in June, and the second is presented at the [ACM/IEEE Supercomputing Conference](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ACM/IEEE_Supercomputing_Conference) in November._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe TOP500 ranks high-performance computing (HPC) by recording how fast a computer system solves a dense n by n system of linear equations in double precision (64 bits) arithmetic on distributed-memory computers ([TOP500, 2019](https://www.top500.org/project/linpack/)). This is an implementation of the High Performance Computing [Linpack Benchmark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LINPACK_benchmarks)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nHistorical data for TOP500 can [be found here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18Mha2f9RIQCAAg41vm_UkP524pt59vvD7TcjHZ1SHXw/edit?usp=sharing). Please make a copy by clicking \"file\" and then \"make a copy\" if you wish to edit it.", "resc": "The following sub-questions will resolve as the sum of performance (at Rmax) in exaFLOPS (1 exaFLOP = \\(10^{18}\\) FLOPS) of all supercomputers listed by [TOP500](https://www.top500.org/lists/top500/) for the respective date.", "lower_25": "39.8", "median": "78.3", "upper_75": "142", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If the federal minimum wage is $10 or less at the end of 2024, what is the chance that the average employment-to-population ratio will be 59.70 in 2025?", "desc": "In economics, the supply and demand model predicts that a minimum wage will cause unemployment if it is set above the equilibrium wage. The minimum wage is a [price floor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_floor) on labor, and the S+D model predicts that binding price floors lead to surpluses, with more willing sellers than buyers.\n\nHowever, the recent empirical results on minimum wage effects have been mixed, and the issue appears to be contentious among economists. In the U.S., the results of the 2020 election have put the minimum wage issue back on the table, and some increase appears likely per some other questions:\n\n* [Will the federal minimum wage increase in the United States before 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3631/will-the-federal-minimum-wage-increase-in-the-united-states-before-2025/) (currently at median of 89%).\n* [If Joe Biden becomes president, what will the federal minimum wage be at the end of 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) (roughly 95% of the distribution is over the current wage of $7.25).\n\nThe University of Chicago's [Initiative on Global Markets](https://www.igmchicago.org/) surveys panels of top economists on issues of public policy. IGM recently conducted two surveys on the minimum wage: one for the [U.S.](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/the-us-minimum-wage/) and one for [Europe](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/the-us-minimum-wage-2/). The distribution of opinion on employment effects was broad and also differed substantially between the continents. In the U.S., 45% agreed or strongly agreed that an increase from $7.25 to $15 would reduce employment, 33% were uncertain, and 14% disagreed. In Europe, 23% agreed, 40% were uncertain, and 15% disagreed.\n\nLet's exploit the possibility of an upcoming minimum wage increase to get a handle on the truth. [This question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) gives us a range of possible minimum wage levels that could be set at the end of 2024. Roughly speaking, the 25th percentile is $10 and the 75th percentile is $15. We can use questions of the form, *if the federal minimum wage is in [X, Y], what will the employment-to-population ratio be in 2025?*, and compare how the employment-to-population ratio is expected to vary with minimum wage level. The premises we will want to compare are:\n\n* If the minimum wage is $10 or less (inclusive) — this question.\n* [If the minimum wage is $15 or greater (inclusive)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6626/minimum-wage-impact-on-employment-15/).\n* For completeness, [if the minimum wage is $10-$15 (exclusive)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6627/minimum-wage-impact-on-employment-10-15/).", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, all dollar figures are given in nominal terms.\n\n### Closing condition\n\nThis question closes (retroactively) to the earliest of:\n\n1. The date when any of the three premises mentioned above falls to < 10% on [the minimum wage level question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/). That is, the first date when the cumulative probability between [0, 10] is less than 10%, or between (10, 15) is less than 10%, or between [15, ∞) is less than 10%.\n\n2. The resolution date of the [minimum wage level question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) (the date when it actually resolves).\n\n3. The closing date stated on this question.\n\nThe reason for this strange closing condition is that the purpose of these questions is to compare outcomes across counterfactual scenarios. In order for the questions to be worth predicting on, they need to have some reasonable probability of resolving unambiguously. So we want to close the questions once we have high confidence which scenario we are in.\n\n### Resolution details\n\nThe resolution criteria require evaluating two measures: the minimum wage at the end of 2024, and the average employment-to-population ratio over 2025.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, \"minimum wage\" refers to the federal minimum wage for covered nonexempt employees. The minimum wage will be decided by the [US Department of Labor](https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimumwage) website. This question is about the active minimum wage at the end of 2024, so if a bill is passed in 2024 that mandates a certain minimum wage in 2025, that will not be considered. If that website does not give information on the minimum wage (or lack thereof), this question will resolve based on credible media reports.\n\nIf there is no minimum wage, the minimum wage will be considered to be $0.\n\nIf the minimum wage is greater than $10.00 at end of 2024, this question resolves ambiguous.\n\nFor the employment-to-population ratio, we will use the BLS figures as summarized by the [FRED EMRATIO series](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EMRATIO), averaged over the year of 2025 (you can see this by clicking on the gear icon on the top right, changing the frequency to Annual, and using the Average aggregation method). If this method no longer works, we will resolve by aggregating over the BLS monthly reports manually", "lower_25": "58.93", "median": "59.70", "upper_75": "60.50", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum compute (in petaFLOPS-days) ever used in training an AI experiment by January 2026 will be 6.41M?", "desc": "Various figures in AI research have noted the importance of computer hardware for AI progress ([LeCun et al., 2015](https://www.nature.com/articles/nature14539); [Schmidhuber, 2015](https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/DeepLearningInNeuralNetworksOverview.JSchmidhuber2015.pdf)). Exponential improvements in the computing power available for a given price, and the development of particular technologies such as graphics processing units (GPUs), have accelerated progress in multiple AI domains ([Brundage, 2016](https://www.milesbrundage.com/uploads/2/1/6/8/21681226/modelingprogressinai.pdf)). \n\nRecent progress in has been accompanied by the use of increasing amounts of computation. [According to OpenAI](https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/), since 2012, the amount of compute used in the largest AI training runs has been increasing exponentially with a 3.5 month doubling time. This trend sustained by both the continued progress in hardware performance, and increased spending on AI experiments [(AI Impacts, 2018)](https://aiimpacts.org/interpreting-ai-compute-trends/).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as a credible estimate of the cost of the most compute used in a \"single AI experiment\" as of the specified date of the sub-question.\n\nJan-2022 will be evaluated on Jan 14, 2022; Feb-2023 on Feb 14, 2023; Jan-2026 on Jan 1, 2026; and Jan 2031 on Jan 1, 2031.\n\nBy \"single AI experiment\" we mean an effort to train a set of models running on a set of \"architectures\". The effort should be completed within a determinate amount of time (the experiment must not have an open-ended time frame). For our purposes, the publication of the principal results of the effort ends the experiment. \n\nBy \"architectures\" we mean the systems described in the relevant publications that define how inputs signal or percept sequences are to be mapped on various outputs. These outputs might be probability distributions over actions (in the case of a policy network), representations over expected value or reward of futures states (in the case of value networks) or descriptions of futures states.\n\n**Methodology**\n\nThe following methodologies that were used by OpenAI [(Amodei et al., 2018)](https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/) shall produce our estimates. Method 1: \n\n> When we had enough information, we directly counted the number of FLOPS (adds and multiplies) in the described architecture per training example and multiplied by the total number of forward and backward passes during training. \n\nIf there is not enough information to produce a reliable estimate using method 1, we shall use method 2:\n\n> When we didn't have enough information to directly count FLOPs, we looked GPU training time and total number of GPUs used and assumed a utilization efficiency (usually 0.33). For the majority of the papers we were able to use the first method, but for a significant minority we relied on the second, and we computed both whenever possible as a consistency check. In the majority of cases we also confirmed with the authors. The calculations are not intended to be precise but we aim to be correct within a factor 2-3.", "lower_25": "1.02M", "median": "6.41M", "upper_75": "47.7M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum compute (in petaFLOPS-days) ever used in training an AI experiment by January 2026 will be 6.41M?", "desc": "Various figures in AI research have noted the importance of computer hardware for AI progress ([LeCun et al., 2015](https://www.nature.com/articles/nature14539); [Schmidhuber, 2015](https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/DeepLearningInNeuralNetworksOverview.JSchmidhuber2015.pdf)). Exponential improvements in the computing power available for a given price, and the development of particular technologies such as graphics processing units (GPUs), have accelerated progress in multiple AI domains ([Brundage, 2016](https://www.milesbrundage.com/uploads/2/1/6/8/21681226/modelingprogressinai.pdf)). \n\nRecent progress in has been accompanied by the use of increasing amounts of computation. [According to OpenAI](https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/), since 2012, the amount of compute used in the largest AI training runs has been increasing exponentially with a 3.5 month doubling time. This trend sustained by both the continued progress in hardware performance, and increased spending on AI experiments [(AI Impacts, 2018)](https://aiimpacts.org/interpreting-ai-compute-trends/).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as a credible estimate of the cost of the most compute used in a \"single AI experiment\" as of the specified date of the sub-question.\n\nJan-2022 will be evaluated on Jan 14, 2022; Feb-2023 on Feb 14, 2023; Jan-2026 on Jan 1, 2026; and Jan 2031 on Jan 1, 2031.\n\nBy \"single AI experiment\" we mean an effort to train a set of models running on a set of \"architectures\". The effort should be completed within a determinate amount of time (the experiment must not have an open-ended time frame). For our purposes, the publication of the principal results of the effort ends the experiment. \n\nBy \"architectures\" we mean the systems described in the relevant publications that define how inputs signal or percept sequences are to be mapped on various outputs. These outputs might be probability distributions over actions (in the case of a policy network), representations over expected value or reward of futures states (in the case of value networks) or descriptions of futures states.\n\n**Methodology**\n\nThe following methodologies that were used by OpenAI [(Amodei et al., 2018)](https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/) shall produce our estimates. Method 1: \n\n> When we had enough information, we directly counted the number of FLOPS (adds and multiplies) in the described architecture per training example and multiplied by the total number of forward and backward passes during training. \n\nIf there is not enough information to produce a reliable estimate using method 1, we shall use method 2:\n\n> When we didn't have enough information to directly count FLOPs, we looked GPU training time and total number of GPUs used and assumed a utilization efficiency (usually 0.33). For the majority of the papers we were able to use the first method, but for a significant minority we relied on the second, and we computed both whenever possible as a consistency check. In the majority of cases we also confirmed with the authors. The calculations are not intended to be precise but we aim to be correct within a factor 2-3.", "lower_25": "1.02M", "median": "6.41M", "upper_75": "47.7M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Alexander Lukashenko will leave power in Belarus by Mar 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 2025", "median": "Mar 2027", "upper_75": "Dec 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum compute (in petaFLOPS-days) ever used in training an AI experiment by January 2026 will be 6.41M?", "desc": "Various figures in AI research have noted the importance of computer hardware for AI progress ([LeCun et al., 2015](https://www.nature.com/articles/nature14539); [Schmidhuber, 2015](https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/DeepLearningInNeuralNetworksOverview.JSchmidhuber2015.pdf)). Exponential improvements in the computing power available for a given price, and the development of particular technologies such as graphics processing units (GPUs), have accelerated progress in multiple AI domains ([Brundage, 2016](https://www.milesbrundage.com/uploads/2/1/6/8/21681226/modelingprogressinai.pdf)). \n\nRecent progress in has been accompanied by the use of increasing amounts of computation. [According to OpenAI](https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/), since 2012, the amount of compute used in the largest AI training runs has been increasing exponentially with a 3.5 month doubling time. This trend sustained by both the continued progress in hardware performance, and increased spending on AI experiments [(AI Impacts, 2018)](https://aiimpacts.org/interpreting-ai-compute-trends/).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as a credible estimate of the cost of the most compute used in a \"single AI experiment\" as of the specified date of the sub-question.\n\nJan-2022 will be evaluated on Jan 14, 2022; Feb-2023 on Feb 14, 2023; Jan-2026 on Jan 1, 2026; and Jan 2031 on Jan 1, 2031.\n\nBy \"single AI experiment\" we mean an effort to train a set of models running on a set of \"architectures\". The effort should be completed within a determinate amount of time (the experiment must not have an open-ended time frame). For our purposes, the publication of the principal results of the effort ends the experiment. \n\nBy \"architectures\" we mean the systems described in the relevant publications that define how inputs signal or percept sequences are to be mapped on various outputs. These outputs might be probability distributions over actions (in the case of a policy network), representations over expected value or reward of futures states (in the case of value networks) or descriptions of futures states.\n\n**Methodology**\n\nThe following methodologies that were used by OpenAI [(Amodei et al., 2018)](https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/) shall produce our estimates. Method 1: \n\n> When we had enough information, we directly counted the number of FLOPS (adds and multiplies) in the described architecture per training example and multiplied by the total number of forward and backward passes during training. \n\nIf there is not enough information to produce a reliable estimate using method 1, we shall use method 2:\n\n> When we didn't have enough information to directly count FLOPs, we looked GPU training time and total number of GPUs used and assumed a utilization efficiency (usually 0.33). For the majority of the papers we were able to use the first method, but for a significant minority we relied on the second, and we computed both whenever possible as a consistency check. In the majority of cases we also confirmed with the authors. The calculations are not intended to be precise but we aim to be correct within a factor 2-3.", "lower_25": "1.02M", "median": "6.41M", "upper_75": "47.7M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the sum of the performance (in exaFLOPS) of the top 500 supercomputers will be 142 by June 2030?", "desc": "In the seven decades since the invention of the [point-contact transistor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Point-contact_transistor) at Bell Labs, relentless progress in the development of semiconductor devices — Moore's law — has been achieved despite [regular warnings](https://www.nature.com/news/the-chips-are-down-for-moore-s-law-1.19338) from industry observers about impending limits._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe [TOP500 project](https://www.top500.org/lists/top500/) collects and ranks system performance metrics of the most powerful non-distributed computer systems in the world. The project was started in 1993 and publishes an updated list of the supercomputers twice a year. The first of these updates always coincides with the [International Supercomputing Conference](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISC_High_Performance) in June, and the second is presented at the [ACM/IEEE Supercomputing Conference](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ACM/IEEE_Supercomputing_Conference) in November._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe TOP500 ranks high-performance computing (HPC) by recording how fast a computer system solves a dense n by n system of linear equations in double precision (64 bits) arithmetic on distributed-memory computers ([TOP500, 2019](https://www.top500.org/project/linpack/)). This is an implementation of the High Performance Computing [Linpack Benchmark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LINPACK_benchmarks)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nHistorical data for TOP500 can [be found here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18Mha2f9RIQCAAg41vm_UkP524pt59vvD7TcjHZ1SHXw/edit?usp=sharing). Please make a copy by clicking \"file\" and then \"make a copy\" if you wish to edit it.", "resc": "The following sub-questions will resolve as the sum of performance (at Rmax) in exaFLOPS (1 exaFLOP = \\(10^{18}\\) FLOPS) of all supercomputers listed by [TOP500](https://www.top500.org/lists/top500/) for the respective date.", "lower_25": "39.8", "median": "78.3", "upper_75": "142", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art performance on one-shot image classification on miniImageNet will be 93.81% on 2026-12-14, amongst models not trained on extra data?", "desc": "Image Classification is the task of identifying an image by assigning to it a specific label. Typically, Image Classification refers to images in which only one object appears and is analysed. In contrast, object detection involves both classification and localisation tasks, and is used to analyse more realistic cases in which multiple objects may exist in an image.\n\nThe miniImageNet dataset contains 100 classes randomly chosen from [ImageNet](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1409.0575.pdf) and 600 images of size 84×84 pixels per class. It is split into 64 base classes, 16 validation classes and 20 novel classes.\n\nAs of writing this question, the state-of-the-art model for is ResNeSt-200 PT+MAP [(Hu et al., 2020)](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.03806v2.pdf), which achieves an accuracy of 82.92.\n\nAn excellent reference for tracking state-of-the-art models is [PapersWithCode](https://paperswithcode.com/sota/few-shot-image-classification-on-mini-1), which tracks performance data of ML models.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest level of performance achieved on miniImageNet up until 2026-12-14, 11:59PM GMT amongst models trained on only the miniImageNet's data—no extra training data may be used.", "lower_25": "89.02", "median": "91.25", "upper_75": "93.81", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art performance on one-shot image classification on miniImageNet will be 93.81% on 2026-12-14, amongst models not trained on extra data?", "desc": "Image Classification is the task of identifying an image by assigning to it a specific label. Typically, Image Classification refers to images in which only one object appears and is analysed. In contrast, object detection involves both classification and localisation tasks, and is used to analyse more realistic cases in which multiple objects may exist in an image.\n\nThe miniImageNet dataset contains 100 classes randomly chosen from [ImageNet](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1409.0575.pdf) and 600 images of size 84×84 pixels per class. It is split into 64 base classes, 16 validation classes and 20 novel classes.\n\nAs of writing this question, the state-of-the-art model for is ResNeSt-200 PT+MAP [(Hu et al., 2020)](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.03806v2.pdf), which achieves an accuracy of 82.92.\n\nAn excellent reference for tracking state-of-the-art models is [PapersWithCode](https://paperswithcode.com/sota/few-shot-image-classification-on-mini-1), which tracks performance data of ML models.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest level of performance achieved on miniImageNet up until 2026-12-14, 11:59PM GMT amongst models trained on only the miniImageNet's data—no extra training data may be used.", "lower_25": "89.02", "median": "91.25", "upper_75": "93.81", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the sum of the performance (in exaFLOPS) of the top 500 supercomputers will be 142 by June 2030?", "desc": "In the seven decades since the invention of the [point-contact transistor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Point-contact_transistor) at Bell Labs, relentless progress in the development of semiconductor devices — Moore's law — has been achieved despite [regular warnings](https://www.nature.com/news/the-chips-are-down-for-moore-s-law-1.19338) from industry observers about impending limits._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe [TOP500 project](https://www.top500.org/lists/top500/) collects and ranks system performance metrics of the most powerful non-distributed computer systems in the world. The project was started in 1993 and publishes an updated list of the supercomputers twice a year. The first of these updates always coincides with the [International Supercomputing Conference](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISC_High_Performance) in June, and the second is presented at the [ACM/IEEE Supercomputing Conference](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ACM/IEEE_Supercomputing_Conference) in November._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe TOP500 ranks high-performance computing (HPC) by recording how fast a computer system solves a dense n by n system of linear equations in double precision (64 bits) arithmetic on distributed-memory computers ([TOP500, 2019](https://www.top500.org/project/linpack/)). This is an implementation of the High Performance Computing [Linpack Benchmark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LINPACK_benchmarks)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nHistorical data for TOP500 can [be found here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18Mha2f9RIQCAAg41vm_UkP524pt59vvD7TcjHZ1SHXw/edit?usp=sharing). Please make a copy by clicking \"file\" and then \"make a copy\" if you wish to edit it.", "resc": "The following sub-questions will resolve as the sum of performance (at Rmax) in exaFLOPS (1 exaFLOP = \\(10^{18}\\) FLOPS) of all supercomputers listed by [TOP500](https://www.top500.org/lists/top500/) for the respective date.", "lower_25": "39.8", "median": "78.3", "upper_75": "142", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best available GPU on the following dates (Jan-2030) will have an average top price performance of 234 G3D Mark /$?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "157", "median": "234", "upper_75": "355", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How much will the average degree of automation change for key US professions from December 2020 to January 2030? (7.47)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "7.47", "median": "22.30", "upper_75": "38.50", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How much will the average degree of automation change for key US professions from December 2020 to January 2030? (7.47)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "7.47", "median": "22.30", "upper_75": "38.50", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How much will the average degree of automation change for key US professions from December 2020 to January 2030? (7.47)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "7.47", "median": "22.30", "upper_75": "38.50", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best available GPU on the following dates (Jan-2030) will have an average top price performance of 234 G3D Mark /$?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "157", "median": "234", "upper_75": "355", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 50.7k Computer and Information Research Scientists in the United States in January 1, 2030?", "desc": "One important driver of progress in AI, as well as potential bottleneck for the development and diffusion of AI systems, is the number of professionals with the relevant skills. \n\nIn the United States, there are currently around 32,700 Computer and Information Research Scientists according to the [Bureau of Labour Statistics](https://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-information-technology/computer-and-information-research-scientists.htm).", "resc": "This question resolves as the \"Number of jobs\" for the profession \"Computer and Information Research Scientists\" according to the [Bureau of Labour Statistics](https://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-information-technology/computer-and-information-research-scientists.htm) on January 1 2030 at 11:59PM GMT", "lower_25": "37.2k", "median": "43.1k", "upper_75": "50.7k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art performance on one-shot image classification on miniImageNet will be 93.81% on 2026-12-14, amongst models not trained on extra data?", "desc": "Image Classification is the task of identifying an image by assigning to it a specific label. Typically, Image Classification refers to images in which only one object appears and is analysed. In contrast, object detection involves both classification and localisation tasks, and is used to analyse more realistic cases in which multiple objects may exist in an image.\n\nThe miniImageNet dataset contains 100 classes randomly chosen from [ImageNet](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1409.0575.pdf) and 600 images of size 84×84 pixels per class. It is split into 64 base classes, 16 validation classes and 20 novel classes.\n\nAs of writing this question, the state-of-the-art model for is ResNeSt-200 PT+MAP [(Hu et al., 2020)](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.03806v2.pdf), which achieves an accuracy of 82.92.\n\nAn excellent reference for tracking state-of-the-art models is [PapersWithCode](https://paperswithcode.com/sota/few-shot-image-classification-on-mini-1), which tracks performance data of ML models.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest level of performance achieved on miniImageNet up until 2026-12-14, 11:59PM GMT amongst models trained on only the miniImageNet's data—no extra training data may be used.", "lower_25": "89.02", "median": "91.25", "upper_75": "93.81", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 50.7k Computer and Information Research Scientists in the United States in January 1, 2030?", "desc": "One important driver of progress in AI, as well as potential bottleneck for the development and diffusion of AI systems, is the number of professionals with the relevant skills. \n\nIn the United States, there are currently around 32,700 Computer and Information Research Scientists according to the [Bureau of Labour Statistics](https://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-information-technology/computer-and-information-research-scientists.htm).", "resc": "This question resolves as the \"Number of jobs\" for the profession \"Computer and Information Research Scientists\" according to the [Bureau of Labour Statistics](https://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-information-technology/computer-and-information-research-scientists.htm) on January 1 2030 at 11:59PM GMT", "lower_25": "37.2k", "median": "43.1k", "upper_75": "50.7k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best available GPU on the following dates (Jan-2030) will have an average top price performance of 234 G3D Mark /$?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "157", "median": "234", "upper_75": "355", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Alphabet Inc.'s market capitalisation will be 3.36 trillion USD at market close on January 1, 2030?", "desc": "Alphabet Inc. is he parent company of Google. As of December 5, 2020, Alphabet Inc.'s market capitalisation was $1.235tr.\n\nGoogle has a few AI labs. Amongst these are [Google Brain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Brain) and [DeepMind](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DeepMind). Many of their products and services (such as their search engine, their self-driving car subsidiary) are much infused by the latest innovations in machine learning.", "resc": "This question resolves as Alphabet Inc.'s market capitalisation at market close on January 1, 2030 in trillions of 2019USD, according to [Yahoo Finance](https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/GOOG/) in 2019 USD.", "lower_25": "1.94", "median": "3.36", "upper_75": "5.58", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.97k e-prints on multi-modal learning will be published on ArXiv over the 2021-02-14 to 2031-02-14 period?", "desc": "[arXiv](arxiv.org) is a repository of electronic preprints approved for posting after moderation, but not full peer review. It consists of scientific papers in the fields of mathematics, physics, astronomy, electrical engineering, computer science, quantitative biology, statistics, mathematical finance and economics, which can be accessed online. \n\nMany machine learning articles will be posted on arXiv before publication. In theoretical computer science and machine learning, over 60% of published papers have arXiv e-prints [(Sutton et al. 2017)](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1710.05225.pdf).\n\nMultimodal machine learning aims to build models that can process and relate information from multiple modalities (including linguistic, acoustic and visual signals). Multimodal machine learning enables a wide range of applications: from audio-visual speech recognition to image captioning [(Baltrusaitis et al., 2017)](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.09406.pdf).", "resc": "This question resolves as the total number of e-prints on multi-modal ML systems will be published on arXiv over the 2021-12-14 to 2031-02-14 period (inclusive), as per the e-print's \"original submission date\".\n\n**Details of the search query**\n\nFor the purpose of this question e-prints published over the 2021-12-14 to 2031-02-14 period (inclusive) under Computer Science that contain the following keywords:\n\n> \"Multimodal Machine Learning”, \"multimodal representation”, “multimodal representation learning\", “multimodal AI”, “multimodal artificial intelligence”, “multimodal feature learning”, “multimodal observations”, “Multimodal deep Learning”, “Multimodal reinforcement learning”, “multimodal fusion”, Multi-modal Machine Learning”, Multi-modal Machine Learning”, “multi-modal representation learning”, “multi-modal AI”, “multi-modal artificial intelligence”, “multi-modal feature learning”, “multi-modal observations”, “Multi-modal deep Learning”, “Multi-modal reinforcement learning”, “multi-modal fusion”, “cross-modal learning”, “multi-modality learning”, “multimodality learning\"\n\nThe query should *include* cross-listed papers (papers listed on other subjects besides Computer Science). The query may be [executed here](https://arxiv.org/search/advanced?terms-0-operator=AND&terms-0-term=%22Multimodal+Machine+Learning%22&terms-0-field=all&terms-1-operator=OR&terms-1-term=%22multimodal+representation%22&terms-1-field=all&terms-2-operator=OR&terms-2-term=%22multimodal+representation+learning%22&terms-2-field=all&terms-3-operator=OR&terms-3-term=%22multimodal+AI%22&terms-3-field=all&terms-4-operator=OR&terms-4-term=%22multimodal+artificial+intelligence%22&terms-4-field=all&terms-5-operator=OR&terms-5-term=%22multimodal+feature+learning%22&terms-5-field=all&terms-6-operator=OR&terms-6-term=%22multimodal+observations%22&terms-6-field=all&terms-7-operator=OR&terms-7-term=%22Multimodal+deep+Learning%22&terms-7-field=all&terms-8-operator=OR&terms-8-term=%22Multimodal+reinforcement+learning%22&terms-8-field=all&terms-9-operator=OR&terms-9-term=%22multimodal+fusion%22&terms-9-field=all&terms-10-operator=OR&terms-10-term=%22Multi-modal+Machine+Learning%22&terms-10-field=all&terms-12-operator=OR&terms-12-term=%22multi-modal+representation+learning%22&terms-12-field=all&terms-13-operator=OR&terms-13-term=%22multi-modal+AI%22&terms-13-field=all&terms-14-operator=OR&terms-14-term=%22multi-modal+artificial+intelligence%22&terms-14-field=all&terms-15-operator=OR&terms-15-term=%22multi-modal+feature+learning%22&terms-15-field=all&terms-16-operator=OR&terms-16-term=%22multi-modal+observations%22&terms-16-field=all&terms-17-operator=OR&terms-17-term=%22Multi-modal+deep+Learning%22&terms-17-field=all&terms-18-operator=OR&terms-18-term=%22Multi-modal+reinforcement+learning%22&terms-18-field=all&terms-19-operator=OR&terms-19-term=%22multi-modal+fusion%22&terms-19-field=all&terms-20-operator=OR&terms-20-term=%22cross-modal+learning%22&terms-20-field=all&terms-21-operator=OR&terms-21-term=%22multi-modality+learning%22&terms-21-field=all&terms-22-operator=OR&terms-22-term=%22multimodality+learning%22&terms-22-field=all&classification-computer_science=y&classification-physics_archives=all&classification-include_cross_list=include&date-filter_by=all_dates&date-year=2019&date-from_date=&date-to_date=&date-date_type=submitted_date_first&abstracts=show&size=50&order=-announced_date_first).\n\nRunning this query for previous years gives:\n\n- 45 for the calendar year 2017\n- 71 for the calendar year 2018\n- 91 for the calendar year 2019\n- 181 for the calendar year 202", "lower_25": "4.97k", "median": "8.42k", "upper_75": "15.4k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that software and information services will contribute 50% of total GDP to US GDP in Q3 of 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.73", "median": "5.07", "upper_75": "7.05", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Alphabet Inc.'s market capitalisation will be 3.36 trillion USD at market close on January 1, 2030?", "desc": "Alphabet Inc. is he parent company of Google. As of December 5, 2020, Alphabet Inc.'s market capitalisation was $1.235tr.\n\nGoogle has a few AI labs. Amongst these are [Google Brain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Brain) and [DeepMind](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DeepMind). Many of their products and services (such as their search engine, their self-driving car subsidiary) are much infused by the latest innovations in machine learning.", "resc": "This question resolves as Alphabet Inc.'s market capitalisation at market close on January 1, 2030 in trillions of 2019USD, according to [Yahoo Finance](https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/GOOG/) in 2019 USD.", "lower_25": "1.94", "median": "3.36", "upper_75": "5.58", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.97k e-prints on multi-modal learning will be published on ArXiv over the 2021-02-14 to 2031-02-14 period?", "desc": "[arXiv](arxiv.org) is a repository of electronic preprints approved for posting after moderation, but not full peer review. It consists of scientific papers in the fields of mathematics, physics, astronomy, electrical engineering, computer science, quantitative biology, statistics, mathematical finance and economics, which can be accessed online. \n\nMany machine learning articles will be posted on arXiv before publication. In theoretical computer science and machine learning, over 60% of published papers have arXiv e-prints [(Sutton et al. 2017)](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1710.05225.pdf).\n\nMultimodal machine learning aims to build models that can process and relate information from multiple modalities (including linguistic, acoustic and visual signals). Multimodal machine learning enables a wide range of applications: from audio-visual speech recognition to image captioning [(Baltrusaitis et al., 2017)](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.09406.pdf).", "resc": "This question resolves as the total number of e-prints on multi-modal ML systems will be published on arXiv over the 2021-12-14 to 2031-02-14 period (inclusive), as per the e-print's \"original submission date\".\n\n**Details of the search query**\n\nFor the purpose of this question e-prints published over the 2021-12-14 to 2031-02-14 period (inclusive) under Computer Science that contain the following keywords:\n\n> \"Multimodal Machine Learning”, \"multimodal representation”, “multimodal representation learning\", “multimodal AI”, “multimodal artificial intelligence”, “multimodal feature learning”, “multimodal observations”, “Multimodal deep Learning”, “Multimodal reinforcement learning”, “multimodal fusion”, Multi-modal Machine Learning”, Multi-modal Machine Learning”, “multi-modal representation learning”, “multi-modal AI”, “multi-modal artificial intelligence”, “multi-modal feature learning”, “multi-modal observations”, “Multi-modal deep Learning”, “Multi-modal reinforcement learning”, “multi-modal fusion”, “cross-modal learning”, “multi-modality learning”, “multimodality learning\"\n\nThe query should *include* cross-listed papers (papers listed on other subjects besides Computer Science). The query may be [executed here](https://arxiv.org/search/advanced?terms-0-operator=AND&terms-0-term=%22Multimodal+Machine+Learning%22&terms-0-field=all&terms-1-operator=OR&terms-1-term=%22multimodal+representation%22&terms-1-field=all&terms-2-operator=OR&terms-2-term=%22multimodal+representation+learning%22&terms-2-field=all&terms-3-operator=OR&terms-3-term=%22multimodal+AI%22&terms-3-field=all&terms-4-operator=OR&terms-4-term=%22multimodal+artificial+intelligence%22&terms-4-field=all&terms-5-operator=OR&terms-5-term=%22multimodal+feature+learning%22&terms-5-field=all&terms-6-operator=OR&terms-6-term=%22multimodal+observations%22&terms-6-field=all&terms-7-operator=OR&terms-7-term=%22Multimodal+deep+Learning%22&terms-7-field=all&terms-8-operator=OR&terms-8-term=%22Multimodal+reinforcement+learning%22&terms-8-field=all&terms-9-operator=OR&terms-9-term=%22multimodal+fusion%22&terms-9-field=all&terms-10-operator=OR&terms-10-term=%22Multi-modal+Machine+Learning%22&terms-10-field=all&terms-12-operator=OR&terms-12-term=%22multi-modal+representation+learning%22&terms-12-field=all&terms-13-operator=OR&terms-13-term=%22multi-modal+AI%22&terms-13-field=all&terms-14-operator=OR&terms-14-term=%22multi-modal+artificial+intelligence%22&terms-14-field=all&terms-15-operator=OR&terms-15-term=%22multi-modal+feature+learning%22&terms-15-field=all&terms-16-operator=OR&terms-16-term=%22multi-modal+observations%22&terms-16-field=all&terms-17-operator=OR&terms-17-term=%22Multi-modal+deep+Learning%22&terms-17-field=all&terms-18-operator=OR&terms-18-term=%22Multi-modal+reinforcement+learning%22&terms-18-field=all&terms-19-operator=OR&terms-19-term=%22multi-modal+fusion%22&terms-19-field=all&terms-20-operator=OR&terms-20-term=%22cross-modal+learning%22&terms-20-field=all&terms-21-operator=OR&terms-21-term=%22multi-modality+learning%22&terms-21-field=all&terms-22-operator=OR&terms-22-term=%22multimodality+learning%22&terms-22-field=all&classification-computer_science=y&classification-physics_archives=all&classification-include_cross_list=include&date-filter_by=all_dates&date-year=2019&date-from_date=&date-to_date=&date-date_type=submitted_date_first&abstracts=show&size=50&order=-announced_date_first).\n\nRunning this query for previous years gives:\n\n- 45 for the calendar year 2017\n- 71 for the calendar year 2018\n- 91 for the calendar year 2019\n- 181 for the calendar year 202", "lower_25": "4.97k", "median": "8.42k", "upper_75": "15.4k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that software and information services will contribute 50% of total GDP to US GDP in Q3 of 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.73", "median": "5.07", "upper_75": "7.05", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Alphabet Inc.'s market capitalisation will be 3.36 trillion USD at market close on January 1, 2030?", "desc": "Alphabet Inc. is he parent company of Google. As of December 5, 2020, Alphabet Inc.'s market capitalisation was $1.235tr.\n\nGoogle has a few AI labs. Amongst these are [Google Brain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Brain) and [DeepMind](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DeepMind). Many of their products and services (such as their search engine, their self-driving car subsidiary) are much infused by the latest innovations in machine learning.", "resc": "This question resolves as Alphabet Inc.'s market capitalisation at market close on January 1, 2030 in trillions of 2019USD, according to [Yahoo Finance](https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/GOOG/) in 2019 USD.", "lower_25": "1.94", "median": "3.36", "upper_75": "5.58", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.97k e-prints on multi-modal learning will be published on ArXiv over the 2021-02-14 to 2031-02-14 period?", "desc": "[arXiv](arxiv.org) is a repository of electronic preprints approved for posting after moderation, but not full peer review. It consists of scientific papers in the fields of mathematics, physics, astronomy, electrical engineering, computer science, quantitative biology, statistics, mathematical finance and economics, which can be accessed online. \n\nMany machine learning articles will be posted on arXiv before publication. In theoretical computer science and machine learning, over 60% of published papers have arXiv e-prints [(Sutton et al. 2017)](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1710.05225.pdf).\n\nMultimodal machine learning aims to build models that can process and relate information from multiple modalities (including linguistic, acoustic and visual signals). Multimodal machine learning enables a wide range of applications: from audio-visual speech recognition to image captioning [(Baltrusaitis et al., 2017)](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.09406.pdf).", "resc": "This question resolves as the total number of e-prints on multi-modal ML systems will be published on arXiv over the 2021-12-14 to 2031-02-14 period (inclusive), as per the e-print's \"original submission date\".\n\n**Details of the search query**\n\nFor the purpose of this question e-prints published over the 2021-12-14 to 2031-02-14 period (inclusive) under Computer Science that contain the following keywords:\n\n> \"Multimodal Machine Learning”, \"multimodal representation”, “multimodal representation learning\", “multimodal AI”, “multimodal artificial intelligence”, “multimodal feature learning”, “multimodal observations”, “Multimodal deep Learning”, “Multimodal reinforcement learning”, “multimodal fusion”, Multi-modal Machine Learning”, Multi-modal Machine Learning”, “multi-modal representation learning”, “multi-modal AI”, “multi-modal artificial intelligence”, “multi-modal feature learning”, “multi-modal observations”, “Multi-modal deep Learning”, “Multi-modal reinforcement learning”, “multi-modal fusion”, “cross-modal learning”, “multi-modality learning”, “multimodality learning\"\n\nThe query should *include* cross-listed papers (papers listed on other subjects besides Computer Science). The query may be [executed here](https://arxiv.org/search/advanced?terms-0-operator=AND&terms-0-term=%22Multimodal+Machine+Learning%22&terms-0-field=all&terms-1-operator=OR&terms-1-term=%22multimodal+representation%22&terms-1-field=all&terms-2-operator=OR&terms-2-term=%22multimodal+representation+learning%22&terms-2-field=all&terms-3-operator=OR&terms-3-term=%22multimodal+AI%22&terms-3-field=all&terms-4-operator=OR&terms-4-term=%22multimodal+artificial+intelligence%22&terms-4-field=all&terms-5-operator=OR&terms-5-term=%22multimodal+feature+learning%22&terms-5-field=all&terms-6-operator=OR&terms-6-term=%22multimodal+observations%22&terms-6-field=all&terms-7-operator=OR&terms-7-term=%22Multimodal+deep+Learning%22&terms-7-field=all&terms-8-operator=OR&terms-8-term=%22Multimodal+reinforcement+learning%22&terms-8-field=all&terms-9-operator=OR&terms-9-term=%22multimodal+fusion%22&terms-9-field=all&terms-10-operator=OR&terms-10-term=%22Multi-modal+Machine+Learning%22&terms-10-field=all&terms-12-operator=OR&terms-12-term=%22multi-modal+representation+learning%22&terms-12-field=all&terms-13-operator=OR&terms-13-term=%22multi-modal+AI%22&terms-13-field=all&terms-14-operator=OR&terms-14-term=%22multi-modal+artificial+intelligence%22&terms-14-field=all&terms-15-operator=OR&terms-15-term=%22multi-modal+feature+learning%22&terms-15-field=all&terms-16-operator=OR&terms-16-term=%22multi-modal+observations%22&terms-16-field=all&terms-17-operator=OR&terms-17-term=%22Multi-modal+deep+Learning%22&terms-17-field=all&terms-18-operator=OR&terms-18-term=%22Multi-modal+reinforcement+learning%22&terms-18-field=all&terms-19-operator=OR&terms-19-term=%22multi-modal+fusion%22&terms-19-field=all&terms-20-operator=OR&terms-20-term=%22cross-modal+learning%22&terms-20-field=all&terms-21-operator=OR&terms-21-term=%22multi-modality+learning%22&terms-21-field=all&terms-22-operator=OR&terms-22-term=%22multimodality+learning%22&terms-22-field=all&classification-computer_science=y&classification-physics_archives=all&classification-include_cross_list=include&date-filter_by=all_dates&date-year=2019&date-from_date=&date-to_date=&date-date_type=submitted_date_first&abstracts=show&size=50&order=-announced_date_first).\n\nRunning this query for previous years gives:\n\n- 45 for the calendar year 2017\n- 71 for the calendar year 2018\n- 91 for the calendar year 2019\n- 181 for the calendar year 202", "lower_25": "4.97k", "median": "8.42k", "upper_75": "15.4k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that software and information services will contribute 50% of total GDP to US GDP in Q3 of 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.73", "median": "5.07", "upper_75": "7.05", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a country will reach longevity escape velocity, i.e. sustained increase of life expectancy of at least 1, by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2064", "upper_75": "2166", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 21.6k e-prints on AI Safety, interpretability or explainability will be published on ArXiv over the 2021-02-14 to 2031-02-14 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "7.88k", "median": "13.3k", "upper_75": "21.6k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 21.6k e-prints on AI Safety, interpretability or explainability will be published on ArXiv over the 2021-02-14 to 2031-02-14 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "7.88k", "median": "13.3k", "upper_75": "21.6k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will officially cease to be a socialist state by 2189?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2055", "median": "2094", "upper_75": "2189", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a country will reach longevity escape velocity, i.e. sustained increase of life expectancy of at least 1, by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2064", "upper_75": "2166", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will officially cease to be a socialist state by 2189?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2055", "median": "2094", "upper_75": "2189", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will officially cease to be a socialist state by 2189?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2055", "median": "2094", "upper_75": "2189", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a country will reach longevity escape velocity, i.e. sustained increase of life expectancy of at least 1, by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2064", "upper_75": "2166", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 21.6k e-prints on AI Safety, interpretability or explainability will be published on ArXiv over the 2021-02-14 to 2031-02-14 period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "7.88k", "median": "13.3k", "upper_75": "21.6k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Tesla will report producing 2.56M vehicles in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.56M", "median": "3.37M", "upper_75": "4.48M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that less than 1 non-Tesla vehicles will be licensed with Tesla software by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "Tesla Motors [has indicated it will license its software to other auto makers](https://www.thedrive.com/news/38973/elon-musk-says-tesla-has-spoken-with-other-car-companies-about-licensing-autopilot).\n\n[According to Cathie Wood, CEO of ARK Invest](https://youtu.be/wFXvDaXrzTM), Tesla has about 30 billion miles of real world data that is being used to train their self-driving Neural Net (from a February 2021 interview). She claims the next largest database is managed by Google and is only about 1/1000 as large. Woods further claims the size of their databases give Tesla a huge competitive advantage in development of FSD technology.\n\n[Others have disputed Wood's claims](https://www.quora.com/Does-Teslas-autonomous-driving-group-have-a-data-advantage-over-Google).\n\n**How many non-Tesla vehicles will be licensed with Tesla software by 2030?**\n\nThis question will resolve to the number of non-Tesla street legal vehicles which are using licensed Tesla software according to official Tesla sources available before January 1, 2030. Such software must be related to autopilot or Full Self Driving capabilities. If Tesla has made no announcements indicating they have licensed such software this will resolve as **\"< 1\"**. If Tesla announces it has licensed the software but no official sources providing the number of vehicles exist, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe most recent number from official Tesla sources will be used. If the number of vehicles using licensed software is announced separately by vehicle type they may be added together to arrive at a total so long as the announcements were less than a year apart and there is no overlap in the figures. If a number is announced only for a certain type of vehicle but there are previous numbers available that include all vehicle types the previous numbers will be favored. Admins may use their discretion to determine appropriate resolution based on reasonable interpretations of the available announcements in accordance with the criteria defined here.\n\nIf the number of licensed vehicles exceeds 100 million this resolves as **\"> 100,000,000\"**.\n\n[fine-print]\nIf the most recent official statement is several years old (for example a statement from 2027 or even earlier) those numbers will still be used.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "< 1", "median": "6.14", "upper_75": "6.83M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Tesla will report producing 2.56M vehicles in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.56M", "median": "3.37M", "upper_75": "4.48M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Tesla will report producing 2.56M vehicles in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.56M", "median": "3.37M", "upper_75": "4.48M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1 bitcoin will reach a value of 372k by 2030?", "desc": "The value of one bitcoin has been in flux since the inception of the cryptocurrency in 2009. As of 3/12/21, it's worth over $55,000. What is the maximum value it will reach by the end of this decade?", "resc": "The price of one bitcoin will be finally determined by a leading cryptocurrency market exchange (see below) on Jan. 1, 2030 (12:00 AM GMT). \n\n- We shall derive the price of 1 BTC from Binance, the exchange with the current highest trading volume.", "lower_25": "102k", "median": "177k", "upper_75": "372k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated population of blue whales in 2050, given that there are currently 20.2k blue whales?", "desc": "[Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_whale): \n>The blue whale (Balaenoptera musculus) is a marine mammal belonging to the baleen whale suborder Mysticeti. Reaching a maximum confirmed length of 29.9 meters (98 feet) and weight of 173 tonnes (190 tons), it is the largest animal known to have ever existed. [...] The blue whale was once abundant in nearly all the oceans on Earth until the end of the 19th century. It was hunted almost to the point of extinction by whaling until the International Whaling Commission banned all hunting of blue whales in 1967. The International Whaling Commission catch database estimates that 382,595 blue whales were caught between 1868 and 1978. The global blue whale population is estimated to be 10,000–25,000, roughly 3–11% of the population size estimated in 1911.\n\nInteresting reference is also [IUCN Red List of Endangered Species](https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/pdf/50226962/attachment)", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total population of blue whales on Earth on January 1, 2050, according to most recent estimate from [IUCN](https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/2477/156923585), or the best source as determined by the Metaculus. The estimate will include all subspecies of blue whales. If only an interval is given, this question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geometric_mean) of the interval range", "lower_25": "6.16k", "median": "20.2k", "upper_75": "45.8k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that less than 1 non-Tesla vehicles will be licensed with Tesla software by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "Tesla Motors [has indicated it will license its software to other auto makers](https://www.thedrive.com/news/38973/elon-musk-says-tesla-has-spoken-with-other-car-companies-about-licensing-autopilot).\n\n[According to Cathie Wood, CEO of ARK Invest](https://youtu.be/wFXvDaXrzTM), Tesla has about 30 billion miles of real world data that is being used to train their self-driving Neural Net (from a February 2021 interview). She claims the next largest database is managed by Google and is only about 1/1000 as large. Woods further claims the size of their databases give Tesla a huge competitive advantage in development of FSD technology.\n\n[Others have disputed Wood's claims](https://www.quora.com/Does-Teslas-autonomous-driving-group-have-a-data-advantage-over-Google).\n\n**How many non-Tesla vehicles will be licensed with Tesla software by 2030?**\n\nThis question will resolve to the number of non-Tesla street legal vehicles which are using licensed Tesla software according to official Tesla sources available before January 1, 2030. Such software must be related to autopilot or Full Self Driving capabilities. If Tesla has made no announcements indicating they have licensed such software this will resolve as **\"< 1\"**. If Tesla announces it has licensed the software but no official sources providing the number of vehicles exist, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe most recent number from official Tesla sources will be used. If the number of vehicles using licensed software is announced separately by vehicle type they may be added together to arrive at a total so long as the announcements were less than a year apart and there is no overlap in the figures. If a number is announced only for a certain type of vehicle but there are previous numbers available that include all vehicle types the previous numbers will be favored. Admins may use their discretion to determine appropriate resolution based on reasonable interpretations of the available announcements in accordance with the criteria defined here.\n\nIf the number of licensed vehicles exceeds 100 million this resolves as **\"> 100,000,000\"**.\n\n[fine-print]\nIf the most recent official statement is several years old (for example a statement from 2027 or even earlier) those numbers will still be used.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "< 1", "median": "6.14", "upper_75": "6.83M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that less than 1 non-Tesla vehicles will be licensed with Tesla software by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "Tesla Motors [has indicated it will license its software to other auto makers](https://www.thedrive.com/news/38973/elon-musk-says-tesla-has-spoken-with-other-car-companies-about-licensing-autopilot).\n\n[According to Cathie Wood, CEO of ARK Invest](https://youtu.be/wFXvDaXrzTM), Tesla has about 30 billion miles of real world data that is being used to train their self-driving Neural Net (from a February 2021 interview). She claims the next largest database is managed by Google and is only about 1/1000 as large. Woods further claims the size of their databases give Tesla a huge competitive advantage in development of FSD technology.\n\n[Others have disputed Wood's claims](https://www.quora.com/Does-Teslas-autonomous-driving-group-have-a-data-advantage-over-Google).\n\n**How many non-Tesla vehicles will be licensed with Tesla software by 2030?**\n\nThis question will resolve to the number of non-Tesla street legal vehicles which are using licensed Tesla software according to official Tesla sources available before January 1, 2030. Such software must be related to autopilot or Full Self Driving capabilities. If Tesla has made no announcements indicating they have licensed such software this will resolve as **\"< 1\"**. If Tesla announces it has licensed the software but no official sources providing the number of vehicles exist, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe most recent number from official Tesla sources will be used. If the number of vehicles using licensed software is announced separately by vehicle type they may be added together to arrive at a total so long as the announcements were less than a year apart and there is no overlap in the figures. If a number is announced only for a certain type of vehicle but there are previous numbers available that include all vehicle types the previous numbers will be favored. Admins may use their discretion to determine appropriate resolution based on reasonable interpretations of the available announcements in accordance with the criteria defined here.\n\nIf the number of licensed vehicles exceeds 100 million this resolves as **\"> 100,000,000\"**.\n\n[fine-print]\nIf the most recent official statement is several years old (for example a statement from 2027 or even earlier) those numbers will still be used.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "< 1", "median": "6.14", "upper_75": "6.83M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1 bitcoin will reach a value of 372k by 2030?", "desc": "The value of one bitcoin has been in flux since the inception of the cryptocurrency in 2009. As of 3/12/21, it's worth over $55,000. What is the maximum value it will reach by the end of this decade?", "resc": "The price of one bitcoin will be finally determined by a leading cryptocurrency market exchange (see below) on Jan. 1, 2030 (12:00 AM GMT). \n\n- We shall derive the price of 1 BTC from Binance, the exchange with the current highest trading volume.", "lower_25": "102k", "median": "177k", "upper_75": "372k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated population of blue whales in 2050, given that there are currently 20.2k blue whales?", "desc": "[Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_whale): \n>The blue whale (Balaenoptera musculus) is a marine mammal belonging to the baleen whale suborder Mysticeti. Reaching a maximum confirmed length of 29.9 meters (98 feet) and weight of 173 tonnes (190 tons), it is the largest animal known to have ever existed. [...] The blue whale was once abundant in nearly all the oceans on Earth until the end of the 19th century. It was hunted almost to the point of extinction by whaling until the International Whaling Commission banned all hunting of blue whales in 1967. The International Whaling Commission catch database estimates that 382,595 blue whales were caught between 1868 and 1978. The global blue whale population is estimated to be 10,000–25,000, roughly 3–11% of the population size estimated in 1911.\n\nInteresting reference is also [IUCN Red List of Endangered Species](https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/pdf/50226962/attachment)", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total population of blue whales on Earth on January 1, 2050, according to most recent estimate from [IUCN](https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/2477/156923585), or the best source as determined by the Metaculus. The estimate will include all subspecies of blue whales. If only an interval is given, this question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geometric_mean) of the interval range", "lower_25": "6.16k", "median": "20.2k", "upper_75": "45.8k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1 bitcoin will reach a value of 372k by 2030?", "desc": "The value of one bitcoin has been in flux since the inception of the cryptocurrency in 2009. As of 3/12/21, it's worth over $55,000. What is the maximum value it will reach by the end of this decade?", "resc": "The price of one bitcoin will be finally determined by a leading cryptocurrency market exchange (see below) on Jan. 1, 2030 (12:00 AM GMT). \n\n- We shall derive the price of 1 BTC from Binance, the exchange with the current highest trading volume.", "lower_25": "102k", "median": "177k", "upper_75": "372k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If the federal minimum wage is $15 or greater at the end of 2024, what is the chance that the average employment-to-population ratio will be 60.14 in 2025?", "desc": "In economics, the supply and demand model predicts that a minimum wage will cause unemployment if it is set above the equilibrium wage. The minimum wage is a [price floor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_floor) on labor, and the S+D model predicts that binding price floors lead to surpluses, with more willing sellers than buyers.\n\nHowever, the recent empirical results on minimum wage effects have been mixed, and the issue appears to be contentious among economists. In the U.S., the results of the 2020 election have put the minimum wage issue back on the table, and some increase appears likely per some other questions:\n\n* [Will the federal minimum wage increase in the United States before 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3631/will-the-federal-minimum-wage-increase-in-the-united-states-before-2025/) (currently at median of 89%).\n* [If Joe Biden becomes president, what will the federal minimum wage be at the end of 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) (roughly 95% of the distribution is over the current wage of $7.25).\n\nThe University of Chicago's [Initiative on Global Markets](https://www.igmchicago.org/) surveys panels of top economists on issues of public policy. IGM recently conducted two surveys on the minimum wage: one for the [U.S.](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/the-us-minimum-wage/) and one for [Europe](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/the-us-minimum-wage-2/). The distribution of opinion on employment effects was broad and also differed substantially between the continents. In the U.S., 45% agreed or strongly agreed that an increase from $7.25 to $15 would reduce employment, 33% were uncertain, and 14% disagreed. In Europe, 23% agreed, 40% were uncertain, and 15% disagreed.\n\nLet's exploit the possibility of an upcoming minimum wage increase to get a handle on the truth. [This question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) gives us a range of possible minimum wage levels that could be set at the end of 2024. Roughly speaking, the 25th percentile is $10 and the 75th percentile is $15. We can use questions of the form, *if the federal minimum wage is in [X, Y], what will the employment-to-population ratio be in 2025?*, and compare how the employment-to-population ratio is expected to vary with minimum wage level. The premises we will want to compare are:\n\n* [If the minimum wage is $10 or less (inclusive)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6547/minimum-wage-impact-on-employment-0-10/).\n* If the minimum wage is $15 or greater (inclusive) — this question.\n* For completeness, [if the minimum wage is $10-$15 (exclusive)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6627/minimum-wage-impact-on-employment-10-15/).", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, all dollar figures are given in nominal terms.\n\n### Closing condition\n\nThis question closes (retroactively) to the earliest of:\n\n1. The date when any of the three premises mentioned above falls to < 10% on [the minimum wage level question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/). That is, the first date when the cumulative probability between [0, 10] is less than 10%, or between (10, 15) is less than 10%, or between [15, ∞) is less than 10%.\n\n2. The resolution date of the [minimum wage level question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) (the date when it actually resolves).\n\n3. The closing date stated on this question.\n\nThe reason for this strange closing condition is that the purpose of these questions is to compare outcomes across counterfactual scenarios. In order for the questions to be worth predicting on, they need to have some reasonable probability of resolving unambiguously. So we want to close the questions once we have high confidence which scenario we are in.\n\n### Resolution details\n\nThe resolution criteria require evaluating two measures: the minimum wage at the end of 2024, and the average employment-to-population ratio over 2025.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, \"minimum wage\" refers to the federal minimum wage for covered nonexempt employees. The minimum wage will be decided by the [US Department of Labor](https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimumwage) website. This question is about the active minimum wage at the end of 2024, so if a bill is passed in 2024 that mandates a certain minimum wage in 2025, that will not be considered. If that website does not give information on the minimum wage (or lack thereof), this question will resolve based on credible media reports.\n\nIf there is no minimum wage, the minimum wage will be considered to be $0.\n\nIf the minimum wage is less than $15 at end of 2024, this question resolves ambiguous.\n\nFor the employment-to-population ratio, we will use the BLS figures as summarized by the [FRED EMRATIO series](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EMRATIO), averaged over the year of 2025 (you can see this by clicking on the gear icon on the top right, changing the frequency to Annual, and using the Average aggregation method). If this method no longer works, we will resolve by aggregating over the BLS monthly reports manually", "lower_25": "58.62", "median": "59.38", "upper_75": "60.14", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated population of blue whales in 2050, given that there are currently 20.2k blue whales?", "desc": "[Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_whale): \n>The blue whale (Balaenoptera musculus) is a marine mammal belonging to the baleen whale suborder Mysticeti. Reaching a maximum confirmed length of 29.9 meters (98 feet) and weight of 173 tonnes (190 tons), it is the largest animal known to have ever existed. [...] The blue whale was once abundant in nearly all the oceans on Earth until the end of the 19th century. It was hunted almost to the point of extinction by whaling until the International Whaling Commission banned all hunting of blue whales in 1967. The International Whaling Commission catch database estimates that 382,595 blue whales were caught between 1868 and 1978. The global blue whale population is estimated to be 10,000–25,000, roughly 3–11% of the population size estimated in 1911.\n\nInteresting reference is also [IUCN Red List of Endangered Species](https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/pdf/50226962/attachment)", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total population of blue whales on Earth on January 1, 2050, according to most recent estimate from [IUCN](https://www.iucnredlist.org/species/2477/156923585), or the best source as determined by the Metaculus. The estimate will include all subspecies of blue whales. If only an interval is given, this question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geometric_mean) of the interval range", "lower_25": "6.16k", "median": "20.2k", "upper_75": "45.8k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If the federal minimum wage is $15 or greater at the end of 2024, what is the chance that the average employment-to-population ratio will be 60.14 in 2025?", "desc": "In economics, the supply and demand model predicts that a minimum wage will cause unemployment if it is set above the equilibrium wage. The minimum wage is a [price floor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_floor) on labor, and the S+D model predicts that binding price floors lead to surpluses, with more willing sellers than buyers.\n\nHowever, the recent empirical results on minimum wage effects have been mixed, and the issue appears to be contentious among economists. In the U.S., the results of the 2020 election have put the minimum wage issue back on the table, and some increase appears likely per some other questions:\n\n* [Will the federal minimum wage increase in the United States before 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3631/will-the-federal-minimum-wage-increase-in-the-united-states-before-2025/) (currently at median of 89%).\n* [If Joe Biden becomes president, what will the federal minimum wage be at the end of 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) (roughly 95% of the distribution is over the current wage of $7.25).\n\nThe University of Chicago's [Initiative on Global Markets](https://www.igmchicago.org/) surveys panels of top economists on issues of public policy. IGM recently conducted two surveys on the minimum wage: one for the [U.S.](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/the-us-minimum-wage/) and one for [Europe](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/the-us-minimum-wage-2/). The distribution of opinion on employment effects was broad and also differed substantially between the continents. In the U.S., 45% agreed or strongly agreed that an increase from $7.25 to $15 would reduce employment, 33% were uncertain, and 14% disagreed. In Europe, 23% agreed, 40% were uncertain, and 15% disagreed.\n\nLet's exploit the possibility of an upcoming minimum wage increase to get a handle on the truth. [This question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) gives us a range of possible minimum wage levels that could be set at the end of 2024. Roughly speaking, the 25th percentile is $10 and the 75th percentile is $15. We can use questions of the form, *if the federal minimum wage is in [X, Y], what will the employment-to-population ratio be in 2025?*, and compare how the employment-to-population ratio is expected to vary with minimum wage level. The premises we will want to compare are:\n\n* [If the minimum wage is $10 or less (inclusive)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6547/minimum-wage-impact-on-employment-0-10/).\n* If the minimum wage is $15 or greater (inclusive) — this question.\n* For completeness, [if the minimum wage is $10-$15 (exclusive)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6627/minimum-wage-impact-on-employment-10-15/).", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, all dollar figures are given in nominal terms.\n\n### Closing condition\n\nThis question closes (retroactively) to the earliest of:\n\n1. The date when any of the three premises mentioned above falls to < 10% on [the minimum wage level question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/). That is, the first date when the cumulative probability between [0, 10] is less than 10%, or between (10, 15) is less than 10%, or between [15, ∞) is less than 10%.\n\n2. The resolution date of the [minimum wage level question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) (the date when it actually resolves).\n\n3. The closing date stated on this question.\n\nThe reason for this strange closing condition is that the purpose of these questions is to compare outcomes across counterfactual scenarios. In order for the questions to be worth predicting on, they need to have some reasonable probability of resolving unambiguously. So we want to close the questions once we have high confidence which scenario we are in.\n\n### Resolution details\n\nThe resolution criteria require evaluating two measures: the minimum wage at the end of 2024, and the average employment-to-population ratio over 2025.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, \"minimum wage\" refers to the federal minimum wage for covered nonexempt employees. The minimum wage will be decided by the [US Department of Labor](https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimumwage) website. This question is about the active minimum wage at the end of 2024, so if a bill is passed in 2024 that mandates a certain minimum wage in 2025, that will not be considered. If that website does not give information on the minimum wage (or lack thereof), this question will resolve based on credible media reports.\n\nIf there is no minimum wage, the minimum wage will be considered to be $0.\n\nIf the minimum wage is less than $15 at end of 2024, this question resolves ambiguous.\n\nFor the employment-to-population ratio, we will use the BLS figures as summarized by the [FRED EMRATIO series](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EMRATIO), averaged over the year of 2025 (you can see this by clicking on the gear icon on the top right, changing the frequency to Annual, and using the Average aggregation method). If this method no longer works, we will resolve by aggregating over the BLS monthly reports manually", "lower_25": "58.62", "median": "59.38", "upper_75": "60.14", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If the federal minimum wage is $15 or greater at the end of 2024, what is the chance that the average employment-to-population ratio will be 60.14 in 2025?", "desc": "In economics, the supply and demand model predicts that a minimum wage will cause unemployment if it is set above the equilibrium wage. The minimum wage is a [price floor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_floor) on labor, and the S+D model predicts that binding price floors lead to surpluses, with more willing sellers than buyers.\n\nHowever, the recent empirical results on minimum wage effects have been mixed, and the issue appears to be contentious among economists. In the U.S., the results of the 2020 election have put the minimum wage issue back on the table, and some increase appears likely per some other questions:\n\n* [Will the federal minimum wage increase in the United States before 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3631/will-the-federal-minimum-wage-increase-in-the-united-states-before-2025/) (currently at median of 89%).\n* [If Joe Biden becomes president, what will the federal minimum wage be at the end of 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) (roughly 95% of the distribution is over the current wage of $7.25).\n\nThe University of Chicago's [Initiative on Global Markets](https://www.igmchicago.org/) surveys panels of top economists on issues of public policy. IGM recently conducted two surveys on the minimum wage: one for the [U.S.](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/the-us-minimum-wage/) and one for [Europe](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/the-us-minimum-wage-2/). The distribution of opinion on employment effects was broad and also differed substantially between the continents. In the U.S., 45% agreed or strongly agreed that an increase from $7.25 to $15 would reduce employment, 33% were uncertain, and 14% disagreed. In Europe, 23% agreed, 40% were uncertain, and 15% disagreed.\n\nLet's exploit the possibility of an upcoming minimum wage increase to get a handle on the truth. [This question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) gives us a range of possible minimum wage levels that could be set at the end of 2024. Roughly speaking, the 25th percentile is $10 and the 75th percentile is $15. We can use questions of the form, *if the federal minimum wage is in [X, Y], what will the employment-to-population ratio be in 2025?*, and compare how the employment-to-population ratio is expected to vary with minimum wage level. The premises we will want to compare are:\n\n* [If the minimum wage is $10 or less (inclusive)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6547/minimum-wage-impact-on-employment-0-10/).\n* If the minimum wage is $15 or greater (inclusive) — this question.\n* For completeness, [if the minimum wage is $10-$15 (exclusive)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6627/minimum-wage-impact-on-employment-10-15/).", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, all dollar figures are given in nominal terms.\n\n### Closing condition\n\nThis question closes (retroactively) to the earliest of:\n\n1. The date when any of the three premises mentioned above falls to < 10% on [the minimum wage level question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/). That is, the first date when the cumulative probability between [0, 10] is less than 10%, or between (10, 15) is less than 10%, or between [15, ∞) is less than 10%.\n\n2. The resolution date of the [minimum wage level question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) (the date when it actually resolves).\n\n3. The closing date stated on this question.\n\nThe reason for this strange closing condition is that the purpose of these questions is to compare outcomes across counterfactual scenarios. In order for the questions to be worth predicting on, they need to have some reasonable probability of resolving unambiguously. So we want to close the questions once we have high confidence which scenario we are in.\n\n### Resolution details\n\nThe resolution criteria require evaluating two measures: the minimum wage at the end of 2024, and the average employment-to-population ratio over 2025.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, \"minimum wage\" refers to the federal minimum wage for covered nonexempt employees. The minimum wage will be decided by the [US Department of Labor](https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimumwage) website. This question is about the active minimum wage at the end of 2024, so if a bill is passed in 2024 that mandates a certain minimum wage in 2025, that will not be considered. If that website does not give information on the minimum wage (or lack thereof), this question will resolve based on credible media reports.\n\nIf there is no minimum wage, the minimum wage will be considered to be $0.\n\nIf the minimum wage is less than $15 at end of 2024, this question resolves ambiguous.\n\nFor the employment-to-population ratio, we will use the BLS figures as summarized by the [FRED EMRATIO series](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EMRATIO), averaged over the year of 2025 (you can see this by clicking on the gear icon on the top right, changing the frequency to Annual, and using the Average aggregation method). If this method no longer works, we will resolve by aggregating over the BLS monthly reports manually", "lower_25": "58.62", "median": "59.38", "upper_75": "60.14", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "In how many years will humanity's descendants meet grabby aliens?\n\nKeyword: 8.45×1015\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that humanity's descendants will meet grabby aliens in 8.45×1015 years?", "desc": "Robin Hanson, Daniel Martin, Calvin McCarter and Jonathan Paulson have [a new paper out about grabby aliens](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2102.01522.pdf). From the abstract,\n\n> According to a hard-steps model of advanced life timing, humans seem puzzlingly early. We offer an explanation: an early deadline is set by 'grabby' civilizations (GC), who expand rapidly, never die alone, change the appearance of the volumes they control, and who are not born within other GC volumes. If we might soon become grabby, then today is near a sample origin date of such a GC. A selection effect explains why we don't see them even though they probably control over a third of the universe now. Each parameter in our three parameter model can be estimated to within roughly a factor of four, allowing principled predictions of GC origins, spacing, appearance, and durations till we see or meet them.\n\nScott Aaronson wrote a qualitative summary of the paper [here](https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=5253). [Figure 8](https://imgur.com/a/bK33kUn) in their paper provides a cumulative probability distribution for when our descendents will encounter grabby aliens, under various parameter settings in their model. \n\nThis question is important for long-termists, since it provides one constraint on the overall size and power our civilization will eventually have. Assuming that human descendants do not have the ability to conquer neighboring alien civilizations, our descedents will be constrained by the amount of resources we can \"grab\" in a phase of rapid expansion and colonization, much like the [European imperialists](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_European_imperialism) of prior centuries.", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of years since 2021 that human descendants (biological or artificial) physically encounter \"grabby aliens\", defined as aliens that consume at least 10^26 watts of power, corresponding to Carl Sagan's proposed definition of a Type II civilization on the [Kardashev scale](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kardashev_scale). For the purpose of this question, to physically encounter an alien civilization means that any part of their technology is within 1 light year of any part of our technology.\n\n*ETA 2021-02-22 In case humanity goes extinct before it meets grabby aliens, it resolves as \">10^16\".", "lower_25": "14.7k", "median": "689M", "upper_75": "8.45×1015", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global direct primary energy consumption (in terawatt-hours) will be 244k in 2100?", "desc": "[Global direct primary energy consumption per year](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-primary-energy) is estimated to have increased from 12100 TWh in 1900 to 158800 TWh in 2019 - a thirteenfold increase over 119 years. However, in recent decades, the exponential growth in per capita energy use in wealthy countries that had continued since the beginning of the 19th century has flatlined, and energy use per capita is now in decline in many wealthy countries.\n\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the annual global direct primary energy consumption (in terawatt-hours) for the year 2100 according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-primary-energy). If OWID no longer reports this data by 2100, an alternative credible source may be selected, or the question may resolve as **Ambiguous** at Metaculus' discretion", "lower_25": "244k", "median": "1.11M", "upper_75": "3.65M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "If the federal minimum wage is greater than $10 and less than $15, what is the chance that the average employment-to-population ratio will be 58.76 in 2025?", "desc": "In economics, the supply and demand model predicts that a minimum wage will cause unemployment if it is set above the equilibrium wage. The minimum wage is a [price floor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_floor) on labor, and the S+D model predicts that binding price floors lead to surpluses, with more willing sellers than buyers.\n\nHowever, the recent empirical results on minimum wage effects have been mixed, and the issue appears to be contentious among economists. In the U.S., the results of the 2020 election have put the minimum wage issue back on the table, and some increase appears likely per some other questions:\n\n* [Will the federal minimum wage increase in the United States before 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3631/will-the-federal-minimum-wage-increase-in-the-united-states-before-2025/) (currently at median of 89%).\n* [If Joe Biden becomes president, what will the federal minimum wage be at the end of 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) (roughly 95% of the distribution is over the current wage of $7.25).\n\nThe University of Chicago's [Initiative on Global Markets](https://www.igmchicago.org/) surveys panels of top economists on issues of public policy. IGM recently conducted two surveys on the minimum wage: one for the [U.S.](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/the-us-minimum-wage/) and one for [Europe](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/the-us-minimum-wage-2/). The distribution of opinion on employment effects was broad and also differed substantially between the continents. In the U.S., 45% agreed or strongly agreed that an increase from $7.25 to $15 would reduce employment, 33% were uncertain, and 14% disagreed. In Europe, 23% agreed, 40% were uncertain, and 15% disagreed.\n\nLet's exploit the possibility of an upcoming minimum wage increase to get a handle on the truth. [This question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) gives us a range of possible minimum wage levels that could be set at the end of 2024. Roughly speaking, the 25th percentile is $10 and the 75th percentile is $15. We can use questions of the form, *if the federal minimum wage is in [X, Y], what will the employment-to-population ratio be in 2025?*, and compare how the employment-to-population ratio is expected to vary with minimum wage level. The premises we will want to compare are:\n\n* [If the minimum wage is $10 or less (inclusive)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6547/minimum-wage-impact-on-employment-0-10/).\n* [If the minimum wage is $15 or greater (inclusive)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6626/minimum-wage-impact-on-employment-15/).\n* For completeness, if the minimum wage is $10-$15 (exclusive) — this question.", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, all dollar figures are given in nominal terms.\n\n### Closing condition\n\nThis question closes (retroactively) to the earliest of:\n\n1. The date when any of the three premises mentioned above falls to < 10% on [the minimum wage level question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/). That is, the first date when the cumulative probability between [0, 10] is less than 10%, or between (10, 15) is less than 10%, or between [15, ∞) is less than 10%.\n\n2. The resolution date of the [minimum wage level question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) (the date when it actually resolves).\n\n3. The closing date stated on this question.\n\nThe reason for this strange closing condition is that the purpose of these questions is to compare outcomes across counterfactual scenarios. In order for the questions to be worth predicting on, they need to have some reasonable probability of resolving unambiguously. So we want to close the questions once we have high confidence which scenario we are in.\n\n### Resolution details\n\nThe resolution criteria require evaluating two measures: the minimum wage at the end of 2024, and the average employment-to-population ratio over 2025.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, \"minimum wage\" refers to the federal minimum wage for covered nonexempt employees. The minimum wage will be decided by the [US Department of Labor](https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimumwage) website. This question is about the active minimum wage at the end of 2024, so if a bill is passed in 2024 that mandates a certain minimum wage in 2025, that will not be considered. If that website does not give information on the minimum wage (or lack thereof), this question will resolve based on credible media reports.\n\nIf there is no minimum wage, the minimum wage will be considered to be $0.\n\nIf the minimum wage is <= $10 or >= $15 at end of 2024, this question resolves ambiguous.\n\nFor the employment-to-population ratio, we will use the BLS figures as summarized by the [FRED EMRATIO series](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EMRATIO), averaged over the year of 2025 (you can see this by clicking on the gear icon on the top right, changing the frequency to Annual, and using the Average aggregation method). If this method no longer works, we will resolve by aggregating over the BLS monthly reports manually", "lower_25": "58.76", "median": "59.51", "upper_75": "60.27", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global direct primary energy consumption (in terawatt-hours) will be 244k in 2100?", "desc": "[Global direct primary energy consumption per year](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-primary-energy) is estimated to have increased from 12100 TWh in 1900 to 158800 TWh in 2019 - a thirteenfold increase over 119 years. However, in recent decades, the exponential growth in per capita energy use in wealthy countries that had continued since the beginning of the 19th century has flatlined, and energy use per capita is now in decline in many wealthy countries.\n\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the annual global direct primary energy consumption (in terawatt-hours) for the year 2100 according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-primary-energy). If OWID no longer reports this data by 2100, an alternative credible source may be selected, or the question may resolve as **Ambiguous** at Metaculus' discretion", "lower_25": "244k", "median": "1.11M", "upper_75": "3.65M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global direct primary energy consumption (in terawatt-hours) will be 244k in 2100?", "desc": "[Global direct primary energy consumption per year](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-primary-energy) is estimated to have increased from 12100 TWh in 1900 to 158800 TWh in 2019 - a thirteenfold increase over 119 years. However, in recent decades, the exponential growth in per capita energy use in wealthy countries that had continued since the beginning of the 19th century has flatlined, and energy use per capita is now in decline in many wealthy countries.\n\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the annual global direct primary energy consumption (in terawatt-hours) for the year 2100 according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-primary-energy). If OWID no longer reports this data by 2100, an alternative credible source may be selected, or the question may resolve as **Ambiguous** at Metaculus' discretion", "lower_25": "244k", "median": "1.11M", "upper_75": "3.65M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "If the federal minimum wage is greater than $10 and less than $15, what is the chance that the average employment-to-population ratio will be 58.76 in 2025?", "desc": "In economics, the supply and demand model predicts that a minimum wage will cause unemployment if it is set above the equilibrium wage. The minimum wage is a [price floor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_floor) on labor, and the S+D model predicts that binding price floors lead to surpluses, with more willing sellers than buyers.\n\nHowever, the recent empirical results on minimum wage effects have been mixed, and the issue appears to be contentious among economists. In the U.S., the results of the 2020 election have put the minimum wage issue back on the table, and some increase appears likely per some other questions:\n\n* [Will the federal minimum wage increase in the United States before 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3631/will-the-federal-minimum-wage-increase-in-the-united-states-before-2025/) (currently at median of 89%).\n* [If Joe Biden becomes president, what will the federal minimum wage be at the end of 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) (roughly 95% of the distribution is over the current wage of $7.25).\n\nThe University of Chicago's [Initiative on Global Markets](https://www.igmchicago.org/) surveys panels of top economists on issues of public policy. IGM recently conducted two surveys on the minimum wage: one for the [U.S.](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/the-us-minimum-wage/) and one for [Europe](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/the-us-minimum-wage-2/). The distribution of opinion on employment effects was broad and also differed substantially between the continents. In the U.S., 45% agreed or strongly agreed that an increase from $7.25 to $15 would reduce employment, 33% were uncertain, and 14% disagreed. In Europe, 23% agreed, 40% were uncertain, and 15% disagreed.\n\nLet's exploit the possibility of an upcoming minimum wage increase to get a handle on the truth. [This question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) gives us a range of possible minimum wage levels that could be set at the end of 2024. Roughly speaking, the 25th percentile is $10 and the 75th percentile is $15. We can use questions of the form, *if the federal minimum wage is in [X, Y], what will the employment-to-population ratio be in 2025?*, and compare how the employment-to-population ratio is expected to vary with minimum wage level. The premises we will want to compare are:\n\n* [If the minimum wage is $10 or less (inclusive)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6547/minimum-wage-impact-on-employment-0-10/).\n* [If the minimum wage is $15 or greater (inclusive)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6626/minimum-wage-impact-on-employment-15/).\n* For completeness, if the minimum wage is $10-$15 (exclusive) — this question.", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, all dollar figures are given in nominal terms.\n\n### Closing condition\n\nThis question closes (retroactively) to the earliest of:\n\n1. The date when any of the three premises mentioned above falls to < 10% on [the minimum wage level question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/). That is, the first date when the cumulative probability between [0, 10] is less than 10%, or between (10, 15) is less than 10%, or between [15, ∞) is less than 10%.\n\n2. The resolution date of the [minimum wage level question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) (the date when it actually resolves).\n\n3. The closing date stated on this question.\n\nThe reason for this strange closing condition is that the purpose of these questions is to compare outcomes across counterfactual scenarios. In order for the questions to be worth predicting on, they need to have some reasonable probability of resolving unambiguously. So we want to close the questions once we have high confidence which scenario we are in.\n\n### Resolution details\n\nThe resolution criteria require evaluating two measures: the minimum wage at the end of 2024, and the average employment-to-population ratio over 2025.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, \"minimum wage\" refers to the federal minimum wage for covered nonexempt employees. The minimum wage will be decided by the [US Department of Labor](https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimumwage) website. This question is about the active minimum wage at the end of 2024, so if a bill is passed in 2024 that mandates a certain minimum wage in 2025, that will not be considered. If that website does not give information on the minimum wage (or lack thereof), this question will resolve based on credible media reports.\n\nIf there is no minimum wage, the minimum wage will be considered to be $0.\n\nIf the minimum wage is <= $10 or >= $15 at end of 2024, this question resolves ambiguous.\n\nFor the employment-to-population ratio, we will use the BLS figures as summarized by the [FRED EMRATIO series](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EMRATIO), averaged over the year of 2025 (you can see this by clicking on the gear icon on the top right, changing the frequency to Annual, and using the Average aggregation method). If this method no longer works, we will resolve by aggregating over the BLS monthly reports manually", "lower_25": "58.76", "median": "59.51", "upper_75": "60.27", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How correlated will progress be across subfields of AI as determined by Metaculus between 2021 to 2025? What is the chance that 0.038 correlation will be observed?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.038", "median": "0.138", "upper_75": "0.293", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Terence Mauri will get 7.48 out of 100 predictions about \"robotic judges\" in 2070 correct?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.30", "median": "7.48", "upper_75": "14.20", "prediction": "7.48%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an algorithm will not be able to predict the Big Five personality traits of a person from a naturalistic photograph or video by Dec 2025?", "desc": "The [Big Five personality traits](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Five_personality_traits), also known as the OCEAN model, is a grouping for personality traits that is divided into five factors: Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. \nThese traits are [mostly stable for adults](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0165176511004666), and there have been works studying the relationship between these factors and areas such as [personal values](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0146167202289008), [political attitudes](https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051010-111659), and [academic achievement](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1041608008000587).\n\nWhile there have been studies trying to predict the Big Five scores from sources other than self-reports (such as from behavior at [social networks](https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.4809) or from [smartphone data](https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/5959587)), it is possible that in the future these scores could be somewhat accurately predicted from photos, in the manner that now facial recognition technology [can expose political orientation](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-020-79310-1).", "resc": "The question resolves positively on the first date a trustworthy publication claims that an algorithm can predict the Big Five personality traits of a person from naturalistic photographs or videos. \nIn 90% or more of the individual cases, the predicted values for the five traits must have an average error of 20 points or less over a 100-point scale. In other words, at most 10% of the tested individuals can have an average prediction error higher than 20 points between the five traits.", "lower_25": "Jun 2025", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Terence Mauri will get 7.48 out of 100 predictions about \"robotic judges\" in 2070 correct?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.30", "median": "7.48", "upper_75": "14.20", "prediction": "7.48%"} -{"title": "If the federal minimum wage is greater than $10 and less than $15, what is the chance that the average employment-to-population ratio will be 58.76 in 2025?", "desc": "In economics, the supply and demand model predicts that a minimum wage will cause unemployment if it is set above the equilibrium wage. The minimum wage is a [price floor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Price_floor) on labor, and the S+D model predicts that binding price floors lead to surpluses, with more willing sellers than buyers.\n\nHowever, the recent empirical results on minimum wage effects have been mixed, and the issue appears to be contentious among economists. In the U.S., the results of the 2020 election have put the minimum wage issue back on the table, and some increase appears likely per some other questions:\n\n* [Will the federal minimum wage increase in the United States before 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3631/will-the-federal-minimum-wage-increase-in-the-united-states-before-2025/) (currently at median of 89%).\n* [If Joe Biden becomes president, what will the federal minimum wage be at the end of 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) (roughly 95% of the distribution is over the current wage of $7.25).\n\nThe University of Chicago's [Initiative on Global Markets](https://www.igmchicago.org/) surveys panels of top economists on issues of public policy. IGM recently conducted two surveys on the minimum wage: one for the [U.S.](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/the-us-minimum-wage/) and one for [Europe](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/the-us-minimum-wage-2/). The distribution of opinion on employment effects was broad and also differed substantially between the continents. In the U.S., 45% agreed or strongly agreed that an increase from $7.25 to $15 would reduce employment, 33% were uncertain, and 14% disagreed. In Europe, 23% agreed, 40% were uncertain, and 15% disagreed.\n\nLet's exploit the possibility of an upcoming minimum wage increase to get a handle on the truth. [This question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) gives us a range of possible minimum wage levels that could be set at the end of 2024. Roughly speaking, the 25th percentile is $10 and the 75th percentile is $15. We can use questions of the form, *if the federal minimum wage is in [X, Y], what will the employment-to-population ratio be in 2025?*, and compare how the employment-to-population ratio is expected to vary with minimum wage level. The premises we will want to compare are:\n\n* [If the minimum wage is $10 or less (inclusive)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6547/minimum-wage-impact-on-employment-0-10/).\n* [If the minimum wage is $15 or greater (inclusive)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6626/minimum-wage-impact-on-employment-15/).\n* For completeness, if the minimum wage is $10-$15 (exclusive) — this question.", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, all dollar figures are given in nominal terms.\n\n### Closing condition\n\nThis question closes (retroactively) to the earliest of:\n\n1. The date when any of the three premises mentioned above falls to < 10% on [the minimum wage level question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/). That is, the first date when the cumulative probability between [0, 10] is less than 10%, or between (10, 15) is less than 10%, or between [15, ∞) is less than 10%.\n\n2. The resolution date of the [minimum wage level question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4470/if-joe-biden-becomes-president-what-will-the-federal-minimum-wage-be-at-the-end-of-2024/) (the date when it actually resolves).\n\n3. The closing date stated on this question.\n\nThe reason for this strange closing condition is that the purpose of these questions is to compare outcomes across counterfactual scenarios. In order for the questions to be worth predicting on, they need to have some reasonable probability of resolving unambiguously. So we want to close the questions once we have high confidence which scenario we are in.\n\n### Resolution details\n\nThe resolution criteria require evaluating two measures: the minimum wage at the end of 2024, and the average employment-to-population ratio over 2025.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, \"minimum wage\" refers to the federal minimum wage for covered nonexempt employees. The minimum wage will be decided by the [US Department of Labor](https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimumwage) website. This question is about the active minimum wage at the end of 2024, so if a bill is passed in 2024 that mandates a certain minimum wage in 2025, that will not be considered. If that website does not give information on the minimum wage (or lack thereof), this question will resolve based on credible media reports.\n\nIf there is no minimum wage, the minimum wage will be considered to be $0.\n\nIf the minimum wage is <= $10 or >= $15 at end of 2024, this question resolves ambiguous.\n\nFor the employment-to-population ratio, we will use the BLS figures as summarized by the [FRED EMRATIO series](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EMRATIO), averaged over the year of 2025 (you can see this by clicking on the gear icon on the top right, changing the frequency to Annual, and using the Average aggregation method). If this method no longer works, we will resolve by aggregating over the BLS monthly reports manually", "lower_25": "58.76", "median": "59.51", "upper_75": "60.27", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an algorithm will not be able to predict the Big Five personality traits of a person from a naturalistic photograph or video by Dec 2025?", "desc": "The [Big Five personality traits](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Five_personality_traits), also known as the OCEAN model, is a grouping for personality traits that is divided into five factors: Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. \nThese traits are [mostly stable for adults](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0165176511004666), and there have been works studying the relationship between these factors and areas such as [personal values](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0146167202289008), [political attitudes](https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051010-111659), and [academic achievement](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1041608008000587).\n\nWhile there have been studies trying to predict the Big Five scores from sources other than self-reports (such as from behavior at [social networks](https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.4809) or from [smartphone data](https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/5959587)), it is possible that in the future these scores could be somewhat accurately predicted from photos, in the manner that now facial recognition technology [can expose political orientation](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-020-79310-1).", "resc": "The question resolves positively on the first date a trustworthy publication claims that an algorithm can predict the Big Five personality traits of a person from naturalistic photographs or videos. \nIn 90% or more of the individual cases, the predicted values for the five traits must have an average error of 20 points or less over a 100-point scale. In other words, at most 10% of the tested individuals can have an average prediction error higher than 20 points between the five traits.", "lower_25": "Jun 2025", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How correlated will progress be across subfields of AI as determined by Metaculus between 2021 to 2025? What is the chance that 0.038 correlation will be observed?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.038", "median": "0.138", "upper_75": "0.293", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first human mission to Venus will take place by 2070?", "desc": "[Venus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venus) is a terrestrial planet and is sometimes called Earth's \"sister planet\" because of their similar size, mass, proximity to the Sun, and bulk composition. It is radically different from Earth in other respects.\n\nIt has the densest atmosphere of the four terrestrial planets, consisting of more than 96% carbon dioxide. The atmospheric pressure at the planet's surface is about 92 times the sea level pressure of Earth, or roughly the pressure at 900m underwater on Earth. Venus has, by far, the hottest surface of any planet in the Solar System, with a mean temperature of 464 °C, even though Mercury is closer to the Sun.\n\nDue to its proximity to Earth, Venus has been a prime target for early interplanetary exploration. It was the first planet beyond Earth visited by a spacecraft ([Mariner 2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mariner_2) in 1962), and the first to be successfully landed on (by [Venera 7](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venera_7) in 1970). Venus' thick clouds render observation of its surface impossible in visible light, and the first detailed maps did not emerge until the arrival of the [Magellan orbiter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magellan_(spacecraft)) in 1991. Plans have been proposed for rovers or more complex missions, but they are hindered by Venus's hostile surface conditions.\n\nThe first robotic space probe mission to Venus, and the first to any planet, began with the Soviet [Venera program](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venera) in 1961. The United States' exploration of Venus had its first success with the Mariner 2 mission on 14 December 1962, becoming the world's first successful interplanetary mission, passing 34,833 km above the surface of Venus, and gathering data on the planet's atmosphere. In the decades since, [a number of robotic missions to Venus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_missions_to_Venus) have taken place, including orbiters and landers.\n\n[Manned Venus Flyby](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manned_Venus_flyby) was a 1967–1968 NASA proposal to send three astronauts on a flyby mission to Venus in an Apollo-derived spacecraft in 1973–1974, using a gravity assist to shorten the return journey to Earth; but this proposed mission was never realized.\n\nAs of March 2021, no human missions to Venus have taken place, and none are actively being planned, but recent concepts have included the [High Altitude Venus Operational Concept](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_Altitude_Venus_Operational_Concept), which would involve [human crews exploring the Venusian atmosphere in dirigibles](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0az7DEwG68A&ab_channel=NASALangleyResearchCenter), and establishing floating outposts to allow for a long-term human presence on Venus. A detailed presentation on this proposal is available [here.](https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20160006329)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first date on which conscious humans approach Venus within a distance of 1 million kilometres.\n\nThe humans must be awake and alert flesh-and-bone humans, not EMs or some non-corporeal instantiation of consciousness. They must not be in suspended animation, hibernation, or any sort of minimally-conscious state.", "lower_25": "2043", "median": "2070", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2075", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How correlated will progress be across subfields of AI as determined by Metaculus between 2021 to 2025? What is the chance that 0.038 correlation will be observed?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.038", "median": "0.138", "upper_75": "0.293", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an algorithm will not be able to predict the Big Five personality traits of a person from a naturalistic photograph or video by Dec 2025?", "desc": "The [Big Five personality traits](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Five_personality_traits), also known as the OCEAN model, is a grouping for personality traits that is divided into five factors: Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. \nThese traits are [mostly stable for adults](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0165176511004666), and there have been works studying the relationship between these factors and areas such as [personal values](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0146167202289008), [political attitudes](https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051010-111659), and [academic achievement](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1041608008000587).\n\nWhile there have been studies trying to predict the Big Five scores from sources other than self-reports (such as from behavior at [social networks](https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.4809) or from [smartphone data](https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/5959587)), it is possible that in the future these scores could be somewhat accurately predicted from photos, in the manner that now facial recognition technology [can expose political orientation](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-020-79310-1).", "resc": "The question resolves positively on the first date a trustworthy publication claims that an algorithm can predict the Big Five personality traits of a person from naturalistic photographs or videos. \nIn 90% or more of the individual cases, the predicted values for the five traits must have an average error of 20 points or less over a 100-point scale. In other words, at most 10% of the tested individuals can have an average prediction error higher than 20 points between the five traits.", "lower_25": "Jun 2025", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "In how many years will humanity's descendants meet grabby aliens?\n\nKeyword: 8.45×1015\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that humanity's descendants will meet grabby aliens in 8.45×1015 years?", "desc": "Robin Hanson, Daniel Martin, Calvin McCarter and Jonathan Paulson have [a new paper out about grabby aliens](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2102.01522.pdf). From the abstract,\n\n> According to a hard-steps model of advanced life timing, humans seem puzzlingly early. We offer an explanation: an early deadline is set by 'grabby' civilizations (GC), who expand rapidly, never die alone, change the appearance of the volumes they control, and who are not born within other GC volumes. If we might soon become grabby, then today is near a sample origin date of such a GC. A selection effect explains why we don't see them even though they probably control over a third of the universe now. Each parameter in our three parameter model can be estimated to within roughly a factor of four, allowing principled predictions of GC origins, spacing, appearance, and durations till we see or meet them.\n\nScott Aaronson wrote a qualitative summary of the paper [here](https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=5253). [Figure 8](https://imgur.com/a/bK33kUn) in their paper provides a cumulative probability distribution for when our descendents will encounter grabby aliens, under various parameter settings in their model. \n\nThis question is important for long-termists, since it provides one constraint on the overall size and power our civilization will eventually have. Assuming that human descendants do not have the ability to conquer neighboring alien civilizations, our descedents will be constrained by the amount of resources we can \"grab\" in a phase of rapid expansion and colonization, much like the [European imperialists](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_European_imperialism) of prior centuries.", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of years since 2021 that human descendants (biological or artificial) physically encounter \"grabby aliens\", defined as aliens that consume at least 10^26 watts of power, corresponding to Carl Sagan's proposed definition of a Type II civilization on the [Kardashev scale](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kardashev_scale). For the purpose of this question, to physically encounter an alien civilization means that any part of their technology is within 1 light year of any part of our technology.\n\n*ETA 2021-02-22 In case humanity goes extinct before it meets grabby aliens, it resolves as \">10^16\".", "lower_25": "14.7k", "median": "689M", "upper_75": "8.45×1015", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 734-day uninterrupted stay in deep space before 2051?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will the first humans land successfully on Mars?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3515/when-will-the-first-humans-land-successfully-on-mars/)\n- [How big will the first crew sent to Mars be?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5277/the-first-martian-crew-size/)\n- [One Million Martian Residents by 2075?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3519/one-million-martian-residents-by-2075/)\n\n----\n\n[Valeri Polyakov](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Valeri_Polyakov) holds the record for the longest uninterrupted spaceflight in low earth orbit of 437 days. It was his second spaceflight to the Russian Mir station that began on 8 January 1994. Upon landing, Polyakov opted not to be carried the few feet between the Soyuz capsule and a nearby lawn chair, instead walking the short distance. In doing so, he wished to prove that humans could be physically capable of working on the surface of Mars after a long-duration transit phase.\n\nThe longest crewed deep space mission was [Apollo 17](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_17) with total duration of 12 and a half days and over 3 days on the lunar surface.", "resc": "We will define human stay in deep space as the number of full days when a human is on trajectory leaving Earth [gravitational sphere of influence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sphere_of_influence_(astrodynamics)). So, starting from the initial burn, including presence in the interplanetary space and on the surface of other celestial bodies, until death, breaking to land on Earth or entering Earth orbit.\n\nIf there is no stay longer than 12.5 days (the length of the [Apollo 17](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_17) mission), the question will resolve as 12.5. if the longest stay is longer than 10,000 days (27.4 years), this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "378", "median": "734", "upper_75": "1.37k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first human mission to Venus will take place by 2070?", "desc": "[Venus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venus) is a terrestrial planet and is sometimes called Earth's \"sister planet\" because of their similar size, mass, proximity to the Sun, and bulk composition. It is radically different from Earth in other respects.\n\nIt has the densest atmosphere of the four terrestrial planets, consisting of more than 96% carbon dioxide. The atmospheric pressure at the planet's surface is about 92 times the sea level pressure of Earth, or roughly the pressure at 900m underwater on Earth. Venus has, by far, the hottest surface of any planet in the Solar System, with a mean temperature of 464 °C, even though Mercury is closer to the Sun.\n\nDue to its proximity to Earth, Venus has been a prime target for early interplanetary exploration. It was the first planet beyond Earth visited by a spacecraft ([Mariner 2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mariner_2) in 1962), and the first to be successfully landed on (by [Venera 7](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venera_7) in 1970). Venus' thick clouds render observation of its surface impossible in visible light, and the first detailed maps did not emerge until the arrival of the [Magellan orbiter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magellan_(spacecraft)) in 1991. Plans have been proposed for rovers or more complex missions, but they are hindered by Venus's hostile surface conditions.\n\nThe first robotic space probe mission to Venus, and the first to any planet, began with the Soviet [Venera program](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venera) in 1961. The United States' exploration of Venus had its first success with the Mariner 2 mission on 14 December 1962, becoming the world's first successful interplanetary mission, passing 34,833 km above the surface of Venus, and gathering data on the planet's atmosphere. In the decades since, [a number of robotic missions to Venus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_missions_to_Venus) have taken place, including orbiters and landers.\n\n[Manned Venus Flyby](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manned_Venus_flyby) was a 1967–1968 NASA proposal to send three astronauts on a flyby mission to Venus in an Apollo-derived spacecraft in 1973–1974, using a gravity assist to shorten the return journey to Earth; but this proposed mission was never realized.\n\nAs of March 2021, no human missions to Venus have taken place, and none are actively being planned, but recent concepts have included the [High Altitude Venus Operational Concept](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_Altitude_Venus_Operational_Concept), which would involve [human crews exploring the Venusian atmosphere in dirigibles](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0az7DEwG68A&ab_channel=NASALangleyResearchCenter), and establishing floating outposts to allow for a long-term human presence on Venus. A detailed presentation on this proposal is available [here.](https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20160006329)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first date on which conscious humans approach Venus within a distance of 1 million kilometres.\n\nThe humans must be awake and alert flesh-and-bone humans, not EMs or some non-corporeal instantiation of consciousness. They must not be in suspended animation, hibernation, or any sort of minimally-conscious state.", "lower_25": "2043", "median": "2070", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2075", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 734-day uninterrupted stay in deep space before 2051?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will the first humans land successfully on Mars?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3515/when-will-the-first-humans-land-successfully-on-mars/)\n- [How big will the first crew sent to Mars be?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5277/the-first-martian-crew-size/)\n- [One Million Martian Residents by 2075?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3519/one-million-martian-residents-by-2075/)\n\n----\n\n[Valeri Polyakov](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Valeri_Polyakov) holds the record for the longest uninterrupted spaceflight in low earth orbit of 437 days. It was his second spaceflight to the Russian Mir station that began on 8 January 1994. Upon landing, Polyakov opted not to be carried the few feet between the Soyuz capsule and a nearby lawn chair, instead walking the short distance. In doing so, he wished to prove that humans could be physically capable of working on the surface of Mars after a long-duration transit phase.\n\nThe longest crewed deep space mission was [Apollo 17](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_17) with total duration of 12 and a half days and over 3 days on the lunar surface.", "resc": "We will define human stay in deep space as the number of full days when a human is on trajectory leaving Earth [gravitational sphere of influence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sphere_of_influence_(astrodynamics)). So, starting from the initial burn, including presence in the interplanetary space and on the surface of other celestial bodies, until death, breaking to land on Earth or entering Earth orbit.\n\nIf there is no stay longer than 12.5 days (the length of the [Apollo 17](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_17) mission), the question will resolve as 12.5. if the longest stay is longer than 10,000 days (27.4 years), this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "378", "median": "734", "upper_75": "1.37k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first human mission to Venus will take place by 2070?", "desc": "[Venus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venus) is a terrestrial planet and is sometimes called Earth's \"sister planet\" because of their similar size, mass, proximity to the Sun, and bulk composition. It is radically different from Earth in other respects.\n\nIt has the densest atmosphere of the four terrestrial planets, consisting of more than 96% carbon dioxide. The atmospheric pressure at the planet's surface is about 92 times the sea level pressure of Earth, or roughly the pressure at 900m underwater on Earth. Venus has, by far, the hottest surface of any planet in the Solar System, with a mean temperature of 464 °C, even though Mercury is closer to the Sun.\n\nDue to its proximity to Earth, Venus has been a prime target for early interplanetary exploration. It was the first planet beyond Earth visited by a spacecraft ([Mariner 2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mariner_2) in 1962), and the first to be successfully landed on (by [Venera 7](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venera_7) in 1970). Venus' thick clouds render observation of its surface impossible in visible light, and the first detailed maps did not emerge until the arrival of the [Magellan orbiter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magellan_(spacecraft)) in 1991. Plans have been proposed for rovers or more complex missions, but they are hindered by Venus's hostile surface conditions.\n\nThe first robotic space probe mission to Venus, and the first to any planet, began with the Soviet [Venera program](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venera) in 1961. The United States' exploration of Venus had its first success with the Mariner 2 mission on 14 December 1962, becoming the world's first successful interplanetary mission, passing 34,833 km above the surface of Venus, and gathering data on the planet's atmosphere. In the decades since, [a number of robotic missions to Venus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_missions_to_Venus) have taken place, including orbiters and landers.\n\n[Manned Venus Flyby](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manned_Venus_flyby) was a 1967–1968 NASA proposal to send three astronauts on a flyby mission to Venus in an Apollo-derived spacecraft in 1973–1974, using a gravity assist to shorten the return journey to Earth; but this proposed mission was never realized.\n\nAs of March 2021, no human missions to Venus have taken place, and none are actively being planned, but recent concepts have included the [High Altitude Venus Operational Concept](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_Altitude_Venus_Operational_Concept), which would involve [human crews exploring the Venusian atmosphere in dirigibles](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0az7DEwG68A&ab_channel=NASALangleyResearchCenter), and establishing floating outposts to allow for a long-term human presence on Venus. A detailed presentation on this proposal is available [here.](https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20160006329)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first date on which conscious humans approach Venus within a distance of 1 million kilometres.\n\nThe humans must be awake and alert flesh-and-bone humans, not EMs or some non-corporeal instantiation of consciousness. They must not be in suspended animation, hibernation, or any sort of minimally-conscious state.", "lower_25": "2043", "median": "2070", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2075", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first O'Neill cylinder variant will be completed by 2061?", "desc": "Large space habitats have long been a dream of space enthusiasts. Elon Musk has recently [expressed an ambition](https://wccftech.com/spacex-launch-costs-down-musk/) to bring Starship launch costs down to $10/kg of payload. At launch costs in this range, it becomes economically realistic, if not necessarily likely, that enormous quantities of construction materials could be launched into space. With sufficiently low launch costs, a modestly sized permanent space habitat falls within reach of wealthy individuals, corporations and nation-states.\n\n\"[O'Neill cylinder](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O%27Neill_cylinder)\" properly refers to a specific, very large design for a space habitat. Many possible design variants are possible, most of them significantly smaller than the original proposal.", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, we will consider any space habitat that:\n\n * involves a cylinder at least 500m in exterior length,\n\n * at least 200m exterior diameter, and\n\n * spins on its axis to create at least 0.5g of pseudogravity on its interior surface\n\n... to qualify as a valid variant of the O'Neill-type space habitat. \n\nThe date of completion of the structure will be determined by at least one credible media source reporting that such a structure has been completed.", "lower_25": "2061", "median": "2091", "upper_75": "2161", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first O'Neill cylinder variant will be completed by 2061?", "desc": "Large space habitats have long been a dream of space enthusiasts. Elon Musk has recently [expressed an ambition](https://wccftech.com/spacex-launch-costs-down-musk/) to bring Starship launch costs down to $10/kg of payload. At launch costs in this range, it becomes economically realistic, if not necessarily likely, that enormous quantities of construction materials could be launched into space. With sufficiently low launch costs, a modestly sized permanent space habitat falls within reach of wealthy individuals, corporations and nation-states.\n\n\"[O'Neill cylinder](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O%27Neill_cylinder)\" properly refers to a specific, very large design for a space habitat. Many possible design variants are possible, most of them significantly smaller than the original proposal.", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, we will consider any space habitat that:\n\n * involves a cylinder at least 500m in exterior length,\n\n * at least 200m exterior diameter, and\n\n * spins on its axis to create at least 0.5g of pseudogravity on its interior surface\n\n... to qualify as a valid variant of the O'Neill-type space habitat. \n\nThe date of completion of the structure will be determined by at least one credible media source reporting that such a structure has been completed.", "lower_25": "2061", "median": "2091", "upper_75": "2161", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first O'Neill cylinder variant will be completed by 2061?", "desc": "Large space habitats have long been a dream of space enthusiasts. Elon Musk has recently [expressed an ambition](https://wccftech.com/spacex-launch-costs-down-musk/) to bring Starship launch costs down to $10/kg of payload. At launch costs in this range, it becomes economically realistic, if not necessarily likely, that enormous quantities of construction materials could be launched into space. With sufficiently low launch costs, a modestly sized permanent space habitat falls within reach of wealthy individuals, corporations and nation-states.\n\n\"[O'Neill cylinder](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O%27Neill_cylinder)\" properly refers to a specific, very large design for a space habitat. Many possible design variants are possible, most of them significantly smaller than the original proposal.", "resc": "For the purposes of this question, we will consider any space habitat that:\n\n * involves a cylinder at least 500m in exterior length,\n\n * at least 200m exterior diameter, and\n\n * spins on its axis to create at least 0.5g of pseudogravity on its interior surface\n\n... to qualify as a valid variant of the O'Neill-type space habitat. \n\nThe date of completion of the structure will be determined by at least one credible media source reporting that such a structure has been completed.", "lower_25": "2061", "median": "2091", "upper_75": "2161", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 734-day uninterrupted stay in deep space before 2051?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n- [When will the first humans land successfully on Mars?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3515/when-will-the-first-humans-land-successfully-on-mars/)\n- [How big will the first crew sent to Mars be?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5277/the-first-martian-crew-size/)\n- [One Million Martian Residents by 2075?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3519/one-million-martian-residents-by-2075/)\n\n----\n\n[Valeri Polyakov](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Valeri_Polyakov) holds the record for the longest uninterrupted spaceflight in low earth orbit of 437 days. It was his second spaceflight to the Russian Mir station that began on 8 January 1994. Upon landing, Polyakov opted not to be carried the few feet between the Soyuz capsule and a nearby lawn chair, instead walking the short distance. In doing so, he wished to prove that humans could be physically capable of working on the surface of Mars after a long-duration transit phase.\n\nThe longest crewed deep space mission was [Apollo 17](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_17) with total duration of 12 and a half days and over 3 days on the lunar surface.", "resc": "We will define human stay in deep space as the number of full days when a human is on trajectory leaving Earth [gravitational sphere of influence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sphere_of_influence_(astrodynamics)). So, starting from the initial burn, including presence in the interplanetary space and on the surface of other celestial bodies, until death, breaking to land on Earth or entering Earth orbit.\n\nIf there is no stay longer than 12.5 days (the length of the [Apollo 17](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_17) mission), the question will resolve as 12.5. if the longest stay is longer than 10,000 days (27.4 years), this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "378", "median": "734", "upper_75": "1.37k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will win a Gold Medal in the International Math Olympiad by Oct 2029?", "desc": "The [International Math Olympiad](https://www.imo-official.org/) is a mathematics competition for kids 18-and-under featuring extrordinarily difficult and novel mathematics problems. Contestants complete a total of 6 problems over 2 days, with 4.5 hours each day to submit their solutions. Problems are graded by judges on a 0 - 7 point scale for correct proofs, skill demonstrated, and partial results. Gold Medals are awarded for total scores of 31 or more (an average per-question score greater than 5). In the 2020 Olympiad, out of 616 contestants representing 105 countries, 49 gold medals were awarded and only one competitor won a perfect score of 42.\n\nThe [IMO Grand Challenge](https://imo-grand-challenge.github.io/) is a proposed AI challenge to develop an AI which can win a gold medal in the Olympiad. The rules have been tentatively described as follows:\n\n>To remove ambiguity about the scoring rules, we propose the formal-to-formal (F2F) variant of the IMO: the AI receives a formal representation of the problem (in the Lean Theorem Prover), and is required to emit a formal (i.e. machine-checkable) proof. We are working on a proposal for encoding IMO problems in Lean and will seek broad consensus on the protocol.\n>\n>Other proposed rules:\n>\n>Credit. Each proof certificate that the AI produces must be checkable by the Lean kernel in 10 minutes (which is approximately the amount of time it takes a human judge to judge a human's solution). Unlike human competitors, the AI has no opportunity for partial credit.\n>\n>Resources. The AI has only as much time as a human competitor (4.5 hours for each set of 3 problems), but there are no other limits on the computational resources it may use during that time.\n>\n>Reproducibility. The AI must be open-source, released publicly before the first day of the IMO, and be easily reproduceable. The AI cannot query the Internet.\n\nThere is no official commitment from the IMO or other AI development teams to compete for this challenge, but it's possible this may happen eventually.", "resc": "This question resolves on the date an AI system competes well enough on an IMO test to earn the equivalent of a gold medal. The IMO test must be most current IMO test at the time the feat is completed (previous years do not qualify).\n\nTentatively, we will hold the same terms as currently proposed by the IMO Grand Challenge:\n\n* The AIs must recieve formal representations of the IMO problems and present formal (machine-checkable) proofs.\n\n* The proof certificates produced must be checkable in 10 minutes. \n\n* The AI has 4.5 hours per set of 3 problems to compute, but there are no other limitations on computational resources.\n\n* The AI must be open-source, publicly released before the IMO begins, and be easily reproducable.\n\n* The AI cannot have access to the internet during the test.\n\nIf the IMO Grand Challenge eventually uses different constraints than those above, or the IMO test format changes, Metaculus Admins may modify this question at their discretion or resolve ambiguously, if they choose so.", "lower_25": "Dec 2024", "median": "Oct 2026", "upper_75": "Oct 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 5.57k billionaires (in USD) in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "The number of billionaires in the world has increased from 470 in 2000 to 2,095 in 2020, according to [Forbes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_World%27s_Billionaires#Statistics). But it seems to be stagnating since 2017.\n\n***How many billionaires (in nominal USD) will there be in 2030?***\n\nThis will resolve according to the number of billionaires in 2030 according to the [Forbes Billionaires list](https://www.forbes.com/billionaires/). If Forbes publishes multiple reports of billionaires, the greatest value in 2030 will be used.\n\n[fine-print]\nThe question resolves ambiguously if Forbes doesn't publish a list of billionaires for 2030.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "3.36k", "median": "4.30k", "upper_75": "5.57k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prize pool of an esport tournament will be greater than any other sport tournament in the year 2067?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2067", "median": "2094", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prize pool of an esport tournament will be greater than any other sport tournament in the year 2067?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2067", "median": "2094", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will win a Gold Medal in the International Math Olympiad by Oct 2029?", "desc": "The [International Math Olympiad](https://www.imo-official.org/) is a mathematics competition for kids 18-and-under featuring extrordinarily difficult and novel mathematics problems. Contestants complete a total of 6 problems over 2 days, with 4.5 hours each day to submit their solutions. Problems are graded by judges on a 0 - 7 point scale for correct proofs, skill demonstrated, and partial results. Gold Medals are awarded for total scores of 31 or more (an average per-question score greater than 5). In the 2020 Olympiad, out of 616 contestants representing 105 countries, 49 gold medals were awarded and only one competitor won a perfect score of 42.\n\nThe [IMO Grand Challenge](https://imo-grand-challenge.github.io/) is a proposed AI challenge to develop an AI which can win a gold medal in the Olympiad. The rules have been tentatively described as follows:\n\n>To remove ambiguity about the scoring rules, we propose the formal-to-formal (F2F) variant of the IMO: the AI receives a formal representation of the problem (in the Lean Theorem Prover), and is required to emit a formal (i.e. machine-checkable) proof. We are working on a proposal for encoding IMO problems in Lean and will seek broad consensus on the protocol.\n>\n>Other proposed rules:\n>\n>Credit. Each proof certificate that the AI produces must be checkable by the Lean kernel in 10 minutes (which is approximately the amount of time it takes a human judge to judge a human's solution). Unlike human competitors, the AI has no opportunity for partial credit.\n>\n>Resources. The AI has only as much time as a human competitor (4.5 hours for each set of 3 problems), but there are no other limits on the computational resources it may use during that time.\n>\n>Reproducibility. The AI must be open-source, released publicly before the first day of the IMO, and be easily reproduceable. The AI cannot query the Internet.\n\nThere is no official commitment from the IMO or other AI development teams to compete for this challenge, but it's possible this may happen eventually.", "resc": "This question resolves on the date an AI system competes well enough on an IMO test to earn the equivalent of a gold medal. The IMO test must be most current IMO test at the time the feat is completed (previous years do not qualify).\n\nTentatively, we will hold the same terms as currently proposed by the IMO Grand Challenge:\n\n* The AIs must recieve formal representations of the IMO problems and present formal (machine-checkable) proofs.\n\n* The proof certificates produced must be checkable in 10 minutes. \n\n* The AI has 4.5 hours per set of 3 problems to compute, but there are no other limitations on computational resources.\n\n* The AI must be open-source, publicly released before the IMO begins, and be easily reproducable.\n\n* The AI cannot have access to the internet during the test.\n\nIf the IMO Grand Challenge eventually uses different constraints than those above, or the IMO test format changes, Metaculus Admins may modify this question at their discretion or resolve ambiguously, if they choose so.", "lower_25": "Dec 2024", "median": "Oct 2026", "upper_75": "Oct 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gini coefficient for income in India will be 40.8 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "36.4", "median": "38.5", "upper_75": "40.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gini coefficient for income in India will be 40.8 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "36.4", "median": "38.5", "upper_75": "40.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first zetta-FLOPS performer will appear by 2041?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "2041", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will win a Gold Medal in the International Math Olympiad by Oct 2029?", "desc": "The [International Math Olympiad](https://www.imo-official.org/) is a mathematics competition for kids 18-and-under featuring extrordinarily difficult and novel mathematics problems. Contestants complete a total of 6 problems over 2 days, with 4.5 hours each day to submit their solutions. Problems are graded by judges on a 0 - 7 point scale for correct proofs, skill demonstrated, and partial results. Gold Medals are awarded for total scores of 31 or more (an average per-question score greater than 5). In the 2020 Olympiad, out of 616 contestants representing 105 countries, 49 gold medals were awarded and only one competitor won a perfect score of 42.\n\nThe [IMO Grand Challenge](https://imo-grand-challenge.github.io/) is a proposed AI challenge to develop an AI which can win a gold medal in the Olympiad. The rules have been tentatively described as follows:\n\n>To remove ambiguity about the scoring rules, we propose the formal-to-formal (F2F) variant of the IMO: the AI receives a formal representation of the problem (in the Lean Theorem Prover), and is required to emit a formal (i.e. machine-checkable) proof. We are working on a proposal for encoding IMO problems in Lean and will seek broad consensus on the protocol.\n>\n>Other proposed rules:\n>\n>Credit. Each proof certificate that the AI produces must be checkable by the Lean kernel in 10 minutes (which is approximately the amount of time it takes a human judge to judge a human's solution). Unlike human competitors, the AI has no opportunity for partial credit.\n>\n>Resources. The AI has only as much time as a human competitor (4.5 hours for each set of 3 problems), but there are no other limits on the computational resources it may use during that time.\n>\n>Reproducibility. The AI must be open-source, released publicly before the first day of the IMO, and be easily reproduceable. The AI cannot query the Internet.\n\nThere is no official commitment from the IMO or other AI development teams to compete for this challenge, but it's possible this may happen eventually.", "resc": "This question resolves on the date an AI system competes well enough on an IMO test to earn the equivalent of a gold medal. The IMO test must be most current IMO test at the time the feat is completed (previous years do not qualify).\n\nTentatively, we will hold the same terms as currently proposed by the IMO Grand Challenge:\n\n* The AIs must recieve formal representations of the IMO problems and present formal (machine-checkable) proofs.\n\n* The proof certificates produced must be checkable in 10 minutes. \n\n* The AI has 4.5 hours per set of 3 problems to compute, but there are no other limitations on computational resources.\n\n* The AI must be open-source, publicly released before the IMO begins, and be easily reproducable.\n\n* The AI cannot have access to the internet during the test.\n\nIf the IMO Grand Challenge eventually uses different constraints than those above, or the IMO test format changes, Metaculus Admins may modify this question at their discretion or resolve ambiguously, if they choose so.", "lower_25": "Dec 2024", "median": "Oct 2026", "upper_75": "Oct 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first zetta-FLOPS performer will appear by 2041?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "2041", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gini coefficient for income in China will be 38.2 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "35.5", "median": "38.2", "upper_75": "41.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gini coefficient for income in India will be 40.8 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "36.4", "median": "38.5", "upper_75": "40.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 5.57k billionaires (in USD) in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "The number of billionaires in the world has increased from 470 in 2000 to 2,095 in 2020, according to [Forbes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_World%27s_Billionaires#Statistics). But it seems to be stagnating since 2017.\n\n***How many billionaires (in nominal USD) will there be in 2030?***\n\nThis will resolve according to the number of billionaires in 2030 according to the [Forbes Billionaires list](https://www.forbes.com/billionaires/). If Forbes publishes multiple reports of billionaires, the greatest value in 2030 will be used.\n\n[fine-print]\nThe question resolves ambiguously if Forbes doesn't publish a list of billionaires for 2030.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "3.36k", "median": "4.30k", "upper_75": "5.57k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prize pool of an esport tournament will be greater than any other sport tournament in the year 2067?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2067", "median": "2094", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gini coefficient for income in China will be 38.2 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "35.5", "median": "38.2", "upper_75": "41.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gini coefficient for income in China will be 38.2 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "35.5", "median": "38.2", "upper_75": "41.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 5.57k billionaires (in USD) in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "The number of billionaires in the world has increased from 470 in 2000 to 2,095 in 2020, according to [Forbes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_World%27s_Billionaires#Statistics). But it seems to be stagnating since 2017.\n\n***How many billionaires (in nominal USD) will there be in 2030?***\n\nThis will resolve according to the number of billionaires in 2030 according to the [Forbes Billionaires list](https://www.forbes.com/billionaires/). If Forbes publishes multiple reports of billionaires, the greatest value in 2030 will be used.\n\n[fine-print]\nThe question resolves ambiguously if Forbes doesn't publish a list of billionaires for 2030.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "3.36k", "median": "4.30k", "upper_75": "5.57k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first zetta-FLOPS performer will appear by 2041?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "2041", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the most expensive NFT will be sold for 203M USD by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "77.3M", "median": "107M", "upper_75": "203M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an electric bike will win the AMA Supercross series championship by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2040", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an electric bike will win the AMA Supercross series championship by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2040", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an electric bike will win the AMA Supercross series championship by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2040", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first autonomous, road legal, human carrying motorcycle will be sold in the United States by 2045?", "desc": "Autonomous motorcycles have [already been built](https://www.press.bmwgroup.com/global/article/detail/T0284901EN/bmw-motorrad-presents-autonomous-driving-bmw-r-1200-gs-outlook-on-the-future-of-motorcycle-safety-and-technology-in-miramas?language=en). Yamaha has even made an [autonomous racing motorcycle](https://global.yamaha-motor.com/design_technology/technology/motobot/\n) controlled by its own robotic rider. Other manufacturers have released [motorcycles with rider assist technology that could be used in future autonomous vehicles](https://electrek.co/2017/09/29/honda-introduces-riding-assist-e-self-balancing-electric-motorcycle/).\n\nCould there be a market for such vehicles? The market for autonomous vehicles globally in 2019 reached [$54 billion](https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/autonomous-vehicle-market). Road-legal motorcycle sales in the USA in 2019 surpassed [300,000 units](https://www.statista.com/statistics/252264/us-motorcycle-salesin-units-by-type/). With these data, the future possibility of an autonomous motorcycle market in the USA can be taken seriously.", "resc": "This question resolves positive when a road-legal motorcycle with autonomous driving capability and intended to carry at least one human is able to be purchased in the United States.\n\nAutonomous driving capability is defined as the ability of the motorcycle to do the following without any rider intervention on the controls:\n\n1) Accelerate from a stop and reach a speed of at least 60 mph. If necessary, the rider is allowed to move their feet from the motorcycle to the ground and vice versa in order to stay upright at a stop.\n\n2) Decelerate from at least 60 mph to a complete stop.\n\n3) Lateral acceleration of at least .5G or approximately 27* of lean angle measured from the contact patch through the center of mass of bike and rider, under good conditions. \n\n4) Recognize and obey traffic control devices well enough to conduct a trip of at least 5 miles consisting of at least one full stop, one right turn, one left turn, and a top speed of at least 45 mph. \n\nMotorcycle is a two wheeled motorized vehicle. Road-legal means the vehicle is authorized by all relevant authorities the full use of all public roads and highways of at least one US state", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2045", "upper_75": "2062", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the most expensive NFT will be sold for 203M USD by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "77.3M", "median": "107M", "upper_75": "203M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a 1M-population country will adopt Universal Basic Income by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2047", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first autonomous, road legal, human carrying motorcycle will be sold in the United States by 2045?", "desc": "Autonomous motorcycles have [already been built](https://www.press.bmwgroup.com/global/article/detail/T0284901EN/bmw-motorrad-presents-autonomous-driving-bmw-r-1200-gs-outlook-on-the-future-of-motorcycle-safety-and-technology-in-miramas?language=en). Yamaha has even made an [autonomous racing motorcycle](https://global.yamaha-motor.com/design_technology/technology/motobot/\n) controlled by its own robotic rider. Other manufacturers have released [motorcycles with rider assist technology that could be used in future autonomous vehicles](https://electrek.co/2017/09/29/honda-introduces-riding-assist-e-self-balancing-electric-motorcycle/).\n\nCould there be a market for such vehicles? The market for autonomous vehicles globally in 2019 reached [$54 billion](https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/autonomous-vehicle-market). Road-legal motorcycle sales in the USA in 2019 surpassed [300,000 units](https://www.statista.com/statistics/252264/us-motorcycle-salesin-units-by-type/). With these data, the future possibility of an autonomous motorcycle market in the USA can be taken seriously.", "resc": "This question resolves positive when a road-legal motorcycle with autonomous driving capability and intended to carry at least one human is able to be purchased in the United States.\n\nAutonomous driving capability is defined as the ability of the motorcycle to do the following without any rider intervention on the controls:\n\n1) Accelerate from a stop and reach a speed of at least 60 mph. If necessary, the rider is allowed to move their feet from the motorcycle to the ground and vice versa in order to stay upright at a stop.\n\n2) Decelerate from at least 60 mph to a complete stop.\n\n3) Lateral acceleration of at least .5G or approximately 27* of lean angle measured from the contact patch through the center of mass of bike and rider, under good conditions. \n\n4) Recognize and obey traffic control devices well enough to conduct a trip of at least 5 miles consisting of at least one full stop, one right turn, one left turn, and a top speed of at least 45 mph. \n\nMotorcycle is a two wheeled motorized vehicle. Road-legal means the vehicle is authorized by all relevant authorities the full use of all public roads and highways of at least one US state", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2045", "upper_75": "2062", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first autonomous, road legal, human carrying motorcycle will be sold in the United States by 2045?", "desc": "Autonomous motorcycles have [already been built](https://www.press.bmwgroup.com/global/article/detail/T0284901EN/bmw-motorrad-presents-autonomous-driving-bmw-r-1200-gs-outlook-on-the-future-of-motorcycle-safety-and-technology-in-miramas?language=en). Yamaha has even made an [autonomous racing motorcycle](https://global.yamaha-motor.com/design_technology/technology/motobot/\n) controlled by its own robotic rider. Other manufacturers have released [motorcycles with rider assist technology that could be used in future autonomous vehicles](https://electrek.co/2017/09/29/honda-introduces-riding-assist-e-self-balancing-electric-motorcycle/).\n\nCould there be a market for such vehicles? The market for autonomous vehicles globally in 2019 reached [$54 billion](https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/autonomous-vehicle-market). Road-legal motorcycle sales in the USA in 2019 surpassed [300,000 units](https://www.statista.com/statistics/252264/us-motorcycle-salesin-units-by-type/). With these data, the future possibility of an autonomous motorcycle market in the USA can be taken seriously.", "resc": "This question resolves positive when a road-legal motorcycle with autonomous driving capability and intended to carry at least one human is able to be purchased in the United States.\n\nAutonomous driving capability is defined as the ability of the motorcycle to do the following without any rider intervention on the controls:\n\n1) Accelerate from a stop and reach a speed of at least 60 mph. If necessary, the rider is allowed to move their feet from the motorcycle to the ground and vice versa in order to stay upright at a stop.\n\n2) Decelerate from at least 60 mph to a complete stop.\n\n3) Lateral acceleration of at least .5G or approximately 27* of lean angle measured from the contact patch through the center of mass of bike and rider, under good conditions. \n\n4) Recognize and obey traffic control devices well enough to conduct a trip of at least 5 miles consisting of at least one full stop, one right turn, one left turn, and a top speed of at least 45 mph. \n\nMotorcycle is a two wheeled motorized vehicle. Road-legal means the vehicle is authorized by all relevant authorities the full use of all public roads and highways of at least one US state", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2045", "upper_75": "2062", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a 1M-population country will adopt Universal Basic Income by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2047", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the most expensive NFT will be sold for 203M USD by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "77.3M", "median": "107M", "upper_75": "203M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a 1M-population country will adopt Universal Basic Income by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2047", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first openly furry person will be elected to a major US office by 2030?", "desc": "[Furries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Furry_fandom) are a subculture interested in anthropomorphic animal characters with human personalities and characteristics. Furries form a diverse group, their common interests having several dimensions, which include artistic and sexual preferences, as well as self-image and identity aspects.\n\nIn 2017, [a councilman in Connecticut resigned](https://www.reddit.com/r/DeFranco/comments/6z5pec/councilman_resigning_after_secret_furry_life/) after being outed as a furry. As of this writing, no openly furry politician holds an office in US government.", "resc": "This question resolves when the first openly furry person is elected to any of the following offices:\n\n- US Congress\n- US President or Vice President\n- Any US State Legislature\n- Any US State Governorship (including Lieutenant Governors [in those states where the Lieutenant Governor is elected](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/List_of_current_United_States_lieutenant_governors) by popular vote)\n\nA politician is considered to be \"openly furry\" if credible media reports indicate they self-identify as such before being elected. They may presently identify as a furry, or may have been a furry in the past (without apologizing or renouncing such an identity)", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2048", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next man will win his 10th tennis slam title by 2033?", "desc": "Tennis has four major events each season: Australian Open, Rolland Garros, Wimbledon and the US Open. Winning multiple of these titles is a very impressive achievement.\n\nAs of writing there are [8 players](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Grand_Slam_men%27s_singles_champions#Most_Grand_Slam_singles_titles) who have won 10 of these tournaments:\n\n* Roger Federer, Rafael Nadal: 20\n* Novak Djokovic: 18\n* Pete Sampras: 16\n* Roy Emerson: 12\n* Rod Laver, Björn Borg: 11\n* Bill Tilden: 10\n\nThree of the players at the top of this list are still active today (Federer, Nadal and Djokovic). They are widely considered the greatest of all time. \n\nAs part of [The Tennis Abstract Podcast's 100th episode](http://www.tennisabstract.com/blog/2021/03/17/podcast-episode-100-100-questions-for-episode-100/) it was asked \"In what year will the next man win his 10th Slam title?\". The answer given was \"2042\".", "resc": "This question will resolve based on credible media reports, on the date of the player's final tournament win", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the regime change in a EU country ceasing to be a democracy by 2070 will be by \"the left\" or by \"the right\"?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "71.6", "median": "95.2", "upper_75": "99.0", "prediction": "71.6%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the regime change in a EU country ceasing to be a democracy by 2070 will be by \"the left\" or by \"the right\"?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "71.6", "median": "95.2", "upper_75": "99.0", "prediction": "71.6%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first openly furry person will be elected to a major US office by 2030?", "desc": "[Furries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Furry_fandom) are a subculture interested in anthropomorphic animal characters with human personalities and characteristics. Furries form a diverse group, their common interests having several dimensions, which include artistic and sexual preferences, as well as self-image and identity aspects.\n\nIn 2017, [a councilman in Connecticut resigned](https://www.reddit.com/r/DeFranco/comments/6z5pec/councilman_resigning_after_secret_furry_life/) after being outed as a furry. As of this writing, no openly furry politician holds an office in US government.", "resc": "This question resolves when the first openly furry person is elected to any of the following offices:\n\n- US Congress\n- US President or Vice President\n- Any US State Legislature\n- Any US State Governorship (including Lieutenant Governors [in those states where the Lieutenant Governor is elected](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/List_of_current_United_States_lieutenant_governors) by popular vote)\n\nA politician is considered to be \"openly furry\" if credible media reports indicate they self-identify as such before being elected. They may presently identify as a furry, or may have been a furry in the past (without apologizing or renouncing such an identity)", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2048", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next man will win his 10th tennis slam title by 2033?", "desc": "Tennis has four major events each season: Australian Open, Rolland Garros, Wimbledon and the US Open. Winning multiple of these titles is a very impressive achievement.\n\nAs of writing there are [8 players](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Grand_Slam_men%27s_singles_champions#Most_Grand_Slam_singles_titles) who have won 10 of these tournaments:\n\n* Roger Federer, Rafael Nadal: 20\n* Novak Djokovic: 18\n* Pete Sampras: 16\n* Roy Emerson: 12\n* Rod Laver, Björn Borg: 11\n* Bill Tilden: 10\n\nThree of the players at the top of this list are still active today (Federer, Nadal and Djokovic). They are widely considered the greatest of all time. \n\nAs part of [The Tennis Abstract Podcast's 100th episode](http://www.tennisabstract.com/blog/2021/03/17/podcast-episode-100-100-questions-for-episode-100/) it was asked \"In what year will the next man win his 10th Slam title?\". The answer given was \"2042\".", "resc": "This question will resolve based on credible media reports, on the date of the player's final tournament win", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "In 2050, what is the chance that the all-time tennis slam singles record for men will be 24.4?", "desc": "Tennis has four major events each season: Australian Open, Rolland Garros, Wimbledon and the US Open. Winning multiple of these titles is a very impressive achievement.\n\nCurrently 2 players have won 20 Grand Slams (Roger Federer and Rafael Nadal). This question asks what will this record be in 2050?\n\nAs part of [The Tennis Abstract Podcast's 100th episode](http://www.tennisabstract.com/blog/2021/03/17/podcast-episode-100-100-questions-for-episode-100/) it was asked \"What will the all-time Slam singles title record be for men in 2050?\". The answer given was \"22 - Djokovic, Nadal and Sinner\".", "resc": "This question will resolve according to what the record number of slam victories are in 2050. If the list of tournaments which are considered a slam changes, we will limit the list to the four which most resemble the historic 4.\n\nIn order to avoid \"spiky\" predictions, we will take the number of slams and add N(0, 0.5) randomly generated by an admin", "lower_25": "24.4", "median": "25.9", "upper_75": "28.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first openly furry person will be elected to a major US office by 2030?", "desc": "[Furries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Furry_fandom) are a subculture interested in anthropomorphic animal characters with human personalities and characteristics. Furries form a diverse group, their common interests having several dimensions, which include artistic and sexual preferences, as well as self-image and identity aspects.\n\nIn 2017, [a councilman in Connecticut resigned](https://www.reddit.com/r/DeFranco/comments/6z5pec/councilman_resigning_after_secret_furry_life/) after being outed as a furry. As of this writing, no openly furry politician holds an office in US government.", "resc": "This question resolves when the first openly furry person is elected to any of the following offices:\n\n- US Congress\n- US President or Vice President\n- Any US State Legislature\n- Any US State Governorship (including Lieutenant Governors [in those states where the Lieutenant Governor is elected](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/List_of_current_United_States_lieutenant_governors) by popular vote)\n\nA politician is considered to be \"openly furry\" if credible media reports indicate they self-identify as such before being elected. They may presently identify as a furry, or may have been a furry in the past (without apologizing or renouncing such an identity)", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2048", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next man will win his 10th tennis slam title by 2033?", "desc": "Tennis has four major events each season: Australian Open, Rolland Garros, Wimbledon and the US Open. Winning multiple of these titles is a very impressive achievement.\n\nAs of writing there are [8 players](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Grand_Slam_men%27s_singles_champions#Most_Grand_Slam_singles_titles) who have won 10 of these tournaments:\n\n* Roger Federer, Rafael Nadal: 20\n* Novak Djokovic: 18\n* Pete Sampras: 16\n* Roy Emerson: 12\n* Rod Laver, Björn Borg: 11\n* Bill Tilden: 10\n\nThree of the players at the top of this list are still active today (Federer, Nadal and Djokovic). They are widely considered the greatest of all time. \n\nAs part of [The Tennis Abstract Podcast's 100th episode](http://www.tennisabstract.com/blog/2021/03/17/podcast-episode-100-100-questions-for-episode-100/) it was asked \"In what year will the next man win his 10th Slam title?\". The answer given was \"2042\".", "resc": "This question will resolve based on credible media reports, on the date of the player's final tournament win", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "In 2050, what is the chance that the all-time tennis slam singles record for men will be 24.4?", "desc": "Tennis has four major events each season: Australian Open, Rolland Garros, Wimbledon and the US Open. Winning multiple of these titles is a very impressive achievement.\n\nCurrently 2 players have won 20 Grand Slams (Roger Federer and Rafael Nadal). This question asks what will this record be in 2050?\n\nAs part of [The Tennis Abstract Podcast's 100th episode](http://www.tennisabstract.com/blog/2021/03/17/podcast-episode-100-100-questions-for-episode-100/) it was asked \"What will the all-time Slam singles title record be for men in 2050?\". The answer given was \"22 - Djokovic, Nadal and Sinner\".", "resc": "This question will resolve according to what the record number of slam victories are in 2050. If the list of tournaments which are considered a slam changes, we will limit the list to the four which most resemble the historic 4.\n\nIn order to avoid \"spiky\" predictions, we will take the number of slams and add N(0, 0.5) randomly generated by an admin", "lower_25": "24.4", "median": "25.9", "upper_75": "28.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the last US casino will not close before December 2299?", "desc": "Casinos are currently legal in some (Indian reservations, Nevada) but not most parts of the US.", "resc": "If and when the last legal casino in the US closes, the question will resolve. Casinos on Indian reservations count for purposes of this question.", "lower_25": "Mar 2297", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2299", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2299", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the last US casino will not close before December 2299?", "desc": "Casinos are currently legal in some (Indian reservations, Nevada) but not most parts of the US.", "resc": "If and when the last legal casino in the US closes, the question will resolve. Casinos on Indian reservations count for purposes of this question.", "lower_25": "Mar 2297", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2299", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2299", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the regime change in a EU country ceasing to be a democracy by 2070 will be by \"the left\" or by \"the right\"?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "71.6", "median": "95.2", "upper_75": "99.0", "prediction": "71.6%"} -{"title": "In 2050, what is the chance that the all-time tennis slam singles record for men will be 24.4?", "desc": "Tennis has four major events each season: Australian Open, Rolland Garros, Wimbledon and the US Open. Winning multiple of these titles is a very impressive achievement.\n\nCurrently 2 players have won 20 Grand Slams (Roger Federer and Rafael Nadal). This question asks what will this record be in 2050?\n\nAs part of [The Tennis Abstract Podcast's 100th episode](http://www.tennisabstract.com/blog/2021/03/17/podcast-episode-100-100-questions-for-episode-100/) it was asked \"What will the all-time Slam singles title record be for men in 2050?\". The answer given was \"22 - Djokovic, Nadal and Sinner\".", "resc": "This question will resolve according to what the record number of slam victories are in 2050. If the list of tournaments which are considered a slam changes, we will limit the list to the four which most resemble the historic 4.\n\nIn order to avoid \"spiky\" predictions, we will take the number of slams and add N(0, 0.5) randomly generated by an admin", "lower_25": "24.4", "median": "25.9", "upper_75": "28.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that credible sources will reveal the existence of something similar to DALL-E but significantly bigger by Nov 2024?", "desc": "OpenAI's [DALL-E](https://openai.com/blog/dall-e/) was revealed on Jan 5 2021. It is a transformer trained on a multimodal dataset including text and images. It has 12 billion parameters.\n\nThe more famous GPT-3 has essentially the same architecture, but was trained only on text, and has 175 billion parameters.", "resc": "The date this question is interested in is the date the existence of the model becomes publicly known. Resolution by credible media report.\n\n(As an aside, I'd love to make the question be about when the model is actually built, rather than when it is known of, but that's a lot harder to resolve because OpenAI typically doesn't reveal training completion dates.)\n\nHere is some more detail on what \"something similar to DALL-E but significantly bigger\" means:\n\n- The model must be trained on images and text, though it can also be trained on other things\n\n- The model must be able to generate images given text descriptions, or images given text+images.\n\n- The model must have at least 50 billion parameters. Mixture-of-Experts models don't count; they instead should be thought of as a group of several smaller models.\n\nThis question closes retroactively the day before the model's existence first becomes known, in the sense described above", "lower_25": "Nov 2023", "median": "May 2024", "upper_75": "Nov 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX will launch humans around the Moon by Jul 2027?", "desc": "24 humans, all professional astronauts in the US Apollo program, have entered Lunar space. SpaceX and Japanese Billionaire Yusaku Maezawa are currently planning the [dearMoon project](https://dearmoon.earth/) flight around the Moon for 2023. The current plan is for SpaceX to launch a Starship around the Moon carrying Maezawa himself, one or two crew members, and eight members of the public selected by Maezawa. The schedule and nature of the dearMoon project has changed in the past, with its original incarnation planned for launch [in 2018](https://web.archive.org/web/20170227214045/http://www.spacex.com/news/2017/02/27/spacex-send-privately-crewed-dragon-spacecraft-beyond-moon-next-year) on SpaceX's Crew Dragon 2 capsule and Falcon Heavy launch vehicle. Given this, it seems plausible that the schedule and nature of the dearMoon project could change again.\n\nBesides the dearMoon project, as of March 2021 SpaceX also has a vehicle [in consideration](https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-names-companies-to-develop-human-landers-for-artemis-moon-missions) for the Human Landing System in NASA's Artemis program. The first Artemis program mission involving the Human Landing System is as of March 2021 scheduled for October 2024, though as of March 2021 Metaculus [predicts](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2818/when-will-nasas-sls-first-launch-a-person-to-the-moon/) that mission will occur in 2028.", "resc": "This question resolves positively when a vehicle primarily owned, operated, or constructed by SpaceX simultaneously has at least one living human aboard and is within 58,000 km of the Moon's surface. The vehicle need not have launched with humans aboard, nor need it enter orbit around nor land on the Moon. For comparison, [Apollo 13](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_13) carried humans within 158 km of the Moon's surface without landing on or entering orbit around the Moon.", "lower_25": "Feb 2026", "median": "Jul 2027", "upper_75": "Mar 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the last US casino will not close before December 2299?", "desc": "Casinos are currently legal in some (Indian reservations, Nevada) but not most parts of the US.", "resc": "If and when the last legal casino in the US closes, the question will resolve. Casinos on Indian reservations count for purposes of this question.", "lower_25": "Mar 2297", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2299", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2299", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that credible sources will reveal the existence of something similar to DALL-E but significantly bigger by Nov 2024?", "desc": "OpenAI's [DALL-E](https://openai.com/blog/dall-e/) was revealed on Jan 5 2021. It is a transformer trained on a multimodal dataset including text and images. It has 12 billion parameters.\n\nThe more famous GPT-3 has essentially the same architecture, but was trained only on text, and has 175 billion parameters.", "resc": "The date this question is interested in is the date the existence of the model becomes publicly known. Resolution by credible media report.\n\n(As an aside, I'd love to make the question be about when the model is actually built, rather than when it is known of, but that's a lot harder to resolve because OpenAI typically doesn't reveal training completion dates.)\n\nHere is some more detail on what \"something similar to DALL-E but significantly bigger\" means:\n\n- The model must be trained on images and text, though it can also be trained on other things\n\n- The model must be able to generate images given text descriptions, or images given text+images.\n\n- The model must have at least 50 billion parameters. Mixture-of-Experts models don't count; they instead should be thought of as a group of several smaller models.\n\nThis question closes retroactively the day before the model's existence first becomes known, in the sense described above", "lower_25": "Nov 2023", "median": "May 2024", "upper_75": "Nov 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX will launch humans around the Moon by Jul 2027?", "desc": "24 humans, all professional astronauts in the US Apollo program, have entered Lunar space. SpaceX and Japanese Billionaire Yusaku Maezawa are currently planning the [dearMoon project](https://dearmoon.earth/) flight around the Moon for 2023. The current plan is for SpaceX to launch a Starship around the Moon carrying Maezawa himself, one or two crew members, and eight members of the public selected by Maezawa. The schedule and nature of the dearMoon project has changed in the past, with its original incarnation planned for launch [in 2018](https://web.archive.org/web/20170227214045/http://www.spacex.com/news/2017/02/27/spacex-send-privately-crewed-dragon-spacecraft-beyond-moon-next-year) on SpaceX's Crew Dragon 2 capsule and Falcon Heavy launch vehicle. Given this, it seems plausible that the schedule and nature of the dearMoon project could change again.\n\nBesides the dearMoon project, as of March 2021 SpaceX also has a vehicle [in consideration](https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-names-companies-to-develop-human-landers-for-artemis-moon-missions) for the Human Landing System in NASA's Artemis program. The first Artemis program mission involving the Human Landing System is as of March 2021 scheduled for October 2024, though as of March 2021 Metaculus [predicts](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2818/when-will-nasas-sls-first-launch-a-person-to-the-moon/) that mission will occur in 2028.", "resc": "This question resolves positively when a vehicle primarily owned, operated, or constructed by SpaceX simultaneously has at least one living human aboard and is within 58,000 km of the Moon's surface. The vehicle need not have launched with humans aboard, nor need it enter orbit around nor land on the Moon. For comparison, [Apollo 13](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_13) carried humans within 158 km of the Moon's surface without landing on or entering orbit around the Moon.", "lower_25": "Feb 2026", "median": "Jul 2027", "upper_75": "Mar 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that credible sources will reveal the existence of something similar to DALL-E but significantly bigger by Nov 2024?", "desc": "OpenAI's [DALL-E](https://openai.com/blog/dall-e/) was revealed on Jan 5 2021. It is a transformer trained on a multimodal dataset including text and images. It has 12 billion parameters.\n\nThe more famous GPT-3 has essentially the same architecture, but was trained only on text, and has 175 billion parameters.", "resc": "The date this question is interested in is the date the existence of the model becomes publicly known. Resolution by credible media report.\n\n(As an aside, I'd love to make the question be about when the model is actually built, rather than when it is known of, but that's a lot harder to resolve because OpenAI typically doesn't reveal training completion dates.)\n\nHere is some more detail on what \"something similar to DALL-E but significantly bigger\" means:\n\n- The model must be trained on images and text, though it can also be trained on other things\n\n- The model must be able to generate images given text descriptions, or images given text+images.\n\n- The model must have at least 50 billion parameters. Mixture-of-Experts models don't count; they instead should be thought of as a group of several smaller models.\n\nThis question closes retroactively the day before the model's existence first becomes known, in the sense described above", "lower_25": "Nov 2023", "median": "May 2024", "upper_75": "Nov 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX will launch humans around the Moon by Jul 2027?", "desc": "24 humans, all professional astronauts in the US Apollo program, have entered Lunar space. SpaceX and Japanese Billionaire Yusaku Maezawa are currently planning the [dearMoon project](https://dearmoon.earth/) flight around the Moon for 2023. The current plan is for SpaceX to launch a Starship around the Moon carrying Maezawa himself, one or two crew members, and eight members of the public selected by Maezawa. The schedule and nature of the dearMoon project has changed in the past, with its original incarnation planned for launch [in 2018](https://web.archive.org/web/20170227214045/http://www.spacex.com/news/2017/02/27/spacex-send-privately-crewed-dragon-spacecraft-beyond-moon-next-year) on SpaceX's Crew Dragon 2 capsule and Falcon Heavy launch vehicle. Given this, it seems plausible that the schedule and nature of the dearMoon project could change again.\n\nBesides the dearMoon project, as of March 2021 SpaceX also has a vehicle [in consideration](https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-names-companies-to-develop-human-landers-for-artemis-moon-missions) for the Human Landing System in NASA's Artemis program. The first Artemis program mission involving the Human Landing System is as of March 2021 scheduled for October 2024, though as of March 2021 Metaculus [predicts](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2818/when-will-nasas-sls-first-launch-a-person-to-the-moon/) that mission will occur in 2028.", "resc": "This question resolves positively when a vehicle primarily owned, operated, or constructed by SpaceX simultaneously has at least one living human aboard and is within 58,000 km of the Moon's surface. The vehicle need not have launched with humans aboard, nor need it enter orbit around nor land on the Moon. For comparison, [Apollo 13](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_13) carried humans within 158 km of the Moon's surface without landing on or entering orbit around the Moon.", "lower_25": "Feb 2026", "median": "Jul 2027", "upper_75": "Mar 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "According to the EA Survey, what is the chance that 34.2% of EA dollars will go to cause prioritization in 2025?", "desc": "Each year, the Effective Altruism Survey tracks information about how the EA community donates. For example, the [2019 survey](https://www.rethinkpriorities.org/blog/2020/2/14/ea-survey-2019-series-donation-data) found that, in 2018, survey participants reported $4 million in donations to specific charities, broken down into five cause areas, with the following percentages of donations going to each:\n\n1. global poverty: 39%\n2. cause prioritization: 24%\n3. meta: 23%\n4. animal welfare: 8%\n5. long term future: 6%", "resc": "Donation data for 2025 should be taken from the 2026 EA Survey, or from whatever survey reports on 2025 donations. If no such survey is published by the end of 2027, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThe set of donations to be considered is exactly the set of donations that are reported on the EA Survey.\n\nIf cause prioritization is not one of the reported cause areas or does not unambiguously correspond to a set of reported cause areas, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nWe also have the corresponding questions for the other causes, see the [2025 EA survey mini-series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ea-survey-2025)", "lower_25": "14.4", "median": "22.5", "upper_75": "34.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "According to the EA Survey, what is the chance that 28.7% of EA dollars will go to meta charities in 2025?", "desc": "Each year, the Effective Altruism Survey tracks information about how the EA community donates. For example, the [2019 survey](https://www.rethinkpriorities.org/blog/2020/2/14/ea-survey-2019-series-donation-data) found that, in 2018, survey participants reported $4 million in donations to specific charities, broken down into five cause areas, with the following percentages of donations going to each:\n\n1. global poverty: 39%\n2. cause prioritization: 24%\n3. meta: 23%\n4. animal welfare: 8%\n5. long term future: 6%", "resc": "Donation data for 2025 should be taken from the 2026 EA Survey, or from whatever survey reports on 2025 donations. If no such survey is published by the end of 2027, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThe set of donations to be considered is exactly the set of donations that are reported on the EA Survey.\n\nIf meta is not one of the reported cause areas or does not unambiguously correspond to a set of reported cause areas, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nWe also have the corresponding questions for the other causes, see the [2025 EA survey mini-series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ea-survey-2025)", "lower_25": "17.0", "median": "22.8", "upper_75": "28.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will become possible to transplant organs without the recipient needing immunosuppressant drugs by 2033?", "desc": "Organ transplants have existed as a medical treatment for decades; however, transplant recipients must take a multitude of immunosuppressant drugs on a daily basis for the rest of their lives in order to avoid organ rejection. This dependence on drugs is of course a sad and significant inconvenience to the patients. A number of laboratories around the world are working to eliminate the necessity of them, and they have made progress by for example using bone marrow from the donor (which was shown to decrease the dose of drugs needed).", "resc": "This question will resolve when the first organ transplant is successfully performed without the need for any immunosuppressants.\n\nFor this question, any transplant of the following organs shall count: skin, cornea, uterus, kidney, liver, lung, heart, pancreas, intestine, stomach, testis, penis, thymus.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Gross World Product will exceed 1 quadrillion USD by 2053?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [gross world product (GWP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_world_product) is the combined gross national income of all the countries in the world. Because imports and exports balance exactly when considering the whole world, this also equals the total global gross domestic product (GDP).\n\nAs of 2019, GWP was $84.8 trillion in 2010 US$ (or $0.0848 quadrillion), according to [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD).\n\n**When will Gross World Product exceed $1 quadrillion in 2010 USD?**\n\nThis resolves when GWP exceeds 1.00 quadrillion USD, i.e. $\\(10^{15}\\) (in 2010 USD) according to the [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD). If that's not available, other credible data sources may be consulted.\n\nFor the purpose of this question, GWP refers to the value of humanity-generated output generated on Earth and elsewhere.\n\nTo pin down a *specific day*, we will logarithmically interpolate between the first day of the first year when GWP meets the threshold and the first day of the prior year (see the fine-print for the methodology).\n\n*ETA 2021-07-08: In case of human extinction, the question is to resolve ambiguously.*\n\n[fine-print] Specifically, let the GWP at year \\(k\\) be \\(y_k\\), and let \\(t_0\\) be the first day of the last year with \\(y_0<10^{15}\\), and let \\(t_1\\) be the first day of the first year with \\(y_1 \\geq 10^{15}\\). Then the exact resolution date will be given by\n\\[t_{\\rm res} = t_0 + 365 \\times \\frac{\\log{\\frac{10^{15}}{y_0}}}{\\log{\\frac{y_1}{y_0}}}\\]", "lower_25": "2053", "median": "2074", "upper_75": "2102", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Gross World Product will exceed 1 quadrillion USD by 2053?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [gross world product (GWP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_world_product) is the combined gross national income of all the countries in the world. Because imports and exports balance exactly when considering the whole world, this also equals the total global gross domestic product (GDP).\n\nAs of 2019, GWP was $84.8 trillion in 2010 US$ (or $0.0848 quadrillion), according to [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD).\n\n**When will Gross World Product exceed $1 quadrillion in 2010 USD?**\n\nThis resolves when GWP exceeds 1.00 quadrillion USD, i.e. $\\(10^{15}\\) (in 2010 USD) according to the [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD). If that's not available, other credible data sources may be consulted.\n\nFor the purpose of this question, GWP refers to the value of humanity-generated output generated on Earth and elsewhere.\n\nTo pin down a *specific day*, we will logarithmically interpolate between the first day of the first year when GWP meets the threshold and the first day of the prior year (see the fine-print for the methodology).\n\n*ETA 2021-07-08: In case of human extinction, the question is to resolve ambiguously.*\n\n[fine-print] Specifically, let the GWP at year \\(k\\) be \\(y_k\\), and let \\(t_0\\) be the first day of the last year with \\(y_0<10^{15}\\), and let \\(t_1\\) be the first day of the first year with \\(y_1 \\geq 10^{15}\\). Then the exact resolution date will be given by\n\\[t_{\\rm res} = t_0 + 365 \\times \\frac{\\log{\\frac{10^{15}}{y_0}}}{\\log{\\frac{y_1}{y_0}}}\\]", "lower_25": "2053", "median": "2074", "upper_75": "2102", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "According to the EA Survey, what is the chance that 28.7% of EA dollars will go to meta charities in 2025?", "desc": "Each year, the Effective Altruism Survey tracks information about how the EA community donates. For example, the [2019 survey](https://www.rethinkpriorities.org/blog/2020/2/14/ea-survey-2019-series-donation-data) found that, in 2018, survey participants reported $4 million in donations to specific charities, broken down into five cause areas, with the following percentages of donations going to each:\n\n1. global poverty: 39%\n2. cause prioritization: 24%\n3. meta: 23%\n4. animal welfare: 8%\n5. long term future: 6%", "resc": "Donation data for 2025 should be taken from the 2026 EA Survey, or from whatever survey reports on 2025 donations. If no such survey is published by the end of 2027, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThe set of donations to be considered is exactly the set of donations that are reported on the EA Survey.\n\nIf meta is not one of the reported cause areas or does not unambiguously correspond to a set of reported cause areas, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nWe also have the corresponding questions for the other causes, see the [2025 EA survey mini-series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ea-survey-2025)", "lower_25": "17.0", "median": "22.8", "upper_75": "28.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will become possible to transplant organs without the recipient needing immunosuppressant drugs by 2033?", "desc": "Organ transplants have existed as a medical treatment for decades; however, transplant recipients must take a multitude of immunosuppressant drugs on a daily basis for the rest of their lives in order to avoid organ rejection. This dependence on drugs is of course a sad and significant inconvenience to the patients. A number of laboratories around the world are working to eliminate the necessity of them, and they have made progress by for example using bone marrow from the donor (which was shown to decrease the dose of drugs needed).", "resc": "This question will resolve when the first organ transplant is successfully performed without the need for any immunosuppressants.\n\nFor this question, any transplant of the following organs shall count: skin, cornea, uterus, kidney, liver, lung, heart, pancreas, intestine, stomach, testis, penis, thymus.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will become possible to transplant organs without the recipient needing immunosuppressant drugs by 2033?", "desc": "Organ transplants have existed as a medical treatment for decades; however, transplant recipients must take a multitude of immunosuppressant drugs on a daily basis for the rest of their lives in order to avoid organ rejection. This dependence on drugs is of course a sad and significant inconvenience to the patients. A number of laboratories around the world are working to eliminate the necessity of them, and they have made progress by for example using bone marrow from the donor (which was shown to decrease the dose of drugs needed).", "resc": "This question will resolve when the first organ transplant is successfully performed without the need for any immunosuppressants.\n\nFor this question, any transplant of the following organs shall count: skin, cornea, uterus, kidney, liver, lung, heart, pancreas, intestine, stomach, testis, penis, thymus.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "According to the EA Survey, what is the chance that 21.70 percentage of EA dollars will go to animal welfare in 2025?", "desc": "Each year, the Effective Altruism Survey tracks information about how the EA community donates. For example, the [2019 survey](https://www.rethinkpriorities.org/blog/2020/2/14/ea-survey-2019-series-donation-data) found that, in 2018, survey participants reported $4 million in donations to specific charities, broken down into five cause areas, with the following percentages of donations going to each:\n\n1. global poverty: 39%\n2. cause prioritization: 24%\n3. meta: 23%\n4. animal welfare: 8%\n5. long term future: 6%", "resc": "Donation data for 2025 should be taken from the 2026 EA Survey, or from whatever survey reports on 2025 donations. If no such survey is published by the end of 2027, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThe set of donations to be considered is exactly the set of donations that are reported on the EA Survey.\n\nIf animal welfare is not one of the reported cause areas or does not unambiguously correspond to a set of reported cause areas, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\n\nWe also have the corresponding questions for the other causes, see the [2025 EA survey mini-series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ea-survey-2025)", "lower_25": "7.93", "median": "12.80", "upper_75": "21.70", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "According to the EA Survey, what is the chance that 14.60 percentage of EA dollars will go to long term future charities in 2025?", "desc": "Each year, the Effective Altruism Survey tracks information about how the EA community donates. For example, the [2019 survey](https://www.rethinkpriorities.org/blog/2020/2/14/ea-survey-2019-series-donation-data) found that, in 2018, survey participants reported $4 million in donations to specific charities, broken down into five cause areas, with the following percentages of donations going to each:\n\n1. global poverty: 39%\n2. cause prioritization: 24%\n3. meta: 23%\n4. animal welfare: 8%\n5. long term future: 6%", "resc": "Donation data for 2025 should be taken from the 2026 EA Survey, or from whatever survey reports on 2025 donations. If no such survey is published by the end of 2027, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThe set of donations to be considered is exactly the set of donations that are reported on the EA Survey.\n\nIf long-term future is not one of the reported cause areas or does not unambiguously correspond to a set of reported cause areas, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\n\nWe also have the corresponding questions for the other causes, see the [2025 EA survey mini-series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ea-survey-2025)", "lower_25": "9.34", "median": "14.60", "upper_75": "21.40", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Gross World Product will exceed 1 quadrillion USD by 2053?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [gross world product (GWP)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_world_product) is the combined gross national income of all the countries in the world. Because imports and exports balance exactly when considering the whole world, this also equals the total global gross domestic product (GDP).\n\nAs of 2019, GWP was $84.8 trillion in 2010 US$ (or $0.0848 quadrillion), according to [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD).\n\n**When will Gross World Product exceed $1 quadrillion in 2010 USD?**\n\nThis resolves when GWP exceeds 1.00 quadrillion USD, i.e. $\\(10^{15}\\) (in 2010 USD) according to the [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD). If that's not available, other credible data sources may be consulted.\n\nFor the purpose of this question, GWP refers to the value of humanity-generated output generated on Earth and elsewhere.\n\nTo pin down a *specific day*, we will logarithmically interpolate between the first day of the first year when GWP meets the threshold and the first day of the prior year (see the fine-print for the methodology).\n\n*ETA 2021-07-08: In case of human extinction, the question is to resolve ambiguously.*\n\n[fine-print] Specifically, let the GWP at year \\(k\\) be \\(y_k\\), and let \\(t_0\\) be the first day of the last year with \\(y_0<10^{15}\\), and let \\(t_1\\) be the first day of the first year with \\(y_1 \\geq 10^{15}\\). Then the exact resolution date will be given by\n\\[t_{\\rm res} = t_0 + 365 \\times \\frac{\\log{\\frac{10^{15}}{y_0}}}{\\log{\\frac{y_1}{y_0}}}\\]", "lower_25": "2053", "median": "2074", "upper_75": "2102", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "According to the EA Survey, what is the chance that 14.60 percentage of EA dollars will go to long term future charities in 2025?", "desc": "Each year, the Effective Altruism Survey tracks information about how the EA community donates. For example, the [2019 survey](https://www.rethinkpriorities.org/blog/2020/2/14/ea-survey-2019-series-donation-data) found that, in 2018, survey participants reported $4 million in donations to specific charities, broken down into five cause areas, with the following percentages of donations going to each:\n\n1. global poverty: 39%\n2. cause prioritization: 24%\n3. meta: 23%\n4. animal welfare: 8%\n5. long term future: 6%", "resc": "Donation data for 2025 should be taken from the 2026 EA Survey, or from whatever survey reports on 2025 donations. If no such survey is published by the end of 2027, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThe set of donations to be considered is exactly the set of donations that are reported on the EA Survey.\n\nIf long-term future is not one of the reported cause areas or does not unambiguously correspond to a set of reported cause areas, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\n\nWe also have the corresponding questions for the other causes, see the [2025 EA survey mini-series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ea-survey-2025)", "lower_25": "9.34", "median": "14.60", "upper_75": "21.40", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a performer will win a 4th Oscar for Acting by 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences](oscars.org) annually gives awards (known as The Oscars) for the cinematic arts. Among these awards are the categories for Acting or Best Performances.\n\nKatharine Hepburn holds the record of winning the most (4) competitive Oscars for performances. Ingrid Bergman, Meryl Streep, Jack Nicholson, and Daniel Day-Lewis have won 3 each. [Many performers have 2 such awards](http://awardsdatabase.oscars.org/Help/Statistics?file=indexStats.html), including Mahershala Ali, who won two this century.\n\n***When will another performer win a 4th competitive Oscar for acting or performance?***\n\nThe question will resolve as the date on which, according to AMPAS, a performer will have won their fourth competitive performance award. The 4 awards may have been won at any time before or during the life of this question.\n\nTo resolve the question, any official AMPAS press release, announcement, or [listing](http://awardsdatabase.oscars.org/Help/Statistics?file=indexStats.html) will suffice. In the event of unclarity, a credible statement by an AMPAS executive or by a film historian may be consulted in the discretion of the admins.\n\n[fine-print]\nA \"performer\" \"wins\" an award if AMPAS says so. If holographic representations or other non-humans become eligible under AMPAS rules, they'll be eligible here.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "According to the EA Survey, what is the chance that 34.2% of EA dollars will go to cause prioritization in 2025?", "desc": "Each year, the Effective Altruism Survey tracks information about how the EA community donates. For example, the [2019 survey](https://www.rethinkpriorities.org/blog/2020/2/14/ea-survey-2019-series-donation-data) found that, in 2018, survey participants reported $4 million in donations to specific charities, broken down into five cause areas, with the following percentages of donations going to each:\n\n1. global poverty: 39%\n2. cause prioritization: 24%\n3. meta: 23%\n4. animal welfare: 8%\n5. long term future: 6%", "resc": "Donation data for 2025 should be taken from the 2026 EA Survey, or from whatever survey reports on 2025 donations. If no such survey is published by the end of 2027, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThe set of donations to be considered is exactly the set of donations that are reported on the EA Survey.\n\nIf cause prioritization is not one of the reported cause areas or does not unambiguously correspond to a set of reported cause areas, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nWe also have the corresponding questions for the other causes, see the [2025 EA survey mini-series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ea-survey-2025)", "lower_25": "14.4", "median": "22.5", "upper_75": "34.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "According to the EA Survey, what is the chance that 21.70 percentage of EA dollars will go to animal welfare in 2025?", "desc": "Each year, the Effective Altruism Survey tracks information about how the EA community donates. For example, the [2019 survey](https://www.rethinkpriorities.org/blog/2020/2/14/ea-survey-2019-series-donation-data) found that, in 2018, survey participants reported $4 million in donations to specific charities, broken down into five cause areas, with the following percentages of donations going to each:\n\n1. global poverty: 39%\n2. cause prioritization: 24%\n3. meta: 23%\n4. animal welfare: 8%\n5. long term future: 6%", "resc": "Donation data for 2025 should be taken from the 2026 EA Survey, or from whatever survey reports on 2025 donations. If no such survey is published by the end of 2027, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThe set of donations to be considered is exactly the set of donations that are reported on the EA Survey.\n\nIf animal welfare is not one of the reported cause areas or does not unambiguously correspond to a set of reported cause areas, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\n\nWe also have the corresponding questions for the other causes, see the [2025 EA survey mini-series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ea-survey-2025)", "lower_25": "7.93", "median": "12.80", "upper_75": "21.70", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "According to the EA Survey, what is the chance that 21.70 percentage of EA dollars will go to animal welfare in 2025?", "desc": "Each year, the Effective Altruism Survey tracks information about how the EA community donates. For example, the [2019 survey](https://www.rethinkpriorities.org/blog/2020/2/14/ea-survey-2019-series-donation-data) found that, in 2018, survey participants reported $4 million in donations to specific charities, broken down into five cause areas, with the following percentages of donations going to each:\n\n1. global poverty: 39%\n2. cause prioritization: 24%\n3. meta: 23%\n4. animal welfare: 8%\n5. long term future: 6%", "resc": "Donation data for 2025 should be taken from the 2026 EA Survey, or from whatever survey reports on 2025 donations. If no such survey is published by the end of 2027, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThe set of donations to be considered is exactly the set of donations that are reported on the EA Survey.\n\nIf animal welfare is not one of the reported cause areas or does not unambiguously correspond to a set of reported cause areas, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\n\nWe also have the corresponding questions for the other causes, see the [2025 EA survey mini-series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ea-survey-2025)", "lower_25": "7.93", "median": "12.80", "upper_75": "21.70", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "According to the EA Survey, what is the chance that 14.60 percentage of EA dollars will go to long term future charities in 2025?", "desc": "Each year, the Effective Altruism Survey tracks information about how the EA community donates. For example, the [2019 survey](https://www.rethinkpriorities.org/blog/2020/2/14/ea-survey-2019-series-donation-data) found that, in 2018, survey participants reported $4 million in donations to specific charities, broken down into five cause areas, with the following percentages of donations going to each:\n\n1. global poverty: 39%\n2. cause prioritization: 24%\n3. meta: 23%\n4. animal welfare: 8%\n5. long term future: 6%", "resc": "Donation data for 2025 should be taken from the 2026 EA Survey, or from whatever survey reports on 2025 donations. If no such survey is published by the end of 2027, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThe set of donations to be considered is exactly the set of donations that are reported on the EA Survey.\n\nIf long-term future is not one of the reported cause areas or does not unambiguously correspond to a set of reported cause areas, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\n\nWe also have the corresponding questions for the other causes, see the [2025 EA survey mini-series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ea-survey-2025)", "lower_25": "9.34", "median": "14.60", "upper_75": "21.40", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a performer will win a 4th Oscar for Acting by 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences](oscars.org) annually gives awards (known as The Oscars) for the cinematic arts. Among these awards are the categories for Acting or Best Performances.\n\nKatharine Hepburn holds the record of winning the most (4) competitive Oscars for performances. Ingrid Bergman, Meryl Streep, Jack Nicholson, and Daniel Day-Lewis have won 3 each. [Many performers have 2 such awards](http://awardsdatabase.oscars.org/Help/Statistics?file=indexStats.html), including Mahershala Ali, who won two this century.\n\n***When will another performer win a 4th competitive Oscar for acting or performance?***\n\nThe question will resolve as the date on which, according to AMPAS, a performer will have won their fourth competitive performance award. The 4 awards may have been won at any time before or during the life of this question.\n\nTo resolve the question, any official AMPAS press release, announcement, or [listing](http://awardsdatabase.oscars.org/Help/Statistics?file=indexStats.html) will suffice. In the event of unclarity, a credible statement by an AMPAS executive or by a film historian may be consulted in the discretion of the admins.\n\n[fine-print]\nA \"performer\" \"wins\" an award if AMPAS says so. If holographic representations or other non-humans become eligible under AMPAS rules, they'll be eligible here.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a performer will win a 4th Oscar for Acting by 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences](oscars.org) annually gives awards (known as The Oscars) for the cinematic arts. Among these awards are the categories for Acting or Best Performances.\n\nKatharine Hepburn holds the record of winning the most (4) competitive Oscars for performances. Ingrid Bergman, Meryl Streep, Jack Nicholson, and Daniel Day-Lewis have won 3 each. [Many performers have 2 such awards](http://awardsdatabase.oscars.org/Help/Statistics?file=indexStats.html), including Mahershala Ali, who won two this century.\n\n***When will another performer win a 4th competitive Oscar for acting or performance?***\n\nThe question will resolve as the date on which, according to AMPAS, a performer will have won their fourth competitive performance award. The 4 awards may have been won at any time before or during the life of this question.\n\nTo resolve the question, any official AMPAS press release, announcement, or [listing](http://awardsdatabase.oscars.org/Help/Statistics?file=indexStats.html) will suffice. In the event of unclarity, a credible statement by an AMPAS executive or by a film historian may be consulted in the discretion of the admins.\n\n[fine-print]\nA \"performer\" \"wins\" an award if AMPAS says so. If holographic representations or other non-humans become eligible under AMPAS rules, they'll be eligible here.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "According to the EA Survey, what is the chance that 28.7% of EA dollars will go to meta charities in 2025?", "desc": "Each year, the Effective Altruism Survey tracks information about how the EA community donates. For example, the [2019 survey](https://www.rethinkpriorities.org/blog/2020/2/14/ea-survey-2019-series-donation-data) found that, in 2018, survey participants reported $4 million in donations to specific charities, broken down into five cause areas, with the following percentages of donations going to each:\n\n1. global poverty: 39%\n2. cause prioritization: 24%\n3. meta: 23%\n4. animal welfare: 8%\n5. long term future: 6%", "resc": "Donation data for 2025 should be taken from the 2026 EA Survey, or from whatever survey reports on 2025 donations. If no such survey is published by the end of 2027, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThe set of donations to be considered is exactly the set of donations that are reported on the EA Survey.\n\nIf meta is not one of the reported cause areas or does not unambiguously correspond to a set of reported cause areas, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nWe also have the corresponding questions for the other causes, see the [2025 EA survey mini-series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ea-survey-2025)", "lower_25": "17.0", "median": "22.8", "upper_75": "28.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US MSRP of the lowest priced Tesla in 2030 will be 25.1k?", "desc": "", "resc": "This question will resolve to the lowest [MSRP](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_price) of a street legal, 4 wheel, enclosed vehicle,capable of carrying at least 2 people sold in the US by Tesla as a new, 2030 vehicle in terms of 2021 dollars. Inflation adjustment should be handled by BLS CPI inflation calculator found [here](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm)", "lower_25": "20.1k", "median": "25.1k", "upper_75": "30.3k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US MSRP of the lowest priced Tesla in 2030 will be 25.1k?", "desc": "", "resc": "This question will resolve to the lowest [MSRP](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_price) of a street legal, 4 wheel, enclosed vehicle,capable of carrying at least 2 people sold in the US by Tesla as a new, 2030 vehicle in terms of 2021 dollars. Inflation adjustment should be handled by BLS CPI inflation calculator found [here](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm)", "lower_25": "20.1k", "median": "25.1k", "upper_75": "30.3k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US MSRP of the lowest priced Tesla in 2030 will be 25.1k?", "desc": "", "resc": "This question will resolve to the lowest [MSRP](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_price) of a street legal, 4 wheel, enclosed vehicle,capable of carrying at least 2 people sold in the US by Tesla as a new, 2030 vehicle in terms of 2021 dollars. Inflation adjustment should be handled by BLS CPI inflation calculator found [here](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm)", "lower_25": "20.1k", "median": "25.1k", "upper_75": "30.3k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "According to the EA Survey, what is the chance that 34.2% of EA dollars will go to cause prioritization in 2025?", "desc": "Each year, the Effective Altruism Survey tracks information about how the EA community donates. For example, the [2019 survey](https://www.rethinkpriorities.org/blog/2020/2/14/ea-survey-2019-series-donation-data) found that, in 2018, survey participants reported $4 million in donations to specific charities, broken down into five cause areas, with the following percentages of donations going to each:\n\n1. global poverty: 39%\n2. cause prioritization: 24%\n3. meta: 23%\n4. animal welfare: 8%\n5. long term future: 6%", "resc": "Donation data for 2025 should be taken from the 2026 EA Survey, or from whatever survey reports on 2025 donations. If no such survey is published by the end of 2027, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThe set of donations to be considered is exactly the set of donations that are reported on the EA Survey.\n\nIf cause prioritization is not one of the reported cause areas or does not unambiguously correspond to a set of reported cause areas, then the question resolves ambiguously.\n\nWe also have the corresponding questions for the other causes, see the [2025 EA survey mini-series](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?search=cat:series--ea-survey-2025)", "lower_25": "14.4", "median": "22.5", "upper_75": "34.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Nate Silver will release his second book by Jul 28, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 28, 2024", "median": "Aug 19, 2024", "upper_75": "Sep 26, 2024", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the World's GDP at the end of 2025 will be 154 trillions of dollars?", "desc": "", "resc": "Modelling the amount of climate change we expect requires estimates of the total emissions, which have historically increased with total GDP. Tradeoffs between climate mitigation and adaptation also depend strongly on how developed we expect different countries to be. By forecasting GDP we can ensure our climate models and climate change policies place most emphasis on worlds that have a high probability of existing.\n\nThe World Bank reports country-by country GDP adjusted for purchasing power on a yearly basis. A search tool is available [here](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD).\n\n***What will be the World's GDP in 2025 in trillions of 2017 USD?***\n\nResolution will be according to the source linked above, for the first estimate of the 2025 GDP (PPP) of the World published by the World Bank. This will likely be published in 2026. GDP should be measured in **constant 2017 international $**, so that estimates can be taken directly from the world bank. \n\n[fine-print]\nIf the World Bank is no longer producing yearly estimates, this question may resolve according to another credible source, for example Our World In Data.\n\nIn case of needing to inflation-adjust the backup datasource to 2017, [this](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US) price-deflator will be used, with [this](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPALTT01USQ661S) the first-choice backup, though admins can select a suitable alternative if neither is available.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "139", "median": "154", "upper_75": "171", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the EU's GDP in 2025 will be 21.0 trillions of dollars?", "desc": "Modelling the amount of climate change we expect requires estimates of the total emissions, which have historically increased with total GDP. Tradeoffs between climate mitigation and adaptation also depend strongly on how developed we expect different countries to be. By forecasting GDP we can ensure our climate models and climate change policies place most emphasis on worlds that have a high probability of existing.\n\nThe World Bank reports country-by country GDP adjusted for purchasing power on a yearly basis. A search tool is available [here](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the 2025 GDP (PPP) in **constant 2017 international $** for the EU published by the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD). This will likely be published in 2026.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the EU will considered to be the 27 member countries as of April 2021, listed in full in the fine print. That is, if one of these countries leaves, their GDP will still be counted, and if a new country joins, its GDP will not be counted.", "lower_25": "18.9", "median": "21.0", "upper_75": "23.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Nate Silver will release his second book by Jul 28, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 28, 2024", "median": "Aug 19, 2024", "upper_75": "Sep 26, 2024", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the EU's GDP in 2025 will be 21.0 trillions of dollars?", "desc": "Modelling the amount of climate change we expect requires estimates of the total emissions, which have historically increased with total GDP. Tradeoffs between climate mitigation and adaptation also depend strongly on how developed we expect different countries to be. By forecasting GDP we can ensure our climate models and climate change policies place most emphasis on worlds that have a high probability of existing.\n\nThe World Bank reports country-by country GDP adjusted for purchasing power on a yearly basis. A search tool is available [here](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the 2025 GDP (PPP) in **constant 2017 international $** for the EU published by the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD). This will likely be published in 2026.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the EU will considered to be the 27 member countries as of April 2021, listed in full in the fine print. That is, if one of these countries leaves, their GDP will still be counted, and if a new country joins, its GDP will not be counted.", "lower_25": "18.9", "median": "21.0", "upper_75": "23.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the World's GDP at the end of 2025 will be 154 trillions of dollars?", "desc": "", "resc": "Modelling the amount of climate change we expect requires estimates of the total emissions, which have historically increased with total GDP. Tradeoffs between climate mitigation and adaptation also depend strongly on how developed we expect different countries to be. By forecasting GDP we can ensure our climate models and climate change policies place most emphasis on worlds that have a high probability of existing.\n\nThe World Bank reports country-by country GDP adjusted for purchasing power on a yearly basis. A search tool is available [here](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD).\n\n***What will be the World's GDP in 2025 in trillions of 2017 USD?***\n\nResolution will be according to the source linked above, for the first estimate of the 2025 GDP (PPP) of the World published by the World Bank. This will likely be published in 2026. GDP should be measured in **constant 2017 international $**, so that estimates can be taken directly from the world bank. \n\n[fine-print]\nIf the World Bank is no longer producing yearly estimates, this question may resolve according to another credible source, for example Our World In Data.\n\nIn case of needing to inflation-adjust the backup datasource to 2017, [this](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US) price-deflator will be used, with [this](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPALTT01USQ661S) the first-choice backup, though admins can select a suitable alternative if neither is available.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "139", "median": "154", "upper_75": "171", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the World's GDP at the end of 2025 will be 154 trillions of dollars?", "desc": "", "resc": "Modelling the amount of climate change we expect requires estimates of the total emissions, which have historically increased with total GDP. Tradeoffs between climate mitigation and adaptation also depend strongly on how developed we expect different countries to be. By forecasting GDP we can ensure our climate models and climate change policies place most emphasis on worlds that have a high probability of existing.\n\nThe World Bank reports country-by country GDP adjusted for purchasing power on a yearly basis. A search tool is available [here](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD).\n\n***What will be the World's GDP in 2025 in trillions of 2017 USD?***\n\nResolution will be according to the source linked above, for the first estimate of the 2025 GDP (PPP) of the World published by the World Bank. This will likely be published in 2026. GDP should be measured in **constant 2017 international $**, so that estimates can be taken directly from the world bank. \n\n[fine-print]\nIf the World Bank is no longer producing yearly estimates, this question may resolve according to another credible source, for example Our World In Data.\n\nIn case of needing to inflation-adjust the backup datasource to 2017, [this](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US) price-deflator will be used, with [this](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPALTT01USQ661S) the first-choice backup, though admins can select a suitable alternative if neither is available.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "139", "median": "154", "upper_75": "171", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many years before (or after) AGI is developed, will the world real GDP be 25% higher than every previous year for the first time?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the world real GDP will be 25% higher than every previous year for the first time, −0.953 years before (or after) AGI is developed?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "−0.953", "median": "4.54", "upper_75": "14.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the EU's GDP in 2025 will be 21.0 trillions of dollars?", "desc": "Modelling the amount of climate change we expect requires estimates of the total emissions, which have historically increased with total GDP. Tradeoffs between climate mitigation and adaptation also depend strongly on how developed we expect different countries to be. By forecasting GDP we can ensure our climate models and climate change policies place most emphasis on worlds that have a high probability of existing.\n\nThe World Bank reports country-by country GDP adjusted for purchasing power on a yearly basis. A search tool is available [here](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the 2025 GDP (PPP) in **constant 2017 international $** for the EU published by the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD). This will likely be published in 2026.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the EU will considered to be the 27 member countries as of April 2021, listed in full in the fine print. That is, if one of these countries leaves, their GDP will still be counted, and if a new country joins, its GDP will not be counted.", "lower_25": "18.9", "median": "21.0", "upper_75": "23.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that insect feed will replace fishmeal for animal feed by 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that insect feed will replace fishmeal for animal feed by 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Nate Silver will release his second book by Jul 28, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 28, 2024", "median": "Aug 19, 2024", "upper_75": "Sep 26, 2024", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI program will be better than humans at making Metaculus forecasts by 2034?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI program will be better than humans at making Metaculus forecasts by 2034?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI program will be better than humans at making Metaculus forecasts by 2034?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many years before (or after) AGI is developed, will the world real GDP be 25% higher than every previous year for the first time?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the world real GDP will be 25% higher than every previous year for the first time, −0.953 years before (or after) AGI is developed?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "−0.953", "median": "4.54", "upper_75": "14.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 176k refugees will be admitted to the US from 2021 to 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "136k", "median": "176k", "upper_75": "221k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first babies screened by Orchid Health will be born by Dec 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jun 2023", "median": "Aug 2024", "upper_75": "Dec 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 176k refugees will be admitted to the US from 2021 to 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "136k", "median": "176k", "upper_75": "221k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many years before (or after) AGI is developed, will the world real GDP be 25% higher than every previous year for the first time?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the world real GDP will be 25% higher than every previous year for the first time, −0.953 years before (or after) AGI is developed?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "−0.953", "median": "4.54", "upper_75": "14.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that insect feed will replace fishmeal for animal feed by 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 176k refugees will be admitted to the US from 2021 to 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "136k", "median": "176k", "upper_75": "221k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a biocomputer will not be able to perform an SHA-256 hash by 2060?", "desc": "A significant amount of energy, money, and energy is currently (as of 2021) being devoted to performing SHA-256 hashes, because these are the basic operation of bitcoin mining, so that the ability to perform energy efficient hashes is economically rewarded.\n\n[Biocomputers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_computing) are a promising but very nascent idea to perform digital operations using complex biological molecules — for example enzymes operating on DNA or RNA.\n\nIn principle, biocomputers could perform an immense number of computations in parallel using very little energy. In particular, in very round numbers, the bitcoin network is (as of mid 2021) performing about [100M terahashes/s](https://www.blockchain.com/charts/hash-rate), or \\(10^{20}\\) hashes/second. That's really a lot. But imagine a biocomputer in which a fairly long strand of DNA (say 10^6 atoms) and some large enzymes (\\(\\sim 10^5\\) atoms each) compute a hash — so about \\(10^7\\) atoms at most. A hash is probably of order \\(10^5\\) simple (bitwise) operations. DNA polymerase can act on about 700 base pairs second; so let's suppose it takes 100-1000 seconds to do a hash. Then we'd need about \\(10^{22-23} \\cdot 10^7 = 10^{29-30}\\) atoms working the problem to outcompute the rest of the world (of 2021). But that's just a small vat of chemicals.", "resc": "Resolves when a biocomputer is demonstrated to either perform a SHA256 hash, or a complex calculation with thousands of operations judged by Metaculus staff to be roughly as difficult as such a hash", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2060", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a biocomputer will not be able to perform an SHA-256 hash by 2060?", "desc": "A significant amount of energy, money, and energy is currently (as of 2021) being devoted to performing SHA-256 hashes, because these are the basic operation of bitcoin mining, so that the ability to perform energy efficient hashes is economically rewarded.\n\n[Biocomputers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_computing) are a promising but very nascent idea to perform digital operations using complex biological molecules — for example enzymes operating on DNA or RNA.\n\nIn principle, biocomputers could perform an immense number of computations in parallel using very little energy. In particular, in very round numbers, the bitcoin network is (as of mid 2021) performing about [100M terahashes/s](https://www.blockchain.com/charts/hash-rate), or \\(10^{20}\\) hashes/second. That's really a lot. But imagine a biocomputer in which a fairly long strand of DNA (say 10^6 atoms) and some large enzymes (\\(\\sim 10^5\\) atoms each) compute a hash — so about \\(10^7\\) atoms at most. A hash is probably of order \\(10^5\\) simple (bitwise) operations. DNA polymerase can act on about 700 base pairs second; so let's suppose it takes 100-1000 seconds to do a hash. Then we'd need about \\(10^{22-23} \\cdot 10^7 = 10^{29-30}\\) atoms working the problem to outcompute the rest of the world (of 2021). But that's just a small vat of chemicals.", "resc": "Resolves when a biocomputer is demonstrated to either perform a SHA256 hash, or a complex calculation with thousands of operations judged by Metaculus staff to be roughly as difficult as such a hash", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2060", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first babies screened by Orchid Health will be born by Dec 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jun 2023", "median": "Aug 2024", "upper_75": "Dec 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a single facility will have the largest cultivated meat production capacity of 6.13k metric tons per year by January 1, 2030?", "desc": "[Cultivated meat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultured_meat) is animal meat that is produced by cultivating animal cells directly. Cultivated meat is made of the same cell types arranged in the same or similar structure as animal tissues, thus replicating the sensory and nutritional profiles of conventional meat. This production method eliminates the need to raise and farm animals for food. \n\nBy the end of 2019, 55 announced early-stage companies around the world were focused on producing cultivated meat and seafood or serving these producers along the value chain, according to the Good Food Institute's [2019 State of the Industry Report](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-eggs-and-dairy-state-of-the-industry-report/). \n\nSo far, cultivated meat production facilities have not seen commercial scale. That said, plans are under way:\n\n- In August 2019, BlueNalu [released a five-stage commercialization strategy](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219) that calls for moving the company from pilot-scale research and development to facilities with 150,000 square feet of food production space and the capacity to make 18 million pounds (~8,000 metric tons) of finished cultivated seafood products per year\n\n- In September 2020 Mosa Meat's head of operations [announced](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2020/09/25/How-will-Mosa-Meat-spend-its-latest-55m-injection) that they will be scaling all the way up to a 200L bioreactor capable of producing 100kg of cultured burgers for each 200L production line.", "resc": "This question will resolves as the highest reported production capacity, in metric tons per year, of a single physical facility that produces cultivated meat products by January 1, 2030.\n\nThe following types of evidence would decide the question:\n\n- A company publication (such as a press release) or a credible media report which reports the estimated maximum amount in metric tons that a single company produced within a 365 day time period. \n\n- Statements by other credible sources (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies) further qualify\n\nResolution requires the cultivated meat production facility to be operational, but it need not run at maximum production capacity. For a product to be deemed a \"cultivated meat product\", it must contain at least 20% cultivated meat by weight (where cultivated meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal's body).\n\nThe production process may involve any medium, such as scaffolding techniques, cultivators or bioreactors. It may be further co-owned or co-operated by multiple organizations", "lower_25": "6.13k", "median": "13.1k", "upper_75": "28.3k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a single facility will have the largest cultivated meat production capacity of 6.13k metric tons per year by January 1, 2030?", "desc": "[Cultivated meat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultured_meat) is animal meat that is produced by cultivating animal cells directly. Cultivated meat is made of the same cell types arranged in the same or similar structure as animal tissues, thus replicating the sensory and nutritional profiles of conventional meat. This production method eliminates the need to raise and farm animals for food. \n\nBy the end of 2019, 55 announced early-stage companies around the world were focused on producing cultivated meat and seafood or serving these producers along the value chain, according to the Good Food Institute's [2019 State of the Industry Report](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-eggs-and-dairy-state-of-the-industry-report/). \n\nSo far, cultivated meat production facilities have not seen commercial scale. That said, plans are under way:\n\n- In August 2019, BlueNalu [released a five-stage commercialization strategy](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219) that calls for moving the company from pilot-scale research and development to facilities with 150,000 square feet of food production space and the capacity to make 18 million pounds (~8,000 metric tons) of finished cultivated seafood products per year\n\n- In September 2020 Mosa Meat's head of operations [announced](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2020/09/25/How-will-Mosa-Meat-spend-its-latest-55m-injection) that they will be scaling all the way up to a 200L bioreactor capable of producing 100kg of cultured burgers for each 200L production line.", "resc": "This question will resolves as the highest reported production capacity, in metric tons per year, of a single physical facility that produces cultivated meat products by January 1, 2030.\n\nThe following types of evidence would decide the question:\n\n- A company publication (such as a press release) or a credible media report which reports the estimated maximum amount in metric tons that a single company produced within a 365 day time period. \n\n- Statements by other credible sources (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies) further qualify\n\nResolution requires the cultivated meat production facility to be operational, but it need not run at maximum production capacity. For a product to be deemed a \"cultivated meat product\", it must contain at least 20% cultivated meat by weight (where cultivated meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal's body).\n\nThe production process may involve any medium, such as scaffolding techniques, cultivators or bioreactors. It may be further co-owned or co-operated by multiple organizations", "lower_25": "6.13k", "median": "13.1k", "upper_75": "28.3k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first babies screened by Orchid Health will be born by Dec 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jun 2023", "median": "Aug 2024", "upper_75": "Dec 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a biocomputer will not be able to perform an SHA-256 hash by 2060?", "desc": "A significant amount of energy, money, and energy is currently (as of 2021) being devoted to performing SHA-256 hashes, because these are the basic operation of bitcoin mining, so that the ability to perform energy efficient hashes is economically rewarded.\n\n[Biocomputers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_computing) are a promising but very nascent idea to perform digital operations using complex biological molecules — for example enzymes operating on DNA or RNA.\n\nIn principle, biocomputers could perform an immense number of computations in parallel using very little energy. In particular, in very round numbers, the bitcoin network is (as of mid 2021) performing about [100M terahashes/s](https://www.blockchain.com/charts/hash-rate), or \\(10^{20}\\) hashes/second. That's really a lot. But imagine a biocomputer in which a fairly long strand of DNA (say 10^6 atoms) and some large enzymes (\\(\\sim 10^5\\) atoms each) compute a hash — so about \\(10^7\\) atoms at most. A hash is probably of order \\(10^5\\) simple (bitwise) operations. DNA polymerase can act on about 700 base pairs second; so let's suppose it takes 100-1000 seconds to do a hash. Then we'd need about \\(10^{22-23} \\cdot 10^7 = 10^{29-30}\\) atoms working the problem to outcompute the rest of the world (of 2021). But that's just a small vat of chemicals.", "resc": "Resolves when a biocomputer is demonstrated to either perform a SHA256 hash, or a complex calculation with thousands of operations judged by Metaculus staff to be roughly as difficult as such a hash", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2060", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.93B USD will be invested in plant-based food companies in 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.42B", "median": "2.05B", "upper_75": "2.93B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a single facility will have a plant-based meat production capacity of 70.3k metric tons per year by January 1, 2030?", "desc": "The production capacity of plant-based foods are steadily growing as more scalable techniques for texturising plant-protein are being developed. As a result, contract manufacturing plants are increasing their throughputs. For example, the UK-based [Plant-bean](https://plantandbean.com/) is planning on opening a new production facility with an initial capacity of [55,000 metric tons](https://thebeet.com/good-news-plant-based-meat-is-about-to-get-cheaper-thanks-to-this-company/) per year. However, this level of throughput is still about one-fourth as large as a typical cattle processing plants, which process typically around 20,000 heads per week ([Vahid et al., 2006](https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/saeaso/35417.html))", "resc": "This question will resolve as the highest reported production capacity, in metric tons per year, of a single physical facility that produces plant-based meat products before January 1, 2030.\n\nThe following types of evidence would decide the question:\n\n- A company publication (such as a press release) or a credible media report which reports the estimated maximum amount in metric tons that a single company produced within a 365 day time period. \n\n- Statements by other credible sources (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies) further qualify\n\nResolution requires the plant-based meat production facility to be operational, but it need not run at maximum production capacity. The production process may involve any plant-based proteins, and any texturising procedure. It may be further co-owned or co-operated by multiple organizations.\n\nPlant based meat is here defined as any product that is made to mimic properties found within natural meats, and advertised as a meat substitute with meat-like qualities (such as taste, texture, nutritional content, or other factors)", "lower_25": "70.3k", "median": "110k", "upper_75": "161k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.93B USD will be invested in plant-based food companies in 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.42B", "median": "2.05B", "upper_75": "2.93B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a de-allergenized peanut, soy, or wheat-based product will first be sold somewhere in the US or EU by 2032?", "desc": "Many plant-based meat alternatives are based on common plants, seeds, nuts and legumes that are high in protein, such as soy, wheat and peanuts. However, allergies to such foodstuffs [are common](https://www.foodallergy.org/living-food-allergies/food-allergy-essentials/common-allergens), which may limit their widespread adoption.\n\nTo resolve the problem, scientists [are working](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2021/01/210127085239.htm) on genetically modifying plants to produce fewer allergens. For example, researchers are studying how we can use plant breeding to [create less allergenic versions of a variety of foods](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2021/01/210127085239.htm), including peanuts. Peanuts contain 16 individual proteins that can cause allergic reactions, which makes breeding them all out a potentially difficult task. However, to alleviate this, Rustgi is investigating using gene-editing CRISPR techniques in order to permanently remove the allergenic proteins.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a peanut, soy, or wheat-based product that is marketed as having been removed of at least some of its allergens is for sale in the United States or any European Union member state. The product must be based on peanut, soy, or wheat, and be marketed as low allergenic or non-allergenic.\n\nFor the purpose of this question, \"European Member states\" refers to all member states as of the time the question resolves. \n\nThis question will be resolved on the basis of credible media reports, statements by regulatory agencies, or company press-releases. If this does not occur by April 22, 2035, this question will resolve as **April 22, 2035**.\n\n*Note: to preserve incentive-compatibility of our scoring, the resolution will be entered at the earliest on Earth Day 2023, so that this question's resolution will not count toward tournament performance.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a single facility will have the largest cultivated meat production capacity of 6.13k metric tons per year by January 1, 2030?", "desc": "[Cultivated meat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultured_meat) is animal meat that is produced by cultivating animal cells directly. Cultivated meat is made of the same cell types arranged in the same or similar structure as animal tissues, thus replicating the sensory and nutritional profiles of conventional meat. This production method eliminates the need to raise and farm animals for food. \n\nBy the end of 2019, 55 announced early-stage companies around the world were focused on producing cultivated meat and seafood or serving these producers along the value chain, according to the Good Food Institute's [2019 State of the Industry Report](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-eggs-and-dairy-state-of-the-industry-report/). \n\nSo far, cultivated meat production facilities have not seen commercial scale. That said, plans are under way:\n\n- In August 2019, BlueNalu [released a five-stage commercialization strategy](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219) that calls for moving the company from pilot-scale research and development to facilities with 150,000 square feet of food production space and the capacity to make 18 million pounds (~8,000 metric tons) of finished cultivated seafood products per year\n\n- In September 2020 Mosa Meat's head of operations [announced](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2020/09/25/How-will-Mosa-Meat-spend-its-latest-55m-injection) that they will be scaling all the way up to a 200L bioreactor capable of producing 100kg of cultured burgers for each 200L production line.", "resc": "This question will resolves as the highest reported production capacity, in metric tons per year, of a single physical facility that produces cultivated meat products by January 1, 2030.\n\nThe following types of evidence would decide the question:\n\n- A company publication (such as a press release) or a credible media report which reports the estimated maximum amount in metric tons that a single company produced within a 365 day time period. \n\n- Statements by other credible sources (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies) further qualify\n\nResolution requires the cultivated meat production facility to be operational, but it need not run at maximum production capacity. For a product to be deemed a \"cultivated meat product\", it must contain at least 20% cultivated meat by weight (where cultivated meat is here defined as meat that is grown primarily or entirely in cell culture, rather than in an animal's body).\n\nThe production process may involve any medium, such as scaffolding techniques, cultivators or bioreactors. It may be further co-owned or co-operated by multiple organizations", "lower_25": "6.13k", "median": "13.1k", "upper_75": "28.3k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a single facility will have a plant-based meat production capacity of 70.3k metric tons per year by January 1, 2030?", "desc": "The production capacity of plant-based foods are steadily growing as more scalable techniques for texturising plant-protein are being developed. As a result, contract manufacturing plants are increasing their throughputs. For example, the UK-based [Plant-bean](https://plantandbean.com/) is planning on opening a new production facility with an initial capacity of [55,000 metric tons](https://thebeet.com/good-news-plant-based-meat-is-about-to-get-cheaper-thanks-to-this-company/) per year. However, this level of throughput is still about one-fourth as large as a typical cattle processing plants, which process typically around 20,000 heads per week ([Vahid et al., 2006](https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/saeaso/35417.html))", "resc": "This question will resolve as the highest reported production capacity, in metric tons per year, of a single physical facility that produces plant-based meat products before January 1, 2030.\n\nThe following types of evidence would decide the question:\n\n- A company publication (such as a press release) or a credible media report which reports the estimated maximum amount in metric tons that a single company produced within a 365 day time period. \n\n- Statements by other credible sources (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies) further qualify\n\nResolution requires the plant-based meat production facility to be operational, but it need not run at maximum production capacity. The production process may involve any plant-based proteins, and any texturising procedure. It may be further co-owned or co-operated by multiple organizations.\n\nPlant based meat is here defined as any product that is made to mimic properties found within natural meats, and advertised as a meat substitute with meat-like qualities (such as taste, texture, nutritional content, or other factors)", "lower_25": "70.3k", "median": "110k", "upper_75": "161k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a de-allergenized peanut, soy, or wheat-based product will first be sold somewhere in the US or EU by 2032?", "desc": "Many plant-based meat alternatives are based on common plants, seeds, nuts and legumes that are high in protein, such as soy, wheat and peanuts. However, allergies to such foodstuffs [are common](https://www.foodallergy.org/living-food-allergies/food-allergy-essentials/common-allergens), which may limit their widespread adoption.\n\nTo resolve the problem, scientists [are working](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2021/01/210127085239.htm) on genetically modifying plants to produce fewer allergens. For example, researchers are studying how we can use plant breeding to [create less allergenic versions of a variety of foods](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2021/01/210127085239.htm), including peanuts. Peanuts contain 16 individual proteins that can cause allergic reactions, which makes breeding them all out a potentially difficult task. However, to alleviate this, Rustgi is investigating using gene-editing CRISPR techniques in order to permanently remove the allergenic proteins.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a peanut, soy, or wheat-based product that is marketed as having been removed of at least some of its allergens is for sale in the United States or any European Union member state. The product must be based on peanut, soy, or wheat, and be marketed as low allergenic or non-allergenic.\n\nFor the purpose of this question, \"European Member states\" refers to all member states as of the time the question resolves. \n\nThis question will be resolved on the basis of credible media reports, statements by regulatory agencies, or company press-releases. If this does not occur by April 22, 2035, this question will resolve as **April 22, 2035**.\n\n*Note: to preserve incentive-compatibility of our scoring, the resolution will be entered at the earliest on Earth Day 2023, so that this question's resolution will not count toward tournament performance.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.93B USD will be invested in plant-based food companies in 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.42B", "median": "2.05B", "upper_75": "2.93B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.194 proportion of well-known QSRs will offer a cultivated meat product in 2026?", "desc": "Note: this is a long term question which will not count toward the tournament leaderboard. See the tournament page for details.\n\n[Cultivated meat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultured_meat) is animal meat that is produced by cultivating animal cells directly. Cultivated meat is made of the same cell types arranged in the same or similar structure as animal tissues, thus replicating the sensory and nutritional profiles of conventional meat. This production method eliminates the need to raise and farm animals for food.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the proportion of top Quick Service Restaurants that offer at least one cultivated meat product in at least some of their stores in the calendar year 2026.\n\nFor the purpose of this question, Top Quick Service Restaurants include the following:\n\n> Subway, McDonald's, KFC, Pizza Hut, Burger King, Domino's, Hunt Brothers Pizza, Taco Bell, Wendy's, Hardee's, Chick-fil-A, Chipotle, Little Caesars\n\nCompanies need to offer cultivated meat products for sale to the general public in at least one location anywhere in the world at least once in 2026. If any listed QSR is no longer in business in 2026, it will be removed from the list and not influence the total proportion", "lower_25": "0.012", "median": "0.061", "upper_75": "0.194", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.194 proportion of well-known QSRs will offer a cultivated meat product in 2026?", "desc": "Note: this is a long term question which will not count toward the tournament leaderboard. See the tournament page for details.\n\n[Cultivated meat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultured_meat) is animal meat that is produced by cultivating animal cells directly. Cultivated meat is made of the same cell types arranged in the same or similar structure as animal tissues, thus replicating the sensory and nutritional profiles of conventional meat. This production method eliminates the need to raise and farm animals for food.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the proportion of top Quick Service Restaurants that offer at least one cultivated meat product in at least some of their stores in the calendar year 2026.\n\nFor the purpose of this question, Top Quick Service Restaurants include the following:\n\n> Subway, McDonald's, KFC, Pizza Hut, Burger King, Domino's, Hunt Brothers Pizza, Taco Bell, Wendy's, Hardee's, Chick-fil-A, Chipotle, Little Caesars\n\nCompanies need to offer cultivated meat products for sale to the general public in at least one location anywhere in the world at least once in 2026. If any listed QSR is no longer in business in 2026, it will be removed from the list and not influence the total proportion", "lower_25": "0.012", "median": "0.061", "upper_75": "0.194", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a single facility will have a plant-based meat production capacity of 70.3k metric tons per year by January 1, 2030?", "desc": "The production capacity of plant-based foods are steadily growing as more scalable techniques for texturising plant-protein are being developed. As a result, contract manufacturing plants are increasing their throughputs. For example, the UK-based [Plant-bean](https://plantandbean.com/) is planning on opening a new production facility with an initial capacity of [55,000 metric tons](https://thebeet.com/good-news-plant-based-meat-is-about-to-get-cheaper-thanks-to-this-company/) per year. However, this level of throughput is still about one-fourth as large as a typical cattle processing plants, which process typically around 20,000 heads per week ([Vahid et al., 2006](https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/saeaso/35417.html))", "resc": "This question will resolve as the highest reported production capacity, in metric tons per year, of a single physical facility that produces plant-based meat products before January 1, 2030.\n\nThe following types of evidence would decide the question:\n\n- A company publication (such as a press release) or a credible media report which reports the estimated maximum amount in metric tons that a single company produced within a 365 day time period. \n\n- Statements by other credible sources (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies) further qualify\n\nResolution requires the plant-based meat production facility to be operational, but it need not run at maximum production capacity. The production process may involve any plant-based proteins, and any texturising procedure. It may be further co-owned or co-operated by multiple organizations.\n\nPlant based meat is here defined as any product that is made to mimic properties found within natural meats, and advertised as a meat substitute with meat-like qualities (such as taste, texture, nutritional content, or other factors)", "lower_25": "70.3k", "median": "110k", "upper_75": "161k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 5 cultivated meat products will be approved for sale in the US by May 2025?", "desc": "Note: this is a long term question which will not count toward the tournament leaderboard. See the tournament page for details.\n\n[Cultivated meat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultured_meat) is animal meat that is produced by cultivating animal cells directly. Cultivated meat is made of the same cell types arranged in the same or similar structure as animal tissues, thus replicating the sensory and nutritional profiles of conventional meat. This production method eliminates the need to raise and farm animals for food. However, before cultivated meat can come to market, a regulatory framework must be in place. \n\nAccording to the Good Food Institute's [2019 State of the Industry Report](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-eggs-and-dairy-state-of-the-industry-report/):\n\n> In March [2019], the USDA and FDA released a formal agreement outlining regulatory roles that leverage each agency's expertise—the FDA will oversee the earlier stages of cultivated meat production, and the USDA will oversee the later stages.\n\nVox's Kelsey Piper [goes on to explain](https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/3/9/18255806/fda-usda-lab-grown-meat-cell-based-vegan-vegetarian):\n\n> Basically, regulation of meat involves both agencies — the USDA overlooking food processing, labeling, and distribution, and the FDA conducting inspections and safety checks — and the regulation of cell-based meat will, too. This agreement outlines which problems are the jurisdiction of which agency, so they can develop further guidelines without stepping on each others' toes.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first date when at least 5 separate cultivated meat products are approved by federal regulators for commercial sale anywhere in the United States. \n\n- Positive resolution requires regulatory approval but it does not require the relevant products be for sale\n\n- Positive resolution does not require all the relevant products to be labelled as cell-based meat\n\n- Separate cultivated meat products are those belonging to different product lines (i.e. are sold under different brand names), but may be produced by the same company. For example XYZ's \"clean chicken nuggets V1.0\" and XYZ's \"clean chicken nuggets V1.1\" are considered the same product for the purpose of this question\n\n- If this does not occur on or before December 31, 2035, this question will resolve as **>December 31, 2035**\n\n*Note: to preserve incentive-compatibility of our scoring, the resolution will be entered at the earliest on Earth Day 2023, so that this question's resolution will not count toward tournament performance.", "lower_25": "Jun 2024", "median": "May 2025", "upper_75": "Sep 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a de-allergenized peanut, soy, or wheat-based product will first be sold somewhere in the US or EU by 2032?", "desc": "Many plant-based meat alternatives are based on common plants, seeds, nuts and legumes that are high in protein, such as soy, wheat and peanuts. However, allergies to such foodstuffs [are common](https://www.foodallergy.org/living-food-allergies/food-allergy-essentials/common-allergens), which may limit their widespread adoption.\n\nTo resolve the problem, scientists [are working](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2021/01/210127085239.htm) on genetically modifying plants to produce fewer allergens. For example, researchers are studying how we can use plant breeding to [create less allergenic versions of a variety of foods](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2021/01/210127085239.htm), including peanuts. Peanuts contain 16 individual proteins that can cause allergic reactions, which makes breeding them all out a potentially difficult task. However, to alleviate this, Rustgi is investigating using gene-editing CRISPR techniques in order to permanently remove the allergenic proteins.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a peanut, soy, or wheat-based product that is marketed as having been removed of at least some of its allergens is for sale in the United States or any European Union member state. The product must be based on peanut, soy, or wheat, and be marketed as low allergenic or non-allergenic.\n\nFor the purpose of this question, \"European Member states\" refers to all member states as of the time the question resolves. \n\nThis question will be resolved on the basis of credible media reports, statements by regulatory agencies, or company press-releases. If this does not occur by April 22, 2035, this question will resolve as **April 22, 2035**.\n\n*Note: to preserve incentive-compatibility of our scoring, the resolution will be entered at the earliest on Earth Day 2023, so that this question's resolution will not count toward tournament performance.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 5 cultivated meat products will be approved for sale in the US by May 2025?", "desc": "Note: this is a long term question which will not count toward the tournament leaderboard. See the tournament page for details.\n\n[Cultivated meat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultured_meat) is animal meat that is produced by cultivating animal cells directly. Cultivated meat is made of the same cell types arranged in the same or similar structure as animal tissues, thus replicating the sensory and nutritional profiles of conventional meat. This production method eliminates the need to raise and farm animals for food. However, before cultivated meat can come to market, a regulatory framework must be in place. \n\nAccording to the Good Food Institute's [2019 State of the Industry Report](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-eggs-and-dairy-state-of-the-industry-report/):\n\n> In March [2019], the USDA and FDA released a formal agreement outlining regulatory roles that leverage each agency's expertise—the FDA will oversee the earlier stages of cultivated meat production, and the USDA will oversee the later stages.\n\nVox's Kelsey Piper [goes on to explain](https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/3/9/18255806/fda-usda-lab-grown-meat-cell-based-vegan-vegetarian):\n\n> Basically, regulation of meat involves both agencies — the USDA overlooking food processing, labeling, and distribution, and the FDA conducting inspections and safety checks — and the regulation of cell-based meat will, too. This agreement outlines which problems are the jurisdiction of which agency, so they can develop further guidelines without stepping on each others' toes.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first date when at least 5 separate cultivated meat products are approved by federal regulators for commercial sale anywhere in the United States. \n\n- Positive resolution requires regulatory approval but it does not require the relevant products be for sale\n\n- Positive resolution does not require all the relevant products to be labelled as cell-based meat\n\n- Separate cultivated meat products are those belonging to different product lines (i.e. are sold under different brand names), but may be produced by the same company. For example XYZ's \"clean chicken nuggets V1.0\" and XYZ's \"clean chicken nuggets V1.1\" are considered the same product for the purpose of this question\n\n- If this does not occur on or before December 31, 2035, this question will resolve as **>December 31, 2035**\n\n*Note: to preserve incentive-compatibility of our scoring, the resolution will be entered at the earliest on Earth Day 2023, so that this question's resolution will not count toward tournament performance.", "lower_25": "Jun 2024", "median": "May 2025", "upper_75": "Sep 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 5 cultivated meat products will be approved for sale in the US by May 2025?", "desc": "Note: this is a long term question which will not count toward the tournament leaderboard. See the tournament page for details.\n\n[Cultivated meat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultured_meat) is animal meat that is produced by cultivating animal cells directly. Cultivated meat is made of the same cell types arranged in the same or similar structure as animal tissues, thus replicating the sensory and nutritional profiles of conventional meat. This production method eliminates the need to raise and farm animals for food. However, before cultivated meat can come to market, a regulatory framework must be in place. \n\nAccording to the Good Food Institute's [2019 State of the Industry Report](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-eggs-and-dairy-state-of-the-industry-report/):\n\n> In March [2019], the USDA and FDA released a formal agreement outlining regulatory roles that leverage each agency's expertise—the FDA will oversee the earlier stages of cultivated meat production, and the USDA will oversee the later stages.\n\nVox's Kelsey Piper [goes on to explain](https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/3/9/18255806/fda-usda-lab-grown-meat-cell-based-vegan-vegetarian):\n\n> Basically, regulation of meat involves both agencies — the USDA overlooking food processing, labeling, and distribution, and the FDA conducting inspections and safety checks — and the regulation of cell-based meat will, too. This agreement outlines which problems are the jurisdiction of which agency, so they can develop further guidelines without stepping on each others' toes.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first date when at least 5 separate cultivated meat products are approved by federal regulators for commercial sale anywhere in the United States. \n\n- Positive resolution requires regulatory approval but it does not require the relevant products be for sale\n\n- Positive resolution does not require all the relevant products to be labelled as cell-based meat\n\n- Separate cultivated meat products are those belonging to different product lines (i.e. are sold under different brand names), but may be produced by the same company. For example XYZ's \"clean chicken nuggets V1.0\" and XYZ's \"clean chicken nuggets V1.1\" are considered the same product for the purpose of this question\n\n- If this does not occur on or before December 31, 2035, this question will resolve as **>December 31, 2035**\n\n*Note: to preserve incentive-compatibility of our scoring, the resolution will be entered at the earliest on Earth Day 2023, so that this question's resolution will not count toward tournament performance.", "lower_25": "Jun 2024", "median": "May 2025", "upper_75": "Sep 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the age-adjusted mortality rate in England and Wales will be 1.03k in 2051?", "desc": "The worldwide Coronavirus/COVID-19 crisis has got many people talking about comparing the risks across time and place. [John Appleby published a paper in the British Medical Journal in April 2021 discussing the various British (England and Wales) statistics](https://www.bmj.com/content/373/bmj.n896). One interesting figure is the one that shows age standardised mortality rates per 100 000 in England and Wales, 1942-2020 (Figure 4). Here we see that the rate was about 2000 in 1943, this had fallen to just below 1000 in the years before the Coronavirus pandemic. On this metric, the historical improvements are so large that the Coronavirus only caused a reversion to the same rate seen in the 2008-2009. This suggests another metric for progress towards indefinite lifespan. The rate has been halved in the period roughly 60 year period between 1943 and 2010, and theoretically, a 0-rate would mean we have achieved essential immortality.", "resc": "- The age-standardized death/mortality rate for England and Wales in the year 2051, as published by Office for National Statistics (ONS).\n- If the ONS stops existing, or ceases publishing this statistic, admin choose a suitable replacement.\n- If the territory of England and Wales change, this question refers to numbers for whatever the new polities are called that refer to the same geographical region and populations, insofar as this is possible to obtain", "lower_25": "593", "median": "817", "upper_75": "1.03k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.194 proportion of well-known QSRs will offer a cultivated meat product in 2026?", "desc": "Note: this is a long term question which will not count toward the tournament leaderboard. See the tournament page for details.\n\n[Cultivated meat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultured_meat) is animal meat that is produced by cultivating animal cells directly. Cultivated meat is made of the same cell types arranged in the same or similar structure as animal tissues, thus replicating the sensory and nutritional profiles of conventional meat. This production method eliminates the need to raise and farm animals for food.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the proportion of top Quick Service Restaurants that offer at least one cultivated meat product in at least some of their stores in the calendar year 2026.\n\nFor the purpose of this question, Top Quick Service Restaurants include the following:\n\n> Subway, McDonald's, KFC, Pizza Hut, Burger King, Domino's, Hunt Brothers Pizza, Taco Bell, Wendy's, Hardee's, Chick-fil-A, Chipotle, Little Caesars\n\nCompanies need to offer cultivated meat products for sale to the general public in at least one location anywhere in the world at least once in 2026. If any listed QSR is no longer in business in 2026, it will be removed from the list and not influence the total proportion", "lower_25": "0.012", "median": "0.061", "upper_75": "0.194", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How far away is the nearest independent origination of life?\n\nKeyword: 27.0B\n\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the nearest independent origination of life is 27.0B light years away?", "desc": "", "resc": "We know that life originated at least once, on Earth of order 4 billion years ago. Supposing we come across an all-knowing oracle that we can ask, what will it inform us is the next-closest origin of life to Earth's, with distances measured in km. A few salient potential values:\n\n* \\( < 20,000\\): Another independent origination on Earth\n* \\( \\sim 50-400 \\times 10^6\\): on Mars or Venus\n* \\( \\sim 700 \\times 10^6\\): a moon of Jupiter\n* \\( \\sim 10^{12} \\): in the Oort cloud\n* \\( \\sim 10^{14} \\): nearby stars\n* \\( \\sim 10^{17} \\): typical star in our galaxy\n* \\( \\sim 10^{19} \\): nearby galaxy\n* \\( \\sim 10^{23} \\): Hubble distance, approximate size of observable universe\n\n\n***How far away is/was the nearest independent origination of life?***\n\nThis question will almost certainly not resolve, but is fun to ask as a way to assess the import of new evidence that may come in over time. But if it did, it would resolve by \n\na) computing the distance between Earth and each later independent origin of life at the time it arose, up until now, in cosmological time.\n\nb) computing the distance between Earth at the time life arose on it and the location (at that time) of each astronomical body on which life arose earlier.\n\nc) Taking the minimum of all of the above computed distances, in km.\n\nResolves ambiguous if life did *not* originate on Earth.", "lower_25": "27.0B", "median": "4.48×1015", "upper_75": "1.63×1019", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the age-adjusted mortality rate in England and Wales will be 1.03k in 2051?", "desc": "The worldwide Coronavirus/COVID-19 crisis has got many people talking about comparing the risks across time and place. [John Appleby published a paper in the British Medical Journal in April 2021 discussing the various British (England and Wales) statistics](https://www.bmj.com/content/373/bmj.n896). One interesting figure is the one that shows age standardised mortality rates per 100 000 in England and Wales, 1942-2020 (Figure 4). Here we see that the rate was about 2000 in 1943, this had fallen to just below 1000 in the years before the Coronavirus pandemic. On this metric, the historical improvements are so large that the Coronavirus only caused a reversion to the same rate seen in the 2008-2009. This suggests another metric for progress towards indefinite lifespan. The rate has been halved in the period roughly 60 year period between 1943 and 2010, and theoretically, a 0-rate would mean we have achieved essential immortality.", "resc": "- The age-standardized death/mortality rate for England and Wales in the year 2051, as published by Office for National Statistics (ONS).\n- If the ONS stops existing, or ceases publishing this statistic, admin choose a suitable replacement.\n- If the territory of England and Wales change, this question refers to numbers for whatever the new polities are called that refer to the same geographical region and populations, insofar as this is possible to obtain", "lower_25": "593", "median": "817", "upper_75": "1.03k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first biological human to live to the age of 1000 will not be born before 2999?", "desc": "As genetic and biological scientific understanding grows, it seems likely that at some point not far in the future, or perhaps already, people could have been born, or will be born, that will eventually beat the odds and make it to the chronological age of 1000 years old.\n\nProgress has been made in longevity research, such as on mice [here](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/02/160203145723.htm), but how far can humans go? How 'real' is the 115-125 lifespan limit?\n\nA related question has been posted on Metaculus [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4110/assuming-some-humans-are-alive-what-will-be-the-birthdate-of-the-oldest-living-human-on-january-1st-2200).", "resc": "This resolves to the date when the first human confirmed to live to 1000 years old is born. A person will be defined as an intelligence with a biological brain (implants are fine, if they utilise artificial neurons the brain has to be >=50% biological) that identifies themselves as human or a descendent from humanity; posthumans and transhumans are fine, but brain emulations are not. If a 'person' utilises time dilation to extend their lifetime by more than 1% they are disqualified. If nobody has reached 1000 by the year 4000, this resolves as >3000.\n\nNB: Time spent in cryogenic preservation counts.", "lower_25": "1991", "median": "2216", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2999", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How far away is the nearest independent origination of life?\n\nKeyword: 27.0B\n\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the nearest independent origination of life is 27.0B light years away?", "desc": "", "resc": "We know that life originated at least once, on Earth of order 4 billion years ago. Supposing we come across an all-knowing oracle that we can ask, what will it inform us is the next-closest origin of life to Earth's, with distances measured in km. A few salient potential values:\n\n* \\( < 20,000\\): Another independent origination on Earth\n* \\( \\sim 50-400 \\times 10^6\\): on Mars or Venus\n* \\( \\sim 700 \\times 10^6\\): a moon of Jupiter\n* \\( \\sim 10^{12} \\): in the Oort cloud\n* \\( \\sim 10^{14} \\): nearby stars\n* \\( \\sim 10^{17} \\): typical star in our galaxy\n* \\( \\sim 10^{19} \\): nearby galaxy\n* \\( \\sim 10^{23} \\): Hubble distance, approximate size of observable universe\n\n\n***How far away is/was the nearest independent origination of life?***\n\nThis question will almost certainly not resolve, but is fun to ask as a way to assess the import of new evidence that may come in over time. But if it did, it would resolve by \n\na) computing the distance between Earth and each later independent origin of life at the time it arose, up until now, in cosmological time.\n\nb) computing the distance between Earth at the time life arose on it and the location (at that time) of each astronomical body on which life arose earlier.\n\nc) Taking the minimum of all of the above computed distances, in km.\n\nResolves ambiguous if life did *not* originate on Earth.", "lower_25": "27.0B", "median": "4.48×1015", "upper_75": "1.63×1019", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total capacity of large-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS) will be 464 GW by 2030?", "desc": "Carbon capture and storage (CCS) or carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) describes a set of technologies in which carbon dioxide is captured and either used or stored long-term to stop it from contributing to global warming. \n\nCCS is expected to play a role if the world is successful in limiting global warming. Specifically, the IEA's Sustainable Development Scenario models 5,635 million tonnes per annum (Mtpa) of CCS by 2050. \n\nHowever, CCS has been lacklustre so far. All large-scale CCS projects together have only 40 Mtpa of capacity, and the pipeline of large-scale CCS projects is smaller now than it was in 2011. CCS projects attached to electricity generation, in particular, have failed in recent years ([Kemper County](https://www.iea.org/commentaries/we-cant-let-kemper-slow-the-progress-of-carbon-capture-and-storage) and [Petra Nova](https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063714297)). \n\nWe are counting capacity, the amount that the projects could capture, not the amount that they actually capture in the given year. However, to qualify as a large-scale CCS project, the project has to actually capture 0.4-0.8 million tonnes per annum. Once it reaches that threshold its entire capacity, used or unused, counts towards the total.\n\nThis year's [Global Status of CCS report](https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/resources/global-status-report/) from the Global CCS Institute has more details and provided the stats used in this background.", "resc": "What will the Global CCS Institute identify as the total capacity of large-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS) for 2030?", "lower_25": "57.2", "median": "162", "upper_75": "464", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Australia's net greenhouse gas emissions will be 89.9% in 2050?", "desc": "To have a good chance of keeping global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius or below, the world needs to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by about 2050. \n\nReflecting this, many countries have set long-term targets for their greenhouse gas emissions. These targets can be for carbon dioxide emissions only, or for all greenhouse gases. In the latter case, the global warming potential of other gases is converted into its \"carbon dioxide equivalent\", or CO2-e. \n\nThese targets can also be for zero emissions (typically in a particular sector, like electricity) or for net-zero emissions. In the latter case, emissions can be offset against a drawdown of emissions, e.g. from the CO2 absorbed by growing trees. \n\nWhile Australia's federal government is yet to commit to a net-zero target, its Prime Minister Scott Morrison has begun talking [about how it could be achieved](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-04-20/scott-morrison-australia-inner-city-net-zero-emissions-biden/100080402). [All Australian states and territories ](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/dec/02/net-zero-emissions-by-2050-target-climate-summit-president-thanks-australian-states-but-not-morrison-government) already have net-zero by 2050 or earlier targets. \n\nAustralia's current target is a [26-28% reduction by 2030 on 2005 levels](https://www.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/Summary%20Report%20Australias%202030%20Emission%20Reduction%20Target.pdf).\n\nAustralia's emissions in the year ending September 2020 [were 510 million tonnes of CO2](https://www.industry.gov.au/data-and-publications/national-greenhouse-gas-inventory-quarterly-update-september-2020). Historical details are available at the same source.", "resc": "This question resolves as the net CO2-e in million metric tonnes that Australia emits in the calendar year 2050.\n\nIf the area of Australia changes by more than 20% or Australia ceases to exist as a country the answer will instead be calculated based on emissions on what is the geographical bounds of Australia in 2020. \n\nCurrent UN accounting methods do not include [pollution from national disturbances](https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/apr/21/summers-bushfires-released-more-carbon-dioxide-than-australia-does-in-a-year). If they are included in 2050 accounting methods (Australian or world-standard) without any smoothing or averaging adjustment, then the average of emissions for the years 2045 to 2050 can be used to avoid a one-off natural disaster in 2050 throwing out the figure.\n\nCO2-e sold to or bought from other countries as offsets will not affect this figure. E.g. if Australia has 100 million tonnes of CO2-e emissions, but buys 100 million tonnes of offsets, the total will still be 100 million tonnes", "lower_25": "22.6", "median": "89.9", "upper_75": "232", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total capacity of large-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS) will be 464 GW by 2030?", "desc": "Carbon capture and storage (CCS) or carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) describes a set of technologies in which carbon dioxide is captured and either used or stored long-term to stop it from contributing to global warming. \n\nCCS is expected to play a role if the world is successful in limiting global warming. Specifically, the IEA's Sustainable Development Scenario models 5,635 million tonnes per annum (Mtpa) of CCS by 2050. \n\nHowever, CCS has been lacklustre so far. All large-scale CCS projects together have only 40 Mtpa of capacity, and the pipeline of large-scale CCS projects is smaller now than it was in 2011. CCS projects attached to electricity generation, in particular, have failed in recent years ([Kemper County](https://www.iea.org/commentaries/we-cant-let-kemper-slow-the-progress-of-carbon-capture-and-storage) and [Petra Nova](https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063714297)). \n\nWe are counting capacity, the amount that the projects could capture, not the amount that they actually capture in the given year. However, to qualify as a large-scale CCS project, the project has to actually capture 0.4-0.8 million tonnes per annum. Once it reaches that threshold its entire capacity, used or unused, counts towards the total.\n\nThis year's [Global Status of CCS report](https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/resources/global-status-report/) from the Global CCS Institute has more details and provided the stats used in this background.", "resc": "What will the Global CCS Institute identify as the total capacity of large-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS) for 2030?", "lower_25": "57.2", "median": "162", "upper_75": "464", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total capacity of large-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS) will be 464 GW by 2030?", "desc": "Carbon capture and storage (CCS) or carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) describes a set of technologies in which carbon dioxide is captured and either used or stored long-term to stop it from contributing to global warming. \n\nCCS is expected to play a role if the world is successful in limiting global warming. Specifically, the IEA's Sustainable Development Scenario models 5,635 million tonnes per annum (Mtpa) of CCS by 2050. \n\nHowever, CCS has been lacklustre so far. All large-scale CCS projects together have only 40 Mtpa of capacity, and the pipeline of large-scale CCS projects is smaller now than it was in 2011. CCS projects attached to electricity generation, in particular, have failed in recent years ([Kemper County](https://www.iea.org/commentaries/we-cant-let-kemper-slow-the-progress-of-carbon-capture-and-storage) and [Petra Nova](https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063714297)). \n\nWe are counting capacity, the amount that the projects could capture, not the amount that they actually capture in the given year. However, to qualify as a large-scale CCS project, the project has to actually capture 0.4-0.8 million tonnes per annum. Once it reaches that threshold its entire capacity, used or unused, counts towards the total.\n\nThis year's [Global Status of CCS report](https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/resources/global-status-report/) from the Global CCS Institute has more details and provided the stats used in this background.", "resc": "What will the Global CCS Institute identify as the total capacity of large-scale carbon capture and storage (CCS) for 2030?", "lower_25": "57.2", "median": "162", "upper_75": "464", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Australia's net greenhouse gas emissions will be 89.9% in 2050?", "desc": "To have a good chance of keeping global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius or below, the world needs to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by about 2050. \n\nReflecting this, many countries have set long-term targets for their greenhouse gas emissions. These targets can be for carbon dioxide emissions only, or for all greenhouse gases. In the latter case, the global warming potential of other gases is converted into its \"carbon dioxide equivalent\", or CO2-e. \n\nThese targets can also be for zero emissions (typically in a particular sector, like electricity) or for net-zero emissions. In the latter case, emissions can be offset against a drawdown of emissions, e.g. from the CO2 absorbed by growing trees. \n\nWhile Australia's federal government is yet to commit to a net-zero target, its Prime Minister Scott Morrison has begun talking [about how it could be achieved](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-04-20/scott-morrison-australia-inner-city-net-zero-emissions-biden/100080402). [All Australian states and territories ](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/dec/02/net-zero-emissions-by-2050-target-climate-summit-president-thanks-australian-states-but-not-morrison-government) already have net-zero by 2050 or earlier targets. \n\nAustralia's current target is a [26-28% reduction by 2030 on 2005 levels](https://www.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/Summary%20Report%20Australias%202030%20Emission%20Reduction%20Target.pdf).\n\nAustralia's emissions in the year ending September 2020 [were 510 million tonnes of CO2](https://www.industry.gov.au/data-and-publications/national-greenhouse-gas-inventory-quarterly-update-september-2020). Historical details are available at the same source.", "resc": "This question resolves as the net CO2-e in million metric tonnes that Australia emits in the calendar year 2050.\n\nIf the area of Australia changes by more than 20% or Australia ceases to exist as a country the answer will instead be calculated based on emissions on what is the geographical bounds of Australia in 2020. \n\nCurrent UN accounting methods do not include [pollution from national disturbances](https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/apr/21/summers-bushfires-released-more-carbon-dioxide-than-australia-does-in-a-year). If they are included in 2050 accounting methods (Australian or world-standard) without any smoothing or averaging adjustment, then the average of emissions for the years 2045 to 2050 can be used to avoid a one-off natural disaster in 2050 throwing out the figure.\n\nCO2-e sold to or bought from other countries as offsets will not affect this figure. E.g. if Australia has 100 million tonnes of CO2-e emissions, but buys 100 million tonnes of offsets, the total will still be 100 million tonnes", "lower_25": "22.6", "median": "89.9", "upper_75": "232", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Australia's net greenhouse gas emissions will be 89.9% in 2050?", "desc": "To have a good chance of keeping global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius or below, the world needs to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by about 2050. \n\nReflecting this, many countries have set long-term targets for their greenhouse gas emissions. These targets can be for carbon dioxide emissions only, or for all greenhouse gases. In the latter case, the global warming potential of other gases is converted into its \"carbon dioxide equivalent\", or CO2-e. \n\nThese targets can also be for zero emissions (typically in a particular sector, like electricity) or for net-zero emissions. In the latter case, emissions can be offset against a drawdown of emissions, e.g. from the CO2 absorbed by growing trees. \n\nWhile Australia's federal government is yet to commit to a net-zero target, its Prime Minister Scott Morrison has begun talking [about how it could be achieved](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-04-20/scott-morrison-australia-inner-city-net-zero-emissions-biden/100080402). [All Australian states and territories ](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/dec/02/net-zero-emissions-by-2050-target-climate-summit-president-thanks-australian-states-but-not-morrison-government) already have net-zero by 2050 or earlier targets. \n\nAustralia's current target is a [26-28% reduction by 2030 on 2005 levels](https://www.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/Summary%20Report%20Australias%202030%20Emission%20Reduction%20Target.pdf).\n\nAustralia's emissions in the year ending September 2020 [were 510 million tonnes of CO2](https://www.industry.gov.au/data-and-publications/national-greenhouse-gas-inventory-quarterly-update-september-2020). Historical details are available at the same source.", "resc": "This question resolves as the net CO2-e in million metric tonnes that Australia emits in the calendar year 2050.\n\nIf the area of Australia changes by more than 20% or Australia ceases to exist as a country the answer will instead be calculated based on emissions on what is the geographical bounds of Australia in 2020. \n\nCurrent UN accounting methods do not include [pollution from national disturbances](https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/apr/21/summers-bushfires-released-more-carbon-dioxide-than-australia-does-in-a-year). If they are included in 2050 accounting methods (Australian or world-standard) without any smoothing or averaging adjustment, then the average of emissions for the years 2045 to 2050 can be used to avoid a one-off natural disaster in 2050 throwing out the figure.\n\nCO2-e sold to or bought from other countries as offsets will not affect this figure. E.g. if Australia has 100 million tonnes of CO2-e emissions, but buys 100 million tonnes of offsets, the total will still be 100 million tonnes", "lower_25": "22.6", "median": "89.9", "upper_75": "232", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How far away is the nearest independent origination of life?\n\nKeyword: 27.0B\n\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the nearest independent origination of life is 27.0B light years away?", "desc": "", "resc": "We know that life originated at least once, on Earth of order 4 billion years ago. Supposing we come across an all-knowing oracle that we can ask, what will it inform us is the next-closest origin of life to Earth's, with distances measured in km. A few salient potential values:\n\n* \\( < 20,000\\): Another independent origination on Earth\n* \\( \\sim 50-400 \\times 10^6\\): on Mars or Venus\n* \\( \\sim 700 \\times 10^6\\): a moon of Jupiter\n* \\( \\sim 10^{12} \\): in the Oort cloud\n* \\( \\sim 10^{14} \\): nearby stars\n* \\( \\sim 10^{17} \\): typical star in our galaxy\n* \\( \\sim 10^{19} \\): nearby galaxy\n* \\( \\sim 10^{23} \\): Hubble distance, approximate size of observable universe\n\n\n***How far away is/was the nearest independent origination of life?***\n\nThis question will almost certainly not resolve, but is fun to ask as a way to assess the import of new evidence that may come in over time. But if it did, it would resolve by \n\na) computing the distance between Earth and each later independent origin of life at the time it arose, up until now, in cosmological time.\n\nb) computing the distance between Earth at the time life arose on it and the location (at that time) of each astronomical body on which life arose earlier.\n\nc) Taking the minimum of all of the above computed distances, in km.\n\nResolves ambiguous if life did *not* originate on Earth.", "lower_25": "27.0B", "median": "4.48×1015", "upper_75": "1.63×1019", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the age-adjusted mortality rate in England and Wales will be 1.03k in 2051?", "desc": "The worldwide Coronavirus/COVID-19 crisis has got many people talking about comparing the risks across time and place. [John Appleby published a paper in the British Medical Journal in April 2021 discussing the various British (England and Wales) statistics](https://www.bmj.com/content/373/bmj.n896). One interesting figure is the one that shows age standardised mortality rates per 100 000 in England and Wales, 1942-2020 (Figure 4). Here we see that the rate was about 2000 in 1943, this had fallen to just below 1000 in the years before the Coronavirus pandemic. On this metric, the historical improvements are so large that the Coronavirus only caused a reversion to the same rate seen in the 2008-2009. This suggests another metric for progress towards indefinite lifespan. The rate has been halved in the period roughly 60 year period between 1943 and 2010, and theoretically, a 0-rate would mean we have achieved essential immortality.", "resc": "- The age-standardized death/mortality rate for England and Wales in the year 2051, as published by Office for National Statistics (ONS).\n- If the ONS stops existing, or ceases publishing this statistic, admin choose a suitable replacement.\n- If the territory of England and Wales change, this question refers to numbers for whatever the new polities are called that refer to the same geographical region and populations, insofar as this is possible to obtain", "lower_25": "593", "median": "817", "upper_75": "1.03k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first biological human to live to the age of 1000 will not be born before 2999?", "desc": "As genetic and biological scientific understanding grows, it seems likely that at some point not far in the future, or perhaps already, people could have been born, or will be born, that will eventually beat the odds and make it to the chronological age of 1000 years old.\n\nProgress has been made in longevity research, such as on mice [here](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/02/160203145723.htm), but how far can humans go? How 'real' is the 115-125 lifespan limit?\n\nA related question has been posted on Metaculus [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4110/assuming-some-humans-are-alive-what-will-be-the-birthdate-of-the-oldest-living-human-on-january-1st-2200).", "resc": "This resolves to the date when the first human confirmed to live to 1000 years old is born. A person will be defined as an intelligence with a biological brain (implants are fine, if they utilise artificial neurons the brain has to be >=50% biological) that identifies themselves as human or a descendent from humanity; posthumans and transhumans are fine, but brain emulations are not. If a 'person' utilises time dilation to extend their lifetime by more than 1% they are disqualified. If nobody has reached 1000 by the year 4000, this resolves as >3000.\n\nNB: Time spent in cryogenic preservation counts.", "lower_25": "1991", "median": "2216", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2999", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first biological human to live to the age of 1000 will not be born before 2999?", "desc": "As genetic and biological scientific understanding grows, it seems likely that at some point not far in the future, or perhaps already, people could have been born, or will be born, that will eventually beat the odds and make it to the chronological age of 1000 years old.\n\nProgress has been made in longevity research, such as on mice [here](https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/02/160203145723.htm), but how far can humans go? How 'real' is the 115-125 lifespan limit?\n\nA related question has been posted on Metaculus [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4110/assuming-some-humans-are-alive-what-will-be-the-birthdate-of-the-oldest-living-human-on-january-1st-2200).", "resc": "This resolves to the date when the first human confirmed to live to 1000 years old is born. A person will be defined as an intelligence with a biological brain (implants are fine, if they utilise artificial neurons the brain has to be >=50% biological) that identifies themselves as human or a descendent from humanity; posthumans and transhumans are fine, but brain emulations are not. If a 'person' utilises time dilation to extend their lifetime by more than 1% they are disqualified. If nobody has reached 1000 by the year 4000, this resolves as >3000.\n\nNB: Time spent in cryogenic preservation counts.", "lower_25": "1991", "median": "2216", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2999", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will cost 12.3k to deliver a 1kg payload to the Surface of Mars in 2075?", "desc": "In 2021, the Mars Perseverance Rover landed on Mars. With a weight of 1,025kg and a budget of $2.2 Billion dollars, this equates to a cost of $2.1M/kg.\n\nThe cost to deliver a payload to Mars is relevant to many questions, in particular [\"One Million Martian Residents by 2075?\"](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3519/one-million-martian-residents-by-2075/)\n\nVarious estimates for future systems have been proposed. For example, in one presentation SpaceX claimed a [cost](https://handwiki.org/wiki/Unsolved:Space_elevator_economics) of $140/kg to the surface of Mars is achievable.", "resc": "What will be the lowest cost (in 2020 US Dollars/Kg) to deliver a payload to the surface of Mars from the surface of Earth?\n\nThis question will resolve to the cost (payload mass divided by mission budget) of the lowest-cost mission that successfully lands of the surface of Mars, from now until the end of 2075, according to credible media reporting. Or, if delivery of payloads to Mars is a commercially available service, on the lowest commercially available price prior to 2075", "lower_25": "97.6", "median": "1.05k", "upper_75": "12.3k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population of Próspera will be less than 100 in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 100", "median": "< 100", "upper_75": "389", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population of Próspera will be less than 100 in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 100", "median": "< 100", "upper_75": "389", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population of Próspera will be less than 100 in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 100", "median": "< 100", "upper_75": "389", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the fraction of English books that mention \"Deep Learning\" will peak at 50% by 2031, over the 2021 to 2045 period (inclusive)?", "desc": "The Deep Learning Book, an excellent reference textbook on the topic, [introduces deep learning](https://www.deeplearningbook.org/contents/intro.html),\n\n> This book is about a solution to [fuzzy ill-defined problems]. This solution is to allow computers to learn from experience and understand the world in terms of a hierarchy of concepts, with each concept defined through its relation to simpler concepts. By gathering knowledge from experience, this approach avoids the need for human operators to formally specify all the knowledge that the computer needs. The hierarchy of concepts enables the computer to learn complicated concepts by building them out of simpler ones. If we draw a graph showing how these concepts are built on top of each other, the graph is deep, with many layers. For this reason, we call this approach to AI deep learning\n\nGoogle Books Ngram Viewer is an online search engine that charts the frequencies of any set of search strings using a yearly count of [n-grams](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/N-gram) found in sources printed from 1500 onward.", "resc": "This question resolves on the basis of Google's [Ngram viewer](https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=%22deep+learning%22&year_start=1800&year_end=2019&corpus=26&smoothing=0&direct_url=t1%3B%2C%22%20deep%20learning%20%22%3B%2Cc0). The relevant search will be of English texts for case-insensitive terms. The \"Smoothing\" term will be set to 0. If that is not possible, we will use the default \"Smoothing\" settings.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will cost 12.3k to deliver a 1kg payload to the Surface of Mars in 2075?", "desc": "In 2021, the Mars Perseverance Rover landed on Mars. With a weight of 1,025kg and a budget of $2.2 Billion dollars, this equates to a cost of $2.1M/kg.\n\nThe cost to deliver a payload to Mars is relevant to many questions, in particular [\"One Million Martian Residents by 2075?\"](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3519/one-million-martian-residents-by-2075/)\n\nVarious estimates for future systems have been proposed. For example, in one presentation SpaceX claimed a [cost](https://handwiki.org/wiki/Unsolved:Space_elevator_economics) of $140/kg to the surface of Mars is achievable.", "resc": "What will be the lowest cost (in 2020 US Dollars/Kg) to deliver a payload to the surface of Mars from the surface of Earth?\n\nThis question will resolve to the cost (payload mass divided by mission budget) of the lowest-cost mission that successfully lands of the surface of Mars, from now until the end of 2075, according to credible media reporting. Or, if delivery of payloads to Mars is a commercially available service, on the lowest commercially available price prior to 2075", "lower_25": "97.6", "median": "1.05k", "upper_75": "12.3k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Keir Starmer will not cease to be Leader of the Labour Party by January 1, 2025?", "desc": "[The Labour Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Labour_Party_(UK)) is a centre-left political party in the United Kingdom which has been described as an alliance of social democrats, democratic socialists and trade unionists. As of 2017, the party was considered the \"largest party in Western Europe\" in terms of party membership, with more than half a million members.\n\nLabour is currently the Official Opposition in the Parliament of the United Kingdom, having won the second-largest number of seats in the 2019 general election, and has been in opposition since 2010.\n\n[Sir Keir Rodney Starmer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keir_Starmer) KCB QC MP (born 2 September 1962) is a British politician and former lawyer who has served as Leader of the Labour Party and Leader of the Opposition since 2020. He has been Member of Parliament (MP) for Holborn and St Pancras since 2015. Ideologically, Starmer identifies as a socialist and has been described as being on the soft left within the Labour Party.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when Starmer either resigns from or is removed from the position of Leader of the Labour Party, or otherwise ceases to hold the office of Leader of the Labour Party. Resolution should cite a press release from the Labour Party, Keir Starmer, or credible press reports in the British media.\n\nThe resolution date will be the date his leadership actually ceases, rather than the date his resignation is announced, if the resignation does not take effect immediately.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2025, this question will resolve as **>January 1, 2025**", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will cost 12.3k to deliver a 1kg payload to the Surface of Mars in 2075?", "desc": "In 2021, the Mars Perseverance Rover landed on Mars. With a weight of 1,025kg and a budget of $2.2 Billion dollars, this equates to a cost of $2.1M/kg.\n\nThe cost to deliver a payload to Mars is relevant to many questions, in particular [\"One Million Martian Residents by 2075?\"](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3519/one-million-martian-residents-by-2075/)\n\nVarious estimates for future systems have been proposed. For example, in one presentation SpaceX claimed a [cost](https://handwiki.org/wiki/Unsolved:Space_elevator_economics) of $140/kg to the surface of Mars is achievable.", "resc": "What will be the lowest cost (in 2020 US Dollars/Kg) to deliver a payload to the surface of Mars from the surface of Earth?\n\nThis question will resolve to the cost (payload mass divided by mission budget) of the lowest-cost mission that successfully lands of the surface of Mars, from now until the end of 2075, according to credible media reporting. Or, if delivery of payloads to Mars is a commercially available service, on the lowest commercially available price prior to 2075", "lower_25": "97.6", "median": "1.05k", "upper_75": "12.3k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Keir Starmer will not cease to be Leader of the Labour Party by January 1, 2025?", "desc": "[The Labour Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Labour_Party_(UK)) is a centre-left political party in the United Kingdom which has been described as an alliance of social democrats, democratic socialists and trade unionists. As of 2017, the party was considered the \"largest party in Western Europe\" in terms of party membership, with more than half a million members.\n\nLabour is currently the Official Opposition in the Parliament of the United Kingdom, having won the second-largest number of seats in the 2019 general election, and has been in opposition since 2010.\n\n[Sir Keir Rodney Starmer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keir_Starmer) KCB QC MP (born 2 September 1962) is a British politician and former lawyer who has served as Leader of the Labour Party and Leader of the Opposition since 2020. He has been Member of Parliament (MP) for Holborn and St Pancras since 2015. Ideologically, Starmer identifies as a socialist and has been described as being on the soft left within the Labour Party.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when Starmer either resigns from or is removed from the position of Leader of the Labour Party, or otherwise ceases to hold the office of Leader of the Labour Party. Resolution should cite a press release from the Labour Party, Keir Starmer, or credible press reports in the British media.\n\nThe resolution date will be the date his leadership actually ceases, rather than the date his resignation is announced, if the resignation does not take effect immediately.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2025, this question will resolve as **>January 1, 2025**", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How much will it cost per month to store 1 TB on Google Cloud Archive in 2025?", "desc": "Google offers cloud storage services. Their cheapest option is archive storage, which currently goes for the rate of $0.0012 per GB per month in the Iowa (us-central1) region. You can find pricing information on [this page](https://cloud.google.com/storage/pricing).", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of dollars it will cost to store 1 TB (not 1 GB) of data per month on Google Cloud Archive, as of January 1st 2025. The region used will be Iowa (us-central1), if it still exists, or the cheapest region available if Iowa (us-central1) is unavailable. Right now, the cost is $1.20, and would resolve at the value of 1.2", "lower_25": "0.840", "median": "0.987", "upper_75": "1.14", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Keir Starmer will not cease to be Leader of the Labour Party by January 1, 2025?", "desc": "[The Labour Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Labour_Party_(UK)) is a centre-left political party in the United Kingdom which has been described as an alliance of social democrats, democratic socialists and trade unionists. As of 2017, the party was considered the \"largest party in Western Europe\" in terms of party membership, with more than half a million members.\n\nLabour is currently the Official Opposition in the Parliament of the United Kingdom, having won the second-largest number of seats in the 2019 general election, and has been in opposition since 2010.\n\n[Sir Keir Rodney Starmer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keir_Starmer) KCB QC MP (born 2 September 1962) is a British politician and former lawyer who has served as Leader of the Labour Party and Leader of the Opposition since 2020. He has been Member of Parliament (MP) for Holborn and St Pancras since 2015. Ideologically, Starmer identifies as a socialist and has been described as being on the soft left within the Labour Party.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when Starmer either resigns from or is removed from the position of Leader of the Labour Party, or otherwise ceases to hold the office of Leader of the Labour Party. Resolution should cite a press release from the Labour Party, Keir Starmer, or credible press reports in the British media.\n\nThe resolution date will be the date his leadership actually ceases, rather than the date his resignation is announced, if the resignation does not take effect immediately.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2025, this question will resolve as **>January 1, 2025**", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 14.6 million people aged 65 and above will be employed in the US in 2030 (in thousands)?", "desc": "", "resc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n- [How many people 65+ will be employed in the US in 2021 (in thousands)?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6057/us-employment-of-ages-65-in-2021/)\n\n----\n\nThe US Labor Force is aging. As the population ages and social security flounders, more people over the age of 65 find themselves rejoining the workforce and entering the job market. \n\nThe [AARP](https://www.aarp.org/work/employers/info-2019/americans-working-past-65.html) finds that:\n\n> “As of February 2019, more than 20 percent of adults over age 65 are either working or looking for work, compared with 10 percent in 1985, says the report from United Income, a financial planning and investment management company targeted to those ages 50 to 70. The study analyzed data from the Current Population Survey, a report compiled monthly by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BLS expects the trend of older people working to continue, estimating that 13 million Americans age 65 and older will be in the labor force by 2024.”\n\nOldest workers over 65 years of age were disproportionately hit hardest by the economic downturn of the Coronavirus with a drop of 16.6% in employment levels. Health risks also affect older workers, forcing them to exit the workforce in efforts to protect against the harmful effects of the Coronavirus. \n\n> “In April and May, workers aged 65 and older had higher unemployment rates than those between the ages of 25 and 54—a scenario that Johnson says is unique to this recession. Older workers' seniority had protected them in earlier downturns, leading to lower unemployment rates than their younger counterparts. Johnson believes the change is a sign of how the virus is affecting older workers' employment amid this orecession. \"I think this is going to be a trend,\" he says.”\n\n***How many people 65+ will be employed in the US in 2030 (in millions)?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the total number of people (in millions) ages 65+ categorized as having been employed during some part of 2030, according to the [US Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://www.bls.gov/cps/demographics.htm) in their Current Population Survey.", "lower_25": "11.3", "median": "14.6", "upper_75": "18.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Germany will have no coal-fired power plants in its electricity grid by 2035?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Germany fail to meet their coal commission's goals?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2666/will-germany-fail-to-meet-their-coal-commissions-goals/)\n* [When will Australia have no coal-fired power plants in its National Electricity Market?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4472/when-will-australia-have-no-coal-fired-power-plants-in-its-national-electricity-market/)\n\n----\n\nIn 2020, hard (black) or brown coal was responsible for [24% of Germany's electricity generation, or 118 Terawatt hours](https://energy-charts.info/charts/energy_pie/chart.htm?l=en&c=DE&interval=year&year=2020). This is down from [43%, or 230 Terawatt hours, in 2010](https://energy-charts.info/charts/energy_pie/chart.htm?l=en&c=DE&interval=year&year=2010). \n\nIn 2019, Germany's Commission on Growth, Structural Change and Employment published a plan to shut down the last coal-fired power plant by 2038, with the option to move this date forward to 2035. \n\nIn 2021, Germany's Constitutional Court found that the previous target left too much of the emissions reduction work to future generations. The new requirement of \"carbon neutrality\" by 2045 has been described by one think tank as requiring coal closures by [around 2030](https://www.dw.com/en/germany-climate-emissions-industry-cars-coal/a-57504662), a sentiment echoed by German environment minister Svenja Schulze: “we will probably no longer convert coal into electricity in Germany by 2030” (translation by Google Translate [from the Reuters article](https://www.reuters.com/article/deutschland-kohle-schulze-idDEKBN2C71IV)). Chancellor Angela Merkel has [rejected moving the coal closure date forward from 2038.](https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/merkel-rejects-bringing-forward-germanys-exit-coal-2021-05-15/)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date that either of the following occur:\n\n* No coal-fired power plant in Germany is connected to the electricity grid for period of at least two weeks\n* Coal provides less than 1% of Germany's domestic electricity generation over any 12 month period\n\nThe resolution date will be the end date of either the 2-week or 12 month period. If neither occur by December 27, 2038, this question will resolve as **>December 27, 2038**", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How much will it cost per month to store 1 TB on Google Cloud Archive in 2025?", "desc": "Google offers cloud storage services. Their cheapest option is archive storage, which currently goes for the rate of $0.0012 per GB per month in the Iowa (us-central1) region. You can find pricing information on [this page](https://cloud.google.com/storage/pricing).", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of dollars it will cost to store 1 TB (not 1 GB) of data per month on Google Cloud Archive, as of January 1st 2025. The region used will be Iowa (us-central1), if it still exists, or the cheapest region available if Iowa (us-central1) is unavailable. Right now, the cost is $1.20, and would resolve at the value of 1.2", "lower_25": "0.840", "median": "0.987", "upper_75": "1.14", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Germany will have no coal-fired power plants in its electricity grid by 2035?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Germany fail to meet their coal commission's goals?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2666/will-germany-fail-to-meet-their-coal-commissions-goals/)\n* [When will Australia have no coal-fired power plants in its National Electricity Market?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4472/when-will-australia-have-no-coal-fired-power-plants-in-its-national-electricity-market/)\n\n----\n\nIn 2020, hard (black) or brown coal was responsible for [24% of Germany's electricity generation, or 118 Terawatt hours](https://energy-charts.info/charts/energy_pie/chart.htm?l=en&c=DE&interval=year&year=2020). This is down from [43%, or 230 Terawatt hours, in 2010](https://energy-charts.info/charts/energy_pie/chart.htm?l=en&c=DE&interval=year&year=2010). \n\nIn 2019, Germany's Commission on Growth, Structural Change and Employment published a plan to shut down the last coal-fired power plant by 2038, with the option to move this date forward to 2035. \n\nIn 2021, Germany's Constitutional Court found that the previous target left too much of the emissions reduction work to future generations. The new requirement of \"carbon neutrality\" by 2045 has been described by one think tank as requiring coal closures by [around 2030](https://www.dw.com/en/germany-climate-emissions-industry-cars-coal/a-57504662), a sentiment echoed by German environment minister Svenja Schulze: “we will probably no longer convert coal into electricity in Germany by 2030” (translation by Google Translate [from the Reuters article](https://www.reuters.com/article/deutschland-kohle-schulze-idDEKBN2C71IV)). Chancellor Angela Merkel has [rejected moving the coal closure date forward from 2038.](https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/merkel-rejects-bringing-forward-germanys-exit-coal-2021-05-15/)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date that either of the following occur:\n\n* No coal-fired power plant in Germany is connected to the electricity grid for period of at least two weeks\n* Coal provides less than 1% of Germany's domestic electricity generation over any 12 month period\n\nThe resolution date will be the end date of either the 2-week or 12 month period. If neither occur by December 27, 2038, this question will resolve as **>December 27, 2038**", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 14.6 million people aged 65 and above will be employed in the US in 2030 (in thousands)?", "desc": "", "resc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n- [How many people 65+ will be employed in the US in 2021 (in thousands)?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6057/us-employment-of-ages-65-in-2021/)\n\n----\n\nThe US Labor Force is aging. As the population ages and social security flounders, more people over the age of 65 find themselves rejoining the workforce and entering the job market. \n\nThe [AARP](https://www.aarp.org/work/employers/info-2019/americans-working-past-65.html) finds that:\n\n> “As of February 2019, more than 20 percent of adults over age 65 are either working or looking for work, compared with 10 percent in 1985, says the report from United Income, a financial planning and investment management company targeted to those ages 50 to 70. The study analyzed data from the Current Population Survey, a report compiled monthly by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BLS expects the trend of older people working to continue, estimating that 13 million Americans age 65 and older will be in the labor force by 2024.”\n\nOldest workers over 65 years of age were disproportionately hit hardest by the economic downturn of the Coronavirus with a drop of 16.6% in employment levels. Health risks also affect older workers, forcing them to exit the workforce in efforts to protect against the harmful effects of the Coronavirus. \n\n> “In April and May, workers aged 65 and older had higher unemployment rates than those between the ages of 25 and 54—a scenario that Johnson says is unique to this recession. Older workers' seniority had protected them in earlier downturns, leading to lower unemployment rates than their younger counterparts. Johnson believes the change is a sign of how the virus is affecting older workers' employment amid this orecession. \"I think this is going to be a trend,\" he says.”\n\n***How many people 65+ will be employed in the US in 2030 (in millions)?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the total number of people (in millions) ages 65+ categorized as having been employed during some part of 2030, according to the [US Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://www.bls.gov/cps/demographics.htm) in their Current Population Survey.", "lower_25": "11.3", "median": "14.6", "upper_75": "18.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that a West Balkan state will join the EU by January 2030?", "desc": "The European Union currently consists of 27 member states. The most recent state to join was Croatia on July 1, 2013, while Bulgaria and Romania joined on January 1, 2007 and 10 states joined on May 1, 2004. The UK left in 2020, reducing the number of members from 28 to 27.\n\nOther states could join the EU. The [European Commission website](https://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/candidates.htm) states that \"Albania, the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey are candidate countries\". It also lists Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo as potential candidates \"which have a clear prospect of joining the EU in the future but have not yet been granted candidate country status\".", "resc": "This question will resolve on the earliest date that any of the following states joins the EU:\n\n* Albania\n* North Macedonia\n* Montenegro\n* Serbia\n* Bosnia and Herzegovina\n* Kosovo\n\nor any new state within the May 2021 territory of those 6 entities.\n\nThis question will resolve as the date of accession itself, rather than e.g. the signing of a Treaty of Accession. Resolution will require both credible media reports and a European Commission source.\n\nThe incorporation of any part of any of the entities listed into an existing member state would not count to resolve the question", "lower_25": "Jan 2028", "median": "Jan 2030", "upper_75": "Oct 2032", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How much will it cost per month to store 1 TB on Google Cloud Archive in 2025?", "desc": "Google offers cloud storage services. Their cheapest option is archive storage, which currently goes for the rate of $0.0012 per GB per month in the Iowa (us-central1) region. You can find pricing information on [this page](https://cloud.google.com/storage/pricing).", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of dollars it will cost to store 1 TB (not 1 GB) of data per month on Google Cloud Archive, as of January 1st 2025. The region used will be Iowa (us-central1), if it still exists, or the cheapest region available if Iowa (us-central1) is unavailable. Right now, the cost is $1.20, and would resolve at the value of 1.2", "lower_25": "0.840", "median": "0.987", "upper_75": "1.14", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Germany will have no coal-fired power plants in its electricity grid by 2035?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Germany fail to meet their coal commission's goals?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2666/will-germany-fail-to-meet-their-coal-commissions-goals/)\n* [When will Australia have no coal-fired power plants in its National Electricity Market?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4472/when-will-australia-have-no-coal-fired-power-plants-in-its-national-electricity-market/)\n\n----\n\nIn 2020, hard (black) or brown coal was responsible for [24% of Germany's electricity generation, or 118 Terawatt hours](https://energy-charts.info/charts/energy_pie/chart.htm?l=en&c=DE&interval=year&year=2020). This is down from [43%, or 230 Terawatt hours, in 2010](https://energy-charts.info/charts/energy_pie/chart.htm?l=en&c=DE&interval=year&year=2010). \n\nIn 2019, Germany's Commission on Growth, Structural Change and Employment published a plan to shut down the last coal-fired power plant by 2038, with the option to move this date forward to 2035. \n\nIn 2021, Germany's Constitutional Court found that the previous target left too much of the emissions reduction work to future generations. The new requirement of \"carbon neutrality\" by 2045 has been described by one think tank as requiring coal closures by [around 2030](https://www.dw.com/en/germany-climate-emissions-industry-cars-coal/a-57504662), a sentiment echoed by German environment minister Svenja Schulze: “we will probably no longer convert coal into electricity in Germany by 2030” (translation by Google Translate [from the Reuters article](https://www.reuters.com/article/deutschland-kohle-schulze-idDEKBN2C71IV)). Chancellor Angela Merkel has [rejected moving the coal closure date forward from 2038.](https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/merkel-rejects-bringing-forward-germanys-exit-coal-2021-05-15/)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date that either of the following occur:\n\n* No coal-fired power plant in Germany is connected to the electricity grid for period of at least two weeks\n* Coal provides less than 1% of Germany's domestic electricity generation over any 12 month period\n\nThe resolution date will be the end date of either the 2-week or 12 month period. If neither occur by December 27, 2038, this question will resolve as **>December 27, 2038**", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that a West Balkan state will join the EU by January 2030?", "desc": "The European Union currently consists of 27 member states. The most recent state to join was Croatia on July 1, 2013, while Bulgaria and Romania joined on January 1, 2007 and 10 states joined on May 1, 2004. The UK left in 2020, reducing the number of members from 28 to 27.\n\nOther states could join the EU. The [European Commission website](https://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/candidates.htm) states that \"Albania, the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey are candidate countries\". It also lists Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo as potential candidates \"which have a clear prospect of joining the EU in the future but have not yet been granted candidate country status\".", "resc": "This question will resolve on the earliest date that any of the following states joins the EU:\n\n* Albania\n* North Macedonia\n* Montenegro\n* Serbia\n* Bosnia and Herzegovina\n* Kosovo\n\nor any new state within the May 2021 territory of those 6 entities.\n\nThis question will resolve as the date of accession itself, rather than e.g. the signing of a Treaty of Accession. Resolution will require both credible media reports and a European Commission source.\n\nThe incorporation of any part of any of the entities listed into an existing member state would not count to resolve the question", "lower_25": "Jan 2028", "median": "Jan 2030", "upper_75": "Oct 2032", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 14.6 million people aged 65 and above will be employed in the US in 2030 (in thousands)?", "desc": "", "resc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n- [How many people 65+ will be employed in the US in 2021 (in thousands)?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6057/us-employment-of-ages-65-in-2021/)\n\n----\n\nThe US Labor Force is aging. As the population ages and social security flounders, more people over the age of 65 find themselves rejoining the workforce and entering the job market. \n\nThe [AARP](https://www.aarp.org/work/employers/info-2019/americans-working-past-65.html) finds that:\n\n> “As of February 2019, more than 20 percent of adults over age 65 are either working or looking for work, compared with 10 percent in 1985, says the report from United Income, a financial planning and investment management company targeted to those ages 50 to 70. The study analyzed data from the Current Population Survey, a report compiled monthly by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BLS expects the trend of older people working to continue, estimating that 13 million Americans age 65 and older will be in the labor force by 2024.”\n\nOldest workers over 65 years of age were disproportionately hit hardest by the economic downturn of the Coronavirus with a drop of 16.6% in employment levels. Health risks also affect older workers, forcing them to exit the workforce in efforts to protect against the harmful effects of the Coronavirus. \n\n> “In April and May, workers aged 65 and older had higher unemployment rates than those between the ages of 25 and 54—a scenario that Johnson says is unique to this recession. Older workers' seniority had protected them in earlier downturns, leading to lower unemployment rates than their younger counterparts. Johnson believes the change is a sign of how the virus is affecting older workers' employment amid this orecession. \"I think this is going to be a trend,\" he says.”\n\n***How many people 65+ will be employed in the US in 2030 (in millions)?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the total number of people (in millions) ages 65+ categorized as having been employed during some part of 2030, according to the [US Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://www.bls.gov/cps/demographics.htm) in their Current Population Survey.", "lower_25": "11.3", "median": "14.6", "upper_75": "18.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an HSV-1 vaccine will be approved by the FDA by 2036?", "desc": "From [Gene NG News](https://www.goodrx.com/blog/herpes-vaccine-progress/) in November 2020,\n\n> A genetically edited form of a herpes simplex virus (HSV) has outperformed a leading vaccine candidate in a new preclinical study by researchers at the University of Cincinnati, Northwestern University, and the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. The vaccine, called R2, is a form of the herpes simplex virus type 1 (HSV-1) virus that causes cold sores around the lip, but can cross-protect against HSV type 2 (HSV-2), the sexually transmitted type of HSV that is usually responsible for genital herpes.\n\nMany have noted that new mRNA technology created as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic has [the potential to accelerate vaccine development for other diseases](https://globalnews.ca/news/7869139/mrna-vaccines-cancer-flu-covid19/).\n\nWhile HSV-1, and the oral herpes it causes, may not at first sound like an urgent vaccine target, HSV-1 has been implicated as a leading cause of Alzheimers, especially in people who carry [Apolipoprotein E4](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apolipoprotein_E). These research papers summarize the state of the current evidence,\n\n[HSV-1 and Alzheimer's disease: more than a hypothesis](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4019841/)\n\n[Corroboration of a Major Role for Herpes Simplex Virus Type 1 in Alzheimer's Disease](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6202583/)\n\nThe development of an effective HSV-1 vaccine could therefore greatly reduce the number of Alzheimers cases. If the vaccine worked like the [Shingles vaccine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zoster_vaccine), then it may even prevent Alzheimers among people who take the vaccine after already being infected with HSV-1.", "resc": "This question resolves on the date during which the FDA approves a vaccine intended to prevent HSV-1 infection, which includes emergency authorization", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 48.0 portion of Official Currency Reserve (COFER) will be US dollars in Q4 of 2031 according to the IMF?", "desc": "The US dollar is in 2021 the dominant international reserve currency, which means many central banks hold large quanitities of US Dollars. This practice implies the US Fed can expand the supply of US dollars more than many other central banks without risk of inflation. This arrangement is a cornerstone of the [Bretton Woods System](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system) \n\nIn Q4 of 2020, according to [IMF Reports](https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4) US dollars were about 56.7% of all official foreign currency reserves.\n\nThis question will resolve to the percent of all Official Foreign Exchange Reserves held as US Dollars as indicated in official IMF sources for Q4 of 2031.\n\nThe intent of this question in to assess if substantial change to the Bretton Woods System is anticipated by Q4 of 2031 on the part of Metaculus predictors.", "resc": "This question resolves as the percentage of the Official Currency Reserve held in US dollars in Q4 of 2031.\n\nThis question will be judged by looking at the updated version of [IMF COFER](https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4) and dividing claims in dollars by Total Foreign Currency Reserves.", "lower_25": "37.1", "median": "48.0", "upper_75": "56.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an HSV-1 vaccine will be approved by the FDA by 2036?", "desc": "From [Gene NG News](https://www.goodrx.com/blog/herpes-vaccine-progress/) in November 2020,\n\n> A genetically edited form of a herpes simplex virus (HSV) has outperformed a leading vaccine candidate in a new preclinical study by researchers at the University of Cincinnati, Northwestern University, and the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. The vaccine, called R2, is a form of the herpes simplex virus type 1 (HSV-1) virus that causes cold sores around the lip, but can cross-protect against HSV type 2 (HSV-2), the sexually transmitted type of HSV that is usually responsible for genital herpes.\n\nMany have noted that new mRNA technology created as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic has [the potential to accelerate vaccine development for other diseases](https://globalnews.ca/news/7869139/mrna-vaccines-cancer-flu-covid19/).\n\nWhile HSV-1, and the oral herpes it causes, may not at first sound like an urgent vaccine target, HSV-1 has been implicated as a leading cause of Alzheimers, especially in people who carry [Apolipoprotein E4](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apolipoprotein_E). These research papers summarize the state of the current evidence,\n\n[HSV-1 and Alzheimer's disease: more than a hypothesis](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4019841/)\n\n[Corroboration of a Major Role for Herpes Simplex Virus Type 1 in Alzheimer's Disease](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6202583/)\n\nThe development of an effective HSV-1 vaccine could therefore greatly reduce the number of Alzheimers cases. If the vaccine worked like the [Shingles vaccine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zoster_vaccine), then it may even prevent Alzheimers among people who take the vaccine after already being infected with HSV-1.", "resc": "This question resolves on the date during which the FDA approves a vaccine intended to prevent HSV-1 infection, which includes emergency authorization", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that a West Balkan state will join the EU by January 2030?", "desc": "The European Union currently consists of 27 member states. The most recent state to join was Croatia on July 1, 2013, while Bulgaria and Romania joined on January 1, 2007 and 10 states joined on May 1, 2004. The UK left in 2020, reducing the number of members from 28 to 27.\n\nOther states could join the EU. The [European Commission website](https://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/candidates.htm) states that \"Albania, the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey are candidate countries\". It also lists Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo as potential candidates \"which have a clear prospect of joining the EU in the future but have not yet been granted candidate country status\".", "resc": "This question will resolve on the earliest date that any of the following states joins the EU:\n\n* Albania\n* North Macedonia\n* Montenegro\n* Serbia\n* Bosnia and Herzegovina\n* Kosovo\n\nor any new state within the May 2021 territory of those 6 entities.\n\nThis question will resolve as the date of accession itself, rather than e.g. the signing of a Treaty of Accession. Resolution will require both credible media reports and a European Commission source.\n\nThe incorporation of any part of any of the entities listed into an existing member state would not count to resolve the question", "lower_25": "Jan 2028", "median": "Jan 2030", "upper_75": "Oct 2032", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that historical consensus will determine the first AGI came online 50 years earlier than when it became publicly known, given that 721 hours have passed since the first AGI was publicly known?", "desc": "Development of the first artificial general intelligence may share several parallels with the development of the first nuclear weapon. The basic concept of nuclear weapons [existed in the popular sphere](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_World_Set_Free) many years before the [first successful test](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trinity_(nuclear_test)), which itself preceded [public announcement](https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Events/1945-present/public_reaction.htm) of the weapon after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima by some three weeks. AGI's speculated disruptive potential is [very high](https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf), and heads of state have [publicly stated](https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/4/16251226/russia-ai-putin-rule-the-world) that the realization of AGI has not only critical national security implications but implications affecting the future of humanity.\n\nFor these reasons, and because the capability to make nuclear weapons was not immediately announced to the public, it is plausible that a gap between attainment of capability and announcement of capability could exist after creation of the first AGI--whether or not its creation takes place in an adversarial context.", "resc": "The rev slider quantity is hours. Keep in mind that the precision of the future given dates of creation and public awareness are unspecified and unknown. For the purpose of resolution, the lowest credible value, rounded as precision demands, shall be used, as determined by mods. A 0-hour public discovery is represented by the minimum prediction value, as log scale can't be used if 0 is included. The upper boundary is open for predictions exceeding 10000 hours. \n\nThis question resolves positive if all three of the following conditions are satisfied:\n\n1) an AGI is created\n\n2) this AGI becomes public knowledge by any means\n\n3) 50 years after 2) there exists historical consensus on the dates of 1) and 2).\n\nMod discretion reserved for what is or isn't an AGI, since it's not completely clear what future definition will be accepted. This question assumes that if AGI happens there will be a widespread consensus recognizing it as such.\n\nResolves ambiguous if no consensus on AGI's status as such. Resolves ambiguous if no consensus on AGI's creation time, and / or if there is no consensus on when the public becomes aware of AGI", "lower_25": "144", "median": "721", "upper_75": "2.94k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that historical consensus will determine the first AGI came online 50 years earlier than when it became publicly known, given that 721 hours have passed since the first AGI was publicly known?", "desc": "Development of the first artificial general intelligence may share several parallels with the development of the first nuclear weapon. The basic concept of nuclear weapons [existed in the popular sphere](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_World_Set_Free) many years before the [first successful test](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trinity_(nuclear_test)), which itself preceded [public announcement](https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Events/1945-present/public_reaction.htm) of the weapon after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima by some three weeks. AGI's speculated disruptive potential is [very high](https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf), and heads of state have [publicly stated](https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/4/16251226/russia-ai-putin-rule-the-world) that the realization of AGI has not only critical national security implications but implications affecting the future of humanity.\n\nFor these reasons, and because the capability to make nuclear weapons was not immediately announced to the public, it is plausible that a gap between attainment of capability and announcement of capability could exist after creation of the first AGI--whether or not its creation takes place in an adversarial context.", "resc": "The rev slider quantity is hours. Keep in mind that the precision of the future given dates of creation and public awareness are unspecified and unknown. For the purpose of resolution, the lowest credible value, rounded as precision demands, shall be used, as determined by mods. A 0-hour public discovery is represented by the minimum prediction value, as log scale can't be used if 0 is included. The upper boundary is open for predictions exceeding 10000 hours. \n\nThis question resolves positive if all three of the following conditions are satisfied:\n\n1) an AGI is created\n\n2) this AGI becomes public knowledge by any means\n\n3) 50 years after 2) there exists historical consensus on the dates of 1) and 2).\n\nMod discretion reserved for what is or isn't an AGI, since it's not completely clear what future definition will be accepted. This question assumes that if AGI happens there will be a widespread consensus recognizing it as such.\n\nResolves ambiguous if no consensus on AGI's status as such. Resolves ambiguous if no consensus on AGI's creation time, and / or if there is no consensus on when the public becomes aware of AGI", "lower_25": "144", "median": "721", "upper_75": "2.94k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 48.0 portion of Official Currency Reserve (COFER) will be US dollars in Q4 of 2031 according to the IMF?", "desc": "The US dollar is in 2021 the dominant international reserve currency, which means many central banks hold large quanitities of US Dollars. This practice implies the US Fed can expand the supply of US dollars more than many other central banks without risk of inflation. This arrangement is a cornerstone of the [Bretton Woods System](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system) \n\nIn Q4 of 2020, according to [IMF Reports](https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4) US dollars were about 56.7% of all official foreign currency reserves.\n\nThis question will resolve to the percent of all Official Foreign Exchange Reserves held as US Dollars as indicated in official IMF sources for Q4 of 2031.\n\nThe intent of this question in to assess if substantial change to the Bretton Woods System is anticipated by Q4 of 2031 on the part of Metaculus predictors.", "resc": "This question resolves as the percentage of the Official Currency Reserve held in US dollars in Q4 of 2031.\n\nThis question will be judged by looking at the updated version of [IMF COFER](https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4) and dividing claims in dollars by Total Foreign Currency Reserves.", "lower_25": "37.1", "median": "48.0", "upper_75": "56.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Ethereum will be able to do 1,000 transactions per second by Oct 2027?", "desc": "Currently, transaction prices on Ethereum limit what can be done. High transaction prices are largely driven by a maximum amount of transactions per second that can be processed which is over the month of May 2021 between 15 and 20. \n\nWith Polkadot being able to process well over 1,000 transactions per second it's clearly possible for a smart contract platform to be able to process more transactions.\n\nEthereum plans to allow for more transactions with the adoption of Ethereum2.", "resc": "This prediction will resolve as the earliest date when Ethereum is able to handle 1,000 or more transactions per second for 7 consecutive days, according to [Blockchair](https://blockchair.com/ethereum/charts/transactions-per-second). If blockchair does not report this data, another credible source may be used, or the question may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "Aug 2025", "median": "Oct 2027", "upper_75": "Not ≤ May 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Ethereum will be able to do 1,000 transactions per second by Oct 2027?", "desc": "Currently, transaction prices on Ethereum limit what can be done. High transaction prices are largely driven by a maximum amount of transactions per second that can be processed which is over the month of May 2021 between 15 and 20. \n\nWith Polkadot being able to process well over 1,000 transactions per second it's clearly possible for a smart contract platform to be able to process more transactions.\n\nEthereum plans to allow for more transactions with the adoption of Ethereum2.", "resc": "This prediction will resolve as the earliest date when Ethereum is able to handle 1,000 or more transactions per second for 7 consecutive days, according to [Blockchair](https://blockchair.com/ethereum/charts/transactions-per-second). If blockchair does not report this data, another credible source may be used, or the question may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "Aug 2025", "median": "Oct 2027", "upper_75": "Not ≤ May 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an HSV-1 vaccine will be approved by the FDA by 2036?", "desc": "From [Gene NG News](https://www.goodrx.com/blog/herpes-vaccine-progress/) in November 2020,\n\n> A genetically edited form of a herpes simplex virus (HSV) has outperformed a leading vaccine candidate in a new preclinical study by researchers at the University of Cincinnati, Northwestern University, and the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. The vaccine, called R2, is a form of the herpes simplex virus type 1 (HSV-1) virus that causes cold sores around the lip, but can cross-protect against HSV type 2 (HSV-2), the sexually transmitted type of HSV that is usually responsible for genital herpes.\n\nMany have noted that new mRNA technology created as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic has [the potential to accelerate vaccine development for other diseases](https://globalnews.ca/news/7869139/mrna-vaccines-cancer-flu-covid19/).\n\nWhile HSV-1, and the oral herpes it causes, may not at first sound like an urgent vaccine target, HSV-1 has been implicated as a leading cause of Alzheimers, especially in people who carry [Apolipoprotein E4](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apolipoprotein_E). These research papers summarize the state of the current evidence,\n\n[HSV-1 and Alzheimer's disease: more than a hypothesis](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4019841/)\n\n[Corroboration of a Major Role for Herpes Simplex Virus Type 1 in Alzheimer's Disease](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6202583/)\n\nThe development of an effective HSV-1 vaccine could therefore greatly reduce the number of Alzheimers cases. If the vaccine worked like the [Shingles vaccine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zoster_vaccine), then it may even prevent Alzheimers among people who take the vaccine after already being infected with HSV-1.", "resc": "This question resolves on the date during which the FDA approves a vaccine intended to prevent HSV-1 infection, which includes emergency authorization", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Ethereum will be able to do 1,000 transactions per second by Oct 2027?", "desc": "Currently, transaction prices on Ethereum limit what can be done. High transaction prices are largely driven by a maximum amount of transactions per second that can be processed which is over the month of May 2021 between 15 and 20. \n\nWith Polkadot being able to process well over 1,000 transactions per second it's clearly possible for a smart contract platform to be able to process more transactions.\n\nEthereum plans to allow for more transactions with the adoption of Ethereum2.", "resc": "This prediction will resolve as the earliest date when Ethereum is able to handle 1,000 or more transactions per second for 7 consecutive days, according to [Blockchair](https://blockchair.com/ethereum/charts/transactions-per-second). If blockchair does not report this data, another credible source may be used, or the question may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "Aug 2025", "median": "Oct 2027", "upper_75": "Not ≤ May 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least a zettabyte of digital information will be destroyed as the result of a single event by 2093?", "desc": "The amount of data in the world is not precisely known, but should be in the [multi-zettabyte range](https://martech.zone/ibm-big-data-marketing/).\n\nThe amount of data we consume and create shows a strong [growth trend](https://www.statista.com/statistics/871513/worldwide-data-created/). \n\nHumanity has been known to [lose](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_of_Alexandria) large amounts of information [before](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Baghdad_(1258)).", "resc": "This question resolves when either two credible media sources or a peer-reviewed paper report that at least one zettabyte (10^21 bytes) of humanity's digital information has been irrevocably destroyed as the result of a single event. \n\nAdditional resolution details:\n\n- All data in question must have been destroyed within any window of 48 contiguous hours.\n- The information can reside on any number of systems located anywhere.\n- In order for this question to resolve positively, the information cannot have been intentionally destroyed by the legitimate users of the system as part of normal operation of the system", "lower_25": "2046", "median": "2068", "upper_75": "2093", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least a zettabyte of digital information will be destroyed as the result of a single event by 2093?", "desc": "The amount of data in the world is not precisely known, but should be in the [multi-zettabyte range](https://martech.zone/ibm-big-data-marketing/).\n\nThe amount of data we consume and create shows a strong [growth trend](https://www.statista.com/statistics/871513/worldwide-data-created/). \n\nHumanity has been known to [lose](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_of_Alexandria) large amounts of information [before](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Baghdad_(1258)).", "resc": "This question resolves when either two credible media sources or a peer-reviewed paper report that at least one zettabyte (10^21 bytes) of humanity's digital information has been irrevocably destroyed as the result of a single event. \n\nAdditional resolution details:\n\n- All data in question must have been destroyed within any window of 48 contiguous hours.\n- The information can reside on any number of systems located anywhere.\n- In order for this question to resolve positively, the information cannot have been intentionally destroyed by the legitimate users of the system as part of normal operation of the system", "lower_25": "2046", "median": "2068", "upper_75": "2093", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 20.40 portion of Official Currency Reserve (COFER) will be Chinese Yuan in Q4 of 2031 according to the IMF?", "desc": "The US dollar is in 2021 the dominant international reserve currency, which means many central banks hold large quanitities of US Dollars. This practice implies the US Fed can expand the supply of US dollars more than many other central banks without risk of inflation. This arrangement is a cornerstone of the [Bretton Woods System](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system). However, the use of the Chinese Yuan (renminbi) is growing quite rapidly. \n\nIn Q4 of 2020, according to [IMF Reports](https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4) US dollars were about 56.7% of all official foreign currency reserves.\n\nThis question will resolve to the percent of all Official Foreign Exchange Reserves held as Chinese Yuan as indicated in official IMF sources for Q4 of 2031.\n\nThe intent of this question in to assess if substantial change to the [Bretton Woods System](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system) is anticipated by Q4 of 2031 on the part of Metaculus predictors.", "resc": "This question resolves as the percentage of the Official Currency Reserve held in Chinese Yuan in Q4 of 2031.\n\nThis question will be judged by looking at the updated version of [IMF COFER](https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4) and dividing claims in dollars by Total Foreign Currency Reserves.", "lower_25": "4.17", "median": "11.50", "upper_75": "20.40", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least a zettabyte of digital information will be destroyed as the result of a single event by 2093?", "desc": "The amount of data in the world is not precisely known, but should be in the [multi-zettabyte range](https://martech.zone/ibm-big-data-marketing/).\n\nThe amount of data we consume and create shows a strong [growth trend](https://www.statista.com/statistics/871513/worldwide-data-created/). \n\nHumanity has been known to [lose](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_of_Alexandria) large amounts of information [before](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Baghdad_(1258)).", "resc": "This question resolves when either two credible media sources or a peer-reviewed paper report that at least one zettabyte (10^21 bytes) of humanity's digital information has been irrevocably destroyed as the result of a single event. \n\nAdditional resolution details:\n\n- All data in question must have been destroyed within any window of 48 contiguous hours.\n- The information can reside on any number of systems located anywhere.\n- In order for this question to resolve positively, the information cannot have been intentionally destroyed by the legitimate users of the system as part of normal operation of the system", "lower_25": "2046", "median": "2068", "upper_75": "2093", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.95k people will take the EA survey in 2025?", "desc": "Each year since 2014, the [Effective Altruism Survey](https://www.rethinkprojects.org/easurvey) has collected information about the EA community by surveying community members. For example, the [2020](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/ThdR8FzcfA8wckTJi/ea-survey-2020-demographics) survey collected 2,166 valid responses from EAs.\n\nThis question asks about the number of valid responses the 2025 edition of the survey will receive.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the number of valid responses claimed by the publishers of the EA survey in 2025. If the survey does not take place, the question should resolve ambiguous.\n\n*See [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7318/ea-survey-responses-2030/) for a similar question about the 2030 EA Survey.", "lower_25": "2.26k", "median": "2.95k", "upper_75": "4.11k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 20.40 portion of Official Currency Reserve (COFER) will be Chinese Yuan in Q4 of 2031 according to the IMF?", "desc": "The US dollar is in 2021 the dominant international reserve currency, which means many central banks hold large quanitities of US Dollars. This practice implies the US Fed can expand the supply of US dollars more than many other central banks without risk of inflation. This arrangement is a cornerstone of the [Bretton Woods System](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system). However, the use of the Chinese Yuan (renminbi) is growing quite rapidly. \n\nIn Q4 of 2020, according to [IMF Reports](https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4) US dollars were about 56.7% of all official foreign currency reserves.\n\nThis question will resolve to the percent of all Official Foreign Exchange Reserves held as Chinese Yuan as indicated in official IMF sources for Q4 of 2031.\n\nThe intent of this question in to assess if substantial change to the [Bretton Woods System](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system) is anticipated by Q4 of 2031 on the part of Metaculus predictors.", "resc": "This question resolves as the percentage of the Official Currency Reserve held in Chinese Yuan in Q4 of 2031.\n\nThis question will be judged by looking at the updated version of [IMF COFER](https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4) and dividing claims in dollars by Total Foreign Currency Reserves.", "lower_25": "4.17", "median": "11.50", "upper_75": "20.40", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope will be launched by 2027?", "desc": "The [Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nancy_Grace_Roman_Space_Telescope) (Roman Space Telescope, previously known as WFIRST) is an infrared space telescope currently under development by NASA. The telescope is planned (as of June 2021) to feature a 2.4 meter wide primary meter, the same size as that of the [Hubble Space Telescope](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hubble_Space_Telescope). The two major instruments planned for the Roman Space Telescope will be a camera with a field of view 100 times larger than Hubble's, and a coronagraph allowing the direct imaging of exoplanets a billion times fainter than their host star. Though the [FAQ](https://roman.gsfc.nasa.gov/faq.html) of the telescope's website claims \"Preparations are on track for a mid-2020s launch\", previous large NASA astronomy missions such as Hubble and [JWST](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Webb_Space_Telescope) have seen delays of several years.", "resc": "In line with the [question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3033/when-will-the-james-webb-space-telescope-be-launched/) on JWST, this resolves when the Roman Space Telescope is mounted on a rocket and the rocket engines are ignited with the intent of taking off. It also resolves if the Roman Space Telescope reaches space (defined as an altitude of 100 km, aka the Kármán line) through any other mean. The question resolves ambiguous if there are definitive reports that the Roman Space Telescope is cancelled.", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope will be launched by 2027?", "desc": "The [Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nancy_Grace_Roman_Space_Telescope) (Roman Space Telescope, previously known as WFIRST) is an infrared space telescope currently under development by NASA. The telescope is planned (as of June 2021) to feature a 2.4 meter wide primary meter, the same size as that of the [Hubble Space Telescope](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hubble_Space_Telescope). The two major instruments planned for the Roman Space Telescope will be a camera with a field of view 100 times larger than Hubble's, and a coronagraph allowing the direct imaging of exoplanets a billion times fainter than their host star. Though the [FAQ](https://roman.gsfc.nasa.gov/faq.html) of the telescope's website claims \"Preparations are on track for a mid-2020s launch\", previous large NASA astronomy missions such as Hubble and [JWST](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Webb_Space_Telescope) have seen delays of several years.", "resc": "In line with the [question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3033/when-will-the-james-webb-space-telescope-be-launched/) on JWST, this resolves when the Roman Space Telescope is mounted on a rocket and the rocket engines are ignited with the intent of taking off. It also resolves if the Roman Space Telescope reaches space (defined as an altitude of 100 km, aka the Kármán line) through any other mean. The question resolves ambiguous if there are definitive reports that the Roman Space Telescope is cancelled.", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that historical consensus will determine the first AGI came online 50 years earlier than when it became publicly known, given that 721 hours have passed since the first AGI was publicly known?", "desc": "Development of the first artificial general intelligence may share several parallels with the development of the first nuclear weapon. The basic concept of nuclear weapons [existed in the popular sphere](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_World_Set_Free) many years before the [first successful test](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trinity_(nuclear_test)), which itself preceded [public announcement](https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Events/1945-present/public_reaction.htm) of the weapon after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima by some three weeks. AGI's speculated disruptive potential is [very high](https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf), and heads of state have [publicly stated](https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/4/16251226/russia-ai-putin-rule-the-world) that the realization of AGI has not only critical national security implications but implications affecting the future of humanity.\n\nFor these reasons, and because the capability to make nuclear weapons was not immediately announced to the public, it is plausible that a gap between attainment of capability and announcement of capability could exist after creation of the first AGI--whether or not its creation takes place in an adversarial context.", "resc": "The rev slider quantity is hours. Keep in mind that the precision of the future given dates of creation and public awareness are unspecified and unknown. For the purpose of resolution, the lowest credible value, rounded as precision demands, shall be used, as determined by mods. A 0-hour public discovery is represented by the minimum prediction value, as log scale can't be used if 0 is included. The upper boundary is open for predictions exceeding 10000 hours. \n\nThis question resolves positive if all three of the following conditions are satisfied:\n\n1) an AGI is created\n\n2) this AGI becomes public knowledge by any means\n\n3) 50 years after 2) there exists historical consensus on the dates of 1) and 2).\n\nMod discretion reserved for what is or isn't an AGI, since it's not completely clear what future definition will be accepted. This question assumes that if AGI happens there will be a widespread consensus recognizing it as such.\n\nResolves ambiguous if no consensus on AGI's status as such. Resolves ambiguous if no consensus on AGI's creation time, and / or if there is no consensus on when the public becomes aware of AGI", "lower_25": "144", "median": "721", "upper_75": "2.94k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 48.0 portion of Official Currency Reserve (COFER) will be US dollars in Q4 of 2031 according to the IMF?", "desc": "The US dollar is in 2021 the dominant international reserve currency, which means many central banks hold large quanitities of US Dollars. This practice implies the US Fed can expand the supply of US dollars more than many other central banks without risk of inflation. This arrangement is a cornerstone of the [Bretton Woods System](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system) \n\nIn Q4 of 2020, according to [IMF Reports](https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4) US dollars were about 56.7% of all official foreign currency reserves.\n\nThis question will resolve to the percent of all Official Foreign Exchange Reserves held as US Dollars as indicated in official IMF sources for Q4 of 2031.\n\nThe intent of this question in to assess if substantial change to the Bretton Woods System is anticipated by Q4 of 2031 on the part of Metaculus predictors.", "resc": "This question resolves as the percentage of the Official Currency Reserve held in US dollars in Q4 of 2031.\n\nThis question will be judged by looking at the updated version of [IMF COFER](https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4) and dividing claims in dollars by Total Foreign Currency Reserves.", "lower_25": "37.1", "median": "48.0", "upper_75": "56.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope will be launched by 2027?", "desc": "The [Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nancy_Grace_Roman_Space_Telescope) (Roman Space Telescope, previously known as WFIRST) is an infrared space telescope currently under development by NASA. The telescope is planned (as of June 2021) to feature a 2.4 meter wide primary meter, the same size as that of the [Hubble Space Telescope](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hubble_Space_Telescope). The two major instruments planned for the Roman Space Telescope will be a camera with a field of view 100 times larger than Hubble's, and a coronagraph allowing the direct imaging of exoplanets a billion times fainter than their host star. Though the [FAQ](https://roman.gsfc.nasa.gov/faq.html) of the telescope's website claims \"Preparations are on track for a mid-2020s launch\", previous large NASA astronomy missions such as Hubble and [JWST](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Webb_Space_Telescope) have seen delays of several years.", "resc": "In line with the [question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3033/when-will-the-james-webb-space-telescope-be-launched/) on JWST, this resolves when the Roman Space Telescope is mounted on a rocket and the rocket engines are ignited with the intent of taking off. It also resolves if the Roman Space Telescope reaches space (defined as an altitude of 100 km, aka the Kármán line) through any other mean. The question resolves ambiguous if there are definitive reports that the Roman Space Telescope is cancelled.", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 20.40 portion of Official Currency Reserve (COFER) will be Chinese Yuan in Q4 of 2031 according to the IMF?", "desc": "The US dollar is in 2021 the dominant international reserve currency, which means many central banks hold large quanitities of US Dollars. This practice implies the US Fed can expand the supply of US dollars more than many other central banks without risk of inflation. This arrangement is a cornerstone of the [Bretton Woods System](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system). However, the use of the Chinese Yuan (renminbi) is growing quite rapidly. \n\nIn Q4 of 2020, according to [IMF Reports](https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4) US dollars were about 56.7% of all official foreign currency reserves.\n\nThis question will resolve to the percent of all Official Foreign Exchange Reserves held as Chinese Yuan as indicated in official IMF sources for Q4 of 2031.\n\nThe intent of this question in to assess if substantial change to the [Bretton Woods System](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system) is anticipated by Q4 of 2031 on the part of Metaculus predictors.", "resc": "This question resolves as the percentage of the Official Currency Reserve held in Chinese Yuan in Q4 of 2031.\n\nThis question will be judged by looking at the updated version of [IMF COFER](https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4) and dividing claims in dollars by Total Foreign Currency Reserves.", "lower_25": "4.17", "median": "11.50", "upper_75": "20.40", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.05k people will take the EA survey in 2030?", "desc": "Each year since 2014, the [Effective Altruism Survey](https://www.rethinkprojects.org/easurvey) has collected information about the EA community by surveying community members. For example, the [2020](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/ThdR8FzcfA8wckTJi/ea-survey-2020-demographics) survey collected 2,166 valid responses from EAs.\n\nThis question asks about the number of valid responses the 2030 edition of the survey will receive.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the number of valid responses claimed by the publishers of the EA survey in 2030. If the survey does not take place, the question should resolve ambiguous.\n\n*See [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7317/ea-survey-responses-2025/) for a similar question about the 2025 EA Survey.", "lower_25": "2.05k", "median": "3.54k", "upper_75": "6.23k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.05k people will take the EA survey in 2030?", "desc": "Each year since 2014, the [Effective Altruism Survey](https://www.rethinkprojects.org/easurvey) has collected information about the EA community by surveying community members. For example, the [2020](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/ThdR8FzcfA8wckTJi/ea-survey-2020-demographics) survey collected 2,166 valid responses from EAs.\n\nThis question asks about the number of valid responses the 2030 edition of the survey will receive.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the number of valid responses claimed by the publishers of the EA survey in 2030. If the survey does not take place, the question should resolve ambiguous.\n\n*See [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7317/ea-survey-responses-2025/) for a similar question about the 2025 EA Survey.", "lower_25": "2.05k", "median": "3.54k", "upper_75": "6.23k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.05k people will take the EA survey in 2030?", "desc": "Each year since 2014, the [Effective Altruism Survey](https://www.rethinkprojects.org/easurvey) has collected information about the EA community by surveying community members. For example, the [2020](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/ThdR8FzcfA8wckTJi/ea-survey-2020-demographics) survey collected 2,166 valid responses from EAs.\n\nThis question asks about the number of valid responses the 2030 edition of the survey will receive.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the number of valid responses claimed by the publishers of the EA survey in 2030. If the survey does not take place, the question should resolve ambiguous.\n\n*See [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7317/ea-survey-responses-2025/) for a similar question about the 2025 EA Survey.", "lower_25": "2.05k", "median": "3.54k", "upper_75": "6.23k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.95k people will take the EA survey in 2025?", "desc": "Each year since 2014, the [Effective Altruism Survey](https://www.rethinkprojects.org/easurvey) has collected information about the EA community by surveying community members. For example, the [2020](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/ThdR8FzcfA8wckTJi/ea-survey-2020-demographics) survey collected 2,166 valid responses from EAs.\n\nThis question asks about the number of valid responses the 2025 edition of the survey will receive.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the number of valid responses claimed by the publishers of the EA survey in 2025. If the survey does not take place, the question should resolve ambiguous.\n\n*See [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7318/ea-survey-responses-2030/) for a similar question about the 2030 EA Survey.", "lower_25": "2.26k", "median": "2.95k", "upper_75": "4.11k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.95k people will take the EA survey in 2025?", "desc": "Each year since 2014, the [Effective Altruism Survey](https://www.rethinkprojects.org/easurvey) has collected information about the EA community by surveying community members. For example, the [2020](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/ThdR8FzcfA8wckTJi/ea-survey-2020-demographics) survey collected 2,166 valid responses from EAs.\n\nThis question asks about the number of valid responses the 2025 edition of the survey will receive.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the number of valid responses claimed by the publishers of the EA survey in 2025. If the survey does not take place, the question should resolve ambiguous.\n\n*See [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7318/ea-survey-responses-2030/) for a similar question about the 2030 EA Survey.", "lower_25": "2.26k", "median": "2.95k", "upper_75": "4.11k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the number of Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations in the US will have declined by 75% relative to 2020 levels by Not ≤ 2070?", "desc": "A [concentrated animal feeding operation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concentrated_animal_feeding_operation) (CAFO) is an intensive animal feeding operation in which over 1000 animal units are confined for over 45 days a year. An animal unit is the equivalent of 1000 pounds of \"live\" animal weight. A thousand animal units equates to 700 dairy cows, 1000 meat cows, 2500 pigs weighing more than 55 pounds (25 kg), 10,000 pigs weighing under 55 pounds, 10,000 sheep, 55,000 turkeys, 125,000 chickens, or 82,000 egg laying hens or pullets. There were 21,465 CAFOs in the US in 2020, [according to the US Environmental Protection Agency](https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2021-05/documents/cafo_status_report_2020.pdf). This question asks when that number will decline by 90% (i.e, to 2,146 or fewer CAFOs in the US).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when the estimated number of CAFOs in the US declines to 2,146 or fewer, according to the EPA.", "lower_25": "2049", "median": "2062", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2070", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 367M in 2025?", "desc": "[Open Philanthropy](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/) is a major philanthropic foundation focused mainly on on causes associated with the [Effective Altruism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effective_altruism) movement. Most of their money currently comes from [Good Ventures](https://www.goodventures.org/), a foundation managing the philanthopic efforts of Facebook and Asana cofounder [Dustin Moskovitz](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dustin_Moskovitz) and his partner Cari Tuna, who have an estimated net worth of [$21.9bn](https://www.forbes.com/profile/dustin-moskovitz/?sh=1d9ff1161dd3) as of June 2021. They donated $271 million to such causes [in 2020](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/giving/grants) and $298 million in 2019. This question asks about how much they will grant in 2025.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the sum of the dollar values of Open Philanthropy grants dated 2025 and listed in their grants database. If their grants database is no longer public it will resolve to their announced total donations in 2025. If Open Phil do not disclose total grants for 2025 this question should resolve ambiguous.\n\nSee [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7327/open-phil-donations-2030/) for a similar question about 2030.\n\n**29 July edit: If Open Philanthropy no longer exists as an organization at the start of the year in question, this resolves as 0.*", "lower_25": "367M", "median": "637M", "upper_75": "1.12B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 62.1 fraction of the world's population will live in a democracy in 2040?", "desc": "Our World In Data claims that in 2015, 55.8% of people [lived in a democracy](https://ourworldindata.org/democracy). From OWID: \n\n>During the 19th century, most of the world's population lived in colonial empires, autocracies, or anocracies. The late 19th century saw a limited expansion of democracies. And since that time, there has been a general upward trend in the share of the world population living under democracies, save for the period before and during World War II.\n\n>During the second half of the 20th century, colonies gained independence and more countries became democracies. Today, more than half the world's population live in a democracy. And of those [23.23%] who still live in autocracies, four-fifths are Chinese. \n\nThis question asks how this data will look for 2040.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the fraction of people Our World In Data considers to be living in a democracy as of 2040. If OWID no longer exists or no longer publishes a value for this question, admins may choose a credible alternative data source", "lower_25": "43.8", "median": "53.2", "upper_75": "62.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 1.92B dollars in 2030?", "desc": "[Open Philanthropy](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/) is a major philanthropic foundation focused mainly on on causes associated with the [Effective Altruism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effective_altruism) movement. Most of their money currently comes from [Good Ventures](https://www.goodventures.org/), a foundation managing the philanthopic efforts of Facebook and Asana cofounder [Dustin Moskovitz](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dustin_Moskovitz) and his partner Cari Tuna, who have an estimated net worth of [$21.9bn](https://www.forbes.com/profile/dustin-moskovitz/?sh=1d9ff1161dd3) as of June 2021. They donated $271 million to such causes [in 2020](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/giving/grants) and $298 million in 2019. This question asks about how much they will grant in 2030.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the sum of the dollar values of Open Philanthropy grants dated 2030 and listed in their grants database. If their grants database is no longer public it will resolve to their announced total donations in 2030. If Open Phil do not disclose total grants for 2030 this question should resolve ambiguous. \n\nSee [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7326/open-phil-donations-2025/) for a similar question about 2025.\n\n**29 July edit: If Open Philanthropy no longer exists as an organization at the start of the year in question, this resolves as 0.*", "lower_25": "565M", "median": "1.07B", "upper_75": "1.92B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 367M in 2025?", "desc": "[Open Philanthropy](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/) is a major philanthropic foundation focused mainly on on causes associated with the [Effective Altruism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effective_altruism) movement. Most of their money currently comes from [Good Ventures](https://www.goodventures.org/), a foundation managing the philanthopic efforts of Facebook and Asana cofounder [Dustin Moskovitz](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dustin_Moskovitz) and his partner Cari Tuna, who have an estimated net worth of [$21.9bn](https://www.forbes.com/profile/dustin-moskovitz/?sh=1d9ff1161dd3) as of June 2021. They donated $271 million to such causes [in 2020](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/giving/grants) and $298 million in 2019. This question asks about how much they will grant in 2025.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the sum of the dollar values of Open Philanthropy grants dated 2025 and listed in their grants database. If their grants database is no longer public it will resolve to their announced total donations in 2025. If Open Phil do not disclose total grants for 2025 this question should resolve ambiguous.\n\nSee [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7327/open-phil-donations-2030/) for a similar question about 2030.\n\n**29 July edit: If Open Philanthropy no longer exists as an organization at the start of the year in question, this resolves as 0.*", "lower_25": "367M", "median": "637M", "upper_75": "1.12B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the number of Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations in the US will have declined by 75% relative to 2020 levels by Not ≤ 2070?", "desc": "A [concentrated animal feeding operation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concentrated_animal_feeding_operation) (CAFO) is an intensive animal feeding operation in which over 1000 animal units are confined for over 45 days a year. An animal unit is the equivalent of 1000 pounds of \"live\" animal weight. A thousand animal units equates to 700 dairy cows, 1000 meat cows, 2500 pigs weighing more than 55 pounds (25 kg), 10,000 pigs weighing under 55 pounds, 10,000 sheep, 55,000 turkeys, 125,000 chickens, or 82,000 egg laying hens or pullets. There were 21,465 CAFOs in the US in 2020, [according to the US Environmental Protection Agency](https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2021-05/documents/cafo_status_report_2020.pdf). This question asks when that number will decline by 90% (i.e, to 2,146 or fewer CAFOs in the US).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when the estimated number of CAFOs in the US declines to 2,146 or fewer, according to the EPA.", "lower_25": "2049", "median": "2062", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2070", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 367M in 2025?", "desc": "[Open Philanthropy](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/) is a major philanthropic foundation focused mainly on on causes associated with the [Effective Altruism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effective_altruism) movement. Most of their money currently comes from [Good Ventures](https://www.goodventures.org/), a foundation managing the philanthopic efforts of Facebook and Asana cofounder [Dustin Moskovitz](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dustin_Moskovitz) and his partner Cari Tuna, who have an estimated net worth of [$21.9bn](https://www.forbes.com/profile/dustin-moskovitz/?sh=1d9ff1161dd3) as of June 2021. They donated $271 million to such causes [in 2020](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/giving/grants) and $298 million in 2019. This question asks about how much they will grant in 2025.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the sum of the dollar values of Open Philanthropy grants dated 2025 and listed in their grants database. If their grants database is no longer public it will resolve to their announced total donations in 2025. If Open Phil do not disclose total grants for 2025 this question should resolve ambiguous.\n\nSee [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7327/open-phil-donations-2030/) for a similar question about 2030.\n\n**29 July edit: If Open Philanthropy no longer exists as an organization at the start of the year in question, this resolves as 0.*", "lower_25": "367M", "median": "637M", "upper_75": "1.12B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 62.1 fraction of the world's population will live in a democracy in 2040?", "desc": "Our World In Data claims that in 2015, 55.8% of people [lived in a democracy](https://ourworldindata.org/democracy). From OWID: \n\n>During the 19th century, most of the world's population lived in colonial empires, autocracies, or anocracies. The late 19th century saw a limited expansion of democracies. And since that time, there has been a general upward trend in the share of the world population living under democracies, save for the period before and during World War II.\n\n>During the second half of the 20th century, colonies gained independence and more countries became democracies. Today, more than half the world's population live in a democracy. And of those [23.23%] who still live in autocracies, four-fifths are Chinese. \n\nThis question asks how this data will look for 2040.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the fraction of people Our World In Data considers to be living in a democracy as of 2040. If OWID no longer exists or no longer publishes a value for this question, admins may choose a credible alternative data source", "lower_25": "43.8", "median": "53.2", "upper_75": "62.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the number of Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations in the US will have declined by 75% relative to 2020 levels by Not ≤ 2070?", "desc": "A [concentrated animal feeding operation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concentrated_animal_feeding_operation) (CAFO) is an intensive animal feeding operation in which over 1000 animal units are confined for over 45 days a year. An animal unit is the equivalent of 1000 pounds of \"live\" animal weight. A thousand animal units equates to 700 dairy cows, 1000 meat cows, 2500 pigs weighing more than 55 pounds (25 kg), 10,000 pigs weighing under 55 pounds, 10,000 sheep, 55,000 turkeys, 125,000 chickens, or 82,000 egg laying hens or pullets. There were 21,465 CAFOs in the US in 2020, [according to the US Environmental Protection Agency](https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2021-05/documents/cafo_status_report_2020.pdf). This question asks when that number will decline by 90% (i.e, to 2,146 or fewer CAFOs in the US).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when the estimated number of CAFOs in the US declines to 2,146 or fewer, according to the EPA.", "lower_25": "2049", "median": "2062", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2070", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 1.92B dollars in 2030?", "desc": "[Open Philanthropy](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/) is a major philanthropic foundation focused mainly on on causes associated with the [Effective Altruism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effective_altruism) movement. Most of their money currently comes from [Good Ventures](https://www.goodventures.org/), a foundation managing the philanthopic efforts of Facebook and Asana cofounder [Dustin Moskovitz](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dustin_Moskovitz) and his partner Cari Tuna, who have an estimated net worth of [$21.9bn](https://www.forbes.com/profile/dustin-moskovitz/?sh=1d9ff1161dd3) as of June 2021. They donated $271 million to such causes [in 2020](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/giving/grants) and $298 million in 2019. This question asks about how much they will grant in 2030.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the sum of the dollar values of Open Philanthropy grants dated 2030 and listed in their grants database. If their grants database is no longer public it will resolve to their announced total donations in 2030. If Open Phil do not disclose total grants for 2030 this question should resolve ambiguous. \n\nSee [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7326/open-phil-donations-2025/) for a similar question about 2025.\n\n**29 July edit: If Open Philanthropy no longer exists as an organization at the start of the year in question, this resolves as 0.*", "lower_25": "565M", "median": "1.07B", "upper_75": "1.92B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Good Ventures will first donate 5% of Dustin Moskovitz's wealth in one year by 2027?", "desc": "[Good Ventures](https://www.goodventures.org/) is a philanthropic foundation managing the giving of Dustin Moskovitz and Cari Tuna which is a major donor to effective altruist aligned causes. They donated $219 million to such causes [in 2020](https://www.goodventures.org/our-portfolio/grants-database) and $274 million in 2019, for an average of $246 million per year in these two years. Dustin Moskovitz has a net worth of $19.5 billion in June 2021, according to the [Bloomberg Billionaires Index](https://www.bloomberg.com/billionaires/profiles/dustin-a-moskovitz/). According to Open Philanthropy, they intended on founding Good Ventures to give away most of their wealth [during their lifetime](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/about/who-we-are). This question asks when they will first succeed in granting 5% of their wealth in a 12 month period.", "resc": "This questions resolves to the date when the trailing 12 month total of donations made by Good Ventures according to their Grants Database exceeds 5% of Dustin Moskovitz's wealth on that date according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index.\n\nIf this question does not resolve positively by 01/01/2040, it resolves as \">01/01/2040\".", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 1.92B dollars in 2030?", "desc": "[Open Philanthropy](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/) is a major philanthropic foundation focused mainly on on causes associated with the [Effective Altruism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effective_altruism) movement. Most of their money currently comes from [Good Ventures](https://www.goodventures.org/), a foundation managing the philanthopic efforts of Facebook and Asana cofounder [Dustin Moskovitz](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dustin_Moskovitz) and his partner Cari Tuna, who have an estimated net worth of [$21.9bn](https://www.forbes.com/profile/dustin-moskovitz/?sh=1d9ff1161dd3) as of June 2021. They donated $271 million to such causes [in 2020](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/giving/grants) and $298 million in 2019. This question asks about how much they will grant in 2030.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the sum of the dollar values of Open Philanthropy grants dated 2030 and listed in their grants database. If their grants database is no longer public it will resolve to their announced total donations in 2030. If Open Phil do not disclose total grants for 2030 this question should resolve ambiguous. \n\nSee [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7326/open-phil-donations-2025/) for a similar question about 2025.\n\n**29 July edit: If Open Philanthropy no longer exists as an organization at the start of the year in question, this resolves as 0.*", "lower_25": "565M", "median": "1.07B", "upper_75": "1.92B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 62.1 fraction of the world's population will live in a democracy in 2040?", "desc": "Our World In Data claims that in 2015, 55.8% of people [lived in a democracy](https://ourworldindata.org/democracy). From OWID: \n\n>During the 19th century, most of the world's population lived in colonial empires, autocracies, or anocracies. The late 19th century saw a limited expansion of democracies. And since that time, there has been a general upward trend in the share of the world population living under democracies, save for the period before and during World War II.\n\n>During the second half of the 20th century, colonies gained independence and more countries became democracies. Today, more than half the world's population live in a democracy. And of those [23.23%] who still live in autocracies, four-fifths are Chinese. \n\nThis question asks how this data will look for 2040.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the fraction of people Our World In Data considers to be living in a democracy as of 2040. If OWID no longer exists or no longer publishes a value for this question, admins may choose a credible alternative data source", "lower_25": "43.8", "median": "53.2", "upper_75": "62.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Good Ventures will first donate 5% of Dustin Moskovitz's wealth in one year by 2027?", "desc": "[Good Ventures](https://www.goodventures.org/) is a philanthropic foundation managing the giving of Dustin Moskovitz and Cari Tuna which is a major donor to effective altruist aligned causes. They donated $219 million to such causes [in 2020](https://www.goodventures.org/our-portfolio/grants-database) and $274 million in 2019, for an average of $246 million per year in these two years. Dustin Moskovitz has a net worth of $19.5 billion in June 2021, according to the [Bloomberg Billionaires Index](https://www.bloomberg.com/billionaires/profiles/dustin-a-moskovitz/). According to Open Philanthropy, they intended on founding Good Ventures to give away most of their wealth [during their lifetime](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/about/who-we-are). This question asks when they will first succeed in granting 5% of their wealth in a 12 month period.", "resc": "This questions resolves to the date when the trailing 12 month total of donations made by Good Ventures according to their Grants Database exceeds 5% of Dustin Moskovitz's wealth on that date according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index.\n\nIf this question does not resolve positively by 01/01/2040, it resolves as \">01/01/2040\".", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What percentage of US GDP will be spent on healthcare in 2035?\n\nKeyword: 23.4\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 23.4% of US GDP will be spent on healthcare in 2035?", "desc": "The United States [currently spends](health spending) about 17% of its GDP on health spending, which is up from about 6% in 1970. This growth is substantially faster than similar industrialized nations. Economists have pointed the blame at [various sources](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/080615/6-reasons-healthcare-so-expensive-us.asp), mostly pointing to rising prescription drug, device and test costs, rising compensation for doctors and nurses, and administrative waste.", "resc": "This question resolves as the percent value that the United States spends on healthcare, given as a fraction of GDP for the year 2035. Reliable sources used for resolution will be, in order of priority,\n\n* Some official cost estimate given by the US federal government\n* Some official cost estimate given by the OECD\n* A highly reputable study that estimates healthcare spending costs\n\nFor the purpose of this question, healthcare consists of those activities conducted by paid professionals in the treatment, prevention and cure of diseases, excluding personal trainers and those in unlicensed or pseudo-scientific professions. In case this definition is not specific enough, or indeed accurate according to general wisdom, admins should use their discretion in determining which cost estimate is best", "lower_25": "19.6", "median": "23.4", "upper_75": "27.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What percentage of US GDP will be spent on healthcare in 2035?\n\nKeyword: 23.4\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 23.4% of US GDP will be spent on healthcare in 2035?", "desc": "The United States [currently spends](health spending) about 17% of its GDP on health spending, which is up from about 6% in 1970. This growth is substantially faster than similar industrialized nations. Economists have pointed the blame at [various sources](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/080615/6-reasons-healthcare-so-expensive-us.asp), mostly pointing to rising prescription drug, device and test costs, rising compensation for doctors and nurses, and administrative waste.", "resc": "This question resolves as the percent value that the United States spends on healthcare, given as a fraction of GDP for the year 2035. Reliable sources used for resolution will be, in order of priority,\n\n* Some official cost estimate given by the US federal government\n* Some official cost estimate given by the OECD\n* A highly reputable study that estimates healthcare spending costs\n\nFor the purpose of this question, healthcare consists of those activities conducted by paid professionals in the treatment, prevention and cure of diseases, excluding personal trainers and those in unlicensed or pseudo-scientific professions. In case this definition is not specific enough, or indeed accurate according to general wisdom, admins should use their discretion in determining which cost estimate is best", "lower_25": "19.6", "median": "23.4", "upper_75": "27.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Good Ventures will first donate 5% of Dustin Moskovitz's wealth in one year by 2027?", "desc": "[Good Ventures](https://www.goodventures.org/) is a philanthropic foundation managing the giving of Dustin Moskovitz and Cari Tuna which is a major donor to effective altruist aligned causes. They donated $219 million to such causes [in 2020](https://www.goodventures.org/our-portfolio/grants-database) and $274 million in 2019, for an average of $246 million per year in these two years. Dustin Moskovitz has a net worth of $19.5 billion in June 2021, according to the [Bloomberg Billionaires Index](https://www.bloomberg.com/billionaires/profiles/dustin-a-moskovitz/). According to Open Philanthropy, they intended on founding Good Ventures to give away most of their wealth [during their lifetime](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/about/who-we-are). This question asks when they will first succeed in granting 5% of their wealth in a 12 month period.", "resc": "This questions resolves to the date when the trailing 12 month total of donations made by Good Ventures according to their Grants Database exceeds 5% of Dustin Moskovitz's wealth on that date according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index.\n\nIf this question does not resolve positively by 01/01/2040, it resolves as \">01/01/2040\".", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the public will have knowledge of the highest pixel resolution, in centimeters, of a classified U.S. government optical satellite that was operational between 2011-2021 by 2061?", "desc": "", "resc": "Between 1959 and 1986, the U.S. launched their first optical spy satellites. The classified “Keyhole” satellites took photographs on film and dropped them to earth where they were retrieved mid-air by airplanes.\n\nThe Keyhole satellites were declassified between 1992 and 2011. At that time, it became public record that the satellites took photos at pixel resolutions as high as 0.6 m.\n\nFor comparison, during the 1970s and 1980s, the publicly available Landsat satellites had pixel resolutions between 30 m and 80 m. Currently, the highest resolution commercial satellite in operation is 31 cm with satellites of 29 cm resolution planned for launch in 2021.\n\nSince the ability to detect objects from space depends on the image's pixel resolution, the ability to predict what is currently detectable by the U.S. government is related to our prediction of the available satellite imagery resolution.\n\n***What will public knowledge be in the year 2061, about the highest pixel resolution, in centimeters, of a classified U.S. government optical satellite that was operational between 2011-2021?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the highest pixel resolution in centimeters as published by a United States government agency. The satellite must have been classified and operational for at least 6 months between 2011-2021.\n\n[fine-print]\nPixel resolution is defined as the length of one side of a square image pixel. For example, a 50 cm pixel resolution will represent a square of size 50 cm x 50 cm.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "5.27", "median": "6.64", "upper_75": "10.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the public will have knowledge of the highest pixel resolution, in centimeters, of a classified U.S. government optical satellite that was operational between 2011-2021 by 2061?", "desc": "", "resc": "Between 1959 and 1986, the U.S. launched their first optical spy satellites. The classified “Keyhole” satellites took photographs on film and dropped them to earth where they were retrieved mid-air by airplanes.\n\nThe Keyhole satellites were declassified between 1992 and 2011. At that time, it became public record that the satellites took photos at pixel resolutions as high as 0.6 m.\n\nFor comparison, during the 1970s and 1980s, the publicly available Landsat satellites had pixel resolutions between 30 m and 80 m. Currently, the highest resolution commercial satellite in operation is 31 cm with satellites of 29 cm resolution planned for launch in 2021.\n\nSince the ability to detect objects from space depends on the image's pixel resolution, the ability to predict what is currently detectable by the U.S. government is related to our prediction of the available satellite imagery resolution.\n\n***What will public knowledge be in the year 2061, about the highest pixel resolution, in centimeters, of a classified U.S. government optical satellite that was operational between 2011-2021?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the highest pixel resolution in centimeters as published by a United States government agency. The satellite must have been classified and operational for at least 6 months between 2011-2021.\n\n[fine-print]\nPixel resolution is defined as the length of one side of a square image pixel. For example, a 50 cm pixel resolution will represent a square of size 50 cm x 50 cm.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "5.27", "median": "6.64", "upper_75": "10.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Peru's GDP per capita (PPP) will be 23.4k in 2030?", "desc": "[The Republic of Peru](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peru) is a country in western South America. It is bordered in the north by Ecuador and Colombia, in the east by Brazil, in the southeast by Bolivia, in the south by Chile, and in the south and west by the Pacific Ocean. Peru is a megadiverse country with habitats ranging from the arid plains of the Pacific coastal region in the west to the peaks of the Andes mountains extending from the north to the southeast of the country to the tropical Amazon Basin rainforest in the east with the Amazon river. At 1.28 million square kilometres, Peru is the 19th-largest country in the world, and the third-largest in South America. Peru has a [population of approximately 33 million](https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/peru-population/) as of 2021.\n\n[The economy of Peru](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Peru) is the 47th-largest in the world (ranked by Purchasing Power Parity), and the income level is classified as upper middle by the World Bank.\n\nIn June 2021, Peru [narrowly elected](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/perus-socialists-cheer-election-win-conservatives-pledge-fight-2021-06-13/?taid=60c66d2935ede90001f5fc12&utm_campaign=trueAnthem:+Trending+Content&utm_medium=trueAnthem&utm_source=twitter) [Pedro Castillo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pedro_Castillo) as President. Castillo is associated with the left-wing [Free Peru National Political Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_Peru). The party describes itself as being \"a left-wing socialist organization\" that embraces Marxism–Leninism and Mariáteguism. It values democracy, decentralization, internationalism, sovereignty, humanism and anti-imperialism. Following his success in the first round of presidential elections in 2021, Pedro Castillo has said that he opposes communism, and has distanced himself from far-leftists in the party. Castillo has also [said that he will not seek to nationalize companies and will honour the rule of law, and will reject the policies of Chavismo.](https://www.reuters.com/world/no-chavismo-here-peru-socialist-candidate-castillo-seeks-calm-jittery-markets-2021-04-22/)\n\nPeru's [GDP per capita (PPP) in current international dollars](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=PE) for the year 2019 was estimated as $13,416 by the World Bank.", "resc": "This question resolves as [Peru's GDP per capita (PPP) in current international dollars](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=PE) as reported by the World Bank for the year 2030. If World Bank figures are unavailable, figures from the United Nations or International Monetary Fund are also acceptable. If none of these organizations produce an estimate of Peru's PPP GDP per capita for 2030, administrators shall select a credible estimate. If no credible estimates are available, the question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "17.7k", "median": "20.9k", "upper_75": "23.4k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the public will have knowledge of the highest pixel resolution, in centimeters, of a classified U.S. government optical satellite that was operational between 2011-2021 by 2061?", "desc": "", "resc": "Between 1959 and 1986, the U.S. launched their first optical spy satellites. The classified “Keyhole” satellites took photographs on film and dropped them to earth where they were retrieved mid-air by airplanes.\n\nThe Keyhole satellites were declassified between 1992 and 2011. At that time, it became public record that the satellites took photos at pixel resolutions as high as 0.6 m.\n\nFor comparison, during the 1970s and 1980s, the publicly available Landsat satellites had pixel resolutions between 30 m and 80 m. Currently, the highest resolution commercial satellite in operation is 31 cm with satellites of 29 cm resolution planned for launch in 2021.\n\nSince the ability to detect objects from space depends on the image's pixel resolution, the ability to predict what is currently detectable by the U.S. government is related to our prediction of the available satellite imagery resolution.\n\n***What will public knowledge be in the year 2061, about the highest pixel resolution, in centimeters, of a classified U.S. government optical satellite that was operational between 2011-2021?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the highest pixel resolution in centimeters as published by a United States government agency. The satellite must have been classified and operational for at least 6 months between 2011-2021.\n\n[fine-print]\nPixel resolution is defined as the length of one side of a square image pixel. For example, a 50 cm pixel resolution will represent a square of size 50 cm x 50 cm.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "5.27", "median": "6.64", "upper_75": "10.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest pixel resolution of commercially available optical satellite imagery, purchasable in a NATO country, in the year 2050 will be 19.5?", "desc": "In 1972, a joint NASA/USGS program launched the [Landsat-1 satellite program](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landsat_program#Satellite_chronology). During the 1970s and 1980s the Landsat satellites imaged the earth at pixel resolutions ranging from 30 m to 80 m.\n\nLaunched in 2014, Maxar's [WorldView-3](https://cdn1-originals.webdamdb.com/13264_95553821?cache=1597094744&response-content-disposition=inline;filename%253D10028-ds-wv3-08-2020.pdf&response-content-type=application/pdf&Policy=eyJTdGF0ZW1lbnQiOlt7IlJlc291cmNlIjoiaHR0cCo6Ly9jZG4xLW9yaWdpbmFscy53ZWJkYW1kYi5jb20vMTMyNjRfOTU1NTM4MjE~Y2FjaGU9MTU5NzA5NDc0NCZyZXNwb25zZS1jb250ZW50LWRpc3Bvc2l0aW9uPWlubGluZTtmaWxlbmFtZSUyNTNEMTAwMjgtZHMtd3YzLTA4LTIwMjAucGRmJnJlc3BvbnNlLWNvbnRlbnQtdHlwZT1hcHBsaWNhdGlvbi9wZGYiLCJDb25kaXRpb24iOnsiRGF0ZUxlc3NUaGFuIjp7IkFXUzpFcG9jaFRpbWUiOjIxNDc0MTQ0MDB9fX1dfQ__&Signature=Q9fVHxWsPxBLBdSBwsZr0bgpRIbfWIoBkUiQBgqEH~OouLxyI4rjYZW1gJvRugtk7FyDsSAHG62bjKomen-Ag6ME~udDefKsAEoDDikQtR7vWSns~MwQov7XS6FunxW9mVeZhfYUM4hjpBL2t9sxTTr9t4zcFIQC06XLk3GCJiawuWyk1rsiqcuvAYcwUJ0Kyp0QPXmyytgrWBN0VGxvTubXPfyvcvhWMgDRB0EK00kdfkrtbz9w1~V~V2P60qJ2kbT9gT5gGZZ694Tszx7iPYA30ZkrKUsg3mKn9d3sWcE0SEzqYhar8kiH-qhHbIxTmQWj4NVA4V9aU2PdjBGtmg__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAI2ASI2IOLRFF2RHA) currently collects the world's highest resolution commercial satellite imagery. While designed to collect imagery at 31 cm resolution, until June 2014 the U.S. Government restricted the sale of commercial panchromatic imagery to 50 cm resolution. After June 2014, Maxar (then DigitalGlobe) was permitted to sell imagery at 31 cm resolution.\n\nMaxar plans on launching \"WorldView Legion\" satellites starting in the fall of 2021 aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket. This is a program of 6 satellites with a pixel resolution of 29 cm. \n\nSince the ability to detect objects from space depends on the image's pixel resolution, the ability to predict what will be detectable in the future is related to our prediction of the available satellite imagery resolution.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest pixel resolution in centimeters, either available commercially to non-governmental entities, or otherwise publicly available, in a NATO country, from an operational satellite in 2050. This is restricted to NATO countries as governments can restrict the sale of satellite imagery.", "lower_25": "11.8", "median": "15.7", "upper_75": "19.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest pixel resolution of commercially available optical satellite imagery, purchasable in a NATO country, in the year 2050 will be 19.5?", "desc": "In 1972, a joint NASA/USGS program launched the [Landsat-1 satellite program](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landsat_program#Satellite_chronology). During the 1970s and 1980s the Landsat satellites imaged the earth at pixel resolutions ranging from 30 m to 80 m.\n\nLaunched in 2014, Maxar's [WorldView-3](https://cdn1-originals.webdamdb.com/13264_95553821?cache=1597094744&response-content-disposition=inline;filename%253D10028-ds-wv3-08-2020.pdf&response-content-type=application/pdf&Policy=eyJTdGF0ZW1lbnQiOlt7IlJlc291cmNlIjoiaHR0cCo6Ly9jZG4xLW9yaWdpbmFscy53ZWJkYW1kYi5jb20vMTMyNjRfOTU1NTM4MjE~Y2FjaGU9MTU5NzA5NDc0NCZyZXNwb25zZS1jb250ZW50LWRpc3Bvc2l0aW9uPWlubGluZTtmaWxlbmFtZSUyNTNEMTAwMjgtZHMtd3YzLTA4LTIwMjAucGRmJnJlc3BvbnNlLWNvbnRlbnQtdHlwZT1hcHBsaWNhdGlvbi9wZGYiLCJDb25kaXRpb24iOnsiRGF0ZUxlc3NUaGFuIjp7IkFXUzpFcG9jaFRpbWUiOjIxNDc0MTQ0MDB9fX1dfQ__&Signature=Q9fVHxWsPxBLBdSBwsZr0bgpRIbfWIoBkUiQBgqEH~OouLxyI4rjYZW1gJvRugtk7FyDsSAHG62bjKomen-Ag6ME~udDefKsAEoDDikQtR7vWSns~MwQov7XS6FunxW9mVeZhfYUM4hjpBL2t9sxTTr9t4zcFIQC06XLk3GCJiawuWyk1rsiqcuvAYcwUJ0Kyp0QPXmyytgrWBN0VGxvTubXPfyvcvhWMgDRB0EK00kdfkrtbz9w1~V~V2P60qJ2kbT9gT5gGZZ694Tszx7iPYA30ZkrKUsg3mKn9d3sWcE0SEzqYhar8kiH-qhHbIxTmQWj4NVA4V9aU2PdjBGtmg__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAI2ASI2IOLRFF2RHA) currently collects the world's highest resolution commercial satellite imagery. While designed to collect imagery at 31 cm resolution, until June 2014 the U.S. Government restricted the sale of commercial panchromatic imagery to 50 cm resolution. After June 2014, Maxar (then DigitalGlobe) was permitted to sell imagery at 31 cm resolution.\n\nMaxar plans on launching \"WorldView Legion\" satellites starting in the fall of 2021 aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket. This is a program of 6 satellites with a pixel resolution of 29 cm. \n\nSince the ability to detect objects from space depends on the image's pixel resolution, the ability to predict what will be detectable in the future is related to our prediction of the available satellite imagery resolution.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest pixel resolution in centimeters, either available commercially to non-governmental entities, or otherwise publicly available, in a NATO country, from an operational satellite in 2050. This is restricted to NATO countries as governments can restrict the sale of satellite imagery.", "lower_25": "11.8", "median": "15.7", "upper_75": "19.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What percentage of US GDP will be spent on healthcare in 2035?\n\nKeyword: 23.4\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 23.4% of US GDP will be spent on healthcare in 2035?", "desc": "The United States [currently spends](health spending) about 17% of its GDP on health spending, which is up from about 6% in 1970. This growth is substantially faster than similar industrialized nations. Economists have pointed the blame at [various sources](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/080615/6-reasons-healthcare-so-expensive-us.asp), mostly pointing to rising prescription drug, device and test costs, rising compensation for doctors and nurses, and administrative waste.", "resc": "This question resolves as the percent value that the United States spends on healthcare, given as a fraction of GDP for the year 2035. Reliable sources used for resolution will be, in order of priority,\n\n* Some official cost estimate given by the US federal government\n* Some official cost estimate given by the OECD\n* A highly reputable study that estimates healthcare spending costs\n\nFor the purpose of this question, healthcare consists of those activities conducted by paid professionals in the treatment, prevention and cure of diseases, excluding personal trainers and those in unlicensed or pseudo-scientific professions. In case this definition is not specific enough, or indeed accurate according to general wisdom, admins should use their discretion in determining which cost estimate is best", "lower_25": "19.6", "median": "23.4", "upper_75": "27.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that we will see the first live birth from human in vitro gametogenesis by 2032?", "desc": "**[According to Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gametogenesis#In_vitro_gametogenesis), in vitro gametogenesis (IVG)**\n\n>**is the technique of developing in vitro generated gametes, i.e., \"the generation of eggs and sperm from pluripotent stem cells in a culture dish.\"**\n\n**Potential applications of IVG include treating infertility, embryo selection, allowing same-sex couples to have biological children, and iterated embryo selection.**\n\n[Embryo selection is](https://www.gwern.net/Embryo-selection):\n\n>A few eggs are extracted from a woman and fertilized; each resulting sibling embryo is biopsied for a few cells which are sequenced. A single polygenic score is used to rank the embryos by predicted future trait-value, and surviving embryos are implanted one by one until a healthy live birth happens or there are no more embryos. By starting with the top-ranked embryo, an average gain is realized.\n\nThe basic form of this technology, involving simple genetic testing for karyotype (chromosome numbers) and specific (near)-monogenic diseases (e.g. Tay-Sachs) has been used in humans for years. However, the most recent iteration that involves scoring embryos for polygenic traits (e.g. height, intelligence, type 2 diabetes) has only been used a few times so far.\n\nThere is another upcoming technology in this area: iterated embryos selection. Here we select on embryos while also applying in vitro gametogenesis to generate gametes (eggs and spermatozoa) from embryos, thus skipping the step of having to birth a human:\n\n>(Also called “whizzogenetics”, “in vitro eugenics”, or “in vitro breeding”/IVB.) A large set of cells, perhaps from a diverse set of donors, is regressed to stem cells, turned into both sperm/egg cells, fertilizing each other, and then the top-ranked embryos are selected, yielding a moderate gain; those embryos are not implanted but regressed back to stem cells, and the cycle repeats. Each “generation” the increases accumulate; after perhaps a dozen generations, the trait-values have increased many SDs, and the final embryos are then implanted.\n\nThis approach is nearing reality, as various academic publications note, e.g. [\"Artificially produced gametes in mice, humans and other species\" (2021)](https://www.publish.csiro.au/rd/RD20265), [\"Overview of In Vitro Gametogenesis in Mice, Future Applications, and Related Social Changes and Ethics\" (2020)](https://repository.yu.edu/handle/20.500.12202/5635), [\"Roadmap of germline development and in vitro gametogenesis from pluripotent stem cells\" (2019)](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/andr.12726). There are other uses than genetic selection, since this method allows people to self-fertilize (generate both gametes from one person), and fertilize using homosexual parents (one supplies each gamete type). Bioethicists are already discussing such matters, e.g. [\"Drawing the line on in vitro gametogenesis\" (2020)](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/bioe.12679). Thus, to better forecast the potential of human iterated embryo selection, we care about when the component technology will be ready for use.", "resc": "- A trustworthy report of a case of human in vitro gametogenesis leading to a live birth", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Peru's GDP per capita (PPP) will be 23.4k in 2030?", "desc": "[The Republic of Peru](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peru) is a country in western South America. It is bordered in the north by Ecuador and Colombia, in the east by Brazil, in the southeast by Bolivia, in the south by Chile, and in the south and west by the Pacific Ocean. Peru is a megadiverse country with habitats ranging from the arid plains of the Pacific coastal region in the west to the peaks of the Andes mountains extending from the north to the southeast of the country to the tropical Amazon Basin rainforest in the east with the Amazon river. At 1.28 million square kilometres, Peru is the 19th-largest country in the world, and the third-largest in South America. Peru has a [population of approximately 33 million](https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/peru-population/) as of 2021.\n\n[The economy of Peru](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Peru) is the 47th-largest in the world (ranked by Purchasing Power Parity), and the income level is classified as upper middle by the World Bank.\n\nIn June 2021, Peru [narrowly elected](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/perus-socialists-cheer-election-win-conservatives-pledge-fight-2021-06-13/?taid=60c66d2935ede90001f5fc12&utm_campaign=trueAnthem:+Trending+Content&utm_medium=trueAnthem&utm_source=twitter) [Pedro Castillo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pedro_Castillo) as President. Castillo is associated with the left-wing [Free Peru National Political Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_Peru). The party describes itself as being \"a left-wing socialist organization\" that embraces Marxism–Leninism and Mariáteguism. It values democracy, decentralization, internationalism, sovereignty, humanism and anti-imperialism. Following his success in the first round of presidential elections in 2021, Pedro Castillo has said that he opposes communism, and has distanced himself from far-leftists in the party. Castillo has also [said that he will not seek to nationalize companies and will honour the rule of law, and will reject the policies of Chavismo.](https://www.reuters.com/world/no-chavismo-here-peru-socialist-candidate-castillo-seeks-calm-jittery-markets-2021-04-22/)\n\nPeru's [GDP per capita (PPP) in current international dollars](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=PE) for the year 2019 was estimated as $13,416 by the World Bank.", "resc": "This question resolves as [Peru's GDP per capita (PPP) in current international dollars](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=PE) as reported by the World Bank for the year 2030. If World Bank figures are unavailable, figures from the United Nations or International Monetary Fund are also acceptable. If none of these organizations produce an estimate of Peru's PPP GDP per capita for 2030, administrators shall select a credible estimate. If no credible estimates are available, the question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "17.7k", "median": "20.9k", "upper_75": "23.4k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that we will see the first live birth from human in vitro gametogenesis by 2032?", "desc": "**[According to Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gametogenesis#In_vitro_gametogenesis), in vitro gametogenesis (IVG)**\n\n>**is the technique of developing in vitro generated gametes, i.e., \"the generation of eggs and sperm from pluripotent stem cells in a culture dish.\"**\n\n**Potential applications of IVG include treating infertility, embryo selection, allowing same-sex couples to have biological children, and iterated embryo selection.**\n\n[Embryo selection is](https://www.gwern.net/Embryo-selection):\n\n>A few eggs are extracted from a woman and fertilized; each resulting sibling embryo is biopsied for a few cells which are sequenced. A single polygenic score is used to rank the embryos by predicted future trait-value, and surviving embryos are implanted one by one until a healthy live birth happens or there are no more embryos. By starting with the top-ranked embryo, an average gain is realized.\n\nThe basic form of this technology, involving simple genetic testing for karyotype (chromosome numbers) and specific (near)-monogenic diseases (e.g. Tay-Sachs) has been used in humans for years. However, the most recent iteration that involves scoring embryos for polygenic traits (e.g. height, intelligence, type 2 diabetes) has only been used a few times so far.\n\nThere is another upcoming technology in this area: iterated embryos selection. Here we select on embryos while also applying in vitro gametogenesis to generate gametes (eggs and spermatozoa) from embryos, thus skipping the step of having to birth a human:\n\n>(Also called “whizzogenetics”, “in vitro eugenics”, or “in vitro breeding”/IVB.) A large set of cells, perhaps from a diverse set of donors, is regressed to stem cells, turned into both sperm/egg cells, fertilizing each other, and then the top-ranked embryos are selected, yielding a moderate gain; those embryos are not implanted but regressed back to stem cells, and the cycle repeats. Each “generation” the increases accumulate; after perhaps a dozen generations, the trait-values have increased many SDs, and the final embryos are then implanted.\n\nThis approach is nearing reality, as various academic publications note, e.g. [\"Artificially produced gametes in mice, humans and other species\" (2021)](https://www.publish.csiro.au/rd/RD20265), [\"Overview of In Vitro Gametogenesis in Mice, Future Applications, and Related Social Changes and Ethics\" (2020)](https://repository.yu.edu/handle/20.500.12202/5635), [\"Roadmap of germline development and in vitro gametogenesis from pluripotent stem cells\" (2019)](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/andr.12726). There are other uses than genetic selection, since this method allows people to self-fertilize (generate both gametes from one person), and fertilize using homosexual parents (one supplies each gamete type). Bioethicists are already discussing such matters, e.g. [\"Drawing the line on in vitro gametogenesis\" (2020)](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/bioe.12679). Thus, to better forecast the potential of human iterated embryo selection, we care about when the component technology will be ready for use.", "resc": "- A trustworthy report of a case of human in vitro gametogenesis leading to a live birth", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Texas (ERCOT) will next experience rotating electricity outages by 2026?", "desc": "ERCOT, the electricity provider for over 90 percent of Texas [declared an Emergency Emergency Alert 3 (EEA 3)](https://twitter.com/ERCOT_ISO/status/1361215084010352644?s=19) and enacted rolling outages due to the extremely cold weather on February 15 2021 at 1:25 am CST. This was ultimately resolved a few days later. These rolling electricity outages caused billions of dollars in damage to the Texas economy.\n\nMany plants remain damaged from the winter store and grid instability leading to speculation about potential future outages.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the next date when @ERCOT_ISO on twitter indicates that the EEA 3 is declared, or that rotating outages are occurring gridwide, or when the same is indicated on ercot.com.\n\nIf this does not occur before June 14, 2031, this question will resolve as **>June 14, 2031**.", "lower_25": "2023", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Peru's GDP per capita (PPP) will be 23.4k in 2030?", "desc": "[The Republic of Peru](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peru) is a country in western South America. It is bordered in the north by Ecuador and Colombia, in the east by Brazil, in the southeast by Bolivia, in the south by Chile, and in the south and west by the Pacific Ocean. Peru is a megadiverse country with habitats ranging from the arid plains of the Pacific coastal region in the west to the peaks of the Andes mountains extending from the north to the southeast of the country to the tropical Amazon Basin rainforest in the east with the Amazon river. At 1.28 million square kilometres, Peru is the 19th-largest country in the world, and the third-largest in South America. Peru has a [population of approximately 33 million](https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/peru-population/) as of 2021.\n\n[The economy of Peru](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Peru) is the 47th-largest in the world (ranked by Purchasing Power Parity), and the income level is classified as upper middle by the World Bank.\n\nIn June 2021, Peru [narrowly elected](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/perus-socialists-cheer-election-win-conservatives-pledge-fight-2021-06-13/?taid=60c66d2935ede90001f5fc12&utm_campaign=trueAnthem:+Trending+Content&utm_medium=trueAnthem&utm_source=twitter) [Pedro Castillo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pedro_Castillo) as President. Castillo is associated with the left-wing [Free Peru National Political Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_Peru). The party describes itself as being \"a left-wing socialist organization\" that embraces Marxism–Leninism and Mariáteguism. It values democracy, decentralization, internationalism, sovereignty, humanism and anti-imperialism. Following his success in the first round of presidential elections in 2021, Pedro Castillo has said that he opposes communism, and has distanced himself from far-leftists in the party. Castillo has also [said that he will not seek to nationalize companies and will honour the rule of law, and will reject the policies of Chavismo.](https://www.reuters.com/world/no-chavismo-here-peru-socialist-candidate-castillo-seeks-calm-jittery-markets-2021-04-22/)\n\nPeru's [GDP per capita (PPP) in current international dollars](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=PE) for the year 2019 was estimated as $13,416 by the World Bank.", "resc": "This question resolves as [Peru's GDP per capita (PPP) in current international dollars](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=PE) as reported by the World Bank for the year 2030. If World Bank figures are unavailable, figures from the United Nations or International Monetary Fund are also acceptable. If none of these organizations produce an estimate of Peru's PPP GDP per capita for 2030, administrators shall select a credible estimate. If no credible estimates are available, the question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "17.7k", "median": "20.9k", "upper_75": "23.4k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Texas (ERCOT) will next experience rotating electricity outages by 2026?", "desc": "ERCOT, the electricity provider for over 90 percent of Texas [declared an Emergency Emergency Alert 3 (EEA 3)](https://twitter.com/ERCOT_ISO/status/1361215084010352644?s=19) and enacted rolling outages due to the extremely cold weather on February 15 2021 at 1:25 am CST. This was ultimately resolved a few days later. These rolling electricity outages caused billions of dollars in damage to the Texas economy.\n\nMany plants remain damaged from the winter store and grid instability leading to speculation about potential future outages.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the next date when @ERCOT_ISO on twitter indicates that the EEA 3 is declared, or that rotating outages are occurring gridwide, or when the same is indicated on ercot.com.\n\nIf this does not occur before June 14, 2031, this question will resolve as **>June 14, 2031**.", "lower_25": "2023", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Texas (ERCOT) will next experience rotating electricity outages by 2026?", "desc": "ERCOT, the electricity provider for over 90 percent of Texas [declared an Emergency Emergency Alert 3 (EEA 3)](https://twitter.com/ERCOT_ISO/status/1361215084010352644?s=19) and enacted rolling outages due to the extremely cold weather on February 15 2021 at 1:25 am CST. This was ultimately resolved a few days later. These rolling electricity outages caused billions of dollars in damage to the Texas economy.\n\nMany plants remain damaged from the winter store and grid instability leading to speculation about potential future outages.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the next date when @ERCOT_ISO on twitter indicates that the EEA 3 is declared, or that rotating outages are occurring gridwide, or when the same is indicated on ercot.com.\n\nIf this does not occur before June 14, 2031, this question will resolve as **>June 14, 2031**.", "lower_25": "2023", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that we will see the first live birth from human in vitro gametogenesis by 2032?", "desc": "**[According to Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gametogenesis#In_vitro_gametogenesis), in vitro gametogenesis (IVG)**\n\n>**is the technique of developing in vitro generated gametes, i.e., \"the generation of eggs and sperm from pluripotent stem cells in a culture dish.\"**\n\n**Potential applications of IVG include treating infertility, embryo selection, allowing same-sex couples to have biological children, and iterated embryo selection.**\n\n[Embryo selection is](https://www.gwern.net/Embryo-selection):\n\n>A few eggs are extracted from a woman and fertilized; each resulting sibling embryo is biopsied for a few cells which are sequenced. A single polygenic score is used to rank the embryos by predicted future trait-value, and surviving embryos are implanted one by one until a healthy live birth happens or there are no more embryos. By starting with the top-ranked embryo, an average gain is realized.\n\nThe basic form of this technology, involving simple genetic testing for karyotype (chromosome numbers) and specific (near)-monogenic diseases (e.g. Tay-Sachs) has been used in humans for years. However, the most recent iteration that involves scoring embryos for polygenic traits (e.g. height, intelligence, type 2 diabetes) has only been used a few times so far.\n\nThere is another upcoming technology in this area: iterated embryos selection. Here we select on embryos while also applying in vitro gametogenesis to generate gametes (eggs and spermatozoa) from embryos, thus skipping the step of having to birth a human:\n\n>(Also called “whizzogenetics”, “in vitro eugenics”, or “in vitro breeding”/IVB.) A large set of cells, perhaps from a diverse set of donors, is regressed to stem cells, turned into both sperm/egg cells, fertilizing each other, and then the top-ranked embryos are selected, yielding a moderate gain; those embryos are not implanted but regressed back to stem cells, and the cycle repeats. Each “generation” the increases accumulate; after perhaps a dozen generations, the trait-values have increased many SDs, and the final embryos are then implanted.\n\nThis approach is nearing reality, as various academic publications note, e.g. [\"Artificially produced gametes in mice, humans and other species\" (2021)](https://www.publish.csiro.au/rd/RD20265), [\"Overview of In Vitro Gametogenesis in Mice, Future Applications, and Related Social Changes and Ethics\" (2020)](https://repository.yu.edu/handle/20.500.12202/5635), [\"Roadmap of germline development and in vitro gametogenesis from pluripotent stem cells\" (2019)](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/andr.12726). There are other uses than genetic selection, since this method allows people to self-fertilize (generate both gametes from one person), and fertilize using homosexual parents (one supplies each gamete type). Bioethicists are already discussing such matters, e.g. [\"Drawing the line on in vitro gametogenesis\" (2020)](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/bioe.12679). Thus, to better forecast the potential of human iterated embryo selection, we care about when the component technology will be ready for use.", "resc": "- A trustworthy report of a case of human in vitro gametogenesis leading to a live birth", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest pixel resolution of commercially available optical satellite imagery, purchasable in a NATO country, in the year 2050 will be 19.5?", "desc": "In 1972, a joint NASA/USGS program launched the [Landsat-1 satellite program](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landsat_program#Satellite_chronology). During the 1970s and 1980s the Landsat satellites imaged the earth at pixel resolutions ranging from 30 m to 80 m.\n\nLaunched in 2014, Maxar's [WorldView-3](https://cdn1-originals.webdamdb.com/13264_95553821?cache=1597094744&response-content-disposition=inline;filename%253D10028-ds-wv3-08-2020.pdf&response-content-type=application/pdf&Policy=eyJTdGF0ZW1lbnQiOlt7IlJlc291cmNlIjoiaHR0cCo6Ly9jZG4xLW9yaWdpbmFscy53ZWJkYW1kYi5jb20vMTMyNjRfOTU1NTM4MjE~Y2FjaGU9MTU5NzA5NDc0NCZyZXNwb25zZS1jb250ZW50LWRpc3Bvc2l0aW9uPWlubGluZTtmaWxlbmFtZSUyNTNEMTAwMjgtZHMtd3YzLTA4LTIwMjAucGRmJnJlc3BvbnNlLWNvbnRlbnQtdHlwZT1hcHBsaWNhdGlvbi9wZGYiLCJDb25kaXRpb24iOnsiRGF0ZUxlc3NUaGFuIjp7IkFXUzpFcG9jaFRpbWUiOjIxNDc0MTQ0MDB9fX1dfQ__&Signature=Q9fVHxWsPxBLBdSBwsZr0bgpRIbfWIoBkUiQBgqEH~OouLxyI4rjYZW1gJvRugtk7FyDsSAHG62bjKomen-Ag6ME~udDefKsAEoDDikQtR7vWSns~MwQov7XS6FunxW9mVeZhfYUM4hjpBL2t9sxTTr9t4zcFIQC06XLk3GCJiawuWyk1rsiqcuvAYcwUJ0Kyp0QPXmyytgrWBN0VGxvTubXPfyvcvhWMgDRB0EK00kdfkrtbz9w1~V~V2P60qJ2kbT9gT5gGZZ694Tszx7iPYA30ZkrKUsg3mKn9d3sWcE0SEzqYhar8kiH-qhHbIxTmQWj4NVA4V9aU2PdjBGtmg__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAI2ASI2IOLRFF2RHA) currently collects the world's highest resolution commercial satellite imagery. While designed to collect imagery at 31 cm resolution, until June 2014 the U.S. Government restricted the sale of commercial panchromatic imagery to 50 cm resolution. After June 2014, Maxar (then DigitalGlobe) was permitted to sell imagery at 31 cm resolution.\n\nMaxar plans on launching \"WorldView Legion\" satellites starting in the fall of 2021 aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket. This is a program of 6 satellites with a pixel resolution of 29 cm. \n\nSince the ability to detect objects from space depends on the image's pixel resolution, the ability to predict what will be detectable in the future is related to our prediction of the available satellite imagery resolution.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest pixel resolution in centimeters, either available commercially to non-governmental entities, or otherwise publicly available, in a NATO country, from an operational satellite in 2050. This is restricted to NATO countries as governments can restrict the sale of satellite imagery.", "lower_25": "11.8", "median": "15.7", "upper_75": "19.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will be able to solve over 80% of competition-level coding problems on its first try by Sep 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Feb 2025", "median": "Oct 2026", "upper_75": "Sep 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will be able to solve over 80% of competition-level coding problems on its first try by Sep 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Feb 2025", "median": "Oct 2026", "upper_75": "Sep 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will be able to solve over 80% of competition-level coding problems on its first try by Sep 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Feb 2025", "median": "Oct 2026", "upper_75": "Sep 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a US-Russia war will start by 2050, given that it is predicted to start in 2037?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2037", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 50% of the top 50 Effective Altruism Forum users by karma as of June 2021 will be active in 2026?", "desc": "The [Effective Altruism Forum](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/) is a centre of discussion for the Effective Altruism community. Users posts and comments are subject to upvotes and downvotes, and users with well received content accumulate [karma](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/about#Karma)\n\nThey formerly had a karma leaderboard but it was discontinued. Currently Issa Rice maintains a karma leaderboard [here](https://eaforum.issarice.com/userlist?sort=karma). The karma leaderboard ranking of users as of June 2021 can be found in the fine print as well as in [this Google Sheet with user IDs](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/19fT-ZUlVRZUJ9DxTPvRJoE-gfTAaEHFfXhN_TDa_ARs/edit?usp=sharing).\n\nThis question asks how many of the current top 50 users by karma as of June 15 2021 (see fine print for list of usernames) will have at least 1 post or 5 comments in the calendar year 2026, conditional on the EA Forum still existing. For reference, as of June 15 2021, all of the top 50 users meet this criteria for the preceding 12 months.", "resc": "This question resolves to the number of the top 50 EA forum users as of June 15 2021 who make at least one post or five comments in the calendar year 2026, conditional on the forum having any posts in that year.", "lower_25": "31.0", "median": "37.4", "upper_75": "42.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 50% of the top 50 Effective Altruism Forum users by karma as of June 2021 will be active in 2026?", "desc": "The [Effective Altruism Forum](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/) is a centre of discussion for the Effective Altruism community. Users posts and comments are subject to upvotes and downvotes, and users with well received content accumulate [karma](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/about#Karma)\n\nThey formerly had a karma leaderboard but it was discontinued. Currently Issa Rice maintains a karma leaderboard [here](https://eaforum.issarice.com/userlist?sort=karma). The karma leaderboard ranking of users as of June 2021 can be found in the fine print as well as in [this Google Sheet with user IDs](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/19fT-ZUlVRZUJ9DxTPvRJoE-gfTAaEHFfXhN_TDa_ARs/edit?usp=sharing).\n\nThis question asks how many of the current top 50 users by karma as of June 15 2021 (see fine print for list of usernames) will have at least 1 post or 5 comments in the calendar year 2026, conditional on the EA Forum still existing. For reference, as of June 15 2021, all of the top 50 users meet this criteria for the preceding 12 months.", "resc": "This question resolves to the number of the top 50 EA forum users as of June 15 2021 who make at least one post or five comments in the calendar year 2026, conditional on the forum having any posts in that year.", "lower_25": "31.0", "median": "37.4", "upper_75": "42.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a US-Russia war will start by 2050, given that it is predicted to start in 2037?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2037", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If these countries detonate a nuclear weapon by 2050, what is the chance that 0.066 proportion of those detonations will be countervalue? (Pakistan)", "desc": "[Countervalue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervalue) targeting is \"the targeting of an opponent's assets that are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations\". Compared to nuclear strikes against [counterforce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterforce) targets or battlefield targets, countervalue nuclear strikes would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the proportion of offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the respective country which are considered countervalue strikes. Only offensive detonations occurring between January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2049 will be included. If there are no offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the country in question in that time period, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nFor this question, A detonation will be considered \"countervalue\" if credible media reporting does not widely consider a military or industrial target as the primary target of the detonation (except for detonations on capital cities, which will always be considered countervalue without exception). \n\nOffensive nuclear detonations will include only [authorised, inadvertent, and accidental](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf) offensive detonations, not [test detonations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing), [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion), or detonations by non-state actors who seized Pakistan-owned weapons.", "lower_25": "0.066", "median": "0.341", "upper_75": "0.818", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 50% of the top 50 Effective Altruism Forum users by karma as of June 2021 will be active in 2026?", "desc": "The [Effective Altruism Forum](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/) is a centre of discussion for the Effective Altruism community. Users posts and comments are subject to upvotes and downvotes, and users with well received content accumulate [karma](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/about#Karma)\n\nThey formerly had a karma leaderboard but it was discontinued. Currently Issa Rice maintains a karma leaderboard [here](https://eaforum.issarice.com/userlist?sort=karma). The karma leaderboard ranking of users as of June 2021 can be found in the fine print as well as in [this Google Sheet with user IDs](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/19fT-ZUlVRZUJ9DxTPvRJoE-gfTAaEHFfXhN_TDa_ARs/edit?usp=sharing).\n\nThis question asks how many of the current top 50 users by karma as of June 15 2021 (see fine print for list of usernames) will have at least 1 post or 5 comments in the calendar year 2026, conditional on the EA Forum still existing. For reference, as of June 15 2021, all of the top 50 users meet this criteria for the preceding 12 months.", "resc": "This question resolves to the number of the top 50 EA forum users as of June 15 2021 who make at least one post or five comments in the calendar year 2026, conditional on the forum having any posts in that year.", "lower_25": "31.0", "median": "37.4", "upper_75": "42.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 71.7M towards AI risk reduction in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "42.7M", "median": "71.7M", "upper_75": "130M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.151 proportion of non-test nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be against battlefield targets?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.007", "median": "0.151", "upper_75": "0.957", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a US-Russia war will start by 2050, given that it is predicted to start in 2037?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2037", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If these countries detonate a nuclear weapon by 2050, what is the chance that 0.066 proportion of those detonations will be countervalue? (Pakistan)", "desc": "[Countervalue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervalue) targeting is \"the targeting of an opponent's assets that are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations\". Compared to nuclear strikes against [counterforce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterforce) targets or battlefield targets, countervalue nuclear strikes would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the proportion of offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the respective country which are considered countervalue strikes. Only offensive detonations occurring between January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2049 will be included. If there are no offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the country in question in that time period, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nFor this question, A detonation will be considered \"countervalue\" if credible media reporting does not widely consider a military or industrial target as the primary target of the detonation (except for detonations on capital cities, which will always be considered countervalue without exception). \n\nOffensive nuclear detonations will include only [authorised, inadvertent, and accidental](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf) offensive detonations, not [test detonations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing), [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion), or detonations by non-state actors who seized Pakistan-owned weapons.", "lower_25": "0.066", "median": "0.341", "upper_75": "0.818", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 71.7M towards AI risk reduction in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "42.7M", "median": "71.7M", "upper_75": "130M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If these countries detonate a nuclear weapon by 2050, what is the chance that 0.066 proportion of those detonations will be countervalue? (Pakistan)", "desc": "[Countervalue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervalue) targeting is \"the targeting of an opponent's assets that are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations\". Compared to nuclear strikes against [counterforce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterforce) targets or battlefield targets, countervalue nuclear strikes would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the proportion of offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the respective country which are considered countervalue strikes. Only offensive detonations occurring between January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2049 will be included. If there are no offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the country in question in that time period, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nFor this question, A detonation will be considered \"countervalue\" if credible media reporting does not widely consider a military or industrial target as the primary target of the detonation (except for detonations on capital cities, which will always be considered countervalue without exception). \n\nOffensive nuclear detonations will include only [authorised, inadvertent, and accidental](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf) offensive detonations, not [test detonations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing), [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion), or detonations by non-state actors who seized Pakistan-owned weapons.", "lower_25": "0.066", "median": "0.341", "upper_75": "0.818", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 71.7M towards AI risk reduction in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "42.7M", "median": "71.7M", "upper_75": "130M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.151 proportion of non-test nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be against battlefield targets?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.007", "median": "0.151", "upper_75": "0.957", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.151 proportion of non-test nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be against battlefield targets?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.007", "median": "0.151", "upper_75": "0.957", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 16.3M towards AI risk reduction in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "16.3M", "median": "119M", "upper_75": "394M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 16.3M towards AI risk reduction in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "16.3M", "median": "119M", "upper_75": "394M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 16.3M towards AI risk reduction in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "16.3M", "median": "119M", "upper_75": "394M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 394M towards Scientific Research in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "84.9M", "median": "176M", "upper_75": "394M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 394M towards Scientific Research in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "84.9M", "median": "176M", "upper_75": "394M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 163M towards Animal Welfare in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "61.9M", "median": "99.4M", "upper_75": "163M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 163M towards Animal Welfare in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "61.9M", "median": "99.4M", "upper_75": "163M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 70.8M towards Scientific Research in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "70.8M", "median": "141M", "upper_75": "236M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 394M towards Scientific Research in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "84.9M", "median": "176M", "upper_75": "394M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 70.8M towards Scientific Research in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "70.8M", "median": "141M", "upper_75": "236M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 27.6M towards Animal Welfare in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "27.6M", "median": "104M", "upper_75": "226M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 163M towards Animal Welfare in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "61.9M", "median": "99.4M", "upper_75": "163M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 70.8M towards Scientific Research in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "70.8M", "median": "141M", "upper_75": "236M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 27.6M towards Animal Welfare in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "27.6M", "median": "104M", "upper_75": "226M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 150M towards Global Health and Development by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "69.0M", "median": "150M", "upper_75": "333M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 428M towards Global Health and Development in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "171M", "median": "233M", "upper_75": "428M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 27.6M towards Animal Welfare in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "27.6M", "median": "104M", "upper_75": "226M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 150M towards Global Health and Development by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "69.0M", "median": "150M", "upper_75": "333M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 428M towards Global Health and Development in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "171M", "median": "233M", "upper_75": "428M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 428M towards Global Health and Development in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "171M", "median": "233M", "upper_75": "428M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 150M towards Global Health and Development by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "69.0M", "median": "150M", "upper_75": "333M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 68.2M towards Biosecurity and Pandemic Preparedness in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.0M", "median": "43.3M", "upper_75": "68.2M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How much money will Open Philanthropy grant towards Criminal Justice Reform in 2030?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant less than 10 million dollars towards Criminal Justice Reform in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 10M", "median": "< 10M", "upper_75": "14.9M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 68.5M towards Biosecurity and Pandemic Preparedness in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "25.1M", "median": "42.8M", "upper_75": "68.5M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total dependency ratio will be 72.3% in 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "60.5", "median": "66.4", "upper_75": "72.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant less than $10 million towards Criminal Justice Reform in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 10M", "median": "< 10M", "upper_75": "10.37M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total dependency ratio will be 72.3% in 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "60.5", "median": "66.4", "upper_75": "72.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 68.5M towards Biosecurity and Pandemic Preparedness in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "25.1M", "median": "42.8M", "upper_75": "68.5M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 68.2M towards Biosecurity and Pandemic Preparedness in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.0M", "median": "43.3M", "upper_75": "68.2M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 68.2M towards Biosecurity and Pandemic Preparedness in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.0M", "median": "43.3M", "upper_75": "68.2M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant less than $10 million towards Criminal Justice Reform in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 10M", "median": "< 10M", "upper_75": "10.37M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How much money will Open Philanthropy grant towards Criminal Justice Reform in 2030?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant less than 10 million dollars towards Criminal Justice Reform in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 10M", "median": "< 10M", "upper_75": "14.9M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant less than $10 million towards Criminal Justice Reform in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 10M", "median": "< 10M", "upper_75": "10.37M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Germany's total dependency ratio will be 80.4% in 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "71.6", "median": "75.5", "upper_75": "80.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Germany's total dependency ratio will be 80.4% in 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "71.6", "median": "75.5", "upper_75": "80.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 68.5M towards Biosecurity and Pandemic Preparedness in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "25.1M", "median": "42.8M", "upper_75": "68.5M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S.' total dependency ratio will be 85.8% in 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "63.2", "median": "69.3", "upper_75": "85.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total dependency ratio will be 72.3% in 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "60.5", "median": "66.4", "upper_75": "72.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Germany's total dependency ratio will be 80.4% in 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "71.6", "median": "75.5", "upper_75": "80.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.8 US states will decriminalize psilocybin on January 1, 2027?", "desc": "Psilocybin is a Schedule I psychedelic drug in the US.\n\nPsilocybin has [low toxicity and a low harm potential](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21256914/). As of 2021, psilocybin-assisted therapy is or has been investigated for its potential for treating drug dependence, anxiety and mood disorders. FDA gave psilocybin-assisted therapy Breakthrough Therapy Designation [in 2018](https://compasspathways.com/compass-pathways-receives-fda-breakthrough-therapy-designation-for-psilocybin-therapy-for-treatment-resistant-depression/) (for treatment-resistant depression) and [in 2019](https://www.livescience.com/psilocybin-depression-breakthrough-therapy.html) (for major depressive disorder).\n\nIn 2020, Oregon [was](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Oregon_Ballot_Measure_110) the first US state to remove criminal penalties for possession of psilocybin. Also, [several cities](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Psilocybin_decriminalization_in_the_United_States&oldid=1028882880) in Colorado, Denver and California have decriminalized it in 2019-2021, and some legislators are [pushing](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Psilocybin_decriminalization_in_the_United_States&oldid=1028882880) to decriminalize it in New York, California, Vermont, New Jersey.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US states where psilocybin is decriminalized on January 1, 2027.\n\nFor purposes of this question, psilocybin is deemed decriminalized in a state if its possession is de facto not prosecuted. This may happen, for example, via an act of state legislature, or via a non-enforcement policy. Federal-level changes also matter.\n\nDecriminalization may be for any amount of psilocybin; if posession of small amounts is decriminalized, but above a threshold is still illegal, that state *will* be included as \"decriminalized\"", "lower_25": "3.56", "median": "6.43", "upper_75": "10.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.8 US states will decriminalize psilocybin on January 1, 2027?", "desc": "Psilocybin is a Schedule I psychedelic drug in the US.\n\nPsilocybin has [low toxicity and a low harm potential](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21256914/). As of 2021, psilocybin-assisted therapy is or has been investigated for its potential for treating drug dependence, anxiety and mood disorders. FDA gave psilocybin-assisted therapy Breakthrough Therapy Designation [in 2018](https://compasspathways.com/compass-pathways-receives-fda-breakthrough-therapy-designation-for-psilocybin-therapy-for-treatment-resistant-depression/) (for treatment-resistant depression) and [in 2019](https://www.livescience.com/psilocybin-depression-breakthrough-therapy.html) (for major depressive disorder).\n\nIn 2020, Oregon [was](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Oregon_Ballot_Measure_110) the first US state to remove criminal penalties for possession of psilocybin. Also, [several cities](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Psilocybin_decriminalization_in_the_United_States&oldid=1028882880) in Colorado, Denver and California have decriminalized it in 2019-2021, and some legislators are [pushing](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Psilocybin_decriminalization_in_the_United_States&oldid=1028882880) to decriminalize it in New York, California, Vermont, New Jersey.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US states where psilocybin is decriminalized on January 1, 2027.\n\nFor purposes of this question, psilocybin is deemed decriminalized in a state if its possession is de facto not prosecuted. This may happen, for example, via an act of state legislature, or via a non-enforcement policy. Federal-level changes also matter.\n\nDecriminalization may be for any amount of psilocybin; if posession of small amounts is decriminalized, but above a threshold is still illegal, that state *will* be included as \"decriminalized\"", "lower_25": "3.56", "median": "6.43", "upper_75": "10.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How much money will Open Philanthropy grant towards Criminal Justice Reform in 2030?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant less than 10 million dollars towards Criminal Justice Reform in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 10M", "median": "< 10M", "upper_75": "14.9M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If these countries detonate a nuclear weapon by 2050, what is the chance that 0.262 proportion of those detonations will be countervalue? (Russia)", "desc": "[Countervalue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervalue) targeting is \"the targeting of an opponent's assets that are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations\". Compared to nuclear strikes against [counterforce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterforce) targets or battlefield targets, countervalue nuclear strikes would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the proportion of offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the respective country which are considered countervalue strikes. Only offensive detonations occurring between January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2049 will be included. If there are no offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the country in question in that time period, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nFor this question, A detonation will be considered \"countervalue\" if credible media reporting does not widely consider a military or industrial target as the primary target of the detonation (except for detonations on capital cities, which will always be considered countervalue without exception). \n\nOffensive nuclear detonations will include only [authorised, inadvertent, and accidental](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf) offensive detonations, not [test detonations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing), [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion), or detonations by non-state actors who seized Pakistan-owned weapons.", "lower_25": "0.005", "median": "0.022", "upper_75": "0.262", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If these countries detonate a nuclear weapon by 2050, what is the chance that 0.262 proportion of those detonations will be countervalue? (Russia)", "desc": "[Countervalue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervalue) targeting is \"the targeting of an opponent's assets that are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations\". Compared to nuclear strikes against [counterforce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterforce) targets or battlefield targets, countervalue nuclear strikes would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the proportion of offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the respective country which are considered countervalue strikes. Only offensive detonations occurring between January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2049 will be included. If there are no offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the country in question in that time period, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nFor this question, A detonation will be considered \"countervalue\" if credible media reporting does not widely consider a military or industrial target as the primary target of the detonation (except for detonations on capital cities, which will always be considered countervalue without exception). \n\nOffensive nuclear detonations will include only [authorised, inadvertent, and accidental](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf) offensive detonations, not [test detonations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing), [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion), or detonations by non-state actors who seized Pakistan-owned weapons.", "lower_25": "0.005", "median": "0.022", "upper_75": "0.262", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.8 US states will decriminalize psilocybin on January 1, 2027?", "desc": "Psilocybin is a Schedule I psychedelic drug in the US.\n\nPsilocybin has [low toxicity and a low harm potential](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21256914/). As of 2021, psilocybin-assisted therapy is or has been investigated for its potential for treating drug dependence, anxiety and mood disorders. FDA gave psilocybin-assisted therapy Breakthrough Therapy Designation [in 2018](https://compasspathways.com/compass-pathways-receives-fda-breakthrough-therapy-designation-for-psilocybin-therapy-for-treatment-resistant-depression/) (for treatment-resistant depression) and [in 2019](https://www.livescience.com/psilocybin-depression-breakthrough-therapy.html) (for major depressive disorder).\n\nIn 2020, Oregon [was](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Oregon_Ballot_Measure_110) the first US state to remove criminal penalties for possession of psilocybin. Also, [several cities](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Psilocybin_decriminalization_in_the_United_States&oldid=1028882880) in Colorado, Denver and California have decriminalized it in 2019-2021, and some legislators are [pushing](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Psilocybin_decriminalization_in_the_United_States&oldid=1028882880) to decriminalize it in New York, California, Vermont, New Jersey.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US states where psilocybin is decriminalized on January 1, 2027.\n\nFor purposes of this question, psilocybin is deemed decriminalized in a state if its possession is de facto not prosecuted. This may happen, for example, via an act of state legislature, or via a non-enforcement policy. Federal-level changes also matter.\n\nDecriminalization may be for any amount of psilocybin; if posession of small amounts is decriminalized, but above a threshold is still illegal, that state *will* be included as \"decriminalized\"", "lower_25": "3.56", "median": "6.43", "upper_75": "10.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that less than 1 nuclear weapons will be detonated offensively by 2050?", "desc": "Currently, nine countries possess nuclear weapons. Below is a list of the estimated number of nuclear warheads in each country as of May 2021 (according to [the Federation of American Scientists](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/)). \n\n- Russia: 6,257 nuclear warheads\n\n- US: 5,550 nuclear warheads\n\n- China: 350 nuclear warheads\n\n- France: 290 nuclear warheads\n\n- UK: 225 nuclear warheads\n\n- Pakistan: 165 nuclear warheads\n\n- India: 160 nuclear warheads\n\n- Israel: 90 nuclear warheads\n\n- North Korea: Estimated 30-40 nuclear warheads with sufficient fissile materials for 45 nuclear warheads (\"The[ir] number of assembled warheads is unknown, but lower.\")", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of nuclear weapons (fission or thermonuclear) detonated offensively in total between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2050 If there are no offensive detonations before 2050 by any state or non-state actor, then this question will resolve as **<1**. Neither [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) nor [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) will count towards question resolution, even if such detonations cause substantial damage.\n\n>", "lower_25": "< 1", "median": "< 1", "upper_75": "1.79", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that less than 1 nuclear weapons will be detonated offensively by 2050?", "desc": "Currently, nine countries possess nuclear weapons. Below is a list of the estimated number of nuclear warheads in each country as of May 2021 (according to [the Federation of American Scientists](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/)). \n\n- Russia: 6,257 nuclear warheads\n\n- US: 5,550 nuclear warheads\n\n- China: 350 nuclear warheads\n\n- France: 290 nuclear warheads\n\n- UK: 225 nuclear warheads\n\n- Pakistan: 165 nuclear warheads\n\n- India: 160 nuclear warheads\n\n- Israel: 90 nuclear warheads\n\n- North Korea: Estimated 30-40 nuclear warheads with sufficient fissile materials for 45 nuclear warheads (\"The[ir] number of assembled warheads is unknown, but lower.\")", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of nuclear weapons (fission or thermonuclear) detonated offensively in total between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2050 If there are no offensive detonations before 2050 by any state or non-state actor, then this question will resolve as **<1**. Neither [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) nor [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) will count towards question resolution, even if such detonations cause substantial damage.\n\n>", "lower_25": "< 1", "median": "< 1", "upper_75": "1.79", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.037 fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be countervalue?", "desc": "[Countervalue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervalue) targeting is \"the targeting of an opponent's assets that are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations\". Compared to nuclear strikes against [counterforce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterforce) targets or battlefield targets, countervalue nuclear strikes would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter).\n\nThis question asks, conditional on the non-test detonation of a nuclear weapon after the question opens and before 2050, what fraction of individual nuclear strikes will be countervalue strikes.", "resc": "This question resolves as the proportion of nuclear strikes carried out by any country or non-state actor between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2050 which are considered countervalue strikes, including strikes on capital cities. A strike is considered countervalue for these purposes if credible media reporting does not widely consider a military or industrial target as the primary target of the attack (except in the case of strikes on capital cities, which will automatically be considered countervalue for this question even if credible media report that the rationale for the strike was disabling command and control structures). \n\nNuclear strikes here includes authorised strikes, accidental strikes, and strikes by non-state actors. But it does not include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion), even if such detonations cause substantial damage. \n\nThis question will resolve as **ambiguous** if there are no non-test nuclear detonations between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2050.", "lower_25": "0.037", "median": "0.231", "upper_75": "0.630", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "If these countries detonate a nuclear weapon by 2050, what is the chance that 0.015 proportion of those detonations will be countervalue? (United States)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.005", "median": "0.015", "upper_75": "0.106", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S.' total dependency ratio will be 85.8% in 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "63.2", "median": "69.3", "upper_75": "85.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If these countries detonate a nuclear weapon by 2050, what is the chance that 0.015 proportion of those detonations will be countervalue? (United States)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.005", "median": "0.015", "upper_75": "0.106", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If these countries detonate a nuclear weapon by 2050, what is the chance that 0.015 proportion of those detonations will be countervalue? (United States)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.005", "median": "0.015", "upper_75": "0.106", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that less than 1 nuclear weapons will be detonated offensively by 2050?", "desc": "Currently, nine countries possess nuclear weapons. Below is a list of the estimated number of nuclear warheads in each country as of May 2021 (according to [the Federation of American Scientists](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/)). \n\n- Russia: 6,257 nuclear warheads\n\n- US: 5,550 nuclear warheads\n\n- China: 350 nuclear warheads\n\n- France: 290 nuclear warheads\n\n- UK: 225 nuclear warheads\n\n- Pakistan: 165 nuclear warheads\n\n- India: 160 nuclear warheads\n\n- Israel: 90 nuclear warheads\n\n- North Korea: Estimated 30-40 nuclear warheads with sufficient fissile materials for 45 nuclear warheads (\"The[ir] number of assembled warheads is unknown, but lower.\")", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of nuclear weapons (fission or thermonuclear) detonated offensively in total between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2050 If there are no offensive detonations before 2050 by any state or non-state actor, then this question will resolve as **<1**. Neither [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) nor [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) will count towards question resolution, even if such detonations cause substantial damage.\n\n>", "lower_25": "< 1", "median": "< 1", "upper_75": "1.79", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S.' total dependency ratio will be 85.8% in 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "63.2", "median": "69.3", "upper_75": "85.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If these countries detonate a nuclear weapon by 2050, what is the chance that 0.559 proportion of those detonations will be countervalue? (China)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.010", "median": "0.118", "upper_75": "0.559", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If these countries detonate a nuclear weapon by 2050, what is the chance that 0.559 proportion of those detonations will be countervalue? (China)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.010", "median": "0.118", "upper_75": "0.559", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.037 fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be countervalue?", "desc": "[Countervalue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervalue) targeting is \"the targeting of an opponent's assets that are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations\". Compared to nuclear strikes against [counterforce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterforce) targets or battlefield targets, countervalue nuclear strikes would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter).\n\nThis question asks, conditional on the non-test detonation of a nuclear weapon after the question opens and before 2050, what fraction of individual nuclear strikes will be countervalue strikes.", "resc": "This question resolves as the proportion of nuclear strikes carried out by any country or non-state actor between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2050 which are considered countervalue strikes, including strikes on capital cities. A strike is considered countervalue for these purposes if credible media reporting does not widely consider a military or industrial target as the primary target of the attack (except in the case of strikes on capital cities, which will automatically be considered countervalue for this question even if credible media report that the rationale for the strike was disabling command and control structures). \n\nNuclear strikes here includes authorised strikes, accidental strikes, and strikes by non-state actors. But it does not include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion), even if such detonations cause substantial damage. \n\nThis question will resolve as **ambiguous** if there are no non-test nuclear detonations between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2050.", "lower_25": "0.037", "median": "0.231", "upper_75": "0.630", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.037 fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be countervalue?", "desc": "[Countervalue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervalue) targeting is \"the targeting of an opponent's assets that are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations\". Compared to nuclear strikes against [counterforce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterforce) targets or battlefield targets, countervalue nuclear strikes would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter).\n\nThis question asks, conditional on the non-test detonation of a nuclear weapon after the question opens and before 2050, what fraction of individual nuclear strikes will be countervalue strikes.", "resc": "This question resolves as the proportion of nuclear strikes carried out by any country or non-state actor between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2050 which are considered countervalue strikes, including strikes on capital cities. A strike is considered countervalue for these purposes if credible media reporting does not widely consider a military or industrial target as the primary target of the attack (except in the case of strikes on capital cities, which will automatically be considered countervalue for this question even if credible media report that the rationale for the strike was disabling command and control structures). \n\nNuclear strikes here includes authorised strikes, accidental strikes, and strikes by non-state actors. But it does not include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion), even if such detonations cause substantial damage. \n\nThis question will resolve as **ambiguous** if there are no non-test nuclear detonations between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2050.", "lower_25": "0.037", "median": "0.231", "upper_75": "0.630", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "If these countries detonate a nuclear weapon by 2050, what is the chance that 0.559 proportion of those detonations will be countervalue? (China)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.010", "median": "0.118", "upper_75": "0.559", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.7 teragrams of black carbon will be injected into the upper troposphere as a result of the next nuclear conflict?", "desc": "Nuclear war has the potential to kill far more people via its climate effects than it does directly, and those climate effects are also typically seen as the most likely path by which nuclear war could cause an existential catastrophe. The size of these climate effects depends greatly on the amount of black carbon injected into the upper troposphere by the fires caused by nuclear strikes. This black carbon might ([or might not](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_winter#Criticism_and_debate)) then persist in the atmosphere and cause major cooling, agricultural shortfalls, and famine.\n\nThe amount of black carbon that would reach the upper troposphere depends on factors such as the number and yield of nuclear weapons used, the fuel densities of their targets, and whether firestorms would occur. These factor have been debated by various researchers, such as [Toon et al. (2007)](https://acp.copernicus.org/articles/7/1973/2007/), [Reisner et al. (2018)](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2017JD027331), [Robock et al. (2019)](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1029/2019JD030777), [Rodriguez (2019)](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/pMsnCieusmYqGW26W/how-bad-would-nuclear-winter-caused-by-a-us-russia-nuclear), and [Coupe et al. (2019)](https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Nuclear-Winter-Responses-to-Nuclear-War-Between-the-Coupe-Bardeen/560033106c2d599bcace3ce4cb6c67d5b713ec50).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of teragrams of black carbon injected into the upper troposphere as the result of the next nuclear conflict. The number of teragrams will be measured as the median of estimates from studies that (a) cover the climatic effects from the next nuclear conflict, (b) are from peer-reviewed, reputable journals, and (c) are cited by relevant Wikipedia pages.\n\n[The troposphere](https://scied.ucar.edu/learning-zone/atmosphere/troposphere) is here defined as: \"The bottom of the troposphere is at Earth's surface. The troposphere extends upward to about 10 km (6.2 miles or about 33,000 feet) above sea level. The height of the top of the troposphere varies with latitude (it is lowest over the poles and highest at the equator) and by season (it is lower in winter and higher in summer). It can be as high as 20 km (12 miles or 65,000 feet) near the equator, and as low as 7 km (4 miles or 23,000 feet) over the poles in winter.\"\n\n[The upper troposphere](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2011RG000355) is a coupling layer in the atmosphere. It can be broadly defined as the region ±5 km around the tropopause, the traditional boundary between the troposphere and the stratosphere.\n\nThis question will resolve as **ambiguous** if no nuclear war has occurred between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2050, or there are no studies done that estimate the amount of black carbon injected into the troposphere after nuclear conflict. If studies are performed but their results do not lead to clear resolution, a resolution council or Metaculus admins will be consulted to determine proper resolution", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "10.7", "upper_75": "56.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If these countries detonate a nuclear weapon by 2050, what is the chance that 0.262 proportion of those detonations will be countervalue? (Russia)", "desc": "[Countervalue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervalue) targeting is \"the targeting of an opponent's assets that are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations\". Compared to nuclear strikes against [counterforce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterforce) targets or battlefield targets, countervalue nuclear strikes would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the proportion of offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the respective country which are considered countervalue strikes. Only offensive detonations occurring between January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2049 will be included. If there are no offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the country in question in that time period, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nFor this question, A detonation will be considered \"countervalue\" if credible media reporting does not widely consider a military or industrial target as the primary target of the detonation (except for detonations on capital cities, which will always be considered countervalue without exception). \n\nOffensive nuclear detonations will include only [authorised, inadvertent, and accidental](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf) offensive detonations, not [test detonations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing), [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion), or detonations by non-state actors who seized Pakistan-owned weapons.", "lower_25": "0.005", "median": "0.022", "upper_75": "0.262", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.7 teragrams of black carbon will be injected into the upper troposphere as a result of the next nuclear conflict?", "desc": "Nuclear war has the potential to kill far more people via its climate effects than it does directly, and those climate effects are also typically seen as the most likely path by which nuclear war could cause an existential catastrophe. The size of these climate effects depends greatly on the amount of black carbon injected into the upper troposphere by the fires caused by nuclear strikes. This black carbon might ([or might not](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_winter#Criticism_and_debate)) then persist in the atmosphere and cause major cooling, agricultural shortfalls, and famine.\n\nThe amount of black carbon that would reach the upper troposphere depends on factors such as the number and yield of nuclear weapons used, the fuel densities of their targets, and whether firestorms would occur. These factor have been debated by various researchers, such as [Toon et al. (2007)](https://acp.copernicus.org/articles/7/1973/2007/), [Reisner et al. (2018)](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2017JD027331), [Robock et al. (2019)](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1029/2019JD030777), [Rodriguez (2019)](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/pMsnCieusmYqGW26W/how-bad-would-nuclear-winter-caused-by-a-us-russia-nuclear), and [Coupe et al. (2019)](https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Nuclear-Winter-Responses-to-Nuclear-War-Between-the-Coupe-Bardeen/560033106c2d599bcace3ce4cb6c67d5b713ec50).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of teragrams of black carbon injected into the upper troposphere as the result of the next nuclear conflict. The number of teragrams will be measured as the median of estimates from studies that (a) cover the climatic effects from the next nuclear conflict, (b) are from peer-reviewed, reputable journals, and (c) are cited by relevant Wikipedia pages.\n\n[The troposphere](https://scied.ucar.edu/learning-zone/atmosphere/troposphere) is here defined as: \"The bottom of the troposphere is at Earth's surface. The troposphere extends upward to about 10 km (6.2 miles or about 33,000 feet) above sea level. The height of the top of the troposphere varies with latitude (it is lowest over the poles and highest at the equator) and by season (it is lower in winter and higher in summer). It can be as high as 20 km (12 miles or 65,000 feet) near the equator, and as low as 7 km (4 miles or 23,000 feet) over the poles in winter.\"\n\n[The upper troposphere](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2011RG000355) is a coupling layer in the atmosphere. It can be broadly defined as the region ±5 km around the tropopause, the traditional boundary between the troposphere and the stratosphere.\n\nThis question will resolve as **ambiguous** if no nuclear war has occurred between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2050, or there are no studies done that estimate the amount of black carbon injected into the troposphere after nuclear conflict. If studies are performed but their results do not lead to clear resolution, a resolution council or Metaculus admins will be consulted to determine proper resolution", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "10.7", "upper_75": "56.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.7 teragrams of black carbon will be injected into the upper troposphere as a result of the next nuclear conflict?", "desc": "Nuclear war has the potential to kill far more people via its climate effects than it does directly, and those climate effects are also typically seen as the most likely path by which nuclear war could cause an existential catastrophe. The size of these climate effects depends greatly on the amount of black carbon injected into the upper troposphere by the fires caused by nuclear strikes. This black carbon might ([or might not](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_winter#Criticism_and_debate)) then persist in the atmosphere and cause major cooling, agricultural shortfalls, and famine.\n\nThe amount of black carbon that would reach the upper troposphere depends on factors such as the number and yield of nuclear weapons used, the fuel densities of their targets, and whether firestorms would occur. These factor have been debated by various researchers, such as [Toon et al. (2007)](https://acp.copernicus.org/articles/7/1973/2007/), [Reisner et al. (2018)](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2017JD027331), [Robock et al. (2019)](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1029/2019JD030777), [Rodriguez (2019)](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/pMsnCieusmYqGW26W/how-bad-would-nuclear-winter-caused-by-a-us-russia-nuclear), and [Coupe et al. (2019)](https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Nuclear-Winter-Responses-to-Nuclear-War-Between-the-Coupe-Bardeen/560033106c2d599bcace3ce4cb6c67d5b713ec50).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of teragrams of black carbon injected into the upper troposphere as the result of the next nuclear conflict. The number of teragrams will be measured as the median of estimates from studies that (a) cover the climatic effects from the next nuclear conflict, (b) are from peer-reviewed, reputable journals, and (c) are cited by relevant Wikipedia pages.\n\n[The troposphere](https://scied.ucar.edu/learning-zone/atmosphere/troposphere) is here defined as: \"The bottom of the troposphere is at Earth's surface. The troposphere extends upward to about 10 km (6.2 miles or about 33,000 feet) above sea level. The height of the top of the troposphere varies with latitude (it is lowest over the poles and highest at the equator) and by season (it is lower in winter and higher in summer). It can be as high as 20 km (12 miles or 65,000 feet) near the equator, and as low as 7 km (4 miles or 23,000 feet) over the poles in winter.\"\n\n[The upper troposphere](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2011RG000355) is a coupling layer in the atmosphere. It can be broadly defined as the region ±5 km around the tropopause, the traditional boundary between the troposphere and the stratosphere.\n\nThis question will resolve as **ambiguous** if no nuclear war has occurred between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2050, or there are no studies done that estimate the amount of black carbon injected into the troposphere after nuclear conflict. If studies are performed but their results do not lead to clear resolution, a resolution council or Metaculus admins will be consulted to determine proper resolution", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "10.7", "upper_75": "56.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next great financial crisis in the US will occur by 2035?", "desc": "Following the financial crisis of 2008 which accompanied the Great Recession, the United States government has taken a multitude of measures to reduce the risk of another financial crisis. However, it remains difficult to know how effective these measures will be in preventing another crisis or mitigating its effects once one takes place.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a \"great financial crisis\" is defined by reference to the weekly [Financial Stress Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/STLFSI2) of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The index is constructed by extracting the component of principal variation from 18 different indicators of the state of financial markets using principal component analysis and is designed to serve as an overall measure of stress in financial markets. A \"great financial crisis\" is a crisis that's comparable to the crisis of 2008 by this metric.", "resc": "The question resolves to the Friday of the earliest week after the opening date of the question for which the latest version of the Financial Stress Index Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (which is currently SLTFSI2 but might change in the future if further revisions are made to the index by the St. Louis Fed) exceeds its value for the week ending on October 3rd 2008. This value is currently 7.0144, but may be updated if FRED updates the index. If this event doesn't occur until the closing date of the question. the question resolves as >2100. If the index is discontinued altogether, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next great financial crisis in the US will occur by 2035?", "desc": "Following the financial crisis of 2008 which accompanied the Great Recession, the United States government has taken a multitude of measures to reduce the risk of another financial crisis. However, it remains difficult to know how effective these measures will be in preventing another crisis or mitigating its effects once one takes place.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a \"great financial crisis\" is defined by reference to the weekly [Financial Stress Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/STLFSI2) of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The index is constructed by extracting the component of principal variation from 18 different indicators of the state of financial markets using principal component analysis and is designed to serve as an overall measure of stress in financial markets. A \"great financial crisis\" is a crisis that's comparable to the crisis of 2008 by this metric.", "resc": "The question resolves to the Friday of the earliest week after the opening date of the question for which the latest version of the Financial Stress Index Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (which is currently SLTFSI2 but might change in the future if further revisions are made to the index by the St. Louis Fed) exceeds its value for the week ending on October 3rd 2008. This value is currently 7.0144, but may be updated if FRED updates the index. If this event doesn't occur until the closing date of the question. the question resolves as >2100. If the index is discontinued altogether, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Neanderthal will be born again by Nov 2098?", "desc": "The complete genome of a Neanderthal has already been [sequenced](https://www.nature.com/articles/nature12886). The noted geneticist and synthetic biologist [George Church](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Church_(geneticist)) suggests that Neanderthal de-extinction will become [technically possible](https://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/george-church-explains-how-dna-will-be-construction-material-of-the-future-a-877634.html) in the near future.", "resc": "This question will resolve at the time when a Neanderthal is born and lives for at least a year without major life support. The question will resolve at that time to the date of the Neanderthal's birth. If this does not happen by the end of the given range, the question will resolve > end date.\n\nThe revived specimen must have at least 90% of Neanderthal genome. An anatomically modern human spliced with a few Neanderthal genes will not resolve this question", "lower_25": "Nov 2098", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2099", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2099", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the price of Bitcoin will first drop below $6481 (2021 USD) by Sep 2027?", "desc": "[Bitcoin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitcoin) is the oldest cryptocurrency. After an [all time high of 64 805 USD](https://athcoinindex.com/coin/bitcoin), the price has hovered around 35 000 USD for the last few months. Many speculations and allegations surround it, from Bitcoin [becoming the world's reserve currency](https://www.americanexpress.com/us/foreign-exchange/articles/is-global-digital-reserve-currency-on-horizon/) to [it being a Ponzi scheme](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/23/bitcoin-a-gimmick-and-resembles-a-ponzi-scheme-black-swan-author-.html).", "resc": "The question resolves as the day that Kraken reports the [24 hour low](https://www.kraken.com/prices/btc-bitcoin-price-chart/usd-us-dollar?interval=24h) as a value lower than 6481.0 USD ([adjusted for inflation](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL) to 2021 USD).", "lower_25": "Sep 2027", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next great financial crisis in the US will occur by 2035?", "desc": "Following the financial crisis of 2008 which accompanied the Great Recession, the United States government has taken a multitude of measures to reduce the risk of another financial crisis. However, it remains difficult to know how effective these measures will be in preventing another crisis or mitigating its effects once one takes place.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a \"great financial crisis\" is defined by reference to the weekly [Financial Stress Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/STLFSI2) of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The index is constructed by extracting the component of principal variation from 18 different indicators of the state of financial markets using principal component analysis and is designed to serve as an overall measure of stress in financial markets. A \"great financial crisis\" is a crisis that's comparable to the crisis of 2008 by this metric.", "resc": "The question resolves to the Friday of the earliest week after the opening date of the question for which the latest version of the Financial Stress Index Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (which is currently SLTFSI2 but might change in the future if further revisions are made to the index by the St. Louis Fed) exceeds its value for the week ending on October 3rd 2008. This value is currently 7.0144, but may be updated if FRED updates the index. If this event doesn't occur until the closing date of the question. the question resolves as >2100. If the index is discontinued altogether, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Neanderthal will be born again by Nov 2098?", "desc": "The complete genome of a Neanderthal has already been [sequenced](https://www.nature.com/articles/nature12886). The noted geneticist and synthetic biologist [George Church](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Church_(geneticist)) suggests that Neanderthal de-extinction will become [technically possible](https://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/george-church-explains-how-dna-will-be-construction-material-of-the-future-a-877634.html) in the near future.", "resc": "This question will resolve at the time when a Neanderthal is born and lives for at least a year without major life support. The question will resolve at that time to the date of the Neanderthal's birth. If this does not happen by the end of the given range, the question will resolve > end date.\n\nThe revived specimen must have at least 90% of Neanderthal genome. An anatomically modern human spliced with a few Neanderthal genes will not resolve this question", "lower_25": "Nov 2098", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2099", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2099", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Neanderthal will be born again by Nov 2098?", "desc": "The complete genome of a Neanderthal has already been [sequenced](https://www.nature.com/articles/nature12886). The noted geneticist and synthetic biologist [George Church](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Church_(geneticist)) suggests that Neanderthal de-extinction will become [technically possible](https://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/george-church-explains-how-dna-will-be-construction-material-of-the-future-a-877634.html) in the near future.", "resc": "This question will resolve at the time when a Neanderthal is born and lives for at least a year without major life support. The question will resolve at that time to the date of the Neanderthal's birth. If this does not happen by the end of the given range, the question will resolve > end date.\n\nThe revived specimen must have at least 90% of Neanderthal genome. An anatomically modern human spliced with a few Neanderthal genes will not resolve this question", "lower_25": "Nov 2098", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2099", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2099", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the EU will set a phase out deadline for caged-housing for egg-laying hens by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "_This question has been posed by [Rethink Priorities](https://www.rethinkpriorities.org/), a non-profit research organisation, as part of their work on European Union animal welfare policies._\n\nThis is in addition to the [question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5431/will-the-eu-announce-by-2024-going-cage-free/) of whether, by 2024, the European Commission will make a proposal to phase out cages.\n\nOn June 30th 2021, the Commission responded to the [End the Cage Age](https://www.endthecageage.eu/) [European Citizen's Initiative](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12842-Animal-welfare-%E2%80%98End-the-Cage-Age%E2%80%99-European-citizens%E2%80%99-initiative_en), which called for a ban on cages for farmed animals, by [writing](https://europa.eu/citizens-initiative/sites/default/files/2021-06/1_EN_ACT_part1_v7.pdf):\n\n> \" . . the Commission intends to put forward a legislative proposal by the end of 2023 to phase out and finally prohibit the use of cages for all the animal species and categories referred to in the initiative (laying hens, sows, calves, rabbits, pullets, broiler breeders, layer breeders, quail, ducks and geese) as part of the planned revision of EU animal welfare legislation, under conditions (including the length of the transition period) to be determined based on EFSA opinions, the results of an impact assessment and a public consultation.\n. . .\nThe date of entry into force of the prohibition, and thus the length of the phasing out period, will be considered in the context of the impact assessment for the legislative proposal. In particular, this will assess the feasibility of working towards the proposed legislation entering into force from 2027 taking into account the need to support farmers in this transition – financially and otherwise.\n. . .\nthe Commission will consider the available science, an assessment of social,\neconomic and environmental impacts, evolving needs and consumer demand. These elements will be taken into account when it comes to determining the length of a reasonable transition period and the accompanying and supporting measures to facilitate the transition. The Commission in particular will assess the feasibility of working towards the proposed legislation entering into force from 2027.\"\n\nEuropean Union (EU) legislation currently allows the use of \"enriched\" cages for egg-laying hens as well as alternative cage-free systems through [Directive 1999/74/EC](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/1999/74/oj). EU statistics indicate that as of 2020 [52%](https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/food-farming-fisheries/farming/documents/eggs-dashboard_en.pdf) of egg-laying hens in the EU are cage-free.\n\nSome EU countries already have plans to phase out cages or have already done so.\n\n* Germany [announced](https://www.bmel.de/EN/topics/animals/farm-animals/laying-hen-husbandry-q-and-a.html) a phase-out deadline for existing cage holdings by the end of 2025, with an extension to this deadline of up to a maximum of three years (2028) only in special cases of hardship.\n\n* In Austria, a [ban](https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Erv&Dokumentnummer=ERV_2004_1_118) on enriched cages came into force in 2020.\n* In Luxembourg, a [ban](http://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/rgd/2002/01/28/n1/jo) is already in place and no cage hen farms are operating there.\n* Czechia [agreed](https://pozitivni-zpravy.cz/cesi-vybojovali-svobodu-pro-slepice-zakaz-klecovych-chodu-podepsal-prezident/) to phase out cages by 2027.\n* The Slovak agricultural minister [announced](https://www.ciwf.org.uk/news/2020/02/the-slovak-republic-to-end-the-cage-age) the intention to phase out cages by 2030 as part of a memorandum signed with the chicken industry.\n* In the Walloon Region in Belgium, the government has adopted the [Walloon Code of Animal Welfare](https://www.gaia.be/en/news/wallonia-adopts-ambitious-animal-welfare-code), under which keeping hens in enriched cages will become illegal by 2028. \n- France was to [ban](https://www.poultryworld.net/Eggs/Articles/2018/2/France-to-ban-sale-of-eggs-from-caged-hens-by-2022-251161E/) the sale of whole eggs from caged hens in shops by 2022 (but not eggs broken and used as ingredients) though it doesn't seem to have been legislated, and the European Commission [claimed](https://europa.eu/citizens-initiative/sites/default/files/2021-06/1_EN_ACT_part1_v7.pdf) enriched cages are \"banned in France for new or refurbished farms\".\n* The Netherlands [planned](https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2010-284.html) to ban enriched cages from 2021, but allow a larger type of cage (colony cages) to continue to be used- though it seems to have been [postponed](https://www.animalrights.nl/de-%E2%80%98verrijkte-kooi%E2%80%99-voor-legkippen-verboden#fn:2).\n\nIn September 2020, the Czech ministry of agriculture submitted a [proposal](https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10844-2020-INIT/en/pdf) for an EU-wide ban on cages for laying hens from 2030 at an EU council meeting.\n\n***If the EU bans caged-housing for egg-laying hens, what date will be set as the phase out deadline?***\n\nThis question will be resolved when the European Union is reported on the [EU Press Corner website](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/home/en) to have adopted into law a directive or regulation that requires an end to the use of all caged systems for egg-laying hens within the European Union by a certain date. Note the regulation may include a date after which no new cages are to be installed in addition to a date after which all existing cages can no longer be stocked and used. In this question we are concerned with the second of these two dates. \n\nThis question retroactively closes 48 hours before the time of the announcement. If there is no phase-out date included in the law, then this question will resolve ambiguously. It will resolve ambiguous if it doesn't resolve by 2060 or if the date in question is after 2060.\n\n[fine-print]\nEnriched, furnished, or colony cages will be considered caged-housing. Semi- or limited-access barns will not be consider caged-housing. The law may not contain the exact language \"ban cages\" but rather require some minimum space requirements, outdoor access, and enrichment materials that de fact mean extreme confinement in a cage or crate is impossible. The opinion of credible animal rights/welfare organisations like Compassion in World Farming or Eurogroup for Animals can be referred to in case of ambiguity. \n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a computer program will be credited as an artist of at least ten pages of content in Weekly Shonen Jump by Dec 2024?", "desc": "Modern visual creative tools like Adobe Creative and Clip Studio Paint already offer increasingly sophisticated AI-assisted editing. At the leading edge, technologies like [generative adversarial networks](https://medium.com/the-research-nest/generating-art-with-artificial-intelligence-powered-applications-276102955261) and [others](https://reposhub.com/python/deep-learning/lzhbrian-arbitrary-text-to-image-papers.html) may soon allow generating high-fidelity images of any desired content and style.\n\n[Weekly Shōnen Jump](https://www.viz.com/shonenjump) is a Japanese magazine that serializes ongoing manga series. It has by far the largest circulation of any manga magazine, and to draw a weekly manga published in Shōnen Jump is the pinnacle of achievement in the manga industry. Weekly manga chapters are typically about 16-20 pages long.", "resc": "This question will resolves as the earliest date that Weekly Shōnen Jump publishes at least ten magazine pages of content, in the same issue, credited in any part to an artificial intelligence or other computer program. It does not matter whether the content's appearance was paid-for, or on what terms it appeared in the magazine.\n\nIf this does not occur by December 31, 2039, this question will resolve as **> December 31, 2039.*", "lower_25": "Dec 2024", "median": "Jul 2026", "upper_75": "Feb 2029", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the price of Bitcoin will first drop below $6481 (2021 USD) by Sep 2027?", "desc": "[Bitcoin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitcoin) is the oldest cryptocurrency. After an [all time high of 64 805 USD](https://athcoinindex.com/coin/bitcoin), the price has hovered around 35 000 USD for the last few months. Many speculations and allegations surround it, from Bitcoin [becoming the world's reserve currency](https://www.americanexpress.com/us/foreign-exchange/articles/is-global-digital-reserve-currency-on-horizon/) to [it being a Ponzi scheme](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/23/bitcoin-a-gimmick-and-resembles-a-ponzi-scheme-black-swan-author-.html).", "resc": "The question resolves as the day that Kraken reports the [24 hour low](https://www.kraken.com/prices/btc-bitcoin-price-chart/usd-us-dollar?interval=24h) as a value lower than 6481.0 USD ([adjusted for inflation](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL) to 2021 USD).", "lower_25": "Sep 2027", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the price of Bitcoin will first drop below $6481 (2021 USD) by Sep 2027?", "desc": "[Bitcoin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitcoin) is the oldest cryptocurrency. After an [all time high of 64 805 USD](https://athcoinindex.com/coin/bitcoin), the price has hovered around 35 000 USD for the last few months. Many speculations and allegations surround it, from Bitcoin [becoming the world's reserve currency](https://www.americanexpress.com/us/foreign-exchange/articles/is-global-digital-reserve-currency-on-horizon/) to [it being a Ponzi scheme](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/23/bitcoin-a-gimmick-and-resembles-a-ponzi-scheme-black-swan-author-.html).", "resc": "The question resolves as the day that Kraken reports the [24 hour low](https://www.kraken.com/prices/btc-bitcoin-price-chart/usd-us-dollar?interval=24h) as a value lower than 6481.0 USD ([adjusted for inflation](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL) to 2021 USD).", "lower_25": "Sep 2027", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a computer program will be credited as an artist of at least ten pages of content in Weekly Shonen Jump by Dec 2024?", "desc": "Modern visual creative tools like Adobe Creative and Clip Studio Paint already offer increasingly sophisticated AI-assisted editing. At the leading edge, technologies like [generative adversarial networks](https://medium.com/the-research-nest/generating-art-with-artificial-intelligence-powered-applications-276102955261) and [others](https://reposhub.com/python/deep-learning/lzhbrian-arbitrary-text-to-image-papers.html) may soon allow generating high-fidelity images of any desired content and style.\n\n[Weekly Shōnen Jump](https://www.viz.com/shonenjump) is a Japanese magazine that serializes ongoing manga series. It has by far the largest circulation of any manga magazine, and to draw a weekly manga published in Shōnen Jump is the pinnacle of achievement in the manga industry. Weekly manga chapters are typically about 16-20 pages long.", "resc": "This question will resolves as the earliest date that Weekly Shōnen Jump publishes at least ten magazine pages of content, in the same issue, credited in any part to an artificial intelligence or other computer program. It does not matter whether the content's appearance was paid-for, or on what terms it appeared in the magazine.\n\nIf this does not occur by December 31, 2039, this question will resolve as **> December 31, 2039.*", "lower_25": "Dec 2024", "median": "Jul 2026", "upper_75": "Feb 2029", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a computer program will be credited as an artist of at least ten pages of content in Weekly Shonen Jump by Dec 2024?", "desc": "Modern visual creative tools like Adobe Creative and Clip Studio Paint already offer increasingly sophisticated AI-assisted editing. At the leading edge, technologies like [generative adversarial networks](https://medium.com/the-research-nest/generating-art-with-artificial-intelligence-powered-applications-276102955261) and [others](https://reposhub.com/python/deep-learning/lzhbrian-arbitrary-text-to-image-papers.html) may soon allow generating high-fidelity images of any desired content and style.\n\n[Weekly Shōnen Jump](https://www.viz.com/shonenjump) is a Japanese magazine that serializes ongoing manga series. It has by far the largest circulation of any manga magazine, and to draw a weekly manga published in Shōnen Jump is the pinnacle of achievement in the manga industry. Weekly manga chapters are typically about 16-20 pages long.", "resc": "This question will resolves as the earliest date that Weekly Shōnen Jump publishes at least ten magazine pages of content, in the same issue, credited in any part to an artificial intelligence or other computer program. It does not matter whether the content's appearance was paid-for, or on what terms it appeared in the magazine.\n\nIf this does not occur by December 31, 2039, this question will resolve as **> December 31, 2039.*", "lower_25": "Dec 2024", "median": "Jul 2026", "upper_75": "Feb 2029", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real Gross World Product will be 25.8k trillions of 2020 USD in 2100?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "168", "median": "1.34k", "upper_75": "25.8k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real Gross World Product will be 25.8k trillions of 2020 USD in 2100?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "168", "median": "1.34k", "upper_75": "25.8k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the EU will set a phase out deadline for caged-housing for egg-laying hens by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "_This question has been posed by [Rethink Priorities](https://www.rethinkpriorities.org/), a non-profit research organisation, as part of their work on European Union animal welfare policies._\n\nThis is in addition to the [question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5431/will-the-eu-announce-by-2024-going-cage-free/) of whether, by 2024, the European Commission will make a proposal to phase out cages.\n\nOn June 30th 2021, the Commission responded to the [End the Cage Age](https://www.endthecageage.eu/) [European Citizen's Initiative](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12842-Animal-welfare-%E2%80%98End-the-Cage-Age%E2%80%99-European-citizens%E2%80%99-initiative_en), which called for a ban on cages for farmed animals, by [writing](https://europa.eu/citizens-initiative/sites/default/files/2021-06/1_EN_ACT_part1_v7.pdf):\n\n> \" . . the Commission intends to put forward a legislative proposal by the end of 2023 to phase out and finally prohibit the use of cages for all the animal species and categories referred to in the initiative (laying hens, sows, calves, rabbits, pullets, broiler breeders, layer breeders, quail, ducks and geese) as part of the planned revision of EU animal welfare legislation, under conditions (including the length of the transition period) to be determined based on EFSA opinions, the results of an impact assessment and a public consultation.\n. . .\nThe date of entry into force of the prohibition, and thus the length of the phasing out period, will be considered in the context of the impact assessment for the legislative proposal. In particular, this will assess the feasibility of working towards the proposed legislation entering into force from 2027 taking into account the need to support farmers in this transition – financially and otherwise.\n. . .\nthe Commission will consider the available science, an assessment of social,\neconomic and environmental impacts, evolving needs and consumer demand. These elements will be taken into account when it comes to determining the length of a reasonable transition period and the accompanying and supporting measures to facilitate the transition. The Commission in particular will assess the feasibility of working towards the proposed legislation entering into force from 2027.\"\n\nEuropean Union (EU) legislation currently allows the use of \"enriched\" cages for egg-laying hens as well as alternative cage-free systems through [Directive 1999/74/EC](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/1999/74/oj). EU statistics indicate that as of 2020 [52%](https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/food-farming-fisheries/farming/documents/eggs-dashboard_en.pdf) of egg-laying hens in the EU are cage-free.\n\nSome EU countries already have plans to phase out cages or have already done so.\n\n* Germany [announced](https://www.bmel.de/EN/topics/animals/farm-animals/laying-hen-husbandry-q-and-a.html) a phase-out deadline for existing cage holdings by the end of 2025, with an extension to this deadline of up to a maximum of three years (2028) only in special cases of hardship.\n\n* In Austria, a [ban](https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Erv&Dokumentnummer=ERV_2004_1_118) on enriched cages came into force in 2020.\n* In Luxembourg, a [ban](http://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/rgd/2002/01/28/n1/jo) is already in place and no cage hen farms are operating there.\n* Czechia [agreed](https://pozitivni-zpravy.cz/cesi-vybojovali-svobodu-pro-slepice-zakaz-klecovych-chodu-podepsal-prezident/) to phase out cages by 2027.\n* The Slovak agricultural minister [announced](https://www.ciwf.org.uk/news/2020/02/the-slovak-republic-to-end-the-cage-age) the intention to phase out cages by 2030 as part of a memorandum signed with the chicken industry.\n* In the Walloon Region in Belgium, the government has adopted the [Walloon Code of Animal Welfare](https://www.gaia.be/en/news/wallonia-adopts-ambitious-animal-welfare-code), under which keeping hens in enriched cages will become illegal by 2028. \n- France was to [ban](https://www.poultryworld.net/Eggs/Articles/2018/2/France-to-ban-sale-of-eggs-from-caged-hens-by-2022-251161E/) the sale of whole eggs from caged hens in shops by 2022 (but not eggs broken and used as ingredients) though it doesn't seem to have been legislated, and the European Commission [claimed](https://europa.eu/citizens-initiative/sites/default/files/2021-06/1_EN_ACT_part1_v7.pdf) enriched cages are \"banned in France for new or refurbished farms\".\n* The Netherlands [planned](https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2010-284.html) to ban enriched cages from 2021, but allow a larger type of cage (colony cages) to continue to be used- though it seems to have been [postponed](https://www.animalrights.nl/de-%E2%80%98verrijkte-kooi%E2%80%99-voor-legkippen-verboden#fn:2).\n\nIn September 2020, the Czech ministry of agriculture submitted a [proposal](https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10844-2020-INIT/en/pdf) for an EU-wide ban on cages for laying hens from 2030 at an EU council meeting.\n\n***If the EU bans caged-housing for egg-laying hens, what date will be set as the phase out deadline?***\n\nThis question will be resolved when the European Union is reported on the [EU Press Corner website](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/home/en) to have adopted into law a directive or regulation that requires an end to the use of all caged systems for egg-laying hens within the European Union by a certain date. Note the regulation may include a date after which no new cages are to be installed in addition to a date after which all existing cages can no longer be stocked and used. In this question we are concerned with the second of these two dates. \n\nThis question retroactively closes 48 hours before the time of the announcement. If there is no phase-out date included in the law, then this question will resolve ambiguously. It will resolve ambiguous if it doesn't resolve by 2060 or if the date in question is after 2060.\n\n[fine-print]\nEnriched, furnished, or colony cages will be considered caged-housing. Semi- or limited-access barns will not be consider caged-housing. The law may not contain the exact language \"ban cages\" but rather require some minimum space requirements, outdoor access, and enrichment materials that de fact mean extreme confinement in a cage or crate is impossible. The opinion of credible animal rights/welfare organisations like Compassion in World Farming or Eurogroup for Animals can be referred to in case of ambiguity. \n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real Gross World Product will be 25.8k trillions of 2020 USD in 2100?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "168", "median": "1.34k", "upper_75": "25.8k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the EU will set a phase out deadline for caged-housing for egg-laying hens by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "_This question has been posed by [Rethink Priorities](https://www.rethinkpriorities.org/), a non-profit research organisation, as part of their work on European Union animal welfare policies._\n\nThis is in addition to the [question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5431/will-the-eu-announce-by-2024-going-cage-free/) of whether, by 2024, the European Commission will make a proposal to phase out cages.\n\nOn June 30th 2021, the Commission responded to the [End the Cage Age](https://www.endthecageage.eu/) [European Citizen's Initiative](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12842-Animal-welfare-%E2%80%98End-the-Cage-Age%E2%80%99-European-citizens%E2%80%99-initiative_en), which called for a ban on cages for farmed animals, by [writing](https://europa.eu/citizens-initiative/sites/default/files/2021-06/1_EN_ACT_part1_v7.pdf):\n\n> \" . . the Commission intends to put forward a legislative proposal by the end of 2023 to phase out and finally prohibit the use of cages for all the animal species and categories referred to in the initiative (laying hens, sows, calves, rabbits, pullets, broiler breeders, layer breeders, quail, ducks and geese) as part of the planned revision of EU animal welfare legislation, under conditions (including the length of the transition period) to be determined based on EFSA opinions, the results of an impact assessment and a public consultation.\n. . .\nThe date of entry into force of the prohibition, and thus the length of the phasing out period, will be considered in the context of the impact assessment for the legislative proposal. In particular, this will assess the feasibility of working towards the proposed legislation entering into force from 2027 taking into account the need to support farmers in this transition – financially and otherwise.\n. . .\nthe Commission will consider the available science, an assessment of social,\neconomic and environmental impacts, evolving needs and consumer demand. These elements will be taken into account when it comes to determining the length of a reasonable transition period and the accompanying and supporting measures to facilitate the transition. The Commission in particular will assess the feasibility of working towards the proposed legislation entering into force from 2027.\"\n\nEuropean Union (EU) legislation currently allows the use of \"enriched\" cages for egg-laying hens as well as alternative cage-free systems through [Directive 1999/74/EC](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/1999/74/oj). EU statistics indicate that as of 2020 [52%](https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/food-farming-fisheries/farming/documents/eggs-dashboard_en.pdf) of egg-laying hens in the EU are cage-free.\n\nSome EU countries already have plans to phase out cages or have already done so.\n\n* Germany [announced](https://www.bmel.de/EN/topics/animals/farm-animals/laying-hen-husbandry-q-and-a.html) a phase-out deadline for existing cage holdings by the end of 2025, with an extension to this deadline of up to a maximum of three years (2028) only in special cases of hardship.\n\n* In Austria, a [ban](https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Erv&Dokumentnummer=ERV_2004_1_118) on enriched cages came into force in 2020.\n* In Luxembourg, a [ban](http://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/rgd/2002/01/28/n1/jo) is already in place and no cage hen farms are operating there.\n* Czechia [agreed](https://pozitivni-zpravy.cz/cesi-vybojovali-svobodu-pro-slepice-zakaz-klecovych-chodu-podepsal-prezident/) to phase out cages by 2027.\n* The Slovak agricultural minister [announced](https://www.ciwf.org.uk/news/2020/02/the-slovak-republic-to-end-the-cage-age) the intention to phase out cages by 2030 as part of a memorandum signed with the chicken industry.\n* In the Walloon Region in Belgium, the government has adopted the [Walloon Code of Animal Welfare](https://www.gaia.be/en/news/wallonia-adopts-ambitious-animal-welfare-code), under which keeping hens in enriched cages will become illegal by 2028. \n- France was to [ban](https://www.poultryworld.net/Eggs/Articles/2018/2/France-to-ban-sale-of-eggs-from-caged-hens-by-2022-251161E/) the sale of whole eggs from caged hens in shops by 2022 (but not eggs broken and used as ingredients) though it doesn't seem to have been legislated, and the European Commission [claimed](https://europa.eu/citizens-initiative/sites/default/files/2021-06/1_EN_ACT_part1_v7.pdf) enriched cages are \"banned in France for new or refurbished farms\".\n* The Netherlands [planned](https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2010-284.html) to ban enriched cages from 2021, but allow a larger type of cage (colony cages) to continue to be used- though it seems to have been [postponed](https://www.animalrights.nl/de-%E2%80%98verrijkte-kooi%E2%80%99-voor-legkippen-verboden#fn:2).\n\nIn September 2020, the Czech ministry of agriculture submitted a [proposal](https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10844-2020-INIT/en/pdf) for an EU-wide ban on cages for laying hens from 2030 at an EU council meeting.\n\n***If the EU bans caged-housing for egg-laying hens, what date will be set as the phase out deadline?***\n\nThis question will be resolved when the European Union is reported on the [EU Press Corner website](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/home/en) to have adopted into law a directive or regulation that requires an end to the use of all caged systems for egg-laying hens within the European Union by a certain date. Note the regulation may include a date after which no new cages are to be installed in addition to a date after which all existing cages can no longer be stocked and used. In this question we are concerned with the second of these two dates. \n\nThis question retroactively closes 48 hours before the time of the announcement. If there is no phase-out date included in the law, then this question will resolve ambiguously. It will resolve ambiguous if it doesn't resolve by 2060 or if the date in question is after 2060.\n\n[fine-print]\nEnriched, furnished, or colony cages will be considered caged-housing. Semi- or limited-access barns will not be consider caged-housing. The law may not contain the exact language \"ban cages\" but rather require some minimum space requirements, outdoor access, and enrichment materials that de fact mean extreme confinement in a cage or crate is impossible. The opinion of credible animal rights/welfare organisations like Compassion in World Farming or Eurogroup for Animals can be referred to in case of ambiguity. \n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real Gross World Product will be 316k trillions of 2020 USD by 2200?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.17k", "median": "316k", "upper_75": "1.42×1013", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Twin Prime Conjecture will be resolved by 2043?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2043", "upper_75": "2135", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Twin Prime Conjecture will be resolved by 2043?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2043", "upper_75": "2135", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real Gross World Product will be 316k trillions of 2020 USD by 2200?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.17k", "median": "316k", "upper_75": "1.42×1013", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real Gross World Product will be 316k trillions of 2020 USD by 2200?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.17k", "median": "316k", "upper_75": "1.42×1013", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.011 fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be on well-populated areas?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.011", "median": "0.254", "upper_75": "0.941", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Twin Prime Conjecture will be resolved by 2043?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2043", "upper_75": "2135", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Vanguard Information Technology ETF will yield an inflation-adjusted return of 1.28k from 2021-2040 if AGI arrives by 2040, in percentage points?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "195", "median": "1.28k", "upper_75": "12.5k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.011 fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be on well-populated areas?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.011", "median": "0.254", "upper_75": "0.941", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.011 fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be on well-populated areas?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.011", "median": "0.254", "upper_75": "0.941", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "If these countries detonate a nuclear weapon by 2050, what is the chance that 0.082 proportion of those detonations will be countervalue? (India)", "desc": "[Countervalue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervalue) targeting is \"the targeting of an opponent's assets that are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations\". Compared to nuclear strikes against [counterforce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterforce) targets or battlefield targets, countervalue nuclear strikes would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the proportion of offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the respective country which are considered countervalue strikes. Only offensive detonations occurring between January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2049 will be included. If there are no offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the country in question in that time period, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nFor this question, A detonation will be considered \"countervalue\" if credible media reporting does not widely consider a military or industrial target as the primary target of the detonation (except for detonations on capital cities, which will always be considered countervalue without exception). \n\nOffensive nuclear detonations will include only [authorised, inadvertent, and accidental](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf) offensive detonations, not [test detonations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing), [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion), or detonations by non-state actors who seized Pakistan-owned weapons.", "lower_25": "0.021", "median": "0.082", "upper_75": "0.194", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Vanguard Information Technology ETF will yield an inflation-adjusted return of 1.28k from 2021-2040 if AGI arrives by 2040, in percentage points?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "195", "median": "1.28k", "upper_75": "12.5k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If these countries detonate a nuclear weapon by 2050, what is the chance that 0.082 proportion of those detonations will be countervalue? (India)", "desc": "[Countervalue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervalue) targeting is \"the targeting of an opponent's assets that are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations\". Compared to nuclear strikes against [counterforce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterforce) targets or battlefield targets, countervalue nuclear strikes would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the proportion of offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the respective country which are considered countervalue strikes. Only offensive detonations occurring between January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2049 will be included. If there are no offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the country in question in that time period, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nFor this question, A detonation will be considered \"countervalue\" if credible media reporting does not widely consider a military or industrial target as the primary target of the detonation (except for detonations on capital cities, which will always be considered countervalue without exception). \n\nOffensive nuclear detonations will include only [authorised, inadvertent, and accidental](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf) offensive detonations, not [test detonations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing), [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion), or detonations by non-state actors who seized Pakistan-owned weapons.", "lower_25": "0.021", "median": "0.082", "upper_75": "0.194", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 20.4% of the Israeli population will be Haredi in 2050?", "desc": "According to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics as reported by the [Times of Israel](https://www.timesofisrael.com/half-of-israel-to-be-arab-ultra-orthodox-by-2059-projections/) the percentage of Israel's population that is, ultra-Orthodox, or [Haredi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haredi_Judaism), was 9% as of 2017, and is projected to grow to 29% by 2059. A 2020 [report by the Israel Democracy Institute](https://en.idi.org.il/media/14526/statistical-report-on-ultra-orthodox-haredi-society-in-israel-2019.pdf) estimates that as of 2020 12% of Israel's population is Haredi (1,125,000) and projects that this proportion will double in 16 years.\n\n[Haredi Judaism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ultra-Orthodox-Judaism) is defined as a stringent adherence to halakha (Jewish law), traditions and customs. Child-rearing is encouraged in the Haredi community — a [2018 Israel Democracy Institute study](https://en.idi.org.il/articles/25385) estimated that Haredi women on average have 7.1 children.", "resc": "The most recent official [Central Bureau of Statistics](https://www.cbs.gov.il/en/Pages/default.aspx) census or survey as of 1 January 2050 that estimates the percentage of the population that is Haredi will be consulted. If there is no such survey after 31 December 2046, then the most recent estimate by the [Israel Democracy Institute](https://en.idi.org.il/) or a major Israeli newspaper (Haaretz, Ynet, Jerusalem Post) will be consulted.", "lower_25": "15.3", "median": "20.4", "upper_75": "26.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If these countries detonate a nuclear weapon by 2050, what is the chance that 0.082 proportion of those detonations will be countervalue? (India)", "desc": "[Countervalue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervalue) targeting is \"the targeting of an opponent's assets that are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations\". Compared to nuclear strikes against [counterforce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterforce) targets or battlefield targets, countervalue nuclear strikes would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the proportion of offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the respective country which are considered countervalue strikes. Only offensive detonations occurring between January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2049 will be included. If there are no offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the country in question in that time period, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nFor this question, A detonation will be considered \"countervalue\" if credible media reporting does not widely consider a military or industrial target as the primary target of the detonation (except for detonations on capital cities, which will always be considered countervalue without exception). \n\nOffensive nuclear detonations will include only [authorised, inadvertent, and accidental](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf) offensive detonations, not [test detonations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing), [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion), or detonations by non-state actors who seized Pakistan-owned weapons.", "lower_25": "0.021", "median": "0.082", "upper_75": "0.194", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that South Africa's GDP per capita PPP will be 12.3k in 2030 (in constant 2017 USD)?", "desc": "South Africa seemingly faces an economic crisis.\n[Cyril Madlala writes for Daily Maverick 13 July 2021](https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-13-a-race-war-looms-if-the-government-cant-get-the-looting-under-control/):\n\n>A race war looms if the government can't get the looting under control\n>The ANC failed to sort out its politics when the Zuma matter was for its members only to resolve. Now parts of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng are in flames, as they were almost three decades ago. The immediate danger now is of armed conflict between races, because their government is not capable of protecting its citizens from thugs who have hijacked a pro-Zuma bandwagon for their own nefarious intentions.\n\n[Antony Sguazzin writes for Bloomberg/Al Jazeera 13 Jul 2021](https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/7/13/violent-protests-deal-body-blow-to-south-africas-economy):\n\n>Violent protests deal body blow to South Africa's economy\n>Violent protests have dealt a body blow to South Africa's efforts to rebuild the economy in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic and pose the sternest test yet to President Cyril Ramaphosa's authority.\n>The widespread looting and social unrest that's followed the imprisonment of former President Jacob Zuma is damaging business confidence, has disrupted key trade routes and seen businesses from banks and supermarkets to small-time traders shutting their doors. The army has been deployed to help police quell the unrest, which has claimed the lives of 10 people and seen almost 500 arrested.\n\nWill South Africa suffer significant economic decline, or bounce back on track? The GDP per capita PPP was about 12.5k in 2019, and about 11.5k in 2020, though this is probably also related to COVID lockdown.", "resc": "This question will resolve as South Africa's GDP per capita PPP (in constant 2017 USD) for the year 2030, according to the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD?end=2020&locations=ZA&start=1990&view=chart)", "lower_25": "10.1k", "median": "12.3k", "upper_75": "14.6k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Vanguard Information Technology ETF will yield an inflation-adjusted return of 1.28k from 2021-2040 if AGI arrives by 2040, in percentage points?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "195", "median": "1.28k", "upper_75": "12.5k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 20.4% of the Israeli population will be Haredi in 2050?", "desc": "According to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics as reported by the [Times of Israel](https://www.timesofisrael.com/half-of-israel-to-be-arab-ultra-orthodox-by-2059-projections/) the percentage of Israel's population that is, ultra-Orthodox, or [Haredi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haredi_Judaism), was 9% as of 2017, and is projected to grow to 29% by 2059. A 2020 [report by the Israel Democracy Institute](https://en.idi.org.il/media/14526/statistical-report-on-ultra-orthodox-haredi-society-in-israel-2019.pdf) estimates that as of 2020 12% of Israel's population is Haredi (1,125,000) and projects that this proportion will double in 16 years.\n\n[Haredi Judaism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ultra-Orthodox-Judaism) is defined as a stringent adherence to halakha (Jewish law), traditions and customs. Child-rearing is encouraged in the Haredi community — a [2018 Israel Democracy Institute study](https://en.idi.org.il/articles/25385) estimated that Haredi women on average have 7.1 children.", "resc": "The most recent official [Central Bureau of Statistics](https://www.cbs.gov.il/en/Pages/default.aspx) census or survey as of 1 January 2050 that estimates the percentage of the population that is Haredi will be consulted. If there is no such survey after 31 December 2046, then the most recent estimate by the [Israel Democracy Institute](https://en.idi.org.il/) or a major Israeli newspaper (Haaretz, Ynet, Jerusalem Post) will be consulted.", "lower_25": "15.3", "median": "20.4", "upper_75": "26.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Assuming our future simulates us, what is the chance that the first peer-reviewed guesses of our instantiation date will be 13.4?", "desc": "Some researchers suggest the odds of our current reality being a simulation are [very high](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nick_Bostrom). \n\nUnder some scenarios, our current reality could be a simulation created under a reality--itself possibly a simulation--historically coincident with our own apparent universe to at least the present, in many or all respects.\n\nIn this case, since the mother universe corresponds substantially or fully to our own so far, one obvious question is at what date in the mother universe (equivalent to a possibly divergent copy of our future) was our own simulation created?", "resc": "Slider is in billions of years from instantiation of mother universe. Upper boundary is open. \n\nResolves when either 3 credible peer reviewed studies or 4 credible media sources--as determined by metaculus moderators--all announce and agree with each other to within 100 million years on a date of instantiation, in the mother universe, for the simulation constituting our reality either in conjunction with the declaration that we are in a simulation or merely taking it for granted. \n\nResolves ambiguous if we're provably in a simulation where the mother universe does not contain fully or substantially the history of our universe up to at least the time this question goes live.\n\nResolves ambiguous if we're provably in a simulation but the concept of a mother universe is incorrect or inapplicable.\n\nResolves ambiguous if proven we're not in a simulation.\n\nIf the mother universe is itself a simulation, that's no problem.\n\nLower and upper boundaries are open for dates outside of the given range.", "lower_25": "0.791", "median": "13.4", "upper_75": "14.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 20.4% of the Israeli population will be Haredi in 2050?", "desc": "According to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics as reported by the [Times of Israel](https://www.timesofisrael.com/half-of-israel-to-be-arab-ultra-orthodox-by-2059-projections/) the percentage of Israel's population that is, ultra-Orthodox, or [Haredi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haredi_Judaism), was 9% as of 2017, and is projected to grow to 29% by 2059. A 2020 [report by the Israel Democracy Institute](https://en.idi.org.il/media/14526/statistical-report-on-ultra-orthodox-haredi-society-in-israel-2019.pdf) estimates that as of 2020 12% of Israel's population is Haredi (1,125,000) and projects that this proportion will double in 16 years.\n\n[Haredi Judaism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ultra-Orthodox-Judaism) is defined as a stringent adherence to halakha (Jewish law), traditions and customs. Child-rearing is encouraged in the Haredi community — a [2018 Israel Democracy Institute study](https://en.idi.org.il/articles/25385) estimated that Haredi women on average have 7.1 children.", "resc": "The most recent official [Central Bureau of Statistics](https://www.cbs.gov.il/en/Pages/default.aspx) census or survey as of 1 January 2050 that estimates the percentage of the population that is Haredi will be consulted. If there is no such survey after 31 December 2046, then the most recent estimate by the [Israel Democracy Institute](https://en.idi.org.il/) or a major Israeli newspaper (Haaretz, Ynet, Jerusalem Post) will be consulted.", "lower_25": "15.3", "median": "20.4", "upper_75": "26.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Assuming our future simulates us, what is the chance that the first peer-reviewed guesses of our instantiation date will be 13.4?", "desc": "Some researchers suggest the odds of our current reality being a simulation are [very high](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nick_Bostrom). \n\nUnder some scenarios, our current reality could be a simulation created under a reality--itself possibly a simulation--historically coincident with our own apparent universe to at least the present, in many or all respects.\n\nIn this case, since the mother universe corresponds substantially or fully to our own so far, one obvious question is at what date in the mother universe (equivalent to a possibly divergent copy of our future) was our own simulation created?", "resc": "Slider is in billions of years from instantiation of mother universe. Upper boundary is open. \n\nResolves when either 3 credible peer reviewed studies or 4 credible media sources--as determined by metaculus moderators--all announce and agree with each other to within 100 million years on a date of instantiation, in the mother universe, for the simulation constituting our reality either in conjunction with the declaration that we are in a simulation or merely taking it for granted. \n\nResolves ambiguous if we're provably in a simulation where the mother universe does not contain fully or substantially the history of our universe up to at least the time this question goes live.\n\nResolves ambiguous if we're provably in a simulation but the concept of a mother universe is incorrect or inapplicable.\n\nResolves ambiguous if proven we're not in a simulation.\n\nIf the mother universe is itself a simulation, that's no problem.\n\nLower and upper boundaries are open for dates outside of the given range.", "lower_25": "0.791", "median": "13.4", "upper_75": "14.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that South Africa's GDP per capita PPP will be 12.3k in 2030 (in constant 2017 USD)?", "desc": "South Africa seemingly faces an economic crisis.\n[Cyril Madlala writes for Daily Maverick 13 July 2021](https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-13-a-race-war-looms-if-the-government-cant-get-the-looting-under-control/):\n\n>A race war looms if the government can't get the looting under control\n>The ANC failed to sort out its politics when the Zuma matter was for its members only to resolve. Now parts of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng are in flames, as they were almost three decades ago. The immediate danger now is of armed conflict between races, because their government is not capable of protecting its citizens from thugs who have hijacked a pro-Zuma bandwagon for their own nefarious intentions.\n\n[Antony Sguazzin writes for Bloomberg/Al Jazeera 13 Jul 2021](https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/7/13/violent-protests-deal-body-blow-to-south-africas-economy):\n\n>Violent protests deal body blow to South Africa's economy\n>Violent protests have dealt a body blow to South Africa's efforts to rebuild the economy in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic and pose the sternest test yet to President Cyril Ramaphosa's authority.\n>The widespread looting and social unrest that's followed the imprisonment of former President Jacob Zuma is damaging business confidence, has disrupted key trade routes and seen businesses from banks and supermarkets to small-time traders shutting their doors. The army has been deployed to help police quell the unrest, which has claimed the lives of 10 people and seen almost 500 arrested.\n\nWill South Africa suffer significant economic decline, or bounce back on track? The GDP per capita PPP was about 12.5k in 2019, and about 11.5k in 2020, though this is probably also related to COVID lockdown.", "resc": "This question will resolve as South Africa's GDP per capita PPP (in constant 2017 USD) for the year 2030, according to the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD?end=2020&locations=ZA&start=1990&view=chart)", "lower_25": "10.1k", "median": "12.3k", "upper_75": "14.6k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 1% of people in any major city or country will have experienced using augmented reality outside by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2037", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that South Africa's GDP per capita PPP will be 12.3k in 2030 (in constant 2017 USD)?", "desc": "South Africa seemingly faces an economic crisis.\n[Cyril Madlala writes for Daily Maverick 13 July 2021](https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2021-07-13-a-race-war-looms-if-the-government-cant-get-the-looting-under-control/):\n\n>A race war looms if the government can't get the looting under control\n>The ANC failed to sort out its politics when the Zuma matter was for its members only to resolve. Now parts of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng are in flames, as they were almost three decades ago. The immediate danger now is of armed conflict between races, because their government is not capable of protecting its citizens from thugs who have hijacked a pro-Zuma bandwagon for their own nefarious intentions.\n\n[Antony Sguazzin writes for Bloomberg/Al Jazeera 13 Jul 2021](https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/7/13/violent-protests-deal-body-blow-to-south-africas-economy):\n\n>Violent protests deal body blow to South Africa's economy\n>Violent protests have dealt a body blow to South Africa's efforts to rebuild the economy in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic and pose the sternest test yet to President Cyril Ramaphosa's authority.\n>The widespread looting and social unrest that's followed the imprisonment of former President Jacob Zuma is damaging business confidence, has disrupted key trade routes and seen businesses from banks and supermarkets to small-time traders shutting their doors. The army has been deployed to help police quell the unrest, which has claimed the lives of 10 people and seen almost 500 arrested.\n\nWill South Africa suffer significant economic decline, or bounce back on track? The GDP per capita PPP was about 12.5k in 2019, and about 11.5k in 2020, though this is probably also related to COVID lockdown.", "resc": "This question will resolve as South Africa's GDP per capita PPP (in constant 2017 USD) for the year 2030, according to the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD?end=2020&locations=ZA&start=1990&view=chart)", "lower_25": "10.1k", "median": "12.3k", "upper_75": "14.6k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Assuming our future simulates us, what is the chance that the first peer-reviewed guesses of our instantiation date will be 13.4?", "desc": "Some researchers suggest the odds of our current reality being a simulation are [very high](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nick_Bostrom). \n\nUnder some scenarios, our current reality could be a simulation created under a reality--itself possibly a simulation--historically coincident with our own apparent universe to at least the present, in many or all respects.\n\nIn this case, since the mother universe corresponds substantially or fully to our own so far, one obvious question is at what date in the mother universe (equivalent to a possibly divergent copy of our future) was our own simulation created?", "resc": "Slider is in billions of years from instantiation of mother universe. Upper boundary is open. \n\nResolves when either 3 credible peer reviewed studies or 4 credible media sources--as determined by metaculus moderators--all announce and agree with each other to within 100 million years on a date of instantiation, in the mother universe, for the simulation constituting our reality either in conjunction with the declaration that we are in a simulation or merely taking it for granted. \n\nResolves ambiguous if we're provably in a simulation where the mother universe does not contain fully or substantially the history of our universe up to at least the time this question goes live.\n\nResolves ambiguous if we're provably in a simulation but the concept of a mother universe is incorrect or inapplicable.\n\nResolves ambiguous if proven we're not in a simulation.\n\nIf the mother universe is itself a simulation, that's no problem.\n\nLower and upper boundaries are open for dates outside of the given range.", "lower_25": "0.791", "median": "13.4", "upper_75": "14.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 1% of people in any major city or country will have experienced using augmented reality outside by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2037", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 34.7 fraction of the German population will have a migration background in 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "34.7", "median": "40.5", "upper_75": "45.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 1% of people in any major city or country will have experienced using augmented reality outside by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2037", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 34.7 fraction of the German population will have a migration background in 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "34.7", "median": "40.5", "upper_75": "45.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an average of 222k people will be reported to have died per year of COVID-19 in the United States during the years 2022-2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "92.2k", "median": "137k", "upper_75": "222k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an average of 222k people will be reported to have died per year of COVID-19 in the United States during the years 2022-2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "92.2k", "median": "137k", "upper_75": "222k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What percentage of young US men will be sexless in 2024?\n\nKeyword: 24.8\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 24.8% of young US men will be sexless in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "The share of US adults reporting no sexual intercourse in the previous year [seems to have gone up](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/03/29/share-americans-not-having-sex-has-reached-record-high/) over the last decade. The change appears to be driven mostly by young people, especially young men.\n\n***What percentage of US men under 30 will report no sexual intercourse in the previous year in 2024?***\n\nThis question will resolve according to the [General Social Survey](http://www.gss.norc.org/).\n\nThis question will resolve ambiguously if the General Social Survey stops asking about sexual intercourse in the previous year.\n\nRelated question: [What percentage of young US women will be sexless in 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7570/female-sexlessness-in-the-us/)", "lower_25": "21.2", "median": "24.8", "upper_75": "29.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an average of 222k people will be reported to have died per year of COVID-19 in the United States during the years 2022-2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "92.2k", "median": "137k", "upper_75": "222k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6DoF enabled virtual and augmented reality headset sales will exceed 50 million units per year by 2030?", "desc": "Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) may become superior to PCs and smartphones for most tasks, including communication, digital assistance, writing, coding, and entertainment. Over 1 billion smartphones and 200 million PCs are sold each year, and if VR/AR becomes superior, it will sell at similar quantities. This question is related to [When will VR headsets sell 10M units per year](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4845/when-will-virtual-reality-headset-sales-exceed-10-million-units-per-year/).", "resc": "Virtual reality and augmented reality devices are defined as devices that are attached to the user's head, display an image to the user's eyes, and has 6DoF tracking, meaning it tracks the head's position and rotation in space.\n\nThis question resolves as the first date in which it is determined that 50 million VR headsets were sold up to that date, in that year.\nSales may be computed by adding reports from different manufacturers, or from credible estimates from e.g. analytics firms such as Nielsen SuperData. However, note that any estimate combining multiple headsets must clearly include only qualifying headsets; an estimate of \"VR/AR sales\" in general may include many non-qualifying devices. If a single source reports X total sales at the end of 2025 and Y total sales at the end of 2026, Y-X may be taken as the sales numbers for 2026, but this can only be done with two estimates from the same source, not different sources.\n\nThis question retroactively closes as the time when such a report (or the last such report, if multiple are combined) is made available", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6DoF enabled virtual and augmented reality headset sales will exceed 50 million units per year by 2030?", "desc": "Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) may become superior to PCs and smartphones for most tasks, including communication, digital assistance, writing, coding, and entertainment. Over 1 billion smartphones and 200 million PCs are sold each year, and if VR/AR becomes superior, it will sell at similar quantities. This question is related to [When will VR headsets sell 10M units per year](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4845/when-will-virtual-reality-headset-sales-exceed-10-million-units-per-year/).", "resc": "Virtual reality and augmented reality devices are defined as devices that are attached to the user's head, display an image to the user's eyes, and has 6DoF tracking, meaning it tracks the head's position and rotation in space.\n\nThis question resolves as the first date in which it is determined that 50 million VR headsets were sold up to that date, in that year.\nSales may be computed by adding reports from different manufacturers, or from credible estimates from e.g. analytics firms such as Nielsen SuperData. However, note that any estimate combining multiple headsets must clearly include only qualifying headsets; an estimate of \"VR/AR sales\" in general may include many non-qualifying devices. If a single source reports X total sales at the end of 2025 and Y total sales at the end of 2026, Y-X may be taken as the sales numbers for 2026, but this can only be done with two estimates from the same source, not different sources.\n\nThis question retroactively closes as the time when such a report (or the last such report, if multiple are combined) is made available", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What percentage of young US men will be sexless in 2024?\n\nKeyword: 24.8\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 24.8% of young US men will be sexless in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "The share of US adults reporting no sexual intercourse in the previous year [seems to have gone up](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/03/29/share-americans-not-having-sex-has-reached-record-high/) over the last decade. The change appears to be driven mostly by young people, especially young men.\n\n***What percentage of US men under 30 will report no sexual intercourse in the previous year in 2024?***\n\nThis question will resolve according to the [General Social Survey](http://www.gss.norc.org/).\n\nThis question will resolve ambiguously if the General Social Survey stops asking about sexual intercourse in the previous year.\n\nRelated question: [What percentage of young US women will be sexless in 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7570/female-sexlessness-in-the-us/)", "lower_25": "21.2", "median": "24.8", "upper_75": "29.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6DoF enabled virtual and augmented reality headset sales will exceed 50 million units per year by 2030?", "desc": "Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) may become superior to PCs and smartphones for most tasks, including communication, digital assistance, writing, coding, and entertainment. Over 1 billion smartphones and 200 million PCs are sold each year, and if VR/AR becomes superior, it will sell at similar quantities. This question is related to [When will VR headsets sell 10M units per year](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4845/when-will-virtual-reality-headset-sales-exceed-10-million-units-per-year/).", "resc": "Virtual reality and augmented reality devices are defined as devices that are attached to the user's head, display an image to the user's eyes, and has 6DoF tracking, meaning it tracks the head's position and rotation in space.\n\nThis question resolves as the first date in which it is determined that 50 million VR headsets were sold up to that date, in that year.\nSales may be computed by adding reports from different manufacturers, or from credible estimates from e.g. analytics firms such as Nielsen SuperData. However, note that any estimate combining multiple headsets must clearly include only qualifying headsets; an estimate of \"VR/AR sales\" in general may include many non-qualifying devices. If a single source reports X total sales at the end of 2025 and Y total sales at the end of 2026, Y-X may be taken as the sales numbers for 2026, but this can only be done with two estimates from the same source, not different sources.\n\nThis question retroactively closes as the time when such a report (or the last such report, if multiple are combined) is made available", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will not be a (classical) polynomial time algorithm for factoring integers by Jan 15, 2121?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 15, 2121", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 15, 2121", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 15, 2121", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Israel will recognize Palestine by 2042?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2042", "median": "2064", "upper_75": "2111", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Haredi share of Israel's population will reach 27.1 at its peak?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.6", "median": "27.1", "upper_75": "38.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Israel will recognize Palestine by 2042?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2042", "median": "2064", "upper_75": "2111", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Haredi share of Israel's population will reach 27.1 at its peak?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.6", "median": "27.1", "upper_75": "38.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Haredi share of Israel's population will reach 27.1 at its peak?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.6", "median": "27.1", "upper_75": "38.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Israel will recognize Palestine by 2042?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2042", "median": "2064", "upper_75": "2111", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will not be a (classical) polynomial time algorithm for factoring integers by Jan 15, 2121?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 15, 2121", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 15, 2121", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 15, 2121", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first woman will win the World Chess Championships before 2119?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2064", "median": "2094", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2119", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest grouping of stars in the Milky Way, in the year 1 billion, that don't seem to be militarily hostile to each other will have a fraction of 0.831?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.02×10−5", "median": "0.275", "upper_75": "0.831", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first woman will win the World Chess Championships before 2119?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2064", "median": "2094", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2119", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that President Teodoro Obiang will leave office in Equatorial Guinea by 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first woman will win the World Chess Championships before 2119?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2064", "median": "2094", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2119", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will not be a (classical) polynomial time algorithm for factoring integers by Jan 15, 2121?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 15, 2121", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 15, 2121", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 15, 2121", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest grouping of stars in the Milky Way, in the year 1 billion, that don't seem to be militarily hostile to each other will have a fraction of 0.831?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.02×10−5", "median": "0.275", "upper_75": "0.831", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that President Teodoro Obiang will leave office in Equatorial Guinea by 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Poland's Economist Democracy Index will be 7.64 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.60", "median": "7.14", "upper_75": "7.64", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Poland's Economist Democracy Index will be 7.64 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.60", "median": "7.14", "upper_75": "7.64", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that President Teodoro Obiang will leave office in Equatorial Guinea by 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the PAP will win 91.47% of seats in the next Singaporean general election?", "desc": "The PAP, or the People's action party, has won a supermajority of more than 2/3rds of seats for [every election in Singapore since 1968](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Action_Party).\n\nHowever, since the 2011 elections, the PAP appears to have been slowly losing dominance. [In 2011, the PAP won with only 60.14% of votes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Singaporean_general_election), a historic low. In 2020, while they received 61.24% of votes, they received a historically low percentage of seats, [with 83/89 or 93% of elected seats going to the PAP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Singaporean_general_election).\n\nOne complicating factor in election predictions is that [publishing opinion polls is illegal during the election campaign period](https://www.ft.com/content/4880976c-c4ab-3d9d-ab54-7398b44994ea). This has resulted in a dearth of information, and makes it relatively difficult to gauge the sentiment of voters.", "resc": "This will resolve based on credible media reports. The percentage of seats is defined as the number of seats won by the PAP, divided by the total number of elected Members of Parliament, multiplied by \\(100\\%\\). This excludes Non-constituency Members of Parliament and Nominated Members of Parliament.", "lower_25": "82.40", "median": "87.30", "upper_75": "91.47", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that COVID-19 will be eradicated by 2071?", "desc": "Over 4 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines have been administered globally, but the virus continues to spread even in countries with very high rates of vaccination such as [Israel](https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus/country/israel).\n\nSufficiently widespread vaccination (and natural antibodies from infection) could eventually succeed in eradicating the virus; alternatively it might become an endemic virus like other coronaviruses. Future mutations might require the development of new types of booster doses. Animal reservoirs complicate the picture even more, as full vaccination in humans might not be sufficient to drive it to extinction.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the earliest date of announcement by the WHO (or a similar global health agency) that COVID-19 (of any and all variants) has been eradicated globally.\n\nIn the case the WHO does not exist or is not the best source, Metaculus Admins may, at their discretion, use a superior source", "lower_25": "2071", "median": "2095", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What percentage of young US men will be sexless in 2024?\n\nKeyword: 24.8\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 24.8% of young US men will be sexless in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "The share of US adults reporting no sexual intercourse in the previous year [seems to have gone up](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/03/29/share-americans-not-having-sex-has-reached-record-high/) over the last decade. The change appears to be driven mostly by young people, especially young men.\n\n***What percentage of US men under 30 will report no sexual intercourse in the previous year in 2024?***\n\nThis question will resolve according to the [General Social Survey](http://www.gss.norc.org/).\n\nThis question will resolve ambiguously if the General Social Survey stops asking about sexual intercourse in the previous year.\n\nRelated question: [What percentage of young US women will be sexless in 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7570/female-sexlessness-in-the-us/)", "lower_25": "21.2", "median": "24.8", "upper_75": "29.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that COVID-19 will be eradicated by 2071?", "desc": "Over 4 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines have been administered globally, but the virus continues to spread even in countries with very high rates of vaccination such as [Israel](https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus/country/israel).\n\nSufficiently widespread vaccination (and natural antibodies from infection) could eventually succeed in eradicating the virus; alternatively it might become an endemic virus like other coronaviruses. Future mutations might require the development of new types of booster doses. Animal reservoirs complicate the picture even more, as full vaccination in humans might not be sufficient to drive it to extinction.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the earliest date of announcement by the WHO (or a similar global health agency) that COVID-19 (of any and all variants) has been eradicated globally.\n\nIn the case the WHO does not exist or is not the best source, Metaculus Admins may, at their discretion, use a superior source", "lower_25": "2071", "median": "2095", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the PAP will win 91.47% of seats in the next Singaporean general election?", "desc": "The PAP, or the People's action party, has won a supermajority of more than 2/3rds of seats for [every election in Singapore since 1968](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Action_Party).\n\nHowever, since the 2011 elections, the PAP appears to have been slowly losing dominance. [In 2011, the PAP won with only 60.14% of votes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Singaporean_general_election), a historic low. In 2020, while they received 61.24% of votes, they received a historically low percentage of seats, [with 83/89 or 93% of elected seats going to the PAP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Singaporean_general_election).\n\nOne complicating factor in election predictions is that [publishing opinion polls is illegal during the election campaign period](https://www.ft.com/content/4880976c-c4ab-3d9d-ab54-7398b44994ea). This has resulted in a dearth of information, and makes it relatively difficult to gauge the sentiment of voters.", "resc": "This will resolve based on credible media reports. The percentage of seats is defined as the number of seats won by the PAP, divided by the total number of elected Members of Parliament, multiplied by \\(100\\%\\). This excludes Non-constituency Members of Parliament and Nominated Members of Parliament.", "lower_25": "82.40", "median": "87.30", "upper_75": "91.47", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that COVID-19 will be eradicated by 2071?", "desc": "Over 4 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines have been administered globally, but the virus continues to spread even in countries with very high rates of vaccination such as [Israel](https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus/country/israel).\n\nSufficiently widespread vaccination (and natural antibodies from infection) could eventually succeed in eradicating the virus; alternatively it might become an endemic virus like other coronaviruses. Future mutations might require the development of new types of booster doses. Animal reservoirs complicate the picture even more, as full vaccination in humans might not be sufficient to drive it to extinction.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the earliest date of announcement by the WHO (or a similar global health agency) that COVID-19 (of any and all variants) has been eradicated globally.\n\nIn the case the WHO does not exist or is not the best source, Metaculus Admins may, at their discretion, use a superior source", "lower_25": "2071", "median": "2095", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Poland's Economist Democracy Index will be 7.64 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.60", "median": "7.14", "upper_75": "7.64", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the PAP will win 91.47% of seats in the next Singaporean general election?", "desc": "The PAP, or the People's action party, has won a supermajority of more than 2/3rds of seats for [every election in Singapore since 1968](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Action_Party).\n\nHowever, since the 2011 elections, the PAP appears to have been slowly losing dominance. [In 2011, the PAP won with only 60.14% of votes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Singaporean_general_election), a historic low. In 2020, while they received 61.24% of votes, they received a historically low percentage of seats, [with 83/89 or 93% of elected seats going to the PAP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Singaporean_general_election).\n\nOne complicating factor in election predictions is that [publishing opinion polls is illegal during the election campaign period](https://www.ft.com/content/4880976c-c4ab-3d9d-ab54-7398b44994ea). This has resulted in a dearth of information, and makes it relatively difficult to gauge the sentiment of voters.", "resc": "This will resolve based on credible media reports. The percentage of seats is defined as the number of seats won by the PAP, divided by the total number of elected Members of Parliament, multiplied by \\(100\\%\\). This excludes Non-constituency Members of Parliament and Nominated Members of Parliament.", "lower_25": "82.40", "median": "87.30", "upper_75": "91.47", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest grouping of stars in the Milky Way, in the year 1 billion, that don't seem to be militarily hostile to each other will have a fraction of 0.831?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.02×10−5", "median": "0.275", "upper_75": "0.831", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Labour will win 428 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "There are 650 seats in the UK's House of Commons. In the [2019 general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_United_Kingdom_general_election):\n
  • The Conservative Party won 365 seats
  • \n
  • The Labour Party won 202 seats
  • \n
  • The Scottish National Party won 48 seats
  • \n
  • The Liberal Democrats won 11 seats
  • \n
  • The remaining 24 seats were won by Northern Irish parties (18), Plaid Cymru (4), the Green Party (1) and the Speaker of the House of Commons (1).
\n\nThe [next UK general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_United_Kingdom_general_election) is expected to be held no later than January 24, 2025 (see the relevant Metaculus question [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6368/next-uk-general-election/)).\n\nConstituency boundaries may be altered ahead of the next election. The [independent boundary reviews](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05929/) must be completed by July 1, 2023. One certain impact of these changes (if adopted in time) is that the number of Scottish seats will fall by 2, the Welsh number will fall by 8, and the English number will rise by 10.", "resc": "Each sub-question below will resolve as the number of seats won for the respective party in the next UK general election held after December 12, 2019. This question will use the [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/)'s results of the election, or credible media reports.\n\nThe Speaker of the House of Commons will not be included with their former party's count", "lower_25": "330", "median": "379", "upper_75": "428", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average age of new motherhood in the U.S. will be 29.8 years old in 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "Future fertility rates are important for policy. The long-term changes in age structure and human capital have effects on society.\n\nA major contributor is the age when women have their first child.\n\n***What will be the average age of new motherhood, in the U.S., in 2050?***\n\nOur best estimate is likely to be from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which publishes the National Vital Statistics Report. If such figures are only published by a different organization we can use that.\n\nResolves ambiguously if there are no official figures being published.", "lower_25": "28.0", "median": "29.8", "upper_75": "32.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis (SETH) will be disproved before 2126?", "desc": "The [Strong Exponential Type Hypothesis (SETH)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exponential_time_hypothesis#Definition) is the claim that, for every \\( \\delta>0 \\), if \\(k\\) is large the \\(k\\)-SAT problem takes time more than \\( (2-\\delta)^n \\) on an input of size \\(n\\). [Some experts believe](https://www.imsc.res.in/~vraman/exact/ryan.pdf) that SETH is false. When will SETH be disproved?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of a publication in a major mathematical journal or computer science conference which finds an algorithm for the \\(k\\)-SAT problem that runs in time \\( (2-\\delta)^n \\) for all \\(k\\). It will wait either 2 years after such a publication or until the resolve date before waiting to resolve, whichever is closer.\n\nIf there is a proof published that shows that such an algorithm is impossible, this question will close retroactively 1 day before the paper is published/preprinted. The question would resolve as >2121", "lower_25": "2057", "median": "Not ≤ 2126", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2126", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average age of new motherhood in the U.S. will be 29.8 years old in 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "Future fertility rates are important for policy. The long-term changes in age structure and human capital have effects on society.\n\nA major contributor is the age when women have their first child.\n\n***What will be the average age of new motherhood, in the U.S., in 2050?***\n\nOur best estimate is likely to be from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which publishes the National Vital Statistics Report. If such figures are only published by a different organization we can use that.\n\nResolves ambiguously if there are no official figures being published.", "lower_25": "28.0", "median": "29.8", "upper_75": "32.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Conservative party will win 175 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "There are 650 seats in the UK's House of Commons. In the [2019 general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_United_Kingdom_general_election):\n
  • The Conservative Party won 365 seats
  • \n
  • The Labour Party won 202 seats
  • \n
  • The Scottish National Party won 48 seats
  • \n
  • The Liberal Democrats won 11 seats
  • \n
  • The remaining 24 seats were won by Northern Irish parties (18), Plaid Cymru (4), the Green Party (1) and the Speaker of the House of Commons (1).
\n\nThe [next UK general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_United_Kingdom_general_election) is expected to be held no later than January 24, 2025 (see the relevant Metaculus question [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6368/next-uk-general-election/)).\n\nConstituency boundaries may be altered ahead of the next election. The [independent boundary reviews](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05929/) must be completed by July 1, 2023. One certain impact of these changes (if adopted in time) is that the number of Scottish seats will fall by 2, the Welsh number will fall by 8, and the English number will rise by 10.", "resc": "Each sub-question below will resolve as the number of seats won for the respective party in the next UK general election held after December 12, 2019. This question will use the [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/)'s results of the election, or credible media reports.\n\nThe Speaker of the House of Commons will not be included with their former party's count", "lower_25": "129", "median": "175", "upper_75": "225", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Conservative party will win 175 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "There are 650 seats in the UK's House of Commons. In the [2019 general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_United_Kingdom_general_election):\n
  • The Conservative Party won 365 seats
  • \n
  • The Labour Party won 202 seats
  • \n
  • The Scottish National Party won 48 seats
  • \n
  • The Liberal Democrats won 11 seats
  • \n
  • The remaining 24 seats were won by Northern Irish parties (18), Plaid Cymru (4), the Green Party (1) and the Speaker of the House of Commons (1).
\n\nThe [next UK general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_United_Kingdom_general_election) is expected to be held no later than January 24, 2025 (see the relevant Metaculus question [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6368/next-uk-general-election/)).\n\nConstituency boundaries may be altered ahead of the next election. The [independent boundary reviews](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05929/) must be completed by July 1, 2023. One certain impact of these changes (if adopted in time) is that the number of Scottish seats will fall by 2, the Welsh number will fall by 8, and the English number will rise by 10.", "resc": "Each sub-question below will resolve as the number of seats won for the respective party in the next UK general election held after December 12, 2019. This question will use the [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/)'s results of the election, or credible media reports.\n\nThe Speaker of the House of Commons will not be included with their former party's count", "lower_25": "129", "median": "175", "upper_75": "225", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Labour will win 428 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "There are 650 seats in the UK's House of Commons. In the [2019 general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_United_Kingdom_general_election):\n
  • The Conservative Party won 365 seats
  • \n
  • The Labour Party won 202 seats
  • \n
  • The Scottish National Party won 48 seats
  • \n
  • The Liberal Democrats won 11 seats
  • \n
  • The remaining 24 seats were won by Northern Irish parties (18), Plaid Cymru (4), the Green Party (1) and the Speaker of the House of Commons (1).
\n\nThe [next UK general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_United_Kingdom_general_election) is expected to be held no later than January 24, 2025 (see the relevant Metaculus question [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6368/next-uk-general-election/)).\n\nConstituency boundaries may be altered ahead of the next election. The [independent boundary reviews](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05929/) must be completed by July 1, 2023. One certain impact of these changes (if adopted in time) is that the number of Scottish seats will fall by 2, the Welsh number will fall by 8, and the English number will rise by 10.", "resc": "Each sub-question below will resolve as the number of seats won for the respective party in the next UK general election held after December 12, 2019. This question will use the [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/)'s results of the election, or credible media reports.\n\nThe Speaker of the House of Commons will not be included with their former party's count", "lower_25": "330", "median": "379", "upper_75": "428", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis (SETH) will be disproved before 2126?", "desc": "The [Strong Exponential Type Hypothesis (SETH)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exponential_time_hypothesis#Definition) is the claim that, for every \\( \\delta>0 \\), if \\(k\\) is large the \\(k\\)-SAT problem takes time more than \\( (2-\\delta)^n \\) on an input of size \\(n\\). [Some experts believe](https://www.imsc.res.in/~vraman/exact/ryan.pdf) that SETH is false. When will SETH be disproved?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of a publication in a major mathematical journal or computer science conference which finds an algorithm for the \\(k\\)-SAT problem that runs in time \\( (2-\\delta)^n \\) for all \\(k\\). It will wait either 2 years after such a publication or until the resolve date before waiting to resolve, whichever is closer.\n\nIf there is a proof published that shows that such an algorithm is impossible, this question will close retroactively 1 day before the paper is published/preprinted. The question would resolve as >2121", "lower_25": "2057", "median": "Not ≤ 2126", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2126", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Liberal Democrats will win 29.3 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "16.5", "median": "29.3", "upper_75": "45.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Labour will win 428 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "There are 650 seats in the UK's House of Commons. In the [2019 general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_United_Kingdom_general_election):\n
  • The Conservative Party won 365 seats
  • \n
  • The Labour Party won 202 seats
  • \n
  • The Scottish National Party won 48 seats
  • \n
  • The Liberal Democrats won 11 seats
  • \n
  • The remaining 24 seats were won by Northern Irish parties (18), Plaid Cymru (4), the Green Party (1) and the Speaker of the House of Commons (1).
\n\nThe [next UK general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_United_Kingdom_general_election) is expected to be held no later than January 24, 2025 (see the relevant Metaculus question [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6368/next-uk-general-election/)).\n\nConstituency boundaries may be altered ahead of the next election. The [independent boundary reviews](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05929/) must be completed by July 1, 2023. One certain impact of these changes (if adopted in time) is that the number of Scottish seats will fall by 2, the Welsh number will fall by 8, and the English number will rise by 10.", "resc": "Each sub-question below will resolve as the number of seats won for the respective party in the next UK general election held after December 12, 2019. This question will use the [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/)'s results of the election, or credible media reports.\n\nThe Speaker of the House of Commons will not be included with their former party's count", "lower_25": "330", "median": "379", "upper_75": "428", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Liberal Democrats will win 29.3 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "16.5", "median": "29.3", "upper_75": "45.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Scottish National Party will win 26.9 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "19.5", "median": "26.9", "upper_75": "34.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average age of new motherhood in the U.S. will be 29.8 years old in 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "Future fertility rates are important for policy. The long-term changes in age structure and human capital have effects on society.\n\nA major contributor is the age when women have their first child.\n\n***What will be the average age of new motherhood, in the U.S., in 2050?***\n\nOur best estimate is likely to be from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which publishes the National Vital Statistics Report. If such figures are only published by a different organization we can use that.\n\nResolves ambiguously if there are no official figures being published.", "lower_25": "28.0", "median": "29.8", "upper_75": "32.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis (SETH) will be disproved before 2126?", "desc": "The [Strong Exponential Type Hypothesis (SETH)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exponential_time_hypothesis#Definition) is the claim that, for every \\( \\delta>0 \\), if \\(k\\) is large the \\(k\\)-SAT problem takes time more than \\( (2-\\delta)^n \\) on an input of size \\(n\\). [Some experts believe](https://www.imsc.res.in/~vraman/exact/ryan.pdf) that SETH is false. When will SETH be disproved?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of a publication in a major mathematical journal or computer science conference which finds an algorithm for the \\(k\\)-SAT problem that runs in time \\( (2-\\delta)^n \\) for all \\(k\\). It will wait either 2 years after such a publication or until the resolve date before waiting to resolve, whichever is closer.\n\nIf there is a proof published that shows that such an algorithm is impossible, this question will close retroactively 1 day before the paper is published/preprinted. The question would resolve as >2121", "lower_25": "2057", "median": "Not ≤ 2126", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2126", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Conservative party will win 175 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "There are 650 seats in the UK's House of Commons. In the [2019 general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_United_Kingdom_general_election):\n
  • The Conservative Party won 365 seats
  • \n
  • The Labour Party won 202 seats
  • \n
  • The Scottish National Party won 48 seats
  • \n
  • The Liberal Democrats won 11 seats
  • \n
  • The remaining 24 seats were won by Northern Irish parties (18), Plaid Cymru (4), the Green Party (1) and the Speaker of the House of Commons (1).
\n\nThe [next UK general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_United_Kingdom_general_election) is expected to be held no later than January 24, 2025 (see the relevant Metaculus question [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6368/next-uk-general-election/)).\n\nConstituency boundaries may be altered ahead of the next election. The [independent boundary reviews](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05929/) must be completed by July 1, 2023. One certain impact of these changes (if adopted in time) is that the number of Scottish seats will fall by 2, the Welsh number will fall by 8, and the English number will rise by 10.", "resc": "Each sub-question below will resolve as the number of seats won for the respective party in the next UK general election held after December 12, 2019. This question will use the [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/)'s results of the election, or credible media reports.\n\nThe Speaker of the House of Commons will not be included with their former party's count", "lower_25": "129", "median": "175", "upper_75": "225", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Liberal Democrats will win 29.3 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "16.5", "median": "29.3", "upper_75": "45.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Scottish National Party will win 26.9 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "19.5", "median": "26.9", "upper_75": "34.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Scottish National Party will win 26.9 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "19.5", "median": "26.9", "upper_75": "34.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the USA will win 123 medals at Paris 2024?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will USA top the medal table in Paris 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7664/usa-most-successful-olympic-team-in-paris/)\n* [Will France come in the Top 5 at Paris 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7669/france-home-game-advantage/)\n\n----\n\nThe [2024 Olympic Games](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Summer_Olympics) is a sporting competition which takes place every four years. It involves a range of different events across multiple sports.\n\nAt the Olympic Games, Gold, Silver and Bronze medals are awarded to 1st, 2nd and 3rd place in each event. (In some events two Bronze medals are awarded mostly combat sports).\n\nThe US team has [won the most medals at every Olympic games going back to Atlanta 1996](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_at_the_Olympics).", "resc": "This question resolves to the number of medals won by the United States Olympic Team at Paris 2024. (Gold, Silver and Bronze medals all count as 1)", "lower_25": "110", "median": "117", "upper_75": "123", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the USA will win 123 medals at Paris 2024?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will USA top the medal table in Paris 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7664/usa-most-successful-olympic-team-in-paris/)\n* [Will France come in the Top 5 at Paris 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7669/france-home-game-advantage/)\n\n----\n\nThe [2024 Olympic Games](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Summer_Olympics) is a sporting competition which takes place every four years. It involves a range of different events across multiple sports.\n\nAt the Olympic Games, Gold, Silver and Bronze medals are awarded to 1st, 2nd and 3rd place in each event. (In some events two Bronze medals are awarded mostly combat sports).\n\nThe US team has [won the most medals at every Olympic games going back to Atlanta 1996](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_at_the_Olympics).", "resc": "This question resolves to the number of medals won by the United States Olympic Team at Paris 2024. (Gold, Silver and Bronze medals all count as 1)", "lower_25": "110", "median": "117", "upper_75": "123", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real Gross World Product will be less than 1015 trillions of 2020 US$ by 2200?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 1015", "median": "< 1015", "upper_75": "< 1015", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on civilization launching one or more von Neumann probes by 2200 that will reach another solar system within 100,000 years, what is the chance that the fastest one will have an average speed of 0.0100 c?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.0100", "median": "0.0685", "upper_75": "0.262", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the USA will win 123 medals at Paris 2024?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will USA top the medal table in Paris 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7664/usa-most-successful-olympic-team-in-paris/)\n* [Will France come in the Top 5 at Paris 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7669/france-home-game-advantage/)\n\n----\n\nThe [2024 Olympic Games](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Summer_Olympics) is a sporting competition which takes place every four years. It involves a range of different events across multiple sports.\n\nAt the Olympic Games, Gold, Silver and Bronze medals are awarded to 1st, 2nd and 3rd place in each event. (In some events two Bronze medals are awarded mostly combat sports).\n\nThe US team has [won the most medals at every Olympic games going back to Atlanta 1996](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_at_the_Olympics).", "resc": "This question resolves to the number of medals won by the United States Olympic Team at Paris 2024. (Gold, Silver and Bronze medals all count as 1)", "lower_25": "110", "median": "117", "upper_75": "123", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real Gross World Product will be less than 1015 trillions of 2020 US$ by 2200?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 1015", "median": "< 1015", "upper_75": "< 1015", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a human fatality during travel to or from a heavenly body by 2038?", "desc": "Under various definitions of spaceflight, it's commonly accepted that as of this writing, [19 humans](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_spaceflight-related_accidents_and_incidents) have lost their lives taking part in the practice.\n\nSo far, nobody has died attempting to travel to or from another celestial body away from the earth, although the [possibility has existed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_13).\n\nThis question asks when the first human will die in space during a trip to or from a heavenly body.", "resc": "Any trip to or from any celestial object(s) that are not man-made qualifies.\n\nThe death(s) can occur for any reason.\n\nThe individuals in question must have died at least 100,000 miles (160934 km) from the earth's surface, chosen as slightly less than half the minimum distance from the earth to the moon, to differentiate the death from present historical spaceflight fatalities which have all occurred in close proximity to the earth.\n\nIf there is a potential fulfillment of the distance criterion that is not completely clear, a standard of \"more likely than not\" will be used to resolve. Otherwise, the question does not resolve.\n\nDeath of at least one human will be determined as reported by at least 3 credible, mainstream news sources.\n\nThe definition of human should include some leeway to incorporate biological or cybernetic modifications, subject to moderator discretion.\n\nIf such an event does not occur by 2100-01-01, the question resolves as \">2100\"", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2045", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on civilization launching one or more von Neumann probes by 2200 that will reach another solar system within 100,000 years, what is the chance that the fastest one will have an average speed of 0.0100 c?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.0100", "median": "0.0685", "upper_75": "0.262", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on civilization launching one or more von Neumann probes by 2200 that will reach another solar system within 100,000 years, what is the chance that the fastest one will have an average speed of 0.0100 c?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.0100", "median": "0.0685", "upper_75": "0.262", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest real Gross World Product for the period 2020 through 1,000,002,200, in trillions of 2020 US$ will be greater than 1085?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 1015", "median": "1.27×1019", "upper_75": "> 1085", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest real Gross World Product for the period 2020 through 1,000,002,200, in trillions of 2020 US$ will be greater than 1085?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 1015", "median": "1.27×1019", "upper_75": "> 1085", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the product of the global mean temperature anomaly with the logarithm of GWP will be 5.48 in 2100?", "desc": "While raw temperature anomaly projections usually capture most of the attention focused on global warming, these raw figures by themselves convey little information about the potential economic (or other) consequences of exceeding particular warming thresholds.\n\nThe purpose of this question is to obtain some idea about the joint distribution of the gross world product and the temperature anomaly. Given the mean forecast on this question, we can obtain an estimate of the sensitivity of the world economy to changes in the global mean temperature (setting aside issues of endogeneity, reverse causality, et cetera) by computing an OLS regression coefficient of the gross world product on the global mean temperature.", "resc": "This question will resolve as \\( \\log_{10}(\\textrm{GWP}) \\times \\textrm{anomaly} \\) where \\( \\textrm{GWP} \\) denotes the resolution value of [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7497/gwp-in-2100-in-trillions-of-us/) in units of trillions of 2020 dollars and \\( \\textrm{anomaly} \\) denotes the resolution value of [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/605/how-much-global-warming-by-2100/) in units of celsius degrees. If either of these reference questions resolve ambiguously, this question will also resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "3.44", "median": "5.48", "upper_75": "7.35", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real Gross World Product will be less than 1015 trillions of 2020 US$ by 2200?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 1015", "median": "< 1015", "upper_75": "< 1015", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest real Gross World Product for the period 2020 through 1,000,002,200, in trillions of 2020 US$ will be greater than 1085?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 1015", "median": "1.27×1019", "upper_75": "> 1085", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NASA will next land astronauts on the Moon by Jun 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jun 2027", "median": "Jan 2029", "upper_75": "Mar 2031", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the product of the global mean temperature anomaly with the logarithm of GWP will be 5.48 in 2100?", "desc": "While raw temperature anomaly projections usually capture most of the attention focused on global warming, these raw figures by themselves convey little information about the potential economic (or other) consequences of exceeding particular warming thresholds.\n\nThe purpose of this question is to obtain some idea about the joint distribution of the gross world product and the temperature anomaly. Given the mean forecast on this question, we can obtain an estimate of the sensitivity of the world economy to changes in the global mean temperature (setting aside issues of endogeneity, reverse causality, et cetera) by computing an OLS regression coefficient of the gross world product on the global mean temperature.", "resc": "This question will resolve as \\( \\log_{10}(\\textrm{GWP}) \\times \\textrm{anomaly} \\) where \\( \\textrm{GWP} \\) denotes the resolution value of [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7497/gwp-in-2100-in-trillions-of-us/) in units of trillions of 2020 dollars and \\( \\textrm{anomaly} \\) denotes the resolution value of [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/605/how-much-global-warming-by-2100/) in units of celsius degrees. If either of these reference questions resolve ambiguously, this question will also resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "3.44", "median": "5.48", "upper_75": "7.35", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a human fatality during travel to or from a heavenly body by 2038?", "desc": "Under various definitions of spaceflight, it's commonly accepted that as of this writing, [19 humans](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_spaceflight-related_accidents_and_incidents) have lost their lives taking part in the practice.\n\nSo far, nobody has died attempting to travel to or from another celestial body away from the earth, although the [possibility has existed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_13).\n\nThis question asks when the first human will die in space during a trip to or from a heavenly body.", "resc": "Any trip to or from any celestial object(s) that are not man-made qualifies.\n\nThe death(s) can occur for any reason.\n\nThe individuals in question must have died at least 100,000 miles (160934 km) from the earth's surface, chosen as slightly less than half the minimum distance from the earth to the moon, to differentiate the death from present historical spaceflight fatalities which have all occurred in close proximity to the earth.\n\nIf there is a potential fulfillment of the distance criterion that is not completely clear, a standard of \"more likely than not\" will be used to resolve. Otherwise, the question does not resolve.\n\nDeath of at least one human will be determined as reported by at least 3 credible, mainstream news sources.\n\nThe definition of human should include some leeway to incorporate biological or cybernetic modifications, subject to moderator discretion.\n\nIf such an event does not occur by 2100-01-01, the question resolves as \">2100\"", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2045", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a human fatality during travel to or from a heavenly body by 2038?", "desc": "Under various definitions of spaceflight, it's commonly accepted that as of this writing, [19 humans](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_spaceflight-related_accidents_and_incidents) have lost their lives taking part in the practice.\n\nSo far, nobody has died attempting to travel to or from another celestial body away from the earth, although the [possibility has existed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_13).\n\nThis question asks when the first human will die in space during a trip to or from a heavenly body.", "resc": "Any trip to or from any celestial object(s) that are not man-made qualifies.\n\nThe death(s) can occur for any reason.\n\nThe individuals in question must have died at least 100,000 miles (160934 km) from the earth's surface, chosen as slightly less than half the minimum distance from the earth to the moon, to differentiate the death from present historical spaceflight fatalities which have all occurred in close proximity to the earth.\n\nIf there is a potential fulfillment of the distance criterion that is not completely clear, a standard of \"more likely than not\" will be used to resolve. Otherwise, the question does not resolve.\n\nDeath of at least one human will be determined as reported by at least 3 credible, mainstream news sources.\n\nThe definition of human should include some leeway to incorporate biological or cybernetic modifications, subject to moderator discretion.\n\nIf such an event does not occur by 2100-01-01, the question resolves as \">2100\"", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2045", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the product of the global mean temperature anomaly with the logarithm of GWP will be 5.48 in 2100?", "desc": "While raw temperature anomaly projections usually capture most of the attention focused on global warming, these raw figures by themselves convey little information about the potential economic (or other) consequences of exceeding particular warming thresholds.\n\nThe purpose of this question is to obtain some idea about the joint distribution of the gross world product and the temperature anomaly. Given the mean forecast on this question, we can obtain an estimate of the sensitivity of the world economy to changes in the global mean temperature (setting aside issues of endogeneity, reverse causality, et cetera) by computing an OLS regression coefficient of the gross world product on the global mean temperature.", "resc": "This question will resolve as \\( \\log_{10}(\\textrm{GWP}) \\times \\textrm{anomaly} \\) where \\( \\textrm{GWP} \\) denotes the resolution value of [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7497/gwp-in-2100-in-trillions-of-us/) in units of trillions of 2020 dollars and \\( \\textrm{anomaly} \\) denotes the resolution value of [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/605/how-much-global-warming-by-2100/) in units of celsius degrees. If either of these reference questions resolve ambiguously, this question will also resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "3.44", "median": "5.48", "upper_75": "7.35", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NASA will next land astronauts on the Moon by Jun 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jun 2027", "median": "Jan 2029", "upper_75": "Mar 2031", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NASA will next land astronauts on the Moon by Jun 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jun 2027", "median": "Jan 2029", "upper_75": "Mar 2031", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the IPCC's best estimate of the transient climate response in 2100 will be 1.88?", "desc": "Transient climate response (TCR) is a measure that is used in climate science to quantify the short-term impact of an increase in carbon dioxide concentrations on the climate system, particularly on the global mean temperature. The IPCC [defines](https://archive.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg1/345.htm) the transient climate response as follows:\n\n> The \"transient climate response\", TCR, is the temperature change at the time of CO2 doubling and the \"equilibrium climate sensitivity\", \\( T_{2 \\times} \\), is the temperature change after the system has reached a new equilibrium for doubled CO2, i.e., after the \"additional warming commitment\" has been realised.\n\n> The temperature change at any time during a climate change integration depends on the competing effects of all of the processes that affect energy input, output, and storage in the ocean. In particular, the global mean temperature change which occurs at the time of CO2 doubling for the specific case of a 1%/yr increase of CO2 is termed the \"transient climate response\" (TCR) of the system.\n\nIn its [sixth assessment report](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/) published in 2021, the IPCC gave a best estimate of 1.8 C for TCR, with a \"likely\" range of 1.4 C to 2.2 C and a \"very likely\" range of 1.2 C to 2.4 C.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the best estimate of the transient climate response, *as currently defined by the IPCC*, reported by the IPCC in its first assessment report that is published after the year 2100. If the IPCC changes the definition of TCR they use in their report, for instance looking at a quadrupling of carbon dioxide instead of a doubling, the value reported by the IPCC will be adjusted to match their current definition of TCR. If such an unambiguous adjustment is not possible due to a substantial change in the definition used by the IPCC, or if the IPCC ceases to report TCR estimates, the question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "1.58", "median": "1.88", "upper_75": "2.20", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the product of the gross world product with the IPCC's best estimate of TCR will be 22.9 in 2100?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "10.5", "median": "16.5", "upper_75": "22.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the product of the global mean temperature anomaly with the IPCC's best estimate of TCR will be 2.44 in 2100?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.44", "median": "3.92", "upper_75": "5.79", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the product of the global mean temperature anomaly with the IPCC's best estimate of TCR will be 2.44 in 2100?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.44", "median": "3.92", "upper_75": "5.79", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the product of the global mean temperature anomaly with the IPCC's best estimate of TCR will be 2.44 in 2100?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.44", "median": "3.92", "upper_75": "5.79", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that net U.S. geothermal electricity production will be 22.3k GWh in the year 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "15.1k", "median": "18.4k", "upper_75": "22.3k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that net U.S. geothermal electricity production will be 22.3k GWh in the year 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "15.1k", "median": "18.4k", "upper_75": "22.3k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that LeBron James will score 43.70k career points in the NBA regular season when he retires?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "40.97k", "median": "42.28k", "upper_75": "43.70k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the IPCC's best estimate of the transient climate response in 2100 will be 1.88?", "desc": "Transient climate response (TCR) is a measure that is used in climate science to quantify the short-term impact of an increase in carbon dioxide concentrations on the climate system, particularly on the global mean temperature. The IPCC [defines](https://archive.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg1/345.htm) the transient climate response as follows:\n\n> The \"transient climate response\", TCR, is the temperature change at the time of CO2 doubling and the \"equilibrium climate sensitivity\", \\( T_{2 \\times} \\), is the temperature change after the system has reached a new equilibrium for doubled CO2, i.e., after the \"additional warming commitment\" has been realised.\n\n> The temperature change at any time during a climate change integration depends on the competing effects of all of the processes that affect energy input, output, and storage in the ocean. In particular, the global mean temperature change which occurs at the time of CO2 doubling for the specific case of a 1%/yr increase of CO2 is termed the \"transient climate response\" (TCR) of the system.\n\nIn its [sixth assessment report](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/) published in 2021, the IPCC gave a best estimate of 1.8 C for TCR, with a \"likely\" range of 1.4 C to 2.2 C and a \"very likely\" range of 1.2 C to 2.4 C.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the best estimate of the transient climate response, *as currently defined by the IPCC*, reported by the IPCC in its first assessment report that is published after the year 2100. If the IPCC changes the definition of TCR they use in their report, for instance looking at a quadrupling of carbon dioxide instead of a doubling, the value reported by the IPCC will be adjusted to match their current definition of TCR. If such an unambiguous adjustment is not possible due to a substantial change in the definition used by the IPCC, or if the IPCC ceases to report TCR estimates, the question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "1.58", "median": "1.88", "upper_75": "2.20", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the product of the gross world product with the IPCC's best estimate of TCR will be 22.9 in 2100?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "10.5", "median": "16.5", "upper_75": "22.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the product of the gross world product with the IPCC's best estimate of TCR will be 22.9 in 2100?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "10.5", "median": "16.5", "upper_75": "22.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that net U.S. geothermal electricity production will be 22.3k GWh in the year 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "15.1k", "median": "18.4k", "upper_75": "22.3k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Singapore's land area will be 848.7 square kilometers in 2070?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "767", "median": "799", "upper_75": "848.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the IPCC's best estimate of the transient climate response in 2100 will be 1.88?", "desc": "Transient climate response (TCR) is a measure that is used in climate science to quantify the short-term impact of an increase in carbon dioxide concentrations on the climate system, particularly on the global mean temperature. The IPCC [defines](https://archive.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg1/345.htm) the transient climate response as follows:\n\n> The \"transient climate response\", TCR, is the temperature change at the time of CO2 doubling and the \"equilibrium climate sensitivity\", \\( T_{2 \\times} \\), is the temperature change after the system has reached a new equilibrium for doubled CO2, i.e., after the \"additional warming commitment\" has been realised.\n\n> The temperature change at any time during a climate change integration depends on the competing effects of all of the processes that affect energy input, output, and storage in the ocean. In particular, the global mean temperature change which occurs at the time of CO2 doubling for the specific case of a 1%/yr increase of CO2 is termed the \"transient climate response\" (TCR) of the system.\n\nIn its [sixth assessment report](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/) published in 2021, the IPCC gave a best estimate of 1.8 C for TCR, with a \"likely\" range of 1.4 C to 2.2 C and a \"very likely\" range of 1.2 C to 2.4 C.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the best estimate of the transient climate response, *as currently defined by the IPCC*, reported by the IPCC in its first assessment report that is published after the year 2100. If the IPCC changes the definition of TCR they use in their report, for instance looking at a quadrupling of carbon dioxide instead of a doubling, the value reported by the IPCC will be adjusted to match their current definition of TCR. If such an unambiguous adjustment is not possible due to a substantial change in the definition used by the IPCC, or if the IPCC ceases to report TCR estimates, the question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "1.58", "median": "1.88", "upper_75": "2.20", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that LeBron James will score 43.70k career points in the NBA regular season when he retires?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "40.97k", "median": "42.28k", "upper_75": "43.70k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Singapore's land area will be 848.7 square kilometers in 2070?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "767", "median": "799", "upper_75": "848.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Singapore's land area will be 848.7 square kilometers in 2070?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "767", "median": "799", "upper_75": "848.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Monetochka will perform in the US by Nov 2023?", "desc": "Monetochka (Монеточка) is the mononym used by [Liza Gyrdymova](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monetochka), a Russian singer-songwriter. Although popular in Russia, she is little-known in the west and has never toured or performed in the United States. There is some reason to think that she may perform or tour in the US as it has a large Russian-speaking population; in addition, the core assets of such a performer are in principle marketable internationally.", "resc": "Resolves when credible media reports or credible multimedia demonstrates that Monetochka has held at least one performance in the USA. Only one credible media report is required to resolve. The performance must have already taken place to resolve. \n\nPerformance is defined as Monetochka playing in-person in front of an in-person audience at least 3 of her songs at full length or longer, at one event in a single venue. The performance must be at least semi-public; i.e. performing for friends, family or business associates only does not count. The bar is set low on this criterion to allow for a relatively casual performance during a personal trip to the USA to qualify. \n\nPerformance in music videos filmed in the USA such as in \"нет монет\" does not resolve unless these are shot incidentally to a performance as described above", "lower_25": "Nov 2023", "median": "Jan 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 2025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Monetochka will perform in the US by Nov 2023?", "desc": "Monetochka (Монеточка) is the mononym used by [Liza Gyrdymova](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monetochka), a Russian singer-songwriter. Although popular in Russia, she is little-known in the west and has never toured or performed in the United States. There is some reason to think that she may perform or tour in the US as it has a large Russian-speaking population; in addition, the core assets of such a performer are in principle marketable internationally.", "resc": "Resolves when credible media reports or credible multimedia demonstrates that Monetochka has held at least one performance in the USA. Only one credible media report is required to resolve. The performance must have already taken place to resolve. \n\nPerformance is defined as Monetochka playing in-person in front of an in-person audience at least 3 of her songs at full length or longer, at one event in a single venue. The performance must be at least semi-public; i.e. performing for friends, family or business associates only does not count. The bar is set low on this criterion to allow for a relatively casual performance during a personal trip to the USA to qualify. \n\nPerformance in music videos filmed in the USA such as in \"нет монет\" does not resolve unless these are shot incidentally to a performance as described above", "lower_25": "Nov 2023", "median": "Jan 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 2025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Monetochka will perform in the US by Nov 2023?", "desc": "Monetochka (Монеточка) is the mononym used by [Liza Gyrdymova](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monetochka), a Russian singer-songwriter. Although popular in Russia, she is little-known in the west and has never toured or performed in the United States. There is some reason to think that she may perform or tour in the US as it has a large Russian-speaking population; in addition, the core assets of such a performer are in principle marketable internationally.", "resc": "Resolves when credible media reports or credible multimedia demonstrates that Monetochka has held at least one performance in the USA. Only one credible media report is required to resolve. The performance must have already taken place to resolve. \n\nPerformance is defined as Monetochka playing in-person in front of an in-person audience at least 3 of her songs at full length or longer, at one event in a single venue. The performance must be at least semi-public; i.e. performing for friends, family or business associates only does not count. The bar is set low on this criterion to allow for a relatively casual performance during a personal trip to the USA to qualify. \n\nPerformance in music videos filmed in the USA such as in \"нет монет\" does not resolve unless these are shot incidentally to a performance as described above", "lower_25": "Nov 2023", "median": "Jan 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 2025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 200.4 UN member states in 2070?", "desc": "The [United Nations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations) has [193 member states.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Member_states_of_the_United_Nations) [South Sudan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sudan) is the most recent member state, joining on 2011-07-13.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of [UN Member States](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states) on January 1, 2070, at 00:00 UTC.\n\nIf the UN no longer exists, then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. If there is an equivalent international governing body similar to the UN, Metaculus Admins may, at their discretion, use that in the place of the UN", "lower_25": "191.9", "median": "196.2", "upper_75": "200.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Serbia will recognize Kosovo by 2088?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2088", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Serbia will recognize Kosovo by 2088?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2088", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that The Economist will rank Russia as a hybrid regime or better in its Democracy Index by 2063?", "desc": "Russia scored 5.02/10 (hybrid regime) in the first edition of the Democracy Index published in 2006 by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). However, the rating has quickly deteriorated to below 4.01 in 2011 and and it is scoring 3.31/10 (authoritarian regime) in the 2020 edition of the index.", "resc": "This question will resolve when the Democracy Index rates Russia as 4.01/10 or higher (the minimum score to be considered a hybrid regime) in at least one report.", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2045", "upper_75": "2063", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that The Economist will rank Russia as a hybrid regime or better in its Democracy Index by 2063?", "desc": "Russia scored 5.02/10 (hybrid regime) in the first edition of the Democracy Index published in 2006 by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). However, the rating has quickly deteriorated to below 4.01 in 2011 and and it is scoring 3.31/10 (authoritarian regime) in the 2020 edition of the index.", "resc": "This question will resolve when the Democracy Index rates Russia as 4.01/10 or higher (the minimum score to be considered a hybrid regime) in at least one report.", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2045", "upper_75": "2063", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Serbia will recognize Kosovo by 2088?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2088", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Morocco will recognize Western Sahara by 2118?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2085", "median": "2118", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2120", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Morocco will recognize Western Sahara by 2118?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2085", "median": "2118", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2120", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 200.4 UN member states in 2070?", "desc": "The [United Nations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations) has [193 member states.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Member_states_of_the_United_Nations) [South Sudan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sudan) is the most recent member state, joining on 2011-07-13.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of [UN Member States](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states) on January 1, 2070, at 00:00 UTC.\n\nIf the UN no longer exists, then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. If there is an equivalent international governing body similar to the UN, Metaculus Admins may, at their discretion, use that in the place of the UN", "lower_25": "191.9", "median": "196.2", "upper_75": "200.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Morocco will recognize Western Sahara by 2118?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2085", "median": "2118", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2120", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 200.4 UN member states in 2070?", "desc": "The [United Nations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations) has [193 member states.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Member_states_of_the_United_Nations) [South Sudan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sudan) is the most recent member state, joining on 2011-07-13.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of [UN Member States](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states) on January 1, 2070, at 00:00 UTC.\n\nIf the UN no longer exists, then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. If there is an equivalent international governing body similar to the UN, Metaculus Admins may, at their discretion, use that in the place of the UN", "lower_25": "191.9", "median": "196.2", "upper_75": "200.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will elect a President who is not a Democrat or a Republican by 2125?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will the Democratic or Republican Party cease to exist?](https://redesign.metaculus.com/questions/1481/when-will-either-the-democratic-or-republican-party-in-the-us-cease-to-exist/)\n\n----\n\n[Joe Biden](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_Biden), a [Democrat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Party_(United_States)) is the current [President](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States) of the [United States.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States) The previous President, [Donald Trump](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Trump) was a [Republican](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republican_Party_(United_States)). The last US president not to be from either party was [Millard Fillmore](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millard_Fillmore) of the [Whig Party.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whig_Party_(United_States))", "resc": "The question resolves positive on the date that a President of the United States takes office who is not a member of the Democratic Party or the Republican Party. If it does not happen by the resolve date, it resolves as >. If a President leaves a party in the middle of a term, that does not trigger a resolution.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, if within a span of 4 years, 75% or more congresspeople in a given party all change membership to another party, that second party will be considered the same party under a new name", "lower_25": "2068", "median": "2095", "upper_75": "2125", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Cyprus will recognize North Cyprus by 2114?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2054", "median": "2081", "upper_75": "2114", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that The Economist will rank Russia as a hybrid regime or better in its Democracy Index by 2063?", "desc": "Russia scored 5.02/10 (hybrid regime) in the first edition of the Democracy Index published in 2006 by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). However, the rating has quickly deteriorated to below 4.01 in 2011 and and it is scoring 3.31/10 (authoritarian regime) in the 2020 edition of the index.", "resc": "This question will resolve when the Democracy Index rates Russia as 4.01/10 or higher (the minimum score to be considered a hybrid regime) in at least one report.", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2045", "upper_75": "2063", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will elect a President who is not a Democrat or a Republican by 2125?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will the Democratic or Republican Party cease to exist?](https://redesign.metaculus.com/questions/1481/when-will-either-the-democratic-or-republican-party-in-the-us-cease-to-exist/)\n\n----\n\n[Joe Biden](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_Biden), a [Democrat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Party_(United_States)) is the current [President](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States) of the [United States.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States) The previous President, [Donald Trump](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Trump) was a [Republican](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republican_Party_(United_States)). The last US president not to be from either party was [Millard Fillmore](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millard_Fillmore) of the [Whig Party.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whig_Party_(United_States))", "resc": "The question resolves positive on the date that a President of the United States takes office who is not a member of the Democratic Party or the Republican Party. If it does not happen by the resolve date, it resolves as >. If a President leaves a party in the middle of a term, that does not trigger a resolution.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, if within a span of 4 years, 75% or more congresspeople in a given party all change membership to another party, that second party will be considered the same party under a new name", "lower_25": "2068", "median": "2095", "upper_75": "2125", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Cyprus will recognize North Cyprus by 2114?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2054", "median": "2081", "upper_75": "2114", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Cyprus will recognize North Cyprus by 2114?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2054", "median": "2081", "upper_75": "2114", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will elect a President who is not a Democrat or a Republican by 2125?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will the Democratic or Republican Party cease to exist?](https://redesign.metaculus.com/questions/1481/when-will-either-the-democratic-or-republican-party-in-the-us-cease-to-exist/)\n\n----\n\n[Joe Biden](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_Biden), a [Democrat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Party_(United_States)) is the current [President](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States) of the [United States.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States) The previous President, [Donald Trump](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Trump) was a [Republican](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republican_Party_(United_States)). The last US president not to be from either party was [Millard Fillmore](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millard_Fillmore) of the [Whig Party.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whig_Party_(United_States))", "resc": "The question resolves positive on the date that a President of the United States takes office who is not a member of the Democratic Party or the Republican Party. If it does not happen by the resolve date, it resolves as >. If a President leaves a party in the middle of a term, that does not trigger a resolution.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, if within a span of 4 years, 75% or more congresspeople in a given party all change membership to another party, that second party will be considered the same party under a new name", "lower_25": "2068", "median": "2095", "upper_75": "2125", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Iran will cease to be an Islamic Republic by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2060", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Iran will cease to be an Islamic Republic by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2060", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Men's winning 100m time in the 2024 Olympic Final will be 9.787 seconds?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.751", "median": "9.787", "upper_75": "9.819", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India's score in the Democracy Index will be 6.93 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.57", "median": "6.32", "upper_75": "6.93", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India's score in the Democracy Index will be 6.93 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.57", "median": "6.32", "upper_75": "6.93", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Men's winning 100m time in the 2024 Olympic Final will be 9.787 seconds?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.751", "median": "9.787", "upper_75": "9.819", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Iran will cease to be an Islamic Republic by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2060", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the women's winning 100m time in the 2024 Olympic Final will be 10.69 seconds?", "desc": "The [100m final](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/100_metres_at_the_Olympics) is one of the most popular and high profile events at the Olympics.\n\n[The Women's 100m time had been progressing over time](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_100_metres_world_record_progression) but has been static since the 1980s. [This is consistent with most women's athletics records](https://sportsscientists.com/2016/08/world-records-fossils/) and is likely related to the systemtic doping from that era. However, in 2021 both Elaine Thompson-Herah and Shelly-Ann Fraser-Pryce ran low 10.6x so the possibility of seeing Florence Griffith-Joyner's world record dropping is increasing.", "resc": "The official winning time of the Women's 100m final for the 2024 Olympics. If the 2024 Olympics do not take place in 2024 then this question will resolve ambiguous.\n\n*Related Questions:*\n\n* [Men's 2024 100m Final](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7775/2024-mens-100m-final/)\n* [Women's 2020 100m Final](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5861/2020-olympic-womens-100m-final/", "lower_25": "10.53", "median": "10.59", "upper_75": "10.69", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the women's winning 100m time in the 2024 Olympic Final will be 10.69 seconds?", "desc": "The [100m final](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/100_metres_at_the_Olympics) is one of the most popular and high profile events at the Olympics.\n\n[The Women's 100m time had been progressing over time](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_100_metres_world_record_progression) but has been static since the 1980s. [This is consistent with most women's athletics records](https://sportsscientists.com/2016/08/world-records-fossils/) and is likely related to the systemtic doping from that era. However, in 2021 both Elaine Thompson-Herah and Shelly-Ann Fraser-Pryce ran low 10.6x so the possibility of seeing Florence Griffith-Joyner's world record dropping is increasing.", "resc": "The official winning time of the Women's 100m final for the 2024 Olympics. If the 2024 Olympics do not take place in 2024 then this question will resolve ambiguous.\n\n*Related Questions:*\n\n* [Men's 2024 100m Final](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7775/2024-mens-100m-final/)\n* [Women's 2020 100m Final](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5861/2020-olympic-womens-100m-final/", "lower_25": "10.53", "median": "10.59", "upper_75": "10.69", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India's score in the Democracy Index will be 6.93 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.57", "median": "6.32", "upper_75": "6.93", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the women's winning 100m time in the 2024 Olympic Final will be 10.69 seconds?", "desc": "The [100m final](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/100_metres_at_the_Olympics) is one of the most popular and high profile events at the Olympics.\n\n[The Women's 100m time had been progressing over time](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_100_metres_world_record_progression) but has been static since the 1980s. [This is consistent with most women's athletics records](https://sportsscientists.com/2016/08/world-records-fossils/) and is likely related to the systemtic doping from that era. However, in 2021 both Elaine Thompson-Herah and Shelly-Ann Fraser-Pryce ran low 10.6x so the possibility of seeing Florence Griffith-Joyner's world record dropping is increasing.", "resc": "The official winning time of the Women's 100m final for the 2024 Olympics. If the 2024 Olympics do not take place in 2024 then this question will resolve ambiguous.\n\n*Related Questions:*\n\n* [Men's 2024 100m Final](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7775/2024-mens-100m-final/)\n* [Women's 2020 100m Final](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5861/2020-olympic-womens-100m-final/", "lower_25": "10.53", "median": "10.59", "upper_75": "10.69", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Men's winning 100m time in the 2024 Olympic Final will be 9.787 seconds?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.751", "median": "9.787", "upper_75": "9.819", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Belgium will no longer be a united sovereign state by Not ≤ 2120?", "desc": "[Belgium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belgium) is composed of 3 cultural regions: the predominately Dutch-speaking [Flemish region](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flemish_Region) in the north, the predominately French-speaking [Walloon region](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wallonia) in the south, and the [Brussels capital region](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brussels) in the center. The separation in Belgium has resulted in [political turmoil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007%E2%80%932011_Belgian_political_crisis) and some have suggested [partition.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition_of_Belgium)", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that there is no longer a sovereign state with its capital within the modern day borders of Belgium that controls more than 50% of the land area of [Brussels](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brussels), [Charleroi, Liège, Namur](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wallonia#Cities), [Antwerp, Ghent, and Bruges](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flanders#Cities)", "lower_25": "2073", "median": "2113", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2120", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that \"Tesla Bots\" will be available to US consumers by 2027?", "desc": "On August 19 2021, at Tesla's [AI Day](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0z4FweCy4M&ab_channel=Tesla) event, [Tesla, Inc.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tesla,_Inc.) CEO Elon Musk [unveiled a design for the Tesla Bot,](https://www.theverge.com/2021/8/19/22633514/tesla-robot-prototype-elon-musk-humanoid-ai-day?utm_campaign=theverge&utm_content=chorus&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter) a humanoid robot. \n\nAccording to [The Verge](https://www.theverge.com/2021/8/19/22633514/tesla-robot-prototype-elon-musk-humanoid-ai-day?utm_campaign=theverge&utm_content=chorus&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter),\n\n>Tesla CEO Elon Musk says his company is working on a humanoid robot and that it will build a prototype “sometime next year.” The humanoid robot will leverage Tesla's experience with automated machines in its factories, as well as some of the hardware and software that powers the company's Autopilot driver assistance software.\n\n>Musk, who has spoken publicly about his fears of runaway artificial intelligence, said Tesla is “intended to be friendly,” but that Tesla is designing the robot at a “mechanical level” so that “you can run away from it, and most likely overpower it.” It will be five feet, eight inches tall, and have a screen for a face.\n\n>The robots will be designed to handle “tasks that are unsafe, repetitive or boring,” the company's website reads. “I think essentially in the future, physical work will be a choice, if you if you want to do it you can,” Musk said.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date on which general US consumers can take delivery from Tesla, Inc. a device having characteristics broadly in line with those of the proposed Tesla Bot. In particular, the device must be a humanoid robot, and must be able to perform some physical tasks upon being given directions to do so - a remote-controlled device manually operated by a human will not count.\n\nNote that this question will resolve as the first date on which general consumers physically possess the device, having purchased it, leased it, licensed it, or otherwise contracted with Tesla for physical custody of it, not on the date on which a deposit can be placed, a device can be ordered, pre-ordered, or otherwise contracted for. The consumers must be legally entitled to operate the device; a right to possess but not operate the device will not count", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Belgium will no longer be a united sovereign state by Not ≤ 2120?", "desc": "[Belgium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belgium) is composed of 3 cultural regions: the predominately Dutch-speaking [Flemish region](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flemish_Region) in the north, the predominately French-speaking [Walloon region](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wallonia) in the south, and the [Brussels capital region](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brussels) in the center. The separation in Belgium has resulted in [political turmoil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007%E2%80%932011_Belgian_political_crisis) and some have suggested [partition.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition_of_Belgium)", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that there is no longer a sovereign state with its capital within the modern day borders of Belgium that controls more than 50% of the land area of [Brussels](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brussels), [Charleroi, Liège, Namur](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wallonia#Cities), [Antwerp, Ghent, and Bruges](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flanders#Cities)", "lower_25": "2073", "median": "2113", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2120", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 446 millimeters of sea level rise in 2100?", "desc": "[Sea level rise](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_level_rise) is one of the main effects associated with [climate change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climate_change). Some climatologists [have suggested](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FRs4kIthJ9k) that it is possible for sea level to change dramatically over a relatively small period of time, on the order of decades.\n\nAs of January 2022, global sea levels have been increasing [at 3.3 mm per year](https://sealevel.nasa.gov/understanding-sea-level/key-indicators/global-mean-sea-level), a pace that has [accelerated since the 90s](https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-sea-level). [Church, et al. 2013](https://www.jstor.org/stable/24897551) modeled sea level rise for scenarios [RCP 2.6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representative_Concentration_Pathway), RCP 3.4, and RCP 4.5 and gave forecasts of 440mm, 530mm, and 740mm (respectively) by 2100. A [2017 NOAA report](https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/publications/techrpt83_Global_and_Regional_SLR_Scenarios_for_the_US_final.pdf) surveyed several projections of [RCP 8.0](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representative_Concentration_Pathway), which is considered as a worst-case scenario, and found projections for sea level rise by 2100 as high as 2700mm.\n\n[NASA data from 1993 to 2021](https://podaac.jpl.nasa.gov/dataset/MERGED_TP_J1_OSTM_OST_GMSL_ASCII_V51?ids=&values=&search=GMSL&provider=PODAAC) has been copied [here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qGNIh2-0vuGFZz4K5yguwGwG_5GxkSIFofzleXopEa4/edit?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the most recent measure of sea level on January 1, 2100 compared to the 1993-2008 average in millimeters, as reported by [NASA](https://sealevel.nasa.gov/understanding-sea-level/key-indicators/global-mean-sea-level)", "lower_25": "446", "median": "591", "upper_75": "754", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Belgium will no longer be a united sovereign state by Not ≤ 2120?", "desc": "[Belgium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belgium) is composed of 3 cultural regions: the predominately Dutch-speaking [Flemish region](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flemish_Region) in the north, the predominately French-speaking [Walloon region](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wallonia) in the south, and the [Brussels capital region](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brussels) in the center. The separation in Belgium has resulted in [political turmoil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007%E2%80%932011_Belgian_political_crisis) and some have suggested [partition.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition_of_Belgium)", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that there is no longer a sovereign state with its capital within the modern day borders of Belgium that controls more than 50% of the land area of [Brussels](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brussels), [Charleroi, Liège, Namur](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wallonia#Cities), [Antwerp, Ghent, and Bruges](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flanders#Cities)", "lower_25": "2073", "median": "2113", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2120", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that \"Tesla Bots\" will be available to US consumers by 2027?", "desc": "On August 19 2021, at Tesla's [AI Day](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0z4FweCy4M&ab_channel=Tesla) event, [Tesla, Inc.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tesla,_Inc.) CEO Elon Musk [unveiled a design for the Tesla Bot,](https://www.theverge.com/2021/8/19/22633514/tesla-robot-prototype-elon-musk-humanoid-ai-day?utm_campaign=theverge&utm_content=chorus&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter) a humanoid robot. \n\nAccording to [The Verge](https://www.theverge.com/2021/8/19/22633514/tesla-robot-prototype-elon-musk-humanoid-ai-day?utm_campaign=theverge&utm_content=chorus&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter),\n\n>Tesla CEO Elon Musk says his company is working on a humanoid robot and that it will build a prototype “sometime next year.” The humanoid robot will leverage Tesla's experience with automated machines in its factories, as well as some of the hardware and software that powers the company's Autopilot driver assistance software.\n\n>Musk, who has spoken publicly about his fears of runaway artificial intelligence, said Tesla is “intended to be friendly,” but that Tesla is designing the robot at a “mechanical level” so that “you can run away from it, and most likely overpower it.” It will be five feet, eight inches tall, and have a screen for a face.\n\n>The robots will be designed to handle “tasks that are unsafe, repetitive or boring,” the company's website reads. “I think essentially in the future, physical work will be a choice, if you if you want to do it you can,” Musk said.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date on which general US consumers can take delivery from Tesla, Inc. a device having characteristics broadly in line with those of the proposed Tesla Bot. In particular, the device must be a humanoid robot, and must be able to perform some physical tasks upon being given directions to do so - a remote-controlled device manually operated by a human will not count.\n\nNote that this question will resolve as the first date on which general consumers physically possess the device, having purchased it, leased it, licensed it, or otherwise contracted with Tesla for physical custody of it, not on the date on which a deposit can be placed, a device can be ordered, pre-ordered, or otherwise contracted for. The consumers must be legally entitled to operate the device; a right to possess but not operate the device will not count", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 446 millimeters of sea level rise in 2100?", "desc": "[Sea level rise](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_level_rise) is one of the main effects associated with [climate change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climate_change). Some climatologists [have suggested](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FRs4kIthJ9k) that it is possible for sea level to change dramatically over a relatively small period of time, on the order of decades.\n\nAs of January 2022, global sea levels have been increasing [at 3.3 mm per year](https://sealevel.nasa.gov/understanding-sea-level/key-indicators/global-mean-sea-level), a pace that has [accelerated since the 90s](https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-sea-level). [Church, et al. 2013](https://www.jstor.org/stable/24897551) modeled sea level rise for scenarios [RCP 2.6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representative_Concentration_Pathway), RCP 3.4, and RCP 4.5 and gave forecasts of 440mm, 530mm, and 740mm (respectively) by 2100. A [2017 NOAA report](https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/publications/techrpt83_Global_and_Regional_SLR_Scenarios_for_the_US_final.pdf) surveyed several projections of [RCP 8.0](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representative_Concentration_Pathway), which is considered as a worst-case scenario, and found projections for sea level rise by 2100 as high as 2700mm.\n\n[NASA data from 1993 to 2021](https://podaac.jpl.nasa.gov/dataset/MERGED_TP_J1_OSTM_OST_GMSL_ASCII_V51?ids=&values=&search=GMSL&provider=PODAAC) has been copied [here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qGNIh2-0vuGFZz4K5yguwGwG_5GxkSIFofzleXopEa4/edit?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the most recent measure of sea level on January 1, 2100 compared to the 1993-2008 average in millimeters, as reported by [NASA](https://sealevel.nasa.gov/understanding-sea-level/key-indicators/global-mean-sea-level)", "lower_25": "446", "median": "591", "upper_75": "754", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Mars helicopter Ingenuity will stop making successful flights for 6 months by Mar 16, 2024, if it is operational through January 1, 2022?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Dec 26, 2023", "median": "Jan 26, 2024", "upper_75": "Mar 16, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Mars helicopter Ingenuity will stop making successful flights for 6 months by Mar 16, 2024, if it is operational through January 1, 2022?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Dec 26, 2023", "median": "Jan 26, 2024", "upper_75": "Mar 16, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 446 millimeters of sea level rise in 2100?", "desc": "[Sea level rise](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_level_rise) is one of the main effects associated with [climate change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climate_change). Some climatologists [have suggested](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FRs4kIthJ9k) that it is possible for sea level to change dramatically over a relatively small period of time, on the order of decades.\n\nAs of January 2022, global sea levels have been increasing [at 3.3 mm per year](https://sealevel.nasa.gov/understanding-sea-level/key-indicators/global-mean-sea-level), a pace that has [accelerated since the 90s](https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-sea-level). [Church, et al. 2013](https://www.jstor.org/stable/24897551) modeled sea level rise for scenarios [RCP 2.6](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representative_Concentration_Pathway), RCP 3.4, and RCP 4.5 and gave forecasts of 440mm, 530mm, and 740mm (respectively) by 2100. A [2017 NOAA report](https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/publications/techrpt83_Global_and_Regional_SLR_Scenarios_for_the_US_final.pdf) surveyed several projections of [RCP 8.0](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representative_Concentration_Pathway), which is considered as a worst-case scenario, and found projections for sea level rise by 2100 as high as 2700mm.\n\n[NASA data from 1993 to 2021](https://podaac.jpl.nasa.gov/dataset/MERGED_TP_J1_OSTM_OST_GMSL_ASCII_V51?ids=&values=&search=GMSL&provider=PODAAC) has been copied [here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qGNIh2-0vuGFZz4K5yguwGwG_5GxkSIFofzleXopEa4/edit?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the most recent measure of sea level on January 1, 2100 compared to the 1993-2008 average in millimeters, as reported by [NASA](https://sealevel.nasa.gov/understanding-sea-level/key-indicators/global-mean-sea-level)", "lower_25": "446", "median": "591", "upper_75": "754", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that \"Tesla Bots\" will be available to US consumers by 2027?", "desc": "On August 19 2021, at Tesla's [AI Day](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0z4FweCy4M&ab_channel=Tesla) event, [Tesla, Inc.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tesla,_Inc.) CEO Elon Musk [unveiled a design for the Tesla Bot,](https://www.theverge.com/2021/8/19/22633514/tesla-robot-prototype-elon-musk-humanoid-ai-day?utm_campaign=theverge&utm_content=chorus&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter) a humanoid robot. \n\nAccording to [The Verge](https://www.theverge.com/2021/8/19/22633514/tesla-robot-prototype-elon-musk-humanoid-ai-day?utm_campaign=theverge&utm_content=chorus&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter),\n\n>Tesla CEO Elon Musk says his company is working on a humanoid robot and that it will build a prototype “sometime next year.” The humanoid robot will leverage Tesla's experience with automated machines in its factories, as well as some of the hardware and software that powers the company's Autopilot driver assistance software.\n\n>Musk, who has spoken publicly about his fears of runaway artificial intelligence, said Tesla is “intended to be friendly,” but that Tesla is designing the robot at a “mechanical level” so that “you can run away from it, and most likely overpower it.” It will be five feet, eight inches tall, and have a screen for a face.\n\n>The robots will be designed to handle “tasks that are unsafe, repetitive or boring,” the company's website reads. “I think essentially in the future, physical work will be a choice, if you if you want to do it you can,” Musk said.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date on which general US consumers can take delivery from Tesla, Inc. a device having characteristics broadly in line with those of the proposed Tesla Bot. In particular, the device must be a humanoid robot, and must be able to perform some physical tasks upon being given directions to do so - a remote-controlled device manually operated by a human will not count.\n\nNote that this question will resolve as the first date on which general consumers physically possess the device, having purchased it, leased it, licensed it, or otherwise contracted with Tesla for physical custody of it, not on the date on which a deposit can be placed, a device can be ordered, pre-ordered, or otherwise contracted for. The consumers must be legally entitled to operate the device; a right to possess but not operate the device will not count", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Mars helicopter Ingenuity will stop making successful flights for 6 months by Mar 16, 2024, if it is operational through January 1, 2022?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Dec 26, 2023", "median": "Jan 26, 2024", "upper_75": "Mar 16, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the atmospheric CO2 concentration will be 661 ppm in 2100?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [How much greater (in ˚C) will the average global temperature in 2100 be than the average global temperature in 1880?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/605/how-much-global-warming-by-2100/)\n\n----", "resc": "This question will resolve as the latest estimate of atmospheric CO2 \n concentration in parts per million (PPM) on January 1, 2100 according to the [US government](https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/gl_data.html) or other reliable sources, if US government data is not available", "lower_25": "492", "median": "566", "upper_75": "661", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the atmospheric CO2 concentration will be 661 ppm in 2100?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [How much greater (in ˚C) will the average global temperature in 2100 be than the average global temperature in 1880?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/605/how-much-global-warming-by-2100/)\n\n----", "resc": "This question will resolve as the latest estimate of atmospheric CO2 \n concentration in parts per million (PPM) on January 1, 2100 according to the [US government](https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/gl_data.html) or other reliable sources, if US government data is not available", "lower_25": "492", "median": "566", "upper_75": "661", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Mohammed bin Salman will become the king of Saudi Arabia by 2026?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Mohammed bin Salman become the next king of Saudi Arabia? ](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1603/will-mohammed-bin-salman-become-the-next-king-of-saudi-arabia/)", "resc": "The question will resolve as the date when Mohammed bin Salman becomes king of Saudi Arabia, according to credible media reports.\n\nIf he does not become king by January 2, 2050, this question will resolve as **> January 2, 2050**", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will be able to play Angry Birds at a level exceeding that of the best human players by Apr 2026?", "desc": "[Angry Birds](http://chrome.angrybirds.com/) is a popular video game where the task is to shoot birds with different properties from a slingshot at a structure that houses pigs and to destroy the pigs. The structure can be very complicated and can involve a number of different object categories with different properties. The game and the structure largely observes the laws of physics and it is possible to infer how the structure will change when hit at a certain position.\n\nEach year at the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), an [AI Angry Birds competition](http://aibirds.org/) is held. \n\nThe stated goal of the competition is \n>to build an intelligent Angry Birds playing agent that can play new levels better than the best human players. This is a very difficult problem as it requires agents to predict the outcome of physical actions without having complete knowledge of the world, and then to select a good action out of infinitely many possible actions. This is an essential capability of future AI systems that interact with the physical world. The Angry Birds AI competition provides a simplified and controlled environment for developing and testing these capabilities.", "resc": "This question resolves positively when credible media reports indicate that an AI has exceeded human performance at new (that is, previously unseen to the AI) levels of Angry Birds", "lower_25": "Feb 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Apr 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Mohammed bin Salman will become the king of Saudi Arabia by 2026?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Mohammed bin Salman become the next king of Saudi Arabia? ](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1603/will-mohammed-bin-salman-become-the-next-king-of-saudi-arabia/)", "resc": "The question will resolve as the date when Mohammed bin Salman becomes king of Saudi Arabia, according to credible media reports.\n\nIf he does not become king by January 2, 2050, this question will resolve as **> January 2, 2050**", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the atmospheric CO2 concentration will be 661 ppm in 2100?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [How much greater (in ˚C) will the average global temperature in 2100 be than the average global temperature in 1880?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/605/how-much-global-warming-by-2100/)\n\n----", "resc": "This question will resolve as the latest estimate of atmospheric CO2 \n concentration in parts per million (PPM) on January 1, 2100 according to the [US government](https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/gl_data.html) or other reliable sources, if US government data is not available", "lower_25": "492", "median": "566", "upper_75": "661", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least one offensive detonation of nuclear weapons will occur by 2050, given that 14.8 detonations are expected?", "desc": "Currently, nine countries possess nuclear weapons. Below is a list of the estimated number of nuclear warheads in each country as of May 2021 (according to [the Federation of American Scientists](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/)). \n\n- Russia: 6,257 nuclear warheads\n\n- US: 5,550 nuclear warheads\n\n- China: 350 nuclear warheads\n\n- France: 290 nuclear warheads\n\n- UK: 225 nuclear warheads\n\n- Pakistan: 165 nuclear warheads\n\n- India: 160 nuclear warheads\n\n- Israel: 90 nuclear warheads\n\n- North Korea: Estimated 30-40 nuclear warheads with sufficient fissile materials for 45 nuclear warheads (\"The[ir] number of assembled warheads is unknown, but lower.\")", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of nuclear weapons (fission or thermonuclear) detonated offensively in total between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2050. If there are no offensive detonations before 2050 by any state or non-state actor, then this question will resolve as **ambiguous**. That is, this question conditions on at least one offensive detonation occurring by 2050. Neither [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) nor [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) will count towards question resolution, even if such detonations cause substantial damage.\n\n>", "lower_25": "2.32", "median": "14.8", "upper_75": "269", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Mohammed bin Salman will become the king of Saudi Arabia by 2026?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Mohammed bin Salman become the next king of Saudi Arabia? ](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1603/will-mohammed-bin-salman-become-the-next-king-of-saudi-arabia/)", "resc": "The question will resolve as the date when Mohammed bin Salman becomes king of Saudi Arabia, according to credible media reports.\n\nIf he does not become king by January 2, 2050, this question will resolve as **> January 2, 2050**", "lower_25": "2024", "median": "2026", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least one offensive detonation of nuclear weapons will occur by 2050, given that 14.8 detonations are expected?", "desc": "Currently, nine countries possess nuclear weapons. Below is a list of the estimated number of nuclear warheads in each country as of May 2021 (according to [the Federation of American Scientists](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/)). \n\n- Russia: 6,257 nuclear warheads\n\n- US: 5,550 nuclear warheads\n\n- China: 350 nuclear warheads\n\n- France: 290 nuclear warheads\n\n- UK: 225 nuclear warheads\n\n- Pakistan: 165 nuclear warheads\n\n- India: 160 nuclear warheads\n\n- Israel: 90 nuclear warheads\n\n- North Korea: Estimated 30-40 nuclear warheads with sufficient fissile materials for 45 nuclear warheads (\"The[ir] number of assembled warheads is unknown, but lower.\")", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of nuclear weapons (fission or thermonuclear) detonated offensively in total between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2050. If there are no offensive detonations before 2050 by any state or non-state actor, then this question will resolve as **ambiguous**. That is, this question conditions on at least one offensive detonation occurring by 2050. Neither [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) nor [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) will count towards question resolution, even if such detonations cause substantial damage.\n\n>", "lower_25": "2.32", "median": "14.8", "upper_75": "269", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Hungary's children per woman will be 1.83 in the year 2031?", "desc": "According to the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=HU), Hungary's births per woman rate since 1960 peaked at 2.35 in 1975, and has remained under 1.60 since 1994.", "resc": "This question will resolve as Hungary's \"total births per woman\" for the year 2031, according to [The World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=HU).\n\nIn the case that the World Bank does not report this data for 2031, Metaculus Admins may use an alternative estimate from a credible source", "lower_25": "1.47", "median": "1.65", "upper_75": "1.83", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Hungary's children per woman will be 1.83 in the year 2031?", "desc": "According to the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=HU), Hungary's births per woman rate since 1960 peaked at 2.35 in 1975, and has remained under 1.60 since 1994.", "resc": "This question will resolve as Hungary's \"total births per woman\" for the year 2031, according to [The World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=HU).\n\nIn the case that the World Bank does not report this data for 2031, Metaculus Admins may use an alternative estimate from a credible source", "lower_25": "1.47", "median": "1.65", "upper_75": "1.83", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will be able to play Angry Birds at a level exceeding that of the best human players by Apr 2026?", "desc": "[Angry Birds](http://chrome.angrybirds.com/) is a popular video game where the task is to shoot birds with different properties from a slingshot at a structure that houses pigs and to destroy the pigs. The structure can be very complicated and can involve a number of different object categories with different properties. The game and the structure largely observes the laws of physics and it is possible to infer how the structure will change when hit at a certain position.\n\nEach year at the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), an [AI Angry Birds competition](http://aibirds.org/) is held. \n\nThe stated goal of the competition is \n>to build an intelligent Angry Birds playing agent that can play new levels better than the best human players. This is a very difficult problem as it requires agents to predict the outcome of physical actions without having complete knowledge of the world, and then to select a good action out of infinitely many possible actions. This is an essential capability of future AI systems that interact with the physical world. The Angry Birds AI competition provides a simplified and controlled environment for developing and testing these capabilities.", "resc": "This question resolves positively when credible media reports indicate that an AI has exceeded human performance at new (that is, previously unseen to the AI) levels of Angry Birds", "lower_25": "Feb 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Apr 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least one offensive detonation of nuclear weapons will occur by 2050, given that 14.8 detonations are expected?", "desc": "Currently, nine countries possess nuclear weapons. Below is a list of the estimated number of nuclear warheads in each country as of May 2021 (according to [the Federation of American Scientists](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/)). \n\n- Russia: 6,257 nuclear warheads\n\n- US: 5,550 nuclear warheads\n\n- China: 350 nuclear warheads\n\n- France: 290 nuclear warheads\n\n- UK: 225 nuclear warheads\n\n- Pakistan: 165 nuclear warheads\n\n- India: 160 nuclear warheads\n\n- Israel: 90 nuclear warheads\n\n- North Korea: Estimated 30-40 nuclear warheads with sufficient fissile materials for 45 nuclear warheads (\"The[ir] number of assembled warheads is unknown, but lower.\")", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of nuclear weapons (fission or thermonuclear) detonated offensively in total between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2050. If there are no offensive detonations before 2050 by any state or non-state actor, then this question will resolve as **ambiguous**. That is, this question conditions on at least one offensive detonation occurring by 2050. Neither [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) nor [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) will count towards question resolution, even if such detonations cause substantial damage.\n\n>", "lower_25": "2.32", "median": "14.8", "upper_75": "269", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will be able to play Angry Birds at a level exceeding that of the best human players by Apr 2026?", "desc": "[Angry Birds](http://chrome.angrybirds.com/) is a popular video game where the task is to shoot birds with different properties from a slingshot at a structure that houses pigs and to destroy the pigs. The structure can be very complicated and can involve a number of different object categories with different properties. The game and the structure largely observes the laws of physics and it is possible to infer how the structure will change when hit at a certain position.\n\nEach year at the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), an [AI Angry Birds competition](http://aibirds.org/) is held. \n\nThe stated goal of the competition is \n>to build an intelligent Angry Birds playing agent that can play new levels better than the best human players. This is a very difficult problem as it requires agents to predict the outcome of physical actions without having complete knowledge of the world, and then to select a good action out of infinitely many possible actions. This is an essential capability of future AI systems that interact with the physical world. The Angry Birds AI competition provides a simplified and controlled environment for developing and testing these capabilities.", "resc": "This question resolves positively when credible media reports indicate that an AI has exceeded human performance at new (that is, previously unseen to the AI) levels of Angry Birds", "lower_25": "Feb 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Apr 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that self-driving taxis will be available in at least one large German city by 2026?", "desc": "Self-driving cars are on the way, but how soon? Germany is the most populous country in Europe and a large car market. It is also known for having very strict regulations on many things, thus potentially postponing an introduction of self-driving cars even when they are technologically ready.\n\nOne use of self-driving cars will be to automate taxi services, i.e., taxis without a human driver. This would be an Uber-like ride service where one can order a car to come pick one up from A to B. [Such a service is currently being tested with a human driver by Waymo in San Francisco USA.](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-24/waymo-brings-self-driving-taxis-to-san-francisco-with-a-catch)", "resc": "- A legal app is available for public use that summons a taxi car without a human driver that takes one to the desired destination.\n- This must be available in one of the five largest Germany cities: Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, and Frankfurt am Main.\n- The service must not require the user to have a driver's license", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Afghanistan will not allow same-sex marriage by 2100?", "desc": "The return of the Taliban is a serious threat to civil rights in Afghanistan, and LGBT+ people will be particularly at risk. However, the 21st Century has eighty years left to run. What will it hold for liberalism and human rights in Afghanistan? \n\nSame-sex relations are currently illegal in Afghanistan, and while the death penalty is not (or was not) enforced it legally remains an option ([ILAN](https://ilga.org/maps-sexual-orientation-laws), [HRW](http://internap.hrw.org/features/features/lgbt_laws/)). \n\nThe Constitution of Afghanistan gives preeminence to Sharia law, which in practice serves to limit same-sex relationships even in the absence of particular legal provisions. However, recognition of Sharia law (beyond just personal status issues) does not necessarily prohibit decriminalisation of same-sex activity, with Iraq as a (rare) example of a country with de facto decriminalisation of same-sex activity despite Sharia. \n\nAs of 2021, same-sex marriage is legal in at least some jurisdictions in 29 countries, up from zero in 2000. \n\nWhile decriminalisation of homosexuality obviously remains a more pressing issue than same-sex marriage, social reforms can move quickly. South Africa decriminalised same-sex activities in 1998 and legalised same-sex marriage eight years later. Decriminalisation across the United States came about 12 years before the legalisation of same-sex marriage.", "resc": "Question resolves positive on the day that marriages can take place within Afghanistan between people of the same sex. \n\nResolves positive even if the law only applies in parts of the country (e.g. particular jurisdictions) or to particular classes of people (e.g. non-Muslims only). \n\nRecognition of marriages performed elsewhere is not sufficient. \n\nChanges to Afghanistan's borders will not affect resolution of this question, but if the state of Afghanistan ceases to exist in any meaningful sense, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "2067", "median": "2094", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Afghanistan will not allow same-sex marriage by 2100?", "desc": "The return of the Taliban is a serious threat to civil rights in Afghanistan, and LGBT+ people will be particularly at risk. However, the 21st Century has eighty years left to run. What will it hold for liberalism and human rights in Afghanistan? \n\nSame-sex relations are currently illegal in Afghanistan, and while the death penalty is not (or was not) enforced it legally remains an option ([ILAN](https://ilga.org/maps-sexual-orientation-laws), [HRW](http://internap.hrw.org/features/features/lgbt_laws/)). \n\nThe Constitution of Afghanistan gives preeminence to Sharia law, which in practice serves to limit same-sex relationships even in the absence of particular legal provisions. However, recognition of Sharia law (beyond just personal status issues) does not necessarily prohibit decriminalisation of same-sex activity, with Iraq as a (rare) example of a country with de facto decriminalisation of same-sex activity despite Sharia. \n\nAs of 2021, same-sex marriage is legal in at least some jurisdictions in 29 countries, up from zero in 2000. \n\nWhile decriminalisation of homosexuality obviously remains a more pressing issue than same-sex marriage, social reforms can move quickly. South Africa decriminalised same-sex activities in 1998 and legalised same-sex marriage eight years later. Decriminalisation across the United States came about 12 years before the legalisation of same-sex marriage.", "resc": "Question resolves positive on the day that marriages can take place within Afghanistan between people of the same sex. \n\nResolves positive even if the law only applies in parts of the country (e.g. particular jurisdictions) or to particular classes of people (e.g. non-Muslims only). \n\nRecognition of marriages performed elsewhere is not sufficient. \n\nChanges to Afghanistan's borders will not affect resolution of this question, but if the state of Afghanistan ceases to exist in any meaningful sense, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "2067", "median": "2094", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Afghanistan will not allow same-sex marriage by 2100?", "desc": "The return of the Taliban is a serious threat to civil rights in Afghanistan, and LGBT+ people will be particularly at risk. However, the 21st Century has eighty years left to run. What will it hold for liberalism and human rights in Afghanistan? \n\nSame-sex relations are currently illegal in Afghanistan, and while the death penalty is not (or was not) enforced it legally remains an option ([ILAN](https://ilga.org/maps-sexual-orientation-laws), [HRW](http://internap.hrw.org/features/features/lgbt_laws/)). \n\nThe Constitution of Afghanistan gives preeminence to Sharia law, which in practice serves to limit same-sex relationships even in the absence of particular legal provisions. However, recognition of Sharia law (beyond just personal status issues) does not necessarily prohibit decriminalisation of same-sex activity, with Iraq as a (rare) example of a country with de facto decriminalisation of same-sex activity despite Sharia. \n\nAs of 2021, same-sex marriage is legal in at least some jurisdictions in 29 countries, up from zero in 2000. \n\nWhile decriminalisation of homosexuality obviously remains a more pressing issue than same-sex marriage, social reforms can move quickly. South Africa decriminalised same-sex activities in 1998 and legalised same-sex marriage eight years later. Decriminalisation across the United States came about 12 years before the legalisation of same-sex marriage.", "resc": "Question resolves positive on the day that marriages can take place within Afghanistan between people of the same sex. \n\nResolves positive even if the law only applies in parts of the country (e.g. particular jurisdictions) or to particular classes of people (e.g. non-Muslims only). \n\nRecognition of marriages performed elsewhere is not sufficient. \n\nChanges to Afghanistan's borders will not affect resolution of this question, but if the state of Afghanistan ceases to exist in any meaningful sense, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "2067", "median": "2094", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that self-driving taxis will be available in at least one large German city by 2026?", "desc": "Self-driving cars are on the way, but how soon? Germany is the most populous country in Europe and a large car market. It is also known for having very strict regulations on many things, thus potentially postponing an introduction of self-driving cars even when they are technologically ready.\n\nOne use of self-driving cars will be to automate taxi services, i.e., taxis without a human driver. This would be an Uber-like ride service where one can order a car to come pick one up from A to B. [Such a service is currently being tested with a human driver by Waymo in San Francisco USA.](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-24/waymo-brings-self-driving-taxis-to-san-francisco-with-a-catch)", "resc": "- A legal app is available for public use that summons a taxi car without a human driver that takes one to the desired destination.\n- This must be available in one of the five largest Germany cities: Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, and Frankfurt am Main.\n- The service must not require the user to have a driver's license", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will implement a national carbon tax or carbon pricing mechanism by 2043?", "desc": "An [overwhelming majority](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/carbon-tax/) of economists [endorse carbon pricing mechanisms]((https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/carbon-taxes-ii/)) as effective ways to [reduce the amount of global greenhouse gases](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climate_change). [A petition of 2,500 economists](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economists%27_Statement_on_Climate_Change) (including 19 Nobel laureates) advocated for carbon pricing in 1997, prior to the [Kyoto Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyoto_Protocol) negotiations. \n\nCarbon pricing mostly comes in 2 major categories: carbon taxes and emissions trading markets (also known as \"cap-and-trade\" policies). [Carbon taxes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_tax) generally set a standard price on CO2 (and other greenhouse gases), and charge corporations at the point they've produced those emissions, which in turn raises the prices of their products. [Emissions trading markets](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emissions_trading) (cap-and-trade) set a fixed number of permits allowing a producer to emit a certain amount of greenhouse gas. A producer can reduce their emissions and sell their extra permits, or purchase permits from other companies if they want to emit more greenhouse gasses. In the long term, emissions can be further cut by increasing the price of the carbon tax, or reducing the number of carbon permits allowed in the market.\n\nEither of these mechanisms would result in high-emissions goods becoming more expensive, and create a market incentive for low-emissions products to be sold or invented. Carbon taxes would also create government revenue-- at a rate of $51- $125 [per ton of CO2](https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/02/26/biden-cost-climate-change/), that could produce $270 - 660 billion annually (based on [2017 US emissions](https://ourworldindata.org/co2/country/united-states?country=~USA)). However, regardless of how this money is used (given back to citizens as a [dividend](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_fee_and_dividend), or to fund government expenses), the result would still have the effect of [reducing demand for high-emissions goods](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigovian_tax).\n\nThough there is currently no national carbon pricing policy in the US, some states have adopted cap-and-trade policies, such as the [RGGI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_Greenhouse_Gas_Initiative) in the northeast, and the [WCI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Climate_Initiative) in California. [Bills to implement carbon pricing](https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/what-you-need-know-about-federal-carbon-tax-united-states) have been proposed several times in Congress.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that a national carbon tax or emissions trading policy is signed into law. In the event that a bill is approved by the House, Senate, and President, the question will close retroactively 24 hours before the bill is approved by the chamber which proposed it.\n\nResolution will use an official government source or credible media reports.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2043", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Hungary's children per woman will be 1.83 in the year 2031?", "desc": "According to the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=HU), Hungary's births per woman rate since 1960 peaked at 2.35 in 1975, and has remained under 1.60 since 1994.", "resc": "This question will resolve as Hungary's \"total births per woman\" for the year 2031, according to [The World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=HU).\n\nIn the case that the World Bank does not report this data for 2031, Metaculus Admins may use an alternative estimate from a credible source", "lower_25": "1.47", "median": "1.65", "upper_75": "1.83", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will implement a national carbon tax or carbon pricing mechanism by 2043?", "desc": "An [overwhelming majority](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/carbon-tax/) of economists [endorse carbon pricing mechanisms]((https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/carbon-taxes-ii/)) as effective ways to [reduce the amount of global greenhouse gases](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climate_change). [A petition of 2,500 economists](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economists%27_Statement_on_Climate_Change) (including 19 Nobel laureates) advocated for carbon pricing in 1997, prior to the [Kyoto Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyoto_Protocol) negotiations. \n\nCarbon pricing mostly comes in 2 major categories: carbon taxes and emissions trading markets (also known as \"cap-and-trade\" policies). [Carbon taxes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_tax) generally set a standard price on CO2 (and other greenhouse gases), and charge corporations at the point they've produced those emissions, which in turn raises the prices of their products. [Emissions trading markets](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emissions_trading) (cap-and-trade) set a fixed number of permits allowing a producer to emit a certain amount of greenhouse gas. A producer can reduce their emissions and sell their extra permits, or purchase permits from other companies if they want to emit more greenhouse gasses. In the long term, emissions can be further cut by increasing the price of the carbon tax, or reducing the number of carbon permits allowed in the market.\n\nEither of these mechanisms would result in high-emissions goods becoming more expensive, and create a market incentive for low-emissions products to be sold or invented. Carbon taxes would also create government revenue-- at a rate of $51- $125 [per ton of CO2](https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/02/26/biden-cost-climate-change/), that could produce $270 - 660 billion annually (based on [2017 US emissions](https://ourworldindata.org/co2/country/united-states?country=~USA)). However, regardless of how this money is used (given back to citizens as a [dividend](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_fee_and_dividend), or to fund government expenses), the result would still have the effect of [reducing demand for high-emissions goods](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigovian_tax).\n\nThough there is currently no national carbon pricing policy in the US, some states have adopted cap-and-trade policies, such as the [RGGI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_Greenhouse_Gas_Initiative) in the northeast, and the [WCI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Climate_Initiative) in California. [Bills to implement carbon pricing](https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/what-you-need-know-about-federal-carbon-tax-united-states) have been proposed several times in Congress.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that a national carbon tax or emissions trading policy is signed into law. In the event that a bill is approved by the House, Senate, and President, the question will close retroactively 24 hours before the bill is approved by the chamber which proposed it.\n\nResolution will use an official government source or credible media reports.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2043", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that self-driving taxis will be available in at least one large German city by 2026?", "desc": "Self-driving cars are on the way, but how soon? Germany is the most populous country in Europe and a large car market. It is also known for having very strict regulations on many things, thus potentially postponing an introduction of self-driving cars even when they are technologically ready.\n\nOne use of self-driving cars will be to automate taxi services, i.e., taxis without a human driver. This would be an Uber-like ride service where one can order a car to come pick one up from A to B. [Such a service is currently being tested with a human driver by Waymo in San Francisco USA.](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-24/waymo-brings-self-driving-taxis-to-san-francisco-with-a-catch)", "resc": "- A legal app is available for public use that summons a taxi car without a human driver that takes one to the desired destination.\n- This must be available in one of the five largest Germany cities: Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, and Frankfurt am Main.\n- The service must not require the user to have a driver's license", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that we will know whether the Shannon capacity of a 7-cycle is equal to the Theta function of the 7-cycle by 2113?", "desc": "Determining the [Shannon capacity of a 7-cycle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shannon_capacity_of_a_graph#Computational_complexity) is a famous [open problem](http://www.openproblemgarden.org/op/shannon_capacity_of_the_seven_cycle) in mathematics and [computer science](https://rjlipton.wpcomstaging.com/2013/07/10/rough-problems/). The best known upper bound for \\(\\Theta(C_7)\\) is \\(\\vartheta(C_7)\\), the value of the [Lovász theta function](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lov%C3%A1sz_number). This is given by a [semidefinite program](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semidefinite_programming) and is similar to some upper bounds for sphere packing.", "resc": "This question will resolve positively on the date of publication in a major mathematics journal or computer science conference *proving or disproving* \\(\\Theta(C_7)=\\vartheta(C_7)\\). If there is no such proof by 2122-01-01, the question will resolve as >. If a proof is published, but not confirmed by peer review by 2122-01-01, the question may wait to resolve until peer review has reached a consensus", "lower_25": "2065", "median": "2090", "upper_75": "2113", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a proof (or disproof) that P=BPP by 2097?", "desc": "The [P vs BPP](http://www.openproblemgarden.org/op/p_vs_bpp) question asks whether any problem in [BPP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BPP_(complexity)), the class of problems that can be efficiently solved in polynomial time using randomness, [is the same as](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BPP_(complexity)#Problems) [P](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P_(complexity)), the class of problems that can be efficiently solved in polynomial time without randomness.\n\nP is contained in BPP, and BPP is [contained in](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BPP_(complexity)#Complexity-theoretic_properties) the [polynomial hierarchy PH](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polynomial_hierarchy) which also contains [NP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NP_(complexity)). If [P=NP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P_versus_NP_problem), then P=PH and so P=BPP.", "resc": "This question will resolve positively in the event of a publication in a major mathematics journal or computer science conference proving or disproving that P=BPP. If a proof is published, but not confirmed by peer review within the input range, the question may wait to resolve until peer review has reached a consensus.\n\nIn the event that a proof is published and confirmed by peer review, the question will close retroactively 24 hours before the proof is published or pre-printed", "lower_25": "2054", "median": "2074", "upper_75": "2097", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a proof (or disproof) that P=BPP by 2097?", "desc": "The [P vs BPP](http://www.openproblemgarden.org/op/p_vs_bpp) question asks whether any problem in [BPP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BPP_(complexity)), the class of problems that can be efficiently solved in polynomial time using randomness, [is the same as](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BPP_(complexity)#Problems) [P](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P_(complexity)), the class of problems that can be efficiently solved in polynomial time without randomness.\n\nP is contained in BPP, and BPP is [contained in](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BPP_(complexity)#Complexity-theoretic_properties) the [polynomial hierarchy PH](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polynomial_hierarchy) which also contains [NP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NP_(complexity)). If [P=NP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P_versus_NP_problem), then P=PH and so P=BPP.", "resc": "This question will resolve positively in the event of a publication in a major mathematics journal or computer science conference proving or disproving that P=BPP. If a proof is published, but not confirmed by peer review within the input range, the question may wait to resolve until peer review has reached a consensus.\n\nIn the event that a proof is published and confirmed by peer review, the question will close retroactively 24 hours before the proof is published or pre-printed", "lower_25": "2054", "median": "2074", "upper_75": "2097", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that we will know whether the Shannon capacity of a 7-cycle is equal to the Theta function of the 7-cycle by 2113?", "desc": "Determining the [Shannon capacity of a 7-cycle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shannon_capacity_of_a_graph#Computational_complexity) is a famous [open problem](http://www.openproblemgarden.org/op/shannon_capacity_of_the_seven_cycle) in mathematics and [computer science](https://rjlipton.wpcomstaging.com/2013/07/10/rough-problems/). The best known upper bound for \\(\\Theta(C_7)\\) is \\(\\vartheta(C_7)\\), the value of the [Lovász theta function](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lov%C3%A1sz_number). This is given by a [semidefinite program](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semidefinite_programming) and is similar to some upper bounds for sphere packing.", "resc": "This question will resolve positively on the date of publication in a major mathematics journal or computer science conference *proving or disproving* \\(\\Theta(C_7)=\\vartheta(C_7)\\). If there is no such proof by 2122-01-01, the question will resolve as >. If a proof is published, but not confirmed by peer review by 2122-01-01, the question may wait to resolve until peer review has reached a consensus", "lower_25": "2065", "median": "2090", "upper_75": "2113", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will implement a national carbon tax or carbon pricing mechanism by 2043?", "desc": "An [overwhelming majority](https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/carbon-tax/) of economists [endorse carbon pricing mechanisms]((https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/carbon-taxes-ii/)) as effective ways to [reduce the amount of global greenhouse gases](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Climate_change). [A petition of 2,500 economists](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economists%27_Statement_on_Climate_Change) (including 19 Nobel laureates) advocated for carbon pricing in 1997, prior to the [Kyoto Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyoto_Protocol) negotiations. \n\nCarbon pricing mostly comes in 2 major categories: carbon taxes and emissions trading markets (also known as \"cap-and-trade\" policies). [Carbon taxes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_tax) generally set a standard price on CO2 (and other greenhouse gases), and charge corporations at the point they've produced those emissions, which in turn raises the prices of their products. [Emissions trading markets](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emissions_trading) (cap-and-trade) set a fixed number of permits allowing a producer to emit a certain amount of greenhouse gas. A producer can reduce their emissions and sell their extra permits, or purchase permits from other companies if they want to emit more greenhouse gasses. In the long term, emissions can be further cut by increasing the price of the carbon tax, or reducing the number of carbon permits allowed in the market.\n\nEither of these mechanisms would result in high-emissions goods becoming more expensive, and create a market incentive for low-emissions products to be sold or invented. Carbon taxes would also create government revenue-- at a rate of $51- $125 [per ton of CO2](https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/02/26/biden-cost-climate-change/), that could produce $270 - 660 billion annually (based on [2017 US emissions](https://ourworldindata.org/co2/country/united-states?country=~USA)). However, regardless of how this money is used (given back to citizens as a [dividend](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_fee_and_dividend), or to fund government expenses), the result would still have the effect of [reducing demand for high-emissions goods](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigovian_tax).\n\nThough there is currently no national carbon pricing policy in the US, some states have adopted cap-and-trade policies, such as the [RGGI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regional_Greenhouse_Gas_Initiative) in the northeast, and the [WCI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Climate_Initiative) in California. [Bills to implement carbon pricing](https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/what-you-need-know-about-federal-carbon-tax-united-states) have been proposed several times in Congress.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that a national carbon tax or emissions trading policy is signed into law. In the event that a bill is approved by the House, Senate, and President, the question will close retroactively 24 hours before the bill is approved by the chamber which proposed it.\n\nResolution will use an official government source or credible media reports.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2043", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that we will know whether the Shannon capacity of a 7-cycle is equal to the Theta function of the 7-cycle by 2113?", "desc": "Determining the [Shannon capacity of a 7-cycle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shannon_capacity_of_a_graph#Computational_complexity) is a famous [open problem](http://www.openproblemgarden.org/op/shannon_capacity_of_the_seven_cycle) in mathematics and [computer science](https://rjlipton.wpcomstaging.com/2013/07/10/rough-problems/). The best known upper bound for \\(\\Theta(C_7)\\) is \\(\\vartheta(C_7)\\), the value of the [Lovász theta function](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lov%C3%A1sz_number). This is given by a [semidefinite program](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semidefinite_programming) and is similar to some upper bounds for sphere packing.", "resc": "This question will resolve positively on the date of publication in a major mathematics journal or computer science conference *proving or disproving* \\(\\Theta(C_7)=\\vartheta(C_7)\\). If there is no such proof by 2122-01-01, the question will resolve as >. If a proof is published, but not confirmed by peer review by 2122-01-01, the question may wait to resolve until peer review has reached a consensus", "lower_25": "2065", "median": "2090", "upper_75": "2113", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the LDP will lose its status as the largest party in the House of Representatives of Japan by 2049?", "desc": "The [Liberal Democratic Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_Democratic_Party_(Japan)), or LDP for short, is a conservative party in Japanese politics. Since its foundation in 1955, it has dominated Japanese politics, and has been the largest party in the [House of Representatives](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Representatives_of_Japan) with the exception of a period from 2009 to 2013.", "resc": "This revolves as the date when the Liberal Democratic Party stops being the largest party in the House of Representatives of Japan.\n\nIf this does not occur before 31 Dec 2049, then this resolves to > 31 Dec 2049", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2043", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that someone will be convicted of a murder that occurred outside of Earth's atmosphere by 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "Public and private entities have been making advances in efforts to expand humanity's presence in space and establish colonies on other planets. Additionally, humans already have had an extended presence in space through the [International Space Station](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Space_Station). What future governments and jurisdictions may look like in space and on other planets remains unclear.\n\n***When will someone first be convicted for a murder that occurred outside of Earth's atmosphere?***\n\nThis question resolves as the date a human is first convicted of murder for killing another human while outside of Earth's Karman line. The location of the conviction itself is immaterial, a murder that takes place in space but where the legal proceedings occur on Earth would qualify. For the purposes of this question murder will be defined as an intentional killing, either premeditated or in the heat of the moment, commonly referred to as [first or second degree murder](https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/what-are-the-different-types-of-criminal-homicide-30970). If terminology or legal classifications having to do with murder change the admins will use their judgement to determine if the conviction meets the definition of first or second degree murder at the time this question was authored. Homicide as part of a recognized military action is typically not punishable in a court of law and would not qualify for the purposes of this question.\n\nBoth the murderer and the victim must be above the Karman line at the time of the murder to qualify. If a violent attack occurs above the Karman line but the victim later dies on Earth it still qualifies so long as all of the violence inflicted by the perpetrator occurred above the Karman line.\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously in case the murder involves a Metaculus user.", "lower_25": "2052", "median": "2081", "upper_75": "2120", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that someone will be convicted of a murder that occurred outside of Earth's atmosphere by 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "Public and private entities have been making advances in efforts to expand humanity's presence in space and establish colonies on other planets. Additionally, humans already have had an extended presence in space through the [International Space Station](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Space_Station). What future governments and jurisdictions may look like in space and on other planets remains unclear.\n\n***When will someone first be convicted for a murder that occurred outside of Earth's atmosphere?***\n\nThis question resolves as the date a human is first convicted of murder for killing another human while outside of Earth's Karman line. The location of the conviction itself is immaterial, a murder that takes place in space but where the legal proceedings occur on Earth would qualify. For the purposes of this question murder will be defined as an intentional killing, either premeditated or in the heat of the moment, commonly referred to as [first or second degree murder](https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/what-are-the-different-types-of-criminal-homicide-30970). If terminology or legal classifications having to do with murder change the admins will use their judgement to determine if the conviction meets the definition of first or second degree murder at the time this question was authored. Homicide as part of a recognized military action is typically not punishable in a court of law and would not qualify for the purposes of this question.\n\nBoth the murderer and the victim must be above the Karman line at the time of the murder to qualify. If a violent attack occurs above the Karman line but the victim later dies on Earth it still qualifies so long as all of the violence inflicted by the perpetrator occurred above the Karman line.\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously in case the murder involves a Metaculus user.", "lower_25": "2052", "median": "2081", "upper_75": "2120", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that someone will be convicted of a murder that occurred outside of Earth's atmosphere by 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "Public and private entities have been making advances in efforts to expand humanity's presence in space and establish colonies on other planets. Additionally, humans already have had an extended presence in space through the [International Space Station](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Space_Station). What future governments and jurisdictions may look like in space and on other planets remains unclear.\n\n***When will someone first be convicted for a murder that occurred outside of Earth's atmosphere?***\n\nThis question resolves as the date a human is first convicted of murder for killing another human while outside of Earth's Karman line. The location of the conviction itself is immaterial, a murder that takes place in space but where the legal proceedings occur on Earth would qualify. For the purposes of this question murder will be defined as an intentional killing, either premeditated or in the heat of the moment, commonly referred to as [first or second degree murder](https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/what-are-the-different-types-of-criminal-homicide-30970). If terminology or legal classifications having to do with murder change the admins will use their judgement to determine if the conviction meets the definition of first or second degree murder at the time this question was authored. Homicide as part of a recognized military action is typically not punishable in a court of law and would not qualify for the purposes of this question.\n\nBoth the murderer and the victim must be above the Karman line at the time of the murder to qualify. If a violent attack occurs above the Karman line but the victim later dies on Earth it still qualifies so long as all of the violence inflicted by the perpetrator occurred above the Karman line.\n\nThe question resolves ambiguously in case the murder involves a Metaculus user.", "lower_25": "2052", "median": "2081", "upper_75": "2120", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the LDP will lose its status as the largest party in the House of Representatives of Japan by 2049?", "desc": "The [Liberal Democratic Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_Democratic_Party_(Japan)), or LDP for short, is a conservative party in Japanese politics. Since its foundation in 1955, it has dominated Japanese politics, and has been the largest party in the [House of Representatives](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Representatives_of_Japan) with the exception of a period from 2009 to 2013.", "resc": "This revolves as the date when the Liberal Democratic Party stops being the largest party in the House of Representatives of Japan.\n\nIf this does not occur before 31 Dec 2049, then this resolves to > 31 Dec 2049", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2043", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the LDP will lose its status as the largest party in the House of Representatives of Japan by 2049?", "desc": "The [Liberal Democratic Party](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_Democratic_Party_(Japan)), or LDP for short, is a conservative party in Japanese politics. Since its foundation in 1955, it has dominated Japanese politics, and has been the largest party in the [House of Representatives](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Representatives_of_Japan) with the exception of a period from 2009 to 2013.", "resc": "This revolves as the date when the Liberal Democratic Party stops being the largest party in the House of Representatives of Japan.\n\nIf this does not occur before 31 Dec 2049, then this resolves to > 31 Dec 2049", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2043", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Tether (USDT) breaks its peg with the U.S. dollar by June 1, 2025, with a 75% likelihood occurring in March 2025?", "desc": "So called stablecoins are pegged to fiat currency such as the U.S. dollar. Issuers of stablecoins operate therefore as unregulated quasi-money market funds (MMFs). In contrast to regulated entities such as MMFs, stablecoin issuers often give little to no insight into their reserves.\n\n[Tether Limited](https://tether.to/) is the issuer of the [largest stablecoin](https://www.theblockcrypto.com/data/decentralized-finance/stablecoins/total-stablecoin-supply-daily), USDT, with a market capitalization of [around US$65 billion](https://www.theblockcrypto.com/data/decentralized-finance/stablecoins/usdt-supply-by-blockchain-daily). Tether is infamous for its controversial business dealings, including but not limited to losing US$851 million of customer deposits at sister company Bitfinex with Panama-based Crypto Capital Corp. Consequently, [US$625 million](https://www.ft.com/content/75daa4c5-8d26-35e9-bd3e-21e8430a3068) were drawn from Tether's reserves without disclosure to their customers. \n\nTether's backing [remains questionable to this day](https://www.ft.com/content/342966af-98dc-4b48-b997-38c00804270a); with the majority of reserves supposedly held in commercial paper with unknown credit risk.\n\nImportantly, stablecoins ([and specifically USDT](https://www.theblockcrypto.com/data/decentralized-finance/stablecoins/adjusted-on-chain-volume-of-stablecoins-monthly)) provide the majority of liquidity to the crypto ecosystem; hence a run on Tether could lead to substantial volatility in the crypto markets.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date by which USDT has been trading below US$0.9 for at least 12 hours on at least 2 of the following crypto exchanges: Binance, Coinbase, Kraken, FTX or Bitfinex.\n\nThis question will resolve ambiguously if USDT does not break its peg before June 1, 2025 or the mentioned exchanges cease to exist and/or do not trade USDT/USD.", "lower_25": "Feb 2024", "median": "Oct 2024", "upper_75": "Mar 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a proof (or disproof) that P=BPP by 2097?", "desc": "The [P vs BPP](http://www.openproblemgarden.org/op/p_vs_bpp) question asks whether any problem in [BPP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BPP_(complexity)), the class of problems that can be efficiently solved in polynomial time using randomness, [is the same as](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BPP_(complexity)#Problems) [P](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P_(complexity)), the class of problems that can be efficiently solved in polynomial time without randomness.\n\nP is contained in BPP, and BPP is [contained in](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BPP_(complexity)#Complexity-theoretic_properties) the [polynomial hierarchy PH](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polynomial_hierarchy) which also contains [NP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NP_(complexity)). If [P=NP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P_versus_NP_problem), then P=PH and so P=BPP.", "resc": "This question will resolve positively in the event of a publication in a major mathematics journal or computer science conference proving or disproving that P=BPP. If a proof is published, but not confirmed by peer review within the input range, the question may wait to resolve until peer review has reached a consensus.\n\nIn the event that a proof is published and confirmed by peer review, the question will close retroactively 24 hours before the proof is published or pre-printed", "lower_25": "2054", "median": "2074", "upper_75": "2097", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that psilocybin will be legal for therapy in 4.50 of the 50 US states by December 31, 2025?", "desc": "Improving mental health seems like one of the most direct ways of\nmaking people better off, and there appear to be many promising areas for reform — especially with regard to new [drug therapies](https://maps.org/). \n\nOne of the new possible drug therapies focuses on the use of psilocybin. Studies suggest substantial rapid and enduring antidepressant effects of psilocybin-assisted therapy among patients with [major depressive disorder](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/fullarticle/2772630).\n\n The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) granted psilocybin breakthrough therapy designation. In November 2020, the state of Oregon became the first U.S. state to both decriminalize psilocybin and also legalize it for therapeutic use.", "resc": "Territories and Washington D.C. are not considered a state for the purpose of this question.\nDecriminalization of psilocybin is not considered the same as its approval for medical use", "lower_25": "2.40", "median": "4.50", "upper_75": "7.61", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Israel will legalize same-sex marriage by 2033?", "desc": "[LGBT rights in Israel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGBT_rights_in_Israel) are considered to be advanced relative to other countries in the Middle East. \n However, [marriage in Israel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marriage_in_Israel) is controlled by the religious authorities. As such there are no civil marriage whatsoever, and no same-sex marriage. However, foreign marriages, including same-sex marriages are recognized. A majority of Israelis [support same-sex marriage.](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-the-great-israeli-marriage-project-support-for-civil-marriage-and-lgbtq-rights-1.10146642)", "resc": "This question resolves as the day that legally recognized marriages take place within the State of Israel between people of the same sex according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions). It resolves as **\"> December 31, 2121\"** if that does not happen before December 31, 2121", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2044", "upper_75": "2059", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Israel will legalize same-sex marriage by 2033?", "desc": "[LGBT rights in Israel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGBT_rights_in_Israel) are considered to be advanced relative to other countries in the Middle East. \n However, [marriage in Israel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marriage_in_Israel) is controlled by the religious authorities. As such there are no civil marriage whatsoever, and no same-sex marriage. However, foreign marriages, including same-sex marriages are recognized. A majority of Israelis [support same-sex marriage.](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-the-great-israeli-marriage-project-support-for-civil-marriage-and-lgbtq-rights-1.10146642)", "resc": "This question resolves as the day that legally recognized marriages take place within the State of Israel between people of the same sex according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions). It resolves as **\"> December 31, 2121\"** if that does not happen before December 31, 2121", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2044", "upper_75": "2059", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Israel will legalize same-sex marriage by 2033?", "desc": "[LGBT rights in Israel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGBT_rights_in_Israel) are considered to be advanced relative to other countries in the Middle East. \n However, [marriage in Israel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marriage_in_Israel) is controlled by the religious authorities. As such there are no civil marriage whatsoever, and no same-sex marriage. However, foreign marriages, including same-sex marriages are recognized. A majority of Israelis [support same-sex marriage.](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-the-great-israeli-marriage-project-support-for-civil-marriage-and-lgbtq-rights-1.10146642)", "resc": "This question resolves as the day that legally recognized marriages take place within the State of Israel between people of the same sex according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions). It resolves as **\"> December 31, 2121\"** if that does not happen before December 31, 2121", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2044", "upper_75": "2059", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that psilocybin will be legal for therapy in 4.50 of the 50 US states by December 31, 2025?", "desc": "Improving mental health seems like one of the most direct ways of\nmaking people better off, and there appear to be many promising areas for reform — especially with regard to new [drug therapies](https://maps.org/). \n\nOne of the new possible drug therapies focuses on the use of psilocybin. Studies suggest substantial rapid and enduring antidepressant effects of psilocybin-assisted therapy among patients with [major depressive disorder](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/fullarticle/2772630).\n\n The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) granted psilocybin breakthrough therapy designation. In November 2020, the state of Oregon became the first U.S. state to both decriminalize psilocybin and also legalize it for therapeutic use.", "resc": "Territories and Washington D.C. are not considered a state for the purpose of this question.\nDecriminalization of psilocybin is not considered the same as its approval for medical use", "lower_25": "2.40", "median": "4.50", "upper_75": "7.61", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Tether (USDT) breaks its peg with the U.S. dollar by June 1, 2025, with a 75% likelihood occurring in March 2025?", "desc": "So called stablecoins are pegged to fiat currency such as the U.S. dollar. Issuers of stablecoins operate therefore as unregulated quasi-money market funds (MMFs). In contrast to regulated entities such as MMFs, stablecoin issuers often give little to no insight into their reserves.\n\n[Tether Limited](https://tether.to/) is the issuer of the [largest stablecoin](https://www.theblockcrypto.com/data/decentralized-finance/stablecoins/total-stablecoin-supply-daily), USDT, with a market capitalization of [around US$65 billion](https://www.theblockcrypto.com/data/decentralized-finance/stablecoins/usdt-supply-by-blockchain-daily). Tether is infamous for its controversial business dealings, including but not limited to losing US$851 million of customer deposits at sister company Bitfinex with Panama-based Crypto Capital Corp. Consequently, [US$625 million](https://www.ft.com/content/75daa4c5-8d26-35e9-bd3e-21e8430a3068) were drawn from Tether's reserves without disclosure to their customers. \n\nTether's backing [remains questionable to this day](https://www.ft.com/content/342966af-98dc-4b48-b997-38c00804270a); with the majority of reserves supposedly held in commercial paper with unknown credit risk.\n\nImportantly, stablecoins ([and specifically USDT](https://www.theblockcrypto.com/data/decentralized-finance/stablecoins/adjusted-on-chain-volume-of-stablecoins-monthly)) provide the majority of liquidity to the crypto ecosystem; hence a run on Tether could lead to substantial volatility in the crypto markets.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date by which USDT has been trading below US$0.9 for at least 12 hours on at least 2 of the following crypto exchanges: Binance, Coinbase, Kraken, FTX or Bitfinex.\n\nThis question will resolve ambiguously if USDT does not break its peg before June 1, 2025 or the mentioned exchanges cease to exist and/or do not trade USDT/USD.", "lower_25": "Feb 2024", "median": "Oct 2024", "upper_75": "Mar 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Tether (USDT) breaks its peg with the U.S. dollar by June 1, 2025, with a 75% likelihood occurring in March 2025?", "desc": "So called stablecoins are pegged to fiat currency such as the U.S. dollar. Issuers of stablecoins operate therefore as unregulated quasi-money market funds (MMFs). In contrast to regulated entities such as MMFs, stablecoin issuers often give little to no insight into their reserves.\n\n[Tether Limited](https://tether.to/) is the issuer of the [largest stablecoin](https://www.theblockcrypto.com/data/decentralized-finance/stablecoins/total-stablecoin-supply-daily), USDT, with a market capitalization of [around US$65 billion](https://www.theblockcrypto.com/data/decentralized-finance/stablecoins/usdt-supply-by-blockchain-daily). Tether is infamous for its controversial business dealings, including but not limited to losing US$851 million of customer deposits at sister company Bitfinex with Panama-based Crypto Capital Corp. Consequently, [US$625 million](https://www.ft.com/content/75daa4c5-8d26-35e9-bd3e-21e8430a3068) were drawn from Tether's reserves without disclosure to their customers. \n\nTether's backing [remains questionable to this day](https://www.ft.com/content/342966af-98dc-4b48-b997-38c00804270a); with the majority of reserves supposedly held in commercial paper with unknown credit risk.\n\nImportantly, stablecoins ([and specifically USDT](https://www.theblockcrypto.com/data/decentralized-finance/stablecoins/adjusted-on-chain-volume-of-stablecoins-monthly)) provide the majority of liquidity to the crypto ecosystem; hence a run on Tether could lead to substantial volatility in the crypto markets.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date by which USDT has been trading below US$0.9 for at least 12 hours on at least 2 of the following crypto exchanges: Binance, Coinbase, Kraken, FTX or Bitfinex.\n\nThis question will resolve ambiguously if USDT does not break its peg before June 1, 2025 or the mentioned exchanges cease to exist and/or do not trade USDT/USD.", "lower_25": "Feb 2024", "median": "Oct 2024", "upper_75": "Mar 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum Antartic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) in these years will be 2.72?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Maximum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11544/)\n* [Minimum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11545/)\n* [Maximum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11546/)\n\n----\n\n> The sea ice cover is one of the key components of the polar climate system. It has been a focus of attention in recent years, largely because of a strong decrease in the Arctic sea ice cover and modeling results that indicate that global warming could be amplified in the Arctic on account of ice-albedo feedback. This results from the high reflectivity (albedo) of the sea ice compared to ice-free waters. A satellite-based data record starting in late 1978 shows that indeed rapid changes have been occurring in the Arctic, where the ice coverage has been declining at a substantial rate. In contrast, in the Antarctic the sea ice coverage has been increasing although at a lesser rate than the decreases in the Arctic. \n\n> Sea ice concentration is the percent areal coverage of ice within the data element (grid cell). Sea ice extent is the integral sum of the areas of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration, while sea ice area is the integral sum of the product of ice concentration and area of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration. \n\nSource: [NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center](https://earth.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/data/current-state-sea-ice-cover)", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the minimum sea ice extent (in millions km^2) of the Antarctic Ice Cap in the given year, according to the [US National Snow and Ice Data Center](https://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index/data-and-image-archive)", "lower_25": "1.74", "median": "2.21", "upper_75": "2.72", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum Antartic sea ice extent in these years will be 17.59?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "17.59", "median": "18.26", "upper_75": "18.74", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum Antartic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) in these years will be 2.72?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Maximum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11544/)\n* [Minimum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11545/)\n* [Maximum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11546/)\n\n----\n\n> The sea ice cover is one of the key components of the polar climate system. It has been a focus of attention in recent years, largely because of a strong decrease in the Arctic sea ice cover and modeling results that indicate that global warming could be amplified in the Arctic on account of ice-albedo feedback. This results from the high reflectivity (albedo) of the sea ice compared to ice-free waters. A satellite-based data record starting in late 1978 shows that indeed rapid changes have been occurring in the Arctic, where the ice coverage has been declining at a substantial rate. In contrast, in the Antarctic the sea ice coverage has been increasing although at a lesser rate than the decreases in the Arctic. \n\n> Sea ice concentration is the percent areal coverage of ice within the data element (grid cell). Sea ice extent is the integral sum of the areas of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration, while sea ice area is the integral sum of the product of ice concentration and area of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration. \n\nSource: [NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center](https://earth.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/data/current-state-sea-ice-cover)", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the minimum sea ice extent (in millions km^2) of the Antarctic Ice Cap in the given year, according to the [US National Snow and Ice Data Center](https://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index/data-and-image-archive)", "lower_25": "1.74", "median": "2.21", "upper_75": "2.72", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum Antartic sea ice extent in these years (2030) will be 17.87?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "17.24", "median": "17.87", "upper_75": "18.55", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum Antartic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) in these years will be 2.72?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Maximum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11544/)\n* [Minimum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11545/)\n* [Maximum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11546/)\n\n----\n\n> The sea ice cover is one of the key components of the polar climate system. It has been a focus of attention in recent years, largely because of a strong decrease in the Arctic sea ice cover and modeling results that indicate that global warming could be amplified in the Arctic on account of ice-albedo feedback. This results from the high reflectivity (albedo) of the sea ice compared to ice-free waters. A satellite-based data record starting in late 1978 shows that indeed rapid changes have been occurring in the Arctic, where the ice coverage has been declining at a substantial rate. In contrast, in the Antarctic the sea ice coverage has been increasing although at a lesser rate than the decreases in the Arctic. \n\n> Sea ice concentration is the percent areal coverage of ice within the data element (grid cell). Sea ice extent is the integral sum of the areas of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration, while sea ice area is the integral sum of the product of ice concentration and area of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration. \n\nSource: [NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center](https://earth.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/data/current-state-sea-ice-cover)", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the minimum sea ice extent (in millions km^2) of the Antarctic Ice Cap in the given year, according to the [US National Snow and Ice Data Center](https://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index/data-and-image-archive)", "lower_25": "1.74", "median": "2.21", "upper_75": "2.72", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum Antartic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) in these years will be 2.26?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.71", "median": "2.26", "upper_75": "3.01", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum Antartic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) in these years will be 2.26?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.71", "median": "2.26", "upper_75": "3.01", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the space traveler fatality rate due to spacecraft anomalies will be less than 10−3 in the 2020's?", "desc": "", "resc": "2021 has seen the realization of the dream of private space tourism, with the successful flight of Blue Origin's New Shepherd and Virgin Galactic's SpaceShipTwo, and SpaceX's \"Inspiration 4\" mission. Professional astronauts travelling to and living on the ISS and Tiangong also continues as usual. The purpose of this question is to characterize the near-term risk of flying to space for all space travelers.\n\n***What will be the space traveler fatality rate due to spacecraft anomalies in the 2020's?***\n\nDeaths must be on a vehicle that is designed to travel above 50 miles (80.5 km) in altitude, or otherwise occur above 50 miles, meeting the US DoD criteria for astronaut wings. As of the writing of this question this includes anything already in or which reaches orbit, spacewalks, as well as both the New Shepherd and SpaceShipTwo suborbital vehicles. Deaths must be on routine flights, and not during development, training, or testing. To date, Wikipedia's [List of spaceflight-related accidents and injuries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_spaceflight-related_accidents_and_incidents) tallies 19 deaths during spaceflight after excluding deaths during training and testing, which are the only deaths on that page which would meet the intent of this question.\n\nDeaths must also be of (actual or potential) space travelers who are on the vehicle, and not surrounding people. Accidents on supporting infrastructure does not count, unless that accident causes an event on the vehicle which then itself causes fatalities. For example, a fire on a launch pad would not count, that fire causing the vehicle to explode and kill pad workers or observing astronauts would also not, but that vehicle explosion killing people in the capsule would. Deaths on the ground due to falling debris also would not count.\n\nThe fatality rate will be determined by dividing the number of spaceflight fatalities by the number of space travelers between the dates of 2020-01-01 and 2029-12-31. The total number of space travelers will be determined by summing the number of US DoD-qualified people on [List of space travelers by name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_space_travelers_by_name) and [Commercial astronaut](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commercial_astronaut), and subtracting the 574 people on the [2019-12-31 edit](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=List_of_space_travelers_by_name&oldid=933739120) of the first page. As of 2021-09-09 this stands at 587 + 7 - 574 = 20. The number of fatalities will be determined from the \"Astronaut fatalities: During Spaceflight\" section of [List of spaceflight-related accidents and injuries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_spaceflight-related_accidents_and_incidents) page, excluding training and testing, with dates in the 2020's. Names must have been on either list for three months in the event of editing controversies. Comparable pages will be used if those are not available at the time of resolution, or do not meet the intent of this question. \n\nAs of the writing of this question, the fatality rate in the 2020's is 0%, and prior to 2020 is 19/574 = 3.3%.\n\n[fine-print]\nThe resolution criteria is on a per-person basis, so an astronaut who takes multiple flights would not count multiple times. Astronauts who first flew before 2020 and take another flight in the future would also be excluded from the total number of space travelers under the resolution criteria, though their death would count. \n\nAcute injuries which lead to death on the ground within a month will count as deaths.\n\nDeaths due to health conditions not caused by an anomaly (excitement-induced heart attacks, for example) will not count for the purposes of this question.\n\nIn-space homocides, deaths due to sabotage, or other intentional deaths will not count for the purposes of this question.\n\n\"Space traveler\" is used as a general term and is meant to encompass professional astronauts/cosmonauts, tourists, etc.\n\nMake predictions in percents. A fatality rate of 1% would correspond to a prediction of 1, not 0.01.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "< 10−3", "median": "< 10−3", "upper_75": "2.30×10−3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that psilocybin will be legal for therapy in 4.50 of the 50 US states by December 31, 2025?", "desc": "Improving mental health seems like one of the most direct ways of\nmaking people better off, and there appear to be many promising areas for reform — especially with regard to new [drug therapies](https://maps.org/). \n\nOne of the new possible drug therapies focuses on the use of psilocybin. Studies suggest substantial rapid and enduring antidepressant effects of psilocybin-assisted therapy among patients with [major depressive disorder](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/fullarticle/2772630).\n\n The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) granted psilocybin breakthrough therapy designation. In November 2020, the state of Oregon became the first U.S. state to both decriminalize psilocybin and also legalize it for therapeutic use.", "resc": "Territories and Washington D.C. are not considered a state for the purpose of this question.\nDecriminalization of psilocybin is not considered the same as its approval for medical use", "lower_25": "2.40", "median": "4.50", "upper_75": "7.61", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum Antartic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) in these years will be 2.26?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.71", "median": "2.26", "upper_75": "3.01", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the space traveler fatality rate due to spacecraft anomalies will be less than 10−3 in the 2020's?", "desc": "", "resc": "2021 has seen the realization of the dream of private space tourism, with the successful flight of Blue Origin's New Shepherd and Virgin Galactic's SpaceShipTwo, and SpaceX's \"Inspiration 4\" mission. Professional astronauts travelling to and living on the ISS and Tiangong also continues as usual. The purpose of this question is to characterize the near-term risk of flying to space for all space travelers.\n\n***What will be the space traveler fatality rate due to spacecraft anomalies in the 2020's?***\n\nDeaths must be on a vehicle that is designed to travel above 50 miles (80.5 km) in altitude, or otherwise occur above 50 miles, meeting the US DoD criteria for astronaut wings. As of the writing of this question this includes anything already in or which reaches orbit, spacewalks, as well as both the New Shepherd and SpaceShipTwo suborbital vehicles. Deaths must be on routine flights, and not during development, training, or testing. To date, Wikipedia's [List of spaceflight-related accidents and injuries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_spaceflight-related_accidents_and_incidents) tallies 19 deaths during spaceflight after excluding deaths during training and testing, which are the only deaths on that page which would meet the intent of this question.\n\nDeaths must also be of (actual or potential) space travelers who are on the vehicle, and not surrounding people. Accidents on supporting infrastructure does not count, unless that accident causes an event on the vehicle which then itself causes fatalities. For example, a fire on a launch pad would not count, that fire causing the vehicle to explode and kill pad workers or observing astronauts would also not, but that vehicle explosion killing people in the capsule would. Deaths on the ground due to falling debris also would not count.\n\nThe fatality rate will be determined by dividing the number of spaceflight fatalities by the number of space travelers between the dates of 2020-01-01 and 2029-12-31. The total number of space travelers will be determined by summing the number of US DoD-qualified people on [List of space travelers by name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_space_travelers_by_name) and [Commercial astronaut](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commercial_astronaut), and subtracting the 574 people on the [2019-12-31 edit](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=List_of_space_travelers_by_name&oldid=933739120) of the first page. As of 2021-09-09 this stands at 587 + 7 - 574 = 20. The number of fatalities will be determined from the \"Astronaut fatalities: During Spaceflight\" section of [List of spaceflight-related accidents and injuries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_spaceflight-related_accidents_and_incidents) page, excluding training and testing, with dates in the 2020's. Names must have been on either list for three months in the event of editing controversies. Comparable pages will be used if those are not available at the time of resolution, or do not meet the intent of this question. \n\nAs of the writing of this question, the fatality rate in the 2020's is 0%, and prior to 2020 is 19/574 = 3.3%.\n\n[fine-print]\nThe resolution criteria is on a per-person basis, so an astronaut who takes multiple flights would not count multiple times. Astronauts who first flew before 2020 and take another flight in the future would also be excluded from the total number of space travelers under the resolution criteria, though their death would count. \n\nAcute injuries which lead to death on the ground within a month will count as deaths.\n\nDeaths due to health conditions not caused by an anomaly (excitement-induced heart attacks, for example) will not count for the purposes of this question.\n\nIn-space homocides, deaths due to sabotage, or other intentional deaths will not count for the purposes of this question.\n\n\"Space traveler\" is used as a general term and is meant to encompass professional astronauts/cosmonauts, tourists, etc.\n\nMake predictions in percents. A fatality rate of 1% would correspond to a prediction of 1, not 0.01.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "< 10−3", "median": "< 10−3", "upper_75": "2.30×10−3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum Antartic sea ice extent in these years will be 17.59?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "17.59", "median": "18.26", "upper_75": "18.74", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum Antartic sea ice extent in these years (2030) will be 17.87?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "17.24", "median": "17.87", "upper_75": "18.55", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum arctic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) in these years will be 14.35?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "14.00", "median": "14.35", "upper_75": "14.67", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum arctic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) in these years will be 14.35?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "14.00", "median": "14.35", "upper_75": "14.67", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum Antartic sea ice extent in these years (2030) will be 17.87?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "17.24", "median": "17.87", "upper_75": "18.55", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum Antartic sea ice extent in these years will be 17.59?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "17.59", "median": "18.26", "upper_75": "18.74", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum arctic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) in these years will be 14.35?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "14.00", "median": "14.35", "upper_75": "14.67", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum arctic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) in these years will be 75% of 14.44?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Minimum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11545/)\n* [Maximum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11546/)\n* [Minimum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11547/)\n\n----\n\n> The sea ice cover is one of the key components of the polar climate system. It has been a focus of attention in recent years, largely because of a strong decrease in the Arctic sea ice cover and modeling results that indicate that global warming could be amplified in the Arctic on account of ice-albedo feedback. This results from the high reflectivity (albedo) of the sea ice compared to ice-free waters. A satellite-based data record starting in late 1978 shows that indeed rapid changes have been occurring in the Arctic, where the ice coverage has been declining at a substantial rate. In contrast, in the Antarctic the sea ice coverage has been increasing although at a lesser rate than the decreases in the Arctic. \n\n> Sea ice concentration is the percent areal coverage of ice within the data element (grid cell). Sea ice extent is the integral sum of the areas of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration, while sea ice area is the integral sum of the product of ice concentration and area of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration. \n\nSource: [NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center](https://earth.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/data/current-state-sea-ice-cover)", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the maximum sea ice extent (in millions km^2) of the Artic Ice Cap in the given year, according to the [US National Snow and Ice Data Center](https://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index/data-and-image-archive)", "lower_25": "13.18", "median": "13.81", "upper_75": "14.44", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the space traveler fatality rate due to spacecraft anomalies will be less than 10−3 in the 2020's?", "desc": "", "resc": "2021 has seen the realization of the dream of private space tourism, with the successful flight of Blue Origin's New Shepherd and Virgin Galactic's SpaceShipTwo, and SpaceX's \"Inspiration 4\" mission. Professional astronauts travelling to and living on the ISS and Tiangong also continues as usual. The purpose of this question is to characterize the near-term risk of flying to space for all space travelers.\n\n***What will be the space traveler fatality rate due to spacecraft anomalies in the 2020's?***\n\nDeaths must be on a vehicle that is designed to travel above 50 miles (80.5 km) in altitude, or otherwise occur above 50 miles, meeting the US DoD criteria for astronaut wings. As of the writing of this question this includes anything already in or which reaches orbit, spacewalks, as well as both the New Shepherd and SpaceShipTwo suborbital vehicles. Deaths must be on routine flights, and not during development, training, or testing. To date, Wikipedia's [List of spaceflight-related accidents and injuries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_spaceflight-related_accidents_and_incidents) tallies 19 deaths during spaceflight after excluding deaths during training and testing, which are the only deaths on that page which would meet the intent of this question.\n\nDeaths must also be of (actual or potential) space travelers who are on the vehicle, and not surrounding people. Accidents on supporting infrastructure does not count, unless that accident causes an event on the vehicle which then itself causes fatalities. For example, a fire on a launch pad would not count, that fire causing the vehicle to explode and kill pad workers or observing astronauts would also not, but that vehicle explosion killing people in the capsule would. Deaths on the ground due to falling debris also would not count.\n\nThe fatality rate will be determined by dividing the number of spaceflight fatalities by the number of space travelers between the dates of 2020-01-01 and 2029-12-31. The total number of space travelers will be determined by summing the number of US DoD-qualified people on [List of space travelers by name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_space_travelers_by_name) and [Commercial astronaut](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commercial_astronaut), and subtracting the 574 people on the [2019-12-31 edit](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=List_of_space_travelers_by_name&oldid=933739120) of the first page. As of 2021-09-09 this stands at 587 + 7 - 574 = 20. The number of fatalities will be determined from the \"Astronaut fatalities: During Spaceflight\" section of [List of spaceflight-related accidents and injuries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_spaceflight-related_accidents_and_incidents) page, excluding training and testing, with dates in the 2020's. Names must have been on either list for three months in the event of editing controversies. Comparable pages will be used if those are not available at the time of resolution, or do not meet the intent of this question. \n\nAs of the writing of this question, the fatality rate in the 2020's is 0%, and prior to 2020 is 19/574 = 3.3%.\n\n[fine-print]\nThe resolution criteria is on a per-person basis, so an astronaut who takes multiple flights would not count multiple times. Astronauts who first flew before 2020 and take another flight in the future would also be excluded from the total number of space travelers under the resolution criteria, though their death would count. \n\nAcute injuries which lead to death on the ground within a month will count as deaths.\n\nDeaths due to health conditions not caused by an anomaly (excitement-induced heart attacks, for example) will not count for the purposes of this question.\n\nIn-space homocides, deaths due to sabotage, or other intentional deaths will not count for the purposes of this question.\n\n\"Space traveler\" is used as a general term and is meant to encompass professional astronauts/cosmonauts, tourists, etc.\n\nMake predictions in percents. A fatality rate of 1% would correspond to a prediction of 1, not 0.01.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "< 10−3", "median": "< 10−3", "upper_75": "2.30×10−3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum arctic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) in these years will be 75% of 14.44?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Minimum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11545/)\n* [Maximum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11546/)\n* [Minimum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11547/)\n\n----\n\n> The sea ice cover is one of the key components of the polar climate system. It has been a focus of attention in recent years, largely because of a strong decrease in the Arctic sea ice cover and modeling results that indicate that global warming could be amplified in the Arctic on account of ice-albedo feedback. This results from the high reflectivity (albedo) of the sea ice compared to ice-free waters. A satellite-based data record starting in late 1978 shows that indeed rapid changes have been occurring in the Arctic, where the ice coverage has been declining at a substantial rate. In contrast, in the Antarctic the sea ice coverage has been increasing although at a lesser rate than the decreases in the Arctic. \n\n> Sea ice concentration is the percent areal coverage of ice within the data element (grid cell). Sea ice extent is the integral sum of the areas of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration, while sea ice area is the integral sum of the product of ice concentration and area of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration. \n\nSource: [NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center](https://earth.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/data/current-state-sea-ice-cover)", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the maximum sea ice extent (in millions km^2) of the Artic Ice Cap in the given year, according to the [US National Snow and Ice Data Center](https://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index/data-and-image-archive)", "lower_25": "13.18", "median": "13.81", "upper_75": "14.44", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that terrorism will cause 25.0k deaths globally in 2025?", "desc": "The [Global Terrorism Database](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Terrorism_Database) records terrorist incidents across the globe. The most recent data published (as of September 2021) was for 2019.\n\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of people killed by terrorist attacks in the year 2025 according to the [National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/) (START). For example, the equivalent number for 2019 is 20,309.\n\nThis question will close retroactively 24 hours before the publication of 2025 data by START", "lower_25": "19.5k", "median": "25.0k", "upper_75": "31.0k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum arctic sea ice extent in the following years (2025) will be 4.33?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.41", "median": "3.89", "upper_75": "4.33", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that terrorism will cause 25.0k deaths globally in 2025?", "desc": "The [Global Terrorism Database](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Terrorism_Database) records terrorist incidents across the globe. The most recent data published (as of September 2021) was for 2019.\n\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of people killed by terrorist attacks in the year 2025 according to the [National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/) (START). For example, the equivalent number for 2019 is 20,309.\n\nThis question will close retroactively 24 hours before the publication of 2025 data by START", "lower_25": "19.5k", "median": "25.0k", "upper_75": "31.0k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum arctic sea ice extent in the following years (2025) will be 4.33?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.41", "median": "3.89", "upper_75": "4.33", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many emojis will there be in 2026, considering that there are currently 5.43k emojis?", "desc": "July 17th is World Emoji Day. This day is typically used by platform vendors to announce new emojis supported on their platform. \n\nEmojis are a subsection of the Unicode standard, and by World Emoji Day, the upcoming version of the yearly Unicode standard is in a very stable state, so that the total number of Emojis can be determined.\n\nThe number of Emojis has increased steadily since [Unicode v11.0 in 2018 when it was at 2789](https://unicode.org/emoji/charts-11.0/emoji-counts.html) to [3633 in Unicode v14.0, published 2021](https://unicode.org/emoji/charts-14.0/emoji-counts.html).\n\nWhat will be the growth trend of Emojis in the next five years and how many emojis will be there in Unicode 19.0, expected in 2026?", "resc": "The question will resolve according to the total number of Emojis reported in the [Emoji Counts](https://unicode.org/emoji/charts/emoji-counts.html) table published by Unicode, Inc.\n\nIf no Emoji Counts chart is published by Unicode, Inc. at that location, Metaculus moderators may determine the count according to numbers published by Unicode, Inc. or a successor organization elsewhere. \n\nIf the latest version of the Unicode standard at resolution time is not 19.0, the question will be resolved according to the latest released version. This also applies if the standard ceases to be updated or published in the meantime", "lower_25": "4.03k", "median": "4.56k", "upper_75": "5.43k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum arctic sea ice extent in the following years (2030) will be 2.33?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.33", "median": "3.19", "upper_75": "3.86", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum arctic sea ice extent in the following years (2025) will be 4.33?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.41", "median": "3.89", "upper_75": "4.33", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will cease to be a Maronite President of Lebanon, a Sunni Prime Minister of Lebanon, or a Shia Speaker of Parliament of Lebanon by 2031?", "desc": "Lebanon has an [informal agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Pact) which stipulates among other things that the President is always Maronite, the Prime Minister is always Sunni, and the Speaker of Parliament is always Shia. The [Taif Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taif_Agreement) ended the [Lebanese Civil War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanese_Civil_War) and modified this sectarian system, changing the quotas for allocated seats slightly in favor of the Muslim population. Recently, there have been [anti-sectarian and anti-corruption protests](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/17_October_Revolution) following troubles in Lebanon.", "resc": "This question resolves positive when at least one of the following holds:\n\n- One of the offices of President of Lebanon, Prime Minister of Lebanon, and Speaker of the House of Lebanon, or an equivalent successor role, is vacant continuously for a period of 28 days.\n\n- There is a President of Lebanon (or an equivalent successor role) who is not a Maronite Christian\n\n- There is a Prime Minister of Lebanon (or an equivalent successor role) who is not a Sunni Muslim.\n\n- There is a Speaker of Parliament of Lebanon (or an equivalent successor role) who is not a Shia Muslim.", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will cease to be a Maronite President of Lebanon, a Sunni Prime Minister of Lebanon, or a Shia Speaker of Parliament of Lebanon by 2031?", "desc": "Lebanon has an [informal agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Pact) which stipulates among other things that the President is always Maronite, the Prime Minister is always Sunni, and the Speaker of Parliament is always Shia. The [Taif Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taif_Agreement) ended the [Lebanese Civil War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanese_Civil_War) and modified this sectarian system, changing the quotas for allocated seats slightly in favor of the Muslim population. Recently, there have been [anti-sectarian and anti-corruption protests](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/17_October_Revolution) following troubles in Lebanon.", "resc": "This question resolves positive when at least one of the following holds:\n\n- One of the offices of President of Lebanon, Prime Minister of Lebanon, and Speaker of the House of Lebanon, or an equivalent successor role, is vacant continuously for a period of 28 days.\n\n- There is a President of Lebanon (or an equivalent successor role) who is not a Maronite Christian\n\n- There is a Prime Minister of Lebanon (or an equivalent successor role) who is not a Sunni Muslim.\n\n- There is a Speaker of Parliament of Lebanon (or an equivalent successor role) who is not a Shia Muslim.", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many emojis will there be in 2026, considering that there are currently 5.43k emojis?", "desc": "July 17th is World Emoji Day. This day is typically used by platform vendors to announce new emojis supported on their platform. \n\nEmojis are a subsection of the Unicode standard, and by World Emoji Day, the upcoming version of the yearly Unicode standard is in a very stable state, so that the total number of Emojis can be determined.\n\nThe number of Emojis has increased steadily since [Unicode v11.0 in 2018 when it was at 2789](https://unicode.org/emoji/charts-11.0/emoji-counts.html) to [3633 in Unicode v14.0, published 2021](https://unicode.org/emoji/charts-14.0/emoji-counts.html).\n\nWhat will be the growth trend of Emojis in the next five years and how many emojis will be there in Unicode 19.0, expected in 2026?", "resc": "The question will resolve according to the total number of Emojis reported in the [Emoji Counts](https://unicode.org/emoji/charts/emoji-counts.html) table published by Unicode, Inc.\n\nIf no Emoji Counts chart is published by Unicode, Inc. at that location, Metaculus moderators may determine the count according to numbers published by Unicode, Inc. or a successor organization elsewhere. \n\nIf the latest version of the Unicode standard at resolution time is not 19.0, the question will be resolved according to the latest released version. This also applies if the standard ceases to be updated or published in the meantime", "lower_25": "4.03k", "median": "4.56k", "upper_75": "5.43k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will cease to be a Maronite President of Lebanon, a Sunni Prime Minister of Lebanon, or a Shia Speaker of Parliament of Lebanon by 2031?", "desc": "Lebanon has an [informal agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Pact) which stipulates among other things that the President is always Maronite, the Prime Minister is always Sunni, and the Speaker of Parliament is always Shia. The [Taif Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taif_Agreement) ended the [Lebanese Civil War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanese_Civil_War) and modified this sectarian system, changing the quotas for allocated seats slightly in favor of the Muslim population. Recently, there have been [anti-sectarian and anti-corruption protests](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/17_October_Revolution) following troubles in Lebanon.", "resc": "This question resolves positive when at least one of the following holds:\n\n- One of the offices of President of Lebanon, Prime Minister of Lebanon, and Speaker of the House of Lebanon, or an equivalent successor role, is vacant continuously for a period of 28 days.\n\n- There is a President of Lebanon (or an equivalent successor role) who is not a Maronite Christian\n\n- There is a Prime Minister of Lebanon (or an equivalent successor role) who is not a Sunni Muslim.\n\n- There is a Speaker of Parliament of Lebanon (or an equivalent successor role) who is not a Shia Muslim.", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum arctic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) in these years will be 75% of 14.44?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Minimum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11545/)\n* [Maximum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11546/)\n* [Minimum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11547/)\n\n----\n\n> The sea ice cover is one of the key components of the polar climate system. It has been a focus of attention in recent years, largely because of a strong decrease in the Arctic sea ice cover and modeling results that indicate that global warming could be amplified in the Arctic on account of ice-albedo feedback. This results from the high reflectivity (albedo) of the sea ice compared to ice-free waters. A satellite-based data record starting in late 1978 shows that indeed rapid changes have been occurring in the Arctic, where the ice coverage has been declining at a substantial rate. In contrast, in the Antarctic the sea ice coverage has been increasing although at a lesser rate than the decreases in the Arctic. \n\n> Sea ice concentration is the percent areal coverage of ice within the data element (grid cell). Sea ice extent is the integral sum of the areas of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration, while sea ice area is the integral sum of the product of ice concentration and area of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration. \n\nSource: [NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center](https://earth.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/data/current-state-sea-ice-cover)", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the maximum sea ice extent (in millions km^2) of the Artic Ice Cap in the given year, according to the [US National Snow and Ice Data Center](https://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index/data-and-image-archive)", "lower_25": "13.18", "median": "13.81", "upper_75": "14.44", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum arctic sea ice extent in the following years (2030) will be 2.33?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.33", "median": "3.19", "upper_75": "3.86", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum arctic sea ice extent in the following years (2030) will be 2.33?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.33", "median": "3.19", "upper_75": "3.86", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many emojis will there be in 2026, considering that there are currently 5.43k emojis?", "desc": "July 17th is World Emoji Day. This day is typically used by platform vendors to announce new emojis supported on their platform. \n\nEmojis are a subsection of the Unicode standard, and by World Emoji Day, the upcoming version of the yearly Unicode standard is in a very stable state, so that the total number of Emojis can be determined.\n\nThe number of Emojis has increased steadily since [Unicode v11.0 in 2018 when it was at 2789](https://unicode.org/emoji/charts-11.0/emoji-counts.html) to [3633 in Unicode v14.0, published 2021](https://unicode.org/emoji/charts-14.0/emoji-counts.html).\n\nWhat will be the growth trend of Emojis in the next five years and how many emojis will be there in Unicode 19.0, expected in 2026?", "resc": "The question will resolve according to the total number of Emojis reported in the [Emoji Counts](https://unicode.org/emoji/charts/emoji-counts.html) table published by Unicode, Inc.\n\nIf no Emoji Counts chart is published by Unicode, Inc. at that location, Metaculus moderators may determine the count according to numbers published by Unicode, Inc. or a successor organization elsewhere. \n\nIf the latest version of the Unicode standard at resolution time is not 19.0, the question will be resolved according to the latest released version. This also applies if the standard ceases to be updated or published in the meantime", "lower_25": "4.03k", "median": "4.56k", "upper_75": "5.43k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that terrorism will cause 25.0k deaths globally in 2025?", "desc": "The [Global Terrorism Database](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Terrorism_Database) records terrorist incidents across the globe. The most recent data published (as of September 2021) was for 2019.\n\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of people killed by terrorist attacks in the year 2025 according to the [National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/) (START). For example, the equivalent number for 2019 is 20,309.\n\nThis question will close retroactively 24 hours before the publication of 2025 data by START", "lower_25": "19.5k", "median": "25.0k", "upper_75": "31.0k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best proven upper bound on the infimum of S in 2120 will be 0.743?", "desc": "", "resc": "*This question is linked to a fortified essay by ege_erdil on the past and future of the Riemann hypothesis. [Read the essay](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7997/riemann-hypothesis-past-and-future/) to learn more.*\n


\nLet \\( \\mu \\) denote the Mobius function and define \\( M \\) as a function from the positive integers to the integers to be equal to the partial sums of the Mobius function. In other words, define\n\n\\[ M\\left(N\\right)=\\sum_{k=1}^{N}{\\mu(k)} \\]\n\nIt is known that \\( M\\left(N\\right)=o(N) \\): this statement is equivalent to the prime number theorem. ( \\( M\\left(N\\right) \\) is called the [Mertens function](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mertens_function).)\n\nLet \\( S \\) denote the set of all positive real numbers \\( r \\) such that \\( M\\left(N\\right)=O(N^{r+\\epsilon}) \\) for all \\( \\epsilon>0 \\). The statement that \\( \\inf{S} = 1/2 \\) is equivalent to the Riemann hypothesis, but even if this does not hold, we can still try to ask about how big the partial sums \\( M\\left(N\\right) \\) can grow. Currently, the best proven upper bound on \\( \\inf S \\) is 1.\n\n**What will be the best proven upper bound on the infimum of \\( S \\) in 2120?**\n\nThis question will resolve as the best (smallest) proven upper bound on the infimum of \\( S \\) that is available in the year 2120.", "lower_25": "0.502", "median": "0.506", "upper_75": "0.743", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best proven upper bound on the infimum of S in 2120 will be 0.743?", "desc": "", "resc": "*This question is linked to a fortified essay by ege_erdil on the past and future of the Riemann hypothesis. [Read the essay](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7997/riemann-hypothesis-past-and-future/) to learn more.*\n


\nLet \\( \\mu \\) denote the Mobius function and define \\( M \\) as a function from the positive integers to the integers to be equal to the partial sums of the Mobius function. In other words, define\n\n\\[ M\\left(N\\right)=\\sum_{k=1}^{N}{\\mu(k)} \\]\n\nIt is known that \\( M\\left(N\\right)=o(N) \\): this statement is equivalent to the prime number theorem. ( \\( M\\left(N\\right) \\) is called the [Mertens function](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mertens_function).)\n\nLet \\( S \\) denote the set of all positive real numbers \\( r \\) such that \\( M\\left(N\\right)=O(N^{r+\\epsilon}) \\) for all \\( \\epsilon>0 \\). The statement that \\( \\inf{S} = 1/2 \\) is equivalent to the Riemann hypothesis, but even if this does not hold, we can still try to ask about how big the partial sums \\( M\\left(N\\right) \\) can grow. Currently, the best proven upper bound on \\( \\inf S \\) is 1.\n\n**What will be the best proven upper bound on the infimum of \\( S \\) in 2120?**\n\nThis question will resolve as the best (smallest) proven upper bound on the infimum of \\( S \\) that is available in the year 2120.", "lower_25": "0.502", "median": "0.506", "upper_75": "0.743", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best proven upper bound on the infimum of S in 2120 will be 0.743?", "desc": "", "resc": "*This question is linked to a fortified essay by ege_erdil on the past and future of the Riemann hypothesis. [Read the essay](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7997/riemann-hypothesis-past-and-future/) to learn more.*\n


\nLet \\( \\mu \\) denote the Mobius function and define \\( M \\) as a function from the positive integers to the integers to be equal to the partial sums of the Mobius function. In other words, define\n\n\\[ M\\left(N\\right)=\\sum_{k=1}^{N}{\\mu(k)} \\]\n\nIt is known that \\( M\\left(N\\right)=o(N) \\): this statement is equivalent to the prime number theorem. ( \\( M\\left(N\\right) \\) is called the [Mertens function](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mertens_function).)\n\nLet \\( S \\) denote the set of all positive real numbers \\( r \\) such that \\( M\\left(N\\right)=O(N^{r+\\epsilon}) \\) for all \\( \\epsilon>0 \\). The statement that \\( \\inf{S} = 1/2 \\) is equivalent to the Riemann hypothesis, but even if this does not hold, we can still try to ask about how big the partial sums \\( M\\left(N\\right) \\) can grow. Currently, the best proven upper bound on \\( \\inf S \\) is 1.\n\n**What will be the best proven upper bound on the infimum of \\( S \\) in 2120?**\n\nThis question will resolve as the best (smallest) proven upper bound on the infimum of \\( S \\) that is available in the year 2120.", "lower_25": "0.502", "median": "0.506", "upper_75": "0.743", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best proven lower bound on the infimum of S in 2120 will be 0.5027?", "desc": "", "resc": "*This question is linked to a fortified essay by ege_erdil on the past and future of the Riemann hypothesis. [Read the full essay here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7997/riemann-hypothesis-past-and-future/).*\n


\nLet \\( \\mu \\) denote the Mobius function and define \\( M \\) as a function from the positive integers to the integers to be equal to the partial sums of the Mobius function. In other words, define\n\n\\[ M\\left(N\\right)=\\sum_{k=1}^{N}{\\mu(k)} \\]\n\nIt is known that \\( M\\left(N\\right)=o(N) \\): this statement is equivalent to the prime number theorem. ( \\( M\\left(N\\right) \\) is called the [Mertens function](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mertens_function).)\n\nLet \\( S \\) denote the set of all positive real numbers \\( r \\) such that \\( M\\left(N\\right)=O(N^{r+\\epsilon}) \\) for all \\( \\epsilon>0 \\). The statement that \\( \\inf{S} = 1/2 \\) is equivalent to the Riemann hypothesis, but even if this does not hold, we can still try to ask about how big the partial sums \\( M\\left(N\\right) \\) can grow. Currently, the best proven lower bound on \\( \\inf S \\) is \\( 1/2 \\).\n\n**What will be the best proven lower bound on the infimum of \\( S \\) in 2120?**\n\nThis question will resolve as the best (largest) proven lower bound on the infimum of \\( S \\) that is available in the year 2120.", "lower_25": "0.5013", "median": "0.5027", "upper_75": "0.5059", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a language model will be developed by May 2023 that yields approximately human-level output?", "desc": "*This question is linked to a fortified essay on Human-Level Language Models. [Read the essay](https://www.metaculus.com/notebooks/8329/human-level-language-models/) to learn more and to see how they're linked.*\n\nA [language model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_model) is a probability distribution over a sequence of text, often used with the aim to write sentences in natural language that are coherent, despite not being written by any human. In 1950, Claude Shannon placed a lower bound on the inherent [entropy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_(information_theory)) in the English language to be [around 0.6](https://www.princeton.edu/~wbialek/rome/refs/shannon_51.pdf). Later research has [roughly confirmed](https://www.gwern.net/Differences#efficient-natural-languages) this result.\n\nArguably, a language model can be said to be at roughly \"human-level\" if its entropy is roughly equal to the estimated entropy in printed English. Concretely, let's define a human-level language model to be one whose word-level perplexity score is below 9.95, a character-level perplexity below 1.57, or a calculated entropy value below 0.65. These estimates lie slightly above the Shannon's lower bound estimate, to avoid a scenario where the question resolves very late as a result of a poor entropy estimate.", "resc": "Any of the following datasets are valid test sets in the English language for the purpose of this question:\n\n* Penn Treebank (Word Level)\t\n* Penn Treebank (Character Level)\n* WikiText-103\n* enwiki8\t\n* One Billion Word\n* Text8\n* WikiText-2\n* The Pile\n\nSee [this page](https://paperswithcode.com/task/language-modelling) for more information about each dataset, and current progress. This question resolves on the date during which a paper describing some language model is first published, which after or simultaneous with publishing, is revealed to have a word-level perplexity score below 9.95, a character-level perplexity score below 1.57, or a calculated entropy value below 0.65 on at least TWO of the benchmarks above. Importantly, the original paper introducing the paper need not report these results; this question may indeed resolve years after such a development becomes clear", "lower_25": "May 2023", "median": "Jun 2024", "upper_75": "Mar 2027", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best proven lower bound on the infimum of S in 2120 will be 0.5027?", "desc": "", "resc": "*This question is linked to a fortified essay by ege_erdil on the past and future of the Riemann hypothesis. [Read the full essay here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7997/riemann-hypothesis-past-and-future/).*\n


\nLet \\( \\mu \\) denote the Mobius function and define \\( M \\) as a function from the positive integers to the integers to be equal to the partial sums of the Mobius function. In other words, define\n\n\\[ M\\left(N\\right)=\\sum_{k=1}^{N}{\\mu(k)} \\]\n\nIt is known that \\( M\\left(N\\right)=o(N) \\): this statement is equivalent to the prime number theorem. ( \\( M\\left(N\\right) \\) is called the [Mertens function](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mertens_function).)\n\nLet \\( S \\) denote the set of all positive real numbers \\( r \\) such that \\( M\\left(N\\right)=O(N^{r+\\epsilon}) \\) for all \\( \\epsilon>0 \\). The statement that \\( \\inf{S} = 1/2 \\) is equivalent to the Riemann hypothesis, but even if this does not hold, we can still try to ask about how big the partial sums \\( M\\left(N\\right) \\) can grow. Currently, the best proven lower bound on \\( \\inf S \\) is \\( 1/2 \\).\n\n**What will be the best proven lower bound on the infimum of \\( S \\) in 2120?**\n\nThis question will resolve as the best (largest) proven lower bound on the infimum of \\( S \\) that is available in the year 2120.", "lower_25": "0.5013", "median": "0.5027", "upper_75": "0.5059", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a language model will be developed by May 2023 that yields approximately human-level output?", "desc": "*This question is linked to a fortified essay on Human-Level Language Models. [Read the essay](https://www.metaculus.com/notebooks/8329/human-level-language-models/) to learn more and to see how they're linked.*\n\nA [language model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_model) is a probability distribution over a sequence of text, often used with the aim to write sentences in natural language that are coherent, despite not being written by any human. In 1950, Claude Shannon placed a lower bound on the inherent [entropy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_(information_theory)) in the English language to be [around 0.6](https://www.princeton.edu/~wbialek/rome/refs/shannon_51.pdf). Later research has [roughly confirmed](https://www.gwern.net/Differences#efficient-natural-languages) this result.\n\nArguably, a language model can be said to be at roughly \"human-level\" if its entropy is roughly equal to the estimated entropy in printed English. Concretely, let's define a human-level language model to be one whose word-level perplexity score is below 9.95, a character-level perplexity below 1.57, or a calculated entropy value below 0.65. These estimates lie slightly above the Shannon's lower bound estimate, to avoid a scenario where the question resolves very late as a result of a poor entropy estimate.", "resc": "Any of the following datasets are valid test sets in the English language for the purpose of this question:\n\n* Penn Treebank (Word Level)\t\n* Penn Treebank (Character Level)\n* WikiText-103\n* enwiki8\t\n* One Billion Word\n* Text8\n* WikiText-2\n* The Pile\n\nSee [this page](https://paperswithcode.com/task/language-modelling) for more information about each dataset, and current progress. This question resolves on the date during which a paper describing some language model is first published, which after or simultaneous with publishing, is revealed to have a word-level perplexity score below 9.95, a character-level perplexity score below 1.57, or a calculated entropy value below 0.65 on at least TWO of the benchmarks above. Importantly, the original paper introducing the paper need not report these results; this question may indeed resolve years after such a development becomes clear", "lower_25": "May 2023", "median": "Jun 2024", "upper_75": "Mar 2027", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will give 4.45 billion USD in aid to Israel in 2030?", "desc": "The United States and Israel are [close](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel%E2%80%93United_States_relations) [military](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel%E2%80%93United_States_military_relations) [allies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Major_non-NATO_ally). Over the years, Israel has received [foreign aid from the United States](https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/total-u-s-foreign-aid-to-israel-1949-present), both military and economic. Proponents [argue](https://www.jns.org/opinion/us-aid-to-israel-is-an-investment/) that this aid helps advance Israeli and American interests. [Critics sympathetic to Israel](https://townhall.com/columnists/jeffjacoby/2016/09/05/israel-doesnt-need-american-foreign-aid-n2213875) [have](https://twitter.com/anshelpfeffer/status/1395769238523088897) [argued](https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium.HIGHLIGHT-end-u-s-aid-to-israel-for-the-sake-of-american-jews-1.9829349) that the aid is unnecessary, superfluous, and harmful for Israel because it is earmarked to buy American planes and that it is [no longer significant](https://twitter.com/davidshor/status/1440678615650213902). [Critics hostile to Israel](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/biden-israel-arms-sale-congress-reaction) have criticized the aid, calling it a violation of the [Leahy Law](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leahy_Law). The United States and Israel [signed a deal](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-israel-statement-idUSKCN11K2CI) under which the United States would give Israel $3.8B USD per year, which expires at the end of September 2028, when [FY 2028](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiscal_year#United_States) ends.", "resc": "This question resolves as the total amount of aid in billions of USD that Israel receives from the United States in [FY 2030](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiscal_year#United_States), as reported by the [Jewish Virtual Library](https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/total-u-s-foreign-aid-to-israel-1949-present). Should the Jewish Virtual Library not exist or not publish the relevant information, moderators may pick another reliable source at their discretion. Should no source be deemed suitable, the question will resolve ambiguou", "lower_25": "0.684", "median": "3.12", "upper_75": "4.45", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best proven lower bound on the infimum of S in 2120 will be 0.5027?", "desc": "", "resc": "*This question is linked to a fortified essay by ege_erdil on the past and future of the Riemann hypothesis. [Read the full essay here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7997/riemann-hypothesis-past-and-future/).*\n


\nLet \\( \\mu \\) denote the Mobius function and define \\( M \\) as a function from the positive integers to the integers to be equal to the partial sums of the Mobius function. In other words, define\n\n\\[ M\\left(N\\right)=\\sum_{k=1}^{N}{\\mu(k)} \\]\n\nIt is known that \\( M\\left(N\\right)=o(N) \\): this statement is equivalent to the prime number theorem. ( \\( M\\left(N\\right) \\) is called the [Mertens function](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mertens_function).)\n\nLet \\( S \\) denote the set of all positive real numbers \\( r \\) such that \\( M\\left(N\\right)=O(N^{r+\\epsilon}) \\) for all \\( \\epsilon>0 \\). The statement that \\( \\inf{S} = 1/2 \\) is equivalent to the Riemann hypothesis, but even if this does not hold, we can still try to ask about how big the partial sums \\( M\\left(N\\right) \\) can grow. Currently, the best proven lower bound on \\( \\inf S \\) is \\( 1/2 \\).\n\n**What will be the best proven lower bound on the infimum of \\( S \\) in 2120?**\n\nThis question will resolve as the best (largest) proven lower bound on the infimum of \\( S \\) that is available in the year 2120.", "lower_25": "0.5013", "median": "0.5027", "upper_75": "0.5059", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the WHO will announce the end of the COVID-19 pandemic by Aug 2028?", "desc": "On 2020-01-30, the World Health Organization [announced a Public Health Emergency of International Concern](https://web.archive.org/web/20210815071616/https://www.who.int/news/item/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-%282005%29-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-%282019-ncov%29) regarding the COVID-19 in China. [They declared](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-51839944) that the outbreak had become a pandemic on 2021-03-11 . [The declarations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_Health_Emergency_of_International_Concern) are typically renewed every 3 months as the WHO gives updated information on the severity of the outbreak, medical information, and policy recommendations. The WHO has renewed the PHEIC every 3 months since 2020-01-30, most recently [on 2021-07-14](https://web.archive.org/web/20210815063146/https://www.who.int/news/item/15-07-2021-statement-on-the-eighth-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-%282005%29-emergency-committee-regarding-the-coronavirus-disease-%28covid-19%29-pandemic).\n\nThe world is struggling to ask the nebulous question, \"When will the pandemic end?\" For some, it already has; from other points of view ([\"When will COVID-19 be eradicated?\"](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7601/covid-19-eradication/)) it may never end. But we don't have to bother with defining the \"end\" of the pandemic-- that's the WHO's job.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that the WHO announces that COVID-19 (and all related variants) is no longer a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, nor is it a global pandemic. No other sources (US CDC, EU CDC) will be considered for this question", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Jul 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the WHO will announce the end of the COVID-19 pandemic by Aug 2028?", "desc": "On 2020-01-30, the World Health Organization [announced a Public Health Emergency of International Concern](https://web.archive.org/web/20210815071616/https://www.who.int/news/item/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-%282005%29-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-%282019-ncov%29) regarding the COVID-19 in China. [They declared](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-51839944) that the outbreak had become a pandemic on 2021-03-11 . [The declarations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_Health_Emergency_of_International_Concern) are typically renewed every 3 months as the WHO gives updated information on the severity of the outbreak, medical information, and policy recommendations. The WHO has renewed the PHEIC every 3 months since 2020-01-30, most recently [on 2021-07-14](https://web.archive.org/web/20210815063146/https://www.who.int/news/item/15-07-2021-statement-on-the-eighth-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-%282005%29-emergency-committee-regarding-the-coronavirus-disease-%28covid-19%29-pandemic).\n\nThe world is struggling to ask the nebulous question, \"When will the pandemic end?\" For some, it already has; from other points of view ([\"When will COVID-19 be eradicated?\"](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7601/covid-19-eradication/)) it may never end. But we don't have to bother with defining the \"end\" of the pandemic-- that's the WHO's job.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that the WHO announces that COVID-19 (and all related variants) is no longer a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, nor is it a global pandemic. No other sources (US CDC, EU CDC) will be considered for this question", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Jul 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first FAAMG company will have a workforce that is 50% or fewer men by Not ≤ 2099?", "desc": "", "resc": "The San Francisco Chronicle [reports](https://www.sfchronicle.com/tech/article/Silicon-Valley-pledged-to-become-more-diverse-A-16414178.php):\n\n> With the industry having been a majority-white, majority-male space since birth, tech giants issued promises to diversify their staffs and promised hefty donations designed in part to help diversify employment pipelines and increase training for tech jobs.\n>\n> Among the more ambitious pledges last year, Google and Facebook pledged to increase underrepresented leadership by 30% over the next five years, with each earmarking more than $100 million to support Black business owners and other groups in the Black community. Other firms joined in: A 2020 study by corporate analytics service Blendoor estimates that more than $4.5 billion was poured into diversity efforts across the entire industry.\n\nThe \"Diversity in High Tech\" special report of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission states:\n\n> In Silicon Valley, employment of women and men in non-technology firms is at about parity with 49 percent women and 51 percent men. This compares to the 30 percent participation rate for women at 75 select leading Silicon Valley tech firms.\n\n***When will the first FAAMG have a workforce that is 50% or fewer men?***\n\nThe question will resolve when one of Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Google or Microsoft has published a diversity report where 50% or less (rounded off to the nearest integer) of its workforce is male, or when a third party auditor has published a report to that effect.\n\nIf this does not occur by 2100, this question resolves as >2100. \n\n[fine-print]\nThe correct year is the calendar year that the report covers, not the year it is published (or if the report says gender parity was reached in a period spanning multiple calendar years, the first of those calendar years).\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2054", "median": "2099", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2099", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first FAAMG company will have a workforce that is 50% or fewer men by Not ≤ 2099?", "desc": "", "resc": "The San Francisco Chronicle [reports](https://www.sfchronicle.com/tech/article/Silicon-Valley-pledged-to-become-more-diverse-A-16414178.php):\n\n> With the industry having been a majority-white, majority-male space since birth, tech giants issued promises to diversify their staffs and promised hefty donations designed in part to help diversify employment pipelines and increase training for tech jobs.\n>\n> Among the more ambitious pledges last year, Google and Facebook pledged to increase underrepresented leadership by 30% over the next five years, with each earmarking more than $100 million to support Black business owners and other groups in the Black community. Other firms joined in: A 2020 study by corporate analytics service Blendoor estimates that more than $4.5 billion was poured into diversity efforts across the entire industry.\n\nThe \"Diversity in High Tech\" special report of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission states:\n\n> In Silicon Valley, employment of women and men in non-technology firms is at about parity with 49 percent women and 51 percent men. This compares to the 30 percent participation rate for women at 75 select leading Silicon Valley tech firms.\n\n***When will the first FAAMG have a workforce that is 50% or fewer men?***\n\nThe question will resolve when one of Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Google or Microsoft has published a diversity report where 50% or less (rounded off to the nearest integer) of its workforce is male, or when a third party auditor has published a report to that effect.\n\nIf this does not occur by 2100, this question resolves as >2100. \n\n[fine-print]\nThe correct year is the calendar year that the report covers, not the year it is published (or if the report says gender parity was reached in a period spanning multiple calendar years, the first of those calendar years).\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2054", "median": "2099", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2099", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first FAAMG company will have a workforce that is 50% or fewer men by Not ≤ 2099?", "desc": "", "resc": "The San Francisco Chronicle [reports](https://www.sfchronicle.com/tech/article/Silicon-Valley-pledged-to-become-more-diverse-A-16414178.php):\n\n> With the industry having been a majority-white, majority-male space since birth, tech giants issued promises to diversify their staffs and promised hefty donations designed in part to help diversify employment pipelines and increase training for tech jobs.\n>\n> Among the more ambitious pledges last year, Google and Facebook pledged to increase underrepresented leadership by 30% over the next five years, with each earmarking more than $100 million to support Black business owners and other groups in the Black community. Other firms joined in: A 2020 study by corporate analytics service Blendoor estimates that more than $4.5 billion was poured into diversity efforts across the entire industry.\n\nThe \"Diversity in High Tech\" special report of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission states:\n\n> In Silicon Valley, employment of women and men in non-technology firms is at about parity with 49 percent women and 51 percent men. This compares to the 30 percent participation rate for women at 75 select leading Silicon Valley tech firms.\n\n***When will the first FAAMG have a workforce that is 50% or fewer men?***\n\nThe question will resolve when one of Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Google or Microsoft has published a diversity report where 50% or less (rounded off to the nearest integer) of its workforce is male, or when a third party auditor has published a report to that effect.\n\nIf this does not occur by 2100, this question resolves as >2100. \n\n[fine-print]\nThe correct year is the calendar year that the report covers, not the year it is published (or if the report says gender parity was reached in a period spanning multiple calendar years, the first of those calendar years).\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2054", "median": "2099", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2099", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a language model will be developed by May 2023 that yields approximately human-level output?", "desc": "*This question is linked to a fortified essay on Human-Level Language Models. [Read the essay](https://www.metaculus.com/notebooks/8329/human-level-language-models/) to learn more and to see how they're linked.*\n\nA [language model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_model) is a probability distribution over a sequence of text, often used with the aim to write sentences in natural language that are coherent, despite not being written by any human. In 1950, Claude Shannon placed a lower bound on the inherent [entropy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropy_(information_theory)) in the English language to be [around 0.6](https://www.princeton.edu/~wbialek/rome/refs/shannon_51.pdf). Later research has [roughly confirmed](https://www.gwern.net/Differences#efficient-natural-languages) this result.\n\nArguably, a language model can be said to be at roughly \"human-level\" if its entropy is roughly equal to the estimated entropy in printed English. Concretely, let's define a human-level language model to be one whose word-level perplexity score is below 9.95, a character-level perplexity below 1.57, or a calculated entropy value below 0.65. These estimates lie slightly above the Shannon's lower bound estimate, to avoid a scenario where the question resolves very late as a result of a poor entropy estimate.", "resc": "Any of the following datasets are valid test sets in the English language for the purpose of this question:\n\n* Penn Treebank (Word Level)\t\n* Penn Treebank (Character Level)\n* WikiText-103\n* enwiki8\t\n* One Billion Word\n* Text8\n* WikiText-2\n* The Pile\n\nSee [this page](https://paperswithcode.com/task/language-modelling) for more information about each dataset, and current progress. This question resolves on the date during which a paper describing some language model is first published, which after or simultaneous with publishing, is revealed to have a word-level perplexity score below 9.95, a character-level perplexity score below 1.57, or a calculated entropy value below 0.65 on at least TWO of the benchmarks above. Importantly, the original paper introducing the paper need not report these results; this question may indeed resolve years after such a development becomes clear", "lower_25": "May 2023", "median": "Jun 2024", "upper_75": "Mar 2027", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a language model will achieve a perplexity score of 14.1 on the Penn Treebank (Word Level) by the end of 2024?", "desc": "*This question is linked to a fortified essay on Human-Level Language Models. [Read the essay](https://www.metaculus.com/notebooks/8329/human-level-language-models/) to learn more and to see how they're linked.*\n\nThe [Penn Treebank dataset](https://catalog.ldc.upenn.edu/LDC99T42) is \"one million words of 1989 Wall Street Journal material annotated in Treebank II style\". It has been used for decades to measure the performance of language models at the task of predicting characters in English text. OpenAI's GPT-3 reportedly scored a word-level [perplexity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perplexity) score of 20.5. What will be the best reported score by the end of 2024?", "resc": "Papers With Code currently documents progress on the Penn Treebank (Word Level) dataset, which you can find [here](https://paperswithcode.com/sota/language-modelling-on-penn-treebank-word). At the end of 2024, the best credible word-level perplexity score by any language model, discovered by Metaculites on the Penn Treebank (Word Level) will determine resolution. For example, if no model improves on GPT-3's current lead, then this question will resolve at a value of 20.5", "lower_25": "11.0", "median": "14.1", "upper_75": "17.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will give 4.45 billion USD in aid to Israel in 2030?", "desc": "The United States and Israel are [close](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel%E2%80%93United_States_relations) [military](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel%E2%80%93United_States_military_relations) [allies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Major_non-NATO_ally). Over the years, Israel has received [foreign aid from the United States](https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/total-u-s-foreign-aid-to-israel-1949-present), both military and economic. Proponents [argue](https://www.jns.org/opinion/us-aid-to-israel-is-an-investment/) that this aid helps advance Israeli and American interests. [Critics sympathetic to Israel](https://townhall.com/columnists/jeffjacoby/2016/09/05/israel-doesnt-need-american-foreign-aid-n2213875) [have](https://twitter.com/anshelpfeffer/status/1395769238523088897) [argued](https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium.HIGHLIGHT-end-u-s-aid-to-israel-for-the-sake-of-american-jews-1.9829349) that the aid is unnecessary, superfluous, and harmful for Israel because it is earmarked to buy American planes and that it is [no longer significant](https://twitter.com/davidshor/status/1440678615650213902). [Critics hostile to Israel](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/biden-israel-arms-sale-congress-reaction) have criticized the aid, calling it a violation of the [Leahy Law](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leahy_Law). The United States and Israel [signed a deal](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-israel-statement-idUSKCN11K2CI) under which the United States would give Israel $3.8B USD per year, which expires at the end of September 2028, when [FY 2028](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiscal_year#United_States) ends.", "resc": "This question resolves as the total amount of aid in billions of USD that Israel receives from the United States in [FY 2030](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiscal_year#United_States), as reported by the [Jewish Virtual Library](https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/total-u-s-foreign-aid-to-israel-1949-present). Should the Jewish Virtual Library not exist or not publish the relevant information, moderators may pick another reliable source at their discretion. Should no source be deemed suitable, the question will resolve ambiguou", "lower_25": "0.684", "median": "3.12", "upper_75": "4.45", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will give 4.45 billion USD in aid to Israel in 2030?", "desc": "The United States and Israel are [close](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel%E2%80%93United_States_relations) [military](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel%E2%80%93United_States_military_relations) [allies](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Major_non-NATO_ally). Over the years, Israel has received [foreign aid from the United States](https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/total-u-s-foreign-aid-to-israel-1949-present), both military and economic. Proponents [argue](https://www.jns.org/opinion/us-aid-to-israel-is-an-investment/) that this aid helps advance Israeli and American interests. [Critics sympathetic to Israel](https://townhall.com/columnists/jeffjacoby/2016/09/05/israel-doesnt-need-american-foreign-aid-n2213875) [have](https://twitter.com/anshelpfeffer/status/1395769238523088897) [argued](https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium.HIGHLIGHT-end-u-s-aid-to-israel-for-the-sake-of-american-jews-1.9829349) that the aid is unnecessary, superfluous, and harmful for Israel because it is earmarked to buy American planes and that it is [no longer significant](https://twitter.com/davidshor/status/1440678615650213902). [Critics hostile to Israel](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/biden-israel-arms-sale-congress-reaction) have criticized the aid, calling it a violation of the [Leahy Law](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leahy_Law). The United States and Israel [signed a deal](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-israel-statement-idUSKCN11K2CI) under which the United States would give Israel $3.8B USD per year, which expires at the end of September 2028, when [FY 2028](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiscal_year#United_States) ends.", "resc": "This question resolves as the total amount of aid in billions of USD that Israel receives from the United States in [FY 2030](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiscal_year#United_States), as reported by the [Jewish Virtual Library](https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/total-u-s-foreign-aid-to-israel-1949-present). Should the Jewish Virtual Library not exist or not publish the relevant information, moderators may pick another reliable source at their discretion. Should no source be deemed suitable, the question will resolve ambiguou", "lower_25": "0.684", "median": "3.12", "upper_75": "4.45", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the WHO will announce the end of the COVID-19 pandemic by Aug 2028?", "desc": "On 2020-01-30, the World Health Organization [announced a Public Health Emergency of International Concern](https://web.archive.org/web/20210815071616/https://www.who.int/news/item/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-%282005%29-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-%282019-ncov%29) regarding the COVID-19 in China. [They declared](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-51839944) that the outbreak had become a pandemic on 2021-03-11 . [The declarations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_Health_Emergency_of_International_Concern) are typically renewed every 3 months as the WHO gives updated information on the severity of the outbreak, medical information, and policy recommendations. The WHO has renewed the PHEIC every 3 months since 2020-01-30, most recently [on 2021-07-14](https://web.archive.org/web/20210815063146/https://www.who.int/news/item/15-07-2021-statement-on-the-eighth-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-%282005%29-emergency-committee-regarding-the-coronavirus-disease-%28covid-19%29-pandemic).\n\nThe world is struggling to ask the nebulous question, \"When will the pandemic end?\" For some, it already has; from other points of view ([\"When will COVID-19 be eradicated?\"](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7601/covid-19-eradication/)) it may never end. But we don't have to bother with defining the \"end\" of the pandemic-- that's the WHO's job.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that the WHO announces that COVID-19 (and all related variants) is no longer a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, nor is it a global pandemic. No other sources (US CDC, EU CDC) will be considered for this question", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Jul 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a language model will achieve a perplexity score of 14.1 on the Penn Treebank (Word Level) by the end of 2024?", "desc": "*This question is linked to a fortified essay on Human-Level Language Models. [Read the essay](https://www.metaculus.com/notebooks/8329/human-level-language-models/) to learn more and to see how they're linked.*\n\nThe [Penn Treebank dataset](https://catalog.ldc.upenn.edu/LDC99T42) is \"one million words of 1989 Wall Street Journal material annotated in Treebank II style\". It has been used for decades to measure the performance of language models at the task of predicting characters in English text. OpenAI's GPT-3 reportedly scored a word-level [perplexity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perplexity) score of 20.5. What will be the best reported score by the end of 2024?", "resc": "Papers With Code currently documents progress on the Penn Treebank (Word Level) dataset, which you can find [here](https://paperswithcode.com/sota/language-modelling-on-penn-treebank-word). At the end of 2024, the best credible word-level perplexity score by any language model, discovered by Metaculites on the Penn Treebank (Word Level) will determine resolution. For example, if no model improves on GPT-3's current lead, then this question will resolve at a value of 20.5", "lower_25": "11.0", "median": "14.1", "upper_75": "17.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a language model will achieve a perplexity score of 14.1 on the Penn Treebank (Word Level) by the end of 2024?", "desc": "*This question is linked to a fortified essay on Human-Level Language Models. [Read the essay](https://www.metaculus.com/notebooks/8329/human-level-language-models/) to learn more and to see how they're linked.*\n\nThe [Penn Treebank dataset](https://catalog.ldc.upenn.edu/LDC99T42) is \"one million words of 1989 Wall Street Journal material annotated in Treebank II style\". It has been used for decades to measure the performance of language models at the task of predicting characters in English text. OpenAI's GPT-3 reportedly scored a word-level [perplexity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perplexity) score of 20.5. What will be the best reported score by the end of 2024?", "resc": "Papers With Code currently documents progress on the Penn Treebank (Word Level) dataset, which you can find [here](https://paperswithcode.com/sota/language-modelling-on-penn-treebank-word). At the end of 2024, the best credible word-level perplexity score by any language model, discovered by Metaculites on the Penn Treebank (Word Level) will determine resolution. For example, if no model improves on GPT-3's current lead, then this question will resolve at a value of 20.5", "lower_25": "11.0", "median": "14.1", "upper_75": "17.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Australia will commission its first nuclear-powered submarine by 2046?", "desc": "In September 2021, the [Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced](https://www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-canberra-act-24) that Australia would scrap its existing contract for Attack-class submarines with France and instead build nuclear-powered submarines with the support of the United States and United Kingdom, a \"forever partnership\" called [AUKUS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AUKUS). \n\nThe Australian Government has spent $2.4 billion so far on the Attack-class submarine contract, which it signed in 2016. \n\nThe next step for nuclear-powered submarines is an [18-month taskforce](https://www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-canberra-act-24) to assess infrastructure needs, waste disposal, and other considerations. \n\nOne concern for the nuclear-powered submarine timeline is how long Australia's current submarines, the Collins-class, can remain in use. They were originally expected to be decommissioned in 2026; under the old agreement the plan was to extend their lives until the [early 2030s](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-03-01/collins-class-submarine-life-to-be-extended/7212532). \n\nThe federal Opposition says the new submarines may not be constructed [until 2040](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09-17/aus-strategically-naked-under-submarine-deal/100469254).\n\nIn the meantime, the US is apparently unlikely to lease nuclear-powered submarines and buying them \"off the shelf\" [would take at least five years](https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/australia-unlikely-to-lease-us-submarines-says-former-navy-chief-20210922-p58tqe).", "resc": "Resolves according to credible media reporting, an entry on Australia's Royal Navy website or other official report by the Royal Navy, or figures published by a credible organisation like the U.S. Naval Institute. \n\nShip commissioning involves putting the ship into active service. There can be a large gap between when a ship is \"launched\" (first transferred from land to water) and when it is \"commissioned\"", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "2046", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness conjecture will be proved true by 2104?", "desc": "*This question is linked to a fortified essay on the Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness problem. [Read the essay to learn more](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8162/ultraviolet-catastrophes-and-turbulence/).*\n\nThe [Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness conjecture](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navier%E2%80%93Stokes_existence_and_smoothness) is an important open problem in fluid dynamics and the theory of partial differential equations. It's been designated as one of the Clay Institute's Millennium Prize Problems in 2000 and there is a 1 million dollar bounty available for either proving or disproving the conjecture. In the official introduction to the problem [here](https://www.claymath.org/sites/default/files/navierstokes.pdf), the Clay Institute splits the problem into four statements A, B, C and D; and the problem is considered to have been settled if *any one* of them is proven.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the date in which the Millennium Prize for the proof of the Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness conjecture is awarded before the resolution date of this question for either a proof of statement A or statement B. It will resolve as > if the Millennium Prize is awarded for the proof of the breakdown of the equations, in other words for a proof of C or D; or if neither event takes place until the resolution time of the question", "lower_25": "2049", "median": "2104", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2121", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Australia will commission its first nuclear-powered submarine by 2046?", "desc": "In September 2021, the [Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced](https://www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-canberra-act-24) that Australia would scrap its existing contract for Attack-class submarines with France and instead build nuclear-powered submarines with the support of the United States and United Kingdom, a \"forever partnership\" called [AUKUS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AUKUS). \n\nThe Australian Government has spent $2.4 billion so far on the Attack-class submarine contract, which it signed in 2016. \n\nThe next step for nuclear-powered submarines is an [18-month taskforce](https://www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-canberra-act-24) to assess infrastructure needs, waste disposal, and other considerations. \n\nOne concern for the nuclear-powered submarine timeline is how long Australia's current submarines, the Collins-class, can remain in use. They were originally expected to be decommissioned in 2026; under the old agreement the plan was to extend their lives until the [early 2030s](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-03-01/collins-class-submarine-life-to-be-extended/7212532). \n\nThe federal Opposition says the new submarines may not be constructed [until 2040](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09-17/aus-strategically-naked-under-submarine-deal/100469254).\n\nIn the meantime, the US is apparently unlikely to lease nuclear-powered submarines and buying them \"off the shelf\" [would take at least five years](https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/australia-unlikely-to-lease-us-submarines-says-former-navy-chief-20210922-p58tqe).", "resc": "Resolves according to credible media reporting, an entry on Australia's Royal Navy website or other official report by the Royal Navy, or figures published by a credible organisation like the U.S. Naval Institute. \n\nShip commissioning involves putting the ship into active service. There can be a large gap between when a ship is \"launched\" (first transferred from land to water) and when it is \"commissioned\"", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "2046", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Australia will commission its first nuclear-powered submarine by 2046?", "desc": "In September 2021, the [Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced](https://www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-canberra-act-24) that Australia would scrap its existing contract for Attack-class submarines with France and instead build nuclear-powered submarines with the support of the United States and United Kingdom, a \"forever partnership\" called [AUKUS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AUKUS). \n\nThe Australian Government has spent $2.4 billion so far on the Attack-class submarine contract, which it signed in 2016. \n\nThe next step for nuclear-powered submarines is an [18-month taskforce](https://www.pm.gov.au/media/press-conference-canberra-act-24) to assess infrastructure needs, waste disposal, and other considerations. \n\nOne concern for the nuclear-powered submarine timeline is how long Australia's current submarines, the Collins-class, can remain in use. They were originally expected to be decommissioned in 2026; under the old agreement the plan was to extend their lives until the [early 2030s](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-03-01/collins-class-submarine-life-to-be-extended/7212532). \n\nThe federal Opposition says the new submarines may not be constructed [until 2040](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09-17/aus-strategically-naked-under-submarine-deal/100469254).\n\nIn the meantime, the US is apparently unlikely to lease nuclear-powered submarines and buying them \"off the shelf\" [would take at least five years](https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/australia-unlikely-to-lease-us-submarines-says-former-navy-chief-20210922-p58tqe).", "resc": "Resolves according to credible media reporting, an entry on Australia's Royal Navy website or other official report by the Royal Navy, or figures published by a credible organisation like the U.S. Naval Institute. \n\nShip commissioning involves putting the ship into active service. There can be a large gap between when a ship is \"launched\" (first transferred from land to water) and when it is \"commissioned\"", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "2046", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness conjecture will be proved true by 2104?", "desc": "*This question is linked to a fortified essay on the Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness problem. [Read the essay to learn more](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8162/ultraviolet-catastrophes-and-turbulence/).*\n\nThe [Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness conjecture](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navier%E2%80%93Stokes_existence_and_smoothness) is an important open problem in fluid dynamics and the theory of partial differential equations. It's been designated as one of the Clay Institute's Millennium Prize Problems in 2000 and there is a 1 million dollar bounty available for either proving or disproving the conjecture. In the official introduction to the problem [here](https://www.claymath.org/sites/default/files/navierstokes.pdf), the Clay Institute splits the problem into four statements A, B, C and D; and the problem is considered to have been settled if *any one* of them is proven.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the date in which the Millennium Prize for the proof of the Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness conjecture is awarded before the resolution date of this question for either a proof of statement A or statement B. It will resolve as > if the Millennium Prize is awarded for the proof of the breakdown of the equations, in other words for a proof of C or D; or if neither event takes place until the resolution time of the question", "lower_25": "2049", "median": "2104", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2121", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness conjecture will be proved false before 2121?", "desc": "*This question is linked to a fortified essay on the Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness problem. [Read the essay to learn more](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8162/ultraviolet-catastrophes-and-turbulence/).*\n\nThe [Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness conjecture](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navier%E2%80%93Stokes_existence_and_smoothness) is an important open problem in fluid dynamics and the theory of partial differential equations. It's been designated as one of the Clay Institute's Millennium Prize Problems in 2000 and there is a 1 million dollar bounty available for either proving or disproving the conjecture. In the official introduction to the problem [here](https://www.claymath.org/sites/default/files/navierstokes.pdf), the Clay Institute splits the problem into four statements A, B, C and D; and the problem is considered to have been settled if *any one* of them is proven", "resc": "This question will resolve to the date in which the Millennium Prize for the proof of the breakdown of the Navier-Stokes solutions before the resolution date of this question for either a proof of statement C or statement D. It will resolve as > if the Millennium Prize is awarded for the proof of the existence and smoothness conjecture, in other words for a proof of A or B; or if neither event takes place until the resolution time of the question", "lower_25": "2106", "median": "Not ≤ 2121", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2121", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness conjecture will be proved false before 2121?", "desc": "*This question is linked to a fortified essay on the Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness problem. [Read the essay to learn more](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8162/ultraviolet-catastrophes-and-turbulence/).*\n\nThe [Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness conjecture](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navier%E2%80%93Stokes_existence_and_smoothness) is an important open problem in fluid dynamics and the theory of partial differential equations. It's been designated as one of the Clay Institute's Millennium Prize Problems in 2000 and there is a 1 million dollar bounty available for either proving or disproving the conjecture. In the official introduction to the problem [here](https://www.claymath.org/sites/default/files/navierstokes.pdf), the Clay Institute splits the problem into four statements A, B, C and D; and the problem is considered to have been settled if *any one* of them is proven", "resc": "This question will resolve to the date in which the Millennium Prize for the proof of the breakdown of the Navier-Stokes solutions before the resolution date of this question for either a proof of statement C or statement D. It will resolve as > if the Millennium Prize is awarded for the proof of the existence and smoothness conjecture, in other words for a proof of A or B; or if neither event takes place until the resolution time of the question", "lower_25": "2106", "median": "Not ≤ 2121", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2121", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness conjecture will be proved false before 2121?", "desc": "*This question is linked to a fortified essay on the Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness problem. [Read the essay to learn more](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8162/ultraviolet-catastrophes-and-turbulence/).*\n\nThe [Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness conjecture](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navier%E2%80%93Stokes_existence_and_smoothness) is an important open problem in fluid dynamics and the theory of partial differential equations. It's been designated as one of the Clay Institute's Millennium Prize Problems in 2000 and there is a 1 million dollar bounty available for either proving or disproving the conjecture. In the official introduction to the problem [here](https://www.claymath.org/sites/default/files/navierstokes.pdf), the Clay Institute splits the problem into four statements A, B, C and D; and the problem is considered to have been settled if *any one* of them is proven", "resc": "This question will resolve to the date in which the Millennium Prize for the proof of the breakdown of the Navier-Stokes solutions before the resolution date of this question for either a proof of statement C or statement D. It will resolve as > if the Millennium Prize is awarded for the proof of the existence and smoothness conjecture, in other words for a proof of A or B; or if neither event takes place until the resolution time of the question", "lower_25": "2106", "median": "Not ≤ 2121", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2121", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a sample from one of the icy moons in the outer solar system will be successfully returned to Earth by 2064?", "desc": "The icy moons of the gas giant planets are one of the most promising places for hosting microbial life in the present time in our solar system. Missions such as NASA's Europa Clipper will be launched in the coming years to establish whether icy moons such as Europa are able to support microbial life. \n\nOnce this is established, several other mission concepts currently being investigated would be capable of searching for signs of any microbial life on Enceladus, Europa or other icy moons. One of these concepts involves flying through the water vapor plumes observed on Enceladus that are assumed to blast water and ice particles coming from the subglacial ocean on that moon. These plumes are assumed to be connected directly to the subglacial ocean on Enceladus and could thus carry signatures of any life native to Enceladus. There are strong indications that such plumes exist also on Europa and could also exist on other icy moons.", "resc": "The question resolves on the date that a sample from any of the icy moons in the outer solar system (in the asteroid belt and beyond) is successfully returned to be analyzed in a lab by humans. The resolution date will be the date the sample safely arrives at the lab. If this does not happen before January 1, 2100, this will resolve as \"**>January 1, 2100**\".", "lower_25": "2052", "median": "2064", "upper_75": "2077", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If Iran has a nuclear weapon in 2030, what is the chance that Israel's 2031 GNI per capita will be 74.0?", "desc": "[A previous question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5253/iran-gets-nuke-by-2030/) asks if Iran will get a nuclear weapon by 2030. \n The World Bank [keeps track](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GNI_(nominal)_per_capita) of Gross National Income per capita, and publishes yearly figures. [Some Israelis](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-s-two-terrible-options-live-with-a-nuclear-iran-or-bomb-it-1.10243995) have warned that an Iranian bomb is a grave threat to the Israeli economy, but [others claim](https://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Israel-can-live-with-Iranian-nuclear-bomb) Israel can live with an Iranian bomb, just as South Korea lives with a North Korean bomb.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the value of Israel's 2031 GNI per capita in thousands of 2022 US dollars if [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5253/iran-gets-nuke-by-2030/) resolves positively. Otherwise, it will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "46.7", "median": "59.6", "upper_75": "74.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a probe will first reach an ocean within one of the icy moons of the outer solar system by 2054?", "desc": "The icy moons of the outer solar system are one of the most promising places for hosting microbial life in the present time. Several of them, e.g. Europa and Enceladus, are assumed to satisfy the conditions for hosting microbial life: liquid water in vast oceans under an ice cover, sufficient energy and the appropriate chemicals. \n\nSeveral mission concepts exist to search for extant life on one of these moons. The more ambitious and challenging of them involve landing a spacecraft and deploying a melting probe to melt through several kilometers of ice to reach the subglacial ocean. Once there, the ocean can be investigated for the existence of extant life.", "resc": "The question will resolve as the date a probe first reaches the main body of an ocean on one of the icy moons. Official announcements by the space agency performing the mission will count as a resolution source, and the resolution date will be the date the agency has confirmed the probe has reached the ocean. The probe may have damaged systems but must at least be able to communicate with Earth/humans/its surface module.\n\nIf this does not happen successfully by January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as **>January 1, 2100.**", "lower_25": "2043", "median": "2054", "upper_75": "2069", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a probe will first reach an ocean within one of the icy moons of the outer solar system by 2054?", "desc": "The icy moons of the outer solar system are one of the most promising places for hosting microbial life in the present time. Several of them, e.g. Europa and Enceladus, are assumed to satisfy the conditions for hosting microbial life: liquid water in vast oceans under an ice cover, sufficient energy and the appropriate chemicals. \n\nSeveral mission concepts exist to search for extant life on one of these moons. The more ambitious and challenging of them involve landing a spacecraft and deploying a melting probe to melt through several kilometers of ice to reach the subglacial ocean. Once there, the ocean can be investigated for the existence of extant life.", "resc": "The question will resolve as the date a probe first reaches the main body of an ocean on one of the icy moons. Official announcements by the space agency performing the mission will count as a resolution source, and the resolution date will be the date the agency has confirmed the probe has reached the ocean. The probe may have damaged systems but must at least be able to communicate with Earth/humans/its surface module.\n\nIf this does not happen successfully by January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as **>January 1, 2100.**", "lower_25": "2043", "median": "2054", "upper_75": "2069", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a sample from one of the icy moons in the outer solar system will be successfully returned to Earth by 2064?", "desc": "The icy moons of the gas giant planets are one of the most promising places for hosting microbial life in the present time in our solar system. Missions such as NASA's Europa Clipper will be launched in the coming years to establish whether icy moons such as Europa are able to support microbial life. \n\nOnce this is established, several other mission concepts currently being investigated would be capable of searching for signs of any microbial life on Enceladus, Europa or other icy moons. One of these concepts involves flying through the water vapor plumes observed on Enceladus that are assumed to blast water and ice particles coming from the subglacial ocean on that moon. These plumes are assumed to be connected directly to the subglacial ocean on Enceladus and could thus carry signatures of any life native to Enceladus. There are strong indications that such plumes exist also on Europa and could also exist on other icy moons.", "resc": "The question resolves on the date that a sample from any of the icy moons in the outer solar system (in the asteroid belt and beyond) is successfully returned to be analyzed in a lab by humans. The resolution date will be the date the sample safely arrives at the lab. If this does not happen before January 1, 2100, this will resolve as \"**>January 1, 2100**\".", "lower_25": "2052", "median": "2064", "upper_75": "2077", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a probe will first reach an ocean within one of the icy moons of the outer solar system by 2054?", "desc": "The icy moons of the outer solar system are one of the most promising places for hosting microbial life in the present time. Several of them, e.g. Europa and Enceladus, are assumed to satisfy the conditions for hosting microbial life: liquid water in vast oceans under an ice cover, sufficient energy and the appropriate chemicals. \n\nSeveral mission concepts exist to search for extant life on one of these moons. The more ambitious and challenging of them involve landing a spacecraft and deploying a melting probe to melt through several kilometers of ice to reach the subglacial ocean. Once there, the ocean can be investigated for the existence of extant life.", "resc": "The question will resolve as the date a probe first reaches the main body of an ocean on one of the icy moons. Official announcements by the space agency performing the mission will count as a resolution source, and the resolution date will be the date the agency has confirmed the probe has reached the ocean. The probe may have damaged systems but must at least be able to communicate with Earth/humans/its surface module.\n\nIf this does not happen successfully by January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as **>January 1, 2100.**", "lower_25": "2043", "median": "2054", "upper_75": "2069", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If Iran does not have a nuclear weapon in 2030, what is the chance that Israel's 2031 GNI per capita will be 64.7?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Iran possess a nuclear weapon before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5253/iran-obtains-nuclear-weapon-by-2030/)\n\n----\n\n The World Bank [keeps track](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GNI_(nominal)_per_capita) of Gross National Income per capita, and publishes yearly figures. [Some Israelis](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-s-two-terrible-options-live-with-a-nuclear-iran-or-bomb-it-1.10243995) have warned that an Iranian bomb is a grave threat to the Israeli economy, but [others claim](https://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Israel-can-live-with-Iranian-nuclear-bomb) Israel can live with an Iranian bomb, just as South Korea lives with a North Korean bomb.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the value of Israel's 2031 GNI per capita in thousands of 2022 US dollars if [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5253/iran-gets-nuke-by-2030/) resolves negatively. Otherwise, it will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "34.7", "median": "56.6", "upper_75": "64.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If Iran does not have a nuclear weapon in 2030, what is the chance that Israel's 2031 GNI per capita will be 64.7?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Iran possess a nuclear weapon before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5253/iran-obtains-nuclear-weapon-by-2030/)\n\n----\n\n The World Bank [keeps track](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GNI_(nominal)_per_capita) of Gross National Income per capita, and publishes yearly figures. [Some Israelis](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-s-two-terrible-options-live-with-a-nuclear-iran-or-bomb-it-1.10243995) have warned that an Iranian bomb is a grave threat to the Israeli economy, but [others claim](https://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Israel-can-live-with-Iranian-nuclear-bomb) Israel can live with an Iranian bomb, just as South Korea lives with a North Korean bomb.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the value of Israel's 2031 GNI per capita in thousands of 2022 US dollars if [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5253/iran-gets-nuke-by-2030/) resolves negatively. Otherwise, it will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "34.7", "median": "56.6", "upper_75": "64.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If Iran has a nuclear weapon in 2030, what is the chance that Israel's 2031 GNI per capita will be 74.0?", "desc": "[A previous question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5253/iran-gets-nuke-by-2030/) asks if Iran will get a nuclear weapon by 2030. \n The World Bank [keeps track](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GNI_(nominal)_per_capita) of Gross National Income per capita, and publishes yearly figures. [Some Israelis](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-s-two-terrible-options-live-with-a-nuclear-iran-or-bomb-it-1.10243995) have warned that an Iranian bomb is a grave threat to the Israeli economy, but [others claim](https://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Israel-can-live-with-Iranian-nuclear-bomb) Israel can live with an Iranian bomb, just as South Korea lives with a North Korean bomb.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the value of Israel's 2031 GNI per capita in thousands of 2022 US dollars if [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5253/iran-gets-nuke-by-2030/) resolves positively. Otherwise, it will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "46.7", "median": "59.6", "upper_75": "74.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If Iran does not have a nuclear weapon in 2030, what is the chance that Israel's 2031 GNI per capita will be 64.7?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Iran possess a nuclear weapon before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5253/iran-obtains-nuclear-weapon-by-2030/)\n\n----\n\n The World Bank [keeps track](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GNI_(nominal)_per_capita) of Gross National Income per capita, and publishes yearly figures. [Some Israelis](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-s-two-terrible-options-live-with-a-nuclear-iran-or-bomb-it-1.10243995) have warned that an Iranian bomb is a grave threat to the Israeli economy, but [others claim](https://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Israel-can-live-with-Iranian-nuclear-bomb) Israel can live with an Iranian bomb, just as South Korea lives with a North Korean bomb.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the value of Israel's 2031 GNI per capita in thousands of 2022 US dollars if [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5253/iran-gets-nuke-by-2030/) resolves negatively. Otherwise, it will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "34.7", "median": "56.6", "upper_75": "64.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness conjecture will be proved true by 2104?", "desc": "*This question is linked to a fortified essay on the Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness problem. [Read the essay to learn more](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8162/ultraviolet-catastrophes-and-turbulence/).*\n\nThe [Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness conjecture](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navier%E2%80%93Stokes_existence_and_smoothness) is an important open problem in fluid dynamics and the theory of partial differential equations. It's been designated as one of the Clay Institute's Millennium Prize Problems in 2000 and there is a 1 million dollar bounty available for either proving or disproving the conjecture. In the official introduction to the problem [here](https://www.claymath.org/sites/default/files/navierstokes.pdf), the Clay Institute splits the problem into four statements A, B, C and D; and the problem is considered to have been settled if *any one* of them is proven.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the date in which the Millennium Prize for the proof of the Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness conjecture is awarded before the resolution date of this question for either a proof of statement A or statement B. It will resolve as > if the Millennium Prize is awarded for the proof of the breakdown of the equations, in other words for a proof of C or D; or if neither event takes place until the resolution time of the question", "lower_25": "2049", "median": "2104", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2121", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next Palestinian election will be held in 2027?", "desc": "There have been three Palestinian elections so far. The first was the general election in [1996](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Palestinian_general_election) and Yasser Arafat won with almost 90% of the vote. The second was the Presidential Election in [2005](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Palestinian_presidential_election), which Mahmoud Abbas won, and which was boycotted by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The third Palestinian election was the legislative election in [2006](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Palestinian_legislative_election), where [opinion polls](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Palestinian_legislative_election#Opinion_polls) predicted a Fatah victory, but the result was instead a Hamas victory. Hamas [took over Gaza](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gaza_(2007)) in 2007. There was scheduled to be [presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Palestinian_presidential_election) and a [legislative election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Palestinian_legislative_election) in 2021, but both have been postponed indefinitely.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the date of the next Palestinian election, as reported by reliable media sources, whether legislative, presidential, or general (i.e. both presidential and legislative). If there is no election by the resolve date it resolves as >", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "If Iran has a nuclear weapon in 2030, what is the chance that Israel's 2031 GNI per capita will be 74.0?", "desc": "[A previous question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5253/iran-gets-nuke-by-2030/) asks if Iran will get a nuclear weapon by 2030. \n The World Bank [keeps track](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GNI_(nominal)_per_capita) of Gross National Income per capita, and publishes yearly figures. [Some Israelis](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-s-two-terrible-options-live-with-a-nuclear-iran-or-bomb-it-1.10243995) have warned that an Iranian bomb is a grave threat to the Israeli economy, but [others claim](https://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Israel-can-live-with-Iranian-nuclear-bomb) Israel can live with an Iranian bomb, just as South Korea lives with a North Korean bomb.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the value of Israel's 2031 GNI per capita in thousands of 2022 US dollars if [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5253/iran-gets-nuke-by-2030/) resolves positively. Otherwise, it will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "46.7", "median": "59.6", "upper_75": "74.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next Palestinian election will be held in 2027?", "desc": "There have been three Palestinian elections so far. The first was the general election in [1996](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Palestinian_general_election) and Yasser Arafat won with almost 90% of the vote. The second was the Presidential Election in [2005](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Palestinian_presidential_election), which Mahmoud Abbas won, and which was boycotted by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The third Palestinian election was the legislative election in [2006](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Palestinian_legislative_election), where [opinion polls](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Palestinian_legislative_election#Opinion_polls) predicted a Fatah victory, but the result was instead a Hamas victory. Hamas [took over Gaza](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gaza_(2007)) in 2007. There was scheduled to be [presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Palestinian_presidential_election) and a [legislative election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Palestinian_legislative_election) in 2021, but both have been postponed indefinitely.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the date of the next Palestinian election, as reported by reliable media sources, whether legislative, presidential, or general (i.e. both presidential and legislative). If there is no election by the resolve date it resolves as >", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next Palestinian election will be held in 2027?", "desc": "There have been three Palestinian elections so far. The first was the general election in [1996](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Palestinian_general_election) and Yasser Arafat won with almost 90% of the vote. The second was the Presidential Election in [2005](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Palestinian_presidential_election), which Mahmoud Abbas won, and which was boycotted by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The third Palestinian election was the legislative election in [2006](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Palestinian_legislative_election), where [opinion polls](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Palestinian_legislative_election#Opinion_polls) predicted a Fatah victory, but the result was instead a Hamas victory. Hamas [took over Gaza](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gaza_(2007)) in 2007. There was scheduled to be [presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Palestinian_presidential_election) and a [legislative election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Palestinian_legislative_election) in 2021, but both have been postponed indefinitely.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the date of the next Palestinian election, as reported by reliable media sources, whether legislative, presidential, or general (i.e. both presidential and legislative). If there is no election by the resolve date it resolves as >", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best published polygenic score for intelligence will be 0.326 in 2026?", "desc": "Related questions:\n\n- [When will 100 babies be born whose embryos were selected for genetic scores for intelligence?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5525/ivf-based-embryo-selection-for-intelligence/)\n- [When will we see the first viable human case of in vitro gametogenesis?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7385/first-human-in-vitro-gametogenesis/)\n\n[Embryo selection](https://www.gwern.net/Embryo-selection) is a technology that allows people to select for traits in their future children. Current technology allows parents to choose from easily predictable traits such as sex, eye color, hair color, and skin color, but it is also possible to select for complex traits such as height, mental health, and intelligence. The latter has [received](https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/11/08/132018/polygenic-score-ivf-embryo-dna-tests-genomic-prediction-gattaca/) [significant](https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/12/embryo-profiling-iq-almost-here/) attention due to among others the company Genomic Prediction. While the company does not currently offer this service, it is widely expected that someone will in the near future, or even currently behind the curtains.\n\n[The efficiency of this method requires](https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsr2105065) that the polygenic scores work between siblings, as all embryos are siblings (when the same father is used for all embryos). However, [often scores for socially valued traits perform less well among siblings than unrelated persons](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0002929719302319). Thus, this quantity is of central importance to the future. [The latest GWAS for intelligence, EA4, found that sibling validity was 82% as effective as that between families.](https://twitter.com/Russwarne/status/1433857394803544068)", "resc": "- Any public study showing the validity of polygenic scores to predict intelligence or educational achievement (i.e., scholastic tests like SAT in the USA or CITO in Netherlands) among full siblings is acceptable for the purpose of this question (fixed effects design). Educational attainment (i.e., degrees or years of schooling) is NOT a valid outcome.\n- The study can be a preprint (not peer-reviewed).\n- The efficiency is measured as the beta value from this design. [This study gives an example](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0002929719302319). A value of 0 means the scores has no predictive validity, and a value of 1 means it predicts all variation in intelligence. The maximum possible validity is limited by the square root of the heritability. E.g., if heritability is 60%, the maximum possible validity is 0.77", "lower_25": "0.188", "median": "0.252", "upper_75": "0.326", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a sample from one of the icy moons in the outer solar system will be successfully returned to Earth by 2064?", "desc": "The icy moons of the gas giant planets are one of the most promising places for hosting microbial life in the present time in our solar system. Missions such as NASA's Europa Clipper will be launched in the coming years to establish whether icy moons such as Europa are able to support microbial life. \n\nOnce this is established, several other mission concepts currently being investigated would be capable of searching for signs of any microbial life on Enceladus, Europa or other icy moons. One of these concepts involves flying through the water vapor plumes observed on Enceladus that are assumed to blast water and ice particles coming from the subglacial ocean on that moon. These plumes are assumed to be connected directly to the subglacial ocean on Enceladus and could thus carry signatures of any life native to Enceladus. There are strong indications that such plumes exist also on Europa and could also exist on other icy moons.", "resc": "The question resolves on the date that a sample from any of the icy moons in the outer solar system (in the asteroid belt and beyond) is successfully returned to be analyzed in a lab by humans. The resolution date will be the date the sample safely arrives at the lab. If this does not happen before January 1, 2100, this will resolve as \"**>January 1, 2100**\".", "lower_25": "2052", "median": "2064", "upper_75": "2077", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 34.9% of employed persons will work at home on an average day in 2030?", "desc": "Contemporary American society centers around place-based work. Cities like Detroit and New York were built on industry, with modern infrastructure set up to support commerce and expanding workforces. It's not a stretch to say that Americans tend to organize their lives around work. Citizens live in areas with job opportunities, they receive healthcare from employers and they spend significant time and money commuting from and to work.\n\nThe ability to work remotely is a noteworthy shift from this standard. The combination of high speed internet connection, laptop and secure VPN now enables a significant subset of employees to access their workplace without stepping foot inside an office. In the early part of the 21st century, most employers were loath to embrace these technological advances except on an ad hoc basis, perhaps due to concerns about productivity or ability to retain talent. However, the COVID-19 pandemic forced these same employers to institute potentially long-term work-from-home policies. Moving forward, they may continue or expand remote work policies due to employee demand, as a cost-saving measure or due to growing concerns about [GHG emissions](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8092/percentage-of-us-remote-workers-in-2030/).\n\n[This study](https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/BFI_White-Paper_Dingel_Neiman_3.2020.pdf) estimates that only 37% of American jobs are feasible to be performed at home. Improvements to technologies such as virtual reality may further increase the number of jobs that can be done remotely. The consequences of an increasingly remote workplace are ill-defined, but it's likely that employees will choose to live in locations central to family or personal interests. Will people move to areas with lower costs of living, or will the networking effects of city life become even more amplified? These shifts are sure to impact business, investment, taxes and healthcare in unforeseen ways.\n\nThe U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics conducts an annual American Time Use Survey (ATUS), which measures the amount of time people spend doing various activities, such as paid work, childcare, volunteering, and socializing. This survey ([see questionnaire here](https://www.bls.gov/tus/tuquestionnaire.pdf)) attempts to quantify the percentage of Americans working from home on an average day. From years 2009-2019, this number remained within a range of 21-24%. In 2020, [this number doubled to 42%](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/atus.nr0.htm).", "resc": "This question will resolve according to the [BLS 2030 ATUS](https://www.bls.gov/tus/) survey for the percentage of Americans working from home on an average day (currently series `\tTUU30105AA01043855` reported [here](https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate))", "lower_25": "29.1", "median": "34.9", "upper_75": "40.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best published polygenic score for intelligence will be 0.326 in 2026?", "desc": "Related questions:\n\n- [When will 100 babies be born whose embryos were selected for genetic scores for intelligence?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5525/ivf-based-embryo-selection-for-intelligence/)\n- [When will we see the first viable human case of in vitro gametogenesis?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7385/first-human-in-vitro-gametogenesis/)\n\n[Embryo selection](https://www.gwern.net/Embryo-selection) is a technology that allows people to select for traits in their future children. Current technology allows parents to choose from easily predictable traits such as sex, eye color, hair color, and skin color, but it is also possible to select for complex traits such as height, mental health, and intelligence. The latter has [received](https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/11/08/132018/polygenic-score-ivf-embryo-dna-tests-genomic-prediction-gattaca/) [significant](https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/12/embryo-profiling-iq-almost-here/) attention due to among others the company Genomic Prediction. While the company does not currently offer this service, it is widely expected that someone will in the near future, or even currently behind the curtains.\n\n[The efficiency of this method requires](https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsr2105065) that the polygenic scores work between siblings, as all embryos are siblings (when the same father is used for all embryos). However, [often scores for socially valued traits perform less well among siblings than unrelated persons](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0002929719302319). Thus, this quantity is of central importance to the future. [The latest GWAS for intelligence, EA4, found that sibling validity was 82% as effective as that between families.](https://twitter.com/Russwarne/status/1433857394803544068)", "resc": "- Any public study showing the validity of polygenic scores to predict intelligence or educational achievement (i.e., scholastic tests like SAT in the USA or CITO in Netherlands) among full siblings is acceptable for the purpose of this question (fixed effects design). Educational attainment (i.e., degrees or years of schooling) is NOT a valid outcome.\n- The study can be a preprint (not peer-reviewed).\n- The efficiency is measured as the beta value from this design. [This study gives an example](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0002929719302319). A value of 0 means the scores has no predictive validity, and a value of 1 means it predicts all variation in intelligence. The maximum possible validity is limited by the square root of the heritability. E.g., if heritability is 60%, the maximum possible validity is 0.77", "lower_25": "0.188", "median": "0.252", "upper_75": "0.326", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 114k US Jews will move to Israel by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "The State of Israel defines itself as the Jewish homeland and [Israeli law makes citizenship available](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_Return) to anyone who can prove recent Jewish ancestry. [About 5,000 North American Jews were expected to emigrate to Israel from North America in 2021](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/record-breaking-aliyah-from-north-america-projected-for-2021-675271) out of a total of [about 7.6 million.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Jews). Historically, [between 100,000 and 150,000](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aliyah#Statistics) American Jews have moved to Israel, about 30,000 of whom moved in the last decades.\n\nIsrael's economy has [weathered](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-economy-rebounds-q2-grows-annualised-154-2021-08-16/) the [COVID pandemic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19_pandemic_in_Israel) relatively well, in part due to its [world-leading vaccination campaign](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19_vaccination_in_Israel). \n\nOver the next few decades, the proportion of American Jews who are Orthodox is expected to [grow](https://twitter.com/HeTows/status/1480205816284200967), and historically they are more likely to move to Israel.\n\n***How many US Jews will move to Israel before 2050?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the number of Jews from the United States that move to Israel from 2021-2049 inclusive, as per the statistics provided by the Israeli government or another reliable source.", "lower_25": "88.4k", "median": "114k", "upper_75": "133k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 114k US Jews will move to Israel by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "The State of Israel defines itself as the Jewish homeland and [Israeli law makes citizenship available](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_Return) to anyone who can prove recent Jewish ancestry. [About 5,000 North American Jews were expected to emigrate to Israel from North America in 2021](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/record-breaking-aliyah-from-north-america-projected-for-2021-675271) out of a total of [about 7.6 million.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Jews). Historically, [between 100,000 and 150,000](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aliyah#Statistics) American Jews have moved to Israel, about 30,000 of whom moved in the last decades.\n\nIsrael's economy has [weathered](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-economy-rebounds-q2-grows-annualised-154-2021-08-16/) the [COVID pandemic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19_pandemic_in_Israel) relatively well, in part due to its [world-leading vaccination campaign](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19_vaccination_in_Israel). \n\nOver the next few decades, the proportion of American Jews who are Orthodox is expected to [grow](https://twitter.com/HeTows/status/1480205816284200967), and historically they are more likely to move to Israel.\n\n***How many US Jews will move to Israel before 2050?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the number of Jews from the United States that move to Israel from 2021-2049 inclusive, as per the statistics provided by the Israeli government or another reliable source.", "lower_25": "88.4k", "median": "114k", "upper_75": "133k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US murder rate will be 4.18 in 2030?", "desc": "In 2018, the USA had a [murder rate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_intentional_homicide_rate) of 4.96 per 100,000 inhabitants. The United States experience a [surge in murder in 2020](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/27/us/fbi-murders-2020-cities.html) after the [unrest following the death of George Floyd](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democrats-policing-murder-rate/2021/06/26/e37c38fc-d4fd-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html), a trend [which continued into 2021](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/22/upshot/murder-rise-2020.html). The murder rate was measured at [6.5 murders per 100,000 inhabitants](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-s-government-can-solve-the-arab-crime-epidemic-or-become-one-of-its-victims-1.10243345), not as high as the [peak of around 10](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/22/upshot/murder-rise-2020.html).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the value of the US murder rate per 100,000 inhabitants in 2030, as reported by the [Federal Bureau of Investigation](https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/topic-pages/murder), or another reliable source if necessary", "lower_25": "4.18", "median": "5.53", "upper_75": "7.30", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US murder rate will be 4.18 in 2030?", "desc": "In 2018, the USA had a [murder rate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_intentional_homicide_rate) of 4.96 per 100,000 inhabitants. The United States experience a [surge in murder in 2020](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/27/us/fbi-murders-2020-cities.html) after the [unrest following the death of George Floyd](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democrats-policing-murder-rate/2021/06/26/e37c38fc-d4fd-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html), a trend [which continued into 2021](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/22/upshot/murder-rise-2020.html). The murder rate was measured at [6.5 murders per 100,000 inhabitants](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-s-government-can-solve-the-arab-crime-epidemic-or-become-one-of-its-victims-1.10243345), not as high as the [peak of around 10](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/22/upshot/murder-rise-2020.html).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the value of the US murder rate per 100,000 inhabitants in 2030, as reported by the [Federal Bureau of Investigation](https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/topic-pages/murder), or another reliable source if necessary", "lower_25": "4.18", "median": "5.53", "upper_75": "7.30", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US murder rate will be 4.18 in 2030?", "desc": "In 2018, the USA had a [murder rate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_intentional_homicide_rate) of 4.96 per 100,000 inhabitants. The United States experience a [surge in murder in 2020](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/27/us/fbi-murders-2020-cities.html) after the [unrest following the death of George Floyd](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democrats-policing-murder-rate/2021/06/26/e37c38fc-d4fd-11eb-ae54-515e2f63d37d_story.html), a trend [which continued into 2021](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/22/upshot/murder-rise-2020.html). The murder rate was measured at [6.5 murders per 100,000 inhabitants](https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-s-government-can-solve-the-arab-crime-epidemic-or-become-one-of-its-victims-1.10243345), not as high as the [peak of around 10](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/22/upshot/murder-rise-2020.html).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the value of the US murder rate per 100,000 inhabitants in 2030, as reported by the [Federal Bureau of Investigation](https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019/topic-pages/murder), or another reliable source if necessary", "lower_25": "4.18", "median": "5.53", "upper_75": "7.30", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 114k US Jews will move to Israel by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "The State of Israel defines itself as the Jewish homeland and [Israeli law makes citizenship available](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_Return) to anyone who can prove recent Jewish ancestry. [About 5,000 North American Jews were expected to emigrate to Israel from North America in 2021](https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/record-breaking-aliyah-from-north-america-projected-for-2021-675271) out of a total of [about 7.6 million.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Jews). Historically, [between 100,000 and 150,000](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aliyah#Statistics) American Jews have moved to Israel, about 30,000 of whom moved in the last decades.\n\nIsrael's economy has [weathered](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-economy-rebounds-q2-grows-annualised-154-2021-08-16/) the [COVID pandemic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19_pandemic_in_Israel) relatively well, in part due to its [world-leading vaccination campaign](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19_vaccination_in_Israel). \n\nOver the next few decades, the proportion of American Jews who are Orthodox is expected to [grow](https://twitter.com/HeTows/status/1480205816284200967), and historically they are more likely to move to Israel.\n\n***How many US Jews will move to Israel before 2050?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the number of Jews from the United States that move to Israel from 2021-2049 inclusive, as per the statistics provided by the Israeli government or another reliable source.", "lower_25": "88.4k", "median": "114k", "upper_75": "133k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best published polygenic score for intelligence will be 0.326 in 2026?", "desc": "Related questions:\n\n- [When will 100 babies be born whose embryos were selected for genetic scores for intelligence?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5525/ivf-based-embryo-selection-for-intelligence/)\n- [When will we see the first viable human case of in vitro gametogenesis?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7385/first-human-in-vitro-gametogenesis/)\n\n[Embryo selection](https://www.gwern.net/Embryo-selection) is a technology that allows people to select for traits in their future children. Current technology allows parents to choose from easily predictable traits such as sex, eye color, hair color, and skin color, but it is also possible to select for complex traits such as height, mental health, and intelligence. The latter has [received](https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/11/08/132018/polygenic-score-ivf-embryo-dna-tests-genomic-prediction-gattaca/) [significant](https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/12/embryo-profiling-iq-almost-here/) attention due to among others the company Genomic Prediction. While the company does not currently offer this service, it is widely expected that someone will in the near future, or even currently behind the curtains.\n\n[The efficiency of this method requires](https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsr2105065) that the polygenic scores work between siblings, as all embryos are siblings (when the same father is used for all embryos). However, [often scores for socially valued traits perform less well among siblings than unrelated persons](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0002929719302319). Thus, this quantity is of central importance to the future. [The latest GWAS for intelligence, EA4, found that sibling validity was 82% as effective as that between families.](https://twitter.com/Russwarne/status/1433857394803544068)", "resc": "- Any public study showing the validity of polygenic scores to predict intelligence or educational achievement (i.e., scholastic tests like SAT in the USA or CITO in Netherlands) among full siblings is acceptable for the purpose of this question (fixed effects design). Educational attainment (i.e., degrees or years of schooling) is NOT a valid outcome.\n- The study can be a preprint (not peer-reviewed).\n- The efficiency is measured as the beta value from this design. [This study gives an example](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0002929719302319). A value of 0 means the scores has no predictive validity, and a value of 1 means it predicts all variation in intelligence. The maximum possible validity is limited by the square root of the heritability. E.g., if heritability is 60%, the maximum possible validity is 0.77", "lower_25": "0.188", "median": "0.252", "upper_75": "0.326", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the peak human population before 2100 will be 11.0 billion?", "desc": "The global human population has [grown continuously](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/population) for centuries due to technological, agricultural, and health advancements. Population growth peaked in 1968 at an [annual growth rate of 2.1%](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth-past-future), while in 2019 that rate slowed to 1% annually.\n\nWikipedia provides an [overview of population projections](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Projections_of_population_growth), including the UN's 2019 projections which predicted 10 billion people in 2057, and a peak of 10.8 billion people in 2100. The UN's model focuses mainly on fertility rates; using a lower fertility rate projects population to peak at 8.9 billion in 2052, or to reach 15 billion in 2100 under a high fertility model. [A 2018 model](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth#projections-of-the-total-population-un-vs-iiasa-wc) by the Wittgenstein Center and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis projected population to peak at 9.4 billion around 2070.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the peak global human population before January 1, 2100, according to the [United Nations](https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population-dashboard). The population should measure humans who live primarily on Earth, not in Low-Earth Orbit or beyond. If the UN no longer exists or does not continuously report this data, a similar neutral international research group may be used.", "lower_25": "9.28B", "median": "9.99B", "upper_75": "11.0B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 34.9% of employed persons will work at home on an average day in 2030?", "desc": "Contemporary American society centers around place-based work. Cities like Detroit and New York were built on industry, with modern infrastructure set up to support commerce and expanding workforces. It's not a stretch to say that Americans tend to organize their lives around work. Citizens live in areas with job opportunities, they receive healthcare from employers and they spend significant time and money commuting from and to work.\n\nThe ability to work remotely is a noteworthy shift from this standard. The combination of high speed internet connection, laptop and secure VPN now enables a significant subset of employees to access their workplace without stepping foot inside an office. In the early part of the 21st century, most employers were loath to embrace these technological advances except on an ad hoc basis, perhaps due to concerns about productivity or ability to retain talent. However, the COVID-19 pandemic forced these same employers to institute potentially long-term work-from-home policies. Moving forward, they may continue or expand remote work policies due to employee demand, as a cost-saving measure or due to growing concerns about [GHG emissions](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8092/percentage-of-us-remote-workers-in-2030/).\n\n[This study](https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/BFI_White-Paper_Dingel_Neiman_3.2020.pdf) estimates that only 37% of American jobs are feasible to be performed at home. Improvements to technologies such as virtual reality may further increase the number of jobs that can be done remotely. The consequences of an increasingly remote workplace are ill-defined, but it's likely that employees will choose to live in locations central to family or personal interests. Will people move to areas with lower costs of living, or will the networking effects of city life become even more amplified? These shifts are sure to impact business, investment, taxes and healthcare in unforeseen ways.\n\nThe U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics conducts an annual American Time Use Survey (ATUS), which measures the amount of time people spend doing various activities, such as paid work, childcare, volunteering, and socializing. This survey ([see questionnaire here](https://www.bls.gov/tus/tuquestionnaire.pdf)) attempts to quantify the percentage of Americans working from home on an average day. From years 2009-2019, this number remained within a range of 21-24%. In 2020, [this number doubled to 42%](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/atus.nr0.htm).", "resc": "This question will resolve according to the [BLS 2030 ATUS](https://www.bls.gov/tus/) survey for the percentage of Americans working from home on an average day (currently series `\tTUU30105AA01043855` reported [here](https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate))", "lower_25": "29.1", "median": "34.9", "upper_75": "40.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the peak human population before 2100 will be 11.0 billion?", "desc": "The global human population has [grown continuously](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/population) for centuries due to technological, agricultural, and health advancements. Population growth peaked in 1968 at an [annual growth rate of 2.1%](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth-past-future), while in 2019 that rate slowed to 1% annually.\n\nWikipedia provides an [overview of population projections](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Projections_of_population_growth), including the UN's 2019 projections which predicted 10 billion people in 2057, and a peak of 10.8 billion people in 2100. The UN's model focuses mainly on fertility rates; using a lower fertility rate projects population to peak at 8.9 billion in 2052, or to reach 15 billion in 2100 under a high fertility model. [A 2018 model](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth#projections-of-the-total-population-un-vs-iiasa-wc) by the Wittgenstein Center and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis projected population to peak at 9.4 billion around 2070.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the peak global human population before January 1, 2100, according to the [United Nations](https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population-dashboard). The population should measure humans who live primarily on Earth, not in Low-Earth Orbit or beyond. If the UN no longer exists or does not continuously report this data, a similar neutral international research group may be used.", "lower_25": "9.28B", "median": "9.99B", "upper_75": "11.0B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 34.9% of employed persons will work at home on an average day in 2030?", "desc": "Contemporary American society centers around place-based work. Cities like Detroit and New York were built on industry, with modern infrastructure set up to support commerce and expanding workforces. It's not a stretch to say that Americans tend to organize their lives around work. Citizens live in areas with job opportunities, they receive healthcare from employers and they spend significant time and money commuting from and to work.\n\nThe ability to work remotely is a noteworthy shift from this standard. The combination of high speed internet connection, laptop and secure VPN now enables a significant subset of employees to access their workplace without stepping foot inside an office. In the early part of the 21st century, most employers were loath to embrace these technological advances except on an ad hoc basis, perhaps due to concerns about productivity or ability to retain talent. However, the COVID-19 pandemic forced these same employers to institute potentially long-term work-from-home policies. Moving forward, they may continue or expand remote work policies due to employee demand, as a cost-saving measure or due to growing concerns about [GHG emissions](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8092/percentage-of-us-remote-workers-in-2030/).\n\n[This study](https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/BFI_White-Paper_Dingel_Neiman_3.2020.pdf) estimates that only 37% of American jobs are feasible to be performed at home. Improvements to technologies such as virtual reality may further increase the number of jobs that can be done remotely. The consequences of an increasingly remote workplace are ill-defined, but it's likely that employees will choose to live in locations central to family or personal interests. Will people move to areas with lower costs of living, or will the networking effects of city life become even more amplified? These shifts are sure to impact business, investment, taxes and healthcare in unforeseen ways.\n\nThe U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics conducts an annual American Time Use Survey (ATUS), which measures the amount of time people spend doing various activities, such as paid work, childcare, volunteering, and socializing. This survey ([see questionnaire here](https://www.bls.gov/tus/tuquestionnaire.pdf)) attempts to quantify the percentage of Americans working from home on an average day. From years 2009-2019, this number remained within a range of 21-24%. In 2020, [this number doubled to 42%](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/atus.nr0.htm).", "resc": "This question will resolve according to the [BLS 2030 ATUS](https://www.bls.gov/tus/) survey for the percentage of Americans working from home on an average day (currently series `\tTUU30105AA01043855` reported [here](https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate))", "lower_25": "29.1", "median": "34.9", "upper_75": "40.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that any type of dog will have a life expectancy at birth of 30 years or more by 2098?", "desc": "While fighting diseases has long been a major end-goal in biological research, the pursuit of life extension in general has more recently been given serious attention and resources. To what degree will these efforts extend to pets?\n\nSuch research and even clinical testing is already underway at biotechnology companies such as [Rejuvenate Bio](https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/05/09/142971/a-stealthy-harvard-startup-wants-to-reverse-aging-in-dogs-and-humans-could-be-next/) and [Loyal](https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2021/07/06/dog-aging-loyal-longevity-fund-celine-hailoua.html), and at the NIH-funded [Dog Aging Project](https://dogagingproject.org/). Research efforts are being boosted not only by demand for improved pet health, but also because these therapies are stepping stones to similar therapies for humans, helping to fill scientific, financial, and regulatory gaps.\n\nA 30-year life expectancy at birth is roughly double the highest expectancy of any current dog breed. This would not necessarily require heritable alterations of existing breeds, just any genetic, medical, lifestyle, and other changes that result in a breed or smaller subgroup of dog living to 30 years on average.\n\nMedian predictions for related Metaculus questions on human longevity suggest [rapid](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5852/date-when-lifespan-increases-075-yrsyr/) [progress](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6592/when-will-a-country-reach-escape-velocity/) that could delay aging indefinitely to occur around a century from now, at which time lifespan may have increased by [a few decades](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/353/will-someone-born-before-2001-live-to-be-150/) from today's level. However, there is huge variance in those predictions.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a reputable source such as a veterinary association, kennel club, or scientific review paper lists the average life expectancy at birth of any dog group as 30 or higher.", "lower_25": "2050", "median": "2074", "upper_75": "2098", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the peak human population before 2100 will be 11.0 billion?", "desc": "The global human population has [grown continuously](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/population) for centuries due to technological, agricultural, and health advancements. Population growth peaked in 1968 at an [annual growth rate of 2.1%](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth-past-future), while in 2019 that rate slowed to 1% annually.\n\nWikipedia provides an [overview of population projections](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Projections_of_population_growth), including the UN's 2019 projections which predicted 10 billion people in 2057, and a peak of 10.8 billion people in 2100. The UN's model focuses mainly on fertility rates; using a lower fertility rate projects population to peak at 8.9 billion in 2052, or to reach 15 billion in 2100 under a high fertility model. [A 2018 model](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth#projections-of-the-total-population-un-vs-iiasa-wc) by the Wittgenstein Center and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis projected population to peak at 9.4 billion around 2070.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the peak global human population before January 1, 2100, according to the [United Nations](https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population-dashboard). The population should measure humans who live primarily on Earth, not in Low-Earth Orbit or beyond. If the UN no longer exists or does not continuously report this data, a similar neutral international research group may be used.", "lower_25": "9.28B", "median": "9.99B", "upper_75": "11.0B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a high frame rate film will be awarded an Academy Award by 2040?", "desc": "Today, most mainstream cinematic movies are made to be watched in 24 frames per second (FPS). This is despite the widespread availability of screens and cameras made for 60 FPS content. Services such as [Youtube](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YouTube#Quality_and_formats), [Netflix](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meridian_(film)) and [Vimeo](https://vimeo.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360056550451-Video-and-audio-compression-guidelines) already have the ability to playback content in 60 FPS.\n\nSome movies have been released in 48 FPS, such as [The Hobbit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Hobbit_(film_series)), and some even in 120 FPS, such as [Gemini Man](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gemini_Man_(film)) or (parts of) [Billy Lynn's Long Halftime Walk](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billy_Lynn%27s_Long_Halftime_Walk_(film)), but none of these have had widespread acclaim by critics. One way to measure how much critics enjoy a film is the [Academy Awards](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Academy_Awards) (known as the Oscars), which nominates and gives awards to films and directors & actors of films.", "resc": "We consider High Frame Rate (HFR) to be 59.5 or higher FPS. A film will qualify even if it is not HFR for the entirety of the film.\n\nThis question will resolve when an Academy Award is given to a movie that is released in HFR before it is nominated. The award must be in the categories of Best Picture, Best Director, Best Actor or Best Actress. When the award is given to a person, such as \"Best Actor\", then the movie they performed in to get the award must have been released in HFR.\n\nA movie is \"released in HFR\" if the general public can view the movie in HFR format, whether this is online streaming, in theater, on blue-ray, or otherwise", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that any type of dog will have a life expectancy at birth of 30 years or more by 2098?", "desc": "While fighting diseases has long been a major end-goal in biological research, the pursuit of life extension in general has more recently been given serious attention and resources. To what degree will these efforts extend to pets?\n\nSuch research and even clinical testing is already underway at biotechnology companies such as [Rejuvenate Bio](https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/05/09/142971/a-stealthy-harvard-startup-wants-to-reverse-aging-in-dogs-and-humans-could-be-next/) and [Loyal](https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2021/07/06/dog-aging-loyal-longevity-fund-celine-hailoua.html), and at the NIH-funded [Dog Aging Project](https://dogagingproject.org/). Research efforts are being boosted not only by demand for improved pet health, but also because these therapies are stepping stones to similar therapies for humans, helping to fill scientific, financial, and regulatory gaps.\n\nA 30-year life expectancy at birth is roughly double the highest expectancy of any current dog breed. This would not necessarily require heritable alterations of existing breeds, just any genetic, medical, lifestyle, and other changes that result in a breed or smaller subgroup of dog living to 30 years on average.\n\nMedian predictions for related Metaculus questions on human longevity suggest [rapid](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5852/date-when-lifespan-increases-075-yrsyr/) [progress](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6592/when-will-a-country-reach-escape-velocity/) that could delay aging indefinitely to occur around a century from now, at which time lifespan may have increased by [a few decades](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/353/will-someone-born-before-2001-live-to-be-150/) from today's level. However, there is huge variance in those predictions.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a reputable source such as a veterinary association, kennel club, or scientific review paper lists the average life expectancy at birth of any dog group as 30 or higher.", "lower_25": "2050", "median": "2074", "upper_75": "2098", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average US labor force participation rate for the decade 2040-2049 will be 38.8?", "desc": "Labor force participation rate uses the definition described by the OECD: the labor force divided by the total working-age population, where the 'working age' population refers to people aged 15 to 64.\n\nMany people think that automation will reduce the number of jobs available. This would push people either into unemployment or perhaps out of participation in the workforce altogether. If some predictions are borne out, we could have substantially fewer people working. This has all sorts of implications. What sort of social support will people need if they cannot find a job? If work is redundant, is it necessary to have an economy that incentivizes work? Geopolitically, right now many countries (e.g., China, Japan) are worried about their aging workforces and low birthrates. Will automation make labor redundant in the end anyway?\n\n\"Unemployed\" is a slightly different category which refers to people who want a job but do not have one. \"Labor force participation\" refers to the number of working people divided by the total number of working aged people.\n\nSee recent participation rates here: https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/civilian-labor-force-participation-rate.htm", "resc": "This resolves to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics' Civilian Labor force participation rate, taking the average of all years from 2040 to 2049 inclusive, restricting age range to between 15 to 64 inclusive.\n\nIf the Bureau does not publicly provide precisely that age range - for instance, if it only provides statistics for 16 year or older - then the nearest publicly provided data applies.\n\nAppropriate data that provides for yearly or better measurements or estimates of the labor force participation rate should be used.\n\nIf the US Bureau of Labor no longer exists or does not collect appropriate statistics, this contract resolves to other relevant sources, prioritizing sources within US government, then intergovernmental sources like the OECD, and then appropriate private US-based and international sources", "lower_25": "38.8", "median": "49.7", "upper_75": "58.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that any type of dog will have a life expectancy at birth of 30 years or more by 2098?", "desc": "While fighting diseases has long been a major end-goal in biological research, the pursuit of life extension in general has more recently been given serious attention and resources. To what degree will these efforts extend to pets?\n\nSuch research and even clinical testing is already underway at biotechnology companies such as [Rejuvenate Bio](https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/05/09/142971/a-stealthy-harvard-startup-wants-to-reverse-aging-in-dogs-and-humans-could-be-next/) and [Loyal](https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2021/07/06/dog-aging-loyal-longevity-fund-celine-hailoua.html), and at the NIH-funded [Dog Aging Project](https://dogagingproject.org/). Research efforts are being boosted not only by demand for improved pet health, but also because these therapies are stepping stones to similar therapies for humans, helping to fill scientific, financial, and regulatory gaps.\n\nA 30-year life expectancy at birth is roughly double the highest expectancy of any current dog breed. This would not necessarily require heritable alterations of existing breeds, just any genetic, medical, lifestyle, and other changes that result in a breed or smaller subgroup of dog living to 30 years on average.\n\nMedian predictions for related Metaculus questions on human longevity suggest [rapid](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5852/date-when-lifespan-increases-075-yrsyr/) [progress](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6592/when-will-a-country-reach-escape-velocity/) that could delay aging indefinitely to occur around a century from now, at which time lifespan may have increased by [a few decades](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/353/will-someone-born-before-2001-live-to-be-150/) from today's level. However, there is huge variance in those predictions.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a reputable source such as a veterinary association, kennel club, or scientific review paper lists the average life expectancy at birth of any dog group as 30 or higher.", "lower_25": "2050", "median": "2074", "upper_75": "2098", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average US labor force participation rate for the decade 2040-2049 will be 38.8?", "desc": "Labor force participation rate uses the definition described by the OECD: the labor force divided by the total working-age population, where the 'working age' population refers to people aged 15 to 64.\n\nMany people think that automation will reduce the number of jobs available. This would push people either into unemployment or perhaps out of participation in the workforce altogether. If some predictions are borne out, we could have substantially fewer people working. This has all sorts of implications. What sort of social support will people need if they cannot find a job? If work is redundant, is it necessary to have an economy that incentivizes work? Geopolitically, right now many countries (e.g., China, Japan) are worried about their aging workforces and low birthrates. Will automation make labor redundant in the end anyway?\n\n\"Unemployed\" is a slightly different category which refers to people who want a job but do not have one. \"Labor force participation\" refers to the number of working people divided by the total number of working aged people.\n\nSee recent participation rates here: https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/civilian-labor-force-participation-rate.htm", "resc": "This resolves to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics' Civilian Labor force participation rate, taking the average of all years from 2040 to 2049 inclusive, restricting age range to between 15 to 64 inclusive.\n\nIf the Bureau does not publicly provide precisely that age range - for instance, if it only provides statistics for 16 year or older - then the nearest publicly provided data applies.\n\nAppropriate data that provides for yearly or better measurements or estimates of the labor force participation rate should be used.\n\nIf the US Bureau of Labor no longer exists or does not collect appropriate statistics, this contract resolves to other relevant sources, prioritizing sources within US government, then intergovernmental sources like the OECD, and then appropriate private US-based and international sources", "lower_25": "38.8", "median": "49.7", "upper_75": "58.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average US labor force participation rate for the decade 2040-2049 will be 38.8?", "desc": "Labor force participation rate uses the definition described by the OECD: the labor force divided by the total working-age population, where the 'working age' population refers to people aged 15 to 64.\n\nMany people think that automation will reduce the number of jobs available. This would push people either into unemployment or perhaps out of participation in the workforce altogether. If some predictions are borne out, we could have substantially fewer people working. This has all sorts of implications. What sort of social support will people need if they cannot find a job? If work is redundant, is it necessary to have an economy that incentivizes work? Geopolitically, right now many countries (e.g., China, Japan) are worried about their aging workforces and low birthrates. Will automation make labor redundant in the end anyway?\n\n\"Unemployed\" is a slightly different category which refers to people who want a job but do not have one. \"Labor force participation\" refers to the number of working people divided by the total number of working aged people.\n\nSee recent participation rates here: https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/civilian-labor-force-participation-rate.htm", "resc": "This resolves to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics' Civilian Labor force participation rate, taking the average of all years from 2040 to 2049 inclusive, restricting age range to between 15 to 64 inclusive.\n\nIf the Bureau does not publicly provide precisely that age range - for instance, if it only provides statistics for 16 year or older - then the nearest publicly provided data applies.\n\nAppropriate data that provides for yearly or better measurements or estimates of the labor force participation rate should be used.\n\nIf the US Bureau of Labor no longer exists or does not collect appropriate statistics, this contract resolves to other relevant sources, prioritizing sources within US government, then intergovernmental sources like the OECD, and then appropriate private US-based and international sources", "lower_25": "38.8", "median": "49.7", "upper_75": "58.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a high frame rate film will be awarded an Academy Award by 2040?", "desc": "Today, most mainstream cinematic movies are made to be watched in 24 frames per second (FPS). This is despite the widespread availability of screens and cameras made for 60 FPS content. Services such as [Youtube](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YouTube#Quality_and_formats), [Netflix](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meridian_(film)) and [Vimeo](https://vimeo.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360056550451-Video-and-audio-compression-guidelines) already have the ability to playback content in 60 FPS.\n\nSome movies have been released in 48 FPS, such as [The Hobbit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Hobbit_(film_series)), and some even in 120 FPS, such as [Gemini Man](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gemini_Man_(film)) or (parts of) [Billy Lynn's Long Halftime Walk](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billy_Lynn%27s_Long_Halftime_Walk_(film)), but none of these have had widespread acclaim by critics. One way to measure how much critics enjoy a film is the [Academy Awards](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Academy_Awards) (known as the Oscars), which nominates and gives awards to films and directors & actors of films.", "resc": "We consider High Frame Rate (HFR) to be 59.5 or higher FPS. A film will qualify even if it is not HFR for the entirety of the film.\n\nThis question will resolve when an Academy Award is given to a movie that is released in HFR before it is nominated. The award must be in the categories of Best Picture, Best Director, Best Actor or Best Actress. When the award is given to a person, such as \"Best Actor\", then the movie they performed in to get the award must have been released in HFR.\n\nA movie is \"released in HFR\" if the general public can view the movie in HFR format, whether this is online streaming, in theater, on blue-ray, or otherwise", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 256-bit ECC will become insecure by 2045?", "desc": "[Elliptic-curve cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic-curve_cryptography) is a public-key cryptography system which is based on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem over elliptic curves. Today it is used in many cryptographic applications, however it is known that due to the efficiency of Shor's algorithm for finding hidden subgroups it is not particularly quantum resistant. It would only take a small quantum computer with a memory of a few thousand qubits (with suitable error tolerance, etc.) to be able to break 256 bit elliptic curve cryptography. It is also possible that there will be a breakthrough in classical algorithms for finding discrete logarithms and 256 bit elliptic curve cryptography will be broken that way.\n\nRegardless of the precise sequence of events leading to it, this question asks the following:", "resc": "This question resolves to the date of an announcement by NIST/FIPS, ANSI, or other comparable standards organizations recommending the discontinuation of 256-bit ECC due to credible reports of the algorithm being rendered insecure. If this doesn't occur by 2100-01-01, the question will resolve as >2100-01-01", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2045", "upper_75": "2060", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 256-bit ECC will become insecure by 2045?", "desc": "[Elliptic-curve cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic-curve_cryptography) is a public-key cryptography system which is based on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem over elliptic curves. Today it is used in many cryptographic applications, however it is known that due to the efficiency of Shor's algorithm for finding hidden subgroups it is not particularly quantum resistant. It would only take a small quantum computer with a memory of a few thousand qubits (with suitable error tolerance, etc.) to be able to break 256 bit elliptic curve cryptography. It is also possible that there will be a breakthrough in classical algorithms for finding discrete logarithms and 256 bit elliptic curve cryptography will be broken that way.\n\nRegardless of the precise sequence of events leading to it, this question asks the following:", "resc": "This question resolves to the date of an announcement by NIST/FIPS, ANSI, or other comparable standards organizations recommending the discontinuation of 256-bit ECC due to credible reports of the algorithm being rendered insecure. If this doesn't occur by 2100-01-01, the question will resolve as >2100-01-01", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2045", "upper_75": "2060", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 256-bit ECC will become insecure by 2045?", "desc": "[Elliptic-curve cryptography](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic-curve_cryptography) is a public-key cryptography system which is based on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem over elliptic curves. Today it is used in many cryptographic applications, however it is known that due to the efficiency of Shor's algorithm for finding hidden subgroups it is not particularly quantum resistant. It would only take a small quantum computer with a memory of a few thousand qubits (with suitable error tolerance, etc.) to be able to break 256 bit elliptic curve cryptography. It is also possible that there will be a breakthrough in classical algorithms for finding discrete logarithms and 256 bit elliptic curve cryptography will be broken that way.\n\nRegardless of the precise sequence of events leading to it, this question asks the following:", "resc": "This question resolves to the date of an announcement by NIST/FIPS, ANSI, or other comparable standards organizations recommending the discontinuation of 256-bit ECC due to credible reports of the algorithm being rendered insecure. If this doesn't occur by 2100-01-01, the question will resolve as >2100-01-01", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2045", "upper_75": "2060", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a new record for the best proven upper bound on the average rank of elliptic curves by Apr 2029?", "desc": "The [rank of an elliptic curve](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rank_of_an_elliptic_curve) is the rank of the group of rational points of an elliptic curve defined over the rational numbers, or equivalently it's the dimension of the rational vector space we get by tensoring the group of rational points with \\( \\mathbb Q \\) over \\( \\mathbb Z \\). Intuitively, it is a measure of the \"size\" of the collection of rational points on an elliptic curve.\n\nIn this question we're interested in the quantity\n\n\\[ S = \\limsup_{X \\to \\infty} \\frac{\\sum_{H(E) \\leq X} r(E)}{\\sum_{H(E) \\leq X} 1} \\]\n\nwhere \\( H(E) \\) denotes the height of an elliptic curve, \\( r(E) \\) denotes its rank and the sums range over all elliptic curves over the rational numbers satisfying the given height condition.\n\nIt is a folklore conjecture that \\( S = 1/2 \\), but currently the best available upper bound on \\( S \\) is \\( 7/6 \\).", "resc": "This question resolves to the date when a valid proof is given that \\( S < 7/6 - \\epsilon \\) for some real \\( \\epsilon > 0 \\). The last breakthrough before this question opened was a [proof](https://annals.math.princeton.edu/2015/181-2/p04) given by Bhargava and Shankar in 2015 which established the \\( 7/6 \\) bound which is currently the best bound available. If this doesn't occur until the resolution date of the question, the question resolves as >", "lower_25": "Jun 2027", "median": "Apr 2029", "upper_75": "Sep 2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a high frame rate film will be awarded an Academy Award by 2040?", "desc": "Today, most mainstream cinematic movies are made to be watched in 24 frames per second (FPS). This is despite the widespread availability of screens and cameras made for 60 FPS content. Services such as [Youtube](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YouTube#Quality_and_formats), [Netflix](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meridian_(film)) and [Vimeo](https://vimeo.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/360056550451-Video-and-audio-compression-guidelines) already have the ability to playback content in 60 FPS.\n\nSome movies have been released in 48 FPS, such as [The Hobbit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Hobbit_(film_series)), and some even in 120 FPS, such as [Gemini Man](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gemini_Man_(film)) or (parts of) [Billy Lynn's Long Halftime Walk](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billy_Lynn%27s_Long_Halftime_Walk_(film)), but none of these have had widespread acclaim by critics. One way to measure how much critics enjoy a film is the [Academy Awards](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Academy_Awards) (known as the Oscars), which nominates and gives awards to films and directors & actors of films.", "resc": "We consider High Frame Rate (HFR) to be 59.5 or higher FPS. A film will qualify even if it is not HFR for the entirety of the film.\n\nThis question will resolve when an Academy Award is given to a movie that is released in HFR before it is nominated. The award must be in the categories of Best Picture, Best Director, Best Actor or Best Actress. When the award is given to a person, such as \"Best Actor\", then the movie they performed in to get the award must have been released in HFR.\n\nA movie is \"released in HFR\" if the general public can view the movie in HFR format, whether this is online streaming, in theater, on blue-ray, or otherwise", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that The Elder Scrolls VI will be released by Oct 2027?", "desc": "[The Elder Scrolls](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Elder_Scrolls) is a series of action role-playing video games primarily developed by Bethesda Game Studios and published by Bethesda Softworks. The series focuses on free-form gameplay in a detailed open world. Morrowind, Oblivion and Skyrim all won Game of the Year awards from multiple outlets. The series has sold more than 58 million copies worldwide.\n\n[An official announcement teaser](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkFdqqyI8y4) for The Elder Scrolls VI, the next major installment of the series, was shown back in 2018, with little in the way of official news since.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which the next major instalment in The Elder Scrolls series (e.g. not a remaster or handheld game), the successor to TES V: Skyrim, is released for sale to the public in at least 1 country. \n\nThis date is the date on which the game can either be purchased from retailers or directly downloaded from an online store, not the date on which the game becomes available for pre-order", "lower_25": "Oct 2025", "median": "Aug 2026", "upper_75": "Oct 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a new record for the best proven lower bound on the maximum possible rank of an elliptic curve will be set by 2029?", "desc": "The [rank of an elliptic curve](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rank_of_an_elliptic_curve) is the rank of the group of rational points of an elliptic curve defined over the rational numbers, or equivalently it's the dimension of the rational vector space we get by tensoring the group of rational points with \\( \\mathbb Q \\) over \\( \\mathbb Z \\). Intuitively, it is a measure of the \"size\" of the collection of rational points on an elliptic curve.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a valid proof is given that there is an elliptic curve with rank strictly greater than \\( 28 \\). The current best lower bound on the maximum is \\( 28 \\), which has been proven by Noam Elkies in 2006.\n\nIf this does not occur by December 29, 2044, this question will resolve as **> December 29, 2044**", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2044", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that The Elder Scrolls VI will be released by Oct 2027?", "desc": "[The Elder Scrolls](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Elder_Scrolls) is a series of action role-playing video games primarily developed by Bethesda Game Studios and published by Bethesda Softworks. The series focuses on free-form gameplay in a detailed open world. Morrowind, Oblivion and Skyrim all won Game of the Year awards from multiple outlets. The series has sold more than 58 million copies worldwide.\n\n[An official announcement teaser](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkFdqqyI8y4) for The Elder Scrolls VI, the next major installment of the series, was shown back in 2018, with little in the way of official news since.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which the next major instalment in The Elder Scrolls series (e.g. not a remaster or handheld game), the successor to TES V: Skyrim, is released for sale to the public in at least 1 country. \n\nThis date is the date on which the game can either be purchased from retailers or directly downloaded from an online store, not the date on which the game becomes available for pre-order", "lower_25": "Oct 2025", "median": "Aug 2026", "upper_75": "Oct 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a new record for the best proven lower bound on the maximum possible rank of an elliptic curve will be set by 2029?", "desc": "The [rank of an elliptic curve](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rank_of_an_elliptic_curve) is the rank of the group of rational points of an elliptic curve defined over the rational numbers, or equivalently it's the dimension of the rational vector space we get by tensoring the group of rational points with \\( \\mathbb Q \\) over \\( \\mathbb Z \\). Intuitively, it is a measure of the \"size\" of the collection of rational points on an elliptic curve.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a valid proof is given that there is an elliptic curve with rank strictly greater than \\( 28 \\). The current best lower bound on the maximum is \\( 28 \\), which has been proven by Noam Elkies in 2006.\n\nIf this does not occur by December 29, 2044, this question will resolve as **> December 29, 2044**", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2044", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that The Elder Scrolls VI will be released by Oct 2027?", "desc": "[The Elder Scrolls](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Elder_Scrolls) is a series of action role-playing video games primarily developed by Bethesda Game Studios and published by Bethesda Softworks. The series focuses on free-form gameplay in a detailed open world. Morrowind, Oblivion and Skyrim all won Game of the Year awards from multiple outlets. The series has sold more than 58 million copies worldwide.\n\n[An official announcement teaser](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkFdqqyI8y4) for The Elder Scrolls VI, the next major installment of the series, was shown back in 2018, with little in the way of official news since.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which the next major instalment in The Elder Scrolls series (e.g. not a remaster or handheld game), the successor to TES V: Skyrim, is released for sale to the public in at least 1 country. \n\nThis date is the date on which the game can either be purchased from retailers or directly downloaded from an online store, not the date on which the game becomes available for pre-order", "lower_25": "Oct 2025", "median": "Aug 2026", "upper_75": "Oct 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.1 countries will recognize Bitcoin as legal tender on 2030-01-01?", "desc": "Recently, El Salvador [became the first country to accept bitcoin as legal tender](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/07/el-salvador-buys-400-bitcoin-ahead-of-law-making-it-legal-currency.html) and Brazil is [considering following suit.](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/bitcoin-set-become-legal-payment-154644863.html)", "resc": "This question will resolve to the number of United Nations member states that have Bitcoin as legal tender on 2030-01-01, as reported by reliable media outlets.\n\nIn the case of a significant fork in Bitcoin's code, this question will recognize the highest-valued coin which contains more than 90% of the blockchain record (from 2009 to 2021) as the original \"Bitcoin\"", "lower_25": "2.92", "median": "5.83", "upper_75": "10.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a new record for the best proven upper bound on the average rank of elliptic curves by Apr 2029?", "desc": "The [rank of an elliptic curve](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rank_of_an_elliptic_curve) is the rank of the group of rational points of an elliptic curve defined over the rational numbers, or equivalently it's the dimension of the rational vector space we get by tensoring the group of rational points with \\( \\mathbb Q \\) over \\( \\mathbb Z \\). Intuitively, it is a measure of the \"size\" of the collection of rational points on an elliptic curve.\n\nIn this question we're interested in the quantity\n\n\\[ S = \\limsup_{X \\to \\infty} \\frac{\\sum_{H(E) \\leq X} r(E)}{\\sum_{H(E) \\leq X} 1} \\]\n\nwhere \\( H(E) \\) denotes the height of an elliptic curve, \\( r(E) \\) denotes its rank and the sums range over all elliptic curves over the rational numbers satisfying the given height condition.\n\nIt is a folklore conjecture that \\( S = 1/2 \\), but currently the best available upper bound on \\( S \\) is \\( 7/6 \\).", "resc": "This question resolves to the date when a valid proof is given that \\( S < 7/6 - \\epsilon \\) for some real \\( \\epsilon > 0 \\). The last breakthrough before this question opened was a [proof](https://annals.math.princeton.edu/2015/181-2/p04) given by Bhargava and Shankar in 2015 which established the \\( 7/6 \\) bound which is currently the best bound available. If this doesn't occur until the resolution date of the question, the question resolves as >", "lower_25": "Jun 2027", "median": "Apr 2029", "upper_75": "Sep 2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a new record for the best proven lower bound on the maximum possible rank of an elliptic curve will be set by 2029?", "desc": "The [rank of an elliptic curve](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rank_of_an_elliptic_curve) is the rank of the group of rational points of an elliptic curve defined over the rational numbers, or equivalently it's the dimension of the rational vector space we get by tensoring the group of rational points with \\( \\mathbb Q \\) over \\( \\mathbb Z \\). Intuitively, it is a measure of the \"size\" of the collection of rational points on an elliptic curve.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a valid proof is given that there is an elliptic curve with rank strictly greater than \\( 28 \\). The current best lower bound on the maximum is \\( 28 \\), which has been proven by Noam Elkies in 2006.\n\nIf this does not occur by December 29, 2044, this question will resolve as **> December 29, 2044**", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2044", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.1 countries will recognize Bitcoin as legal tender on 2030-01-01?", "desc": "Recently, El Salvador [became the first country to accept bitcoin as legal tender](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/07/el-salvador-buys-400-bitcoin-ahead-of-law-making-it-legal-currency.html) and Brazil is [considering following suit.](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/bitcoin-set-become-legal-payment-154644863.html)", "resc": "This question will resolve to the number of United Nations member states that have Bitcoin as legal tender on 2030-01-01, as reported by reliable media outlets.\n\nIn the case of a significant fork in Bitcoin's code, this question will recognize the highest-valued coin which contains more than 90% of the blockchain record (from 2009 to 2021) as the original \"Bitcoin\"", "lower_25": "2.92", "median": "5.83", "upper_75": "10.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a new record for the best proven upper bound on the average rank of elliptic curves by Apr 2029?", "desc": "The [rank of an elliptic curve](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rank_of_an_elliptic_curve) is the rank of the group of rational points of an elliptic curve defined over the rational numbers, or equivalently it's the dimension of the rational vector space we get by tensoring the group of rational points with \\( \\mathbb Q \\) over \\( \\mathbb Z \\). Intuitively, it is a measure of the \"size\" of the collection of rational points on an elliptic curve.\n\nIn this question we're interested in the quantity\n\n\\[ S = \\limsup_{X \\to \\infty} \\frac{\\sum_{H(E) \\leq X} r(E)}{\\sum_{H(E) \\leq X} 1} \\]\n\nwhere \\( H(E) \\) denotes the height of an elliptic curve, \\( r(E) \\) denotes its rank and the sums range over all elliptic curves over the rational numbers satisfying the given height condition.\n\nIt is a folklore conjecture that \\( S = 1/2 \\), but currently the best available upper bound on \\( S \\) is \\( 7/6 \\).", "resc": "This question resolves to the date when a valid proof is given that \\( S < 7/6 - \\epsilon \\) for some real \\( \\epsilon > 0 \\). The last breakthrough before this question opened was a [proof](https://annals.math.princeton.edu/2015/181-2/p04) given by Bhargava and Shankar in 2015 which established the \\( 7/6 \\) bound which is currently the best bound available. If this doesn't occur until the resolution date of the question, the question resolves as >", "lower_25": "Jun 2027", "median": "Apr 2029", "upper_75": "Sep 2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.1 countries will recognize Bitcoin as legal tender on 2030-01-01?", "desc": "Recently, El Salvador [became the first country to accept bitcoin as legal tender](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/07/el-salvador-buys-400-bitcoin-ahead-of-law-making-it-legal-currency.html) and Brazil is [considering following suit.](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/bitcoin-set-become-legal-payment-154644863.html)", "resc": "This question will resolve to the number of United Nations member states that have Bitcoin as legal tender on 2030-01-01, as reported by reliable media outlets.\n\nIn the case of a significant fork in Bitcoin's code, this question will recognize the highest-valued coin which contains more than 90% of the blockchain record (from 2009 to 2021) as the original \"Bitcoin\"", "lower_25": "2.92", "median": "5.83", "upper_75": "10.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 10 countries will formally recognize Somaliland as an independent state by 2052?", "desc": "In 1991, the [Republic of Somaliland](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/somaliland-horn-africas-breakaway-state) broke away from the Somali Democratic Republic after a decade-long rebellion against Siad Barre's ruling government, which was ousted that year. Since the outbreak of the Somali Civil War in 1991, Somaliland has been a de facto independent country with democratically elected governments. The Republic of Somaliland asserts that it is the successor state to British Somaliland and the short-lived State of Somaliland which followed. \n\nDespite 30 years of democratic government and de facto independence, Somaliland has not been formally recognized by any UN member state. Somaliland maintains [representative offices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_Somaliland#Diplomatic_representative_offices) in Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Sweden, Italy, the United States, Kenya, the United Kingdom, and Taiwan. Ethiopia, Turkey, Djibouti, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Taiwan maintain diplomatic offices in Somaliland. However, none of these offices constitutes formal recognition of Somaliland as being independent from Somalia.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when 10 or more UN member countries (excluding observers and non-member states) formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland as an independent state, as reported either by reputable media or directly by the foreign ministry (or equivalent department) of the country announcing recognition", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2052", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2069", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 10 countries will formally recognize Somaliland as an independent state by 2052?", "desc": "In 1991, the [Republic of Somaliland](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/somaliland-horn-africas-breakaway-state) broke away from the Somali Democratic Republic after a decade-long rebellion against Siad Barre's ruling government, which was ousted that year. Since the outbreak of the Somali Civil War in 1991, Somaliland has been a de facto independent country with democratically elected governments. The Republic of Somaliland asserts that it is the successor state to British Somaliland and the short-lived State of Somaliland which followed. \n\nDespite 30 years of democratic government and de facto independence, Somaliland has not been formally recognized by any UN member state. Somaliland maintains [representative offices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_Somaliland#Diplomatic_representative_offices) in Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Sweden, Italy, the United States, Kenya, the United Kingdom, and Taiwan. Ethiopia, Turkey, Djibouti, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Taiwan maintain diplomatic offices in Somaliland. However, none of these offices constitutes formal recognition of Somaliland as being independent from Somalia.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when 10 or more UN member countries (excluding observers and non-member states) formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland as an independent state, as reported either by reputable media or directly by the foreign ministry (or equivalent department) of the country announcing recognition", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2052", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2069", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 10 countries will formally recognize Somaliland as an independent state by 2052?", "desc": "In 1991, the [Republic of Somaliland](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/somaliland-horn-africas-breakaway-state) broke away from the Somali Democratic Republic after a decade-long rebellion against Siad Barre's ruling government, which was ousted that year. Since the outbreak of the Somali Civil War in 1991, Somaliland has been a de facto independent country with democratically elected governments. The Republic of Somaliland asserts that it is the successor state to British Somaliland and the short-lived State of Somaliland which followed. \n\nDespite 30 years of democratic government and de facto independence, Somaliland has not been formally recognized by any UN member state. Somaliland maintains [representative offices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_Somaliland#Diplomatic_representative_offices) in Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Sweden, Italy, the United States, Kenya, the United Kingdom, and Taiwan. Ethiopia, Turkey, Djibouti, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Taiwan maintain diplomatic offices in Somaliland. However, none of these offices constitutes formal recognition of Somaliland as being independent from Somalia.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when 10 or more UN member countries (excluding observers and non-member states) formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland as an independent state, as reported either by reputable media or directly by the foreign ministry (or equivalent department) of the country announcing recognition", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2052", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2069", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest yield (in kt) nuclear weapon offensively detonated by 2050, if any offensive detonation occurs, will be 869?", "desc": "For context and motivation for this and other questions in this tournament on nuclear proliferation, force sizes, or yields, see [here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ldq0qAutq5Gam8dIRVxA_bzd0Rqz_pL3md8dosHoXjU/edit).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations (see fine print for definitions) of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the yield (in kilotonnes) of the largest yield nuclear weapon detonated offensively by 2050. This question resolves ambiguously if no offensive nuclear detonation occurs between November 1, 2021 to January 1, 2050.\n\nResolution will be based on estimates from reliable news sources or from government or multi-national reports such as from the UN.", "lower_25": "58.8", "median": "276", "upper_75": "869", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest yield (in kt) nuclear weapon offensively detonated by 2050, if any offensive detonation occurs, will be 869?", "desc": "For context and motivation for this and other questions in this tournament on nuclear proliferation, force sizes, or yields, see [here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ldq0qAutq5Gam8dIRVxA_bzd0Rqz_pL3md8dosHoXjU/edit).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations (see fine print for definitions) of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the yield (in kilotonnes) of the largest yield nuclear weapon detonated offensively by 2050. This question resolves ambiguously if no offensive nuclear detonation occurs between November 1, 2021 to January 1, 2050.\n\nResolution will be based on estimates from reliable news sources or from government or multi-national reports such as from the UN.", "lower_25": "58.8", "median": "276", "upper_75": "869", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least one HEMP attack will occur by 2030, given that 9.58 attacks are expected?", "desc": "According to the [US EMP Commission (2004)](http://www.empcommission.org/docs/empc_exec_rpt.pdf):\n\n>\"Several potential adversaries have or can acquire the capability to attack the United States with a high-altitude nuclear weapon-generated electromagnetic pulse (EMP). A determined adversary can achieve an EMP attack capability without having a high level of sophistication. EMP is one of a small number of threats that can hold our society at risk of catastrophic consequences. EMP will cover the wide geographic region within line of sight to the nuclear weapon.\"\n\nOther questions in this tournament asks [how _likely_ a HEMP attack is by 2024](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7412/hemp-attack-before-2024/) and whether, if one or more HEMP attacks occur by 2030, they'd cause a total of >10 million fatalities. This question is about how many such attacks would occur, if any do. For further context on this question, see [Nuclear risk research idea: Nuclear EMPs](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1I_4XTKOytSIm4q--BH3cK8R7Yg7K-KbydKtPLTJJ90I/edit#heading=h.4afvzod1qk1t) and [[rough notes] Harms from nuclear conflict via EMPs, fallout, or ozone depletion](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ws5i4_axkPLO95oIhVvE2_5b2xGcR-ktD9gRHUDjX_Y/edit).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse attacks that occur in total between November 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If there are no HEMP attacks by 2030 by any state or non-state actor, then this question will resolve ambiguously. That is, this question conditions on at least one HEMP attack occurring by 2030.\n\nFor this question, a [HEMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_electromagnetic_pulse) is defined as either:\n\n* a >1 kiloton explosion at greater than 30 kilometer altitude (including detonation in space), or\n\n* a non-nuclear device which produces similar or larger EMP field levels over similar or larger areas compared to a HEMP detonation", "lower_25": "1.85", "median": "3.90", "upper_75": "9.58", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 25.9 million people living on Mars by 2050?", "desc": "*Related question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will the first humans land successfully on Mars?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3515/when-will-the-first-humans-land-successfully-on-mars/)\n\n----\n\n[SpaceX](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX), [NASA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nasa), and other entities are aiming to send people to Mars with the long term goal of [establishing a permanent human presence](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/23/elon-musk-aiming-for-mars-so-humanity-is-not-a-single-planet-species.html).\n\nNeuroscientist and fiction author Erik Hoel predicted in a [blog post published August 25, 2021](https://erikhoel.substack.com/p/futurists-have-their-heads-in-the):\n\n>By 2050 there will be an established and growing civilian presence on Mars—a city on the Red Planet. [...] the first city will experience surprisingly explosive economic growth, adding population in a way no Earth city is at the time. It's very possible someone you know right now will be living on Mars by 2050.\n\nHoel later doubled-down on his prediction with some nearer-term predictions, including [the first human permanent residents and initial base construction by 2030](https://erikhoel.substack.com/p/nasa-and-spacex-are-establishing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of people living on Mars in the year 2050. The resolution will be based on reports from any reputable government or corporate entity with a presence on Mars or from reputable media sources. \"Residents\" may include any human living on or visiting Mars' surface for any time in the calendar year 2050, in [UTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coordinated_Universal_Time) time", "lower_25": "< 1", "median": "1.23", "upper_75": "25.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 25.9 million people living on Mars by 2050?", "desc": "*Related question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will the first humans land successfully on Mars?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3515/when-will-the-first-humans-land-successfully-on-mars/)\n\n----\n\n[SpaceX](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX), [NASA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nasa), and other entities are aiming to send people to Mars with the long term goal of [establishing a permanent human presence](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/23/elon-musk-aiming-for-mars-so-humanity-is-not-a-single-planet-species.html).\n\nNeuroscientist and fiction author Erik Hoel predicted in a [blog post published August 25, 2021](https://erikhoel.substack.com/p/futurists-have-their-heads-in-the):\n\n>By 2050 there will be an established and growing civilian presence on Mars—a city on the Red Planet. [...] the first city will experience surprisingly explosive economic growth, adding population in a way no Earth city is at the time. It's very possible someone you know right now will be living on Mars by 2050.\n\nHoel later doubled-down on his prediction with some nearer-term predictions, including [the first human permanent residents and initial base construction by 2030](https://erikhoel.substack.com/p/nasa-and-spacex-are-establishing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of people living on Mars in the year 2050. The resolution will be based on reports from any reputable government or corporate entity with a presence on Mars or from reputable media sources. \"Residents\" may include any human living on or visiting Mars' surface for any time in the calendar year 2050, in [UTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coordinated_Universal_Time) time", "lower_25": "< 1", "median": "1.23", "upper_75": "25.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest yield (in kt) nuclear weapon offensively detonated by 2050, if any offensive detonation occurs, will be 869?", "desc": "For context and motivation for this and other questions in this tournament on nuclear proliferation, force sizes, or yields, see [here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ldq0qAutq5Gam8dIRVxA_bzd0Rqz_pL3md8dosHoXjU/edit).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations (see fine print for definitions) of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the yield (in kilotonnes) of the largest yield nuclear weapon detonated offensively by 2050. This question resolves ambiguously if no offensive nuclear detonation occurs between November 1, 2021 to January 1, 2050.\n\nResolution will be based on estimates from reliable news sources or from government or multi-national reports such as from the UN.", "lower_25": "58.8", "median": "276", "upper_75": "869", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 25.9 million people living on Mars by 2050?", "desc": "*Related question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will the first humans land successfully on Mars?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3515/when-will-the-first-humans-land-successfully-on-mars/)\n\n----\n\n[SpaceX](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX), [NASA](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nasa), and other entities are aiming to send people to Mars with the long term goal of [establishing a permanent human presence](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/23/elon-musk-aiming-for-mars-so-humanity-is-not-a-single-planet-species.html).\n\nNeuroscientist and fiction author Erik Hoel predicted in a [blog post published August 25, 2021](https://erikhoel.substack.com/p/futurists-have-their-heads-in-the):\n\n>By 2050 there will be an established and growing civilian presence on Mars—a city on the Red Planet. [...] the first city will experience surprisingly explosive economic growth, adding population in a way no Earth city is at the time. It's very possible someone you know right now will be living on Mars by 2050.\n\nHoel later doubled-down on his prediction with some nearer-term predictions, including [the first human permanent residents and initial base construction by 2030](https://erikhoel.substack.com/p/nasa-and-spacex-are-establishing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of people living on Mars in the year 2050. The resolution will be based on reports from any reputable government or corporate entity with a presence on Mars or from reputable media sources. \"Residents\" may include any human living on or visiting Mars' surface for any time in the calendar year 2050, in [UTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coordinated_Universal_Time) time", "lower_25": "< 1", "median": "1.23", "upper_75": "25.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least one HEMP attack will occur by 2030, given that 9.58 attacks are expected?", "desc": "According to the [US EMP Commission (2004)](http://www.empcommission.org/docs/empc_exec_rpt.pdf):\n\n>\"Several potential adversaries have or can acquire the capability to attack the United States with a high-altitude nuclear weapon-generated electromagnetic pulse (EMP). A determined adversary can achieve an EMP attack capability without having a high level of sophistication. EMP is one of a small number of threats that can hold our society at risk of catastrophic consequences. EMP will cover the wide geographic region within line of sight to the nuclear weapon.\"\n\nOther questions in this tournament asks [how _likely_ a HEMP attack is by 2024](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7412/hemp-attack-before-2024/) and whether, if one or more HEMP attacks occur by 2030, they'd cause a total of >10 million fatalities. This question is about how many such attacks would occur, if any do. For further context on this question, see [Nuclear risk research idea: Nuclear EMPs](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1I_4XTKOytSIm4q--BH3cK8R7Yg7K-KbydKtPLTJJ90I/edit#heading=h.4afvzod1qk1t) and [[rough notes] Harms from nuclear conflict via EMPs, fallout, or ozone depletion](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ws5i4_axkPLO95oIhVvE2_5b2xGcR-ktD9gRHUDjX_Y/edit).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse attacks that occur in total between November 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If there are no HEMP attacks by 2030 by any state or non-state actor, then this question will resolve ambiguously. That is, this question conditions on at least one HEMP attack occurring by 2030.\n\nFor this question, a [HEMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_electromagnetic_pulse) is defined as either:\n\n* a >1 kiloton explosion at greater than 30 kilometer altitude (including detonation in space), or\n\n* a non-nuclear device which produces similar or larger EMP field levels over similar or larger areas compared to a HEMP detonation", "lower_25": "1.85", "median": "3.90", "upper_75": "9.58", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.057 fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by countries by 2050 will be on cities with >1500 people per km^2?", "desc": "", "resc": "Nuclear detonations on targets with higher population densities would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter). Several questions in this tournament are intended to shed light on the question of how many nuclear detonations would occur on well-populated areas, including [What fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be countervalue?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7461/total-countervalue-detonations-by-2050/), [What fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be on towns/cities with >500 people per square kilometer?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7503/fraction-detonations-by-2050-on-townscities/), and similar questions. This question uses a different operationalization for a similar purpose.\n\n***What fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by countries by 2050 will be on cities with >1,500 people per km^2?***\n\nThis question resolves as the proportion of offensive state nuclear detonations between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2050 which occur on or over a point that is within the bounds of city that has a population density of at least 1,500 people per square kilometer. The question resolves ambiguously if there are no offensive state nuclear detonations between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2050.\n\n[fine-print]\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive state nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental detonations of weapons that were owned by a state at the time of detonation (see the fine print for definitions). This excludes detonations of weapons that were created by non-state actors or were sold to non-state actors by the state that had owned the weapon.\n\nCities are defined as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" [_Degrees of Urbanization_](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas).\n\nThe military significance or stated purpose of the strike is not taken into consideration for this question (except that [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) and [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) are not counted towards positive resolution). For example, either a strike intended to kill civilians or a strike intended to destroy a military asset that happens to be in a capital city could both count towards this proportion.\n\nDetonations must occur less than 20 kilometers above the surface of the Earth in order to count as being \" on or over a point that is within the bounds of a city\".\n\nOffensive state nuclear detonations could include detonations by non-state actors which stole a nuclear weapon owned by a state. The main reason for including such detonations is that they can be hard to distinguish from two types of detonations that do seem worth including: \n\n* cases where actors within an official chain of command \"go rogue\" and use a weapon\n\n* cases where a country basically _allows_ terrorists to steal and use its weapons against the country's adversary\n\nIn a deliberate detonation, the attacking nation decides to launch one or more nuclear weapons either in response to a genuine nuclear attack or without believing that it is under nuclear attack. “In an inadvertent detonation, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under nuclear attack and launches one or more nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack” [(Barrett et al., 2013)](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf). “In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders” [(Barrett et al., 2013)](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf).\n\nTest detonations and peaceful nuclear explosions are defined as detonations which are claimed as being a test or a peaceful nuclear explosion by an official government communication within 30 days of the event, without this being disputed by reliable media, state reports, or multinational reports.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "0.057", "median": "0.174", "upper_75": "0.319", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that The Green Party will have more than one Member of Parliament in UK Parliament by 2046?", "desc": "[The Green Party of England and Wales](https://vote.greenparty.org.uk/_) is a left of centre political party with a specific focus on environmentalism. According to [Politics.co.uk](https://www.politics.co.uk/reference/green-party/), The Green Party has increased representation at local council level, but since its founding in 1973 the political party has been represented in UK Parliament by only one Member of Parliament (the Brighton Pavilion seat since 2010) (as of 27 October 2021).", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that two or more Green Party candidates are elected as Members of Parliament in UK Parliament. The resolution date will be the date they take office, not (for example) the date they win an election", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2046", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that The Green Party will have more than one Member of Parliament in UK Parliament by 2046?", "desc": "[The Green Party of England and Wales](https://vote.greenparty.org.uk/_) is a left of centre political party with a specific focus on environmentalism. According to [Politics.co.uk](https://www.politics.co.uk/reference/green-party/), The Green Party has increased representation at local council level, but since its founding in 1973 the political party has been represented in UK Parliament by only one Member of Parliament (the Brighton Pavilion seat since 2010) (as of 27 October 2021).", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that two or more Green Party candidates are elected as Members of Parliament in UK Parliament. The resolution date will be the date they take office, not (for example) the date they win an election", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2046", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that The Green Party will have more than one Member of Parliament in UK Parliament by 2046?", "desc": "[The Green Party of England and Wales](https://vote.greenparty.org.uk/_) is a left of centre political party with a specific focus on environmentalism. According to [Politics.co.uk](https://www.politics.co.uk/reference/green-party/), The Green Party has increased representation at local council level, but since its founding in 1973 the political party has been represented in UK Parliament by only one Member of Parliament (the Brighton Pavilion seat since 2010) (as of 27 October 2021).", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that two or more Green Party candidates are elected as Members of Parliament in UK Parliament. The resolution date will be the date they take office, not (for example) the date they win an election", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2046", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.057 fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by countries by 2050 will be on cities with >1500 people per km^2?", "desc": "", "resc": "Nuclear detonations on targets with higher population densities would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter). Several questions in this tournament are intended to shed light on the question of how many nuclear detonations would occur on well-populated areas, including [What fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be countervalue?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7461/total-countervalue-detonations-by-2050/), [What fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be on towns/cities with >500 people per square kilometer?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7503/fraction-detonations-by-2050-on-townscities/), and similar questions. This question uses a different operationalization for a similar purpose.\n\n***What fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by countries by 2050 will be on cities with >1,500 people per km^2?***\n\nThis question resolves as the proportion of offensive state nuclear detonations between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2050 which occur on or over a point that is within the bounds of city that has a population density of at least 1,500 people per square kilometer. The question resolves ambiguously if there are no offensive state nuclear detonations between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2050.\n\n[fine-print]\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive state nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental detonations of weapons that were owned by a state at the time of detonation (see the fine print for definitions). This excludes detonations of weapons that were created by non-state actors or were sold to non-state actors by the state that had owned the weapon.\n\nCities are defined as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" [_Degrees of Urbanization_](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas).\n\nThe military significance or stated purpose of the strike is not taken into consideration for this question (except that [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) and [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) are not counted towards positive resolution). For example, either a strike intended to kill civilians or a strike intended to destroy a military asset that happens to be in a capital city could both count towards this proportion.\n\nDetonations must occur less than 20 kilometers above the surface of the Earth in order to count as being \" on or over a point that is within the bounds of a city\".\n\nOffensive state nuclear detonations could include detonations by non-state actors which stole a nuclear weapon owned by a state. The main reason for including such detonations is that they can be hard to distinguish from two types of detonations that do seem worth including: \n\n* cases where actors within an official chain of command \"go rogue\" and use a weapon\n\n* cases where a country basically _allows_ terrorists to steal and use its weapons against the country's adversary\n\nIn a deliberate detonation, the attacking nation decides to launch one or more nuclear weapons either in response to a genuine nuclear attack or without believing that it is under nuclear attack. “In an inadvertent detonation, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under nuclear attack and launches one or more nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack” [(Barrett et al., 2013)](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf). “In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders” [(Barrett et al., 2013)](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf).\n\nTest detonations and peaceful nuclear explosions are defined as detonations which are claimed as being a test or a peaceful nuclear explosion by an official government communication within 30 days of the event, without this being disputed by reliable media, state reports, or multinational reports.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "0.057", "median": "0.174", "upper_75": "0.319", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least one HEMP attack will occur by 2030, given that 9.58 attacks are expected?", "desc": "According to the [US EMP Commission (2004)](http://www.empcommission.org/docs/empc_exec_rpt.pdf):\n\n>\"Several potential adversaries have or can acquire the capability to attack the United States with a high-altitude nuclear weapon-generated electromagnetic pulse (EMP). A determined adversary can achieve an EMP attack capability without having a high level of sophistication. EMP is one of a small number of threats that can hold our society at risk of catastrophic consequences. EMP will cover the wide geographic region within line of sight to the nuclear weapon.\"\n\nOther questions in this tournament asks [how _likely_ a HEMP attack is by 2024](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7412/hemp-attack-before-2024/) and whether, if one or more HEMP attacks occur by 2030, they'd cause a total of >10 million fatalities. This question is about how many such attacks would occur, if any do. For further context on this question, see [Nuclear risk research idea: Nuclear EMPs](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1I_4XTKOytSIm4q--BH3cK8R7Yg7K-KbydKtPLTJJ90I/edit#heading=h.4afvzod1qk1t) and [[rough notes] Harms from nuclear conflict via EMPs, fallout, or ozone depletion](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ws5i4_axkPLO95oIhVvE2_5b2xGcR-ktD9gRHUDjX_Y/edit).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse attacks that occur in total between November 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If there are no HEMP attacks by 2030 by any state or non-state actor, then this question will resolve ambiguously. That is, this question conditions on at least one HEMP attack occurring by 2030.\n\nFor this question, a [HEMP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_electromagnetic_pulse) is defined as either:\n\n* a >1 kiloton explosion at greater than 30 kilometer altitude (including detonation in space), or\n\n* a non-nuclear device which produces similar or larger EMP field levels over similar or larger areas compared to a HEMP detonation", "lower_25": "1.85", "median": "3.90", "upper_75": "9.58", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many career points will James Harden score in the NBA regular season when he retires?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that James Harden will score 28.2k career points in the NBA regular season when he retires?", "desc": "As of October 24, 2021, James Harden had scored a total of [22,114 points](https://www.nba.com/stats/alltime-leaders/) during the NBA regular season. James Harden is 32 years old and currently plays Guard for the [Brooklyn Nets](https://www.nba.com/stats/player/201935/). He is known for 3-point shooting and is currently the [top left-handed scorer](https://rocketswire.usatoday.com/2020/08/03/james-harden-tops-david-robinson-to-become-nbas-top-lefty-scorer/) in the history of the NBA.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of points James Harden has scored in his career during regular NBA season games, at the time of his retirement, according to [NBA](https://www.nba.com/stats/player/201935).\n\nHarden's official retirement date will come from a formal announcement by him or by a spokesperson on his behalf; if he returns to the NBA after this retirement date, his later points will not be included in this question", "lower_25": "26.7k", "median": "28.2k", "upper_75": "30.1k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the five-year relative survival rate of pancreatic cancer patients in the US will exceed 50% by 2050?", "desc": "Survival rates for pancreatic cancer, one of the more lethal cancer types, have begun to [increase substantially](https://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/pancreas.html). Five-year relative survival in the US has risen from 5.3% in 2000 to 12.1% in 2013. The five-year relative survival rate statistic is the fraction of patients alive five years after diagnosis normalized by the survival rate of similar people without a cancer diagnosis. That means a five-year relative survival rate of 100% indicates no lethal effect of cancer on that timescale, even though the patients might die of unrelated causes.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date which the [US National Cancer Institute declares](https://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/pancreas.html) that the five-year relative survival rate for pancreatic cancer is more than 50.0%", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.057 fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by countries by 2050 will be on cities with >1500 people per km^2?", "desc": "", "resc": "Nuclear detonations on targets with higher population densities would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter). Several questions in this tournament are intended to shed light on the question of how many nuclear detonations would occur on well-populated areas, including [What fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be countervalue?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7461/total-countervalue-detonations-by-2050/), [What fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be on towns/cities with >500 people per square kilometer?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7503/fraction-detonations-by-2050-on-townscities/), and similar questions. This question uses a different operationalization for a similar purpose.\n\n***What fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by countries by 2050 will be on cities with >1,500 people per km^2?***\n\nThis question resolves as the proportion of offensive state nuclear detonations between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2050 which occur on or over a point that is within the bounds of city that has a population density of at least 1,500 people per square kilometer. The question resolves ambiguously if there are no offensive state nuclear detonations between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2050.\n\n[fine-print]\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive state nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental detonations of weapons that were owned by a state at the time of detonation (see the fine print for definitions). This excludes detonations of weapons that were created by non-state actors or were sold to non-state actors by the state that had owned the weapon.\n\nCities are defined as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" [_Degrees of Urbanization_](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas).\n\nThe military significance or stated purpose of the strike is not taken into consideration for this question (except that [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) and [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) are not counted towards positive resolution). For example, either a strike intended to kill civilians or a strike intended to destroy a military asset that happens to be in a capital city could both count towards this proportion.\n\nDetonations must occur less than 20 kilometers above the surface of the Earth in order to count as being \" on or over a point that is within the bounds of a city\".\n\nOffensive state nuclear detonations could include detonations by non-state actors which stole a nuclear weapon owned by a state. The main reason for including such detonations is that they can be hard to distinguish from two types of detonations that do seem worth including: \n\n* cases where actors within an official chain of command \"go rogue\" and use a weapon\n\n* cases where a country basically _allows_ terrorists to steal and use its weapons against the country's adversary\n\nIn a deliberate detonation, the attacking nation decides to launch one or more nuclear weapons either in response to a genuine nuclear attack or without believing that it is under nuclear attack. “In an inadvertent detonation, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under nuclear attack and launches one or more nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack” [(Barrett et al., 2013)](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf). “In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders” [(Barrett et al., 2013)](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf).\n\nTest detonations and peaceful nuclear explosions are defined as detonations which are claimed as being a test or a peaceful nuclear explosion by an official government communication within 30 days of the event, without this being disputed by reliable media, state reports, or multinational reports.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "0.057", "median": "0.174", "upper_75": "0.319", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the rate of new pancreatic cancer cases in the US will be 16.3% in the year 2038?", "desc": "", "resc": "There are different metrics of progress in fighting cancer, and for some metrics it is not always clear which direction is good or bad. Survival rates for a cancer type can increase while the incidence of new cases also increases, and the latter could happen for reasons as benign as an increase in detection.\n\n***What will the rate (per 100k people) of new pancreatic cancer cases be in the US in the year 2038?***\n\nThe question will resolve as the rate of pancreatic cancer cases per 100,000 people according to [the US National Cancer Institute](https://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/pancreas.html) for 2038. This figure is for all ages, sexes, and races.", "lower_25": "12.7", "median": "14.3", "upper_75": "16.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5 states will have ranked-choice voting for their US senators by 2028?", "desc": "Many see ranked-choice voting as a way to improve the democratic voting system, including by reducing polarization and helping third parties. Ranked choice voting allows voters to rank candidates in order of their preferences. If no candidate receives more than half of the first-place votes there is an instant run off, where the candidate with the fewest votes drops off and this process continues until there is a majority winner. Ranked-choice voting has [prominent](https://www.fairvote.org/ranked_choice_voting_endorsements#national_political_leaders) supporters across the political spectrum such as Barack Obama, Andrew Yang, John McCain and Jo Jorgensen. \n\nIn 2020 [Alaska](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/alaska-ranked-choice-voting) adapted ranked-choice voting for their statewide elections while [Maine](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/us/maine-ranked-choice-voting.html) did in 2016. Currently, only these 2 states have their US Senators elected by ranked-choice voting. Wisconsin currently has a [RCV bill](https://apnews.com/article/legislature-voting-bills-wisconsin-state-legislature-41bd936ff1774d33c6a9e88a90ed8e07) in their legislature with bipartisan support.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date which 5 or more states use ranked-choice voting to elect US senators in their general elections. \"Ranked-choice voting\" may also be known as \"[instant-run-off voting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting)\" or other names; [other ranked voting systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranked_voting) will be ignored for this question. The resolution of this question will be the date that the 5th state holds their first ranked-choice general election.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How much will entry level software engineers at Google get paid in 2027 according to levels.fyi?\n\nKeyword: 238k\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that entry level software engineers at Google will get paid 50% of the average salary in 2027 according to levels.fyi?", "desc": "Google is one of the largest technology companies in the world [by market capitalization](https://companiesmarketcap.com/tech/largest-tech-companies-by-market-cap/) and [by revenue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_technology_companies_by_revenue). It's also considered by most to be a prestigious place to work, with high entry level pay for its software engineers. According to levels.fyi entry-level software engineers currently (as of October 2021) make an average of $191,861 per year when including salary, stock grants, and bonuses.", "resc": "This question resolves according to the total compensation that levels.fyi reports for entry level software engineers in the year 2027 in the United States. The measurement should be taken as soon as possible, with earlier measured values in the year 2027 taking precedence over later measured values. Total compensation refers to the number of dollars an employee is expected to earn per year before taxes after including salary, stock grants, and bonuses. \n\nIf levels.fyi migrates to a different domain, then that domain will be used for resolution. If levels.fyi becomes defunct, or there is no user data submitted for Google during 2026, then this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "209k", "median": "238k", "upper_75": "278k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the five-year relative survival rate of pancreatic cancer patients in the US will exceed 50% by 2050?", "desc": "Survival rates for pancreatic cancer, one of the more lethal cancer types, have begun to [increase substantially](https://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/pancreas.html). Five-year relative survival in the US has risen from 5.3% in 2000 to 12.1% in 2013. The five-year relative survival rate statistic is the fraction of patients alive five years after diagnosis normalized by the survival rate of similar people without a cancer diagnosis. That means a five-year relative survival rate of 100% indicates no lethal effect of cancer on that timescale, even though the patients might die of unrelated causes.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date which the [US National Cancer Institute declares](https://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/pancreas.html) that the five-year relative survival rate for pancreatic cancer is more than 50.0%", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the rate of new pancreatic cancer cases in the US will be 16.3% in the year 2038?", "desc": "", "resc": "There are different metrics of progress in fighting cancer, and for some metrics it is not always clear which direction is good or bad. Survival rates for a cancer type can increase while the incidence of new cases also increases, and the latter could happen for reasons as benign as an increase in detection.\n\n***What will the rate (per 100k people) of new pancreatic cancer cases be in the US in the year 2038?***\n\nThe question will resolve as the rate of pancreatic cancer cases per 100,000 people according to [the US National Cancer Institute](https://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/pancreas.html) for 2038. This figure is for all ages, sexes, and races.", "lower_25": "12.7", "median": "14.3", "upper_75": "16.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the rate of new pancreatic cancer cases in the US will be 16.3% in the year 2038?", "desc": "", "resc": "There are different metrics of progress in fighting cancer, and for some metrics it is not always clear which direction is good or bad. Survival rates for a cancer type can increase while the incidence of new cases also increases, and the latter could happen for reasons as benign as an increase in detection.\n\n***What will the rate (per 100k people) of new pancreatic cancer cases be in the US in the year 2038?***\n\nThe question will resolve as the rate of pancreatic cancer cases per 100,000 people according to [the US National Cancer Institute](https://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/pancreas.html) for 2038. This figure is for all ages, sexes, and races.", "lower_25": "12.7", "median": "14.3", "upper_75": "16.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5 states will have ranked-choice voting for their US senators by 2028?", "desc": "Many see ranked-choice voting as a way to improve the democratic voting system, including by reducing polarization and helping third parties. Ranked choice voting allows voters to rank candidates in order of their preferences. If no candidate receives more than half of the first-place votes there is an instant run off, where the candidate with the fewest votes drops off and this process continues until there is a majority winner. Ranked-choice voting has [prominent](https://www.fairvote.org/ranked_choice_voting_endorsements#national_political_leaders) supporters across the political spectrum such as Barack Obama, Andrew Yang, John McCain and Jo Jorgensen. \n\nIn 2020 [Alaska](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/alaska-ranked-choice-voting) adapted ranked-choice voting for their statewide elections while [Maine](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/us/maine-ranked-choice-voting.html) did in 2016. Currently, only these 2 states have their US Senators elected by ranked-choice voting. Wisconsin currently has a [RCV bill](https://apnews.com/article/legislature-voting-bills-wisconsin-state-legislature-41bd936ff1774d33c6a9e88a90ed8e07) in their legislature with bipartisan support.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date which 5 or more states use ranked-choice voting to elect US senators in their general elections. \"Ranked-choice voting\" may also be known as \"[instant-run-off voting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting)\" or other names; [other ranked voting systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranked_voting) will be ignored for this question. The resolution of this question will be the date that the 5th state holds their first ranked-choice general election.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5 states will have ranked-choice voting for their US senators by 2028?", "desc": "Many see ranked-choice voting as a way to improve the democratic voting system, including by reducing polarization and helping third parties. Ranked choice voting allows voters to rank candidates in order of their preferences. If no candidate receives more than half of the first-place votes there is an instant run off, where the candidate with the fewest votes drops off and this process continues until there is a majority winner. Ranked-choice voting has [prominent](https://www.fairvote.org/ranked_choice_voting_endorsements#national_political_leaders) supporters across the political spectrum such as Barack Obama, Andrew Yang, John McCain and Jo Jorgensen. \n\nIn 2020 [Alaska](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/alaska-ranked-choice-voting) adapted ranked-choice voting for their statewide elections while [Maine](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/us/maine-ranked-choice-voting.html) did in 2016. Currently, only these 2 states have their US Senators elected by ranked-choice voting. Wisconsin currently has a [RCV bill](https://apnews.com/article/legislature-voting-bills-wisconsin-state-legislature-41bd936ff1774d33c6a9e88a90ed8e07) in their legislature with bipartisan support.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date which 5 or more states use ranked-choice voting to elect US senators in their general elections. \"Ranked-choice voting\" may also be known as \"[instant-run-off voting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting)\" or other names; [other ranked voting systems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranked_voting) will be ignored for this question. The resolution of this question will be the date that the 5th state holds their first ranked-choice general election.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.80 percentage of primary energy in the United States will come from solar in 2031?", "desc": "Our World In Data [shows](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/solar-share-energy) that solar energy has grown dramatically in the United States in recent years, growing from 0.89 TWh in 2009 to 132.63 TWh in 2019. This corresponds to [an increase](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/solar-share-energy?tab=chart&country=~USA) from 0.02% of primary energy generation to 1.02% over the same time period. This was made possible by the [rapidly declining price of solar energy](https://ourworldindata.org/cheap-renewables-growth).\n\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of primary energy generated in the United States that comes from solar energy in 2031, according to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). For 2019, this figure was 1.02%. If statistics are no longer published by the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, then another source will be consulted at the admins' discretion. Our World In Data notes that for their methodology,\n\n> Primary energy in exajoules (EJ) has been converted to TWh by Our World in Data based on a conversion factor of 277.778.\n\n> Each source's share of energy based on the \"substitution method\" were calculated by Our World in Data by taking all energy sources' energy normalised to EJ – this takes account of the inefficiencies in fossil fuel production and is a better approximation of \"final energy\" consumption.\n\n> Additional metrics have been calculated by Our World in Data:\n> – Annual change in energy consumption by source: this is calculated as the difference from the previous year\n> – % of total primary energy: calculated as each source's share of primary energy from all sources\n\nThis method of calculation will be used for the purpose of this question, which will hopefully be performed by Our World In Data. Their page on solar energy can be found [here](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/solar-energy-consumption)", "lower_25": "4.80", "median": "7.88", "upper_75": "14.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the five-year relative survival rate of pancreatic cancer patients in the US will exceed 50% by 2050?", "desc": "Survival rates for pancreatic cancer, one of the more lethal cancer types, have begun to [increase substantially](https://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/pancreas.html). Five-year relative survival in the US has risen from 5.3% in 2000 to 12.1% in 2013. The five-year relative survival rate statistic is the fraction of patients alive five years after diagnosis normalized by the survival rate of similar people without a cancer diagnosis. That means a five-year relative survival rate of 100% indicates no lethal effect of cancer on that timescale, even though the patients might die of unrelated causes.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date which the [US National Cancer Institute declares](https://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/pancreas.html) that the five-year relative survival rate for pancreatic cancer is more than 50.0%", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Colorado River's average annual flow volume will be 11.5M from 2025-2050?", "desc": "Water scarcity is a [trending topic in mainstream media](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/16/climate/colorado-river-water-cuts.html) thanks to concerns mainly due to impending climate change. The Colorado River, the major waterway in the American southwest, is central to this conversation. The region relies on its water to grow tens of billions of dollars of crops, support local flora/fauna, provide 4200+ megawatts of hydropower to cities and quench 40 million residents' thirst. Unfortunately, the Colorado River basin is currently experiencing the Millennium Drought, two decades of below-average flows due.\n \nLees Ferry divides the drainage areas of the upper and lower basins, and its water gauges are used to determine water allocations for the Colorado River. [The Colorado River Compact of 1922](https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf) allotted 16.5 million acre-feet of Colorado River water annually to various states. A century's worth of data and tree ring analyses have since [refined the annual flow estimate](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2005WR004455) of the river to 13-15 million acre-feet. This means that the river's allotments are over-budget by more than 1 million acre-feet. Additionally, climate change may increase the gap in this allotment budget. Here's the [2018 National Climate Assessment](https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/25/) on climate change's potential influence on the American southwest:\n \n>The increase in heat and reduction of snow under climate change have amplified recent hydrological droughts (severe shortages of water) in California, the Colorado River Basin, and the Rio Grande. Snow droughts can arise from a lack of precipitation (dry snow drought), temperatures that are too warm for snow (warm snow drought), or a combination of the two. Periods of low precipitation from natural variations in the climate system are the primary cause of major hydrological droughts in the Southwest region, with increasing temperatures from climate change amplifying recent hydrological droughts, particularly in California and the upper Colorado River Basin.\n \nUnder the higher scenario (RCP8.5), climate models project an 8.6°F (4.8°C) increase in Southwest regional annual average temperature by 2100. Southern parts of the region could get up to 45 more days each year with maximum temperatures of 90°F (32°C) or higher. Projected hotter temperatures increase probabilities of decadal to multi-decadal megadroughts, which are persistent droughts lasting longer than a decade, even when precipitation increases. Under the higher scenario (RCP8.5), much of the mountain area in California with winters currently dominated by snow would begin to receive more precipitation as rain and then only rain by 2050. Colder and higher areas in the intermountain West would also receive more rain in the fall and spring but continue to receive snow in the winter at the highest elevations.”\n \nIn the future, will the Colorado River's flow deviate from its historic average? Will climate change play a role in the river's water shortages? Are precipitation shortfalls temporary?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the average annual natural flow volume (in acre-feet) of the Colorado River at Lees Ferry, AZ from 2025-01-01 to 2049-12-31. Natural flow volume data to be provided by the [US Bureau of Reclamation](https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/NaturalFlow/index.html) (currently USGS # 09380000) or another credible source of hydrological data", "lower_25": "11.5M", "median": "12.8M", "upper_75": "14.0M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Colorado River's average annual flow volume will be 11.5M from 2025-2050?", "desc": "Water scarcity is a [trending topic in mainstream media](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/16/climate/colorado-river-water-cuts.html) thanks to concerns mainly due to impending climate change. The Colorado River, the major waterway in the American southwest, is central to this conversation. The region relies on its water to grow tens of billions of dollars of crops, support local flora/fauna, provide 4200+ megawatts of hydropower to cities and quench 40 million residents' thirst. Unfortunately, the Colorado River basin is currently experiencing the Millennium Drought, two decades of below-average flows due.\n \nLees Ferry divides the drainage areas of the upper and lower basins, and its water gauges are used to determine water allocations for the Colorado River. [The Colorado River Compact of 1922](https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf) allotted 16.5 million acre-feet of Colorado River water annually to various states. A century's worth of data and tree ring analyses have since [refined the annual flow estimate](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2005WR004455) of the river to 13-15 million acre-feet. This means that the river's allotments are over-budget by more than 1 million acre-feet. Additionally, climate change may increase the gap in this allotment budget. Here's the [2018 National Climate Assessment](https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/25/) on climate change's potential influence on the American southwest:\n \n>The increase in heat and reduction of snow under climate change have amplified recent hydrological droughts (severe shortages of water) in California, the Colorado River Basin, and the Rio Grande. Snow droughts can arise from a lack of precipitation (dry snow drought), temperatures that are too warm for snow (warm snow drought), or a combination of the two. Periods of low precipitation from natural variations in the climate system are the primary cause of major hydrological droughts in the Southwest region, with increasing temperatures from climate change amplifying recent hydrological droughts, particularly in California and the upper Colorado River Basin.\n \nUnder the higher scenario (RCP8.5), climate models project an 8.6°F (4.8°C) increase in Southwest regional annual average temperature by 2100. Southern parts of the region could get up to 45 more days each year with maximum temperatures of 90°F (32°C) or higher. Projected hotter temperatures increase probabilities of decadal to multi-decadal megadroughts, which are persistent droughts lasting longer than a decade, even when precipitation increases. Under the higher scenario (RCP8.5), much of the mountain area in California with winters currently dominated by snow would begin to receive more precipitation as rain and then only rain by 2050. Colder and higher areas in the intermountain West would also receive more rain in the fall and spring but continue to receive snow in the winter at the highest elevations.”\n \nIn the future, will the Colorado River's flow deviate from its historic average? Will climate change play a role in the river's water shortages? Are precipitation shortfalls temporary?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the average annual natural flow volume (in acre-feet) of the Colorado River at Lees Ferry, AZ from 2025-01-01 to 2049-12-31. Natural flow volume data to be provided by the [US Bureau of Reclamation](https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/NaturalFlow/index.html) (currently USGS # 09380000) or another credible source of hydrological data", "lower_25": "11.5M", "median": "12.8M", "upper_75": "14.0M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How will China score on the Human Freedom Index in 2030?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that China will score 5.06 on the Human Freedom Index in 2030?", "desc": "From the [Washington Post](https://archive.md/Q208l),\n\n> A dizzying regulatory crackdown unleashed by China's government has spared almost no sector over the past few months. This sprawling “rectification” campaign — with such disparate targets as ride-hailing services, insurance, education and even the amount of time children can spend playing video games — is redrawing the boundaries of business and society in China as Xi prepares to take on a controversial third term in 2022.\n\n> “It's striking and significant. This is clearly not a sector-by-sector rectification; this is an entire economic, industry and structural rectification,” said Jude Blanchette, who holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.\n\nThe [Human Freedom Index](https://www.cato.org/human-freedom-index/2020) is from CATO, a libertarian institute. It\n\n> is the most comprehensive freedom index so far created for a globally meaningful set of countries. The HFI covers 162 countries for 2018, the most recent year for which sufficient data are available. The index ranks countries beginning in 2008, the earliest year for which a robust enough index could be produced.\n\nIn 2018 (obtained via the 2020 report), China had a human freedom score of 6.07, compared to, for example, 8.44 for the United States and an average of 6.93. The human freedom score is an average of their scores for \"personal freedom\" and \"economic freedom\".", "resc": "This question resolves according to the \"human freedom\" score (out of 10) of China for the year 2030, as rated by CATO's Human Freedom Index. The index appears to publish roughly three years following the year of ranking, implying an anticipated resolution date of around 2033.", "lower_25": "5.06", "median": "5.59", "upper_75": "6.17", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.80 percentage of primary energy in the United States will come from solar in 2031?", "desc": "Our World In Data [shows](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/solar-share-energy) that solar energy has grown dramatically in the United States in recent years, growing from 0.89 TWh in 2009 to 132.63 TWh in 2019. This corresponds to [an increase](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/solar-share-energy?tab=chart&country=~USA) from 0.02% of primary energy generation to 1.02% over the same time period. This was made possible by the [rapidly declining price of solar energy](https://ourworldindata.org/cheap-renewables-growth).\n\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of primary energy generated in the United States that comes from solar energy in 2031, according to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). For 2019, this figure was 1.02%. If statistics are no longer published by the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, then another source will be consulted at the admins' discretion. Our World In Data notes that for their methodology,\n\n> Primary energy in exajoules (EJ) has been converted to TWh by Our World in Data based on a conversion factor of 277.778.\n\n> Each source's share of energy based on the \"substitution method\" were calculated by Our World in Data by taking all energy sources' energy normalised to EJ – this takes account of the inefficiencies in fossil fuel production and is a better approximation of \"final energy\" consumption.\n\n> Additional metrics have been calculated by Our World in Data:\n> – Annual change in energy consumption by source: this is calculated as the difference from the previous year\n> – % of total primary energy: calculated as each source's share of primary energy from all sources\n\nThis method of calculation will be used for the purpose of this question, which will hopefully be performed by Our World In Data. Their page on solar energy can be found [here](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/solar-energy-consumption)", "lower_25": "4.80", "median": "7.88", "upper_75": "14.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.80 percentage of primary energy in the United States will come from solar in 2031?", "desc": "Our World In Data [shows](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/solar-share-energy) that solar energy has grown dramatically in the United States in recent years, growing from 0.89 TWh in 2009 to 132.63 TWh in 2019. This corresponds to [an increase](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/solar-share-energy?tab=chart&country=~USA) from 0.02% of primary energy generation to 1.02% over the same time period. This was made possible by the [rapidly declining price of solar energy](https://ourworldindata.org/cheap-renewables-growth).\n\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of primary energy generated in the United States that comes from solar energy in 2031, according to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). For 2019, this figure was 1.02%. If statistics are no longer published by the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, then another source will be consulted at the admins' discretion. Our World In Data notes that for their methodology,\n\n> Primary energy in exajoules (EJ) has been converted to TWh by Our World in Data based on a conversion factor of 277.778.\n\n> Each source's share of energy based on the \"substitution method\" were calculated by Our World in Data by taking all energy sources' energy normalised to EJ – this takes account of the inefficiencies in fossil fuel production and is a better approximation of \"final energy\" consumption.\n\n> Additional metrics have been calculated by Our World in Data:\n> – Annual change in energy consumption by source: this is calculated as the difference from the previous year\n> – % of total primary energy: calculated as each source's share of primary energy from all sources\n\nThis method of calculation will be used for the purpose of this question, which will hopefully be performed by Our World In Data. Their page on solar energy can be found [here](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/solar-energy-consumption)", "lower_25": "4.80", "median": "7.88", "upper_75": "14.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Colorado River's average annual flow volume will be 11.5M from 2025-2050?", "desc": "Water scarcity is a [trending topic in mainstream media](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/16/climate/colorado-river-water-cuts.html) thanks to concerns mainly due to impending climate change. The Colorado River, the major waterway in the American southwest, is central to this conversation. The region relies on its water to grow tens of billions of dollars of crops, support local flora/fauna, provide 4200+ megawatts of hydropower to cities and quench 40 million residents' thirst. Unfortunately, the Colorado River basin is currently experiencing the Millennium Drought, two decades of below-average flows due.\n \nLees Ferry divides the drainage areas of the upper and lower basins, and its water gauges are used to determine water allocations for the Colorado River. [The Colorado River Compact of 1922](https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf) allotted 16.5 million acre-feet of Colorado River water annually to various states. A century's worth of data and tree ring analyses have since [refined the annual flow estimate](https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2005WR004455) of the river to 13-15 million acre-feet. This means that the river's allotments are over-budget by more than 1 million acre-feet. Additionally, climate change may increase the gap in this allotment budget. Here's the [2018 National Climate Assessment](https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/25/) on climate change's potential influence on the American southwest:\n \n>The increase in heat and reduction of snow under climate change have amplified recent hydrological droughts (severe shortages of water) in California, the Colorado River Basin, and the Rio Grande. Snow droughts can arise from a lack of precipitation (dry snow drought), temperatures that are too warm for snow (warm snow drought), or a combination of the two. Periods of low precipitation from natural variations in the climate system are the primary cause of major hydrological droughts in the Southwest region, with increasing temperatures from climate change amplifying recent hydrological droughts, particularly in California and the upper Colorado River Basin.\n \nUnder the higher scenario (RCP8.5), climate models project an 8.6°F (4.8°C) increase in Southwest regional annual average temperature by 2100. Southern parts of the region could get up to 45 more days each year with maximum temperatures of 90°F (32°C) or higher. Projected hotter temperatures increase probabilities of decadal to multi-decadal megadroughts, which are persistent droughts lasting longer than a decade, even when precipitation increases. Under the higher scenario (RCP8.5), much of the mountain area in California with winters currently dominated by snow would begin to receive more precipitation as rain and then only rain by 2050. Colder and higher areas in the intermountain West would also receive more rain in the fall and spring but continue to receive snow in the winter at the highest elevations.”\n \nIn the future, will the Colorado River's flow deviate from its historic average? Will climate change play a role in the river's water shortages? Are precipitation shortfalls temporary?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the average annual natural flow volume (in acre-feet) of the Colorado River at Lees Ferry, AZ from 2025-01-01 to 2049-12-31. Natural flow volume data to be provided by the [US Bureau of Reclamation](https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/NaturalFlow/index.html) (currently USGS # 09380000) or another credible source of hydrological data", "lower_25": "11.5M", "median": "12.8M", "upper_75": "14.0M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US labor force participation rate will fall below 10% by Not ≤ 2300?", "desc": "From [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/participationrate.asp),\n\n> The labor force participation rate is a measure of an economy's active workforce. The formula for the number is the sum of all workers who are employed or actively seeking employment divided by the total noninstitutionalized, civilian working-age population.\n\n> The U.S. labor participation rate stood at 61.4% as of February 2021, according to the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which publishes updates monthly. The monthly figures have hovered around 63% since 2013, after a sharp decline in the wake of the Great Recession. In August 2020, there were 13.6 million unemployed, up 7.6 million from the 6 million in August 2019.\n\nOne of the many anticipated effects of automation is a decline in the labor force participation rate. For example, in 1850 [about](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-force-participation-rate-of-men-65-years-and-older-in-the-usa) 76.6% of men aged 65 and older participated in the labor force. This figure is now down to 23.38%. Among other factors, this decline probably reflects a shift from work to leisure among older people as society got richer from automation.", "resc": "This question resolves on the first day of the month during which a U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) report for that month indicates that the labor force participation rate in the United States fell below 10% for the first time in US history. FRED Economic data currently [tracks](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CIVPART) a chart of BLS statistics on the labor force participation rate since 1948.\n\nIn case the BLS ceases to exist, or changes its name, another reputable organization will take its place. Reputable organizations include, in order of precedence: federal government bodies, international bodies, and highly respected academic groups.\n\nRelated question: [Will Robin Hanson win his bet against Matthew Barnett on whether ems will come before de novo AGI?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8475/hanson-vs-barnett-bet-on-ems-first/", "lower_25": "2059", "median": "2158", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2300", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US labor force participation rate will fall below 10% by Not ≤ 2300?", "desc": "From [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/participationrate.asp),\n\n> The labor force participation rate is a measure of an economy's active workforce. The formula for the number is the sum of all workers who are employed or actively seeking employment divided by the total noninstitutionalized, civilian working-age population.\n\n> The U.S. labor participation rate stood at 61.4% as of February 2021, according to the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which publishes updates monthly. The monthly figures have hovered around 63% since 2013, after a sharp decline in the wake of the Great Recession. In August 2020, there were 13.6 million unemployed, up 7.6 million from the 6 million in August 2019.\n\nOne of the many anticipated effects of automation is a decline in the labor force participation rate. For example, in 1850 [about](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-force-participation-rate-of-men-65-years-and-older-in-the-usa) 76.6% of men aged 65 and older participated in the labor force. This figure is now down to 23.38%. Among other factors, this decline probably reflects a shift from work to leisure among older people as society got richer from automation.", "resc": "This question resolves on the first day of the month during which a U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) report for that month indicates that the labor force participation rate in the United States fell below 10% for the first time in US history. FRED Economic data currently [tracks](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CIVPART) a chart of BLS statistics on the labor force participation rate since 1948.\n\nIn case the BLS ceases to exist, or changes its name, another reputable organization will take its place. Reputable organizations include, in order of precedence: federal government bodies, international bodies, and highly respected academic groups.\n\nRelated question: [Will Robin Hanson win his bet against Matthew Barnett on whether ems will come before de novo AGI?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8475/hanson-vs-barnett-bet-on-ems-first/", "lower_25": "2059", "median": "2158", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2300", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How much will entry level software engineers at Google get paid in 2027 according to levels.fyi?\n\nKeyword: 238k\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that entry level software engineers at Google will get paid 50% of the average salary in 2027 according to levels.fyi?", "desc": "Google is one of the largest technology companies in the world [by market capitalization](https://companiesmarketcap.com/tech/largest-tech-companies-by-market-cap/) and [by revenue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_technology_companies_by_revenue). It's also considered by most to be a prestigious place to work, with high entry level pay for its software engineers. According to levels.fyi entry-level software engineers currently (as of October 2021) make an average of $191,861 per year when including salary, stock grants, and bonuses.", "resc": "This question resolves according to the total compensation that levels.fyi reports for entry level software engineers in the year 2027 in the United States. The measurement should be taken as soon as possible, with earlier measured values in the year 2027 taking precedence over later measured values. Total compensation refers to the number of dollars an employee is expected to earn per year before taxes after including salary, stock grants, and bonuses. \n\nIf levels.fyi migrates to a different domain, then that domain will be used for resolution. If levels.fyi becomes defunct, or there is no user data submitted for Google during 2026, then this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "209k", "median": "238k", "upper_75": "278k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US labor force participation rate will fall below 10% by Not ≤ 2300?", "desc": "From [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/participationrate.asp),\n\n> The labor force participation rate is a measure of an economy's active workforce. The formula for the number is the sum of all workers who are employed or actively seeking employment divided by the total noninstitutionalized, civilian working-age population.\n\n> The U.S. labor participation rate stood at 61.4% as of February 2021, according to the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which publishes updates monthly. The monthly figures have hovered around 63% since 2013, after a sharp decline in the wake of the Great Recession. In August 2020, there were 13.6 million unemployed, up 7.6 million from the 6 million in August 2019.\n\nOne of the many anticipated effects of automation is a decline in the labor force participation rate. For example, in 1850 [about](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-force-participation-rate-of-men-65-years-and-older-in-the-usa) 76.6% of men aged 65 and older participated in the labor force. This figure is now down to 23.38%. Among other factors, this decline probably reflects a shift from work to leisure among older people as society got richer from automation.", "resc": "This question resolves on the first day of the month during which a U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) report for that month indicates that the labor force participation rate in the United States fell below 10% for the first time in US history. FRED Economic data currently [tracks](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CIVPART) a chart of BLS statistics on the labor force participation rate since 1948.\n\nIn case the BLS ceases to exist, or changes its name, another reputable organization will take its place. Reputable organizations include, in order of precedence: federal government bodies, international bodies, and highly respected academic groups.\n\nRelated question: [Will Robin Hanson win his bet against Matthew Barnett on whether ems will come before de novo AGI?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8475/hanson-vs-barnett-bet-on-ems-first/", "lower_25": "2059", "median": "2158", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2300", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How will China score on the Human Freedom Index in 2030?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that China will score 5.06 on the Human Freedom Index in 2030?", "desc": "From the [Washington Post](https://archive.md/Q208l),\n\n> A dizzying regulatory crackdown unleashed by China's government has spared almost no sector over the past few months. This sprawling “rectification” campaign — with such disparate targets as ride-hailing services, insurance, education and even the amount of time children can spend playing video games — is redrawing the boundaries of business and society in China as Xi prepares to take on a controversial third term in 2022.\n\n> “It's striking and significant. This is clearly not a sector-by-sector rectification; this is an entire economic, industry and structural rectification,” said Jude Blanchette, who holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.\n\nThe [Human Freedom Index](https://www.cato.org/human-freedom-index/2020) is from CATO, a libertarian institute. It\n\n> is the most comprehensive freedom index so far created for a globally meaningful set of countries. The HFI covers 162 countries for 2018, the most recent year for which sufficient data are available. The index ranks countries beginning in 2008, the earliest year for which a robust enough index could be produced.\n\nIn 2018 (obtained via the 2020 report), China had a human freedom score of 6.07, compared to, for example, 8.44 for the United States and an average of 6.93. The human freedom score is an average of their scores for \"personal freedom\" and \"economic freedom\".", "resc": "This question resolves according to the \"human freedom\" score (out of 10) of China for the year 2030, as rated by CATO's Human Freedom Index. The index appears to publish roughly three years following the year of ranking, implying an anticipated resolution date of around 2033.", "lower_25": "5.06", "median": "5.59", "upper_75": "6.17", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the S&P 500 dividend yield will be 1.70% in end-of-year 2031?", "desc": "The S&P 500 [dividend yield](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dividend_yield) is defined as the sum of the most recent full year dividend paid by all companies in the S&P 500 divided by the current S&P 500 share price, both calculated according to the weights of the S&P 500 index at a given moment. It measures how high prices are relative to dividends: low dividend yields mean prices are high compared to dividends, and vice versa.\n\nDividend yields are often used as a measure of \"overvaluation\" in the stock market, and they have been trending downwards for the past forty years. This question is about the future of this measure.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the S&P 500 dividend yield in units of percentages reported for the date of December 31 2031 [by NASDAQ](https://data.nasdaq.com/data/MULTPL/SP500_DIV_YIELD_MONTH-sp-500-dividend-yield-by-month). If there is no data for December 31 2031 available by the resolution time of the question, the question will resolve as the dividend yield for the latest date in 2031 for which data is available.\n\nIf NASDAQ ceases to report S&P 500 dividend yields, the question will be resolved according to another credible source", "lower_25": "0.790", "median": "1.16", "upper_75": "1.70", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the S&P 500 dividend yield will be 1.70% in end-of-year 2031?", "desc": "The S&P 500 [dividend yield](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dividend_yield) is defined as the sum of the most recent full year dividend paid by all companies in the S&P 500 divided by the current S&P 500 share price, both calculated according to the weights of the S&P 500 index at a given moment. It measures how high prices are relative to dividends: low dividend yields mean prices are high compared to dividends, and vice versa.\n\nDividend yields are often used as a measure of \"overvaluation\" in the stock market, and they have been trending downwards for the past forty years. This question is about the future of this measure.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the S&P 500 dividend yield in units of percentages reported for the date of December 31 2031 [by NASDAQ](https://data.nasdaq.com/data/MULTPL/SP500_DIV_YIELD_MONTH-sp-500-dividend-yield-by-month). If there is no data for December 31 2031 available by the resolution time of the question, the question will resolve as the dividend yield for the latest date in 2031 for which data is available.\n\nIf NASDAQ ceases to report S&P 500 dividend yields, the question will be resolved according to another credible source", "lower_25": "0.790", "median": "1.16", "upper_75": "1.70", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US unemployment rate will reach 11.3% after the next market crash happens?", "desc": "The exact nature of the relationship between economic conditions and the performance of the stock market has been a subject of much controversy, and some proposed models to explain the [equity premium puzzle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equity_premium_puzzle) make concrete claims about this connection which we might hope to test.\n\nAn important case is a class of models which involve \"long-run risk\". According to these models, what primarily drives stock market crashes is news about the long-run, and it just so happens that often short-run economic performance gives us the best clues about long-run risks, which leads to the observed pattern of correlation between stock market performance and the business cycle. However, according to long-run risk models this connection is only incidental, and a potential change in the properties of the GDP or consumption time series (such as a change in autocorrelation or conditional [heteroskedasticity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heteroscedasticity)) can upend it entirely.\n\nThis question, along with its [sibling question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8508/us-unemployment-after-next-volatile-market/), is intended to test this class of models by eliciting the beliefs of Metaculites about the tightness of the connection between market crashes or tumultous market episodes and current macroeconomic events.", "resc": "This question resolves as the civilian unemployment rate [reported by the BLS](https://www.bls.gov/charts/employment-situation/civilian-unemployment-rate.htm) in units of percentages *6 months after* the first month in which the S&P 500 closes below 70% of its previous all-time peak value in any given trading day that month. The peak value is the all-time peak, not the peak in that specific month; and there doesn't need to be a 30% decline within the space of one month, just a 30% overall fall from the previous all-time peak value. \n\nTo illustrate with an example, if the S&P 500 closes below 70% of its previous peak close value in March 2032, this question would resolve as the civilian unemployment rate reported by the BLS for September 2032.\n\nIf the S&P 500 never falls below 70% of its previous peak value until the resolution date of the question, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "6.18", "median": "8.33", "upper_75": "11.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US unemployment rate will reach 11.3% after the next market crash happens?", "desc": "The exact nature of the relationship between economic conditions and the performance of the stock market has been a subject of much controversy, and some proposed models to explain the [equity premium puzzle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equity_premium_puzzle) make concrete claims about this connection which we might hope to test.\n\nAn important case is a class of models which involve \"long-run risk\". According to these models, what primarily drives stock market crashes is news about the long-run, and it just so happens that often short-run economic performance gives us the best clues about long-run risks, which leads to the observed pattern of correlation between stock market performance and the business cycle. However, according to long-run risk models this connection is only incidental, and a potential change in the properties of the GDP or consumption time series (such as a change in autocorrelation or conditional [heteroskedasticity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heteroscedasticity)) can upend it entirely.\n\nThis question, along with its [sibling question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8508/us-unemployment-after-next-volatile-market/), is intended to test this class of models by eliciting the beliefs of Metaculites about the tightness of the connection between market crashes or tumultous market episodes and current macroeconomic events.", "resc": "This question resolves as the civilian unemployment rate [reported by the BLS](https://www.bls.gov/charts/employment-situation/civilian-unemployment-rate.htm) in units of percentages *6 months after* the first month in which the S&P 500 closes below 70% of its previous all-time peak value in any given trading day that month. The peak value is the all-time peak, not the peak in that specific month; and there doesn't need to be a 30% decline within the space of one month, just a 30% overall fall from the previous all-time peak value. \n\nTo illustrate with an example, if the S&P 500 closes below 70% of its previous peak close value in March 2032, this question would resolve as the civilian unemployment rate reported by the BLS for September 2032.\n\nIf the S&P 500 never falls below 70% of its previous peak value until the resolution date of the question, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "6.18", "median": "8.33", "upper_75": "11.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US unemployment rate will be 7.28% after the next volatile market episode?", "desc": "The exact nature of the relationship between economic conditions and the performance of the stock market has been a subject of much controversy, and some proposed models to explain the [equity premium puzzle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equity_premium_puzzle) make concrete claims about this connection which we might hope to test.\n\nAn important case is a class of models which involve \"long-run risk\". According to these models, what primarily drives stock market crashes is news about the long-run, and it just so happens that often short-run economic performance gives us the best clues about long-run risks, which leads to the observed pattern of correlation between stock market performance and the business cycle. However, according to long-run risk models this connection is only incidental, and a potential change in the properties of the GDP or consumption time series (such as a change in autocorrelation or conditional [heteroskedasticity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heteroscedasticity)) can upend it entirely.\n\nThis question, along with its [sibling question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8497/us-unemployment-after-the-next-market-crash/), is intended to test this class of models by eliciting the beliefs of Metaculites about the tightness of the connection between market crashes or tumultous market episodes and current macroeconomic events.", "resc": "This question resolves as the civilian unemployment rate [reported by the BLS](https://www.bls.gov/charts/employment-situation/civilian-unemployment-rate.htm) in units of percentages *6 months after* the first month in which the VIX index closes above 50 in any day of that month.\n\nTo illustrate with an example, if the VIX closes above 50 for the first time after this question opens on some day in March 2032, this question would resolve as the civilian unemployment rate reported by the BLS for September 2032.\n\nIf the VIX doesn't close above 50 at any time until the resolution date of this question, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "5.77", "median": "7.28", "upper_75": "9.60", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US unemployment rate will reach 11.3% after the next market crash happens?", "desc": "The exact nature of the relationship between economic conditions and the performance of the stock market has been a subject of much controversy, and some proposed models to explain the [equity premium puzzle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equity_premium_puzzle) make concrete claims about this connection which we might hope to test.\n\nAn important case is a class of models which involve \"long-run risk\". According to these models, what primarily drives stock market crashes is news about the long-run, and it just so happens that often short-run economic performance gives us the best clues about long-run risks, which leads to the observed pattern of correlation between stock market performance and the business cycle. However, according to long-run risk models this connection is only incidental, and a potential change in the properties of the GDP or consumption time series (such as a change in autocorrelation or conditional [heteroskedasticity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heteroscedasticity)) can upend it entirely.\n\nThis question, along with its [sibling question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8508/us-unemployment-after-next-volatile-market/), is intended to test this class of models by eliciting the beliefs of Metaculites about the tightness of the connection between market crashes or tumultous market episodes and current macroeconomic events.", "resc": "This question resolves as the civilian unemployment rate [reported by the BLS](https://www.bls.gov/charts/employment-situation/civilian-unemployment-rate.htm) in units of percentages *6 months after* the first month in which the S&P 500 closes below 70% of its previous all-time peak value in any given trading day that month. The peak value is the all-time peak, not the peak in that specific month; and there doesn't need to be a 30% decline within the space of one month, just a 30% overall fall from the previous all-time peak value. \n\nTo illustrate with an example, if the S&P 500 closes below 70% of its previous peak close value in March 2032, this question would resolve as the civilian unemployment rate reported by the BLS for September 2032.\n\nIf the S&P 500 never falls below 70% of its previous peak value until the resolution date of the question, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "6.18", "median": "8.33", "upper_75": "11.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US Supreme Court will rule on the constitutionality of any part of the Bank Secrecy Act before 2070?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [If the US Supreme Court hears a case on the Bank Secrecy Act by 2070, will they find it to be constitutional?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8526/constitutionality-of-bank-secrecy-act/)\n\n----\n\nThe Bank Secrecy Act was passed into law in 1970 and serves as the legislative bedrock for America's system of financial surveillance. Subsequent legislation and administrative actions have fortified a system of mandated information gathering and sharing by custodial financial entities such as banks. Government actors may access this information, often without warrants, for the stated purpose of rooting our money laundering, tax evasion, and terrorism.\n\nThe BSA was put before the Supreme Court for [constitutional violations](https://www.coincenter.org/app/uploads/2020/05/e-cash-dex-constitution.pdf), notably of the 1st, 4th, and 5th amendments, but these challenges were shot down on mostly procedural grounds. Justice Thurgood Marshall, in a dissent to the California Bankers Association v. Shultz challenge to the BSA, noted serious problems with the Court's procedural treatment of 4th Amendment problems, while Justice William J. Brennan noted the extreme breadth of information that could be granted through financial surveillance, even with the limited technology of the time. Furthermore, recent comments by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Neil Gorsuch indicate a willingness to review “third party doctrine” precepts upon which such surveillance is founded.\n\nHowever, the clear direction in legislation and regulation is to build upon the BSA and expand financial surveillance, indicating a lack of concern about immediate constitutional challenge.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when the Supreme Court issues a verdict on a case which challenges any part of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. The decision of the court must make a judgement on the constitutionality of the BSA; dismissing the case on procedural grounds (for example) would not resolve the question. This question will resolve on the date of the verdict, regardless of whether the court finds the law constitutional or not.\n\nIf this does not happen by 2070-01-01, this question resolves as >2070-01-01", "lower_25": "2061", "median": "2069", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2070", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the S&P 500 dividend yield will be 1.70% in end-of-year 2031?", "desc": "The S&P 500 [dividend yield](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dividend_yield) is defined as the sum of the most recent full year dividend paid by all companies in the S&P 500 divided by the current S&P 500 share price, both calculated according to the weights of the S&P 500 index at a given moment. It measures how high prices are relative to dividends: low dividend yields mean prices are high compared to dividends, and vice versa.\n\nDividend yields are often used as a measure of \"overvaluation\" in the stock market, and they have been trending downwards for the past forty years. This question is about the future of this measure.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the S&P 500 dividend yield in units of percentages reported for the date of December 31 2031 [by NASDAQ](https://data.nasdaq.com/data/MULTPL/SP500_DIV_YIELD_MONTH-sp-500-dividend-yield-by-month). If there is no data for December 31 2031 available by the resolution time of the question, the question will resolve as the dividend yield for the latest date in 2031 for which data is available.\n\nIf NASDAQ ceases to report S&P 500 dividend yields, the question will be resolved according to another credible source", "lower_25": "0.790", "median": "1.16", "upper_75": "1.70", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US Supreme Court will rule on the constitutionality of any part of the Bank Secrecy Act before 2070?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [If the US Supreme Court hears a case on the Bank Secrecy Act by 2070, will they find it to be constitutional?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8526/constitutionality-of-bank-secrecy-act/)\n\n----\n\nThe Bank Secrecy Act was passed into law in 1970 and serves as the legislative bedrock for America's system of financial surveillance. Subsequent legislation and administrative actions have fortified a system of mandated information gathering and sharing by custodial financial entities such as banks. Government actors may access this information, often without warrants, for the stated purpose of rooting our money laundering, tax evasion, and terrorism.\n\nThe BSA was put before the Supreme Court for [constitutional violations](https://www.coincenter.org/app/uploads/2020/05/e-cash-dex-constitution.pdf), notably of the 1st, 4th, and 5th amendments, but these challenges were shot down on mostly procedural grounds. Justice Thurgood Marshall, in a dissent to the California Bankers Association v. Shultz challenge to the BSA, noted serious problems with the Court's procedural treatment of 4th Amendment problems, while Justice William J. Brennan noted the extreme breadth of information that could be granted through financial surveillance, even with the limited technology of the time. Furthermore, recent comments by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Neil Gorsuch indicate a willingness to review “third party doctrine” precepts upon which such surveillance is founded.\n\nHowever, the clear direction in legislation and regulation is to build upon the BSA and expand financial surveillance, indicating a lack of concern about immediate constitutional challenge.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when the Supreme Court issues a verdict on a case which challenges any part of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. The decision of the court must make a judgement on the constitutionality of the BSA; dismissing the case on procedural grounds (for example) would not resolve the question. This question will resolve on the date of the verdict, regardless of whether the court finds the law constitutional or not.\n\nIf this does not happen by 2070-01-01, this question resolves as >2070-01-01", "lower_25": "2061", "median": "2069", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2070", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US unemployment rate will be 7.28% after the next volatile market episode?", "desc": "The exact nature of the relationship between economic conditions and the performance of the stock market has been a subject of much controversy, and some proposed models to explain the [equity premium puzzle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equity_premium_puzzle) make concrete claims about this connection which we might hope to test.\n\nAn important case is a class of models which involve \"long-run risk\". According to these models, what primarily drives stock market crashes is news about the long-run, and it just so happens that often short-run economic performance gives us the best clues about long-run risks, which leads to the observed pattern of correlation between stock market performance and the business cycle. However, according to long-run risk models this connection is only incidental, and a potential change in the properties of the GDP or consumption time series (such as a change in autocorrelation or conditional [heteroskedasticity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heteroscedasticity)) can upend it entirely.\n\nThis question, along with its [sibling question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8497/us-unemployment-after-the-next-market-crash/), is intended to test this class of models by eliciting the beliefs of Metaculites about the tightness of the connection between market crashes or tumultous market episodes and current macroeconomic events.", "resc": "This question resolves as the civilian unemployment rate [reported by the BLS](https://www.bls.gov/charts/employment-situation/civilian-unemployment-rate.htm) in units of percentages *6 months after* the first month in which the VIX index closes above 50 in any day of that month.\n\nTo illustrate with an example, if the VIX closes above 50 for the first time after this question opens on some day in March 2032, this question would resolve as the civilian unemployment rate reported by the BLS for September 2032.\n\nIf the VIX doesn't close above 50 at any time until the resolution date of this question, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "5.77", "median": "7.28", "upper_75": "9.60", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US Supreme Court will rule on the constitutionality of any part of the Bank Secrecy Act before 2070?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [If the US Supreme Court hears a case on the Bank Secrecy Act by 2070, will they find it to be constitutional?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8526/constitutionality-of-bank-secrecy-act/)\n\n----\n\nThe Bank Secrecy Act was passed into law in 1970 and serves as the legislative bedrock for America's system of financial surveillance. Subsequent legislation and administrative actions have fortified a system of mandated information gathering and sharing by custodial financial entities such as banks. Government actors may access this information, often without warrants, for the stated purpose of rooting our money laundering, tax evasion, and terrorism.\n\nThe BSA was put before the Supreme Court for [constitutional violations](https://www.coincenter.org/app/uploads/2020/05/e-cash-dex-constitution.pdf), notably of the 1st, 4th, and 5th amendments, but these challenges were shot down on mostly procedural grounds. Justice Thurgood Marshall, in a dissent to the California Bankers Association v. Shultz challenge to the BSA, noted serious problems with the Court's procedural treatment of 4th Amendment problems, while Justice William J. Brennan noted the extreme breadth of information that could be granted through financial surveillance, even with the limited technology of the time. Furthermore, recent comments by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Neil Gorsuch indicate a willingness to review “third party doctrine” precepts upon which such surveillance is founded.\n\nHowever, the clear direction in legislation and regulation is to build upon the BSA and expand financial surveillance, indicating a lack of concern about immediate constitutional challenge.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when the Supreme Court issues a verdict on a case which challenges any part of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. The decision of the court must make a judgement on the constitutionality of the BSA; dismissing the case on procedural grounds (for example) would not resolve the question. This question will resolve on the date of the verdict, regardless of whether the court finds the law constitutional or not.\n\nIf this does not happen by 2070-01-01, this question resolves as >2070-01-01", "lower_25": "2061", "median": "2069", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2070", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Peter Thiel's net worth will be 11.6 billion dollars in January 2030?", "desc": "[Peter Andreas Thiel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Thiel), born 11 October 1967, is a German-American billionaire entrepreneur and venture capitalist. A co-founder of PayPal, Palantir Technologies, and Founders Fund, and investor in many other ventures, he is a well-known figure in the US technology scene.\n\nAs of November 7 2021, Thiel has an estimated net worth of US $7.24 billion according to [the Bloomberg Billionaires Index.](https://www.bloomberg.com/billionaires/profiles/peter-a-thiel/)", "resc": "This question resolves as Peter Thiel's net worth, in billions of nominal US dollars, on January 1 2030, according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index. If (and only if) that index is no longer available, this question resolves as his estimated net worth according to Forbes on that date. If Forbes also does not provide an estimate of his net worth on that date, the most recent credible media reports of his net worth (as judged by Metaculus admins) should be consulted. \n\nIf Thiel is no longer alive on 1 January 2030, this question resolves ambiguously. If there are no credible reports of Thiel's net worth within one year prior to 1 January 2030, the question will also resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "11.6", "median": "21.1", "upper_75": "32.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US unemployment rate will be 7.28% after the next volatile market episode?", "desc": "The exact nature of the relationship between economic conditions and the performance of the stock market has been a subject of much controversy, and some proposed models to explain the [equity premium puzzle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equity_premium_puzzle) make concrete claims about this connection which we might hope to test.\n\nAn important case is a class of models which involve \"long-run risk\". According to these models, what primarily drives stock market crashes is news about the long-run, and it just so happens that often short-run economic performance gives us the best clues about long-run risks, which leads to the observed pattern of correlation between stock market performance and the business cycle. However, according to long-run risk models this connection is only incidental, and a potential change in the properties of the GDP or consumption time series (such as a change in autocorrelation or conditional [heteroskedasticity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heteroscedasticity)) can upend it entirely.\n\nThis question, along with its [sibling question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8497/us-unemployment-after-the-next-market-crash/), is intended to test this class of models by eliciting the beliefs of Metaculites about the tightness of the connection between market crashes or tumultous market episodes and current macroeconomic events.", "resc": "This question resolves as the civilian unemployment rate [reported by the BLS](https://www.bls.gov/charts/employment-situation/civilian-unemployment-rate.htm) in units of percentages *6 months after* the first month in which the VIX index closes above 50 in any day of that month.\n\nTo illustrate with an example, if the VIX closes above 50 for the first time after this question opens on some day in March 2032, this question would resolve as the civilian unemployment rate reported by the BLS for September 2032.\n\nIf the VIX doesn't close above 50 at any time until the resolution date of this question, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "5.77", "median": "7.28", "upper_75": "9.60", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How much will entry level software engineers at Google get paid in 2027 according to levels.fyi?\n\nKeyword: 238k\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that entry level software engineers at Google will get paid 50% of the average salary in 2027 according to levels.fyi?", "desc": "Google is one of the largest technology companies in the world [by market capitalization](https://companiesmarketcap.com/tech/largest-tech-companies-by-market-cap/) and [by revenue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_technology_companies_by_revenue). It's also considered by most to be a prestigious place to work, with high entry level pay for its software engineers. According to levels.fyi entry-level software engineers currently (as of October 2021) make an average of $191,861 per year when including salary, stock grants, and bonuses.", "resc": "This question resolves according to the total compensation that levels.fyi reports for entry level software engineers in the year 2027 in the United States. The measurement should be taken as soon as possible, with earlier measured values in the year 2027 taking precedence over later measured values. Total compensation refers to the number of dollars an employee is expected to earn per year before taxes after including salary, stock grants, and bonuses. \n\nIf levels.fyi migrates to a different domain, then that domain will be used for resolution. If levels.fyi becomes defunct, or there is no user data submitted for Google during 2026, then this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "209k", "median": "238k", "upper_75": "278k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Peter Thiel's net worth will be 11.6 billion dollars in January 2030?", "desc": "[Peter Andreas Thiel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Thiel), born 11 October 1967, is a German-American billionaire entrepreneur and venture capitalist. A co-founder of PayPal, Palantir Technologies, and Founders Fund, and investor in many other ventures, he is a well-known figure in the US technology scene.\n\nAs of November 7 2021, Thiel has an estimated net worth of US $7.24 billion according to [the Bloomberg Billionaires Index.](https://www.bloomberg.com/billionaires/profiles/peter-a-thiel/)", "resc": "This question resolves as Peter Thiel's net worth, in billions of nominal US dollars, on January 1 2030, according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index. If (and only if) that index is no longer available, this question resolves as his estimated net worth according to Forbes on that date. If Forbes also does not provide an estimate of his net worth on that date, the most recent credible media reports of his net worth (as judged by Metaculus admins) should be consulted. \n\nIf Thiel is no longer alive on 1 January 2030, this question resolves ambiguously. If there are no credible reports of Thiel's net worth within one year prior to 1 January 2030, the question will also resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "11.6", "median": "21.1", "upper_75": "32.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.74 Metaculus users will attend the unofficial Metaculus Meetup at the Taco Bell in Westfield, Indiana on the 1st of January 2025?", "desc": "Earlier this year, in the comment section of a [question about the price of Taco Bell Crunchwrap Supreme in Westfield, Indiana in 2025](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6344/2025-price-of-a-crunchwrap-supreme/) several Metaculites agreed to meet at Taco Bell in Westfield, Indiana on January 1st 2025. \n\n[I asked](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6344/2025-price-of-a-crunchwrap-supreme/#comment-53716):\n\n> Anyone interested in an in-person Meetup at the Taco Bell in Westfield, Indiana on the 1st of January 2025?\n\nTo which [Pablo responded](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6344/2025-price-of-a-crunchwrap-supreme/#comment-53851):\n\n> @Tamay I hereby promise to fly to Westfield, Indiana to attend this important meeting, regardless of where in the world I happen to be on the previous day.\n\nSeveral other Metaculus users indicated interest in attending the unofficial Metaculus meetup", "resc": "This question resolves according to the best available evidence that indicates how many Metaculus users (with accounts that are at least 1 year old), attended the Meetup at the Taco Bell in Westfield, Indiana.\n\nThe meetup may be rescheduled, but no sooner or later than 7 days from January 1, 2025. If the Westfield Indiana Taco bell is no longer the store used in the [relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6344/2025-price-of-a-crunchwrap-supreme/), the meetup may take place at the secondary location used to resolve the question", "lower_25": "< 1", "median": "1.64", "upper_75": "4.74", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Peter Thiel's net worth will be 11.6 billion dollars in January 2030?", "desc": "[Peter Andreas Thiel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Thiel), born 11 October 1967, is a German-American billionaire entrepreneur and venture capitalist. A co-founder of PayPal, Palantir Technologies, and Founders Fund, and investor in many other ventures, he is a well-known figure in the US technology scene.\n\nAs of November 7 2021, Thiel has an estimated net worth of US $7.24 billion according to [the Bloomberg Billionaires Index.](https://www.bloomberg.com/billionaires/profiles/peter-a-thiel/)", "resc": "This question resolves as Peter Thiel's net worth, in billions of nominal US dollars, on January 1 2030, according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index. If (and only if) that index is no longer available, this question resolves as his estimated net worth according to Forbes on that date. If Forbes also does not provide an estimate of his net worth on that date, the most recent credible media reports of his net worth (as judged by Metaculus admins) should be consulted. \n\nIf Thiel is no longer alive on 1 January 2030, this question resolves ambiguously. If there are no credible reports of Thiel's net worth within one year prior to 1 January 2030, the question will also resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "11.6", "median": "21.1", "upper_75": "32.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 62.3% of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?", "desc": "Neuroscientist and fiction author Erik Hoel wrote the following about electric cars in the year 2050 in a [blog post published August 25, 2021](https://erikhoel.substack.com/p/futurists-have-their-heads-in-the)\n\n>Entertainment systems will be more high def, cars will be all electric, houses will be smart, and even food will taste better and be more locally grown.\n\nElectric cars have been making up an increasing portion of new car sales in the US in recent years, but data shows electric cars still make up a small fraction of new light-duty vehicle sales each year. According to a [report released by the Argonne National Laboratory](https://publications.anl.gov/anlpubs/2021/06/167626.pdf)\n\n>Over 306,000 plug-in electric vehicles [PEVs] were sold in the United States in 2020, a 4% decrease from 2019. Sales of all-electric BEVs grew 4% to 239,000, while PHEV sales decreased by 25% to 67,000. Relative to the total light-duty vehicle (LDV) market, total PEV shares grew from 1.9% in 2019 to 2.1% in 2020, as the overall LDV sales reduced by nearly 15% in 2020. \n\nThe same report defines PEVs as plug-in electric vehicles, and BEV and PHEV in the quote as follows\n\n>There are two types of PEVs: battery electric vehicles (BEVs) are powered exclusively by electricity, while plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) have a battery as well as a separate internal combustion engine for extended driving range.\n\nUsing the numbers above, we can estimate that BEVs were approximately 1.6% of all LDV sales in the US in 2020.\n\nMonthly updates from the Argonne National Laboratory show PEVs sold as a share of LDVs sold [increasing to above 3.5% in 2021](https://www.anl.gov/es/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) (using data through September of 2021).\n\nThe Argonne National Laboratory defines LDVs as vehicles weighing less than 10,000 pounds.\n\nBEVs were 1.4% of new vehicle sales in the US in 2020 according to IEA. [They projected](https://www.iea.org/articles/global-ev-data-explorer) that under a scenario of current market trends and government policies (their [STEPS scenario](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2021/prospects-for-electric-vehicle-deployment#abstract)), BEVs would be 10.7% of new US vehicle sales in 2030, whereas under their policy recommendations scenario ([SDS](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2021/prospects-for-electric-vehicle-deployment#abstract)), the same figure would be 36.3%.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percentage of light-duty vehicles (LDVs) sold in the United States which are all-electric (BEVs), according to the [International Energy Agency](https://www.iea.org/articles/global-ev-data-explorer). For the purposes of this question, LDVs are vehicles weighing less than 10,000 pounds and battery electric vehicles must be all-electric vehicles.\n\nIf vehicle classifications or definitions change, the intent of the resolution criteria is to align closely with the definitions and data described in the question background, and Metaculus Admins may use their discretion to determine if sources are in sufficient alignment with the intent of the question. If the IEA no longer publishes relevant data, the closest similar credible estimate may be used, or may be resolved ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "62.3", "median": "81.9", "upper_75": "92.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.74 Metaculus users will attend the unofficial Metaculus Meetup at the Taco Bell in Westfield, Indiana on the 1st of January 2025?", "desc": "Earlier this year, in the comment section of a [question about the price of Taco Bell Crunchwrap Supreme in Westfield, Indiana in 2025](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6344/2025-price-of-a-crunchwrap-supreme/) several Metaculites agreed to meet at Taco Bell in Westfield, Indiana on January 1st 2025. \n\n[I asked](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6344/2025-price-of-a-crunchwrap-supreme/#comment-53716):\n\n> Anyone interested in an in-person Meetup at the Taco Bell in Westfield, Indiana on the 1st of January 2025?\n\nTo which [Pablo responded](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6344/2025-price-of-a-crunchwrap-supreme/#comment-53851):\n\n> @Tamay I hereby promise to fly to Westfield, Indiana to attend this important meeting, regardless of where in the world I happen to be on the previous day.\n\nSeveral other Metaculus users indicated interest in attending the unofficial Metaculus meetup", "resc": "This question resolves according to the best available evidence that indicates how many Metaculus users (with accounts that are at least 1 year old), attended the Meetup at the Taco Bell in Westfield, Indiana.\n\nThe meetup may be rescheduled, but no sooner or later than 7 days from January 1, 2025. If the Westfield Indiana Taco bell is no longer the store used in the [relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6344/2025-price-of-a-crunchwrap-supreme/), the meetup may take place at the secondary location used to resolve the question", "lower_25": "< 1", "median": "1.64", "upper_75": "4.74", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 37.6% of US children will be living with a single parent in 2050?", "desc": "Data shows that the share of children living with a single parent in the United States has increased substantially since 1968, from [13% in 1968 to 25% in 2017](https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/27/about-one-third-of-u-s-children-are-living-with-an-unmarried-parent/). The US Census Bureau also found 26.4% of children lived with a single parent in a [2021 survey (Table C2)](https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2021/demo/families/cps-2021.html). Pew found the US to have the [highest percentage of children in single-parent households](https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/12/u-s-children-more-likely-than-children-in-other-countries-to-live-with-just-one-parent/) (23%) over any other country surveyed in 2019.\n\nNeuroscientist and fiction author Erik Hoel wrote the following about families with children in the year 2050 in a [blog post published August 25, 2021](https://erikhoel.substack.com/p/futurists-have-their-heads-in-the)\n\n>A near majority of children will be being raised in single-parent homes by 2050.", "resc": "This will resolve according to figures published for year 2050 by the [US Census Bureau](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2021/families-and-living-arrangements.html). If the US Census Bureau does not publish any data for this year, other demography statistics by a US goverment agency may be used. If no such statistics exist, Metaculus Admins may use one or more estimates made by credible research organizations, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a child will be considered \"living with a single parent\" if they live with only one of their biological parents, regardless of whether they live with other adults in their household or if their parent is the householder. Guardians will not be considered \"single parents\" for the purpose of this question", "lower_25": "25.5", "median": "31.2", "upper_75": "37.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the top marginal federal income tax rate in the USA will be 37.0% by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "The top marginal federal income tax rate is a topic of continued debate. In general, Republicans will try to lower this value and Democrats will raise it. Historically, it has fluctuated wildly, [even reaching 94% at the end of World War 2](https://www.statista.com/chart/16782/historic-marginal-income-tax-rates/). In recent years, due to the increasing power of socialism in USA, some speculate the tax marginal tax rate will increase a lot. [Joe Biden proposed raising it slightly (from 37% to 39.6%)](https://smartasset.com/taxes/current-federal-income-tax-brackets), but this has not been put into law so far. Some surveys indicate Americans are OK with raising the top marginal tax ([2019](https://thehill.com/hilltv/what-americas-thinking/425422-a-majority-of-americans-support-raising-the-top-tax-rate-to-70)) as was proposed by Democrat Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.\n\n***What will the top federal marginal income tax rate by in the USA in 2030?***\n\nThis quesion resolves as the top federal marginal income tax rate in the United States on January 1st 2030, according to reliable sources.", "lower_25": "37.0", "median": "38.7", "upper_75": "42.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the top marginal federal income tax rate in the USA will be 37.0% by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "The top marginal federal income tax rate is a topic of continued debate. In general, Republicans will try to lower this value and Democrats will raise it. Historically, it has fluctuated wildly, [even reaching 94% at the end of World War 2](https://www.statista.com/chart/16782/historic-marginal-income-tax-rates/). In recent years, due to the increasing power of socialism in USA, some speculate the tax marginal tax rate will increase a lot. [Joe Biden proposed raising it slightly (from 37% to 39.6%)](https://smartasset.com/taxes/current-federal-income-tax-brackets), but this has not been put into law so far. Some surveys indicate Americans are OK with raising the top marginal tax ([2019](https://thehill.com/hilltv/what-americas-thinking/425422-a-majority-of-americans-support-raising-the-top-tax-rate-to-70)) as was proposed by Democrat Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.\n\n***What will the top federal marginal income tax rate by in the USA in 2030?***\n\nThis quesion resolves as the top federal marginal income tax rate in the United States on January 1st 2030, according to reliable sources.", "lower_25": "37.0", "median": "38.7", "upper_75": "42.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 37.6% of US children will be living with a single parent in 2050?", "desc": "Data shows that the share of children living with a single parent in the United States has increased substantially since 1968, from [13% in 1968 to 25% in 2017](https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/27/about-one-third-of-u-s-children-are-living-with-an-unmarried-parent/). The US Census Bureau also found 26.4% of children lived with a single parent in a [2021 survey (Table C2)](https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2021/demo/families/cps-2021.html). Pew found the US to have the [highest percentage of children in single-parent households](https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/12/u-s-children-more-likely-than-children-in-other-countries-to-live-with-just-one-parent/) (23%) over any other country surveyed in 2019.\n\nNeuroscientist and fiction author Erik Hoel wrote the following about families with children in the year 2050 in a [blog post published August 25, 2021](https://erikhoel.substack.com/p/futurists-have-their-heads-in-the)\n\n>A near majority of children will be being raised in single-parent homes by 2050.", "resc": "This will resolve according to figures published for year 2050 by the [US Census Bureau](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2021/families-and-living-arrangements.html). If the US Census Bureau does not publish any data for this year, other demography statistics by a US goverment agency may be used. If no such statistics exist, Metaculus Admins may use one or more estimates made by credible research organizations, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a child will be considered \"living with a single parent\" if they live with only one of their biological parents, regardless of whether they live with other adults in their household or if their parent is the householder. Guardians will not be considered \"single parents\" for the purpose of this question", "lower_25": "25.5", "median": "31.2", "upper_75": "37.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the top marginal federal income tax rate in the USA will be 37.0% by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "The top marginal federal income tax rate is a topic of continued debate. In general, Republicans will try to lower this value and Democrats will raise it. Historically, it has fluctuated wildly, [even reaching 94% at the end of World War 2](https://www.statista.com/chart/16782/historic-marginal-income-tax-rates/). In recent years, due to the increasing power of socialism in USA, some speculate the tax marginal tax rate will increase a lot. [Joe Biden proposed raising it slightly (from 37% to 39.6%)](https://smartasset.com/taxes/current-federal-income-tax-brackets), but this has not been put into law so far. Some surveys indicate Americans are OK with raising the top marginal tax ([2019](https://thehill.com/hilltv/what-americas-thinking/425422-a-majority-of-americans-support-raising-the-top-tax-rate-to-70)) as was proposed by Democrat Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.\n\n***What will the top federal marginal income tax rate by in the USA in 2030?***\n\nThis quesion resolves as the top federal marginal income tax rate in the United States on January 1st 2030, according to reliable sources.", "lower_25": "37.0", "median": "38.7", "upper_75": "42.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 20.5k nuclear weapons globally in 2050?", "desc": "According to the Federation of American Scientists there were [13,150 nuclear warheads in existence in 2021](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/)\\*. This number includes retired warheads. [Nuclear stockpiles](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/number-of-nuclear-warheads-in-the-inventory-of-the-nuclear-powers) peaked in 1986 at an estimated 64,400 warheads, and have declined with the end of the [cold war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_war).\n\nNeuroscientist and fiction author Erik Hoel wrote the following about nuclear weapons in the year 2050 in a [blog post published August 25, 2021](https://erikhoel.substack.com/p/futurists-have-their-heads-in-the)\n\n>There will not be a World War III during this period. Indeed, nuclear disarmament will continue.\n\n\\*This number includes 40-50 nuclear warheads for North Korea based on an estimated amount of fissile material available. See footnote *r* in the linked estimate.", "resc": "This question will resolve according to the total number of nuclear weapons on Earth or within geosynchrous orbit, according to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), including retired warheads and any other warheads which have not been dismantled. If the FAS no longer publishes relevant estimates, other credible estimates by government agencies or nuclear weapons researchers may be used. Estimates of fissile material may count as well if provided similarly to the estimate for North Korea in the 2021 estimate", "lower_25": "6.36k", "median": "11.0k", "upper_75": "20.5k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 62.3% of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?", "desc": "Neuroscientist and fiction author Erik Hoel wrote the following about electric cars in the year 2050 in a [blog post published August 25, 2021](https://erikhoel.substack.com/p/futurists-have-their-heads-in-the)\n\n>Entertainment systems will be more high def, cars will be all electric, houses will be smart, and even food will taste better and be more locally grown.\n\nElectric cars have been making up an increasing portion of new car sales in the US in recent years, but data shows electric cars still make up a small fraction of new light-duty vehicle sales each year. According to a [report released by the Argonne National Laboratory](https://publications.anl.gov/anlpubs/2021/06/167626.pdf)\n\n>Over 306,000 plug-in electric vehicles [PEVs] were sold in the United States in 2020, a 4% decrease from 2019. Sales of all-electric BEVs grew 4% to 239,000, while PHEV sales decreased by 25% to 67,000. Relative to the total light-duty vehicle (LDV) market, total PEV shares grew from 1.9% in 2019 to 2.1% in 2020, as the overall LDV sales reduced by nearly 15% in 2020. \n\nThe same report defines PEVs as plug-in electric vehicles, and BEV and PHEV in the quote as follows\n\n>There are two types of PEVs: battery electric vehicles (BEVs) are powered exclusively by electricity, while plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) have a battery as well as a separate internal combustion engine for extended driving range.\n\nUsing the numbers above, we can estimate that BEVs were approximately 1.6% of all LDV sales in the US in 2020.\n\nMonthly updates from the Argonne National Laboratory show PEVs sold as a share of LDVs sold [increasing to above 3.5% in 2021](https://www.anl.gov/es/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) (using data through September of 2021).\n\nThe Argonne National Laboratory defines LDVs as vehicles weighing less than 10,000 pounds.\n\nBEVs were 1.4% of new vehicle sales in the US in 2020 according to IEA. [They projected](https://www.iea.org/articles/global-ev-data-explorer) that under a scenario of current market trends and government policies (their [STEPS scenario](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2021/prospects-for-electric-vehicle-deployment#abstract)), BEVs would be 10.7% of new US vehicle sales in 2030, whereas under their policy recommendations scenario ([SDS](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2021/prospects-for-electric-vehicle-deployment#abstract)), the same figure would be 36.3%.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percentage of light-duty vehicles (LDVs) sold in the United States which are all-electric (BEVs), according to the [International Energy Agency](https://www.iea.org/articles/global-ev-data-explorer). For the purposes of this question, LDVs are vehicles weighing less than 10,000 pounds and battery electric vehicles must be all-electric vehicles.\n\nIf vehicle classifications or definitions change, the intent of the resolution criteria is to align closely with the definitions and data described in the question background, and Metaculus Admins may use their discretion to determine if sources are in sufficient alignment with the intent of the question. If the IEA no longer publishes relevant data, the closest similar credible estimate may be used, or may be resolved ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "62.3", "median": "81.9", "upper_75": "92.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 62.3% of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?", "desc": "Neuroscientist and fiction author Erik Hoel wrote the following about electric cars in the year 2050 in a [blog post published August 25, 2021](https://erikhoel.substack.com/p/futurists-have-their-heads-in-the)\n\n>Entertainment systems will be more high def, cars will be all electric, houses will be smart, and even food will taste better and be more locally grown.\n\nElectric cars have been making up an increasing portion of new car sales in the US in recent years, but data shows electric cars still make up a small fraction of new light-duty vehicle sales each year. According to a [report released by the Argonne National Laboratory](https://publications.anl.gov/anlpubs/2021/06/167626.pdf)\n\n>Over 306,000 plug-in electric vehicles [PEVs] were sold in the United States in 2020, a 4% decrease from 2019. Sales of all-electric BEVs grew 4% to 239,000, while PHEV sales decreased by 25% to 67,000. Relative to the total light-duty vehicle (LDV) market, total PEV shares grew from 1.9% in 2019 to 2.1% in 2020, as the overall LDV sales reduced by nearly 15% in 2020. \n\nThe same report defines PEVs as plug-in electric vehicles, and BEV and PHEV in the quote as follows\n\n>There are two types of PEVs: battery electric vehicles (BEVs) are powered exclusively by electricity, while plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) have a battery as well as a separate internal combustion engine for extended driving range.\n\nUsing the numbers above, we can estimate that BEVs were approximately 1.6% of all LDV sales in the US in 2020.\n\nMonthly updates from the Argonne National Laboratory show PEVs sold as a share of LDVs sold [increasing to above 3.5% in 2021](https://www.anl.gov/es/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) (using data through September of 2021).\n\nThe Argonne National Laboratory defines LDVs as vehicles weighing less than 10,000 pounds.\n\nBEVs were 1.4% of new vehicle sales in the US in 2020 according to IEA. [They projected](https://www.iea.org/articles/global-ev-data-explorer) that under a scenario of current market trends and government policies (their [STEPS scenario](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2021/prospects-for-electric-vehicle-deployment#abstract)), BEVs would be 10.7% of new US vehicle sales in 2030, whereas under their policy recommendations scenario ([SDS](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2021/prospects-for-electric-vehicle-deployment#abstract)), the same figure would be 36.3%.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percentage of light-duty vehicles (LDVs) sold in the United States which are all-electric (BEVs), according to the [International Energy Agency](https://www.iea.org/articles/global-ev-data-explorer). For the purposes of this question, LDVs are vehicles weighing less than 10,000 pounds and battery electric vehicles must be all-electric vehicles.\n\nIf vehicle classifications or definitions change, the intent of the resolution criteria is to align closely with the definitions and data described in the question background, and Metaculus Admins may use their discretion to determine if sources are in sufficient alignment with the intent of the question. If the IEA no longer publishes relevant data, the closest similar credible estimate may be used, or may be resolved ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "62.3", "median": "81.9", "upper_75": "92.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX will be a trillion-dollar company by 2038?", "desc": "SpaceX is among the highest-valued privately held companies in the world. As of October, 2021, the company's [published valuation](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/08/elon-musks-spacex-valuation-100-billion.html) was 100.3 billion nominal US Dollars. The demand for a stake in the company is high, and its valuation is [expected to continue growing](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/20/spacex-to-become-more-valuable-than-tesla-morgan-stanley-survey.html).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which major financial media report that the total valuation of SpaceX and/or any subsidiaries thereof has exceeded one trillion nominal US Dollars. If any component of the company is spun off prior to the date of resolution, their combined market capitalization will comprise the total valuation.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 20.5k nuclear weapons globally in 2050?", "desc": "According to the Federation of American Scientists there were [13,150 nuclear warheads in existence in 2021](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/)\\*. This number includes retired warheads. [Nuclear stockpiles](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/number-of-nuclear-warheads-in-the-inventory-of-the-nuclear-powers) peaked in 1986 at an estimated 64,400 warheads, and have declined with the end of the [cold war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_war).\n\nNeuroscientist and fiction author Erik Hoel wrote the following about nuclear weapons in the year 2050 in a [blog post published August 25, 2021](https://erikhoel.substack.com/p/futurists-have-their-heads-in-the)\n\n>There will not be a World War III during this period. Indeed, nuclear disarmament will continue.\n\n\\*This number includes 40-50 nuclear warheads for North Korea based on an estimated amount of fissile material available. See footnote *r* in the linked estimate.", "resc": "This question will resolve according to the total number of nuclear weapons on Earth or within geosynchrous orbit, according to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), including retired warheads and any other warheads which have not been dismantled. If the FAS no longer publishes relevant estimates, other credible estimates by government agencies or nuclear weapons researchers may be used. Estimates of fissile material may count as well if provided similarly to the estimate for North Korea in the 2021 estimate", "lower_25": "6.36k", "median": "11.0k", "upper_75": "20.5k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX will be a trillion-dollar company by 2038?", "desc": "SpaceX is among the highest-valued privately held companies in the world. As of October, 2021, the company's [published valuation](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/08/elon-musks-spacex-valuation-100-billion.html) was 100.3 billion nominal US Dollars. The demand for a stake in the company is high, and its valuation is [expected to continue growing](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/20/spacex-to-become-more-valuable-than-tesla-morgan-stanley-survey.html).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which major financial media report that the total valuation of SpaceX and/or any subsidiaries thereof has exceeded one trillion nominal US Dollars. If any component of the company is spun off prior to the date of resolution, their combined market capitalization will comprise the total valuation.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 20.5k nuclear weapons globally in 2050?", "desc": "According to the Federation of American Scientists there were [13,150 nuclear warheads in existence in 2021](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/)\\*. This number includes retired warheads. [Nuclear stockpiles](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/number-of-nuclear-warheads-in-the-inventory-of-the-nuclear-powers) peaked in 1986 at an estimated 64,400 warheads, and have declined with the end of the [cold war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_war).\n\nNeuroscientist and fiction author Erik Hoel wrote the following about nuclear weapons in the year 2050 in a [blog post published August 25, 2021](https://erikhoel.substack.com/p/futurists-have-their-heads-in-the)\n\n>There will not be a World War III during this period. Indeed, nuclear disarmament will continue.\n\n\\*This number includes 40-50 nuclear warheads for North Korea based on an estimated amount of fissile material available. See footnote *r* in the linked estimate.", "resc": "This question will resolve according to the total number of nuclear weapons on Earth or within geosynchrous orbit, according to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), including retired warheads and any other warheads which have not been dismantled. If the FAS no longer publishes relevant estimates, other credible estimates by government agencies or nuclear weapons researchers may be used. Estimates of fissile material may count as well if provided similarly to the estimate for North Korea in the 2021 estimate", "lower_25": "6.36k", "median": "11.0k", "upper_75": "20.5k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.5 cities in China will be offensively attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "4.34", "median": "10.5", "upper_75": "25.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.009 fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by the US by 2050 will be on cities with >1500 people per km^2?", "desc": "Nuclear detonations on targets with higher population densities would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter). Several questions in this tournament are intended to shed light on the question of how many nuclear detonations would occur on well-populated areas, including [What fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be countervalue?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7461/total-countervalue-detonations-by-2050/), [What fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be on towns/cities with >500 people per square kilometer?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7503/fraction-detonations-by-2050-on-townscities/), [What proportion of offensive nuclear weapon detonations by the US by 2050 will be countervalue, if any detonation by the US occurs?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7458/countervalue-detonations-by-the-us-by-2050/), and similar questions. This questions uses a different operationalization for a similar purpose.", "resc": "This question resolves as the proportion of offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the US by the end of 2049 (2049-12-31) which occur on or over a point that is within the bounds of city that has a population density of at least 1500 people per square kilometer. The question resolves ambiguously if there are no offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the US after the question opens and before 2050.\n\n\nCities are defined as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" % of nuc. weapon detonations by US on cities [(_Degrees of Urbanization_)](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas).\n\n\nOffensive nuclear detonations carried out by the US includes only deliberate, inadvertent, and accidental offensive detonations of US-owned weapons, not [test detonations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing), [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion), or detonations by non-state actors who seized US-owned weapons. (See fine print for definitions.)\n\n\nThe military significance or stated purpose of the strike is not taken into consideration for this question (except that detonations for testing purposes and peaceful nuclear explosions.) For example, either a strike intended to kill civilians or a strike intended to destroy a military asset that happens to be in a capital city could both count towards this proportion.", "lower_25": "0.009", "median": "0.036", "upper_75": "0.112", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.009 fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by the US by 2050 will be on cities with >1500 people per km^2?", "desc": "Nuclear detonations on targets with higher population densities would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter). Several questions in this tournament are intended to shed light on the question of how many nuclear detonations would occur on well-populated areas, including [What fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be countervalue?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7461/total-countervalue-detonations-by-2050/), [What fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be on towns/cities with >500 people per square kilometer?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7503/fraction-detonations-by-2050-on-townscities/), [What proportion of offensive nuclear weapon detonations by the US by 2050 will be countervalue, if any detonation by the US occurs?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7458/countervalue-detonations-by-the-us-by-2050/), and similar questions. This questions uses a different operationalization for a similar purpose.", "resc": "This question resolves as the proportion of offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the US by the end of 2049 (2049-12-31) which occur on or over a point that is within the bounds of city that has a population density of at least 1500 people per square kilometer. The question resolves ambiguously if there are no offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the US after the question opens and before 2050.\n\n\nCities are defined as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" % of nuc. weapon detonations by US on cities [(_Degrees of Urbanization_)](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas).\n\n\nOffensive nuclear detonations carried out by the US includes only deliberate, inadvertent, and accidental offensive detonations of US-owned weapons, not [test detonations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing), [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion), or detonations by non-state actors who seized US-owned weapons. (See fine print for definitions.)\n\n\nThe military significance or stated purpose of the strike is not taken into consideration for this question (except that detonations for testing purposes and peaceful nuclear explosions.) For example, either a strike intended to kill civilians or a strike intended to destroy a military asset that happens to be in a capital city could both count towards this proportion.", "lower_25": "0.009", "median": "0.036", "upper_75": "0.112", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 26.1 cities in the United States will be offensively attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "4.33", "median": "10.7", "upper_75": "26.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.5 cities in China will be offensively attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "4.34", "median": "10.5", "upper_75": "25.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 26.1 cities in the United States will be offensively attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "4.33", "median": "10.7", "upper_75": "26.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.5 cities in China will be offensively attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "4.34", "median": "10.5", "upper_75": "25.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.93 cities in India will be offensively attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "0.926", "median": "2.57", "upper_75": "6.93", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX will be a trillion-dollar company by 2038?", "desc": "SpaceX is among the highest-valued privately held companies in the world. As of October, 2021, the company's [published valuation](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/08/elon-musks-spacex-valuation-100-billion.html) was 100.3 billion nominal US Dollars. The demand for a stake in the company is high, and its valuation is [expected to continue growing](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/20/spacex-to-become-more-valuable-than-tesla-morgan-stanley-survey.html).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which major financial media report that the total valuation of SpaceX and/or any subsidiaries thereof has exceeded one trillion nominal US Dollars. If any component of the company is spun off prior to the date of resolution, their combined market capitalization will comprise the total valuation.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the FDA or EMA will first approve a drug for the treatment of obesity that causes >25% weight loss by 2032?", "desc": "Many drugs are currently in development for the treatment of obesity or overweightness. Notably in June 2021, the FDA approved a 2.4mg dose of [Semaglutide (Wegovy)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semaglutide) for weight loss, which showed [15](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa2032183)-[18](https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2021.3224)% weight loss in trials. Several other weight loss drugs are in active development, such as [bimagrumab](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bimagrumab) and [tirzepatide](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8618/tirzepatide-approved-for-weight-loss-by-2025/).\n\nPrior to the development of these drugs, the most effective and demonstrable treatment for obesity was bariatric surgery, which commonly results in [25% reduction in body weight](https://doi.org/10.7326/m17-2786). However, fewer than [1 in 400 people with obesity](https://asmbs.org/resources/estimate-of-bariatric-surgery-numbers) undergo this surgery each year. If a less expensive and invasive treatment were developed, we might see greater numbers seeking treatment.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when either the US Food and Drug Administration or the European Medicines Agency approve a drug for the treatment of obesity or overweightness which demonstrates an average weight loss of >25%. \n\nThis question tracks absolute weight loss caused by the drug plus diet and lifestyle advice, not the “treatment difference” figure in which placebo group weight loss is subtracted. This must be demonstrated in a placebo-controlled randomized trial for patients with obesity or overweightness. This result may be demonstrated in either a phase 2 or 3 trial, and the weight lost can reach over 25% at any time in the study, even if some weight is regained by the end of the study", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the FDA or EMA will first approve a drug for the treatment of obesity that causes >25% weight loss by 2032?", "desc": "Many drugs are currently in development for the treatment of obesity or overweightness. Notably in June 2021, the FDA approved a 2.4mg dose of [Semaglutide (Wegovy)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semaglutide) for weight loss, which showed [15](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa2032183)-[18](https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2021.3224)% weight loss in trials. Several other weight loss drugs are in active development, such as [bimagrumab](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bimagrumab) and [tirzepatide](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8618/tirzepatide-approved-for-weight-loss-by-2025/).\n\nPrior to the development of these drugs, the most effective and demonstrable treatment for obesity was bariatric surgery, which commonly results in [25% reduction in body weight](https://doi.org/10.7326/m17-2786). However, fewer than [1 in 400 people with obesity](https://asmbs.org/resources/estimate-of-bariatric-surgery-numbers) undergo this surgery each year. If a less expensive and invasive treatment were developed, we might see greater numbers seeking treatment.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when either the US Food and Drug Administration or the European Medicines Agency approve a drug for the treatment of obesity or overweightness which demonstrates an average weight loss of >25%. \n\nThis question tracks absolute weight loss caused by the drug plus diet and lifestyle advice, not the “treatment difference” figure in which placebo group weight loss is subtracted. This must be demonstrated in a placebo-controlled randomized trial for patients with obesity or overweightness. This result may be demonstrated in either a phase 2 or 3 trial, and the weight lost can reach over 25% at any time in the study, even if some weight is regained by the end of the study", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.93 cities in India will be offensively attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "0.926", "median": "2.57", "upper_75": "6.93", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.93 cities in India will be offensively attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "0.926", "median": "2.57", "upper_75": "6.93", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.2 cities in Russia will be offensively attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "4.2", "median": "10.5", "upper_75": "24.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the FDA or EMA will first approve a drug for the treatment of obesity that causes >25% weight loss by 2032?", "desc": "Many drugs are currently in development for the treatment of obesity or overweightness. Notably in June 2021, the FDA approved a 2.4mg dose of [Semaglutide (Wegovy)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semaglutide) for weight loss, which showed [15](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa2032183)-[18](https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2021.3224)% weight loss in trials. Several other weight loss drugs are in active development, such as [bimagrumab](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bimagrumab) and [tirzepatide](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8618/tirzepatide-approved-for-weight-loss-by-2025/).\n\nPrior to the development of these drugs, the most effective and demonstrable treatment for obesity was bariatric surgery, which commonly results in [25% reduction in body weight](https://doi.org/10.7326/m17-2786). However, fewer than [1 in 400 people with obesity](https://asmbs.org/resources/estimate-of-bariatric-surgery-numbers) undergo this surgery each year. If a less expensive and invasive treatment were developed, we might see greater numbers seeking treatment.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when either the US Food and Drug Administration or the European Medicines Agency approve a drug for the treatment of obesity or overweightness which demonstrates an average weight loss of >25%. \n\nThis question tracks absolute weight loss caused by the drug plus diet and lifestyle advice, not the “treatment difference” figure in which placebo group weight loss is subtracted. This must be demonstrated in a placebo-controlled randomized trial for patients with obesity or overweightness. This result may be demonstrated in either a phase 2 or 3 trial, and the weight lost can reach over 25% at any time in the study, even if some weight is regained by the end of the study", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.2 cities in Russia will be offensively attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "4.2", "median": "10.5", "upper_75": "24.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.009 fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by the US by 2050 will be on cities with >1500 people per km^2?", "desc": "Nuclear detonations on targets with higher population densities would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter). Several questions in this tournament are intended to shed light on the question of how many nuclear detonations would occur on well-populated areas, including [What fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be countervalue?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7461/total-countervalue-detonations-by-2050/), [What fraction of nuclear weapon detonations by 2050 will be on towns/cities with >500 people per square kilometer?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7503/fraction-detonations-by-2050-on-townscities/), [What proportion of offensive nuclear weapon detonations by the US by 2050 will be countervalue, if any detonation by the US occurs?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7458/countervalue-detonations-by-the-us-by-2050/), and similar questions. This questions uses a different operationalization for a similar purpose.", "resc": "This question resolves as the proportion of offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the US by the end of 2049 (2049-12-31) which occur on or over a point that is within the bounds of city that has a population density of at least 1500 people per square kilometer. The question resolves ambiguously if there are no offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the US after the question opens and before 2050.\n\n\nCities are defined as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" % of nuc. weapon detonations by US on cities [(_Degrees of Urbanization_)](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas).\n\n\nOffensive nuclear detonations carried out by the US includes only deliberate, inadvertent, and accidental offensive detonations of US-owned weapons, not [test detonations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing), [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion), or detonations by non-state actors who seized US-owned weapons. (See fine print for definitions.)\n\n\nThe military significance or stated purpose of the strike is not taken into consideration for this question (except that detonations for testing purposes and peaceful nuclear explosions.) For example, either a strike intended to kill civilians or a strike intended to destroy a military asset that happens to be in a capital city could both count towards this proportion.", "lower_25": "0.009", "median": "0.036", "upper_75": "0.112", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.2 cities in Russia will be offensively attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "4.2", "median": "10.5", "upper_75": "24.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "If these countries are attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030, what is the chance that 2.13 cities in Israel will be offensively attacked?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "0.85", "median": "2.13", "upper_75": "5.07", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If these countries are attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030, what is the chance that 2.13 cities in Israel will be offensively attacked?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "0.85", "median": "2.13", "upper_75": "5.07", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 26.1 cities in the United States will be offensively attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "4.33", "median": "10.7", "upper_75": "26.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If these countries are attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030, what is the chance that 2.13 cities in Israel will be offensively attacked?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "0.85", "median": "2.13", "upper_75": "5.07", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.706 fraction of cities in Pakistan will be offensively attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "0.706", "median": "1.62", "upper_75": "3.19", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.706 fraction of cities in Pakistan will be offensively attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "0.706", "median": "1.62", "upper_75": "3.19", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "If these countries are attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030, what is the chance that 3.72 cities in that country will be offensively attacked? (Europe)", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "3.72", "median": "9.12", "upper_75": "22.70", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.706 fraction of cities in Pakistan will be offensively attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "0.706", "median": "1.62", "upper_75": "3.19", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "If these countries are attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030, what is the chance that 3.72 cities in that country will be offensively attacked? (Europe)", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "3.72", "median": "9.12", "upper_75": "22.70", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "If North Korea is attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030, what is the chance that 1.79 cities in that country will be offensively attacked?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "0.742", "median": "1.79", "upper_75": "3.99", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If >100 offensive nuclear detonations occur in a single conflict by 2030, what is the chance that there will be 43.6 hours between the first and final detonation in the conflict?", "desc": "If there's a large nuclear conflict, how quickly would it play out? Rapid strike and perhaps rapid retaliation? A series of tit-for-tat exchanges playing out over a longer timespan? Something else or in between? \n\n\nOne reason this matters is that it affects how much room there is to intervene _after_ a nuclear conflict has already started, in order to reduce the level to which the conflict escalates.", "resc": "This question is conditional on there being more than 100 offensive nuclear detonations on or over a territory in a single conflict between January 1, 2021 and December 31, 2029. That is, if that condition isn't met, this question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThis question resolves as the number of hours between the first and final detonation in the first nuclear conflict by 2030 in which there are >100 offensive nuclear detonations. If there are multiple separate conflicts by 2030 which each involve >100 offensive nuclear detonations, only the first such conflict will be taken into account for resolving this question. \n\nDetonations will be considered to be part of the same conflict if each detonation occurs within 30 days or less of a previous detonation (even if the detonations involve different pairs of states, involve unrelated motivations, etc.).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations (see the fine print for definitions), but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) and [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion).", "lower_25": "8.58", "median": "43.6", "upper_75": "289", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If North Korea is attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030, what is the chance that 1.79 cities in that country will be offensively attacked?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "0.742", "median": "1.79", "upper_75": "3.99", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What percentage of Americans will be obese in 2032?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 45.6% of Americans will be obese in 2032?", "desc": "*Related question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What percentage of Americans will be considered obese or overweight in 2030? ](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1482/what-percentage-of-americans-will-be-considered-obese-or-overweight-in-2030/)\n\n----\n\n[Forty-three percent](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/obesity-adult-17-18/obesity-adult.htm) of US adults had obesity in 2017-2018. People with obesity typically do not want to have obesity, as demonstrated by the fact that [two-thirds](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db313.htm) of American adults with obesity attempt to lose weight each year. It stands to reason that there will be a high demand for safe and effective weight loss drugs.\n\nWegovy has been shown to cause [15](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa2032183)-[18](https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2021.3224)% loss of body weight with relatively minor side effects. It is the first highly effective, and apparently safe, weight loss drug to gain regulatory approval in the US (June 2021). Although in 2021 its US wholesale cost is [$1,349 per month](https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2021-07-29/diabetes-drug-weight-management-formula-big-price), demand has nevertheless outstripped supply.\nThe possibility that Wegovy and other new weight loss drugs will drive down obesity rates must be considered alongside the observation that obesity rates have been increasing in the US since the 1960s, but particularly [since the 1976-1980](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/obesity-adult-17-18/obesity-adult.htm) NHANES survey period. [Some](https://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Obesity-Update-2017.pdf) [projections](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMsa1909301) suggest that US obesity rates will continue to increase.", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of US adults with obesity in 2032, according to the US CDC's [National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhanes/index.htm). Obesity is defined in this question as having a [BMI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Body_mass_index) of 30.0 or greater. This figure will be taken for all US adults age 18 and older, among all genders and races. This will resolve based on the NHANES for the 2031-2032 period; if there is no such publication or a near equivalent, Metaculus Admins may use other estimates by researchers or government health agencies, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion", "lower_25": "41.3", "median": "45.6", "upper_75": "49.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If >100 offensive nuclear detonations occur in a single conflict by 2030, what is the chance that there will be 43.6 hours between the first and final detonation in the conflict?", "desc": "If there's a large nuclear conflict, how quickly would it play out? Rapid strike and perhaps rapid retaliation? A series of tit-for-tat exchanges playing out over a longer timespan? Something else or in between? \n\n\nOne reason this matters is that it affects how much room there is to intervene _after_ a nuclear conflict has already started, in order to reduce the level to which the conflict escalates.", "resc": "This question is conditional on there being more than 100 offensive nuclear detonations on or over a territory in a single conflict between January 1, 2021 and December 31, 2029. That is, if that condition isn't met, this question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThis question resolves as the number of hours between the first and final detonation in the first nuclear conflict by 2030 in which there are >100 offensive nuclear detonations. If there are multiple separate conflicts by 2030 which each involve >100 offensive nuclear detonations, only the first such conflict will be taken into account for resolving this question. \n\nDetonations will be considered to be part of the same conflict if each detonation occurs within 30 days or less of a previous detonation (even if the detonations involve different pairs of states, involve unrelated motivations, etc.).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations (see the fine print for definitions), but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) and [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion).", "lower_25": "8.58", "median": "43.6", "upper_75": "289", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.092 fraction of offensive nuclear detonations will be in the Southern Hemisphere, if more than 50 detonations happen globally by 2050?", "desc": "The extent of the harms from nuclear conflict, and especially the likelihood of a negative [trajectory change](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/tag/trajectory-change) that stretches into the long-term future, probably depend mostly on the possible [nuclear winter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_winter) effects and societal disruption effects. Those effects may be weaker if the vast majority of nuclear detonations occur in just the Northern Hemisphere (rather than there also being many in the Southern Hemisphere), because:\n\n\n* That might reduce the size of nuclear winter effects in Southern Hemisphere, perhaps allowing Southern Hemisphere countries to feed themselves and even produce surpluses that can feed people elsewhere.\n\n\n* If capitals or other cities in the Southern Hemisphere aren't hit, that might substantially reduce the societal and political disruption Southern Hemisphere countries face, perhaps preventing those countries from collapsing or helping them recover more quickly.", "resc": "This question resolves as the proportion of offensive state nuclear detonations that occur between this question opening and 2050-01-01 that are on or over a point in the Southern Hemisphere. The question resolves ambiguously if it is not the case that >50 offensive state nuclear detonations between the question opening and 2050.\n\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive state nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental detonations of weapons that were owned by a state at the time of detonation (see the fine print for definitions). This excludes detonations of weapons that were created by non-state actors or were sold to non-state actors by the state that had owned the weapon.\n\n\nBy the Southern Hemisphere, we mean the half of Earth that is south of the Equator. A list of countries which lie in the Southern Hemisphere can be found in the [World Population Review](https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/southern-hemisphere-countries).\n\n\nResolution will be based on reputable reports – preferably published by international organizations, NGOs focused on nuclear risk, scientific organizations or government agencies of countries that are not part to the conflict (or even countries participating in the conflict, if their reports agree on the facts). If such reports are not available, data will be compiled from credible media reports.", "lower_25": "0.009", "median": "0.028", "upper_75": "0.092", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If >100 offensive nuclear detonations occur in a single conflict by 2030, what is the chance that there will be 43.6 hours between the first and final detonation in the conflict?", "desc": "If there's a large nuclear conflict, how quickly would it play out? Rapid strike and perhaps rapid retaliation? A series of tit-for-tat exchanges playing out over a longer timespan? Something else or in between? \n\n\nOne reason this matters is that it affects how much room there is to intervene _after_ a nuclear conflict has already started, in order to reduce the level to which the conflict escalates.", "resc": "This question is conditional on there being more than 100 offensive nuclear detonations on or over a territory in a single conflict between January 1, 2021 and December 31, 2029. That is, if that condition isn't met, this question resolves ambiguously.\n\nThis question resolves as the number of hours between the first and final detonation in the first nuclear conflict by 2030 in which there are >100 offensive nuclear detonations. If there are multiple separate conflicts by 2030 which each involve >100 offensive nuclear detonations, only the first such conflict will be taken into account for resolving this question. \n\nDetonations will be considered to be part of the same conflict if each detonation occurs within 30 days or less of a previous detonation (even if the detonations involve different pairs of states, involve unrelated motivations, etc.).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations (see the fine print for definitions), but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) and [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion).", "lower_25": "8.58", "median": "43.6", "upper_75": "289", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 75% of offensive nuclear detonations by 2030 will be of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, if there's at least one offensive detonation by then?", "desc": "What types of offensive nuclear detonation would occur given nuclear conflict is relevant both for understanding the total risk posed by nuclear weapons and for understanding how best to reduce that risk. \n\n\n[Non-strategic nuclear weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tactical_nuclear_weapon) (also known as tactical nuclear weapons) are typically lower yield, shorter-range, and intended for detonating closer to friendly forces or friendly territory than strategic nuclear weapons. (Though definitions vary, and what a weapon is designed for could differ from what it's used for.)", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of offensive detonations of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the period between the opening of this question and December 31, 2029, divided by the number of all offensive nuclear detonations in the same period. This question resolves as \"0\" if there is no nuclear detonation of nonstrategic weapons, but at least one offensive nuclear detonation occurs in this period. This question resolves ambiguously if no offensive nuclear detonation occurs at all in this period.\n\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a non-strategic nuclear is a nuclear weapon designed mostly to be used on a battlefield, near friendly forces, or on or near friendly territory, while a strategic nuclear weapon is a weapon designed mostly to be targeted at the enemy interior (away from the war front) against military bases, cities, towns, arms industries, and other hardened or larger-area targets. But note that this question is about the type of weapon, not the type of target; it's conceivable that a non-strategic weapon could be used against the sort of target strategic weapons are designed for or vice versa.\n\n\nThe military significance or stated purpose of the strike is not taken into consideration for this question (except that [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) and [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) are not counted towards positive resolution).\n\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations (see the fine print for definitions) of state or nonstate nuclear weapons.\n\n\nResolution will be based on reputable reports -- preferably published by international organizations, NGOs focused on nuclear risk, scientific organizations or government agencies of countries that are not part to the conflict (or even countries participating in the conflict, if their reports agree on the facts). If such reports are not available, data will be compiled from credible media reports.\n\n\n**See also:**\n\n* [Will the first offensive nuclear detonation by 2024 be of a nonstrategic nuclear weapon, if there's an offensive detonation anywhere by then?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8584/nsnw-as-the-first-nuclear-detonation-by-2024/)\n\n* [Will the first offensive nuclear detonation by 2024 be against a battlefield target, if there's an offensive detonation anywhere by then?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8585/bt-as-the-first-nuclear-detonation-by-2024/)\n\n* [Collection of questions on nuclear targeting](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8604/collection-of-questions-on-nuclear-targeting/)\n\n* [Will there be >3000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons at the end of 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8150/3000-nonstrategic-weapons-at-end-of-2023/)\n\n* [How many nonstrategic nuclear weapons will be deployed at the end of 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8175/non-strategic-weapons-deployed-at-end-of-2023/)", "lower_25": "0.067", "median": "0.839", "upper_75": "0.981", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 75% of offensive nuclear detonations by 2030 will be of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, if there's at least one offensive detonation by then?", "desc": "What types of offensive nuclear detonation would occur given nuclear conflict is relevant both for understanding the total risk posed by nuclear weapons and for understanding how best to reduce that risk. \n\n\n[Non-strategic nuclear weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tactical_nuclear_weapon) (also known as tactical nuclear weapons) are typically lower yield, shorter-range, and intended for detonating closer to friendly forces or friendly territory than strategic nuclear weapons. (Though definitions vary, and what a weapon is designed for could differ from what it's used for.)", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of offensive detonations of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the period between the opening of this question and December 31, 2029, divided by the number of all offensive nuclear detonations in the same period. This question resolves as \"0\" if there is no nuclear detonation of nonstrategic weapons, but at least one offensive nuclear detonation occurs in this period. This question resolves ambiguously if no offensive nuclear detonation occurs at all in this period.\n\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a non-strategic nuclear is a nuclear weapon designed mostly to be used on a battlefield, near friendly forces, or on or near friendly territory, while a strategic nuclear weapon is a weapon designed mostly to be targeted at the enemy interior (away from the war front) against military bases, cities, towns, arms industries, and other hardened or larger-area targets. But note that this question is about the type of weapon, not the type of target; it's conceivable that a non-strategic weapon could be used against the sort of target strategic weapons are designed for or vice versa.\n\n\nThe military significance or stated purpose of the strike is not taken into consideration for this question (except that [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) and [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) are not counted towards positive resolution).\n\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations (see the fine print for definitions) of state or nonstate nuclear weapons.\n\n\nResolution will be based on reputable reports -- preferably published by international organizations, NGOs focused on nuclear risk, scientific organizations or government agencies of countries that are not part to the conflict (or even countries participating in the conflict, if their reports agree on the facts). If such reports are not available, data will be compiled from credible media reports.\n\n\n**See also:**\n\n* [Will the first offensive nuclear detonation by 2024 be of a nonstrategic nuclear weapon, if there's an offensive detonation anywhere by then?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8584/nsnw-as-the-first-nuclear-detonation-by-2024/)\n\n* [Will the first offensive nuclear detonation by 2024 be against a battlefield target, if there's an offensive detonation anywhere by then?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8585/bt-as-the-first-nuclear-detonation-by-2024/)\n\n* [Collection of questions on nuclear targeting](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8604/collection-of-questions-on-nuclear-targeting/)\n\n* [Will there be >3000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons at the end of 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8150/3000-nonstrategic-weapons-at-end-of-2023/)\n\n* [How many nonstrategic nuclear weapons will be deployed at the end of 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8175/non-strategic-weapons-deployed-at-end-of-2023/)", "lower_25": "0.067", "median": "0.839", "upper_75": "0.981", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.092 fraction of offensive nuclear detonations will be in the Southern Hemisphere, if more than 50 detonations happen globally by 2050?", "desc": "The extent of the harms from nuclear conflict, and especially the likelihood of a negative [trajectory change](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/tag/trajectory-change) that stretches into the long-term future, probably depend mostly on the possible [nuclear winter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_winter) effects and societal disruption effects. Those effects may be weaker if the vast majority of nuclear detonations occur in just the Northern Hemisphere (rather than there also being many in the Southern Hemisphere), because:\n\n\n* That might reduce the size of nuclear winter effects in Southern Hemisphere, perhaps allowing Southern Hemisphere countries to feed themselves and even produce surpluses that can feed people elsewhere.\n\n\n* If capitals or other cities in the Southern Hemisphere aren't hit, that might substantially reduce the societal and political disruption Southern Hemisphere countries face, perhaps preventing those countries from collapsing or helping them recover more quickly.", "resc": "This question resolves as the proportion of offensive state nuclear detonations that occur between this question opening and 2050-01-01 that are on or over a point in the Southern Hemisphere. The question resolves ambiguously if it is not the case that >50 offensive state nuclear detonations between the question opening and 2050.\n\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive state nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental detonations of weapons that were owned by a state at the time of detonation (see the fine print for definitions). This excludes detonations of weapons that were created by non-state actors or were sold to non-state actors by the state that had owned the weapon.\n\n\nBy the Southern Hemisphere, we mean the half of Earth that is south of the Equator. A list of countries which lie in the Southern Hemisphere can be found in the [World Population Review](https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/southern-hemisphere-countries).\n\n\nResolution will be based on reputable reports – preferably published by international organizations, NGOs focused on nuclear risk, scientific organizations or government agencies of countries that are not part to the conflict (or even countries participating in the conflict, if their reports agree on the facts). If such reports are not available, data will be compiled from credible media reports.", "lower_25": "0.009", "median": "0.028", "upper_75": "0.092", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What percentage of Americans will be obese in 2032?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 45.6% of Americans will be obese in 2032?", "desc": "*Related question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What percentage of Americans will be considered obese or overweight in 2030? ](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1482/what-percentage-of-americans-will-be-considered-obese-or-overweight-in-2030/)\n\n----\n\n[Forty-three percent](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/obesity-adult-17-18/obesity-adult.htm) of US adults had obesity in 2017-2018. People with obesity typically do not want to have obesity, as demonstrated by the fact that [two-thirds](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db313.htm) of American adults with obesity attempt to lose weight each year. It stands to reason that there will be a high demand for safe and effective weight loss drugs.\n\nWegovy has been shown to cause [15](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa2032183)-[18](https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2021.3224)% loss of body weight with relatively minor side effects. It is the first highly effective, and apparently safe, weight loss drug to gain regulatory approval in the US (June 2021). Although in 2021 its US wholesale cost is [$1,349 per month](https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2021-07-29/diabetes-drug-weight-management-formula-big-price), demand has nevertheless outstripped supply.\nThe possibility that Wegovy and other new weight loss drugs will drive down obesity rates must be considered alongside the observation that obesity rates have been increasing in the US since the 1960s, but particularly [since the 1976-1980](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/obesity-adult-17-18/obesity-adult.htm) NHANES survey period. [Some](https://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Obesity-Update-2017.pdf) [projections](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMsa1909301) suggest that US obesity rates will continue to increase.", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of US adults with obesity in 2032, according to the US CDC's [National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhanes/index.htm). Obesity is defined in this question as having a [BMI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Body_mass_index) of 30.0 or greater. This figure will be taken for all US adults age 18 and older, among all genders and races. This will resolve based on the NHANES for the 2031-2032 period; if there is no such publication or a near equivalent, Metaculus Admins may use other estimates by researchers or government health agencies, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion", "lower_25": "41.3", "median": "45.6", "upper_75": "49.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 12.9% of US adults will have Diabetes (type 1 and 2) in 2032?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that [13%](https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pdfs/data/statistics/national-diabetes-statistics-report.pdf) of US adults had diabetes in 2015-2016 (all types). [Rates of diabetes have been increasing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epidemiology_of_diabetes#United_States), correlating with similar increasing rates of obesity and overweight.\n\nExcess body fat is a key cause of type 2 diabetes, the most prevalent type of diabetes. Weight loss has been shown to both [prevent the development](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa012512) of type 2 diabetes, and put existing type 2 diabetes [into remission](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)33102-1). The FDA recently approved Wegovy for the treatment of obesity, which causes [15](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa2032183)-[18](https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2021.3224)% loss of body weight in randomized trials, with relatively minor side effects. Other related weight loss drugs may soon be approved. Demand for these drugs is expected to be high, although they are costly in the US.\n\nIt is possible that these new weight loss drugs may halt or reverse trends in diabetes rates.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the estimated percentage of US adults with diabetes (all types) in the year 2032, according to the US CDC. CDC estimates of diabetes prevalence are typically delayed by several years, so the estimate for 2032 may not be published until 2033-2037. The [CDC estimate](https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pdfs/data/statistics/national-diabetes-statistics-report.pdf) for 2015-2016 is 13.0%. This figure will account for the total rate of both diagnosed and undiagnosed cases, including all types of diabetes, for US adults age 18 and over for all genders and races. If the CDC does not have this data available, Metaculus Admins may use estimates from other researchers or government agencies, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion", "lower_25": "9.95", "median": "12.9", "upper_75": "16.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 12.9% of US adults will have Diabetes (type 1 and 2) in 2032?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that [13%](https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pdfs/data/statistics/national-diabetes-statistics-report.pdf) of US adults had diabetes in 2015-2016 (all types). [Rates of diabetes have been increasing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epidemiology_of_diabetes#United_States), correlating with similar increasing rates of obesity and overweight.\n\nExcess body fat is a key cause of type 2 diabetes, the most prevalent type of diabetes. Weight loss has been shown to both [prevent the development](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa012512) of type 2 diabetes, and put existing type 2 diabetes [into remission](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)33102-1). The FDA recently approved Wegovy for the treatment of obesity, which causes [15](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa2032183)-[18](https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2021.3224)% loss of body weight in randomized trials, with relatively minor side effects. Other related weight loss drugs may soon be approved. Demand for these drugs is expected to be high, although they are costly in the US.\n\nIt is possible that these new weight loss drugs may halt or reverse trends in diabetes rates.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the estimated percentage of US adults with diabetes (all types) in the year 2032, according to the US CDC. CDC estimates of diabetes prevalence are typically delayed by several years, so the estimate for 2032 may not be published until 2033-2037. The [CDC estimate](https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pdfs/data/statistics/national-diabetes-statistics-report.pdf) for 2015-2016 is 13.0%. This figure will account for the total rate of both diagnosed and undiagnosed cases, including all types of diabetes, for US adults age 18 and over for all genders and races. If the CDC does not have this data available, Metaculus Admins may use estimates from other researchers or government agencies, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion", "lower_25": "9.95", "median": "12.9", "upper_75": "16.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What percentage of Americans will be obese in 2032?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 45.6% of Americans will be obese in 2032?", "desc": "*Related question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What percentage of Americans will be considered obese or overweight in 2030? ](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1482/what-percentage-of-americans-will-be-considered-obese-or-overweight-in-2030/)\n\n----\n\n[Forty-three percent](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/obesity-adult-17-18/obesity-adult.htm) of US adults had obesity in 2017-2018. People with obesity typically do not want to have obesity, as demonstrated by the fact that [two-thirds](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db313.htm) of American adults with obesity attempt to lose weight each year. It stands to reason that there will be a high demand for safe and effective weight loss drugs.\n\nWegovy has been shown to cause [15](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa2032183)-[18](https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2021.3224)% loss of body weight with relatively minor side effects. It is the first highly effective, and apparently safe, weight loss drug to gain regulatory approval in the US (June 2021). Although in 2021 its US wholesale cost is [$1,349 per month](https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2021-07-29/diabetes-drug-weight-management-formula-big-price), demand has nevertheless outstripped supply.\nThe possibility that Wegovy and other new weight loss drugs will drive down obesity rates must be considered alongside the observation that obesity rates have been increasing in the US since the 1960s, but particularly [since the 1976-1980](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/obesity-adult-17-18/obesity-adult.htm) NHANES survey period. [Some](https://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Obesity-Update-2017.pdf) [projections](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMsa1909301) suggest that US obesity rates will continue to increase.", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of US adults with obesity in 2032, according to the US CDC's [National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey](https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nhanes/index.htm). Obesity is defined in this question as having a [BMI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Body_mass_index) of 30.0 or greater. This figure will be taken for all US adults age 18 and older, among all genders and races. This will resolve based on the NHANES for the 2031-2032 period; if there is no such publication or a near equivalent, Metaculus Admins may use other estimates by researchers or government health agencies, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion", "lower_25": "41.3", "median": "45.6", "upper_75": "49.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If North Korea is attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030, what is the chance that 1.79 cities in that country will be offensively attacked?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "0.742", "median": "1.79", "upper_75": "3.99", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If these countries are attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030, what is the chance that 3.72 cities in that country will be offensively attacked? (Europe)", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "3.72", "median": "9.12", "upper_75": "22.70", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Vera Rubin Observatory will identify 2.73 interstellar objects in its first two years of observations?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of November 2021, two [interstellar objects](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interstellar_object) (1I/\\`Oumuamua and 2I/Borisov) have been discovered while traversing the Solar System. While the galactic population of such objects is relatively unconstrained, the forthcoming [Vera Rubin Observatory](https://www.lsst.org/) will have a larger field-of-view in which to identify interstellar objects. This question is part of a fortified essay on the origin and composition of interstellar objects like `Oumuamua.\n\n***How many interstellar objects will be identified by the Vera Rubin Observatory in its first two years of observations?***\n\nThis question will resolve to the whole number value of interstellar objects that were first identified by the Vera Rubin Observatory within two years of its [first light](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_light_(astronomy)) image. The number of objects discovered by this observatory will be determined by the number of objects with the \"I\" [designation](https://minorplanetcenter.net//mpec/K17/K17V17.html) as interstellar with a discovery asterisk corresponding to the Vera Rubin Observatory, as recorded by the [Minor Planet Center](https://minorplanetcenter.net/).\n\n[fine-print]\nThis question will close on the date considered to be \"first light\" (i.e. first scientific operations) for the Vera Rubin Observatory in Chile. This first light date will be determined as announced by the Rubin Observatory on their [website](https://www.lsst.org/). Resolution will be 2 years and 3 months after first light, to allow 3 months to classify any ambiguous observations.\n\nIn the case that Vera Rubin Observatory does not make begin first light or make observations before 2030-01-01, this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\nAs of November 17, 2021, the Vera Rubin Observatory is [expected](https://www.lsst.org/about/project-status) to see its first light in January 2023 and scientific operations are set to begin in late 2023.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "1.21", "median": "2.73", "upper_75": "5.58", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Vera Rubin Observatory will identify 2.73 interstellar objects in its first two years of observations?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of November 2021, two [interstellar objects](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interstellar_object) (1I/\\`Oumuamua and 2I/Borisov) have been discovered while traversing the Solar System. While the galactic population of such objects is relatively unconstrained, the forthcoming [Vera Rubin Observatory](https://www.lsst.org/) will have a larger field-of-view in which to identify interstellar objects. This question is part of a fortified essay on the origin and composition of interstellar objects like `Oumuamua.\n\n***How many interstellar objects will be identified by the Vera Rubin Observatory in its first two years of observations?***\n\nThis question will resolve to the whole number value of interstellar objects that were first identified by the Vera Rubin Observatory within two years of its [first light](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_light_(astronomy)) image. The number of objects discovered by this observatory will be determined by the number of objects with the \"I\" [designation](https://minorplanetcenter.net//mpec/K17/K17V17.html) as interstellar with a discovery asterisk corresponding to the Vera Rubin Observatory, as recorded by the [Minor Planet Center](https://minorplanetcenter.net/).\n\n[fine-print]\nThis question will close on the date considered to be \"first light\" (i.e. first scientific operations) for the Vera Rubin Observatory in Chile. This first light date will be determined as announced by the Rubin Observatory on their [website](https://www.lsst.org/). Resolution will be 2 years and 3 months after first light, to allow 3 months to classify any ambiguous observations.\n\nIn the case that Vera Rubin Observatory does not make begin first light or make observations before 2030-01-01, this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\nAs of November 17, 2021, the Vera Rubin Observatory is [expected](https://www.lsst.org/about/project-status) to see its first light in January 2023 and scientific operations are set to begin in late 2023.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "1.21", "median": "2.73", "upper_75": "5.58", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 12.9% of US adults will have Diabetes (type 1 and 2) in 2032?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimates that [13%](https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pdfs/data/statistics/national-diabetes-statistics-report.pdf) of US adults had diabetes in 2015-2016 (all types). [Rates of diabetes have been increasing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epidemiology_of_diabetes#United_States), correlating with similar increasing rates of obesity and overweight.\n\nExcess body fat is a key cause of type 2 diabetes, the most prevalent type of diabetes. Weight loss has been shown to both [prevent the development](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa012512) of type 2 diabetes, and put existing type 2 diabetes [into remission](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)33102-1). The FDA recently approved Wegovy for the treatment of obesity, which causes [15](http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa2032183)-[18](https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2021.3224)% loss of body weight in randomized trials, with relatively minor side effects. Other related weight loss drugs may soon be approved. Demand for these drugs is expected to be high, although they are costly in the US.\n\nIt is possible that these new weight loss drugs may halt or reverse trends in diabetes rates.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the estimated percentage of US adults with diabetes (all types) in the year 2032, according to the US CDC. CDC estimates of diabetes prevalence are typically delayed by several years, so the estimate for 2032 may not be published until 2033-2037. The [CDC estimate](https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pdfs/data/statistics/national-diabetes-statistics-report.pdf) for 2015-2016 is 13.0%. This figure will account for the total rate of both diagnosed and undiagnosed cases, including all types of diabetes, for US adults age 18 and over for all genders and races. If the CDC does not have this data available, Metaculus Admins may use estimates from other researchers or government agencies, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion", "lower_25": "9.95", "median": "12.9", "upper_75": "16.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Vera Rubin Observatory will identify 2.73 interstellar objects in its first two years of observations?", "desc": "", "resc": "As of November 2021, two [interstellar objects](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interstellar_object) (1I/\\`Oumuamua and 2I/Borisov) have been discovered while traversing the Solar System. While the galactic population of such objects is relatively unconstrained, the forthcoming [Vera Rubin Observatory](https://www.lsst.org/) will have a larger field-of-view in which to identify interstellar objects. This question is part of a fortified essay on the origin and composition of interstellar objects like `Oumuamua.\n\n***How many interstellar objects will be identified by the Vera Rubin Observatory in its first two years of observations?***\n\nThis question will resolve to the whole number value of interstellar objects that were first identified by the Vera Rubin Observatory within two years of its [first light](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_light_(astronomy)) image. The number of objects discovered by this observatory will be determined by the number of objects with the \"I\" [designation](https://minorplanetcenter.net//mpec/K17/K17V17.html) as interstellar with a discovery asterisk corresponding to the Vera Rubin Observatory, as recorded by the [Minor Planet Center](https://minorplanetcenter.net/).\n\n[fine-print]\nThis question will close on the date considered to be \"first light\" (i.e. first scientific operations) for the Vera Rubin Observatory in Chile. This first light date will be determined as announced by the Rubin Observatory on their [website](https://www.lsst.org/). Resolution will be 2 years and 3 months after first light, to allow 3 months to classify any ambiguous observations.\n\nIn the case that Vera Rubin Observatory does not make begin first light or make observations before 2030-01-01, this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\nAs of November 17, 2021, the Vera Rubin Observatory is [expected](https://www.lsst.org/about/project-status) to see its first light in January 2023 and scientific operations are set to begin in late 2023.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "1.21", "median": "2.73", "upper_75": "5.58", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 75% of offensive nuclear detonations by 2030 will be of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, if there's at least one offensive detonation by then?", "desc": "What types of offensive nuclear detonation would occur given nuclear conflict is relevant both for understanding the total risk posed by nuclear weapons and for understanding how best to reduce that risk. \n\n\n[Non-strategic nuclear weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tactical_nuclear_weapon) (also known as tactical nuclear weapons) are typically lower yield, shorter-range, and intended for detonating closer to friendly forces or friendly territory than strategic nuclear weapons. (Though definitions vary, and what a weapon is designed for could differ from what it's used for.)", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of offensive detonations of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the period between the opening of this question and December 31, 2029, divided by the number of all offensive nuclear detonations in the same period. This question resolves as \"0\" if there is no nuclear detonation of nonstrategic weapons, but at least one offensive nuclear detonation occurs in this period. This question resolves ambiguously if no offensive nuclear detonation occurs at all in this period.\n\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a non-strategic nuclear is a nuclear weapon designed mostly to be used on a battlefield, near friendly forces, or on or near friendly territory, while a strategic nuclear weapon is a weapon designed mostly to be targeted at the enemy interior (away from the war front) against military bases, cities, towns, arms industries, and other hardened or larger-area targets. But note that this question is about the type of weapon, not the type of target; it's conceivable that a non-strategic weapon could be used against the sort of target strategic weapons are designed for or vice versa.\n\n\nThe military significance or stated purpose of the strike is not taken into consideration for this question (except that [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) and [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) are not counted towards positive resolution).\n\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations (see the fine print for definitions) of state or nonstate nuclear weapons.\n\n\nResolution will be based on reputable reports -- preferably published by international organizations, NGOs focused on nuclear risk, scientific organizations or government agencies of countries that are not part to the conflict (or even countries participating in the conflict, if their reports agree on the facts). If such reports are not available, data will be compiled from credible media reports.\n\n\n**See also:**\n\n* [Will the first offensive nuclear detonation by 2024 be of a nonstrategic nuclear weapon, if there's an offensive detonation anywhere by then?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8584/nsnw-as-the-first-nuclear-detonation-by-2024/)\n\n* [Will the first offensive nuclear detonation by 2024 be against a battlefield target, if there's an offensive detonation anywhere by then?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8585/bt-as-the-first-nuclear-detonation-by-2024/)\n\n* [Collection of questions on nuclear targeting](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8604/collection-of-questions-on-nuclear-targeting/)\n\n* [Will there be >3000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons at the end of 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8150/3000-nonstrategic-weapons-at-end-of-2023/)\n\n* [How many nonstrategic nuclear weapons will be deployed at the end of 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8175/non-strategic-weapons-deployed-at-end-of-2023/)", "lower_25": "0.067", "median": "0.839", "upper_75": "0.981", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.092 fraction of offensive nuclear detonations will be in the Southern Hemisphere, if more than 50 detonations happen globally by 2050?", "desc": "The extent of the harms from nuclear conflict, and especially the likelihood of a negative [trajectory change](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/tag/trajectory-change) that stretches into the long-term future, probably depend mostly on the possible [nuclear winter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_winter) effects and societal disruption effects. Those effects may be weaker if the vast majority of nuclear detonations occur in just the Northern Hemisphere (rather than there also being many in the Southern Hemisphere), because:\n\n\n* That might reduce the size of nuclear winter effects in Southern Hemisphere, perhaps allowing Southern Hemisphere countries to feed themselves and even produce surpluses that can feed people elsewhere.\n\n\n* If capitals or other cities in the Southern Hemisphere aren't hit, that might substantially reduce the societal and political disruption Southern Hemisphere countries face, perhaps preventing those countries from collapsing or helping them recover more quickly.", "resc": "This question resolves as the proportion of offensive state nuclear detonations that occur between this question opening and 2050-01-01 that are on or over a point in the Southern Hemisphere. The question resolves ambiguously if it is not the case that >50 offensive state nuclear detonations between the question opening and 2050.\n\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive state nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental detonations of weapons that were owned by a state at the time of detonation (see the fine print for definitions). This excludes detonations of weapons that were created by non-state actors or were sold to non-state actors by the state that had owned the weapon.\n\n\nBy the Southern Hemisphere, we mean the half of Earth that is south of the Equator. A list of countries which lie in the Southern Hemisphere can be found in the [World Population Review](https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/southern-hemisphere-countries).\n\n\nResolution will be based on reputable reports – preferably published by international organizations, NGOs focused on nuclear risk, scientific organizations or government agencies of countries that are not part to the conflict (or even countries participating in the conflict, if their reports agree on the facts). If such reports are not available, data will be compiled from credible media reports.", "lower_25": "0.009", "median": "0.028", "upper_75": "0.092", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the levelised cost of PV solar energy in 2030 will be 0.0201 USD per kWh?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n[What will the global weighted-average levelized cost of energy of utility-scale solar PV be in 2022, in 2018 USD per kWh?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3521/what-will-the-cost-of-energy-of-utility-scale-solar-photovoltaics-be-in-2022-in-2018-usd-per-kwh/)\n\n----\n\nEnergy is captured from the sun largely in 3 ways: [photovoltaic power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Photovoltaic_system) (PV), which captures solar energy directly through the [photovoltaic effect](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Photovoltaic_effect), [concentrated solar power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concentrated_solar_power), which focuses sunlight on a water source to generate steam, and [solar thermal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_thermal_energy), which captures solar energy directly as a heat source. The [Levelised Cost of Energy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levelized_cost_of_energy) (LCoE) is an estimate of the full cost of building and operating an energy generating plant, relative to the expected amount of energy generated in its lifetime. [Utility-scale solar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utility-scale_solar) refers to large PV installations which supply an electrical grid, compared to [rooftop solar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooftop_photovoltaic_power_station), which is generally more expensive per unit of energy produced.\n\nThe cost of new solar energy has fallen significantly in the last decade, from 0.381 USD/kWh in 2010 to 0.057 in 2020 ([IRENA](https://www.irena.org/publications/2021/Jun/Renewable-Power-Costs-in-2020)). Over the same period, solar has grown from 0.15% of global electricity production to 3.27% ([Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Solar&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Share+of+total)).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global weighted-average Levelised Cost of Energy for utility-scale photovoltaic power in 2030, according to [IRENA's annual estimates](https://www.irena.org/publications/2021/Jun/Renewable-Power-Costs-in-2020). This cost will be indexed to 2021 USD using the [CPI for all urban consumers for all items](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL). If IRENA no longer publishes this figure or significantly changes their methodology, Metaculus Admins may select a similar replacement, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion", "lower_25": "0.0126", "median": "0.0201", "upper_75": "0.0358", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that fossil fuels will make up less than 50% of global primary energy consumption by 2065?", "desc": "In 2019, fossil fuels made [84%](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total) of global primary energy consumption. Primary energy refers not just to electricity, but also energy used in transport, industry, and in buildings (such as heating, appliances, and water heating). That 84% share is a reduction from 91% in 1979, despite a population growth of 76% and a 17.8% per-capita increase in energy consumption.\n\n\n\n[Welsby et. al. 2021](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03821-8) projected that in order to have a 50% chance of [limiting warming to 1.5C by 2100](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_United_Nations_Climate_Change_Conference), the world must reduce oil and gas consumption by 3% each year until 2050. The US Department of Energy [published a study](https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-releases-solar-futures-study-providing-blueprint-zero-carbon-grid) which showed that the US could achieve a carbon-free electrical grid by 2050 by massively investing in solar and wind power.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the estimated date when energy from fossil fuels makes up less than 50% of global primary energy consumption, according to the [BP statistical review of energy](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). If BP no longer publishes this data or significantly changes their methodology, Metaculus Admins may use a similar source for resolution, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion.", "lower_25": "2042", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2065", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that fossil fuels will make up less than 50% of global primary energy consumption by 2065?", "desc": "In 2019, fossil fuels made [84%](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total) of global primary energy consumption. Primary energy refers not just to electricity, but also energy used in transport, industry, and in buildings (such as heating, appliances, and water heating). That 84% share is a reduction from 91% in 1979, despite a population growth of 76% and a 17.8% per-capita increase in energy consumption.\n\n\n\n[Welsby et. al. 2021](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03821-8) projected that in order to have a 50% chance of [limiting warming to 1.5C by 2100](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_United_Nations_Climate_Change_Conference), the world must reduce oil and gas consumption by 3% each year until 2050. The US Department of Energy [published a study](https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-releases-solar-futures-study-providing-blueprint-zero-carbon-grid) which showed that the US could achieve a carbon-free electrical grid by 2050 by massively investing in solar and wind power.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the estimated date when energy from fossil fuels makes up less than 50% of global primary energy consumption, according to the [BP statistical review of energy](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). If BP no longer publishes this data or significantly changes their methodology, Metaculus Admins may use a similar source for resolution, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion.", "lower_25": "2042", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2065", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How close to Earth will the next 10 Interstellar Objects pass, with a 75% chance of passing within 0.770 units?", "desc": "As of November 2021, two [interstellar objects](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interstellar_object) have been identified. With more powerful all-sky telescopes such as the Vera Rubin Observatory set to commence operations within a few years, the prospects for detecting interstellar objects will only increase. The anomalous [\\`Oumuamua](https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/asteroids-comets-and-meteors/comets/oumuamua/in-depth/) was intrinsically dim and would not have been detected had its closest approach been much farther than its value of 0.16[au](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astronomical_unit). [Borisov](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2I/Borisov), however, had a brightness-boosting \"coma\" (i.e. [tail](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2I/Borisov#/media/File:Comet-2IBorisov-HubbleST-20191016_(cropped).png)) that allowed for it to be easily identified despite only approaching 1.9au from Earth. \\`Oumuamua's close approach suggests that the population of small objects such as \\`Oumuamua may be far larger than the population of larger Borisov-like objects. The closest approach distance of the next identified interstellar object can be used as an inverse proxy for the typical intrinsic brightness of these objects, and also for the number of these objects that exist in the galaxy.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the median of the closest approach distances (in [astronomical units](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astronomical_unit)) to the Earth of the next 10 Interstellar objects, as determined by the orbital solution published by the [Minor Planet Center](https://www.minorplanetcenter.net/). An object will be considered \"interstellar\" when it is given the \"I\" [label](https://minorplanetcenter.net//mpec/K17/K17V17.html) by the [Minor Planet Center](https://www.minorplanetcenter.net/).\n\nBy \"next 10 Interstellar Objects\", we mean the 10 objects labeled \"[Interstellar](https://minorplanetcenter.net//mpec/K17/K17V17.html)\" by the Minor Planet Center, in the order they were classified, following 'Oumuamua and 2I/Borisov. If 10 new ISOs are not discovered by 2032-01-01, this question will resolve as the median of all new ISOs discovered up until then.\n\nThis question will close retroatively 24 hours before the classification of the first new ISO. If no interstellar objects are discovered by 2032-01-01, then this question will resolve ambiguously. Resolution may be delayed by a month or more to confirm the classification of any ambiguous objects", "lower_25": "0.291", "median": "0.519", "upper_75": "0.770", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that fossil fuels will make up less than 50% of global primary energy consumption by 2065?", "desc": "In 2019, fossil fuels made [84%](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total) of global primary energy consumption. Primary energy refers not just to electricity, but also energy used in transport, industry, and in buildings (such as heating, appliances, and water heating). That 84% share is a reduction from 91% in 1979, despite a population growth of 76% and a 17.8% per-capita increase in energy consumption.\n\n\n\n[Welsby et. al. 2021](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03821-8) projected that in order to have a 50% chance of [limiting warming to 1.5C by 2100](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_United_Nations_Climate_Change_Conference), the world must reduce oil and gas consumption by 3% each year until 2050. The US Department of Energy [published a study](https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-releases-solar-futures-study-providing-blueprint-zero-carbon-grid) which showed that the US could achieve a carbon-free electrical grid by 2050 by massively investing in solar and wind power.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the estimated date when energy from fossil fuels makes up less than 50% of global primary energy consumption, according to the [BP statistical review of energy](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). If BP no longer publishes this data or significantly changes their methodology, Metaculus Admins may use a similar source for resolution, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion.", "lower_25": "2042", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2065", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How close to Earth will the next 10 Interstellar Objects pass, with a 75% chance of passing within 0.770 units?", "desc": "As of November 2021, two [interstellar objects](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interstellar_object) have been identified. With more powerful all-sky telescopes such as the Vera Rubin Observatory set to commence operations within a few years, the prospects for detecting interstellar objects will only increase. The anomalous [\\`Oumuamua](https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/asteroids-comets-and-meteors/comets/oumuamua/in-depth/) was intrinsically dim and would not have been detected had its closest approach been much farther than its value of 0.16[au](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astronomical_unit). [Borisov](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2I/Borisov), however, had a brightness-boosting \"coma\" (i.e. [tail](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2I/Borisov#/media/File:Comet-2IBorisov-HubbleST-20191016_(cropped).png)) that allowed for it to be easily identified despite only approaching 1.9au from Earth. \\`Oumuamua's close approach suggests that the population of small objects such as \\`Oumuamua may be far larger than the population of larger Borisov-like objects. The closest approach distance of the next identified interstellar object can be used as an inverse proxy for the typical intrinsic brightness of these objects, and also for the number of these objects that exist in the galaxy.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the median of the closest approach distances (in [astronomical units](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astronomical_unit)) to the Earth of the next 10 Interstellar objects, as determined by the orbital solution published by the [Minor Planet Center](https://www.minorplanetcenter.net/). An object will be considered \"interstellar\" when it is given the \"I\" [label](https://minorplanetcenter.net//mpec/K17/K17V17.html) by the [Minor Planet Center](https://www.minorplanetcenter.net/).\n\nBy \"next 10 Interstellar Objects\", we mean the 10 objects labeled \"[Interstellar](https://minorplanetcenter.net//mpec/K17/K17V17.html)\" by the Minor Planet Center, in the order they were classified, following 'Oumuamua and 2I/Borisov. If 10 new ISOs are not discovered by 2032-01-01, this question will resolve as the median of all new ISOs discovered up until then.\n\nThis question will close retroatively 24 hours before the classification of the first new ISO. If no interstellar objects are discovered by 2032-01-01, then this question will resolve ambiguously. Resolution may be delayed by a month or more to confirm the classification of any ambiguous objects", "lower_25": "0.291", "median": "0.519", "upper_75": "0.770", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the levelised cost of PV solar energy in 2030 will be 0.0201 USD per kWh?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n[What will the global weighted-average levelized cost of energy of utility-scale solar PV be in 2022, in 2018 USD per kWh?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3521/what-will-the-cost-of-energy-of-utility-scale-solar-photovoltaics-be-in-2022-in-2018-usd-per-kwh/)\n\n----\n\nEnergy is captured from the sun largely in 3 ways: [photovoltaic power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Photovoltaic_system) (PV), which captures solar energy directly through the [photovoltaic effect](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Photovoltaic_effect), [concentrated solar power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concentrated_solar_power), which focuses sunlight on a water source to generate steam, and [solar thermal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_thermal_energy), which captures solar energy directly as a heat source. The [Levelised Cost of Energy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levelized_cost_of_energy) (LCoE) is an estimate of the full cost of building and operating an energy generating plant, relative to the expected amount of energy generated in its lifetime. [Utility-scale solar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utility-scale_solar) refers to large PV installations which supply an electrical grid, compared to [rooftop solar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooftop_photovoltaic_power_station), which is generally more expensive per unit of energy produced.\n\nThe cost of new solar energy has fallen significantly in the last decade, from 0.381 USD/kWh in 2010 to 0.057 in 2020 ([IRENA](https://www.irena.org/publications/2021/Jun/Renewable-Power-Costs-in-2020)). Over the same period, solar has grown from 0.15% of global electricity production to 3.27% ([Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Solar&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Share+of+total)).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global weighted-average Levelised Cost of Energy for utility-scale photovoltaic power in 2030, according to [IRENA's annual estimates](https://www.irena.org/publications/2021/Jun/Renewable-Power-Costs-in-2020). This cost will be indexed to 2021 USD using the [CPI for all urban consumers for all items](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL). If IRENA no longer publishes this figure or significantly changes their methodology, Metaculus Admins may select a similar replacement, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion", "lower_25": "0.0126", "median": "0.0201", "upper_75": "0.0358", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Reserve Bank's cash rate target will be 3.54% in June 2025 if Labor wins the next Australian election?", "desc": "Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison pointed to rising inflation in the United States as evidence that economic recovery needs to be well-managed, implying that [interest rates would go up under the Labor Opposition but not under his government](https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/scott-morrison-claims-inflation-and-petrol-prices-will-go-up-under-labor-in-election-fear-pitch/news-story/7174a6689c96463deed9935a080d5a31). \n\nA similar claim by then Prime Minister John Howard in 2004 backfired [when interest rates rose in 2007](https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/scott-morrison-channels-john-howard-on-interest-rates-20211115-p598wz). \n\nAustralia's current interest rate is 0.1%. [The Reserve Bank previously said it was targeting for it to remain at that level through to 2024, although it recently relaxed its wording](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-02/reserve-bank-rba-interest-rates-november-2021/100588242). \n\nInterest rate decisions are published [on the Reserve Bank's website](https://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/int-rate-decisions/2021/); data on the cash rate target since 1990 is [also available](https://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/cash-rate/) from the RBA.\n\nSee also the [matching question, conditional on the coalition winning the next election](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8672/aussie-interest-rates-higher-under-coalition/).", "resc": "This question will resolve according to the published cash rate target according to the [Reserve Bank of Australia](https://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/cash-rate/), as of June 1 2025.\n\nIf the Prime Minister following the next federal election is not a member of the Labor Party or the Labor Caucus, this question will resolve as ambiguous.", "lower_25": "1.36", "median": "2.32", "upper_75": "3.54", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Reserve Bank's cash rate target will be 3.54% in June 2025 if Labor wins the next Australian election?", "desc": "Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison pointed to rising inflation in the United States as evidence that economic recovery needs to be well-managed, implying that [interest rates would go up under the Labor Opposition but not under his government](https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/scott-morrison-claims-inflation-and-petrol-prices-will-go-up-under-labor-in-election-fear-pitch/news-story/7174a6689c96463deed9935a080d5a31). \n\nA similar claim by then Prime Minister John Howard in 2004 backfired [when interest rates rose in 2007](https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/scott-morrison-channels-john-howard-on-interest-rates-20211115-p598wz). \n\nAustralia's current interest rate is 0.1%. [The Reserve Bank previously said it was targeting for it to remain at that level through to 2024, although it recently relaxed its wording](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-02/reserve-bank-rba-interest-rates-november-2021/100588242). \n\nInterest rate decisions are published [on the Reserve Bank's website](https://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/int-rate-decisions/2021/); data on the cash rate target since 1990 is [also available](https://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/cash-rate/) from the RBA.\n\nSee also the [matching question, conditional on the coalition winning the next election](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8672/aussie-interest-rates-higher-under-coalition/).", "resc": "This question will resolve according to the published cash rate target according to the [Reserve Bank of Australia](https://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/cash-rate/), as of June 1 2025.\n\nIf the Prime Minister following the next federal election is not a member of the Labor Party or the Labor Caucus, this question will resolve as ambiguous.", "lower_25": "1.36", "median": "2.32", "upper_75": "3.54", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that peak space debris will be reached by 2044 if Kessler syndrome is not triggered?", "desc": "[Space debris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris) pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and travelling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. The number of debris keeps growing as space gets more crowded and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use. \n\nTo avoid this outcome [mitigation measures](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Mitigating_space_debris_generation) are being put in place, including guidelines for operators to remove their spacecraft after the end of their operational lives and actively removing debris by capturing them with dedicated spacecraft, or by Earth-based methods such as using laser beams to slowly push them out of orbit.\n\nIt can be imagined then that if these efforts are successful, a balance point will be reached sometime in the future, where enough spacecraft are removed from orbit after end-of-mission and enough pieces of existing debris are actively removed so that a Kessler syndrome is avoided.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date at which the maximum number of space debris pieces larger than 10cm is reached between January 1, 2022 and January 1, 2050, according to the [ESA's Space Debris Office](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers). If the ESA no longer reports this data, a similar authority for monitoring orbital space debris will be used, or the question may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a Kessler syndrome is assumed to have been triggered if it is so declared by a credible source such as the ESA Space Debris Office or NASA", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2041", "upper_75": "2044", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first space mission will remove more than one piece of space debris from orbit by 2032?", "desc": "[Space debris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris) pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and travelling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. The number of debris keeps growing as space gets more crowded and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use.\n\nTo avoid this outcome, mitigation measures are being put in place such as the active capture and removal or space debris. The [first such mission](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Clean_Space/ESA_commissions_world_s_first_space_debris_removal) is an ESA-private collaboration and is planned to be launched in 2025 and target a Vega launcher upper stage for removal. [More ambitious mission concepts](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271224478_Mission_Concept_for_Multi_Space_Debris_Removal) aim to remove multiple pieces of debris, by repeatedly capturing pieces of debris and removing them from orbit.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that a single mission has captured 2 pieces of space debris and placed them into a removal orbit. Any future activities of this mission are irrelevant for the resolution of this question.\n\nRemoval orbits can be any orbits according to space debris removal guidelines or regulations at the time of the mission, e.g. in an orbit that will cause re-entry within 25 years or on a designated graveyard orbit. \n\nThe mission can occur anywhere in Low-Earth Earth orbit, meaning within 2,000 km from earth's sea level.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the USA will stop printing paper $1 dollar bills by 2069?", "desc": "The USA has been printing 1 dollar bills [since 1862](https://www.moneyfactory.gov/uscurrency/1note.html). As of 2021, the bills are printed on paper made from [75% cotton and 25% linen](https://www.moneyfactory.gov/hmimpaperandink.html), but there have been proposals to change this practice. The USA could follow the example of countries such as the UK, Canada, and Australia and replace the dollar bill with dollar coins, or introduce [polymer banknotes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polymer_banknote).\n\nSome other possibilities for the end of the $1 bill include the USA suffering inflation to the extent that $1 notes become useless, the dollar being replaced by another currency, or the USA entirely ceasing the production of physical cash altogether.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when the US [Bureau of Engraving and Printing](https://www.bep.gov/currency/circulating-currency) and all parties which produce official US currency no longer produce paper $1 USD banknotes. This question will resolve on the date of an official announcement by US Congress or the Bureau of Engraving and Printing that they no longer intend to produce paper $1 dollars, so long as such a policy is held for at least 365 days.", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2051", "upper_75": "2069", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Reserve Bank's cash rate target will be 3.54% in June 2025 if Labor wins the next Australian election?", "desc": "Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison pointed to rising inflation in the United States as evidence that economic recovery needs to be well-managed, implying that [interest rates would go up under the Labor Opposition but not under his government](https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/scott-morrison-claims-inflation-and-petrol-prices-will-go-up-under-labor-in-election-fear-pitch/news-story/7174a6689c96463deed9935a080d5a31). \n\nA similar claim by then Prime Minister John Howard in 2004 backfired [when interest rates rose in 2007](https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/scott-morrison-channels-john-howard-on-interest-rates-20211115-p598wz). \n\nAustralia's current interest rate is 0.1%. [The Reserve Bank previously said it was targeting for it to remain at that level through to 2024, although it recently relaxed its wording](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-02/reserve-bank-rba-interest-rates-november-2021/100588242). \n\nInterest rate decisions are published [on the Reserve Bank's website](https://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/int-rate-decisions/2021/); data on the cash rate target since 1990 is [also available](https://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/cash-rate/) from the RBA.\n\nSee also the [matching question, conditional on the coalition winning the next election](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8672/aussie-interest-rates-higher-under-coalition/).", "resc": "This question will resolve according to the published cash rate target according to the [Reserve Bank of Australia](https://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/cash-rate/), as of June 1 2025.\n\nIf the Prime Minister following the next federal election is not a member of the Labor Party or the Labor Caucus, this question will resolve as ambiguous.", "lower_25": "1.36", "median": "2.32", "upper_75": "3.54", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the USA will stop printing paper $1 dollar bills by 2069?", "desc": "The USA has been printing 1 dollar bills [since 1862](https://www.moneyfactory.gov/uscurrency/1note.html). As of 2021, the bills are printed on paper made from [75% cotton and 25% linen](https://www.moneyfactory.gov/hmimpaperandink.html), but there have been proposals to change this practice. The USA could follow the example of countries such as the UK, Canada, and Australia and replace the dollar bill with dollar coins, or introduce [polymer banknotes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polymer_banknote).\n\nSome other possibilities for the end of the $1 bill include the USA suffering inflation to the extent that $1 notes become useless, the dollar being replaced by another currency, or the USA entirely ceasing the production of physical cash altogether.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when the US [Bureau of Engraving and Printing](https://www.bep.gov/currency/circulating-currency) and all parties which produce official US currency no longer produce paper $1 USD banknotes. This question will resolve on the date of an official announcement by US Congress or the Bureau of Engraving and Printing that they no longer intend to produce paper $1 dollars, so long as such a policy is held for at least 365 days.", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2051", "upper_75": "2069", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that peak space debris will be reached by 2044 if Kessler syndrome is not triggered?", "desc": "[Space debris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris) pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and travelling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. The number of debris keeps growing as space gets more crowded and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use. \n\nTo avoid this outcome [mitigation measures](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Mitigating_space_debris_generation) are being put in place, including guidelines for operators to remove their spacecraft after the end of their operational lives and actively removing debris by capturing them with dedicated spacecraft, or by Earth-based methods such as using laser beams to slowly push them out of orbit.\n\nIt can be imagined then that if these efforts are successful, a balance point will be reached sometime in the future, where enough spacecraft are removed from orbit after end-of-mission and enough pieces of existing debris are actively removed so that a Kessler syndrome is avoided.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date at which the maximum number of space debris pieces larger than 10cm is reached between January 1, 2022 and January 1, 2050, according to the [ESA's Space Debris Office](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers). If the ESA no longer reports this data, a similar authority for monitoring orbital space debris will be used, or the question may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a Kessler syndrome is assumed to have been triggered if it is so declared by a credible source such as the ESA Space Debris Office or NASA", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2041", "upper_75": "2044", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the USA will stop printing paper $1 dollar bills by 2069?", "desc": "The USA has been printing 1 dollar bills [since 1862](https://www.moneyfactory.gov/uscurrency/1note.html). As of 2021, the bills are printed on paper made from [75% cotton and 25% linen](https://www.moneyfactory.gov/hmimpaperandink.html), but there have been proposals to change this practice. The USA could follow the example of countries such as the UK, Canada, and Australia and replace the dollar bill with dollar coins, or introduce [polymer banknotes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polymer_banknote).\n\nSome other possibilities for the end of the $1 bill include the USA suffering inflation to the extent that $1 notes become useless, the dollar being replaced by another currency, or the USA entirely ceasing the production of physical cash altogether.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when the US [Bureau of Engraving and Printing](https://www.bep.gov/currency/circulating-currency) and all parties which produce official US currency no longer produce paper $1 USD banknotes. This question will resolve on the date of an official announcement by US Congress or the Bureau of Engraving and Printing that they no longer intend to produce paper $1 dollars, so long as such a policy is held for at least 365 days.", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2051", "upper_75": "2069", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that peak space debris will be reached by 2044 if Kessler syndrome is not triggered?", "desc": "[Space debris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris) pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and travelling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. The number of debris keeps growing as space gets more crowded and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use. \n\nTo avoid this outcome [mitigation measures](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Mitigating_space_debris_generation) are being put in place, including guidelines for operators to remove their spacecraft after the end of their operational lives and actively removing debris by capturing them with dedicated spacecraft, or by Earth-based methods such as using laser beams to slowly push them out of orbit.\n\nIt can be imagined then that if these efforts are successful, a balance point will be reached sometime in the future, where enough spacecraft are removed from orbit after end-of-mission and enough pieces of existing debris are actively removed so that a Kessler syndrome is avoided.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date at which the maximum number of space debris pieces larger than 10cm is reached between January 1, 2022 and January 1, 2050, according to the [ESA's Space Debris Office](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers). If the ESA no longer reports this data, a similar authority for monitoring orbital space debris will be used, or the question may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a Kessler syndrome is assumed to have been triggered if it is so declared by a credible source such as the ESA Space Debris Office or NASA", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2041", "upper_75": "2044", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first space mission will remove more than one piece of space debris from orbit by 2032?", "desc": "[Space debris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris) pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and travelling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. The number of debris keeps growing as space gets more crowded and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use.\n\nTo avoid this outcome, mitigation measures are being put in place such as the active capture and removal or space debris. The [first such mission](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Clean_Space/ESA_commissions_world_s_first_space_debris_removal) is an ESA-private collaboration and is planned to be launched in 2025 and target a Vega launcher upper stage for removal. [More ambitious mission concepts](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271224478_Mission_Concept_for_Multi_Space_Debris_Removal) aim to remove multiple pieces of debris, by repeatedly capturing pieces of debris and removing them from orbit.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that a single mission has captured 2 pieces of space debris and placed them into a removal orbit. Any future activities of this mission are irrelevant for the resolution of this question.\n\nRemoval orbits can be any orbits according to space debris removal guidelines or regulations at the time of the mission, e.g. in an orbit that will cause re-entry within 25 years or on a designated graveyard orbit. \n\nThe mission can occur anywhere in Low-Earth Earth orbit, meaning within 2,000 km from earth's sea level.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the levelised cost of PV solar energy in 2030 will be 0.0201 USD per kWh?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n[What will the global weighted-average levelized cost of energy of utility-scale solar PV be in 2022, in 2018 USD per kWh?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3521/what-will-the-cost-of-energy-of-utility-scale-solar-photovoltaics-be-in-2022-in-2018-usd-per-kwh/)\n\n----\n\nEnergy is captured from the sun largely in 3 ways: [photovoltaic power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Photovoltaic_system) (PV), which captures solar energy directly through the [photovoltaic effect](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Photovoltaic_effect), [concentrated solar power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concentrated_solar_power), which focuses sunlight on a water source to generate steam, and [solar thermal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_thermal_energy), which captures solar energy directly as a heat source. The [Levelised Cost of Energy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levelized_cost_of_energy) (LCoE) is an estimate of the full cost of building and operating an energy generating plant, relative to the expected amount of energy generated in its lifetime. [Utility-scale solar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utility-scale_solar) refers to large PV installations which supply an electrical grid, compared to [rooftop solar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooftop_photovoltaic_power_station), which is generally more expensive per unit of energy produced.\n\nThe cost of new solar energy has fallen significantly in the last decade, from 0.381 USD/kWh in 2010 to 0.057 in 2020 ([IRENA](https://www.irena.org/publications/2021/Jun/Renewable-Power-Costs-in-2020)). Over the same period, solar has grown from 0.15% of global electricity production to 3.27% ([Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Solar&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Share+of+total)).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global weighted-average Levelised Cost of Energy for utility-scale photovoltaic power in 2030, according to [IRENA's annual estimates](https://www.irena.org/publications/2021/Jun/Renewable-Power-Costs-in-2020). This cost will be indexed to 2021 USD using the [CPI for all urban consumers for all items](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL). If IRENA no longer publishes this figure or significantly changes their methodology, Metaculus Admins may select a similar replacement, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion", "lower_25": "0.0126", "median": "0.0201", "upper_75": "0.0358", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest single-year population decline between 2021 to 2120 will be 5.51?", "desc": "Historically, global population declines have been rare but not unprecedented. Some causes have been civil wars which overthrew ruling elites in densely populated regions (China in particular), pandemics which have had near-global reach (such as the Black Death) and wars of conquest which have spread across much of the world (such as the wars of Genghis Khan and his successors).\n\nIn our time, we might face the prospect of a mild global population decline due to falling birth rates, but this by itself would not produce a sharp decline in a single year. Any such decline would likely have to come from a catastrophic event similar to the ones listed above. With that in mind, we ask the following question:", "resc": "This question will resolve as the largest single-year percentage decline in world population as reported by [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL) between the years 2021 to 2120, inclusive. Specifically, if \\( P(t) \\) denotes the population for year \\( t \\) in the given chart, the resolution value will be\n\n\\[ \\max_{2021 \\leq t \\leq 2120} \\frac{100 (P(t) - P(t+1))}{P(t)} \\]\n\nIf the World Bank doesn't report all of the necessary population figures for this maximum to be computed, the question will resolve according to another credible source as determined by Metaculus administrators.\n\nIn the case that there is no population decline in any year (that is, population grows every year), this question will resolve as <0.", "lower_25": "0.448", "median": "2.44", "upper_75": "5.51", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first space mission will remove more than one piece of space debris from orbit by 2032?", "desc": "[Space debris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris) pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and travelling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. The number of debris keeps growing as space gets more crowded and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use.\n\nTo avoid this outcome, mitigation measures are being put in place such as the active capture and removal or space debris. The [first such mission](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Clean_Space/ESA_commissions_world_s_first_space_debris_removal) is an ESA-private collaboration and is planned to be launched in 2025 and target a Vega launcher upper stage for removal. [More ambitious mission concepts](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271224478_Mission_Concept_for_Multi_Space_Debris_Removal) aim to remove multiple pieces of debris, by repeatedly capturing pieces of debris and removing them from orbit.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that a single mission has captured 2 pieces of space debris and placed them into a removal orbit. Any future activities of this mission are irrelevant for the resolution of this question.\n\nRemoval orbits can be any orbits according to space debris removal guidelines or regulations at the time of the mission, e.g. in an orbit that will cause re-entry within 25 years or on a designated graveyard orbit. \n\nThe mission can occur anywhere in Low-Earth Earth orbit, meaning within 2,000 km from earth's sea level.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "In 2030, what is the chance that 0.692 proportion of UK's energy consumption will come from overseas electrical connectors versus battery storage?", "desc": "UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson aims to reduce the UK's [greenhouse gas emissions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenhouse_gas_emissions) to [zero by 2050](https://www.carbonbrief.org/daily-brief/all-britains-electricity-to-be-green-by-2035). In 2021, [he pledged](https://www.carbonbrief.org/daily-brief/all-britains-electricity-to-be-green-by-2035) that all of the UK's electricity will be from renewable or nuclear sources by 2035.\n\nOne of the major hurdles to implementing 100% renewable electric grids is inconsistency: solar and wind generators have variable output depending on the weather, and consumers have fluctuating electricity demands over the course of the day. This could be addressed with battery storage: prices for lithium-ion batteries have [fallen by 97% from 1991 to 2021](https://news.mit.edu/2021/lithium-ion-battery-costs-0323), and hydrogen storage could be a [cost effective solution](https://news.mit.edu/2021/making-case-hydrogen-zero-carbon-economy-0831) for storage on a several-month timescale. Intermittent demand and supply can also be addressed by expanding the total size of the electric grid. The UK has [five direct electrical connections](https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-hampshire-55750411) with other nations and is planning on building 10 more by 2023.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the proportion of electricity demand on the island of Great Britain supplied by overseas interconnectors, compared to that supplied by battery storage, for the calendar year 2030. For example, if 500 TWh of demand were supplied by interconnectors and 250 TWh by batteries, this question would resolve as 0.66. Energy imported by interconnectors will be the total amount imported, not net imports (imports minus exports). Resolution may come from official government sources such as [DUKES](https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/digest-of-uk-energy-statistics-dukes) or from independent energy researchers such as the [IEA](https://www.iea.org/)", "lower_25": "0.566", "median": "0.692", "upper_75": "0.800", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest single-year population decline between 2021 to 2120 will be 5.51?", "desc": "Historically, global population declines have been rare but not unprecedented. Some causes have been civil wars which overthrew ruling elites in densely populated regions (China in particular), pandemics which have had near-global reach (such as the Black Death) and wars of conquest which have spread across much of the world (such as the wars of Genghis Khan and his successors).\n\nIn our time, we might face the prospect of a mild global population decline due to falling birth rates, but this by itself would not produce a sharp decline in a single year. Any such decline would likely have to come from a catastrophic event similar to the ones listed above. With that in mind, we ask the following question:", "resc": "This question will resolve as the largest single-year percentage decline in world population as reported by [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL) between the years 2021 to 2120, inclusive. Specifically, if \\( P(t) \\) denotes the population for year \\( t \\) in the given chart, the resolution value will be\n\n\\[ \\max_{2021 \\leq t \\leq 2120} \\frac{100 (P(t) - P(t+1))}{P(t)} \\]\n\nIf the World Bank doesn't report all of the necessary population figures for this maximum to be computed, the question will resolve according to another credible source as determined by Metaculus administrators.\n\nIn the case that there is no population decline in any year (that is, population grows every year), this question will resolve as <0.", "lower_25": "0.448", "median": "2.44", "upper_75": "5.51", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will decline by 18.80% after World War 3, if such a war happens by 2050?", "desc": "Historically, global population declines have been rare but not unprecedented. Some causes have been civil wars which overthrew ruling elites in densely populated regions (China in particular), pandemics which have had near-global reach (such as the Black Death) and wars of conquest which have spread across much of the world (such as the wars of Genghis Khan and his successors).\n\nOne of the plausible ways in which a sharp decline in world population might occur is as a consequence of a world war. With this in mind, we ask the following question:", "resc": "\"World War 3\" will be defined based on [this Metaculus Question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2534/will-there-be-a-world-war-three-before-2050/):\n\n>1. A military conflict begins involving countries representing in totality at least 30% of world GDP or 50% of world population in any year in which the conflict is ongoing.\n\n >2. At least 10 million people (military personel or civillians) are killed in the conflict.\n\nIf such a war occurs before 2050, then in the year it begins, \\( t_r \\), this question will resolve as\n\n\\[ \\max_{t_r - 1 \\leq t \\leq 2060} \\frac{100 (P(t_r - 1) - P(t))}{P(t_r - 1)} \\]\n\nwhere \\( P(t) \\) denotes the population for year \\( t \\) obtained from [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL). In other words, the question will resolve as the percentage decline of global population from the year before the outbreak of WW3 to either the year 2060 or the year in which the decline bottoms out, whichever comes first. If there is no decline at all, the expression above would be equal to zero, so in this case the question would resolve as 0.\n\nIf World War 3 (as defined above) does not occur by 2050-01-01, then this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\nIf the World Bank doesn't report all of the necessary population figures for this maximum to be computed, the question will resolve according to another credible source as determined by Metaculus administrators.", "lower_25": "1.12", "median": "4.06", "upper_75": "18.80", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will decline by 18.80% after World War 3, if such a war happens by 2050?", "desc": "Historically, global population declines have been rare but not unprecedented. Some causes have been civil wars which overthrew ruling elites in densely populated regions (China in particular), pandemics which have had near-global reach (such as the Black Death) and wars of conquest which have spread across much of the world (such as the wars of Genghis Khan and his successors).\n\nOne of the plausible ways in which a sharp decline in world population might occur is as a consequence of a world war. With this in mind, we ask the following question:", "resc": "\"World War 3\" will be defined based on [this Metaculus Question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2534/will-there-be-a-world-war-three-before-2050/):\n\n>1. A military conflict begins involving countries representing in totality at least 30% of world GDP or 50% of world population in any year in which the conflict is ongoing.\n\n >2. At least 10 million people (military personel or civillians) are killed in the conflict.\n\nIf such a war occurs before 2050, then in the year it begins, \\( t_r \\), this question will resolve as\n\n\\[ \\max_{t_r - 1 \\leq t \\leq 2060} \\frac{100 (P(t_r - 1) - P(t))}{P(t_r - 1)} \\]\n\nwhere \\( P(t) \\) denotes the population for year \\( t \\) obtained from [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL). In other words, the question will resolve as the percentage decline of global population from the year before the outbreak of WW3 to either the year 2060 or the year in which the decline bottoms out, whichever comes first. If there is no decline at all, the expression above would be equal to zero, so in this case the question would resolve as 0.\n\nIf World War 3 (as defined above) does not occur by 2050-01-01, then this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\nIf the World Bank doesn't report all of the necessary population figures for this maximum to be computed, the question will resolve according to another credible source as determined by Metaculus administrators.", "lower_25": "1.12", "median": "4.06", "upper_75": "18.80", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "In 2030, what is the chance that 0.692 proportion of UK's energy consumption will come from overseas electrical connectors versus battery storage?", "desc": "UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson aims to reduce the UK's [greenhouse gas emissions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenhouse_gas_emissions) to [zero by 2050](https://www.carbonbrief.org/daily-brief/all-britains-electricity-to-be-green-by-2035). In 2021, [he pledged](https://www.carbonbrief.org/daily-brief/all-britains-electricity-to-be-green-by-2035) that all of the UK's electricity will be from renewable or nuclear sources by 2035.\n\nOne of the major hurdles to implementing 100% renewable electric grids is inconsistency: solar and wind generators have variable output depending on the weather, and consumers have fluctuating electricity demands over the course of the day. This could be addressed with battery storage: prices for lithium-ion batteries have [fallen by 97% from 1991 to 2021](https://news.mit.edu/2021/lithium-ion-battery-costs-0323), and hydrogen storage could be a [cost effective solution](https://news.mit.edu/2021/making-case-hydrogen-zero-carbon-economy-0831) for storage on a several-month timescale. Intermittent demand and supply can also be addressed by expanding the total size of the electric grid. The UK has [five direct electrical connections](https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-hampshire-55750411) with other nations and is planning on building 10 more by 2023.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the proportion of electricity demand on the island of Great Britain supplied by overseas interconnectors, compared to that supplied by battery storage, for the calendar year 2030. For example, if 500 TWh of demand were supplied by interconnectors and 250 TWh by batteries, this question would resolve as 0.66. Energy imported by interconnectors will be the total amount imported, not net imports (imports minus exports). Resolution may come from official government sources such as [DUKES](https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/digest-of-uk-energy-statistics-dukes) or from independent energy researchers such as the [IEA](https://www.iea.org/)", "lower_25": "0.566", "median": "0.692", "upper_75": "0.800", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 49.9 charter cities by 2026?", "desc": "A [charter city](https://www.chartercitiesinstitute.org/category/reference-guides) is a new city with new rules. More specifically, the Charter Cities Institute defines a charter city as a new city developed on a greenfield site with significantly devolved administrative and regulatory authority. Charter cities are intended to help countries in the Global South overcome the political and technical obstacles to improving governance, fostering growth, and policy experimentation. Historical examples of “proto-charter cities” often discussed include Shenzhen, Dubai, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Honduras adopted charter cities legislation ([Zones for Employment and Economic Development](http://ojs.instituteforcompgov.org/index.php/jsj/issue/view/4), or ZEDEs) in 2012 and three such developments currently exist (Próspera, Ciudad Morazán, and ZEDE Orquídea). Other new cities throughout Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia meet all or some of the criteria to be considered charter cities. \n\nIn October 2021, the Adrianople Group, a special economic zone consultancy, launched the [Open Zone Map](https://www.openzonemap.com/map). This project attempts to map every charter city, special economic zone, free trade zone, or other type of special zone in the world. Although definitions of charter cities vary (for instance, see the [Charter Cities Institute](https://www.chartercitiesinstitute.org/faq) vs. [Pronomos Capital](https://www.pronomos.vc/post/what-is-a-charter-city)), the Open Zone Map defines a charter city as “A large zone with deep incentives, both a commercial and residential district, and its own school.” As of October 2021, there are 29 charter cities listed on the Open Zone Map.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the number of charter cities identified on the [Open Zone Map](https://www.openzonemap.com/map) on January 1, 2026. If the Open Zone Map is no longer available, or is no longer actively updated as determined by Metaculus moderators, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "30.1", "median": "37.2", "upper_75": "49.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum global single-year death toll attributable to a single pandemic between 2022 to 2121 will be 119M?", "desc": "Historically, global population declines have been rare but not unprecedented. Some causes have been civil wars which overthrew ruling elites in densely populated regions (China in particular), pandemics which have had near-global reach (such as the Black Death) and wars of conquest which have spread across much of the world (such as the wars of Genghis Khan and his successors).\n\nIn our time, we might face the prospect of a mild global population decline due to falling birth rates, but this by itself would not produce a sharp decline in a single year. Any such decline would likely have to come from a catastrophic event similar to the ones listed above. With that in mind, we ask the following question:", "resc": "This question will resolve as\n\n\\[ \\max_{\\textrm{pandemic}, \\, 2022 \\leq \\textrm{year} \\leq 2121} (\\textrm{total global deaths attributable to pandemic in the given year}) \\]\n\nwhere the maximum is taken over all pandemics and all years from 2022 to 2121, inclusive. In other words, the resolution value will be equal to the highest number of annual deaths attributable to a *given pandemic*. If there are two pandemics ongoing in a particular year, only the one with the highest estimated death toll for that given year will be taken into consideration. This question will measure deaths in a calendar year (January 1 to December 31), not maximum deaths in any 365-day period.\n\nResolution will be based on credible sources such as the WHO, the CDC, *et cetera*. If these agencies give a range for possible number of deaths from the pandemic instead of a point estimate, for the purposes of this question the death toll attributable to that pandemic will be taken to be the *minimum* of their range. As an example, for COVID-19 this minimum would be the total number of deaths reported by governments, around 3.3 million as of November 2021.\n\nThis question will resolve according to the number of deaths where the infectious disease is the primary cause of death, not secondary factors such as famines, wars, infrastructure failures, et cetera", "lower_25": "9.18M", "median": "33.9M", "upper_75": "119M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum global single-year death toll attributable to a single pandemic between 2022 to 2121 will be 119M?", "desc": "Historically, global population declines have been rare but not unprecedented. Some causes have been civil wars which overthrew ruling elites in densely populated regions (China in particular), pandemics which have had near-global reach (such as the Black Death) and wars of conquest which have spread across much of the world (such as the wars of Genghis Khan and his successors).\n\nIn our time, we might face the prospect of a mild global population decline due to falling birth rates, but this by itself would not produce a sharp decline in a single year. Any such decline would likely have to come from a catastrophic event similar to the ones listed above. With that in mind, we ask the following question:", "resc": "This question will resolve as\n\n\\[ \\max_{\\textrm{pandemic}, \\, 2022 \\leq \\textrm{year} \\leq 2121} (\\textrm{total global deaths attributable to pandemic in the given year}) \\]\n\nwhere the maximum is taken over all pandemics and all years from 2022 to 2121, inclusive. In other words, the resolution value will be equal to the highest number of annual deaths attributable to a *given pandemic*. If there are two pandemics ongoing in a particular year, only the one with the highest estimated death toll for that given year will be taken into consideration. This question will measure deaths in a calendar year (January 1 to December 31), not maximum deaths in any 365-day period.\n\nResolution will be based on credible sources such as the WHO, the CDC, *et cetera*. If these agencies give a range for possible number of deaths from the pandemic instead of a point estimate, for the purposes of this question the death toll attributable to that pandemic will be taken to be the *minimum* of their range. As an example, for COVID-19 this minimum would be the total number of deaths reported by governments, around 3.3 million as of November 2021.\n\nThis question will resolve according to the number of deaths where the infectious disease is the primary cause of death, not secondary factors such as famines, wars, infrastructure failures, et cetera", "lower_25": "9.18M", "median": "33.9M", "upper_75": "119M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 49.9 charter cities by 2026?", "desc": "A [charter city](https://www.chartercitiesinstitute.org/category/reference-guides) is a new city with new rules. More specifically, the Charter Cities Institute defines a charter city as a new city developed on a greenfield site with significantly devolved administrative and regulatory authority. Charter cities are intended to help countries in the Global South overcome the political and technical obstacles to improving governance, fostering growth, and policy experimentation. Historical examples of “proto-charter cities” often discussed include Shenzhen, Dubai, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Honduras adopted charter cities legislation ([Zones for Employment and Economic Development](http://ojs.instituteforcompgov.org/index.php/jsj/issue/view/4), or ZEDEs) in 2012 and three such developments currently exist (Próspera, Ciudad Morazán, and ZEDE Orquídea). Other new cities throughout Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia meet all or some of the criteria to be considered charter cities. \n\nIn October 2021, the Adrianople Group, a special economic zone consultancy, launched the [Open Zone Map](https://www.openzonemap.com/map). This project attempts to map every charter city, special economic zone, free trade zone, or other type of special zone in the world. Although definitions of charter cities vary (for instance, see the [Charter Cities Institute](https://www.chartercitiesinstitute.org/faq) vs. [Pronomos Capital](https://www.pronomos.vc/post/what-is-a-charter-city)), the Open Zone Map defines a charter city as “A large zone with deep incentives, both a commercial and residential district, and its own school.” As of October 2021, there are 29 charter cities listed on the Open Zone Map.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the number of charter cities identified on the [Open Zone Map](https://www.openzonemap.com/map) on January 1, 2026. If the Open Zone Map is no longer available, or is no longer actively updated as determined by Metaculus moderators, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "30.1", "median": "37.2", "upper_75": "49.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 49.9 charter cities by 2026?", "desc": "A [charter city](https://www.chartercitiesinstitute.org/category/reference-guides) is a new city with new rules. More specifically, the Charter Cities Institute defines a charter city as a new city developed on a greenfield site with significantly devolved administrative and regulatory authority. Charter cities are intended to help countries in the Global South overcome the political and technical obstacles to improving governance, fostering growth, and policy experimentation. Historical examples of “proto-charter cities” often discussed include Shenzhen, Dubai, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Honduras adopted charter cities legislation ([Zones for Employment and Economic Development](http://ojs.instituteforcompgov.org/index.php/jsj/issue/view/4), or ZEDEs) in 2012 and three such developments currently exist (Próspera, Ciudad Morazán, and ZEDE Orquídea). Other new cities throughout Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia meet all or some of the criteria to be considered charter cities. \n\nIn October 2021, the Adrianople Group, a special economic zone consultancy, launched the [Open Zone Map](https://www.openzonemap.com/map). This project attempts to map every charter city, special economic zone, free trade zone, or other type of special zone in the world. Although definitions of charter cities vary (for instance, see the [Charter Cities Institute](https://www.chartercitiesinstitute.org/faq) vs. [Pronomos Capital](https://www.pronomos.vc/post/what-is-a-charter-city)), the Open Zone Map defines a charter city as “A large zone with deep incentives, both a commercial and residential district, and its own school.” As of October 2021, there are 29 charter cities listed on the Open Zone Map.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the number of charter cities identified on the [Open Zone Map](https://www.openzonemap.com/map) on January 1, 2026. If the Open Zone Map is no longer available, or is no longer actively updated as determined by Metaculus moderators, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "30.1", "median": "37.2", "upper_75": "49.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will decline by 18.80% after World War 3, if such a war happens by 2050?", "desc": "Historically, global population declines have been rare but not unprecedented. Some causes have been civil wars which overthrew ruling elites in densely populated regions (China in particular), pandemics which have had near-global reach (such as the Black Death) and wars of conquest which have spread across much of the world (such as the wars of Genghis Khan and his successors).\n\nOne of the plausible ways in which a sharp decline in world population might occur is as a consequence of a world war. With this in mind, we ask the following question:", "resc": "\"World War 3\" will be defined based on [this Metaculus Question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2534/will-there-be-a-world-war-three-before-2050/):\n\n>1. A military conflict begins involving countries representing in totality at least 30% of world GDP or 50% of world population in any year in which the conflict is ongoing.\n\n >2. At least 10 million people (military personel or civillians) are killed in the conflict.\n\nIf such a war occurs before 2050, then in the year it begins, \\( t_r \\), this question will resolve as\n\n\\[ \\max_{t_r - 1 \\leq t \\leq 2060} \\frac{100 (P(t_r - 1) - P(t))}{P(t_r - 1)} \\]\n\nwhere \\( P(t) \\) denotes the population for year \\( t \\) obtained from [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL). In other words, the question will resolve as the percentage decline of global population from the year before the outbreak of WW3 to either the year 2060 or the year in which the decline bottoms out, whichever comes first. If there is no decline at all, the expression above would be equal to zero, so in this case the question would resolve as 0.\n\nIf World War 3 (as defined above) does not occur by 2050-01-01, then this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\nIf the World Bank doesn't report all of the necessary population figures for this maximum to be computed, the question will resolve according to another credible source as determined by Metaculus administrators.", "lower_25": "1.12", "median": "4.06", "upper_75": "18.80", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 15.5k structures will be newly deposited to the Protein Data Bank archive in 2025?", "desc": "The structures of proteins in different contexts are collected in the [Protein Data Bank](https://www.wwpdb.org/). These come from different types of experiments, mainly X-ray crystallography, NMR, and cryo-electron microscopy (cryo-EM). The number of structures [deposited each year](https://www.wwpdb.org/stats/deposition) has been increasing, rising from 2,938 in 2000 to 15,436 in 2020.", "resc": "The count for 2025 will appear in the Total Depositions column of the table “Statistics For PDB Structures That Are Deposited And Processed By Year And Site” on [this page](https://www.wwpdb.org/stats/deposition), or the most similar form of statistics provided by the Worldwide PDB organization at that time.\n\nThis resolves when the year 2026 is added to the table, indicating the running count for 2025 is complete", "lower_25": "15.5k", "median": "20.7k", "upper_75": "29.6k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 15.5k structures will be newly deposited to the Protein Data Bank archive in 2025?", "desc": "The structures of proteins in different contexts are collected in the [Protein Data Bank](https://www.wwpdb.org/). These come from different types of experiments, mainly X-ray crystallography, NMR, and cryo-electron microscopy (cryo-EM). The number of structures [deposited each year](https://www.wwpdb.org/stats/deposition) has been increasing, rising from 2,938 in 2000 to 15,436 in 2020.", "resc": "The count for 2025 will appear in the Total Depositions column of the table “Statistics For PDB Structures That Are Deposited And Processed By Year And Site” on [this page](https://www.wwpdb.org/stats/deposition), or the most similar form of statistics provided by the Worldwide PDB organization at that time.\n\nThis resolves when the year 2026 is added to the table, indicating the running count for 2025 is complete", "lower_25": "15.5k", "median": "20.7k", "upper_75": "29.6k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "In 2030, what is the chance that 0.692 proportion of UK's energy consumption will come from overseas electrical connectors versus battery storage?", "desc": "UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson aims to reduce the UK's [greenhouse gas emissions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenhouse_gas_emissions) to [zero by 2050](https://www.carbonbrief.org/daily-brief/all-britains-electricity-to-be-green-by-2035). In 2021, [he pledged](https://www.carbonbrief.org/daily-brief/all-britains-electricity-to-be-green-by-2035) that all of the UK's electricity will be from renewable or nuclear sources by 2035.\n\nOne of the major hurdles to implementing 100% renewable electric grids is inconsistency: solar and wind generators have variable output depending on the weather, and consumers have fluctuating electricity demands over the course of the day. This could be addressed with battery storage: prices for lithium-ion batteries have [fallen by 97% from 1991 to 2021](https://news.mit.edu/2021/lithium-ion-battery-costs-0323), and hydrogen storage could be a [cost effective solution](https://news.mit.edu/2021/making-case-hydrogen-zero-carbon-economy-0831) for storage on a several-month timescale. Intermittent demand and supply can also be addressed by expanding the total size of the electric grid. The UK has [five direct electrical connections](https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-hampshire-55750411) with other nations and is planning on building 10 more by 2023.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the proportion of electricity demand on the island of Great Britain supplied by overseas interconnectors, compared to that supplied by battery storage, for the calendar year 2030. For example, if 500 TWh of demand were supplied by interconnectors and 250 TWh by batteries, this question would resolve as 0.66. Energy imported by interconnectors will be the total amount imported, not net imports (imports minus exports). Resolution may come from official government sources such as [DUKES](https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/digest-of-uk-energy-statistics-dukes) or from independent energy researchers such as the [IEA](https://www.iea.org/)", "lower_25": "0.566", "median": "0.692", "upper_75": "0.800", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 22.7% of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "22.7", "median": "31.7", "upper_75": "41.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Stripe will go public by Nov 2024?", "desc": "Stripe [is](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stripe_(company)),\n\n> an Irish-American financial services and software as a service (SaaS) company dual-headquartered in San Francisco, United States and Dublin, Ireland.\n\nAt the moment, Stripe is [the most highly valued venture-backed private company](https://news.crunchbase.com/news/under-the-hood-a-closer-look-at-stripe-the-most-highly-valued-venture-backed-private-company-in-the-us/) in the United States. In recent months, Stripe has considered debuting [a public listing](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-10/stripe-is-said-to-discuss-public-listing-with-bankers-for-2022) according to reports. However, recently Stripe co-founder John Collison [said](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/23/stripe-very-happy-staying-private-co-founder-john-collison-says.html), \"We're very happy as a private company\".", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when Stripe conducts an initial public offering, direct listing, or is acquired by a public company. If this does not happen by December 30, 2031, this question will resolve as **>December 30, 2031**", "lower_25": "Sep 2023", "median": "Feb 2024", "upper_75": "Nov 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Stripe will go public by Nov 2024?", "desc": "Stripe [is](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stripe_(company)),\n\n> an Irish-American financial services and software as a service (SaaS) company dual-headquartered in San Francisco, United States and Dublin, Ireland.\n\nAt the moment, Stripe is [the most highly valued venture-backed private company](https://news.crunchbase.com/news/under-the-hood-a-closer-look-at-stripe-the-most-highly-valued-venture-backed-private-company-in-the-us/) in the United States. In recent months, Stripe has considered debuting [a public listing](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-10/stripe-is-said-to-discuss-public-listing-with-bankers-for-2022) according to reports. However, recently Stripe co-founder John Collison [said](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/23/stripe-very-happy-staying-private-co-founder-john-collison-says.html), \"We're very happy as a private company\".", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when Stripe conducts an initial public offering, direct listing, or is acquired by a public company. If this does not happen by December 30, 2031, this question will resolve as **>December 30, 2031**", "lower_25": "Sep 2023", "median": "Feb 2024", "upper_75": "Nov 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest single-year population decline between 2021 to 2120 will be 5.51?", "desc": "Historically, global population declines have been rare but not unprecedented. Some causes have been civil wars which overthrew ruling elites in densely populated regions (China in particular), pandemics which have had near-global reach (such as the Black Death) and wars of conquest which have spread across much of the world (such as the wars of Genghis Khan and his successors).\n\nIn our time, we might face the prospect of a mild global population decline due to falling birth rates, but this by itself would not produce a sharp decline in a single year. Any such decline would likely have to come from a catastrophic event similar to the ones listed above. With that in mind, we ask the following question:", "resc": "This question will resolve as the largest single-year percentage decline in world population as reported by [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL) between the years 2021 to 2120, inclusive. Specifically, if \\( P(t) \\) denotes the population for year \\( t \\) in the given chart, the resolution value will be\n\n\\[ \\max_{2021 \\leq t \\leq 2120} \\frac{100 (P(t) - P(t+1))}{P(t)} \\]\n\nIf the World Bank doesn't report all of the necessary population figures for this maximum to be computed, the question will resolve according to another credible source as determined by Metaculus administrators.\n\nIn the case that there is no population decline in any year (that is, population grows every year), this question will resolve as <0.", "lower_25": "0.448", "median": "2.44", "upper_75": "5.51", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.88 share of all payments (in percent) in the United States will be transacted and settled in real-time in 2028?", "desc": "[Real-Time Payments (RTP)](https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fednow_faq.htm) allow financial transactions to be processed and settled instantly, in real-time. This is in contrast to traditional payment methods like credit cards or Automated Clearing House (ACH) transactions, which can take several days to process and settle.\n\nThere are several reasons why RTP systems have been slow to catch on in the United States compared to other countries. One reason is that the existing payment infrastructure in the United States is already well-established and widely used. RTP systems can also raise regulatory concerns around issues such as money laundering and terrorist financing. To address these concerns, financial institutions may be required to implement strict processes to verify the identity of their customers and ensure that they are not involved in illegal activities. [These requirements can be time-consuming and costly.](https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2020/01/06/fednow-are-us-banks-ready-for-real-time-payments/?)\n\nNonetheless, in the United States [The Clearing House's *RTP Network*](https://www.theclearinghouse.org/payment-systems/rtp) is active and [the Federal Reserve's *FedNow* is scheduled to launch in 2023.](https://www.alacriti.com/what-are-real-time-payments/) According to [ACI Worldwide's 2022 *Prime Time for Real-Time* report](https://go.aciworldwide.com/Global-Payments-Report-USA.html),\n\n>The adoption of real-time payments is still limited in the U.S., accounting for only 0.9% share of total payments volume in 2021, which is not significant compared to paper-based payments and electronic payments (excluding real-time payments) at 21.4% and 77.7%, respectively.\n\n> The U.S. recorded 1.8 billion real-time transactions in 2021, which resulted in an estimated cost savings of $648 million for businesses and consumers. This in turn helped to unlock $1.4 billion of additional economic output, representing 0.01% of the country's GDP.\n\n> With real-time transactions set to rise to 8.9 billion in 2026, net savings for consumers and businesses are forecasted to climb to $2 billion. That would help to generate an additional $5 billion of economic output, equivalent to 0.02% of the country's forecasted GDP.", "resc": "This question resolves as the percent of all payments by volume in the United States made using real-time payment methods in 2028, according to [ACI Worldwide's *Prime Time for Real-Time* report](https://www.aciworldwide.com/real-time-payments-report) first containing the relevant data for 2028.", "lower_25": "1.14", "median": "3.88", "upper_75": "17.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 22.7% of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "22.7", "median": "31.7", "upper_75": "41.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.88 share of all payments (in percent) in the United States will be transacted and settled in real-time in 2028?", "desc": "[Real-Time Payments (RTP)](https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fednow_faq.htm) allow financial transactions to be processed and settled instantly, in real-time. This is in contrast to traditional payment methods like credit cards or Automated Clearing House (ACH) transactions, which can take several days to process and settle.\n\nThere are several reasons why RTP systems have been slow to catch on in the United States compared to other countries. One reason is that the existing payment infrastructure in the United States is already well-established and widely used. RTP systems can also raise regulatory concerns around issues such as money laundering and terrorist financing. To address these concerns, financial institutions may be required to implement strict processes to verify the identity of their customers and ensure that they are not involved in illegal activities. [These requirements can be time-consuming and costly.](https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2020/01/06/fednow-are-us-banks-ready-for-real-time-payments/?)\n\nNonetheless, in the United States [The Clearing House's *RTP Network*](https://www.theclearinghouse.org/payment-systems/rtp) is active and [the Federal Reserve's *FedNow* is scheduled to launch in 2023.](https://www.alacriti.com/what-are-real-time-payments/) According to [ACI Worldwide's 2022 *Prime Time for Real-Time* report](https://go.aciworldwide.com/Global-Payments-Report-USA.html),\n\n>The adoption of real-time payments is still limited in the U.S., accounting for only 0.9% share of total payments volume in 2021, which is not significant compared to paper-based payments and electronic payments (excluding real-time payments) at 21.4% and 77.7%, respectively.\n\n> The U.S. recorded 1.8 billion real-time transactions in 2021, which resulted in an estimated cost savings of $648 million for businesses and consumers. This in turn helped to unlock $1.4 billion of additional economic output, representing 0.01% of the country's GDP.\n\n> With real-time transactions set to rise to 8.9 billion in 2026, net savings for consumers and businesses are forecasted to climb to $2 billion. That would help to generate an additional $5 billion of economic output, equivalent to 0.02% of the country's forecasted GDP.", "resc": "This question resolves as the percent of all payments by volume in the United States made using real-time payment methods in 2028, according to [ACI Worldwide's *Prime Time for Real-Time* report](https://www.aciworldwide.com/real-time-payments-report) first containing the relevant data for 2028.", "lower_25": "1.14", "median": "3.88", "upper_75": "17.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 15.5k structures will be newly deposited to the Protein Data Bank archive in 2025?", "desc": "The structures of proteins in different contexts are collected in the [Protein Data Bank](https://www.wwpdb.org/). These come from different types of experiments, mainly X-ray crystallography, NMR, and cryo-electron microscopy (cryo-EM). The number of structures [deposited each year](https://www.wwpdb.org/stats/deposition) has been increasing, rising from 2,938 in 2000 to 15,436 in 2020.", "resc": "The count for 2025 will appear in the Total Depositions column of the table “Statistics For PDB Structures That Are Deposited And Processed By Year And Site” on [this page](https://www.wwpdb.org/stats/deposition), or the most similar form of statistics provided by the Worldwide PDB organization at that time.\n\nThis resolves when the year 2026 is added to the table, indicating the running count for 2025 is complete", "lower_25": "15.5k", "median": "20.7k", "upper_75": "29.6k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.88 share of all payments (in percent) in the United States will be transacted and settled in real-time in 2028?", "desc": "[Real-Time Payments (RTP)](https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fednow_faq.htm) allow financial transactions to be processed and settled instantly, in real-time. This is in contrast to traditional payment methods like credit cards or Automated Clearing House (ACH) transactions, which can take several days to process and settle.\n\nThere are several reasons why RTP systems have been slow to catch on in the United States compared to other countries. One reason is that the existing payment infrastructure in the United States is already well-established and widely used. RTP systems can also raise regulatory concerns around issues such as money laundering and terrorist financing. To address these concerns, financial institutions may be required to implement strict processes to verify the identity of their customers and ensure that they are not involved in illegal activities. [These requirements can be time-consuming and costly.](https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2020/01/06/fednow-are-us-banks-ready-for-real-time-payments/?)\n\nNonetheless, in the United States [The Clearing House's *RTP Network*](https://www.theclearinghouse.org/payment-systems/rtp) is active and [the Federal Reserve's *FedNow* is scheduled to launch in 2023.](https://www.alacriti.com/what-are-real-time-payments/) According to [ACI Worldwide's 2022 *Prime Time for Real-Time* report](https://go.aciworldwide.com/Global-Payments-Report-USA.html),\n\n>The adoption of real-time payments is still limited in the U.S., accounting for only 0.9% share of total payments volume in 2021, which is not significant compared to paper-based payments and electronic payments (excluding real-time payments) at 21.4% and 77.7%, respectively.\n\n> The U.S. recorded 1.8 billion real-time transactions in 2021, which resulted in an estimated cost savings of $648 million for businesses and consumers. This in turn helped to unlock $1.4 billion of additional economic output, representing 0.01% of the country's GDP.\n\n> With real-time transactions set to rise to 8.9 billion in 2026, net savings for consumers and businesses are forecasted to climb to $2 billion. That would help to generate an additional $5 billion of economic output, equivalent to 0.02% of the country's forecasted GDP.", "resc": "This question resolves as the percent of all payments by volume in the United States made using real-time payment methods in 2028, according to [ACI Worldwide's *Prime Time for Real-Time* report](https://www.aciworldwide.com/real-time-payments-report) first containing the relevant data for 2028.", "lower_25": "1.14", "median": "3.88", "upper_75": "17.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 22.7% of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "22.7", "median": "31.7", "upper_75": "41.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that the EU will pass the AI Act by May 2024?", "desc": "In [April 2021](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021PC0206), the European Commission presented the proposal for the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act). This legal framework sets out [“horizontal rules for the development, commodification and use of AI-driven products, services and systems within the territory of the EU”](https://law.stanford.edu/publications/eu-artificial-intelligence-act-the-european-approach-to-ai/), including regulation for AI systems of limited risk (such as chatbots) up to high risk AI systems (such as medical devices or stand-alone law enforcement) or unacceptable risk systems (such as systems that are reliably resulting in physical or psychological harms), summarised by the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation [here](https://cdei.blog.gov.uk/2021/05/11/the-european-commissions-artificial-intelligence-act-highlights-the-need-for-an-effective-ai-assurance-ecosystem/). In a nutshell, the [regulations proposed would apply to](https://blog.burges-salmon.com/post/102hcof/eu-artificial-intelligence-act-what-has-happened-so-far-and-what-to-expect-next): (i) providers placing on the EU market, (ii) users of AI systems located within the EU, and (iii) providers and users of AI systems that are located in a third country, with the output being produced being used in the EU.\n\nNegotiations on the AI Act are jointly led by the internal market and civil liberties committees. It is expected that these negotiations will entail significant changes to both the content and the timeline of the act, for example in response to the September 2021 opinion on the draft legislation by the [European Economic and Social Committee](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=PI_EESC%3AEESC-2021-02482-AS ). Recently, the Future of Life institute has also published a position paper on the AI Act, putting forth additional recommendations to be adapted in an effort to keep with up [“AI development [that is] occurring at breakneck speed”](https://futureoflife.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/FLI-Position-Paper-on-the-EU-AI-Act.pdf?x72900).\n\nPassing the AI Act would be a [hallmark achievement of EU regulation](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/), being one of the first of its kind. This might have wide-ranging impacts across the world in terms of setting regulatory guidelines that may then be adapted or rejected by other major powers, impacting AI policy world-wide.", "resc": "This question will resolve positively if the AI Act (specifically the [‘Regulation laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence'](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021PC0206) or the same legislation with changed name) passes in the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. It resolves ambiguously if there is no such political entity as the EU at the time of resolution", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "May 2024", "upper_75": "Jul 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum global single-year death toll attributable to a single pandemic between 2022 to 2121 will be 119M?", "desc": "Historically, global population declines have been rare but not unprecedented. Some causes have been civil wars which overthrew ruling elites in densely populated regions (China in particular), pandemics which have had near-global reach (such as the Black Death) and wars of conquest which have spread across much of the world (such as the wars of Genghis Khan and his successors).\n\nIn our time, we might face the prospect of a mild global population decline due to falling birth rates, but this by itself would not produce a sharp decline in a single year. Any such decline would likely have to come from a catastrophic event similar to the ones listed above. With that in mind, we ask the following question:", "resc": "This question will resolve as\n\n\\[ \\max_{\\textrm{pandemic}, \\, 2022 \\leq \\textrm{year} \\leq 2121} (\\textrm{total global deaths attributable to pandemic in the given year}) \\]\n\nwhere the maximum is taken over all pandemics and all years from 2022 to 2121, inclusive. In other words, the resolution value will be equal to the highest number of annual deaths attributable to a *given pandemic*. If there are two pandemics ongoing in a particular year, only the one with the highest estimated death toll for that given year will be taken into consideration. This question will measure deaths in a calendar year (January 1 to December 31), not maximum deaths in any 365-day period.\n\nResolution will be based on credible sources such as the WHO, the CDC, *et cetera*. If these agencies give a range for possible number of deaths from the pandemic instead of a point estimate, for the purposes of this question the death toll attributable to that pandemic will be taken to be the *minimum* of their range. As an example, for COVID-19 this minimum would be the total number of deaths reported by governments, around 3.3 million as of November 2021.\n\nThis question will resolve according to the number of deaths where the infectious disease is the primary cause of death, not secondary factors such as famines, wars, infrastructure failures, et cetera", "lower_25": "9.18M", "median": "33.9M", "upper_75": "119M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 41.5 tonnes of space debris will be removed by active measures by 2040?", "desc": "[Space debris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris) pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and travelling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. [The amount of debris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris#/media/File:LEO-SpaceDebris-Nov2020.png) has grown as more spacecraft and satellites occupy low-earth orbit and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use.\n\nTo avoid this outcome [mitigation measures](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Mitigating_space_debris_generation) are being put in place, including actively removing debris by capturing them with dedicated spacecraft, or by Earth-based methods such as using laser beams to slowly push them out of orbit. The total mass of space debris in orbit (as of January 2022) is estimated to be [more than 9,800 tonnes](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers).", "resc": "This question will be resolved as the total mass in tonnes (1000 kg) of cumulative space debris removed by January 1, 2040, according to the ESA's [Annual Space Environment Report](https://www.sdo.esoc.esa.int/environment_report/Space_Environment_Report_latest.pdf). In case the value is reported as a distribution, the mean value will be used to resolved this question. \n\n\"Active measures\" can include any human-driven measure to remove debris from sensitive orbits e.g. removal by other spacecraft, laser or ion beams, induced localized atmospheres, etc. They do not include measures such as post mission disposal performed by operational satellites", "lower_25": "1.47", "median": "41.5", "upper_75": "875", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 68.0% of spacecraft will satisfy post-mission disposal regulations in the decade of 2020-2029?", "desc": "[Space debris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris) pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and travelling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. [The amount of debris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris#/media/File:LEO-SpaceDebris-Nov2020.png) has grown as more spacecraft and satellites occupy low-earth orbit and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use.\n\nTo avoid this outcome [mitigation measures](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Mitigating_space_debris_generation) are being put in place, including guidelines for operators to remove their spacecraft after the end of their operational lives.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of all Low-Earth Orbit spacecraft and payloads satisfying post-mission disposal guidelines for 2020 to 2029 (inclusive) according to the [annual space environment report](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/ESA_s_Space_Environment_Report_2021) published by the ESA Space Debris Office (Fig. 5a of the 2021 report's executive summary). If a precise percentage for the decade is not available from ESA, this question will resolve as the average of yearly percentages from 2020 to 2029.\n\nThe required quantity refers only to spacecraft/payloads in any protected orbit, **that are not on a naturally compliant orbit**. The quantity also refers **only to active payloads and not rocket bodies**.\n\nAccordingly, the post-mission disposal regulations to be satisfied will be as understood by the ESA Space Debris Office, currently (and foreseen to remain) the same as [defined by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC)](https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/iadc-space-debris-guidelines-revision-2.pdf)", "lower_25": "50.2", "median": "59.2", "upper_75": "68.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that the EU will pass the AI Act by May 2024?", "desc": "In [April 2021](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021PC0206), the European Commission presented the proposal for the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act). This legal framework sets out [“horizontal rules for the development, commodification and use of AI-driven products, services and systems within the territory of the EU”](https://law.stanford.edu/publications/eu-artificial-intelligence-act-the-european-approach-to-ai/), including regulation for AI systems of limited risk (such as chatbots) up to high risk AI systems (such as medical devices or stand-alone law enforcement) or unacceptable risk systems (such as systems that are reliably resulting in physical or psychological harms), summarised by the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation [here](https://cdei.blog.gov.uk/2021/05/11/the-european-commissions-artificial-intelligence-act-highlights-the-need-for-an-effective-ai-assurance-ecosystem/). In a nutshell, the [regulations proposed would apply to](https://blog.burges-salmon.com/post/102hcof/eu-artificial-intelligence-act-what-has-happened-so-far-and-what-to-expect-next): (i) providers placing on the EU market, (ii) users of AI systems located within the EU, and (iii) providers and users of AI systems that are located in a third country, with the output being produced being used in the EU.\n\nNegotiations on the AI Act are jointly led by the internal market and civil liberties committees. It is expected that these negotiations will entail significant changes to both the content and the timeline of the act, for example in response to the September 2021 opinion on the draft legislation by the [European Economic and Social Committee](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=PI_EESC%3AEESC-2021-02482-AS ). Recently, the Future of Life institute has also published a position paper on the AI Act, putting forth additional recommendations to be adapted in an effort to keep with up [“AI development [that is] occurring at breakneck speed”](https://futureoflife.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/FLI-Position-Paper-on-the-EU-AI-Act.pdf?x72900).\n\nPassing the AI Act would be a [hallmark achievement of EU regulation](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/), being one of the first of its kind. This might have wide-ranging impacts across the world in terms of setting regulatory guidelines that may then be adapted or rejected by other major powers, impacting AI policy world-wide.", "resc": "This question will resolve positively if the AI Act (specifically the [‘Regulation laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence'](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021PC0206) or the same legislation with changed name) passes in the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. It resolves ambiguously if there is no such political entity as the EU at the time of resolution", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "May 2024", "upper_75": "Jul 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 68.0% of spacecraft will satisfy post-mission disposal regulations in the decade of 2020-2029?", "desc": "[Space debris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris) pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and travelling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. [The amount of debris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris#/media/File:LEO-SpaceDebris-Nov2020.png) has grown as more spacecraft and satellites occupy low-earth orbit and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use.\n\nTo avoid this outcome [mitigation measures](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Mitigating_space_debris_generation) are being put in place, including guidelines for operators to remove their spacecraft after the end of their operational lives.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of all Low-Earth Orbit spacecraft and payloads satisfying post-mission disposal guidelines for 2020 to 2029 (inclusive) according to the [annual space environment report](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/ESA_s_Space_Environment_Report_2021) published by the ESA Space Debris Office (Fig. 5a of the 2021 report's executive summary). If a precise percentage for the decade is not available from ESA, this question will resolve as the average of yearly percentages from 2020 to 2029.\n\nThe required quantity refers only to spacecraft/payloads in any protected orbit, **that are not on a naturally compliant orbit**. The quantity also refers **only to active payloads and not rocket bodies**.\n\nAccordingly, the post-mission disposal regulations to be satisfied will be as understood by the ESA Space Debris Office, currently (and foreseen to remain) the same as [defined by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC)](https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/iadc-space-debris-guidelines-revision-2.pdf)", "lower_25": "50.2", "median": "59.2", "upper_75": "68.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that the EU will pass the AI Act by May 2024?", "desc": "In [April 2021](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021PC0206), the European Commission presented the proposal for the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act). This legal framework sets out [“horizontal rules for the development, commodification and use of AI-driven products, services and systems within the territory of the EU”](https://law.stanford.edu/publications/eu-artificial-intelligence-act-the-european-approach-to-ai/), including regulation for AI systems of limited risk (such as chatbots) up to high risk AI systems (such as medical devices or stand-alone law enforcement) or unacceptable risk systems (such as systems that are reliably resulting in physical or psychological harms), summarised by the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation [here](https://cdei.blog.gov.uk/2021/05/11/the-european-commissions-artificial-intelligence-act-highlights-the-need-for-an-effective-ai-assurance-ecosystem/). In a nutshell, the [regulations proposed would apply to](https://blog.burges-salmon.com/post/102hcof/eu-artificial-intelligence-act-what-has-happened-so-far-and-what-to-expect-next): (i) providers placing on the EU market, (ii) users of AI systems located within the EU, and (iii) providers and users of AI systems that are located in a third country, with the output being produced being used in the EU.\n\nNegotiations on the AI Act are jointly led by the internal market and civil liberties committees. It is expected that these negotiations will entail significant changes to both the content and the timeline of the act, for example in response to the September 2021 opinion on the draft legislation by the [European Economic and Social Committee](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=PI_EESC%3AEESC-2021-02482-AS ). Recently, the Future of Life institute has also published a position paper on the AI Act, putting forth additional recommendations to be adapted in an effort to keep with up [“AI development [that is] occurring at breakneck speed”](https://futureoflife.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/FLI-Position-Paper-on-the-EU-AI-Act.pdf?x72900).\n\nPassing the AI Act would be a [hallmark achievement of EU regulation](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu/), being one of the first of its kind. This might have wide-ranging impacts across the world in terms of setting regulatory guidelines that may then be adapted or rejected by other major powers, impacting AI policy world-wide.", "resc": "This question will resolve positively if the AI Act (specifically the [‘Regulation laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence'](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021PC0206) or the same legislation with changed name) passes in the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. It resolves ambiguously if there is no such political entity as the EU at the time of resolution", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "May 2024", "upper_75": "Jul 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Stripe will go public by Nov 2024?", "desc": "Stripe [is](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stripe_(company)),\n\n> an Irish-American financial services and software as a service (SaaS) company dual-headquartered in San Francisco, United States and Dublin, Ireland.\n\nAt the moment, Stripe is [the most highly valued venture-backed private company](https://news.crunchbase.com/news/under-the-hood-a-closer-look-at-stripe-the-most-highly-valued-venture-backed-private-company-in-the-us/) in the United States. In recent months, Stripe has considered debuting [a public listing](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-10/stripe-is-said-to-discuss-public-listing-with-bankers-for-2022) according to reports. However, recently Stripe co-founder John Collison [said](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/23/stripe-very-happy-staying-private-co-founder-john-collison-says.html), \"We're very happy as a private company\".", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when Stripe conducts an initial public offering, direct listing, or is acquired by a public company. If this does not happen by December 30, 2031, this question will resolve as **>December 30, 2031**", "lower_25": "Sep 2023", "median": "Feb 2024", "upper_75": "Nov 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 41.5 tonnes of space debris will be removed by active measures by 2040?", "desc": "[Space debris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris) pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and travelling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. [The amount of debris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris#/media/File:LEO-SpaceDebris-Nov2020.png) has grown as more spacecraft and satellites occupy low-earth orbit and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use.\n\nTo avoid this outcome [mitigation measures](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Mitigating_space_debris_generation) are being put in place, including actively removing debris by capturing them with dedicated spacecraft, or by Earth-based methods such as using laser beams to slowly push them out of orbit. The total mass of space debris in orbit (as of January 2022) is estimated to be [more than 9,800 tonnes](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers).", "resc": "This question will be resolved as the total mass in tonnes (1000 kg) of cumulative space debris removed by January 1, 2040, according to the ESA's [Annual Space Environment Report](https://www.sdo.esoc.esa.int/environment_report/Space_Environment_Report_latest.pdf). In case the value is reported as a distribution, the mean value will be used to resolved this question. \n\n\"Active measures\" can include any human-driven measure to remove debris from sensitive orbits e.g. removal by other spacecraft, laser or ion beams, induced localized atmospheres, etc. They do not include measures such as post mission disposal performed by operational satellites", "lower_25": "1.47", "median": "41.5", "upper_75": "875", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 41.5 tonnes of space debris will be removed by active measures by 2040?", "desc": "[Space debris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris) pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and travelling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. [The amount of debris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris#/media/File:LEO-SpaceDebris-Nov2020.png) has grown as more spacecraft and satellites occupy low-earth orbit and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use.\n\nTo avoid this outcome [mitigation measures](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Mitigating_space_debris_generation) are being put in place, including actively removing debris by capturing them with dedicated spacecraft, or by Earth-based methods such as using laser beams to slowly push them out of orbit. The total mass of space debris in orbit (as of January 2022) is estimated to be [more than 9,800 tonnes](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers).", "resc": "This question will be resolved as the total mass in tonnes (1000 kg) of cumulative space debris removed by January 1, 2040, according to the ESA's [Annual Space Environment Report](https://www.sdo.esoc.esa.int/environment_report/Space_Environment_Report_latest.pdf). In case the value is reported as a distribution, the mean value will be used to resolved this question. \n\n\"Active measures\" can include any human-driven measure to remove debris from sensitive orbits e.g. removal by other spacecraft, laser or ion beams, induced localized atmospheres, etc. They do not include measures such as post mission disposal performed by operational satellites", "lower_25": "1.47", "median": "41.5", "upper_75": "875", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the last baseball World Series will be played by 2062?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2062", "median": "2091", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the last baseball World Series will be played by 2062?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2062", "median": "2091", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 68.0% of spacecraft will satisfy post-mission disposal regulations in the decade of 2020-2029?", "desc": "[Space debris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris) pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and travelling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. [The amount of debris](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_debris#/media/File:LEO-SpaceDebris-Nov2020.png) has grown as more spacecraft and satellites occupy low-earth orbit and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use.\n\nTo avoid this outcome [mitigation measures](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Mitigating_space_debris_generation) are being put in place, including guidelines for operators to remove their spacecraft after the end of their operational lives.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of all Low-Earth Orbit spacecraft and payloads satisfying post-mission disposal guidelines for 2020 to 2029 (inclusive) according to the [annual space environment report](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/ESA_s_Space_Environment_Report_2021) published by the ESA Space Debris Office (Fig. 5a of the 2021 report's executive summary). If a precise percentage for the decade is not available from ESA, this question will resolve as the average of yearly percentages from 2020 to 2029.\n\nThe required quantity refers only to spacecraft/payloads in any protected orbit, **that are not on a naturally compliant orbit**. The quantity also refers **only to active payloads and not rocket bodies**.\n\nAccordingly, the post-mission disposal regulations to be satisfied will be as understood by the ESA Space Debris Office, currently (and foreseen to remain) the same as [defined by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC)](https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/library/iadc-space-debris-guidelines-revision-2.pdf)", "lower_25": "50.2", "median": "59.2", "upper_75": "68.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Shiller P/E ratio of the S&P 500 will be 30.9 on January 1, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.1", "median": "25.4", "upper_75": "30.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Shiller P/E ratio of the S&P 500 will be 30.9 on January 1, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.1", "median": "25.4", "upper_75": "30.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the last baseball World Series will be played by 2062?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2062", "median": "2091", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that one or more Australian governments will stop celebrating Australia Day on the 26th of January by February 2031?", "desc": "On 26 January 1788, the First Fleet landed in Sydney Cove and raised the British flag. In the intervening centuries, the anniversary or a date close to it (like the nearest Monday) was marked with various degrees of formality, under a variety of names. \n\nSince the 1990s, 26 January has been a consistent public holiday across all Australian states and territories, under the name \"Australia Day\" which had been used since 1935 ([the legislated name in South Australia is \"26 January\",](https://about.abc.net.au/statements/australia-day-invasion-day-or-just-the-26-january/) but it is referred to in official publications as \"Australia Day\"). \n\nThe anniversary has been challenged since at least 1938, when it was branded a \"Day of Mourning\". During the 1988 bicentennial, it was protested as \"Invasion Day\", and in recent years a \"Change the Date\" campaign has gained momentum. \n\nIn 2021, [half of Australians predicted the date of Australia Day would change within the next 10 years, although only 28% supported a change.](https://www.ipsos.com/en-au/ipsos-australia-day-poll-report)\n\n[Several alternative dates have been suggested.](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-25/australia-day:-change-the-date-options/9359260)\n\nMore history is available in a [1991 parliamentary brief](https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22library/prspub/VUN00%22).", "resc": "This question will resolve on the first 26th of January following any of these events:\n\n* a state or territory government announces that the 26th of January will no longer be a public holiday in that state or territory\n* a state, territory or federal government announces a different official name for the 26th of January public holiday than \"Australia Day\", to be preferred in official correspondence over \"Australia Day\"\n* a state, territory or federal government announces that they will recognise a different date as \"Australia Day\"\n* the federal government announces that the Australian of the Year Award will be awarded on a day other than the 26th of January. \n\nIf none of the above occur, this will resolve as > July 1, 2041\n\nA change from the 26th of January to a date referencing the 26th of January or the end of January (e.g. \"the closest Monday to the 26th of January\") does not count for these purposes. That would be an administrative change (presumably to guarantee an Australia Day long weekend), not a change in policy. \n\nFor the avoidance of doubt, local governments do not count. It must be the Commonwealth Government, one of the two (self-governing) territory governments or one of the six state governments", "lower_25": "Mar 2026", "median": "Feb 2028", "upper_75": "Feb 2031", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Shiller P/E ratio of the S&P 500 will be 30.9 on January 1, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.1", "median": "25.4", "upper_75": "30.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that one or more Australian governments will stop celebrating Australia Day on the 26th of January by February 2031?", "desc": "On 26 January 1788, the First Fleet landed in Sydney Cove and raised the British flag. In the intervening centuries, the anniversary or a date close to it (like the nearest Monday) was marked with various degrees of formality, under a variety of names. \n\nSince the 1990s, 26 January has been a consistent public holiday across all Australian states and territories, under the name \"Australia Day\" which had been used since 1935 ([the legislated name in South Australia is \"26 January\",](https://about.abc.net.au/statements/australia-day-invasion-day-or-just-the-26-january/) but it is referred to in official publications as \"Australia Day\"). \n\nThe anniversary has been challenged since at least 1938, when it was branded a \"Day of Mourning\". During the 1988 bicentennial, it was protested as \"Invasion Day\", and in recent years a \"Change the Date\" campaign has gained momentum. \n\nIn 2021, [half of Australians predicted the date of Australia Day would change within the next 10 years, although only 28% supported a change.](https://www.ipsos.com/en-au/ipsos-australia-day-poll-report)\n\n[Several alternative dates have been suggested.](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-25/australia-day:-change-the-date-options/9359260)\n\nMore history is available in a [1991 parliamentary brief](https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22library/prspub/VUN00%22).", "resc": "This question will resolve on the first 26th of January following any of these events:\n\n* a state or territory government announces that the 26th of January will no longer be a public holiday in that state or territory\n* a state, territory or federal government announces a different official name for the 26th of January public holiday than \"Australia Day\", to be preferred in official correspondence over \"Australia Day\"\n* a state, territory or federal government announces that they will recognise a different date as \"Australia Day\"\n* the federal government announces that the Australian of the Year Award will be awarded on a day other than the 26th of January. \n\nIf none of the above occur, this will resolve as > July 1, 2041\n\nA change from the 26th of January to a date referencing the 26th of January or the end of January (e.g. \"the closest Monday to the 26th of January\") does not count for these purposes. That would be an administrative change (presumably to guarantee an Australia Day long weekend), not a change in policy. \n\nFor the avoidance of doubt, local governments do not count. It must be the Commonwealth Government, one of the two (self-governing) territory governments or one of the six state governments", "lower_25": "Mar 2026", "median": "Feb 2028", "upper_75": "Feb 2031", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Czech Republic will have no coal-fired power plants in its electricity grid by 2042?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2042", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best accuracy score on the MATH dataset will be 0.936 by 2025?", "desc": "From [Hendrycks et al](https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.03874),\n\n> Many intellectual endeavors require mathematical problem solving, but this skill remains beyond the capabilities of computers. To measure this ability in machine learning models, we introduce MATH, a new dataset of 12,500 challenging competition mathematics problems. Each problem in MATH has a full step-by-step solution which can be used to teach models to generate answer derivations and explanations. [...]\n\n> Even though we are able to increase accuracy on MATH, our results show that accuracy remains relatively low, even with enormous Transformer models. Moreover, we find that simply increasing budgets and model parameter counts will be impractical for achieving strong mathematical reasoning if scaling trends continue. While scaling Transformers is automatically solving most other text-based tasks, scaling is not currently solving MATH. To have more traction on mathematical problem solving we will likely need new algorithmic advancements from the broader research community.\n\nIn addition,\n\n> It's also worth mentioning the competition maths problems in MATH are designed under the assumption that competitors don't use calculators or script executors. That way, solving them requires making a clever observation or reducing the search space to make the problem tractable. With a script executor, competitors do not need to figure out how to succinctly reason to the conclusion and cleverness is rarely needed. \n\n> There are other competition problems designed to be difficult even with calculators and script exectuors, but there are not nearly as many of these problems lying around.\n\nIf we care about measuring and forecasting mathematical problem solving capabilities with MATH, it will probably make sense to give ML models a no calculator restriction, just as is done for human contestants.\n\nThe best model in the paper only received an average accuracy of 6.9% on the dataset.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the state-of-the-art average accuracy score on the [MATH dataset](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2103.03874.pdf), as reported prior to January 1 2025. Credible reports include but are not limited to blog posts, arXiv preprints, and papers.", "lower_25": "0.866", "median": "0.936", "upper_75": "0.976", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Czech Republic will have no coal-fired power plants in its electricity grid by 2042?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2042", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that one or more Australian governments will stop celebrating Australia Day on the 26th of January by February 2031?", "desc": "On 26 January 1788, the First Fleet landed in Sydney Cove and raised the British flag. In the intervening centuries, the anniversary or a date close to it (like the nearest Monday) was marked with various degrees of formality, under a variety of names. \n\nSince the 1990s, 26 January has been a consistent public holiday across all Australian states and territories, under the name \"Australia Day\" which had been used since 1935 ([the legislated name in South Australia is \"26 January\",](https://about.abc.net.au/statements/australia-day-invasion-day-or-just-the-26-january/) but it is referred to in official publications as \"Australia Day\"). \n\nThe anniversary has been challenged since at least 1938, when it was branded a \"Day of Mourning\". During the 1988 bicentennial, it was protested as \"Invasion Day\", and in recent years a \"Change the Date\" campaign has gained momentum. \n\nIn 2021, [half of Australians predicted the date of Australia Day would change within the next 10 years, although only 28% supported a change.](https://www.ipsos.com/en-au/ipsos-australia-day-poll-report)\n\n[Several alternative dates have been suggested.](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-25/australia-day:-change-the-date-options/9359260)\n\nMore history is available in a [1991 parliamentary brief](https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22library/prspub/VUN00%22).", "resc": "This question will resolve on the first 26th of January following any of these events:\n\n* a state or territory government announces that the 26th of January will no longer be a public holiday in that state or territory\n* a state, territory or federal government announces a different official name for the 26th of January public holiday than \"Australia Day\", to be preferred in official correspondence over \"Australia Day\"\n* a state, territory or federal government announces that they will recognise a different date as \"Australia Day\"\n* the federal government announces that the Australian of the Year Award will be awarded on a day other than the 26th of January. \n\nIf none of the above occur, this will resolve as > July 1, 2041\n\nA change from the 26th of January to a date referencing the 26th of January or the end of January (e.g. \"the closest Monday to the 26th of January\") does not count for these purposes. That would be an administrative change (presumably to guarantee an Australia Day long weekend), not a change in policy. \n\nFor the avoidance of doubt, local governments do not count. It must be the Commonwealth Government, one of the two (self-governing) territory governments or one of the six state governments", "lower_25": "Mar 2026", "median": "Feb 2028", "upper_75": "Feb 2031", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best accuracy score on the MATH dataset will be 0.936 by 2025?", "desc": "From [Hendrycks et al](https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.03874),\n\n> Many intellectual endeavors require mathematical problem solving, but this skill remains beyond the capabilities of computers. To measure this ability in machine learning models, we introduce MATH, a new dataset of 12,500 challenging competition mathematics problems. Each problem in MATH has a full step-by-step solution which can be used to teach models to generate answer derivations and explanations. [...]\n\n> Even though we are able to increase accuracy on MATH, our results show that accuracy remains relatively low, even with enormous Transformer models. Moreover, we find that simply increasing budgets and model parameter counts will be impractical for achieving strong mathematical reasoning if scaling trends continue. While scaling Transformers is automatically solving most other text-based tasks, scaling is not currently solving MATH. To have more traction on mathematical problem solving we will likely need new algorithmic advancements from the broader research community.\n\nIn addition,\n\n> It's also worth mentioning the competition maths problems in MATH are designed under the assumption that competitors don't use calculators or script executors. That way, solving them requires making a clever observation or reducing the search space to make the problem tractable. With a script executor, competitors do not need to figure out how to succinctly reason to the conclusion and cleverness is rarely needed. \n\n> There are other competition problems designed to be difficult even with calculators and script exectuors, but there are not nearly as many of these problems lying around.\n\nIf we care about measuring and forecasting mathematical problem solving capabilities with MATH, it will probably make sense to give ML models a no calculator restriction, just as is done for human contestants.\n\nThe best model in the paper only received an average accuracy of 6.9% on the dataset.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the state-of-the-art average accuracy score on the [MATH dataset](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2103.03874.pdf), as reported prior to January 1 2025. Credible reports include but are not limited to blog posts, arXiv preprints, and papers.", "lower_25": "0.866", "median": "0.936", "upper_75": "0.976", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that BTC will realize a volatility of 2.61 from January 1, 2025 to December 31, 2026?", "desc": "An important question for the future of cryptocurrencies in general and BTC in particular is what will happen to their volatility in the future. As of the time of writing of this question it's normal for BTC prices to have a realized volatility on the order of 3% per day or 60% annualized; in other words, we can think that on a typical day the price of BTC will change by around 3% in either direction. This volatility makes it more difficult to use BTC as both a medium of exchange and a store of wealth.\n\nAsset price data to answer this question is scant, even at the horizon of 3 to 5 years that is relevant for this question. Nevertheless, the question is important for the future of cryptocurrencies. Will their current level of volatility die down in the future, and if so, how fast will this happen?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the sample standard deviation (in other words, standard deviation with the Bessel correction) of the *daily log returns* of BTC from January 1, 2025 to December 31, 2026. \n\nTo provide more detail; for every day \\( i \\) ranging from January 1, 2025 to December 31, 2026 inclusive, let \\( P(i) \\) be the closing price of BTC obtained from the [Wall Street Journal](https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/fx/BTCUSD/historical-prices) for the day \\( i \\). The question asks for the sample standard deviation of the collection containing\n\n\\[ 100 \\ln(P(i+1)/P(i)) \\] \n\n(in other words, the daily log return in units of percentages) for each day \\( i \\) in the specified range.\n\nImportantly, this volatility is *not annualized*, so forecast accordingly", "lower_25": "1.94", "median": "2.61", "upper_75": "4.06", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that BTC will realize a volatility of 2.61 from January 1, 2025 to December 31, 2026?", "desc": "An important question for the future of cryptocurrencies in general and BTC in particular is what will happen to their volatility in the future. As of the time of writing of this question it's normal for BTC prices to have a realized volatility on the order of 3% per day or 60% annualized; in other words, we can think that on a typical day the price of BTC will change by around 3% in either direction. This volatility makes it more difficult to use BTC as both a medium of exchange and a store of wealth.\n\nAsset price data to answer this question is scant, even at the horizon of 3 to 5 years that is relevant for this question. Nevertheless, the question is important for the future of cryptocurrencies. Will their current level of volatility die down in the future, and if so, how fast will this happen?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the sample standard deviation (in other words, standard deviation with the Bessel correction) of the *daily log returns* of BTC from January 1, 2025 to December 31, 2026. \n\nTo provide more detail; for every day \\( i \\) ranging from January 1, 2025 to December 31, 2026 inclusive, let \\( P(i) \\) be the closing price of BTC obtained from the [Wall Street Journal](https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/fx/BTCUSD/historical-prices) for the day \\( i \\). The question asks for the sample standard deviation of the collection containing\n\n\\[ 100 \\ln(P(i+1)/P(i)) \\] \n\n(in other words, the daily log return in units of percentages) for each day \\( i \\) in the specified range.\n\nImportantly, this volatility is *not annualized*, so forecast accordingly", "lower_25": "1.94", "median": "2.61", "upper_75": "4.06", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Czech Republic will have no coal-fired power plants in its electricity grid by 2042?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2042", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first human baby will be born, whose embryo was polygenically selected from a cohort of at least 50 simultaneously obtained ova by 2035?", "desc": "[In vitro fertilization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_vitro_fertilisation) (IVF) is a fertilization procedure in which ova are removed from a woman and combined with sperm in a laboratory culture, and a resulting embryo is implanted into the woman's or a surrogate patient's uterus. Combining sperm with extracted ova results in multiple viable embryos. Embryo selection involves genetically sequencing these embryos to determine probabilities of the traits that they may produce. Most traits, such as low susceptibility to certain diseases or intelligence, are influenced by the interaction of many genes, i.e. they are polygenic, so a statistical analysis is performed on the genome to determine a score based on the probabilities of different traits of interest. The embryo with the most desirable score is then implanted. This is known as polygenic embryo selection.\n\nThis confers a limited advantage, however, since the number of ova that can be extracted in an IVF cycle is very low, and so the best of the embryos is unlikely to be significantly better than the average.\n\nThere is currently no technology that can yield larger numbers of ova simultaneously. If this were possible, one could perform polygenic selection on the large number of resulting embryos, where selection would yield large advantages: massive multiple embryo selection (MMES). The possible routes to MMES may look like, for example:\n\n1. New fertility drugs that induce the creation of larger numbers of ova in a cycle.\n2. Stem cell technology that would allow us to obtain a large number of the woman's stem cells — a primordial kind of cell that can turn into any other kind of cell — and then induce them to turn into eggs. Large numbers of ova may be able to be obtained in this way.", "resc": "This question will be resolved on the date of birth of the first human baby whose embryo was polygenically selected from a cohort of at least 50 simultaneously obtained ova. All of the eggs in this polygenic selection must be obtained from the same individual simultaneously (and not, for example, over multiple IVF cycles and preserved).\n\nReports in credible media sources will be sufficient for resolution", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best accuracy score on the MATH dataset will be 0.936 by 2025?", "desc": "From [Hendrycks et al](https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.03874),\n\n> Many intellectual endeavors require mathematical problem solving, but this skill remains beyond the capabilities of computers. To measure this ability in machine learning models, we introduce MATH, a new dataset of 12,500 challenging competition mathematics problems. Each problem in MATH has a full step-by-step solution which can be used to teach models to generate answer derivations and explanations. [...]\n\n> Even though we are able to increase accuracy on MATH, our results show that accuracy remains relatively low, even with enormous Transformer models. Moreover, we find that simply increasing budgets and model parameter counts will be impractical for achieving strong mathematical reasoning if scaling trends continue. While scaling Transformers is automatically solving most other text-based tasks, scaling is not currently solving MATH. To have more traction on mathematical problem solving we will likely need new algorithmic advancements from the broader research community.\n\nIn addition,\n\n> It's also worth mentioning the competition maths problems in MATH are designed under the assumption that competitors don't use calculators or script executors. That way, solving them requires making a clever observation or reducing the search space to make the problem tractable. With a script executor, competitors do not need to figure out how to succinctly reason to the conclusion and cleverness is rarely needed. \n\n> There are other competition problems designed to be difficult even with calculators and script exectuors, but there are not nearly as many of these problems lying around.\n\nIf we care about measuring and forecasting mathematical problem solving capabilities with MATH, it will probably make sense to give ML models a no calculator restriction, just as is done for human contestants.\n\nThe best model in the paper only received an average accuracy of 6.9% on the dataset.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the state-of-the-art average accuracy score on the [MATH dataset](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2103.03874.pdf), as reported prior to January 1 2025. Credible reports include but are not limited to blog posts, arXiv preprints, and papers.", "lower_25": "0.866", "median": "0.936", "upper_75": "0.976", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a whole human genome in 2026 will be 194 times the cost in 2021 USD?", "desc": "A genome consists of all of the DNA contained in a cell's nucleus. DNA is composed of four bases (abbreviated G, A, T, and C), with the biological information encoded within DNA determined by the order of those bases. [Sequencing a genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whole_genome_sequencing) involves using various techniques to ascertain the order in which these bases are present in the DNA of an individual organism.\n\nThe first human genome sequencing was completed around 2001. Since then, technological advancements have enabled the cost of the procedure to drop rapidly. According to the _National Human Genome Research Institute_, sequencing a human genome cost over US$10 million in 2006, and only around US$562 in 2021. The cost data, graphs, and methods can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a whole human genome in the year 2026, accrding to the [US National Human Genome Research Institute](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost). This question resolve as the average of all values reported for 2026 (expected to be quarterly), and will be indexed to 2021 USD using the [CPI](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL). To account for data revisions, this will resolve based on the latest report published by NHGRI by December 31, 2027.\n\nIf NHGRI does not provide this data by December 31, 2027, Metaculus may select any successor organization with similar data or methodology, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "70.9", "median": "116", "upper_75": "194", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that BTC will realize a volatility of 2.61 from January 1, 2025 to December 31, 2026?", "desc": "An important question for the future of cryptocurrencies in general and BTC in particular is what will happen to their volatility in the future. As of the time of writing of this question it's normal for BTC prices to have a realized volatility on the order of 3% per day or 60% annualized; in other words, we can think that on a typical day the price of BTC will change by around 3% in either direction. This volatility makes it more difficult to use BTC as both a medium of exchange and a store of wealth.\n\nAsset price data to answer this question is scant, even at the horizon of 3 to 5 years that is relevant for this question. Nevertheless, the question is important for the future of cryptocurrencies. Will their current level of volatility die down in the future, and if so, how fast will this happen?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the sample standard deviation (in other words, standard deviation with the Bessel correction) of the *daily log returns* of BTC from January 1, 2025 to December 31, 2026. \n\nTo provide more detail; for every day \\( i \\) ranging from January 1, 2025 to December 31, 2026 inclusive, let \\( P(i) \\) be the closing price of BTC obtained from the [Wall Street Journal](https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/fx/BTCUSD/historical-prices) for the day \\( i \\). The question asks for the sample standard deviation of the collection containing\n\n\\[ 100 \\ln(P(i+1)/P(i)) \\] \n\n(in other words, the daily log return in units of percentages) for each day \\( i \\) in the specified range.\n\nImportantly, this volatility is *not annualized*, so forecast accordingly", "lower_25": "1.94", "median": "2.61", "upper_75": "4.06", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the EU will adopt legally binding regulations protecting the individual's right to explanation by 2025?", "desc": "The EU has already adopted the [General Data Protection Regulation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Data_Protection_Regulation) (GDPR), which, in Recital 71, notes that data subjects have a [right to explanation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_to_explanation). The [Equal Credit Opportunity Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equal_Credit_Opportunity_Act) (ECOA) in the US mentions a similar right, as does the Loi pour une République numérique (loi numérique) in France. However, unlike the ECOA and loi numérique, the GDPR's right to explanation is [not legally binding](https://iapp.org/news/a/is-there-a-right-to-explanation-for-machine-learning-in-the-gdpr/).", "resc": "This will resolve on the date that the European Union passes a law which protects the individual's general right to explanation, requiring algorithms to explain to users which data was relevant in algorithmic decisions. This law need not be in the same form described in Recital 71 of GDPR. This law must apply to automated decisions generally within the EU, not targeted only in narrow purposes or domains (e.g. ECOA only applies to adverse credit decisions)", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will adopt national general-purpose data protection regulations by 2040 or later?", "desc": "The EU has already adopted the [General Data Protection Regulation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Data_Protection_Regulation) (GDPR), which outlines the rights of data subjects. In the state of California, the [California Consumer Privacy Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_Consumer_Privacy_Act) (CPPA) guarantees similar rights surrounding personal data. However, the US Federal Government has no similar legislation.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that federal legislation is passed in the US which guarantees the individual's [right of access](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_of_access_to_personal_data), that is the right of a data subject to access personal data collected on them and to know how that data is collected. Other data protection laws already exist, such as the [Fair Credit Reporting Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair_Credit_Reporting_Act) which establishes the individual's rights to data on credit reporting; this question pertains to a law protecting the right of access for data collected in general terms, which is applicable to at least 66% of the US population. The legislation need not consider the right to be forgotten or the right to object. Official announcements from the US government or credible media reports may suffice as a source", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the EU will adopt legally binding regulations protecting the individual's right to explanation by 2025?", "desc": "The EU has already adopted the [General Data Protection Regulation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Data_Protection_Regulation) (GDPR), which, in Recital 71, notes that data subjects have a [right to explanation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_to_explanation). The [Equal Credit Opportunity Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equal_Credit_Opportunity_Act) (ECOA) in the US mentions a similar right, as does the Loi pour une République numérique (loi numérique) in France. However, unlike the ECOA and loi numérique, the GDPR's right to explanation is [not legally binding](https://iapp.org/news/a/is-there-a-right-to-explanation-for-machine-learning-in-the-gdpr/).", "resc": "This will resolve on the date that the European Union passes a law which protects the individual's general right to explanation, requiring algorithms to explain to users which data was relevant in algorithmic decisions. This law need not be in the same form described in Recital 71 of GDPR. This law must apply to automated decisions generally within the EU, not targeted only in narrow purposes or domains (e.g. ECOA only applies to adverse credit decisions)", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a whole human genome in 2026 will be 194 times the cost in 2021 USD?", "desc": "A genome consists of all of the DNA contained in a cell's nucleus. DNA is composed of four bases (abbreviated G, A, T, and C), with the biological information encoded within DNA determined by the order of those bases. [Sequencing a genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whole_genome_sequencing) involves using various techniques to ascertain the order in which these bases are present in the DNA of an individual organism.\n\nThe first human genome sequencing was completed around 2001. Since then, technological advancements have enabled the cost of the procedure to drop rapidly. According to the _National Human Genome Research Institute_, sequencing a human genome cost over US$10 million in 2006, and only around US$562 in 2021. The cost data, graphs, and methods can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a whole human genome in the year 2026, accrding to the [US National Human Genome Research Institute](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost). This question resolve as the average of all values reported for 2026 (expected to be quarterly), and will be indexed to 2021 USD using the [CPI](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL). To account for data revisions, this will resolve based on the latest report published by NHGRI by December 31, 2027.\n\nIf NHGRI does not provide this data by December 31, 2027, Metaculus may select any successor organization with similar data or methodology, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "70.9", "median": "116", "upper_75": "194", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the EU will adopt legally binding regulations protecting the individual's right to explanation by 2025?", "desc": "The EU has already adopted the [General Data Protection Regulation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Data_Protection_Regulation) (GDPR), which, in Recital 71, notes that data subjects have a [right to explanation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_to_explanation). The [Equal Credit Opportunity Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equal_Credit_Opportunity_Act) (ECOA) in the US mentions a similar right, as does the Loi pour une République numérique (loi numérique) in France. However, unlike the ECOA and loi numérique, the GDPR's right to explanation is [not legally binding](https://iapp.org/news/a/is-there-a-right-to-explanation-for-machine-learning-in-the-gdpr/).", "resc": "This will resolve on the date that the European Union passes a law which protects the individual's general right to explanation, requiring algorithms to explain to users which data was relevant in algorithmic decisions. This law need not be in the same form described in Recital 71 of GDPR. This law must apply to automated decisions generally within the EU, not targeted only in narrow purposes or domains (e.g. ECOA only applies to adverse credit decisions)", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a whole human genome in 2026 will be 194 times the cost in 2021 USD?", "desc": "A genome consists of all of the DNA contained in a cell's nucleus. DNA is composed of four bases (abbreviated G, A, T, and C), with the biological information encoded within DNA determined by the order of those bases. [Sequencing a genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whole_genome_sequencing) involves using various techniques to ascertain the order in which these bases are present in the DNA of an individual organism.\n\nThe first human genome sequencing was completed around 2001. Since then, technological advancements have enabled the cost of the procedure to drop rapidly. According to the _National Human Genome Research Institute_, sequencing a human genome cost over US$10 million in 2006, and only around US$562 in 2021. The cost data, graphs, and methods can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a whole human genome in the year 2026, accrding to the [US National Human Genome Research Institute](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost). This question resolve as the average of all values reported for 2026 (expected to be quarterly), and will be indexed to 2021 USD using the [CPI](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL). To account for data revisions, this will resolve based on the latest report published by NHGRI by December 31, 2027.\n\nIf NHGRI does not provide this data by December 31, 2027, Metaculus may select any successor organization with similar data or methodology, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "70.9", "median": "116", "upper_75": "194", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first human baby will be born, whose embryo was polygenically selected from a cohort of at least 50 simultaneously obtained ova by 2035?", "desc": "[In vitro fertilization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_vitro_fertilisation) (IVF) is a fertilization procedure in which ova are removed from a woman and combined with sperm in a laboratory culture, and a resulting embryo is implanted into the woman's or a surrogate patient's uterus. Combining sperm with extracted ova results in multiple viable embryos. Embryo selection involves genetically sequencing these embryos to determine probabilities of the traits that they may produce. Most traits, such as low susceptibility to certain diseases or intelligence, are influenced by the interaction of many genes, i.e. they are polygenic, so a statistical analysis is performed on the genome to determine a score based on the probabilities of different traits of interest. The embryo with the most desirable score is then implanted. This is known as polygenic embryo selection.\n\nThis confers a limited advantage, however, since the number of ova that can be extracted in an IVF cycle is very low, and so the best of the embryos is unlikely to be significantly better than the average.\n\nThere is currently no technology that can yield larger numbers of ova simultaneously. If this were possible, one could perform polygenic selection on the large number of resulting embryos, where selection would yield large advantages: massive multiple embryo selection (MMES). The possible routes to MMES may look like, for example:\n\n1. New fertility drugs that induce the creation of larger numbers of ova in a cycle.\n2. Stem cell technology that would allow us to obtain a large number of the woman's stem cells — a primordial kind of cell that can turn into any other kind of cell — and then induce them to turn into eggs. Large numbers of ova may be able to be obtained in this way.", "resc": "This question will be resolved on the date of birth of the first human baby whose embryo was polygenically selected from a cohort of at least 50 simultaneously obtained ova. All of the eggs in this polygenic selection must be obtained from the same individual simultaneously (and not, for example, over multiple IVF cycles and preserved).\n\nReports in credible media sources will be sufficient for resolution", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will adopt national general-purpose data protection regulations by 2040 or later?", "desc": "The EU has already adopted the [General Data Protection Regulation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Data_Protection_Regulation) (GDPR), which outlines the rights of data subjects. In the state of California, the [California Consumer Privacy Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_Consumer_Privacy_Act) (CPPA) guarantees similar rights surrounding personal data. However, the US Federal Government has no similar legislation.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that federal legislation is passed in the US which guarantees the individual's [right of access](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_of_access_to_personal_data), that is the right of a data subject to access personal data collected on them and to know how that data is collected. Other data protection laws already exist, such as the [Fair Credit Reporting Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair_Credit_Reporting_Act) which establishes the individual's rights to data on credit reporting; this question pertains to a law protecting the right of access for data collected in general terms, which is applicable to at least 66% of the US population. The legislation need not consider the right to be forgotten or the right to object. Official announcements from the US government or credible media reports may suffice as a source", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Christie's auction for a single NFT will realize a price of less than $500,000 in 2030 (in 2021 USD)?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [By 2030, how much will the most expensive NFT be sold for, in 2020 USD?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6804/most-expensive-nft-by-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOne of the most notable, recent highlights in the cryptocurrency industry was the [Christie's auction of a non-fungible token](https://onlineonly.christies.com/s/beeple-first-5000-days/beeple-b-1981-1/112924) (NFT). It represented a digital artwork by Beeple, called EVERYDAYS: THE FIRST 5000 DAYS, and realized $69,346,250 on March 11, 2021. As of December 2021, a non-exhaustive list of the highest-yielding, closed, NFT auctions is as follows:\n\n* EVERYDAYS: THE FIRST 5000 DAYS by Beeple (Christie's sale for $69,346,250)\n* HUMAN ONE by Beeple (Christie's sale for $28,985,000)\n* Bored Ape Yacht Club #8746 by YUGA LABS (Christie's sale for HKD 9,610,000)\n* The Fungible by Pak (Sotheby's sale for $16,825,999)\n* REPLICATOR by Mad Dog Jones (Phillip's sale for $4,144,000)\n* Quantum by Kevin McCoy (Sotheby's sale for $1,472,000)\n\nIn these cases, the NFT is a digital record that tracks verifiable ownership of the digital artwork.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the highest price paid ([inflation-adjusted to 2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL)) for one [Non-Fungible Token](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-fungible_token#Standards_in_blockchains) (NFT) auctioned by [Christie's](https://www.christies.com/) in the year 2030. A \"Non-Fungible Token\" for the purposes of this question will include any unique token which can be exchanged and recorded on a [cryptographic blockchain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain) (that is, not just restricted to [ERC-721](http://erc721.org/) or [Etherium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethereum)-based NFT systems). Resolution may come from official announcements by Art Basel, credible media reports, or public blockchain data.\n\nIn the case where no NFTs are auctioned by Christie's in 2030, or if NFTs are auctioned but do not close, this question will resolve as <$500k USD. If payment is made in currency other than USD, the value will be converted to USD according to public exchange rates at the time of sale (then [inflation-adjusted to 2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL)). If Christie's no longer auctions art or high-value products of any kind, this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\nNote that this question does not measure [the most expensive NFT sold](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6804/most-expensive-nft-by-2030/) *by 2030*, but the most expensive NFT sold by Christie's *in only the year 2030*", "lower_25": "< 500k", "median": "512k", "upper_75": "2.56M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total fertility rate will be 1.14 in 2031?", "desc": "China repealed its [one-child policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-child_policy) in 2015. It now allows people to have up to [three children](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/31/world/asia/china-three-child-policy.html). \n Some commenters [have predicted](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/coming-demographic-collapse-china-180960) that China will \"demographically collapse\". In an attempt to increase fertility and to avert [the problems associated with an aging population](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aging_of_China), China [is encouraging](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/10/china-editorial-says-communist-party-members-must-have-three-children) members of the CPC to have three children. China had a [total fertility rate (TFR)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) of [only](https://www.reuters.com/article/china-society-census-fertility-idUSL4N2MY140) 1.3 in 2020, well below the replacement level. Here we ask if these attempts will succeed. Richard Hanania [called](https://twitter.com/RichardHanania/status/1478826248071618563) Chinese TFR the \"world's most important metric in the next 20 years\".", "resc": "This question will resolve as China's total births per woman in the year 2031, according to [The World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=CN)", "lower_25": "0.966", "median": "1.14", "upper_75": "1.32", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will adopt national general-purpose data protection regulations by 2040 or later?", "desc": "The EU has already adopted the [General Data Protection Regulation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Data_Protection_Regulation) (GDPR), which outlines the rights of data subjects. In the state of California, the [California Consumer Privacy Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_Consumer_Privacy_Act) (CPPA) guarantees similar rights surrounding personal data. However, the US Federal Government has no similar legislation.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that federal legislation is passed in the US which guarantees the individual's [right of access](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_of_access_to_personal_data), that is the right of a data subject to access personal data collected on them and to know how that data is collected. Other data protection laws already exist, such as the [Fair Credit Reporting Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair_Credit_Reporting_Act) which establishes the individual's rights to data on credit reporting; this question pertains to a law protecting the right of access for data collected in general terms, which is applicable to at least 66% of the US population. The legislation need not consider the right to be forgotten or the right to object. Official announcements from the US government or credible media reports may suffice as a source", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a reusable single-stage-to-orbit vehicle will deliver a payload to orbit by Nov 24, 2035?", "desc": "In an effort to drive launch prices down, [SpaceX](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX) and other \"new space\" launch providers have been developing and flying multi-stage rockets, aiming towards [full reusability of the all stages](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reusable_launch_system). \n\nAnother concept for reusable launchers are [single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) vehicles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-stage-to-orbit). Such vehicles would provide launch cost saving by eliminating the need for different stages, be they reusable or not. However, SSTOs must try to squeeze out the necessary engine performance, while drastically reducing structural weight, and still be able to reliably deliver a meaningful payload in orbit. Several [reusable SSTO concepts](https://scholar.afit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4552&context=etd) have been proposed.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that a [single-stage-to-orbit vehicle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-stage-to-orbit) successfully places a payload in orbit ([above 100km in altitude](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C3%A1rm%C3%A1n_line)), and returns in a condition to be able to be reused. Statements by the Launch provider, National Space Agencies, and credible media reports may suffice as a resolution source.\n\nThe payload should be a minimum of 1 kg, and should be operational after being deployed in orbit. If it is determined that the payload has been damaged due to the fault of the SSTO vehicle, that launch will not qualify to resolve; if the payload is inoperational due to no fault of the SSTO vehicle, this will resolve the question", "lower_25": "Nov 24, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2036", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2036", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Christie's auction for a single NFT will realize a price of less than $500,000 in 2030 (in 2021 USD)?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [By 2030, how much will the most expensive NFT be sold for, in 2020 USD?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6804/most-expensive-nft-by-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOne of the most notable, recent highlights in the cryptocurrency industry was the [Christie's auction of a non-fungible token](https://onlineonly.christies.com/s/beeple-first-5000-days/beeple-b-1981-1/112924) (NFT). It represented a digital artwork by Beeple, called EVERYDAYS: THE FIRST 5000 DAYS, and realized $69,346,250 on March 11, 2021. As of December 2021, a non-exhaustive list of the highest-yielding, closed, NFT auctions is as follows:\n\n* EVERYDAYS: THE FIRST 5000 DAYS by Beeple (Christie's sale for $69,346,250)\n* HUMAN ONE by Beeple (Christie's sale for $28,985,000)\n* Bored Ape Yacht Club #8746 by YUGA LABS (Christie's sale for HKD 9,610,000)\n* The Fungible by Pak (Sotheby's sale for $16,825,999)\n* REPLICATOR by Mad Dog Jones (Phillip's sale for $4,144,000)\n* Quantum by Kevin McCoy (Sotheby's sale for $1,472,000)\n\nIn these cases, the NFT is a digital record that tracks verifiable ownership of the digital artwork.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the highest price paid ([inflation-adjusted to 2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL)) for one [Non-Fungible Token](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-fungible_token#Standards_in_blockchains) (NFT) auctioned by [Christie's](https://www.christies.com/) in the year 2030. A \"Non-Fungible Token\" for the purposes of this question will include any unique token which can be exchanged and recorded on a [cryptographic blockchain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain) (that is, not just restricted to [ERC-721](http://erc721.org/) or [Etherium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethereum)-based NFT systems). Resolution may come from official announcements by Art Basel, credible media reports, or public blockchain data.\n\nIn the case where no NFTs are auctioned by Christie's in 2030, or if NFTs are auctioned but do not close, this question will resolve as <$500k USD. If payment is made in currency other than USD, the value will be converted to USD according to public exchange rates at the time of sale (then [inflation-adjusted to 2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL)). If Christie's no longer auctions art or high-value products of any kind, this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\nNote that this question does not measure [the most expensive NFT sold](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6804/most-expensive-nft-by-2030/) *by 2030*, but the most expensive NFT sold by Christie's *in only the year 2030*", "lower_25": "< 500k", "median": "512k", "upper_75": "2.56M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 42.6% of Hispanic or Latino voters will vote Republican in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "In the 2020 election, [37 percent](https://www.dropbox.com/s/ka9n5gzxwotfu1a/wh2020_public_release_crosstabs.xlsx?dl=0) of Latinos who voted for Democrats or Republicans voted for the Republicans. This represented an increase from 29 percent in 2016 and 30 percent in 2012. In December 2021, a [poll](https://twitter.com/RichardHanania/status/1473152045884583936) showed that Latinos had a lower approval rating of President Biden than Whites. [Multiple](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/oct/5/editorial-democrats-conservative-hispanic-problem/) [commentators](https://www.aei.org/op-eds/defund-the-police-cost-democrats-hispanic-and-black-votes/) have [discussed](https://www.npr.org/2021/07/11/1014967344/latino-voters-are-leaving-the-democratic-party) this shift of Latinos toward the Republican Party in 2020.\n\n***What percentage of Hispanic voters will vote Republican in 2024?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the value R/(D+R) where D is the total number of votes Latinos cast for the Democatic candidate in the 2024 Presidential election and R is the number of votes Latinos cast for the Republican candidate, as reported by [Catalist.](https://www.dropbox.com/s/ka9n5gzxwotfu1a/wh2020_public_release_crosstabs.xlsx?dl=0)", "lower_25": "39.0", "median": "42.6", "upper_75": "46.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a reusable single-stage-to-orbit vehicle will deliver a payload to orbit by Nov 24, 2035?", "desc": "In an effort to drive launch prices down, [SpaceX](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX) and other \"new space\" launch providers have been developing and flying multi-stage rockets, aiming towards [full reusability of the all stages](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reusable_launch_system). \n\nAnother concept for reusable launchers are [single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) vehicles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-stage-to-orbit). Such vehicles would provide launch cost saving by eliminating the need for different stages, be they reusable or not. However, SSTOs must try to squeeze out the necessary engine performance, while drastically reducing structural weight, and still be able to reliably deliver a meaningful payload in orbit. Several [reusable SSTO concepts](https://scholar.afit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4552&context=etd) have been proposed.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that a [single-stage-to-orbit vehicle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-stage-to-orbit) successfully places a payload in orbit ([above 100km in altitude](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C3%A1rm%C3%A1n_line)), and returns in a condition to be able to be reused. Statements by the Launch provider, National Space Agencies, and credible media reports may suffice as a resolution source.\n\nThe payload should be a minimum of 1 kg, and should be operational after being deployed in orbit. If it is determined that the payload has been damaged due to the fault of the SSTO vehicle, that launch will not qualify to resolve; if the payload is inoperational due to no fault of the SSTO vehicle, this will resolve the question", "lower_25": "Nov 24, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2036", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2036", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first human baby will be born, whose embryo was polygenically selected from a cohort of at least 50 simultaneously obtained ova by 2035?", "desc": "[In vitro fertilization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_vitro_fertilisation) (IVF) is a fertilization procedure in which ova are removed from a woman and combined with sperm in a laboratory culture, and a resulting embryo is implanted into the woman's or a surrogate patient's uterus. Combining sperm with extracted ova results in multiple viable embryos. Embryo selection involves genetically sequencing these embryos to determine probabilities of the traits that they may produce. Most traits, such as low susceptibility to certain diseases or intelligence, are influenced by the interaction of many genes, i.e. they are polygenic, so a statistical analysis is performed on the genome to determine a score based on the probabilities of different traits of interest. The embryo with the most desirable score is then implanted. This is known as polygenic embryo selection.\n\nThis confers a limited advantage, however, since the number of ova that can be extracted in an IVF cycle is very low, and so the best of the embryos is unlikely to be significantly better than the average.\n\nThere is currently no technology that can yield larger numbers of ova simultaneously. If this were possible, one could perform polygenic selection on the large number of resulting embryos, where selection would yield large advantages: massive multiple embryo selection (MMES). The possible routes to MMES may look like, for example:\n\n1. New fertility drugs that induce the creation of larger numbers of ova in a cycle.\n2. Stem cell technology that would allow us to obtain a large number of the woman's stem cells — a primordial kind of cell that can turn into any other kind of cell — and then induce them to turn into eggs. Large numbers of ova may be able to be obtained in this way.", "resc": "This question will be resolved on the date of birth of the first human baby whose embryo was polygenically selected from a cohort of at least 50 simultaneously obtained ova. All of the eggs in this polygenic selection must be obtained from the same individual simultaneously (and not, for example, over multiple IVF cycles and preserved).\n\nReports in credible media sources will be sufficient for resolution", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Christie's auction for a single NFT will realize a price of less than $500,000 in 2030 (in 2021 USD)?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [By 2030, how much will the most expensive NFT be sold for, in 2020 USD?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6804/most-expensive-nft-by-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOne of the most notable, recent highlights in the cryptocurrency industry was the [Christie's auction of a non-fungible token](https://onlineonly.christies.com/s/beeple-first-5000-days/beeple-b-1981-1/112924) (NFT). It represented a digital artwork by Beeple, called EVERYDAYS: THE FIRST 5000 DAYS, and realized $69,346,250 on March 11, 2021. As of December 2021, a non-exhaustive list of the highest-yielding, closed, NFT auctions is as follows:\n\n* EVERYDAYS: THE FIRST 5000 DAYS by Beeple (Christie's sale for $69,346,250)\n* HUMAN ONE by Beeple (Christie's sale for $28,985,000)\n* Bored Ape Yacht Club #8746 by YUGA LABS (Christie's sale for HKD 9,610,000)\n* The Fungible by Pak (Sotheby's sale for $16,825,999)\n* REPLICATOR by Mad Dog Jones (Phillip's sale for $4,144,000)\n* Quantum by Kevin McCoy (Sotheby's sale for $1,472,000)\n\nIn these cases, the NFT is a digital record that tracks verifiable ownership of the digital artwork.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the highest price paid ([inflation-adjusted to 2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL)) for one [Non-Fungible Token](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-fungible_token#Standards_in_blockchains) (NFT) auctioned by [Christie's](https://www.christies.com/) in the year 2030. A \"Non-Fungible Token\" for the purposes of this question will include any unique token which can be exchanged and recorded on a [cryptographic blockchain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain) (that is, not just restricted to [ERC-721](http://erc721.org/) or [Etherium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethereum)-based NFT systems). Resolution may come from official announcements by Art Basel, credible media reports, or public blockchain data.\n\nIn the case where no NFTs are auctioned by Christie's in 2030, or if NFTs are auctioned but do not close, this question will resolve as <$500k USD. If payment is made in currency other than USD, the value will be converted to USD according to public exchange rates at the time of sale (then [inflation-adjusted to 2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL)). If Christie's no longer auctions art or high-value products of any kind, this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\nNote that this question does not measure [the most expensive NFT sold](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6804/most-expensive-nft-by-2030/) *by 2030*, but the most expensive NFT sold by Christie's *in only the year 2030*", "lower_25": "< 500k", "median": "512k", "upper_75": "2.56M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Arianespace's revenue (2021 EUR) will be 1.00B in 2025?", "desc": "New space companies like [SpaceX](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spacex) have been [driving launch prices down](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_launch_market_competition) through a combination of technical (launcher reusability) and organizational (lean production, flat organization, etc.) effects.\n\nEstablished launch providers are struggling to adapt. For example, Europe's launch provider, [Arianespace](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arianespace) has seen its position in the commercial launch market [undermined by SpaceX](https://arstechnica.com/science/2018/07/as-the-spacex-steamroller-surges-european-rocket-industry-vows-to-resist/). The company is attempting to adapt by developing the [6th version of its Ariane rocket line](https://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Space_Transportation/Launch_vehicles/Ariane_6), developing [its own capabilities for reusability](https://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Space_Engineering_Technology/ESA_plans_demonstration_of_a_reusable_rocket_stage), and [adapting its management structure](https://www.ariane.group/en/news/airbus-saran-launchers-becomes-74-percent-shareholder-arianespace/). It is however uncertain if and how it could reclaim its position as market leader. Considering its importance as Europe's independent provider of access to space, this could have significant consequences. Arianespace reported a revenue of [1.25 Billion euros in 2021](https://www.arianespace.com/press-release/arianespace-consolidates-leadership-in-commercial-launch-market-with-15-successful-ariane-soyuz-and-vega-launches-in-2021-and-revenue-growth-of-30-while-gearing-up-for-another-busy-year/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as Arianespace's annual revenue for 2025 ([in 2021 inflation-adjusted EUR](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPHPTT01EZM661N)), according to [Ariannespace](https://www.arianespace.com/press-release/arianespace-consolidates-leadership-in-commercial-launch-market-with-15-successful-ariane-soyuz-and-vega-launches-in-2021-and-revenue-growth-of-30-while-gearing-up-for-another-busy-year/). If Arianespace does not publish this data, estimates by credible media reports may be used.\n\nIf no data is available, or if Arianespace is no longer in business, this question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "1.00B", "median": "1.23B", "upper_75": "1.42B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total fertility rate will be 1.14 in 2031?", "desc": "China repealed its [one-child policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-child_policy) in 2015. It now allows people to have up to [three children](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/31/world/asia/china-three-child-policy.html). \n Some commenters [have predicted](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/coming-demographic-collapse-china-180960) that China will \"demographically collapse\". In an attempt to increase fertility and to avert [the problems associated with an aging population](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aging_of_China), China [is encouraging](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/10/china-editorial-says-communist-party-members-must-have-three-children) members of the CPC to have three children. China had a [total fertility rate (TFR)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) of [only](https://www.reuters.com/article/china-society-census-fertility-idUSL4N2MY140) 1.3 in 2020, well below the replacement level. Here we ask if these attempts will succeed. Richard Hanania [called](https://twitter.com/RichardHanania/status/1478826248071618563) Chinese TFR the \"world's most important metric in the next 20 years\".", "resc": "This question will resolve as China's total births per woman in the year 2031, according to [The World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=CN)", "lower_25": "0.966", "median": "1.14", "upper_75": "1.32", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total fertility rate will be 1.14 in 2031?", "desc": "China repealed its [one-child policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-child_policy) in 2015. It now allows people to have up to [three children](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/31/world/asia/china-three-child-policy.html). \n Some commenters [have predicted](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/coming-demographic-collapse-china-180960) that China will \"demographically collapse\". In an attempt to increase fertility and to avert [the problems associated with an aging population](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aging_of_China), China [is encouraging](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/10/china-editorial-says-communist-party-members-must-have-three-children) members of the CPC to have three children. China had a [total fertility rate (TFR)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) of [only](https://www.reuters.com/article/china-society-census-fertility-idUSL4N2MY140) 1.3 in 2020, well below the replacement level. Here we ask if these attempts will succeed. Richard Hanania [called](https://twitter.com/RichardHanania/status/1478826248071618563) Chinese TFR the \"world's most important metric in the next 20 years\".", "resc": "This question will resolve as China's total births per woman in the year 2031, according to [The World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=CN)", "lower_25": "0.966", "median": "1.14", "upper_75": "1.32", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Arianespace's revenue (2021 EUR) will be 1.00B in 2025?", "desc": "New space companies like [SpaceX](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spacex) have been [driving launch prices down](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_launch_market_competition) through a combination of technical (launcher reusability) and organizational (lean production, flat organization, etc.) effects.\n\nEstablished launch providers are struggling to adapt. For example, Europe's launch provider, [Arianespace](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arianespace) has seen its position in the commercial launch market [undermined by SpaceX](https://arstechnica.com/science/2018/07/as-the-spacex-steamroller-surges-european-rocket-industry-vows-to-resist/). The company is attempting to adapt by developing the [6th version of its Ariane rocket line](https://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Space_Transportation/Launch_vehicles/Ariane_6), developing [its own capabilities for reusability](https://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Space_Engineering_Technology/ESA_plans_demonstration_of_a_reusable_rocket_stage), and [adapting its management structure](https://www.ariane.group/en/news/airbus-saran-launchers-becomes-74-percent-shareholder-arianespace/). It is however uncertain if and how it could reclaim its position as market leader. Considering its importance as Europe's independent provider of access to space, this could have significant consequences. Arianespace reported a revenue of [1.25 Billion euros in 2021](https://www.arianespace.com/press-release/arianespace-consolidates-leadership-in-commercial-launch-market-with-15-successful-ariane-soyuz-and-vega-launches-in-2021-and-revenue-growth-of-30-while-gearing-up-for-another-busy-year/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as Arianespace's annual revenue for 2025 ([in 2021 inflation-adjusted EUR](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPHPTT01EZM661N)), according to [Ariannespace](https://www.arianespace.com/press-release/arianespace-consolidates-leadership-in-commercial-launch-market-with-15-successful-ariane-soyuz-and-vega-launches-in-2021-and-revenue-growth-of-30-while-gearing-up-for-another-busy-year/). If Arianespace does not publish this data, estimates by credible media reports may be used.\n\nIf no data is available, or if Arianespace is no longer in business, this question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "1.00B", "median": "1.23B", "upper_75": "1.42B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Arianespace's revenue (2021 EUR) will be 1.00B in 2025?", "desc": "New space companies like [SpaceX](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spacex) have been [driving launch prices down](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_launch_market_competition) through a combination of technical (launcher reusability) and organizational (lean production, flat organization, etc.) effects.\n\nEstablished launch providers are struggling to adapt. For example, Europe's launch provider, [Arianespace](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arianespace) has seen its position in the commercial launch market [undermined by SpaceX](https://arstechnica.com/science/2018/07/as-the-spacex-steamroller-surges-european-rocket-industry-vows-to-resist/). The company is attempting to adapt by developing the [6th version of its Ariane rocket line](https://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Space_Transportation/Launch_vehicles/Ariane_6), developing [its own capabilities for reusability](https://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Space_Engineering_Technology/ESA_plans_demonstration_of_a_reusable_rocket_stage), and [adapting its management structure](https://www.ariane.group/en/news/airbus-saran-launchers-becomes-74-percent-shareholder-arianespace/). It is however uncertain if and how it could reclaim its position as market leader. Considering its importance as Europe's independent provider of access to space, this could have significant consequences. Arianespace reported a revenue of [1.25 Billion euros in 2021](https://www.arianespace.com/press-release/arianespace-consolidates-leadership-in-commercial-launch-market-with-15-successful-ariane-soyuz-and-vega-launches-in-2021-and-revenue-growth-of-30-while-gearing-up-for-another-busy-year/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as Arianespace's annual revenue for 2025 ([in 2021 inflation-adjusted EUR](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPHPTT01EZM661N)), according to [Ariannespace](https://www.arianespace.com/press-release/arianespace-consolidates-leadership-in-commercial-launch-market-with-15-successful-ariane-soyuz-and-vega-launches-in-2021-and-revenue-growth-of-30-while-gearing-up-for-another-busy-year/). If Arianespace does not publish this data, estimates by credible media reports may be used.\n\nIf no data is available, or if Arianespace is no longer in business, this question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "1.00B", "median": "1.23B", "upper_75": "1.42B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a reusable single-stage-to-orbit vehicle will deliver a payload to orbit by Nov 24, 2035?", "desc": "In an effort to drive launch prices down, [SpaceX](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX) and other \"new space\" launch providers have been developing and flying multi-stage rockets, aiming towards [full reusability of the all stages](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reusable_launch_system). \n\nAnother concept for reusable launchers are [single-stage-to-orbit (SSTO) vehicles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-stage-to-orbit). Such vehicles would provide launch cost saving by eliminating the need for different stages, be they reusable or not. However, SSTOs must try to squeeze out the necessary engine performance, while drastically reducing structural weight, and still be able to reliably deliver a meaningful payload in orbit. Several [reusable SSTO concepts](https://scholar.afit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4552&context=etd) have been proposed.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that a [single-stage-to-orbit vehicle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single-stage-to-orbit) successfully places a payload in orbit ([above 100km in altitude](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C3%A1rm%C3%A1n_line)), and returns in a condition to be able to be reused. Statements by the Launch provider, National Space Agencies, and credible media reports may suffice as a resolution source.\n\nThe payload should be a minimum of 1 kg, and should be operational after being deployed in orbit. If it is determined that the payload has been damaged due to the fault of the SSTO vehicle, that launch will not qualify to resolve; if the payload is inoperational due to no fault of the SSTO vehicle, this will resolve the question", "lower_25": "Nov 24, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2036", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2036", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 42.6% of Hispanic or Latino voters will vote Republican in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "In the 2020 election, [37 percent](https://www.dropbox.com/s/ka9n5gzxwotfu1a/wh2020_public_release_crosstabs.xlsx?dl=0) of Latinos who voted for Democrats or Republicans voted for the Republicans. This represented an increase from 29 percent in 2016 and 30 percent in 2012. In December 2021, a [poll](https://twitter.com/RichardHanania/status/1473152045884583936) showed that Latinos had a lower approval rating of President Biden than Whites. [Multiple](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/oct/5/editorial-democrats-conservative-hispanic-problem/) [commentators](https://www.aei.org/op-eds/defund-the-police-cost-democrats-hispanic-and-black-votes/) have [discussed](https://www.npr.org/2021/07/11/1014967344/latino-voters-are-leaving-the-democratic-party) this shift of Latinos toward the Republican Party in 2020.\n\n***What percentage of Hispanic voters will vote Republican in 2024?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the value R/(D+R) where D is the total number of votes Latinos cast for the Democatic candidate in the 2024 Presidential election and R is the number of votes Latinos cast for the Republican candidate, as reported by [Catalist.](https://www.dropbox.com/s/ka9n5gzxwotfu1a/wh2020_public_release_crosstabs.xlsx?dl=0)", "lower_25": "39.0", "median": "42.6", "upper_75": "46.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 67.3 percentage of new passenger car sales will be all-electric in Australia in 2030?", "desc": "*(background text originally by @Grigfall)*\n\nAustralia has lagged many other developed countries when it comes to the adoption of electric vehicles (EVs). Whereas 75% of new passenger car sales in Norway in 2020 were EVs, only 1% were EVs in Australia, according to the [IEA](https://www.iea.org/articles/global-ev-data-explorer)\n\nThe Labor Opposition took a target of 50% EVs in new car sales by 2030 [to the last federal election](https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/apr/01/50-of-new-cars-to-be-electric-vehicles-by-2030-under-labor-climate-change-policy), which the Coalition Government said was a \"war on the weekend\" because EVs would not have \"the grunt\" to pull caravans or boats. However, [the Coalition's own modelling expects 25-50% EV share of new car sales by 2030.](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/apr/05/coalition-modelling-not-far-off-labors-electric-vehicle-target-despite-criticising-it)\n\n[The Coalition has since moderated its language around EVs,](https://thedriven.io/2021/04/01/morrison-now-claims-he-never-mocked-electric-vehicle-tecnology/) but car companies and their representatives have described Australia's EV policies as akin to \"a third world country\" (Volkswagen), a \"uniquely hostile market\" (Electric Vehicle Council) and lacking \"consistent and cohesive national targets and supporting policies\" (Nissan) ([source](https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/not-even-tesla-can-overcome-australia-s-hostility-to-electric-cars-20210414-p57izn.html))\n\nWe have one prediction already: [last year](https://www.afr.com/companies/energy/australia-to-lag-on-ev-sales-until-2030s-bnef-20200522-p54vfd) BloombergNEF predicted EVs as 18% of new car sales in 2030. The IEA also projects [global new EV sales](https://www.iea.org/articles/global-ev-data-explorer) to rise from 4.6% in 2020 to 17.3% under the trajectory of current national policies and industry development (their STEPS projection), potentially as high as 36% under their recommended policy scenario (SDS).", "resc": "The answer will be the share of new passenger vehicles sold in Australia in 2030 that are [battery electric vehicles or fuel cell electric vehicles](https://arena.gov.au/renewable-energy/electric-vehicles/) (i.e. excluding hybrid plug-in electric vehicles). This question will resolve according to the [International Energy Agency's annual global reports](https://www.iea.org/articles/global-ev-data-explorer), or another high-quality source of data if the IEA no longer reports this data", "lower_25": "37.9", "median": "50.8", "upper_75": "67.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will take 5.13 months for the first superintelligent AI to be created after a (weak) AGI is created?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [After an AGI is created, how many months will it be before the first superintelligence?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4123/after-an-agi-is-created-how-many-months-will-it-be-before-the-first-superintelligence/) (alternative resolution criteria)\n\n----\n\n*(background text by @[Matthew_Barnett](https://www.metaculus.com/accounts/profile/108770/))*\n\nFuturists have long speculated that upon the arrival of [artificial general intelligence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_general_intelligence), the first [superintelligent AI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superintelligence) will quickly follow. From I. J. Good, [writing in 1965](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0065245808604180),\n\n> Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an ‘intelligence explosion,' and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control.\n\nNick Bostrom wrote in his book *Superintelligence* (2014),\n\n> Note that one could think that it will take quite a long time until machines reach the human baseline, or one might be agnostic about how long that will take, and yet have a strong view that once this happens, the further ascent into strong superintelligence will be very rapid.\n\nand categorized takeoff durations into three types:\n\n* \"A slow takeoff is one that occurs over some long temporal interval, such as decades or centuries.\"\n\n* \"A fast takeoff occurs over some short temporal interval, such as minutes, hours, or days.\"\n\n* \"A moderate takeoff is one that occurs over some intermediary temporal interval, such as months or years.\"\n\nWhile it seems that most prominent thinkers are convinced that rapid technological and economic progress will follow the development of AGI (See [Paul Christiano](https://sideways-view.com/2018/02/24/takeoff-speeds/), [Robin Hanson](http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/aigrow.pdf), [Eliezer Yudkowsky](https://intelligence.org/files/IEM.pdf), [Ben Goertzel](http://multiverseaccordingtoben.blogspot.com/2011/01/hard-takeoff-hypothesis.html)), most AI researchers surveyed are not convinced. In 2016, AI Impacts [asked](https://aiimpacts.org/2016-expert-survey-on-progress-in-ai/) AI researchers,\n\n> Assume that HLMI will exist at some point. How likely do you then think it is that the rate of global technological improvement will dramatically increase (e.g. by a factor of ten) as a result of machine intelligence:\n\n> Within two years of that point? ___% chance\n\n> Within thirty years of that point? ___% chance\n\nThe median answer was 20% for the two year estimate and 80% for the thirty year estimate.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of months between the first development of a (weak) Artificial General Intelligence and a Superintelligent Artificial Intelligence, according to widespread media and historical consensus. If an AGI is not created before January 1, 2150, this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\n\"Artificial General Intelligence\" (AGI) is defined for the purposes of this question based on [another Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/when-will-the-first-artificial-general-intelligence-system-be-devised-tested-and-publicly-known-of/), the full (updated) definition of which is in the fine print.\n\n\"Superintelligent Artificial Intelligence\" (SAI) is defined for the purposes of this question as an AI which can perform any task humans can perform in 2021, as well or superior to the best humans in their domain. The SAI may be able to perform these tasks themselves, or be capable of designing sub-agents with these capabilities (for instance the SAI may design [robots capable of beating professional football players](www.robocup.org/objective) which are not successful brain surgeons, and design top brain surgeons which are not football players). Tasks include (but are not limited to): performing in top ranks among professional e-sports leagues, performing in top ranks among physical sports, preparing and serving food, providing emotional and psychotherapeutic support, discovering scientific insights which could win [2021 Nobel prizes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobel_Prize), creating original art and entertainment, and having professional-level software design and AI design capabilities.\n\nAs an AI improves in capacity, it may not be clear at which point the SAI has become able to perform any task as well as top humans. It will be defined that the AI is superintelligent if, in less than 7 days in a non-externally-constrained environment, the AI already has or can learn/invent the capacity to do any given task. A \"non-externally-constrained environment\" here means, for instance, access to the internet and compute and resources similar to contemporaneous AIs.", "lower_25": "5.13", "median": "26.2", "upper_75": "118", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 42.6% of Hispanic or Latino voters will vote Republican in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "In the 2020 election, [37 percent](https://www.dropbox.com/s/ka9n5gzxwotfu1a/wh2020_public_release_crosstabs.xlsx?dl=0) of Latinos who voted for Democrats or Republicans voted for the Republicans. This represented an increase from 29 percent in 2016 and 30 percent in 2012. In December 2021, a [poll](https://twitter.com/RichardHanania/status/1473152045884583936) showed that Latinos had a lower approval rating of President Biden than Whites. [Multiple](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/oct/5/editorial-democrats-conservative-hispanic-problem/) [commentators](https://www.aei.org/op-eds/defund-the-police-cost-democrats-hispanic-and-black-votes/) have [discussed](https://www.npr.org/2021/07/11/1014967344/latino-voters-are-leaving-the-democratic-party) this shift of Latinos toward the Republican Party in 2020.\n\n***What percentage of Hispanic voters will vote Republican in 2024?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the value R/(D+R) where D is the total number of votes Latinos cast for the Democatic candidate in the 2024 Presidential election and R is the number of votes Latinos cast for the Republican candidate, as reported by [Catalist.](https://www.dropbox.com/s/ka9n5gzxwotfu1a/wh2020_public_release_crosstabs.xlsx?dl=0)", "lower_25": "39.0", "median": "42.6", "upper_75": "46.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will take 5.13 months for the first superintelligent AI to be created after a (weak) AGI is created?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [After an AGI is created, how many months will it be before the first superintelligence?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4123/after-an-agi-is-created-how-many-months-will-it-be-before-the-first-superintelligence/) (alternative resolution criteria)\n\n----\n\n*(background text by @[Matthew_Barnett](https://www.metaculus.com/accounts/profile/108770/))*\n\nFuturists have long speculated that upon the arrival of [artificial general intelligence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_general_intelligence), the first [superintelligent AI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superintelligence) will quickly follow. From I. J. Good, [writing in 1965](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0065245808604180),\n\n> Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an ‘intelligence explosion,' and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control.\n\nNick Bostrom wrote in his book *Superintelligence* (2014),\n\n> Note that one could think that it will take quite a long time until machines reach the human baseline, or one might be agnostic about how long that will take, and yet have a strong view that once this happens, the further ascent into strong superintelligence will be very rapid.\n\nand categorized takeoff durations into three types:\n\n* \"A slow takeoff is one that occurs over some long temporal interval, such as decades or centuries.\"\n\n* \"A fast takeoff occurs over some short temporal interval, such as minutes, hours, or days.\"\n\n* \"A moderate takeoff is one that occurs over some intermediary temporal interval, such as months or years.\"\n\nWhile it seems that most prominent thinkers are convinced that rapid technological and economic progress will follow the development of AGI (See [Paul Christiano](https://sideways-view.com/2018/02/24/takeoff-speeds/), [Robin Hanson](http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/aigrow.pdf), [Eliezer Yudkowsky](https://intelligence.org/files/IEM.pdf), [Ben Goertzel](http://multiverseaccordingtoben.blogspot.com/2011/01/hard-takeoff-hypothesis.html)), most AI researchers surveyed are not convinced. In 2016, AI Impacts [asked](https://aiimpacts.org/2016-expert-survey-on-progress-in-ai/) AI researchers,\n\n> Assume that HLMI will exist at some point. How likely do you then think it is that the rate of global technological improvement will dramatically increase (e.g. by a factor of ten) as a result of machine intelligence:\n\n> Within two years of that point? ___% chance\n\n> Within thirty years of that point? ___% chance\n\nThe median answer was 20% for the two year estimate and 80% for the thirty year estimate.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of months between the first development of a (weak) Artificial General Intelligence and a Superintelligent Artificial Intelligence, according to widespread media and historical consensus. If an AGI is not created before January 1, 2150, this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\n\"Artificial General Intelligence\" (AGI) is defined for the purposes of this question based on [another Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/when-will-the-first-artificial-general-intelligence-system-be-devised-tested-and-publicly-known-of/), the full (updated) definition of which is in the fine print.\n\n\"Superintelligent Artificial Intelligence\" (SAI) is defined for the purposes of this question as an AI which can perform any task humans can perform in 2021, as well or superior to the best humans in their domain. The SAI may be able to perform these tasks themselves, or be capable of designing sub-agents with these capabilities (for instance the SAI may design [robots capable of beating professional football players](www.robocup.org/objective) which are not successful brain surgeons, and design top brain surgeons which are not football players). Tasks include (but are not limited to): performing in top ranks among professional e-sports leagues, performing in top ranks among physical sports, preparing and serving food, providing emotional and psychotherapeutic support, discovering scientific insights which could win [2021 Nobel prizes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobel_Prize), creating original art and entertainment, and having professional-level software design and AI design capabilities.\n\nAs an AI improves in capacity, it may not be clear at which point the SAI has become able to perform any task as well as top humans. It will be defined that the AI is superintelligent if, in less than 7 days in a non-externally-constrained environment, the AI already has or can learn/invent the capacity to do any given task. A \"non-externally-constrained environment\" here means, for instance, access to the internet and compute and resources similar to contemporaneous AIs.", "lower_25": "5.13", "median": "26.2", "upper_75": "118", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will take 5.13 months for the first superintelligent AI to be created after a (weak) AGI is created?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [After an AGI is created, how many months will it be before the first superintelligence?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4123/after-an-agi-is-created-how-many-months-will-it-be-before-the-first-superintelligence/) (alternative resolution criteria)\n\n----\n\n*(background text by @[Matthew_Barnett](https://www.metaculus.com/accounts/profile/108770/))*\n\nFuturists have long speculated that upon the arrival of [artificial general intelligence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_general_intelligence), the first [superintelligent AI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superintelligence) will quickly follow. From I. J. Good, [writing in 1965](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0065245808604180),\n\n> Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an ‘intelligence explosion,' and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control.\n\nNick Bostrom wrote in his book *Superintelligence* (2014),\n\n> Note that one could think that it will take quite a long time until machines reach the human baseline, or one might be agnostic about how long that will take, and yet have a strong view that once this happens, the further ascent into strong superintelligence will be very rapid.\n\nand categorized takeoff durations into three types:\n\n* \"A slow takeoff is one that occurs over some long temporal interval, such as decades or centuries.\"\n\n* \"A fast takeoff occurs over some short temporal interval, such as minutes, hours, or days.\"\n\n* \"A moderate takeoff is one that occurs over some intermediary temporal interval, such as months or years.\"\n\nWhile it seems that most prominent thinkers are convinced that rapid technological and economic progress will follow the development of AGI (See [Paul Christiano](https://sideways-view.com/2018/02/24/takeoff-speeds/), [Robin Hanson](http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/aigrow.pdf), [Eliezer Yudkowsky](https://intelligence.org/files/IEM.pdf), [Ben Goertzel](http://multiverseaccordingtoben.blogspot.com/2011/01/hard-takeoff-hypothesis.html)), most AI researchers surveyed are not convinced. In 2016, AI Impacts [asked](https://aiimpacts.org/2016-expert-survey-on-progress-in-ai/) AI researchers,\n\n> Assume that HLMI will exist at some point. How likely do you then think it is that the rate of global technological improvement will dramatically increase (e.g. by a factor of ten) as a result of machine intelligence:\n\n> Within two years of that point? ___% chance\n\n> Within thirty years of that point? ___% chance\n\nThe median answer was 20% for the two year estimate and 80% for the thirty year estimate.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of months between the first development of a (weak) Artificial General Intelligence and a Superintelligent Artificial Intelligence, according to widespread media and historical consensus. If an AGI is not created before January 1, 2150, this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\n\"Artificial General Intelligence\" (AGI) is defined for the purposes of this question based on [another Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/when-will-the-first-artificial-general-intelligence-system-be-devised-tested-and-publicly-known-of/), the full (updated) definition of which is in the fine print.\n\n\"Superintelligent Artificial Intelligence\" (SAI) is defined for the purposes of this question as an AI which can perform any task humans can perform in 2021, as well or superior to the best humans in their domain. The SAI may be able to perform these tasks themselves, or be capable of designing sub-agents with these capabilities (for instance the SAI may design [robots capable of beating professional football players](www.robocup.org/objective) which are not successful brain surgeons, and design top brain surgeons which are not football players). Tasks include (but are not limited to): performing in top ranks among professional e-sports leagues, performing in top ranks among physical sports, preparing and serving food, providing emotional and psychotherapeutic support, discovering scientific insights which could win [2021 Nobel prizes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobel_Prize), creating original art and entertainment, and having professional-level software design and AI design capabilities.\n\nAs an AI improves in capacity, it may not be clear at which point the SAI has become able to perform any task as well as top humans. It will be defined that the AI is superintelligent if, in less than 7 days in a non-externally-constrained environment, the AI already has or can learn/invent the capacity to do any given task. A \"non-externally-constrained environment\" here means, for instance, access to the internet and compute and resources similar to contemporaneous AIs.", "lower_25": "5.13", "median": "26.2", "upper_75": "118", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Thwaites Eastern Ice Shelf will collapse by Aug 2027?", "desc": "Ice shelves are permanent floating sheets of ice that connect to a landmass. Most of the world's ice shelves hug the coast of Antarctica. Because ice shelves already float in the ocean, they [do not contribute directly to sea level rise](https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/quickfacts/iceshelves.html) when they break up. However, ice shelf collapse could contribute to sea level rise indirectly. Thwaites Glacier is the size of Florida. It is the cork in the bottle of the entire West Antarctic ice sheet, which contains [enough ice to raise sea levels](https://cires.colorado.edu/news/threat-thwaites-retreat-antarctica%E2%80%99s-riskiest-glacier) by [10 feet](https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/doomsday-glacier-thwaites-antarctica-climate-crisis-1273841/).\n\nGlaciologist Professor Ted Scambos [said to the BBC in December 2021](https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-59644494):\n\n>There is going to be dramatic change in the front of the glacier, **probably in less than a decade.** Both published and unpublished studies point in that direction [...] This will accelerate the pace (of Thwaites) and widen, effectively, the dangerous part of the glacier\n\nA collaborative report by Erin C. Pettit et al. [predicted](https://agu.confex.com/agu/fm21/meetingapp.cgi/Paper/978762):\n\n>We have mapped out weaker and stronger areas of the ice shelf and suggest a “zig-zag” pathway the fractures might take through the ice, ultimately **leading to break up of the shelf in as little as 5 years**, which result in more ice flowing off the continent.", "resc": "This question will resolve when over 50% of the Thwaites Eastern Ice Shelf has collapsed or melted, according to [The International Thwaites Glacier Collaboration](https://thwaitesglacier.org/), or from credible reports by media and government agencies. The collapsed extent of the Thwaites Eastern Ice Shelf should be in comparison to its extent in December 2021. Other events such as the melting, collapse, falling into the sea of other glaciers or ice sheets, or any corresponding sea level rise, are not relevant to the resolution of this question", "lower_25": "Feb 2026", "median": "Aug 2027", "upper_75": "Nov 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Chesapeake Bay will receive a grade of A- or higher from UMD's Eco Health Report Card by 2091?", "desc": "The [Chesapeake Bay](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chesapeake_Bay) is the largest estuary in the United States and an important natural resource in the mid-Atlantic region. Economically significant fisheries include blue crab, oysters, striped bass and many more. In 1607, George Percy of the Jamestown Colony wrote that oysters in the bay [\"lay on the ground as thick as stones\"](http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/pds/amerbegin/settlement/text1/JamestownPercyObservations.pdf). The bay was a breadbasket for early settlers and [still is for the region.](https://www.cbf.org/issues/what-we-have-to-lose/economic-importance-of-the-bay/)\n\nUnfortunately, the Chesapeake Bay's health has floundered in the 20th century due to upstream nutrient pollution, excess stormwater runoff and overfishing. Climate change and consequential sea level rise is also a concern. Local residents often [avoid swimming in it](https://www.thebaynet.com/articles/0921/do-you-swim-in-the-chesapeake-bay-poll-shows-many-southern-marylanders-prefer-not-to2.html). Over the past half century, organizations like the [Chesapeake Bay Foundation](https://www.cbf.org) have endeavored to restore the bay with varying results. 1998's [Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act](https://www.deq.virginia.gov/water/chesapeake-bay/chesapeake-bay-preservation-act) was a first attempt to tackle the bay's many coordination issues. Recently, progress has increased. In late 2010, the EPA [issued a TMDL](https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2014-12/documents/bay_tmdl_executive_summary_final_12.29.10_final_1.pdf) for the watershed to help curb nutrient input (the bay's watershed includes the states of Delaware, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia and all of the city of Washington, D.C.). DC's [Clean River Project](https://www.dcwater.com/cleanrivers) uses impact bonds to build the infrastructure necessary to store stormwater runoff.\n\nThe University of Maryland's Center for Environmental Science gave the bay a \"C\" grade in its [most recent report, in 2020](https://ecoreportcard.org). Since the report began in 1986, the bay's overall score has remained between \"C+\" and \"D+\" (55 to 36 out of 100).", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when UMD's annual [Eco Health Report Card](https://ecoreportcard.org/report-cards/chesapeake-bay/bay-health/) issues the Chesapeake Bay a grade of \"A-\" or higher (80 or more out of a score of 100). The resolution date will be the date that the report is published. This question will resolve for the score for the Chesapeake Bay, **not** the Chesapeake Bay's watershed. If the University of Maryland does not issue updated reporting for a period of 5 years or more, and there is no clear successor organization using similar methodology, this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\nIf UMD changes their scoring to use a different scale, Metaculus Admins may estimate the score for Chesapeake Bay's overall health re-scaled to a 0 to 100 scale. If for 5 consecutive years, UMD's methodology changes significantly to make such a conversion ambiguous, this question will resolve ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2057", "median": "2073", "upper_75": "2091", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Thwaites Eastern Ice Shelf will collapse by Aug 2027?", "desc": "Ice shelves are permanent floating sheets of ice that connect to a landmass. Most of the world's ice shelves hug the coast of Antarctica. Because ice shelves already float in the ocean, they [do not contribute directly to sea level rise](https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/quickfacts/iceshelves.html) when they break up. However, ice shelf collapse could contribute to sea level rise indirectly. Thwaites Glacier is the size of Florida. It is the cork in the bottle of the entire West Antarctic ice sheet, which contains [enough ice to raise sea levels](https://cires.colorado.edu/news/threat-thwaites-retreat-antarctica%E2%80%99s-riskiest-glacier) by [10 feet](https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/doomsday-glacier-thwaites-antarctica-climate-crisis-1273841/).\n\nGlaciologist Professor Ted Scambos [said to the BBC in December 2021](https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-59644494):\n\n>There is going to be dramatic change in the front of the glacier, **probably in less than a decade.** Both published and unpublished studies point in that direction [...] This will accelerate the pace (of Thwaites) and widen, effectively, the dangerous part of the glacier\n\nA collaborative report by Erin C. Pettit et al. [predicted](https://agu.confex.com/agu/fm21/meetingapp.cgi/Paper/978762):\n\n>We have mapped out weaker and stronger areas of the ice shelf and suggest a “zig-zag” pathway the fractures might take through the ice, ultimately **leading to break up of the shelf in as little as 5 years**, which result in more ice flowing off the continent.", "resc": "This question will resolve when over 50% of the Thwaites Eastern Ice Shelf has collapsed or melted, according to [The International Thwaites Glacier Collaboration](https://thwaitesglacier.org/), or from credible reports by media and government agencies. The collapsed extent of the Thwaites Eastern Ice Shelf should be in comparison to its extent in December 2021. Other events such as the melting, collapse, falling into the sea of other glaciers or ice sheets, or any corresponding sea level rise, are not relevant to the resolution of this question", "lower_25": "Feb 2026", "median": "Aug 2027", "upper_75": "Nov 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How much of the world's electricity will be generated from solar power in the year 2030, according to the keyword 7.52k?", "desc": "World leaders have made [increasingly ambitious pledges](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/cop26-heres-what-countries-have-pledged) to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, though it is unknown whether these pledges will be met. Many of these pledges involve expanding the role of renewables in electricity generation. Wind and solar [have been growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-elec-by-source) as a share of total electricity production, while the share of coal, [one of the most carbon intensive electricity sources](https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11), has fallen.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) solar generated 855.7 TWh of electricity in 2020.\n\nOur World in Data also provides an [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Solar&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) where trends in electricity generation by source can be seen.", "resc": "This resolves as the global amount of electricity generated by solar in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins", "lower_25": "3.38k", "median": "5.36k", "upper_75": "7.52k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 89.4k reported COVID-19 deaths will occur (globally) in 2025?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will the WHO announce that the COVID-19 pandemic has ended?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8033/date-who-announces-end-of-covid-19-pandemic/)\n\n----\n\nThe COVID-19 pandemic, also known as the coronavirus pandemic, is an ongoing global pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). As of January 4, 2022, the pandemic had caused more than 292 million cases and 5.45 million deaths, making it one of the deadliest in history. \n\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of deaths from COVID-19 reported by [WHO](https://covid19.who.int/) occuring in the calendar year 2025. In the case that WHO data is not available, another source such as [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/covid-deaths) may be used", "lower_25": "89.4k", "median": "217k", "upper_75": "542k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Thwaites Eastern Ice Shelf will collapse by Aug 2027?", "desc": "Ice shelves are permanent floating sheets of ice that connect to a landmass. Most of the world's ice shelves hug the coast of Antarctica. Because ice shelves already float in the ocean, they [do not contribute directly to sea level rise](https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/quickfacts/iceshelves.html) when they break up. However, ice shelf collapse could contribute to sea level rise indirectly. Thwaites Glacier is the size of Florida. It is the cork in the bottle of the entire West Antarctic ice sheet, which contains [enough ice to raise sea levels](https://cires.colorado.edu/news/threat-thwaites-retreat-antarctica%E2%80%99s-riskiest-glacier) by [10 feet](https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/doomsday-glacier-thwaites-antarctica-climate-crisis-1273841/).\n\nGlaciologist Professor Ted Scambos [said to the BBC in December 2021](https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-59644494):\n\n>There is going to be dramatic change in the front of the glacier, **probably in less than a decade.** Both published and unpublished studies point in that direction [...] This will accelerate the pace (of Thwaites) and widen, effectively, the dangerous part of the glacier\n\nA collaborative report by Erin C. Pettit et al. [predicted](https://agu.confex.com/agu/fm21/meetingapp.cgi/Paper/978762):\n\n>We have mapped out weaker and stronger areas of the ice shelf and suggest a “zig-zag” pathway the fractures might take through the ice, ultimately **leading to break up of the shelf in as little as 5 years**, which result in more ice flowing off the continent.", "resc": "This question will resolve when over 50% of the Thwaites Eastern Ice Shelf has collapsed or melted, according to [The International Thwaites Glacier Collaboration](https://thwaitesglacier.org/), or from credible reports by media and government agencies. The collapsed extent of the Thwaites Eastern Ice Shelf should be in comparison to its extent in December 2021. Other events such as the melting, collapse, falling into the sea of other glaciers or ice sheets, or any corresponding sea level rise, are not relevant to the resolution of this question", "lower_25": "Feb 2026", "median": "Aug 2027", "upper_75": "Nov 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "In January 2030, what is the chance that the Federal Reserve's Index for industrial production of semiconductors and circuit boards will be 818?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the Federal Reserves' Industrial Production Index be for January 2030, for semiconductors, printed circuit boards and related products?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6304/us-semiconductor-fab-capacity-jan-2030/) (closed)\n\n----\n\nSemiconductor devices are key devices in modern electronics. [The main applications](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B0123694019004976) of semiconductors are electronic devices like junction diodes, transistors, and memories, which are widely used in large-scale integrated circuits. The [printed circuit board](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Printed_circuit_board) is the platform upon which microelectronic components such as semiconductor chips and capacitors are mounted.\n\nRecent advancements in AI have come at least in part due to the increased power and decreasing cost of CPUs and GPUs, for which semiconductors are vital components. AI capabilities have been improved further by designing chips optimized for running AI functions. In April 2020, [Georgetown University's CSET](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_Security_and_Emerging_Technology) published an [in-depth survey](https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/AI-Chips%E2%80%94What-They-Are-and-Why-They-Matter.pdf) on AI chip designs and their impacts on the AI research field.\n\nIn 2020 to 2021, the world experienced a [broad shortage of computer chips](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020%E2%80%932021_global_chip_shortage) affecting multiple industries. AMD CEO Lisa Su [predicted in September 2021](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/27/amd-ceo-lisa-su-says-chip-shortage-likely-to-end-next-year.html) that the chip shortage would remain \"pretty tight\", but that the chip production would improve in the second half of 2022.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the value of the Federal Reserves' Index for [Industrial Production: Durable Goods Materials: Semiconductors, Printed Circuit Boards, and Other](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IPB53122S) for January 2030. \n\nThe industrial production (IP) index measures the real output of all relevant establishments located in the United States, regardless of their ownership, but not those located in U.S. territories.\n\nThe index is constructed so that the mean value for the base period 2017 is 100. In case the Index adopts a different base period, we shall reconstruct the series so that the mean value for 2017 is 100 and use this transformed index to resolve the question", "lower_25": "407", "median": "589", "upper_75": "818", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 67.3 percentage of new passenger car sales will be all-electric in Australia in 2030?", "desc": "*(background text originally by @Grigfall)*\n\nAustralia has lagged many other developed countries when it comes to the adoption of electric vehicles (EVs). Whereas 75% of new passenger car sales in Norway in 2020 were EVs, only 1% were EVs in Australia, according to the [IEA](https://www.iea.org/articles/global-ev-data-explorer)\n\nThe Labor Opposition took a target of 50% EVs in new car sales by 2030 [to the last federal election](https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/apr/01/50-of-new-cars-to-be-electric-vehicles-by-2030-under-labor-climate-change-policy), which the Coalition Government said was a \"war on the weekend\" because EVs would not have \"the grunt\" to pull caravans or boats. However, [the Coalition's own modelling expects 25-50% EV share of new car sales by 2030.](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/apr/05/coalition-modelling-not-far-off-labors-electric-vehicle-target-despite-criticising-it)\n\n[The Coalition has since moderated its language around EVs,](https://thedriven.io/2021/04/01/morrison-now-claims-he-never-mocked-electric-vehicle-tecnology/) but car companies and their representatives have described Australia's EV policies as akin to \"a third world country\" (Volkswagen), a \"uniquely hostile market\" (Electric Vehicle Council) and lacking \"consistent and cohesive national targets and supporting policies\" (Nissan) ([source](https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/not-even-tesla-can-overcome-australia-s-hostility-to-electric-cars-20210414-p57izn.html))\n\nWe have one prediction already: [last year](https://www.afr.com/companies/energy/australia-to-lag-on-ev-sales-until-2030s-bnef-20200522-p54vfd) BloombergNEF predicted EVs as 18% of new car sales in 2030. The IEA also projects [global new EV sales](https://www.iea.org/articles/global-ev-data-explorer) to rise from 4.6% in 2020 to 17.3% under the trajectory of current national policies and industry development (their STEPS projection), potentially as high as 36% under their recommended policy scenario (SDS).", "resc": "The answer will be the share of new passenger vehicles sold in Australia in 2030 that are [battery electric vehicles or fuel cell electric vehicles](https://arena.gov.au/renewable-energy/electric-vehicles/) (i.e. excluding hybrid plug-in electric vehicles). This question will resolve according to the [International Energy Agency's annual global reports](https://www.iea.org/articles/global-ev-data-explorer), or another high-quality source of data if the IEA no longer reports this data", "lower_25": "37.9", "median": "50.8", "upper_75": "67.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How much of the world's electricity will be generated from solar power in the year 2030, according to the keyword 7.52k?", "desc": "World leaders have made [increasingly ambitious pledges](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/cop26-heres-what-countries-have-pledged) to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, though it is unknown whether these pledges will be met. Many of these pledges involve expanding the role of renewables in electricity generation. Wind and solar [have been growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-elec-by-source) as a share of total electricity production, while the share of coal, [one of the most carbon intensive electricity sources](https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11), has fallen.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) solar generated 855.7 TWh of electricity in 2020.\n\nOur World in Data also provides an [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Solar&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) where trends in electricity generation by source can be seen.", "resc": "This resolves as the global amount of electricity generated by solar in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins", "lower_25": "3.38k", "median": "5.36k", "upper_75": "7.52k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "In January 2030, what is the chance that the Federal Reserve's Index for industrial production of semiconductors and circuit boards will be 818?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the Federal Reserves' Industrial Production Index be for January 2030, for semiconductors, printed circuit boards and related products?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6304/us-semiconductor-fab-capacity-jan-2030/) (closed)\n\n----\n\nSemiconductor devices are key devices in modern electronics. [The main applications](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B0123694019004976) of semiconductors are electronic devices like junction diodes, transistors, and memories, which are widely used in large-scale integrated circuits. The [printed circuit board](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Printed_circuit_board) is the platform upon which microelectronic components such as semiconductor chips and capacitors are mounted.\n\nRecent advancements in AI have come at least in part due to the increased power and decreasing cost of CPUs and GPUs, for which semiconductors are vital components. AI capabilities have been improved further by designing chips optimized for running AI functions. In April 2020, [Georgetown University's CSET](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_Security_and_Emerging_Technology) published an [in-depth survey](https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/AI-Chips%E2%80%94What-They-Are-and-Why-They-Matter.pdf) on AI chip designs and their impacts on the AI research field.\n\nIn 2020 to 2021, the world experienced a [broad shortage of computer chips](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020%E2%80%932021_global_chip_shortage) affecting multiple industries. AMD CEO Lisa Su [predicted in September 2021](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/27/amd-ceo-lisa-su-says-chip-shortage-likely-to-end-next-year.html) that the chip shortage would remain \"pretty tight\", but that the chip production would improve in the second half of 2022.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the value of the Federal Reserves' Index for [Industrial Production: Durable Goods Materials: Semiconductors, Printed Circuit Boards, and Other](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IPB53122S) for January 2030. \n\nThe industrial production (IP) index measures the real output of all relevant establishments located in the United States, regardless of their ownership, but not those located in U.S. territories.\n\nThe index is constructed so that the mean value for the base period 2017 is 100. In case the Index adopts a different base period, we shall reconstruct the series so that the mean value for 2017 is 100 and use this transformed index to resolve the question", "lower_25": "407", "median": "589", "upper_75": "818", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "In January 2030, what is the chance that the Federal Reserve's Index for industrial production of semiconductors and circuit boards will be 818?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the Federal Reserves' Industrial Production Index be for January 2030, for semiconductors, printed circuit boards and related products?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6304/us-semiconductor-fab-capacity-jan-2030/) (closed)\n\n----\n\nSemiconductor devices are key devices in modern electronics. [The main applications](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B0123694019004976) of semiconductors are electronic devices like junction diodes, transistors, and memories, which are widely used in large-scale integrated circuits. The [printed circuit board](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Printed_circuit_board) is the platform upon which microelectronic components such as semiconductor chips and capacitors are mounted.\n\nRecent advancements in AI have come at least in part due to the increased power and decreasing cost of CPUs and GPUs, for which semiconductors are vital components. AI capabilities have been improved further by designing chips optimized for running AI functions. In April 2020, [Georgetown University's CSET](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_Security_and_Emerging_Technology) published an [in-depth survey](https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/AI-Chips%E2%80%94What-They-Are-and-Why-They-Matter.pdf) on AI chip designs and their impacts on the AI research field.\n\nIn 2020 to 2021, the world experienced a [broad shortage of computer chips](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020%E2%80%932021_global_chip_shortage) affecting multiple industries. AMD CEO Lisa Su [predicted in September 2021](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/27/amd-ceo-lisa-su-says-chip-shortage-likely-to-end-next-year.html) that the chip shortage would remain \"pretty tight\", but that the chip production would improve in the second half of 2022.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the value of the Federal Reserves' Index for [Industrial Production: Durable Goods Materials: Semiconductors, Printed Circuit Boards, and Other](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IPB53122S) for January 2030. \n\nThe industrial production (IP) index measures the real output of all relevant establishments located in the United States, regardless of their ownership, but not those located in U.S. territories.\n\nThe index is constructed so that the mean value for the base period 2017 is 100. In case the Index adopts a different base period, we shall reconstruct the series so that the mean value for 2017 is 100 and use this transformed index to resolve the question", "lower_25": "407", "median": "589", "upper_75": "818", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Chesapeake Bay will receive a grade of A- or higher from UMD's Eco Health Report Card by 2091?", "desc": "The [Chesapeake Bay](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chesapeake_Bay) is the largest estuary in the United States and an important natural resource in the mid-Atlantic region. Economically significant fisheries include blue crab, oysters, striped bass and many more. In 1607, George Percy of the Jamestown Colony wrote that oysters in the bay [\"lay on the ground as thick as stones\"](http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/pds/amerbegin/settlement/text1/JamestownPercyObservations.pdf). The bay was a breadbasket for early settlers and [still is for the region.](https://www.cbf.org/issues/what-we-have-to-lose/economic-importance-of-the-bay/)\n\nUnfortunately, the Chesapeake Bay's health has floundered in the 20th century due to upstream nutrient pollution, excess stormwater runoff and overfishing. Climate change and consequential sea level rise is also a concern. Local residents often [avoid swimming in it](https://www.thebaynet.com/articles/0921/do-you-swim-in-the-chesapeake-bay-poll-shows-many-southern-marylanders-prefer-not-to2.html). Over the past half century, organizations like the [Chesapeake Bay Foundation](https://www.cbf.org) have endeavored to restore the bay with varying results. 1998's [Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act](https://www.deq.virginia.gov/water/chesapeake-bay/chesapeake-bay-preservation-act) was a first attempt to tackle the bay's many coordination issues. Recently, progress has increased. In late 2010, the EPA [issued a TMDL](https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2014-12/documents/bay_tmdl_executive_summary_final_12.29.10_final_1.pdf) for the watershed to help curb nutrient input (the bay's watershed includes the states of Delaware, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia and all of the city of Washington, D.C.). DC's [Clean River Project](https://www.dcwater.com/cleanrivers) uses impact bonds to build the infrastructure necessary to store stormwater runoff.\n\nThe University of Maryland's Center for Environmental Science gave the bay a \"C\" grade in its [most recent report, in 2020](https://ecoreportcard.org). Since the report began in 1986, the bay's overall score has remained between \"C+\" and \"D+\" (55 to 36 out of 100).", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when UMD's annual [Eco Health Report Card](https://ecoreportcard.org/report-cards/chesapeake-bay/bay-health/) issues the Chesapeake Bay a grade of \"A-\" or higher (80 or more out of a score of 100). The resolution date will be the date that the report is published. This question will resolve for the score for the Chesapeake Bay, **not** the Chesapeake Bay's watershed. If the University of Maryland does not issue updated reporting for a period of 5 years or more, and there is no clear successor organization using similar methodology, this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\nIf UMD changes their scoring to use a different scale, Metaculus Admins may estimate the score for Chesapeake Bay's overall health re-scaled to a 0 to 100 scale. If for 5 consecutive years, UMD's methodology changes significantly to make such a conversion ambiguous, this question will resolve ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2057", "median": "2073", "upper_75": "2091", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 89.4k reported COVID-19 deaths will occur (globally) in 2025?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will the WHO announce that the COVID-19 pandemic has ended?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8033/date-who-announces-end-of-covid-19-pandemic/)\n\n----\n\nThe COVID-19 pandemic, also known as the coronavirus pandemic, is an ongoing global pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). As of January 4, 2022, the pandemic had caused more than 292 million cases and 5.45 million deaths, making it one of the deadliest in history. \n\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of deaths from COVID-19 reported by [WHO](https://covid19.who.int/) occuring in the calendar year 2025. In the case that WHO data is not available, another source such as [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/covid-deaths) may be used", "lower_25": "89.4k", "median": "217k", "upper_75": "542k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Chesapeake Bay will receive a grade of A- or higher from UMD's Eco Health Report Card by 2091?", "desc": "The [Chesapeake Bay](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chesapeake_Bay) is the largest estuary in the United States and an important natural resource in the mid-Atlantic region. Economically significant fisheries include blue crab, oysters, striped bass and many more. In 1607, George Percy of the Jamestown Colony wrote that oysters in the bay [\"lay on the ground as thick as stones\"](http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/pds/amerbegin/settlement/text1/JamestownPercyObservations.pdf). The bay was a breadbasket for early settlers and [still is for the region.](https://www.cbf.org/issues/what-we-have-to-lose/economic-importance-of-the-bay/)\n\nUnfortunately, the Chesapeake Bay's health has floundered in the 20th century due to upstream nutrient pollution, excess stormwater runoff and overfishing. Climate change and consequential sea level rise is also a concern. Local residents often [avoid swimming in it](https://www.thebaynet.com/articles/0921/do-you-swim-in-the-chesapeake-bay-poll-shows-many-southern-marylanders-prefer-not-to2.html). Over the past half century, organizations like the [Chesapeake Bay Foundation](https://www.cbf.org) have endeavored to restore the bay with varying results. 1998's [Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act](https://www.deq.virginia.gov/water/chesapeake-bay/chesapeake-bay-preservation-act) was a first attempt to tackle the bay's many coordination issues. Recently, progress has increased. In late 2010, the EPA [issued a TMDL](https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2014-12/documents/bay_tmdl_executive_summary_final_12.29.10_final_1.pdf) for the watershed to help curb nutrient input (the bay's watershed includes the states of Delaware, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia and all of the city of Washington, D.C.). DC's [Clean River Project](https://www.dcwater.com/cleanrivers) uses impact bonds to build the infrastructure necessary to store stormwater runoff.\n\nThe University of Maryland's Center for Environmental Science gave the bay a \"C\" grade in its [most recent report, in 2020](https://ecoreportcard.org). Since the report began in 1986, the bay's overall score has remained between \"C+\" and \"D+\" (55 to 36 out of 100).", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when UMD's annual [Eco Health Report Card](https://ecoreportcard.org/report-cards/chesapeake-bay/bay-health/) issues the Chesapeake Bay a grade of \"A-\" or higher (80 or more out of a score of 100). The resolution date will be the date that the report is published. This question will resolve for the score for the Chesapeake Bay, **not** the Chesapeake Bay's watershed. If the University of Maryland does not issue updated reporting for a period of 5 years or more, and there is no clear successor organization using similar methodology, this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\nIf UMD changes their scoring to use a different scale, Metaculus Admins may estimate the score for Chesapeake Bay's overall health re-scaled to a 0 to 100 scale. If for 5 consecutive years, UMD's methodology changes significantly to make such a conversion ambiguous, this question will resolve ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2057", "median": "2073", "upper_75": "2091", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How much of the world's electricity will be generated from solar power in the year 2030, according to the keyword 7.52k?", "desc": "World leaders have made [increasingly ambitious pledges](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/cop26-heres-what-countries-have-pledged) to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, though it is unknown whether these pledges will be met. Many of these pledges involve expanding the role of renewables in electricity generation. Wind and solar [have been growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-elec-by-source) as a share of total electricity production, while the share of coal, [one of the most carbon intensive electricity sources](https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11), has fallen.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) solar generated 855.7 TWh of electricity in 2020.\n\nOur World in Data also provides an [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Solar&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) where trends in electricity generation by source can be seen.", "resc": "This resolves as the global amount of electricity generated by solar in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins", "lower_25": "3.38k", "median": "5.36k", "upper_75": "7.52k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.40k terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from wind power worldwide in the year 2030?", "desc": "World leaders have made [increasingly ambitious pledges](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/cop26-heres-what-countries-have-pledged) to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, though it is unknown whether these pledges will be met. Many of these pledges involve expanding the role of renewables in electricity generation. Wind and solar [have been growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-elec-by-source) as a share of total electricity production, while the share of coal, [one of the most carbon intensive electricity sources](https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11), has fallen.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) wind generated 1,591.2 TWh of electricity in 2020.\n\nOur World in Data also provides an [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Wind&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) where trends in electricity generation by source can be seen.\n\n*Note that as of February 15, 2023 the chart below currently uses the resolution source, but may not necessarily reflect the source used or historical values that will be used at time of resolution.*\n", "resc": "This resolves as the global amount of electricity generated by wind in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins", "lower_25": "2.90k", "median": "4.40k", "upper_75": "6.63k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 8.83k terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from coal worldwide in the year 2030?", "desc": "World leaders have made [increasingly ambitious pledges](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/cop26-heres-what-countries-have-pledged) to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, though it is unknown whether these pledges will be met. Many of these pledges involve expanding the role of renewables in electricity generation. Wind and solar [have been growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-elec-by-source) as a share of total electricity production, while the share of coal, [one of the most carbon intensive electricity sources](https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11), has fallen.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) coal generated 9,421.4 TWh of electricity in 2020.\n\nOur World in Data also provides an [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Coal&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) where trends in electricity generation by source can be seen.", "resc": "This resolves as the global amount of electricity generated by coal in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins", "lower_25": "6.12k", "median": "8.83k", "upper_75": "12.7k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 67.3 percentage of new passenger car sales will be all-electric in Australia in 2030?", "desc": "*(background text originally by @Grigfall)*\n\nAustralia has lagged many other developed countries when it comes to the adoption of electric vehicles (EVs). Whereas 75% of new passenger car sales in Norway in 2020 were EVs, only 1% were EVs in Australia, according to the [IEA](https://www.iea.org/articles/global-ev-data-explorer)\n\nThe Labor Opposition took a target of 50% EVs in new car sales by 2030 [to the last federal election](https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/apr/01/50-of-new-cars-to-be-electric-vehicles-by-2030-under-labor-climate-change-policy), which the Coalition Government said was a \"war on the weekend\" because EVs would not have \"the grunt\" to pull caravans or boats. However, [the Coalition's own modelling expects 25-50% EV share of new car sales by 2030.](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/apr/05/coalition-modelling-not-far-off-labors-electric-vehicle-target-despite-criticising-it)\n\n[The Coalition has since moderated its language around EVs,](https://thedriven.io/2021/04/01/morrison-now-claims-he-never-mocked-electric-vehicle-tecnology/) but car companies and their representatives have described Australia's EV policies as akin to \"a third world country\" (Volkswagen), a \"uniquely hostile market\" (Electric Vehicle Council) and lacking \"consistent and cohesive national targets and supporting policies\" (Nissan) ([source](https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/not-even-tesla-can-overcome-australia-s-hostility-to-electric-cars-20210414-p57izn.html))\n\nWe have one prediction already: [last year](https://www.afr.com/companies/energy/australia-to-lag-on-ev-sales-until-2030s-bnef-20200522-p54vfd) BloombergNEF predicted EVs as 18% of new car sales in 2030. The IEA also projects [global new EV sales](https://www.iea.org/articles/global-ev-data-explorer) to rise from 4.6% in 2020 to 17.3% under the trajectory of current national policies and industry development (their STEPS projection), potentially as high as 36% under their recommended policy scenario (SDS).", "resc": "The answer will be the share of new passenger vehicles sold in Australia in 2030 that are [battery electric vehicles or fuel cell electric vehicles](https://arena.gov.au/renewable-energy/electric-vehicles/) (i.e. excluding hybrid plug-in electric vehicles). This question will resolve according to the [International Energy Agency's annual global reports](https://www.iea.org/articles/global-ev-data-explorer), or another high-quality source of data if the IEA no longer reports this data", "lower_25": "37.9", "median": "50.8", "upper_75": "67.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.40k terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from wind power worldwide in the year 2030?", "desc": "World leaders have made [increasingly ambitious pledges](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/cop26-heres-what-countries-have-pledged) to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, though it is unknown whether these pledges will be met. Many of these pledges involve expanding the role of renewables in electricity generation. Wind and solar [have been growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-elec-by-source) as a share of total electricity production, while the share of coal, [one of the most carbon intensive electricity sources](https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11), has fallen.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) wind generated 1,591.2 TWh of electricity in 2020.\n\nOur World in Data also provides an [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Wind&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) where trends in electricity generation by source can be seen.\n\n*Note that as of February 15, 2023 the chart below currently uses the resolution source, but may not necessarily reflect the source used or historical values that will be used at time of resolution.*\n", "resc": "This resolves as the global amount of electricity generated by wind in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins", "lower_25": "2.90k", "median": "4.40k", "upper_75": "6.63k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 89.4k reported COVID-19 deaths will occur (globally) in 2025?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will the WHO announce that the COVID-19 pandemic has ended?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8033/date-who-announces-end-of-covid-19-pandemic/)\n\n----\n\nThe COVID-19 pandemic, also known as the coronavirus pandemic, is an ongoing global pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). As of January 4, 2022, the pandemic had caused more than 292 million cases and 5.45 million deaths, making it one of the deadliest in history. \n\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of deaths from COVID-19 reported by [WHO](https://covid19.who.int/) occuring in the calendar year 2025. In the case that WHO data is not available, another source such as [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/covid-deaths) may be used", "lower_25": "89.4k", "median": "217k", "upper_75": "542k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.40k terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from wind power worldwide in the year 2030?", "desc": "World leaders have made [increasingly ambitious pledges](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/cop26-heres-what-countries-have-pledged) to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, though it is unknown whether these pledges will be met. Many of these pledges involve expanding the role of renewables in electricity generation. Wind and solar [have been growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-elec-by-source) as a share of total electricity production, while the share of coal, [one of the most carbon intensive electricity sources](https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11), has fallen.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) wind generated 1,591.2 TWh of electricity in 2020.\n\nOur World in Data also provides an [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Wind&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) where trends in electricity generation by source can be seen.\n\n*Note that as of February 15, 2023 the chart below currently uses the resolution source, but may not necessarily reflect the source used or historical values that will be used at time of resolution.*\n", "resc": "This resolves as the global amount of electricity generated by wind in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins", "lower_25": "2.90k", "median": "4.40k", "upper_75": "6.63k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.03k terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from hydro power worldwide in the year 2030?", "desc": "World leaders have made [increasingly ambitious pledges](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/cop26-heres-what-countries-have-pledged) to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, though it is unknown whether these pledges will be met. Many of these pledges involve expanding the role of renewables in electricity generation. Wind and solar [have been growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-elec-by-source) as a share of total electricity production, while the share of coal, [one of the most carbon intensive electricity sources](https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11), has fallen.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) hydro generated 4,296.8 TWh of electricity in 2020.\n\nOur World in Data also provides an [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Hydropower&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) where trends in electricity generation by source can be seen.\n\n*Note that as of February 15, 2023 the chart below currently uses the resolution source, but may not necessarily reflect the source used or historical values that will be used at time of resolution.*\n", "resc": "This resolves as the global amount of electricity generated by hydropower in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins", "lower_25": "4.50k", "median": "5.26k", "upper_75": "6.03k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.99k terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from natural gas worldwide in the year 2030?", "desc": "World leaders have made [increasingly ambitious pledges](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/cop26-heres-what-countries-have-pledged) to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, though it is unknown whether these pledges will be met. Many of these pledges involve expanding the role of renewables in electricity generation. Wind and solar [have been growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-elec-by-source) as a share of total electricity production, while the share of coal, [one of the most carbon intensive electricity sources](https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11), has fallen.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) natural gas generated 6,268.1 TWh of electricity in 2020.\n\nOur World in Data also provides an [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Gas&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) where trends in electricity generation by source can be seen.", "resc": "This resolves as the global amount of electricity generated by gas in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins", "lower_25": "5.99k", "median": "7.27k", "upper_75": "8.47k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.26k terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from nuclear power worldwide in the year 2030?", "desc": "World leaders have made [increasingly ambitious pledges](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/cop26-heres-what-countries-have-pledged) to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, though it is unknown whether these pledges will be met. Many of these pledges involve expanding the role of renewables in electricity generation. Wind and solar [have been growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-elec-by-source) as a share of total electricity production, while the share of coal, [one of the most carbon intensive electricity sources](https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11), has fallen.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) nuclear power generated 2,700.1 TWh of electricity in 2020.\n\nOur World in Data also provides an [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) where trends in electricity generation by source can be seen.\n\n*Note that as of February 15, 2023 the chart below currently uses the resolution source, but may not necessarily reflect the source used or historical values that will be used at time of resolution.*\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global amount of electricity generated by nuclear fission in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins", "lower_25": "2.45k", "median": "3.26k", "upper_75": "4.51k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 8.83k terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from coal worldwide in the year 2030?", "desc": "World leaders have made [increasingly ambitious pledges](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/cop26-heres-what-countries-have-pledged) to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, though it is unknown whether these pledges will be met. Many of these pledges involve expanding the role of renewables in electricity generation. Wind and solar [have been growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-elec-by-source) as a share of total electricity production, while the share of coal, [one of the most carbon intensive electricity sources](https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11), has fallen.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) coal generated 9,421.4 TWh of electricity in 2020.\n\nOur World in Data also provides an [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Coal&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) where trends in electricity generation by source can be seen.", "resc": "This resolves as the global amount of electricity generated by coal in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins", "lower_25": "6.12k", "median": "8.83k", "upper_75": "12.7k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.26k terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from nuclear power worldwide in the year 2030?", "desc": "World leaders have made [increasingly ambitious pledges](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/cop26-heres-what-countries-have-pledged) to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, though it is unknown whether these pledges will be met. Many of these pledges involve expanding the role of renewables in electricity generation. Wind and solar [have been growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-elec-by-source) as a share of total electricity production, while the share of coal, [one of the most carbon intensive electricity sources](https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11), has fallen.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) nuclear power generated 2,700.1 TWh of electricity in 2020.\n\nOur World in Data also provides an [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) where trends in electricity generation by source can be seen.\n\n*Note that as of February 15, 2023 the chart below currently uses the resolution source, but may not necessarily reflect the source used or historical values that will be used at time of resolution.*\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global amount of electricity generated by nuclear fission in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins", "lower_25": "2.45k", "median": "3.26k", "upper_75": "4.51k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.26k terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from nuclear power worldwide in the year 2030?", "desc": "World leaders have made [increasingly ambitious pledges](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/cop26-heres-what-countries-have-pledged) to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, though it is unknown whether these pledges will be met. Many of these pledges involve expanding the role of renewables in electricity generation. Wind and solar [have been growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-elec-by-source) as a share of total electricity production, while the share of coal, [one of the most carbon intensive electricity sources](https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11), has fallen.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) nuclear power generated 2,700.1 TWh of electricity in 2020.\n\nOur World in Data also provides an [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) where trends in electricity generation by source can be seen.\n\n*Note that as of February 15, 2023 the chart below currently uses the resolution source, but may not necessarily reflect the source used or historical values that will be used at time of resolution.*\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global amount of electricity generated by nuclear fission in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins", "lower_25": "2.45k", "median": "3.26k", "upper_75": "4.51k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.03k terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from hydro power worldwide in the year 2030?", "desc": "World leaders have made [increasingly ambitious pledges](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/cop26-heres-what-countries-have-pledged) to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, though it is unknown whether these pledges will be met. Many of these pledges involve expanding the role of renewables in electricity generation. Wind and solar [have been growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-elec-by-source) as a share of total electricity production, while the share of coal, [one of the most carbon intensive electricity sources](https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11), has fallen.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) hydro generated 4,296.8 TWh of electricity in 2020.\n\nOur World in Data also provides an [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Hydropower&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) where trends in electricity generation by source can be seen.\n\n*Note that as of February 15, 2023 the chart below currently uses the resolution source, but may not necessarily reflect the source used or historical values that will be used at time of resolution.*\n", "resc": "This resolves as the global amount of electricity generated by hydropower in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins", "lower_25": "4.50k", "median": "5.26k", "upper_75": "6.03k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.03k terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from hydro power worldwide in the year 2030?", "desc": "World leaders have made [increasingly ambitious pledges](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/cop26-heres-what-countries-have-pledged) to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, though it is unknown whether these pledges will be met. Many of these pledges involve expanding the role of renewables in electricity generation. Wind and solar [have been growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-elec-by-source) as a share of total electricity production, while the share of coal, [one of the most carbon intensive electricity sources](https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11), has fallen.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) hydro generated 4,296.8 TWh of electricity in 2020.\n\nOur World in Data also provides an [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Hydropower&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) where trends in electricity generation by source can be seen.\n\n*Note that as of February 15, 2023 the chart below currently uses the resolution source, but may not necessarily reflect the source used or historical values that will be used at time of resolution.*\n", "resc": "This resolves as the global amount of electricity generated by hydropower in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins", "lower_25": "4.50k", "median": "5.26k", "upper_75": "6.03k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.99k terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from natural gas worldwide in the year 2030?", "desc": "World leaders have made [increasingly ambitious pledges](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/cop26-heres-what-countries-have-pledged) to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, though it is unknown whether these pledges will be met. Many of these pledges involve expanding the role of renewables in electricity generation. Wind and solar [have been growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-elec-by-source) as a share of total electricity production, while the share of coal, [one of the most carbon intensive electricity sources](https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11), has fallen.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) natural gas generated 6,268.1 TWh of electricity in 2020.\n\nOur World in Data also provides an [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Gas&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) where trends in electricity generation by source can be seen.", "resc": "This resolves as the global amount of electricity generated by gas in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins", "lower_25": "5.99k", "median": "7.27k", "upper_75": "8.47k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 36.8k terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated worldwide in the year 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "A key factor in estimating the makeup of future energy sources in electricity generation as well as future CO2 emissions is how much overall electricity demand there will be in the future. Total electricity generation has shown a [steady upward trend](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Gas&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) over the last several decades.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) there was 26,823.2 terawatt-hours (TWh) of electricity generated worldwide in 2020.\n\n***How many terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated worldwide in the year 2030?***\n\nThis resolves as the global amount of electricity generated in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins.", "lower_25": "30.5k", "median": "33.1k", "upper_75": "36.8k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 36.8k terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated worldwide in the year 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "A key factor in estimating the makeup of future energy sources in electricity generation as well as future CO2 emissions is how much overall electricity demand there will be in the future. Total electricity generation has shown a [steady upward trend](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Gas&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) over the last several decades.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) there was 26,823.2 terawatt-hours (TWh) of electricity generated worldwide in 2020.\n\n***How many terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated worldwide in the year 2030?***\n\nThis resolves as the global amount of electricity generated in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins.", "lower_25": "30.5k", "median": "33.1k", "upper_75": "36.8k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 623 GW of new wind capacity will be installed globally by 2030?", "desc": "US President Joe Biden has [set a target](https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/exclusive-white-house-pushing-80-clean-us-power-grid-by-2030-2021-04-26/) to reach 80% of US electricity from carbon-free sources by 2030, and 100% by 2035. UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson [pledged for the same goal](https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/all-britains-power-be-green-by-2035-pm-johnson-says-2021-10-04/) by 2035.\n\n[According to IRENA](https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2021/Apr/IRENA_-RE_Capacity_Highlights_2021.pdf?la=en&hash=1E133689564BC40C2392E85026F71A0D7A9C0B91) global wind power capacity grew by 111 GW in 2020. Global Wind capacity has grown from 2010 to 2020 by a factor of 4.0, and [wind consumption grew](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Wind&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption) by a factor of 4.9 from 2009 to 2019. (Because power generated by wind is not constant, energy production can grow faster than capacity as the [capacity factor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wind_power#Wind_power_capacity_and_production) becomes more efficient).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global new wind capacity installed in 2030, in gigawatts. Resolution may come from the [BP Statistical Review of Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), official government estimates, or other independent energy researchers such as [IRENA](https://www.irena.org/). For example, the wind capacity in 2020 was 733.3 GW, while 2019 was 622.2 GW, meaning that 111.1 GW new capacity was added in 2020", "lower_25": "117", "median": "190", "upper_75": "623", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.99k terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from natural gas worldwide in the year 2030?", "desc": "World leaders have made [increasingly ambitious pledges](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/cop26-heres-what-countries-have-pledged) to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, though it is unknown whether these pledges will be met. Many of these pledges involve expanding the role of renewables in electricity generation. Wind and solar [have been growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-elec-by-source) as a share of total electricity production, while the share of coal, [one of the most carbon intensive electricity sources](https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11), has fallen.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) natural gas generated 6,268.1 TWh of electricity in 2020.\n\nOur World in Data also provides an [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Gas&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) where trends in electricity generation by source can be seen.", "resc": "This resolves as the global amount of electricity generated by gas in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins", "lower_25": "5.99k", "median": "7.27k", "upper_75": "8.47k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 8.83k terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from coal worldwide in the year 2030?", "desc": "World leaders have made [increasingly ambitious pledges](https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/cop26-heres-what-countries-have-pledged) to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, though it is unknown whether these pledges will be met. Many of these pledges involve expanding the role of renewables in electricity generation. Wind and solar [have been growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/share-elec-by-source) as a share of total electricity production, while the share of coal, [one of the most carbon intensive electricity sources](https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11), has fallen.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) coal generated 9,421.4 TWh of electricity in 2020.\n\nOur World in Data also provides an [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Coal&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) where trends in electricity generation by source can be seen.", "resc": "This resolves as the global amount of electricity generated by coal in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins", "lower_25": "6.12k", "median": "8.83k", "upper_75": "12.7k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that fossil fuels will make up less than 50% of United States primary energy consumption by 2052?", "desc": "*Note, most of the text from this question was copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8651/date-fossil-fuels-50-of-global-energy/), which is about global energy consumption, rather than energy consumption in the United States.*\n\nIn 2019, fossil fuels made [83.26%](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~USA&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total) of United States primary energy consumption. Primary energy refers not just to electricity, but also energy used in transport, industry, and in buildings (such as heating, appliances, and water heating). \n\n[Welsby et. al. 2021](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03821-8) projected that in order to have a 50% chance of [limiting warming to 1.5C by 2100](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_United_Nations_Climate_Change_Conference), the world must reduce oil and gas consumption by 3% each year until 2050. The US Department of Energy [published a study](https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-releases-solar-futures-study-providing-blueprint-zero-carbon-grid) which showed that the US could achieve a carbon-free electrical grid by 2050 by massively investing in solar and wind power.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the estimated date when energy from fossil fuels makes up less than 50% of United States primary energy consumption, according to the [BP statistical review of energy](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~USA&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). If BP no longer publishes this data or significantly changes their methodology, Metaculus Admins may use a similar source for resolution, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion.", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2042", "upper_75": "2052", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that fossil fuels will make up less than 50% of United States primary energy consumption by 2052?", "desc": "*Note, most of the text from this question was copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8651/date-fossil-fuels-50-of-global-energy/), which is about global energy consumption, rather than energy consumption in the United States.*\n\nIn 2019, fossil fuels made [83.26%](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~USA&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total) of United States primary energy consumption. Primary energy refers not just to electricity, but also energy used in transport, industry, and in buildings (such as heating, appliances, and water heating). \n\n[Welsby et. al. 2021](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03821-8) projected that in order to have a 50% chance of [limiting warming to 1.5C by 2100](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_United_Nations_Climate_Change_Conference), the world must reduce oil and gas consumption by 3% each year until 2050. The US Department of Energy [published a study](https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-releases-solar-futures-study-providing-blueprint-zero-carbon-grid) which showed that the US could achieve a carbon-free electrical grid by 2050 by massively investing in solar and wind power.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the estimated date when energy from fossil fuels makes up less than 50% of United States primary energy consumption, according to the [BP statistical review of energy](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~USA&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). If BP no longer publishes this data or significantly changes their methodology, Metaculus Admins may use a similar source for resolution, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion.", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2042", "upper_75": "2052", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 36.8k terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated worldwide in the year 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "A key factor in estimating the makeup of future energy sources in electricity generation as well as future CO2 emissions is how much overall electricity demand there will be in the future. Total electricity generation has shown a [steady upward trend](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Gas&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Annual+generation) over the last several decades.\n\nAccording to the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2021](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html) there was 26,823.2 terawatt-hours (TWh) of electricity generated worldwide in 2020.\n\n***How many terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated worldwide in the year 2030?***\n\nThis resolves as the global amount of electricity generated in terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2030 as estimated by the [BP Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). The first published estimate will be used, later revisions will be irrelevant for the purposes of this question. If BP no longer publishes the relevant data, comparable data from alternate sources may be used at the discretion of the admins.", "lower_25": "30.5k", "median": "33.1k", "upper_75": "36.8k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 623 GW of new wind capacity will be installed globally by 2030?", "desc": "US President Joe Biden has [set a target](https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/exclusive-white-house-pushing-80-clean-us-power-grid-by-2030-2021-04-26/) to reach 80% of US electricity from carbon-free sources by 2030, and 100% by 2035. UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson [pledged for the same goal](https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/all-britains-power-be-green-by-2035-pm-johnson-says-2021-10-04/) by 2035.\n\n[According to IRENA](https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2021/Apr/IRENA_-RE_Capacity_Highlights_2021.pdf?la=en&hash=1E133689564BC40C2392E85026F71A0D7A9C0B91) global wind power capacity grew by 111 GW in 2020. Global Wind capacity has grown from 2010 to 2020 by a factor of 4.0, and [wind consumption grew](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Wind&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption) by a factor of 4.9 from 2009 to 2019. (Because power generated by wind is not constant, energy production can grow faster than capacity as the [capacity factor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wind_power#Wind_power_capacity_and_production) becomes more efficient).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global new wind capacity installed in 2030, in gigawatts. Resolution may come from the [BP Statistical Review of Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), official government estimates, or other independent energy researchers such as [IRENA](https://www.irena.org/). For example, the wind capacity in 2020 was 733.3 GW, while 2019 was 622.2 GW, meaning that 111.1 GW new capacity was added in 2020", "lower_25": "117", "median": "190", "upper_75": "623", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that fossil fuels will make up less than 50% of United States primary energy consumption by 2052?", "desc": "*Note, most of the text from this question was copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8651/date-fossil-fuels-50-of-global-energy/), which is about global energy consumption, rather than energy consumption in the United States.*\n\nIn 2019, fossil fuels made [83.26%](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~USA&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total) of United States primary energy consumption. Primary energy refers not just to electricity, but also energy used in transport, industry, and in buildings (such as heating, appliances, and water heating). \n\n[Welsby et. al. 2021](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03821-8) projected that in order to have a 50% chance of [limiting warming to 1.5C by 2100](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_United_Nations_Climate_Change_Conference), the world must reduce oil and gas consumption by 3% each year until 2050. The US Department of Energy [published a study](https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-releases-solar-futures-study-providing-blueprint-zero-carbon-grid) which showed that the US could achieve a carbon-free electrical grid by 2050 by massively investing in solar and wind power.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the estimated date when energy from fossil fuels makes up less than 50% of United States primary energy consumption, according to the [BP statistical review of energy](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~USA&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). If BP no longer publishes this data or significantly changes their methodology, Metaculus Admins may use a similar source for resolution, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion.", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2042", "upper_75": "2052", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Highest level of ECB Deposit Facility Rate before the next Euro Area (EA) recession will be 3.82?", "desc": "Central bank key interest rates tend to implicate the overall strength of the economy in stable, developed countries and currency areas. Unlike the Federal Reserve, ECB maintained its extremely low interest rates throughout the economic upswing of the previous decade. The European Central Bank interest rate for bank overnight deposits has remained negative since June 2013. As of January 2022, it stands at -0.5%.\n\nWhile the economies recover from Covid recession and inflation runs relatively high on both EA and US, Federal Reserve has already announced its intentions to raise its key interest rates during 2022. Will ECB at some point see the EA economy fit enough to follow Fed ´s lead and try to normalize its interest rate levels?", "resc": "Question resolves when, according to the Eurostat, the Euro Area real GDP officially contracts (Quarter-on-quarter) for two successive quarters, which confirms a recession. \n\nDeposit Facility Rate, among with other ECB key interest rates, are publicly announced on ECB website, and historical rates can be found from multiple sources. See, for example:\nhttps://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/key_ecb_interest_rates/html/index.en.html", "lower_25": "0.410", "median": "2.62", "upper_75": "3.82", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Xi Jinping will leave power in China by 2033?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will Xi Jinping leave power in China?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/955/when-will-xi-jinping-leave-power-in-china/) [closed]\n* [Will Xi Jinping continue leading China in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8533/xi-jinping-leading-china-in-2030/)\n\n----\n\n[Xi Jinping](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xi_Jinping) has been the paramount leader of China since 2012, when he became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and later President of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 2013. In 2018, when Xi was re-elected for a second term, the National People's Congress passed a constitutional amendment abolishing the two-term limit for the presidency.\n\nOn 11 November 2021, the [CCP declared Xi's ideology](https://www.npr.org/2021/11/11/1054646063/china-xi-jinping-communist-party) the \"essence of Chinese culture\". This is the third fundamental resolution of the Chinese Communist Party since its inception. The first resolution was adopted in 1945 to increase and ratify the power of [Mao Zedong](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mao_Zedong). The decision to issue one under Xi symbolically raises him to the same level of prestige as Mao.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when Xi Jinping holds none of the following offices:\n\n* Secretary General of the Communist Party of China\n* Chairman of the Central Military Commission\n* President of the People's Republic of China\n\nThis may be due to any reason (coup, death, resignation, or otherwise). In the event that there is any future office of greater authority (in theory or in practice) to any of the previous offices, Xi may also be considered to \"remain in power\" if he holds such an office", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 623 GW of new wind capacity will be installed globally by 2030?", "desc": "US President Joe Biden has [set a target](https://www.reuters.com/business/sustainable-business/exclusive-white-house-pushing-80-clean-us-power-grid-by-2030-2021-04-26/) to reach 80% of US electricity from carbon-free sources by 2030, and 100% by 2035. UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson [pledged for the same goal](https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/all-britains-power-be-green-by-2035-pm-johnson-says-2021-10-04/) by 2035.\n\n[According to IRENA](https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2021/Apr/IRENA_-RE_Capacity_Highlights_2021.pdf?la=en&hash=1E133689564BC40C2392E85026F71A0D7A9C0B91) global wind power capacity grew by 111 GW in 2020. Global Wind capacity has grown from 2010 to 2020 by a factor of 4.0, and [wind consumption grew](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Wind&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption) by a factor of 4.9 from 2009 to 2019. (Because power generated by wind is not constant, energy production can grow faster than capacity as the [capacity factor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wind_power#Wind_power_capacity_and_production) becomes more efficient).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global new wind capacity installed in 2030, in gigawatts. Resolution may come from the [BP Statistical Review of Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), official government estimates, or other independent energy researchers such as [IRENA](https://www.irena.org/). For example, the wind capacity in 2020 was 733.3 GW, while 2019 was 622.2 GW, meaning that 111.1 GW new capacity was added in 2020", "lower_25": "117", "median": "190", "upper_75": "623", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Xi Jinping will leave power in China by 2033?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will Xi Jinping leave power in China?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/955/when-will-xi-jinping-leave-power-in-china/) [closed]\n* [Will Xi Jinping continue leading China in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8533/xi-jinping-leading-china-in-2030/)\n\n----\n\n[Xi Jinping](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xi_Jinping) has been the paramount leader of China since 2012, when he became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and later President of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 2013. In 2018, when Xi was re-elected for a second term, the National People's Congress passed a constitutional amendment abolishing the two-term limit for the presidency.\n\nOn 11 November 2021, the [CCP declared Xi's ideology](https://www.npr.org/2021/11/11/1054646063/china-xi-jinping-communist-party) the \"essence of Chinese culture\". This is the third fundamental resolution of the Chinese Communist Party since its inception. The first resolution was adopted in 1945 to increase and ratify the power of [Mao Zedong](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mao_Zedong). The decision to issue one under Xi symbolically raises him to the same level of prestige as Mao.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when Xi Jinping holds none of the following offices:\n\n* Secretary General of the Communist Party of China\n* Chairman of the Central Military Commission\n* President of the People's Republic of China\n\nThis may be due to any reason (coup, death, resignation, or otherwise). In the event that there is any future office of greater authority (in theory or in practice) to any of the previous offices, Xi may also be considered to \"remain in power\" if he holds such an office", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Xi Jinping will leave power in China by 2033?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will Xi Jinping leave power in China?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/955/when-will-xi-jinping-leave-power-in-china/) [closed]\n* [Will Xi Jinping continue leading China in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8533/xi-jinping-leading-china-in-2030/)\n\n----\n\n[Xi Jinping](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xi_Jinping) has been the paramount leader of China since 2012, when he became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and later President of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 2013. In 2018, when Xi was re-elected for a second term, the National People's Congress passed a constitutional amendment abolishing the two-term limit for the presidency.\n\nOn 11 November 2021, the [CCP declared Xi's ideology](https://www.npr.org/2021/11/11/1054646063/china-xi-jinping-communist-party) the \"essence of Chinese culture\". This is the third fundamental resolution of the Chinese Communist Party since its inception. The first resolution was adopted in 1945 to increase and ratify the power of [Mao Zedong](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mao_Zedong). The decision to issue one under Xi symbolically raises him to the same level of prestige as Mao.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when Xi Jinping holds none of the following offices:\n\n* Secretary General of the Communist Party of China\n* Chairman of the Central Military Commission\n* President of the People's Republic of China\n\nThis may be due to any reason (coup, death, resignation, or otherwise). In the event that there is any future office of greater authority (in theory or in practice) to any of the previous offices, Xi may also be considered to \"remain in power\" if he holds such an office", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Highest level of ECB Deposit Facility Rate before the next Euro Area (EA) recession will be 3.82?", "desc": "Central bank key interest rates tend to implicate the overall strength of the economy in stable, developed countries and currency areas. Unlike the Federal Reserve, ECB maintained its extremely low interest rates throughout the economic upswing of the previous decade. The European Central Bank interest rate for bank overnight deposits has remained negative since June 2013. As of January 2022, it stands at -0.5%.\n\nWhile the economies recover from Covid recession and inflation runs relatively high on both EA and US, Federal Reserve has already announced its intentions to raise its key interest rates during 2022. Will ECB at some point see the EA economy fit enough to follow Fed ´s lead and try to normalize its interest rate levels?", "resc": "Question resolves when, according to the Eurostat, the Euro Area real GDP officially contracts (Quarter-on-quarter) for two successive quarters, which confirms a recession. \n\nDeposit Facility Rate, among with other ECB key interest rates, are publicly announced on ECB website, and historical rates can be found from multiple sources. See, for example:\nhttps://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/key_ecb_interest_rates/html/index.en.html", "lower_25": "0.410", "median": "2.62", "upper_75": "3.82", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that P = NP will be settled before Not ≤ 2121?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Does P = NP?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1408/does-p--np-informally-if-the-solution-to-a-problem-is-easy-to-check-for-correctness-must-the-problem-be-easy-to-solve/)\n* [When will the next Millennium Prize Problem be solved?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6460/date-of-next-millennium-prize-problem-proof/)\n\n----\n\nThe [P = NP problem](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P_versus_NP_problem) is a famous open problem in computer science, first formally stated in 1971, that is also one of the Clay Institute's [Millennium Prize Problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems). Roughly speaking, it asks whether problems whose solutions can be verified efficiently can also be solved efficiently.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date on which the Clay Institute's [Millennium Prize](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems) is awarded for either a proof or a disproof of the statement that P = NP. If no such award takes place until the resolution time of the question, the question resolves as >", "lower_25": "2051", "median": "2080", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2121", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Highest level of ECB Deposit Facility Rate before the next Euro Area (EA) recession will be 3.82?", "desc": "Central bank key interest rates tend to implicate the overall strength of the economy in stable, developed countries and currency areas. Unlike the Federal Reserve, ECB maintained its extremely low interest rates throughout the economic upswing of the previous decade. The European Central Bank interest rate for bank overnight deposits has remained negative since June 2013. As of January 2022, it stands at -0.5%.\n\nWhile the economies recover from Covid recession and inflation runs relatively high on both EA and US, Federal Reserve has already announced its intentions to raise its key interest rates during 2022. Will ECB at some point see the EA economy fit enough to follow Fed ´s lead and try to normalize its interest rate levels?", "resc": "Question resolves when, according to the Eurostat, the Euro Area real GDP officially contracts (Quarter-on-quarter) for two successive quarters, which confirms a recession. \n\nDeposit Facility Rate, among with other ECB key interest rates, are publicly announced on ECB website, and historical rates can be found from multiple sources. See, for example:\nhttps://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/key_ecb_interest_rates/html/index.en.html", "lower_25": "0.410", "median": "2.62", "upper_75": "3.82", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "In 2040, what is the chance that the smallest value of the busy beaver function known to be undecidable in ZFC set theory will be 179.0?", "desc": "The [busy beavers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Busy_beaver) are a class of Turing machines which are optimized to either run as long as possible or print as big of an output as possible on their input tape given a constraint on their number of states.\n\nFor this question, define the function \\( \\textrm{BB} \\) (sometimes also denoted using the letter \\( S \\)) as follows: let \\( T(N) \\) denote the set of all Turing machines having \\( 2 \\) input symbols \\( \\{ 0, 1 \\} \\) with \\( N \\) states. For any Turing machine \\( M \\) with these input symbols, let \\( s(M) \\) be the number of shifts made by the Turing machine before halting when given an initial input tape with only zeroes on it. We make the following definition for \\( N \\geq 2 \\):\n\n\\[ \\textrm{BB}(N) = \\max_{M \\in T(N), \\, s(M) \\neq \\infty} s(M) \\]\n\nIn other words, \\( \\textrm{BB}(N) \\) is the maximum finite number of steps that a two symbol Turing machine with \\( N \\) states can take before halting. Since there are only finitely many Turing machines having a given number of states, the maximum defining \\( \\textrm{BB} \\) is well-defined as long as there is *some* Turing machine with \\( N \\) states that halts, which is true as long as \\( N \\geq 2 \\).\n\nSome small values that are decided by Peano arithmetic are \\( \\textrm{BB}(2) = 6, \\, \\textrm{BB}(3) = 21 \\) and \\( \\textrm{BB}(4) = 107 \\).\n\nIt is known that for any theory in first order logic, there is a maximum value of the busy beaver function that the theory will be able to decide. Assuming that ZFC set theory is consistent, the smallest value of the busy beaver function that's currently known to be undecidable in it is \\( \\textrm{BB}(748) \\), however this bound is likely far from optimal.", "resc": "This question will resolve (on January 1, 2040) as the smallest positive integer \\( N \\) for which it's been proven that \\( \\textrm{BB}(N) \\) is undecidable in ZFC set theory assuming that ZFC set theory is consistent. If ZFC set theory is proven to be inconsistent the question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "20.0", "median": "65.4", "upper_75": "179.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "In 2040, what is the chance that the smallest value of the busy beaver function known to be undecidable in Peano arithmetic will be 236.0?", "desc": "The [busy beavers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Busy_beaver) are a class of Turing machines which are optimized to either run as long as possible or print as big of an output as possible on their input tape given a constraint on their number of states.\n\nFor this question, define the function \\( \\textrm{BB} \\) (sometimes also denoted using the letter \\( S \\)) as follows: let \\( T(N) \\) denote the set of all Turing machines having \\( 2 \\) input symbols \\( \\{ 0, 1 \\} \\) with \\( N \\) states. For any Turing machine \\( M \\) with these input symbols, let \\( s(M) \\) be the number of shifts made by the Turing machine before halting when given an initial input tape with only zeroes on it. We make the following definition for \\( N \\geq 2 \\):\n\n\\[ \\textrm{BB}(N) = \\max_{M \\in T(N), \\, s(M) \\neq \\infty} s(M) \\]\n\nIn other words, \\( \\textrm{BB}(N) \\) is the maximum finite number of steps that a two symbol Turing machine with \\( N \\) states can take before halting. Since there are only finitely many Turing machines having a given number of states, the maximum defining \\( \\textrm{BB} \\) is well-defined as long as there is *some* Turing machine with \\( N \\) states that halts, which is true as long as \\( N \\geq 2 \\).\n\nSome small values that are decided by Peano arithmetic are \\( \\textrm{BB}(2) = 6, \\, \\textrm{BB}(3) = 21 \\) and \\( \\textrm{BB}(4) = 107 \\).\n\nIt is known that for any theory in first order logic, there is a maximum value of the busy beaver function that the theory will be able to decide. Assuming that ZFC set theory is consistent, the smallest value of the busy beaver function that's currently known to be undecidable in it is \\( \\textrm{BB}(748) \\) (this also holds for Peano arithmetic), however this bound is likely far from optimal.", "resc": "This question will resolve (on January 1, 2040) as the smallest positive integer \\( N \\) for which it's been proven that \\( \\textrm{BB}(N) \\) is undecidable in Peano arithmetic assuming that Peano arithmetic is consistent. If Peano arithmetic is proven to be inconsistent, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "33.7", "median": "89.4", "upper_75": "236.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that P = NP will be settled before Not ≤ 2121?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Does P = NP?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1408/does-p--np-informally-if-the-solution-to-a-problem-is-easy-to-check-for-correctness-must-the-problem-be-easy-to-solve/)\n* [When will the next Millennium Prize Problem be solved?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6460/date-of-next-millennium-prize-problem-proof/)\n\n----\n\nThe [P = NP problem](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P_versus_NP_problem) is a famous open problem in computer science, first formally stated in 1971, that is also one of the Clay Institute's [Millennium Prize Problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems). Roughly speaking, it asks whether problems whose solutions can be verified efficiently can also be solved efficiently.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date on which the Clay Institute's [Millennium Prize](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems) is awarded for either a proof or a disproof of the statement that P = NP. If no such award takes place until the resolution time of the question, the question resolves as >", "lower_25": "2051", "median": "2080", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2121", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "In 2040, what is the chance that the smallest value of the busy beaver function known to be undecidable in ZFC set theory will be 179.0?", "desc": "The [busy beavers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Busy_beaver) are a class of Turing machines which are optimized to either run as long as possible or print as big of an output as possible on their input tape given a constraint on their number of states.\n\nFor this question, define the function \\( \\textrm{BB} \\) (sometimes also denoted using the letter \\( S \\)) as follows: let \\( T(N) \\) denote the set of all Turing machines having \\( 2 \\) input symbols \\( \\{ 0, 1 \\} \\) with \\( N \\) states. For any Turing machine \\( M \\) with these input symbols, let \\( s(M) \\) be the number of shifts made by the Turing machine before halting when given an initial input tape with only zeroes on it. We make the following definition for \\( N \\geq 2 \\):\n\n\\[ \\textrm{BB}(N) = \\max_{M \\in T(N), \\, s(M) \\neq \\infty} s(M) \\]\n\nIn other words, \\( \\textrm{BB}(N) \\) is the maximum finite number of steps that a two symbol Turing machine with \\( N \\) states can take before halting. Since there are only finitely many Turing machines having a given number of states, the maximum defining \\( \\textrm{BB} \\) is well-defined as long as there is *some* Turing machine with \\( N \\) states that halts, which is true as long as \\( N \\geq 2 \\).\n\nSome small values that are decided by Peano arithmetic are \\( \\textrm{BB}(2) = 6, \\, \\textrm{BB}(3) = 21 \\) and \\( \\textrm{BB}(4) = 107 \\).\n\nIt is known that for any theory in first order logic, there is a maximum value of the busy beaver function that the theory will be able to decide. Assuming that ZFC set theory is consistent, the smallest value of the busy beaver function that's currently known to be undecidable in it is \\( \\textrm{BB}(748) \\), however this bound is likely far from optimal.", "resc": "This question will resolve (on January 1, 2040) as the smallest positive integer \\( N \\) for which it's been proven that \\( \\textrm{BB}(N) \\) is undecidable in ZFC set theory assuming that ZFC set theory is consistent. If ZFC set theory is proven to be inconsistent the question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "20.0", "median": "65.4", "upper_75": "179.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "In 2040, what is the chance that the smallest value of the busy beaver function known to be undecidable in Peano arithmetic will be 236.0?", "desc": "The [busy beavers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Busy_beaver) are a class of Turing machines which are optimized to either run as long as possible or print as big of an output as possible on their input tape given a constraint on their number of states.\n\nFor this question, define the function \\( \\textrm{BB} \\) (sometimes also denoted using the letter \\( S \\)) as follows: let \\( T(N) \\) denote the set of all Turing machines having \\( 2 \\) input symbols \\( \\{ 0, 1 \\} \\) with \\( N \\) states. For any Turing machine \\( M \\) with these input symbols, let \\( s(M) \\) be the number of shifts made by the Turing machine before halting when given an initial input tape with only zeroes on it. We make the following definition for \\( N \\geq 2 \\):\n\n\\[ \\textrm{BB}(N) = \\max_{M \\in T(N), \\, s(M) \\neq \\infty} s(M) \\]\n\nIn other words, \\( \\textrm{BB}(N) \\) is the maximum finite number of steps that a two symbol Turing machine with \\( N \\) states can take before halting. Since there are only finitely many Turing machines having a given number of states, the maximum defining \\( \\textrm{BB} \\) is well-defined as long as there is *some* Turing machine with \\( N \\) states that halts, which is true as long as \\( N \\geq 2 \\).\n\nSome small values that are decided by Peano arithmetic are \\( \\textrm{BB}(2) = 6, \\, \\textrm{BB}(3) = 21 \\) and \\( \\textrm{BB}(4) = 107 \\).\n\nIt is known that for any theory in first order logic, there is a maximum value of the busy beaver function that the theory will be able to decide. Assuming that ZFC set theory is consistent, the smallest value of the busy beaver function that's currently known to be undecidable in it is \\( \\textrm{BB}(748) \\) (this also holds for Peano arithmetic), however this bound is likely far from optimal.", "resc": "This question will resolve (on January 1, 2040) as the smallest positive integer \\( N \\) for which it's been proven that \\( \\textrm{BB}(N) \\) is undecidable in Peano arithmetic assuming that Peano arithmetic is consistent. If Peano arithmetic is proven to be inconsistent, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "33.7", "median": "89.4", "upper_75": "236.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "In 2040, what is the chance that the smallest value of the busy beaver function known to be undecidable in ZFC set theory will be 179.0?", "desc": "The [busy beavers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Busy_beaver) are a class of Turing machines which are optimized to either run as long as possible or print as big of an output as possible on their input tape given a constraint on their number of states.\n\nFor this question, define the function \\( \\textrm{BB} \\) (sometimes also denoted using the letter \\( S \\)) as follows: let \\( T(N) \\) denote the set of all Turing machines having \\( 2 \\) input symbols \\( \\{ 0, 1 \\} \\) with \\( N \\) states. For any Turing machine \\( M \\) with these input symbols, let \\( s(M) \\) be the number of shifts made by the Turing machine before halting when given an initial input tape with only zeroes on it. We make the following definition for \\( N \\geq 2 \\):\n\n\\[ \\textrm{BB}(N) = \\max_{M \\in T(N), \\, s(M) \\neq \\infty} s(M) \\]\n\nIn other words, \\( \\textrm{BB}(N) \\) is the maximum finite number of steps that a two symbol Turing machine with \\( N \\) states can take before halting. Since there are only finitely many Turing machines having a given number of states, the maximum defining \\( \\textrm{BB} \\) is well-defined as long as there is *some* Turing machine with \\( N \\) states that halts, which is true as long as \\( N \\geq 2 \\).\n\nSome small values that are decided by Peano arithmetic are \\( \\textrm{BB}(2) = 6, \\, \\textrm{BB}(3) = 21 \\) and \\( \\textrm{BB}(4) = 107 \\).\n\nIt is known that for any theory in first order logic, there is a maximum value of the busy beaver function that the theory will be able to decide. Assuming that ZFC set theory is consistent, the smallest value of the busy beaver function that's currently known to be undecidable in it is \\( \\textrm{BB}(748) \\), however this bound is likely far from optimal.", "resc": "This question will resolve (on January 1, 2040) as the smallest positive integer \\( N \\) for which it's been proven that \\( \\textrm{BB}(N) \\) is undecidable in ZFC set theory assuming that ZFC set theory is consistent. If ZFC set theory is proven to be inconsistent the question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "20.0", "median": "65.4", "upper_75": "179.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that P = NP will be settled before Not ≤ 2121?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Does P = NP?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1408/does-p--np-informally-if-the-solution-to-a-problem-is-easy-to-check-for-correctness-must-the-problem-be-easy-to-solve/)\n* [When will the next Millennium Prize Problem be solved?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6460/date-of-next-millennium-prize-problem-proof/)\n\n----\n\nThe [P = NP problem](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P_versus_NP_problem) is a famous open problem in computer science, first formally stated in 1971, that is also one of the Clay Institute's [Millennium Prize Problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems). Roughly speaking, it asks whether problems whose solutions can be verified efficiently can also be solved efficiently.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date on which the Clay Institute's [Millennium Prize](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems) is awarded for either a proof or a disproof of the statement that P = NP. If no such award takes place until the resolution time of the question, the question resolves as >", "lower_25": "2051", "median": "2080", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2121", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 18.6% of US energy will be produced by nuclear fission power in 2050?", "desc": "\n\nThe [share of US energy consumption](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~USA&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption) supplied by nuclear power grew from 0.4% in 1970 to 7.5% in 1990. However, that share has remained between 8% to 9% since 1999, while the US' total energy consumption also plateaued around 26 exawatt-hours during the same period.\n\nSeveral nuclear plants have been decomissioned or postponed construction after events such as the [Three Mile Island Accident](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Mile_Island_accident) in 1979 or the [Fukushima Accident](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Japanese_nuclear_accidents) in 2011. In an analysis by Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser for [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-energy#nuclear-energy-and-renewables-are-far-far-safer-than-fossil-fuels), the authors found that when accounting for deaths from air pollution and in accidents from extracting resources (uranium, coal, oil), oil and coal cause 18.4 to 32.7 deaths per terawatt-hour of energy, where nuclear causes 0.07 deaths per TWh.\n\nMajor US lobbying organizations are opposed to nuclear power, such as [Greenpeace](https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/fighting-climate-chaos/issues/nuclear/) and the [Sierra Club](https://www.sierraclub.org/nuclear-free). [Gallup public opinion polling](https://news.gallup.com/poll/248048/years-three-mile-island-americans-split-nuclear-power.aspx) since 1994 has found generally more Americans in favor of nuclear than oppose, though in 2019 both positions had equal support.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the share of US primary energy consumption which is produced by nuclear power sources in the year 2050, according to the [BP Statistical Review of Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). If BP no longer publishes this data, another source such as the [International Energy Agency](https://www.iea.org/fuels-and-technologies/nuclear) may be used.\n\nThis question will soley focus on energy produced through [Nuclear Fission](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fission); [Nuclear Fusion Power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fusion) will be excluded", "lower_25": "5.80", "median": "11.2", "upper_75": "18.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 18.6% of US energy will be produced by nuclear fission power in 2050?", "desc": "\n\nThe [share of US energy consumption](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~USA&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption) supplied by nuclear power grew from 0.4% in 1970 to 7.5% in 1990. However, that share has remained between 8% to 9% since 1999, while the US' total energy consumption also plateaued around 26 exawatt-hours during the same period.\n\nSeveral nuclear plants have been decomissioned or postponed construction after events such as the [Three Mile Island Accident](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Mile_Island_accident) in 1979 or the [Fukushima Accident](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Japanese_nuclear_accidents) in 2011. In an analysis by Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser for [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-energy#nuclear-energy-and-renewables-are-far-far-safer-than-fossil-fuels), the authors found that when accounting for deaths from air pollution and in accidents from extracting resources (uranium, coal, oil), oil and coal cause 18.4 to 32.7 deaths per terawatt-hour of energy, where nuclear causes 0.07 deaths per TWh.\n\nMajor US lobbying organizations are opposed to nuclear power, such as [Greenpeace](https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/fighting-climate-chaos/issues/nuclear/) and the [Sierra Club](https://www.sierraclub.org/nuclear-free). [Gallup public opinion polling](https://news.gallup.com/poll/248048/years-three-mile-island-americans-split-nuclear-power.aspx) since 1994 has found generally more Americans in favor of nuclear than oppose, though in 2019 both positions had equal support.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the share of US primary energy consumption which is produced by nuclear power sources in the year 2050, according to the [BP Statistical Review of Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). If BP no longer publishes this data, another source such as the [International Energy Agency](https://www.iea.org/fuels-and-technologies/nuclear) may be used.\n\nThis question will soley focus on energy produced through [Nuclear Fission](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fission); [Nuclear Fusion Power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fusion) will be excluded", "lower_25": "5.80", "median": "11.2", "upper_75": "18.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 18.6% of US energy will be produced by nuclear fission power in 2050?", "desc": "\n\nThe [share of US energy consumption](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~USA&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption) supplied by nuclear power grew from 0.4% in 1970 to 7.5% in 1990. However, that share has remained between 8% to 9% since 1999, while the US' total energy consumption also plateaued around 26 exawatt-hours during the same period.\n\nSeveral nuclear plants have been decomissioned or postponed construction after events such as the [Three Mile Island Accident](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Mile_Island_accident) in 1979 or the [Fukushima Accident](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Japanese_nuclear_accidents) in 2011. In an analysis by Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser for [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-energy#nuclear-energy-and-renewables-are-far-far-safer-than-fossil-fuels), the authors found that when accounting for deaths from air pollution and in accidents from extracting resources (uranium, coal, oil), oil and coal cause 18.4 to 32.7 deaths per terawatt-hour of energy, where nuclear causes 0.07 deaths per TWh.\n\nMajor US lobbying organizations are opposed to nuclear power, such as [Greenpeace](https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/fighting-climate-chaos/issues/nuclear/) and the [Sierra Club](https://www.sierraclub.org/nuclear-free). [Gallup public opinion polling](https://news.gallup.com/poll/248048/years-three-mile-island-americans-split-nuclear-power.aspx) since 1994 has found generally more Americans in favor of nuclear than oppose, though in 2019 both positions had equal support.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the share of US primary energy consumption which is produced by nuclear power sources in the year 2050, according to the [BP Statistical Review of Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). If BP no longer publishes this data, another source such as the [International Energy Agency](https://www.iea.org/fuels-and-technologies/nuclear) may be used.\n\nThis question will soley focus on energy produced through [Nuclear Fission](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fission); [Nuclear Fusion Power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fusion) will be excluded", "lower_25": "5.80", "median": "11.2", "upper_75": "18.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "In 2040, what is the chance that the smallest value of the busy beaver function known to be undecidable in Peano arithmetic will be 236.0?", "desc": "The [busy beavers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Busy_beaver) are a class of Turing machines which are optimized to either run as long as possible or print as big of an output as possible on their input tape given a constraint on their number of states.\n\nFor this question, define the function \\( \\textrm{BB} \\) (sometimes also denoted using the letter \\( S \\)) as follows: let \\( T(N) \\) denote the set of all Turing machines having \\( 2 \\) input symbols \\( \\{ 0, 1 \\} \\) with \\( N \\) states. For any Turing machine \\( M \\) with these input symbols, let \\( s(M) \\) be the number of shifts made by the Turing machine before halting when given an initial input tape with only zeroes on it. We make the following definition for \\( N \\geq 2 \\):\n\n\\[ \\textrm{BB}(N) = \\max_{M \\in T(N), \\, s(M) \\neq \\infty} s(M) \\]\n\nIn other words, \\( \\textrm{BB}(N) \\) is the maximum finite number of steps that a two symbol Turing machine with \\( N \\) states can take before halting. Since there are only finitely many Turing machines having a given number of states, the maximum defining \\( \\textrm{BB} \\) is well-defined as long as there is *some* Turing machine with \\( N \\) states that halts, which is true as long as \\( N \\geq 2 \\).\n\nSome small values that are decided by Peano arithmetic are \\( \\textrm{BB}(2) = 6, \\, \\textrm{BB}(3) = 21 \\) and \\( \\textrm{BB}(4) = 107 \\).\n\nIt is known that for any theory in first order logic, there is a maximum value of the busy beaver function that the theory will be able to decide. Assuming that ZFC set theory is consistent, the smallest value of the busy beaver function that's currently known to be undecidable in it is \\( \\textrm{BB}(748) \\) (this also holds for Peano arithmetic), however this bound is likely far from optimal.", "resc": "This question will resolve (on January 1, 2040) as the smallest positive integer \\( N \\) for which it's been proven that \\( \\textrm{BB}(N) \\) is undecidable in Peano arithmetic assuming that Peano arithmetic is consistent. If Peano arithmetic is proven to be inconsistent, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "33.7", "median": "89.4", "upper_75": "236.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that nuclear fusion will provide at least 0.1% of the world's primary energy by 2039?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will a fusion reactor reach ignition?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3727/when-will-a-fusion-reactor-reach-ignition/)\n* [When will a private fusion company first report a yearly profit?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3725/when-will-a-private-fusion-company-first-report-a-yearly-profit/)\n* [When will nuclear fusion provide >10% of the world's primary energy?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9465/nuclear-fusion-power-10-of-global-energy/)\n\n----\n\nIn 2001, Nuclear Fission power plants generated a record [6.6% of the world's primary energy](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total), though total production has somewhat declined since then as the world's total energy demand has increased (as of 2019). [Nuclear Fusion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power) is an entirely different physical reaction which has been actively investigated since the 1940s. Fusion power has several potential advantages over Fission power: less radioactive hazard, reduced radioactive waste products, and cheaper fuel. However, all reactor designs tested as of 2021 require more energy to operate than the amount of energy they produce.\n\n[Helion](https://www.helionenergy.com/) CEO David Kirtley said to [Forbes in January 2022](https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2022/01/02/fueled-by-billionaire-dollars-nuclear-fusion-enters-a-new-age/?sh=1da1351629f3): \"In 10 years we will have commercial electricity for sale, for sure.\" In the same article, Forbes quotes [Commonwealth Fusion Systems](https://cfs.energy/) CEO Bob Mumgaard, who predicts to produce \"a working reactor in 6 years\". In November 2021, [Helion raised $500 million](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-05/thiel-backed-helion-targets-nuclear-fusion-breakthrough-by-2024) in funding, with commitments for another $1.7 billion linked to certain performance milestones. According to Bloomberg, Helion set a goal to achieve net electricity from fusion in 2024.\n\nIn October 2021, The [US Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=49856) projected the world's total primary energy consumption to grow from 601.5 quadrillion [BTUs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_thermal_unit) in 2020 to 886.3 quadrillion BTUs in 2050. Most of that growth is expected in non-[OECD](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) asian countries. Renewable energy is expected to grow from 14.7% of the world's energy in 2020 to 26.5% in 2050, with nuclear fission projected to remain at 4% on the same period.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the earliest date when at least 0.1% of Earth's annual energy consumption is produced by nuclear fusion reactors, according to the [BP statistical review of energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). If BP does not publish this data, other energy researchers such as the [International Energy Agency](https://www.iea.org/) may be consulted.", "lower_25": "2039", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2064", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 45.7% of the US population will have been diagnosed with myopia/nearsightedness in 2050?", "desc": "[Myopia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myopia) (or nearsightedness) is a condition where distant objects appear out-of-focus, whereas objects closer to the subject remain clear (depending on the severity of the condition). The most common treatment is eyeglasses and contact lenses, though surgeries such as [LASIK](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LASIK) continue to be developed. Myopia is known to be influenced by both genetic and environmental risk factors ([Bressler, 2020](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/2769247))\n\nAccording to [Vitale, et. al](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20008719/), among individuals aged 12 to 54 years old in the US, 25.0% were found to have myopia in 1971-1972, compared to 41.6% in 1999-2004. The World Health Organization and Brien Holden Vision Institute issued [a report in 2015](https://www.who.int/blindness/causes/MyopiaReportforWeb.pdf) estimating the global prevalence of myopia at 28% in 2010, and projected an increase to 52% in 2050.\n\nin the blog [Atoms vs Bits](https://www.atvbt.com/2050/), Jehan wrote in January 2022: \"Most myopia (nearsightedness) will be solved preventatively without invasive intervention [by 2050]\". The author's confidence in the prediction was \"around 80%\". Jehan wrote:\n\n>There are strong reasons to believe that nearsightedness can be controlled environmentally. [Only 1.2%](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3930282/) of rural Nepalese children are myopic compared to 59% of East Asian 17-year olds in Australia.\n\n> [...] I predict that this finding will become well-established and widely recognized, resulting in parenting norms that prevent the development of nearsightedness. [...] As this knowledge spreads among the educated, not needing glasses will become a class and cultural indicator, much the way straight teeth are now, which will drive adoption.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the US population who have myopia or have been treated/cured for myopia in 2050. This figure will be estimated for all ages, races, sexes, genders, etc. The [National Institute of Health](https://www.nei.nih.gov/learn-about-eye-health/outreach-campaigns-and-resources/eye-health-data-and-statistics/nearsightedness-myopia-data-and-statistics), [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention](https://www.cdc.gov/visionhealth/basics/ced/index.html), [World Health Organization](https://www.who.int/blindness/causes/MyopiaReportforWeb.pdf), or other credible academic surveys may be used as a resolution source (in that order of preference)", "lower_25": "45.7", "median": "56.9", "upper_75": "64.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Alireza Firouzja will not be the top FIDE-ranked chess player by 2035?", "desc": "[Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alireza_Firouzja):\n>Alireza Firouzja (Persian: علی‌رضا فیروزجا, Persian pronunciation: [æliːɾezɑː fiːɾuːzˈdʒɑː]; born 18 June 2003) is an Iranian-French chess grandmaster. Since December 1, 2021, Firouzja holds the No. 2 position in the FIDE world chess rankings, and is the youngest ever 2800-rated player, beating the previous record set by Magnus Carlsen by more than five months.\n\n[Magnus Carlsen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnus_Carlsen) has been the top FIDE ranked player since July 1, 2011, and has held the title of [World Champion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Chess_Championship) since 2013. After his victory in the 2021 World Championship, Carlsen [commented](https://www.chess.com/news/view/magnus-carlsen-defend-world-chess-title-alireza-firouzja): \"If someone other than Firouzja wins the Candidates Tournament, it is unlikely that I will play the next world championship match\".", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when Alireza Firouzja becomes the #1 ranked player in FIDE's [Top 100 Open rankings](https://ratings.fide.com/top_lists.phtml). It is not necessary for Firouzja to maintain this ranking for any length of time, so long as FIDE confirms that Firouzja's #1 ranking was correct (ie. not a bug or due to a disqualified or rule-breaking result).\n\nIf Firouzja does not reach #1 by January 1, 2035, this question will resolve as **>January 1, 2035.*", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that nuclear fusion will provide more than 10% of the world's primary energy by 2055?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will a fusion reactor reach ignition?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3727/when-will-a-fusion-reactor-reach-ignition/)\n* [When will a private fusion company first report a yearly profit?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3725/when-will-a-private-fusion-company-first-report-a-yearly-profit/)\n* [When will nuclear fusion provide >0.1% of the world's primary energy?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9464/nuclear-fusion-power-01-of-global-energy/)\n\n----\n\nIn 2001, Nuclear Fission power plants generated a record [6.6% of the world's primary energy](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total), though total production has somewhat declined since then as the world's total energy demand has increased (as of 2019). [Nuclear Fusion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power) is an entirely different physical reaction which has been actively investigated since the 1940s. Fusion power has several potential advantages over Fission power: less radioactive hazard, reduced radioactive waste products, and cheaper fuel. However, all reactor designs tested as of 2021 require more energy to operate than the amount of energy they produce.\n\n[Helion](https://www.helionenergy.com/) CEO David Kirtley said to [Forbes in January 2022](https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2022/01/02/fueled-by-billionaire-dollars-nuclear-fusion-enters-a-new-age/?sh=1da1351629f3): \"In 10 years we will have commercial electricity for sale, for sure.\" In the same article, Forbes quotes [Commonwealth Fusion Systems](https://cfs.energy/) CEO Bob Mumgaard, who predicts to produce \"a working reactor in 6 years\". In November 2021, [Helion raised $500 million](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-05/thiel-backed-helion-targets-nuclear-fusion-breakthrough-by-2024) in funding, with commitments for another $1.7 billion linked to certain performance milestones. According to Bloomberg, Helion set a goal to achieve net electricity from fusion in 2024.\n\nIn October 2021, The [US Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=49856) projected the world's total primary energy consumption to grow from 601.5 quadrillion [BTUs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_thermal_unit) in 2020 to 886.3 quadrillion BTUs in 2050. Most of that growth is expected in non-[OECD](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) asian countries. Renewable energy is expected to grow from 14.7% of the world's energy in 2020 to 26.5% in 2050, with nuclear fission projected to remain at 4% on the same period.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the earliest date when at least 10% of Earth's annual primary energy consumption is produced by nuclear fusion reactors, according to the [BP statistical review of energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). If BP does not publish this data, other energy researchers such as the [International Energy Agency](https://www.iea.org/) may be consulted.\n\nIf this does not occur by January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as **> January 1, 2100**.", "lower_25": "2055", "median": "2074", "upper_75": "2099", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Magnus Carlsen no longer be the top FIDE-ranked chess player by Apr 2028?", "desc": "[Magnus Carlsen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnus_Carlsen) is a Norwegian chess player who has [held a #1 ranking among all FIDE players](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_FIDE_chess_world_number_ones) since July 1, 2011. He has held the [World Championship title](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Chess_Championship) since 2013 and holds it currently (as of January 2022). He surpassed a rating of 2800 at 18, and a year later reached No. 1 in the FIDE world rankings, the youngest player at the time to achieve either feat. Carlsen is now 31 years old.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when Magnus Carlsen is no longer the #1 ranked player in [FIDE's Top 100 Open rankings](https://ratings.fide.com/top_lists.phtml). The period which Carlsen is not #1 may last for any length of time, so long as FIDE confirms that Carlsen's lower ranking is correct (ie. not a bug or due to a disqualified or rule-breaking result).\n\nIf Carlsen remains #1 until January 1, 2035, this question will resolve as \">January 1, 2035\". If Carlsen is deceased, his final ranking will be considered to remain until another player reaches a higher ranking", "lower_25": "Dec 2024", "median": "Feb 2026", "upper_75": "Apr 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Magnus Carlsen no longer be the top FIDE-ranked chess player by Apr 2028?", "desc": "[Magnus Carlsen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnus_Carlsen) is a Norwegian chess player who has [held a #1 ranking among all FIDE players](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_FIDE_chess_world_number_ones) since July 1, 2011. He has held the [World Championship title](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Chess_Championship) since 2013 and holds it currently (as of January 2022). He surpassed a rating of 2800 at 18, and a year later reached No. 1 in the FIDE world rankings, the youngest player at the time to achieve either feat. Carlsen is now 31 years old.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when Magnus Carlsen is no longer the #1 ranked player in [FIDE's Top 100 Open rankings](https://ratings.fide.com/top_lists.phtml). The period which Carlsen is not #1 may last for any length of time, so long as FIDE confirms that Carlsen's lower ranking is correct (ie. not a bug or due to a disqualified or rule-breaking result).\n\nIf Carlsen remains #1 until January 1, 2035, this question will resolve as \">January 1, 2035\". If Carlsen is deceased, his final ranking will be considered to remain until another player reaches a higher ranking", "lower_25": "Dec 2024", "median": "Feb 2026", "upper_75": "Apr 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 45.7% of the US population will have been diagnosed with myopia/nearsightedness in 2050?", "desc": "[Myopia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myopia) (or nearsightedness) is a condition where distant objects appear out-of-focus, whereas objects closer to the subject remain clear (depending on the severity of the condition). The most common treatment is eyeglasses and contact lenses, though surgeries such as [LASIK](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LASIK) continue to be developed. Myopia is known to be influenced by both genetic and environmental risk factors ([Bressler, 2020](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/2769247))\n\nAccording to [Vitale, et. al](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20008719/), among individuals aged 12 to 54 years old in the US, 25.0% were found to have myopia in 1971-1972, compared to 41.6% in 1999-2004. The World Health Organization and Brien Holden Vision Institute issued [a report in 2015](https://www.who.int/blindness/causes/MyopiaReportforWeb.pdf) estimating the global prevalence of myopia at 28% in 2010, and projected an increase to 52% in 2050.\n\nin the blog [Atoms vs Bits](https://www.atvbt.com/2050/), Jehan wrote in January 2022: \"Most myopia (nearsightedness) will be solved preventatively without invasive intervention [by 2050]\". The author's confidence in the prediction was \"around 80%\". Jehan wrote:\n\n>There are strong reasons to believe that nearsightedness can be controlled environmentally. [Only 1.2%](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3930282/) of rural Nepalese children are myopic compared to 59% of East Asian 17-year olds in Australia.\n\n> [...] I predict that this finding will become well-established and widely recognized, resulting in parenting norms that prevent the development of nearsightedness. [...] As this knowledge spreads among the educated, not needing glasses will become a class and cultural indicator, much the way straight teeth are now, which will drive adoption.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the US population who have myopia or have been treated/cured for myopia in 2050. This figure will be estimated for all ages, races, sexes, genders, etc. The [National Institute of Health](https://www.nei.nih.gov/learn-about-eye-health/outreach-campaigns-and-resources/eye-health-data-and-statistics/nearsightedness-myopia-data-and-statistics), [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention](https://www.cdc.gov/visionhealth/basics/ced/index.html), [World Health Organization](https://www.who.int/blindness/causes/MyopiaReportforWeb.pdf), or other credible academic surveys may be used as a resolution source (in that order of preference)", "lower_25": "45.7", "median": "56.9", "upper_75": "64.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Alireza Firouzja will not be the top FIDE-ranked chess player by 2035?", "desc": "[Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alireza_Firouzja):\n>Alireza Firouzja (Persian: علی‌رضا فیروزجا, Persian pronunciation: [æliːɾezɑː fiːɾuːzˈdʒɑː]; born 18 June 2003) is an Iranian-French chess grandmaster. Since December 1, 2021, Firouzja holds the No. 2 position in the FIDE world chess rankings, and is the youngest ever 2800-rated player, beating the previous record set by Magnus Carlsen by more than five months.\n\n[Magnus Carlsen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnus_Carlsen) has been the top FIDE ranked player since July 1, 2011, and has held the title of [World Champion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Chess_Championship) since 2013. After his victory in the 2021 World Championship, Carlsen [commented](https://www.chess.com/news/view/magnus-carlsen-defend-world-chess-title-alireza-firouzja): \"If someone other than Firouzja wins the Candidates Tournament, it is unlikely that I will play the next world championship match\".", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when Alireza Firouzja becomes the #1 ranked player in FIDE's [Top 100 Open rankings](https://ratings.fide.com/top_lists.phtml). It is not necessary for Firouzja to maintain this ranking for any length of time, so long as FIDE confirms that Firouzja's #1 ranking was correct (ie. not a bug or due to a disqualified or rule-breaking result).\n\nIf Firouzja does not reach #1 by January 1, 2035, this question will resolve as **>January 1, 2035.*", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.01 percentage of global primary energy consumption will be produced by Nuclear Power in 2025?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from nuclear power worldwide in the year 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9222/twh-of-electricity-from-nuclear-in-2030/)\n* [What percentage of global primary energy consumption will be produced by Nuclear Power in 2040?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9497/share-of-world-energy-from-nuclear-in-2040/)\n\n----\n\nThe amount of energy produced by [nuclear power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power) worldwide has grown from 220 Terawatt-hours in 1970 to 7,450 in 2005, and has [declined somewhat since](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption). As a share of total primary energy consumption, nuclear power peaked at 6.6% in 2001, then declined to 4.2% in 2019. Several countries have re-committed to nuclear power in recent years, with the US Democratic platform [endorsing](https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertbryce/2020/08/23/after-48-years-democrats-endorse-nuclear-energy-in-platform/?sh=42812bfc5829) nuclear energy in 2020 and the French president Emmanuel Macron in 2021 [committing](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/macron-says-france-will-build-more-nuclear-energy-reactors-2021-11-09/) to the construction of new power plants. New reactor technology also poses [exciting research opportunities](https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/27/136920/the-new-safer-nuclear-reactors-that-might-help-stop-climate-change/), and with it, chances for expansion.\n\nIn an analysis by Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser for [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-energy#nuclear-energy-and-renewables-are-far-far-safer-than-fossil-fuels), the authors found that when accounting for deaths from air pollution and in accidents from extracting resources (uranium, coal, oil), oil and coal cause 18.4 to 32.7 deaths per terawatt-hour of energy, where nuclear causes 0.07 deaths per TWh.\n\nThe United Nations Economic Comission for Europe [in a 2020 study](https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2022-01/LCA_final-FD_0.pdf) found European Nuclear power to produce 5.1 grams of CO2-equivalent per kWh, compared to 11-37 g CO2/kWh for different installations of solar power, and 280-1,000 g CO2/kWh for different coal plant designs.\n\nThe US Energy Information Agency's [2021 International report](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/IEO2021_Narrative.pdf) predicted mild growth in nuclear primary energy globally, from 27.5 BTUs in 2020 to 30.9 BTUs in 2025. This growth match the world's growing total primary energy consumption of 601 BTUs in 2020 to 667 BTUs in 2025. The EIA predicted the majority of growth in nuclear power to occur in Asia, while seeing a slight decline in the Americas and in Europe.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the share of world primary energy consumption which is produced by nuclear power sources in 2025, according to the [BP Statistical Review of Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). If BP no longer publishes this data, another source such as the [International Energy Agency](https://www.iea.org/fuels-and-technologies/nuclear) may be used.\n\nThis question will soley focus on energy produced through [Nuclear Fission](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fission); [Nuclear Fusion Power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fusion) will be excluded", "lower_25": "3.65", "median": "4.01", "upper_75": "4.43", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Alireza Firouzja will not be the top FIDE-ranked chess player by 2035?", "desc": "[Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alireza_Firouzja):\n>Alireza Firouzja (Persian: علی‌رضا فیروزجا, Persian pronunciation: [æliːɾezɑː fiːɾuːzˈdʒɑː]; born 18 June 2003) is an Iranian-French chess grandmaster. Since December 1, 2021, Firouzja holds the No. 2 position in the FIDE world chess rankings, and is the youngest ever 2800-rated player, beating the previous record set by Magnus Carlsen by more than five months.\n\n[Magnus Carlsen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnus_Carlsen) has been the top FIDE ranked player since July 1, 2011, and has held the title of [World Champion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Chess_Championship) since 2013. After his victory in the 2021 World Championship, Carlsen [commented](https://www.chess.com/news/view/magnus-carlsen-defend-world-chess-title-alireza-firouzja): \"If someone other than Firouzja wins the Candidates Tournament, it is unlikely that I will play the next world championship match\".", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when Alireza Firouzja becomes the #1 ranked player in FIDE's [Top 100 Open rankings](https://ratings.fide.com/top_lists.phtml). It is not necessary for Firouzja to maintain this ranking for any length of time, so long as FIDE confirms that Firouzja's #1 ranking was correct (ie. not a bug or due to a disqualified or rule-breaking result).\n\nIf Firouzja does not reach #1 by January 1, 2035, this question will resolve as **>January 1, 2035.*", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Magnus Carlsen no longer be the top FIDE-ranked chess player by Apr 2028?", "desc": "[Magnus Carlsen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnus_Carlsen) is a Norwegian chess player who has [held a #1 ranking among all FIDE players](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_FIDE_chess_world_number_ones) since July 1, 2011. He has held the [World Championship title](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Chess_Championship) since 2013 and holds it currently (as of January 2022). He surpassed a rating of 2800 at 18, and a year later reached No. 1 in the FIDE world rankings, the youngest player at the time to achieve either feat. Carlsen is now 31 years old.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when Magnus Carlsen is no longer the #1 ranked player in [FIDE's Top 100 Open rankings](https://ratings.fide.com/top_lists.phtml). The period which Carlsen is not #1 may last for any length of time, so long as FIDE confirms that Carlsen's lower ranking is correct (ie. not a bug or due to a disqualified or rule-breaking result).\n\nIf Carlsen remains #1 until January 1, 2035, this question will resolve as \">January 1, 2035\". If Carlsen is deceased, his final ranking will be considered to remain until another player reaches a higher ranking", "lower_25": "Dec 2024", "median": "Feb 2026", "upper_75": "Apr 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 45.7% of the US population will have been diagnosed with myopia/nearsightedness in 2050?", "desc": "[Myopia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myopia) (or nearsightedness) is a condition where distant objects appear out-of-focus, whereas objects closer to the subject remain clear (depending on the severity of the condition). The most common treatment is eyeglasses and contact lenses, though surgeries such as [LASIK](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LASIK) continue to be developed. Myopia is known to be influenced by both genetic and environmental risk factors ([Bressler, 2020](https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/2769247))\n\nAccording to [Vitale, et. al](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20008719/), among individuals aged 12 to 54 years old in the US, 25.0% were found to have myopia in 1971-1972, compared to 41.6% in 1999-2004. The World Health Organization and Brien Holden Vision Institute issued [a report in 2015](https://www.who.int/blindness/causes/MyopiaReportforWeb.pdf) estimating the global prevalence of myopia at 28% in 2010, and projected an increase to 52% in 2050.\n\nin the blog [Atoms vs Bits](https://www.atvbt.com/2050/), Jehan wrote in January 2022: \"Most myopia (nearsightedness) will be solved preventatively without invasive intervention [by 2050]\". The author's confidence in the prediction was \"around 80%\". Jehan wrote:\n\n>There are strong reasons to believe that nearsightedness can be controlled environmentally. [Only 1.2%](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3930282/) of rural Nepalese children are myopic compared to 59% of East Asian 17-year olds in Australia.\n\n> [...] I predict that this finding will become well-established and widely recognized, resulting in parenting norms that prevent the development of nearsightedness. [...] As this knowledge spreads among the educated, not needing glasses will become a class and cultural indicator, much the way straight teeth are now, which will drive adoption.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the US population who have myopia or have been treated/cured for myopia in 2050. This figure will be estimated for all ages, races, sexes, genders, etc. The [National Institute of Health](https://www.nei.nih.gov/learn-about-eye-health/outreach-campaigns-and-resources/eye-health-data-and-statistics/nearsightedness-myopia-data-and-statistics), [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention](https://www.cdc.gov/visionhealth/basics/ced/index.html), [World Health Organization](https://www.who.int/blindness/causes/MyopiaReportforWeb.pdf), or other credible academic surveys may be used as a resolution source (in that order of preference)", "lower_25": "45.7", "median": "56.9", "upper_75": "64.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that nuclear fusion will provide at least 0.1% of the world's primary energy by 2039?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will a fusion reactor reach ignition?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3727/when-will-a-fusion-reactor-reach-ignition/)\n* [When will a private fusion company first report a yearly profit?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3725/when-will-a-private-fusion-company-first-report-a-yearly-profit/)\n* [When will nuclear fusion provide >10% of the world's primary energy?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9465/nuclear-fusion-power-10-of-global-energy/)\n\n----\n\nIn 2001, Nuclear Fission power plants generated a record [6.6% of the world's primary energy](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total), though total production has somewhat declined since then as the world's total energy demand has increased (as of 2019). [Nuclear Fusion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power) is an entirely different physical reaction which has been actively investigated since the 1940s. Fusion power has several potential advantages over Fission power: less radioactive hazard, reduced radioactive waste products, and cheaper fuel. However, all reactor designs tested as of 2021 require more energy to operate than the amount of energy they produce.\n\n[Helion](https://www.helionenergy.com/) CEO David Kirtley said to [Forbes in January 2022](https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2022/01/02/fueled-by-billionaire-dollars-nuclear-fusion-enters-a-new-age/?sh=1da1351629f3): \"In 10 years we will have commercial electricity for sale, for sure.\" In the same article, Forbes quotes [Commonwealth Fusion Systems](https://cfs.energy/) CEO Bob Mumgaard, who predicts to produce \"a working reactor in 6 years\". In November 2021, [Helion raised $500 million](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-05/thiel-backed-helion-targets-nuclear-fusion-breakthrough-by-2024) in funding, with commitments for another $1.7 billion linked to certain performance milestones. According to Bloomberg, Helion set a goal to achieve net electricity from fusion in 2024.\n\nIn October 2021, The [US Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=49856) projected the world's total primary energy consumption to grow from 601.5 quadrillion [BTUs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_thermal_unit) in 2020 to 886.3 quadrillion BTUs in 2050. Most of that growth is expected in non-[OECD](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) asian countries. Renewable energy is expected to grow from 14.7% of the world's energy in 2020 to 26.5% in 2050, with nuclear fission projected to remain at 4% on the same period.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the earliest date when at least 0.1% of Earth's annual energy consumption is produced by nuclear fusion reactors, according to the [BP statistical review of energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). If BP does not publish this data, other energy researchers such as the [International Energy Agency](https://www.iea.org/) may be consulted.", "lower_25": "2039", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2064", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that nuclear fusion will provide at least 0.1% of the world's primary energy by 2039?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will a fusion reactor reach ignition?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3727/when-will-a-fusion-reactor-reach-ignition/)\n* [When will a private fusion company first report a yearly profit?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3725/when-will-a-private-fusion-company-first-report-a-yearly-profit/)\n* [When will nuclear fusion provide >10% of the world's primary energy?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9465/nuclear-fusion-power-10-of-global-energy/)\n\n----\n\nIn 2001, Nuclear Fission power plants generated a record [6.6% of the world's primary energy](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total), though total production has somewhat declined since then as the world's total energy demand has increased (as of 2019). [Nuclear Fusion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power) is an entirely different physical reaction which has been actively investigated since the 1940s. Fusion power has several potential advantages over Fission power: less radioactive hazard, reduced radioactive waste products, and cheaper fuel. However, all reactor designs tested as of 2021 require more energy to operate than the amount of energy they produce.\n\n[Helion](https://www.helionenergy.com/) CEO David Kirtley said to [Forbes in January 2022](https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2022/01/02/fueled-by-billionaire-dollars-nuclear-fusion-enters-a-new-age/?sh=1da1351629f3): \"In 10 years we will have commercial electricity for sale, for sure.\" In the same article, Forbes quotes [Commonwealth Fusion Systems](https://cfs.energy/) CEO Bob Mumgaard, who predicts to produce \"a working reactor in 6 years\". In November 2021, [Helion raised $500 million](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-05/thiel-backed-helion-targets-nuclear-fusion-breakthrough-by-2024) in funding, with commitments for another $1.7 billion linked to certain performance milestones. According to Bloomberg, Helion set a goal to achieve net electricity from fusion in 2024.\n\nIn October 2021, The [US Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=49856) projected the world's total primary energy consumption to grow from 601.5 quadrillion [BTUs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_thermal_unit) in 2020 to 886.3 quadrillion BTUs in 2050. Most of that growth is expected in non-[OECD](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) asian countries. Renewable energy is expected to grow from 14.7% of the world's energy in 2020 to 26.5% in 2050, with nuclear fission projected to remain at 4% on the same period.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the earliest date when at least 0.1% of Earth's annual energy consumption is produced by nuclear fusion reactors, according to the [BP statistical review of energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). If BP does not publish this data, other energy researchers such as the [International Energy Agency](https://www.iea.org/) may be consulted.", "lower_25": "2039", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2064", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.01 percentage of global primary energy consumption will be produced by Nuclear Power in 2025?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from nuclear power worldwide in the year 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9222/twh-of-electricity-from-nuclear-in-2030/)\n* [What percentage of global primary energy consumption will be produced by Nuclear Power in 2040?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9497/share-of-world-energy-from-nuclear-in-2040/)\n\n----\n\nThe amount of energy produced by [nuclear power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power) worldwide has grown from 220 Terawatt-hours in 1970 to 7,450 in 2005, and has [declined somewhat since](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption). As a share of total primary energy consumption, nuclear power peaked at 6.6% in 2001, then declined to 4.2% in 2019. Several countries have re-committed to nuclear power in recent years, with the US Democratic platform [endorsing](https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertbryce/2020/08/23/after-48-years-democrats-endorse-nuclear-energy-in-platform/?sh=42812bfc5829) nuclear energy in 2020 and the French president Emmanuel Macron in 2021 [committing](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/macron-says-france-will-build-more-nuclear-energy-reactors-2021-11-09/) to the construction of new power plants. New reactor technology also poses [exciting research opportunities](https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/27/136920/the-new-safer-nuclear-reactors-that-might-help-stop-climate-change/), and with it, chances for expansion.\n\nIn an analysis by Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser for [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-energy#nuclear-energy-and-renewables-are-far-far-safer-than-fossil-fuels), the authors found that when accounting for deaths from air pollution and in accidents from extracting resources (uranium, coal, oil), oil and coal cause 18.4 to 32.7 deaths per terawatt-hour of energy, where nuclear causes 0.07 deaths per TWh.\n\nThe United Nations Economic Comission for Europe [in a 2020 study](https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2022-01/LCA_final-FD_0.pdf) found European Nuclear power to produce 5.1 grams of CO2-equivalent per kWh, compared to 11-37 g CO2/kWh for different installations of solar power, and 280-1,000 g CO2/kWh for different coal plant designs.\n\nThe US Energy Information Agency's [2021 International report](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/IEO2021_Narrative.pdf) predicted mild growth in nuclear primary energy globally, from 27.5 BTUs in 2020 to 30.9 BTUs in 2025. This growth match the world's growing total primary energy consumption of 601 BTUs in 2020 to 667 BTUs in 2025. The EIA predicted the majority of growth in nuclear power to occur in Asia, while seeing a slight decline in the Americas and in Europe.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the share of world primary energy consumption which is produced by nuclear power sources in 2025, according to the [BP Statistical Review of Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). If BP no longer publishes this data, another source such as the [International Energy Agency](https://www.iea.org/fuels-and-technologies/nuclear) may be used.\n\nThis question will soley focus on energy produced through [Nuclear Fission](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fission); [Nuclear Fusion Power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fusion) will be excluded", "lower_25": "3.65", "median": "4.01", "upper_75": "4.43", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.01 percentage of global primary energy consumption will be produced by Nuclear Power in 2025?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from nuclear power worldwide in the year 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9222/twh-of-electricity-from-nuclear-in-2030/)\n* [What percentage of global primary energy consumption will be produced by Nuclear Power in 2040?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9497/share-of-world-energy-from-nuclear-in-2040/)\n\n----\n\nThe amount of energy produced by [nuclear power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power) worldwide has grown from 220 Terawatt-hours in 1970 to 7,450 in 2005, and has [declined somewhat since](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption). As a share of total primary energy consumption, nuclear power peaked at 6.6% in 2001, then declined to 4.2% in 2019. Several countries have re-committed to nuclear power in recent years, with the US Democratic platform [endorsing](https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertbryce/2020/08/23/after-48-years-democrats-endorse-nuclear-energy-in-platform/?sh=42812bfc5829) nuclear energy in 2020 and the French president Emmanuel Macron in 2021 [committing](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/macron-says-france-will-build-more-nuclear-energy-reactors-2021-11-09/) to the construction of new power plants. New reactor technology also poses [exciting research opportunities](https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/27/136920/the-new-safer-nuclear-reactors-that-might-help-stop-climate-change/), and with it, chances for expansion.\n\nIn an analysis by Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser for [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-energy#nuclear-energy-and-renewables-are-far-far-safer-than-fossil-fuels), the authors found that when accounting for deaths from air pollution and in accidents from extracting resources (uranium, coal, oil), oil and coal cause 18.4 to 32.7 deaths per terawatt-hour of energy, where nuclear causes 0.07 deaths per TWh.\n\nThe United Nations Economic Comission for Europe [in a 2020 study](https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2022-01/LCA_final-FD_0.pdf) found European Nuclear power to produce 5.1 grams of CO2-equivalent per kWh, compared to 11-37 g CO2/kWh for different installations of solar power, and 280-1,000 g CO2/kWh for different coal plant designs.\n\nThe US Energy Information Agency's [2021 International report](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/IEO2021_Narrative.pdf) predicted mild growth in nuclear primary energy globally, from 27.5 BTUs in 2020 to 30.9 BTUs in 2025. This growth match the world's growing total primary energy consumption of 601 BTUs in 2020 to 667 BTUs in 2025. The EIA predicted the majority of growth in nuclear power to occur in Asia, while seeing a slight decline in the Americas and in Europe.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the share of world primary energy consumption which is produced by nuclear power sources in 2025, according to the [BP Statistical Review of Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). If BP no longer publishes this data, another source such as the [International Energy Agency](https://www.iea.org/fuels-and-technologies/nuclear) may be used.\n\nThis question will soley focus on energy produced through [Nuclear Fission](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fission); [Nuclear Fusion Power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fusion) will be excluded", "lower_25": "3.65", "median": "4.01", "upper_75": "4.43", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 58.6% of France's electricity consumption will be supplied by nuclear power in 2035?", "desc": "As of 2019, France produces a larger share of its electricity (67%) from nuclear power [than any other nation](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=FRA~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Share+of+total) (the second highest share from 2019 data is Slovakia, at 54%). French President Francois Hollande [committed in 2014](https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25674581) to reducing this share to 50% by 2025. Current French president Emmanuel Macron successfully delayed this deadline to 2035 at the beginning of his first term, beginning in 2017, but retained a commitment to downscaling nuclear generation. Now, he's seeking re-election in 2022, and after COP-26, has [championed building new reactors](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/macron-says-france-will-build-more-nuclear-energy-reactors-2021-11-09/), in apparent defiance of the broader government's commitment to downscaling production.", "resc": "This question will resolve as as the percentage of France's total electricity consumption supplied by nuclear power in 2035, according to the [BP statistical review of energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). If BP no longer produces this data, alternative energy researchers such as the [IEA](https://www.iea.org/) may be used.", "lower_25": "58.6", "median": "67.2", "upper_75": "74.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 58.6% of France's electricity consumption will be supplied by nuclear power in 2035?", "desc": "As of 2019, France produces a larger share of its electricity (67%) from nuclear power [than any other nation](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=FRA~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Share+of+total) (the second highest share from 2019 data is Slovakia, at 54%). French President Francois Hollande [committed in 2014](https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25674581) to reducing this share to 50% by 2025. Current French president Emmanuel Macron successfully delayed this deadline to 2035 at the beginning of his first term, beginning in 2017, but retained a commitment to downscaling nuclear generation. Now, he's seeking re-election in 2022, and after COP-26, has [championed building new reactors](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/macron-says-france-will-build-more-nuclear-energy-reactors-2021-11-09/), in apparent defiance of the broader government's commitment to downscaling production.", "resc": "This question will resolve as as the percentage of France's total electricity consumption supplied by nuclear power in 2035, according to the [BP statistical review of energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). If BP no longer produces this data, alternative energy researchers such as the [IEA](https://www.iea.org/) may be used.", "lower_25": "58.6", "median": "67.2", "upper_75": "74.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that nuclear power will produce 4.46% of global primary energy consumption by 2040?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What percentage of global primary energy consumption will be produced by Nuclear Power in 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9495/share-of-world-energy-from-nuclear-in-2025/)\n* [How many terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from nuclear power worldwide in the year 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9222/twh-of-electricity-from-nuclear-in-2030/)\n\n----\n\nThe amount of energy produced by [nuclear power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power) worldwide has grown from 220 Terawatt-hours in 1970 to 7,450 in 2005, and has [declined somewhat since](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption). As a share of total primary energy consumption, nuclear power peaked at 6.6% in 2001, then declined to 4.2% in 2019. Several countries have re-committed to nuclear power in recent years, with the US Democratic platform [endorsing](https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertbryce/2020/08/23/after-48-years-democrats-endorse-nuclear-energy-in-platform/?sh=42812bfc5829) nuclear energy in 2020 and the French president Emmanuel Macron in 2021 [committing](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/macron-says-france-will-build-more-nuclear-energy-reactors-2021-11-09/) to the construction of new power plants. New reactor technology also poses [exciting research opportunities](https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/27/136920/the-new-safer-nuclear-reactors-that-might-help-stop-climate-change/), and with it, chances for expansion.\n\nIn an analysis by Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser for [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-energy#nuclear-energy-and-renewables-are-far-far-safer-than-fossil-fuels), the authors found that when accounting for deaths from air pollution and in accidents from extracting resources (uranium, coal, oil), oil and coal cause 18.4 to 32.7 deaths per terawatt-hour of energy, where nuclear causes 0.07 deaths per TWh.\n\nThe United Nations Economic Comission for Europe [in a 2020 study](https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2022-01/LCA_final-FD_0.pdf) found European Nuclear power to produce 5.1 grams of CO2-equivalent per kWh, compared to 11-37 g CO2/kWh for different installations of solar power, and 280-1,000 g CO2/kWh for different coal plant designs.\n\nThe US Energy Information Agency's [2021 International report](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/IEO2021_Narrative.pdf) predicted mild growth in nuclear primary energy globally, from 27.5 BTUs in 2020 to 33.5 BTUs in 2040. This growth would be slightly less than the world's growing total primary energy consumption of 601 BTUs in 2020 to 795 BTUs in 2040. The study predicted the majority of growth in nuclear power to occur in non-[OECD](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) Asian countries, while seeing a slight decline in the Americas and in Europe.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the share of world primary energy consumption which is produced by nuclear power sources in 2040, according to the [BP Statistical Review of Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). If BP no longer publishes this data, another source such as the [International Energy Agency](https://www.iea.org/fuels-and-technologies/nuclear) may be used.\n\nThis question will soley focus on energy produced through [Nuclear Fission](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fission); [Nuclear Fusion Power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fusion) will be excluded", "lower_25": "4.46", "median": "8.36", "upper_75": "13.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "In 2040, what is the chance that the UK will consume 494 TWh of natural gas?", "desc": "In 2016, The UK [produced approximately 461 Megatonnes](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/co2?time=1937..2020&facet=none&country=~GBR&Gas=All+GHGs+%28CO%E2%82%82eq%29&Accounting=Production-based&Fuel=Total&Count=Per+country) of [CO2 equivalents](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_warming_potential). 37% of these emissions were attributed to the purpose of heating (173 Mt CO2 / year). The UK Department of Business, Energy and Industry Strategy found in 2018 that [the main uses of heat](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/766109/decarbonising-heating.pdf) were space heating (46%), hot water (11%), cooking (5%) and industrial processes (38%). Natural gas produces [0.185 kg CO2 per kWh](https://www.carbonindependent.org/15.html).\n\nApproximately [87% of properties in the UK](https://www.statista.com/statistics/426988/united-kingdom-uk-heating-methods/) are heated using Natural Gas. Most with gas central heating will also use gas for cooking and hot water usage. Hydrogen has been proposed as an alternative to Natural Gas and [trials are underway](https://www.keele.ac.uk/sustainable-futures/ourchallengethemes/providingcleanenergyreducingcarbonemissions/hydeploy/) to test feasibility. [Estimates by Keele University and Cadent](https://www.keele.ac.uk/sustainable-futures/ourchallengethemes/providingcleanenergyreducingcarbonemissions/hydeploy/) predict that dosing the gas network with 20% Hydrogen could reduce CO2 emissions by 6 million tonnes per year.\n\nIndustrial heat processes carry [far more variables](https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/sustainability/our%20insights/how%20industry%20can%20move%20toward%20a%20low%20carbon%20future/decarbonization-of-industrial-sectors-the-next-frontier.pdf) than domestic heat. Many specialised processes exist which rules out a one-size-fits-all solution. Government intervention is required to guide, support & regulate and is fortunately [already underway](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/970229/Industrial_Decarbonisation_Strategy_March_2021.pdf).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of Natural Gas consumed (in Terawatt-hours) by the United Kingdom in the year 2040, according to the [BP statistical review of energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~GBR&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Gas&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption) provides historical and comparison graphs for BP's data.\n\nIf BP no longer publishes this data, an alternative source may be selected such as the [IEA](https://www.iea.org/) or the UK [Department of Business, Energy and Industry Strategy](https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-business-energy-and-industrial-strategy)", "lower_25": "269", "median": "494", "upper_75": "852", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Carlos Alcaraz will win 8.99 Grand Slams?", "desc": "[Carlos Alcaraz](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos_Alcaraz) is a Spanish professional tennis player. As of May 2022, he is ranked #6 in the world at age 19, making him the highest-ranked teenager by a large margin.\n\nAs of May 2022, in the past 12 months, he has:\n\n* Reached the third round of both the French and the Australian Open\n* Reached the quarterfinals of the U.S. Open\n* Won both the Miami and Madrid Opens, two Masters 1000 tournaments\n\nHis high performance at a young age has [invited](https://www.tennisnow.com/Blogs/NET-POSTS/September-2021-(1)/Toni-Nadal-Alcaraz-is-Successor-to-Big-3.aspx) [comparisons](https://tennishead.net/explosive-carlos-alcaraz-compared-to-rafael-nadal-by-slam-legend) to the early careers of Rafael Nadal and other top players.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of tennis (singles) Grand Slams that Alcaraz has won over the span of his career. This question will only include Slams which Alcaraz wins in singles, not doubles or mixed doubles events.\n\nIt will resolve when Alcaraz officially announces his retirement, or when credible media reports state that he will no longer play professional tennis.", "lower_25": "8.99", "median": "13.0", "upper_75": "16.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "In 2040, what is the chance that the UK will consume 494 TWh of natural gas?", "desc": "In 2016, The UK [produced approximately 461 Megatonnes](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/co2?time=1937..2020&facet=none&country=~GBR&Gas=All+GHGs+%28CO%E2%82%82eq%29&Accounting=Production-based&Fuel=Total&Count=Per+country) of [CO2 equivalents](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_warming_potential). 37% of these emissions were attributed to the purpose of heating (173 Mt CO2 / year). The UK Department of Business, Energy and Industry Strategy found in 2018 that [the main uses of heat](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/766109/decarbonising-heating.pdf) were space heating (46%), hot water (11%), cooking (5%) and industrial processes (38%). Natural gas produces [0.185 kg CO2 per kWh](https://www.carbonindependent.org/15.html).\n\nApproximately [87% of properties in the UK](https://www.statista.com/statistics/426988/united-kingdom-uk-heating-methods/) are heated using Natural Gas. Most with gas central heating will also use gas for cooking and hot water usage. Hydrogen has been proposed as an alternative to Natural Gas and [trials are underway](https://www.keele.ac.uk/sustainable-futures/ourchallengethemes/providingcleanenergyreducingcarbonemissions/hydeploy/) to test feasibility. [Estimates by Keele University and Cadent](https://www.keele.ac.uk/sustainable-futures/ourchallengethemes/providingcleanenergyreducingcarbonemissions/hydeploy/) predict that dosing the gas network with 20% Hydrogen could reduce CO2 emissions by 6 million tonnes per year.\n\nIndustrial heat processes carry [far more variables](https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/sustainability/our%20insights/how%20industry%20can%20move%20toward%20a%20low%20carbon%20future/decarbonization-of-industrial-sectors-the-next-frontier.pdf) than domestic heat. Many specialised processes exist which rules out a one-size-fits-all solution. Government intervention is required to guide, support & regulate and is fortunately [already underway](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/970229/Industrial_Decarbonisation_Strategy_March_2021.pdf).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of Natural Gas consumed (in Terawatt-hours) by the United Kingdom in the year 2040, according to the [BP statistical review of energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~GBR&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Gas&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption) provides historical and comparison graphs for BP's data.\n\nIf BP no longer publishes this data, an alternative source may be selected such as the [IEA](https://www.iea.org/) or the UK [Department of Business, Energy and Industry Strategy](https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-business-energy-and-industrial-strategy)", "lower_25": "269", "median": "494", "upper_75": "852", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that South Korea's fertility will be 0.562 in 2032?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will China's total fertility rate be in 2031?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8959/chinese-fertility-in-2031/)\n* [What will be Hungary's children per woman in the year 2031?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7821/hungary-fertility-in-2031/)\n* [What will Hungary's total fertility rate be in 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6800/hungarys-total-fertility-rate-be-in-2023/) [closed]\n\n----\n\nOf all developed countries, South Korea has the lowest recorded fertility. It dropped below the 1.0 line to 0.918 in 2019 according to [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=KR).", "resc": "This question will resolve as South Korea's total fertility rate in 2032 according to [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=KR). If the World Bank does not report this data, an alternative estimate by the UN Population Division or other credible source may be used. \n\nIf South Korea unifies with North Korea before this date, the value for the preunified territory will be used. If such data is not available, then this question will resolve as \"Ambiguous\"", "lower_25": "0.562", "median": "0.700", "upper_75": "0.878", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Carlos Alcaraz will win 8.99 Grand Slams?", "desc": "[Carlos Alcaraz](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos_Alcaraz) is a Spanish professional tennis player. As of May 2022, he is ranked #6 in the world at age 19, making him the highest-ranked teenager by a large margin.\n\nAs of May 2022, in the past 12 months, he has:\n\n* Reached the third round of both the French and the Australian Open\n* Reached the quarterfinals of the U.S. Open\n* Won both the Miami and Madrid Opens, two Masters 1000 tournaments\n\nHis high performance at a young age has [invited](https://www.tennisnow.com/Blogs/NET-POSTS/September-2021-(1)/Toni-Nadal-Alcaraz-is-Successor-to-Big-3.aspx) [comparisons](https://tennishead.net/explosive-carlos-alcaraz-compared-to-rafael-nadal-by-slam-legend) to the early careers of Rafael Nadal and other top players.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of tennis (singles) Grand Slams that Alcaraz has won over the span of his career. This question will only include Slams which Alcaraz wins in singles, not doubles or mixed doubles events.\n\nIt will resolve when Alcaraz officially announces his retirement, or when credible media reports state that he will no longer play professional tennis.", "lower_25": "8.99", "median": "13.0", "upper_75": "16.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that nuclear power will produce 4.46% of global primary energy consumption by 2040?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What percentage of global primary energy consumption will be produced by Nuclear Power in 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9495/share-of-world-energy-from-nuclear-in-2025/)\n* [How many terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from nuclear power worldwide in the year 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9222/twh-of-electricity-from-nuclear-in-2030/)\n\n----\n\nThe amount of energy produced by [nuclear power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power) worldwide has grown from 220 Terawatt-hours in 1970 to 7,450 in 2005, and has [declined somewhat since](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption). As a share of total primary energy consumption, nuclear power peaked at 6.6% in 2001, then declined to 4.2% in 2019. Several countries have re-committed to nuclear power in recent years, with the US Democratic platform [endorsing](https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertbryce/2020/08/23/after-48-years-democrats-endorse-nuclear-energy-in-platform/?sh=42812bfc5829) nuclear energy in 2020 and the French president Emmanuel Macron in 2021 [committing](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/macron-says-france-will-build-more-nuclear-energy-reactors-2021-11-09/) to the construction of new power plants. New reactor technology also poses [exciting research opportunities](https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/27/136920/the-new-safer-nuclear-reactors-that-might-help-stop-climate-change/), and with it, chances for expansion.\n\nIn an analysis by Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser for [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-energy#nuclear-energy-and-renewables-are-far-far-safer-than-fossil-fuels), the authors found that when accounting for deaths from air pollution and in accidents from extracting resources (uranium, coal, oil), oil and coal cause 18.4 to 32.7 deaths per terawatt-hour of energy, where nuclear causes 0.07 deaths per TWh.\n\nThe United Nations Economic Comission for Europe [in a 2020 study](https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2022-01/LCA_final-FD_0.pdf) found European Nuclear power to produce 5.1 grams of CO2-equivalent per kWh, compared to 11-37 g CO2/kWh for different installations of solar power, and 280-1,000 g CO2/kWh for different coal plant designs.\n\nThe US Energy Information Agency's [2021 International report](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/IEO2021_Narrative.pdf) predicted mild growth in nuclear primary energy globally, from 27.5 BTUs in 2020 to 33.5 BTUs in 2040. This growth would be slightly less than the world's growing total primary energy consumption of 601 BTUs in 2020 to 795 BTUs in 2040. The study predicted the majority of growth in nuclear power to occur in non-[OECD](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) Asian countries, while seeing a slight decline in the Americas and in Europe.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the share of world primary energy consumption which is produced by nuclear power sources in 2040, according to the [BP Statistical Review of Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). If BP no longer publishes this data, another source such as the [International Energy Agency](https://www.iea.org/fuels-and-technologies/nuclear) may be used.\n\nThis question will soley focus on energy produced through [Nuclear Fission](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fission); [Nuclear Fusion Power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fusion) will be excluded", "lower_25": "4.46", "median": "8.36", "upper_75": "13.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that South Korea's fertility will be 0.562 in 2032?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will China's total fertility rate be in 2031?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8959/chinese-fertility-in-2031/)\n* [What will be Hungary's children per woman in the year 2031?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7821/hungary-fertility-in-2031/)\n* [What will Hungary's total fertility rate be in 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6800/hungarys-total-fertility-rate-be-in-2023/) [closed]\n\n----\n\nOf all developed countries, South Korea has the lowest recorded fertility. It dropped below the 1.0 line to 0.918 in 2019 according to [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=KR).", "resc": "This question will resolve as South Korea's total fertility rate in 2032 according to [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=KR). If the World Bank does not report this data, an alternative estimate by the UN Population Division or other credible source may be used. \n\nIf South Korea unifies with North Korea before this date, the value for the preunified territory will be used. If such data is not available, then this question will resolve as \"Ambiguous\"", "lower_25": "0.562", "median": "0.700", "upper_75": "0.878", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Carlos Alcaraz will win 8.99 Grand Slams?", "desc": "[Carlos Alcaraz](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carlos_Alcaraz) is a Spanish professional tennis player. As of May 2022, he is ranked #6 in the world at age 19, making him the highest-ranked teenager by a large margin.\n\nAs of May 2022, in the past 12 months, he has:\n\n* Reached the third round of both the French and the Australian Open\n* Reached the quarterfinals of the U.S. Open\n* Won both the Miami and Madrid Opens, two Masters 1000 tournaments\n\nHis high performance at a young age has [invited](https://www.tennisnow.com/Blogs/NET-POSTS/September-2021-(1)/Toni-Nadal-Alcaraz-is-Successor-to-Big-3.aspx) [comparisons](https://tennishead.net/explosive-carlos-alcaraz-compared-to-rafael-nadal-by-slam-legend) to the early careers of Rafael Nadal and other top players.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of tennis (singles) Grand Slams that Alcaraz has won over the span of his career. This question will only include Slams which Alcaraz wins in singles, not doubles or mixed doubles events.\n\nIt will resolve when Alcaraz officially announces his retirement, or when credible media reports state that he will no longer play professional tennis.", "lower_25": "8.99", "median": "13.0", "upper_75": "16.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.99 percentage of world GDP will be spent on military expenses in 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will any country's military expenditure exceed that of the United States before 2030? ](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2605/will-any-countrys-military-expenditure-exceed-that-of-the-united-states-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\n[Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/battle-related-deaths-in-state-based-conflicts-since-1946-by-world-region) has estimated that battle-related deaths have been generally declining from 1945 to 2016, despite [world population growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/population-since-1800?country=~OWID_WRL) threefold in that period. Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute shows that [military expenditures have grown steadily](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD) from 1984 to 2020; however as a percentage of [world GDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product), military expenditures have actually declined from 1984 at 4.18% to 2.32% in 1996, where they have remained by 2020. According to [SIPRI](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/military-expenditure-share-gdp-sipri?country=USA~OWID_WRL), the US has consistently spent more on military expenditures than the world average, and spent the more in 2021 [than any other nation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures) (39% of world military spending). The second highest spender in 2021, China, spent 13% of world spending on military expenditures.\n\nThe [Global Peace Dividend](https://peace-dividend.org/) is an international campaign launched in 2022, endorsed by 50 [Nobel Laureates](https://peace-dividend.org/), [The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists](https://thebulletin.org/2022/01/bulletin-joins-nobel-laureates-in-call-to-redirect-military-spending/), and [Veterans for Peace](https://www.veteransforpeace.org/). The Peace Dividend [proposes](https://peace-dividend.org/the-appeal) for all nations to coordinate to reduce military spending by 2% per year for 5 years. They propose half of these reductions to be remain at the disposal of their respective governments, and half to be \"allocated to a global fund, under UN supervision, to address humanity's grave common problems: pandemics, climate change, and extreme poverty.\" They project these savings to amount to as much as 1 trillion USD by 2030. The Peace Dividend cites the [SALT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Arms_Limitation_Talks), [START](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/START_I), and [New START](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_START) treaties as previous sucessful arms control negotiations.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of Earth's GDP in 2030 which is spent on military expenditures, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's [military expenditures database](https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex). If SIPRI no longer provides this data or significantly changes methodology, Metaculus Admins may select an alternative source, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion", "lower_25": "1.90", "median": "2.37", "upper_75": "2.99", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 58.6% of France's electricity consumption will be supplied by nuclear power in 2035?", "desc": "As of 2019, France produces a larger share of its electricity (67%) from nuclear power [than any other nation](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=FRA~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Electricity+only&Metric=Share+of+total) (the second highest share from 2019 data is Slovakia, at 54%). French President Francois Hollande [committed in 2014](https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-25674581) to reducing this share to 50% by 2025. Current French president Emmanuel Macron successfully delayed this deadline to 2035 at the beginning of his first term, beginning in 2017, but retained a commitment to downscaling nuclear generation. Now, he's seeking re-election in 2022, and after COP-26, has [championed building new reactors](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/macron-says-france-will-build-more-nuclear-energy-reactors-2021-11-09/), in apparent defiance of the broader government's commitment to downscaling production.", "resc": "This question will resolve as as the percentage of France's total electricity consumption supplied by nuclear power in 2035, according to the [BP statistical review of energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). If BP no longer produces this data, alternative energy researchers such as the [IEA](https://www.iea.org/) may be used.", "lower_25": "58.6", "median": "67.2", "upper_75": "74.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.99 percentage of world GDP will be spent on military expenses in 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will any country's military expenditure exceed that of the United States before 2030? ](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2605/will-any-countrys-military-expenditure-exceed-that-of-the-united-states-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\n[Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/battle-related-deaths-in-state-based-conflicts-since-1946-by-world-region) has estimated that battle-related deaths have been generally declining from 1945 to 2016, despite [world population growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/population-since-1800?country=~OWID_WRL) threefold in that period. Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute shows that [military expenditures have grown steadily](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD) from 1984 to 2020; however as a percentage of [world GDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product), military expenditures have actually declined from 1984 at 4.18% to 2.32% in 1996, where they have remained by 2020. According to [SIPRI](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/military-expenditure-share-gdp-sipri?country=USA~OWID_WRL), the US has consistently spent more on military expenditures than the world average, and spent the more in 2021 [than any other nation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures) (39% of world military spending). The second highest spender in 2021, China, spent 13% of world spending on military expenditures.\n\nThe [Global Peace Dividend](https://peace-dividend.org/) is an international campaign launched in 2022, endorsed by 50 [Nobel Laureates](https://peace-dividend.org/), [The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists](https://thebulletin.org/2022/01/bulletin-joins-nobel-laureates-in-call-to-redirect-military-spending/), and [Veterans for Peace](https://www.veteransforpeace.org/). The Peace Dividend [proposes](https://peace-dividend.org/the-appeal) for all nations to coordinate to reduce military spending by 2% per year for 5 years. They propose half of these reductions to be remain at the disposal of their respective governments, and half to be \"allocated to a global fund, under UN supervision, to address humanity's grave common problems: pandemics, climate change, and extreme poverty.\" They project these savings to amount to as much as 1 trillion USD by 2030. The Peace Dividend cites the [SALT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Arms_Limitation_Talks), [START](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/START_I), and [New START](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_START) treaties as previous sucessful arms control negotiations.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of Earth's GDP in 2030 which is spent on military expenditures, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's [military expenditures database](https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex). If SIPRI no longer provides this data or significantly changes methodology, Metaculus Admins may select an alternative source, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion", "lower_25": "1.90", "median": "2.37", "upper_75": "2.99", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that nuclear power will produce 4.46% of global primary energy consumption by 2040?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What percentage of global primary energy consumption will be produced by Nuclear Power in 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9495/share-of-world-energy-from-nuclear-in-2025/)\n* [How many terawatt-hours of electricity will be generated from nuclear power worldwide in the year 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9222/twh-of-electricity-from-nuclear-in-2030/)\n\n----\n\nThe amount of energy produced by [nuclear power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power) worldwide has grown from 220 Terawatt-hours in 1970 to 7,450 in 2005, and has [declined somewhat since](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption). As a share of total primary energy consumption, nuclear power peaked at 6.6% in 2001, then declined to 4.2% in 2019. Several countries have re-committed to nuclear power in recent years, with the US Democratic platform [endorsing](https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertbryce/2020/08/23/after-48-years-democrats-endorse-nuclear-energy-in-platform/?sh=42812bfc5829) nuclear energy in 2020 and the French president Emmanuel Macron in 2021 [committing](https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/macron-says-france-will-build-more-nuclear-energy-reactors-2021-11-09/) to the construction of new power plants. New reactor technology also poses [exciting research opportunities](https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/27/136920/the-new-safer-nuclear-reactors-that-might-help-stop-climate-change/), and with it, chances for expansion.\n\nIn an analysis by Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser for [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-energy#nuclear-energy-and-renewables-are-far-far-safer-than-fossil-fuels), the authors found that when accounting for deaths from air pollution and in accidents from extracting resources (uranium, coal, oil), oil and coal cause 18.4 to 32.7 deaths per terawatt-hour of energy, where nuclear causes 0.07 deaths per TWh.\n\nThe United Nations Economic Comission for Europe [in a 2020 study](https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2022-01/LCA_final-FD_0.pdf) found European Nuclear power to produce 5.1 grams of CO2-equivalent per kWh, compared to 11-37 g CO2/kWh for different installations of solar power, and 280-1,000 g CO2/kWh for different coal plant designs.\n\nThe US Energy Information Agency's [2021 International report](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/IEO2021_Narrative.pdf) predicted mild growth in nuclear primary energy globally, from 27.5 BTUs in 2020 to 33.5 BTUs in 2040. This growth would be slightly less than the world's growing total primary energy consumption of 601 BTUs in 2020 to 795 BTUs in 2040. The study predicted the majority of growth in nuclear power to occur in non-[OECD](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) Asian countries, while seeing a slight decline in the Americas and in Europe.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the share of world primary energy consumption which is produced by nuclear power sources in 2040, according to the [BP Statistical Review of Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). If BP no longer publishes this data, another source such as the [International Energy Agency](https://www.iea.org/fuels-and-technologies/nuclear) may be used.\n\nThis question will soley focus on energy produced through [Nuclear Fission](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fission); [Nuclear Fusion Power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fusion) will be excluded", "lower_25": "4.46", "median": "8.36", "upper_75": "13.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "In 2040, what is the chance that the UK will consume 494 TWh of natural gas?", "desc": "In 2016, The UK [produced approximately 461 Megatonnes](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/co2?time=1937..2020&facet=none&country=~GBR&Gas=All+GHGs+%28CO%E2%82%82eq%29&Accounting=Production-based&Fuel=Total&Count=Per+country) of [CO2 equivalents](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_warming_potential). 37% of these emissions were attributed to the purpose of heating (173 Mt CO2 / year). The UK Department of Business, Energy and Industry Strategy found in 2018 that [the main uses of heat](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/766109/decarbonising-heating.pdf) were space heating (46%), hot water (11%), cooking (5%) and industrial processes (38%). Natural gas produces [0.185 kg CO2 per kWh](https://www.carbonindependent.org/15.html).\n\nApproximately [87% of properties in the UK](https://www.statista.com/statistics/426988/united-kingdom-uk-heating-methods/) are heated using Natural Gas. Most with gas central heating will also use gas for cooking and hot water usage. Hydrogen has been proposed as an alternative to Natural Gas and [trials are underway](https://www.keele.ac.uk/sustainable-futures/ourchallengethemes/providingcleanenergyreducingcarbonemissions/hydeploy/) to test feasibility. [Estimates by Keele University and Cadent](https://www.keele.ac.uk/sustainable-futures/ourchallengethemes/providingcleanenergyreducingcarbonemissions/hydeploy/) predict that dosing the gas network with 20% Hydrogen could reduce CO2 emissions by 6 million tonnes per year.\n\nIndustrial heat processes carry [far more variables](https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/sustainability/our%20insights/how%20industry%20can%20move%20toward%20a%20low%20carbon%20future/decarbonization-of-industrial-sectors-the-next-frontier.pdf) than domestic heat. Many specialised processes exist which rules out a one-size-fits-all solution. Government intervention is required to guide, support & regulate and is fortunately [already underway](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/970229/Industrial_Decarbonisation_Strategy_March_2021.pdf).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of Natural Gas consumed (in Terawatt-hours) by the United Kingdom in the year 2040, according to the [BP statistical review of energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html). [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~GBR&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Gas&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption) provides historical and comparison graphs for BP's data.\n\nIf BP no longer publishes this data, an alternative source may be selected such as the [IEA](https://www.iea.org/) or the UK [Department of Business, Energy and Industry Strategy](https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-business-energy-and-industrial-strategy)", "lower_25": "269", "median": "494", "upper_75": "852", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.99 percentage of world GDP will be spent on military expenses in 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will any country's military expenditure exceed that of the United States before 2030? ](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2605/will-any-countrys-military-expenditure-exceed-that-of-the-united-states-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\n[Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/battle-related-deaths-in-state-based-conflicts-since-1946-by-world-region) has estimated that battle-related deaths have been generally declining from 1945 to 2016, despite [world population growing](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/population-since-1800?country=~OWID_WRL) threefold in that period. Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute shows that [military expenditures have grown steadily](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD) from 1984 to 2020; however as a percentage of [world GDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product), military expenditures have actually declined from 1984 at 4.18% to 2.32% in 1996, where they have remained by 2020. According to [SIPRI](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/military-expenditure-share-gdp-sipri?country=USA~OWID_WRL), the US has consistently spent more on military expenditures than the world average, and spent the more in 2021 [than any other nation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures) (39% of world military spending). The second highest spender in 2021, China, spent 13% of world spending on military expenditures.\n\nThe [Global Peace Dividend](https://peace-dividend.org/) is an international campaign launched in 2022, endorsed by 50 [Nobel Laureates](https://peace-dividend.org/), [The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists](https://thebulletin.org/2022/01/bulletin-joins-nobel-laureates-in-call-to-redirect-military-spending/), and [Veterans for Peace](https://www.veteransforpeace.org/). The Peace Dividend [proposes](https://peace-dividend.org/the-appeal) for all nations to coordinate to reduce military spending by 2% per year for 5 years. They propose half of these reductions to be remain at the disposal of their respective governments, and half to be \"allocated to a global fund, under UN supervision, to address humanity's grave common problems: pandemics, climate change, and extreme poverty.\" They project these savings to amount to as much as 1 trillion USD by 2030. The Peace Dividend cites the [SALT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Arms_Limitation_Talks), [START](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/START_I), and [New START](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_START) treaties as previous sucessful arms control negotiations.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of Earth's GDP in 2030 which is spent on military expenditures, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's [military expenditures database](https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex). If SIPRI no longer provides this data or significantly changes methodology, Metaculus Admins may select an alternative source, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion", "lower_25": "1.90", "median": "2.37", "upper_75": "2.99", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that South Korea's fertility will be 0.562 in 2032?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will China's total fertility rate be in 2031?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8959/chinese-fertility-in-2031/)\n* [What will be Hungary's children per woman in the year 2031?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7821/hungary-fertility-in-2031/)\n* [What will Hungary's total fertility rate be in 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6800/hungarys-total-fertility-rate-be-in-2023/) [closed]\n\n----\n\nOf all developed countries, South Korea has the lowest recorded fertility. It dropped below the 1.0 line to 0.918 in 2019 according to [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=KR).", "resc": "This question will resolve as South Korea's total fertility rate in 2032 according to [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=KR). If the World Bank does not report this data, an alternative estimate by the UN Population Division or other credible source may be used. \n\nIf South Korea unifies with North Korea before this date, the value for the preunified territory will be used. If such data is not available, then this question will resolve as \"Ambiguous\"", "lower_25": "0.562", "median": "0.700", "upper_75": "0.878", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest Common Crawl will be 1.93k TiB by 2032?", "desc": "[Common Crawl](https://commoncrawl.org/) is a nonprofit that crawls the web and freely provides its archives and datasets to the public. Common Crawl's web archive consists of petabytes of data collected since 2011. It completes crawls generally every month.\n\nTheir November/December 2021 crawl contains 2.5 billion web pages or 280 TiB of uncompressed content, according to their [latest blog post](http://commoncrawl.org/connect/blog/). Data on their previous crawl sizes may be [found here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Crawl#History_of_Common_Crawl_data).", "resc": "This resolves as the largest monthly Common Crawl dataset, in uncompressed content, in tebibytes (TiBs) (\\(1024^4 \\) bytes) by January 1st, 2032. \n\nIf Common Crawl no longer generates dataset at roughly a monthly cadence, or is discontinued altogether, this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "607", "median": "1.17k", "upper_75": "1.93k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest Common Crawl will be 1.93k TiB by 2032?", "desc": "[Common Crawl](https://commoncrawl.org/) is a nonprofit that crawls the web and freely provides its archives and datasets to the public. Common Crawl's web archive consists of petabytes of data collected since 2011. It completes crawls generally every month.\n\nTheir November/December 2021 crawl contains 2.5 billion web pages or 280 TiB of uncompressed content, according to their [latest blog post](http://commoncrawl.org/connect/blog/). Data on their previous crawl sizes may be [found here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Crawl#History_of_Common_Crawl_data).", "resc": "This resolves as the largest monthly Common Crawl dataset, in uncompressed content, in tebibytes (TiBs) (\\(1024^4 \\) bytes) by January 1st, 2032. \n\nIf Common Crawl no longer generates dataset at roughly a monthly cadence, or is discontinued altogether, this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "607", "median": "1.17k", "upper_75": "1.93k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest Common Crawl will be 1.93k TiB by 2032?", "desc": "[Common Crawl](https://commoncrawl.org/) is a nonprofit that crawls the web and freely provides its archives and datasets to the public. Common Crawl's web archive consists of petabytes of data collected since 2011. It completes crawls generally every month.\n\nTheir November/December 2021 crawl contains 2.5 billion web pages or 280 TiB of uncompressed content, according to their [latest blog post](http://commoncrawl.org/connect/blog/). Data on their previous crawl sizes may be [found here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Crawl#History_of_Common_Crawl_data).", "resc": "This resolves as the largest monthly Common Crawl dataset, in uncompressed content, in tebibytes (TiBs) (\\(1024^4 \\) bytes) by January 1st, 2032. \n\nIf Common Crawl no longer generates dataset at roughly a monthly cadence, or is discontinued altogether, this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "607", "median": "1.17k", "upper_75": "1.93k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that >50% of users will access Google over IPv6 by Dec 2024?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will global IPv4 traffic account for less than 1% of total internet traffic?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4449/when-will-global-ipv4-traffic-account-for-less-than-1-of-total-internet-traffic/)\n\n----\n\n[IPv4](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv4) (Internet Protocol version 4) was introduced in 1983 and now forms the basis for internet routing. There are only 2^32 IPv4 addresses and [the internet is running out of addresses](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv4_address_exhaustion). The internet is currently transitioning over to IPv6 which has 2^128 addresses. As of January 22, 2022, 38.05% of users access Google over IPv6.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when [Google's daily IPv6 statistics](https://www.google.com/intl/en/ipv6/statistics.html) show >50% total IPv6 adoption globally for that day. This figure should include all Google traffic in all regions/servicies. If Google no longer provides this data, another credible source of Google traffic may be used. If no such estimates exist, this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\nIf this does not occur by January 1, 2030, this question will resolve as \">January 1, 2030\"", "lower_25": "Jul 2024", "median": "Dec 2024", "upper_75": "Jun 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX Starship will first successfully fly an external customer payload by Aug 2025?", "desc": "SpaceX [Starship](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX_Starship) is a heavy-lift orbital launch vehicle, intended for crewed and uncrewed flight, reusability, and deep-space capability.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date that a paid customer payload is first flown on Starship, to Low Earth Orbit or beyond.\n\n\"Starship\" will be as defined in [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4588/when-will-spacexs-starship-carry-a-human-to-orbit/).\n\nThe payload may be people, cargo, or a satellite, as long as some entity other than SpaceX pays SpaceX for the launch services. That may include NASA, another government agency, a private individual, or company. It will not include internal SpaceX payloads. Starlink or other companies spun out of SpaceX will not be included; this is not intended to be a question about SpaceX / Starlink corporate restructuring.\n\n\"Successful\" flight will be based on credible media reports that the launch met mission objectives, regardless of later payload success or failure, or public statements by the customer that the launch was successful", "lower_25": "Jul 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that >50% of users will access Google over IPv6 by Dec 2024?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will global IPv4 traffic account for less than 1% of total internet traffic?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4449/when-will-global-ipv4-traffic-account-for-less-than-1-of-total-internet-traffic/)\n\n----\n\n[IPv4](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv4) (Internet Protocol version 4) was introduced in 1983 and now forms the basis for internet routing. There are only 2^32 IPv4 addresses and [the internet is running out of addresses](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv4_address_exhaustion). The internet is currently transitioning over to IPv6 which has 2^128 addresses. As of January 22, 2022, 38.05% of users access Google over IPv6.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when [Google's daily IPv6 statistics](https://www.google.com/intl/en/ipv6/statistics.html) show >50% total IPv6 adoption globally for that day. This figure should include all Google traffic in all regions/servicies. If Google no longer provides this data, another credible source of Google traffic may be used. If no such estimates exist, this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\nIf this does not occur by January 1, 2030, this question will resolve as \">January 1, 2030\"", "lower_25": "Jul 2024", "median": "Dec 2024", "upper_75": "Jun 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a biological attack against crops or livestock will result in at least 100 deaths or $1 billion (2021 USD) in damages by 2094?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Pandemic series: a bioterror attack against crops or livestock by 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/251/bioagents-against-cropslivestock/) [closed]\n\n----\n\nAlthough the intended target of biological weapons of war or terror is generally human, there is a history of development of [bioweapons against agricultural crops or livestock](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agro-terrorism) going back up to a century. See [This comprehensive article](http://www.eubarnet.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Agroterrorism-Biological-Crimes.pdf).\nAs a particularly scary example, part of the Soviet Union's extensive bioweapons program was a secret division code-named \"ecology\" that targeted livestock by developing variants of foot-and-mouth, rinderpest, swine fever, and psittacosis to infect cows, pigs, and chickens. \n\nRocco Casgrade published an [analysis](https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/73casa.pdf) in the 2000 [Nonproliferation Review](https://nonproliferation.org/research/nonproliferation-review/), calling agroterrorism a \"high-consequences, high-probability\" event, and said \"US agencies and agricultural industries have not taken the necessary steps to prevent agroterrorist attacks.\"\n\nTommy Thompson, former US Secretary of Health and Human Services, [remarked in 2004](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5274022.stm), \"I, for the life of me, cannot understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food supply, because it is so easy to do\". Dean Olson gave a [report on agroterrorism](https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/agroterrorism-threats-to-americas-economy-and-food-supply) to the US FBI's Law Enforcement Bulletin, noting \"When American and allied forces overran al Qaeda sanctuaries in the caves of eastern Afghanistan in 2002, among the thousands of documents they discovered were U.S. agricultural documents and al Qaeda training manuals targeting agriculture.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve on the estimated date of a biological attack against agricultural livestock or crops which results in at least 100 deaths or $1 billion in damages ([inflation adjusted to 2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL)). This attack may occur anywhere on Earth (not just the US). Damages from the attack may be estimated by government sources, international security agencies, and media reports, if Metaculus Admins determine such sources to be credible. Economic damages may include direct production losses as well as indirect losses such as decreased consumer purchasing or export restrictions.\n\nThe damages must be attributed to a single attack; multiple attacks/agents which sum to greater than $1 billion or 100 deaths will not qualify for resolution. For the purposes of this question, a \"biological attack\" will include any natural or engineered organisms or viruses which were believed to be deliberately released and for which agriculture was the primary target.\n\nTo assess the claims that the attack was deliberate and targeting agriculture, Metaculus Admins may use government sources, international security agencies, and media reports, if they determine such sources to be credible. In the case of ambiguity, Metaculus may delay resolution to obtain further evidence, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion.\n\nIf no such attack occurs between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as \">January 1, 2100\"", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2056", "upper_75": "2094", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will break up Meta Platforms by Jun 2029?", "desc": "[Facebook](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meta_Platforms) has used [Section 230](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Section_230) of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 to shield itself from lawsuits, same as other Big Tech companies; but it has been on the receiving end of a massive amount of criticism because of various practices, and suspicions that political actors use the platform to spread political misinformation. \n\nIn October 2021, a Facebook whistle-blower accused the company of various misdeeds, fueling widespread concerns about its power and influence over U.S. public discourse. As judge James Boasberg [rejected federal antitrust complaints](https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-judge-tells-ftc-file-new-complaint-against-facebook-2021-06-28/) against Facebook in June 2021, he left the door open for refiling anti-trust complaints against the company – and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) [duly refiled in August](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/19/ftc-files-new-antitrust-complaint-against-facebook.html), looking to keep the case open. \n\nThe emergent theory at the FTC is that dominant tech companies could be bad even if they don't raise prices for consumers, because they may have excessive social, political and economic power, a view that has been [openly defended](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-06-29/facebook-victory-against-the-ftc-is-an-antitrust-lesson-in-monopoly-power-kqi8jeku) by FTC chairman Lina Khan. \n\nThere is a clear threat that Facebook ends up forced to spin off one of its valuable properties, amid all the unrest around Section 230 and Big Tech power. The question is how elevated this threat is.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that Meta Platforms has divested ownership of any or all of [Facebook](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook), [Instagram](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instagram), [WhatsApp](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WhatsApp), or [Oculus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oculus_(brand)), due to an order by a branch of the US Federal Government (such as the [Federal Trade Comission](https://www.ftc.gov/) or the Department of Justice's [Antitrust Division](https://www.justice.gov/atr)). Divestment must be complete within 3 years of the order in order to qualify for resolution. This question will also resolve in the event that, by order of the federal government, a component of a Meta company is broken off into an independent company (such as separating Facebook's news department from Facebook, or Instagram's image hosting from the social network). Credible media reports, corporate statements by Meta or reports from the FTC may qualify as resolution sources.\n\nIf Facebook faces no antitrust violations by January 1, 2030, this question will resolve as \">January 1, 2030\".", "lower_25": "Jun 2029", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a biological attack against crops or livestock will result in at least 100 deaths or $1 billion (2021 USD) in damages by 2094?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Pandemic series: a bioterror attack against crops or livestock by 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/251/bioagents-against-cropslivestock/) [closed]\n\n----\n\nAlthough the intended target of biological weapons of war or terror is generally human, there is a history of development of [bioweapons against agricultural crops or livestock](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agro-terrorism) going back up to a century. See [This comprehensive article](http://www.eubarnet.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Agroterrorism-Biological-Crimes.pdf).\nAs a particularly scary example, part of the Soviet Union's extensive bioweapons program was a secret division code-named \"ecology\" that targeted livestock by developing variants of foot-and-mouth, rinderpest, swine fever, and psittacosis to infect cows, pigs, and chickens. \n\nRocco Casgrade published an [analysis](https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/73casa.pdf) in the 2000 [Nonproliferation Review](https://nonproliferation.org/research/nonproliferation-review/), calling agroterrorism a \"high-consequences, high-probability\" event, and said \"US agencies and agricultural industries have not taken the necessary steps to prevent agroterrorist attacks.\"\n\nTommy Thompson, former US Secretary of Health and Human Services, [remarked in 2004](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5274022.stm), \"I, for the life of me, cannot understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food supply, because it is so easy to do\". Dean Olson gave a [report on agroterrorism](https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/agroterrorism-threats-to-americas-economy-and-food-supply) to the US FBI's Law Enforcement Bulletin, noting \"When American and allied forces overran al Qaeda sanctuaries in the caves of eastern Afghanistan in 2002, among the thousands of documents they discovered were U.S. agricultural documents and al Qaeda training manuals targeting agriculture.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve on the estimated date of a biological attack against agricultural livestock or crops which results in at least 100 deaths or $1 billion in damages ([inflation adjusted to 2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL)). This attack may occur anywhere on Earth (not just the US). Damages from the attack may be estimated by government sources, international security agencies, and media reports, if Metaculus Admins determine such sources to be credible. Economic damages may include direct production losses as well as indirect losses such as decreased consumer purchasing or export restrictions.\n\nThe damages must be attributed to a single attack; multiple attacks/agents which sum to greater than $1 billion or 100 deaths will not qualify for resolution. For the purposes of this question, a \"biological attack\" will include any natural or engineered organisms or viruses which were believed to be deliberately released and for which agriculture was the primary target.\n\nTo assess the claims that the attack was deliberate and targeting agriculture, Metaculus Admins may use government sources, international security agencies, and media reports, if they determine such sources to be credible. In the case of ambiguity, Metaculus may delay resolution to obtain further evidence, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion.\n\nIf no such attack occurs between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as \">January 1, 2100\"", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2056", "upper_75": "2094", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Altos Labs will first trial an anti-aging intervention in humans by 2027?", "desc": "In 2006, Shinya Yamanaka [discovered](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Induced_pluripotent_stem_cell) that mature cells can be reprogrammed into pluripotent stem cells by the induction of four proteins, which are now called the Yamanaka factors. The discovery [earned him](https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/medicine/2012/summary/) the 2012 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, together with Sir John B. Gurdon. \n\nIn 2010, [it was suggested](https://twitter.com/ArtirKel/status/1483839966954201089) that a similar process could be used to rejuvenate old tissue, without necessarily turning it into pluripotent stem cells. And indeed, reprogramming with Yamanaka factors has been [shown](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6351826/) to reverse epigenetic aging, even in [very old](http://genesdev.cshlp.org/content/25/21/2248.short) and [senescent](https://nintil.com/reversible-senescence/) cells. \n\nUnfortunately, though, reprogramming *in vivo* [was found in 2013](https://www.nature.com/articles/nature12586) to lead to the formation of several teratomas and embryo-like structures. \n\nBut tweaking the technique a bit was [was later shown, in 2016](https://www.cell.com/cell/fulltext/S0092-8674(16)31664-6), to extend the life of progeroid mice, and then in 2020, to [improve the health](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2213671120303854) and [reverse vision loss](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2975-4) of wildtype mice.\n\nIn January 19, 2022, Altos Labs [announced itself](https://altoslabs.com/) as \n> a new biotechnology company focused on cellular rejuvenation programming to restore cell health and resilience, with the goal of reversing disease to transform medicine.\n\nThey're starting out [with $3B in funding](https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/altos-labs-launches-with-the-goal-to-transform-medicine-through-cellular-rejuvenation-programming-301463541.html?tc=eml_cleartime), some of which [seems to have come from Jeff Bezos](https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/09/04/1034364/altos-labs-silicon-valleys-jeff-bezos-milner-bet-living-forever/). Altos has Yamanaka and other Nobel laureates as scientific advisors and board members, and several former tenured professors as principal investigators. Many of those are authors of seminal cellular reprogramming papers or epigenetic aging clock experts.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when Altos Labs first registers and is responsible for a clinical trial on the treatment of [biomarkers or symptoms of aging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biomarkers_of_aging). This date will be determined via the \"First Posted\" date on the clinical trial's [clinicaltrials.gov](clinicaltrials.gov) webpage, or if that data is unavailable, any credible source can be used to determine when the trial was first registered.\n\nIf Altos Labs has no such trial by January 1, 2038, this question will resolve as \">January 1, 2038\".", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will break up Meta Platforms by Jun 2029?", "desc": "[Facebook](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meta_Platforms) has used [Section 230](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Section_230) of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 to shield itself from lawsuits, same as other Big Tech companies; but it has been on the receiving end of a massive amount of criticism because of various practices, and suspicions that political actors use the platform to spread political misinformation. \n\nIn October 2021, a Facebook whistle-blower accused the company of various misdeeds, fueling widespread concerns about its power and influence over U.S. public discourse. As judge James Boasberg [rejected federal antitrust complaints](https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-judge-tells-ftc-file-new-complaint-against-facebook-2021-06-28/) against Facebook in June 2021, he left the door open for refiling anti-trust complaints against the company – and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) [duly refiled in August](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/19/ftc-files-new-antitrust-complaint-against-facebook.html), looking to keep the case open. \n\nThe emergent theory at the FTC is that dominant tech companies could be bad even if they don't raise prices for consumers, because they may have excessive social, political and economic power, a view that has been [openly defended](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-06-29/facebook-victory-against-the-ftc-is-an-antitrust-lesson-in-monopoly-power-kqi8jeku) by FTC chairman Lina Khan. \n\nThere is a clear threat that Facebook ends up forced to spin off one of its valuable properties, amid all the unrest around Section 230 and Big Tech power. The question is how elevated this threat is.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that Meta Platforms has divested ownership of any or all of [Facebook](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook), [Instagram](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instagram), [WhatsApp](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WhatsApp), or [Oculus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oculus_(brand)), due to an order by a branch of the US Federal Government (such as the [Federal Trade Comission](https://www.ftc.gov/) or the Department of Justice's [Antitrust Division](https://www.justice.gov/atr)). Divestment must be complete within 3 years of the order in order to qualify for resolution. This question will also resolve in the event that, by order of the federal government, a component of a Meta company is broken off into an independent company (such as separating Facebook's news department from Facebook, or Instagram's image hosting from the social network). Credible media reports, corporate statements by Meta or reports from the FTC may qualify as resolution sources.\n\nIf Facebook faces no antitrust violations by January 1, 2030, this question will resolve as \">January 1, 2030\".", "lower_25": "Jun 2029", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Altos Labs will first trial an anti-aging intervention in humans by 2027?", "desc": "In 2006, Shinya Yamanaka [discovered](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Induced_pluripotent_stem_cell) that mature cells can be reprogrammed into pluripotent stem cells by the induction of four proteins, which are now called the Yamanaka factors. The discovery [earned him](https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/medicine/2012/summary/) the 2012 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, together with Sir John B. Gurdon. \n\nIn 2010, [it was suggested](https://twitter.com/ArtirKel/status/1483839966954201089) that a similar process could be used to rejuvenate old tissue, without necessarily turning it into pluripotent stem cells. And indeed, reprogramming with Yamanaka factors has been [shown](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6351826/) to reverse epigenetic aging, even in [very old](http://genesdev.cshlp.org/content/25/21/2248.short) and [senescent](https://nintil.com/reversible-senescence/) cells. \n\nUnfortunately, though, reprogramming *in vivo* [was found in 2013](https://www.nature.com/articles/nature12586) to lead to the formation of several teratomas and embryo-like structures. \n\nBut tweaking the technique a bit was [was later shown, in 2016](https://www.cell.com/cell/fulltext/S0092-8674(16)31664-6), to extend the life of progeroid mice, and then in 2020, to [improve the health](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2213671120303854) and [reverse vision loss](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2975-4) of wildtype mice.\n\nIn January 19, 2022, Altos Labs [announced itself](https://altoslabs.com/) as \n> a new biotechnology company focused on cellular rejuvenation programming to restore cell health and resilience, with the goal of reversing disease to transform medicine.\n\nThey're starting out [with $3B in funding](https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/altos-labs-launches-with-the-goal-to-transform-medicine-through-cellular-rejuvenation-programming-301463541.html?tc=eml_cleartime), some of which [seems to have come from Jeff Bezos](https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/09/04/1034364/altos-labs-silicon-valleys-jeff-bezos-milner-bet-living-forever/). Altos has Yamanaka and other Nobel laureates as scientific advisors and board members, and several former tenured professors as principal investigators. Many of those are authors of seminal cellular reprogramming papers or epigenetic aging clock experts.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when Altos Labs first registers and is responsible for a clinical trial on the treatment of [biomarkers or symptoms of aging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biomarkers_of_aging). This date will be determined via the \"First Posted\" date on the clinical trial's [clinicaltrials.gov](clinicaltrials.gov) webpage, or if that data is unavailable, any credible source can be used to determine when the trial was first registered.\n\nIf Altos Labs has no such trial by January 1, 2038, this question will resolve as \">January 1, 2038\".", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.99% of exhibitors at Art Basel (in Basel, Switzerland) in 2030 will offer an NFT?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will at least one work presented at Art Basel 2030 use an NFT?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9587/nft-presented-at-art-basel-2030/)\n\n----\n\n[Non-Fungible Tokens](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-fungible_token#Standards_in_blockchains) (NFTs) are unique tokens which store data on decentralized, cryptographically-secured [blockchains](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain). These tokens can record changes of ownership and prices paid for transfers. NFTs have become increasingly popular in the art collector community as a means of establishing provenance for digital artworks.\n\n[Art Basel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Art_Basel) is the world's premier venue for contemporary art, including new-media and digital art. In 2021, all three of the Art Basel fairs (Miami Beach, Hong Kong, and Basel) featured NFTs. They were especially prominent at Art Basel Miami Beach, November 30 - December 4, 2021.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of exhibitors at Art Basel's Basel, Switzerland fair in 2030 who offer the sale of at least one [Non-Fungible Token](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-fungible_token#Standards_in_blockchains) (NFT). A \"Non-Fungible Token\" for the purposes of this question will include any unique token which can be exchanged and recorded on a [cryptographic blockchain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain) (that is, not just restricted to [ERC-721](http://erc721.org/) or [Etherium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethereum)-based NFT systems). Resolution may come from official announcements by Art Basel, credible media reports, or public blockchain data.", "lower_25": "1.13", "median": "5.99", "upper_75": "15.10", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Altos Labs will first trial an anti-aging intervention in humans by 2027?", "desc": "In 2006, Shinya Yamanaka [discovered](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Induced_pluripotent_stem_cell) that mature cells can be reprogrammed into pluripotent stem cells by the induction of four proteins, which are now called the Yamanaka factors. The discovery [earned him](https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/medicine/2012/summary/) the 2012 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, together with Sir John B. Gurdon. \n\nIn 2010, [it was suggested](https://twitter.com/ArtirKel/status/1483839966954201089) that a similar process could be used to rejuvenate old tissue, without necessarily turning it into pluripotent stem cells. And indeed, reprogramming with Yamanaka factors has been [shown](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6351826/) to reverse epigenetic aging, even in [very old](http://genesdev.cshlp.org/content/25/21/2248.short) and [senescent](https://nintil.com/reversible-senescence/) cells. \n\nUnfortunately, though, reprogramming *in vivo* [was found in 2013](https://www.nature.com/articles/nature12586) to lead to the formation of several teratomas and embryo-like structures. \n\nBut tweaking the technique a bit was [was later shown, in 2016](https://www.cell.com/cell/fulltext/S0092-8674(16)31664-6), to extend the life of progeroid mice, and then in 2020, to [improve the health](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2213671120303854) and [reverse vision loss](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2975-4) of wildtype mice.\n\nIn January 19, 2022, Altos Labs [announced itself](https://altoslabs.com/) as \n> a new biotechnology company focused on cellular rejuvenation programming to restore cell health and resilience, with the goal of reversing disease to transform medicine.\n\nThey're starting out [with $3B in funding](https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/altos-labs-launches-with-the-goal-to-transform-medicine-through-cellular-rejuvenation-programming-301463541.html?tc=eml_cleartime), some of which [seems to have come from Jeff Bezos](https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/09/04/1034364/altos-labs-silicon-valleys-jeff-bezos-milner-bet-living-forever/). Altos has Yamanaka and other Nobel laureates as scientific advisors and board members, and several former tenured professors as principal investigators. Many of those are authors of seminal cellular reprogramming papers or epigenetic aging clock experts.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when Altos Labs first registers and is responsible for a clinical trial on the treatment of [biomarkers or symptoms of aging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biomarkers_of_aging). This date will be determined via the \"First Posted\" date on the clinical trial's [clinicaltrials.gov](clinicaltrials.gov) webpage, or if that data is unavailable, any credible source can be used to determine when the trial was first registered.\n\nIf Altos Labs has no such trial by January 1, 2038, this question will resolve as \">January 1, 2038\".", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.99% of exhibitors at Art Basel (in Basel, Switzerland) in 2030 will offer an NFT?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will at least one work presented at Art Basel 2030 use an NFT?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9587/nft-presented-at-art-basel-2030/)\n\n----\n\n[Non-Fungible Tokens](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-fungible_token#Standards_in_blockchains) (NFTs) are unique tokens which store data on decentralized, cryptographically-secured [blockchains](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain). These tokens can record changes of ownership and prices paid for transfers. NFTs have become increasingly popular in the art collector community as a means of establishing provenance for digital artworks.\n\n[Art Basel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Art_Basel) is the world's premier venue for contemporary art, including new-media and digital art. In 2021, all three of the Art Basel fairs (Miami Beach, Hong Kong, and Basel) featured NFTs. They were especially prominent at Art Basel Miami Beach, November 30 - December 4, 2021.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of exhibitors at Art Basel's Basel, Switzerland fair in 2030 who offer the sale of at least one [Non-Fungible Token](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-fungible_token#Standards_in_blockchains) (NFT). A \"Non-Fungible Token\" for the purposes of this question will include any unique token which can be exchanged and recorded on a [cryptographic blockchain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain) (that is, not just restricted to [ERC-721](http://erc721.org/) or [Etherium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethereum)-based NFT systems). Resolution may come from official announcements by Art Basel, credible media reports, or public blockchain data.", "lower_25": "1.13", "median": "5.99", "upper_75": "15.10", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that >50% of users will access Google over IPv6 by Dec 2024?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will global IPv4 traffic account for less than 1% of total internet traffic?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4449/when-will-global-ipv4-traffic-account-for-less-than-1-of-total-internet-traffic/)\n\n----\n\n[IPv4](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv4) (Internet Protocol version 4) was introduced in 1983 and now forms the basis for internet routing. There are only 2^32 IPv4 addresses and [the internet is running out of addresses](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPv4_address_exhaustion). The internet is currently transitioning over to IPv6 which has 2^128 addresses. As of January 22, 2022, 38.05% of users access Google over IPv6.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when [Google's daily IPv6 statistics](https://www.google.com/intl/en/ipv6/statistics.html) show >50% total IPv6 adoption globally for that day. This figure should include all Google traffic in all regions/servicies. If Google no longer provides this data, another credible source of Google traffic may be used. If no such estimates exist, this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\nIf this does not occur by January 1, 2030, this question will resolve as \">January 1, 2030\"", "lower_25": "Jul 2024", "median": "Dec 2024", "upper_75": "Jun 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will break up Meta Platforms by Jun 2029?", "desc": "[Facebook](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meta_Platforms) has used [Section 230](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Section_230) of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 to shield itself from lawsuits, same as other Big Tech companies; but it has been on the receiving end of a massive amount of criticism because of various practices, and suspicions that political actors use the platform to spread political misinformation. \n\nIn October 2021, a Facebook whistle-blower accused the company of various misdeeds, fueling widespread concerns about its power and influence over U.S. public discourse. As judge James Boasberg [rejected federal antitrust complaints](https://www.reuters.com/technology/us-judge-tells-ftc-file-new-complaint-against-facebook-2021-06-28/) against Facebook in June 2021, he left the door open for refiling anti-trust complaints against the company – and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) [duly refiled in August](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/19/ftc-files-new-antitrust-complaint-against-facebook.html), looking to keep the case open. \n\nThe emergent theory at the FTC is that dominant tech companies could be bad even if they don't raise prices for consumers, because they may have excessive social, political and economic power, a view that has been [openly defended](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-06-29/facebook-victory-against-the-ftc-is-an-antitrust-lesson-in-monopoly-power-kqi8jeku) by FTC chairman Lina Khan. \n\nThere is a clear threat that Facebook ends up forced to spin off one of its valuable properties, amid all the unrest around Section 230 and Big Tech power. The question is how elevated this threat is.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that Meta Platforms has divested ownership of any or all of [Facebook](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook), [Instagram](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instagram), [WhatsApp](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WhatsApp), or [Oculus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oculus_(brand)), due to an order by a branch of the US Federal Government (such as the [Federal Trade Comission](https://www.ftc.gov/) or the Department of Justice's [Antitrust Division](https://www.justice.gov/atr)). Divestment must be complete within 3 years of the order in order to qualify for resolution. This question will also resolve in the event that, by order of the federal government, a component of a Meta company is broken off into an independent company (such as separating Facebook's news department from Facebook, or Instagram's image hosting from the social network). Credible media reports, corporate statements by Meta or reports from the FTC may qualify as resolution sources.\n\nIf Facebook faces no antitrust violations by January 1, 2030, this question will resolve as \">January 1, 2030\".", "lower_25": "Jun 2029", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX Starship will first successfully fly an external customer payload by Aug 2025?", "desc": "SpaceX [Starship](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX_Starship) is a heavy-lift orbital launch vehicle, intended for crewed and uncrewed flight, reusability, and deep-space capability.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date that a paid customer payload is first flown on Starship, to Low Earth Orbit or beyond.\n\n\"Starship\" will be as defined in [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4588/when-will-spacexs-starship-carry-a-human-to-orbit/).\n\nThe payload may be people, cargo, or a satellite, as long as some entity other than SpaceX pays SpaceX for the launch services. That may include NASA, another government agency, a private individual, or company. It will not include internal SpaceX payloads. Starlink or other companies spun out of SpaceX will not be included; this is not intended to be a question about SpaceX / Starlink corporate restructuring.\n\n\"Successful\" flight will be based on credible media reports that the launch met mission objectives, regardless of later payload success or failure, or public statements by the customer that the launch was successful", "lower_25": "Jul 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.99% of exhibitors at Art Basel (in Basel, Switzerland) in 2030 will offer an NFT?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will at least one work presented at Art Basel 2030 use an NFT?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9587/nft-presented-at-art-basel-2030/)\n\n----\n\n[Non-Fungible Tokens](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-fungible_token#Standards_in_blockchains) (NFTs) are unique tokens which store data on decentralized, cryptographically-secured [blockchains](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain). These tokens can record changes of ownership and prices paid for transfers. NFTs have become increasingly popular in the art collector community as a means of establishing provenance for digital artworks.\n\n[Art Basel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Art_Basel) is the world's premier venue for contemporary art, including new-media and digital art. In 2021, all three of the Art Basel fairs (Miami Beach, Hong Kong, and Basel) featured NFTs. They were especially prominent at Art Basel Miami Beach, November 30 - December 4, 2021.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of exhibitors at Art Basel's Basel, Switzerland fair in 2030 who offer the sale of at least one [Non-Fungible Token](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-fungible_token#Standards_in_blockchains) (NFT). A \"Non-Fungible Token\" for the purposes of this question will include any unique token which can be exchanged and recorded on a [cryptographic blockchain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockchain) (that is, not just restricted to [ERC-721](http://erc721.org/) or [Etherium](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethereum)-based NFT systems). Resolution may come from official announcements by Art Basel, credible media reports, or public blockchain data.", "lower_25": "1.13", "median": "5.99", "upper_75": "15.10", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX Starship will first successfully fly an external customer payload by Aug 2025?", "desc": "SpaceX [Starship](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpaceX_Starship) is a heavy-lift orbital launch vehicle, intended for crewed and uncrewed flight, reusability, and deep-space capability.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date that a paid customer payload is first flown on Starship, to Low Earth Orbit or beyond.\n\n\"Starship\" will be as defined in [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4588/when-will-spacexs-starship-carry-a-human-to-orbit/).\n\nThe payload may be people, cargo, or a satellite, as long as some entity other than SpaceX pays SpaceX for the launch services. That may include NASA, another government agency, a private individual, or company. It will not include internal SpaceX payloads. Starlink or other companies spun out of SpaceX will not be included; this is not intended to be a question about SpaceX / Starlink corporate restructuring.\n\n\"Successful\" flight will be based on credible media reports that the launch met mission objectives, regardless of later payload success or failure, or public statements by the customer that the launch was successful", "lower_25": "Jul 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a biological attack against crops or livestock will result in at least 100 deaths or $1 billion (2021 USD) in damages by 2094?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Pandemic series: a bioterror attack against crops or livestock by 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/251/bioagents-against-cropslivestock/) [closed]\n\n----\n\nAlthough the intended target of biological weapons of war or terror is generally human, there is a history of development of [bioweapons against agricultural crops or livestock](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agro-terrorism) going back up to a century. See [This comprehensive article](http://www.eubarnet.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Agroterrorism-Biological-Crimes.pdf).\nAs a particularly scary example, part of the Soviet Union's extensive bioweapons program was a secret division code-named \"ecology\" that targeted livestock by developing variants of foot-and-mouth, rinderpest, swine fever, and psittacosis to infect cows, pigs, and chickens. \n\nRocco Casgrade published an [analysis](https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/73casa.pdf) in the 2000 [Nonproliferation Review](https://nonproliferation.org/research/nonproliferation-review/), calling agroterrorism a \"high-consequences, high-probability\" event, and said \"US agencies and agricultural industries have not taken the necessary steps to prevent agroterrorist attacks.\"\n\nTommy Thompson, former US Secretary of Health and Human Services, [remarked in 2004](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5274022.stm), \"I, for the life of me, cannot understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food supply, because it is so easy to do\". Dean Olson gave a [report on agroterrorism](https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/agroterrorism-threats-to-americas-economy-and-food-supply) to the US FBI's Law Enforcement Bulletin, noting \"When American and allied forces overran al Qaeda sanctuaries in the caves of eastern Afghanistan in 2002, among the thousands of documents they discovered were U.S. agricultural documents and al Qaeda training manuals targeting agriculture.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve on the estimated date of a biological attack against agricultural livestock or crops which results in at least 100 deaths or $1 billion in damages ([inflation adjusted to 2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL)). This attack may occur anywhere on Earth (not just the US). Damages from the attack may be estimated by government sources, international security agencies, and media reports, if Metaculus Admins determine such sources to be credible. Economic damages may include direct production losses as well as indirect losses such as decreased consumer purchasing or export restrictions.\n\nThe damages must be attributed to a single attack; multiple attacks/agents which sum to greater than $1 billion or 100 deaths will not qualify for resolution. For the purposes of this question, a \"biological attack\" will include any natural or engineered organisms or viruses which were believed to be deliberately released and for which agriculture was the primary target.\n\nTo assess the claims that the attack was deliberate and targeting agriculture, Metaculus Admins may use government sources, international security agencies, and media reports, if they determine such sources to be credible. In the case of ambiguity, Metaculus may delay resolution to obtain further evidence, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion.\n\nIf no such attack occurs between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as \">January 1, 2100\"", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2056", "upper_75": "2094", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What will be Germany's per-capita CO2 emissions in 2030, in tonnes?\n\nKeyword: 8.21\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that Germany's per-capita CO2 emissions in 2030 will be 75% of the current level?", "desc": "Germany's recently elected coalition government announced (in November 2021) more aggressive pledges to add renewable energy to their electricity grid, pledging to power [80% of their electricity demand](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/german-coalition-commits-faster-decarbonisation-2021-11-24/) with renewables, and pledging to phase out coal power in 2030, earlier than their previous 2038 goal. However, Germany is also moving away from nuclear energy, planning to phase it out [entirely by the end of 2022](https://apnews.com/article/technology-business-germany-angela-merkel-gerhard-schroeder-11b97717f822a38c90fb7483ffc825aa). [The German coalition government](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scholz_cabinet) is the first to include Die Grünen (The Greens) since 2005, and a Green Party member of the Bundestag, [Steffi Lemke](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steffi_Lemke), now serves as the Federal Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear safety, and Consumer protection. \n\nThere is debate among climate activists about whether nuclear power can be phased out in a way that allows for CO2 emissions to be reduced through the use of renewable energy. Like many Green Parties, the German Green Party [takes the view](https://www.ft.com/content/92ab113f-ab17-4492-be65-56c9173cfc53) that it is possible to significantly reduce CO2 emissions without relying on nuclear power. Germany currently has higher levels of [per-capita CO2 emissions](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/co2?facet=none&country=DEU~FRA&Gas=CO%E2%82%82&Accounting=Consumption-based&Fuel=Total&Count=Per+capita) than many of its neighbors - for example, in 2019, France had yearly per-capita emissions of 6.48 tonnes of CO2, whereas the equivalent figure for Germany was 9.88 tonnes. France relies heavily on nuclear power - accounting for approximately [70.6%](https://pris.iaea.org/pris/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=FR) of France's total electricity production.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of per-capita CO2 emissions in Germany in 2030, in tonnes of CO2, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/co2?facet=none&country=~DEU&Gas=CO%E2%82%82&Accounting=Consumption-based&Fuel=Total&Count=Per+capita). CO2 emissions will be accounted on a consumption-based estimation, accounting for trade (removing emissions from exports, and adding emissions from imports).\n\nIf Our World in Data or the [Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/) no longer publishes this data for 2030, a credible alternative source will be used", "lower_25": "5.63", "median": "6.80", "upper_75": "8.21", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What will be Germany's per-capita CO2 emissions in 2030, in tonnes?\n\nKeyword: 8.21\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that Germany's per-capita CO2 emissions in 2030 will be 75% of the current level?", "desc": "Germany's recently elected coalition government announced (in November 2021) more aggressive pledges to add renewable energy to their electricity grid, pledging to power [80% of their electricity demand](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/german-coalition-commits-faster-decarbonisation-2021-11-24/) with renewables, and pledging to phase out coal power in 2030, earlier than their previous 2038 goal. However, Germany is also moving away from nuclear energy, planning to phase it out [entirely by the end of 2022](https://apnews.com/article/technology-business-germany-angela-merkel-gerhard-schroeder-11b97717f822a38c90fb7483ffc825aa). [The German coalition government](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scholz_cabinet) is the first to include Die Grünen (The Greens) since 2005, and a Green Party member of the Bundestag, [Steffi Lemke](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steffi_Lemke), now serves as the Federal Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear safety, and Consumer protection. \n\nThere is debate among climate activists about whether nuclear power can be phased out in a way that allows for CO2 emissions to be reduced through the use of renewable energy. Like many Green Parties, the German Green Party [takes the view](https://www.ft.com/content/92ab113f-ab17-4492-be65-56c9173cfc53) that it is possible to significantly reduce CO2 emissions without relying on nuclear power. Germany currently has higher levels of [per-capita CO2 emissions](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/co2?facet=none&country=DEU~FRA&Gas=CO%E2%82%82&Accounting=Consumption-based&Fuel=Total&Count=Per+capita) than many of its neighbors - for example, in 2019, France had yearly per-capita emissions of 6.48 tonnes of CO2, whereas the equivalent figure for Germany was 9.88 tonnes. France relies heavily on nuclear power - accounting for approximately [70.6%](https://pris.iaea.org/pris/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=FR) of France's total electricity production.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of per-capita CO2 emissions in Germany in 2030, in tonnes of CO2, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/co2?facet=none&country=~DEU&Gas=CO%E2%82%82&Accounting=Consumption-based&Fuel=Total&Count=Per+capita). CO2 emissions will be accounted on a consumption-based estimation, accounting for trade (removing emissions from exports, and adding emissions from imports).\n\nIf Our World in Data or the [Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/) no longer publishes this data for 2030, a credible alternative source will be used", "lower_25": "5.63", "median": "6.80", "upper_75": "8.21", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a wild grizzly bear will be sighted in Colorado by 2049?", "desc": "The [grizzly bear](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grizzly_bear) (Ursus arctos horribilis) is a brown bear native to North America. Prior to the 20th century, grizzlies ranged from Canada down to Mexico and west of Kansas across to the Pacific Ocean. Due to excessive hunting and habitat loss, grizzly bears were considered locally extinct from most of the contiguous United States.\n\nIn 1973, the grizzly bear was [added to the list](https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp/species/7642#status) of species protected by the Endangered Species Act (ESA). This protection rendered grizzly bear hunting illegal and mandated that recovery plans be made for the species. Over the next half century, bear populations in the contiguous United States have somewhat recovered thanks to natural migration and intentional reintroductions by wildlife agencies. There are now substantial populations in Montana and Wyoming and very small populations in Washington and Idaho. The grizzly bear was [delisted and relisted under the ESA](https://www.nps.gov/yell/learn/nature/bearesa.htm) several times, and is currently federally protected.\n\nThe state of Colorado once hosted a robust population of grizzly bears. The San Juan and Rocky Mountain ranges are perfect habitat for bears. Unfortunately, the grizzly was hunted to local extinction [in the mid 20th century](https://www.dmns.org/science/featured-collections/zoology/colorado-s-last-grizzly-bear/). In 2020, Colorado voters [passed an initiative](https://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Proposition_114,_Gray_Wolf_Reintroduction_Initiative_(2020)) to reintroduce the grey wolf to the state by 2024, raising the prospects of the grizzly bear to return as well.", "resc": "This question will resolve when a wild grizzly bear is sighted within Colorado state borders, according to confirmation by [Colorado Parks and Wildlife](https://cpw.state.co.us/) or a US government agency. This may be due to intentional reintroduction or natural recolonization of any wild grizzly bear (but not any grizzly bear in captivity in, for example, a zoo).\n\nIf this does not occur by January 1, 2050, or if the grizzly bear is confirmed to be extinct, this question will resolve as \">January 1, 2050\"", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2037", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will first successfully land people on Mars by 2058?", "desc": "A [human mission to Mars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_mission_to_Mars) has been the subject of science fiction, aerospace engineering, and scientific proposals since the 20th century.\n\nIn the early 21st century, numerous US, European, and Asian organizations were developing proposals for human missions to Mars, and [dozens of Mars mission plans have been devised](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_crewed_Mars_mission_plans) over the decades since the dawn of spaceflight. \n\nIn 2021, it was reported that [China plans to send its first crewed mission to Mars in 2033 and build a base there](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/24/china-plans-to-send-its-first-crewed-mission-to-mars-in-2033.html). \n\n[According to Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/china-plans-its-first-crewed-mission-mars-2033-2021-06-24/),\n\n>China aims to send its first crewed mission to Mars in 2033, with regular follow-up flights to follow, under a long-term plan to build a permanently inhabited base on the Red Planet and extract its resources.\n\n>The ambitious plan, which will intensify a race with the United States to plant humans on Mars, was disclosed in detail for the first time after China landed a robotic rover on Mars in mid-May in its inaugural mission to the planet.\n\n>Crewed launches to Mars are planned for 2033, 2035, 2037, 2041 and beyond, the head of China's main rocket maker, Wang Xiaojun, told a space exploration conference in Russia recently by video link.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which the first Chinese Mars mission's crewed vehicle touches down on Mars successfully. A 'successful' landing is defined, for the purposes of this question, as one in which at least one crew member survives the landing. A 'crewed vehicle' is defined here as containing at least one conscious flesh-and-bone human.\n\nA mission is considered a 'Chinese mission' if it is more than 50% funded by the Government of the People's Republic of China, or by any agency thereof, or by any agency of the country's 23 provinces, four municipalities, five autonomous regions, and two Special Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macau), or by any legal or natural person(s) resident (or incorporated) in the People's Republic of China, including Hong Kong and Macau, or by any combination of the aforementioned entities.\n\nA mission in which such entities contribute exactly 50% or less than 50% of the funding does not count as a Chinese-developed mission for the purposes of this question.\n\nIf the People's Republic of China ceases to exist before this question resolves, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "2042", "median": "2048", "upper_75": "2058", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best non-human SAT-style score on the hard subset of the QuALITY dataset will be 80.2% by January 1, 2025?", "desc": "From the abstract of [Pang et al.](https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.08608):\n\n> To enable building and testing models on long-document comprehension, we introduce QuALITY, a multiple-choice QA dataset with context passages in English that have an average length of about 5,000 tokens, much longer than typical current models can process. Unlike in prior work with passages, our questions are written and validated by contributors who have read the entire passage, rather than relying on summaries or excerpts. In addition, only half of the questions are answerable by annotators working under tight time constraints, indicating that skimming and simple search are not enough to consistently perform well. Current models perform poorly on this task (55.4%) and significantly lag behind human performance (93.5%).\n\nTracking and predicting progress on this dataset seems especially relevant to Transformative AI timelines and strategy given:\n\n\n\n* Those with short Transformative AI timelines or who expect Transformative AI to look similar to today's AI generally expect language model capabilities to continue to scale quickly.\n* Language models have surpassed human performance on many benchmarks, e.g. [SuperGLUE](https://super.gluebenchmark.com/leaderboard/), that require only reasoning over relatively short texts.\n* Reasoning requiring understanding of long texts is a strong candidate for a capability that won't improve much as language models get scaled up and tweaked.\n\nThe QuALITY dataset is chosen here because it showcases a task that does not require domain expertise and has a nicely objective evaluation metric, where the gap between language models and humans is still huge. Sam Bowman, whose group also created SuperGLUE, [tweets](https://twitter.com/sleepinyourhat/status/1471225421794529281): “Yes, the acronym is a little tone-deaf, but this is almost certainly the best benchmark or dataset release from my group so far.”\n\nThe hard subset of the dataset for prediction was chosen because, as described in the paper, these are the questions for which annotators do not do well under strict time constraints. This is intended as a proxy for requiring understanding of the full text to answer correctly. The SAT-style score is chosen to penalize wrong answers when the model is very uncertain; see [here](https://github.com/nyu-mll/quality/blob/main/leaderboard/submission.md#faq) for details. As shown on the [leaderboard](https://nyu-mll.github.io/quality/), human performance is 85.4, while the best baseline model scores 28.1.", "resc": "Resolution will be according to the [leaderboard](https://nyu-mll.github.io/quality/) maintained by the dataset authors. In the case of the leaderboard no longer being maintained, the question will be resolved based on evidence presented in credible reports, as judged by Metaculus moderators.\n\nSee also the same question on other timescales: [2030](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9629/question-answering-on-long-texts-by-2030/) and [2040](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9630/question-answering-on-long-texts-by-2040/", "lower_25": "72.3", "median": "80.2", "upper_75": "87.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best non-human SAT-style score on the hard subset of the QuALITY dataset will be 96.37% by January 1, 2030?", "desc": "From the abstract of [Pang et al.](https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.08608):\n\n> To enable building and testing models on long-document comprehension, we introduce QuALITY, a multiple-choice QA dataset with context passages in English that have an average length of about 5,000 tokens, much longer than typical current models can process. Unlike in prior work with passages, our questions are written and validated by contributors who have read the entire passage, rather than relying on summaries or excerpts. In addition, only half of the questions are answerable by annotators working under tight time constraints, indicating that skimming and simple search are not enough to consistently perform well. Current models perform poorly on this task (55.4%) and significantly lag behind human performance (93.5%).\n\nTracking and predicting progress on this dataset seems especially relevant to Transformative AI timelines and strategy given:\n\n\n\n* Those with short Transformative AI timelines or who expect Transformative AI to look similar to today's AI generally expect language model capabilities to continue to scale quickly.\n* Language models have surpassed human performance on many benchmarks, e.g. [SuperGLUE](https://super.gluebenchmark.com/leaderboard/), that require only reasoning over relatively short texts.\n* Reasoning requiring understanding of long texts is a strong candidate for a capability that won't improve much as language models get scaled up and tweaked.\n\nThe QuALITY dataset is chosen here because it showcases a task that doesn't require domain expertise and has a nicely objective evaluation metric, where the gap between language models and humans is still huge. Sam Bowman, whose group also created SuperGLUE, [tweets](https://twitter.com/sleepinyourhat/status/1471225421794529281): “Yes, the acronym is a little tone-deaf, but this is almost certainly the best benchmark or dataset release from my group so far.”\n\nThe hard subset of the dataset was chosen for prediction because, as described in the paper, these are the questions for which annotators don't do well under strict time constraints. This is intended as a proxy for requiring understanding of the full text to answer correctly. The SAT-style score is chosen to penalize wrong answers when the model is very uncertain; see [here](https://github.com/nyu-mll/quality/blob/main/leaderboard/submission.md#faq) for details. As shown on the [leaderboard](https://nyu-mll.github.io/quality/), human performance is 85.4, while the best baseline model scores 28.1.", "resc": "Resolution will be according to the [leaderboard](https://nyu-mll.github.io/quality/) maintained by the dataset authors. In the case of the leaderboard no longer being maintained, the question will be resolved based on evidence presented in credible reports, as judged by Metaculus moderators.\n\nSee also the same question on other timescales: [2025](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9628/question-answering-on-long-texts-by-2025/) and [2040](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9630/question-answering-on-long-texts-by-2040/", "lower_25": "89.81", "median": "96.37", "upper_75": "98.75", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best non-human SAT-style score on the hard subset of the QuALITY dataset will be 96.37% by January 1, 2030?", "desc": "From the abstract of [Pang et al.](https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.08608):\n\n> To enable building and testing models on long-document comprehension, we introduce QuALITY, a multiple-choice QA dataset with context passages in English that have an average length of about 5,000 tokens, much longer than typical current models can process. Unlike in prior work with passages, our questions are written and validated by contributors who have read the entire passage, rather than relying on summaries or excerpts. In addition, only half of the questions are answerable by annotators working under tight time constraints, indicating that skimming and simple search are not enough to consistently perform well. Current models perform poorly on this task (55.4%) and significantly lag behind human performance (93.5%).\n\nTracking and predicting progress on this dataset seems especially relevant to Transformative AI timelines and strategy given:\n\n\n\n* Those with short Transformative AI timelines or who expect Transformative AI to look similar to today's AI generally expect language model capabilities to continue to scale quickly.\n* Language models have surpassed human performance on many benchmarks, e.g. [SuperGLUE](https://super.gluebenchmark.com/leaderboard/), that require only reasoning over relatively short texts.\n* Reasoning requiring understanding of long texts is a strong candidate for a capability that won't improve much as language models get scaled up and tweaked.\n\nThe QuALITY dataset is chosen here because it showcases a task that doesn't require domain expertise and has a nicely objective evaluation metric, where the gap between language models and humans is still huge. Sam Bowman, whose group also created SuperGLUE, [tweets](https://twitter.com/sleepinyourhat/status/1471225421794529281): “Yes, the acronym is a little tone-deaf, but this is almost certainly the best benchmark or dataset release from my group so far.”\n\nThe hard subset of the dataset was chosen for prediction because, as described in the paper, these are the questions for which annotators don't do well under strict time constraints. This is intended as a proxy for requiring understanding of the full text to answer correctly. The SAT-style score is chosen to penalize wrong answers when the model is very uncertain; see [here](https://github.com/nyu-mll/quality/blob/main/leaderboard/submission.md#faq) for details. As shown on the [leaderboard](https://nyu-mll.github.io/quality/), human performance is 85.4, while the best baseline model scores 28.1.", "resc": "Resolution will be according to the [leaderboard](https://nyu-mll.github.io/quality/) maintained by the dataset authors. In the case of the leaderboard no longer being maintained, the question will be resolved based on evidence presented in credible reports, as judged by Metaculus moderators.\n\nSee also the same question on other timescales: [2025](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9628/question-answering-on-long-texts-by-2025/) and [2040](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9630/question-answering-on-long-texts-by-2040/", "lower_25": "89.81", "median": "96.37", "upper_75": "98.75", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best non-human SAT-style score on the hard subset of the QuALITY dataset will be 80.2% by January 1, 2025?", "desc": "From the abstract of [Pang et al.](https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.08608):\n\n> To enable building and testing models on long-document comprehension, we introduce QuALITY, a multiple-choice QA dataset with context passages in English that have an average length of about 5,000 tokens, much longer than typical current models can process. Unlike in prior work with passages, our questions are written and validated by contributors who have read the entire passage, rather than relying on summaries or excerpts. In addition, only half of the questions are answerable by annotators working under tight time constraints, indicating that skimming and simple search are not enough to consistently perform well. Current models perform poorly on this task (55.4%) and significantly lag behind human performance (93.5%).\n\nTracking and predicting progress on this dataset seems especially relevant to Transformative AI timelines and strategy given:\n\n\n\n* Those with short Transformative AI timelines or who expect Transformative AI to look similar to today's AI generally expect language model capabilities to continue to scale quickly.\n* Language models have surpassed human performance on many benchmarks, e.g. [SuperGLUE](https://super.gluebenchmark.com/leaderboard/), that require only reasoning over relatively short texts.\n* Reasoning requiring understanding of long texts is a strong candidate for a capability that won't improve much as language models get scaled up and tweaked.\n\nThe QuALITY dataset is chosen here because it showcases a task that does not require domain expertise and has a nicely objective evaluation metric, where the gap between language models and humans is still huge. Sam Bowman, whose group also created SuperGLUE, [tweets](https://twitter.com/sleepinyourhat/status/1471225421794529281): “Yes, the acronym is a little tone-deaf, but this is almost certainly the best benchmark or dataset release from my group so far.”\n\nThe hard subset of the dataset for prediction was chosen because, as described in the paper, these are the questions for which annotators do not do well under strict time constraints. This is intended as a proxy for requiring understanding of the full text to answer correctly. The SAT-style score is chosen to penalize wrong answers when the model is very uncertain; see [here](https://github.com/nyu-mll/quality/blob/main/leaderboard/submission.md#faq) for details. As shown on the [leaderboard](https://nyu-mll.github.io/quality/), human performance is 85.4, while the best baseline model scores 28.1.", "resc": "Resolution will be according to the [leaderboard](https://nyu-mll.github.io/quality/) maintained by the dataset authors. In the case of the leaderboard no longer being maintained, the question will be resolved based on evidence presented in credible reports, as judged by Metaculus moderators.\n\nSee also the same question on other timescales: [2030](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9629/question-answering-on-long-texts-by-2030/) and [2040](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9630/question-answering-on-long-texts-by-2040/", "lower_25": "72.3", "median": "80.2", "upper_75": "87.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best non-human SAT-style score on the hard subset of the QuALITY dataset will be 93.0 by January 1, 2040?", "desc": "From the abstract of [Pang et al.](https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.08608):\n\n> To enable building and testing models on long-document comprehension, we introduce QuALITY, a multiple-choice QA dataset with context passages in English that have an average length of about 5,000 tokens, much longer than typical current models can process. Unlike in prior work with passages, our questions are written and validated by contributors who have read the entire passage, rather than relying on summaries or excerpts. In addition, only half of the questions are answerable by annotators working under tight time constraints, indicating that skimming and simple search are not enough to consistently perform well. Current models perform poorly on this task (55.4%) and significantly lag behind human performance (93.5%).\n\nTracking and predicting progress on this dataset seems especially relevant to Transformative AI timelines and strategy given:\n\n\n\n* Those with short Transformative AI timelines or who expect Transformative AI to look similar to today's AI generally expect language model capabilities to continue to scale quickly.\n* Language models have surpassed human performance on many benchmarks, e.g. [SuperGLUE](https://super.gluebenchmark.com/leaderboard/), that require only reasoning over relatively short texts.\n* Reasoning requiring understanding of long texts is a strong candidate for a capability that won't improve much as language models get scaled up and tweaked.\n\nThe QuALITY dataset is chosen here because it showcases a task that does not require domain expertise and has a nicely objective evaluation metric, where the gap between language models and humans is still huge. Sam Bowman, whose group also created SuperGLUE, [tweets](https://twitter.com/sleepinyourhat/status/1471225421794529281): “Yes, the acronym is a little tone-deaf, but this is almost certainly the best benchmark or dataset release from my group so far.”\n\nThe hard subset of the dataset for prediction was chosen because, as described in the paper, these are the questions for which annotators do not do well under strict time constraints. This is intended as a proxy for requiring understanding of the full text to answer correctly. The SAT-style score is chosen to penalize wrong answers when the model is very uncertain; see [here](https://github.com/nyu-mll/quality/blob/main/leaderboard/submission.md#faq) for details. As shown on the [leaderboard](https://nyu-mll.github.io/quality/), human performance is 85.4, while the best baseline model scores 28.1.", "resc": "Resolution will be according to the [leaderboard](https://nyu-mll.github.io/quality/) maintained by the dataset authors. In the case of the leaderboard no longer being maintained, the question will be resolved based on evidence presented in credible reports, as judged by Metaculus moderators.\n\nSee also the same question on other timescales: [2025](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9628/question-answering-on-long-texts-by-2025/) and [2030](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9629/question-answering-on-long-texts-by-2030/", "lower_25": "82.3", "median": "93.0", "upper_75": "97.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What will be Germany's per-capita CO2 emissions in 2030, in tonnes?\n\nKeyword: 8.21\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that Germany's per-capita CO2 emissions in 2030 will be 75% of the current level?", "desc": "Germany's recently elected coalition government announced (in November 2021) more aggressive pledges to add renewable energy to their electricity grid, pledging to power [80% of their electricity demand](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/german-coalition-commits-faster-decarbonisation-2021-11-24/) with renewables, and pledging to phase out coal power in 2030, earlier than their previous 2038 goal. However, Germany is also moving away from nuclear energy, planning to phase it out [entirely by the end of 2022](https://apnews.com/article/technology-business-germany-angela-merkel-gerhard-schroeder-11b97717f822a38c90fb7483ffc825aa). [The German coalition government](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scholz_cabinet) is the first to include Die Grünen (The Greens) since 2005, and a Green Party member of the Bundestag, [Steffi Lemke](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steffi_Lemke), now serves as the Federal Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear safety, and Consumer protection. \n\nThere is debate among climate activists about whether nuclear power can be phased out in a way that allows for CO2 emissions to be reduced through the use of renewable energy. Like many Green Parties, the German Green Party [takes the view](https://www.ft.com/content/92ab113f-ab17-4492-be65-56c9173cfc53) that it is possible to significantly reduce CO2 emissions without relying on nuclear power. Germany currently has higher levels of [per-capita CO2 emissions](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/co2?facet=none&country=DEU~FRA&Gas=CO%E2%82%82&Accounting=Consumption-based&Fuel=Total&Count=Per+capita) than many of its neighbors - for example, in 2019, France had yearly per-capita emissions of 6.48 tonnes of CO2, whereas the equivalent figure for Germany was 9.88 tonnes. France relies heavily on nuclear power - accounting for approximately [70.6%](https://pris.iaea.org/pris/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=FR) of France's total electricity production.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of per-capita CO2 emissions in Germany in 2030, in tonnes of CO2, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/co2?facet=none&country=~DEU&Gas=CO%E2%82%82&Accounting=Consumption-based&Fuel=Total&Count=Per+capita). CO2 emissions will be accounted on a consumption-based estimation, accounting for trade (removing emissions from exports, and adding emissions from imports).\n\nIf Our World in Data or the [Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/) no longer publishes this data for 2030, a credible alternative source will be used", "lower_25": "5.63", "median": "6.80", "upper_75": "8.21", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will first successfully land people on Mars by 2058?", "desc": "A [human mission to Mars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_mission_to_Mars) has been the subject of science fiction, aerospace engineering, and scientific proposals since the 20th century.\n\nIn the early 21st century, numerous US, European, and Asian organizations were developing proposals for human missions to Mars, and [dozens of Mars mission plans have been devised](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_crewed_Mars_mission_plans) over the decades since the dawn of spaceflight. \n\nIn 2021, it was reported that [China plans to send its first crewed mission to Mars in 2033 and build a base there](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/24/china-plans-to-send-its-first-crewed-mission-to-mars-in-2033.html). \n\n[According to Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/china-plans-its-first-crewed-mission-mars-2033-2021-06-24/),\n\n>China aims to send its first crewed mission to Mars in 2033, with regular follow-up flights to follow, under a long-term plan to build a permanently inhabited base on the Red Planet and extract its resources.\n\n>The ambitious plan, which will intensify a race with the United States to plant humans on Mars, was disclosed in detail for the first time after China landed a robotic rover on Mars in mid-May in its inaugural mission to the planet.\n\n>Crewed launches to Mars are planned for 2033, 2035, 2037, 2041 and beyond, the head of China's main rocket maker, Wang Xiaojun, told a space exploration conference in Russia recently by video link.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which the first Chinese Mars mission's crewed vehicle touches down on Mars successfully. A 'successful' landing is defined, for the purposes of this question, as one in which at least one crew member survives the landing. A 'crewed vehicle' is defined here as containing at least one conscious flesh-and-bone human.\n\nA mission is considered a 'Chinese mission' if it is more than 50% funded by the Government of the People's Republic of China, or by any agency thereof, or by any agency of the country's 23 provinces, four municipalities, five autonomous regions, and two Special Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macau), or by any legal or natural person(s) resident (or incorporated) in the People's Republic of China, including Hong Kong and Macau, or by any combination of the aforementioned entities.\n\nA mission in which such entities contribute exactly 50% or less than 50% of the funding does not count as a Chinese-developed mission for the purposes of this question.\n\nIf the People's Republic of China ceases to exist before this question resolves, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "2042", "median": "2048", "upper_75": "2058", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a wild grizzly bear will be sighted in Colorado by 2049?", "desc": "The [grizzly bear](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grizzly_bear) (Ursus arctos horribilis) is a brown bear native to North America. Prior to the 20th century, grizzlies ranged from Canada down to Mexico and west of Kansas across to the Pacific Ocean. Due to excessive hunting and habitat loss, grizzly bears were considered locally extinct from most of the contiguous United States.\n\nIn 1973, the grizzly bear was [added to the list](https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp/species/7642#status) of species protected by the Endangered Species Act (ESA). This protection rendered grizzly bear hunting illegal and mandated that recovery plans be made for the species. Over the next half century, bear populations in the contiguous United States have somewhat recovered thanks to natural migration and intentional reintroductions by wildlife agencies. There are now substantial populations in Montana and Wyoming and very small populations in Washington and Idaho. The grizzly bear was [delisted and relisted under the ESA](https://www.nps.gov/yell/learn/nature/bearesa.htm) several times, and is currently federally protected.\n\nThe state of Colorado once hosted a robust population of grizzly bears. The San Juan and Rocky Mountain ranges are perfect habitat for bears. Unfortunately, the grizzly was hunted to local extinction [in the mid 20th century](https://www.dmns.org/science/featured-collections/zoology/colorado-s-last-grizzly-bear/). In 2020, Colorado voters [passed an initiative](https://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Proposition_114,_Gray_Wolf_Reintroduction_Initiative_(2020)) to reintroduce the grey wolf to the state by 2024, raising the prospects of the grizzly bear to return as well.", "resc": "This question will resolve when a wild grizzly bear is sighted within Colorado state borders, according to confirmation by [Colorado Parks and Wildlife](https://cpw.state.co.us/) or a US government agency. This may be due to intentional reintroduction or natural recolonization of any wild grizzly bear (but not any grizzly bear in captivity in, for example, a zoo).\n\nIf this does not occur by January 1, 2050, or if the grizzly bear is confirmed to be extinct, this question will resolve as \">January 1, 2050\"", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2037", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best non-human SAT-style score on the hard subset of the QuALITY dataset will be 93.0 by January 1, 2040?", "desc": "From the abstract of [Pang et al.](https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.08608):\n\n> To enable building and testing models on long-document comprehension, we introduce QuALITY, a multiple-choice QA dataset with context passages in English that have an average length of about 5,000 tokens, much longer than typical current models can process. Unlike in prior work with passages, our questions are written and validated by contributors who have read the entire passage, rather than relying on summaries or excerpts. In addition, only half of the questions are answerable by annotators working under tight time constraints, indicating that skimming and simple search are not enough to consistently perform well. Current models perform poorly on this task (55.4%) and significantly lag behind human performance (93.5%).\n\nTracking and predicting progress on this dataset seems especially relevant to Transformative AI timelines and strategy given:\n\n\n\n* Those with short Transformative AI timelines or who expect Transformative AI to look similar to today's AI generally expect language model capabilities to continue to scale quickly.\n* Language models have surpassed human performance on many benchmarks, e.g. [SuperGLUE](https://super.gluebenchmark.com/leaderboard/), that require only reasoning over relatively short texts.\n* Reasoning requiring understanding of long texts is a strong candidate for a capability that won't improve much as language models get scaled up and tweaked.\n\nThe QuALITY dataset is chosen here because it showcases a task that does not require domain expertise and has a nicely objective evaluation metric, where the gap between language models and humans is still huge. Sam Bowman, whose group also created SuperGLUE, [tweets](https://twitter.com/sleepinyourhat/status/1471225421794529281): “Yes, the acronym is a little tone-deaf, but this is almost certainly the best benchmark or dataset release from my group so far.”\n\nThe hard subset of the dataset for prediction was chosen because, as described in the paper, these are the questions for which annotators do not do well under strict time constraints. This is intended as a proxy for requiring understanding of the full text to answer correctly. The SAT-style score is chosen to penalize wrong answers when the model is very uncertain; see [here](https://github.com/nyu-mll/quality/blob/main/leaderboard/submission.md#faq) for details. As shown on the [leaderboard](https://nyu-mll.github.io/quality/), human performance is 85.4, while the best baseline model scores 28.1.", "resc": "Resolution will be according to the [leaderboard](https://nyu-mll.github.io/quality/) maintained by the dataset authors. In the case of the leaderboard no longer being maintained, the question will be resolved based on evidence presented in credible reports, as judged by Metaculus moderators.\n\nSee also the same question on other timescales: [2025](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9628/question-answering-on-long-texts-by-2025/) and [2030](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9629/question-answering-on-long-texts-by-2030/", "lower_25": "82.3", "median": "93.0", "upper_75": "97.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best non-human SAT-style score on the hard subset of the QuALITY dataset will be 96.37% by January 1, 2030?", "desc": "From the abstract of [Pang et al.](https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.08608):\n\n> To enable building and testing models on long-document comprehension, we introduce QuALITY, a multiple-choice QA dataset with context passages in English that have an average length of about 5,000 tokens, much longer than typical current models can process. Unlike in prior work with passages, our questions are written and validated by contributors who have read the entire passage, rather than relying on summaries or excerpts. In addition, only half of the questions are answerable by annotators working under tight time constraints, indicating that skimming and simple search are not enough to consistently perform well. Current models perform poorly on this task (55.4%) and significantly lag behind human performance (93.5%).\n\nTracking and predicting progress on this dataset seems especially relevant to Transformative AI timelines and strategy given:\n\n\n\n* Those with short Transformative AI timelines or who expect Transformative AI to look similar to today's AI generally expect language model capabilities to continue to scale quickly.\n* Language models have surpassed human performance on many benchmarks, e.g. [SuperGLUE](https://super.gluebenchmark.com/leaderboard/), that require only reasoning over relatively short texts.\n* Reasoning requiring understanding of long texts is a strong candidate for a capability that won't improve much as language models get scaled up and tweaked.\n\nThe QuALITY dataset is chosen here because it showcases a task that doesn't require domain expertise and has a nicely objective evaluation metric, where the gap between language models and humans is still huge. Sam Bowman, whose group also created SuperGLUE, [tweets](https://twitter.com/sleepinyourhat/status/1471225421794529281): “Yes, the acronym is a little tone-deaf, but this is almost certainly the best benchmark or dataset release from my group so far.”\n\nThe hard subset of the dataset was chosen for prediction because, as described in the paper, these are the questions for which annotators don't do well under strict time constraints. This is intended as a proxy for requiring understanding of the full text to answer correctly. The SAT-style score is chosen to penalize wrong answers when the model is very uncertain; see [here](https://github.com/nyu-mll/quality/blob/main/leaderboard/submission.md#faq) for details. As shown on the [leaderboard](https://nyu-mll.github.io/quality/), human performance is 85.4, while the best baseline model scores 28.1.", "resc": "Resolution will be according to the [leaderboard](https://nyu-mll.github.io/quality/) maintained by the dataset authors. In the case of the leaderboard no longer being maintained, the question will be resolved based on evidence presented in credible reports, as judged by Metaculus moderators.\n\nSee also the same question on other timescales: [2025](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9628/question-answering-on-long-texts-by-2025/) and [2040](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9630/question-answering-on-long-texts-by-2040/", "lower_25": "89.81", "median": "96.37", "upper_75": "98.75", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best non-human SAT-style score on the hard subset of the QuALITY dataset will be 93.0 by January 1, 2040?", "desc": "From the abstract of [Pang et al.](https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.08608):\n\n> To enable building and testing models on long-document comprehension, we introduce QuALITY, a multiple-choice QA dataset with context passages in English that have an average length of about 5,000 tokens, much longer than typical current models can process. Unlike in prior work with passages, our questions are written and validated by contributors who have read the entire passage, rather than relying on summaries or excerpts. In addition, only half of the questions are answerable by annotators working under tight time constraints, indicating that skimming and simple search are not enough to consistently perform well. Current models perform poorly on this task (55.4%) and significantly lag behind human performance (93.5%).\n\nTracking and predicting progress on this dataset seems especially relevant to Transformative AI timelines and strategy given:\n\n\n\n* Those with short Transformative AI timelines or who expect Transformative AI to look similar to today's AI generally expect language model capabilities to continue to scale quickly.\n* Language models have surpassed human performance on many benchmarks, e.g. [SuperGLUE](https://super.gluebenchmark.com/leaderboard/), that require only reasoning over relatively short texts.\n* Reasoning requiring understanding of long texts is a strong candidate for a capability that won't improve much as language models get scaled up and tweaked.\n\nThe QuALITY dataset is chosen here because it showcases a task that does not require domain expertise and has a nicely objective evaluation metric, where the gap between language models and humans is still huge. Sam Bowman, whose group also created SuperGLUE, [tweets](https://twitter.com/sleepinyourhat/status/1471225421794529281): “Yes, the acronym is a little tone-deaf, but this is almost certainly the best benchmark or dataset release from my group so far.”\n\nThe hard subset of the dataset for prediction was chosen because, as described in the paper, these are the questions for which annotators do not do well under strict time constraints. This is intended as a proxy for requiring understanding of the full text to answer correctly. The SAT-style score is chosen to penalize wrong answers when the model is very uncertain; see [here](https://github.com/nyu-mll/quality/blob/main/leaderboard/submission.md#faq) for details. As shown on the [leaderboard](https://nyu-mll.github.io/quality/), human performance is 85.4, while the best baseline model scores 28.1.", "resc": "Resolution will be according to the [leaderboard](https://nyu-mll.github.io/quality/) maintained by the dataset authors. In the case of the leaderboard no longer being maintained, the question will be resolved based on evidence presented in credible reports, as judged by Metaculus moderators.\n\nSee also the same question on other timescales: [2025](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9628/question-answering-on-long-texts-by-2025/) and [2030](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9629/question-answering-on-long-texts-by-2030/", "lower_25": "82.3", "median": "93.0", "upper_75": "97.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 24.8% of Earth's land will be protected for wildlife on January 1, 2050?", "desc": "[Land conservation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habitat_conservation) is the practice of limiting human impact and activity in protected areas. Generally speaking, protecting greater shares of land leads to preserving natural resources and [reducing the rate of extinctions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conservation_biology). Types of protected land include national parks, national forests, state parks, preserves, easements and more. IUCN's [2020 Protected Planet Report](https://livereport.protectedplanet.net/chapter-1) estimates that 16.8% of terrestrial lands (and 8.01% of marine area) on Earth are protected as of February 2022.\n\nDr. [E.O. Wilson](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eo_wilson), a renowned environmental scientist, created the [Half-Earth Initiative](https://www.half-earthproject.org/), an ambitious initiative to set aside half of Earth's land and sea for protection. The UN's Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework [draft in July 2021](https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2021/07/a-new-global-framework-for-managing-nature-through-2030-1st-detailed-draft-agreement-debuts/) included a 30x30 Initiative to conserve 30% of land and sea by 2030, which was referenced (but not committed to) in the UN's October 2021 [Kunming declaration](https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/c2db/972a/fb32e0a277bf1ccfff742be5/cop-15-05-add1-en.pdf). [Nature found](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00450-5) that most of the UN's [10-year biodiversity targets](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_on_Biological_Diversity#Strategic_Plan_for_Biodiversity_2011-2020) set in 2010 had not been met by 2020.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of Earth's land which is classified as Terrestrial protected area and [other effective area-based conservation measures](https://www.iucn.org/commissions/world-commission-protected-areas/our-work/oecms), according to the UN's [Protected Planet Initiative](https://www.protectedplanet.net/en). The most recent estimate as of January 1, 2050 will be used for resolution.\n\nIf this data is not available in January 1, 2050, or has not been updated for 3 years or more, an alternative resolution source may be used, or the question may resolve ambiguously, at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "18.6", "median": "24.8", "upper_75": "32.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 24.8% of Earth's land will be protected for wildlife on January 1, 2050?", "desc": "[Land conservation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habitat_conservation) is the practice of limiting human impact and activity in protected areas. Generally speaking, protecting greater shares of land leads to preserving natural resources and [reducing the rate of extinctions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conservation_biology). Types of protected land include national parks, national forests, state parks, preserves, easements and more. IUCN's [2020 Protected Planet Report](https://livereport.protectedplanet.net/chapter-1) estimates that 16.8% of terrestrial lands (and 8.01% of marine area) on Earth are protected as of February 2022.\n\nDr. [E.O. Wilson](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eo_wilson), a renowned environmental scientist, created the [Half-Earth Initiative](https://www.half-earthproject.org/), an ambitious initiative to set aside half of Earth's land and sea for protection. The UN's Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework [draft in July 2021](https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2021/07/a-new-global-framework-for-managing-nature-through-2030-1st-detailed-draft-agreement-debuts/) included a 30x30 Initiative to conserve 30% of land and sea by 2030, which was referenced (but not committed to) in the UN's October 2021 [Kunming declaration](https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/c2db/972a/fb32e0a277bf1ccfff742be5/cop-15-05-add1-en.pdf). [Nature found](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00450-5) that most of the UN's [10-year biodiversity targets](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_on_Biological_Diversity#Strategic_Plan_for_Biodiversity_2011-2020) set in 2010 had not been met by 2020.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of Earth's land which is classified as Terrestrial protected area and [other effective area-based conservation measures](https://www.iucn.org/commissions/world-commission-protected-areas/our-work/oecms), according to the UN's [Protected Planet Initiative](https://www.protectedplanet.net/en). The most recent estimate as of January 1, 2050 will be used for resolution.\n\nIf this data is not available in January 1, 2050, or has not been updated for 3 years or more, an alternative resolution source may be used, or the question may resolve ambiguously, at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "18.6", "median": "24.8", "upper_75": "32.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will first successfully land people on Mars by 2058?", "desc": "A [human mission to Mars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_mission_to_Mars) has been the subject of science fiction, aerospace engineering, and scientific proposals since the 20th century.\n\nIn the early 21st century, numerous US, European, and Asian organizations were developing proposals for human missions to Mars, and [dozens of Mars mission plans have been devised](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_crewed_Mars_mission_plans) over the decades since the dawn of spaceflight. \n\nIn 2021, it was reported that [China plans to send its first crewed mission to Mars in 2033 and build a base there](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/24/china-plans-to-send-its-first-crewed-mission-to-mars-in-2033.html). \n\n[According to Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/china-plans-its-first-crewed-mission-mars-2033-2021-06-24/),\n\n>China aims to send its first crewed mission to Mars in 2033, with regular follow-up flights to follow, under a long-term plan to build a permanently inhabited base on the Red Planet and extract its resources.\n\n>The ambitious plan, which will intensify a race with the United States to plant humans on Mars, was disclosed in detail for the first time after China landed a robotic rover on Mars in mid-May in its inaugural mission to the planet.\n\n>Crewed launches to Mars are planned for 2033, 2035, 2037, 2041 and beyond, the head of China's main rocket maker, Wang Xiaojun, told a space exploration conference in Russia recently by video link.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which the first Chinese Mars mission's crewed vehicle touches down on Mars successfully. A 'successful' landing is defined, for the purposes of this question, as one in which at least one crew member survives the landing. A 'crewed vehicle' is defined here as containing at least one conscious flesh-and-bone human.\n\nA mission is considered a 'Chinese mission' if it is more than 50% funded by the Government of the People's Republic of China, or by any agency thereof, or by any agency of the country's 23 provinces, four municipalities, five autonomous regions, and two Special Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macau), or by any legal or natural person(s) resident (or incorporated) in the People's Republic of China, including Hong Kong and Macau, or by any combination of the aforementioned entities.\n\nA mission in which such entities contribute exactly 50% or less than 50% of the funding does not count as a Chinese-developed mission for the purposes of this question.\n\nIf the People's Republic of China ceases to exist before this question resolves, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "2042", "median": "2048", "upper_75": "2058", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an upper-bound on the age of federal US politicians will be implemented by Not ≤ 2100?", "desc": "There are minimum age requirements for participation in the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives, and to become the U.S. president. These requirements are contained in the [U.S. Constitution](https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/):\n\n(House) In Section 2 of Article I of the U.S. Constitution:\n\n> No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.\n\n(Senate) In Section 3 of Article I of the U.S. Constitution:\n\n> No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.\n\n(President) In Section 1 of Article II of the U.S. Constitution:\n\n> No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when an upper age limit is signed into law on any of the following offices in the US: [President](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States), [Senator](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Senate), or [Representative](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives).\n\nIf no such limit is imposed at any time between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2062", "median": "Not ≤ 2100", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a wild grizzly bear will be sighted in Colorado by 2049?", "desc": "The [grizzly bear](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grizzly_bear) (Ursus arctos horribilis) is a brown bear native to North America. Prior to the 20th century, grizzlies ranged from Canada down to Mexico and west of Kansas across to the Pacific Ocean. Due to excessive hunting and habitat loss, grizzly bears were considered locally extinct from most of the contiguous United States.\n\nIn 1973, the grizzly bear was [added to the list](https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp/species/7642#status) of species protected by the Endangered Species Act (ESA). This protection rendered grizzly bear hunting illegal and mandated that recovery plans be made for the species. Over the next half century, bear populations in the contiguous United States have somewhat recovered thanks to natural migration and intentional reintroductions by wildlife agencies. There are now substantial populations in Montana and Wyoming and very small populations in Washington and Idaho. The grizzly bear was [delisted and relisted under the ESA](https://www.nps.gov/yell/learn/nature/bearesa.htm) several times, and is currently federally protected.\n\nThe state of Colorado once hosted a robust population of grizzly bears. The San Juan and Rocky Mountain ranges are perfect habitat for bears. Unfortunately, the grizzly was hunted to local extinction [in the mid 20th century](https://www.dmns.org/science/featured-collections/zoology/colorado-s-last-grizzly-bear/). In 2020, Colorado voters [passed an initiative](https://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Proposition_114,_Gray_Wolf_Reintroduction_Initiative_(2020)) to reintroduce the grey wolf to the state by 2024, raising the prospects of the grizzly bear to return as well.", "resc": "This question will resolve when a wild grizzly bear is sighted within Colorado state borders, according to confirmation by [Colorado Parks and Wildlife](https://cpw.state.co.us/) or a US government agency. This may be due to intentional reintroduction or natural recolonization of any wild grizzly bear (but not any grizzly bear in captivity in, for example, a zoo).\n\nIf this does not occur by January 1, 2050, or if the grizzly bear is confirmed to be extinct, this question will resolve as \">January 1, 2050\"", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2037", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean age of the next 5 US Presidents from 2022 to 2040 will be 58.9 years old?", "desc": "To be president of the United States, one must be at least 35 years of age. \n\nIn Section 1 of Article II of the [U.S. Constitution](https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/):\n\n> No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.\n\nThe [youngest US President](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_presidents_of_the_United_States_by_age) was Theodore Roosevelt at 42 years 322 days in 1901 (JFK was the youngest elected president; Theodore Roosevelt was vice president when William McKinley was assassinated), and the oldest elected president is Joe Biden at 78 years 61 days in 2021 (incumbent president). \n\nOpinion polls, such as those sponsored by [_Independent_](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-election-2020/joe-biden-age-trump-2020-election-polls-older-b1457890.html), typically indicate that people feel the current President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump are/were \"too old\" to serve as President. \n\nThe mean age in years of the last 5 Presidents (as of 2022) at the start of presidency is \\( \\frac{54+47+51+70+78}{5} = 60 \\) corresponding to George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Barack Obama (second term), Donald Trump, and Joe Biden, respectively.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the mean age (in years) of the next 5 US Presidents to be inaugurated following Joe Biden's January 20, 2021 inauguration. The President's age will be measured as of their age on their inauguration date. Any US President who serves multiple terms will be counted on each inauguration date.\n\nElections are currently scheduled for 2024, 2028, 2032, 2036, and 2040, but there is potential for a President to be inaugarated earlier than those dates if a Vice President or other individual [is promoted to the office](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_line_of_succession) following a President's death, impeachment, or resignation. This question will recognize the first 5 Presidential inaugurations after Biden's inauguration on January 20, 2021, up until January 1, 2045. If there are fewer than 5 such inaugurations in that period, the average will be calculated with that lesser number", "lower_25": "58.9", "median": "63.8", "upper_75": "69.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an upper-bound on the age of federal US politicians will be implemented by Not ≤ 2100?", "desc": "There are minimum age requirements for participation in the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives, and to become the U.S. president. These requirements are contained in the [U.S. Constitution](https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/):\n\n(House) In Section 2 of Article I of the U.S. Constitution:\n\n> No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.\n\n(Senate) In Section 3 of Article I of the U.S. Constitution:\n\n> No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.\n\n(President) In Section 1 of Article II of the U.S. Constitution:\n\n> No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when an upper age limit is signed into law on any of the following offices in the US: [President](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States), [Senator](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Senate), or [Representative](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives).\n\nIf no such limit is imposed at any time between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2062", "median": "Not ≤ 2100", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an upper-bound on the age of federal US politicians will be implemented by Not ≤ 2100?", "desc": "There are minimum age requirements for participation in the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives, and to become the U.S. president. These requirements are contained in the [U.S. Constitution](https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/):\n\n(House) In Section 2 of Article I of the U.S. Constitution:\n\n> No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.\n\n(Senate) In Section 3 of Article I of the U.S. Constitution:\n\n> No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.\n\n(President) In Section 1 of Article II of the U.S. Constitution:\n\n> No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when an upper age limit is signed into law on any of the following offices in the US: [President](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_United_States), [Senator](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Senate), or [Representative](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives).\n\nIf no such limit is imposed at any time between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2100, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2062", "median": "Not ≤ 2100", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first batch of Mill CPUs will not ship before January 2035?", "desc": "The Mill is a new CPU architecture (like ARM and x86) and family (like AMD Ryzen or Intel Skylake) developed by [Mill Computing Inc.](https://millcomputing.com/) It aims to be more power-efficient than existing architectures.\n\nSince 2013 there have been [talks](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCKdGg6hZoUYnjyRUb08Kjbg/videos) about The Mill, but in the past years there have been few updates, and apparently Covid delayed the project. Still, [the developers have posted on their forum](https://millcomputing.com/topic/news/#post-3717) as late as November 2021, confirming that the project was still alive at the time. (Edit: [March 2022](https://millcomputing.com/topic/news/#post-3749).)", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when the first Mill CPUs have been sold to a customer, according to [Mill Computing](https://millcomputing.com/) or credible media reports. This will not include FPGAs or other testkits, the CPU must be in its final intended form", "lower_25": "May 2030", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean age of the next 5 US Presidents from 2022 to 2040 will be 58.9 years old?", "desc": "To be president of the United States, one must be at least 35 years of age. \n\nIn Section 1 of Article II of the [U.S. Constitution](https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/):\n\n> No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.\n\nThe [youngest US President](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_presidents_of_the_United_States_by_age) was Theodore Roosevelt at 42 years 322 days in 1901 (JFK was the youngest elected president; Theodore Roosevelt was vice president when William McKinley was assassinated), and the oldest elected president is Joe Biden at 78 years 61 days in 2021 (incumbent president). \n\nOpinion polls, such as those sponsored by [_Independent_](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-election-2020/joe-biden-age-trump-2020-election-polls-older-b1457890.html), typically indicate that people feel the current President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump are/were \"too old\" to serve as President. \n\nThe mean age in years of the last 5 Presidents (as of 2022) at the start of presidency is \\( \\frac{54+47+51+70+78}{5} = 60 \\) corresponding to George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Barack Obama (second term), Donald Trump, and Joe Biden, respectively.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the mean age (in years) of the next 5 US Presidents to be inaugurated following Joe Biden's January 20, 2021 inauguration. The President's age will be measured as of their age on their inauguration date. Any US President who serves multiple terms will be counted on each inauguration date.\n\nElections are currently scheduled for 2024, 2028, 2032, 2036, and 2040, but there is potential for a President to be inaugarated earlier than those dates if a Vice President or other individual [is promoted to the office](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_line_of_succession) following a President's death, impeachment, or resignation. This question will recognize the first 5 Presidential inaugurations after Biden's inauguration on January 20, 2021, up until January 1, 2045. If there are fewer than 5 such inaugurations in that period, the average will be calculated with that lesser number", "lower_25": "58.9", "median": "63.8", "upper_75": "69.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best non-human SAT-style score on the hard subset of the QuALITY dataset will be 80.2% by January 1, 2025?", "desc": "From the abstract of [Pang et al.](https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.08608):\n\n> To enable building and testing models on long-document comprehension, we introduce QuALITY, a multiple-choice QA dataset with context passages in English that have an average length of about 5,000 tokens, much longer than typical current models can process. Unlike in prior work with passages, our questions are written and validated by contributors who have read the entire passage, rather than relying on summaries or excerpts. In addition, only half of the questions are answerable by annotators working under tight time constraints, indicating that skimming and simple search are not enough to consistently perform well. Current models perform poorly on this task (55.4%) and significantly lag behind human performance (93.5%).\n\nTracking and predicting progress on this dataset seems especially relevant to Transformative AI timelines and strategy given:\n\n\n\n* Those with short Transformative AI timelines or who expect Transformative AI to look similar to today's AI generally expect language model capabilities to continue to scale quickly.\n* Language models have surpassed human performance on many benchmarks, e.g. [SuperGLUE](https://super.gluebenchmark.com/leaderboard/), that require only reasoning over relatively short texts.\n* Reasoning requiring understanding of long texts is a strong candidate for a capability that won't improve much as language models get scaled up and tweaked.\n\nThe QuALITY dataset is chosen here because it showcases a task that does not require domain expertise and has a nicely objective evaluation metric, where the gap between language models and humans is still huge. Sam Bowman, whose group also created SuperGLUE, [tweets](https://twitter.com/sleepinyourhat/status/1471225421794529281): “Yes, the acronym is a little tone-deaf, but this is almost certainly the best benchmark or dataset release from my group so far.”\n\nThe hard subset of the dataset for prediction was chosen because, as described in the paper, these are the questions for which annotators do not do well under strict time constraints. This is intended as a proxy for requiring understanding of the full text to answer correctly. The SAT-style score is chosen to penalize wrong answers when the model is very uncertain; see [here](https://github.com/nyu-mll/quality/blob/main/leaderboard/submission.md#faq) for details. As shown on the [leaderboard](https://nyu-mll.github.io/quality/), human performance is 85.4, while the best baseline model scores 28.1.", "resc": "Resolution will be according to the [leaderboard](https://nyu-mll.github.io/quality/) maintained by the dataset authors. In the case of the leaderboard no longer being maintained, the question will be resolved based on evidence presented in credible reports, as judged by Metaculus moderators.\n\nSee also the same question on other timescales: [2030](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9629/question-answering-on-long-texts-by-2030/) and [2040](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9630/question-answering-on-long-texts-by-2040/", "lower_25": "72.3", "median": "80.2", "upper_75": "87.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first batch of Mill CPUs will not ship before January 2035?", "desc": "The Mill is a new CPU architecture (like ARM and x86) and family (like AMD Ryzen or Intel Skylake) developed by [Mill Computing Inc.](https://millcomputing.com/) It aims to be more power-efficient than existing architectures.\n\nSince 2013 there have been [talks](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCKdGg6hZoUYnjyRUb08Kjbg/videos) about The Mill, but in the past years there have been few updates, and apparently Covid delayed the project. Still, [the developers have posted on their forum](https://millcomputing.com/topic/news/#post-3717) as late as November 2021, confirming that the project was still alive at the time. (Edit: [March 2022](https://millcomputing.com/topic/news/#post-3749).)", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when the first Mill CPUs have been sold to a customer, according to [Mill Computing](https://millcomputing.com/) or credible media reports. This will not include FPGAs or other testkits, the CPU must be in its final intended form", "lower_25": "May 2030", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first batch of Mill CPUs will not ship before January 2035?", "desc": "The Mill is a new CPU architecture (like ARM and x86) and family (like AMD Ryzen or Intel Skylake) developed by [Mill Computing Inc.](https://millcomputing.com/) It aims to be more power-efficient than existing architectures.\n\nSince 2013 there have been [talks](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCKdGg6hZoUYnjyRUb08Kjbg/videos) about The Mill, but in the past years there have been few updates, and apparently Covid delayed the project. Still, [the developers have posted on their forum](https://millcomputing.com/topic/news/#post-3717) as late as November 2021, confirming that the project was still alive at the time. (Edit: [March 2022](https://millcomputing.com/topic/news/#post-3749).)", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date when the first Mill CPUs have been sold to a customer, according to [Mill Computing](https://millcomputing.com/) or credible media reports. This will not include FPGAs or other testkits, the CPU must be in its final intended form", "lower_25": "May 2030", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 24.8% of Earth's land will be protected for wildlife on January 1, 2050?", "desc": "[Land conservation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habitat_conservation) is the practice of limiting human impact and activity in protected areas. Generally speaking, protecting greater shares of land leads to preserving natural resources and [reducing the rate of extinctions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conservation_biology). Types of protected land include national parks, national forests, state parks, preserves, easements and more. IUCN's [2020 Protected Planet Report](https://livereport.protectedplanet.net/chapter-1) estimates that 16.8% of terrestrial lands (and 8.01% of marine area) on Earth are protected as of February 2022.\n\nDr. [E.O. Wilson](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eo_wilson), a renowned environmental scientist, created the [Half-Earth Initiative](https://www.half-earthproject.org/), an ambitious initiative to set aside half of Earth's land and sea for protection. The UN's Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework [draft in July 2021](https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2021/07/a-new-global-framework-for-managing-nature-through-2030-1st-detailed-draft-agreement-debuts/) included a 30x30 Initiative to conserve 30% of land and sea by 2030, which was referenced (but not committed to) in the UN's October 2021 [Kunming declaration](https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/c2db/972a/fb32e0a277bf1ccfff742be5/cop-15-05-add1-en.pdf). [Nature found](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00450-5) that most of the UN's [10-year biodiversity targets](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_on_Biological_Diversity#Strategic_Plan_for_Biodiversity_2011-2020) set in 2010 had not been met by 2020.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of Earth's land which is classified as Terrestrial protected area and [other effective area-based conservation measures](https://www.iucn.org/commissions/world-commission-protected-areas/our-work/oecms), according to the UN's [Protected Planet Initiative](https://www.protectedplanet.net/en). The most recent estimate as of January 1, 2050 will be used for resolution.\n\nIf this data is not available in January 1, 2050, or has not been updated for 3 years or more, an alternative resolution source may be used, or the question may resolve ambiguously, at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "18.6", "median": "24.8", "upper_75": "32.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 9.445 percent of the US population will live in Texas in the next census?", "desc": "Texas had one of the largest population increases in the prior census and is one of the most populous states. Currently about 8.9% of the US population lives there.", "resc": "The data source is population estimates published on census.gov for the soonest date after the 2030 census is completed", "lower_25": "8.958", "median": "9.118", "upper_75": "9.445", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean age of the next 5 US Presidents from 2022 to 2040 will be 58.9 years old?", "desc": "To be president of the United States, one must be at least 35 years of age. \n\nIn Section 1 of Article II of the [U.S. Constitution](https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/):\n\n> No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.\n\nThe [youngest US President](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_presidents_of_the_United_States_by_age) was Theodore Roosevelt at 42 years 322 days in 1901 (JFK was the youngest elected president; Theodore Roosevelt was vice president when William McKinley was assassinated), and the oldest elected president is Joe Biden at 78 years 61 days in 2021 (incumbent president). \n\nOpinion polls, such as those sponsored by [_Independent_](https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-election-2020/joe-biden-age-trump-2020-election-polls-older-b1457890.html), typically indicate that people feel the current President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump are/were \"too old\" to serve as President. \n\nThe mean age in years of the last 5 Presidents (as of 2022) at the start of presidency is \\( \\frac{54+47+51+70+78}{5} = 60 \\) corresponding to George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Barack Obama (second term), Donald Trump, and Joe Biden, respectively.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the mean age (in years) of the next 5 US Presidents to be inaugurated following Joe Biden's January 20, 2021 inauguration. The President's age will be measured as of their age on their inauguration date. Any US President who serves multiple terms will be counted on each inauguration date.\n\nElections are currently scheduled for 2024, 2028, 2032, 2036, and 2040, but there is potential for a President to be inaugarated earlier than those dates if a Vice President or other individual [is promoted to the office](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_line_of_succession) following a President's death, impeachment, or resignation. This question will recognize the first 5 Presidential inaugurations after Biden's inauguration on January 20, 2021, up until January 1, 2045. If there are fewer than 5 such inaugurations in that period, the average will be calculated with that lesser number", "lower_25": "58.9", "median": "63.8", "upper_75": "69.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 9.445 percent of the US population will live in Texas in the next census?", "desc": "Texas had one of the largest population increases in the prior census and is one of the most populous states. Currently about 8.9% of the US population lives there.", "resc": "The data source is population estimates published on census.gov for the soonest date after the 2030 census is completed", "lower_25": "8.958", "median": "9.118", "upper_75": "9.445", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 17.1 named variants of SARS-COV-2 in its first 10 years?", "desc": "[In the last day of the 2010s](https://twitter.com/who/status/1213795226072109058), the World Health Organization was notified by Beijing of a cluster of pneumonia cases in Wuhan, Hubei. This marked the beginning of the current COVID-19 pandemic.\n\nSince May 31, 2021, variants of the virus are being assigned Greek letter names. It is quite conceivable that these will run out, and the WHO has already been looking for replacement names. [Constellations are being considered](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/science-and-disease/variants-could-named-star-constellations-greek-alphabet-runs/), but out of the 88 officially recognized by the International Astronomical Union, at least some are unlikely to be used due to the WHO principles that the name must be unambiguous, simple to pronouce and non-stigmatizing (it is hard to conceive of it approving names like \"Camelopardalis\" or \"Corona Australis\" or \"Indus\", which means \"the Indian\", let alone zodiac constellations many people associate with their horoscope).\n\nIn any case, if the disease continues to be relevant one might imagine naming variants will continue to be necessary, with new sources for names being added as required.", "resc": "The number in question is the count of officially-named variants in the series that, as of the time of writing, goes from Alpha to Omicron, skipping the letters nu and xi; if the naming for everyday use is later revised to include pre-Alpha variants on a par with Alpha and other letters, those are considered valid. Constellations or other sources of names also count.", "lower_25": "14.7", "median": "17.1", "upper_75": "22.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 17.1 named variants of SARS-COV-2 in its first 10 years?", "desc": "[In the last day of the 2010s](https://twitter.com/who/status/1213795226072109058), the World Health Organization was notified by Beijing of a cluster of pneumonia cases in Wuhan, Hubei. This marked the beginning of the current COVID-19 pandemic.\n\nSince May 31, 2021, variants of the virus are being assigned Greek letter names. It is quite conceivable that these will run out, and the WHO has already been looking for replacement names. [Constellations are being considered](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/science-and-disease/variants-could-named-star-constellations-greek-alphabet-runs/), but out of the 88 officially recognized by the International Astronomical Union, at least some are unlikely to be used due to the WHO principles that the name must be unambiguous, simple to pronouce and non-stigmatizing (it is hard to conceive of it approving names like \"Camelopardalis\" or \"Corona Australis\" or \"Indus\", which means \"the Indian\", let alone zodiac constellations many people associate with their horoscope).\n\nIn any case, if the disease continues to be relevant one might imagine naming variants will continue to be necessary, with new sources for names being added as required.", "resc": "The number in question is the count of officially-named variants in the series that, as of the time of writing, goes from Alpha to Omicron, skipping the letters nu and xi; if the naming for everyday use is later revised to include pre-Alpha variants on a par with Alpha and other letters, those are considered valid. Constellations or other sources of names also count.", "lower_25": "14.7", "median": "17.1", "upper_75": "22.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 17.1 named variants of SARS-COV-2 in its first 10 years?", "desc": "[In the last day of the 2010s](https://twitter.com/who/status/1213795226072109058), the World Health Organization was notified by Beijing of a cluster of pneumonia cases in Wuhan, Hubei. This marked the beginning of the current COVID-19 pandemic.\n\nSince May 31, 2021, variants of the virus are being assigned Greek letter names. It is quite conceivable that these will run out, and the WHO has already been looking for replacement names. [Constellations are being considered](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/science-and-disease/variants-could-named-star-constellations-greek-alphabet-runs/), but out of the 88 officially recognized by the International Astronomical Union, at least some are unlikely to be used due to the WHO principles that the name must be unambiguous, simple to pronouce and non-stigmatizing (it is hard to conceive of it approving names like \"Camelopardalis\" or \"Corona Australis\" or \"Indus\", which means \"the Indian\", let alone zodiac constellations many people associate with their horoscope).\n\nIn any case, if the disease continues to be relevant one might imagine naming variants will continue to be necessary, with new sources for names being added as required.", "resc": "The number in question is the count of officially-named variants in the series that, as of the time of writing, goes from Alpha to Omicron, skipping the letters nu and xi; if the naming for everyday use is later revised to include pre-Alpha variants on a par with Alpha and other letters, those are considered valid. Constellations or other sources of names also count.", "lower_25": "14.7", "median": "17.1", "upper_75": "22.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 9.445 percent of the US population will live in Texas in the next census?", "desc": "Texas had one of the largest population increases in the prior census and is one of the most populous states. Currently about 8.9% of the US population lives there.", "resc": "The data source is population estimates published on census.gov for the soonest date after the 2030 census is completed", "lower_25": "8.958", "median": "9.118", "upper_75": "9.445", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a person who was screened or genetically modified as an embryo will file a lawsuit against their parent(s) for doing so by 2049?", "desc": "", "resc": "Most individuals do not take legal action against their parents for the decisions they made before the individual's birth, but, nonetheless, some do take action. For example, in 2019, Raphael Samuel sued his parents for giving birth to him without his consent (see [here](https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/shortcuts/2019/feb/05/consent-being-born-man-suing-parents-for-giving-birth-to-him)). There have been many other instances of people who've resented their parents for giving birth to them, but few have actually taken legal action. \n\nWhile people's attitudes towards embryo selection and genetic modification are, for the most part, worried and unenthusiastic (see [here](https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/12/10/biotechnology-research-viewed-with-caution-globally-but-most-support-gene-editing-for-babies-to-treat-disease/)), they may change in the future, especially as public understanding and access to the technology increases and as people leave religion. Should parents in the 22nd century adopt genetic screening and modification technologies for their children, some of these children might come to resent their choice later on.\n\n***When will a person who was screened or genetically modified as an embryo file a lawsuit against their parents for doing so?***\n\nThis question resolves as the date a lawsuit is filed by an individual against their biological parent(s) for choosing to have the individual screened or genetically modified as an embryo. This question should close retroactively to one month before the lawsuit file date.", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "2061", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a person who was screened or genetically modified as an embryo will file a lawsuit against their parent(s) for doing so by 2049?", "desc": "", "resc": "Most individuals do not take legal action against their parents for the decisions they made before the individual's birth, but, nonetheless, some do take action. For example, in 2019, Raphael Samuel sued his parents for giving birth to him without his consent (see [here](https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/shortcuts/2019/feb/05/consent-being-born-man-suing-parents-for-giving-birth-to-him)). There have been many other instances of people who've resented their parents for giving birth to them, but few have actually taken legal action. \n\nWhile people's attitudes towards embryo selection and genetic modification are, for the most part, worried and unenthusiastic (see [here](https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/12/10/biotechnology-research-viewed-with-caution-globally-but-most-support-gene-editing-for-babies-to-treat-disease/)), they may change in the future, especially as public understanding and access to the technology increases and as people leave religion. Should parents in the 22nd century adopt genetic screening and modification technologies for their children, some of these children might come to resent their choice later on.\n\n***When will a person who was screened or genetically modified as an embryo file a lawsuit against their parents for doing so?***\n\nThis question resolves as the date a lawsuit is filed by an individual against their biological parent(s) for choosing to have the individual screened or genetically modified as an embryo. This question should close retroactively to one month before the lawsuit file date.", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "2061", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum price (in 2021 USD) to clone a pet dog in 2030 will be 7.01k?", "desc": "According to the [Genetic Science Learning Center](https://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/cloning/clonezone/), one timeline of research relevant to cloning is*:\n\n- 1885 - First-ever demonstration of artificial embryo twinning\n- 1902 - Artificial embryo twinning in a vertebrate\n- 1928 - The cell nucleus controls embryonic development\n- 1952 - First successful nuclear transfer\n- 1958 - Nuclear transfer from a differentiated cell\n- 1975 - First mammalian embryo created by nuclear transfer\n- 1984 - First mammal created by nuclear transfer\n- 1987 - Nuclear transfer from embryonic cell\n- 1996 - Nuclear transfer from laboratory cells\n- 1996 - Dolly: First mammal created by somatic cell nuclear transfer\n- 1997 - First primate created by embryonic cell nuclear transfer\n- 1997 - Nuclear transfer from genetically engineered laboratory cells\n- 1998-1999 - More mammals cloned by somatic cell nuclear transfer\n- 2001 - Endangered animals cloned by somatic cell nuclear transfer\n- 2007 - Primate embryonic stem cells created by somatic cell nuclear transfer\n- 2013 - Human embryonic stem cells created by somatic cell nuclear transfer\n\nThe abstract of the 2015 paper _[Artificial cloning of domestic animals](https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/112/29/8874.full.pdf)_ summarizes the state of progress well:\n\n> Domestic animals can be cloned using techniques such as embryo\nsplitting and nuclear transfer to produce genetically identical\nindividuals. Although embryo splitting is limited to the production\nof only a few identical individuals, nuclear transfer of donor nuclei\ninto recipient oocytes, whose own nuclear DNA has been removed,\ncan result in large numbers of identical individuals. Moreover,\nclones can be produced using donor cells from sterile animals, such\nas steers and geldings, and, unlike their genetic source, these clones\nare fertile. In reality, due to low efficiencies and the high costs of\ncloning domestic species, only a limited number of identical in-\ndividuals are generally produced, and these clones are primarily\nused as breed stock. In addition to providing a means of rescuing\nand propagating valuable genetics, somatic cell nuclear transfer\n(SCNT) research has contributed knowledge that has led to the\ndirect reprogramming of cells (e.g., to induce pluripotent stem cells)\nand a better understanding of epigenetic regulation during embry-\nonic development.\n\nIn August 2005, researchers at the Seoul National University in South Korea produced the [first cloned dog](https://www.science.org/content/article/first-dog-cloned) that survived, and named it \"Snuppy\". There remains much work to be done before [cloning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commercial_animal_cloning) becomes cheap enough to be commercially accessible to most people. Nevertheless, services are still available. In 2008, the cost of cloning a pet was [USD 100k](https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/21/us/21dog.html). Currently, the company _[My Friend Again – The Dog Cloning Company](https://myfriendagain.com/dog-cloning-cost/)_ charges USD 50k to clone a dog, and USD ~25k to clone a cat. The company [_Viagen_](https://www.viagenpets.com/product/initiate-cloning/) charges USD 50k for dogs as well, but charges USD 35k for cats, and USD 85k for horses. \n\n(*) more information on each bullet point can be found on their website.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the minimum commercially price (in [inflation adjusted 2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL)) available for cloning a pet dog in 2030", "lower_25": "7.01k", "median": "11.3k", "upper_75": "19.4k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that some country will do widespread embryo selection for intelligence by 2073?", "desc": "Embryo selection is a potential emerging technology and is the subject of [several previous Metaculus questions](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?order_by=-activity&search=Embryo%20selection) and a [notebook](https://www.metaculus.com/notebooks/9247/polygenic-selection-of-embryos/). One of the most discussed applications of embryo selection is embryo selection for intelligence. In 2014, [Dominic Cummings](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominic_Cummings) suggested in a [blog post](https://dominiccummings.com/2014/08/19/standin-by-the-window-where-the-light-is-strong-de-extinction-machine-intelligence-the-search-for-extra-solar-life-neural-networks-autonomous-drone-swarms-bombing-parliament-genetics-amp/) that governments should fund embryo selection for intelligence for the population, because the affluent people would have the ability to do it in any case. Here we ask when some country will have widespread embryo selection for intelligence.", "resc": "This question resolves positively when some country with over a million people has more than 10% of its newborns developed from embryos selected for polygenic scores for intelligence within a single calander year, according to credible reports. If no country has >10% of its newborns selected for intelligence by 2099-12-31 it resolves as >.\n\nMoreover, for the question to resolve positively, the particular procedure used for embryo selection must, in expectation, result in an increase of at least 1/5 standard deviations in IQ (i.e. 3 IQ points), according to credible evidence", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2052", "upper_75": "2073", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that some country will do widespread embryo selection for intelligence by 2073?", "desc": "Embryo selection is a potential emerging technology and is the subject of [several previous Metaculus questions](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?order_by=-activity&search=Embryo%20selection) and a [notebook](https://www.metaculus.com/notebooks/9247/polygenic-selection-of-embryos/). One of the most discussed applications of embryo selection is embryo selection for intelligence. In 2014, [Dominic Cummings](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominic_Cummings) suggested in a [blog post](https://dominiccummings.com/2014/08/19/standin-by-the-window-where-the-light-is-strong-de-extinction-machine-intelligence-the-search-for-extra-solar-life-neural-networks-autonomous-drone-swarms-bombing-parliament-genetics-amp/) that governments should fund embryo selection for intelligence for the population, because the affluent people would have the ability to do it in any case. Here we ask when some country will have widespread embryo selection for intelligence.", "resc": "This question resolves positively when some country with over a million people has more than 10% of its newborns developed from embryos selected for polygenic scores for intelligence within a single calander year, according to credible reports. If no country has >10% of its newborns selected for intelligence by 2099-12-31 it resolves as >.\n\nMoreover, for the question to resolve positively, the particular procedure used for embryo selection must, in expectation, result in an increase of at least 1/5 standard deviations in IQ (i.e. 3 IQ points), according to credible evidence", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2052", "upper_75": "2073", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Kim Jong Un will no longer be the leader of North Korea by 2037?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Kim Jong-un remain the de facto leader of North Korea until (at least) January 1, 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9086/kim-jong-un-leader-of-dprk-until-2024/)\n\n----\n\n[Kim Jong-un](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Jong-un) (born 8 January 1982 or 1983) is a North Korean politician who in 2011 took the office of Supreme Leader of North Korea (officially known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea). Relations between the United States and North Korea are tense, and North Korea has never [officially ended the Korean War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_relations). In 2006, North Korea performed their [first nuclear weapon test](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_North_Korean_nuclear_test), and the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation estimated North Korea to have [20-30 assembled nuclear warheads](https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-north-koreas-nuclear-inventory/) in 2021. In 2014, the United Nation's Office of the High Comissioner for Human Rights released [a lengthy report](www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIDPRK/Report/A.HRC.25.CRP.1_ENG.doc) calling North Korea an authoritarian, totalitarian state:\n\n>Systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations have been, and are being, committed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, its institutions and officials. In many instances, the violations of human rights found by the Commission constitute crimes against humanity. These are not mere excesses of the state. They are essential components of a political system that has moved far from the ideals on which it claims to be founded. The gravity, scale and nature of these violations reveal a state that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world.\n\nMetaculus has forecasted on the end of Kim's leadership on several previous occasions, in [2024](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9086/kim-jong-un-leader-of-dprk-until-2024/), [2022](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3445/will-kim-jong-un-still-be-the-de-facto-leader-of-north-korea-on-1-january-2022/), [2020](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1690/will-kim-jong-un-still-be-the-de-facto-leader-of-north-korea-on-1-january-2020/)", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that at least 2 [Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_members_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council) recognize or acknowledge that someone other than Kim Jong Un is the de-facto leader of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Resolution will be determined by official statements by the respective states in the UN security council.", "lower_25": "2037", "median": "2047", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum price (in 2021 USD) to clone a pet dog in 2030 will be 7.01k?", "desc": "According to the [Genetic Science Learning Center](https://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/cloning/clonezone/), one timeline of research relevant to cloning is*:\n\n- 1885 - First-ever demonstration of artificial embryo twinning\n- 1902 - Artificial embryo twinning in a vertebrate\n- 1928 - The cell nucleus controls embryonic development\n- 1952 - First successful nuclear transfer\n- 1958 - Nuclear transfer from a differentiated cell\n- 1975 - First mammalian embryo created by nuclear transfer\n- 1984 - First mammal created by nuclear transfer\n- 1987 - Nuclear transfer from embryonic cell\n- 1996 - Nuclear transfer from laboratory cells\n- 1996 - Dolly: First mammal created by somatic cell nuclear transfer\n- 1997 - First primate created by embryonic cell nuclear transfer\n- 1997 - Nuclear transfer from genetically engineered laboratory cells\n- 1998-1999 - More mammals cloned by somatic cell nuclear transfer\n- 2001 - Endangered animals cloned by somatic cell nuclear transfer\n- 2007 - Primate embryonic stem cells created by somatic cell nuclear transfer\n- 2013 - Human embryonic stem cells created by somatic cell nuclear transfer\n\nThe abstract of the 2015 paper _[Artificial cloning of domestic animals](https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/112/29/8874.full.pdf)_ summarizes the state of progress well:\n\n> Domestic animals can be cloned using techniques such as embryo\nsplitting and nuclear transfer to produce genetically identical\nindividuals. Although embryo splitting is limited to the production\nof only a few identical individuals, nuclear transfer of donor nuclei\ninto recipient oocytes, whose own nuclear DNA has been removed,\ncan result in large numbers of identical individuals. Moreover,\nclones can be produced using donor cells from sterile animals, such\nas steers and geldings, and, unlike their genetic source, these clones\nare fertile. In reality, due to low efficiencies and the high costs of\ncloning domestic species, only a limited number of identical in-\ndividuals are generally produced, and these clones are primarily\nused as breed stock. In addition to providing a means of rescuing\nand propagating valuable genetics, somatic cell nuclear transfer\n(SCNT) research has contributed knowledge that has led to the\ndirect reprogramming of cells (e.g., to induce pluripotent stem cells)\nand a better understanding of epigenetic regulation during embry-\nonic development.\n\nIn August 2005, researchers at the Seoul National University in South Korea produced the [first cloned dog](https://www.science.org/content/article/first-dog-cloned) that survived, and named it \"Snuppy\". There remains much work to be done before [cloning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commercial_animal_cloning) becomes cheap enough to be commercially accessible to most people. Nevertheless, services are still available. In 2008, the cost of cloning a pet was [USD 100k](https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/21/us/21dog.html). Currently, the company _[My Friend Again – The Dog Cloning Company](https://myfriendagain.com/dog-cloning-cost/)_ charges USD 50k to clone a dog, and USD ~25k to clone a cat. The company [_Viagen_](https://www.viagenpets.com/product/initiate-cloning/) charges USD 50k for dogs as well, but charges USD 35k for cats, and USD 85k for horses. \n\n(*) more information on each bullet point can be found on their website.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the minimum commercially price (in [inflation adjusted 2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL)) available for cloning a pet dog in 2030", "lower_25": "7.01k", "median": "11.3k", "upper_75": "19.4k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum price (in 2021 USD) to clone a pet dog in 2030 will be 7.01k?", "desc": "According to the [Genetic Science Learning Center](https://learn.genetics.utah.edu/content/cloning/clonezone/), one timeline of research relevant to cloning is*:\n\n- 1885 - First-ever demonstration of artificial embryo twinning\n- 1902 - Artificial embryo twinning in a vertebrate\n- 1928 - The cell nucleus controls embryonic development\n- 1952 - First successful nuclear transfer\n- 1958 - Nuclear transfer from a differentiated cell\n- 1975 - First mammalian embryo created by nuclear transfer\n- 1984 - First mammal created by nuclear transfer\n- 1987 - Nuclear transfer from embryonic cell\n- 1996 - Nuclear transfer from laboratory cells\n- 1996 - Dolly: First mammal created by somatic cell nuclear transfer\n- 1997 - First primate created by embryonic cell nuclear transfer\n- 1997 - Nuclear transfer from genetically engineered laboratory cells\n- 1998-1999 - More mammals cloned by somatic cell nuclear transfer\n- 2001 - Endangered animals cloned by somatic cell nuclear transfer\n- 2007 - Primate embryonic stem cells created by somatic cell nuclear transfer\n- 2013 - Human embryonic stem cells created by somatic cell nuclear transfer\n\nThe abstract of the 2015 paper _[Artificial cloning of domestic animals](https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/112/29/8874.full.pdf)_ summarizes the state of progress well:\n\n> Domestic animals can be cloned using techniques such as embryo\nsplitting and nuclear transfer to produce genetically identical\nindividuals. Although embryo splitting is limited to the production\nof only a few identical individuals, nuclear transfer of donor nuclei\ninto recipient oocytes, whose own nuclear DNA has been removed,\ncan result in large numbers of identical individuals. Moreover,\nclones can be produced using donor cells from sterile animals, such\nas steers and geldings, and, unlike their genetic source, these clones\nare fertile. In reality, due to low efficiencies and the high costs of\ncloning domestic species, only a limited number of identical in-\ndividuals are generally produced, and these clones are primarily\nused as breed stock. In addition to providing a means of rescuing\nand propagating valuable genetics, somatic cell nuclear transfer\n(SCNT) research has contributed knowledge that has led to the\ndirect reprogramming of cells (e.g., to induce pluripotent stem cells)\nand a better understanding of epigenetic regulation during embry-\nonic development.\n\nIn August 2005, researchers at the Seoul National University in South Korea produced the [first cloned dog](https://www.science.org/content/article/first-dog-cloned) that survived, and named it \"Snuppy\". There remains much work to be done before [cloning](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commercial_animal_cloning) becomes cheap enough to be commercially accessible to most people. Nevertheless, services are still available. In 2008, the cost of cloning a pet was [USD 100k](https://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/21/us/21dog.html). Currently, the company _[My Friend Again – The Dog Cloning Company](https://myfriendagain.com/dog-cloning-cost/)_ charges USD 50k to clone a dog, and USD ~25k to clone a cat. The company [_Viagen_](https://www.viagenpets.com/product/initiate-cloning/) charges USD 50k for dogs as well, but charges USD 35k for cats, and USD 85k for horses. \n\n(*) more information on each bullet point can be found on their website.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the minimum commercially price (in [inflation adjusted 2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL)) available for cloning a pet dog in 2030", "lower_25": "7.01k", "median": "11.3k", "upper_75": "19.4k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Kim Jong Un will no longer be the leader of North Korea by 2037?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Kim Jong-un remain the de facto leader of North Korea until (at least) January 1, 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9086/kim-jong-un-leader-of-dprk-until-2024/)\n\n----\n\n[Kim Jong-un](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Jong-un) (born 8 January 1982 or 1983) is a North Korean politician who in 2011 took the office of Supreme Leader of North Korea (officially known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea). Relations between the United States and North Korea are tense, and North Korea has never [officially ended the Korean War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_relations). In 2006, North Korea performed their [first nuclear weapon test](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_North_Korean_nuclear_test), and the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation estimated North Korea to have [20-30 assembled nuclear warheads](https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-north-koreas-nuclear-inventory/) in 2021. In 2014, the United Nation's Office of the High Comissioner for Human Rights released [a lengthy report](www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIDPRK/Report/A.HRC.25.CRP.1_ENG.doc) calling North Korea an authoritarian, totalitarian state:\n\n>Systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations have been, and are being, committed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, its institutions and officials. In many instances, the violations of human rights found by the Commission constitute crimes against humanity. These are not mere excesses of the state. They are essential components of a political system that has moved far from the ideals on which it claims to be founded. The gravity, scale and nature of these violations reveal a state that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world.\n\nMetaculus has forecasted on the end of Kim's leadership on several previous occasions, in [2024](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9086/kim-jong-un-leader-of-dprk-until-2024/), [2022](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3445/will-kim-jong-un-still-be-the-de-facto-leader-of-north-korea-on-1-january-2022/), [2020](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1690/will-kim-jong-un-still-be-the-de-facto-leader-of-north-korea-on-1-january-2020/)", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that at least 2 [Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_members_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council) recognize or acknowledge that someone other than Kim Jong Un is the de-facto leader of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Resolution will be determined by official statements by the respective states in the UN security council.", "lower_25": "2037", "median": "2047", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a person who was not screened or genetically modified as an embryo will file a lawsuit against their parents for not doing so by 2041?", "desc": "_Related Question on Metaculus_: \n\n- [When will a person who was screened or genetically modified as an embryo file a lawsuit against their parents for doing so?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9778/screenmodified-person-sues-parents/)\n\n---\n\nGene-editing and embryo selection are widely unpopular with people, especially among the nonsecular; people are unethusiastic and worried about these technologies and their use on humans (see [here](https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/12/10/biotechnology-research-viewed-with-caution-globally-but-most-support-gene-editing-for-babies-to-treat-disease/)). Nevertheless, the potential for these technologies to improve the life outcomes of people is high. For example, [polygenic screening](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polygenic_score) can be used to score candidate embryos on the basis of IQ, among other traits. Should some parents in the 22nd century not adopt genetic screening and modification technologies for their children, some of these children might come to resent their choice later on, given the disparity between these children's capabilities and those of their screened/modified peers.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date a lawsuit is filed by an individual against their biological parent(s) for not choosing to have the individual screened or genetically modified as an embryo. This question should close retroactively to one month before the lawsuit file date", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2053", "upper_75": "2074", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Kim Jong Un will no longer be the leader of North Korea by 2037?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Kim Jong-un remain the de facto leader of North Korea until (at least) January 1, 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9086/kim-jong-un-leader-of-dprk-until-2024/)\n\n----\n\n[Kim Jong-un](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Jong-un) (born 8 January 1982 or 1983) is a North Korean politician who in 2011 took the office of Supreme Leader of North Korea (officially known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea). Relations between the United States and North Korea are tense, and North Korea has never [officially ended the Korean War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea%E2%80%93United_States_relations). In 2006, North Korea performed their [first nuclear weapon test](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_North_Korean_nuclear_test), and the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation estimated North Korea to have [20-30 assembled nuclear warheads](https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-north-koreas-nuclear-inventory/) in 2021. In 2014, the United Nation's Office of the High Comissioner for Human Rights released [a lengthy report](www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIDPRK/Report/A.HRC.25.CRP.1_ENG.doc) calling North Korea an authoritarian, totalitarian state:\n\n>Systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations have been, and are being, committed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, its institutions and officials. In many instances, the violations of human rights found by the Commission constitute crimes against humanity. These are not mere excesses of the state. They are essential components of a political system that has moved far from the ideals on which it claims to be founded. The gravity, scale and nature of these violations reveal a state that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world.\n\nMetaculus has forecasted on the end of Kim's leadership on several previous occasions, in [2024](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9086/kim-jong-un-leader-of-dprk-until-2024/), [2022](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3445/will-kim-jong-un-still-be-the-de-facto-leader-of-north-korea-on-1-january-2022/), [2020](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1690/will-kim-jong-un-still-be-the-de-facto-leader-of-north-korea-on-1-january-2020/)", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that at least 2 [Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permanent_members_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council) recognize or acknowledge that someone other than Kim Jong Un is the de-facto leader of Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Resolution will be determined by official statements by the respective states in the UN security council.", "lower_25": "2037", "median": "2047", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Against Malaria Foundation will be 75% cost-effective in 2027, according to GiveWell?", "desc": "The [Against Malaria Foundation](https://www.againstmalaria.com/) (AMF) is a charity that provides long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs) to populations at high risk of malaria. These nets protect people, especially children, from dying from malaria.\n\n[GiveWell](https://www.givewell.org/) are a charity that produce high quality cost-effectiveness analyses. These analyses try to estimate the marginal impact of increasing donations to different charities, and they summarize this as a single number: cost per life saved, after adjustments.\n\nGiveWell have consistently rated AMF as one of the most cost-effective charities available. Previous cost-effectiveness analyses can be found [here](https://www.givewell.org/how-we-work/our-criteria/cost-effectiveness/cost-effectiveness-models). GiveWell's current methodology can be found [here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ZKq-MNU-xtn_48uN33L6VvBEZRAduvjwWMeaEffL4K4/edit).", "resc": "Resolution will be according to the first GiveWell cost-effectiveness estimate published in 2027.\n\nIf GiveWell produce separate estimates for several geographical areas, we will use the estimate for the area where AMF is maximally cost-effective. According to the September 2021 data, this would be the cost-effectiveness in Nigeria (PMI States): $4,113 per life saved.\n\nWe want to find the cost per life saved, after adjustments, and will use the best estimate of that. In 2019, we would have used 'cost per life saved, after downside adjustments, adjustments for excluded effects, and funging adjustments'. In 2018, we would have used 'cost per death averted [after accounting for leverage and funging](https://blog.givewell.org/2018/02/13/revisiting-leverage/)'. If no appropriate figure is given (if all numbers are in terms of cash transfers, for example), then the question will resolve as ambiguous.\n\nIf the estimates of several people are given, we will take the median estimate.\n\nIf GiveWell do not update their cost-effectiveness analysis for AMF in 2027, this question will resolve as ambiguous", "lower_25": "3.90k", "median": "4.93k", "upper_75": "6.53k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a person who was not screened or genetically modified as an embryo will file a lawsuit against their parents for not doing so by 2041?", "desc": "_Related Question on Metaculus_: \n\n- [When will a person who was screened or genetically modified as an embryo file a lawsuit against their parents for doing so?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9778/screenmodified-person-sues-parents/)\n\n---\n\nGene-editing and embryo selection are widely unpopular with people, especially among the nonsecular; people are unethusiastic and worried about these technologies and their use on humans (see [here](https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/12/10/biotechnology-research-viewed-with-caution-globally-but-most-support-gene-editing-for-babies-to-treat-disease/)). Nevertheless, the potential for these technologies to improve the life outcomes of people is high. For example, [polygenic screening](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polygenic_score) can be used to score candidate embryos on the basis of IQ, among other traits. Should some parents in the 22nd century not adopt genetic screening and modification technologies for their children, some of these children might come to resent their choice later on, given the disparity between these children's capabilities and those of their screened/modified peers.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date a lawsuit is filed by an individual against their biological parent(s) for not choosing to have the individual screened or genetically modified as an embryo. This question should close retroactively to one month before the lawsuit file date", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2053", "upper_75": "2074", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the levelized cost of battery storage will be 436 in 2027?", "desc": "The [Levelised Cost of Energy Storage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levelized_cost_of_energy) (LCOS) is an estimate of the full cost of building and operating an energy storage facility, relative to the expected amount of energy generated in its lifetime. Lazard released a [report in October 2021](https://www.lazard.com/perspective/levelized-cost-of-energy-levelized-cost-of-storage-and-levelized-cost-of-hydrogen/) analyzing multiple battery storage systems, finding the cheapest use case in a wholesale PV + storage system, at a cost of 85 - 158 $/MWh (for a geometric mean value of 116 $/MWh).\n\n[Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/battery-price-decline#the-price-of-lithium-ion-batteries-has-declined-by-97-since-1991) reported that the price of batteries fell by 97% from 1991 to 2018.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the Levelized Cost of Energy Storage according to [Lazard's LCOS report](https://www.lazard.com/perspective/levelized-cost-of-energy-levelized-cost-of-storage-and-levelized-cost-of-hydrogen/) for 2027, for a behind-the-meter wholesale (0.5MW / 2 MWh) system. if Lazard provides a range of estimates (as in the LCOS 7.0 report for 235 - 335 $/MWh), this question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geometric_mean) of the 2 endpoints of that range (which would be 280.58 $/MWh in the LCOS 7.0).\n\nIf Lazard does not release an updated report on battery costs in 2027 to 2029, this question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "108", "median": "188", "upper_75": "436", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a person who was not screened or genetically modified as an embryo will file a lawsuit against their parents for not doing so by 2041?", "desc": "_Related Question on Metaculus_: \n\n- [When will a person who was screened or genetically modified as an embryo file a lawsuit against their parents for doing so?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9778/screenmodified-person-sues-parents/)\n\n---\n\nGene-editing and embryo selection are widely unpopular with people, especially among the nonsecular; people are unethusiastic and worried about these technologies and their use on humans (see [here](https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/12/10/biotechnology-research-viewed-with-caution-globally-but-most-support-gene-editing-for-babies-to-treat-disease/)). Nevertheless, the potential for these technologies to improve the life outcomes of people is high. For example, [polygenic screening](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polygenic_score) can be used to score candidate embryos on the basis of IQ, among other traits. Should some parents in the 22nd century not adopt genetic screening and modification technologies for their children, some of these children might come to resent their choice later on, given the disparity between these children's capabilities and those of their screened/modified peers.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date a lawsuit is filed by an individual against their biological parent(s) for not choosing to have the individual screened or genetically modified as an embryo. This question should close retroactively to one month before the lawsuit file date", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2053", "upper_75": "2074", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a person who was screened or genetically modified as an embryo will file a lawsuit against their parent(s) for doing so by 2049?", "desc": "", "resc": "Most individuals do not take legal action against their parents for the decisions they made before the individual's birth, but, nonetheless, some do take action. For example, in 2019, Raphael Samuel sued his parents for giving birth to him without his consent (see [here](https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/shortcuts/2019/feb/05/consent-being-born-man-suing-parents-for-giving-birth-to-him)). There have been many other instances of people who've resented their parents for giving birth to them, but few have actually taken legal action. \n\nWhile people's attitudes towards embryo selection and genetic modification are, for the most part, worried and unenthusiastic (see [here](https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/12/10/biotechnology-research-viewed-with-caution-globally-but-most-support-gene-editing-for-babies-to-treat-disease/)), they may change in the future, especially as public understanding and access to the technology increases and as people leave religion. Should parents in the 22nd century adopt genetic screening and modification technologies for their children, some of these children might come to resent their choice later on.\n\n***When will a person who was screened or genetically modified as an embryo file a lawsuit against their parents for doing so?***\n\nThis question resolves as the date a lawsuit is filed by an individual against their biological parent(s) for choosing to have the individual screened or genetically modified as an embryo. This question should close retroactively to one month before the lawsuit file date.", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "2061", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a magnitude 7.8 or higher earthquake will strike the SF Bay Area by 2052 and result in the death of 3.18k people?", "desc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1906_San_Francisco_earthquake),\n\n> The coast of Northern California was struck by a major earthquake at 5:12 a.m. on Wednesday, April 18, 1906, with an estimated moment magnitude of 7.9 and a maximum Mercalli intensity of XI (Extreme). High-intensity shaking was felt from Eureka on the North Coast to the Salinas Valley, an agricultural region to the south of the San Francisco Bay Area. Devastating fires soon broke out in the city and lasted for several days. More than 3,000 people died, and over 80% of the city of San Francisco was destroyed. The events are remembered as one of the worst and deadliest earthquakes in the history of the United States. The death toll remains the greatest loss of life from a natural disaster in California's history and high on the lists of American disasters.", "resc": "For this question, a qualifying earthquake must have an epicenter within 100 kilometers of the south entrance to the Golden Gate bridge with a [moment magnitude](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_magnitude_scale) of at least 7.8. If the Bay Area is struck with such an earthquake, then this question will resolve as the number of people who died in the Bay Area as a result of the direct immediate consequences of the earthquake, including tsunamis, fires, structural collapses, and other earthquake-related disasters, according to credible authorities, such as the U.S. Geological Survey.\n\nIf such an earthquake does not occur by January 1, 2052, then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "83.5", "median": "581", "upper_75": "3.18k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Against Malaria Foundation will be 75% cost-effective in 2027, according to GiveWell?", "desc": "The [Against Malaria Foundation](https://www.againstmalaria.com/) (AMF) is a charity that provides long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs) to populations at high risk of malaria. These nets protect people, especially children, from dying from malaria.\n\n[GiveWell](https://www.givewell.org/) are a charity that produce high quality cost-effectiveness analyses. These analyses try to estimate the marginal impact of increasing donations to different charities, and they summarize this as a single number: cost per life saved, after adjustments.\n\nGiveWell have consistently rated AMF as one of the most cost-effective charities available. Previous cost-effectiveness analyses can be found [here](https://www.givewell.org/how-we-work/our-criteria/cost-effectiveness/cost-effectiveness-models). GiveWell's current methodology can be found [here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ZKq-MNU-xtn_48uN33L6VvBEZRAduvjwWMeaEffL4K4/edit).", "resc": "Resolution will be according to the first GiveWell cost-effectiveness estimate published in 2027.\n\nIf GiveWell produce separate estimates for several geographical areas, we will use the estimate for the area where AMF is maximally cost-effective. According to the September 2021 data, this would be the cost-effectiveness in Nigeria (PMI States): $4,113 per life saved.\n\nWe want to find the cost per life saved, after adjustments, and will use the best estimate of that. In 2019, we would have used 'cost per life saved, after downside adjustments, adjustments for excluded effects, and funging adjustments'. In 2018, we would have used 'cost per death averted [after accounting for leverage and funging](https://blog.givewell.org/2018/02/13/revisiting-leverage/)'. If no appropriate figure is given (if all numbers are in terms of cash transfers, for example), then the question will resolve as ambiguous.\n\nIf the estimates of several people are given, we will take the median estimate.\n\nIf GiveWell do not update their cost-effectiveness analysis for AMF in 2027, this question will resolve as ambiguous", "lower_25": "3.90k", "median": "4.93k", "upper_75": "6.53k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that some country will do widespread embryo selection for intelligence by 2073?", "desc": "Embryo selection is a potential emerging technology and is the subject of [several previous Metaculus questions](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/?order_by=-activity&search=Embryo%20selection) and a [notebook](https://www.metaculus.com/notebooks/9247/polygenic-selection-of-embryos/). One of the most discussed applications of embryo selection is embryo selection for intelligence. In 2014, [Dominic Cummings](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominic_Cummings) suggested in a [blog post](https://dominiccummings.com/2014/08/19/standin-by-the-window-where-the-light-is-strong-de-extinction-machine-intelligence-the-search-for-extra-solar-life-neural-networks-autonomous-drone-swarms-bombing-parliament-genetics-amp/) that governments should fund embryo selection for intelligence for the population, because the affluent people would have the ability to do it in any case. Here we ask when some country will have widespread embryo selection for intelligence.", "resc": "This question resolves positively when some country with over a million people has more than 10% of its newborns developed from embryos selected for polygenic scores for intelligence within a single calander year, according to credible reports. If no country has >10% of its newborns selected for intelligence by 2099-12-31 it resolves as >.\n\nMoreover, for the question to resolve positively, the particular procedure used for embryo selection must, in expectation, result in an increase of at least 1/5 standard deviations in IQ (i.e. 3 IQ points), according to credible evidence", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2052", "upper_75": "2073", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a magnitude 7.8 or higher earthquake will strike the SF Bay Area by 2052 and result in the death of 3.18k people?", "desc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1906_San_Francisco_earthquake),\n\n> The coast of Northern California was struck by a major earthquake at 5:12 a.m. on Wednesday, April 18, 1906, with an estimated moment magnitude of 7.9 and a maximum Mercalli intensity of XI (Extreme). High-intensity shaking was felt from Eureka on the North Coast to the Salinas Valley, an agricultural region to the south of the San Francisco Bay Area. Devastating fires soon broke out in the city and lasted for several days. More than 3,000 people died, and over 80% of the city of San Francisco was destroyed. The events are remembered as one of the worst and deadliest earthquakes in the history of the United States. The death toll remains the greatest loss of life from a natural disaster in California's history and high on the lists of American disasters.", "resc": "For this question, a qualifying earthquake must have an epicenter within 100 kilometers of the south entrance to the Golden Gate bridge with a [moment magnitude](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_magnitude_scale) of at least 7.8. If the Bay Area is struck with such an earthquake, then this question will resolve as the number of people who died in the Bay Area as a result of the direct immediate consequences of the earthquake, including tsunamis, fires, structural collapses, and other earthquake-related disasters, according to credible authorities, such as the U.S. Geological Survey.\n\nIf such an earthquake does not occur by January 1, 2052, then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "83.5", "median": "581", "upper_75": "3.18k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a magnitude 7.8 or higher earthquake will strike the SF Bay Area by 2052 and result in the death of 3.18k people?", "desc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1906_San_Francisco_earthquake),\n\n> The coast of Northern California was struck by a major earthquake at 5:12 a.m. on Wednesday, April 18, 1906, with an estimated moment magnitude of 7.9 and a maximum Mercalli intensity of XI (Extreme). High-intensity shaking was felt from Eureka on the North Coast to the Salinas Valley, an agricultural region to the south of the San Francisco Bay Area. Devastating fires soon broke out in the city and lasted for several days. More than 3,000 people died, and over 80% of the city of San Francisco was destroyed. The events are remembered as one of the worst and deadliest earthquakes in the history of the United States. The death toll remains the greatest loss of life from a natural disaster in California's history and high on the lists of American disasters.", "resc": "For this question, a qualifying earthquake must have an epicenter within 100 kilometers of the south entrance to the Golden Gate bridge with a [moment magnitude](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_magnitude_scale) of at least 7.8. If the Bay Area is struck with such an earthquake, then this question will resolve as the number of people who died in the Bay Area as a result of the direct immediate consequences of the earthquake, including tsunamis, fires, structural collapses, and other earthquake-related disasters, according to credible authorities, such as the U.S. Geological Survey.\n\nIf such an earthquake does not occur by January 1, 2052, then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "83.5", "median": "581", "upper_75": "3.18k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the levelized cost of battery storage will be 436 in 2027?", "desc": "The [Levelised Cost of Energy Storage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levelized_cost_of_energy) (LCOS) is an estimate of the full cost of building and operating an energy storage facility, relative to the expected amount of energy generated in its lifetime. Lazard released a [report in October 2021](https://www.lazard.com/perspective/levelized-cost-of-energy-levelized-cost-of-storage-and-levelized-cost-of-hydrogen/) analyzing multiple battery storage systems, finding the cheapest use case in a wholesale PV + storage system, at a cost of 85 - 158 $/MWh (for a geometric mean value of 116 $/MWh).\n\n[Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/battery-price-decline#the-price-of-lithium-ion-batteries-has-declined-by-97-since-1991) reported that the price of batteries fell by 97% from 1991 to 2018.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the Levelized Cost of Energy Storage according to [Lazard's LCOS report](https://www.lazard.com/perspective/levelized-cost-of-energy-levelized-cost-of-storage-and-levelized-cost-of-hydrogen/) for 2027, for a behind-the-meter wholesale (0.5MW / 2 MWh) system. if Lazard provides a range of estimates (as in the LCOS 7.0 report for 235 - 335 $/MWh), this question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geometric_mean) of the 2 endpoints of that range (which would be 280.58 $/MWh in the LCOS 7.0).\n\nIf Lazard does not release an updated report on battery costs in 2027 to 2029, this question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "108", "median": "188", "upper_75": "436", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the levelized cost of battery storage will be 436 in 2027?", "desc": "The [Levelised Cost of Energy Storage](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levelized_cost_of_energy) (LCOS) is an estimate of the full cost of building and operating an energy storage facility, relative to the expected amount of energy generated in its lifetime. Lazard released a [report in October 2021](https://www.lazard.com/perspective/levelized-cost-of-energy-levelized-cost-of-storage-and-levelized-cost-of-hydrogen/) analyzing multiple battery storage systems, finding the cheapest use case in a wholesale PV + storage system, at a cost of 85 - 158 $/MWh (for a geometric mean value of 116 $/MWh).\n\n[Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/battery-price-decline#the-price-of-lithium-ion-batteries-has-declined-by-97-since-1991) reported that the price of batteries fell by 97% from 1991 to 2018.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the Levelized Cost of Energy Storage according to [Lazard's LCOS report](https://www.lazard.com/perspective/levelized-cost-of-energy-levelized-cost-of-storage-and-levelized-cost-of-hydrogen/) for 2027, for a behind-the-meter wholesale (0.5MW / 2 MWh) system. if Lazard provides a range of estimates (as in the LCOS 7.0 report for 235 - 335 $/MWh), this question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geometric_mean) of the 2 endpoints of that range (which would be 280.58 $/MWh in the LCOS 7.0).\n\nIf Lazard does not release an updated report on battery costs in 2027 to 2029, this question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "108", "median": "188", "upper_75": "436", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Against Malaria Foundation will be 75% cost-effective in 2027, according to GiveWell?", "desc": "The [Against Malaria Foundation](https://www.againstmalaria.com/) (AMF) is a charity that provides long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs) to populations at high risk of malaria. These nets protect people, especially children, from dying from malaria.\n\n[GiveWell](https://www.givewell.org/) are a charity that produce high quality cost-effectiveness analyses. These analyses try to estimate the marginal impact of increasing donations to different charities, and they summarize this as a single number: cost per life saved, after adjustments.\n\nGiveWell have consistently rated AMF as one of the most cost-effective charities available. Previous cost-effectiveness analyses can be found [here](https://www.givewell.org/how-we-work/our-criteria/cost-effectiveness/cost-effectiveness-models). GiveWell's current methodology can be found [here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ZKq-MNU-xtn_48uN33L6VvBEZRAduvjwWMeaEffL4K4/edit).", "resc": "Resolution will be according to the first GiveWell cost-effectiveness estimate published in 2027.\n\nIf GiveWell produce separate estimates for several geographical areas, we will use the estimate for the area where AMF is maximally cost-effective. According to the September 2021 data, this would be the cost-effectiveness in Nigeria (PMI States): $4,113 per life saved.\n\nWe want to find the cost per life saved, after adjustments, and will use the best estimate of that. In 2019, we would have used 'cost per life saved, after downside adjustments, adjustments for excluded effects, and funging adjustments'. In 2018, we would have used 'cost per death averted [after accounting for leverage and funging](https://blog.givewell.org/2018/02/13/revisiting-leverage/)'. If no appropriate figure is given (if all numbers are in terms of cash transfers, for example), then the question will resolve as ambiguous.\n\nIf the estimates of several people are given, we will take the median estimate.\n\nIf GiveWell do not update their cost-effectiveness analysis for AMF in 2027, this question will resolve as ambiguous", "lower_25": "3.90k", "median": "4.93k", "upper_75": "6.53k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How far from Earth (in km) is the nearest celestial object with stable liquid water on its surface, given that 1.24×1015 km is the maximum distance?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How far away is/was the nearest independent origination of life?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7079/where-is-the-nearest-origin-of-et-life/)\n\n----\n\nThe Earth is the only celestial body known to have liquid water on its surface. There is disputed evidence that Mars may have [transient brine flows](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seasonal_flows_on_warm_Martian_slopes), but even should these prove to be water based they would not be stable bodies of water. Because all known life on Earth (and therefore all life currently known to exist) requires liquid water, finding liquid water on another world would be an important step in determining the prevalence of life in the universe.\n\nSome potential values, in km, borrowed from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7079/where-is-the-nearest-origin-of-et-life/):\n\n - \\(40,000 = 4\\times 10^{5}\\): the Moon\n - \\(\\textrm{4 million} = 4\\times 10^{7}\\): Mars or Venus\n - \\(\\textrm{70 million} = 7 \\times 10^{8}\\): a moon of Jupiter\n - \\(∼10^{14}\\): nearby stars\n - \\(∼10^{17}\\): typical star in our galaxy\n - \\(∼10^{18}\\): opposite edge of the [milky way galaxy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milky_Way#Sun's_location_and_neighborhood)", "resc": "This question will resolve to the distance in kilometers from Earth to the nearest non-Earth body of liquid water known to exist that:\n\n1. Is at least 1000 square meters in area.\n2. Is on its host body's surface, with solid below it and only gas between it and the vacuum of space.\n3. Consists of at least 50% water. (For comparison, the saltiest known pond on Earth is 57% water.)\n4. Exists continuously as liquid for the host body's orbital period around its star, or at least 100 Earth years should the host body not be in orbit around a star.\n5. Was not created or transported by intelligence originating on Earth.\n\nThis question will resolve as the distance from Earth to the nearest such celestial body in km, on January 1, 2100. The nearest object will be determined from all candidates known on January 1, 2100 from scientific evidence available to Metaculus.\n\nIf no such body of water is known to exist as of January 1, 2100, the question will resolve as \\(>10^{18}\\).", "lower_25": "8.52×1013", "median": "2.88×1014", "upper_75": "1.24×1015", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How far from Earth (in km) is the nearest celestial object with stable liquid water on its surface, given that 1.24×1015 km is the maximum distance?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How far away is/was the nearest independent origination of life?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7079/where-is-the-nearest-origin-of-et-life/)\n\n----\n\nThe Earth is the only celestial body known to have liquid water on its surface. There is disputed evidence that Mars may have [transient brine flows](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seasonal_flows_on_warm_Martian_slopes), but even should these prove to be water based they would not be stable bodies of water. Because all known life on Earth (and therefore all life currently known to exist) requires liquid water, finding liquid water on another world would be an important step in determining the prevalence of life in the universe.\n\nSome potential values, in km, borrowed from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7079/where-is-the-nearest-origin-of-et-life/):\n\n - \\(40,000 = 4\\times 10^{5}\\): the Moon\n - \\(\\textrm{4 million} = 4\\times 10^{7}\\): Mars or Venus\n - \\(\\textrm{70 million} = 7 \\times 10^{8}\\): a moon of Jupiter\n - \\(∼10^{14}\\): nearby stars\n - \\(∼10^{17}\\): typical star in our galaxy\n - \\(∼10^{18}\\): opposite edge of the [milky way galaxy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milky_Way#Sun's_location_and_neighborhood)", "resc": "This question will resolve to the distance in kilometers from Earth to the nearest non-Earth body of liquid water known to exist that:\n\n1. Is at least 1000 square meters in area.\n2. Is on its host body's surface, with solid below it and only gas between it and the vacuum of space.\n3. Consists of at least 50% water. (For comparison, the saltiest known pond on Earth is 57% water.)\n4. Exists continuously as liquid for the host body's orbital period around its star, or at least 100 Earth years should the host body not be in orbit around a star.\n5. Was not created or transported by intelligence originating on Earth.\n\nThis question will resolve as the distance from Earth to the nearest such celestial body in km, on January 1, 2100. The nearest object will be determined from all candidates known on January 1, 2100 from scientific evidence available to Metaculus.\n\nIf no such body of water is known to exist as of January 1, 2100, the question will resolve as \\(>10^{18}\\).", "lower_25": "8.52×1013", "median": "2.88×1014", "upper_75": "1.24×1015", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.80k people will fly to space for the first time in the 2020's?", "desc": "2021 saw the realization of the dream of private space tourism, with the successful flight of Blue Origin's New Shepherd and Virgin Galactic's SpaceShipTwo, and SpaceX's \"Inspiration 4\" mission. Professional astronauts travelling to and living on the ISS and Tiangong also continues as usual. Between increasing tourist flights and continuing professional astronauts, this decade is expected to see more people fly to space than ever before.", "resc": "A person reaching space will follow the US DoD criteria of reaching over 50 miles (80 km) in the atmosphere rather than the FAI definition of crossing the Karman line (100 km).\nThe total number of space travelers will be determined by summing the number of US DoD-qualified people on [List of space travelers by name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_space_travelers_by_name) and [Commercial astronaut](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commercial_astronaut), and subtracting the 574 people on the 2019-12-31 edit of the first page. As of 2022-02-22 this stands at 587 + 30 - 574 = 43. Comparable pages will be used if those are not available at the time of resolution, or do not meet the intent of this question.", "lower_25": "441", "median": "711", "upper_75": "1.80k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.80k people will fly to space for the first time in the 2020's?", "desc": "2021 saw the realization of the dream of private space tourism, with the successful flight of Blue Origin's New Shepherd and Virgin Galactic's SpaceShipTwo, and SpaceX's \"Inspiration 4\" mission. Professional astronauts travelling to and living on the ISS and Tiangong also continues as usual. Between increasing tourist flights and continuing professional astronauts, this decade is expected to see more people fly to space than ever before.", "resc": "A person reaching space will follow the US DoD criteria of reaching over 50 miles (80 km) in the atmosphere rather than the FAI definition of crossing the Karman line (100 km).\nThe total number of space travelers will be determined by summing the number of US DoD-qualified people on [List of space travelers by name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_space_travelers_by_name) and [Commercial astronaut](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commercial_astronaut), and subtracting the 574 people on the 2019-12-31 edit of the first page. As of 2022-02-22 this stands at 587 + 30 - 574 = 43. Comparable pages will be used if those are not available at the time of resolution, or do not meet the intent of this question.", "lower_25": "441", "median": "711", "upper_75": "1.80k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.80k people will fly to space for the first time in the 2020's?", "desc": "2021 saw the realization of the dream of private space tourism, with the successful flight of Blue Origin's New Shepherd and Virgin Galactic's SpaceShipTwo, and SpaceX's \"Inspiration 4\" mission. Professional astronauts travelling to and living on the ISS and Tiangong also continues as usual. Between increasing tourist flights and continuing professional astronauts, this decade is expected to see more people fly to space than ever before.", "resc": "A person reaching space will follow the US DoD criteria of reaching over 50 miles (80 km) in the atmosphere rather than the FAI definition of crossing the Karman line (100 km).\nThe total number of space travelers will be determined by summing the number of US DoD-qualified people on [List of space travelers by name](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_space_travelers_by_name) and [Commercial astronaut](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commercial_astronaut), and subtracting the 574 people on the 2019-12-31 edit of the first page. As of 2022-02-22 this stands at 587 + 30 - 574 = 43. Comparable pages will be used if those are not available at the time of resolution, or do not meet the intent of this question.", "lower_25": "441", "median": "711", "upper_75": "1.80k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will reopen its embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan by Sep 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "According to the US [embassy website](https://af.usembassy.gov/embassy/), \"The U.S. Embassy in Kabul suspended operations on August 31, 2021.\"\n\nAt some point in the future the US may choose to reopen its embassy in Kabul if diplomatic relations are restored.\n\n***When will the United States reopen its embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan?***\n\nThe question will resolve when an official United States embassy reopens in Kabul Afghanistan, or at the time of question expiry if no embassy is opened. The source for the resolution will be the the United States Department of State website, and any official pronouncement therein declaring an opening of the embassy in Kabul or in the capital city of Afghanistan at that time.\n\n[fine-print]\nAnnouncements of proposed reopening or all other non-official statements will not count toward the resolution of the question. An official diplomatic presence will not suffice to resolve the question nor will any consulate or other governmental or ngo facility that does not constitute the official US embassy.\n\nIf the capital city moves or the status of Afghanistan as an officially recognized country changes, this question may resolve in the negative, regardless of whether the United States has an embassy in Kabul. For instance in the event of a split in the country, this question would resolve in the negative, since the Afghanistan referred to in this question would no longer exist.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "Sep 2026", "median": "Sep 2027", "upper_75": "Sep 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.42k inductees will join the Swedish Armed Forces in 2027 via completing basic enlistment training?", "desc": "", "resc": "After the fall of the Soviet Union, the main perceived threat to Sweden's national security was gone. The Swedish government took this as an opportunity to downsize their armed forces, which at the time relied heavily on conscription. Peace-time conscription was steadily reduced over the years, until it was halted in 2010 with the Swedish Armed Forces becoming a volunteer only force.\n\nAfter the Russian invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014, there was a renewed focus on rebuilding Sweden's defensive capability. Conscription was reintroduced in 2017, and has increased since.\n\nGiven Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and its implications for European security, Sweden may place an even higher focus on national defense, which may be reflected in the number of conscripts taken annually.\n\nPrior to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Government of Sweden had already set the goal of increasing the number of conscripts completing basic training to 8 000 per year by 2025. In 2021 a total of 4 550 conscripts completed basic training. For comparison, in 1997 a total of 27 565 conscripts completed what was considered basic training at the time.\n\n***How many inductees will complete basic enlisted training in the Swedish Armed Forces in 2027?***\n\n[fine-print]For the purpose of this question, an inductee is any individual who undergoes “Grundutbildning med värnplikt” (basic training with conscription) into the Swedish Armed Forces, whether as a consequence of conscription or of voluntary self-submission for selection, as long as they go through substantially the same induction training as current conscripts do. Persons who take alternative routes into service, such as completion of officer cadet training, will *not* count towards the number of \"inductees\". If Sweden again halts conscription but leaves open a volunteer route to enlisted service involving substantially the same training as conscripts formerly underwent, these inductees *will* count towards the total of “Grundutbildning med värnplikt” inductees, even if their service is no longer described as \"med värnplikt\".\n\nThe number of inductees completing basic training in 2027 will be obtained from the Swedish Armed Forces' annual review for 2027 (expected to be published in 2028).\n\nThe Swedish Armed Forces' annual reviews can be found [at their website (in Swedish)](https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/om-forsvarsmakten/dokument/arsredovisningar/). The relevant figures can be found within the “Bilagor” documents.\n\nIf this document is unavailable, an equivalent figure sourced from the Government of Sweden, or one of its related organisations can be used.\n\nIf a figure can be obtained prior to 2028 from any of the sources described above, then the question will retroactively close to an appropriate date approximately matching the date of publication.\n\nIf such a figure cannot be obtained before 2029, this question will resolve ambigiously.[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "5.42k", "median": "7.29k", "upper_75": "9.67k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Jones Act will be repealed by Jan 2028?", "desc": "Section 27 of [Merchant Marine Act of 1920](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merchant_Marine_Act_of_1920), colloquially known as the Jones Act, requires that all goods transported by water between U.S. ports be carried on ships that have been constructed in the United States and that fly the U.S. flag, are owned by U.S. citizens, and are crewed by U.S. citizens and U.S. permanent residents.\n\n## Effects\n\nResearch shows that the Jones Act reduces domestic trade via waterways (relative to other forms of trade) and increases consumer prices. ([Journal of International Economics](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0022199620300933))\n\nThis is especially felt in areas like Hawaii where it is estimated that average family spends extra $1800 per year due to higher prices. ([WSJ](https://www.wsj.com/articles/jonesing-to-give-up-russian-oil-hawaii-jones-act-11646176174))\n\n## Repealment\n\nLegislative efforts to repeal the Jones Act have been repeatedly introduced in Congress since 2010 in the form of the Open America's Waters Act, championed by the late Senator John McCain and by Utah Senator Mike Lee, but have not passed to become law.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the first date on which boats built, crewed, or owned by citizens of at least 10 other non-US countries can transport goods between any two US ports", "lower_25": "Jan 2028", "median": "Sep 2029", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Jones Act will be repealed by Jan 2028?", "desc": "Section 27 of [Merchant Marine Act of 1920](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merchant_Marine_Act_of_1920), colloquially known as the Jones Act, requires that all goods transported by water between U.S. ports be carried on ships that have been constructed in the United States and that fly the U.S. flag, are owned by U.S. citizens, and are crewed by U.S. citizens and U.S. permanent residents.\n\n## Effects\n\nResearch shows that the Jones Act reduces domestic trade via waterways (relative to other forms of trade) and increases consumer prices. ([Journal of International Economics](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0022199620300933))\n\nThis is especially felt in areas like Hawaii where it is estimated that average family spends extra $1800 per year due to higher prices. ([WSJ](https://www.wsj.com/articles/jonesing-to-give-up-russian-oil-hawaii-jones-act-11646176174))\n\n## Repealment\n\nLegislative efforts to repeal the Jones Act have been repeatedly introduced in Congress since 2010 in the form of the Open America's Waters Act, championed by the late Senator John McCain and by Utah Senator Mike Lee, but have not passed to become law.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the first date on which boats built, crewed, or owned by citizens of at least 10 other non-US countries can transport goods between any two US ports", "lower_25": "Jan 2028", "median": "Sep 2029", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will reopen its embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan by Sep 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "According to the US [embassy website](https://af.usembassy.gov/embassy/), \"The U.S. Embassy in Kabul suspended operations on August 31, 2021.\"\n\nAt some point in the future the US may choose to reopen its embassy in Kabul if diplomatic relations are restored.\n\n***When will the United States reopen its embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan?***\n\nThe question will resolve when an official United States embassy reopens in Kabul Afghanistan, or at the time of question expiry if no embassy is opened. The source for the resolution will be the the United States Department of State website, and any official pronouncement therein declaring an opening of the embassy in Kabul or in the capital city of Afghanistan at that time.\n\n[fine-print]\nAnnouncements of proposed reopening or all other non-official statements will not count toward the resolution of the question. An official diplomatic presence will not suffice to resolve the question nor will any consulate or other governmental or ngo facility that does not constitute the official US embassy.\n\nIf the capital city moves or the status of Afghanistan as an officially recognized country changes, this question may resolve in the negative, regardless of whether the United States has an embassy in Kabul. For instance in the event of a split in the country, this question would resolve in the negative, since the Afghanistan referred to in this question would no longer exist.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "Sep 2026", "median": "Sep 2027", "upper_75": "Sep 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that someone in the US will not legally sell their kidney before January 2050?", "desc": "More than 30,000 organ transplants are performed each year in the United States alone, according to 2015 data from the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network. Around the world, the total was estimated to be 135,860 in 2016 according to the Global Observatory on Donation and Transplantation.\n\nHowever, the demand for donor organs often significantly exceeds the supply, meaning that many patients have to wait for a significant period of time before receiving an acceptable donor organ. Many, tragically, die waiting. \n\nThere is significant discussion and debate around permitting the sales of kidneys, sometimes phrased along the lines, 'monetary compensation for kidney donation'. Iran currently is the only country in the world that allows the sale of one's kidney for compensation. Consequently, the country does not have either a waiting list or a shortage of available organs.\n\nIn the US, the 1984 National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e, makes it a federal crime to \"knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.\" State-level prohibitions are based on the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 8A U.L.A. 15, which has been adopted by all 50 states and the District of Columbia with minor variations. The [American Bar Association](https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol30_2003/spring2003/hr_spring03_livingdonors/) writes, \"The original version of UAGA failed to mention commerce in organs explicitly. However, commentators have interpreted it to prohibit the sale of organs.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date that a person in the United States openly sells their kidney in exchange for compensation exceeding $10,000 2023 USD, and a consensus of reliable published sources describes this as a legal, authorized transaction that does not entail penalties or liabilities designed to thwart organ sales.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2050, then this question will resolve as **> January 1, 2050**", "lower_25": "Mar 2048", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2050", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2050", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Jones Act will be repealed by Jan 2028?", "desc": "Section 27 of [Merchant Marine Act of 1920](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merchant_Marine_Act_of_1920), colloquially known as the Jones Act, requires that all goods transported by water between U.S. ports be carried on ships that have been constructed in the United States and that fly the U.S. flag, are owned by U.S. citizens, and are crewed by U.S. citizens and U.S. permanent residents.\n\n## Effects\n\nResearch shows that the Jones Act reduces domestic trade via waterways (relative to other forms of trade) and increases consumer prices. ([Journal of International Economics](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0022199620300933))\n\nThis is especially felt in areas like Hawaii where it is estimated that average family spends extra $1800 per year due to higher prices. ([WSJ](https://www.wsj.com/articles/jonesing-to-give-up-russian-oil-hawaii-jones-act-11646176174))\n\n## Repealment\n\nLegislative efforts to repeal the Jones Act have been repeatedly introduced in Congress since 2010 in the form of the Open America's Waters Act, championed by the late Senator John McCain and by Utah Senator Mike Lee, but have not passed to become law.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the first date on which boats built, crewed, or owned by citizens of at least 10 other non-US countries can transport goods between any two US ports", "lower_25": "Jan 2028", "median": "Sep 2029", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that someone in the US will not legally sell their kidney before January 2050?", "desc": "More than 30,000 organ transplants are performed each year in the United States alone, according to 2015 data from the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network. Around the world, the total was estimated to be 135,860 in 2016 according to the Global Observatory on Donation and Transplantation.\n\nHowever, the demand for donor organs often significantly exceeds the supply, meaning that many patients have to wait for a significant period of time before receiving an acceptable donor organ. Many, tragically, die waiting. \n\nThere is significant discussion and debate around permitting the sales of kidneys, sometimes phrased along the lines, 'monetary compensation for kidney donation'. Iran currently is the only country in the world that allows the sale of one's kidney for compensation. Consequently, the country does not have either a waiting list or a shortage of available organs.\n\nIn the US, the 1984 National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e, makes it a federal crime to \"knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.\" State-level prohibitions are based on the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 8A U.L.A. 15, which has been adopted by all 50 states and the District of Columbia with minor variations. The [American Bar Association](https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol30_2003/spring2003/hr_spring03_livingdonors/) writes, \"The original version of UAGA failed to mention commerce in organs explicitly. However, commentators have interpreted it to prohibit the sale of organs.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date that a person in the United States openly sells their kidney in exchange for compensation exceeding $10,000 2023 USD, and a consensus of reliable published sources describes this as a legal, authorized transaction that does not entail penalties or liabilities designed to thwart organ sales.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2050, then this question will resolve as **> January 1, 2050**", "lower_25": "Mar 2048", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2050", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2050", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will reopen its embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan by Sep 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "According to the US [embassy website](https://af.usembassy.gov/embassy/), \"The U.S. Embassy in Kabul suspended operations on August 31, 2021.\"\n\nAt some point in the future the US may choose to reopen its embassy in Kabul if diplomatic relations are restored.\n\n***When will the United States reopen its embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan?***\n\nThe question will resolve when an official United States embassy reopens in Kabul Afghanistan, or at the time of question expiry if no embassy is opened. The source for the resolution will be the the United States Department of State website, and any official pronouncement therein declaring an opening of the embassy in Kabul or in the capital city of Afghanistan at that time.\n\n[fine-print]\nAnnouncements of proposed reopening or all other non-official statements will not count toward the resolution of the question. An official diplomatic presence will not suffice to resolve the question nor will any consulate or other governmental or ngo facility that does not constitute the official US embassy.\n\nIf the capital city moves or the status of Afghanistan as an officially recognized country changes, this question may resolve in the negative, regardless of whether the United States has an embassy in Kabul. For instance in the event of a split in the country, this question would resolve in the negative, since the Afghanistan referred to in this question would no longer exist.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "Sep 2026", "median": "Sep 2027", "upper_75": "Sep 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How far from Earth (in km) is the nearest celestial object with stable liquid water on its surface, given that 1.24×1015 km is the maximum distance?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How far away is/was the nearest independent origination of life?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7079/where-is-the-nearest-origin-of-et-life/)\n\n----\n\nThe Earth is the only celestial body known to have liquid water on its surface. There is disputed evidence that Mars may have [transient brine flows](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seasonal_flows_on_warm_Martian_slopes), but even should these prove to be water based they would not be stable bodies of water. Because all known life on Earth (and therefore all life currently known to exist) requires liquid water, finding liquid water on another world would be an important step in determining the prevalence of life in the universe.\n\nSome potential values, in km, borrowed from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7079/where-is-the-nearest-origin-of-et-life/):\n\n - \\(40,000 = 4\\times 10^{5}\\): the Moon\n - \\(\\textrm{4 million} = 4\\times 10^{7}\\): Mars or Venus\n - \\(\\textrm{70 million} = 7 \\times 10^{8}\\): a moon of Jupiter\n - \\(∼10^{14}\\): nearby stars\n - \\(∼10^{17}\\): typical star in our galaxy\n - \\(∼10^{18}\\): opposite edge of the [milky way galaxy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milky_Way#Sun's_location_and_neighborhood)", "resc": "This question will resolve to the distance in kilometers from Earth to the nearest non-Earth body of liquid water known to exist that:\n\n1. Is at least 1000 square meters in area.\n2. Is on its host body's surface, with solid below it and only gas between it and the vacuum of space.\n3. Consists of at least 50% water. (For comparison, the saltiest known pond on Earth is 57% water.)\n4. Exists continuously as liquid for the host body's orbital period around its star, or at least 100 Earth years should the host body not be in orbit around a star.\n5. Was not created or transported by intelligence originating on Earth.\n\nThis question will resolve as the distance from Earth to the nearest such celestial body in km, on January 1, 2100. The nearest object will be determined from all candidates known on January 1, 2100 from scientific evidence available to Metaculus.\n\nIf no such body of water is known to exist as of January 1, 2100, the question will resolve as \\(>10^{18}\\).", "lower_25": "8.52×1013", "median": "2.88×1014", "upper_75": "1.24×1015", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Moscow (stock) Exchange will not reopen its stock and derivative markets to both Russians and foreigners by March 2025?", "desc": "MOEX (Moscow Exchange) is one of the two large Russian stock exchanges. Typically, MOEX used to be open Monday through Friday. On February 24 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, and soon the price of RUR (the Russian currency) plummeted. On February 28, Monday, MOEX didn't open and the Bank of Russia decided not to reopen it on the following days (March 1 through March 9) either (see Bank of Russia's press releases: [1](https://cbr.ru/eng/press/pr/?file=28022022_073700ENG_PP28022022_113149.htm), [2](https://cbr.ru/eng/press/pr/?file=04032022_200704ENG_PP05032022_110620.htm), and [3 (in Russian)](https://www.cbr.ru/press/pr/?file=08032022_190945SUP_MEAS08032022_191120.htm)). Neither stocks nor derivatives could be traded on any of these days, while currencies could be traded on some of the days. On March 4, it was announced that MOEX was suspended from Global Trade Group (see [WSJ](https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-03-04/card/moscow-exchange-kicked-out-of-global-trade-group-KffKbanpsXTjdXNfDvNQ)).\n\nAll of this might be related to Putin's [Executive Order 79](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_410417/#dst100009) and [Executive Order 81](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_410578/) which significantly limit how Russian residents can work with foreign currencies, foreign bank accounts, stocks, and real estate. The decision not to reopen MOEX might also be related to: the Russian Government's plans to protect the Russian economy; the sanctions other countries are imposing on Russia; the countersanctions Russia is imposing on other countries; hackers attacking Russian government websites.", "resc": "This resolves on the day MOEX opens its stock and derivative markets to both Russians and foreigners.", "lower_25": "Oct 2024", "median": "Not ≤ Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Mar 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Moscow (stock) Exchange will not reopen its stock and derivative markets to both Russians and foreigners by March 2025?", "desc": "MOEX (Moscow Exchange) is one of the two large Russian stock exchanges. Typically, MOEX used to be open Monday through Friday. On February 24 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, and soon the price of RUR (the Russian currency) plummeted. On February 28, Monday, MOEX didn't open and the Bank of Russia decided not to reopen it on the following days (March 1 through March 9) either (see Bank of Russia's press releases: [1](https://cbr.ru/eng/press/pr/?file=28022022_073700ENG_PP28022022_113149.htm), [2](https://cbr.ru/eng/press/pr/?file=04032022_200704ENG_PP05032022_110620.htm), and [3 (in Russian)](https://www.cbr.ru/press/pr/?file=08032022_190945SUP_MEAS08032022_191120.htm)). Neither stocks nor derivatives could be traded on any of these days, while currencies could be traded on some of the days. On March 4, it was announced that MOEX was suspended from Global Trade Group (see [WSJ](https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-03-04/card/moscow-exchange-kicked-out-of-global-trade-group-KffKbanpsXTjdXNfDvNQ)).\n\nAll of this might be related to Putin's [Executive Order 79](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_410417/#dst100009) and [Executive Order 81](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_410578/) which significantly limit how Russian residents can work with foreign currencies, foreign bank accounts, stocks, and real estate. The decision not to reopen MOEX might also be related to: the Russian Government's plans to protect the Russian economy; the sanctions other countries are imposing on Russia; the countersanctions Russia is imposing on other countries; hackers attacking Russian government websites.", "resc": "This resolves on the day MOEX opens its stock and derivative markets to both Russians and foreigners.", "lower_25": "Oct 2024", "median": "Not ≤ Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Mar 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a permanent human settlement will stay on the Moon for 1 year by 2035?", "desc": "The first humans landed on the moon with the [Apollo 11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_11) mission on 1969. Between then and 1972, a total of 12 humans have landed on the moon, though as of May 2022, no human has landed on the Moon since.\n\nThere are however current plans for the return of humans to the Moon, e.g. the [Artemis program](https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/artemis_plan-20200921.pdf). Even more ambitiously, there are further plans to establish a permanent presence on the Moon:\n\n- The Artemis project includes a [lunar base camp](https://blogs.nasa.gov/artemis/2020/10/28/lunar-living-nasas-artemis-base-camp-concept/). \n- ESA has proposed the establishment of a permanent [Moon Village](https://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Space_Engineering_Technology/Moon_habitat_blueprint_at_Venice_Biennale) that could encompass a wide array of of lunar activities, like 3D printed habitats, refueling stations, science, resource exploitation, or even tourism. \n- Joseph Silk suggested to build a [crewed radiotelescope installation](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-017-08941-8) on the far side of the Moon.\n- The [International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) concept](http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6812150/content.html) currently being developed in cooperation between Roscosmos and the China National Space Administration, aims to establish a long-term human presence at the lunar South Pole between 2036-2045,\n- SpaceX plans to use its Starship spacecraft as a building block for [landing on the moon and maintaining a human presence there](https://www.spacex.com/human-spaceflight/moon/index.html)", "resc": "The question will resolve on the date when there has been at least 1 living human on the surface of Earth's Moon for 365 consecutive days. This does not require for the same person to remain on the Moon for this period, only that there is one or more people continuously on the Moon for the entire time. The resolution date will be at the end of this 365-day period.", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2041", "upper_75": "2047", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a permanent human settlement will stay on the Moon for 1 year by 2035?", "desc": "The first humans landed on the moon with the [Apollo 11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_11) mission on 1969. Between then and 1972, a total of 12 humans have landed on the moon, though as of May 2022, no human has landed on the Moon since.\n\nThere are however current plans for the return of humans to the Moon, e.g. the [Artemis program](https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/artemis_plan-20200921.pdf). Even more ambitiously, there are further plans to establish a permanent presence on the Moon:\n\n- The Artemis project includes a [lunar base camp](https://blogs.nasa.gov/artemis/2020/10/28/lunar-living-nasas-artemis-base-camp-concept/). \n- ESA has proposed the establishment of a permanent [Moon Village](https://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Space_Engineering_Technology/Moon_habitat_blueprint_at_Venice_Biennale) that could encompass a wide array of of lunar activities, like 3D printed habitats, refueling stations, science, resource exploitation, or even tourism. \n- Joseph Silk suggested to build a [crewed radiotelescope installation](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-017-08941-8) on the far side of the Moon.\n- The [International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) concept](http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6812150/content.html) currently being developed in cooperation between Roscosmos and the China National Space Administration, aims to establish a long-term human presence at the lunar South Pole between 2036-2045,\n- SpaceX plans to use its Starship spacecraft as a building block for [landing on the moon and maintaining a human presence there](https://www.spacex.com/human-spaceflight/moon/index.html)", "resc": "The question will resolve on the date when there has been at least 1 living human on the surface of Earth's Moon for 365 consecutive days. This does not require for the same person to remain on the Moon for this period, only that there is one or more people continuously on the Moon for the entire time. The resolution date will be at the end of this 365-day period.", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2041", "upper_75": "2047", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a free flying commercial space station will become operational by Apr 2033?", "desc": "Space stations have offered [platforms for science](https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/research/overview.html) that can only be performed in microgravity, such as studying human physiology and psychology in space. International Space Station operations have been [extended through 2030](https://blogs.nasa.gov/spacestation/2021/12/31/biden-harris-administration-extends-space-station-operations-through-2030/), and China's almost completed Tiangong space station is planned to [remain operational for at least a decade](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-02018-3). \n\nIn line with the current intense activity in commercial human spaceflight, there are a number of planned commercial space stations in Earth orbit that aim to serve as platforms for science, tourism, and research for manufacturing in zero gravity. These include:\n\n- [Starlab](https://nanoracks.com/starlab/) by Nanoracks, Voyager Space, and Lockheed Martin,\n- [Orbital Reef](https://www.orbitalreef.com/) by Blue Origin, \n- [Axiom space station](www.axiomspace.com) by Axiom Space, and\n- a [space station by Northrop Grumman](https://news.northropgrumman.com/news/releases/northrop-grumman-signs-agreement-with-nasa-to-design-space-station-for-low-earth-orbit).\n\nMost of these stations plan on going operational between 2025 to 2030.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a commercial space station is assembled in space (over [100km above sea level](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C3%A1rm%C3%A1n_line)) and a living human crewmember is onboard the station. A space station will be considered \"commercial\" if over 50% of its building and operational costs are paid by private, non-government parties, and if the station is operated primarily by a private organization.", "lower_25": "Jul 2028", "median": "Aug 2030", "upper_75": "Apr 2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a permanent human settlement will stay on the Moon for 1 year by 2035?", "desc": "The first humans landed on the moon with the [Apollo 11](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_11) mission on 1969. Between then and 1972, a total of 12 humans have landed on the moon, though as of May 2022, no human has landed on the Moon since.\n\nThere are however current plans for the return of humans to the Moon, e.g. the [Artemis program](https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/artemis_plan-20200921.pdf). Even more ambitiously, there are further plans to establish a permanent presence on the Moon:\n\n- The Artemis project includes a [lunar base camp](https://blogs.nasa.gov/artemis/2020/10/28/lunar-living-nasas-artemis-base-camp-concept/). \n- ESA has proposed the establishment of a permanent [Moon Village](https://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Space_Engineering_Technology/Moon_habitat_blueprint_at_Venice_Biennale) that could encompass a wide array of of lunar activities, like 3D printed habitats, refueling stations, science, resource exploitation, or even tourism. \n- Joseph Silk suggested to build a [crewed radiotelescope installation](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-017-08941-8) on the far side of the Moon.\n- The [International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) concept](http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6812150/content.html) currently being developed in cooperation between Roscosmos and the China National Space Administration, aims to establish a long-term human presence at the lunar South Pole between 2036-2045,\n- SpaceX plans to use its Starship spacecraft as a building block for [landing on the moon and maintaining a human presence there](https://www.spacex.com/human-spaceflight/moon/index.html)", "resc": "The question will resolve on the date when there has been at least 1 living human on the surface of Earth's Moon for 365 consecutive days. This does not require for the same person to remain on the Moon for this period, only that there is one or more people continuously on the Moon for the entire time. The resolution date will be at the end of this 365-day period.", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2041", "upper_75": "2047", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Moscow (stock) Exchange will not reopen its stock and derivative markets to both Russians and foreigners by March 2025?", "desc": "MOEX (Moscow Exchange) is one of the two large Russian stock exchanges. Typically, MOEX used to be open Monday through Friday. On February 24 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, and soon the price of RUR (the Russian currency) plummeted. On February 28, Monday, MOEX didn't open and the Bank of Russia decided not to reopen it on the following days (March 1 through March 9) either (see Bank of Russia's press releases: [1](https://cbr.ru/eng/press/pr/?file=28022022_073700ENG_PP28022022_113149.htm), [2](https://cbr.ru/eng/press/pr/?file=04032022_200704ENG_PP05032022_110620.htm), and [3 (in Russian)](https://www.cbr.ru/press/pr/?file=08032022_190945SUP_MEAS08032022_191120.htm)). Neither stocks nor derivatives could be traded on any of these days, while currencies could be traded on some of the days. On March 4, it was announced that MOEX was suspended from Global Trade Group (see [WSJ](https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-03-04/card/moscow-exchange-kicked-out-of-global-trade-group-KffKbanpsXTjdXNfDvNQ)).\n\nAll of this might be related to Putin's [Executive Order 79](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_410417/#dst100009) and [Executive Order 81](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_410578/) which significantly limit how Russian residents can work with foreign currencies, foreign bank accounts, stocks, and real estate. The decision not to reopen MOEX might also be related to: the Russian Government's plans to protect the Russian economy; the sanctions other countries are imposing on Russia; the countersanctions Russia is imposing on other countries; hackers attacking Russian government websites.", "resc": "This resolves on the day MOEX opens its stock and derivative markets to both Russians and foreigners.", "lower_25": "Oct 2024", "median": "Not ≤ Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Mar 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that someone in the US will not legally sell their kidney before January 2050?", "desc": "More than 30,000 organ transplants are performed each year in the United States alone, according to 2015 data from the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network. Around the world, the total was estimated to be 135,860 in 2016 according to the Global Observatory on Donation and Transplantation.\n\nHowever, the demand for donor organs often significantly exceeds the supply, meaning that many patients have to wait for a significant period of time before receiving an acceptable donor organ. Many, tragically, die waiting. \n\nThere is significant discussion and debate around permitting the sales of kidneys, sometimes phrased along the lines, 'monetary compensation for kidney donation'. Iran currently is the only country in the world that allows the sale of one's kidney for compensation. Consequently, the country does not have either a waiting list or a shortage of available organs.\n\nIn the US, the 1984 National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e, makes it a federal crime to \"knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.\" State-level prohibitions are based on the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 8A U.L.A. 15, which has been adopted by all 50 states and the District of Columbia with minor variations. The [American Bar Association](https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol30_2003/spring2003/hr_spring03_livingdonors/) writes, \"The original version of UAGA failed to mention commerce in organs explicitly. However, commentators have interpreted it to prohibit the sale of organs.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date that a person in the United States openly sells their kidney in exchange for compensation exceeding $10,000 2023 USD, and a consensus of reliable published sources describes this as a legal, authorized transaction that does not entail penalties or liabilities designed to thwart organ sales.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2050, then this question will resolve as **> January 1, 2050**", "lower_25": "Mar 2048", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2050", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2050", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first tourist will not land on Mars before January 2050?", "desc": "Mars has long been seen as the ultimate goal for human spaceflight. There are [several concepts](https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-44311-9?wt_mc=ThirdParty.SpringerLink.3.EPR653.About_eBook) for a human Mars mission. The [NASA Mars Design Reference Mission concept](https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/373665main_NASA-SP-2009-566.pdf) for example foresees, a number of launches to send cargo, crew, and infrastructure (orbital station, lander, habitat) to Mars orbit. Some of this infrastructure will land on Mars along with the crew for a 500 day mission. The crew would then return to Earth during a 180-day trip. There are also more incremental concepts that would bring humans [first up to Mars orbit](https://hom.planetary.org/faq), or on the [Martian moon Phobos](https://www.space.com/29349-manned-mars-missions-phobos-moon.html#:~:text=An%20incremental%2C%20multiple%2Dmission%20approach,at%20NASA%27s%20Jet%20Propulsion%20Laboratory) by 2033 and then, on a follow-on mission to land on Mars by 2039.\n\nThe ambitions of \"new space\" private companies also extend to Mars, with SpaceX in particular aiming to use its Starship spacecraft as a building block for [landing and maintaining a human presence there](https://www.spacex.com/human-spaceflight/mars/index.html). Indeed, Mars figures strongly in the mind of SpaceX CEO Elon Musk, who has set the settlement of Mars as a guiding goal for SpaceX, and [plans to land people there by 2026](https://observer.com/2020/12/elon-musk-says-spacex-will-land-humans-on-mars-in-a-few-years-if-theyre-lucky/).\n\nRecently, a number of space tourists or even the owners of the companies went on suborbital flights and to Earth orbit, e.g. with [Virgin Galactic](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/07/11/science/virgin-galactic-launch-richard-branson), [Blue Origin](https://www.space.com/jeff-bezos-blue-origin-first-astronaut-launch), and [SpaceX](https://www.businessinsider.com/spacex-inspiration4-first-space-tourists-return-to-earth-2021-9). SpaceX plans to send tourists to go on a trajectory [around the Moon and back](https://dearmoon.earth/) in 2023. It is conceivable that one day, tourists will visit Mars.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date that the first tourist successfully lands on Mars, and lives for at least 24 hours after landing. The tourist must pay for their trip with their own finances, and the trip must be mostly for recreational purposes. Determinations of which travellers to Mars are tourists will be made by the sole discretion of Metaculus Admins.", "lower_25": "Feb 2045", "median": "Nov 2049", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a free flying commercial space station will become operational by Apr 2033?", "desc": "Space stations have offered [platforms for science](https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/research/overview.html) that can only be performed in microgravity, such as studying human physiology and psychology in space. International Space Station operations have been [extended through 2030](https://blogs.nasa.gov/spacestation/2021/12/31/biden-harris-administration-extends-space-station-operations-through-2030/), and China's almost completed Tiangong space station is planned to [remain operational for at least a decade](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-02018-3). \n\nIn line with the current intense activity in commercial human spaceflight, there are a number of planned commercial space stations in Earth orbit that aim to serve as platforms for science, tourism, and research for manufacturing in zero gravity. These include:\n\n- [Starlab](https://nanoracks.com/starlab/) by Nanoracks, Voyager Space, and Lockheed Martin,\n- [Orbital Reef](https://www.orbitalreef.com/) by Blue Origin, \n- [Axiom space station](www.axiomspace.com) by Axiom Space, and\n- a [space station by Northrop Grumman](https://news.northropgrumman.com/news/releases/northrop-grumman-signs-agreement-with-nasa-to-design-space-station-for-low-earth-orbit).\n\nMost of these stations plan on going operational between 2025 to 2030.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a commercial space station is assembled in space (over [100km above sea level](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C3%A1rm%C3%A1n_line)) and a living human crewmember is onboard the station. A space station will be considered \"commercial\" if over 50% of its building and operational costs are paid by private, non-government parties, and if the station is operated primarily by a private organization.", "lower_25": "Jul 2028", "median": "Aug 2030", "upper_75": "Apr 2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a free flying commercial space station will become operational by Apr 2033?", "desc": "Space stations have offered [platforms for science](https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/research/overview.html) that can only be performed in microgravity, such as studying human physiology and psychology in space. International Space Station operations have been [extended through 2030](https://blogs.nasa.gov/spacestation/2021/12/31/biden-harris-administration-extends-space-station-operations-through-2030/), and China's almost completed Tiangong space station is planned to [remain operational for at least a decade](https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-02018-3). \n\nIn line with the current intense activity in commercial human spaceflight, there are a number of planned commercial space stations in Earth orbit that aim to serve as platforms for science, tourism, and research for manufacturing in zero gravity. These include:\n\n- [Starlab](https://nanoracks.com/starlab/) by Nanoracks, Voyager Space, and Lockheed Martin,\n- [Orbital Reef](https://www.orbitalreef.com/) by Blue Origin, \n- [Axiom space station](www.axiomspace.com) by Axiom Space, and\n- a [space station by Northrop Grumman](https://news.northropgrumman.com/news/releases/northrop-grumman-signs-agreement-with-nasa-to-design-space-station-for-low-earth-orbit).\n\nMost of these stations plan on going operational between 2025 to 2030.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a commercial space station is assembled in space (over [100km above sea level](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C3%A1rm%C3%A1n_line)) and a living human crewmember is onboard the station. A space station will be considered \"commercial\" if over 50% of its building and operational costs are paid by private, non-government parties, and if the station is operated primarily by a private organization.", "lower_25": "Jul 2028", "median": "Aug 2030", "upper_75": "Apr 2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first tourist will not land on Mars before January 2050?", "desc": "Mars has long been seen as the ultimate goal for human spaceflight. There are [several concepts](https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-44311-9?wt_mc=ThirdParty.SpringerLink.3.EPR653.About_eBook) for a human Mars mission. The [NASA Mars Design Reference Mission concept](https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/373665main_NASA-SP-2009-566.pdf) for example foresees, a number of launches to send cargo, crew, and infrastructure (orbital station, lander, habitat) to Mars orbit. Some of this infrastructure will land on Mars along with the crew for a 500 day mission. The crew would then return to Earth during a 180-day trip. There are also more incremental concepts that would bring humans [first up to Mars orbit](https://hom.planetary.org/faq), or on the [Martian moon Phobos](https://www.space.com/29349-manned-mars-missions-phobos-moon.html#:~:text=An%20incremental%2C%20multiple%2Dmission%20approach,at%20NASA%27s%20Jet%20Propulsion%20Laboratory) by 2033 and then, on a follow-on mission to land on Mars by 2039.\n\nThe ambitions of \"new space\" private companies also extend to Mars, with SpaceX in particular aiming to use its Starship spacecraft as a building block for [landing and maintaining a human presence there](https://www.spacex.com/human-spaceflight/mars/index.html). Indeed, Mars figures strongly in the mind of SpaceX CEO Elon Musk, who has set the settlement of Mars as a guiding goal for SpaceX, and [plans to land people there by 2026](https://observer.com/2020/12/elon-musk-says-spacex-will-land-humans-on-mars-in-a-few-years-if-theyre-lucky/).\n\nRecently, a number of space tourists or even the owners of the companies went on suborbital flights and to Earth orbit, e.g. with [Virgin Galactic](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/07/11/science/virgin-galactic-launch-richard-branson), [Blue Origin](https://www.space.com/jeff-bezos-blue-origin-first-astronaut-launch), and [SpaceX](https://www.businessinsider.com/spacex-inspiration4-first-space-tourists-return-to-earth-2021-9). SpaceX plans to send tourists to go on a trajectory [around the Moon and back](https://dearmoon.earth/) in 2023. It is conceivable that one day, tourists will visit Mars.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date that the first tourist successfully lands on Mars, and lives for at least 24 hours after landing. The tourist must pay for their trip with their own finances, and the trip must be mostly for recreational purposes. Determinations of which travellers to Mars are tourists will be made by the sole discretion of Metaculus Admins.", "lower_25": "Feb 2045", "median": "Nov 2049", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Russia's fertility rate (in births per woman) will be 1.54 in 2027?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will China's total fertility rate be in 2031?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8959/chinese-fertility-in-2031/)\n* [What will be Hungary's children per woman in the year 2031?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7821/hungary-fertility-in-2031/)\n* [What will Hungary's total fertility rate be in 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6800/hungarys-total-fertility-rate-be-in-2023/) [closed]\n* [What will South Korea's fertility be in 2032?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9530/south-koreas-fertility-in-2032/)\n\n----\n\n[Some](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/labs/pmc/articles/PMC2781832/) researchers have observed that low fertility groups or nations rarely engage in large scale warfare or experience civil war. [The Russian-Ukraine of 2022-current war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine) presents as exception to this rule. Due to the loss of human life from this conflict, one might conceive of Russian leaders trying to aggressively boost fertility in the coming years. On the other hand, [other researchers have found](https://www.prb.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/policy-brief-toll-of-conflict-on-childbearing.pdf) that wars usually have a short term negative effect on fertility rates. [Russia's fertility rate for 2019 was 1.50 down from 1.78 in 2015, but up from the all time low of 1.16 in 1999](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=RU).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of births per woman in the Russian Federation, according to [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=RU) for the year 2027.", "lower_25": "1.17", "median": "1.35", "upper_75": "1.54", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) will achieve a 23.0% CO2 emission reduction by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "Global shipping accounted for over [1,000 million-tonnes of CO2 for 2018](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/Fourth-IMO-Greenhouse-Gas-Study-2020.aspx), which accounted for over 2.5% of worldwide CO2 emissions for that same year. In order to reduce these emissions and combat the growing climate crisis, the [_International Maritime Organization_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Maritime_Organization) (IMO) has set out an ambitious _Greenhouse Gas_ (GHG) emissions reduction strategy (for a general overview see [this article](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/us-poised-to-urge-international-maritime-organization-to-dramatically-accelerate)). The reduction strategy falls under the purview of the [Marine Environmental Protection Committee](https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/Pages/MEPC-default.aspx) (MEPC), one of the five main technical committees of the IMO.\n\nThe reduction strategy is detailed in [_MEPC 72/17/Add. 1, Annex 11_](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Environment/Documents/Resolution%20MEPC.304(72)_E.pdf), and includes the following key goals (page 5):\n\n> to reduce CO2 emissions per transport work, as an average across international shipping , by at least 40% by 2030...compared to 2008...\n\n>...\n\n>to peak GHG emissions from international shipping as soon as possible and\nto reduce the total annual GHG emissions by at least 50% by 2050 compared\nto 2008 whilst pursuing efforts towards phasing them out...\n\nTo achieve these goals the IMO has worked to amend a previously implemented international maritime pollution treaty, [MARPOL 73/78](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MARPOL_73/78). Several GHG-related amendments to _[MARPOL Annex VI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MARPOL_73/78#Annex_VI)_ were [adopted in 2021](https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/pages/MEPC76.aspx). The amendments intend to decrease the carbon intensity of ships via the _Energy Efficiency Design Index_ (EEDI) for new vessels, and the _Energy Efficiency Existing Ship Index_ (EEXI) for existing vessels. As well as operational measures to reduce the carbon intensity in the form of _Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan_ (SEEMP).\n\nFor existing vessels exceeding certain tonnage requirements, compliance will require an evaluation from the vessel operators. This evaluation will come from the EEXI which determines whether the vessel will be prohibited or not. Older vessels may need to be scrapped, whereas newer vessels can be retrofitted with tried and tested, as well as new and emerging technologies. _Carbon Capture and Storage_ (CCS) is an important technology to look at for this, as well as renewable energy sources. Reductions in service speeds may also be applicable to reduce emissions. For newbuilds and less so, existing vessels, alternative fuels may be considered, such as _Liquid Natural Gas_ (LNG) and hydrogen. Fuel cells, batteries, and hybrid power systems are all highly relevant technologies as well.\n\nAccording to the [_Fourth Greenhouse Gas Study 2020_](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/Fourth-IMO-Greenhouse-Gas-Study-2020.aspx) published by the IMO, total maritime shipping emissions in 2018 were around 90% of 2008 emissions (see footnote).\n\n---\n\nAdditional information:\n\n* [Recent updates from IMO related to greenhouse gas emissions](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/GHG-Emissions.aspx) \n* [A note from the IMO regarding its GHG emissions goals](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/250_IMO%20submission_Talanoa%20Dialogue_April%202018.pdf) submitted as part of the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change [Talanoa Dialogue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talanoa_Dialogue) \n* [Initial IMO GHG reduction strategy - MEPC 72/17/Add. 1, Annex 11](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Environment/Documents/Resolution%20MEPC.304(72)_E.pdf) \n* [Guidelines for the EEDI Method for new ships](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/MEPCDocuments/MEPC.308(73).pdf) \n* [Index of MEPC Resolutions related to MARPOL Annex VI](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/Index-of-MEPC-Resolutions-and-Guidelines-related-to-MARPOL-Annex-VI.aspx)\n\n---\n\n***What % CO2 emission reduction from international maritime shipping will the International Maritime Organization (IMO) report for the year 2030?***\n\nThis will resolve as the percent reduction in CO2 emissions reported by IMO for the year 2030 relative to the baseline 2008 number. The percent reduction will be as reported by the IMO. If a percentage is not explicitly reported by IMO, the most recent estimates of 2008 CO2 equivalent emissions and 2030 CO2 equivalent emissions may be used to calculate the value. If IMO no longer reports emissions data credible alternate sources may be used. Admins may use their discretion to assess whether alternate sources are credible and comparable, or whether CO2 equivalent emissions reported by IMO can be reliably used to compute a percentage reduction. Admins may use their discretion to resolve this question ambiguously if they believe the available data is not sufficient.\n\nIf CO2 equivalent emissions in 2030 exceed those of 2008, this resolves as <0.\n\nData on global maritime emissions for a certain year is typically reported to the IMO in the Summer of the following year. In the Spring of the next year, the Secretariat will then release a report summarizing the data (see MEPC 72/17/Add. 1 Annex 11, page 10).\n\nTherefore,\n\n1) Summer 2031: maritime data reported to IMO for year 2030;\n\n2) Spring 2032: Secretariat releases report with the emission stats for 2030, likely resolving this question.\n\n[fine-print]\nIt's unclear if the estimate for 2018 emissions of 90% of 2008 emissions is for total shipping ([international, domestic, and fishing](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/Fourth-IMO-Greenhouse-Gas-Study-2020.aspx)) or international only. If the distinction between international and total shipping is unclear in the published IMO report used for resolution total shipping may be used to resolve the question. However, the emissions reduction for international shipping only is preferred if available.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "6.67", "median": "14.6", "upper_75": "23.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) will achieve a 23.0% CO2 emission reduction by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "Global shipping accounted for over [1,000 million-tonnes of CO2 for 2018](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/Fourth-IMO-Greenhouse-Gas-Study-2020.aspx), which accounted for over 2.5% of worldwide CO2 emissions for that same year. In order to reduce these emissions and combat the growing climate crisis, the [_International Maritime Organization_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Maritime_Organization) (IMO) has set out an ambitious _Greenhouse Gas_ (GHG) emissions reduction strategy (for a general overview see [this article](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/us-poised-to-urge-international-maritime-organization-to-dramatically-accelerate)). The reduction strategy falls under the purview of the [Marine Environmental Protection Committee](https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/Pages/MEPC-default.aspx) (MEPC), one of the five main technical committees of the IMO.\n\nThe reduction strategy is detailed in [_MEPC 72/17/Add. 1, Annex 11_](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Environment/Documents/Resolution%20MEPC.304(72)_E.pdf), and includes the following key goals (page 5):\n\n> to reduce CO2 emissions per transport work, as an average across international shipping , by at least 40% by 2030...compared to 2008...\n\n>...\n\n>to peak GHG emissions from international shipping as soon as possible and\nto reduce the total annual GHG emissions by at least 50% by 2050 compared\nto 2008 whilst pursuing efforts towards phasing them out...\n\nTo achieve these goals the IMO has worked to amend a previously implemented international maritime pollution treaty, [MARPOL 73/78](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MARPOL_73/78). Several GHG-related amendments to _[MARPOL Annex VI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MARPOL_73/78#Annex_VI)_ were [adopted in 2021](https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/pages/MEPC76.aspx). The amendments intend to decrease the carbon intensity of ships via the _Energy Efficiency Design Index_ (EEDI) for new vessels, and the _Energy Efficiency Existing Ship Index_ (EEXI) for existing vessels. As well as operational measures to reduce the carbon intensity in the form of _Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan_ (SEEMP).\n\nFor existing vessels exceeding certain tonnage requirements, compliance will require an evaluation from the vessel operators. This evaluation will come from the EEXI which determines whether the vessel will be prohibited or not. Older vessels may need to be scrapped, whereas newer vessels can be retrofitted with tried and tested, as well as new and emerging technologies. _Carbon Capture and Storage_ (CCS) is an important technology to look at for this, as well as renewable energy sources. Reductions in service speeds may also be applicable to reduce emissions. For newbuilds and less so, existing vessels, alternative fuels may be considered, such as _Liquid Natural Gas_ (LNG) and hydrogen. Fuel cells, batteries, and hybrid power systems are all highly relevant technologies as well.\n\nAccording to the [_Fourth Greenhouse Gas Study 2020_](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/Fourth-IMO-Greenhouse-Gas-Study-2020.aspx) published by the IMO, total maritime shipping emissions in 2018 were around 90% of 2008 emissions (see footnote).\n\n---\n\nAdditional information:\n\n* [Recent updates from IMO related to greenhouse gas emissions](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/GHG-Emissions.aspx) \n* [A note from the IMO regarding its GHG emissions goals](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/250_IMO%20submission_Talanoa%20Dialogue_April%202018.pdf) submitted as part of the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change [Talanoa Dialogue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talanoa_Dialogue) \n* [Initial IMO GHG reduction strategy - MEPC 72/17/Add. 1, Annex 11](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Environment/Documents/Resolution%20MEPC.304(72)_E.pdf) \n* [Guidelines for the EEDI Method for new ships](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/MEPCDocuments/MEPC.308(73).pdf) \n* [Index of MEPC Resolutions related to MARPOL Annex VI](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/Index-of-MEPC-Resolutions-and-Guidelines-related-to-MARPOL-Annex-VI.aspx)\n\n---\n\n***What % CO2 emission reduction from international maritime shipping will the International Maritime Organization (IMO) report for the year 2030?***\n\nThis will resolve as the percent reduction in CO2 emissions reported by IMO for the year 2030 relative to the baseline 2008 number. The percent reduction will be as reported by the IMO. If a percentage is not explicitly reported by IMO, the most recent estimates of 2008 CO2 equivalent emissions and 2030 CO2 equivalent emissions may be used to calculate the value. If IMO no longer reports emissions data credible alternate sources may be used. Admins may use their discretion to assess whether alternate sources are credible and comparable, or whether CO2 equivalent emissions reported by IMO can be reliably used to compute a percentage reduction. Admins may use their discretion to resolve this question ambiguously if they believe the available data is not sufficient.\n\nIf CO2 equivalent emissions in 2030 exceed those of 2008, this resolves as <0.\n\nData on global maritime emissions for a certain year is typically reported to the IMO in the Summer of the following year. In the Spring of the next year, the Secretariat will then release a report summarizing the data (see MEPC 72/17/Add. 1 Annex 11, page 10).\n\nTherefore,\n\n1) Summer 2031: maritime data reported to IMO for year 2030;\n\n2) Spring 2032: Secretariat releases report with the emission stats for 2030, likely resolving this question.\n\n[fine-print]\nIt's unclear if the estimate for 2018 emissions of 90% of 2008 emissions is for total shipping ([international, domestic, and fishing](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/Fourth-IMO-Greenhouse-Gas-Study-2020.aspx)) or international only. If the distinction between international and total shipping is unclear in the published IMO report used for resolution total shipping may be used to resolve the question. However, the emissions reduction for international shipping only is preferred if available.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "6.67", "median": "14.6", "upper_75": "23.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Turkish mission will not make a hard landing on the Moon before January 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will a Turkish mission make a soft landing on the Moon?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10344/turkish-soft-landing-on-moon/)\n\nThe [Turkish Space Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Space_Agency) (TUA in Turkish) was established in 2018 by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.\n\nThe first probe to successfully land on Earth's Moon was the Soviet mission [Luna 2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luna_2). Since then, the list of nations and entities who have made [missions to the Moon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_missions_to_the_Moon) include the USSR, the United States, Japan, the European Space Agency, China, India, Luxembourg, and Israel.\n\nIn 2021, the TUA [announced a goal](https://africanews.space/turkey-to-build-a-rocket-launch-site-in-somalia-to-support-its-usd-1-billion-moon-mission/) of soft landing a rover on the Moon by 2028, and hard landing on the Moon by 2023. Erdoğan [re-committed to the 2023 goal](https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/inspiration-for-new-goals-erdogan-praises-youngsters-in-uae-address-54802) in February 2022.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that a Turkish rocket hard lands itself or a payload on the surface of Earth's Moon. The date and time of the landing (in [UTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coordinated_Universal_Time)) will be the resolution value.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a \"Turkish rocket\" will be any rocket that is at least 50% funded by the Turkish government, but need not be built or operated by TUA (one built and operated by SpaceX, but funded by TUA would qualify). A \"hard landing\" will be defined as any part of the rocket or payload landing on Earth's Moon, even if it is heavily or totally damaged en route or in landing.\n\nIf such a mission never occurs, or occurs after January 1, 2030, this question will resolve as \">Jan 1, 2030\"", "lower_25": "Jan 2029", "median": "Dec 2029", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first tourist will not land on Mars before January 2050?", "desc": "Mars has long been seen as the ultimate goal for human spaceflight. There are [several concepts](https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-44311-9?wt_mc=ThirdParty.SpringerLink.3.EPR653.About_eBook) for a human Mars mission. The [NASA Mars Design Reference Mission concept](https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/373665main_NASA-SP-2009-566.pdf) for example foresees, a number of launches to send cargo, crew, and infrastructure (orbital station, lander, habitat) to Mars orbit. Some of this infrastructure will land on Mars along with the crew for a 500 day mission. The crew would then return to Earth during a 180-day trip. There are also more incremental concepts that would bring humans [first up to Mars orbit](https://hom.planetary.org/faq), or on the [Martian moon Phobos](https://www.space.com/29349-manned-mars-missions-phobos-moon.html#:~:text=An%20incremental%2C%20multiple%2Dmission%20approach,at%20NASA%27s%20Jet%20Propulsion%20Laboratory) by 2033 and then, on a follow-on mission to land on Mars by 2039.\n\nThe ambitions of \"new space\" private companies also extend to Mars, with SpaceX in particular aiming to use its Starship spacecraft as a building block for [landing and maintaining a human presence there](https://www.spacex.com/human-spaceflight/mars/index.html). Indeed, Mars figures strongly in the mind of SpaceX CEO Elon Musk, who has set the settlement of Mars as a guiding goal for SpaceX, and [plans to land people there by 2026](https://observer.com/2020/12/elon-musk-says-spacex-will-land-humans-on-mars-in-a-few-years-if-theyre-lucky/).\n\nRecently, a number of space tourists or even the owners of the companies went on suborbital flights and to Earth orbit, e.g. with [Virgin Galactic](https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/07/11/science/virgin-galactic-launch-richard-branson), [Blue Origin](https://www.space.com/jeff-bezos-blue-origin-first-astronaut-launch), and [SpaceX](https://www.businessinsider.com/spacex-inspiration4-first-space-tourists-return-to-earth-2021-9). SpaceX plans to send tourists to go on a trajectory [around the Moon and back](https://dearmoon.earth/) in 2023. It is conceivable that one day, tourists will visit Mars.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date that the first tourist successfully lands on Mars, and lives for at least 24 hours after landing. The tourist must pay for their trip with their own finances, and the trip must be mostly for recreational purposes. Determinations of which travellers to Mars are tourists will be made by the sole discretion of Metaculus Admins.", "lower_25": "Feb 2045", "median": "Nov 2049", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Turkish mission will make a soft landing on the Moon by Jun 2037?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When Will a Turkish mission make a hard landing on the Moon?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10343/turkish-hard-landing-on-moon/)\n\n----\n\nThe [Turkish Space Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Space_Agency) (TUA in Turkish) was established in 2018 by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.\n\nThe first probe to successfully land on Earth's Moon was the Soviet mission [Luna 2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luna_2). Since then, the list of nations and entities who have made [missions to the Moon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_missions_to_the_Moon) include the USSR, the United States, Japan, the European Space Agency, China, India, Luxembourg, and Israel.\n\nIn 2021, the TUA [announced a goal](https://africanews.space/turkey-to-build-a-rocket-launch-site-in-somalia-to-support-its-usd-1-billion-moon-mission/) of soft landing a rover on the Moon by 2028, and hard landing on the Moon by 2023. Erdoğan [re-committed to the 2023 goal](https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/inspiration-for-new-goals-erdogan-praises-youngsters-in-uae-address-54802) in February 2022.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that a Turkish mission soft lands a payload on the surface of Earth's Moon. The date and time of the landing (in [UTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coordinated_Universal_Time)) will be the resolution value.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a \"Turkish mission\" will be any rocket, rover, and payload which is in total at least 50% funded by the Turkish government, but need not be built or operated by TUA (one built and operated by SpaceX, but funded by TUA would qualify). A \"soft landing\" will be defined as the mission's payload landing on Earth's Moon and retaining at least the ability to communicate with an orbiter or Earth communications site. If, for any reason, the payload's communication's systems are functional for less than 24 hours within the first week of landing, the mission will be considered unsuccessful.\n\nIf such a mission never occurs, or occurs after January 1, 2040, this question will resolve as \">Jan 1, 2040\"", "lower_25": "Jun 2037", "median": "Dec 2039", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2040", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Turkish mission will not make a hard landing on the Moon before January 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will a Turkish mission make a soft landing on the Moon?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10344/turkish-soft-landing-on-moon/)\n\nThe [Turkish Space Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Space_Agency) (TUA in Turkish) was established in 2018 by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.\n\nThe first probe to successfully land on Earth's Moon was the Soviet mission [Luna 2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luna_2). Since then, the list of nations and entities who have made [missions to the Moon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_missions_to_the_Moon) include the USSR, the United States, Japan, the European Space Agency, China, India, Luxembourg, and Israel.\n\nIn 2021, the TUA [announced a goal](https://africanews.space/turkey-to-build-a-rocket-launch-site-in-somalia-to-support-its-usd-1-billion-moon-mission/) of soft landing a rover on the Moon by 2028, and hard landing on the Moon by 2023. Erdoğan [re-committed to the 2023 goal](https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/inspiration-for-new-goals-erdogan-praises-youngsters-in-uae-address-54802) in February 2022.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that a Turkish rocket hard lands itself or a payload on the surface of Earth's Moon. The date and time of the landing (in [UTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coordinated_Universal_Time)) will be the resolution value.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a \"Turkish rocket\" will be any rocket that is at least 50% funded by the Turkish government, but need not be built or operated by TUA (one built and operated by SpaceX, but funded by TUA would qualify). A \"hard landing\" will be defined as any part of the rocket or payload landing on Earth's Moon, even if it is heavily or totally damaged en route or in landing.\n\nIf such a mission never occurs, or occurs after January 1, 2030, this question will resolve as \">Jan 1, 2030\"", "lower_25": "Jan 2029", "median": "Dec 2029", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) will achieve a 23.0% CO2 emission reduction by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "Global shipping accounted for over [1,000 million-tonnes of CO2 for 2018](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/Fourth-IMO-Greenhouse-Gas-Study-2020.aspx), which accounted for over 2.5% of worldwide CO2 emissions for that same year. In order to reduce these emissions and combat the growing climate crisis, the [_International Maritime Organization_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Maritime_Organization) (IMO) has set out an ambitious _Greenhouse Gas_ (GHG) emissions reduction strategy (for a general overview see [this article](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/us-poised-to-urge-international-maritime-organization-to-dramatically-accelerate)). The reduction strategy falls under the purview of the [Marine Environmental Protection Committee](https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/Pages/MEPC-default.aspx) (MEPC), one of the five main technical committees of the IMO.\n\nThe reduction strategy is detailed in [_MEPC 72/17/Add. 1, Annex 11_](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Environment/Documents/Resolution%20MEPC.304(72)_E.pdf), and includes the following key goals (page 5):\n\n> to reduce CO2 emissions per transport work, as an average across international shipping , by at least 40% by 2030...compared to 2008...\n\n>...\n\n>to peak GHG emissions from international shipping as soon as possible and\nto reduce the total annual GHG emissions by at least 50% by 2050 compared\nto 2008 whilst pursuing efforts towards phasing them out...\n\nTo achieve these goals the IMO has worked to amend a previously implemented international maritime pollution treaty, [MARPOL 73/78](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MARPOL_73/78). Several GHG-related amendments to _[MARPOL Annex VI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MARPOL_73/78#Annex_VI)_ were [adopted in 2021](https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/pages/MEPC76.aspx). The amendments intend to decrease the carbon intensity of ships via the _Energy Efficiency Design Index_ (EEDI) for new vessels, and the _Energy Efficiency Existing Ship Index_ (EEXI) for existing vessels. As well as operational measures to reduce the carbon intensity in the form of _Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan_ (SEEMP).\n\nFor existing vessels exceeding certain tonnage requirements, compliance will require an evaluation from the vessel operators. This evaluation will come from the EEXI which determines whether the vessel will be prohibited or not. Older vessels may need to be scrapped, whereas newer vessels can be retrofitted with tried and tested, as well as new and emerging technologies. _Carbon Capture and Storage_ (CCS) is an important technology to look at for this, as well as renewable energy sources. Reductions in service speeds may also be applicable to reduce emissions. For newbuilds and less so, existing vessels, alternative fuels may be considered, such as _Liquid Natural Gas_ (LNG) and hydrogen. Fuel cells, batteries, and hybrid power systems are all highly relevant technologies as well.\n\nAccording to the [_Fourth Greenhouse Gas Study 2020_](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/Fourth-IMO-Greenhouse-Gas-Study-2020.aspx) published by the IMO, total maritime shipping emissions in 2018 were around 90% of 2008 emissions (see footnote).\n\n---\n\nAdditional information:\n\n* [Recent updates from IMO related to greenhouse gas emissions](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/GHG-Emissions.aspx) \n* [A note from the IMO regarding its GHG emissions goals](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/250_IMO%20submission_Talanoa%20Dialogue_April%202018.pdf) submitted as part of the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change [Talanoa Dialogue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talanoa_Dialogue) \n* [Initial IMO GHG reduction strategy - MEPC 72/17/Add. 1, Annex 11](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Environment/Documents/Resolution%20MEPC.304(72)_E.pdf) \n* [Guidelines for the EEDI Method for new ships](https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/MEPCDocuments/MEPC.308(73).pdf) \n* [Index of MEPC Resolutions related to MARPOL Annex VI](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/Index-of-MEPC-Resolutions-and-Guidelines-related-to-MARPOL-Annex-VI.aspx)\n\n---\n\n***What % CO2 emission reduction from international maritime shipping will the International Maritime Organization (IMO) report for the year 2030?***\n\nThis will resolve as the percent reduction in CO2 emissions reported by IMO for the year 2030 relative to the baseline 2008 number. The percent reduction will be as reported by the IMO. If a percentage is not explicitly reported by IMO, the most recent estimates of 2008 CO2 equivalent emissions and 2030 CO2 equivalent emissions may be used to calculate the value. If IMO no longer reports emissions data credible alternate sources may be used. Admins may use their discretion to assess whether alternate sources are credible and comparable, or whether CO2 equivalent emissions reported by IMO can be reliably used to compute a percentage reduction. Admins may use their discretion to resolve this question ambiguously if they believe the available data is not sufficient.\n\nIf CO2 equivalent emissions in 2030 exceed those of 2008, this resolves as <0.\n\nData on global maritime emissions for a certain year is typically reported to the IMO in the Summer of the following year. In the Spring of the next year, the Secretariat will then release a report summarizing the data (see MEPC 72/17/Add. 1 Annex 11, page 10).\n\nTherefore,\n\n1) Summer 2031: maritime data reported to IMO for year 2030;\n\n2) Spring 2032: Secretariat releases report with the emission stats for 2030, likely resolving this question.\n\n[fine-print]\nIt's unclear if the estimate for 2018 emissions of 90% of 2008 emissions is for total shipping ([international, domestic, and fishing](https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/Pages/Fourth-IMO-Greenhouse-Gas-Study-2020.aspx)) or international only. If the distinction between international and total shipping is unclear in the published IMO report used for resolution total shipping may be used to resolve the question. However, the emissions reduction for international shipping only is preferred if available.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "6.67", "median": "14.6", "upper_75": "23.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Turkish mission will not make a hard landing on the Moon before January 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will a Turkish mission make a soft landing on the Moon?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10344/turkish-soft-landing-on-moon/)\n\nThe [Turkish Space Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Space_Agency) (TUA in Turkish) was established in 2018 by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.\n\nThe first probe to successfully land on Earth's Moon was the Soviet mission [Luna 2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luna_2). Since then, the list of nations and entities who have made [missions to the Moon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_missions_to_the_Moon) include the USSR, the United States, Japan, the European Space Agency, China, India, Luxembourg, and Israel.\n\nIn 2021, the TUA [announced a goal](https://africanews.space/turkey-to-build-a-rocket-launch-site-in-somalia-to-support-its-usd-1-billion-moon-mission/) of soft landing a rover on the Moon by 2028, and hard landing on the Moon by 2023. Erdoğan [re-committed to the 2023 goal](https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/inspiration-for-new-goals-erdogan-praises-youngsters-in-uae-address-54802) in February 2022.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that a Turkish rocket hard lands itself or a payload on the surface of Earth's Moon. The date and time of the landing (in [UTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coordinated_Universal_Time)) will be the resolution value.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a \"Turkish rocket\" will be any rocket that is at least 50% funded by the Turkish government, but need not be built or operated by TUA (one built and operated by SpaceX, but funded by TUA would qualify). A \"hard landing\" will be defined as any part of the rocket or payload landing on Earth's Moon, even if it is heavily or totally damaged en route or in landing.\n\nIf such a mission never occurs, or occurs after January 1, 2030, this question will resolve as \">Jan 1, 2030\"", "lower_25": "Jan 2029", "median": "Dec 2029", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Turkish mission will make a soft landing on the Moon by Jun 2037?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When Will a Turkish mission make a hard landing on the Moon?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10343/turkish-hard-landing-on-moon/)\n\n----\n\nThe [Turkish Space Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Space_Agency) (TUA in Turkish) was established in 2018 by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.\n\nThe first probe to successfully land on Earth's Moon was the Soviet mission [Luna 2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luna_2). Since then, the list of nations and entities who have made [missions to the Moon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_missions_to_the_Moon) include the USSR, the United States, Japan, the European Space Agency, China, India, Luxembourg, and Israel.\n\nIn 2021, the TUA [announced a goal](https://africanews.space/turkey-to-build-a-rocket-launch-site-in-somalia-to-support-its-usd-1-billion-moon-mission/) of soft landing a rover on the Moon by 2028, and hard landing on the Moon by 2023. Erdoğan [re-committed to the 2023 goal](https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/inspiration-for-new-goals-erdogan-praises-youngsters-in-uae-address-54802) in February 2022.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that a Turkish mission soft lands a payload on the surface of Earth's Moon. The date and time of the landing (in [UTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coordinated_Universal_Time)) will be the resolution value.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a \"Turkish mission\" will be any rocket, rover, and payload which is in total at least 50% funded by the Turkish government, but need not be built or operated by TUA (one built and operated by SpaceX, but funded by TUA would qualify). A \"soft landing\" will be defined as the mission's payload landing on Earth's Moon and retaining at least the ability to communicate with an orbiter or Earth communications site. If, for any reason, the payload's communication's systems are functional for less than 24 hours within the first week of landing, the mission will be considered unsuccessful.\n\nIf such a mission never occurs, or occurs after January 1, 2040, this question will resolve as \">Jan 1, 2040\"", "lower_25": "Jun 2037", "median": "Dec 2039", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2040", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Russia's fertility rate (in births per woman) will be 1.54 in 2027?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will China's total fertility rate be in 2031?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8959/chinese-fertility-in-2031/)\n* [What will be Hungary's children per woman in the year 2031?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7821/hungary-fertility-in-2031/)\n* [What will Hungary's total fertility rate be in 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6800/hungarys-total-fertility-rate-be-in-2023/) [closed]\n* [What will South Korea's fertility be in 2032?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9530/south-koreas-fertility-in-2032/)\n\n----\n\n[Some](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/labs/pmc/articles/PMC2781832/) researchers have observed that low fertility groups or nations rarely engage in large scale warfare or experience civil war. [The Russian-Ukraine of 2022-current war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine) presents as exception to this rule. Due to the loss of human life from this conflict, one might conceive of Russian leaders trying to aggressively boost fertility in the coming years. On the other hand, [other researchers have found](https://www.prb.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/policy-brief-toll-of-conflict-on-childbearing.pdf) that wars usually have a short term negative effect on fertility rates. [Russia's fertility rate for 2019 was 1.50 down from 1.78 in 2015, but up from the all time low of 1.16 in 1999](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=RU).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of births per woman in the Russian Federation, according to [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=RU) for the year 2027.", "lower_25": "1.17", "median": "1.35", "upper_75": "1.54", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average inflation in Turkey from 2022 to 2024 (inclusive) will be greater than 30%?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Turkey's annual inflation fall to 4% or less before 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10359/turkish-inflation-under-4-by-2025/)\n\n----\n\nTurkey has been in a significant [debt and inflation crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018%E2%80%932022_Turkish_currency_and_debt_crisis) since 2018. This has been partially attributed to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's belief that [lowering interest rates boosts economic growth](https://apnews.com/article/business-middle-east-europe-prices-inflation-d462a5d85364a50f159fa620287b9f21) and reduces inflation, whereas most nation's central banks follow the opposite strategy of raising interest rates to fight inflation. The value of the Turkish Lira against the USD has [fallen by 28%](https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=TRY&to=USD) from November 2021 to February 2022. Turkish Finance Minister Nureddin Nebati [said in March 2022,](https://gulfnews.com/business/banking/turkeys-finance-minister-says-the-rise-in-energy-prices-is-accelerating-inflation-1.86573615) \"What we have seen in recent months is that the exchange rate is stable and moves forward within acceptable limits\".\n\nInflation in Turkey has been above 10% since November 2019, and reached 54% in February 2022. President Erdogan [said in December 2021](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/erdogan-says-he-lowered-inflation-4-before-will-do-it-again-soon-2021-12-19/), \"Sooner or later, just as we lowered inflation all the way to 4% when I came to power, we will lower it again. But, I will not let my citizens, my people, be crushed under interest rates\". Annual Inflation did drop to 4.0% in March 2011, however the average inflation that year was 6.5%. The IMF's [October 2021 World Economic Outlook](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/October/weo-report?c=186,&s=PCPIPCH,&sy=2019&ey=2026&ssm=0&scsm=1&scc=0&ssd=1&ssc=0&sic=0&sort=country&ds=.&br=1) survey expects inflation to remain high, averaging at 13.55% from 2022 to 2024.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the average annual inflation (in percentage points) in Turkey measured from January 2022 to December 2024 (inclusive), according to the [Turkish Statistical Institute](https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Kategori/GetKategori?p=enflasyon-ve-fiyat-106&dil=2) (TurkStat). For comparison, the average annual inflation from 2018 to 2020 (inclusive) is 14.65% according to [TurkStat](https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/DownloadIstatistikselTablo?p=KMExlm5AVU2ln21dc2evQ2SnPKPmGEBqV6H8CcJSjNNBzZZT2CJNzYtIqx1WGQK8).\n\nThis question will resolve according to TurkStat's most recent data on July 1, 2025. If TurkStat's data is incomplete, unavailable, or known to be inaccurate, Metaculus Admins may choose another credible source or resolve as **Ambiguous**, at their discretion", "lower_25": "> 30", "median": "> 30", "upper_75": "> 30", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average inflation in Turkey from 2022 to 2024 (inclusive) will be greater than 30%?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Turkey's annual inflation fall to 4% or less before 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10359/turkish-inflation-under-4-by-2025/)\n\n----\n\nTurkey has been in a significant [debt and inflation crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018%E2%80%932022_Turkish_currency_and_debt_crisis) since 2018. This has been partially attributed to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's belief that [lowering interest rates boosts economic growth](https://apnews.com/article/business-middle-east-europe-prices-inflation-d462a5d85364a50f159fa620287b9f21) and reduces inflation, whereas most nation's central banks follow the opposite strategy of raising interest rates to fight inflation. The value of the Turkish Lira against the USD has [fallen by 28%](https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=TRY&to=USD) from November 2021 to February 2022. Turkish Finance Minister Nureddin Nebati [said in March 2022,](https://gulfnews.com/business/banking/turkeys-finance-minister-says-the-rise-in-energy-prices-is-accelerating-inflation-1.86573615) \"What we have seen in recent months is that the exchange rate is stable and moves forward within acceptable limits\".\n\nInflation in Turkey has been above 10% since November 2019, and reached 54% in February 2022. President Erdogan [said in December 2021](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/erdogan-says-he-lowered-inflation-4-before-will-do-it-again-soon-2021-12-19/), \"Sooner or later, just as we lowered inflation all the way to 4% when I came to power, we will lower it again. But, I will not let my citizens, my people, be crushed under interest rates\". Annual Inflation did drop to 4.0% in March 2011, however the average inflation that year was 6.5%. The IMF's [October 2021 World Economic Outlook](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/October/weo-report?c=186,&s=PCPIPCH,&sy=2019&ey=2026&ssm=0&scsm=1&scc=0&ssd=1&ssc=0&sic=0&sort=country&ds=.&br=1) survey expects inflation to remain high, averaging at 13.55% from 2022 to 2024.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the average annual inflation (in percentage points) in Turkey measured from January 2022 to December 2024 (inclusive), according to the [Turkish Statistical Institute](https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Kategori/GetKategori?p=enflasyon-ve-fiyat-106&dil=2) (TurkStat). For comparison, the average annual inflation from 2018 to 2020 (inclusive) is 14.65% according to [TurkStat](https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/DownloadIstatistikselTablo?p=KMExlm5AVU2ln21dc2evQ2SnPKPmGEBqV6H8CcJSjNNBzZZT2CJNzYtIqx1WGQK8).\n\nThis question will resolve according to TurkStat's most recent data on July 1, 2025. If TurkStat's data is incomplete, unavailable, or known to be inaccurate, Metaculus Admins may choose another credible source or resolve as **Ambiguous**, at their discretion", "lower_25": "> 30", "median": "> 30", "upper_75": "> 30", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Russia's fertility rate (in births per woman) will be 1.54 in 2027?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will China's total fertility rate be in 2031?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8959/chinese-fertility-in-2031/)\n* [What will be Hungary's children per woman in the year 2031?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7821/hungary-fertility-in-2031/)\n* [What will Hungary's total fertility rate be in 2023?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6800/hungarys-total-fertility-rate-be-in-2023/) [closed]\n* [What will South Korea's fertility be in 2032?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9530/south-koreas-fertility-in-2032/)\n\n----\n\n[Some](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/labs/pmc/articles/PMC2781832/) researchers have observed that low fertility groups or nations rarely engage in large scale warfare or experience civil war. [The Russian-Ukraine of 2022-current war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine) presents as exception to this rule. Due to the loss of human life from this conflict, one might conceive of Russian leaders trying to aggressively boost fertility in the coming years. On the other hand, [other researchers have found](https://www.prb.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/policy-brief-toll-of-conflict-on-childbearing.pdf) that wars usually have a short term negative effect on fertility rates. [Russia's fertility rate for 2019 was 1.50 down from 1.78 in 2015, but up from the all time low of 1.16 in 1999](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=RU).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of births per woman in the Russian Federation, according to [the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=RU) for the year 2027.", "lower_25": "1.17", "median": "1.35", "upper_75": "1.54", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Turkish mission will make a soft landing on the Moon by Jun 2037?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When Will a Turkish mission make a hard landing on the Moon?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10343/turkish-hard-landing-on-moon/)\n\n----\n\nThe [Turkish Space Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_Space_Agency) (TUA in Turkish) was established in 2018 by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.\n\nThe first probe to successfully land on Earth's Moon was the Soviet mission [Luna 2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luna_2). Since then, the list of nations and entities who have made [missions to the Moon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_missions_to_the_Moon) include the USSR, the United States, Japan, the European Space Agency, China, India, Luxembourg, and Israel.\n\nIn 2021, the TUA [announced a goal](https://africanews.space/turkey-to-build-a-rocket-launch-site-in-somalia-to-support-its-usd-1-billion-moon-mission/) of soft landing a rover on the Moon by 2028, and hard landing on the Moon by 2023. Erdoğan [re-committed to the 2023 goal](https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/inspiration-for-new-goals-erdogan-praises-youngsters-in-uae-address-54802) in February 2022.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that a Turkish mission soft lands a payload on the surface of Earth's Moon. The date and time of the landing (in [UTC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coordinated_Universal_Time)) will be the resolution value.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, a \"Turkish mission\" will be any rocket, rover, and payload which is in total at least 50% funded by the Turkish government, but need not be built or operated by TUA (one built and operated by SpaceX, but funded by TUA would qualify). A \"soft landing\" will be defined as the mission's payload landing on Earth's Moon and retaining at least the ability to communicate with an orbiter or Earth communications site. If, for any reason, the payload's communication's systems are functional for less than 24 hours within the first week of landing, the mission will be considered unsuccessful.\n\nIf such a mission never occurs, or occurs after January 1, 2040, this question will resolve as \">Jan 1, 2040\"", "lower_25": "Jun 2037", "median": "Dec 2039", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2040", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average inflation in Turkey from 2022 to 2024 (inclusive) will be greater than 30%?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Turkey's annual inflation fall to 4% or less before 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10359/turkish-inflation-under-4-by-2025/)\n\n----\n\nTurkey has been in a significant [debt and inflation crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018%E2%80%932022_Turkish_currency_and_debt_crisis) since 2018. This has been partially attributed to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's belief that [lowering interest rates boosts economic growth](https://apnews.com/article/business-middle-east-europe-prices-inflation-d462a5d85364a50f159fa620287b9f21) and reduces inflation, whereas most nation's central banks follow the opposite strategy of raising interest rates to fight inflation. The value of the Turkish Lira against the USD has [fallen by 28%](https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=TRY&to=USD) from November 2021 to February 2022. Turkish Finance Minister Nureddin Nebati [said in March 2022,](https://gulfnews.com/business/banking/turkeys-finance-minister-says-the-rise-in-energy-prices-is-accelerating-inflation-1.86573615) \"What we have seen in recent months is that the exchange rate is stable and moves forward within acceptable limits\".\n\nInflation in Turkey has been above 10% since November 2019, and reached 54% in February 2022. President Erdogan [said in December 2021](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/erdogan-says-he-lowered-inflation-4-before-will-do-it-again-soon-2021-12-19/), \"Sooner or later, just as we lowered inflation all the way to 4% when I came to power, we will lower it again. But, I will not let my citizens, my people, be crushed under interest rates\". Annual Inflation did drop to 4.0% in March 2011, however the average inflation that year was 6.5%. The IMF's [October 2021 World Economic Outlook](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/October/weo-report?c=186,&s=PCPIPCH,&sy=2019&ey=2026&ssm=0&scsm=1&scc=0&ssd=1&ssc=0&sic=0&sort=country&ds=.&br=1) survey expects inflation to remain high, averaging at 13.55% from 2022 to 2024.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the average annual inflation (in percentage points) in Turkey measured from January 2022 to December 2024 (inclusive), according to the [Turkish Statistical Institute](https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Kategori/GetKategori?p=enflasyon-ve-fiyat-106&dil=2) (TurkStat). For comparison, the average annual inflation from 2018 to 2020 (inclusive) is 14.65% according to [TurkStat](https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/DownloadIstatistikselTablo?p=KMExlm5AVU2ln21dc2evQ2SnPKPmGEBqV6H8CcJSjNNBzZZT2CJNzYtIqx1WGQK8).\n\nThis question will resolve according to TurkStat's most recent data on July 1, 2025. If TurkStat's data is incomplete, unavailable, or known to be inaccurate, Metaculus Admins may choose another credible source or resolve as **Ambiguous**, at their discretion", "lower_25": "> 30", "median": "> 30", "upper_75": "> 30", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.89k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2.89", "median": "68.3", "upper_75": "1.89k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the abc conjecture will be settled by 2036?", "desc": "[The abc conjecture](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abc_conjecture) is a conjecture in number theory which states that for a given \\( \\varepsilon > 0 \\), there are only finitely many positive integer solutions of the equation \\( a + b = c \\) with \\( a, b \\) coprime such that\n\n\\[ c > \\textrm{rad}(abc)^{1 + \\varepsilon} \\]\n\nIn 2012, [Shinichi Mochizuki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shinichi_Mochizuki) claimed a proof of the conjecture, but his proof has failed to achieve widespread recognition among mathematicians as of 2022.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of a publication in a major mathematics journal which has proved or disproved the abc conjecture.\n\nIf the correctness of the proof given in the publication takes time to be recognized by the mathematics community, the question will retroactively resolve to the date of publication of the proof when Metaculus admins judge that the proof has gained sufficient recognition. This means that the question can resolve as \"<2022\" if a proof that has been published in the past is recognized in the future as being correct.\n\nIf these conditions aren't met by January 1, 2100, the question will resolve as \">2100\".", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "2062", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.89k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2.89", "median": "68.3", "upper_75": "1.89k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will win a Nobel prize for the first time by 2059?", "desc": "The Nobel prize can be given in the categories of Physics, Chemistry, Physiology or Medicine, Literature, and Peace. In case the categories change in the future, [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobel_Prize) will decide.", "resc": "I define \"winning a Nobel prize\" as an AI winning any of the Nobel Prizes listed on [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobel_Prize) for its contribution to the field. \n\n* The contribution to the winning project must be as substantial as previous human winners. \n\n* Automating a part of the pipeline, e.g. predicting protein folding or proving a theorem do NOT count as substantial contributions.\n\n* The recipient of the Nobel Prize has to be the AI and not the scientist(s) building & deploying it\n\n* In case the AI wins the literature prize it has to be the sole author. \n\n* In case the AI wins the Peace prize it has to be explicitly stated as the sole recipient. The scientists or organization building & deploying it do not count.\n\n* A collaboration of AIs can be interpreted as one AI for the above criteria, i.e. if multiple AIs are responsible for winning the prize, the question resolves positively.\n\nIn case of ambiguity wrt to the resolution of this question, a 5-person expert panel (e.g. determined by citations or equivalent in respective field) has to unanimously agree that the AI was the biggest contributor to the project and that all above criteria are fulfilled.\n\nProcedure for the experts: You sort the experts in the respective subfield by citation count and start from the top. If an expert doesn't want to comment or doesn't respond within two weeks, you can leave them out. If an expert has already made unambiguous public comments on the topic, their personal comment is not necessary anymore. All experts have to agree that the AI (or AIs) was the biggest contributor to the project. In case of the literature prize, the experts are literature researchers (e.g. professors) and in case of the Peace prize, the experts are political scientists.\n\nHowever, I expect there to be relatively widespread consensus wrt to the resolution of this question such that this expert panel won't be necessary. I could imagine that these experts are quite busy and don't want to spend their time resolving forecasting questions.\n\nIn the case that this question does not resolve by January 1, 2200, this question will resolve as >January 1, 2200", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2059", "upper_75": "2128", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.89k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2.89", "median": "68.3", "upper_75": "1.89k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.01k metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n \n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)). \n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). 700 people have eaten Good Meat's cultured chicken bites, according to the company ([Severson 2022](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/15/dining/cell-cultured-meat.html?referringSource=articleShare)). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). It seems plausible the path of cultured meat production will be as an ingredient in otherwise plant-based meat ([Specht et al 2021](https://gfi.org/cultivated/tea-statement/), [Swartz 2021](https://twitter.com/elliotswartz/status/1442833532670275584), [Ben-Arye 2020](https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-020-0046-5)).\n\nIn November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([AT Kearney 2021](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-), [McKinsey 2020](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2020](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future.\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies.\n\nThe Metaculus community medians for ≥20% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3081/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-20-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2023 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3087/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-20-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2025.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution wiil be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥20% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "12.3", "median": "106", "upper_75": "1.01k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 23.8 metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\nIn the USA, composite wholesale broiler (chicken) is [~$1.50 per kilogram](https://www.nationalchickencouncil.org/about-the-industry/statistics/wholesale-and-retail-prices-for-chicken-beef-and-pork/) (kg) with a monthly weighted average wholesale price over the last five years of [$1.27/kg to $2.88/kg](https://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=chicken&months=60). The global monthly price of poultry for the last five years has ranged between [$1.60/kg and $3.50/kg](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PPOULTUSDM#0). Pasture-raised retail chicken (fresh backs) is as low as [$4.20/kg](https://maplewindfarm.com/store/product/retail-chicken-backs) in the USA. Beef (ground chuck) in the USA is in the [$5/kg](https://www.beefitswhatsfordinner.com/resources/wholesale-price-update)-[$15/kg](https://www.ft.com/content/20ae8314-e1fa-4bcb-b2c0-99e58df6bfb7) range (conventional to grass fed).\n\nIn the US market, the retail average of plant-based meat being sold in the meat aisle, ‘fresh' plant-based meat, was around $22/kg, and for frozen plant-based meats, around $15/kg ([Bollard 2021](https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/lewis-bollard-big-wins-against-factory-farming/)). Cheaper options exist such as Gardein Beefless ground for [~$8.50/kg](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1) retail. Beyond and Impossible are selling their plant-based beef products for [$15](https://www.independent.ie/business/farming/agri-business/agri-food/impossible-foods-cuts-wholesale-prices-for-plant-based-burger-by-15pc-for-second-time-in-one-year-39938975.html)-[$25/kg](https://www.ft.com/content/20ae8314-e1fa-4bcb-b2c0-99e58df6bfb7), but the cost of goods sold for Beyond may be $7.70/kg to $9.90/kg ([Bollard 2021](https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/lewis-bollard-big-wins-against-factory-farming/)). The wholesale selling price of Quorn's mycoprotein (Fusarium Venenatum) products is [~$3/kg wet](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/y8jHKDkhPXApHp2gb/cultured-meat-a-comparison-of-techno-economic-analyses?commentId=BGCvr6axDsu33aeTq).\n\nA techno-economic analysis (TEA) using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030. [Humbird (2020)](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348009195_Scale-Up_Economics_for_Cultured_Meat_Techno-Economic_Analysis_and_Due_Diligence) presents a TEA which argues that a number of very difficult scientific and engineering problems need to be solved to get cultured meat production of 100,000 metric tons to less than $25/kg (the reference point of the more expensive end of plant-based meats), at least with production processes anywhere similar to known processes. A TEA from [Risner, et al. (2020)](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full) suggested in the near term cultured meat could become more like luxury food items; almas beluga caviar (US$10,000/kg), Atlantic bluefin tuna (US$6,500/kg), and foie gras (US$1,232/kg). “Understanding assumptions in TEAs suggest that [cultured meat] can reasonably be produced in the $100-1000/kg range in the short term (i.e. today) & below that in the med-term” ([Swartz 2021](https://twitter.com/elliotswartz/status/1442833521890914311)).\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat sold for <$10/kg wholesale on average.\n\nMcKinsey ([2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan)) argues 75% of costs can be eliminated “through increased scale and best-in-class manufacturing processes”, another 25% through “fine-tuning R&D”- which would bring the total cost down 99.5%, “from the low thousands of dollars to under $5 per pound” (~$11/kg). They also offer market size in US dollars which implies cultured meat products in 2030 will cost on average $12-$13/kg regardless of their low/medium/high growth scenarios. AT Kearney ([2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) model premium cultured meat costing in the range of $40/kg by 2030 but “complex cultured meat structures at market prices of conventional meat” by 2035. BCG ([2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)) predicts cultured meat will achieve price parity by 2032. FAIRR ([2021](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iMd8mHmOpFJdrqvtAKKnh-crxIto9Ab8/view) [2020](https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1EODlfz9vD-VZq0lPRi0YJD0g21ROdgXz)) report forecasts of cultured meat dropping to as low as $10-$18/kg by 2022.\n\nThe Metaculus community medians for \"the lowest retail price, in USD per kg, of any product containing 50% clean meat\" in US or European retail supermarkets are $20 for [2026](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3103/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2026/) and $11 for [2029](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3104/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2029/). ≥80% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3086/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-80-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2026 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3088/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-80-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2034. ≥20% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3081/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-20-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2023 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3087/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-20-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2025. The median is 2027 for when two or more supermarkets in the US sell products made of [≥20% clean fish](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3447/when-will-two-or-more-supermarkets-sell-products-made-of-20-clean-fish-in-their-physical-retail-stores-in-at-least-25-us-states/), containing at least 8 grams of clean fish, for less than $250/kg in their physical retail stores in at least 25 states.\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [~$17 USD](https://twitter.com/joshtetrick/status/1340298046932832256) for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat, at a loss to the producer, Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). The company again sold cultured chicken curry at a loss for ~$3 USD for a promotional event in February 2022 ([Firlany & Lei 2022](https://www.eco-business.com/videos/cell-based-chicken-curry-anyone/), [Soh 2022](https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/environment/cell-cultured-chicken-meat-gets-hawker-treatment-at-curry-rice-stall), [Vegconomist 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/eat-just-good-meat-hawkers/)).\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be via industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.) Evidence of the cultured meat containing a product's listing price and composition should come from credible media reports, online supermarket listings, or from at least three reports sourced from social media and/or submissions by Metaculus users/admin.\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if this refers to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The following sales do not identify the price of the product for the purpose of this question: samples given out for free, sales discounted with one-time discounts or discounts derived from coupons, or programmes such as loyalty schemes or credit card membership, amongst other pricing schemes valid for limited time or only available to a subset of customers. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All $ figures are in 2022 [inflation-adjusted USD](https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/) unless otherwise specified ($ numbers pegged to 2022 USD but not PPP adjusted for location, as we believe is standard) \n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) (Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "< 1", "median": "2.41", "upper_75": "23.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the abc conjecture will be settled by 2036?", "desc": "[The abc conjecture](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abc_conjecture) is a conjecture in number theory which states that for a given \\( \\varepsilon > 0 \\), there are only finitely many positive integer solutions of the equation \\( a + b = c \\) with \\( a, b \\) coprime such that\n\n\\[ c > \\textrm{rad}(abc)^{1 + \\varepsilon} \\]\n\nIn 2012, [Shinichi Mochizuki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shinichi_Mochizuki) claimed a proof of the conjecture, but his proof has failed to achieve widespread recognition among mathematicians as of 2022.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of a publication in a major mathematics journal which has proved or disproved the abc conjecture.\n\nIf the correctness of the proof given in the publication takes time to be recognized by the mathematics community, the question will retroactively resolve to the date of publication of the proof when Metaculus admins judge that the proof has gained sufficient recognition. This means that the question can resolve as \"<2022\" if a proof that has been published in the past is recognized in the future as being correct.\n\nIf these conditions aren't met by January 1, 2100, the question will resolve as \">2100\".", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "2062", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 23.8 metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\nIn the USA, composite wholesale broiler (chicken) is [~$1.50 per kilogram](https://www.nationalchickencouncil.org/about-the-industry/statistics/wholesale-and-retail-prices-for-chicken-beef-and-pork/) (kg) with a monthly weighted average wholesale price over the last five years of [$1.27/kg to $2.88/kg](https://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=chicken&months=60). The global monthly price of poultry for the last five years has ranged between [$1.60/kg and $3.50/kg](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PPOULTUSDM#0). Pasture-raised retail chicken (fresh backs) is as low as [$4.20/kg](https://maplewindfarm.com/store/product/retail-chicken-backs) in the USA. Beef (ground chuck) in the USA is in the [$5/kg](https://www.beefitswhatsfordinner.com/resources/wholesale-price-update)-[$15/kg](https://www.ft.com/content/20ae8314-e1fa-4bcb-b2c0-99e58df6bfb7) range (conventional to grass fed).\n\nIn the US market, the retail average of plant-based meat being sold in the meat aisle, ‘fresh' plant-based meat, was around $22/kg, and for frozen plant-based meats, around $15/kg ([Bollard 2021](https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/lewis-bollard-big-wins-against-factory-farming/)). Cheaper options exist such as Gardein Beefless ground for [~$8.50/kg](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1) retail. Beyond and Impossible are selling their plant-based beef products for [$15](https://www.independent.ie/business/farming/agri-business/agri-food/impossible-foods-cuts-wholesale-prices-for-plant-based-burger-by-15pc-for-second-time-in-one-year-39938975.html)-[$25/kg](https://www.ft.com/content/20ae8314-e1fa-4bcb-b2c0-99e58df6bfb7), but the cost of goods sold for Beyond may be $7.70/kg to $9.90/kg ([Bollard 2021](https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/lewis-bollard-big-wins-against-factory-farming/)). The wholesale selling price of Quorn's mycoprotein (Fusarium Venenatum) products is [~$3/kg wet](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/y8jHKDkhPXApHp2gb/cultured-meat-a-comparison-of-techno-economic-analyses?commentId=BGCvr6axDsu33aeTq).\n\nA techno-economic analysis (TEA) using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030. [Humbird (2020)](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348009195_Scale-Up_Economics_for_Cultured_Meat_Techno-Economic_Analysis_and_Due_Diligence) presents a TEA which argues that a number of very difficult scientific and engineering problems need to be solved to get cultured meat production of 100,000 metric tons to less than $25/kg (the reference point of the more expensive end of plant-based meats), at least with production processes anywhere similar to known processes. A TEA from [Risner, et al. (2020)](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full) suggested in the near term cultured meat could become more like luxury food items; almas beluga caviar (US$10,000/kg), Atlantic bluefin tuna (US$6,500/kg), and foie gras (US$1,232/kg). “Understanding assumptions in TEAs suggest that [cultured meat] can reasonably be produced in the $100-1000/kg range in the short term (i.e. today) & below that in the med-term” ([Swartz 2021](https://twitter.com/elliotswartz/status/1442833521890914311)).\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat sold for <$10/kg wholesale on average.\n\nMcKinsey ([2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan)) argues 75% of costs can be eliminated “through increased scale and best-in-class manufacturing processes”, another 25% through “fine-tuning R&D”- which would bring the total cost down 99.5%, “from the low thousands of dollars to under $5 per pound” (~$11/kg). They also offer market size in US dollars which implies cultured meat products in 2030 will cost on average $12-$13/kg regardless of their low/medium/high growth scenarios. AT Kearney ([2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) model premium cultured meat costing in the range of $40/kg by 2030 but “complex cultured meat structures at market prices of conventional meat” by 2035. BCG ([2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)) predicts cultured meat will achieve price parity by 2032. FAIRR ([2021](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iMd8mHmOpFJdrqvtAKKnh-crxIto9Ab8/view) [2020](https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1EODlfz9vD-VZq0lPRi0YJD0g21ROdgXz)) report forecasts of cultured meat dropping to as low as $10-$18/kg by 2022.\n\nThe Metaculus community medians for \"the lowest retail price, in USD per kg, of any product containing 50% clean meat\" in US or European retail supermarkets are $20 for [2026](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3103/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2026/) and $11 for [2029](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3104/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2029/). ≥80% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3086/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-80-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2026 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3088/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-80-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2034. ≥20% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3081/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-20-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2023 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3087/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-20-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2025. The median is 2027 for when two or more supermarkets in the US sell products made of [≥20% clean fish](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3447/when-will-two-or-more-supermarkets-sell-products-made-of-20-clean-fish-in-their-physical-retail-stores-in-at-least-25-us-states/), containing at least 8 grams of clean fish, for less than $250/kg in their physical retail stores in at least 25 states.\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [~$17 USD](https://twitter.com/joshtetrick/status/1340298046932832256) for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat, at a loss to the producer, Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). The company again sold cultured chicken curry at a loss for ~$3 USD for a promotional event in February 2022 ([Firlany & Lei 2022](https://www.eco-business.com/videos/cell-based-chicken-curry-anyone/), [Soh 2022](https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/environment/cell-cultured-chicken-meat-gets-hawker-treatment-at-curry-rice-stall), [Vegconomist 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/eat-just-good-meat-hawkers/)).\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be via industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.) Evidence of the cultured meat containing a product's listing price and composition should come from credible media reports, online supermarket listings, or from at least three reports sourced from social media and/or submissions by Metaculus users/admin.\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if this refers to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The following sales do not identify the price of the product for the purpose of this question: samples given out for free, sales discounted with one-time discounts or discounts derived from coupons, or programmes such as loyalty schemes or credit card membership, amongst other pricing schemes valid for limited time or only available to a subset of customers. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All $ figures are in 2022 [inflation-adjusted USD](https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/) unless otherwise specified ($ numbers pegged to 2022 USD but not PPP adjusted for location, as we believe is standard) \n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) (Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "< 1", "median": "2.41", "upper_75": "23.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.01k metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n \n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)). \n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). 700 people have eaten Good Meat's cultured chicken bites, according to the company ([Severson 2022](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/15/dining/cell-cultured-meat.html?referringSource=articleShare)). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). It seems plausible the path of cultured meat production will be as an ingredient in otherwise plant-based meat ([Specht et al 2021](https://gfi.org/cultivated/tea-statement/), [Swartz 2021](https://twitter.com/elliotswartz/status/1442833532670275584), [Ben-Arye 2020](https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-020-0046-5)).\n\nIn November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([AT Kearney 2021](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-), [McKinsey 2020](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2020](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future.\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies.\n\nThe Metaculus community medians for ≥20% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3081/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-20-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2023 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3087/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-20-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2025.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution wiil be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥20% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "12.3", "median": "106", "upper_75": "1.01k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next (post-Breyer) US Supreme Court vacancy will arise by Aug 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Oct 2024", "median": "Jul 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will win a Nobel prize for the first time by 2059?", "desc": "The Nobel prize can be given in the categories of Physics, Chemistry, Physiology or Medicine, Literature, and Peace. In case the categories change in the future, [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobel_Prize) will decide.", "resc": "I define \"winning a Nobel prize\" as an AI winning any of the Nobel Prizes listed on [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobel_Prize) for its contribution to the field. \n\n* The contribution to the winning project must be as substantial as previous human winners. \n\n* Automating a part of the pipeline, e.g. predicting protein folding or proving a theorem do NOT count as substantial contributions.\n\n* The recipient of the Nobel Prize has to be the AI and not the scientist(s) building & deploying it\n\n* In case the AI wins the literature prize it has to be the sole author. \n\n* In case the AI wins the Peace prize it has to be explicitly stated as the sole recipient. The scientists or organization building & deploying it do not count.\n\n* A collaboration of AIs can be interpreted as one AI for the above criteria, i.e. if multiple AIs are responsible for winning the prize, the question resolves positively.\n\nIn case of ambiguity wrt to the resolution of this question, a 5-person expert panel (e.g. determined by citations or equivalent in respective field) has to unanimously agree that the AI was the biggest contributor to the project and that all above criteria are fulfilled.\n\nProcedure for the experts: You sort the experts in the respective subfield by citation count and start from the top. If an expert doesn't want to comment or doesn't respond within two weeks, you can leave them out. If an expert has already made unambiguous public comments on the topic, their personal comment is not necessary anymore. All experts have to agree that the AI (or AIs) was the biggest contributor to the project. In case of the literature prize, the experts are literature researchers (e.g. professors) and in case of the Peace prize, the experts are political scientists.\n\nHowever, I expect there to be relatively widespread consensus wrt to the resolution of this question such that this expert panel won't be necessary. I could imagine that these experts are quite busy and don't want to spend their time resolving forecasting questions.\n\nIn the case that this question does not resolve by January 1, 2200, this question will resolve as >January 1, 2200", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2059", "upper_75": "2128", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next (post-Breyer) US Supreme Court vacancy will arise by Aug 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Oct 2024", "median": "Jul 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 23.8 metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\nIn the USA, composite wholesale broiler (chicken) is [~$1.50 per kilogram](https://www.nationalchickencouncil.org/about-the-industry/statistics/wholesale-and-retail-prices-for-chicken-beef-and-pork/) (kg) with a monthly weighted average wholesale price over the last five years of [$1.27/kg to $2.88/kg](https://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=chicken&months=60). The global monthly price of poultry for the last five years has ranged between [$1.60/kg and $3.50/kg](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PPOULTUSDM#0). Pasture-raised retail chicken (fresh backs) is as low as [$4.20/kg](https://maplewindfarm.com/store/product/retail-chicken-backs) in the USA. Beef (ground chuck) in the USA is in the [$5/kg](https://www.beefitswhatsfordinner.com/resources/wholesale-price-update)-[$15/kg](https://www.ft.com/content/20ae8314-e1fa-4bcb-b2c0-99e58df6bfb7) range (conventional to grass fed).\n\nIn the US market, the retail average of plant-based meat being sold in the meat aisle, ‘fresh' plant-based meat, was around $22/kg, and for frozen plant-based meats, around $15/kg ([Bollard 2021](https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/lewis-bollard-big-wins-against-factory-farming/)). Cheaper options exist such as Gardein Beefless ground for [~$8.50/kg](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1) retail. Beyond and Impossible are selling their plant-based beef products for [$15](https://www.independent.ie/business/farming/agri-business/agri-food/impossible-foods-cuts-wholesale-prices-for-plant-based-burger-by-15pc-for-second-time-in-one-year-39938975.html)-[$25/kg](https://www.ft.com/content/20ae8314-e1fa-4bcb-b2c0-99e58df6bfb7), but the cost of goods sold for Beyond may be $7.70/kg to $9.90/kg ([Bollard 2021](https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/lewis-bollard-big-wins-against-factory-farming/)). The wholesale selling price of Quorn's mycoprotein (Fusarium Venenatum) products is [~$3/kg wet](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/y8jHKDkhPXApHp2gb/cultured-meat-a-comparison-of-techno-economic-analyses?commentId=BGCvr6axDsu33aeTq).\n\nA techno-economic analysis (TEA) using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030. [Humbird (2020)](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348009195_Scale-Up_Economics_for_Cultured_Meat_Techno-Economic_Analysis_and_Due_Diligence) presents a TEA which argues that a number of very difficult scientific and engineering problems need to be solved to get cultured meat production of 100,000 metric tons to less than $25/kg (the reference point of the more expensive end of plant-based meats), at least with production processes anywhere similar to known processes. A TEA from [Risner, et al. (2020)](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full) suggested in the near term cultured meat could become more like luxury food items; almas beluga caviar (US$10,000/kg), Atlantic bluefin tuna (US$6,500/kg), and foie gras (US$1,232/kg). “Understanding assumptions in TEAs suggest that [cultured meat] can reasonably be produced in the $100-1000/kg range in the short term (i.e. today) & below that in the med-term” ([Swartz 2021](https://twitter.com/elliotswartz/status/1442833521890914311)).\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat sold for <$10/kg wholesale on average.\n\nMcKinsey ([2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan)) argues 75% of costs can be eliminated “through increased scale and best-in-class manufacturing processes”, another 25% through “fine-tuning R&D”- which would bring the total cost down 99.5%, “from the low thousands of dollars to under $5 per pound” (~$11/kg). They also offer market size in US dollars which implies cultured meat products in 2030 will cost on average $12-$13/kg regardless of their low/medium/high growth scenarios. AT Kearney ([2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) model premium cultured meat costing in the range of $40/kg by 2030 but “complex cultured meat structures at market prices of conventional meat” by 2035. BCG ([2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)) predicts cultured meat will achieve price parity by 2032. FAIRR ([2021](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iMd8mHmOpFJdrqvtAKKnh-crxIto9Ab8/view) [2020](https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1EODlfz9vD-VZq0lPRi0YJD0g21ROdgXz)) report forecasts of cultured meat dropping to as low as $10-$18/kg by 2022.\n\nThe Metaculus community medians for \"the lowest retail price, in USD per kg, of any product containing 50% clean meat\" in US or European retail supermarkets are $20 for [2026](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3103/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2026/) and $11 for [2029](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3104/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2029/). ≥80% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3086/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-80-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2026 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3088/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-80-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2034. ≥20% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3081/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-20-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2023 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3087/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-20-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2025. The median is 2027 for when two or more supermarkets in the US sell products made of [≥20% clean fish](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3447/when-will-two-or-more-supermarkets-sell-products-made-of-20-clean-fish-in-their-physical-retail-stores-in-at-least-25-us-states/), containing at least 8 grams of clean fish, for less than $250/kg in their physical retail stores in at least 25 states.\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [~$17 USD](https://twitter.com/joshtetrick/status/1340298046932832256) for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat, at a loss to the producer, Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). The company again sold cultured chicken curry at a loss for ~$3 USD for a promotional event in February 2022 ([Firlany & Lei 2022](https://www.eco-business.com/videos/cell-based-chicken-curry-anyone/), [Soh 2022](https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/environment/cell-cultured-chicken-meat-gets-hawker-treatment-at-curry-rice-stall), [Vegconomist 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/eat-just-good-meat-hawkers/)).\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be via industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.) Evidence of the cultured meat containing a product's listing price and composition should come from credible media reports, online supermarket listings, or from at least three reports sourced from social media and/or submissions by Metaculus users/admin.\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if this refers to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The following sales do not identify the price of the product for the purpose of this question: samples given out for free, sales discounted with one-time discounts or discounts derived from coupons, or programmes such as loyalty schemes or credit card membership, amongst other pricing schemes valid for limited time or only available to a subset of customers. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All $ figures are in 2022 [inflation-adjusted USD](https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/) unless otherwise specified ($ numbers pegged to 2022 USD but not PPP adjusted for location, as we believe is standard) \n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) (Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "< 1", "median": "2.41", "upper_75": "23.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the abc conjecture will be settled by 2036?", "desc": "[The abc conjecture](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abc_conjecture) is a conjecture in number theory which states that for a given \\( \\varepsilon > 0 \\), there are only finitely many positive integer solutions of the equation \\( a + b = c \\) with \\( a, b \\) coprime such that\n\n\\[ c > \\textrm{rad}(abc)^{1 + \\varepsilon} \\]\n\nIn 2012, [Shinichi Mochizuki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shinichi_Mochizuki) claimed a proof of the conjecture, but his proof has failed to achieve widespread recognition among mathematicians as of 2022.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of a publication in a major mathematics journal which has proved or disproved the abc conjecture.\n\nIf the correctness of the proof given in the publication takes time to be recognized by the mathematics community, the question will retroactively resolve to the date of publication of the proof when Metaculus admins judge that the proof has gained sufficient recognition. This means that the question can resolve as \"<2022\" if a proof that has been published in the past is recognized in the future as being correct.\n\nIf these conditions aren't met by January 1, 2100, the question will resolve as \">2100\".", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "2062", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Brazil will emit 1.22B tonnes of greenhouse gas in CO2e in 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How much greenhouse gases will Brazil emit in 2025, in CO2e?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10450/brazillian-ghg-emissions-in-2025/).\n\n----\n\nIn 2015, Brazil signed [The Paris Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement), an international agreement to limit global warming to 2C by 2100 and to aim for 1.5C of warming or less. As part the Paris negotiations, [Brazil committed](https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Brazil%20First/Brazil%20First%20NDC%20(Updated%20submission).pdf) to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 37% in 2025 and 43% in 2030 (compared to their emissions from 2005). Though Brazil set this target in 2015 and re-affirmed it in 2020, deforestation of the Amazon Rainforest has [increased under the Bolsonaro administration](http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes). Alfredo Sirkis, director of the Brazilian Climate Center, [said in 2019](https://news.mongabay.com/2019/09/bolsonaros-brazil-unlikely-to-achieve-paris-agreement-goals-experts/) that Brazil is unlikely to meet its greenhouse gas reduction targets if Bolsonaro's climate policies remain.\n\nInternationally, about [73% of manmade greenhouse gases](https://ourworldindata.org/emissions-by-sector#energy-electricity-heat-and-transport-73-2) are produced in the energy sector, with 18% produced by agriculture, forestry, and land use. Brazil is an outlier: historically, land use has made up the majority of greenhouse gas emissions since 1990 (in [data by Observatório do Clima](https://plataforma.seeg.eco.br/total_emission#), this category is \"Mudança de Uso da Terra e Florestas\"). Much of these emissions can be linked to the [deforestation of the Amazon Rainforest](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deforestation_of_the_Amazon_rainforest), the largest rainforest on Earth, 60% of which is contained within Brazil. \n\nIn 2018, Brazil's total emissions were the [sixth highest](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/co2?tab=table&facet=none&Gas=All+GHGs+%28CO%E2%82%82eq%29&Accounting=Production-based&Fuel=Total&Count=Per+country) compared to all other countries. In Februrary 2022, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/brazil/2021-09-15/) found Brazil's current policies and targets were \"highly insufficient\", compatible with scenarios of 3 to 4C of warming by 2100.\n\nFor a comparison of different emissions estimates for Brazil, see [here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1MIlIn3S4oqoGkCXbmLuRKNtiKxnnOVrEoWLpkWyE-NY/edit?usp=sharing)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the net greenhouse gas emissions produced by Brazil (including Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry emissions) in 2030 in CO2-equivalents, according to [SEEG](https://plataforma.seeg.eco.br/total_emission#). The data in particular will be SEEG's Emissões Líquidas (net emissions), in CO2e (tonnes), GWP-AR5 (GWP: Gross Warming Potential; AR5: using greenhouse gas equivalent estimations according to the [IPCC's Fifth Assesment Report](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/)). For example, Brazil's 2005 emissions under this measure were 2,687,693,178 tonnes CO2e (2.6 billion tonnes).\n\nIf SEEG or Observatório do Clima do not publish this data by January 1, 2033, or such data is found to be false or inadequate, Metaculus Admins may use alternate credible estimates, an average of such estimates, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion.", "lower_25": "685M", "median": "1.22B", "upper_75": "1.85B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will win a Nobel prize for the first time by 2059?", "desc": "The Nobel prize can be given in the categories of Physics, Chemistry, Physiology or Medicine, Literature, and Peace. In case the categories change in the future, [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobel_Prize) will decide.", "resc": "I define \"winning a Nobel prize\" as an AI winning any of the Nobel Prizes listed on [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobel_Prize) for its contribution to the field. \n\n* The contribution to the winning project must be as substantial as previous human winners. \n\n* Automating a part of the pipeline, e.g. predicting protein folding or proving a theorem do NOT count as substantial contributions.\n\n* The recipient of the Nobel Prize has to be the AI and not the scientist(s) building & deploying it\n\n* In case the AI wins the literature prize it has to be the sole author. \n\n* In case the AI wins the Peace prize it has to be explicitly stated as the sole recipient. The scientists or organization building & deploying it do not count.\n\n* A collaboration of AIs can be interpreted as one AI for the above criteria, i.e. if multiple AIs are responsible for winning the prize, the question resolves positively.\n\nIn case of ambiguity wrt to the resolution of this question, a 5-person expert panel (e.g. determined by citations or equivalent in respective field) has to unanimously agree that the AI was the biggest contributor to the project and that all above criteria are fulfilled.\n\nProcedure for the experts: You sort the experts in the respective subfield by citation count and start from the top. If an expert doesn't want to comment or doesn't respond within two weeks, you can leave them out. If an expert has already made unambiguous public comments on the topic, their personal comment is not necessary anymore. All experts have to agree that the AI (or AIs) was the biggest contributor to the project. In case of the literature prize, the experts are literature researchers (e.g. professors) and in case of the Peace prize, the experts are political scientists.\n\nHowever, I expect there to be relatively widespread consensus wrt to the resolution of this question such that this expert panel won't be necessary. I could imagine that these experts are quite busy and don't want to spend their time resolving forecasting questions.\n\nIn the case that this question does not resolve by January 1, 2200, this question will resolve as >January 1, 2200", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2059", "upper_75": "2128", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.01k metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n \n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)). \n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). 700 people have eaten Good Meat's cultured chicken bites, according to the company ([Severson 2022](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/15/dining/cell-cultured-meat.html?referringSource=articleShare)). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). It seems plausible the path of cultured meat production will be as an ingredient in otherwise plant-based meat ([Specht et al 2021](https://gfi.org/cultivated/tea-statement/), [Swartz 2021](https://twitter.com/elliotswartz/status/1442833532670275584), [Ben-Arye 2020](https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-020-0046-5)).\n\nIn November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([AT Kearney 2021](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-), [McKinsey 2020](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2020](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future.\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies.\n\nThe Metaculus community medians for ≥20% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3081/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-20-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2023 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3087/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-20-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2025.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution wiil be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥20% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "12.3", "median": "106", "upper_75": "1.01k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next (post-Breyer) US Supreme Court vacancy will arise by Aug 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Oct 2024", "median": "Jul 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Brazil will emit 1.22B tonnes of greenhouse gas in CO2e in 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How much greenhouse gases will Brazil emit in 2025, in CO2e?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10450/brazillian-ghg-emissions-in-2025/).\n\n----\n\nIn 2015, Brazil signed [The Paris Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement), an international agreement to limit global warming to 2C by 2100 and to aim for 1.5C of warming or less. As part the Paris negotiations, [Brazil committed](https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Brazil%20First/Brazil%20First%20NDC%20(Updated%20submission).pdf) to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 37% in 2025 and 43% in 2030 (compared to their emissions from 2005). Though Brazil set this target in 2015 and re-affirmed it in 2020, deforestation of the Amazon Rainforest has [increased under the Bolsonaro administration](http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes). Alfredo Sirkis, director of the Brazilian Climate Center, [said in 2019](https://news.mongabay.com/2019/09/bolsonaros-brazil-unlikely-to-achieve-paris-agreement-goals-experts/) that Brazil is unlikely to meet its greenhouse gas reduction targets if Bolsonaro's climate policies remain.\n\nInternationally, about [73% of manmade greenhouse gases](https://ourworldindata.org/emissions-by-sector#energy-electricity-heat-and-transport-73-2) are produced in the energy sector, with 18% produced by agriculture, forestry, and land use. Brazil is an outlier: historically, land use has made up the majority of greenhouse gas emissions since 1990 (in [data by Observatório do Clima](https://plataforma.seeg.eco.br/total_emission#), this category is \"Mudança de Uso da Terra e Florestas\"). Much of these emissions can be linked to the [deforestation of the Amazon Rainforest](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deforestation_of_the_Amazon_rainforest), the largest rainforest on Earth, 60% of which is contained within Brazil. \n\nIn 2018, Brazil's total emissions were the [sixth highest](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/co2?tab=table&facet=none&Gas=All+GHGs+%28CO%E2%82%82eq%29&Accounting=Production-based&Fuel=Total&Count=Per+country) compared to all other countries. In Februrary 2022, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/brazil/2021-09-15/) found Brazil's current policies and targets were \"highly insufficient\", compatible with scenarios of 3 to 4C of warming by 2100.\n\nFor a comparison of different emissions estimates for Brazil, see [here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1MIlIn3S4oqoGkCXbmLuRKNtiKxnnOVrEoWLpkWyE-NY/edit?usp=sharing)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the net greenhouse gas emissions produced by Brazil (including Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry emissions) in 2030 in CO2-equivalents, according to [SEEG](https://plataforma.seeg.eco.br/total_emission#). The data in particular will be SEEG's Emissões Líquidas (net emissions), in CO2e (tonnes), GWP-AR5 (GWP: Gross Warming Potential; AR5: using greenhouse gas equivalent estimations according to the [IPCC's Fifth Assesment Report](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/)). For example, Brazil's 2005 emissions under this measure were 2,687,693,178 tonnes CO2e (2.6 billion tonnes).\n\nIf SEEG or Observatório do Clima do not publish this data by January 1, 2033, or such data is found to be false or inadequate, Metaculus Admins may use alternate credible estimates, an average of such estimates, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion.", "lower_25": "685M", "median": "1.22B", "upper_75": "1.85B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Brazil will emit 1.22B tonnes of greenhouse gas in CO2e in 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How much greenhouse gases will Brazil emit in 2025, in CO2e?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10450/brazillian-ghg-emissions-in-2025/).\n\n----\n\nIn 2015, Brazil signed [The Paris Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement), an international agreement to limit global warming to 2C by 2100 and to aim for 1.5C of warming or less. As part the Paris negotiations, [Brazil committed](https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Brazil%20First/Brazil%20First%20NDC%20(Updated%20submission).pdf) to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 37% in 2025 and 43% in 2030 (compared to their emissions from 2005). Though Brazil set this target in 2015 and re-affirmed it in 2020, deforestation of the Amazon Rainforest has [increased under the Bolsonaro administration](http://www.obt.inpe.br/OBT/assuntos/programas/amazonia/prodes). Alfredo Sirkis, director of the Brazilian Climate Center, [said in 2019](https://news.mongabay.com/2019/09/bolsonaros-brazil-unlikely-to-achieve-paris-agreement-goals-experts/) that Brazil is unlikely to meet its greenhouse gas reduction targets if Bolsonaro's climate policies remain.\n\nInternationally, about [73% of manmade greenhouse gases](https://ourworldindata.org/emissions-by-sector#energy-electricity-heat-and-transport-73-2) are produced in the energy sector, with 18% produced by agriculture, forestry, and land use. Brazil is an outlier: historically, land use has made up the majority of greenhouse gas emissions since 1990 (in [data by Observatório do Clima](https://plataforma.seeg.eco.br/total_emission#), this category is \"Mudança de Uso da Terra e Florestas\"). Much of these emissions can be linked to the [deforestation of the Amazon Rainforest](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deforestation_of_the_Amazon_rainforest), the largest rainforest on Earth, 60% of which is contained within Brazil. \n\nIn 2018, Brazil's total emissions were the [sixth highest](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/co2?tab=table&facet=none&Gas=All+GHGs+%28CO%E2%82%82eq%29&Accounting=Production-based&Fuel=Total&Count=Per+country) compared to all other countries. In Februrary 2022, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/brazil/2021-09-15/) found Brazil's current policies and targets were \"highly insufficient\", compatible with scenarios of 3 to 4C of warming by 2100.\n\nFor a comparison of different emissions estimates for Brazil, see [here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1MIlIn3S4oqoGkCXbmLuRKNtiKxnnOVrEoWLpkWyE-NY/edit?usp=sharing)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the net greenhouse gas emissions produced by Brazil (including Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry emissions) in 2030 in CO2-equivalents, according to [SEEG](https://plataforma.seeg.eco.br/total_emission#). The data in particular will be SEEG's Emissões Líquidas (net emissions), in CO2e (tonnes), GWP-AR5 (GWP: Gross Warming Potential; AR5: using greenhouse gas equivalent estimations according to the [IPCC's Fifth Assesment Report](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/)). For example, Brazil's 2005 emissions under this measure were 2,687,693,178 tonnes CO2e (2.6 billion tonnes).\n\nIf SEEG or Observatório do Clima do not publish this data by January 1, 2033, or such data is found to be false or inadequate, Metaculus Admins may use alternate credible estimates, an average of such estimates, or resolve ambiguously at their discretion.", "lower_25": "685M", "median": "1.22B", "upper_75": "1.85B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will abolish physical, non-interest bearing cash by 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2048", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will abolish physical, non-interest bearing cash by 2049 or later?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2039", "median": "Not ≤ 2049", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will abolish physical, non-interest bearing cash by 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2048", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will abolish physical, non-interest bearing cash by 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2048", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will abolish physical, non-interest bearing cash by 2049 or later?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2039", "median": "Not ≤ 2049", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US policy rate will reach the zero lower bound 2.94 times after 2022?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.43", "median": "2.94", "upper_75": "4.25", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will abolish physical, non-interest bearing cash by 2049 or later?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2039", "median": "Not ≤ 2049", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.89k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2.89", "median": "68.3", "upper_75": "1.89k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US policy rate will reach the zero lower bound 2.94 times after 2022?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.43", "median": "2.94", "upper_75": "4.25", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US policy rate will reach the zero lower bound after 2022, and when will it happen?", "desc": "[It appears quite likely](https://www.wsj.com/articles/powell-says-fed-is-closely-monitoring-trade-fight-escalation-11559656510?mod=hp_lead_pos1) that [developed countries will frequently find themselves with interest rates stuck at the zero lower bound (ZLB) in coming decades](https://twitter.com/sam_a_bell/status/1182001518079295491). Indeed, the Eurozone never truly left the ZLB after the Great Recession, and the United States left in 2015 but returned to the ZLB during the COVID-19 recession. Financial markets forecast, however, that the US will leave the ZLB in 2022 as the Fed is expected to raise its policy rate multiple times. Nonetheless, [it seems highly probable that the US will hit the ZLB in whenever the next economic crisis may be](https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2019/september/zero-lower-bound-risk-according-to-option-prices/).", "resc": "The question resolves on the date (after January 1, 2022) when the target policy rate set by the Federal Reserve is set less than or equal to 0.25%; or by January 1, 2050, whichever comes first. This information is taken from (e.g.) the latest press release on [the Federal Reserve's website](http://www.federalreserve.gov/).", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2031", "prediction": "75% (2031)"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US policy rate will reach the zero lower bound after 2022, and when will it happen?", "desc": "[It appears quite likely](https://www.wsj.com/articles/powell-says-fed-is-closely-monitoring-trade-fight-escalation-11559656510?mod=hp_lead_pos1) that [developed countries will frequently find themselves with interest rates stuck at the zero lower bound (ZLB) in coming decades](https://twitter.com/sam_a_bell/status/1182001518079295491). Indeed, the Eurozone never truly left the ZLB after the Great Recession, and the United States left in 2015 but returned to the ZLB during the COVID-19 recession. Financial markets forecast, however, that the US will leave the ZLB in 2022 as the Fed is expected to raise its policy rate multiple times. Nonetheless, [it seems highly probable that the US will hit the ZLB in whenever the next economic crisis may be](https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2019/september/zero-lower-bound-risk-according-to-option-prices/).", "resc": "The question resolves on the date (after January 1, 2022) when the target policy rate set by the Federal Reserve is set less than or equal to 0.25%; or by January 1, 2050, whichever comes first. This information is taken from (e.g.) the latest press release on [the Federal Reserve's website](http://www.federalreserve.gov/).", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2031", "prediction": "75% (2031)"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 25.1 metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "25.1", "median": "156", "upper_75": "1.14k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.89k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2.89", "median": "68.3", "upper_75": "1.89k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 21.8k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "402", "median": "3.12k", "upper_75": "21.8k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US policy rate will reach the zero lower bound 2.94 times after 2022?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.43", "median": "2.94", "upper_75": "4.25", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.89k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "2.89", "median": "68.3", "upper_75": "1.89k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US policy rate will reach the zero lower bound after 2022, and when will it happen?", "desc": "[It appears quite likely](https://www.wsj.com/articles/powell-says-fed-is-closely-monitoring-trade-fight-escalation-11559656510?mod=hp_lead_pos1) that [developed countries will frequently find themselves with interest rates stuck at the zero lower bound (ZLB) in coming decades](https://twitter.com/sam_a_bell/status/1182001518079295491). Indeed, the Eurozone never truly left the ZLB after the Great Recession, and the United States left in 2015 but returned to the ZLB during the COVID-19 recession. Financial markets forecast, however, that the US will leave the ZLB in 2022 as the Fed is expected to raise its policy rate multiple times. Nonetheless, [it seems highly probable that the US will hit the ZLB in whenever the next economic crisis may be](https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2019/september/zero-lower-bound-risk-according-to-option-prices/).", "resc": "The question resolves on the date (after January 1, 2022) when the target policy rate set by the Federal Reserve is set less than or equal to 0.25%; or by January 1, 2050, whichever comes first. This information is taken from (e.g.) the latest press release on [the Federal Reserve's website](http://www.federalreserve.gov/).", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2031", "prediction": "75% (2031)"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 21.8k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "402", "median": "3.12k", "upper_75": "21.8k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 55.7k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "7.98k", "median": "55.7k", "upper_75": "433k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 25.1 metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "25.1", "median": "156", "upper_75": "1.14k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 21.8k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "402", "median": "3.12k", "upper_75": "21.8k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 55.7k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "7.98k", "median": "55.7k", "upper_75": "433k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 55.7k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ���51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "7.98k", "median": "55.7k", "upper_75": "433k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 76.9k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "76.9k", "median": "679k", "upper_75": "7.10M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 25.1 metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "25.1", "median": "156", "upper_75": "1.14k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 76.9k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "76.9k", "median": "679k", "upper_75": "7.10M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 54.7k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "54.7k", "median": "993k", "upper_75": "13.3M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 76.9k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "76.9k", "median": "679k", "upper_75": "7.10M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 54.7k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "54.7k", "median": "993k", "upper_75": "13.3M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 25% of the metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 1", "median": "2.41", "upper_75": "23.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 61.0 metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.55", "median": "10.9", "upper_75": "61.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 54.7k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)).\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). Good Meat produced a couple of hundred kilograms (kg) of cultured meat for sale in Singapore in 2021 ([Baker 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Fassler 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/)).\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies. In November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future. A techno-economic analysis using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "54.7k", "median": "993k", "upper_75": "13.3M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 61.0 metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.55", "median": "10.9", "upper_75": "61.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 25% of the metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 1", "median": "2.41", "upper_75": "23.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 668 metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "24.5", "median": "106", "upper_75": "668", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 25% of the metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 1", "median": "2.41", "upper_75": "23.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 668 metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "24.5", "median": "106", "upper_75": "668", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 48.4 metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "48.4", "median": "1.33k", "upper_75": "11.4k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 61.0 metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.55", "median": "10.9", "upper_75": "61.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 48.4 metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "48.4", "median": "1.33k", "upper_75": "11.4k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 50% of the cultured meat sold from 2020 to 2050 will cost less than $10/kg and weigh at least 8.22 kilograms?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "413", "median": "8.22k", "upper_75": "132k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 693k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\nIn the USA, composite wholesale broiler (chicken) is [~$1.50 per kilogram](https://www.nationalchickencouncil.org/about-the-industry/statistics/wholesale-and-retail-prices-for-chicken-beef-and-pork/) (kg) with a monthly weighted average wholesale price over the last five years of [$1.27/kg to $2.88/kg](https://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=chicken&months=60). The global monthly price of poultry for the last five years has ranged between [$1.60/kg and $3.50/kg](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PPOULTUSDM#0). Pasture-raised retail chicken (fresh backs) is as low as [$4.20/kg](https://maplewindfarm.com/store/product/retail-chicken-backs) in the USA. Beef (ground chuck) in the USA is in the [$5/kg](https://www.beefitswhatsfordinner.com/resources/wholesale-price-update)-[$15/kg](https://www.ft.com/content/20ae8314-e1fa-4bcb-b2c0-99e58df6bfb7) range (conventional to grass fed).\n\nIn the US market, the retail average of plant-based meat being sold in the meat aisle, ‘fresh' plant-based meat, was around $22/kg, and for frozen plant-based meats, around $15/kg ([Bollard 2021](https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/lewis-bollard-big-wins-against-factory-farming/)). Cheaper options exist such as Gardein Beefless ground for [~$8.50/kg](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1) retail. Beyond and Impossible are selling their plant-based beef products for [$15](https://www.independent.ie/business/farming/agri-business/agri-food/impossible-foods-cuts-wholesale-prices-for-plant-based-burger-by-15pc-for-second-time-in-one-year-39938975.html)-[$25/kg](https://www.ft.com/content/20ae8314-e1fa-4bcb-b2c0-99e58df6bfb7), but the cost of goods sold for Beyond may be $7.70/kg to $9.90/kg ([Bollard 2021](https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/lewis-bollard-big-wins-against-factory-farming/)). The wholesale selling price of Quorn's mycoprotein (Fusarium Venenatum) products is [~$3/kg wet](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/y8jHKDkhPXApHp2gb/cultured-meat-a-comparison-of-techno-economic-analyses?commentId=BGCvr6axDsu33aeTq).\n\nA techno-economic analysis (TEA) using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030. [Humbird (2020)](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348009195_Scale-Up_Economics_for_Cultured_Meat_Techno-Economic_Analysis_and_Due_Diligence) presents a TEA which argues that a number of very difficult scientific and engineering problems need to be solved to get cultured meat production of 100,000 metric tons to less than $25/kg (the reference point of the more expensive end of plant-based meats), at least with production processes anywhere similar to known processes. A TEA from [Risner, et al. (2020)](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full) suggested in the near term cultured meat could become more like luxury food items; almas beluga caviar (US$10,000/kg), Atlantic bluefin tuna (US$6,500/kg), and foie gras (US$1,232/kg). “Understanding assumptions in TEAs suggest that [cultured meat] can reasonably be produced in the $100-1000/kg range in the short term (i.e. today) & below that in the med-term” ([Swartz 2021](https://twitter.com/elliotswartz/status/1442833521890914311)).\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat sold for <$10/kg wholesale on average.\n\nMcKinsey ([2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan)) argues 75% of costs can be eliminated “through increased scale and best-in-class manufacturing processes”, another 25% through “fine-tuning R&D”- which would bring the total cost down 99.5%, “from the low thousands of dollars to under $5 per pound” (~$11/kg). They also offer market size in US dollars which implies cultured meat products in 2030 will cost on average $12-$13/kg regardless of their low/medium/high growth scenarios. AT Kearney ([2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) model premium cultured meat costing in the range of $40/kg by 2030 but “complex cultured meat structures at market prices of conventional meat” by 2035. BCG ([2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)) predicts cultured meat will achieve price parity by 2032. FAIRR ([2021](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iMd8mHmOpFJdrqvtAKKnh-crxIto9Ab8/view) [2020](https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1EODlfz9vD-VZq0lPRi0YJD0g21ROdgXz)) report forecasts of cultured meat dropping to as low as $10-$18/kg by 2022.\n\nThe Metaculus community medians for \"the lowest retail price, in USD per kg, of any product containing 50% clean meat\" in US or European retail supermarkets are $20 for [2026](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3103/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2026/) and $11 for [2029](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3104/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2029/). ≥80% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3086/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-80-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2026 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3088/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-80-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2034. ≥20% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3081/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-20-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2023 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3087/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-20-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2025. The median is 2027 for when two or more supermarkets in the US sell products made of [≥20% clean fish](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3447/when-will-two-or-more-supermarkets-sell-products-made-of-20-clean-fish-in-their-physical-retail-stores-in-at-least-25-us-states/), containing at least 8 grams of clean fish, for less than $250/kg in their physical retail stores in at least 25 states.\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [~$17 USD](https://twitter.com/joshtetrick/status/1340298046932832256) for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat, at a loss to the producer, Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). The company again sold cultured chicken curry at a loss for ~$3 USD for a promotional event in February 2022 ([Firlany & Lei 2022](https://www.eco-business.com/videos/cell-based-chicken-curry-anyone/), [Soh 2022](https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/environment/cell-cultured-chicken-meat-gets-hawker-treatment-at-curry-rice-stall), [Vegconomist 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/eat-just-good-meat-hawkers/)).\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be via industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.) Evidence of the cultured meat containing a product's listing price and composition should come from credible media reports, online supermarket listings, or from at least three reports sourced from social media and/or submissions by Metaculus users/admin.\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if this refers to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The following sales do not identify the price of the product for the purpose of this question: samples given out for free, sales discounted with one-time discounts or discounts derived from coupons, or programmes such as loyalty schemes or credit card membership, amongst other pricing schemes valid for limited time or only available to a subset of customers. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All $ figures are in 2022 [inflation-adjusted USD](https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/) unless otherwise specified ($ numbers pegged to 2022 USD but not PPP adjusted for location, as we believe is standard) \n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) (Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "784", "median": "22.8k", "upper_75": "693k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 668 metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "24.5", "median": "106", "upper_75": "668", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 50% of the cultured meat sold from 2020 to 2050 will cost less than $10/kg and weigh at least 8.22 kilograms?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "413", "median": "8.22k", "upper_75": "132k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.01k metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "12.3", "median": "106", "upper_75": "1.01k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 693k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\nIn the USA, composite wholesale broiler (chicken) is [~$1.50 per kilogram](https://www.nationalchickencouncil.org/about-the-industry/statistics/wholesale-and-retail-prices-for-chicken-beef-and-pork/) (kg) with a monthly weighted average wholesale price over the last five years of [$1.27/kg to $2.88/kg](https://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=chicken&months=60). The global monthly price of poultry for the last five years has ranged between [$1.60/kg and $3.50/kg](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PPOULTUSDM#0). Pasture-raised retail chicken (fresh backs) is as low as [$4.20/kg](https://maplewindfarm.com/store/product/retail-chicken-backs) in the USA. Beef (ground chuck) in the USA is in the [$5/kg](https://www.beefitswhatsfordinner.com/resources/wholesale-price-update)-[$15/kg](https://www.ft.com/content/20ae8314-e1fa-4bcb-b2c0-99e58df6bfb7) range (conventional to grass fed).\n\nIn the US market, the retail average of plant-based meat being sold in the meat aisle, ‘fresh' plant-based meat, was around $22/kg, and for frozen plant-based meats, around $15/kg ([Bollard 2021](https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/lewis-bollard-big-wins-against-factory-farming/)). Cheaper options exist such as Gardein Beefless ground for [~$8.50/kg](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1) retail. Beyond and Impossible are selling their plant-based beef products for [$15](https://www.independent.ie/business/farming/agri-business/agri-food/impossible-foods-cuts-wholesale-prices-for-plant-based-burger-by-15pc-for-second-time-in-one-year-39938975.html)-[$25/kg](https://www.ft.com/content/20ae8314-e1fa-4bcb-b2c0-99e58df6bfb7), but the cost of goods sold for Beyond may be $7.70/kg to $9.90/kg ([Bollard 2021](https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/lewis-bollard-big-wins-against-factory-farming/)). The wholesale selling price of Quorn's mycoprotein (Fusarium Venenatum) products is [~$3/kg wet](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/y8jHKDkhPXApHp2gb/cultured-meat-a-comparison-of-techno-economic-analyses?commentId=BGCvr6axDsu33aeTq).\n\nA techno-economic analysis (TEA) using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030. [Humbird (2020)](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348009195_Scale-Up_Economics_for_Cultured_Meat_Techno-Economic_Analysis_and_Due_Diligence) presents a TEA which argues that a number of very difficult scientific and engineering problems need to be solved to get cultured meat production of 100,000 metric tons to less than $25/kg (the reference point of the more expensive end of plant-based meats), at least with production processes anywhere similar to known processes. A TEA from [Risner, et al. (2020)](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full) suggested in the near term cultured meat could become more like luxury food items; almas beluga caviar (US$10,000/kg), Atlantic bluefin tuna (US$6,500/kg), and foie gras (US$1,232/kg). “Understanding assumptions in TEAs suggest that [cultured meat] can reasonably be produced in the $100-1000/kg range in the short term (i.e. today) & below that in the med-term” ([Swartz 2021](https://twitter.com/elliotswartz/status/1442833521890914311)).\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat sold for <$10/kg wholesale on average.\n\nMcKinsey ([2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan)) argues 75% of costs can be eliminated “through increased scale and best-in-class manufacturing processes”, another 25% through “fine-tuning R&D”- which would bring the total cost down 99.5%, “from the low thousands of dollars to under $5 per pound” (~$11/kg). They also offer market size in US dollars which implies cultured meat products in 2030 will cost on average $12-$13/kg regardless of their low/medium/high growth scenarios. AT Kearney ([2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) model premium cultured meat costing in the range of $40/kg by 2030 but “complex cultured meat structures at market prices of conventional meat” by 2035. BCG ([2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)) predicts cultured meat will achieve price parity by 2032. FAIRR ([2021](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iMd8mHmOpFJdrqvtAKKnh-crxIto9Ab8/view) [2020](https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1EODlfz9vD-VZq0lPRi0YJD0g21ROdgXz)) report forecasts of cultured meat dropping to as low as $10-$18/kg by 2022.\n\nThe Metaculus community medians for \"the lowest retail price, in USD per kg, of any product containing 50% clean meat\" in US or European retail supermarkets are $20 for [2026](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3103/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2026/) and $11 for [2029](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3104/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2029/). ≥80% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3086/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-80-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2026 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3088/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-80-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2034. ≥20% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3081/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-20-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2023 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3087/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-20-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2025. The median is 2027 for when two or more supermarkets in the US sell products made of [≥20% clean fish](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3447/when-will-two-or-more-supermarkets-sell-products-made-of-20-clean-fish-in-their-physical-retail-stores-in-at-least-25-us-states/), containing at least 8 grams of clean fish, for less than $250/kg in their physical retail stores in at least 25 states.\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [~$17 USD](https://twitter.com/joshtetrick/status/1340298046932832256) for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat, at a loss to the producer, Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). The company again sold cultured chicken curry at a loss for ~$3 USD for a promotional event in February 2022 ([Firlany & Lei 2022](https://www.eco-business.com/videos/cell-based-chicken-curry-anyone/), [Soh 2022](https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/environment/cell-cultured-chicken-meat-gets-hawker-treatment-at-curry-rice-stall), [Vegconomist 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/eat-just-good-meat-hawkers/)).\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be via industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.) Evidence of the cultured meat containing a product's listing price and composition should come from credible media reports, online supermarket listings, or from at least three reports sourced from social media and/or submissions by Metaculus users/admin.\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if this refers to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The following sales do not identify the price of the product for the purpose of this question: samples given out for free, sales discounted with one-time discounts or discounts derived from coupons, or programmes such as loyalty schemes or credit card membership, amongst other pricing schemes valid for limited time or only available to a subset of customers. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All $ figures are in 2022 [inflation-adjusted USD](https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/) unless otherwise specified ($ numbers pegged to 2022 USD but not PPP adjusted for location, as we believe is standard) \n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) (Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "784", "median": "22.8k", "upper_75": "693k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.01k metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "12.3", "median": "106", "upper_75": "1.01k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 50% of the cultured meat sold from 2020 to 2050 will cost less than $10/kg and weigh at least 8.22 kilograms?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "413", "median": "8.22k", "upper_75": "132k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.01k metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "12.3", "median": "106", "upper_75": "1.01k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 48.4 metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "48.4", "median": "1.33k", "upper_75": "11.4k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.73k metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n \n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)). \n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). 700 people have eaten Good Meat's cultured chicken bites, according to the company ([Severson 2022](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/15/dining/cell-cultured-meat.html?referringSource=articleShare)). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). It seems plausible the path of cultured meat production will be as an ingredient in otherwise plant-based meat ([Specht et al 2021](https://gfi.org/cultivated/tea-statement/), [Swartz 2021](https://twitter.com/elliotswartz/status/1442833532670275584), [Ben-Arye 2020](https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-020-0046-5)).\n\nIn November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([AT Kearney 2021](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-), [McKinsey 2020](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2020](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future.\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies.\n\nThe Metaculus community medians for ≥20% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3081/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-20-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2023 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3087/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-20-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2025.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution wiil be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥20% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "83.2", "median": "1.73k", "upper_75": "60.7k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 56.8k metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n \n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)). \n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). 700 people have eaten Good Meat's cultured chicken bites, according to the company ([Severson 2022](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/15/dining/cell-cultured-meat.html?referringSource=articleShare)). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). It seems plausible the path of cultured meat production will be as an ingredient in otherwise plant-based meat ([Specht et al 2021](https://gfi.org/cultivated/tea-statement/), [Swartz 2021](https://twitter.com/elliotswartz/status/1442833532670275584), [Ben-Arye 2020](https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-020-0046-5)).\n\nIn November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([AT Kearney 2021](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-), [McKinsey 2020](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2020](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future.\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies.\n\nThe Metaculus community medians for ≥20% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3081/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-20-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2023 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3087/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-20-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2025.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution wiil be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥20% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "5.03k", "median": "56.8k", "upper_75": "1.54M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 693k metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n\nIn the USA, composite wholesale broiler (chicken) is [~$1.50 per kilogram](https://www.nationalchickencouncil.org/about-the-industry/statistics/wholesale-and-retail-prices-for-chicken-beef-and-pork/) (kg) with a monthly weighted average wholesale price over the last five years of [$1.27/kg to $2.88/kg](https://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=chicken&months=60). The global monthly price of poultry for the last five years has ranged between [$1.60/kg and $3.50/kg](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PPOULTUSDM#0). Pasture-raised retail chicken (fresh backs) is as low as [$4.20/kg](https://maplewindfarm.com/store/product/retail-chicken-backs) in the USA. Beef (ground chuck) in the USA is in the [$5/kg](https://www.beefitswhatsfordinner.com/resources/wholesale-price-update)-[$15/kg](https://www.ft.com/content/20ae8314-e1fa-4bcb-b2c0-99e58df6bfb7) range (conventional to grass fed).\n\nIn the US market, the retail average of plant-based meat being sold in the meat aisle, ‘fresh' plant-based meat, was around $22/kg, and for frozen plant-based meats, around $15/kg ([Bollard 2021](https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/lewis-bollard-big-wins-against-factory-farming/)). Cheaper options exist such as Gardein Beefless ground for [~$8.50/kg](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1) retail. Beyond and Impossible are selling their plant-based beef products for [$15](https://www.independent.ie/business/farming/agri-business/agri-food/impossible-foods-cuts-wholesale-prices-for-plant-based-burger-by-15pc-for-second-time-in-one-year-39938975.html)-[$25/kg](https://www.ft.com/content/20ae8314-e1fa-4bcb-b2c0-99e58df6bfb7), but the cost of goods sold for Beyond may be $7.70/kg to $9.90/kg ([Bollard 2021](https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/lewis-bollard-big-wins-against-factory-farming/)). The wholesale selling price of Quorn's mycoprotein (Fusarium Venenatum) products is [~$3/kg wet](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/y8jHKDkhPXApHp2gb/cultured-meat-a-comparison-of-techno-economic-analyses?commentId=BGCvr6axDsu33aeTq).\n\nA techno-economic analysis (TEA) using confidential data from cultured meat companies ([Vergeer, et. al 2021](https://cedelft.eu/publications/tea-of-cultivated-meat/)) argued it is feasible to bring cultured meat to sufficiently low cost ($6.43/kg) at industrial scale (10,000 metric tons/year per facility) by 2030. [Humbird (2020)](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348009195_Scale-Up_Economics_for_Cultured_Meat_Techno-Economic_Analysis_and_Due_Diligence) presents a TEA which argues that a number of very difficult scientific and engineering problems need to be solved to get cultured meat production of 100,000 metric tons to less than $25/kg (the reference point of the more expensive end of plant-based meats), at least with production processes anywhere similar to known processes. A TEA from [Risner, et al. (2020)](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full) suggested in the near term cultured meat could become more like luxury food items; almas beluga caviar (US$10,000/kg), Atlantic bluefin tuna (US$6,500/kg), and foie gras (US$1,232/kg). “Understanding assumptions in TEAs suggest that [cultured meat] can reasonably be produced in the $100-1000/kg range in the short term (i.e. today) & below that in the med-term” ([Swartz 2021](https://twitter.com/elliotswartz/status/1442833521890914311)).\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat sold for <$10/kg wholesale on average.\n\nMcKinsey ([2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan)) argues 75% of costs can be eliminated “through increased scale and best-in-class manufacturing processes”, another 25% through “fine-tuning R&D”- which would bring the total cost down 99.5%, “from the low thousands of dollars to under $5 per pound” (~$11/kg). They also offer market size in US dollars which implies cultured meat products in 2030 will cost on average $12-$13/kg regardless of their low/medium/high growth scenarios. AT Kearney ([2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) model premium cultured meat costing in the range of $40/kg by 2030 but “complex cultured meat structures at market prices of conventional meat” by 2035. BCG ([2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)) predicts cultured meat will achieve price parity by 2032. FAIRR ([2021](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iMd8mHmOpFJdrqvtAKKnh-crxIto9Ab8/view) [2020](https://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/1EODlfz9vD-VZq0lPRi0YJD0g21ROdgXz)) report forecasts of cultured meat dropping to as low as $10-$18/kg by 2022.\n\nThe Metaculus community medians for \"the lowest retail price, in USD per kg, of any product containing 50% clean meat\" in US or European retail supermarkets are $20 for [2026](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3103/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2026/) and $11 for [2029](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3104/what-will-the-lowest-retail-price-in-usd-per-kg-of-any-product-containing-50-clean-meat-be-in-the-calendar-year-2029/). ≥80% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3086/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-80-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2026 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3088/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-80-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2034. ≥20% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3081/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-20-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2023 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3087/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-20-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2025. The median is 2027 for when two or more supermarkets in the US sell products made of [≥20% clean fish](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3447/when-will-two-or-more-supermarkets-sell-products-made-of-20-clean-fish-in-their-physical-retail-stores-in-at-least-25-us-states/), containing at least 8 grams of clean fish, for less than $250/kg in their physical retail stores in at least 25 states.\n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [~$17 USD](https://twitter.com/joshtetrick/status/1340298046932832256) for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat, at a loss to the producer, Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). The company again sold cultured chicken curry at a loss for ~$3 USD for a promotional event in February 2022 ([Firlany & Lei 2022](https://www.eco-business.com/videos/cell-based-chicken-curry-anyone/), [Soh 2022](https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/environment/cell-cultured-chicken-meat-gets-hawker-treatment-at-curry-rice-stall), [Vegconomist 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/eat-just-good-meat-hawkers/)).\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥51% cultured meat costing <$10/kg will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution will be via industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.) Evidence of the cultured meat containing a product's listing price and composition should come from credible media reports, online supermarket listings, or from at least three reports sourced from social media and/or submissions by Metaculus users/admin.\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥51% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if this refers to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The following sales do not identify the price of the product for the purpose of this question: samples given out for free, sales discounted with one-time discounts or discounts derived from coupons, or programmes such as loyalty schemes or credit card membership, amongst other pricing schemes valid for limited time or only available to a subset of customers. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All $ figures are in 2022 [inflation-adjusted USD](https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/) unless otherwise specified ($ numbers pegged to 2022 USD but not PPP adjusted for location, as we believe is standard) \n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) (Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "784", "median": "22.8k", "upper_75": "693k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.73k metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n \n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)). \n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). 700 people have eaten Good Meat's cultured chicken bites, according to the company ([Severson 2022](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/15/dining/cell-cultured-meat.html?referringSource=articleShare)). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). It seems plausible the path of cultured meat production will be as an ingredient in otherwise plant-based meat ([Specht et al 2021](https://gfi.org/cultivated/tea-statement/), [Swartz 2021](https://twitter.com/elliotswartz/status/1442833532670275584), [Ben-Arye 2020](https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-020-0046-5)).\n\nIn November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([AT Kearney 2021](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-), [McKinsey 2020](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2020](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future.\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies.\n\nThe Metaculus community medians for ≥20% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3081/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-20-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2023 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3087/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-20-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2025.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution wiil be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥20% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "83.2", "median": "1.73k", "upper_75": "60.7k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 56.8k metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n \n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)). \n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). 700 people have eaten Good Meat's cultured chicken bites, according to the company ([Severson 2022](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/15/dining/cell-cultured-meat.html?referringSource=articleShare)). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). It seems plausible the path of cultured meat production will be as an ingredient in otherwise plant-based meat ([Specht et al 2021](https://gfi.org/cultivated/tea-statement/), [Swartz 2021](https://twitter.com/elliotswartz/status/1442833532670275584), [Ben-Arye 2020](https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-020-0046-5)).\n\nIn November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([AT Kearney 2021](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-), [McKinsey 2020](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2020](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future.\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies.\n\nThe Metaculus community medians for ≥20% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3081/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-20-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2023 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3087/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-20-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2025.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution wiil be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥20% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "5.03k", "median": "56.8k", "upper_75": "1.54M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that > 50M metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "705k", "median": "7.99M", "upper_75": "> 50M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.97M metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "138k", "median": "1.97M", "upper_75": "27.5M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.97M metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "138k", "median": "1.97M", "upper_75": "27.5M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.97M metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "138k", "median": "1.97M", "upper_75": "27.5M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that > 50M metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "705k", "median": "7.99M", "upper_75": "> 50M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that more than 50 million metric tons of cultured meat with at least 20% protein content will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.68M", "median": "37.3M", "upper_75": "> 50M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that > 50M metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "705k", "median": "7.99M", "upper_75": "> 50M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 56.8k metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n \n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)). \n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). 700 people have eaten Good Meat's cultured chicken bites, according to the company ([Severson 2022](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/15/dining/cell-cultured-meat.html?referringSource=articleShare)). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). It seems plausible the path of cultured meat production will be as an ingredient in otherwise plant-based meat ([Specht et al 2021](https://gfi.org/cultivated/tea-statement/), [Swartz 2021](https://twitter.com/elliotswartz/status/1442833532670275584), [Ben-Arye 2020](https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-020-0046-5)).\n\nIn November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([AT Kearney 2021](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-), [McKinsey 2020](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2020](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future.\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies.\n\nThe Metaculus community medians for ≥20% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3081/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-20-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2023 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3087/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-20-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2025.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution wiil be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥20% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "5.03k", "median": "56.8k", "upper_75": "1.54M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that more than 50 million metric tons of cultured meat with at least 20% protein content will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.68M", "median": "37.3M", "upper_75": "> 50M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a human cure for herpes simplex for oral region will be available for purchase by 2045?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "2045", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that more than 50 million metric tons of cultured meat with at least 20% protein content will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.68M", "median": "37.3M", "upper_75": "> 50M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a nation state will achieve Basic Post Scarcity Economy by 2164?", "desc": "Let's define a Basic Post Scarcity Economy as an economic system in which all the basic necessities are provided for free, without requiring any kind of labour in exchange. In this economy working it's entirely optional during the entire lifetime. It is expected that such a lifestyle can be enabled by a widespread automation of the current productive activities. The adjective \"basic\" is added to discriminate this economy from the related post-scarcity economy in which also luxury goods are widely available.\n\nAdditional readings:\n[A curated list of Post-Scarcity resources](https://github.com/lorepieri8/awesome-post-scarcity)", "resc": "For the sake of this forecast, these will be the requirements for a Basic Post Scarcity Economy:\n\n-The following basic services and goods should be provided for free to any citizen: Healthcare, Education, Housing, Food, Clothing, Transportation, Internet and Telecommunication, Utilities, Basic household appliances and furniture (e.g. bed, fridge, etc.), basic personal computing (e.g a phone and a computer). \n\n-Such services are available for free for an unlimited time period.\n\n-Such services should be abundant (e.g. a citizen can require an arbitrary amount of surgeries, a heterogeneous diet, transportation replacements in case of broken components, etc.), but they don't need to be unlimited. For instance requests for free housing in specific places or oversized requirements for food supplies may be refused as they are not considered basic. \n\n-The citizens should not be asked to perform any specific labour activity and should be free to decide how to spend their time, have free speech and be free to follow specific religions and ideologies. Minor duties (such as registering IDs, attending some meetings, education requirements, participation in voting) can be still present. Moreover citizens are still required to follow laws and safety regulations.\n\n-Such freedom should be granted to at least 99% of the citizens at any given time. That is a small part of the population can be still required to perform some work activities. If such working population is required, it should not be forced to work for more than 5 years in a lifetime.\n\n-Non basic services and goods should still be available for purchase by any citizen.\n\nThe question resolves when a nation state with population greater than 500.000 approves a bill which (combined with previous laws) fulfils the requirements of a Basic Post Scarcity Economy. It resolves ambiguously if such economy is not reached by 2200.", "lower_25": "2072", "median": "2096", "upper_75": "2164", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total value of the green hydrogen/ammonia market in 2050 will be 0.848 trillion 2021 USD?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.848", "median": "1.10", "upper_75": "2.41", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.73k metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold from 2020 to 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "_Note: For brevity, I use M for a million (10^6) and B for a billion (10^9)._\n \n~545M metric tons of conventional [meat](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/global-meat-production-by-livestock-type), including [seafood](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/capture-and-aquaculture-production), is produced each year (according to OurWorldinData), mostly via the industrial farming of animals.\n\nUS plant-based meat production in 2020 was between 90,000 and 180,000 metric tons (the former according to [Shapiro 2020](https://paulshapiro.medium.com/just-how-much-meat-is-plant-based-a80478faa95f#:~:text=Best%20estimates%20of%20U.S.%20plant,U.S.%20meat%20production%20by%20volume.%E2%80%9D) and this [paywalled page](https://www.meatingplace.com/Industry/AnalogueDish/Details/92534) from Meatingplace cited in this [newsletter](https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=66df320da8400b581cbc1b539&id=cea38367f1), the latter according to [data](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1urMIldbGwXp-Anpaj-3-TMkNbnj5aW6BjsPgSc21ZM0/edit?usp=sharing) obtained from FoodTrending.com). 13M metric tons of alternative protein (meat, seafood, milk, eggs, and dairy, excluding pulses, tofu, and tempeh) were consumed globally in 2020 ([BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)). \n\nThe first sale of cultured meat occurred in a restaurant in Singapore in December 2020 for [two chicken “bites”](https://www.straitstimes.com/life/food/eat-justs-good-meat-cultured-chicken-to-be-rolled-out-at-private-club-1880-how-does-it) made of [~70%](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41587-021-00855-1) cultured meat produced by Good Meat ([Scipioni 2020](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/singapore-restaurant-first-ever-to-serve-eat-just-lab-grown-chicken.html)). 700 people have eaten Good Meat's cultured chicken bites, according to the company ([Severson 2022](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/15/dining/cell-cultured-meat.html?referringSource=articleShare)). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). It seems plausible the path of cultured meat production will be as an ingredient in otherwise plant-based meat ([Specht et al 2021](https://gfi.org/cultivated/tea-statement/), [Swartz 2021](https://twitter.com/elliotswartz/status/1442833532670275584), [Ben-Arye 2020](https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-020-0046-5)).\n\nIn November 2021, GFI ([2021](https://gfi.org/blog/rational-optimism-for-cultivated-meat/)) wrote, “the industry is currently producing cultivated meat at scales better measured in kilograms than tons.” David Humbird, who wrote a techno-economic analysis (TEA) of scaling up cultured meat, believed cultured meat production was in the 1–10 kg/year range ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438) page 9).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([AT Kearney 2021](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-), [McKinsey 2020](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2020](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nMany cultured meat companies are claiming they will be able to produce tens or thousands of metric tons of cultured meat per year within this decade. The largest production volume planned appears to be BlueNalu's plan ([2019](https://www.bluenalu.com/pr-82219)) to be able to produce 8,000 metric tons per year by 2029. (See other claims and plans from [MicroMeat 2022](https://vegconomist.com/cultivated-cell-cultured-biotechnology/micro-meat-mexicos-first-cultivated-meat-company-is-ready-to-scale-up-production/), [Aleph Farms 2022](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221194759/https://twitter.com/AlephFarms/status/1494433384864616453), [CellMeat 2021](https://www.greenqueen.com.hk/amp/cellmeat-dokdo-shrimp-prototype/), [Good Meat 2021](https://thecounter.org/lab-grown-cultivated-meat-cost-at-scale/), [BioTech Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/29/JBS-to-bring-cultivated-meat-to-market-by-2024-with-BioTech-Foods-deal), [Future Meat 2021](https://www.jns.org/5000-burgers-a-day-worlds-first-cultured-meat-production-plant-opens-in-israel/), [MeaTech 2021](https://thespoon.tech/alt-protein-round-up-tofurkys-algae-based-products-and-animal-free-chicken-fat/#:~:text=MeaTech%20is%20now%20producing%20animal,in%20a%20single%20production%20run.), [Mosa Meat 2021](https://time.com/6109450/sustainable-lab-grown-mosa-meat/), [Upside Foods 2021](https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2021/11/04/Not-only-viable-but-inevitable-Cell-cultured-meat-in-the-spotlight-as-UPSIDE-Foods-opens-most-advanced-cultivated-meat-production-facility-in-the-world), [WildType 2021](https://www.fooddive.com/news/cell-based-meat-plants-come-online-for-future-meat-technologies-and-wildtyp/602301/), [BlueNalu 2020](https://thespoon.tech/bluenalu-announces-new-expanded-facility-to-bring-its-cell-based-seafood-to-test-markets/), [SuperMeat 2020](https://globetrender.com/2020/11/20/cultured-meat-on-the-menu-at-the-chicken-restaurant-in-tel-aviv/), compiled in [this table](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=1858260356)).\n\nConsultancies that have published reports on cultured meat production timelines ([McKinsey 2021](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/cultivated-meat-out-of-the-lab-into-the-frying-pan), [BCG 2021](https://web-assets.bcg.com/a0/28/4295860343c6a2a5b9f4e3436114/bcg-food-for-thought-the-protein-transformation-mar-2021.pdf), [AT Kearney 2020](https://www.de.kearney.com/consumer-retail/article/?/a/when-consumers-go-vegan-how-much-meat-will-be-left-on-the-table-for-agribusiness-)) estimate production could fall in the range of 1,000-90,000 metric tons by 2025, 116,000-3.5M by 2030, 6M-8.8M by 2035 (see my [calculations](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gYqwL86k94bSB2WVba-AMqZs48Z1JRRrIVraNh7ymmA/edit#gid=0) here).\n\nGFI ([2020](https://gfi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/COR-SOTIR-Cultivated-Meat-2021-0429.pdf)) speculated that if the cultured meat production life cycle followed the path of other industrial biotechnologies the industry could move from hundreds of metric tons in 2019-2020 to thousands of metric tons from 2022, and “in the next five, seven, potentially 10 years we will see likely industrial scale production of cultivated meat. This is the point at which the industry is producing millions of metric tons of cultivated meat” ([GFI 2021](https://youtu.be/6cAcuse6Gzs?t=659), though note GFI has not made any official statements/forecasts for cultivated meat production timelines).\n\nTechno-economic analyses (TEAs) by Humbird ([2020](https://engrxiv.org/index.php/engrxiv/preprint/view/1438)) and Risner et al. ([2020](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.09.10.292144v1.full)) were skeptical that >100,000 metric tons/year will be produced in the near future.\n\nA GFI survey ([2021](https://gfi.org/resource/cultivated-meat-media-growth-factor-survey/)), fielded in December 2020, of cultured meat companies found (of 17) 35% expected to produce 0kg to 1kg over the next 12 months (by December 2021), 41% anticipated 1kg to 10kg, 18% 10kg to 100kg, and 6% 100kg to 1,000 kg. Taking the upper bounds, this implies 1.4 metric tons total for 2021 among these 17 companies.\n\nThe Metaculus community medians for ≥20% cultured meat products sold at $30/kg or cheaper in any country are not expected in [restaurants](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3081/when-will-a-restaurant-first-serve-clean-meat-products-containing-20-clean-meat-at-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2023 or [supermarkets](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3087/when-will-a-supermarket-sell-a-product-made-of-20-clean-meat-for-3-per-100-grams-or-cheaper/) until 2025.\n\nThe aggregated probabilities from a panel of forecasters ([Dullaghan & Zhang 2022](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/2b9HCjTiFnWM8jkRM/forecasts-estimate-limited-cultured-meat-production-through)) suggested annual production volumes below 100,000 metric tons were more likely than higher volumes over the next 30 years for cultured meat where >51% of the meat comes from animal cells.\n\n\n***How many metric tons of ≥20% cultured meat will be sold on average in the 5 years leading up to each year below?***\n\nExample: the year 2025 will resolve as the average of the years 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025.\n\nResolution wiil be from industry statistics from credible sources akin to the FAO & USDA (such as independent credible outside analysts, governments, inter-governmental agencies, the FAO itself, & The Good Food Institute's market research reports.)\n\n[fine-print]\n\n- Cultured meat defined as ≥20% of the “meat”, by weight, is produced directly from animal cells (as opposed to plant protein, yeast, farmed animals). Future Meat is aiming to have a 45% chicken product & a 60% lamb product, and the rest 40-55% plant protein and water respectively ([FoodNavigator, 2021](https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/06/23/Our-goal-is-to-make-cultured-meat-affordable-for-everyone-Future-Meat-Technologies-opens-facility-gears-up-for-2022-launch)). The former would not count, the latter would if these refer to weight.\n- Cultured meat here refers to meat and seafood, including but not limited to cells from fish, crustaceans, chickens, pigs, cows, sheep, turkeys.\n- The product must be for sale, and free samples do not count. \"Pop-up\" restaurants that exist for a very short amount of time (such as those at a convention like CES) do not count toward resolution.\n- All figures are global unless otherwise stated\n- Cellular/cultivated/cultured/cell-cultured/clean/lab-grown meat are interchangeable terms used to refer to meat produced from in vitro cultivation of animal cells.\n- Cultured meat refers to any type of cut (ground meat or whole tissue like chicken breast or beef steak)\n- These questions are conditional on no [transformative artificial intelligence](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/some-background-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence) or globally catastrophic disaster (the human population decreases by at least 10% during any period of 5 years or less occurring by the date in question). Note that by \"transformative artificial intelligence\" we mean AI-obviously-identifiable-as-such before with effects clearly comparable to or greater than the first industrial revolution: AI that precipitates either (a) economic growth of >=30% per year for at least a few years or, conversely, (b) an irreversible extinction, curtailment, or a plateau of human growth and potential\". Advances in AI with effects similar to the introduction of electricity or the internet should not be excluded, and you may wish to explicitly model it in your calculations (if you assume this is sufficiently likely) ( Eg, AI assisted bioreactor design or metabolic engineering).\n\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "83.2", "median": "1.73k", "upper_75": "60.7k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total value of the green hydrogen/ammonia market in 2050 will be 0.848 trillion 2021 USD?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.848", "median": "1.10", "upper_75": "2.41", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a human cure for herpes simplex for oral region will be available for purchase by 2045?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "2045", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a human cure for herpes simplex for oral region will be available for purchase by 2045?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "2045", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a nation state will achieve Basic Post Scarcity Economy by 2164?", "desc": "Let's define a Basic Post Scarcity Economy as an economic system in which all the basic necessities are provided for free, without requiring any kind of labour in exchange. In this economy working it's entirely optional during the entire lifetime. It is expected that such a lifestyle can be enabled by a widespread automation of the current productive activities. The adjective \"basic\" is added to discriminate this economy from the related post-scarcity economy in which also luxury goods are widely available.\n\nAdditional readings:\n[A curated list of Post-Scarcity resources](https://github.com/lorepieri8/awesome-post-scarcity)", "resc": "For the sake of this forecast, these will be the requirements for a Basic Post Scarcity Economy:\n\n-The following basic services and goods should be provided for free to any citizen: Healthcare, Education, Housing, Food, Clothing, Transportation, Internet and Telecommunication, Utilities, Basic household appliances and furniture (e.g. bed, fridge, etc.), basic personal computing (e.g a phone and a computer). \n\n-Such services are available for free for an unlimited time period.\n\n-Such services should be abundant (e.g. a citizen can require an arbitrary amount of surgeries, a heterogeneous diet, transportation replacements in case of broken components, etc.), but they don't need to be unlimited. For instance requests for free housing in specific places or oversized requirements for food supplies may be refused as they are not considered basic. \n\n-The citizens should not be asked to perform any specific labour activity and should be free to decide how to spend their time, have free speech and be free to follow specific religions and ideologies. Minor duties (such as registering IDs, attending some meetings, education requirements, participation in voting) can be still present. Moreover citizens are still required to follow laws and safety regulations.\n\n-Such freedom should be granted to at least 99% of the citizens at any given time. That is a small part of the population can be still required to perform some work activities. If such working population is required, it should not be forced to work for more than 5 years in a lifetime.\n\n-Non basic services and goods should still be available for purchase by any citizen.\n\nThe question resolves when a nation state with population greater than 500.000 approves a bill which (combined with previous laws) fulfils the requirements of a Basic Post Scarcity Economy. It resolves ambiguously if such economy is not reached by 2200.", "lower_25": "2072", "median": "2096", "upper_75": "2164", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total value of the green hydrogen/ammonia market in 2050 will be 0.848 trillion 2021 USD?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.848", "median": "1.10", "upper_75": "2.41", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a nation state will achieve Basic Post Scarcity Economy by 2164?", "desc": "Let's define a Basic Post Scarcity Economy as an economic system in which all the basic necessities are provided for free, without requiring any kind of labour in exchange. In this economy working it's entirely optional during the entire lifetime. It is expected that such a lifestyle can be enabled by a widespread automation of the current productive activities. The adjective \"basic\" is added to discriminate this economy from the related post-scarcity economy in which also luxury goods are widely available.\n\nAdditional readings:\n[A curated list of Post-Scarcity resources](https://github.com/lorepieri8/awesome-post-scarcity)", "resc": "For the sake of this forecast, these will be the requirements for a Basic Post Scarcity Economy:\n\n-The following basic services and goods should be provided for free to any citizen: Healthcare, Education, Housing, Food, Clothing, Transportation, Internet and Telecommunication, Utilities, Basic household appliances and furniture (e.g. bed, fridge, etc.), basic personal computing (e.g a phone and a computer). \n\n-Such services are available for free for an unlimited time period.\n\n-Such services should be abundant (e.g. a citizen can require an arbitrary amount of surgeries, a heterogeneous diet, transportation replacements in case of broken components, etc.), but they don't need to be unlimited. For instance requests for free housing in specific places or oversized requirements for food supplies may be refused as they are not considered basic. \n\n-The citizens should not be asked to perform any specific labour activity and should be free to decide how to spend their time, have free speech and be free to follow specific religions and ideologies. Minor duties (such as registering IDs, attending some meetings, education requirements, participation in voting) can be still present. Moreover citizens are still required to follow laws and safety regulations.\n\n-Such freedom should be granted to at least 99% of the citizens at any given time. That is a small part of the population can be still required to perform some work activities. If such working population is required, it should not be forced to work for more than 5 years in a lifetime.\n\n-Non basic services and goods should still be available for purchase by any citizen.\n\nThe question resolves when a nation state with population greater than 500.000 approves a bill which (combined with previous laws) fulfils the requirements of a Basic Post Scarcity Economy. It resolves ambiguously if such economy is not reached by 2200.", "lower_25": "2072", "median": "2096", "upper_75": "2164", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will be possible to continue one's growth after their growth plates have closed by 2114?", "desc": "Currently, there is no cure for short stature (which can be caused by various factors/illnesses) after the individual's growth plates have closed. Research into growing growth plate stem cells through regenerative medicine has begun but is not very far along yet. Two examples are the [work by Noriaki Ono](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-018-0662-5) and that [being done at Children's Hospital Colorado](https://www.childrenscolorado.org/research-innovation/research-area/orthopedics-orthopedic-surgery/growth-plate-generation/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of the first successful case of resuming bone growth at a growth plate in a patient after growth plate closure occurs, according to credible media sources. Note that preventing growth plates from closing prematurely does not suffice as a resolution; the growth must be continued after closure. Methods must involve producing growth at the growth plates in a manner similar to natural bone growth to qualify (for example, lengthening bones through breaking and healing, known as [distraction osteogenesis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distraction_osteogenesis), would not qualify).\n\nThe date of the first credible media report will be used for resolution. If there are no credible media reports of this occurring before January 1, 2150 this question resolves as **\"> December 31, 2149\"**", "lower_25": "2047", "median": "2061", "upper_75": "2114", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will be possible to continue one's growth after their growth plates have closed by 2114?", "desc": "Currently, there is no cure for short stature (which can be caused by various factors/illnesses) after the individual's growth plates have closed. Research into growing growth plate stem cells through regenerative medicine has begun but is not very far along yet. Two examples are the [work by Noriaki Ono](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-018-0662-5) and that [being done at Children's Hospital Colorado](https://www.childrenscolorado.org/research-innovation/research-area/orthopedics-orthopedic-surgery/growth-plate-generation/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of the first successful case of resuming bone growth at a growth plate in a patient after growth plate closure occurs, according to credible media sources. Note that preventing growth plates from closing prematurely does not suffice as a resolution; the growth must be continued after closure. Methods must involve producing growth at the growth plates in a manner similar to natural bone growth to qualify (for example, lengthening bones through breaking and healing, known as [distraction osteogenesis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distraction_osteogenesis), would not qualify).\n\nThe date of the first credible media report will be used for resolution. If there are no credible media reports of this occurring before January 1, 2150 this question resolves as **\"> December 31, 2149\"**", "lower_25": "2047", "median": "2061", "upper_75": "2114", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will be possible to continue one's growth after their growth plates have closed by 2114?", "desc": "Currently, there is no cure for short stature (which can be caused by various factors/illnesses) after the individual's growth plates have closed. Research into growing growth plate stem cells through regenerative medicine has begun but is not very far along yet. Two examples are the [work by Noriaki Ono](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-018-0662-5) and that [being done at Children's Hospital Colorado](https://www.childrenscolorado.org/research-innovation/research-area/orthopedics-orthopedic-surgery/growth-plate-generation/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of the first successful case of resuming bone growth at a growth plate in a patient after growth plate closure occurs, according to credible media sources. Note that preventing growth plates from closing prematurely does not suffice as a resolution; the growth must be continued after closure. Methods must involve producing growth at the growth plates in a manner similar to natural bone growth to qualify (for example, lengthening bones through breaking and healing, known as [distraction osteogenesis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distraction_osteogenesis), would not qualify).\n\nThe date of the first credible media report will be used for resolution. If there are no credible media reports of this occurring before January 1, 2150 this question resolves as **\"> December 31, 2149\"**", "lower_25": "2047", "median": "2061", "upper_75": "2114", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Microsoft's market cap will be 4.17 trillion USD on January 1, 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.68", "median": "4.17", "upper_75": "7.23", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Microsoft's market cap will be 4.17 trillion USD on January 1, 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.68", "median": "4.17", "upper_75": "7.23", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 12.9 countries in OPEC on December 31, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "11.7", "median": "12.9", "upper_75": "13.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Microsoft's market cap will be 4.17 trillion USD on January 1, 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.68", "median": "4.17", "upper_75": "7.23", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 94.71 nuclear reactors will be in operation in the US at the end of 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "91.02", "median": "94.71", "upper_75": "97.51", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 94.71 nuclear reactors will be in operation in the US at the end of 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "91.02", "median": "94.71", "upper_75": "97.51", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 12.9 people in space on April 12, 2030?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will 100 people or more be in space, or on any astronomical body other than earth, simultaneously?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3141/when-will-100-people-or-more-be-in-space-or-on-any-astronomical-body-other-than-earth-simultaneously/)\n* [When will the 1,000th person reach space?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1519/date-1000th-person-reaches-space/)\n* [When will the 10,000th human reach space?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1659/when-will-the-10000th-human-reach-space/)\n\n----\n\nOn April 12, 1961, Yuri Gagarin became the first human to leave Earth. April 12, 1981 saw the launch of the first Space Shuttle. For this reason April 12 is variously marked as [Yuri's Night](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuri%27s_Night), [Cosmonautics Day](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmonautics_Day), and the [International Day of Human Space Flight](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Day_of_Human_Space_Flight).\n\n10 people are in space right now, according to the aptly named [howmanypeopleareinspacerightnow.com](https://www.howmanypeopleareinspacerightnow.com/). Commercial and personal interest in going to space has grown in the last decade, and technological advances have made it more widely accessible.", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of living people more than 100 km above mean sea level on April 12, 2030 (at UTC time). Any person who is in space for any part of that day will be included. To determine resolution, Metaculus Admins will consider all credible sources, including statements by national space agencies, private spaceflight organizations, and credible media reports.\n\nFor this question, \"space\" is defined using the Fédération aéronautique internationale (FAI) convention of the [Kármán line](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C3%A1rm%C3%A1n_line), which is 100 km above sea level of Earth. Any living person outside this boundary, whether they are on a spacecraft, space station, the Moon, Mars, or elsewhere, will be included in the count", "lower_25": "12.9", "median": "25.7", "upper_75": "51.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 94.71 nuclear reactors will be in operation in the US at the end of 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "91.02", "median": "94.71", "upper_75": "97.51", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 12.9 countries in OPEC on December 31, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "11.7", "median": "12.9", "upper_75": "13.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 12.9 people in space on April 12, 2030?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will 100 people or more be in space, or on any astronomical body other than earth, simultaneously?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3141/when-will-100-people-or-more-be-in-space-or-on-any-astronomical-body-other-than-earth-simultaneously/)\n* [When will the 1,000th person reach space?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1519/date-1000th-person-reaches-space/)\n* [When will the 10,000th human reach space?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1659/when-will-the-10000th-human-reach-space/)\n\n----\n\nOn April 12, 1961, Yuri Gagarin became the first human to leave Earth. April 12, 1981 saw the launch of the first Space Shuttle. For this reason April 12 is variously marked as [Yuri's Night](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuri%27s_Night), [Cosmonautics Day](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmonautics_Day), and the [International Day of Human Space Flight](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Day_of_Human_Space_Flight).\n\n10 people are in space right now, according to the aptly named [howmanypeopleareinspacerightnow.com](https://www.howmanypeopleareinspacerightnow.com/). Commercial and personal interest in going to space has grown in the last decade, and technological advances have made it more widely accessible.", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of living people more than 100 km above mean sea level on April 12, 2030 (at UTC time). Any person who is in space for any part of that day will be included. To determine resolution, Metaculus Admins will consider all credible sources, including statements by national space agencies, private spaceflight organizations, and credible media reports.\n\nFor this question, \"space\" is defined using the Fédération aéronautique internationale (FAI) convention of the [Kármán line](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C3%A1rm%C3%A1n_line), which is 100 km above sea level of Earth. Any living person outside this boundary, whether they are on a spacecraft, space station, the Moon, Mars, or elsewhere, will be included in the count", "lower_25": "12.9", "median": "25.7", "upper_75": "51.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 12.9 people in space on April 12, 2030?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will 100 people or more be in space, or on any astronomical body other than earth, simultaneously?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3141/when-will-100-people-or-more-be-in-space-or-on-any-astronomical-body-other-than-earth-simultaneously/)\n* [When will the 1,000th person reach space?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1519/date-1000th-person-reaches-space/)\n* [When will the 10,000th human reach space?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/1659/when-will-the-10000th-human-reach-space/)\n\n----\n\nOn April 12, 1961, Yuri Gagarin became the first human to leave Earth. April 12, 1981 saw the launch of the first Space Shuttle. For this reason April 12 is variously marked as [Yuri's Night](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuri%27s_Night), [Cosmonautics Day](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmonautics_Day), and the [International Day of Human Space Flight](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Day_of_Human_Space_Flight).\n\n10 people are in space right now, according to the aptly named [howmanypeopleareinspacerightnow.com](https://www.howmanypeopleareinspacerightnow.com/). Commercial and personal interest in going to space has grown in the last decade, and technological advances have made it more widely accessible.", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of living people more than 100 km above mean sea level on April 12, 2030 (at UTC time). Any person who is in space for any part of that day will be included. To determine resolution, Metaculus Admins will consider all credible sources, including statements by national space agencies, private spaceflight organizations, and credible media reports.\n\nFor this question, \"space\" is defined using the Fédération aéronautique internationale (FAI) convention of the [Kármán line](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C3%A1rm%C3%A1n_line), which is 100 km above sea level of Earth. Any living person outside this boundary, whether they are on a spacecraft, space station, the Moon, Mars, or elsewhere, will be included in the count", "lower_25": "12.9", "median": "25.7", "upper_75": "51.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Brazil will reach net zero carbon emissions by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2050", "median": "2059", "upper_75": "2079", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Brazil will reach net zero carbon emissions by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2050", "median": "2059", "upper_75": "2079", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Brazil will reach net zero carbon emissions by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2050", "median": "2059", "upper_75": "2079", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 88.0 nuclear reactors in operation in the US on December 31, 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "88.0", "median": "99.3", "upper_75": "117", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 88.0 nuclear reactors in operation in the US on December 31, 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "88.0", "median": "99.3", "upper_75": "117", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 12.9 countries in OPEC on December 31, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "11.7", "median": "12.9", "upper_75": "13.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's primary energy consumption in 2025 will be 174.7 Exajoules?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "157.2", "median": "167.0", "upper_75": "174.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's primary energy consumption in 2025 will be 174.7 Exajoules?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "157.2", "median": "167.0", "upper_75": "174.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How much CO2 will China produce in 2025, in tons?\n\nKeyword: 10.2B\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that China will produce 10.2 billion tons of CO2 in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.39B", "median": "10.2B", "upper_75": "11.0B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How much CO2 will China produce in 2025, in tons?\n\nKeyword: 10.2B\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that China will produce 10.2 billion tons of CO2 in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.39B", "median": "10.2B", "upper_75": "11.0B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 26.0% of Russia's electricity generation will come from nuclear power in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "21.5", "median": "24.2", "upper_75": "26.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 96.1% of new car sales in China will be electric in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "76.9", "median": "90.0", "upper_75": "96.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 26.0% of Russia's electricity generation will come from nuclear power in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "21.5", "median": "24.2", "upper_75": "26.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's primary energy consumption in 2025 will be 174.7 Exajoules?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "157.2", "median": "167.0", "upper_75": "174.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 88.0 nuclear reactors in operation in the US on December 31, 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "88.0", "median": "99.3", "upper_75": "117", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 96.1% of new car sales in China will be electric in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "76.9", "median": "90.0", "upper_75": "96.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 45.3% of Russia's electricity generation will come from nuclear power in 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.6", "median": "35.1", "upper_75": "45.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 26.0% of Russia's electricity generation will come from nuclear power in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "21.5", "median": "24.2", "upper_75": "26.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 96.1% of new car sales in China will be electric in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "76.9", "median": "90.0", "upper_75": "96.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 45.3% of Russia's electricity generation will come from nuclear power in 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.6", "median": "35.1", "upper_75": "45.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will reach net zero carbon emissions by 2091?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2057", "median": "2066", "upper_75": "2091", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will reach net zero carbon emissions by 2091?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2057", "median": "2066", "upper_75": "2091", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will reach net zero carbon emissions by 2091?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2057", "median": "2066", "upper_75": "2091", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 45.3% of Russia's electricity generation will come from nuclear power in 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.6", "median": "35.1", "upper_75": "45.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that humanity will go extinct due to an AI catastrophe before 2300, and if so, when will the last human die?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2047", "upper_75": "2117", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that humanity will go extinct due to an AI catastrophe before 2300, and if so, when will the last human die?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2047", "upper_75": "2117", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average unemployment in the US will be 3.58% from January 2022 to December 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.58", "median": "3.91", "upper_75": "4.64", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How much CO2 will China produce in 2025, in tons?\n\nKeyword: 10.2B\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that China will produce 10.2 billion tons of CO2 in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.39B", "median": "10.2B", "upper_75": "11.0B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average unemployment in the US will be 3.58% from January 2022 to December 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.58", "median": "3.91", "upper_75": "4.64", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that humanity will go extinct due to an AI catastrophe before 2300, and if so, when will the last human die?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2047", "upper_75": "2117", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Germany will elect a new Chancellor by Sep 2026?", "desc": "German Chancellor Olaf Scholz recieved a lot of critisism relating to his decisions concerning the arms deliveries for Ukraine. \n\nGermany currently is governed by a three party coalition of the social democrats (SPD), greens (Grüne) and liberterians (FDP).\n\nHis party, the German social democratic party SPD has historically had a lot of ties to Russia. Former SPD chancelor Gerhard Schröder even became a director for the russian energy company Gazprom and a chairman for Rosneft.\n\nIf the German Bundestag votes on a motion of no confidence it has to vote for a new chancelor with it. ([Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Art 67](https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/art_67.html)).\n\nThe chancelor can also ask the Bundestag for a vote of confidence (Vertrauensfrage) ([Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Art 68 ](https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/art_68.html)). In this case the Bundespräsident can dissolve the Bundestag within 21 days or the Bundestag has to vote for a new chancelor.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date that a new Chancellor of Germany is elected by the Bundestag, following the election of Olaf Scholz on December 8, 2021. If an Acting Chancellor is appointed by the President for a temporary period, the question will wait to resolve upon the official election of the next chancellor by the Bundestag. A re-election of Scholz as Chancellor at the end of his 4-year term will not resolve the question", "lower_25": "Oct 2025", "median": "Jan 2026", "upper_75": "Sep 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Germany will elect a new Chancellor by Sep 2026?", "desc": "German Chancellor Olaf Scholz recieved a lot of critisism relating to his decisions concerning the arms deliveries for Ukraine. \n\nGermany currently is governed by a three party coalition of the social democrats (SPD), greens (Grüne) and liberterians (FDP).\n\nHis party, the German social democratic party SPD has historically had a lot of ties to Russia. Former SPD chancelor Gerhard Schröder even became a director for the russian energy company Gazprom and a chairman for Rosneft.\n\nIf the German Bundestag votes on a motion of no confidence it has to vote for a new chancelor with it. ([Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Art 67](https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/art_67.html)).\n\nThe chancelor can also ask the Bundestag for a vote of confidence (Vertrauensfrage) ([Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Art 68 ](https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/art_68.html)). In this case the Bundespräsident can dissolve the Bundestag within 21 days or the Bundestag has to vote for a new chancelor.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date that a new Chancellor of Germany is elected by the Bundestag, following the election of Olaf Scholz on December 8, 2021. If an Acting Chancellor is appointed by the President for a temporary period, the question will wait to resolve upon the official election of the next chancellor by the Bundestag. A re-election of Scholz as Chancellor at the end of his 4-year term will not resolve the question", "lower_25": "Oct 2025", "median": "Jan 2026", "upper_75": "Sep 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Julian Assange will not be extradited to the US by January 1, 2025?", "desc": "[Julian Assange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Assange) is the founder of [WikiLeaks](https://wikileaks.org/), an archival site which publishes classified material, including several original documents and videos of the Iraq and Afghanistan war, and several emails between Hillary Clinton and the DNC during the 2016 US Presidential Election.\n\nIn November 2010, Sweden issued a [warrant for Assange's arrest](https://www.aklagare.se/en/media/press-service/the-assange-matter/chronology/) on suspicion of rape and sexual assault. In June 2012, after appealing the decisions of the British Supreme Court, Assange recieved asylum at the Ecuadorian Embassy in London. In April 2019, Ecuador withdrew asylum for Assange, and British police [arrested him](https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/11/uk/julian-assange-arrested-gbr-intl/index.html) on charges of skipping bail and on a US request for extradition.\n\nIn January 2021, British Judge Vanessa Baraitser denied a US request for extradition, [saying](https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/USA-v-Assange-judgment-040121.pdf) \"I find that the mental condition of Mr. Assange is such that it would be oppressive to extradite him to the United States of America.\" UK courts have since overturned this decision, and formally approved Assange's extradition [on April 20, 2022](https://apnews.com/article/technology-business-extradition-julian-assange-wikileaks-d61c1d92ac22c2f870e418380db259b6). That decision may be appealed by Assange, and must be approved by the UK Foreign Minister before it is enforced.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that it is confirmed that Julian Assange has been extradited to the US or is in the custody of US law enforcement. If Assange has died before January 1, 2025 and before being held in US custody, this question will resolve as \"**Ambiguous**\"", "lower_25": "Dec 23, 2024", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's total installed capacity (in gigawatts) for gravity batteries will be 152 gigawatts by 2030?", "desc": "[Wind](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/onshore-wind-lcoe-vs-wind-consumption) and [solar](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/solar-pv-prices-vs-cumulative-capacity) are becoming the world's cheapest source of electricity--when the sun is shining or the wind is blowing. These energy sources have [begun to outcompete](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-23/building-new-renewables-cheaper-than-running-fossil-fuel-plants) fossil fuels in $/kWh, but they lack reliability. Large-scale battery storage could mitigate or resolve this issue, ensuring that even when the wind isn't blowing and the sun isn't shining, plenty of stored energy generated from wind and solar could be available.\n\nBesides the lithium batteries used in appliances and cars, [gravity batteries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravity_battery) have the potential to store large quantities of energy. The most prevalent form of gravity battery in 2022 are [pumped hydro stations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pumped-storage_hydroelectricity), which use electricity to pump water up a hill, behind a hydroelectric dam, when electricity is cheap and abundant, and then generate electricity by allowing it to flow downhill again when the electricity supply is low. Another form of gravity battery pulls or pushes heavy solid objects like concrete blocks higher using electric motors and then generates electricity from their movement back down when necessary. Experimental forms include pulling concrete blocks up and down a hill on rails, or pulling blocks of concrete up storage towers.\n\nHydroelectric pumped storage capacity was 168 GW in 2020, rising from 164 GW in 2016, [according](https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world/electricity/electricity-capacity?pd=2&p=0000000000000000000007vo7&u=0&f=A&v=mapbubble&a=-&i=none&vo=value&&t=C&g=00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001&l=249-ruvvvvvfvtvnvv1vrvvvvfvvvvvvfvvvou20evvvvvvvvvvnvvvs0008&s=315532800000&e=1577836800000) to the US Energy Information Administration. Comparatively little, if any, solid storage gravity batteries had been operational in 2022, though many are under development.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world's total installed capacity (in gigawatts) for gravity batteries in the year 2030, according to the [US Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world/electricity/electricity-capacity?pd=2&p=0000000000000000000004004&u=0&f=A&v=mapbubble&a=-&i=none&vo=value&t=C&g=none&l=249--249&s=315532800000&e=1577836800000&).\n\nAny battery designs which primarily store energy as gravitational potential energy will be included in the resolution value. If there is insufficient data about the total capacity of certain designs of batteries, they will be assumed to be not deployed at scale; the question will resolve based on designs with sufficient data reported. If the US EIA does not report this data by January 1, 2034, alternative credible sources may be used, or the question may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "152", "median": "187", "upper_75": "239", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's total installed capacity (in gigawatts) for gravity batteries will be 152 gigawatts by 2030?", "desc": "[Wind](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/onshore-wind-lcoe-vs-wind-consumption) and [solar](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/solar-pv-prices-vs-cumulative-capacity) are becoming the world's cheapest source of electricity--when the sun is shining or the wind is blowing. These energy sources have [begun to outcompete](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-23/building-new-renewables-cheaper-than-running-fossil-fuel-plants) fossil fuels in $/kWh, but they lack reliability. Large-scale battery storage could mitigate or resolve this issue, ensuring that even when the wind isn't blowing and the sun isn't shining, plenty of stored energy generated from wind and solar could be available.\n\nBesides the lithium batteries used in appliances and cars, [gravity batteries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravity_battery) have the potential to store large quantities of energy. The most prevalent form of gravity battery in 2022 are [pumped hydro stations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pumped-storage_hydroelectricity), which use electricity to pump water up a hill, behind a hydroelectric dam, when electricity is cheap and abundant, and then generate electricity by allowing it to flow downhill again when the electricity supply is low. Another form of gravity battery pulls or pushes heavy solid objects like concrete blocks higher using electric motors and then generates electricity from their movement back down when necessary. Experimental forms include pulling concrete blocks up and down a hill on rails, or pulling blocks of concrete up storage towers.\n\nHydroelectric pumped storage capacity was 168 GW in 2020, rising from 164 GW in 2016, [according](https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world/electricity/electricity-capacity?pd=2&p=0000000000000000000007vo7&u=0&f=A&v=mapbubble&a=-&i=none&vo=value&&t=C&g=00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001&l=249-ruvvvvvfvtvnvv1vrvvvvfvvvvvvfvvvou20evvvvvvvvvvnvvvs0008&s=315532800000&e=1577836800000) to the US Energy Information Administration. Comparatively little, if any, solid storage gravity batteries had been operational in 2022, though many are under development.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world's total installed capacity (in gigawatts) for gravity batteries in the year 2030, according to the [US Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world/electricity/electricity-capacity?pd=2&p=0000000000000000000004004&u=0&f=A&v=mapbubble&a=-&i=none&vo=value&t=C&g=none&l=249--249&s=315532800000&e=1577836800000&).\n\nAny battery designs which primarily store energy as gravitational potential energy will be included in the resolution value. If there is insufficient data about the total capacity of certain designs of batteries, they will be assumed to be not deployed at scale; the question will resolve based on designs with sufficient data reported. If the US EIA does not report this data by January 1, 2034, alternative credible sources may be used, or the question may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "152", "median": "187", "upper_75": "239", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Ukraine's score in The Democracy Index in 2024 will be 5.07?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.07", "median": "5.58", "upper_75": "6.12", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Ukraine's score in The Democracy Index in 2024 will be 5.07?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.07", "median": "5.58", "upper_75": "6.12", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Julian Assange will not be extradited to the US by January 1, 2025?", "desc": "[Julian Assange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Assange) is the founder of [WikiLeaks](https://wikileaks.org/), an archival site which publishes classified material, including several original documents and videos of the Iraq and Afghanistan war, and several emails between Hillary Clinton and the DNC during the 2016 US Presidential Election.\n\nIn November 2010, Sweden issued a [warrant for Assange's arrest](https://www.aklagare.se/en/media/press-service/the-assange-matter/chronology/) on suspicion of rape and sexual assault. In June 2012, after appealing the decisions of the British Supreme Court, Assange recieved asylum at the Ecuadorian Embassy in London. In April 2019, Ecuador withdrew asylum for Assange, and British police [arrested him](https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/11/uk/julian-assange-arrested-gbr-intl/index.html) on charges of skipping bail and on a US request for extradition.\n\nIn January 2021, British Judge Vanessa Baraitser denied a US request for extradition, [saying](https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/USA-v-Assange-judgment-040121.pdf) \"I find that the mental condition of Mr. Assange is such that it would be oppressive to extradite him to the United States of America.\" UK courts have since overturned this decision, and formally approved Assange's extradition [on April 20, 2022](https://apnews.com/article/technology-business-extradition-julian-assange-wikileaks-d61c1d92ac22c2f870e418380db259b6). That decision may be appealed by Assange, and must be approved by the UK Foreign Minister before it is enforced.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that it is confirmed that Julian Assange has been extradited to the US or is in the custody of US law enforcement. If Assange has died before January 1, 2025 and before being held in US custody, this question will resolve as \"**Ambiguous**\"", "lower_25": "Dec 23, 2024", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Ukraine's score in The Democracy Index in 2024 will be 5.07?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.07", "median": "5.58", "upper_75": "6.12", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's total installed capacity (in gigawatts) for gravity batteries will be 152 gigawatts by 2030?", "desc": "[Wind](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/onshore-wind-lcoe-vs-wind-consumption) and [solar](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/solar-pv-prices-vs-cumulative-capacity) are becoming the world's cheapest source of electricity--when the sun is shining or the wind is blowing. These energy sources have [begun to outcompete](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-23/building-new-renewables-cheaper-than-running-fossil-fuel-plants) fossil fuels in $/kWh, but they lack reliability. Large-scale battery storage could mitigate or resolve this issue, ensuring that even when the wind isn't blowing and the sun isn't shining, plenty of stored energy generated from wind and solar could be available.\n\nBesides the lithium batteries used in appliances and cars, [gravity batteries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravity_battery) have the potential to store large quantities of energy. The most prevalent form of gravity battery in 2022 are [pumped hydro stations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pumped-storage_hydroelectricity), which use electricity to pump water up a hill, behind a hydroelectric dam, when electricity is cheap and abundant, and then generate electricity by allowing it to flow downhill again when the electricity supply is low. Another form of gravity battery pulls or pushes heavy solid objects like concrete blocks higher using electric motors and then generates electricity from their movement back down when necessary. Experimental forms include pulling concrete blocks up and down a hill on rails, or pulling blocks of concrete up storage towers.\n\nHydroelectric pumped storage capacity was 168 GW in 2020, rising from 164 GW in 2016, [according](https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world/electricity/electricity-capacity?pd=2&p=0000000000000000000007vo7&u=0&f=A&v=mapbubble&a=-&i=none&vo=value&&t=C&g=00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001&l=249-ruvvvvvfvtvnvv1vrvvvvfvvvvvvfvvvou20evvvvvvvvvvnvvvs0008&s=315532800000&e=1577836800000) to the US Energy Information Administration. Comparatively little, if any, solid storage gravity batteries had been operational in 2022, though many are under development.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world's total installed capacity (in gigawatts) for gravity batteries in the year 2030, according to the [US Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world/electricity/electricity-capacity?pd=2&p=0000000000000000000004004&u=0&f=A&v=mapbubble&a=-&i=none&vo=value&t=C&g=none&l=249--249&s=315532800000&e=1577836800000&).\n\nAny battery designs which primarily store energy as gravitational potential energy will be included in the resolution value. If there is insufficient data about the total capacity of certain designs of batteries, they will be assumed to be not deployed at scale; the question will resolve based on designs with sufficient data reported. If the US EIA does not report this data by January 1, 2034, alternative credible sources may be used, or the question may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "152", "median": "187", "upper_75": "239", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average unemployment in the US will be 3.58% from January 2022 to December 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.58", "median": "3.91", "upper_75": "4.64", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Roman Catholic Church will permit the ordination of female clergy by 2099?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2064", "median": "2099", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Roman Catholic Church will permit the ordination of female clergy by 2099?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2064", "median": "2099", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Germany will elect a new Chancellor by Sep 2026?", "desc": "German Chancellor Olaf Scholz recieved a lot of critisism relating to his decisions concerning the arms deliveries for Ukraine. \n\nGermany currently is governed by a three party coalition of the social democrats (SPD), greens (Grüne) and liberterians (FDP).\n\nHis party, the German social democratic party SPD has historically had a lot of ties to Russia. Former SPD chancelor Gerhard Schröder even became a director for the russian energy company Gazprom and a chairman for Rosneft.\n\nIf the German Bundestag votes on a motion of no confidence it has to vote for a new chancelor with it. ([Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Art 67](https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/art_67.html)).\n\nThe chancelor can also ask the Bundestag for a vote of confidence (Vertrauensfrage) ([Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Art 68 ](https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/art_68.html)). In this case the Bundespräsident can dissolve the Bundestag within 21 days or the Bundestag has to vote for a new chancelor.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date that a new Chancellor of Germany is elected by the Bundestag, following the election of Olaf Scholz on December 8, 2021. If an Acting Chancellor is appointed by the President for a temporary period, the question will wait to resolve upon the official election of the next chancellor by the Bundestag. A re-election of Scholz as Chancellor at the end of his 4-year term will not resolve the question", "lower_25": "Oct 2025", "median": "Jan 2026", "upper_75": "Sep 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Roman Catholic Church will permit the ordination of female clergy by 2099?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2064", "median": "2099", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Julian Assange will not be extradited to the US by January 1, 2025?", "desc": "[Julian Assange](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Assange) is the founder of [WikiLeaks](https://wikileaks.org/), an archival site which publishes classified material, including several original documents and videos of the Iraq and Afghanistan war, and several emails between Hillary Clinton and the DNC during the 2016 US Presidential Election.\n\nIn November 2010, Sweden issued a [warrant for Assange's arrest](https://www.aklagare.se/en/media/press-service/the-assange-matter/chronology/) on suspicion of rape and sexual assault. In June 2012, after appealing the decisions of the British Supreme Court, Assange recieved asylum at the Ecuadorian Embassy in London. In April 2019, Ecuador withdrew asylum for Assange, and British police [arrested him](https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/11/uk/julian-assange-arrested-gbr-intl/index.html) on charges of skipping bail and on a US request for extradition.\n\nIn January 2021, British Judge Vanessa Baraitser denied a US request for extradition, [saying](https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/USA-v-Assange-judgment-040121.pdf) \"I find that the mental condition of Mr. Assange is such that it would be oppressive to extradite him to the United States of America.\" UK courts have since overturned this decision, and formally approved Assange's extradition [on April 20, 2022](https://apnews.com/article/technology-business-extradition-julian-assange-wikileaks-d61c1d92ac22c2f870e418380db259b6). That decision may be appealed by Assange, and must be approved by the UK Foreign Minister before it is enforced.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the date that it is confirmed that Julian Assange has been extradited to the US or is in the custody of US law enforcement. If Assange has died before January 1, 2025 and before being held in US custody, this question will resolve as \"**Ambiguous**\"", "lower_25": "Dec 23, 2024", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 12.0 percentage of American workers will be represented by a labor union in 2030?", "desc": "[Labor Unions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trade_union), which once held significant influence in American politics and business, have been declining in membership. In 1954, the percentage of employed Americans in labor unions [peaked at 34.8%](https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/20/for-american-unions-membership-trails-far-behind-public-support/); in 2021, this figure [declined to 11.6%](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t01.htm). According to [OECD data](https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TUD), the US had an average of 10.6% of workers in unions in the 2010s, compared to the OECD median of 17.5%.\n\nIn May 2022, [NPR reported](https://www.npr.org/2022/05/03/1095909869/starbucks-union-ceo-howard-schultz-workers-united-labor-benefits) \"more than 230 Starbucks stores have filed petitions for union elections and about 50 stores have voted to join the national union Workers United since December, making it one of the most significant union drives in America.\" [About 6% of American workers](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm) were employed at a food service or drinking place in 2021, but only 1.6% of them were represented by a union. Other workers have begun organizing unions in 2022, including at [Amazon](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/02/amazon-workers-just-voted-to-join-a-union-heres-what-happens-next-.html) and [Apple](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/apple-union-workers-grand-central-terminal-store-sign-union-cards/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of employed American workers (excluding incorporated self-employed) who are represented by a labor union, according to the [US Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.toc.htm). Currently, this data series ID is `LUU0204899700` and can be accessed [here](https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate).\n\nWorkers will be \"represented by a union\" if they are union members or report no union affiliation but whose jobs are covered by a union or an employee association contract. Statistics for employed Americans and Americans represented by a union should include all industries, occupations, sexes, races, ethnic origins, and all ages 16 years and older. If BLS does not report this data by July 1, 2032, an alternative credible source may be used, or the question may resolve as **Ambiguous** at Metaculus' discretion", "lower_25": "9.83", "median": "12.0", "upper_75": "14.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Windows 11 market share will exceed Windows 10's according to the Steam Hardware and Software Survey by Apr 25, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 16, 2024", "median": "Apr 25, 2024", "upper_75": "Apr 29, 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the market capitalization of Twitter will be less than $10 billion on January 1, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 10B", "median": "22.4B", "upper_75": "44.4B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Windows 11 market share will exceed Windows 10's according to the Steam Hardware and Software Survey by Apr 25, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 16, 2024", "median": "Apr 25, 2024", "upper_75": "Apr 29, 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the market capitalization of Twitter will be less than $10 billion on January 1, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 10B", "median": "22.4B", "upper_75": "44.4B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the market capitalization of Twitter will be less than $10 billion on January 1, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 10B", "median": "22.4B", "upper_75": "44.4B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a living human will first reach a distance of one light year from Earth by 2132?", "desc": "A [light-year](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light-year) is a large unit of length used to express astronomical distances, and is equivalent to about 9.46 trillion kilometres, or 5.88 trillion miles.\n\nThe most distant space probe, [Voyager 1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voyager_1), was about 18 light-hours away from the Earth as of October 2014. It will take about 17,500 years to reach one light-year at its current speed of about 17 km/s (38,000 mph, 61,200 km/h) relative to the Sun. \n\nAs of 2022, there is no known existing propulsion technology that would allow a human to reach such a distance from Earth within a human lifetime, though various [new modes of propulsion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interstellar_travel#Propulsion) have been proposed which may eventually permit this. Alternatively, humans may one day be able to reach vast distances from Earth through [life extension](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Life_extension), or through the use of [suspended animation.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suspended_animation)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which a living, conscious, flesh-and-bone human first reaches a distance of at least one light year from Earth. A credible statement from the entity responsible for operating, managing, or controlling the spaceflight will suffice for resolution, as will credible media reports. Credibility of statements or media reports will be determined by Metaculus Administrators. If administrators cannot come to a consensus regarding a particular statement or report, the question will remain pending resolution until a consensus is reached in relation to some event, or the date is January 1, 3,000.\n\nFor this question, a \"living, conscious human\" will be considered to be someone with enough genetic similarity to successfully reproduce with a typical human from 1900, with 1900-era technology to facilitate the pregnancy and birth", "lower_25": "2132", "median": "2271", "upper_75": "2980", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 12.0 percentage of American workers will be represented by a labor union in 2030?", "desc": "[Labor Unions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trade_union), which once held significant influence in American politics and business, have been declining in membership. In 1954, the percentage of employed Americans in labor unions [peaked at 34.8%](https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/20/for-american-unions-membership-trails-far-behind-public-support/); in 2021, this figure [declined to 11.6%](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t01.htm). According to [OECD data](https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TUD), the US had an average of 10.6% of workers in unions in the 2010s, compared to the OECD median of 17.5%.\n\nIn May 2022, [NPR reported](https://www.npr.org/2022/05/03/1095909869/starbucks-union-ceo-howard-schultz-workers-united-labor-benefits) \"more than 230 Starbucks stores have filed petitions for union elections and about 50 stores have voted to join the national union Workers United since December, making it one of the most significant union drives in America.\" [About 6% of American workers](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm) were employed at a food service or drinking place in 2021, but only 1.6% of them were represented by a union. Other workers have begun organizing unions in 2022, including at [Amazon](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/02/amazon-workers-just-voted-to-join-a-union-heres-what-happens-next-.html) and [Apple](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/apple-union-workers-grand-central-terminal-store-sign-union-cards/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of employed American workers (excluding incorporated self-employed) who are represented by a labor union, according to the [US Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.toc.htm). Currently, this data series ID is `LUU0204899700` and can be accessed [here](https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate).\n\nWorkers will be \"represented by a union\" if they are union members or report no union affiliation but whose jobs are covered by a union or an employee association contract. Statistics for employed Americans and Americans represented by a union should include all industries, occupations, sexes, races, ethnic origins, and all ages 16 years and older. If BLS does not report this data by July 1, 2032, an alternative credible source may be used, or the question may resolve as **Ambiguous** at Metaculus' discretion", "lower_25": "9.83", "median": "12.0", "upper_75": "14.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 12.0 percentage of American workers will be represented by a labor union in 2030?", "desc": "[Labor Unions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trade_union), which once held significant influence in American politics and business, have been declining in membership. In 1954, the percentage of employed Americans in labor unions [peaked at 34.8%](https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/20/for-american-unions-membership-trails-far-behind-public-support/); in 2021, this figure [declined to 11.6%](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t01.htm). According to [OECD data](https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TUD), the US had an average of 10.6% of workers in unions in the 2010s, compared to the OECD median of 17.5%.\n\nIn May 2022, [NPR reported](https://www.npr.org/2022/05/03/1095909869/starbucks-union-ceo-howard-schultz-workers-united-labor-benefits) \"more than 230 Starbucks stores have filed petitions for union elections and about 50 stores have voted to join the national union Workers United since December, making it one of the most significant union drives in America.\" [About 6% of American workers](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm) were employed at a food service or drinking place in 2021, but only 1.6% of them were represented by a union. Other workers have begun organizing unions in 2022, including at [Amazon](https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/02/amazon-workers-just-voted-to-join-a-union-heres-what-happens-next-.html) and [Apple](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/apple-union-workers-grand-central-terminal-store-sign-union-cards/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of employed American workers (excluding incorporated self-employed) who are represented by a labor union, according to the [US Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.toc.htm). Currently, this data series ID is `LUU0204899700` and can be accessed [here](https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate).\n\nWorkers will be \"represented by a union\" if they are union members or report no union affiliation but whose jobs are covered by a union or an employee association contract. Statistics for employed Americans and Americans represented by a union should include all industries, occupations, sexes, races, ethnic origins, and all ages 16 years and older. If BLS does not report this data by July 1, 2032, an alternative credible source may be used, or the question may resolve as **Ambiguous** at Metaculus' discretion", "lower_25": "9.83", "median": "12.0", "upper_75": "14.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "In what percentage of US States will Casey-era abortion rights be granted on May 1, 2026?\n\nKeyword: 66.9\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 66.9% of US States will grant Casey-era abortion rights on May 1, 2026?", "desc": "On May 2, 2022, [POLITICO](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/02/supreme-court-abortion-draft-opinion-00029473) published a leaked draft of a Supreme Court decision that indicated that the Court was planning on overturning [Roe v. Wade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roe_v._Wade) and [Planned Parenthood v. Casey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planned_Parenthood_v._Casey). These two cases establish rights and protections for people seeking abortions; Casey stated that states could not prohibit abortions prior to [fetal viability](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fetal_viability), which is typically 23 to 24 weeks of gestation. Casey also held that states could impose some restrictions on abortions prior to fetal viability, so long as they were not an \"undue burden\", [defined](https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/cases/4680) as a regulation which has \"the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.\"\n\nAbortion is a famously controversial subject in the US, with adamant proponents for both sides arguing for abortion to be legal or illegal in all or nearly all circumstances. FiveThirtyEight journalist Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux estimated in December 2021 that [55-65% of Americans fall in the middle](https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-americans-really-think-about-abortion/), favoring various degrees of access to abortion with restrictions. Gallup has found in polling consistently since 1989 [more Americans support Roe v Wade](https://news.gallup.com/poll/350804/americans-opposed-overturning-roe-wade.aspx) than wish to overturn it.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of US States which protect abortion access at or above the level mandated in [Planned Parenthood v. Casey](https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/cases/4680), on May 1, 2026. If a state bans abortions at any point prior to fetal viability, or any point prior to 23 weeks of gestational age, it will be considered more restrictive than Casey. Additionally, a law may be more restrictive than Casey if it places an \"undue burden\" on people seeking an abortion; determining whether the \"undue burden\" standard has been broken will be done by referencing legal scholar's opinions and by the judgement of Metaculus Admins.\n\nFor example, if federal legislation is passed protecting all abortions in all US States, or protecting abortions up to 24 weeks of gestational age, this question would resolve as **100%**. If there were a nationwide ban on all abortions, or on abortions occuring after 15 weeks of gestational age, this question would resolve as **0%**. If all abortions were banned in 20 states, and all abortions fully protected in 30, this question would resolve as **60%**.\n\nA state's level of abortion rights will be determined by whether restrictions are enforced or enforcable in practice. For example, [trigger laws](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trigger_law) which are technically \"on the books\" but unenforcable will be disregarded for the question's resolution", "lower_25": "45.8", "median": "56.1", "upper_75": "66.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a living human will first reach a distance of one light year from Earth by 2132?", "desc": "A [light-year](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light-year) is a large unit of length used to express astronomical distances, and is equivalent to about 9.46 trillion kilometres, or 5.88 trillion miles.\n\nThe most distant space probe, [Voyager 1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voyager_1), was about 18 light-hours away from the Earth as of October 2014. It will take about 17,500 years to reach one light-year at its current speed of about 17 km/s (38,000 mph, 61,200 km/h) relative to the Sun. \n\nAs of 2022, there is no known existing propulsion technology that would allow a human to reach such a distance from Earth within a human lifetime, though various [new modes of propulsion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interstellar_travel#Propulsion) have been proposed which may eventually permit this. Alternatively, humans may one day be able to reach vast distances from Earth through [life extension](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Life_extension), or through the use of [suspended animation.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suspended_animation)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which a living, conscious, flesh-and-bone human first reaches a distance of at least one light year from Earth. A credible statement from the entity responsible for operating, managing, or controlling the spaceflight will suffice for resolution, as will credible media reports. Credibility of statements or media reports will be determined by Metaculus Administrators. If administrators cannot come to a consensus regarding a particular statement or report, the question will remain pending resolution until a consensus is reached in relation to some event, or the date is January 1, 3,000.\n\nFor this question, a \"living, conscious human\" will be considered to be someone with enough genetic similarity to successfully reproduce with a typical human from 1900, with 1900-era technology to facilitate the pregnancy and birth", "lower_25": "2132", "median": "2271", "upper_75": "2980", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Windows 11 market share will exceed Windows 10's according to the Steam Hardware and Software Survey by Apr 25, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 16, 2024", "median": "Apr 25, 2024", "upper_75": "Apr 29, 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a living human will first reach a distance of one light year from Earth by 2132?", "desc": "A [light-year](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light-year) is a large unit of length used to express astronomical distances, and is equivalent to about 9.46 trillion kilometres, or 5.88 trillion miles.\n\nThe most distant space probe, [Voyager 1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voyager_1), was about 18 light-hours away from the Earth as of October 2014. It will take about 17,500 years to reach one light-year at its current speed of about 17 km/s (38,000 mph, 61,200 km/h) relative to the Sun. \n\nAs of 2022, there is no known existing propulsion technology that would allow a human to reach such a distance from Earth within a human lifetime, though various [new modes of propulsion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interstellar_travel#Propulsion) have been proposed which may eventually permit this. Alternatively, humans may one day be able to reach vast distances from Earth through [life extension](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Life_extension), or through the use of [suspended animation.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suspended_animation)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which a living, conscious, flesh-and-bone human first reaches a distance of at least one light year from Earth. A credible statement from the entity responsible for operating, managing, or controlling the spaceflight will suffice for resolution, as will credible media reports. Credibility of statements or media reports will be determined by Metaculus Administrators. If administrators cannot come to a consensus regarding a particular statement or report, the question will remain pending resolution until a consensus is reached in relation to some event, or the date is January 1, 3,000.\n\nFor this question, a \"living, conscious human\" will be considered to be someone with enough genetic similarity to successfully reproduce with a typical human from 1900, with 1900-era technology to facilitate the pregnancy and birth", "lower_25": "2132", "median": "2271", "upper_75": "2980", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Democratic Party nominee will win 308 Electoral College votes in the 2024 presidential election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "237", "median": "275", "upper_75": "308", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an original, wholly AI-generated feature film will rank #1 on a popular streaming service by Apr 2028?", "desc": "As of 2022, generative artificial intelligence models have demonstrated synthesis of [audio](https://openai.com/blog/jukebox/), [images](https://openai.com/dall-e-2/), and [text](https://beta.openai.com/examples/) at varying levels of quality. Additionally, deepfaked faces and voices are [currently being researched](https://studios.disneyresearch.com/2020/06/29/high-resolution-neural-face-swapping-for-visual-effects/) and [applied](https://www.indiewire.com/2021/07/lucasfilm-hires-deepfake-youtuber-mandalorian-skywalker-vfx-1234653720/) by studios such as Disney to aid in reviving characters from past productions.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a film generated wholly by an artificial intelligence reaches the #1 rank in streaming popularity on any of the top 10 online video streaming services at the time, as verified by the streaming service itself or some other credible source.", "lower_25": "Nov 2025", "median": "Apr 2028", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Democratic Party nominee will win 308 Electoral College votes in the 2024 presidential election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "237", "median": "275", "upper_75": "308", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price NSA Index for January 2025 will be 264?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "264", "median": "298", "upper_75": "332", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price NSA Index for January 2025 will be 264?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "264", "median": "298", "upper_75": "332", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price NSA Index for January 2025 will be 264?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "264", "median": "298", "upper_75": "332", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Republican Party nominee will win 305 Electoral College votes in the 2024 presidential election?", "desc": "To win the Presidency of the United States, a candidate must obtain 270 [Electoral College](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Electoral_College) votes out of a potential 538. \n\nThe largest absolute number of Electoral College votes ever received by any candidate was 525, won by Ronald Reagan [in 1984](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1984_United_States_presidential_election), 97.58% of all possible votes - but Franklin D. Roosevelt and James Monroe received a higher percentage of votes (98.49% and 99.57% respectively.) A list of previous Electoral College results can be found [here.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_presidential_elections_by_Electoral_College_margin#Table_of_election_results)", "resc": "There is a potential complication here: faithless electors. In many states, it is legally possible for an Electoral College elector to refuse to honor the vote of their state population and to cast their vote for someone else. To counter this potential complication, we will say that the Republican candidate has 'won' whatever the final number of legally valid Electoral College votes certified by the United States Congress is in the first week of January 2025, accounting for the effect of any faithless electors", "lower_25": "238", "median": "267", "upper_75": "305", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be at least 500 million Americans by Not ≤ 2121?", "desc": "[One Billion Americans: The Case for Thinking Bigger](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Billion_Americans) is a book by [Matthew Yglesias](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_Yglesias), first published in 2020.\n\nOne Billion Americans argues for a variety of programs, including increased government spending on child care and day care, the use of S-trains for urban transportation, and increased immigration to the United States, under the general rubric of increasing the American population. It suggests that a substantial increase to the population of the United States is necessary to perpetuate American hegemony. The book gives special attention to housing policy, critiquing zoning requirements that limit urban density in American cities.\n\nAs of May 2022, the US population is [estimated to be approximately 332,686,000.](https://www.census.gov/popclock/)\n\nYou can view historical US population data since 1935 [here.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_the_United_States#Vital_statistics)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when at least 500 million persons are estimated to live in the United States, according to the [US Census Bureau](https://www.census.gov/popclock/).\n\nIf the question does not resolve before January 1, 2121, it will resolve as **>January 1, 2121**", "lower_25": "2085", "median": "2119", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2121", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be at least 500 million Americans by Not ≤ 2121?", "desc": "[One Billion Americans: The Case for Thinking Bigger](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Billion_Americans) is a book by [Matthew Yglesias](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_Yglesias), first published in 2020.\n\nOne Billion Americans argues for a variety of programs, including increased government spending on child care and day care, the use of S-trains for urban transportation, and increased immigration to the United States, under the general rubric of increasing the American population. It suggests that a substantial increase to the population of the United States is necessary to perpetuate American hegemony. The book gives special attention to housing policy, critiquing zoning requirements that limit urban density in American cities.\n\nAs of May 2022, the US population is [estimated to be approximately 332,686,000.](https://www.census.gov/popclock/)\n\nYou can view historical US population data since 1935 [here.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_the_United_States#Vital_statistics)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when at least 500 million persons are estimated to live in the United States, according to the [US Census Bureau](https://www.census.gov/popclock/).\n\nIf the question does not resolve before January 1, 2121, it will resolve as **>January 1, 2121**", "lower_25": "2085", "median": "2119", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2121", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "In what percentage of US States will Casey-era abortion rights be granted on May 1, 2026?\n\nKeyword: 66.9\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 66.9% of US States will grant Casey-era abortion rights on May 1, 2026?", "desc": "On May 2, 2022, [POLITICO](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/02/supreme-court-abortion-draft-opinion-00029473) published a leaked draft of a Supreme Court decision that indicated that the Court was planning on overturning [Roe v. Wade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roe_v._Wade) and [Planned Parenthood v. Casey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planned_Parenthood_v._Casey). These two cases establish rights and protections for people seeking abortions; Casey stated that states could not prohibit abortions prior to [fetal viability](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fetal_viability), which is typically 23 to 24 weeks of gestation. Casey also held that states could impose some restrictions on abortions prior to fetal viability, so long as they were not an \"undue burden\", [defined](https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/cases/4680) as a regulation which has \"the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.\"\n\nAbortion is a famously controversial subject in the US, with adamant proponents for both sides arguing for abortion to be legal or illegal in all or nearly all circumstances. FiveThirtyEight journalist Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux estimated in December 2021 that [55-65% of Americans fall in the middle](https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-americans-really-think-about-abortion/), favoring various degrees of access to abortion with restrictions. Gallup has found in polling consistently since 1989 [more Americans support Roe v Wade](https://news.gallup.com/poll/350804/americans-opposed-overturning-roe-wade.aspx) than wish to overturn it.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of US States which protect abortion access at or above the level mandated in [Planned Parenthood v. Casey](https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/cases/4680), on May 1, 2026. If a state bans abortions at any point prior to fetal viability, or any point prior to 23 weeks of gestational age, it will be considered more restrictive than Casey. Additionally, a law may be more restrictive than Casey if it places an \"undue burden\" on people seeking an abortion; determining whether the \"undue burden\" standard has been broken will be done by referencing legal scholar's opinions and by the judgement of Metaculus Admins.\n\nFor example, if federal legislation is passed protecting all abortions in all US States, or protecting abortions up to 24 weeks of gestational age, this question would resolve as **100%**. If there were a nationwide ban on all abortions, or on abortions occuring after 15 weeks of gestational age, this question would resolve as **0%**. If all abortions were banned in 20 states, and all abortions fully protected in 30, this question would resolve as **60%**.\n\nA state's level of abortion rights will be determined by whether restrictions are enforced or enforcable in practice. For example, [trigger laws](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trigger_law) which are technically \"on the books\" but unenforcable will be disregarded for the question's resolution", "lower_25": "45.8", "median": "56.1", "upper_75": "66.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Democratic Party nominee will win 308 Electoral College votes in the 2024 presidential election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "237", "median": "275", "upper_75": "308", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Republican Party nominee will win 305 Electoral College votes in the 2024 presidential election?", "desc": "To win the Presidency of the United States, a candidate must obtain 270 [Electoral College](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Electoral_College) votes out of a potential 538. \n\nThe largest absolute number of Electoral College votes ever received by any candidate was 525, won by Ronald Reagan [in 1984](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1984_United_States_presidential_election), 97.58% of all possible votes - but Franklin D. Roosevelt and James Monroe received a higher percentage of votes (98.49% and 99.57% respectively.) A list of previous Electoral College results can be found [here.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_presidential_elections_by_Electoral_College_margin#Table_of_election_results)", "resc": "There is a potential complication here: faithless electors. In many states, it is legally possible for an Electoral College elector to refuse to honor the vote of their state population and to cast their vote for someone else. To counter this potential complication, we will say that the Republican candidate has 'won' whatever the final number of legally valid Electoral College votes certified by the United States Congress is in the first week of January 2025, accounting for the effect of any faithless electors", "lower_25": "238", "median": "267", "upper_75": "305", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India's rating in the Freedom In the World Report will be 68.8 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "61.8", "median": "65.2", "upper_75": "68.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an original, wholly AI-generated feature film will rank #1 on a popular streaming service by Apr 2028?", "desc": "As of 2022, generative artificial intelligence models have demonstrated synthesis of [audio](https://openai.com/blog/jukebox/), [images](https://openai.com/dall-e-2/), and [text](https://beta.openai.com/examples/) at varying levels of quality. Additionally, deepfaked faces and voices are [currently being researched](https://studios.disneyresearch.com/2020/06/29/high-resolution-neural-face-swapping-for-visual-effects/) and [applied](https://www.indiewire.com/2021/07/lucasfilm-hires-deepfake-youtuber-mandalorian-skywalker-vfx-1234653720/) by studios such as Disney to aid in reviving characters from past productions.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a film generated wholly by an artificial intelligence reaches the #1 rank in streaming popularity on any of the top 10 online video streaming services at the time, as verified by the streaming service itself or some other credible source.", "lower_25": "Nov 2025", "median": "Apr 2028", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be at least 500 million Americans by Not ≤ 2121?", "desc": "[One Billion Americans: The Case for Thinking Bigger](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Billion_Americans) is a book by [Matthew Yglesias](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_Yglesias), first published in 2020.\n\nOne Billion Americans argues for a variety of programs, including increased government spending on child care and day care, the use of S-trains for urban transportation, and increased immigration to the United States, under the general rubric of increasing the American population. It suggests that a substantial increase to the population of the United States is necessary to perpetuate American hegemony. The book gives special attention to housing policy, critiquing zoning requirements that limit urban density in American cities.\n\nAs of May 2022, the US population is [estimated to be approximately 332,686,000.](https://www.census.gov/popclock/)\n\nYou can view historical US population data since 1935 [here.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_the_United_States#Vital_statistics)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when at least 500 million persons are estimated to live in the United States, according to the [US Census Bureau](https://www.census.gov/popclock/).\n\nIf the question does not resolve before January 1, 2121, it will resolve as **>January 1, 2121**", "lower_25": "2085", "median": "2119", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2121", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an original, wholly AI-generated feature film will rank #1 on a popular streaming service by Apr 2028?", "desc": "As of 2022, generative artificial intelligence models have demonstrated synthesis of [audio](https://openai.com/blog/jukebox/), [images](https://openai.com/dall-e-2/), and [text](https://beta.openai.com/examples/) at varying levels of quality. Additionally, deepfaked faces and voices are [currently being researched](https://studios.disneyresearch.com/2020/06/29/high-resolution-neural-face-swapping-for-visual-effects/) and [applied](https://www.indiewire.com/2021/07/lucasfilm-hires-deepfake-youtuber-mandalorian-skywalker-vfx-1234653720/) by studios such as Disney to aid in reviving characters from past productions.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a film generated wholly by an artificial intelligence reaches the #1 rank in streaming popularity on any of the top 10 online video streaming services at the time, as verified by the streaming service itself or some other credible source.", "lower_25": "Nov 2025", "median": "Apr 2028", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India's rating in the Freedom In the World Report will be 68.8 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "61.8", "median": "65.2", "upper_75": "68.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next landslide presidential election will happen in the United States by 2041?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2052", "upper_75": "2074", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Republican Party nominee will win 305 Electoral College votes in the 2024 presidential election?", "desc": "To win the Presidency of the United States, a candidate must obtain 270 [Electoral College](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Electoral_College) votes out of a potential 538. \n\nThe largest absolute number of Electoral College votes ever received by any candidate was 525, won by Ronald Reagan [in 1984](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1984_United_States_presidential_election), 97.58% of all possible votes - but Franklin D. Roosevelt and James Monroe received a higher percentage of votes (98.49% and 99.57% respectively.) A list of previous Electoral College results can be found [here.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_presidential_elections_by_Electoral_College_margin#Table_of_election_results)", "resc": "There is a potential complication here: faithless electors. In many states, it is legally possible for an Electoral College elector to refuse to honor the vote of their state population and to cast their vote for someone else. To counter this potential complication, we will say that the Republican candidate has 'won' whatever the final number of legally valid Electoral College votes certified by the United States Congress is in the first week of January 2025, accounting for the effect of any faithless electors", "lower_25": "238", "median": "267", "upper_75": "305", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next landslide presidential election will happen in the United States by 2041?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2052", "upper_75": "2074", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total market cap of all cryptocurrencies will be 4.24k billion USD at the start of 2027?", "desc": "This is a redone version of [the same question for 2025](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5446/total-market-cap-of-cryptocurrencies-2025/) but with a longer runtime and a higher maximum.\n\n[Coinmarketcap.com](https://coinmarketcap.com/) is perhaps the most popular site for monitoring the values of cryptocurrencies. While one can look at specific coins, one can also look at [the total market cap](https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/), i.e. the summed value in USD of every coin's worth. As of May 19th 2022, this value is $1,239 billion USD, down from all time high of $2,976 billion USD on 10th November 2021. The total market cap is usually highly correlated with the value of Bitcoin, but if the market share of Bitcoin falls drastically, this is no guarantee ([see this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5205/bitcoins-market-dominant-cryptocurrency/)).", "resc": "- Value is taken from [coinmarketcap.com's page](https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/), in billions of USD (nominal).\n- If the site goes down before resolution, Metaculus admins will choose a suitable replacement. If none is found, this resolves ambiguous", "lower_25": "2.29k", "median": "4.24k", "upper_75": "6.25k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next landslide presidential election will happen in the United States by 2041?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2052", "upper_75": "2074", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total market cap of all cryptocurrencies will be 4.24k billion USD at the start of 2027?", "desc": "This is a redone version of [the same question for 2025](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5446/total-market-cap-of-cryptocurrencies-2025/) but with a longer runtime and a higher maximum.\n\n[Coinmarketcap.com](https://coinmarketcap.com/) is perhaps the most popular site for monitoring the values of cryptocurrencies. While one can look at specific coins, one can also look at [the total market cap](https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/), i.e. the summed value in USD of every coin's worth. As of May 19th 2022, this value is $1,239 billion USD, down from all time high of $2,976 billion USD on 10th November 2021. The total market cap is usually highly correlated with the value of Bitcoin, but if the market share of Bitcoin falls drastically, this is no guarantee ([see this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5205/bitcoins-market-dominant-cryptocurrency/)).", "resc": "- Value is taken from [coinmarketcap.com's page](https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/), in billions of USD (nominal).\n- If the site goes down before resolution, Metaculus admins will choose a suitable replacement. If none is found, this resolves ambiguous", "lower_25": "2.29k", "median": "4.24k", "upper_75": "6.25k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total market cap of all cryptocurrencies will be 4.24k billion USD at the start of 2027?", "desc": "This is a redone version of [the same question for 2025](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5446/total-market-cap-of-cryptocurrencies-2025/) but with a longer runtime and a higher maximum.\n\n[Coinmarketcap.com](https://coinmarketcap.com/) is perhaps the most popular site for monitoring the values of cryptocurrencies. While one can look at specific coins, one can also look at [the total market cap](https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/), i.e. the summed value in USD of every coin's worth. As of May 19th 2022, this value is $1,239 billion USD, down from all time high of $2,976 billion USD on 10th November 2021. The total market cap is usually highly correlated with the value of Bitcoin, but if the market share of Bitcoin falls drastically, this is no guarantee ([see this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5205/bitcoins-market-dominant-cryptocurrency/)).", "resc": "- Value is taken from [coinmarketcap.com's page](https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/), in billions of USD (nominal).\n- If the site goes down before resolution, Metaculus admins will choose a suitable replacement. If none is found, this resolves ambiguous", "lower_25": "2.29k", "median": "4.24k", "upper_75": "6.25k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Hang Seng Index will be 36.9k on January 1st 2030?", "desc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hang_Seng_Index),\n\n> The Hang Seng Index (HSI) is a freefloat-adjusted market-capitalization-weighted stock-market index in Hong Kong. It is used to record and monitor daily changes of the largest companies of the Hong Kong stock market and is the main indicator of the overall market performance in Hong Kong. These 66 constituent companies represent about 58% of the capitalisation of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.", "resc": "This question resolves as the most recent closing value of the Hang Seng Index at the end of the day on January 1st 2030, according to the local time in Hong Kong", "lower_25": "< 5k", "median": "18.3k", "upper_75": "36.9k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India's rating in the Freedom In the World Report will be 68.8 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "61.8", "median": "65.2", "upper_75": "68.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the SSE Index will be 4.76k on January 1, 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.28k", "median": "4.76k", "upper_75": "7.07k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the SSE Index will be 4.76k on January 1, 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.28k", "median": "4.76k", "upper_75": "7.07k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Hang Seng Index will be 36.9k on January 1st 2030?", "desc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hang_Seng_Index),\n\n> The Hang Seng Index (HSI) is a freefloat-adjusted market-capitalization-weighted stock-market index in Hong Kong. It is used to record and monitor daily changes of the largest companies of the Hong Kong stock market and is the main indicator of the overall market performance in Hong Kong. These 66 constituent companies represent about 58% of the capitalisation of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.", "resc": "This question resolves as the most recent closing value of the Hang Seng Index at the end of the day on January 1st 2030, according to the local time in Hong Kong", "lower_25": "< 5k", "median": "18.3k", "upper_75": "36.9k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the SSE Index will be 4.76k on January 1, 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.28k", "median": "4.76k", "upper_75": "7.07k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Hang Seng Index will be 36.9k on January 1st 2030?", "desc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hang_Seng_Index),\n\n> The Hang Seng Index (HSI) is a freefloat-adjusted market-capitalization-weighted stock-market index in Hong Kong. It is used to record and monitor daily changes of the largest companies of the Hong Kong stock market and is the main indicator of the overall market performance in Hong Kong. These 66 constituent companies represent about 58% of the capitalisation of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.", "resc": "This question resolves as the most recent closing value of the Hang Seng Index at the end of the day on January 1st 2030, according to the local time in Hong Kong", "lower_25": "< 5k", "median": "18.3k", "upper_75": "36.9k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that martial law will be lifted in at least 3/4 of Ukraine by Apr 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 2025", "median": "Apr 2026", "upper_75": "Apr 2027", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that martial law will be lifted in at least 3/4 of Ukraine by Apr 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 2025", "median": "Apr 2026", "upper_75": "Apr 2027", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that world energy consumption will first exceed 130% of every prior year in 2044?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2044", "median": "2113", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2201", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that martial law will be lifted in at least 3/4 of Ukraine by Apr 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 2025", "median": "Apr 2026", "upper_75": "Apr 2027", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a publicly traded company will have a market cap of at least $5 trillion USD by 2032?", "desc": "[Market capitalization](https://www.investopedia.com/investing/market-capitalization-defined/), or \"market cap\", is the aggregate market value of a company represented in a dollar amount.\n\nThe formula is: [Market Cap = Price Per Share × Shares Outstanding](https://www.investopedia.com/investing/market-capitalization-defined/)\n\nAt the time this question was raised, [Apple Inc. (AAPL), Saudi Arabian Oil Co. (2222.SR), and Microsoft Corp. (MSFT)](https://www.investopedia.com/biggest-companies-in-the-world-by-market-cap-5212784) are each estimated to have a market cap over $2 trillion USD, with [Alphabet Inc. (GOOGL) & Amazon.com Inc. (AMZN)](https://www.investopedia.com/biggest-companies-in-the-world-by-market-cap-5212784) estimated to have a market cap over $1 trillion USD. \n\nFor the purposes of this question, [a publicly-traded company](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/publicly-traded) is one whose shares can be bought and sold on a stock exchange.", "resc": "This question will resolve when a publicly traded company whose shares can be bought and sold on a stock exchange achieves a market capitalisation of $5 trillion (in USD at the time the question resolves, so not inflation-adjusted).", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be 4.14% in the following years?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp))._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS_x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)_x000D_\n_x000D_\nEDIT:_x000D_\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "2.53", "median": "4.14", "upper_75": "5.40", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be 4.14% in the following years?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp))._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS_x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)_x000D_\n_x000D_\nEDIT:_x000D_\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "2.53", "median": "4.14", "upper_75": "5.40", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be 4.14% in the following years?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp))._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS_x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)_x000D_\n_x000D_\nEDIT:_x000D_\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "2.53", "median": "4.14", "upper_75": "5.40", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a publicly traded company will have a market cap of at least $5 trillion USD by 2032?", "desc": "[Market capitalization](https://www.investopedia.com/investing/market-capitalization-defined/), or \"market cap\", is the aggregate market value of a company represented in a dollar amount.\n\nThe formula is: [Market Cap = Price Per Share × Shares Outstanding](https://www.investopedia.com/investing/market-capitalization-defined/)\n\nAt the time this question was raised, [Apple Inc. (AAPL), Saudi Arabian Oil Co. (2222.SR), and Microsoft Corp. (MSFT)](https://www.investopedia.com/biggest-companies-in-the-world-by-market-cap-5212784) are each estimated to have a market cap over $2 trillion USD, with [Alphabet Inc. (GOOGL) & Amazon.com Inc. (AMZN)](https://www.investopedia.com/biggest-companies-in-the-world-by-market-cap-5212784) estimated to have a market cap over $1 trillion USD. \n\nFor the purposes of this question, [a publicly-traded company](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/publicly-traded) is one whose shares can be bought and sold on a stock exchange.", "resc": "This question will resolve when a publicly traded company whose shares can be bought and sold on a stock exchange achieves a market capitalisation of $5 trillion (in USD at the time the question resolves, so not inflation-adjusted).", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that world energy consumption will first exceed 130% of every prior year in 2044?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2044", "median": "2113", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2201", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a publicly traded company will have a market cap of at least $5 trillion USD by 2032?", "desc": "[Market capitalization](https://www.investopedia.com/investing/market-capitalization-defined/), or \"market cap\", is the aggregate market value of a company represented in a dollar amount.\n\nThe formula is: [Market Cap = Price Per Share × Shares Outstanding](https://www.investopedia.com/investing/market-capitalization-defined/)\n\nAt the time this question was raised, [Apple Inc. (AAPL), Saudi Arabian Oil Co. (2222.SR), and Microsoft Corp. (MSFT)](https://www.investopedia.com/biggest-companies-in-the-world-by-market-cap-5212784) are each estimated to have a market cap over $2 trillion USD, with [Alphabet Inc. (GOOGL) & Amazon.com Inc. (AMZN)](https://www.investopedia.com/biggest-companies-in-the-world-by-market-cap-5212784) estimated to have a market cap over $1 trillion USD. \n\nFor the purposes of this question, [a publicly-traded company](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/publicly-traded) is one whose shares can be bought and sold on a stock exchange.", "resc": "This question will resolve when a publicly traded company whose shares can be bought and sold on a stock exchange achieves a market capitalisation of $5 trillion (in USD at the time the question resolves, so not inflation-adjusted).", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that California's High-Speed Rail will be open for service between San Francisco and Anaheim by 2049?", "desc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_High-Speed_Rail),\n\n> California High-Speed Rail (CAHSR or CHSR) is a publicly funded high-speed rail system under construction in the U.S. state of California. Its goal is to connect the Anaheim Regional Transportation Intermodal Center in Anaheim and Union Station in Downtown Los Angeles with the Salesforce Transit Center in San Francisco via the Central Valley, providing a one-seat ride between Union Station and San Francisco in 2 hours and 40 minutes, a distance of 380 miles (610 km). Future extensions (in Phase 2) are planned to connect southward to stations in San Diego County via the Inland Empire, as well as northward to Sacramento...\n\n> The project has been widely described as troubled, being far behind schedule and suffering from management turmoil, problems with procuring land, and engineering issues. In addition, the cost of the project has risen from an estimate of $33 billion in 2008 to $93.5 billion by 2022...\n\n> The complete 500-mile (805-km) Phase 1 system between San Francisco and Anaheim in earlier plans was to be completed in 2033, however, this has been slowed by unanticipated issues.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when an ordinary passenger in California can receive a ticket and ride on a single-seat high-speed rail line from some part of San Francisco to some part of Anaheim (ie. without any transfers). For the purpose of this question, high-speed rail is defined as a rail system that supports the ability for transit at above 250 kilometers per hour during normal operation. This will theoretically be possible when Phase 1 of the California High-Speed Rail is completed", "lower_25": "2042", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2060", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that California's High-Speed Rail will be open for service between San Francisco and Anaheim by 2049?", "desc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_High-Speed_Rail),\n\n> California High-Speed Rail (CAHSR or CHSR) is a publicly funded high-speed rail system under construction in the U.S. state of California. Its goal is to connect the Anaheim Regional Transportation Intermodal Center in Anaheim and Union Station in Downtown Los Angeles with the Salesforce Transit Center in San Francisco via the Central Valley, providing a one-seat ride between Union Station and San Francisco in 2 hours and 40 minutes, a distance of 380 miles (610 km). Future extensions (in Phase 2) are planned to connect southward to stations in San Diego County via the Inland Empire, as well as northward to Sacramento...\n\n> The project has been widely described as troubled, being far behind schedule and suffering from management turmoil, problems with procuring land, and engineering issues. In addition, the cost of the project has risen from an estimate of $33 billion in 2008 to $93.5 billion by 2022...\n\n> The complete 500-mile (805-km) Phase 1 system between San Francisco and Anaheim in earlier plans was to be completed in 2033, however, this has been slowed by unanticipated issues.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when an ordinary passenger in California can receive a ticket and ride on a single-seat high-speed rail line from some part of San Francisco to some part of Anaheim (ie. without any transfers). For the purpose of this question, high-speed rail is defined as a rail system that supports the ability for transit at above 250 kilometers per hour during normal operation. This will theoretically be possible when Phase 1 of the California High-Speed Rail is completed", "lower_25": "2042", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2060", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that world energy consumption will first exceed 130% of every prior year in 2044?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2044", "median": "2113", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2201", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on civilization launching one or more von Neumann probes by 2200 that will reach another solar system within 100,000 years, what is the chance that the fastest one will have an average speed of 1.33 c (> 1)?", "desc": "", "resc": "*This is a companion question to [Fastest von Neumann probe launched by 2200](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7654/expected-speed-of-von-nuemann-probes/), created in case the fastest von Neumann probe launched by 2200 travels faster than the speed of light.*\n\nVon Nuemann probes are [self-replicating spacecraft](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-replicating_spacecraft) capable of traveling to other star systems and self-replicating upon arrival.\n\nIn the 2012 talk [von Neumann probes, Dyson spheres, exploratory engineering and the Fermi paradox](https://youtu.be/zQTfuI-9jIo?t=1485), Stuart Armstrong considered three possible speeds of von Nuemann probes (expressed as percentages of the speed of light, *c*): 50% *c*, 90% *c*, and 99% *c*.\n\n***Conditional on civilization launching one or more von Neumann probes by 2200 that will reach another solar system within 100,000 years, what will be the average speed of the fastest one, in c?***\n\nThis question will resolve according to the best available credible estimate of the average speed of the fastest von Neumann probe launched before January 1, 2200, as judged by Metaculus. The planned average speed according to credible sources will be used for resolution, the probe need not actually reach its destination by January 1, 2200.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, any interstellar spacecraft capable of self-replicating or otherwise performing general engineering work upon arrival to a new solar system would count. In other words, a probe that constructs other machines that are not an exact replica of itself would count, however a probe that merely gathered data and transmitted it back would not. The spirit here is whether the probe or spacecraft is able to begin doing the work of colonizing other solar systems.\n\nIn order to unambiguously express the velocity of a spacecraft, a frame of reference must be specified. For the purposes of this question, this reference frame will be taken to be fixed to the center of mass of the sun.\n\nThe average speed is the speed of the probe averaged over its full journey from departure to arrival solar system, including time spent accelerating and deaccelerating. In the event the destination is reached through means that distort the standard measurement of the distance between objects, such as [wormholes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wormhole#Faster-than-light_travel), the average speed will be calculated as the distance that would have been traveled had the distance not been distorted (preferably using [cosmological comoving coordinates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comoving_and_proper_distances)) divided by the cosmological time the journey took according to the reference frame. Admins may use their judgement to determine the appropriate distance to use, and may make simplifying assumptions as needed.\n\nIf the average speed of the probe is above a million times the speed of light this will resolve as **\"> 1,000,000\"**. If no qualifying probes are launched before January 1, 2200 this question will resolve as **ambiguous**. In the event that the average speed is less than or equal to the speed of light, this question will resolve as **ambiguous** and this companion question will resolve instead:\n\n* [Speed of fastest von Neumann probe by 2200](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7654/expected-speed-of-von-nuemann-probes/)", "lower_25": "1.33", "median": "224", "upper_75": "73.0k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on civilization launching one or more von Neumann probes by 2200 that will reach another solar system within 100,000 years, what is the chance that the fastest one will have an average speed of 1.33 c (> 1)?", "desc": "", "resc": "*This is a companion question to [Fastest von Neumann probe launched by 2200](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7654/expected-speed-of-von-nuemann-probes/), created in case the fastest von Neumann probe launched by 2200 travels faster than the speed of light.*\n\nVon Nuemann probes are [self-replicating spacecraft](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-replicating_spacecraft) capable of traveling to other star systems and self-replicating upon arrival.\n\nIn the 2012 talk [von Neumann probes, Dyson spheres, exploratory engineering and the Fermi paradox](https://youtu.be/zQTfuI-9jIo?t=1485), Stuart Armstrong considered three possible speeds of von Nuemann probes (expressed as percentages of the speed of light, *c*): 50% *c*, 90% *c*, and 99% *c*.\n\n***Conditional on civilization launching one or more von Neumann probes by 2200 that will reach another solar system within 100,000 years, what will be the average speed of the fastest one, in c?***\n\nThis question will resolve according to the best available credible estimate of the average speed of the fastest von Neumann probe launched before January 1, 2200, as judged by Metaculus. The planned average speed according to credible sources will be used for resolution, the probe need not actually reach its destination by January 1, 2200.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, any interstellar spacecraft capable of self-replicating or otherwise performing general engineering work upon arrival to a new solar system would count. In other words, a probe that constructs other machines that are not an exact replica of itself would count, however a probe that merely gathered data and transmitted it back would not. The spirit here is whether the probe or spacecraft is able to begin doing the work of colonizing other solar systems.\n\nIn order to unambiguously express the velocity of a spacecraft, a frame of reference must be specified. For the purposes of this question, this reference frame will be taken to be fixed to the center of mass of the sun.\n\nThe average speed is the speed of the probe averaged over its full journey from departure to arrival solar system, including time spent accelerating and deaccelerating. In the event the destination is reached through means that distort the standard measurement of the distance between objects, such as [wormholes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wormhole#Faster-than-light_travel), the average speed will be calculated as the distance that would have been traveled had the distance not been distorted (preferably using [cosmological comoving coordinates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comoving_and_proper_distances)) divided by the cosmological time the journey took according to the reference frame. Admins may use their judgement to determine the appropriate distance to use, and may make simplifying assumptions as needed.\n\nIf the average speed of the probe is above a million times the speed of light this will resolve as **\"> 1,000,000\"**. If no qualifying probes are launched before January 1, 2200 this question will resolve as **ambiguous**. In the event that the average speed is less than or equal to the speed of light, this question will resolve as **ambiguous** and this companion question will resolve instead:\n\n* [Speed of fastest von Neumann probe by 2200](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7654/expected-speed-of-von-nuemann-probes/)", "lower_25": "1.33", "median": "224", "upper_75": "73.0k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on civilization launching one or more von Neumann probes by 2200 that will reach another solar system within 100,000 years, what is the chance that the fastest one will have an average speed of 1.33 c (> 1)?", "desc": "", "resc": "*This is a companion question to [Fastest von Neumann probe launched by 2200](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7654/expected-speed-of-von-nuemann-probes/), created in case the fastest von Neumann probe launched by 2200 travels faster than the speed of light.*\n\nVon Nuemann probes are [self-replicating spacecraft](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-replicating_spacecraft) capable of traveling to other star systems and self-replicating upon arrival.\n\nIn the 2012 talk [von Neumann probes, Dyson spheres, exploratory engineering and the Fermi paradox](https://youtu.be/zQTfuI-9jIo?t=1485), Stuart Armstrong considered three possible speeds of von Nuemann probes (expressed as percentages of the speed of light, *c*): 50% *c*, 90% *c*, and 99% *c*.\n\n***Conditional on civilization launching one or more von Neumann probes by 2200 that will reach another solar system within 100,000 years, what will be the average speed of the fastest one, in c?***\n\nThis question will resolve according to the best available credible estimate of the average speed of the fastest von Neumann probe launched before January 1, 2200, as judged by Metaculus. The planned average speed according to credible sources will be used for resolution, the probe need not actually reach its destination by January 1, 2200.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, any interstellar spacecraft capable of self-replicating or otherwise performing general engineering work upon arrival to a new solar system would count. In other words, a probe that constructs other machines that are not an exact replica of itself would count, however a probe that merely gathered data and transmitted it back would not. The spirit here is whether the probe or spacecraft is able to begin doing the work of colonizing other solar systems.\n\nIn order to unambiguously express the velocity of a spacecraft, a frame of reference must be specified. For the purposes of this question, this reference frame will be taken to be fixed to the center of mass of the sun.\n\nThe average speed is the speed of the probe averaged over its full journey from departure to arrival solar system, including time spent accelerating and deaccelerating. In the event the destination is reached through means that distort the standard measurement of the distance between objects, such as [wormholes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wormhole#Faster-than-light_travel), the average speed will be calculated as the distance that would have been traveled had the distance not been distorted (preferably using [cosmological comoving coordinates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comoving_and_proper_distances)) divided by the cosmological time the journey took according to the reference frame. Admins may use their judgement to determine the appropriate distance to use, and may make simplifying assumptions as needed.\n\nIf the average speed of the probe is above a million times the speed of light this will resolve as **\"> 1,000,000\"**. If no qualifying probes are launched before January 1, 2200 this question will resolve as **ambiguous**. In the event that the average speed is less than or equal to the speed of light, this question will resolve as **ambiguous** and this companion question will resolve instead:\n\n* [Speed of fastest von Neumann probe by 2200](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7654/expected-speed-of-von-nuemann-probes/)", "lower_25": "1.33", "median": "224", "upper_75": "73.0k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best available GPU on the following dates will have an average top price performance of 337 G3D Mark /$?", "desc": "\nThis question is part of the Maximum Likelihood Round of the Forecasting AI Progress Tournament. You can view all other questions in this round here.\n\n\n-----\n\nMost modern neural network implementations are based on graphics processing units [[1]](https://www.deeplearningbook.org/). This is because GPUs have a much larger number of cores than CPUs, and are thus better suited to executing highly parallelizable programs [[2]](https://www.nature.com/articles/nature14539).\n\n[Videocard benchmarks](https://www.videocardbenchmark.net/) is a benchmarking project by [Passmark](https://www.passmark.com/), a software company. It aggregates performance and price data on GPUs. One of the measures of performance it uses is [3DMark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3DMark), a computer benchmarking tool.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the mean price performance (in G3D Mark / Price) of the top two available GPUs by price performance, according to [Videocard benchmarks](https://www.videocardbenchmark.net/) on 11:59PM GMT on the following dates.\n\nJun-2021 will be evaluated on June 14, 2021; Jan-2022 on Jan 14, 2022; Feb-2023 on Feb 14, 2023; Dec-2026 on Dec 14, 2026; and Jan-2030 on Jan 1, 2030.", "lower_25": "165", "median": "246", "upper_75": "337", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that California's High-Speed Rail will be open for service between San Francisco and Anaheim by 2049?", "desc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_High-Speed_Rail),\n\n> California High-Speed Rail (CAHSR or CHSR) is a publicly funded high-speed rail system under construction in the U.S. state of California. Its goal is to connect the Anaheim Regional Transportation Intermodal Center in Anaheim and Union Station in Downtown Los Angeles with the Salesforce Transit Center in San Francisco via the Central Valley, providing a one-seat ride between Union Station and San Francisco in 2 hours and 40 minutes, a distance of 380 miles (610 km). Future extensions (in Phase 2) are planned to connect southward to stations in San Diego County via the Inland Empire, as well as northward to Sacramento...\n\n> The project has been widely described as troubled, being far behind schedule and suffering from management turmoil, problems with procuring land, and engineering issues. In addition, the cost of the project has risen from an estimate of $33 billion in 2008 to $93.5 billion by 2022...\n\n> The complete 500-mile (805-km) Phase 1 system between San Francisco and Anaheim in earlier plans was to be completed in 2033, however, this has been slowed by unanticipated issues.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when an ordinary passenger in California can receive a ticket and ride on a single-seat high-speed rail line from some part of San Francisco to some part of Anaheim (ie. without any transfers). For the purpose of this question, high-speed rail is defined as a rail system that supports the ability for transit at above 250 kilometers per hour during normal operation. This will theoretically be possible when Phase 1 of the California High-Speed Rail is completed", "lower_25": "2042", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2060", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best available GPU on the following dates will have an average top price performance of 337 G3D Mark /$?", "desc": "\nThis question is part of the Maximum Likelihood Round of the Forecasting AI Progress Tournament. You can view all other questions in this round here.\n\n\n-----\n\nMost modern neural network implementations are based on graphics processing units [[1]](https://www.deeplearningbook.org/). This is because GPUs have a much larger number of cores than CPUs, and are thus better suited to executing highly parallelizable programs [[2]](https://www.nature.com/articles/nature14539).\n\n[Videocard benchmarks](https://www.videocardbenchmark.net/) is a benchmarking project by [Passmark](https://www.passmark.com/), a software company. It aggregates performance and price data on GPUs. One of the measures of performance it uses is [3DMark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3DMark), a computer benchmarking tool.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the mean price performance (in G3D Mark / Price) of the top two available GPUs by price performance, according to [Videocard benchmarks](https://www.videocardbenchmark.net/) on 11:59PM GMT on the following dates.\n\nJun-2021 will be evaluated on June 14, 2021; Jan-2022 on Jan 14, 2022; Feb-2023 on Feb 14, 2023; Dec-2026 on Dec 14, 2026; and Jan-2030 on Jan 1, 2030.", "lower_25": "165", "median": "246", "upper_75": "337", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each of these steps will not happen in Ukraine's EU accession process by June 29, 2024?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "May 17, 2024", "median": "Jun 27, 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jun 29, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.34 cities in a country will be offensively attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "4.34", "median": "10.5", "upper_75": "25.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.34 cities in a country will be offensively attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "4.34", "median": "10.5", "upper_75": "25.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best available GPU on the following dates will have an average top price performance of 337 G3D Mark /$?", "desc": "\nThis question is part of the Maximum Likelihood Round of the Forecasting AI Progress Tournament. You can view all other questions in this round here.\n\n\n-----\n\nMost modern neural network implementations are based on graphics processing units [[1]](https://www.deeplearningbook.org/). This is because GPUs have a much larger number of cores than CPUs, and are thus better suited to executing highly parallelizable programs [[2]](https://www.nature.com/articles/nature14539).\n\n[Videocard benchmarks](https://www.videocardbenchmark.net/) is a benchmarking project by [Passmark](https://www.passmark.com/), a software company. It aggregates performance and price data on GPUs. One of the measures of performance it uses is [3DMark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3DMark), a computer benchmarking tool.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the mean price performance (in G3D Mark / Price) of the top two available GPUs by price performance, according to [Videocard benchmarks](https://www.videocardbenchmark.net/) on 11:59PM GMT on the following dates.\n\nJun-2021 will be evaluated on June 14, 2021; Jan-2022 on Jan 14, 2022; Feb-2023 on Feb 14, 2023; Dec-2026 on Dec 14, 2026; and Jan-2030 on Jan 1, 2030.", "lower_25": "165", "median": "246", "upper_75": "337", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.34 cities in a country will be offensively attacked by a nuclear weapon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "For each of the following countries, the option will resolve as **Ambiguous** if there are no offensive nuclear detonations in that country between January 1, 2021 to January 1, 2030. If there is at least one offensive detonation in that country, the option will resolve as the the total number of cities within whose boundaries a nuclear weapon is offensively detonated, between January 1, 2021 and January 1, 2030. If a city is harmed by one or more nuclear detonations but none occur on or over a point that is within the city's boundaries, that city will not be counted towards this question's resolution. \n\nThis question concerns the number of cities which will be attacked, not the number of attacks; a single city being attacked by multiple nuclear detonations will be counted only once.\n\n\"Europe\" in this question will include not just the European Union, but all countries and regions classified as European in the [CIA World Factbook](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/europe/) in 2021. This full list is reproduced in the fine print.\n\nThis question will resolve based on credible media reports and analysis by nuclear arms experts.\n\nThis question will define cities as having \"a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants in contiguous dense grid cells (>1,500 inhabitants per km2)\" (_[Degrees of Urbanization](https://blogs.worldbank.org/sustainablecities/how-do-we-define-cities-towns-and-rural-areas)_).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, offensive nuclear detonations include deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental/unauthorised detonations of state or nonstate nuclear weapons, but doesn't include [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) or [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) (even if such detonations cause substantial damage)", "lower_25": "4.34", "median": "10.5", "upper_75": "25.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each of these steps will not happen in Ukraine's EU accession process by June 29, 2024?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "May 17, 2024", "median": "Jun 27, 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jun 29, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each of these steps will not happen in Ukraine's EU accession process by June 29, 2024?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "May 17, 2024", "median": "Jun 27, 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jun 29, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a handheld and portable genomic sequencing device that costs <$250 (2021 USD) by Dec 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Oct 2026", "median": "Aug 2028", "upper_75": "Dec 2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a SARS-CoV-2 variant overtakes Omicron as the dominant variant globally before January 1, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many total SARS-CoV-2 mRNA vaccine doses will the US FDA and CDC recommend for at least 15% of the US on December 31, 2024?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the US FDA and CDC will recommend at least 15% of the US population to receive SARS-CoV-2 mRNA vaccine doses by December 31, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.05", "median": "6.98", "upper_75": "7.50", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a handheld and portable genomic sequencing device that costs <$250 (2021 USD) by Dec 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Oct 2026", "median": "Aug 2028", "upper_75": "Dec 2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a SARS-CoV-2 variant overtakes Omicron as the dominant variant globally before January 1, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 8.73 high-risk laboratory biosecurity incidents will occur between 2022 and 2026 (inclusive)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.22", "median": "5.74", "upper_75": "8.73", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a SARS-CoV-2 variant overtakes Omicron as the dominant variant globally before January 1, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that negotiations for Ukraine's EU accession process will be initiated by May 17, 2024?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "May 17, 2024", "median": "Jun 27, 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jun 29, 2024", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each of these steps in Ukraine's EU accession process will happen by 2035?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that negotiations for Ukraine's EU accession process will be initiated by May 17, 2024?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "May 17, 2024", "median": "Jun 27, 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jun 29, 2024", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that negotiations for Ukraine's EU accession process will be initiated by May 17, 2024?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "May 17, 2024", "median": "Jun 27, 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jun 29, 2024", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many total SARS-CoV-2 mRNA vaccine doses will the US FDA and CDC recommend for at least 15% of the US on December 31, 2024?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the US FDA and CDC will recommend at least 15% of the US population to receive SARS-CoV-2 mRNA vaccine doses by December 31, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.05", "median": "6.98", "upper_75": "7.50", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 8.73 high-risk laboratory biosecurity incidents will occur between 2022 and 2026 (inclusive)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.22", "median": "5.74", "upper_75": "8.73", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each of these steps will happen in Ukraine's EU accession process by 2029?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a handheld and portable genomic sequencing device that costs <$250 (2021 USD) by Dec 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Oct 2026", "median": "Aug 2028", "upper_75": "Dec 2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many total SARS-CoV-2 mRNA vaccine doses will the US FDA and CDC recommend for at least 15% of the US on December 31, 2024?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the US FDA and CDC will recommend at least 15% of the US population to receive SARS-CoV-2 mRNA vaccine doses by December 31, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.05", "median": "6.98", "upper_75": "7.50", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that negotiations will be completed in Ukraine's EU accession process by 2039?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*_x000D_\n_x000D_\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)_x000D_\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)_x000D_\n_x000D_\n----_x000D_\n_x000D_\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership._x000D_\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status._x000D_\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start._x000D_\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start._x000D_\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step._x000D_\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once._x000D_\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding._x000D_\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed._x000D_\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed._x000D_\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening._x000D_\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that negotiations will be completed in Ukraine's EU accession process by 2039?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*_x000D_\n_x000D_\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)_x000D_\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)_x000D_\n_x000D_\n----_x000D_\n_x000D_\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership._x000D_\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status._x000D_\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start._x000D_\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start._x000D_\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step._x000D_\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once._x000D_\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding._x000D_\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed._x000D_\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed._x000D_\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening._x000D_\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each of these steps will happen in Ukraine's EU accession process by 2029?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each of these steps in Ukraine's EU accession process will happen by 2035?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that negotiations will be completed in Ukraine's EU accession process by 2039?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*_x000D_\n_x000D_\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)_x000D_\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)_x000D_\n_x000D_\n----_x000D_\n_x000D_\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership._x000D_\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status._x000D_\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start._x000D_\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start._x000D_\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step._x000D_\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once._x000D_\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding._x000D_\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed._x000D_\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed._x000D_\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening._x000D_\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each of these steps will happen in Ukraine's EU accession process by 2029?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each of these steps in Ukraine's EU accession process will happen by 2035?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each of these steps in Ukraine's EU accession process will happen by 2034?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each of these steps in Ukraine's EU accession process will happen by 2034?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Ukraine's EU accession process will have each of these steps completed by Jun 2035?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "Jun 2035", "median": "Oct 2039", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2040", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each of these steps in Ukraine's EU accession process will not happen before 2040?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Ukraine's EU accession process will have each of these steps completed by Jun 2035?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "Jun 2035", "median": "Oct 2039", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2040", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each of these steps in Ukraine's EU accession process will not happen before 2040?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each of these steps in Ukraine's EU accession process will happen by 2034?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will first mint a coin worth $1 billion or more before January 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2032", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2033", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 8.73 high-risk laboratory biosecurity incidents will occur between 2022 and 2026 (inclusive)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.22", "median": "5.74", "upper_75": "8.73", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Ukraine's EU accession process will have each of these steps completed by Jun 2035?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "Jun 2035", "median": "Oct 2039", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2040", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will first mint a coin worth $1 billion or more before January 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2032", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2033", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each of these steps in Ukraine's EU accession process will not happen before 2040?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will Ukraine join the EU before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10081/ukraine-in-eu-before-2024/)\n* [...before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/10043/ukraine-joins-eu-before-2030/)\n\n----\n\nOn February 28, 2022 Ukraine [applied to join the European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Ukraine_to_the_European_Union). Ukraine has already cleared the steps of receiving and replying to the legislative questionnaire, which assesses the compatibility of its internal law and institutions with EU requirements. At a broad level, what still needs to happen is: Brussels institutions decide to open membership negotiations, then all EU countries and Ukraine, plus Brussels, negotiate the exact terms of membership, then a treaty of accession is implemented.\n\nThis question group is about these same part of the process, but zoomed-in a bit more:\n\n* Step 1 in the process is the European Commission recommending that the Council of the European Union grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for EU membership.\n* Step 2 is the Council granting Ukraine candidate status.\n* Step 3 is the Commission recommending that membership negotiations start.\n* Step 4 is the Council determining that negotiations start.\n* Step 5 is negotiations starting. This will most likely happen on the date determined by the previous step.\n* Step 6 is 1/3 of all negotiation chapters (of which there are usually 33) concluding. This and the following two steps are used to give a measure of negotiations progress that is of intermediate granularity between looking at each chapter and looking at all of them at once.\n* Step 7 is 2/3 of chapters concluding.\n* Step 8 is negotiations as a whole concluding, which requires all chapters being closed.\n* Step 9 is the Treaty of Accession being signed.\n* Step 10 is all necessary ratifications happening.\n* Step 11 is Ukraine joining the EU.", "resc": "Generally, each step resolves as the date of the document whose publication means the step has been cleared. For example, the date of resolution of step 1 is the date of the Commission decision to recommend candidate status. The source used should be an authoritative source for the decision itself; for example, the [Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en) or the [Council](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/) websites. The current version of the Wiki article on [EU enlargement](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Potential_enlargement_of_the_European_Union&oldid=1091804047) is a meta-source; we will use sources corresponding to the ones it currently accepts for previous enlargements as valid sources for this question group. Other possible sources include [the EU delegation to Ukraine](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en) and the [Ukrainian Foreign Ministry](https://mfa.gov.ua/en).\n\nStep 10 is not shown on the Wiki page; the Council and/or Commission will certainly publish when ratification is complete - meaning, when the last required instrument of ratification is deposited.", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will first mint a coin worth $1 billion or more before January 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2032", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2033", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India's rating in the Freedom In the World Report will be 68.8 in the year 2025?", "desc": "[The Freedom in The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule) is an annual publication by [Freedom House](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_House), a US non-profit research and advocacy institute. The report, published since 1973, gives an overview of civil liberties and political rights in each nation around the world, as well as some disputed territories and conflict zones._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIndia has been ranked as \"free\" by Freedom House from 1998 until 2021, when it was reclassified as \"partly free\". Their report on India for 2022 [stated](https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2022):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>While India is a multiparty democracy, the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has presided over discriminatory policies and a rise in persecution affecting the Muslim population. The constitution guarantees civil liberties including freedom of expression and freedom of religion, but harassment of journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other government critics has increased significantly under Modi. Muslims, scheduled castes (Dalits), and scheduled tribes (Adivasis) remain economically and socially marginalized._x000D_\n_x000D_\nHistorical data for the Freedom in The World Report can be found [here](https://freedomhouse.org/reports/publication-archives). The overall rating for India since 2006 is reproduced below:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| year | rating | freedom status |_x000D_\n| ---- | ---- | ---- |_x000D_\n| 2022 |\t66 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2021 |\t67 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2020 |\t71 | free |_x000D_\n| 2019 |\t75 | free |_x000D_\n| 2018 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2017 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2016 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2015 |\t78 | free |_x000D_\n| 2014 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2013 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2012 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2011 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2010 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2009 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2008 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2007 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2006 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n_x000D_\nNote that these scores do not include Indian [Kashmir](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir) which has been evaluated separately since 1990, and was considered \"not free\" in the 2022 report.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rating for India in the [Freedom In The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world) for the following years, as their overall score from 0 to 100. Years refer to the editions as Freedom House describes them; for example, the [2022 report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule), covered the events and developments in the world from January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2021._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIn the event that Freedom House changes their overall scoring to a different scale, Metaculus Admins will scale the score to a 0-100 scale if feasible, or add the component ratings to a 0-100 scale. If there is no reasonable conversion between future scores and previous scores, those years may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins.", "lower_25": "61.8", "median": "65.2", "upper_75": "68.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India's rating in the Freedom In the World Report will be 68.8 in the year 2025?", "desc": "[The Freedom in The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule) is an annual publication by [Freedom House](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_House), a US non-profit research and advocacy institute. The report, published since 1973, gives an overview of civil liberties and political rights in each nation around the world, as well as some disputed territories and conflict zones._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIndia has been ranked as \"free\" by Freedom House from 1998 until 2021, when it was reclassified as \"partly free\". Their report on India for 2022 [stated](https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2022):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>While India is a multiparty democracy, the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has presided over discriminatory policies and a rise in persecution affecting the Muslim population. The constitution guarantees civil liberties including freedom of expression and freedom of religion, but harassment of journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other government critics has increased significantly under Modi. Muslims, scheduled castes (Dalits), and scheduled tribes (Adivasis) remain economically and socially marginalized._x000D_\n_x000D_\nHistorical data for the Freedom in The World Report can be found [here](https://freedomhouse.org/reports/publication-archives). The overall rating for India since 2006 is reproduced below:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| year | rating | freedom status |_x000D_\n| ---- | ---- | ---- |_x000D_\n| 2022 |\t66 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2021 |\t67 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2020 |\t71 | free |_x000D_\n| 2019 |\t75 | free |_x000D_\n| 2018 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2017 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2016 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2015 |\t78 | free |_x000D_\n| 2014 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2013 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2012 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2011 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2010 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2009 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2008 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2007 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2006 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n_x000D_\nNote that these scores do not include Indian [Kashmir](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir) which has been evaluated separately since 1990, and was considered \"not free\" in the 2022 report.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rating for India in the [Freedom In The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world) for the following years, as their overall score from 0 to 100. Years refer to the editions as Freedom House describes them; for example, the [2022 report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule), covered the events and developments in the world from January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2021._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIn the event that Freedom House changes their overall scoring to a different scale, Metaculus Admins will scale the score to a 0-100 scale if feasible, or add the component ratings to a 0-100 scale. If there is no reasonable conversion between future scores and previous scores, those years may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins.", "lower_25": "61.8", "median": "65.2", "upper_75": "68.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India's rating in the Freedom In the World Report will be 68.8 in the year 2025?", "desc": "[The Freedom in The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule) is an annual publication by [Freedom House](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_House), a US non-profit research and advocacy institute. The report, published since 1973, gives an overview of civil liberties and political rights in each nation around the world, as well as some disputed territories and conflict zones._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIndia has been ranked as \"free\" by Freedom House from 1998 until 2021, when it was reclassified as \"partly free\". Their report on India for 2022 [stated](https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2022):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>While India is a multiparty democracy, the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has presided over discriminatory policies and a rise in persecution affecting the Muslim population. The constitution guarantees civil liberties including freedom of expression and freedom of religion, but harassment of journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other government critics has increased significantly under Modi. Muslims, scheduled castes (Dalits), and scheduled tribes (Adivasis) remain economically and socially marginalized._x000D_\n_x000D_\nHistorical data for the Freedom in The World Report can be found [here](https://freedomhouse.org/reports/publication-archives). The overall rating for India since 2006 is reproduced below:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| year | rating | freedom status |_x000D_\n| ---- | ---- | ---- |_x000D_\n| 2022 |\t66 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2021 |\t67 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2020 |\t71 | free |_x000D_\n| 2019 |\t75 | free |_x000D_\n| 2018 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2017 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2016 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2015 |\t78 | free |_x000D_\n| 2014 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2013 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2012 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2011 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2010 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2009 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2008 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2007 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2006 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n_x000D_\nNote that these scores do not include Indian [Kashmir](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir) which has been evaluated separately since 1990, and was considered \"not free\" in the 2022 report.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rating for India in the [Freedom In The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world) for the following years, as their overall score from 0 to 100. Years refer to the editions as Freedom House describes them; for example, the [2022 report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule), covered the events and developments in the world from January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2021._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIn the event that Freedom House changes their overall scoring to a different scale, Metaculus Admins will scale the score to a 0-100 scale if feasible, or add the component ratings to a 0-100 scale. If there is no reasonable conversion between future scores and previous scores, those years may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins.", "lower_25": "61.8", "median": "65.2", "upper_75": "68.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India's rating in the Freedom In the World Report will be 60.1 in 2026?", "desc": "[The Freedom in The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule) is an annual publication by [Freedom House](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_House), a US non-profit research and advocacy institute. The report, published since 1973, gives an overview of civil liberties and political rights in each nation around the world, as well as some disputed territories and conflict zones._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIndia has been ranked as \"free\" by Freedom House from 1998 until 2021, when it was reclassified as \"partly free\". Their report on India for 2022 [stated](https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2022):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>While India is a multiparty democracy, the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has presided over discriminatory policies and a rise in persecution affecting the Muslim population. The constitution guarantees civil liberties including freedom of expression and freedom of religion, but harassment of journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other government critics has increased significantly under Modi. Muslims, scheduled castes (Dalits), and scheduled tribes (Adivasis) remain economically and socially marginalized._x000D_\n_x000D_\nHistorical data for the Freedom in The World Report can be found [here](https://freedomhouse.org/reports/publication-archives). The overall rating for India since 2006 is reproduced below:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| year | rating | freedom status |_x000D_\n| ---- | ---- | ---- |_x000D_\n| 2022 |\t66 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2021 |\t67 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2020 |\t71 | free |_x000D_\n| 2019 |\t75 | free |_x000D_\n| 2018 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2017 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2016 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2015 |\t78 | free |_x000D_\n| 2014 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2013 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2012 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2011 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2010 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2009 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2008 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2007 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2006 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n_x000D_\nNote that these scores do not include Indian [Kashmir](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir) which has been evaluated separately since 1990, and was considered \"not free\" in the 2022 report.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rating for India in the [Freedom In The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world) for the following years, as their overall score from 0 to 100. Years refer to the editions as Freedom House describes them; for example, the [2022 report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule), covered the events and developments in the world from January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2021._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIn the event that Freedom House changes their overall scoring to a different scale, Metaculus Admins will scale the score to a 0-100 scale if feasible, or add the component ratings to a 0-100 scale. If there is no reasonable conversion between future scores and previous scores, those years may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins.", "lower_25": "60.1", "median": "64.9", "upper_75": "70.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India's rating in the Freedom In the World Report will be 71.4 for the year 2027?", "desc": "[The Freedom in The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule) is an annual publication by [Freedom House](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_House), a US non-profit research and advocacy institute. The report, published since 1973, gives an overview of civil liberties and political rights in each nation around the world, as well as some disputed territories and conflict zones._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIndia has been ranked as \"free\" by Freedom House from 1998 until 2021, when it was reclassified as \"partly free\". Their report on India for 2022 [stated](https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2022):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>While India is a multiparty democracy, the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has presided over discriminatory policies and a rise in persecution affecting the Muslim population. The constitution guarantees civil liberties including freedom of expression and freedom of religion, but harassment of journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other government critics has increased significantly under Modi. Muslims, scheduled castes (Dalits), and scheduled tribes (Adivasis) remain economically and socially marginalized._x000D_\n_x000D_\nHistorical data for the Freedom in The World Report can be found [here](https://freedomhouse.org/reports/publication-archives). The overall rating for India since 2006 is reproduced below:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| year | rating | freedom status |_x000D_\n| ---- | ---- | ---- |_x000D_\n| 2022 |\t66 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2021 |\t67 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2020 |\t71 | free |_x000D_\n| 2019 |\t75 | free |_x000D_\n| 2018 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2017 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2016 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2015 |\t78 | free |_x000D_\n| 2014 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2013 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2012 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2011 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2010 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2009 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2008 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2007 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2006 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n_x000D_\nNote that these scores do not include Indian [Kashmir](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir) which has been evaluated separately since 1990, and was considered \"not free\" in the 2022 report.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rating for India in the [Freedom In The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world) for the following years, as their overall score from 0 to 100. Years refer to the editions as Freedom House describes them; for example, the [2022 report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule), covered the events and developments in the world from January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2021._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIn the event that Freedom House changes their overall scoring to a different scale, Metaculus Admins will scale the score to a 0-100 scale if feasible, or add the component ratings to a 0-100 scale. If there is no reasonable conversion between future scores and previous scores, those years may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins.", "lower_25": "57.8", "median": "64.5", "upper_75": "71.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India's rating in the Freedom In the World Report will be 60.1 in 2026?", "desc": "[The Freedom in The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule) is an annual publication by [Freedom House](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_House), a US non-profit research and advocacy institute. The report, published since 1973, gives an overview of civil liberties and political rights in each nation around the world, as well as some disputed territories and conflict zones._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIndia has been ranked as \"free\" by Freedom House from 1998 until 2021, when it was reclassified as \"partly free\". Their report on India for 2022 [stated](https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2022):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>While India is a multiparty democracy, the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has presided over discriminatory policies and a rise in persecution affecting the Muslim population. The constitution guarantees civil liberties including freedom of expression and freedom of religion, but harassment of journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other government critics has increased significantly under Modi. Muslims, scheduled castes (Dalits), and scheduled tribes (Adivasis) remain economically and socially marginalized._x000D_\n_x000D_\nHistorical data for the Freedom in The World Report can be found [here](https://freedomhouse.org/reports/publication-archives). The overall rating for India since 2006 is reproduced below:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| year | rating | freedom status |_x000D_\n| ---- | ---- | ---- |_x000D_\n| 2022 |\t66 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2021 |\t67 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2020 |\t71 | free |_x000D_\n| 2019 |\t75 | free |_x000D_\n| 2018 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2017 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2016 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2015 |\t78 | free |_x000D_\n| 2014 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2013 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2012 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2011 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2010 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2009 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2008 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2007 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2006 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n_x000D_\nNote that these scores do not include Indian [Kashmir](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir) which has been evaluated separately since 1990, and was considered \"not free\" in the 2022 report.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rating for India in the [Freedom In The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world) for the following years, as their overall score from 0 to 100. Years refer to the editions as Freedom House describes them; for example, the [2022 report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule), covered the events and developments in the world from January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2021._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIn the event that Freedom House changes their overall scoring to a different scale, Metaculus Admins will scale the score to a 0-100 scale if feasible, or add the component ratings to a 0-100 scale. If there is no reasonable conversion between future scores and previous scores, those years may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins.", "lower_25": "60.1", "median": "64.9", "upper_75": "70.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India's rating in the Freedom In the World Report will be 64.2 by 2030?", "desc": "[The Freedom in The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule) is an annual publication by [Freedom House](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_House), a US non-profit research and advocacy institute. The report, published since 1973, gives an overview of civil liberties and political rights in each nation around the world, as well as some disputed territories and conflict zones._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIndia has been ranked as \"free\" by Freedom House from 1998 until 2021, when it was reclassified as \"partly free\". Their report on India for 2022 [stated](https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2022):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>While India is a multiparty democracy, the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has presided over discriminatory policies and a rise in persecution affecting the Muslim population. The constitution guarantees civil liberties including freedom of expression and freedom of religion, but harassment of journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other government critics has increased significantly under Modi. Muslims, scheduled castes (Dalits), and scheduled tribes (Adivasis) remain economically and socially marginalized._x000D_\n_x000D_\nHistorical data for the Freedom in The World Report can be found [here](https://freedomhouse.org/reports/publication-archives). The overall rating for India since 2006 is reproduced below:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| year | rating | freedom status |_x000D_\n| ---- | ---- | ---- |_x000D_\n| 2022 |\t66 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2021 |\t67 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2020 |\t71 | free |_x000D_\n| 2019 |\t75 | free |_x000D_\n| 2018 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2017 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2016 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2015 |\t78 | free |_x000D_\n| 2014 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2013 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2012 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2011 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2010 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2009 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2008 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2007 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2006 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n_x000D_\nNote that these scores do not include Indian [Kashmir](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir) which has been evaluated separately since 1990, and was considered \"not free\" in the 2022 report.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rating for India in the [Freedom In The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world) for the following years, as their overall score from 0 to 100. Years refer to the editions as Freedom House describes them; for example, the [2022 report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule), covered the events and developments in the world from January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2021._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIn the event that Freedom House changes their overall scoring to a different scale, Metaculus Admins will scale the score to a 0-100 scale if feasible, or add the component ratings to a 0-100 scale. If there is no reasonable conversion between future scores and previous scores, those years may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins.", "lower_25": "57.9", "median": "64.2", "upper_75": "71.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India's rating in the Freedom In the World Report will be 60.1 in 2026?", "desc": "[The Freedom in The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule) is an annual publication by [Freedom House](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_House), a US non-profit research and advocacy institute. The report, published since 1973, gives an overview of civil liberties and political rights in each nation around the world, as well as some disputed territories and conflict zones._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIndia has been ranked as \"free\" by Freedom House from 1998 until 2021, when it was reclassified as \"partly free\". Their report on India for 2022 [stated](https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2022):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>While India is a multiparty democracy, the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has presided over discriminatory policies and a rise in persecution affecting the Muslim population. The constitution guarantees civil liberties including freedom of expression and freedom of religion, but harassment of journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other government critics has increased significantly under Modi. Muslims, scheduled castes (Dalits), and scheduled tribes (Adivasis) remain economically and socially marginalized._x000D_\n_x000D_\nHistorical data for the Freedom in The World Report can be found [here](https://freedomhouse.org/reports/publication-archives). The overall rating for India since 2006 is reproduced below:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| year | rating | freedom status |_x000D_\n| ---- | ---- | ---- |_x000D_\n| 2022 |\t66 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2021 |\t67 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2020 |\t71 | free |_x000D_\n| 2019 |\t75 | free |_x000D_\n| 2018 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2017 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2016 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2015 |\t78 | free |_x000D_\n| 2014 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2013 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2012 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2011 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2010 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2009 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2008 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2007 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2006 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n_x000D_\nNote that these scores do not include Indian [Kashmir](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir) which has been evaluated separately since 1990, and was considered \"not free\" in the 2022 report.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rating for India in the [Freedom In The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world) for the following years, as their overall score from 0 to 100. Years refer to the editions as Freedom House describes them; for example, the [2022 report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule), covered the events and developments in the world from January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2021._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIn the event that Freedom House changes their overall scoring to a different scale, Metaculus Admins will scale the score to a 0-100 scale if feasible, or add the component ratings to a 0-100 scale. If there is no reasonable conversion between future scores and previous scores, those years may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins.", "lower_25": "60.1", "median": "64.9", "upper_75": "70.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India's rating in the Freedom In the World Report will be 64.2 by 2030?", "desc": "[The Freedom in The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule) is an annual publication by [Freedom House](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_House), a US non-profit research and advocacy institute. The report, published since 1973, gives an overview of civil liberties and political rights in each nation around the world, as well as some disputed territories and conflict zones._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIndia has been ranked as \"free\" by Freedom House from 1998 until 2021, when it was reclassified as \"partly free\". Their report on India for 2022 [stated](https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2022):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>While India is a multiparty democracy, the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has presided over discriminatory policies and a rise in persecution affecting the Muslim population. The constitution guarantees civil liberties including freedom of expression and freedom of religion, but harassment of journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other government critics has increased significantly under Modi. Muslims, scheduled castes (Dalits), and scheduled tribes (Adivasis) remain economically and socially marginalized._x000D_\n_x000D_\nHistorical data for the Freedom in The World Report can be found [here](https://freedomhouse.org/reports/publication-archives). The overall rating for India since 2006 is reproduced below:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| year | rating | freedom status |_x000D_\n| ---- | ---- | ---- |_x000D_\n| 2022 |\t66 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2021 |\t67 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2020 |\t71 | free |_x000D_\n| 2019 |\t75 | free |_x000D_\n| 2018 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2017 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2016 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2015 |\t78 | free |_x000D_\n| 2014 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2013 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2012 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2011 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2010 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2009 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2008 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2007 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2006 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n_x000D_\nNote that these scores do not include Indian [Kashmir](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir) which has been evaluated separately since 1990, and was considered \"not free\" in the 2022 report.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rating for India in the [Freedom In The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world) for the following years, as their overall score from 0 to 100. Years refer to the editions as Freedom House describes them; for example, the [2022 report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule), covered the events and developments in the world from January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2021._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIn the event that Freedom House changes their overall scoring to a different scale, Metaculus Admins will scale the score to a 0-100 scale if feasible, or add the component ratings to a 0-100 scale. If there is no reasonable conversion between future scores and previous scores, those years may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins.", "lower_25": "57.9", "median": "64.2", "upper_75": "71.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual US unemployment rate will be 6.08% in 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.02", "median": "6.08", "upper_75": "8.11", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 13.90 share of Africa's total primary energy will come from nuclear (fission & fusion) in 2050?", "desc": "In 2020, nuclear energy only accounted 0.74% of Africa's total primary energy ([source](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-primary-energy?tab=chart&country=~Africa)).\n\nBy comparison, nuclear accounted for 4.31% of the global primary energy mix ([source](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-primary-energy?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL)), and 7.68% for OECD countries ([source](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-primary-energy?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL)).\nFrance had the highest share globally with 36.10% ([source](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-primary-energy?tab=table&country=~OECD)).\n\nAs a country, only South Africa had a non-zero share of nuclear in their energy mix ([source](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-primary-energy)).\n\nAccording to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_commercial_nuclear_reactors#South_Africa), there is currently only one nuclear reactor operated in Africa (by South Africa, [\"Koeberg Nuclear Power Station\"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koeberg_Nuclear_Power_Station)), and only one further nuclear reactor planned for construction (again by South Africa, \"Thyspunt\nor\nDuynefontein\").\n\nNote that due to the increasing importance of electrifying most aspect of human energy consumption (such as transport and heating) in the context of climate change, this question focuses on total _primary_ energy mix calculated as the the sum of electricity, transport and heating.", "resc": "By default, [Our World In Data's estimates](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-primary-energy?tab=chart&country=~Africa) will be used as reference to resolve this question.\n\nThe resolution should happen in the 2 years following the question close to allow for the data to be collected and published. If the relevant data is not available by January 1st, 2053, this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\nIf Our World in Data is no longer publishing such an estimate or altered its calculations in such a way that they no longer reflect the same total primary energy mix as used in all current estimates, an alternative source offering the best balance between trustworthiness (an official and/or supranational organisation) and calculation fit will be chosen instead, at the discretion of Metaculus staff.", "lower_25": "1.48", "median": "3.75", "upper_75": "13.90", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual US unemployment rate will be 6.08% in 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.02", "median": "6.08", "upper_75": "8.11", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India's rating in the Freedom In the World Report will be 71.4 for the year 2027?", "desc": "[The Freedom in The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule) is an annual publication by [Freedom House](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_House), a US non-profit research and advocacy institute. The report, published since 1973, gives an overview of civil liberties and political rights in each nation around the world, as well as some disputed territories and conflict zones._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIndia has been ranked as \"free\" by Freedom House from 1998 until 2021, when it was reclassified as \"partly free\". Their report on India for 2022 [stated](https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2022):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>While India is a multiparty democracy, the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has presided over discriminatory policies and a rise in persecution affecting the Muslim population. The constitution guarantees civil liberties including freedom of expression and freedom of religion, but harassment of journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other government critics has increased significantly under Modi. Muslims, scheduled castes (Dalits), and scheduled tribes (Adivasis) remain economically and socially marginalized._x000D_\n_x000D_\nHistorical data for the Freedom in The World Report can be found [here](https://freedomhouse.org/reports/publication-archives). The overall rating for India since 2006 is reproduced below:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| year | rating | freedom status |_x000D_\n| ---- | ---- | ---- |_x000D_\n| 2022 |\t66 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2021 |\t67 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2020 |\t71 | free |_x000D_\n| 2019 |\t75 | free |_x000D_\n| 2018 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2017 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2016 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2015 |\t78 | free |_x000D_\n| 2014 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2013 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2012 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2011 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2010 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2009 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2008 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2007 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2006 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n_x000D_\nNote that these scores do not include Indian [Kashmir](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir) which has been evaluated separately since 1990, and was considered \"not free\" in the 2022 report.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rating for India in the [Freedom In The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world) for the following years, as their overall score from 0 to 100. Years refer to the editions as Freedom House describes them; for example, the [2022 report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule), covered the events and developments in the world from January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2021._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIn the event that Freedom House changes their overall scoring to a different scale, Metaculus Admins will scale the score to a 0-100 scale if feasible, or add the component ratings to a 0-100 scale. If there is no reasonable conversion between future scores and previous scores, those years may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins.", "lower_25": "57.8", "median": "64.5", "upper_75": "71.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual US unemployment rate will be 6.08% in 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.02", "median": "6.08", "upper_75": "8.11", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India's rating in the Freedom In the World Report will be 64.2 by 2030?", "desc": "[The Freedom in The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule) is an annual publication by [Freedom House](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_House), a US non-profit research and advocacy institute. The report, published since 1973, gives an overview of civil liberties and political rights in each nation around the world, as well as some disputed territories and conflict zones._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIndia has been ranked as \"free\" by Freedom House from 1998 until 2021, when it was reclassified as \"partly free\". Their report on India for 2022 [stated](https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2022):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>While India is a multiparty democracy, the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has presided over discriminatory policies and a rise in persecution affecting the Muslim population. The constitution guarantees civil liberties including freedom of expression and freedom of religion, but harassment of journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other government critics has increased significantly under Modi. Muslims, scheduled castes (Dalits), and scheduled tribes (Adivasis) remain economically and socially marginalized._x000D_\n_x000D_\nHistorical data for the Freedom in The World Report can be found [here](https://freedomhouse.org/reports/publication-archives). The overall rating for India since 2006 is reproduced below:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| year | rating | freedom status |_x000D_\n| ---- | ---- | ---- |_x000D_\n| 2022 |\t66 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2021 |\t67 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2020 |\t71 | free |_x000D_\n| 2019 |\t75 | free |_x000D_\n| 2018 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2017 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2016 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2015 |\t78 | free |_x000D_\n| 2014 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2013 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2012 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2011 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2010 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2009 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2008 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2007 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2006 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n_x000D_\nNote that these scores do not include Indian [Kashmir](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir) which has been evaluated separately since 1990, and was considered \"not free\" in the 2022 report.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rating for India in the [Freedom In The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world) for the following years, as their overall score from 0 to 100. Years refer to the editions as Freedom House describes them; for example, the [2022 report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule), covered the events and developments in the world from January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2021._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIn the event that Freedom House changes their overall scoring to a different scale, Metaculus Admins will scale the score to a 0-100 scale if feasible, or add the component ratings to a 0-100 scale. If there is no reasonable conversion between future scores and previous scores, those years may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins.", "lower_25": "57.9", "median": "64.2", "upper_75": "71.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 13.90 share of Africa's total primary energy will come from nuclear (fission & fusion) in 2050?", "desc": "In 2020, nuclear energy only accounted 0.74% of Africa's total primary energy ([source](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-primary-energy?tab=chart&country=~Africa)).\n\nBy comparison, nuclear accounted for 4.31% of the global primary energy mix ([source](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-primary-energy?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL)), and 7.68% for OECD countries ([source](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-primary-energy?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL)).\nFrance had the highest share globally with 36.10% ([source](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-primary-energy?tab=table&country=~OECD)).\n\nAs a country, only South Africa had a non-zero share of nuclear in their energy mix ([source](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-primary-energy)).\n\nAccording to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_commercial_nuclear_reactors#South_Africa), there is currently only one nuclear reactor operated in Africa (by South Africa, [\"Koeberg Nuclear Power Station\"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koeberg_Nuclear_Power_Station)), and only one further nuclear reactor planned for construction (again by South Africa, \"Thyspunt\nor\nDuynefontein\").\n\nNote that due to the increasing importance of electrifying most aspect of human energy consumption (such as transport and heating) in the context of climate change, this question focuses on total _primary_ energy mix calculated as the the sum of electricity, transport and heating.", "resc": "By default, [Our World In Data's estimates](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-primary-energy?tab=chart&country=~Africa) will be used as reference to resolve this question.\n\nThe resolution should happen in the 2 years following the question close to allow for the data to be collected and published. If the relevant data is not available by January 1st, 2053, this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\nIf Our World in Data is no longer publishing such an estimate or altered its calculations in such a way that they no longer reflect the same total primary energy mix as used in all current estimates, an alternative source offering the best balance between trustworthiness (an official and/or supranational organisation) and calculation fit will be chosen instead, at the discretion of Metaculus staff.", "lower_25": "1.48", "median": "3.75", "upper_75": "13.90", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a whole human genome in 2031 will be 77.0 USD in 2021?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the cost of sequencing a whole human genome in 2026 (in 2021 USD)?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8909/human-genome-sequencing-cost-in-2026/) [*not part of the Biosecurity Tournament*]\n\n----\n\nA [genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome) consists of all the DNA in a cell nucleus. DNA is made up by four bases: G, A, T, and C. Genome sequencing ascertains the order of these bases to understand the biological information encoded by it. Whole genome sequencing involves determining the order of these bases for the entirety of an individual organism's genome.\n\nOne important marker of progress in genomic sequencing is how the cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen over time. [According](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost) to US National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), the first high-quality 'draft' whole human genome sequence (covering ~90% of the genome at ~99.9% accuracy) was completed in 2000 and cost ~$300 million. By 2007, the cost to generate a high-quality draft human genome sequence had fallen to ~$8.6 million. In 2014, the cost was ~$4.9k. The cost as of 2020 (the most recent year with complete information) is $637. The cost data, graphs, and methods can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).\n\nThe purpose of this question is to understand future progress in genome-sequencing technologies and approaches, using the cost of human genome sequencing as a measure of such progress.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a high-quality draft whole human genome in the year 2031, according to the [US National Human Genome Research Institute](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost). This question resolve as the average of all values reported for 2031 (expected to be quarterly), and will be indexed to 2021 USD using the [CPI](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL). To account for data revisions, this will resolve based on the latest report published by NHGRI by December 31, 2032.\n\nIf NHGRI does not provide this data by December 31, 2032, Metaculus may select any successor organization with similar data or methodology, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "34.6", "median": "77.0", "upper_75": "162", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that India's rating in the Freedom In the World Report will be 71.4 for the year 2027?", "desc": "[The Freedom in The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule) is an annual publication by [Freedom House](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_House), a US non-profit research and advocacy institute. The report, published since 1973, gives an overview of civil liberties and political rights in each nation around the world, as well as some disputed territories and conflict zones._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIndia has been ranked as \"free\" by Freedom House from 1998 until 2021, when it was reclassified as \"partly free\". Their report on India for 2022 [stated](https://freedomhouse.org/country/united-states/freedom-world/2022):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>While India is a multiparty democracy, the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has presided over discriminatory policies and a rise in persecution affecting the Muslim population. The constitution guarantees civil liberties including freedom of expression and freedom of religion, but harassment of journalists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other government critics has increased significantly under Modi. Muslims, scheduled castes (Dalits), and scheduled tribes (Adivasis) remain economically and socially marginalized._x000D_\n_x000D_\nHistorical data for the Freedom in The World Report can be found [here](https://freedomhouse.org/reports/publication-archives). The overall rating for India since 2006 is reproduced below:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| year | rating | freedom status |_x000D_\n| ---- | ---- | ---- |_x000D_\n| 2022 |\t66 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2021 |\t67 | partly free |_x000D_\n| 2020 |\t71 | free |_x000D_\n| 2019 |\t75 | free |_x000D_\n| 2018 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2017 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2016 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2015 |\t78 | free |_x000D_\n| 2014 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2013 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2012 |\t77 | free |_x000D_\n| 2011 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2010 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2009 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2008 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2007 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n| 2006 |\t76 | free |_x000D_\n_x000D_\nNote that these scores do not include Indian [Kashmir](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir) which has been evaluated separately since 1990, and was considered \"not free\" in the 2022 report.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rating for India in the [Freedom In The World Report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world) for the following years, as their overall score from 0 to 100. Years refer to the editions as Freedom House describes them; for example, the [2022 report](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule), covered the events and developments in the world from January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2021._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIn the event that Freedom House changes their overall scoring to a different scale, Metaculus Admins will scale the score to a 0-100 scale if feasible, or add the component ratings to a 0-100 scale. If there is no reasonable conversion between future scores and previous scores, those years may resolve ambiguously at the discretion of Metaculus Admins.", "lower_25": "57.8", "median": "64.5", "upper_75": "71.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 13.90 share of Africa's total primary energy will come from nuclear (fission & fusion) in 2050?", "desc": "In 2020, nuclear energy only accounted 0.74% of Africa's total primary energy ([source](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-primary-energy?tab=chart&country=~Africa)).\n\nBy comparison, nuclear accounted for 4.31% of the global primary energy mix ([source](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-primary-energy?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL)), and 7.68% for OECD countries ([source](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-primary-energy?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL)).\nFrance had the highest share globally with 36.10% ([source](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-primary-energy?tab=table&country=~OECD)).\n\nAs a country, only South Africa had a non-zero share of nuclear in their energy mix ([source](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-primary-energy)).\n\nAccording to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_commercial_nuclear_reactors#South_Africa), there is currently only one nuclear reactor operated in Africa (by South Africa, [\"Koeberg Nuclear Power Station\"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koeberg_Nuclear_Power_Station)), and only one further nuclear reactor planned for construction (again by South Africa, \"Thyspunt\nor\nDuynefontein\").\n\nNote that due to the increasing importance of electrifying most aspect of human energy consumption (such as transport and heating) in the context of climate change, this question focuses on total _primary_ energy mix calculated as the the sum of electricity, transport and heating.", "resc": "By default, [Our World In Data's estimates](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-primary-energy?tab=chart&country=~Africa) will be used as reference to resolve this question.\n\nThe resolution should happen in the 2 years following the question close to allow for the data to be collected and published. If the relevant data is not available by January 1st, 2053, this question will resolve ambiguously.\n\nIf Our World in Data is no longer publishing such an estimate or altered its calculations in such a way that they no longer reflect the same total primary energy mix as used in all current estimates, an alternative source offering the best balance between trustworthiness (an official and/or supranational organisation) and calculation fit will be chosen instead, at the discretion of Metaculus staff.", "lower_25": "1.48", "median": "3.75", "upper_75": "13.90", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a whole human genome in 2031 will be 77.0 USD in 2021?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the cost of sequencing a whole human genome in 2026 (in 2021 USD)?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8909/human-genome-sequencing-cost-in-2026/) [*not part of the Biosecurity Tournament*]\n\n----\n\nA [genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome) consists of all the DNA in a cell nucleus. DNA is made up by four bases: G, A, T, and C. Genome sequencing ascertains the order of these bases to understand the biological information encoded by it. Whole genome sequencing involves determining the order of these bases for the entirety of an individual organism's genome.\n\nOne important marker of progress in genomic sequencing is how the cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen over time. [According](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost) to US National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), the first high-quality 'draft' whole human genome sequence (covering ~90% of the genome at ~99.9% accuracy) was completed in 2000 and cost ~$300 million. By 2007, the cost to generate a high-quality draft human genome sequence had fallen to ~$8.6 million. In 2014, the cost was ~$4.9k. The cost as of 2020 (the most recent year with complete information) is $637. The cost data, graphs, and methods can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).\n\nThe purpose of this question is to understand future progress in genome-sequencing technologies and approaches, using the cost of human genome sequencing as a measure of such progress.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a high-quality draft whole human genome in the year 2031, according to the [US National Human Genome Research Institute](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost). This question resolve as the average of all values reported for 2031 (expected to be quarterly), and will be indexed to 2021 USD using the [CPI](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL). To account for data revisions, this will resolve based on the latest report published by NHGRI by December 31, 2032.\n\nIf NHGRI does not provide this data by December 31, 2032, Metaculus may select any successor organization with similar data or methodology, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "34.6", "median": "77.0", "upper_75": "162", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a whole human genome in 2031 will be 77.0 USD in 2021?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the cost of sequencing a whole human genome in 2026 (in 2021 USD)?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8909/human-genome-sequencing-cost-in-2026/) [*not part of the Biosecurity Tournament*]\n\n----\n\nA [genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome) consists of all the DNA in a cell nucleus. DNA is made up by four bases: G, A, T, and C. Genome sequencing ascertains the order of these bases to understand the biological information encoded by it. Whole genome sequencing involves determining the order of these bases for the entirety of an individual organism's genome.\n\nOne important marker of progress in genomic sequencing is how the cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen over time. [According](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost) to US National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), the first high-quality 'draft' whole human genome sequence (covering ~90% of the genome at ~99.9% accuracy) was completed in 2000 and cost ~$300 million. By 2007, the cost to generate a high-quality draft human genome sequence had fallen to ~$8.6 million. In 2014, the cost was ~$4.9k. The cost as of 2020 (the most recent year with complete information) is $637. The cost data, graphs, and methods can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).\n\nThe purpose of this question is to understand future progress in genome-sequencing technologies and approaches, using the cost of human genome sequencing as a measure of such progress.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a high-quality draft whole human genome in the year 2031, according to the [US National Human Genome Research Institute](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost). This question resolve as the average of all values reported for 2031 (expected to be quarterly), and will be indexed to 2021 USD using the [CPI](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL). To account for data revisions, this will resolve based on the latest report published by NHGRI by December 31, 2032.\n\nIf NHGRI does not provide this data by December 31, 2032, Metaculus may select any successor organization with similar data or methodology, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "34.6", "median": "77.0", "upper_75": "162", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will have 50% share (in %) of the world's super-compute performance in the TOP500 list on the following dates?", "desc": "\nThis question is part of the Maximum Likelihood Round of the Forecasting AI Progress Tournament. You can view all other questions in this round here.\n\n\n-----\n\nSince the TOP500 project was started in 1993, supercomputers in the United States have always made up the majority of the world's super-compute performance [(TOP500, 2019)](https://www.top500.org/statistics/overtime/). According to TOP500's biannual report, the share of super-compute based in the United States peaked in November of 2005 at 68.31%, and has since been declining most years and was 28.18% in June 2020.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the share of the world's super-compute performance at the maximum achieved performance on the LINPACK benchmark (Rmax), in teraFLOPS, that is based in the United States according to [TOP500](https://top500.org/statistics/overtime/) on the following dates.", "lower_25": "21.6", "median": "29.9", "upper_75": "37.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art performance on image classification on ImageNet will achieve a top-1 accuracy of 91.94%?", "desc": "\nThis question is part of the Maximum Likelihood Round of the Forecasting AI Progress Tournament. You can view all other questions in this round here.\n\n\n-----\n\nImage Classification is the task of identifying an image by assigning to it a specific label. Typically, Image Classification refers to images in which only one object appears and is analysed. In contrast, object detection involves both classification and localisation tasks, and is used to analyse more realistic cases in which multiple objects may exist in an image.\n\nImageNet [(Deng et al., 2009)](http://www.image-net.org/papers/imagenet_cvpr09.pdf) is a large scale dataset images built upon the backbone of the [WordNet](https://wordnet.princeton.edu/) structure. ImageNet is one of the largest visual recognition datasets which contains high-resolution images. It has tens of millions of annotated images organized by the semantic hierarchy of WordNet. \n\nAs of December 2020, the state-of-the-art model for is EfficientNet-B8 [(Wei et al., 2020)](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.11342v1.pdf), which achieves a top-1 accuracy of 85.8% on ImageNet.\n\nA good reference for tracking state-of-the-art models is [PapersWithCode](https://paperswithcode.com/sota/image-classification-on-imagenet), which tracks performance data of ML models.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the highest level of performance, in top-1 accuracy, achieved on ImageNet up until 11:59PM GMT on the sub-question's date amongst models trained on only the ImageNet's validation set (ImageNet does not clearly demarcate its validation and training sets). No extra training data may be used besides the original ImageNet dataset.\n\nFor this question, augmented versions of the ImageNet dataset, such as ImageNet-V2 [(Recht, 2019)](https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.10811), are considered different from [Deng et al., 2009's](http://www.image-net.org/papers/imagenet_cvpr09.pdf) dataset.", "lower_25": "90.31", "median": "91.94", "upper_75": "93.63", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How much will the average degree of automation change for key US professions from December 2020 to the following dates?\n\nKeyword: 17.4\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the average degree of automation for key US professions will change by 75% from December 2020 to the following dates?", "desc": "\nThis question is part of the Hill Climbing Round of the Forecasting AI Progress Tournament. You can view all other questions in this round here.\n\n\n----\n\n[The Occupational Information Network (O*NET)](https://www.onetonline.org/) is a free online database that contains hundreds of occupational definitions to help students, job seekers, businesses and workforce development professionals to understand today's world of work in the United States.\n\nO*NET reports its estimate of the current level of the “degree of automation” for each job in its database. The scale ranges from 0 to 100 (0=slightly automated; 50=moderately automated; 75=highly automated; 100=completely automated).", "resc": "For this question, the key professions are defined as the following:\n\n| Profession | December 2020 degree of automation |\n| -- | -- |\n| General and Operations Managers | 32 |\n| Registered Nurses | 26 |\n| Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers | 39 |\n| Compliance Managers | 18 |\n| Regulatory Affairs Managers | 17 |\n| Retail Salespersons | 29 |\n| Fast Food and Counter Workers | 32 |\n| Cashiers | 23 |\n| Customer Service Representatives | 46 |\n| Lawyers | 22 |\n| Treasurers and Controllers | 40 |\n| Financial Managers | 39 |\n| Baristas | 41 |\n| Personal Care Aides | 16 |\n| Wind Energy Operations Managers | 39 |\n\nThe average degree of automation of these professions is 30.6.\n\nEach sub-question below will resolve as the percentage change in the average degree of automation from the values in December 2020 (listed above) to the values on the date of the sub-question according to O-NET. Note in particular that:\n\n- the question resolves as the relative percentage change from 30.6 the value on the future date, *not* the absolute [percentage point](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percentage_point) change. For example, a change from 30.6 to 35.0 would be ((35/30.6) - 1) * 100 = a 14.4% increase.\n\n- positive number represent an increase of the degree in automation, and negative numbers represent a decrease in the degree of automation\n\nIf any of the listed profession is no longer reported by O*NET, the calculation is to be done with the relevant profession dropped from both the December 2020 values and the future values", "lower_25": "1.75", "median": "8.32", "upper_75": "17.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art performance on image classification on ImageNet will achieve a top-1 accuracy of 91.94%?", "desc": "\nThis question is part of the Maximum Likelihood Round of the Forecasting AI Progress Tournament. You can view all other questions in this round here.\n\n\n-----\n\nImage Classification is the task of identifying an image by assigning to it a specific label. Typically, Image Classification refers to images in which only one object appears and is analysed. In contrast, object detection involves both classification and localisation tasks, and is used to analyse more realistic cases in which multiple objects may exist in an image.\n\nImageNet [(Deng et al., 2009)](http://www.image-net.org/papers/imagenet_cvpr09.pdf) is a large scale dataset images built upon the backbone of the [WordNet](https://wordnet.princeton.edu/) structure. ImageNet is one of the largest visual recognition datasets which contains high-resolution images. It has tens of millions of annotated images organized by the semantic hierarchy of WordNet. \n\nAs of December 2020, the state-of-the-art model for is EfficientNet-B8 [(Wei et al., 2020)](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.11342v1.pdf), which achieves a top-1 accuracy of 85.8% on ImageNet.\n\nA good reference for tracking state-of-the-art models is [PapersWithCode](https://paperswithcode.com/sota/image-classification-on-imagenet), which tracks performance data of ML models.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the highest level of performance, in top-1 accuracy, achieved on ImageNet up until 11:59PM GMT on the sub-question's date amongst models trained on only the ImageNet's validation set (ImageNet does not clearly demarcate its validation and training sets). No extra training data may be used besides the original ImageNet dataset.\n\nFor this question, augmented versions of the ImageNet dataset, such as ImageNet-V2 [(Recht, 2019)](https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.10811), are considered different from [Deng et al., 2009's](http://www.image-net.org/papers/imagenet_cvpr09.pdf) dataset.", "lower_25": "90.31", "median": "91.94", "upper_75": "93.63", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Jeff Bezos will first land on the moon by 2038?", "desc": "[Jeffrey Preston Bezos](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeff_Bezos), born January 12, 1964, is an American entrepreneur, media proprietor, investor, computer engineer, and commercial astronaut. He is the founder, executive chairman and former president and CEO of Amazon. With a net worth of around US$171 billion as of June 2022, Bezos is the second-wealthiest person in the world and was the wealthiest from 2017 to 2021 according to both Bloomberg's Billionaires Index and Forbes.\n\nBezos has had a longstanding interest in space colonization since his days at Princeton, where he was a contemporary of [Gerard K. O'Neill](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerard_K._O'Neill), who conceptualized a space habitat known as the [O'Neill cylinder](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O%27Neill_cylinder). Bezos has outlined [a long-term vision for large-scale space colonies](https://youtu.be/GQ98hGUe6FM?t=897): \"Manufactured worlds.\"\n\nBezos [first travelled to space in July 2021](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Origin_NS-16) in a suborbital tourism mission using a vehicle produced by his rocket company, Blue Origin. \n\nBezos is also interested in lunar exploration, and through Blue Origin is developing a lunar lander, [Blue Moon.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Moon_(spacecraft)) Blue Moon sought NASA's selection as a human landing system for the Artemis program, but ultimately NASA selected SpaceX's Starship instead. Development of Blue Moon continues.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date on which Jeff Bezos lands on the surface of Earth's moon. Bezos must be alive at the time of the landing (an interment / space burial on the moon will not count), and must be physically present there (i.e. using a telepresence robot system will not count). There is no requirement that Bezos travel to the moon in a system produced by Blue Origin; any mode of transport will suffice.\n\nIf Bezos dies before this question resolves, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Jeff Bezos will first land on the moon by 2038?", "desc": "[Jeffrey Preston Bezos](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeff_Bezos), born January 12, 1964, is an American entrepreneur, media proprietor, investor, computer engineer, and commercial astronaut. He is the founder, executive chairman and former president and CEO of Amazon. With a net worth of around US$171 billion as of June 2022, Bezos is the second-wealthiest person in the world and was the wealthiest from 2017 to 2021 according to both Bloomberg's Billionaires Index and Forbes.\n\nBezos has had a longstanding interest in space colonization since his days at Princeton, where he was a contemporary of [Gerard K. O'Neill](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerard_K._O'Neill), who conceptualized a space habitat known as the [O'Neill cylinder](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O%27Neill_cylinder). Bezos has outlined [a long-term vision for large-scale space colonies](https://youtu.be/GQ98hGUe6FM?t=897): \"Manufactured worlds.\"\n\nBezos [first travelled to space in July 2021](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Origin_NS-16) in a suborbital tourism mission using a vehicle produced by his rocket company, Blue Origin. \n\nBezos is also interested in lunar exploration, and through Blue Origin is developing a lunar lander, [Blue Moon.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Moon_(spacecraft)) Blue Moon sought NASA's selection as a human landing system for the Artemis program, but ultimately NASA selected SpaceX's Starship instead. Development of Blue Moon continues.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date on which Jeff Bezos lands on the surface of Earth's moon. Bezos must be alive at the time of the landing (an interment / space burial on the moon will not count), and must be physically present there (i.e. using a telepresence robot system will not count). There is no requirement that Bezos travel to the moon in a system produced by Blue Origin; any mode of transport will suffice.\n\nIf Bezos dies before this question resolves, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How much will the average degree of automation change for key US professions from December 2020 to the following dates?\n\nKeyword: 17.4\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the average degree of automation for key US professions will change by 75% from December 2020 to the following dates?", "desc": "\nThis question is part of the Hill Climbing Round of the Forecasting AI Progress Tournament. You can view all other questions in this round here.\n\n\n----\n\n[The Occupational Information Network (O*NET)](https://www.onetonline.org/) is a free online database that contains hundreds of occupational definitions to help students, job seekers, businesses and workforce development professionals to understand today's world of work in the United States.\n\nO*NET reports its estimate of the current level of the “degree of automation” for each job in its database. The scale ranges from 0 to 100 (0=slightly automated; 50=moderately automated; 75=highly automated; 100=completely automated).", "resc": "For this question, the key professions are defined as the following:\n\n| Profession | December 2020 degree of automation |\n| -- | -- |\n| General and Operations Managers | 32 |\n| Registered Nurses | 26 |\n| Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers | 39 |\n| Compliance Managers | 18 |\n| Regulatory Affairs Managers | 17 |\n| Retail Salespersons | 29 |\n| Fast Food and Counter Workers | 32 |\n| Cashiers | 23 |\n| Customer Service Representatives | 46 |\n| Lawyers | 22 |\n| Treasurers and Controllers | 40 |\n| Financial Managers | 39 |\n| Baristas | 41 |\n| Personal Care Aides | 16 |\n| Wind Energy Operations Managers | 39 |\n\nThe average degree of automation of these professions is 30.6.\n\nEach sub-question below will resolve as the percentage change in the average degree of automation from the values in December 2020 (listed above) to the values on the date of the sub-question according to O-NET. Note in particular that:\n\n- the question resolves as the relative percentage change from 30.6 the value on the future date, *not* the absolute [percentage point](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percentage_point) change. For example, a change from 30.6 to 35.0 would be ((35/30.6) - 1) * 100 = a 14.4% increase.\n\n- positive number represent an increase of the degree in automation, and negative numbers represent a decrease in the degree of automation\n\nIf any of the listed profession is no longer reported by O*NET, the calculation is to be done with the relevant profession dropped from both the December 2020 values and the future values", "lower_25": "1.75", "median": "8.32", "upper_75": "17.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Jeff Bezos will first land on the moon by 2038?", "desc": "[Jeffrey Preston Bezos](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeff_Bezos), born January 12, 1964, is an American entrepreneur, media proprietor, investor, computer engineer, and commercial astronaut. He is the founder, executive chairman and former president and CEO of Amazon. With a net worth of around US$171 billion as of June 2022, Bezos is the second-wealthiest person in the world and was the wealthiest from 2017 to 2021 according to both Bloomberg's Billionaires Index and Forbes.\n\nBezos has had a longstanding interest in space colonization since his days at Princeton, where he was a contemporary of [Gerard K. O'Neill](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerard_K._O'Neill), who conceptualized a space habitat known as the [O'Neill cylinder](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O%27Neill_cylinder). Bezos has outlined [a long-term vision for large-scale space colonies](https://youtu.be/GQ98hGUe6FM?t=897): \"Manufactured worlds.\"\n\nBezos [first travelled to space in July 2021](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Origin_NS-16) in a suborbital tourism mission using a vehicle produced by his rocket company, Blue Origin. \n\nBezos is also interested in lunar exploration, and through Blue Origin is developing a lunar lander, [Blue Moon.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Moon_(spacecraft)) Blue Moon sought NASA's selection as a human landing system for the Artemis program, but ultimately NASA selected SpaceX's Starship instead. Development of Blue Moon continues.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date on which Jeff Bezos lands on the surface of Earth's moon. Bezos must be alive at the time of the landing (an interment / space burial on the moon will not count), and must be physically present there (i.e. using a telepresence robot system will not count). There is no requirement that Bezos travel to the moon in a system produced by Blue Origin; any mode of transport will suffice.\n\nIf Bezos dies before this question resolves, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art performance on image classification on ImageNet will achieve a top-1 accuracy of 91.94%?", "desc": "\nThis question is part of the Maximum Likelihood Round of the Forecasting AI Progress Tournament. You can view all other questions in this round here.\n\n\n-----\n\nImage Classification is the task of identifying an image by assigning to it a specific label. Typically, Image Classification refers to images in which only one object appears and is analysed. In contrast, object detection involves both classification and localisation tasks, and is used to analyse more realistic cases in which multiple objects may exist in an image.\n\nImageNet [(Deng et al., 2009)](http://www.image-net.org/papers/imagenet_cvpr09.pdf) is a large scale dataset images built upon the backbone of the [WordNet](https://wordnet.princeton.edu/) structure. ImageNet is one of the largest visual recognition datasets which contains high-resolution images. It has tens of millions of annotated images organized by the semantic hierarchy of WordNet. \n\nAs of December 2020, the state-of-the-art model for is EfficientNet-B8 [(Wei et al., 2020)](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2003.11342v1.pdf), which achieves a top-1 accuracy of 85.8% on ImageNet.\n\nA good reference for tracking state-of-the-art models is [PapersWithCode](https://paperswithcode.com/sota/image-classification-on-imagenet), which tracks performance data of ML models.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the highest level of performance, in top-1 accuracy, achieved on ImageNet up until 11:59PM GMT on the sub-question's date amongst models trained on only the ImageNet's validation set (ImageNet does not clearly demarcate its validation and training sets). No extra training data may be used besides the original ImageNet dataset.\n\nFor this question, augmented versions of the ImageNet dataset, such as ImageNet-V2 [(Recht, 2019)](https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.10811), are considered different from [Deng et al., 2009's](http://www.image-net.org/papers/imagenet_cvpr09.pdf) dataset.", "lower_25": "90.31", "median": "91.94", "upper_75": "93.63", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least one licensed vaccine will be available for 24.1 of the 26 human-infecting virus families before 2032?", "desc": "There are 26 known viral families that are implicated in human disease, according to [Siegel et. al (2018)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7151951/). The extent to which these virus families are involved in human disease varies from humans serving \"as a reservoir for the viruses and the link to human disease is clear\" to humans being \"incidental hosts or the link to disease ... [being] more tenuous.\"\n\nIn 2021 the US White House Science and Technology Policy set out a goal in its [pandemic preparedness plan](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/03/fact-sheet-biden-administration-to-transform-capabilities-for-pandemic-preparedness/) of having at least one prototype vaccine ready for each of the 26 known viral families that cause human disease:\n> Success in quickly creating COVID-19 vaccines was possible only because of two decades of intense coronaviruses research that followed the 2002 SARS-CoV-1 outbreak in Asia. Since the next pandemic may not be caused by a coronavirus, we need to generate comparable information for all of the 26 families of viruses known to infect humans.\n\nIn February 2022, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases released a [plan](https://www.niaid.nih.gov/research/pandemic-preparedness) in which it will support development of medical countermeasures, including vaccines, through Phase I/IIa for a prototype pathogen for each human-infecting virus family.\n\nNote that as of June 2022, of the 26 relevant virus families the number for which there is already at least one licensed vaccine for a representative virus is 15 (the 13 listed [table 2 here](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7097586/) as well as [Filoviridae](https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/medicines/human/EPAR/ervebo) and [Coronaviridae](https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/covid-19-vaccines))\n\nThe purpose of this question is to understand for how many of 26 human-infecting viral families there will be at least one prototype vaccine that is licensed. This number is an indicator of our level of pandemic preparedness in terms of vaccine technology and deployment readiness.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of families with at least one representative licensed vaccine before January 1, 2032.\n\nThis question only asks about these 26 families (see fine print), meaning we will not consider any additional virus families that may subsequently be known to be implicated in human disease.\n\nAny type of licensure (emergency, conditional, full, etc.) by any country in the world counts.\n\nFor resolution, there will be no requirements on the demonstrated efficacy or safety of the vaccine; approval by any country is the sole criterion.", "lower_25": "21.0", "median": "22.7", "upper_75": "24.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will have 50% share (in %) of the world's super-compute performance in the TOP500 list on the following dates?", "desc": "\nThis question is part of the Maximum Likelihood Round of the Forecasting AI Progress Tournament. You can view all other questions in this round here.\n\n\n-----\n\nSince the TOP500 project was started in 1993, supercomputers in the United States have always made up the majority of the world's super-compute performance [(TOP500, 2019)](https://www.top500.org/statistics/overtime/). According to TOP500's biannual report, the share of super-compute based in the United States peaked in November of 2005 at 68.31%, and has since been declining most years and was 28.18% in June 2020.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the share of the world's super-compute performance at the maximum achieved performance on the LINPACK benchmark (Rmax), in teraFLOPS, that is based in the United States according to [TOP500](https://top500.org/statistics/overtime/) on the following dates.", "lower_25": "21.6", "median": "29.9", "upper_75": "37.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least one licensed vaccine will be available for 24.1 of the 26 human-infecting virus families before 2032?", "desc": "There are 26 known viral families that are implicated in human disease, according to [Siegel et. al (2018)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7151951/). The extent to which these virus families are involved in human disease varies from humans serving \"as a reservoir for the viruses and the link to human disease is clear\" to humans being \"incidental hosts or the link to disease ... [being] more tenuous.\"\n\nIn 2021 the US White House Science and Technology Policy set out a goal in its [pandemic preparedness plan](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/03/fact-sheet-biden-administration-to-transform-capabilities-for-pandemic-preparedness/) of having at least one prototype vaccine ready for each of the 26 known viral families that cause human disease:\n> Success in quickly creating COVID-19 vaccines was possible only because of two decades of intense coronaviruses research that followed the 2002 SARS-CoV-1 outbreak in Asia. Since the next pandemic may not be caused by a coronavirus, we need to generate comparable information for all of the 26 families of viruses known to infect humans.\n\nIn February 2022, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases released a [plan](https://www.niaid.nih.gov/research/pandemic-preparedness) in which it will support development of medical countermeasures, including vaccines, through Phase I/IIa for a prototype pathogen for each human-infecting virus family.\n\nNote that as of June 2022, of the 26 relevant virus families the number for which there is already at least one licensed vaccine for a representative virus is 15 (the 13 listed [table 2 here](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7097586/) as well as [Filoviridae](https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/medicines/human/EPAR/ervebo) and [Coronaviridae](https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/covid-19-vaccines))\n\nThe purpose of this question is to understand for how many of 26 human-infecting viral families there will be at least one prototype vaccine that is licensed. This number is an indicator of our level of pandemic preparedness in terms of vaccine technology and deployment readiness.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of families with at least one representative licensed vaccine before January 1, 2032.\n\nThis question only asks about these 26 families (see fine print), meaning we will not consider any additional virus families that may subsequently be known to be implicated in human disease.\n\nAny type of licensure (emergency, conditional, full, etc.) by any country in the world counts.\n\nFor resolution, there will be no requirements on the demonstrated efficacy or safety of the vaccine; approval by any country is the sole criterion.", "lower_25": "21.0", "median": "22.7", "upper_75": "24.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 10.2k epidemiologist jobs in the US by 2030?", "desc": "The US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) [has estimated](https://www.bls.gov/ooh/life-physical-and-social-science/epidemiologists.htm) that in 2020 there were 7,800 [epidemiologist](https://stats.bls.gov/ooh/life-physical-and-social-science/epidemiologists.htm#tab-2) jobs in the US The BLS projects that the number of jobs for epidemiologists will increase by 30%, or 2,300 jobs, between 2020 and 2030. They say [the following](https://stats.bls.gov/ooh/life-physical-and-social-science/epidemiologists.htm#tab-6) about their projection:\n> \nThe COVID-19 pandemic contributed to increased demand for epidemiologists to identify and mitigate the impact of diseases.Demand for epidemiologists is expected to increase as enhancements in healthcare technology permit the discovery of new and emerging diseases. However, because it is a small occupation, the fast growth is expected to result in only about 2,300 new jobs over the decade. These discoveries require research to understand the diseases and to develop methods for mitigating their adverse health consequences. Many jobs for these workers are in state and local governments, where they are needed to help respond to emergencies and to provide public health services. However, because epidemiological and public health programs largely depend on public funding, budgetary constraints may directly impact employment growth. Demand for epidemiologists also is expected to increase as more hospitals join programs such as the National Healthcare Safety Network and realize the benefits of strengthened infection control programs.\n\nThe purpose of this question is to use projected growth, or lack thereof, in jobs in the epidemiologists as an indicator of how much work in epidemiology will be occurring in the US in 2030. This may inform career decision-making as well as our understanding of how many people with skills relevant to pandemic preparedness and response might be working in the area.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of people employed as epidemiologists in all industries in the United States in the year 2030. This question will use annual data for 2030, or if this is not available, the earliest data reported for that year.\n\nThis question will use data reported by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics' Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics Survey, currently with the series ID `OEUN000000000000019104101`. Their estimate for [May 2021](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes191041.htm) was 8,180.\n\nIf BLS does not report this estimate by January 1, 2032, Metaculus Admins may select a similar source of data, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "9.30k", "median": "10.2k", "upper_75": "11.1k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 10.2k epidemiologist jobs in the US by 2030?", "desc": "The US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) [has estimated](https://www.bls.gov/ooh/life-physical-and-social-science/epidemiologists.htm) that in 2020 there were 7,800 [epidemiologist](https://stats.bls.gov/ooh/life-physical-and-social-science/epidemiologists.htm#tab-2) jobs in the US The BLS projects that the number of jobs for epidemiologists will increase by 30%, or 2,300 jobs, between 2020 and 2030. They say [the following](https://stats.bls.gov/ooh/life-physical-and-social-science/epidemiologists.htm#tab-6) about their projection:\n> \nThe COVID-19 pandemic contributed to increased demand for epidemiologists to identify and mitigate the impact of diseases.Demand for epidemiologists is expected to increase as enhancements in healthcare technology permit the discovery of new and emerging diseases. However, because it is a small occupation, the fast growth is expected to result in only about 2,300 new jobs over the decade. These discoveries require research to understand the diseases and to develop methods for mitigating their adverse health consequences. Many jobs for these workers are in state and local governments, where they are needed to help respond to emergencies and to provide public health services. However, because epidemiological and public health programs largely depend on public funding, budgetary constraints may directly impact employment growth. Demand for epidemiologists also is expected to increase as more hospitals join programs such as the National Healthcare Safety Network and realize the benefits of strengthened infection control programs.\n\nThe purpose of this question is to use projected growth, or lack thereof, in jobs in the epidemiologists as an indicator of how much work in epidemiology will be occurring in the US in 2030. This may inform career decision-making as well as our understanding of how many people with skills relevant to pandemic preparedness and response might be working in the area.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of people employed as epidemiologists in all industries in the United States in the year 2030. This question will use annual data for 2030, or if this is not available, the earliest data reported for that year.\n\nThis question will use data reported by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics' Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics Survey, currently with the series ID `OEUN000000000000019104101`. Their estimate for [May 2021](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes191041.htm) was 8,180.\n\nIf BLS does not report this estimate by January 1, 2032, Metaculus Admins may select a similar source of data, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "9.30k", "median": "10.2k", "upper_75": "11.1k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 36.9k US deaths will be attributed to betacoronaviruses between 2028 and 2030 (inclusive) if a CDC authorization of a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine is granted?", "desc": "[Betacoronavirus](https://viralzone.expasy.org/764?outline=all_by_species) is a genus of the virus family Coronaviridae. The known human-infecting betacoronaviruses [are](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html): SARS-CoV-2, SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, OC43, and HKU1. SARS-CoV-2 is the virus that is the cause of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. [SARS-CoV](https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/sars/) caused an outbreak in 2002 and went extinct in 2004, and in that time caused 774 total known deaths. [MERS-CoV](https://www.who.int/health-topics/middle-east-respiratory-syndrome-coronavirus-mers#tab=tab_1) was identified in 2012 and has since been circulating at low levels in the in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia and has caused 858 total known deaths. [OC43](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html) and [HKU1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_coronavirus_HKU1) are common human coronaviruses — it is not known how many deaths can be attributed to them, though it is likely to be very low given that these viruses [almost always](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/general-information.html) only produce mild common cold symptoms. University of Paris Professor Patrick Berche [suggests](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35124103/) that OC43 may have been the cause of the [1889–1890 flu pandemic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1889%E2%80%931890_pandemic).\n\nThe purpose of this question is to understand the potential value of a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine in terms of expected number of lives saved.", "resc": "If a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine is authorized by the US FDA at any time before January 1, 2028, the \"not authorized\" option will resolve as **Ambiguous**; if such a vaccine is **not** approved by 2028, the \"authorized\" option will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe remaining question will resolve as the best estimate (as of January 1, 2032) of the total number of deaths in the US due to all betacoronaviruses for the years 2028, 2029 and 2030. Such an estimate should include deaths caused by all known human-infecting betacoronaviruses and include unreported deaths (not just confirmed deaths). If there is no such estimate available, Metaculus will make such an estimate.\n\nFor this question, a vaccine will be considered a \"pan-betacoronavirus\" vaccine if the government authority approves its use for all known betacoronaviruses. There will be no requirements on the demonstrated efficacy or safety of the vaccine; approval by the US FDA is the sole criterion. Any kind of approval, including emergency approval, would count.\n\n*13 July clarification: This question assumes that there will be no further novel betacoronavirus pandemics between now and January 1, 2028. If there is a new betacoronavirus pandemic (e.g.: \"SARS-CoV-3\") in this time frame, then both options in this question will resolve **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "36.9k", "median": "81.9k", "upper_75": "178k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 10.2k epidemiologist jobs in the US by 2030?", "desc": "The US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) [has estimated](https://www.bls.gov/ooh/life-physical-and-social-science/epidemiologists.htm) that in 2020 there were 7,800 [epidemiologist](https://stats.bls.gov/ooh/life-physical-and-social-science/epidemiologists.htm#tab-2) jobs in the US The BLS projects that the number of jobs for epidemiologists will increase by 30%, or 2,300 jobs, between 2020 and 2030. They say [the following](https://stats.bls.gov/ooh/life-physical-and-social-science/epidemiologists.htm#tab-6) about their projection:\n> \nThe COVID-19 pandemic contributed to increased demand for epidemiologists to identify and mitigate the impact of diseases.Demand for epidemiologists is expected to increase as enhancements in healthcare technology permit the discovery of new and emerging diseases. However, because it is a small occupation, the fast growth is expected to result in only about 2,300 new jobs over the decade. These discoveries require research to understand the diseases and to develop methods for mitigating their adverse health consequences. Many jobs for these workers are in state and local governments, where they are needed to help respond to emergencies and to provide public health services. However, because epidemiological and public health programs largely depend on public funding, budgetary constraints may directly impact employment growth. Demand for epidemiologists also is expected to increase as more hospitals join programs such as the National Healthcare Safety Network and realize the benefits of strengthened infection control programs.\n\nThe purpose of this question is to use projected growth, or lack thereof, in jobs in the epidemiologists as an indicator of how much work in epidemiology will be occurring in the US in 2030. This may inform career decision-making as well as our understanding of how many people with skills relevant to pandemic preparedness and response might be working in the area.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of people employed as epidemiologists in all industries in the United States in the year 2030. This question will use annual data for 2030, or if this is not available, the earliest data reported for that year.\n\nThis question will use data reported by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics' Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics Survey, currently with the series ID `OEUN000000000000019104101`. Their estimate for [May 2021](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes191041.htm) was 8,180.\n\nIf BLS does not report this estimate by January 1, 2032, Metaculus Admins may select a similar source of data, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "9.30k", "median": "10.2k", "upper_75": "11.1k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least one licensed vaccine will be available for 24.1 of the 26 human-infecting virus families before 2032?", "desc": "There are 26 known viral families that are implicated in human disease, according to [Siegel et. al (2018)](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7151951/). The extent to which these virus families are involved in human disease varies from humans serving \"as a reservoir for the viruses and the link to human disease is clear\" to humans being \"incidental hosts or the link to disease ... [being] more tenuous.\"\n\nIn 2021 the US White House Science and Technology Policy set out a goal in its [pandemic preparedness plan](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/03/fact-sheet-biden-administration-to-transform-capabilities-for-pandemic-preparedness/) of having at least one prototype vaccine ready for each of the 26 known viral families that cause human disease:\n> Success in quickly creating COVID-19 vaccines was possible only because of two decades of intense coronaviruses research that followed the 2002 SARS-CoV-1 outbreak in Asia. Since the next pandemic may not be caused by a coronavirus, we need to generate comparable information for all of the 26 families of viruses known to infect humans.\n\nIn February 2022, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases released a [plan](https://www.niaid.nih.gov/research/pandemic-preparedness) in which it will support development of medical countermeasures, including vaccines, through Phase I/IIa for a prototype pathogen for each human-infecting virus family.\n\nNote that as of June 2022, of the 26 relevant virus families the number for which there is already at least one licensed vaccine for a representative virus is 15 (the 13 listed [table 2 here](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7097586/) as well as [Filoviridae](https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/medicines/human/EPAR/ervebo) and [Coronaviridae](https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19/covid-19-vaccines))\n\nThe purpose of this question is to understand for how many of 26 human-infecting viral families there will be at least one prototype vaccine that is licensed. This number is an indicator of our level of pandemic preparedness in terms of vaccine technology and deployment readiness.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of families with at least one representative licensed vaccine before January 1, 2032.\n\nThis question only asks about these 26 families (see fine print), meaning we will not consider any additional virus families that may subsequently be known to be implicated in human disease.\n\nAny type of licensure (emergency, conditional, full, etc.) by any country in the world counts.\n\nFor resolution, there will be no requirements on the demonstrated efficacy or safety of the vaccine; approval by any country is the sole criterion.", "lower_25": "21.0", "median": "22.7", "upper_75": "24.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How much will the average degree of automation change for key US professions from December 2020 to the following dates?\n\nKeyword: 17.4\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the average degree of automation for key US professions will change by 75% from December 2020 to the following dates?", "desc": "\nThis question is part of the Hill Climbing Round of the Forecasting AI Progress Tournament. You can view all other questions in this round here.\n\n\n----\n\n[The Occupational Information Network (O*NET)](https://www.onetonline.org/) is a free online database that contains hundreds of occupational definitions to help students, job seekers, businesses and workforce development professionals to understand today's world of work in the United States.\n\nO*NET reports its estimate of the current level of the “degree of automation” for each job in its database. The scale ranges from 0 to 100 (0=slightly automated; 50=moderately automated; 75=highly automated; 100=completely automated).", "resc": "For this question, the key professions are defined as the following:\n\n| Profession | December 2020 degree of automation |\n| -- | -- |\n| General and Operations Managers | 32 |\n| Registered Nurses | 26 |\n| Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers | 39 |\n| Compliance Managers | 18 |\n| Regulatory Affairs Managers | 17 |\n| Retail Salespersons | 29 |\n| Fast Food and Counter Workers | 32 |\n| Cashiers | 23 |\n| Customer Service Representatives | 46 |\n| Lawyers | 22 |\n| Treasurers and Controllers | 40 |\n| Financial Managers | 39 |\n| Baristas | 41 |\n| Personal Care Aides | 16 |\n| Wind Energy Operations Managers | 39 |\n\nThe average degree of automation of these professions is 30.6.\n\nEach sub-question below will resolve as the percentage change in the average degree of automation from the values in December 2020 (listed above) to the values on the date of the sub-question according to O-NET. Note in particular that:\n\n- the question resolves as the relative percentage change from 30.6 the value on the future date, *not* the absolute [percentage point](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percentage_point) change. For example, a change from 30.6 to 35.0 would be ((35/30.6) - 1) * 100 = a 14.4% increase.\n\n- positive number represent an increase of the degree in automation, and negative numbers represent a decrease in the degree of automation\n\nIf any of the listed profession is no longer reported by O*NET, the calculation is to be done with the relevant profession dropped from both the December 2020 values and the future values", "lower_25": "1.75", "median": "8.32", "upper_75": "17.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 36.9k US deaths will be attributed to betacoronaviruses between 2028 and 2030 (inclusive) if a CDC authorization is granted for a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine?", "desc": "[Betacoronavirus](https://viralzone.expasy.org/764?outline=all_by_species) is a genus of the virus family Coronaviridae. The known human-infecting betacoronaviruses [are](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html): SARS-CoV-2, SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, OC43, and HKU1. SARS-CoV-2 is the virus that is the cause of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. [SARS-CoV](https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/sars/) caused an outbreak in 2002 and went extinct in 2004, and in that time caused 774 total known deaths. [MERS-CoV](https://www.who.int/health-topics/middle-east-respiratory-syndrome-coronavirus-mers#tab=tab_1) was identified in 2012 and has since been circulating at low levels in the in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia and has caused 858 total known deaths. [OC43](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html) and [HKU1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_coronavirus_HKU1) are common human coronaviruses — it is not known how many deaths can be attributed to them, though it is likely to be very low given that these viruses [almost always](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/general-information.html) only produce mild common cold symptoms. University of Paris Professor Patrick Berche [suggests](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35124103/) that OC43 may have been the cause of the [1889–1890 flu pandemic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1889%E2%80%931890_pandemic).\n\nThe purpose of this question is to understand the potential value of a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine in terms of expected number of lives saved.", "resc": "If a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine is authorized by the US FDA at any time before January 1, 2028, the \"not authorized\" option will resolve as **Ambiguous**; if such a vaccine is **not** approved by 2028, the \"authorized\" option will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe remaining question will resolve as the best estimate (as of January 1, 2032) of the total number of deaths in the US due to all betacoronaviruses for the years 2028, 2029 and 2030. Such an estimate should include deaths caused by all known human-infecting betacoronaviruses and include unreported deaths (not just confirmed deaths). If there is no such estimate available, Metaculus will make such an estimate.\n\nFor this question, a vaccine will be considered a \"pan-betacoronavirus\" vaccine if the government authority approves its use for all known betacoronaviruses. There will be no requirements on the demonstrated efficacy or safety of the vaccine; approval by the US FDA is the sole criterion. Any kind of approval, including emergency approval, would count.\n\n*13 July clarification: This question assumes that there will be no further novel betacoronavirus pandemics between now and January 1, 2028. If there is a new betacoronavirus pandemic (e.g.: \"SARS-CoV-3\") in this time frame, then both options in this question will resolve **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "36.9k", "median": "81.9k", "upper_75": "178k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum arctic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) will be 14.35 in these years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Minimum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11545/)\n* [Maximum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11546/)\n* [Minimum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11547/)\n\n----\n\n> The sea ice cover is one of the key components of the polar climate system. It has been a focus of attention in recent years, largely because of a strong decrease in the Arctic sea ice cover and modeling results that indicate that global warming could be amplified in the Arctic on account of ice-albedo feedback. This results from the high reflectivity (albedo) of the sea ice compared to ice-free waters. A satellite-based data record starting in late 1978 shows that indeed rapid changes have been occurring in the Arctic, where the ice coverage has been declining at a substantial rate. In contrast, in the Antarctic the sea ice coverage has been increasing although at a lesser rate than the decreases in the Arctic. \n\n> Sea ice concentration is the percent areal coverage of ice within the data element (grid cell). Sea ice extent is the integral sum of the areas of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration, while sea ice area is the integral sum of the product of ice concentration and area of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration. \n\nSource: [NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center](https://earth.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/data/current-state-sea-ice-cover)", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the maximum sea ice extent (in millions km^2) of the Artic Ice Cap in the given year, according to the [US National Snow and Ice Data Center](https://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index/data-and-image-archive)", "lower_25": "14.00", "median": "14.35", "upper_75": "14.67", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 36.9k US deaths will be attributed to betacoronaviruses between 2028 and 2030 (inclusive) if a CDC authorization of a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine is granted?", "desc": "[Betacoronavirus](https://viralzone.expasy.org/764?outline=all_by_species) is a genus of the virus family Coronaviridae. The known human-infecting betacoronaviruses [are](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html): SARS-CoV-2, SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, OC43, and HKU1. SARS-CoV-2 is the virus that is the cause of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. [SARS-CoV](https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/sars/) caused an outbreak in 2002 and went extinct in 2004, and in that time caused 774 total known deaths. [MERS-CoV](https://www.who.int/health-topics/middle-east-respiratory-syndrome-coronavirus-mers#tab=tab_1) was identified in 2012 and has since been circulating at low levels in the in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia and has caused 858 total known deaths. [OC43](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html) and [HKU1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_coronavirus_HKU1) are common human coronaviruses — it is not known how many deaths can be attributed to them, though it is likely to be very low given that these viruses [almost always](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/general-information.html) only produce mild common cold symptoms. University of Paris Professor Patrick Berche [suggests](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35124103/) that OC43 may have been the cause of the [1889–1890 flu pandemic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1889%E2%80%931890_pandemic).\n\nThe purpose of this question is to understand the potential value of a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine in terms of expected number of lives saved.", "resc": "If a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine is authorized by the US FDA at any time before January 1, 2028, the \"not authorized\" option will resolve as **Ambiguous**; if such a vaccine is **not** approved by 2028, the \"authorized\" option will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe remaining question will resolve as the best estimate (as of January 1, 2032) of the total number of deaths in the US due to all betacoronaviruses for the years 2028, 2029 and 2030. Such an estimate should include deaths caused by all known human-infecting betacoronaviruses and include unreported deaths (not just confirmed deaths). If there is no such estimate available, Metaculus will make such an estimate.\n\nFor this question, a vaccine will be considered a \"pan-betacoronavirus\" vaccine if the government authority approves its use for all known betacoronaviruses. There will be no requirements on the demonstrated efficacy or safety of the vaccine; approval by the US FDA is the sole criterion. Any kind of approval, including emergency approval, would count.\n\n*13 July clarification: This question assumes that there will be no further novel betacoronavirus pandemics between now and January 1, 2028. If there is a new betacoronavirus pandemic (e.g.: \"SARS-CoV-3\") in this time frame, then both options in this question will resolve **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "36.9k", "median": "81.9k", "upper_75": "178k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 36.9k US deaths will be attributed to betacoronaviruses between 2028 and 2030 (inclusive) if a CDC authorization is granted for a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine?", "desc": "[Betacoronavirus](https://viralzone.expasy.org/764?outline=all_by_species) is a genus of the virus family Coronaviridae. The known human-infecting betacoronaviruses [are](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html): SARS-CoV-2, SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, OC43, and HKU1. SARS-CoV-2 is the virus that is the cause of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. [SARS-CoV](https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/sars/) caused an outbreak in 2002 and went extinct in 2004, and in that time caused 774 total known deaths. [MERS-CoV](https://www.who.int/health-topics/middle-east-respiratory-syndrome-coronavirus-mers#tab=tab_1) was identified in 2012 and has since been circulating at low levels in the in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia and has caused 858 total known deaths. [OC43](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html) and [HKU1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_coronavirus_HKU1) are common human coronaviruses — it is not known how many deaths can be attributed to them, though it is likely to be very low given that these viruses [almost always](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/general-information.html) only produce mild common cold symptoms. University of Paris Professor Patrick Berche [suggests](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35124103/) that OC43 may have been the cause of the [1889–1890 flu pandemic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1889%E2%80%931890_pandemic).\n\nThe purpose of this question is to understand the potential value of a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine in terms of expected number of lives saved.", "resc": "If a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine is authorized by the US FDA at any time before January 1, 2028, the \"not authorized\" option will resolve as **Ambiguous**; if such a vaccine is **not** approved by 2028, the \"authorized\" option will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe remaining question will resolve as the best estimate (as of January 1, 2032) of the total number of deaths in the US due to all betacoronaviruses for the years 2028, 2029 and 2030. Such an estimate should include deaths caused by all known human-infecting betacoronaviruses and include unreported deaths (not just confirmed deaths). If there is no such estimate available, Metaculus will make such an estimate.\n\nFor this question, a vaccine will be considered a \"pan-betacoronavirus\" vaccine if the government authority approves its use for all known betacoronaviruses. There will be no requirements on the demonstrated efficacy or safety of the vaccine; approval by the US FDA is the sole criterion. Any kind of approval, including emergency approval, would count.\n\n*13 July clarification: This question assumes that there will be no further novel betacoronavirus pandemics between now and January 1, 2028. If there is a new betacoronavirus pandemic (e.g.: \"SARS-CoV-3\") in this time frame, then both options in this question will resolve **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "36.9k", "median": "81.9k", "upper_75": "178k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum arctic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) will be 14.35 in these years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Minimum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11545/)\n* [Maximum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11546/)\n* [Minimum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11547/)\n\n----\n\n> The sea ice cover is one of the key components of the polar climate system. It has been a focus of attention in recent years, largely because of a strong decrease in the Arctic sea ice cover and modeling results that indicate that global warming could be amplified in the Arctic on account of ice-albedo feedback. This results from the high reflectivity (albedo) of the sea ice compared to ice-free waters. A satellite-based data record starting in late 1978 shows that indeed rapid changes have been occurring in the Arctic, where the ice coverage has been declining at a substantial rate. In contrast, in the Antarctic the sea ice coverage has been increasing although at a lesser rate than the decreases in the Arctic. \n\n> Sea ice concentration is the percent areal coverage of ice within the data element (grid cell). Sea ice extent is the integral sum of the areas of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration, while sea ice area is the integral sum of the product of ice concentration and area of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration. \n\nSource: [NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center](https://earth.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/data/current-state-sea-ice-cover)", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the maximum sea ice extent (in millions km^2) of the Artic Ice Cap in the given year, according to the [US National Snow and Ice Data Center](https://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index/data-and-image-archive)", "lower_25": "14.00", "median": "14.35", "upper_75": "14.67", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 36.9k US deaths will be attributed to betacoronaviruses between 2028 and 2030 (inclusive) if a CDC authorization is granted for a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine?", "desc": "[Betacoronavirus](https://viralzone.expasy.org/764?outline=all_by_species) is a genus of the virus family Coronaviridae. The known human-infecting betacoronaviruses [are](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html): SARS-CoV-2, SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, OC43, and HKU1. SARS-CoV-2 is the virus that is the cause of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. [SARS-CoV](https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/sars/) caused an outbreak in 2002 and went extinct in 2004, and in that time caused 774 total known deaths. [MERS-CoV](https://www.who.int/health-topics/middle-east-respiratory-syndrome-coronavirus-mers#tab=tab_1) was identified in 2012 and has since been circulating at low levels in the in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia and has caused 858 total known deaths. [OC43](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html) and [HKU1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_coronavirus_HKU1) are common human coronaviruses — it is not known how many deaths can be attributed to them, though it is likely to be very low given that these viruses [almost always](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/general-information.html) only produce mild common cold symptoms. University of Paris Professor Patrick Berche [suggests](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35124103/) that OC43 may have been the cause of the [1889–1890 flu pandemic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1889%E2%80%931890_pandemic).\n\nThe purpose of this question is to understand the potential value of a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine in terms of expected number of lives saved.", "resc": "If a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine is authorized by the US FDA at any time before January 1, 2028, the \"not authorized\" option will resolve as **Ambiguous**; if such a vaccine is **not** approved by 2028, the \"authorized\" option will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe remaining question will resolve as the best estimate (as of January 1, 2032) of the total number of deaths in the US due to all betacoronaviruses for the years 2028, 2029 and 2030. Such an estimate should include deaths caused by all known human-infecting betacoronaviruses and include unreported deaths (not just confirmed deaths). If there is no such estimate available, Metaculus will make such an estimate.\n\nFor this question, a vaccine will be considered a \"pan-betacoronavirus\" vaccine if the government authority approves its use for all known betacoronaviruses. There will be no requirements on the demonstrated efficacy or safety of the vaccine; approval by the US FDA is the sole criterion. Any kind of approval, including emergency approval, would count.\n\n*13 July clarification: This question assumes that there will be no further novel betacoronavirus pandemics between now and January 1, 2028. If there is a new betacoronavirus pandemic (e.g.: \"SARS-CoV-3\") in this time frame, then both options in this question will resolve **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "36.9k", "median": "81.9k", "upper_75": "178k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 64.4k US deaths attributed to betacoronaviruses between 2028 and 2030 (inclusive) if a CDC authorization of a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine is not granted?", "desc": "[Betacoronavirus](https://viralzone.expasy.org/764?outline=all_by_species) is a genus of the virus family Coronaviridae. The known human-infecting betacoronaviruses [are](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html): SARS-CoV-2, SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, OC43, and HKU1. SARS-CoV-2 is the virus that is the cause of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. [SARS-CoV](https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/sars/) caused an outbreak in 2002 and went extinct in 2004, and in that time caused 774 total known deaths. [MERS-CoV](https://www.who.int/health-topics/middle-east-respiratory-syndrome-coronavirus-mers#tab=tab_1) was identified in 2012 and has since been circulating at low levels in the in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia and has caused 858 total known deaths. [OC43](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html) and [HKU1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_coronavirus_HKU1) are common human coronaviruses — it is not known how many deaths can be attributed to them, though it is likely to be very low given that these viruses [almost always](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/general-information.html) only produce mild common cold symptoms. University of Paris Professor Patrick Berche [suggests](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35124103/) that OC43 may have been the cause of the [1889–1890 flu pandemic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1889%E2%80%931890_pandemic).\n\nThe purpose of this question is to understand the potential value of a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine in terms of expected number of lives saved.", "resc": "If a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine is authorized by the US FDA at any time before January 1, 2028, the \"not authorized\" option will resolve as **Ambiguous**; if such a vaccine is **not** approved by 2028, the \"authorized\" option will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe remaining question will resolve as the best estimate (as of January 1, 2032) of the total number of deaths in the US due to all betacoronaviruses for the years 2028, 2029 and 2030. Such an estimate should include deaths caused by all known human-infecting betacoronaviruses and include unreported deaths (not just confirmed deaths). If there is no such estimate available, Metaculus will make such an estimate.\n\nFor this question, a vaccine will be considered a \"pan-betacoronavirus\" vaccine if the government authority approves its use for all known betacoronaviruses. There will be no requirements on the demonstrated efficacy or safety of the vaccine; approval by the US FDA is the sole criterion. Any kind of approval, including emergency approval, would count.\n\n*13 July clarification: This question assumes that there will be no further novel betacoronavirus pandemics between now and January 1, 2028. If there is a new betacoronavirus pandemic (e.g.: \"SARS-CoV-3\") in this time frame, then both options in this question will resolve **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "64.4k", "median": "155k", "upper_75": "344k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum Antartic sea ice extent will be 18.26 in these years?", "desc": "", "resc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*_x000D_\n_x000D_\n* [Maximum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11544/)_x000D_\n* [Minimum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11545/)_x000D_\n* [Minimum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11547/)_x000D_\n_x000D_\n----_x000D_\n_x000D_\n> The sea ice cover is one of the key components of the polar climate system. It has been a focus of attention in recent years, largely because of a strong decrease in the Arctic sea ice cover and modeling results that indicate that global warming could be amplified in the Arctic on account of ice-albedo feedback. This results from the high reflectivity (albedo) of the sea ice compared to ice-free waters. A satellite-based data record starting in late 1978 shows that indeed rapid changes have been occurring in the Arctic, where the ice coverage has been declining at a substantial rate. In contrast, in the Antarctic the sea ice coverage has been increasing although at a lesser rate than the decreases in the Arctic. _x000D_\n_x000D_\n> Sea ice concentration is the percent areal coverage of ice within the data element (grid cell). Sea ice extent is the integral sum of the areas of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration, while sea ice area is the integral sum of the product of ice concentration and area of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration. _x000D_\n_x000D_\nSource: [NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center](https://earth.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/data/current-state-sea-ice-cover)_x000D_\n_x000D_\n***What will be the maximum Antartic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) in these years?***_x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese sub-questions will resolve as the maximum sea ice extent (in millions km^2) of the Antarctic Ice Cap in the given year, according to the [US National Snow and Ice Data Center](https://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index/data-and-image-archive).", "lower_25": "17.59", "median": "18.26", "upper_75": "18.74", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum arctic sea ice extent will be 3.41 in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Maximum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11544/)\n* [Maximum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11546/)\n* [Minimum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11547/)\n\n----\n\n> The sea ice cover is one of the key components of the polar climate system. It has been a focus of attention in recent years, largely because of a strong decrease in the Arctic sea ice cover and modeling results that indicate that global warming could be amplified in the Arctic on account of ice-albedo feedback. This results from the high reflectivity (albedo) of the sea ice compared to ice-free waters. A satellite-based data record starting in late 1978 shows that indeed rapid changes have been occurring in the Arctic, where the ice coverage has been declining at a substantial rate. In contrast, in the Antarctic the sea ice coverage has been increasing although at a lesser rate than the decreases in the Arctic. \n\n> Sea ice concentration is the percent areal coverage of ice within the data element (grid cell). Sea ice extent is the integral sum of the areas of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration, while sea ice area is the integral sum of the product of ice concentration and area of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration. \n\nSource: [NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center](https://earth.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/data/current-state-sea-ice-cover)\n\n***What will be the minimum arctic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) in these years?***", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the minimum sea ice extent (in millions km^2) of the Artic Ice Cap in the given year, according to the [US National Snow and Ice Data Center](https://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index/data-and-image-archive).", "lower_25": "3.41", "median": "3.89", "upper_75": "4.33", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum arctic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) will be 14.35 in these years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Minimum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11545/)\n* [Maximum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11546/)\n* [Minimum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11547/)\n\n----\n\n> The sea ice cover is one of the key components of the polar climate system. It has been a focus of attention in recent years, largely because of a strong decrease in the Arctic sea ice cover and modeling results that indicate that global warming could be amplified in the Arctic on account of ice-albedo feedback. This results from the high reflectivity (albedo) of the sea ice compared to ice-free waters. A satellite-based data record starting in late 1978 shows that indeed rapid changes have been occurring in the Arctic, where the ice coverage has been declining at a substantial rate. In contrast, in the Antarctic the sea ice coverage has been increasing although at a lesser rate than the decreases in the Arctic. \n\n> Sea ice concentration is the percent areal coverage of ice within the data element (grid cell). Sea ice extent is the integral sum of the areas of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration, while sea ice area is the integral sum of the product of ice concentration and area of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration. \n\nSource: [NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center](https://earth.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/data/current-state-sea-ice-cover)", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the maximum sea ice extent (in millions km^2) of the Artic Ice Cap in the given year, according to the [US National Snow and Ice Data Center](https://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index/data-and-image-archive)", "lower_25": "14.00", "median": "14.35", "upper_75": "14.67", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 36.9k US deaths will be attributed to betacoronaviruses between 2028 and 2030 (inclusive) if a CDC authorization of a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine is granted?", "desc": "[Betacoronavirus](https://viralzone.expasy.org/764?outline=all_by_species) is a genus of the virus family Coronaviridae. The known human-infecting betacoronaviruses [are](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html): SARS-CoV-2, SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, OC43, and HKU1. SARS-CoV-2 is the virus that is the cause of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. [SARS-CoV](https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/sars/) caused an outbreak in 2002 and went extinct in 2004, and in that time caused 774 total known deaths. [MERS-CoV](https://www.who.int/health-topics/middle-east-respiratory-syndrome-coronavirus-mers#tab=tab_1) was identified in 2012 and has since been circulating at low levels in the in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia and has caused 858 total known deaths. [OC43](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html) and [HKU1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_coronavirus_HKU1) are common human coronaviruses — it is not known how many deaths can be attributed to them, though it is likely to be very low given that these viruses [almost always](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/general-information.html) only produce mild common cold symptoms. University of Paris Professor Patrick Berche [suggests](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35124103/) that OC43 may have been the cause of the [1889–1890 flu pandemic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1889%E2%80%931890_pandemic).\n\nThe purpose of this question is to understand the potential value of a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine in terms of expected number of lives saved.", "resc": "If a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine is authorized by the US FDA at any time before January 1, 2028, the \"not authorized\" option will resolve as **Ambiguous**; if such a vaccine is **not** approved by 2028, the \"authorized\" option will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe remaining question will resolve as the best estimate (as of January 1, 2032) of the total number of deaths in the US due to all betacoronaviruses for the years 2028, 2029 and 2030. Such an estimate should include deaths caused by all known human-infecting betacoronaviruses and include unreported deaths (not just confirmed deaths). If there is no such estimate available, Metaculus will make such an estimate.\n\nFor this question, a vaccine will be considered a \"pan-betacoronavirus\" vaccine if the government authority approves its use for all known betacoronaviruses. There will be no requirements on the demonstrated efficacy or safety of the vaccine; approval by the US FDA is the sole criterion. Any kind of approval, including emergency approval, would count.\n\n*13 July clarification: This question assumes that there will be no further novel betacoronavirus pandemics between now and January 1, 2028. If there is a new betacoronavirus pandemic (e.g.: \"SARS-CoV-3\") in this time frame, then both options in this question will resolve **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "36.9k", "median": "81.9k", "upper_75": "178k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum Antartic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) will be 2.72 in these years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Maximum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11544/)\n* [Minimum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11545/)\n* [Maximum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11546/)\n\n----\n\n> The sea ice cover is one of the key components of the polar climate system. It has been a focus of attention in recent years, largely because of a strong decrease in the Arctic sea ice cover and modeling results that indicate that global warming could be amplified in the Arctic on account of ice-albedo feedback. This results from the high reflectivity (albedo) of the sea ice compared to ice-free waters. A satellite-based data record starting in late 1978 shows that indeed rapid changes have been occurring in the Arctic, where the ice coverage has been declining at a substantial rate. In contrast, in the Antarctic the sea ice coverage has been increasing although at a lesser rate than the decreases in the Arctic. \n\n> Sea ice concentration is the percent areal coverage of ice within the data element (grid cell). Sea ice extent is the integral sum of the areas of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration, while sea ice area is the integral sum of the product of ice concentration and area of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration. \n\nSource: [NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center](https://earth.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/data/current-state-sea-ice-cover)", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the minimum sea ice extent (in millions km^2) of the Antarctic Ice Cap in the given year, according to the [US National Snow and Ice Data Center](https://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index/data-and-image-archive)", "lower_25": "1.74", "median": "2.21", "upper_75": "2.72", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 64.4k US deaths attributed to betacoronaviruses between 2028 and 2030 (inclusive) if a CDC authorization of a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine is not granted?", "desc": "[Betacoronavirus](https://viralzone.expasy.org/764?outline=all_by_species) is a genus of the virus family Coronaviridae. The known human-infecting betacoronaviruses [are](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html): SARS-CoV-2, SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, OC43, and HKU1. SARS-CoV-2 is the virus that is the cause of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. [SARS-CoV](https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/sars/) caused an outbreak in 2002 and went extinct in 2004, and in that time caused 774 total known deaths. [MERS-CoV](https://www.who.int/health-topics/middle-east-respiratory-syndrome-coronavirus-mers#tab=tab_1) was identified in 2012 and has since been circulating at low levels in the in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia and has caused 858 total known deaths. [OC43](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html) and [HKU1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_coronavirus_HKU1) are common human coronaviruses — it is not known how many deaths can be attributed to them, though it is likely to be very low given that these viruses [almost always](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/general-information.html) only produce mild common cold symptoms. University of Paris Professor Patrick Berche [suggests](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35124103/) that OC43 may have been the cause of the [1889–1890 flu pandemic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1889%E2%80%931890_pandemic).\n\nThe purpose of this question is to understand the potential value of a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine in terms of expected number of lives saved.", "resc": "If a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine is authorized by the US FDA at any time before January 1, 2028, the \"not authorized\" option will resolve as **Ambiguous**; if such a vaccine is **not** approved by 2028, the \"authorized\" option will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe remaining question will resolve as the best estimate (as of January 1, 2032) of the total number of deaths in the US due to all betacoronaviruses for the years 2028, 2029 and 2030. Such an estimate should include deaths caused by all known human-infecting betacoronaviruses and include unreported deaths (not just confirmed deaths). If there is no such estimate available, Metaculus will make such an estimate.\n\nFor this question, a vaccine will be considered a \"pan-betacoronavirus\" vaccine if the government authority approves its use for all known betacoronaviruses. There will be no requirements on the demonstrated efficacy or safety of the vaccine; approval by the US FDA is the sole criterion. Any kind of approval, including emergency approval, would count.\n\n*13 July clarification: This question assumes that there will be no further novel betacoronavirus pandemics between now and January 1, 2028. If there is a new betacoronavirus pandemic (e.g.: \"SARS-CoV-3\") in this time frame, then both options in this question will resolve **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "64.4k", "median": "155k", "upper_75": "344k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum arctic sea ice extent will be 3.41 in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Maximum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11544/)\n* [Maximum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11546/)\n* [Minimum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11547/)\n\n----\n\n> The sea ice cover is one of the key components of the polar climate system. It has been a focus of attention in recent years, largely because of a strong decrease in the Arctic sea ice cover and modeling results that indicate that global warming could be amplified in the Arctic on account of ice-albedo feedback. This results from the high reflectivity (albedo) of the sea ice compared to ice-free waters. A satellite-based data record starting in late 1978 shows that indeed rapid changes have been occurring in the Arctic, where the ice coverage has been declining at a substantial rate. In contrast, in the Antarctic the sea ice coverage has been increasing although at a lesser rate than the decreases in the Arctic. \n\n> Sea ice concentration is the percent areal coverage of ice within the data element (grid cell). Sea ice extent is the integral sum of the areas of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration, while sea ice area is the integral sum of the product of ice concentration and area of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration. \n\nSource: [NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center](https://earth.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/data/current-state-sea-ice-cover)\n\n***What will be the minimum arctic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) in these years?***", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the minimum sea ice extent (in millions km^2) of the Artic Ice Cap in the given year, according to the [US National Snow and Ice Data Center](https://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index/data-and-image-archive).", "lower_25": "3.41", "median": "3.89", "upper_75": "4.33", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum Antartic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) will be 2.72 in these years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Maximum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11544/)\n* [Minimum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11545/)\n* [Maximum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11546/)\n\n----\n\n> The sea ice cover is one of the key components of the polar climate system. It has been a focus of attention in recent years, largely because of a strong decrease in the Arctic sea ice cover and modeling results that indicate that global warming could be amplified in the Arctic on account of ice-albedo feedback. This results from the high reflectivity (albedo) of the sea ice compared to ice-free waters. A satellite-based data record starting in late 1978 shows that indeed rapid changes have been occurring in the Arctic, where the ice coverage has been declining at a substantial rate. In contrast, in the Antarctic the sea ice coverage has been increasing although at a lesser rate than the decreases in the Arctic. \n\n> Sea ice concentration is the percent areal coverage of ice within the data element (grid cell). Sea ice extent is the integral sum of the areas of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration, while sea ice area is the integral sum of the product of ice concentration and area of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration. \n\nSource: [NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center](https://earth.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/data/current-state-sea-ice-cover)", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the minimum sea ice extent (in millions km^2) of the Antarctic Ice Cap in the given year, according to the [US National Snow and Ice Data Center](https://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index/data-and-image-archive)", "lower_25": "1.74", "median": "2.21", "upper_75": "2.72", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum Antartic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) will be 2.72 in these years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Maximum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11544/)\n* [Minimum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11545/)\n* [Maximum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11546/)\n\n----\n\n> The sea ice cover is one of the key components of the polar climate system. It has been a focus of attention in recent years, largely because of a strong decrease in the Arctic sea ice cover and modeling results that indicate that global warming could be amplified in the Arctic on account of ice-albedo feedback. This results from the high reflectivity (albedo) of the sea ice compared to ice-free waters. A satellite-based data record starting in late 1978 shows that indeed rapid changes have been occurring in the Arctic, where the ice coverage has been declining at a substantial rate. In contrast, in the Antarctic the sea ice coverage has been increasing although at a lesser rate than the decreases in the Arctic. \n\n> Sea ice concentration is the percent areal coverage of ice within the data element (grid cell). Sea ice extent is the integral sum of the areas of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration, while sea ice area is the integral sum of the product of ice concentration and area of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration. \n\nSource: [NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center](https://earth.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/data/current-state-sea-ice-cover)", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the minimum sea ice extent (in millions km^2) of the Antarctic Ice Cap in the given year, according to the [US National Snow and Ice Data Center](https://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index/data-and-image-archive)", "lower_25": "1.74", "median": "2.21", "upper_75": "2.72", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each party will win 379 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "There are 650 seats in the UK's House of Commons. In the [2019 general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_United_Kingdom_general_election):\n
  • The Conservative Party won 365 seats
  • \n
  • The Labour Party won 202 seats
  • \n
  • The Scottish National Party won 48 seats
  • \n
  • The Liberal Democrats won 11 seats
  • \n
  • The remaining 24 seats were won by Northern Irish parties (18), Plaid Cymru (4), the Green Party (1) and the Speaker of the House of Commons (1).
\n\nThe [next UK general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_United_Kingdom_general_election) is expected to be held no later than January 24, 2025 (see the relevant Metaculus question [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6368/next-uk-general-election/)).\n\nConstituency boundaries may be altered ahead of the next election. The [independent boundary reviews](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05929/) must be completed by July 1, 2023. One certain impact of these changes (if adopted in time) is that the number of Scottish seats will fall by 2, the Welsh number will fall by 8, and the English number will rise by 10.", "resc": "Each sub-question below will resolve as the number of seats won for the respective party in the next UK general election held after December 12, 2019. This question will use the [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/)'s results of the election, or credible media reports.\n\nThe Speaker of the House of Commons will not be included with their former party's count", "lower_25": "330", "median": "379", "upper_75": "428", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum Antartic sea ice extent will be 18.26 in these years?", "desc": "", "resc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*_x000D_\n_x000D_\n* [Maximum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11544/)_x000D_\n* [Minimum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11545/)_x000D_\n* [Minimum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11547/)_x000D_\n_x000D_\n----_x000D_\n_x000D_\n> The sea ice cover is one of the key components of the polar climate system. It has been a focus of attention in recent years, largely because of a strong decrease in the Arctic sea ice cover and modeling results that indicate that global warming could be amplified in the Arctic on account of ice-albedo feedback. This results from the high reflectivity (albedo) of the sea ice compared to ice-free waters. A satellite-based data record starting in late 1978 shows that indeed rapid changes have been occurring in the Arctic, where the ice coverage has been declining at a substantial rate. In contrast, in the Antarctic the sea ice coverage has been increasing although at a lesser rate than the decreases in the Arctic. _x000D_\n_x000D_\n> Sea ice concentration is the percent areal coverage of ice within the data element (grid cell). Sea ice extent is the integral sum of the areas of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration, while sea ice area is the integral sum of the product of ice concentration and area of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration. _x000D_\n_x000D_\nSource: [NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center](https://earth.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/data/current-state-sea-ice-cover)_x000D_\n_x000D_\n***What will be the maximum Antartic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) in these years?***_x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese sub-questions will resolve as the maximum sea ice extent (in millions km^2) of the Antarctic Ice Cap in the given year, according to the [US National Snow and Ice Data Center](https://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index/data-and-image-archive).", "lower_25": "17.59", "median": "18.26", "upper_75": "18.74", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each party will win 379 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "There are 650 seats in the UK's House of Commons. In the [2019 general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_United_Kingdom_general_election):\n
  • The Conservative Party won 365 seats
  • \n
  • The Labour Party won 202 seats
  • \n
  • The Scottish National Party won 48 seats
  • \n
  • The Liberal Democrats won 11 seats
  • \n
  • The remaining 24 seats were won by Northern Irish parties (18), Plaid Cymru (4), the Green Party (1) and the Speaker of the House of Commons (1).
\n\nThe [next UK general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_United_Kingdom_general_election) is expected to be held no later than January 24, 2025 (see the relevant Metaculus question [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6368/next-uk-general-election/)).\n\nConstituency boundaries may be altered ahead of the next election. The [independent boundary reviews](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05929/) must be completed by July 1, 2023. One certain impact of these changes (if adopted in time) is that the number of Scottish seats will fall by 2, the Welsh number will fall by 8, and the English number will rise by 10.", "resc": "Each sub-question below will resolve as the number of seats won for the respective party in the next UK general election held after December 12, 2019. This question will use the [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/)'s results of the election, or credible media reports.\n\nThe Speaker of the House of Commons will not be included with their former party's count", "lower_25": "330", "median": "379", "upper_75": "428", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum arctic sea ice extent will be 3.41 in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Maximum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11544/)\n* [Maximum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11546/)\n* [Minimum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11547/)\n\n----\n\n> The sea ice cover is one of the key components of the polar climate system. It has been a focus of attention in recent years, largely because of a strong decrease in the Arctic sea ice cover and modeling results that indicate that global warming could be amplified in the Arctic on account of ice-albedo feedback. This results from the high reflectivity (albedo) of the sea ice compared to ice-free waters. A satellite-based data record starting in late 1978 shows that indeed rapid changes have been occurring in the Arctic, where the ice coverage has been declining at a substantial rate. In contrast, in the Antarctic the sea ice coverage has been increasing although at a lesser rate than the decreases in the Arctic. \n\n> Sea ice concentration is the percent areal coverage of ice within the data element (grid cell). Sea ice extent is the integral sum of the areas of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration, while sea ice area is the integral sum of the product of ice concentration and area of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration. \n\nSource: [NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center](https://earth.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/data/current-state-sea-ice-cover)\n\n***What will be the minimum arctic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) in these years?***", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the minimum sea ice extent (in millions km^2) of the Artic Ice Cap in the given year, according to the [US National Snow and Ice Data Center](https://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index/data-and-image-archive).", "lower_25": "3.41", "median": "3.89", "upper_75": "4.33", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum Antartic sea ice extent will be 18.26 in these years?", "desc": "", "resc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*_x000D_\n_x000D_\n* [Maximum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11544/)_x000D_\n* [Minimum Arctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11545/)_x000D_\n* [Minimum Antarctic Sea Ice Extent](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11547/)_x000D_\n_x000D_\n----_x000D_\n_x000D_\n> The sea ice cover is one of the key components of the polar climate system. It has been a focus of attention in recent years, largely because of a strong decrease in the Arctic sea ice cover and modeling results that indicate that global warming could be amplified in the Arctic on account of ice-albedo feedback. This results from the high reflectivity (albedo) of the sea ice compared to ice-free waters. A satellite-based data record starting in late 1978 shows that indeed rapid changes have been occurring in the Arctic, where the ice coverage has been declining at a substantial rate. In contrast, in the Antarctic the sea ice coverage has been increasing although at a lesser rate than the decreases in the Arctic. _x000D_\n_x000D_\n> Sea ice concentration is the percent areal coverage of ice within the data element (grid cell). Sea ice extent is the integral sum of the areas of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration, while sea ice area is the integral sum of the product of ice concentration and area of all grid cells with at least 15% ice concentration. _x000D_\n_x000D_\nSource: [NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center](https://earth.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/data/current-state-sea-ice-cover)_x000D_\n_x000D_\n***What will be the maximum Antartic sea ice extent (in millions km^2) in these years?***_x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese sub-questions will resolve as the maximum sea ice extent (in millions km^2) of the Antarctic Ice Cap in the given year, according to the [US National Snow and Ice Data Center](https://nsidc.org/data/seaice_index/data-and-image-archive).", "lower_25": "17.59", "median": "18.26", "upper_75": "18.74", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each party will win 379 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "There are 650 seats in the UK's House of Commons. In the [2019 general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_United_Kingdom_general_election):\n
  • The Conservative Party won 365 seats
  • \n
  • The Labour Party won 202 seats
  • \n
  • The Scottish National Party won 48 seats
  • \n
  • The Liberal Democrats won 11 seats
  • \n
  • The remaining 24 seats were won by Northern Irish parties (18), Plaid Cymru (4), the Green Party (1) and the Speaker of the House of Commons (1).
\n\nThe [next UK general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_United_Kingdom_general_election) is expected to be held no later than January 24, 2025 (see the relevant Metaculus question [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6368/next-uk-general-election/)).\n\nConstituency boundaries may be altered ahead of the next election. The [independent boundary reviews](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05929/) must be completed by July 1, 2023. One certain impact of these changes (if adopted in time) is that the number of Scottish seats will fall by 2, the Welsh number will fall by 8, and the English number will rise by 10.", "resc": "Each sub-question below will resolve as the number of seats won for the respective party in the next UK general election held after December 12, 2019. This question will use the [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/)'s results of the election, or credible media reports.\n\nThe Speaker of the House of Commons will not be included with their former party's count", "lower_25": "330", "median": "379", "upper_75": "428", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the sum of the performance (in exaFLOPS) of the top 500 supercomputers will be 33.3% in the following dates?", "desc": "In the seven decades since the invention of the [point-contact transistor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Point-contact_transistor) at Bell Labs, relentless progress in the development of semiconductor devices — Moore's law — has been achieved despite [regular warnings](https://www.nature.com/news/the-chips-are-down-for-moore-s-law-1.19338) from industry observers about impending limits._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe [TOP500 project](https://www.top500.org/lists/top500/) collects and ranks system performance metrics of the most powerful non-distributed computer systems in the world. The project was started in 1993 and publishes an updated list of the supercomputers twice a year. The first of these updates always coincides with the [International Supercomputing Conference](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISC_High_Performance) in June, and the second is presented at the [ACM/IEEE Supercomputing Conference](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ACM/IEEE_Supercomputing_Conference) in November._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe TOP500 ranks high-performance computing (HPC) by recording how fast a computer system solves a dense n by n system of linear equations in double precision (64 bits) arithmetic on distributed-memory computers ([TOP500, 2019](https://www.top500.org/project/linpack/)). This is an implementation of the High Performance Computing [Linpack Benchmark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LINPACK_benchmarks)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nHistorical data for TOP500 can [be found here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18Mha2f9RIQCAAg41vm_UkP524pt59vvD7TcjHZ1SHXw/edit?usp=sharing). Please make a copy by clicking \"file\" and then \"make a copy\" if you wish to edit it.", "resc": "The following sub-questions will resolve as the sum of performance (at Rmax) in exaFLOPS (1 exaFLOP = \\(10^{18}\\) FLOPS) of all supercomputers listed by [TOP500](https://www.top500.org/lists/top500/) for the respective date.", "lower_25": "14.3", "median": "21.2", "upper_75": "33.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If these countries detonate a nuclear weapon by 2050, what is the chance that 0.194 proportion of those detonations will be countervalue?", "desc": "[Countervalue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervalue) targeting is \"the targeting of an opponent's assets that are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations\". Compared to nuclear strikes against [counterforce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterforce) targets or battlefield targets, countervalue nuclear strikes would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the proportion of offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the respective country which are considered countervalue strikes. Only offensive detonations occurring between January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2049 will be included. If there are no offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the country in question in that time period, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nFor this question, A detonation will be considered \"countervalue\" if credible media reporting does not widely consider a military or industrial target as the primary target of the detonation (except for detonations on capital cities, which will always be considered countervalue without exception). \n\nOffensive nuclear detonations will include only [authorised, inadvertent, and accidental](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf) offensive detonations, not [test detonations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing), [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion), or detonations by non-state actors who seized Pakistan-owned weapons.", "lower_25": "0.021", "median": "0.082", "upper_75": "0.194", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum compute (in petaFLOPS-days) ever used in training an AI experiment by the following dates will be 47.7M?", "desc": "Various figures in AI research have noted the importance of computer hardware for AI progress ([LeCun et al., 2015](https://www.nature.com/articles/nature14539); [Schmidhuber, 2015](https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/DeepLearningInNeuralNetworksOverview.JSchmidhuber2015.pdf)). Exponential improvements in the computing power available for a given price, and the development of particular technologies such as graphics processing units (GPUs), have accelerated progress in multiple AI domains ([Brundage, 2016](https://www.milesbrundage.com/uploads/2/1/6/8/21681226/modelingprogressinai.pdf)). \n\nRecent progress in has been accompanied by the use of increasing amounts of computation. [According to OpenAI](https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/), since 2012, the amount of compute used in the largest AI training runs has been increasing exponentially with a 3.5 month doubling time. This trend sustained by both the continued progress in hardware performance, and increased spending on AI experiments [(AI Impacts, 2018)](https://aiimpacts.org/interpreting-ai-compute-trends/).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as a credible estimate of the cost of the most compute used in a \"single AI experiment\" as of the specified date of the sub-question.\n\nJan-2022 will be evaluated on Jan 14, 2022; Feb-2023 on Feb 14, 2023; Jan-2026 on Jan 1, 2026; and Jan 2031 on Jan 1, 2031.\n\nBy \"single AI experiment\" we mean an effort to train a set of models running on a set of \"architectures\". The effort should be completed within a determinate amount of time (the experiment must not have an open-ended time frame). For our purposes, the publication of the principal results of the effort ends the experiment. \n\nBy \"architectures\" we mean the systems described in the relevant publications that define how inputs signal or percept sequences are to be mapped on various outputs. These outputs might be probability distributions over actions (in the case of a policy network), representations over expected value or reward of futures states (in the case of value networks) or descriptions of futures states.\n\n**Methodology**\n\nThe following methodologies that were used by OpenAI [(Amodei et al., 2018)](https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/) shall produce our estimates. Method 1: \n\n> When we had enough information, we directly counted the number of FLOPS (adds and multiplies) in the described architecture per training example and multiplied by the total number of forward and backward passes during training. \n\nIf there is not enough information to produce a reliable estimate using method 1, we shall use method 2:\n\n> When we didn't have enough information to directly count FLOPs, we looked GPU training time and total number of GPUs used and assumed a utilization efficiency (usually 0.33). For the majority of the papers we were able to use the first method, but for a significant minority we relied on the second, and we computed both whenever possible as a consistency check. In the majority of cases we also confirmed with the authors. The calculations are not intended to be precise but we aim to be correct within a factor 2-3.", "lower_25": "1.02M", "median": "6.41M", "upper_75": "47.7M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum compute (in petaFLOPS-days) ever used in training an AI experiment by the following dates will be 47.7M?", "desc": "Various figures in AI research have noted the importance of computer hardware for AI progress ([LeCun et al., 2015](https://www.nature.com/articles/nature14539); [Schmidhuber, 2015](https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/DeepLearningInNeuralNetworksOverview.JSchmidhuber2015.pdf)). Exponential improvements in the computing power available for a given price, and the development of particular technologies such as graphics processing units (GPUs), have accelerated progress in multiple AI domains ([Brundage, 2016](https://www.milesbrundage.com/uploads/2/1/6/8/21681226/modelingprogressinai.pdf)). \n\nRecent progress in has been accompanied by the use of increasing amounts of computation. [According to OpenAI](https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/), since 2012, the amount of compute used in the largest AI training runs has been increasing exponentially with a 3.5 month doubling time. This trend sustained by both the continued progress in hardware performance, and increased spending on AI experiments [(AI Impacts, 2018)](https://aiimpacts.org/interpreting-ai-compute-trends/).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as a credible estimate of the cost of the most compute used in a \"single AI experiment\" as of the specified date of the sub-question.\n\nJan-2022 will be evaluated on Jan 14, 2022; Feb-2023 on Feb 14, 2023; Jan-2026 on Jan 1, 2026; and Jan 2031 on Jan 1, 2031.\n\nBy \"single AI experiment\" we mean an effort to train a set of models running on a set of \"architectures\". The effort should be completed within a determinate amount of time (the experiment must not have an open-ended time frame). For our purposes, the publication of the principal results of the effort ends the experiment. \n\nBy \"architectures\" we mean the systems described in the relevant publications that define how inputs signal or percept sequences are to be mapped on various outputs. These outputs might be probability distributions over actions (in the case of a policy network), representations over expected value or reward of futures states (in the case of value networks) or descriptions of futures states.\n\n**Methodology**\n\nThe following methodologies that were used by OpenAI [(Amodei et al., 2018)](https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/) shall produce our estimates. Method 1: \n\n> When we had enough information, we directly counted the number of FLOPS (adds and multiplies) in the described architecture per training example and multiplied by the total number of forward and backward passes during training. \n\nIf there is not enough information to produce a reliable estimate using method 1, we shall use method 2:\n\n> When we didn't have enough information to directly count FLOPs, we looked GPU training time and total number of GPUs used and assumed a utilization efficiency (usually 0.33). For the majority of the papers we were able to use the first method, but for a significant minority we relied on the second, and we computed both whenever possible as a consistency check. In the majority of cases we also confirmed with the authors. The calculations are not intended to be precise but we aim to be correct within a factor 2-3.", "lower_25": "1.02M", "median": "6.41M", "upper_75": "47.7M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If these countries detonate a nuclear weapon by 2050, what is the chance that 0.194 proportion of those detonations will be countervalue?", "desc": "[Countervalue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervalue) targeting is \"the targeting of an opponent's assets that are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations\". Compared to nuclear strikes against [counterforce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterforce) targets or battlefield targets, countervalue nuclear strikes would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the proportion of offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the respective country which are considered countervalue strikes. Only offensive detonations occurring between January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2049 will be included. If there are no offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the country in question in that time period, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nFor this question, A detonation will be considered \"countervalue\" if credible media reporting does not widely consider a military or industrial target as the primary target of the detonation (except for detonations on capital cities, which will always be considered countervalue without exception). \n\nOffensive nuclear detonations will include only [authorised, inadvertent, and accidental](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf) offensive detonations, not [test detonations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing), [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion), or detonations by non-state actors who seized Pakistan-owned weapons.", "lower_25": "0.021", "median": "0.082", "upper_75": "0.194", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If these countries detonate a nuclear weapon by 2050, what is the chance that 0.194 proportion of those detonations will be countervalue?", "desc": "[Countervalue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Countervalue) targeting is \"the targeting of an opponent's assets that are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations\". Compared to nuclear strikes against [counterforce](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterforce) targets or battlefield targets, countervalue nuclear strikes would typically cause both many more immediate fatalities and much more smoke (increasing the risk of nuclear winter).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the proportion of offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the respective country which are considered countervalue strikes. Only offensive detonations occurring between January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2049 will be included. If there are no offensive nuclear detonations carried out by the country in question in that time period, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nFor this question, A detonation will be considered \"countervalue\" if credible media reporting does not widely consider a military or industrial target as the primary target of the detonation (except for detonations on capital cities, which will always be considered countervalue without exception). \n\nOffensive nuclear detonations will include only [authorised, inadvertent, and accidental](http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs21barrett.pdf) offensive detonations, not [test detonations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing), [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion), or detonations by non-state actors who seized Pakistan-owned weapons.", "lower_25": "0.021", "median": "0.082", "upper_75": "0.194", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art language modelling performance (in perplexity) on WikiText-103 will be 11.4 by the following dates?", "desc": "[Language modelling](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_model) has been applied to a wide range of applications and domains with great success. To name a few, automatic speech recognition, machine translation, spelling correction, touchscreen “soft” keyboards and many natural language processing applications depend on the quality of language models.\n\nThe [WikiText language modelling dataset](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.07843.pdf) is a collection of over 100 million tokens extracted from the set of verified Good and Featured articles on Wikipedia. These articles have been reviewed by humans and are considered well written, factually accurate, broad in coverage, neutral in point of view, and stable. \n\nAs of December 2020, the state-of-the-art model for is kNN-LM [(Khandelwal et al. 2020)](https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.00172v2), which achieves a perplexity of 15.79 on the WikiTex-103 test set.\n\nAn excellent reference for tracking state-of-the-art models is [PapersWithCode](https://paperswithcode.com/sota/language-modelling-on-wikitext-103), which tracks performance data of ML models.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the lowest level of perplexity achieved by any language model on WikiText-103's test set before 11:59PM GMT on the date in question. Qualifying models need to be trained on only the WikiText-103's training set—no extra training data may be used.", "lower_25": "9.84", "median": "11.4", "upper_75": "13.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the sum of the performance (in exaFLOPS) of the top 500 supercomputers will be 33.3% in the following dates?", "desc": "In the seven decades since the invention of the [point-contact transistor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Point-contact_transistor) at Bell Labs, relentless progress in the development of semiconductor devices — Moore's law — has been achieved despite [regular warnings](https://www.nature.com/news/the-chips-are-down-for-moore-s-law-1.19338) from industry observers about impending limits._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe [TOP500 project](https://www.top500.org/lists/top500/) collects and ranks system performance metrics of the most powerful non-distributed computer systems in the world. The project was started in 1993 and publishes an updated list of the supercomputers twice a year. The first of these updates always coincides with the [International Supercomputing Conference](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISC_High_Performance) in June, and the second is presented at the [ACM/IEEE Supercomputing Conference](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ACM/IEEE_Supercomputing_Conference) in November._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe TOP500 ranks high-performance computing (HPC) by recording how fast a computer system solves a dense n by n system of linear equations in double precision (64 bits) arithmetic on distributed-memory computers ([TOP500, 2019](https://www.top500.org/project/linpack/)). This is an implementation of the High Performance Computing [Linpack Benchmark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LINPACK_benchmarks)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nHistorical data for TOP500 can [be found here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18Mha2f9RIQCAAg41vm_UkP524pt59vvD7TcjHZ1SHXw/edit?usp=sharing). Please make a copy by clicking \"file\" and then \"make a copy\" if you wish to edit it.", "resc": "The following sub-questions will resolve as the sum of performance (at Rmax) in exaFLOPS (1 exaFLOP = \\(10^{18}\\) FLOPS) of all supercomputers listed by [TOP500](https://www.top500.org/lists/top500/) for the respective date.", "lower_25": "14.3", "median": "21.2", "upper_75": "33.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first offensive nuclear detonation by 2100 will occur by 2037?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will an offensive nuclear detonation cause at least 1 fatality before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7404/nuclear-detonation-fatality-before-2024/)\n\n* [Will a nuclear weapon be detonated as an act of war by 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4779/at-least-1-nuclear-detonation-in-war-by-2050/)\n\n* [How many nuclear weapons will be detonated offensively by 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7457/-nuclear-weapons-used-by-2050/)\n\n* [If there is at least 1 offensive nuclear detonation by 2100, when will the first detonation occur?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8643/date-of-first-nuclear-detonation-by-2100/) *[previous version of this question]*\n\n----\n\nSince the development of Nuclear Weapons in 1945 and the end of World War 1, the world has had a period of [relative peace](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/battle-related-deaths-in-state-based-conflicts-since-1946) under the [hegemonic dominance of the United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pax_Americana). Though the Cold War between the US and Russia never elevated to direct nuclear conflict, there were [many occasions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nuclear_close_calls) where nuclear conflict was narrowly avoided, including the [1962 cuban missile crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis).\n\nThough the end of the Cold War led to reduced tensions and [reduced nuclear stockpiles](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/number-of-nuclear-warheads-in-the-inventory-of-the-nuclear-powers), the threat of conflict remains. A significant remaining ambiguity is whether a new nuclear conflict is more likely to occur in the near future, or later in the century.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date that the first nuclear weapon (fission or thermonuclear) is detonated offensively between June 1, 2022 to January 1, 2100. If there are no offensive detonations in that time period by any state or non-state actor, then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nNeither [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) nor [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) will count towards question resolution, even if such detonations cause substantial damage.\n\nFor this question, a nuclear weapon is strictly defined as a bomb whose primary energy source is a [fission or fusion nuclear reaction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon), and excludes conventional weapons and \"[dirty bombs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb)\"", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2037", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art language modelling performance (in perplexity) on WikiText-103 will be 11.4 by the following dates?", "desc": "[Language modelling](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_model) has been applied to a wide range of applications and domains with great success. To name a few, automatic speech recognition, machine translation, spelling correction, touchscreen “soft” keyboards and many natural language processing applications depend on the quality of language models.\n\nThe [WikiText language modelling dataset](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.07843.pdf) is a collection of over 100 million tokens extracted from the set of verified Good and Featured articles on Wikipedia. These articles have been reviewed by humans and are considered well written, factually accurate, broad in coverage, neutral in point of view, and stable. \n\nAs of December 2020, the state-of-the-art model for is kNN-LM [(Khandelwal et al. 2020)](https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.00172v2), which achieves a perplexity of 15.79 on the WikiTex-103 test set.\n\nAn excellent reference for tracking state-of-the-art models is [PapersWithCode](https://paperswithcode.com/sota/language-modelling-on-wikitext-103), which tracks performance data of ML models.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the lowest level of perplexity achieved by any language model on WikiText-103's test set before 11:59PM GMT on the date in question. Qualifying models need to be trained on only the WikiText-103's training set—no extra training data may be used.", "lower_25": "9.84", "median": "11.4", "upper_75": "13.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum compute (in petaFLOPS-days) ever used in training an AI experiment by the following dates will be 47.7M?", "desc": "Various figures in AI research have noted the importance of computer hardware for AI progress ([LeCun et al., 2015](https://www.nature.com/articles/nature14539); [Schmidhuber, 2015](https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/DeepLearningInNeuralNetworksOverview.JSchmidhuber2015.pdf)). Exponential improvements in the computing power available for a given price, and the development of particular technologies such as graphics processing units (GPUs), have accelerated progress in multiple AI domains ([Brundage, 2016](https://www.milesbrundage.com/uploads/2/1/6/8/21681226/modelingprogressinai.pdf)). \n\nRecent progress in has been accompanied by the use of increasing amounts of computation. [According to OpenAI](https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/), since 2012, the amount of compute used in the largest AI training runs has been increasing exponentially with a 3.5 month doubling time. This trend sustained by both the continued progress in hardware performance, and increased spending on AI experiments [(AI Impacts, 2018)](https://aiimpacts.org/interpreting-ai-compute-trends/).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as a credible estimate of the cost of the most compute used in a \"single AI experiment\" as of the specified date of the sub-question.\n\nJan-2022 will be evaluated on Jan 14, 2022; Feb-2023 on Feb 14, 2023; Jan-2026 on Jan 1, 2026; and Jan 2031 on Jan 1, 2031.\n\nBy \"single AI experiment\" we mean an effort to train a set of models running on a set of \"architectures\". The effort should be completed within a determinate amount of time (the experiment must not have an open-ended time frame). For our purposes, the publication of the principal results of the effort ends the experiment. \n\nBy \"architectures\" we mean the systems described in the relevant publications that define how inputs signal or percept sequences are to be mapped on various outputs. These outputs might be probability distributions over actions (in the case of a policy network), representations over expected value or reward of futures states (in the case of value networks) or descriptions of futures states.\n\n**Methodology**\n\nThe following methodologies that were used by OpenAI [(Amodei et al., 2018)](https://openai.com/blog/ai-and-compute/) shall produce our estimates. Method 1: \n\n> When we had enough information, we directly counted the number of FLOPS (adds and multiplies) in the described architecture per training example and multiplied by the total number of forward and backward passes during training. \n\nIf there is not enough information to produce a reliable estimate using method 1, we shall use method 2:\n\n> When we didn't have enough information to directly count FLOPs, we looked GPU training time and total number of GPUs used and assumed a utilization efficiency (usually 0.33). For the majority of the papers we were able to use the first method, but for a significant minority we relied on the second, and we computed both whenever possible as a consistency check. In the majority of cases we also confirmed with the authors. The calculations are not intended to be precise but we aim to be correct within a factor 2-3.", "lower_25": "1.02M", "median": "6.41M", "upper_75": "47.7M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art language modelling performance (in perplexity) on WikiText-103 will be 11.4 by the following dates?", "desc": "[Language modelling](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_model) has been applied to a wide range of applications and domains with great success. To name a few, automatic speech recognition, machine translation, spelling correction, touchscreen “soft” keyboards and many natural language processing applications depend on the quality of language models.\n\nThe [WikiText language modelling dataset](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.07843.pdf) is a collection of over 100 million tokens extracted from the set of verified Good and Featured articles on Wikipedia. These articles have been reviewed by humans and are considered well written, factually accurate, broad in coverage, neutral in point of view, and stable. \n\nAs of December 2020, the state-of-the-art model for is kNN-LM [(Khandelwal et al. 2020)](https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.00172v2), which achieves a perplexity of 15.79 on the WikiTex-103 test set.\n\nAn excellent reference for tracking state-of-the-art models is [PapersWithCode](https://paperswithcode.com/sota/language-modelling-on-wikitext-103), which tracks performance data of ML models.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the lowest level of perplexity achieved by any language model on WikiText-103's test set before 11:59PM GMT on the date in question. Qualifying models need to be trained on only the WikiText-103's training set—no extra training data may be used.", "lower_25": "9.84", "median": "11.4", "upper_75": "13.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 64.4k US deaths attributed to betacoronaviruses between 2028 and 2030 (inclusive) if a CDC authorization of a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine is not granted?", "desc": "[Betacoronavirus](https://viralzone.expasy.org/764?outline=all_by_species) is a genus of the virus family Coronaviridae. The known human-infecting betacoronaviruses [are](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html): SARS-CoV-2, SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, OC43, and HKU1. SARS-CoV-2 is the virus that is the cause of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. [SARS-CoV](https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/sars/) caused an outbreak in 2002 and went extinct in 2004, and in that time caused 774 total known deaths. [MERS-CoV](https://www.who.int/health-topics/middle-east-respiratory-syndrome-coronavirus-mers#tab=tab_1) was identified in 2012 and has since been circulating at low levels in the in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia and has caused 858 total known deaths. [OC43](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/types.html) and [HKU1](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_coronavirus_HKU1) are common human coronaviruses — it is not known how many deaths can be attributed to them, though it is likely to be very low given that these viruses [almost always](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/general-information.html) only produce mild common cold symptoms. University of Paris Professor Patrick Berche [suggests](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35124103/) that OC43 may have been the cause of the [1889–1890 flu pandemic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1889%E2%80%931890_pandemic).\n\nThe purpose of this question is to understand the potential value of a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine in terms of expected number of lives saved.", "resc": "If a pan-betacoronavirus vaccine is authorized by the US FDA at any time before January 1, 2028, the \"not authorized\" option will resolve as **Ambiguous**; if such a vaccine is **not** approved by 2028, the \"authorized\" option will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe remaining question will resolve as the best estimate (as of January 1, 2032) of the total number of deaths in the US due to all betacoronaviruses for the years 2028, 2029 and 2030. Such an estimate should include deaths caused by all known human-infecting betacoronaviruses and include unreported deaths (not just confirmed deaths). If there is no such estimate available, Metaculus will make such an estimate.\n\nFor this question, a vaccine will be considered a \"pan-betacoronavirus\" vaccine if the government authority approves its use for all known betacoronaviruses. There will be no requirements on the demonstrated efficacy or safety of the vaccine; approval by the US FDA is the sole criterion. Any kind of approval, including emergency approval, would count.\n\n*13 July clarification: This question assumes that there will be no further novel betacoronavirus pandemics between now and January 1, 2028. If there is a new betacoronavirus pandemic (e.g.: \"SARS-CoV-3\") in this time frame, then both options in this question will resolve **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "64.4k", "median": "155k", "upper_75": "344k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 75% of 428M towards Global Health and Development on the following dates?", "desc": "[Open Philanthropy](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/) is a major philanthropic foundation focused mainly on on causes associated with the [Effective Altruism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effective_altruism) movement. Most of their money currently comes from Good Ventures, a foundation managing the philanthopic efforts of Facebook and Asana cofounder Dustin Moskovitz and his partner Cari Tuna, who have an estimated net worth of [$22.8bn as of June 16th 2021](https://www.forbes.com/profile/dustin-moskovitz/?sh=4d3dcdd1dd34). They donated $101 million to the focus area \"Global Health and Development\" [in 2020](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/grants/?q=&focus-area=global-health-development&yr=2020) and $41 million [in 2019](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/grants/?q=&focus-area=global-health-development&yr=2019).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the sum of the dollar values of Open Philanthropy grants dated in the respective year and listed in their [grants database](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/giving/grants) with the focus area \"Global Health and Development\". If their grants database is no longer public, the question will resolve as their total donations in this focus area publicly announced in that year. If Open Phil do not disclose any public grants in that category in the respective year, that question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf Open Phil change their cataloguing system for focus areas, any areas which are focused primarily on Global Health and Development should count towards resolution of this question.\n\nIf Open Philanthropy no longer exists as an organization at the start of the respective year, that sub-question will resolve as **0**", "lower_25": "171M", "median": "233M", "upper_75": "428M", "prediction": "428M x 75% = 318M"} -{"title": "What is the chance that self-driving taxis will be available to Metaculus users by Jul 2029?", "desc": "A [robotaxi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robotaxi), also known as a self-driving taxi or a driverless taxi, is an autonomous car ([SAE automation level](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car#SAE_classification) 4 or 5) operated for a ridesharing company._x000D_\n_x000D_\nElon Musk (CEO of Tesla) [said in April 2019](https://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-robo-taxis-elon-musk-pt-barnum-circus-2019-4?op=1), \"I feel very confident predicting autonomous robo-taxi for Tesla next year. Not in all jurisdictions, because we won't have regulatory approval everywhere, but I'm confident we'll have at least regulatory approvals somewhere, literally next year.\"_x000D_\n_x000D_\nWaymo launched a driverless taxi service in Phoenix, Arizona, US in [October 2020](https://blog.waymo.com/2020/10/waymo-is-opening-its-fully-driverless.html).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the earliest date when all of the following conditions are fulfilled:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n1. At least 5 top Metaculus users (users in Metaculus' [top 100](https://www.metaculus.com/rankings/?question_status=opened&timeframe=12month) among questions opened in the last 12 months) report riding Tesla self-driving taxi as a normal client._x000D_\n2. At least one of the reported rides must happen outside the United States._x000D_\n3. There must be no human driver or supervisor present in all the reported rides._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese trips may happen in geo-fenced areas._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe sub-questions below refer to the dates when these 5 cumulative trips have been reached for the specific company providing the service. \"Any Service\" refers to any one or multiple self-driving taxi providers; \"Waymo\" and \"Tesla\" refer to only services which use software or equipment developed by the respective company.", "lower_25": "Feb 2025", "median": "Nov 2026", "upper_75": "Jul 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 75% of 428M towards Global Health and Development on the following dates?", "desc": "[Open Philanthropy](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/) is a major philanthropic foundation focused mainly on on causes associated with the [Effective Altruism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effective_altruism) movement. Most of their money currently comes from Good Ventures, a foundation managing the philanthopic efforts of Facebook and Asana cofounder Dustin Moskovitz and his partner Cari Tuna, who have an estimated net worth of [$22.8bn as of June 16th 2021](https://www.forbes.com/profile/dustin-moskovitz/?sh=4d3dcdd1dd34). They donated $101 million to the focus area \"Global Health and Development\" [in 2020](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/grants/?q=&focus-area=global-health-development&yr=2020) and $41 million [in 2019](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/grants/?q=&focus-area=global-health-development&yr=2019).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the sum of the dollar values of Open Philanthropy grants dated in the respective year and listed in their [grants database](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/giving/grants) with the focus area \"Global Health and Development\". If their grants database is no longer public, the question will resolve as their total donations in this focus area publicly announced in that year. If Open Phil do not disclose any public grants in that category in the respective year, that question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf Open Phil change their cataloguing system for focus areas, any areas which are focused primarily on Global Health and Development should count towards resolution of this question.\n\nIf Open Philanthropy no longer exists as an organization at the start of the respective year, that sub-question will resolve as **0**", "lower_25": "171M", "median": "233M", "upper_75": "428M", "prediction": "428M x 75% = 318M"} -{"title": "What is the chance that self-driving taxis will be available to Metaculus users by Jul 2029?", "desc": "A [robotaxi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robotaxi), also known as a self-driving taxi or a driverless taxi, is an autonomous car ([SAE automation level](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car#SAE_classification) 4 or 5) operated for a ridesharing company._x000D_\n_x000D_\nElon Musk (CEO of Tesla) [said in April 2019](https://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-robo-taxis-elon-musk-pt-barnum-circus-2019-4?op=1), \"I feel very confident predicting autonomous robo-taxi for Tesla next year. Not in all jurisdictions, because we won't have regulatory approval everywhere, but I'm confident we'll have at least regulatory approvals somewhere, literally next year.\"_x000D_\n_x000D_\nWaymo launched a driverless taxi service in Phoenix, Arizona, US in [October 2020](https://blog.waymo.com/2020/10/waymo-is-opening-its-fully-driverless.html).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the earliest date when all of the following conditions are fulfilled:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n1. At least 5 top Metaculus users (users in Metaculus' [top 100](https://www.metaculus.com/rankings/?question_status=opened&timeframe=12month) among questions opened in the last 12 months) report riding Tesla self-driving taxi as a normal client._x000D_\n2. At least one of the reported rides must happen outside the United States._x000D_\n3. There must be no human driver or supervisor present in all the reported rides._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese trips may happen in geo-fenced areas._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe sub-questions below refer to the dates when these 5 cumulative trips have been reached for the specific company providing the service. \"Any Service\" refers to any one or multiple self-driving taxi providers; \"Waymo\" and \"Tesla\" refer to only services which use software or equipment developed by the respective company.", "lower_25": "Feb 2025", "median": "Nov 2026", "upper_75": "Jul 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that self-driving taxis will be available to Metaculus users by Jul 2029?", "desc": "A [robotaxi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robotaxi), also known as a self-driving taxi or a driverless taxi, is an autonomous car ([SAE automation level](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car#SAE_classification) 4 or 5) operated for a ridesharing company._x000D_\n_x000D_\nElon Musk (CEO of Tesla) [said in April 2019](https://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-robo-taxis-elon-musk-pt-barnum-circus-2019-4?op=1), \"I feel very confident predicting autonomous robo-taxi for Tesla next year. Not in all jurisdictions, because we won't have regulatory approval everywhere, but I'm confident we'll have at least regulatory approvals somewhere, literally next year.\"_x000D_\n_x000D_\nWaymo launched a driverless taxi service in Phoenix, Arizona, US in [October 2020](https://blog.waymo.com/2020/10/waymo-is-opening-its-fully-driverless.html).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the earliest date when all of the following conditions are fulfilled:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n1. At least 5 top Metaculus users (users in Metaculus' [top 100](https://www.metaculus.com/rankings/?question_status=opened&timeframe=12month) among questions opened in the last 12 months) report riding Tesla self-driving taxi as a normal client._x000D_\n2. At least one of the reported rides must happen outside the United States._x000D_\n3. There must be no human driver or supervisor present in all the reported rides._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese trips may happen in geo-fenced areas._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe sub-questions below refer to the dates when these 5 cumulative trips have been reached for the specific company providing the service. \"Any Service\" refers to any one or multiple self-driving taxi providers; \"Waymo\" and \"Tesla\" refer to only services which use software or equipment developed by the respective company.", "lower_25": "Feb 2025", "median": "Nov 2026", "upper_75": "Jul 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Open Philanthropy will grant 75% of 428M towards Global Health and Development on the following dates?", "desc": "[Open Philanthropy](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/) is a major philanthropic foundation focused mainly on on causes associated with the [Effective Altruism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effective_altruism) movement. Most of their money currently comes from Good Ventures, a foundation managing the philanthopic efforts of Facebook and Asana cofounder Dustin Moskovitz and his partner Cari Tuna, who have an estimated net worth of [$22.8bn as of June 16th 2021](https://www.forbes.com/profile/dustin-moskovitz/?sh=4d3dcdd1dd34). They donated $101 million to the focus area \"Global Health and Development\" [in 2020](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/grants/?q=&focus-area=global-health-development&yr=2020) and $41 million [in 2019](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/grants/?q=&focus-area=global-health-development&yr=2019).", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the sum of the dollar values of Open Philanthropy grants dated in the respective year and listed in their [grants database](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/giving/grants) with the focus area \"Global Health and Development\". If their grants database is no longer public, the question will resolve as their total donations in this focus area publicly announced in that year. If Open Phil do not disclose any public grants in that category in the respective year, that question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf Open Phil change their cataloguing system for focus areas, any areas which are focused primarily on Global Health and Development should count towards resolution of this question.\n\nIf Open Philanthropy no longer exists as an organization at the start of the respective year, that sub-question will resolve as **0**", "lower_25": "171M", "median": "233M", "upper_75": "428M", "prediction": "428M x 75% = 318M"} -{"title": "What is the chance that self-driving car autonomy at level 5 will be developed and commercially available by 2038?", "desc": "Chris Chin of [The Drive](https://www.thedrive.com/tech/31816/key-volkswagen-exec-admits-level-5-autonomous-cars-may-never-happen) gives a quick summary of the [Society of Automotive Engineers'](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car#SAE_classification) levels of autonomy for self-driving cars:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n> A quick primer on the now-industry-standard SAE International rules on how to discuss self-driving abilities: Level 0 is no automation whatsoever. Level 1 is partial assistance with certain aspects of driving, like lane keep assist or adaptive cruise control. Level 2 is a step up to systems that can take control of the vehicle in certain situations, like Tesla's Autopilot or Cadillac's Super Cruise, while still requiring the driver to pay attention._x000D_\n>_x000D_\n> Get past that and we enter the realm of speculation: Level 3 promises full computer control without supervision under defined conditions during a journey, Level 4 is start-to-finish autonomous tech limited only by virtual safeguards like a geofence, and Level 5 is the total hands-off, go literally anywhere at the push of a button experience where the vehicle might not even have physical controls.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve on the earliest date that [SAE](https://www.sae.org/) makes a statement that a commercially available\\(^†\\) self-driving car meets the respective standard of autonomy. If no statement by SAE is available, statements by relevant car manufacturers, taxi service providers, and credible media reports will also be sufficient._x000D_\n_x000D_\nFor this question, \"commercially available\" means that any member of the general public can purchase a car, rent a vehicle, or hail a ride-sharing or public transit vehicle. A service providing commercial delivery or freight would also be sufficient. Any availability of such services anywhere in the world is sufficient for this question._x000D_\n_x000D_\n\\(^†\\) [ETA 2020-11-19]: commercially available cars include vehicles used for ridesharing, robotaxis, etc.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first offensive nuclear detonation by 2100 will occur by 2037?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will an offensive nuclear detonation cause at least 1 fatality before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7404/nuclear-detonation-fatality-before-2024/)\n\n* [Will a nuclear weapon be detonated as an act of war by 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4779/at-least-1-nuclear-detonation-in-war-by-2050/)\n\n* [How many nuclear weapons will be detonated offensively by 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7457/-nuclear-weapons-used-by-2050/)\n\n* [If there is at least 1 offensive nuclear detonation by 2100, when will the first detonation occur?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8643/date-of-first-nuclear-detonation-by-2100/) *[previous version of this question]*\n\n----\n\nSince the development of Nuclear Weapons in 1945 and the end of World War 1, the world has had a period of [relative peace](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/battle-related-deaths-in-state-based-conflicts-since-1946) under the [hegemonic dominance of the United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pax_Americana). Though the Cold War between the US and Russia never elevated to direct nuclear conflict, there were [many occasions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nuclear_close_calls) where nuclear conflict was narrowly avoided, including the [1962 cuban missile crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis).\n\nThough the end of the Cold War led to reduced tensions and [reduced nuclear stockpiles](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/number-of-nuclear-warheads-in-the-inventory-of-the-nuclear-powers), the threat of conflict remains. A significant remaining ambiguity is whether a new nuclear conflict is more likely to occur in the near future, or later in the century.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date that the first nuclear weapon (fission or thermonuclear) is detonated offensively between June 1, 2022 to January 1, 2100. If there are no offensive detonations in that time period by any state or non-state actor, then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nNeither [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) nor [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) will count towards question resolution, even if such detonations cause substantial damage.\n\nFor this question, a nuclear weapon is strictly defined as a bomb whose primary energy source is a [fission or fusion nuclear reaction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon), and excludes conventional weapons and \"[dirty bombs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb)\"", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2037", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that self-driving car autonomy at level 5 will be developed and commercially available by 2038?", "desc": "Chris Chin of [The Drive](https://www.thedrive.com/tech/31816/key-volkswagen-exec-admits-level-5-autonomous-cars-may-never-happen) gives a quick summary of the [Society of Automotive Engineers'](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car#SAE_classification) levels of autonomy for self-driving cars:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n> A quick primer on the now-industry-standard SAE International rules on how to discuss self-driving abilities: Level 0 is no automation whatsoever. Level 1 is partial assistance with certain aspects of driving, like lane keep assist or adaptive cruise control. Level 2 is a step up to systems that can take control of the vehicle in certain situations, like Tesla's Autopilot or Cadillac's Super Cruise, while still requiring the driver to pay attention._x000D_\n>_x000D_\n> Get past that and we enter the realm of speculation: Level 3 promises full computer control without supervision under defined conditions during a journey, Level 4 is start-to-finish autonomous tech limited only by virtual safeguards like a geofence, and Level 5 is the total hands-off, go literally anywhere at the push of a button experience where the vehicle might not even have physical controls.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve on the earliest date that [SAE](https://www.sae.org/) makes a statement that a commercially available\\(^†\\) self-driving car meets the respective standard of autonomy. If no statement by SAE is available, statements by relevant car manufacturers, taxi service providers, and credible media reports will also be sufficient._x000D_\n_x000D_\nFor this question, \"commercially available\" means that any member of the general public can purchase a car, rent a vehicle, or hail a ride-sharing or public transit vehicle. A service providing commercial delivery or freight would also be sufficient. Any availability of such services anywhere in the world is sufficient for this question._x000D_\n_x000D_\n\\(^†\\) [ETA 2020-11-19]: commercially available cars include vehicles used for ridesharing, robotaxis, etc.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US 2024 budget for the CDC's new Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics will be 89.2M?", "desc": "", "resc": "The US Congress is responsible for the US federal government's [budget](https://www.usa.gov/budget). Congress usually passes budgets annually, with each fiscal year running from October 1 to September 30 of the following year. The 2024 fiscal year, FY 2024, starts on October 1, 2023 and ends on September 30, 2024.\n\nThe American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 [provided initial funding](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1319/text) for a [Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics](https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2021/p0818-disease-forecasting-center.html) (CFA) housed within the US CDC. According to CDC, the following are CFA's key functions:\n> \n- Predict: Undertake modeling and forecasting; enhance the ability to determine the foundational data sources needed; support research and innovation in outbreak analytics and science for real-time action; and establish appropriate forecasting horizons.\n- Connect: Expand broad capability for data sharing and integration; maximize interoperability with data standards and utilize open-source software and application programming interface capabilities, with existing and new data streams from the public health ecosystem and beyond.\n- Inform: Translate and communicate forecasts; connect with key decision-makers across sectors including government, businesses, and non-profits, along with individuals with strong intergovernmental affairs and communication capacity for action.\n\nThe CFA officially [launched](https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2022/p0419-forecasting-center.html) in April 2022. The CFA has initial funding of $200 million from the American Rescue Plan Act and as of April 2022 had awarded $26 million in funding to academic institutions and federal partners. CFA [plans to](https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2022/04/19/new-cdc-team-early-alert-pandemic/) eventually have about 100 staff members. However, a potential issue for CFA is that it is unclear whether funding will [\"be sustained for the long term\"](https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2022/04/19/new-cdc-team-early-alert-pandemic/). \n\nAs of June 2022, 2024 budget requests are not out yet.\n\nPresident Biden's FY 2023 budget request is [$50 million](https://www.cdc.gov/budget/documents/fy2023/FY-2023-CDC-congressional-justification.pdf) for CDC's CFA. The relevant House panel — the subcommittee for Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies also recently proposed [$50 million](http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP07/20220623/114920/BILLS-117--AP--LaborHHS.pdf) for CDC's CFA for FY 2023.\n\n***What will be the US 2024 budget (in USD) for the US CDC's new Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the amount of funding, in nominal US Dollars (not adjusted for inflation), which is appropriated to CDC's Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics (CFA) in the Fiscal Year 2024 US federal budget that is signed into law. This would likely be found under the \"CDC-Wide Activities and Program Support\" section of the budget. \n\nThe funds appropriated can be spent by CFA at any time, not just in FY 2024. This question only asks about the amount appropriated to CFA by the FY 2024 budget.\n\n[fine-print]\nIf a US FY 2024 budget is never signed into law, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the CFA no longer exists, or is no longer an agency within the CDC at the time that the FY 2024 budget is passed, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. \n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "48.7M", "median": "64.3M", "upper_75": "89.2M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first offensive nuclear detonation by 2100 will occur by 2037?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will an offensive nuclear detonation cause at least 1 fatality before 2024?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7404/nuclear-detonation-fatality-before-2024/)\n\n* [Will a nuclear weapon be detonated as an act of war by 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4779/at-least-1-nuclear-detonation-in-war-by-2050/)\n\n* [How many nuclear weapons will be detonated offensively by 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7457/-nuclear-weapons-used-by-2050/)\n\n* [If there is at least 1 offensive nuclear detonation by 2100, when will the first detonation occur?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8643/date-of-first-nuclear-detonation-by-2100/) *[previous version of this question]*\n\n----\n\nSince the development of Nuclear Weapons in 1945 and the end of World War 1, the world has had a period of [relative peace](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/battle-related-deaths-in-state-based-conflicts-since-1946) under the [hegemonic dominance of the United States](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pax_Americana). Though the Cold War between the US and Russia never elevated to direct nuclear conflict, there were [many occasions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nuclear_close_calls) where nuclear conflict was narrowly avoided, including the [1962 cuban missile crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis).\n\nThough the end of the Cold War led to reduced tensions and [reduced nuclear stockpiles](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/number-of-nuclear-warheads-in-the-inventory-of-the-nuclear-powers), the threat of conflict remains. A significant remaining ambiguity is whether a new nuclear conflict is more likely to occur in the near future, or later in the century.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date that the first nuclear weapon (fission or thermonuclear) is detonated offensively between June 1, 2022 to January 1, 2100. If there are no offensive detonations in that time period by any state or non-state actor, then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nNeither [detonations for testing purposes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_testing) nor [peaceful nuclear explosions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peaceful_nuclear_explosion) will count towards question resolution, even if such detonations cause substantial damage.\n\nFor this question, a nuclear weapon is strictly defined as a bomb whose primary energy source is a [fission or fusion nuclear reaction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon), and excludes conventional weapons and \"[dirty bombs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb)\"", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2037", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the sum of the performance (in exaFLOPS) of the top 500 supercomputers will be 33.3% in the following dates?", "desc": "In the seven decades since the invention of the [point-contact transistor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Point-contact_transistor) at Bell Labs, relentless progress in the development of semiconductor devices — Moore's law — has been achieved despite [regular warnings](https://www.nature.com/news/the-chips-are-down-for-moore-s-law-1.19338) from industry observers about impending limits._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe [TOP500 project](https://www.top500.org/lists/top500/) collects and ranks system performance metrics of the most powerful non-distributed computer systems in the world. The project was started in 1993 and publishes an updated list of the supercomputers twice a year. The first of these updates always coincides with the [International Supercomputing Conference](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISC_High_Performance) in June, and the second is presented at the [ACM/IEEE Supercomputing Conference](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ACM/IEEE_Supercomputing_Conference) in November._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe TOP500 ranks high-performance computing (HPC) by recording how fast a computer system solves a dense n by n system of linear equations in double precision (64 bits) arithmetic on distributed-memory computers ([TOP500, 2019](https://www.top500.org/project/linpack/)). This is an implementation of the High Performance Computing [Linpack Benchmark](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LINPACK_benchmarks)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nHistorical data for TOP500 can [be found here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18Mha2f9RIQCAAg41vm_UkP524pt59vvD7TcjHZ1SHXw/edit?usp=sharing). Please make a copy by clicking \"file\" and then \"make a copy\" if you wish to edit it.", "resc": "The following sub-questions will resolve as the sum of performance (at Rmax) in exaFLOPS (1 exaFLOP = \\(10^{18}\\) FLOPS) of all supercomputers listed by [TOP500](https://www.top500.org/lists/top500/) for the respective date.", "lower_25": "14.3", "median": "21.2", "upper_75": "33.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US FY 2024 budget for the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) will be 50% of the total budget?", "desc": "The US Congress is responsible for the federal government's budget. It usually passes budgets on a yearly basis, with each fiscal year running from October 1 of one calendar year through September 30 of the next. The 2024 fiscal year, FY 2024, starts on October 1, 2023 and ends on September 30, 2024. [Here](https://www.usa.gov/budget) is more context on the US federal government's budget process.\n\nThe [Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority](https://aspr.hhs.gov/AboutASPR/ProgramOffices/BARDA/Pages/default.aspx) (BARDA) is an office within the US Department of Health and Human Services that is responsible for the procurement and development of medical countermeasures. [It is](https://progress.institute/why-barda-deserves-more-funding/) the the only US government agency that is required to provide advanced R&D for biomedical countermeasures and was key to the development of the Moderna mRNA vaccine.\n\n2024 budget requests are not out yet.\n\nPresident Biden's FY 2023 budget request is [$828 million](https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/fy-2023-budget-in-brief.pdf) for BARDA, which is an increase from the [$745 million](https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/BILLS-117HR2471SA-RCP-117-35.pdf) that was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Biden for FY 2022. The relevant House panel — the subcommittee for Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies recently proposed [$845 million](http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP07/20220623/114920/BILLS-117--AP--LaborHHS.pdf) for BARDA for FY 2023.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of funding, in millions of dollars, which is appropriated to BARDA in the FY 2024 budget that is signed into law. This would likely be found under the \"Public Health and Social Services Emergency fund\" section of the budget. \n\nThe funds appropriated can be spent by BARDA after FY 2024. This question only asks about the amount appropriated to BARDA by the FY 2024 budget.\n\nIf a FY 2024 budget is never signed into law, this resolves ambiguous", "lower_25": "873", "median": "937", "upper_75": "> 990", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that self-driving car autonomy at level 5 will be developed and commercially available by 2038?", "desc": "Chris Chin of [The Drive](https://www.thedrive.com/tech/31816/key-volkswagen-exec-admits-level-5-autonomous-cars-may-never-happen) gives a quick summary of the [Society of Automotive Engineers'](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car#SAE_classification) levels of autonomy for self-driving cars:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n> A quick primer on the now-industry-standard SAE International rules on how to discuss self-driving abilities: Level 0 is no automation whatsoever. Level 1 is partial assistance with certain aspects of driving, like lane keep assist or adaptive cruise control. Level 2 is a step up to systems that can take control of the vehicle in certain situations, like Tesla's Autopilot or Cadillac's Super Cruise, while still requiring the driver to pay attention._x000D_\n>_x000D_\n> Get past that and we enter the realm of speculation: Level 3 promises full computer control without supervision under defined conditions during a journey, Level 4 is start-to-finish autonomous tech limited only by virtual safeguards like a geofence, and Level 5 is the total hands-off, go literally anywhere at the push of a button experience where the vehicle might not even have physical controls.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve on the earliest date that [SAE](https://www.sae.org/) makes a statement that a commercially available\\(^†\\) self-driving car meets the respective standard of autonomy. If no statement by SAE is available, statements by relevant car manufacturers, taxi service providers, and credible media reports will also be sufficient._x000D_\n_x000D_\nFor this question, \"commercially available\" means that any member of the general public can purchase a car, rent a vehicle, or hail a ride-sharing or public transit vehicle. A service providing commercial delivery or freight would also be sufficient. Any availability of such services anywhere in the world is sufficient for this question._x000D_\n_x000D_\n\\(^†\\) [ETA 2020-11-19]: commercially available cars include vehicles used for ridesharing, robotaxis, etc.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US FY 2024 budget for the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) will be 50% of the total budget?", "desc": "The US Congress is responsible for the federal government's budget. It usually passes budgets on a yearly basis, with each fiscal year running from October 1 of one calendar year through September 30 of the next. The 2024 fiscal year, FY 2024, starts on October 1, 2023 and ends on September 30, 2024. [Here](https://www.usa.gov/budget) is more context on the US federal government's budget process.\n\nThe [Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority](https://aspr.hhs.gov/AboutASPR/ProgramOffices/BARDA/Pages/default.aspx) (BARDA) is an office within the US Department of Health and Human Services that is responsible for the procurement and development of medical countermeasures. [It is](https://progress.institute/why-barda-deserves-more-funding/) the the only US government agency that is required to provide advanced R&D for biomedical countermeasures and was key to the development of the Moderna mRNA vaccine.\n\n2024 budget requests are not out yet.\n\nPresident Biden's FY 2023 budget request is [$828 million](https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/fy-2023-budget-in-brief.pdf) for BARDA, which is an increase from the [$745 million](https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/BILLS-117HR2471SA-RCP-117-35.pdf) that was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Biden for FY 2022. The relevant House panel — the subcommittee for Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies recently proposed [$845 million](http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP07/20220623/114920/BILLS-117--AP--LaborHHS.pdf) for BARDA for FY 2023.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of funding, in millions of dollars, which is appropriated to BARDA in the FY 2024 budget that is signed into law. This would likely be found under the \"Public Health and Social Services Emergency fund\" section of the budget. \n\nThe funds appropriated can be spent by BARDA after FY 2024. This question only asks about the amount appropriated to BARDA by the FY 2024 budget.\n\nIf a FY 2024 budget is never signed into law, this resolves ambiguous", "lower_25": "873", "median": "937", "upper_75": "> 990", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US 2024 budget for the CDC's new Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics will be 89.2M?", "desc": "", "resc": "The US Congress is responsible for the US federal government's [budget](https://www.usa.gov/budget). Congress usually passes budgets annually, with each fiscal year running from October 1 to September 30 of the following year. The 2024 fiscal year, FY 2024, starts on October 1, 2023 and ends on September 30, 2024.\n\nThe American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 [provided initial funding](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1319/text) for a [Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics](https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2021/p0818-disease-forecasting-center.html) (CFA) housed within the US CDC. According to CDC, the following are CFA's key functions:\n> \n- Predict: Undertake modeling and forecasting; enhance the ability to determine the foundational data sources needed; support research and innovation in outbreak analytics and science for real-time action; and establish appropriate forecasting horizons.\n- Connect: Expand broad capability for data sharing and integration; maximize interoperability with data standards and utilize open-source software and application programming interface capabilities, with existing and new data streams from the public health ecosystem and beyond.\n- Inform: Translate and communicate forecasts; connect with key decision-makers across sectors including government, businesses, and non-profits, along with individuals with strong intergovernmental affairs and communication capacity for action.\n\nThe CFA officially [launched](https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2022/p0419-forecasting-center.html) in April 2022. The CFA has initial funding of $200 million from the American Rescue Plan Act and as of April 2022 had awarded $26 million in funding to academic institutions and federal partners. CFA [plans to](https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2022/04/19/new-cdc-team-early-alert-pandemic/) eventually have about 100 staff members. However, a potential issue for CFA is that it is unclear whether funding will [\"be sustained for the long term\"](https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2022/04/19/new-cdc-team-early-alert-pandemic/). \n\nAs of June 2022, 2024 budget requests are not out yet.\n\nPresident Biden's FY 2023 budget request is [$50 million](https://www.cdc.gov/budget/documents/fy2023/FY-2023-CDC-congressional-justification.pdf) for CDC's CFA. The relevant House panel — the subcommittee for Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies also recently proposed [$50 million](http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP07/20220623/114920/BILLS-117--AP--LaborHHS.pdf) for CDC's CFA for FY 2023.\n\n***What will be the US 2024 budget (in USD) for the US CDC's new Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the amount of funding, in nominal US Dollars (not adjusted for inflation), which is appropriated to CDC's Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics (CFA) in the Fiscal Year 2024 US federal budget that is signed into law. This would likely be found under the \"CDC-Wide Activities and Program Support\" section of the budget. \n\nThe funds appropriated can be spent by CFA at any time, not just in FY 2024. This question only asks about the amount appropriated to CFA by the FY 2024 budget.\n\n[fine-print]\nIf a US FY 2024 budget is never signed into law, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the CFA no longer exists, or is no longer an agency within the CDC at the time that the FY 2024 budget is passed, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. \n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "48.7M", "median": "64.3M", "upper_75": "89.2M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US FY 2024 budget for the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) will be 50% of the total budget?", "desc": "The US Congress is responsible for the federal government's budget. It usually passes budgets on a yearly basis, with each fiscal year running from October 1 of one calendar year through September 30 of the next. The 2024 fiscal year, FY 2024, starts on October 1, 2023 and ends on September 30, 2024. [Here](https://www.usa.gov/budget) is more context on the US federal government's budget process.\n\nThe [Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority](https://aspr.hhs.gov/AboutASPR/ProgramOffices/BARDA/Pages/default.aspx) (BARDA) is an office within the US Department of Health and Human Services that is responsible for the procurement and development of medical countermeasures. [It is](https://progress.institute/why-barda-deserves-more-funding/) the the only US government agency that is required to provide advanced R&D for biomedical countermeasures and was key to the development of the Moderna mRNA vaccine.\n\n2024 budget requests are not out yet.\n\nPresident Biden's FY 2023 budget request is [$828 million](https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/fy-2023-budget-in-brief.pdf) for BARDA, which is an increase from the [$745 million](https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/BILLS-117HR2471SA-RCP-117-35.pdf) that was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Biden for FY 2022. The relevant House panel — the subcommittee for Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies recently proposed [$845 million](http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP07/20220623/114920/BILLS-117--AP--LaborHHS.pdf) for BARDA for FY 2023.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of funding, in millions of dollars, which is appropriated to BARDA in the FY 2024 budget that is signed into law. This would likely be found under the \"Public Health and Social Services Emergency fund\" section of the budget. \n\nThe funds appropriated can be spent by BARDA after FY 2024. This question only asks about the amount appropriated to BARDA by the FY 2024 budget.\n\nIf a FY 2024 budget is never signed into law, this resolves ambiguous", "lower_25": "873", "median": "937", "upper_75": "> 990", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a new pandemic will occur before 2032 and it will take 75% of the time from the first US laboratory-confirmed case until the first FDA-approved vaccine?", "desc": "A key part of the response to the [next pandemic caused by a novel pathogen](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11164/25m-killed-by-pandemic-2022-to-2031/) will be how quickly a vaccine can be successfully tested and authorized by FDA so that it can subsequently be widely deployed.\n\nFor context, during the COVID-19 pandemic there were 326 days from the first US laboratory-confirmed case [on January 20, 2020](https://www.cdc.gov/museum/timeline/covid19.html) until the first FDA-authorized vaccine on [December 11, 2020](https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-key-action-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-first-covid-19).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of days (not including the end date) between the date that the first US laboratory-confirmed case of a pandemic-causing novel pathogen is reported and the date the US [Food and Drug Administration](https://www.fda.gov/) authorizes a vaccine for that pathogen. If there is no new pandemic between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2032, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nFor this question any type of authorization, including [emergency use authorization](https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization), **will** be considered FDA approval. \n\nFor this question, a \"new pandemic\" is defined as one whose pathogen kills at least 25 million people (globally) between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2032. This pandemic excludes all variants of currently known pathogens, including variants of SARS-CoV-2 — with no exceptions. However, novel pathogens that are the result of [antigenic shift](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antigenic_shift) **do count.** Among pathogens that cause human disease, antigenic shift is currently [only](https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/vim.2017.0141) known to occur with influenza A and this process is described by the US CDC as an [\"abrupt, major change in a flu A virus, resulting in new HA and/or new HA and NA proteins in flu viruses that infect humans\"](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/viruses/change.htm). Contrast this with [antigenic drift](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8669911/), which is the mechanism that produces variants for pathogens like SARS-CoV-2.\n\nIn other words, if [this other Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11164/25m-killed-by-pandemic-2022-to-2031/) resolves as **Yes**, this question will resolve as the number of days from the first US case to the first FDA-approved vaccine.\n\nIf FDA does not authorize a vaccine within 730 days (~2 years) of the first U.S. laboratory-confirmed case of the pandemic-causing novel pathogen, then this question will resolve as **>730**", "lower_25": "232", "median": "297", "upper_75": "390", "prediction": "390 days"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US 2024 budget for the CDC's new Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics will be 89.2M?", "desc": "", "resc": "The US Congress is responsible for the US federal government's [budget](https://www.usa.gov/budget). Congress usually passes budgets annually, with each fiscal year running from October 1 to September 30 of the following year. The 2024 fiscal year, FY 2024, starts on October 1, 2023 and ends on September 30, 2024.\n\nThe American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 [provided initial funding](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1319/text) for a [Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics](https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2021/p0818-disease-forecasting-center.html) (CFA) housed within the US CDC. According to CDC, the following are CFA's key functions:\n> \n- Predict: Undertake modeling and forecasting; enhance the ability to determine the foundational data sources needed; support research and innovation in outbreak analytics and science for real-time action; and establish appropriate forecasting horizons.\n- Connect: Expand broad capability for data sharing and integration; maximize interoperability with data standards and utilize open-source software and application programming interface capabilities, with existing and new data streams from the public health ecosystem and beyond.\n- Inform: Translate and communicate forecasts; connect with key decision-makers across sectors including government, businesses, and non-profits, along with individuals with strong intergovernmental affairs and communication capacity for action.\n\nThe CFA officially [launched](https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2022/p0419-forecasting-center.html) in April 2022. The CFA has initial funding of $200 million from the American Rescue Plan Act and as of April 2022 had awarded $26 million in funding to academic institutions and federal partners. CFA [plans to](https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2022/04/19/new-cdc-team-early-alert-pandemic/) eventually have about 100 staff members. However, a potential issue for CFA is that it is unclear whether funding will [\"be sustained for the long term\"](https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2022/04/19/new-cdc-team-early-alert-pandemic/). \n\nAs of June 2022, 2024 budget requests are not out yet.\n\nPresident Biden's FY 2023 budget request is [$50 million](https://www.cdc.gov/budget/documents/fy2023/FY-2023-CDC-congressional-justification.pdf) for CDC's CFA. The relevant House panel — the subcommittee for Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies also recently proposed [$50 million](http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP07/20220623/114920/BILLS-117--AP--LaborHHS.pdf) for CDC's CFA for FY 2023.\n\n***What will be the US 2024 budget (in USD) for the US CDC's new Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the amount of funding, in nominal US Dollars (not adjusted for inflation), which is appropriated to CDC's Center for Forecasting and Outbreak Analytics (CFA) in the Fiscal Year 2024 US federal budget that is signed into law. This would likely be found under the \"CDC-Wide Activities and Program Support\" section of the budget. \n\nThe funds appropriated can be spent by CFA at any time, not just in FY 2024. This question only asks about the amount appropriated to CFA by the FY 2024 budget.\n\n[fine-print]\nIf a US FY 2024 budget is never signed into law, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the CFA no longer exists, or is no longer an agency within the CDC at the time that the FY 2024 budget is passed, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. \n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "48.7M", "median": "64.3M", "upper_75": "89.2M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an ML model will achieve 90% of human-crowd performance on Autocast by Nov 2026?", "desc": "Recently, [Zou et al., 2022](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2206.15474.pdf) introduced Autocast:\n\n> we introduce Autocast, a new dataset for measuring ML models' forecasting ability. Autocast includes thousands of forecasting questions collected from human forecasting tournaments. The questions vary in the forecasting horizon from days to decades, in the topic (including politics, economics and science), and in the answer format (e.g. multiple-choice vs. predicting a number). The questions are pre-selected for public interest, and there is a strong human baseline (the crowd aggregate of many competitive forecasters).\n\nUsing this dataset, they test a few language models' ability to make forecasts. Models are provided access to contemporaneous (and historical) news sources to precisely simulate the conditions under which humans made past forecasts (avoiding leakage from the future). \n\nThey find that language models perform far below the human expert baseline, yet that\nperformance improves with model size and the incorporation of relevant information. Human performance was found to be 82.5, while the best language model, FiD Static with 2.8B parameters, achieved a score of 40.6.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the earliest date when a credible report indicates that a Machine Learning model achieves at a Score of at least 74.25, under a similar setting as [Zou et al., 2022](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2206.15474.pdf) that eables rigorous test retrodiction by ensuring, with at least as much effort as by Zou et al., that models are exposed only to news from before the outcomes being forecast.\n\nThe score metric is a performance metric between 0 and 100 defined in their section 4.2. Specifically, it is some combination of percent accuracy on true/false questions, multiple-choice questions, and the l1 distance for numerical questions.\n\nIf no publications come out that use the dataset for a period of 3 consecutive years, this question resolves ambiguously.\n\nIn case Autocast is superseded by a later dataset that is similar, this question resolves positively if a model performs at 90% of crowd-level performance on that dataset.", "lower_25": "Dec 2024", "median": "Nov 2026", "upper_75": "Dec 2028", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a new pandemic will occur before 2032 and it will take 75% of the time from the first US laboratory-confirmed case until the first FDA-approved vaccine?", "desc": "A key part of the response to the [next pandemic caused by a novel pathogen](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11164/25m-killed-by-pandemic-2022-to-2031/) will be how quickly a vaccine can be successfully tested and authorized by FDA so that it can subsequently be widely deployed.\n\nFor context, during the COVID-19 pandemic there were 326 days from the first US laboratory-confirmed case [on January 20, 2020](https://www.cdc.gov/museum/timeline/covid19.html) until the first FDA-authorized vaccine on [December 11, 2020](https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-key-action-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-first-covid-19).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of days (not including the end date) between the date that the first US laboratory-confirmed case of a pandemic-causing novel pathogen is reported and the date the US [Food and Drug Administration](https://www.fda.gov/) authorizes a vaccine for that pathogen. If there is no new pandemic between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2032, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nFor this question any type of authorization, including [emergency use authorization](https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization), **will** be considered FDA approval. \n\nFor this question, a \"new pandemic\" is defined as one whose pathogen kills at least 25 million people (globally) between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2032. This pandemic excludes all variants of currently known pathogens, including variants of SARS-CoV-2 — with no exceptions. However, novel pathogens that are the result of [antigenic shift](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antigenic_shift) **do count.** Among pathogens that cause human disease, antigenic shift is currently [only](https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/vim.2017.0141) known to occur with influenza A and this process is described by the US CDC as an [\"abrupt, major change in a flu A virus, resulting in new HA and/or new HA and NA proteins in flu viruses that infect humans\"](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/viruses/change.htm). Contrast this with [antigenic drift](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8669911/), which is the mechanism that produces variants for pathogens like SARS-CoV-2.\n\nIn other words, if [this other Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11164/25m-killed-by-pandemic-2022-to-2031/) resolves as **Yes**, this question will resolve as the number of days from the first US case to the first FDA-approved vaccine.\n\nIf FDA does not authorize a vaccine within 730 days (~2 years) of the first U.S. laboratory-confirmed case of the pandemic-causing novel pathogen, then this question will resolve as **>730**", "lower_25": "232", "median": "297", "upper_75": "390", "prediction": "390 days"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an ML model will achieve 90% of human-crowd performance on Autocast by Nov 2026?", "desc": "Recently, [Zou et al., 2022](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2206.15474.pdf) introduced Autocast:\n\n> we introduce Autocast, a new dataset for measuring ML models' forecasting ability. Autocast includes thousands of forecasting questions collected from human forecasting tournaments. The questions vary in the forecasting horizon from days to decades, in the topic (including politics, economics and science), and in the answer format (e.g. multiple-choice vs. predicting a number). The questions are pre-selected for public interest, and there is a strong human baseline (the crowd aggregate of many competitive forecasters).\n\nUsing this dataset, they test a few language models' ability to make forecasts. Models are provided access to contemporaneous (and historical) news sources to precisely simulate the conditions under which humans made past forecasts (avoiding leakage from the future). \n\nThey find that language models perform far below the human expert baseline, yet that\nperformance improves with model size and the incorporation of relevant information. Human performance was found to be 82.5, while the best language model, FiD Static with 2.8B parameters, achieved a score of 40.6.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the earliest date when a credible report indicates that a Machine Learning model achieves at a Score of at least 74.25, under a similar setting as [Zou et al., 2022](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2206.15474.pdf) that eables rigorous test retrodiction by ensuring, with at least as much effort as by Zou et al., that models are exposed only to news from before the outcomes being forecast.\n\nThe score metric is a performance metric between 0 and 100 defined in their section 4.2. Specifically, it is some combination of percent accuracy on true/false questions, multiple-choice questions, and the l1 distance for numerical questions.\n\nIf no publications come out that use the dataset for a period of 3 consecutive years, this question resolves ambiguously.\n\nIn case Autocast is superseded by a later dataset that is similar, this question resolves positively if a model performs at 90% of crowd-level performance on that dataset.", "lower_25": "Dec 2024", "median": "Nov 2026", "upper_75": "Dec 2028", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an ML model will achieve 90% of human-crowd performance on Autocast by Nov 2026?", "desc": "Recently, [Zou et al., 2022](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2206.15474.pdf) introduced Autocast:\n\n> we introduce Autocast, a new dataset for measuring ML models' forecasting ability. Autocast includes thousands of forecasting questions collected from human forecasting tournaments. The questions vary in the forecasting horizon from days to decades, in the topic (including politics, economics and science), and in the answer format (e.g. multiple-choice vs. predicting a number). The questions are pre-selected for public interest, and there is a strong human baseline (the crowd aggregate of many competitive forecasters).\n\nUsing this dataset, they test a few language models' ability to make forecasts. Models are provided access to contemporaneous (and historical) news sources to precisely simulate the conditions under which humans made past forecasts (avoiding leakage from the future). \n\nThey find that language models perform far below the human expert baseline, yet that\nperformance improves with model size and the incorporation of relevant information. Human performance was found to be 82.5, while the best language model, FiD Static with 2.8B parameters, achieved a score of 40.6.", "resc": "This question will resolve on the earliest date when a credible report indicates that a Machine Learning model achieves at a Score of at least 74.25, under a similar setting as [Zou et al., 2022](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2206.15474.pdf) that eables rigorous test retrodiction by ensuring, with at least as much effort as by Zou et al., that models are exposed only to news from before the outcomes being forecast.\n\nThe score metric is a performance metric between 0 and 100 defined in their section 4.2. Specifically, it is some combination of percent accuracy on true/false questions, multiple-choice questions, and the l1 distance for numerical questions.\n\nIf no publications come out that use the dataset for a period of 3 consecutive years, this question resolves ambiguously.\n\nIn case Autocast is superseded by a later dataset that is similar, this question resolves positively if a model performs at 90% of crowd-level performance on that dataset.", "lower_25": "Dec 2024", "median": "Nov 2026", "upper_75": "Dec 2028", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will be capable of getting a perfect score on the Putnam Mathematical Competition by 2041?", "desc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Lowell_Putnam_Mathematical_Competition),\n\n> The William Lowell Putnam Mathematical Competition, often abbreviated to Putnam Competition, is an annual mathematics competition for undergraduate college students enrolled at institutions of higher learning in the United States and Canada (regardless of the students' nationalities)... It is widely considered to be the most prestigious university-level mathematics competition in the world, and its difficulty is such that the median score is often zero (out of 120) despite being attempted by students specializing in mathematics.\n\nThe layout is as follows,\n\n> The Putnam competition takes place on the first Saturday in December, and consists of two three-hour sittings separated by a lunch break. The competition is supervised by faculty members at the participating schools. Each one consists of twelve challenging problems. The problems cover a range of advanced material in undergraduate mathematics, including concepts from group theory, set theory, graph theory, lattice theory, and number theory. \n\n> Each of the twelve questions is worth 10 points, and the most frequent scores above zero are 10 points for a complete solution, 9 points for a nearly complete solution, and 1 point for the beginnings of a solution. In earlier years, the twelve questions were worth one point each, with no partial credit given. The competition is considered to be very difficult: it is typically attempted by students specializing in mathematics, but the median score is usually zero or one point out of 120 possible, and there have been only five perfect scores as of 2019. In 2003, of the 3,615 students competing, 1,024 (28%) scored 10 or more points, and 42 points was sufficient to make the top percentile.", "resc": "This question resolves on the date during which a computer program first clearly demonstrates the ability to receive a perfect score on the William Lowell Putnam Mathematical Competition, without cheating, and within the time limits given in the real-world competition. Cheating includes training on content that could conceivably spoil the solutions to the competition, and includes having access to external equipment normally forbidden during the competition that can be used to aid solving the problems, or advice from other mathematicians. Thus, Metaculus administrators should be careful not to resolve this question prematurely.\n\nIn the strictest case, the model should be tested on the most recent Putnam Competition, after having trained the model prior to the release of the most recent solutions. [Here](https://kskedlaya.org/putnam-archive/) is an archive of Putnam Competition problems going back to 1985. Since it is generally understood that Putnam problems have become harder over time, this question will not consider any candidate program that receives a perfect score on a Putnam examination from prior to 2000 as eligible to trigger positive resolution", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2041", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a new pandemic before 2032, and if so, how long (in days) will it be from the first US laboratory-confirmed case until the first FDA-approved treatment?", "desc": "A key part of the response to the [next pandemic caused by a novel pathogen](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11164/25m-killed-by-pandemic-2022-to-2031/) will be how quickly a treatment can be successfully tested and approved by FDA so that it can subsequently be widely deployed.\n\nFor context, during the COVID-19 pandemic there were 276 days from the first US laboratory-confirmed case [on January 20, 2020](https://www.cdc.gov/museum/timeline/covid19.html) until the first FDA-approved treatment on [October 22, 2020](https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-treatment-covid-19).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of days (not including the end date) between the date of the first US laboratory-confirmed case of a pandemic-causing novel pathogen is reported and the date the US [Food and Drug Administration](https://www.fda.gov/) approves a treatment. If there is no new pandemic between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2032, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nFor this question [emergency use authorization](https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization) of a treatment **will not** be considered FDA approval. Full FDA approval is required for this question.\n\nFor this question, a \"new pandemic\" is defined as one whose pathogen kills at least 25 million people (globally) between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2032. This pandemic excludes all variants of currently known pathogens, including variants of SARS-CoV-2 — with no exceptions. However, novel pathogens that are the result of [antigenic shift](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antigenic_shift) **do count.** Among pathogens that cause human disease, antigenic shift is currently [only](https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/vim.2017.0141) known to occur with influenza A and this process is described by the US CDC as an [\"abrupt, major change in a flu A virus, resulting in new HA and/or new HA and NA proteins in flu viruses that infect humans\"](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/viruses/change.htm). Contrast this with [antigenic drift](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8669911/), which is the mechanism that produces variants for pathogens like SARS-CoV-2.\n\nIn other words, if [this other Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11164/25m-killed-by-pandemic-2022-to-2031/) resolves as **Yes**, this question will resolve as the number of days from the first US case to the first FDA-approved treatment.\n\nIf FDA does not approve any treatment within 730 days (2 years) of the first US laboratory-confirmed case of the pandemic-causing novel pathogen, then this question will resolve as **>730**", "lower_25": "148", "median": "203", "upper_75": "262", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will be capable of getting a perfect score on the Miklós Schweitzer Competition by 2038?", "desc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikl%C3%B3s_Schweitzer_Competition),\n\n> The Miklós Schweitzer Competition is an annual Hungarian mathematics competition for university undergraduates, established in 1949...\n\n> The Schweitzer contest is uniquely high-level among mathematics competitions. The problems, written by prominent Hungarian mathematicians, are challenging and require in-depth knowledge of the fields represented. The competition is open-book and competitors are allowed ten days to come up with solutions.", "resc": "This question resolves on the date during which a computer program first clearly demonstrates the ability to receive a perfect score on the Miklós Schweitzer Competition, without cheating, and within the time limits given in the real-world competition. Cheating includes training on content that could conceivably spoil the solutions to the competition, and includes having access to external equipment normally forbidden during the competition that can be used to aid solving the problems, or advice from other mathematicians. Thus, Metaculus administrators should be careful not to resolve this question prematurely.\n\nIn the ideal case, the model should be tested on the most recent Miklós Schweitzer Competition, possibly simultaneously with human competitors, after having trained the model prior to the release of the most recent solutions. [Here is an archive](http://www.math.u-szeged.hu/~mmaroti/schweitzer/) of Miklós Schweitzer Competition problems going back to 1995. Note that for many of the years, the problems are stated in Hungarian only, and not English", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will be capable of getting a perfect score on the Putnam Mathematical Competition by 2041?", "desc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Lowell_Putnam_Mathematical_Competition),\n\n> The William Lowell Putnam Mathematical Competition, often abbreviated to Putnam Competition, is an annual mathematics competition for undergraduate college students enrolled at institutions of higher learning in the United States and Canada (regardless of the students' nationalities)... It is widely considered to be the most prestigious university-level mathematics competition in the world, and its difficulty is such that the median score is often zero (out of 120) despite being attempted by students specializing in mathematics.\n\nThe layout is as follows,\n\n> The Putnam competition takes place on the first Saturday in December, and consists of two three-hour sittings separated by a lunch break. The competition is supervised by faculty members at the participating schools. Each one consists of twelve challenging problems. The problems cover a range of advanced material in undergraduate mathematics, including concepts from group theory, set theory, graph theory, lattice theory, and number theory. \n\n> Each of the twelve questions is worth 10 points, and the most frequent scores above zero are 10 points for a complete solution, 9 points for a nearly complete solution, and 1 point for the beginnings of a solution. In earlier years, the twelve questions were worth one point each, with no partial credit given. The competition is considered to be very difficult: it is typically attempted by students specializing in mathematics, but the median score is usually zero or one point out of 120 possible, and there have been only five perfect scores as of 2019. In 2003, of the 3,615 students competing, 1,024 (28%) scored 10 or more points, and 42 points was sufficient to make the top percentile.", "resc": "This question resolves on the date during which a computer program first clearly demonstrates the ability to receive a perfect score on the William Lowell Putnam Mathematical Competition, without cheating, and within the time limits given in the real-world competition. Cheating includes training on content that could conceivably spoil the solutions to the competition, and includes having access to external equipment normally forbidden during the competition that can be used to aid solving the problems, or advice from other mathematicians. Thus, Metaculus administrators should be careful not to resolve this question prematurely.\n\nIn the strictest case, the model should be tested on the most recent Putnam Competition, after having trained the model prior to the release of the most recent solutions. [Here](https://kskedlaya.org/putnam-archive/) is an archive of Putnam Competition problems going back to 1985. Since it is generally understood that Putnam problems have become harder over time, this question will not consider any candidate program that receives a perfect score on a Putnam examination from prior to 2000 as eligible to trigger positive resolution", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2041", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will be capable of getting a perfect score on the Miklós Schweitzer Competition by 2038?", "desc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikl%C3%B3s_Schweitzer_Competition),\n\n> The Miklós Schweitzer Competition is an annual Hungarian mathematics competition for university undergraduates, established in 1949...\n\n> The Schweitzer contest is uniquely high-level among mathematics competitions. The problems, written by prominent Hungarian mathematicians, are challenging and require in-depth knowledge of the fields represented. The competition is open-book and competitors are allowed ten days to come up with solutions.", "resc": "This question resolves on the date during which a computer program first clearly demonstrates the ability to receive a perfect score on the Miklós Schweitzer Competition, without cheating, and within the time limits given in the real-world competition. Cheating includes training on content that could conceivably spoil the solutions to the competition, and includes having access to external equipment normally forbidden during the competition that can be used to aid solving the problems, or advice from other mathematicians. Thus, Metaculus administrators should be careful not to resolve this question prematurely.\n\nIn the ideal case, the model should be tested on the most recent Miklós Schweitzer Competition, possibly simultaneously with human competitors, after having trained the model prior to the release of the most recent solutions. [Here is an archive](http://www.math.u-szeged.hu/~mmaroti/schweitzer/) of Miklós Schweitzer Competition problems going back to 1995. Note that for many of the years, the problems are stated in Hungarian only, and not English", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a new pandemic before 2032, and if so, how long (in days) will it be from the first US laboratory-confirmed case until the first FDA-approved treatment?", "desc": "A key part of the response to the [next pandemic caused by a novel pathogen](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11164/25m-killed-by-pandemic-2022-to-2031/) will be how quickly a treatment can be successfully tested and approved by FDA so that it can subsequently be widely deployed.\n\nFor context, during the COVID-19 pandemic there were 276 days from the first US laboratory-confirmed case [on January 20, 2020](https://www.cdc.gov/museum/timeline/covid19.html) until the first FDA-approved treatment on [October 22, 2020](https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-treatment-covid-19).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of days (not including the end date) between the date of the first US laboratory-confirmed case of a pandemic-causing novel pathogen is reported and the date the US [Food and Drug Administration](https://www.fda.gov/) approves a treatment. If there is no new pandemic between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2032, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nFor this question [emergency use authorization](https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization) of a treatment **will not** be considered FDA approval. Full FDA approval is required for this question.\n\nFor this question, a \"new pandemic\" is defined as one whose pathogen kills at least 25 million people (globally) between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2032. This pandemic excludes all variants of currently known pathogens, including variants of SARS-CoV-2 — with no exceptions. However, novel pathogens that are the result of [antigenic shift](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antigenic_shift) **do count.** Among pathogens that cause human disease, antigenic shift is currently [only](https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/vim.2017.0141) known to occur with influenza A and this process is described by the US CDC as an [\"abrupt, major change in a flu A virus, resulting in new HA and/or new HA and NA proteins in flu viruses that infect humans\"](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/viruses/change.htm). Contrast this with [antigenic drift](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8669911/), which is the mechanism that produces variants for pathogens like SARS-CoV-2.\n\nIn other words, if [this other Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11164/25m-killed-by-pandemic-2022-to-2031/) resolves as **Yes**, this question will resolve as the number of days from the first US case to the first FDA-approved treatment.\n\nIf FDA does not approve any treatment within 730 days (2 years) of the first US laboratory-confirmed case of the pandemic-causing novel pathogen, then this question will resolve as **>730**", "lower_25": "148", "median": "203", "upper_75": "262", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a new pandemic before 2032, and if so, how long (in days) will it be from the first US laboratory-confirmed case until the first FDA-approved treatment?", "desc": "A key part of the response to the [next pandemic caused by a novel pathogen](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11164/25m-killed-by-pandemic-2022-to-2031/) will be how quickly a treatment can be successfully tested and approved by FDA so that it can subsequently be widely deployed.\n\nFor context, during the COVID-19 pandemic there were 276 days from the first US laboratory-confirmed case [on January 20, 2020](https://www.cdc.gov/museum/timeline/covid19.html) until the first FDA-approved treatment on [October 22, 2020](https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-treatment-covid-19).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of days (not including the end date) between the date of the first US laboratory-confirmed case of a pandemic-causing novel pathogen is reported and the date the US [Food and Drug Administration](https://www.fda.gov/) approves a treatment. If there is no new pandemic between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2032, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nFor this question [emergency use authorization](https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization) of a treatment **will not** be considered FDA approval. Full FDA approval is required for this question.\n\nFor this question, a \"new pandemic\" is defined as one whose pathogen kills at least 25 million people (globally) between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2032. This pandemic excludes all variants of currently known pathogens, including variants of SARS-CoV-2 — with no exceptions. However, novel pathogens that are the result of [antigenic shift](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antigenic_shift) **do count.** Among pathogens that cause human disease, antigenic shift is currently [only](https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/vim.2017.0141) known to occur with influenza A and this process is described by the US CDC as an [\"abrupt, major change in a flu A virus, resulting in new HA and/or new HA and NA proteins in flu viruses that infect humans\"](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/viruses/change.htm). Contrast this with [antigenic drift](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8669911/), which is the mechanism that produces variants for pathogens like SARS-CoV-2.\n\nIn other words, if [this other Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11164/25m-killed-by-pandemic-2022-to-2031/) resolves as **Yes**, this question will resolve as the number of days from the first US case to the first FDA-approved treatment.\n\nIf FDA does not approve any treatment within 730 days (2 years) of the first US laboratory-confirmed case of the pandemic-causing novel pathogen, then this question will resolve as **>730**", "lower_25": "148", "median": "203", "upper_75": "262", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will be capable of getting a perfect score on the Putnam Mathematical Competition by 2041?", "desc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Lowell_Putnam_Mathematical_Competition),\n\n> The William Lowell Putnam Mathematical Competition, often abbreviated to Putnam Competition, is an annual mathematics competition for undergraduate college students enrolled at institutions of higher learning in the United States and Canada (regardless of the students' nationalities)... It is widely considered to be the most prestigious university-level mathematics competition in the world, and its difficulty is such that the median score is often zero (out of 120) despite being attempted by students specializing in mathematics.\n\nThe layout is as follows,\n\n> The Putnam competition takes place on the first Saturday in December, and consists of two three-hour sittings separated by a lunch break. The competition is supervised by faculty members at the participating schools. Each one consists of twelve challenging problems. The problems cover a range of advanced material in undergraduate mathematics, including concepts from group theory, set theory, graph theory, lattice theory, and number theory. \n\n> Each of the twelve questions is worth 10 points, and the most frequent scores above zero are 10 points for a complete solution, 9 points for a nearly complete solution, and 1 point for the beginnings of a solution. In earlier years, the twelve questions were worth one point each, with no partial credit given. The competition is considered to be very difficult: it is typically attempted by students specializing in mathematics, but the median score is usually zero or one point out of 120 possible, and there have been only five perfect scores as of 2019. In 2003, of the 3,615 students competing, 1,024 (28%) scored 10 or more points, and 42 points was sufficient to make the top percentile.", "resc": "This question resolves on the date during which a computer program first clearly demonstrates the ability to receive a perfect score on the William Lowell Putnam Mathematical Competition, without cheating, and within the time limits given in the real-world competition. Cheating includes training on content that could conceivably spoil the solutions to the competition, and includes having access to external equipment normally forbidden during the competition that can be used to aid solving the problems, or advice from other mathematicians. Thus, Metaculus administrators should be careful not to resolve this question prematurely.\n\nIn the strictest case, the model should be tested on the most recent Putnam Competition, after having trained the model prior to the release of the most recent solutions. [Here](https://kskedlaya.org/putnam-archive/) is an archive of Putnam Competition problems going back to 1985. Since it is generally understood that Putnam problems have become harder over time, this question will not consider any candidate program that receives a perfect score on a Putnam examination from prior to 2000 as eligible to trigger positive resolution", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2041", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will be capable of getting a perfect score on the Miklós Schweitzer Competition by 2038?", "desc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikl%C3%B3s_Schweitzer_Competition),\n\n> The Miklós Schweitzer Competition is an annual Hungarian mathematics competition for university undergraduates, established in 1949...\n\n> The Schweitzer contest is uniquely high-level among mathematics competitions. The problems, written by prominent Hungarian mathematicians, are challenging and require in-depth knowledge of the fields represented. The competition is open-book and competitors are allowed ten days to come up with solutions.", "resc": "This question resolves on the date during which a computer program first clearly demonstrates the ability to receive a perfect score on the Miklós Schweitzer Competition, without cheating, and within the time limits given in the real-world competition. Cheating includes training on content that could conceivably spoil the solutions to the competition, and includes having access to external equipment normally forbidden during the competition that can be used to aid solving the problems, or advice from other mathematicians. Thus, Metaculus administrators should be careful not to resolve this question prematurely.\n\nIn the ideal case, the model should be tested on the most recent Miklós Schweitzer Competition, possibly simultaneously with human competitors, after having trained the model prior to the release of the most recent solutions. [Here is an archive](http://www.math.u-szeged.hu/~mmaroti/schweitzer/) of Miklós Schweitzer Competition problems going back to 1995. Note that for many of the years, the problems are stated in Hungarian only, and not English", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art performance on the MATH dataset will be 90.74% on the following dates?", "desc": "The MATH dataset is a dataset of challenging high school mathematics problems constructed by [Hendrycks et al. (2021)](https://github.com/hendrycks/math). Hypermind forecasters were commissioned to predict state-of-the-art performance on June 30, 2022, '23, '24, and '25. The 2022 result of 50.3% was significantly outside forecasters' prediction intervals, so we're seeing what the updated forecasts are for 2023, '24, and '25.", "resc": "These questions should resolve identically to the [Hypermind forecasts](https://prod.hypermind.com/ngdp/en/showcase2/showcase.html?sc=JSAI):\n\n\"These questions resolve as the highest performance achieved on MATH by June 30 in the following years by an eligible model.\n\nEligible models may use scratch space before outputting an answer (if desired) and may be trained in any way that does not use the test set (few-shot, fine tuned, etc.). The model need not be publicly released, as long as the resulting performance itself is reported in a published paper (on arxiv or a major ML conference) or through an official communication channel of an industry lab (e.g. claimed in a research blog post on the OpenAI blog, or a press release). In case of ambiguity, the question will resolve according to [Jacob Steinhardt](https://jsteinhardt.stat.berkeley.edu/)'s expert judgement.", "lower_25": "85.90", "median": "90.74", "upper_75": "94.86", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art performance on the MATH dataset will be 90.74% on the following dates?", "desc": "The MATH dataset is a dataset of challenging high school mathematics problems constructed by [Hendrycks et al. (2021)](https://github.com/hendrycks/math). Hypermind forecasters were commissioned to predict state-of-the-art performance on June 30, 2022, '23, '24, and '25. The 2022 result of 50.3% was significantly outside forecasters' prediction intervals, so we're seeing what the updated forecasts are for 2023, '24, and '25.", "resc": "These questions should resolve identically to the [Hypermind forecasts](https://prod.hypermind.com/ngdp/en/showcase2/showcase.html?sc=JSAI):\n\n\"These questions resolve as the highest performance achieved on MATH by June 30 in the following years by an eligible model.\n\nEligible models may use scratch space before outputting an answer (if desired) and may be trained in any way that does not use the test set (few-shot, fine tuned, etc.). The model need not be publicly released, as long as the resulting performance itself is reported in a published paper (on arxiv or a major ML conference) or through an official communication channel of an industry lab (e.g. claimed in a research blog post on the OpenAI blog, or a press release). In case of ambiguity, the question will resolve according to [Jacob Steinhardt](https://jsteinhardt.stat.berkeley.edu/)'s expert judgement.", "lower_25": "85.90", "median": "90.74", "upper_75": "94.86", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art accuracy on the Massive Multitask dataset will be 94.05% on the following dates?", "desc": "The Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU) dataset is a dataset of high school, college, and professional multiple choice exams that test expert subject knowledge. It was constructed by [Hendrycks et al. (2021)](https://github.com/hendrycks/test). Hypermind forecasters were commissioned to predict state-of-the-art performance on June 30, 2022, '23, '24, and '25. The 2022 result of 67.5% was significantly outside forecasters' prediction intervals, so we're seeing what the updated forecasts are for 2023, '24, and '25.", "resc": "These questions should resolve identically to the [Hypermind forecasts](https://prod.hypermind.com/ngdp/en/showcase2/showcase.html?sc=JSAI):\n\n\"These questions resolve as the highest performance achieved on MMLU by June 30 in the following years by an eligible model. Eligible models must not have been specifically trained on data from the MMLU dataset. A model need not be publicly released, as long as the resulting performance itself is reported in a published paper (on arxiv or a major ML conference) or through an official communication channel of an industry lab (e.g. claimed in a research blog post on the OpenAI blog, or a press release). If there's uncertainty about whether something counts, we will defer to [this leaderboard](https://github.com/hendrycks/test).", "lower_25": "89.52", "median": "91.36", "upper_75": "94.05", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art accuracy on the Massive Multitask dataset will be 94.05% on the following dates?", "desc": "The Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU) dataset is a dataset of high school, college, and professional multiple choice exams that test expert subject knowledge. It was constructed by [Hendrycks et al. (2021)](https://github.com/hendrycks/test). Hypermind forecasters were commissioned to predict state-of-the-art performance on June 30, 2022, '23, '24, and '25. The 2022 result of 67.5% was significantly outside forecasters' prediction intervals, so we're seeing what the updated forecasts are for 2023, '24, and '25.", "resc": "These questions should resolve identically to the [Hypermind forecasts](https://prod.hypermind.com/ngdp/en/showcase2/showcase.html?sc=JSAI):\n\n\"These questions resolve as the highest performance achieved on MMLU by June 30 in the following years by an eligible model. Eligible models must not have been specifically trained on data from the MMLU dataset. A model need not be publicly released, as long as the resulting performance itself is reported in a published paper (on arxiv or a major ML conference) or through an official communication channel of an industry lab (e.g. claimed in a research blog post on the OpenAI blog, or a press release). If there's uncertainty about whether something counts, we will defer to [this leaderboard](https://github.com/hendrycks/test).", "lower_25": "89.52", "median": "91.36", "upper_75": "94.05", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art performance on the MATH dataset will be 90.74% on the following dates?", "desc": "The MATH dataset is a dataset of challenging high school mathematics problems constructed by [Hendrycks et al. (2021)](https://github.com/hendrycks/math). Hypermind forecasters were commissioned to predict state-of-the-art performance on June 30, 2022, '23, '24, and '25. The 2022 result of 50.3% was significantly outside forecasters' prediction intervals, so we're seeing what the updated forecasts are for 2023, '24, and '25.", "resc": "These questions should resolve identically to the [Hypermind forecasts](https://prod.hypermind.com/ngdp/en/showcase2/showcase.html?sc=JSAI):\n\n\"These questions resolve as the highest performance achieved on MATH by June 30 in the following years by an eligible model.\n\nEligible models may use scratch space before outputting an answer (if desired) and may be trained in any way that does not use the test set (few-shot, fine tuned, etc.). The model need not be publicly released, as long as the resulting performance itself is reported in a published paper (on arxiv or a major ML conference) or through an official communication channel of an industry lab (e.g. claimed in a research blog post on the OpenAI blog, or a press release). In case of ambiguity, the question will resolve according to [Jacob Steinhardt](https://jsteinhardt.stat.berkeley.edu/)'s expert judgement.", "lower_25": "85.90", "median": "90.74", "upper_75": "94.86", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a new pandemic will occur before 2032 and it will take 75% of the time from the first US laboratory-confirmed case until the first FDA-approved vaccine?", "desc": "A key part of the response to the [next pandemic caused by a novel pathogen](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11164/25m-killed-by-pandemic-2022-to-2031/) will be how quickly a vaccine can be successfully tested and authorized by FDA so that it can subsequently be widely deployed.\n\nFor context, during the COVID-19 pandemic there were 326 days from the first US laboratory-confirmed case [on January 20, 2020](https://www.cdc.gov/museum/timeline/covid19.html) until the first FDA-authorized vaccine on [December 11, 2020](https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-key-action-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-first-covid-19).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of days (not including the end date) between the date that the first US laboratory-confirmed case of a pandemic-causing novel pathogen is reported and the date the US [Food and Drug Administration](https://www.fda.gov/) authorizes a vaccine for that pathogen. If there is no new pandemic between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2032, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nFor this question any type of authorization, including [emergency use authorization](https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization), **will** be considered FDA approval. \n\nFor this question, a \"new pandemic\" is defined as one whose pathogen kills at least 25 million people (globally) between January 1, 2022 to January 1, 2032. This pandemic excludes all variants of currently known pathogens, including variants of SARS-CoV-2 — with no exceptions. However, novel pathogens that are the result of [antigenic shift](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antigenic_shift) **do count.** Among pathogens that cause human disease, antigenic shift is currently [only](https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/vim.2017.0141) known to occur with influenza A and this process is described by the US CDC as an [\"abrupt, major change in a flu A virus, resulting in new HA and/or new HA and NA proteins in flu viruses that infect humans\"](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/viruses/change.htm). Contrast this with [antigenic drift](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8669911/), which is the mechanism that produces variants for pathogens like SARS-CoV-2.\n\nIn other words, if [this other Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11164/25m-killed-by-pandemic-2022-to-2031/) resolves as **Yes**, this question will resolve as the number of days from the first US case to the first FDA-approved vaccine.\n\nIf FDA does not authorize a vaccine within 730 days (~2 years) of the first U.S. laboratory-confirmed case of the pandemic-causing novel pathogen, then this question will resolve as **>730**", "lower_25": "232", "median": "297", "upper_75": "390", "prediction": "390 days"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first AI-generated book will be on the New York Times Best Seller list by 2039?", "desc": "*The New York Times* Best Seller list is the most important list of best-selling books in the United States. The method for generating the list is a trade secret and is not mathematically objective. It is unknown whether AI-generated books will ever be admitted in the list and under what conditions.\n\n\nThe New York Times Best Seller list can be found at [this url](https://www.nytimes.com/books/best-sellers/).", "resc": "Resolution: A book generated by an Artificial Intelligence appears in the list.\n\nThe book can be *copy edited* by a human but no more than a book is usually copy edited. This means that if a human is considered the author *or co-author* the question does not resolve", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be 4.14% in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp)).\n\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS\n\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)\n\nEDIT:\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "2.53", "median": "4.14", "upper_75": "5.40", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first AI-generated book will be on the New York Times Best Seller list by 2039?", "desc": "*The New York Times* Best Seller list is the most important list of best-selling books in the United States. The method for generating the list is a trade secret and is not mathematically objective. It is unknown whether AI-generated books will ever be admitted in the list and under what conditions.\n\n\nThe New York Times Best Seller list can be found at [this url](https://www.nytimes.com/books/best-sellers/).", "resc": "Resolution: A book generated by an Artificial Intelligence appears in the list.\n\nThe book can be *copy edited* by a human but no more than a book is usually copy edited. This means that if a human is considered the author *or co-author* the question does not resolve", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be 4.14% in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp)).\n\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS\n\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)\n\nEDIT:\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "2.53", "median": "4.14", "upper_75": "5.40", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art accuracy on the Massive Multitask dataset will be 94.05% on the following dates?", "desc": "The Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU) dataset is a dataset of high school, college, and professional multiple choice exams that test expert subject knowledge. It was constructed by [Hendrycks et al. (2021)](https://github.com/hendrycks/test). Hypermind forecasters were commissioned to predict state-of-the-art performance on June 30, 2022, '23, '24, and '25. The 2022 result of 67.5% was significantly outside forecasters' prediction intervals, so we're seeing what the updated forecasts are for 2023, '24, and '25.", "resc": "These questions should resolve identically to the [Hypermind forecasts](https://prod.hypermind.com/ngdp/en/showcase2/showcase.html?sc=JSAI):\n\n\"These questions resolve as the highest performance achieved on MMLU by June 30 in the following years by an eligible model. Eligible models must not have been specifically trained on data from the MMLU dataset. A model need not be publicly released, as long as the resulting performance itself is reported in a published paper (on arxiv or a major ML conference) or through an official communication channel of an industry lab (e.g. claimed in a research blog post on the OpenAI blog, or a press release). If there's uncertainty about whether something counts, we will defer to [this leaderboard](https://github.com/hendrycks/test).", "lower_25": "89.52", "median": "91.36", "upper_75": "94.05", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first AI-generated book will be on the New York Times Best Seller list by 2039?", "desc": "*The New York Times* Best Seller list is the most important list of best-selling books in the United States. The method for generating the list is a trade secret and is not mathematically objective. It is unknown whether AI-generated books will ever be admitted in the list and under what conditions.\n\n\nThe New York Times Best Seller list can be found at [this url](https://www.nytimes.com/books/best-sellers/).", "resc": "Resolution: A book generated by an Artificial Intelligence appears in the list.\n\nThe book can be *copy edited* by a human but no more than a book is usually copy edited. This means that if a human is considered the author *or co-author* the question does not resolve", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be 3.53% in the year 2027?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp)).\n\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS\n\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)\n\nEDIT:\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "0.007", "median": "1.78", "upper_75": "3.53", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be 2.45% in the year 2030?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp)).\n\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS\n\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)\n\nEDIT:\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "0.235", "upper_75": "2.45", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be 2.45% in the year 2030?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp)).\n\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS\n\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)\n\nEDIT:\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "0.235", "upper_75": "2.45", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be 3.53% in the year 2027?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp)).\n\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS\n\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)\n\nEDIT:\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "0.007", "median": "1.78", "upper_75": "3.53", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be 4.91% in the year 2035?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp)).\n\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS\n\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)\n\nEDIT:\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "0.650", "upper_75": "4.91", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be 3.53% in the year 2027?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp)).\n\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS\n\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)\n\nEDIT:\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "0.007", "median": "1.78", "upper_75": "3.53", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be 4.91% in the year 2035?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp)).\n\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS\n\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)\n\nEDIT:\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "0.650", "upper_75": "4.91", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be less than 0% in the year 2040?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp)).\n\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS\n\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)\n\nEDIT:\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "< 0", "upper_75": "5.16", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be 1.02% in the year 2050?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp)).\n\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS\n\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)\n\nEDIT:\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "< 0", "upper_75": "1.02", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be 1.02% in the year 2050?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp)).\n\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS\n\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)\n\nEDIT:\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "< 0", "upper_75": "1.02", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art performance on the MATH dataset will be 94.86% on June 30, 2024?", "desc": "The MATH dataset is a dataset of challenging high school mathematics problems constructed by [Hendrycks et al. (2021)](https://github.com/hendrycks/math). Hypermind forecasters were commissioned to predict state-of-the-art performance on June 30, 2022, '23, '24, and '25. The 2022 result of 50.3% was significantly outside forecasters' prediction intervals, so we're seeing what the updated forecasts are for 2023, '24, and '25.", "resc": "These questions should resolve identically to the [Hypermind forecasts](https://prod.hypermind.com/ngdp/en/showcase2/showcase.html?sc=JSAI):\n\n\"These questions resolve as the highest performance achieved on MATH by June 30 in the following years by an eligible model.\n\nEligible models may use scratch space before outputting an answer (if desired) and may be trained in any way that does not use the test set (few-shot, fine tuned, etc.). The model need not be publicly released, as long as the resulting performance itself is reported in a published paper (on arxiv or a major ML conference) or through an official communication channel of an industry lab (e.g. claimed in a research blog post on the OpenAI blog, or a press release). In case of ambiguity, the question will resolve according to [Jacob Steinhardt](https://jsteinhardt.stat.berkeley.edu/)'s expert judgement.", "lower_25": "85.90", "median": "90.74", "upper_75": "94.86", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be 1.02% in the year 2050?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp)).\n\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS\n\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)\n\nEDIT:\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "< 0", "upper_75": "1.02", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be less than 0% in the year 2040?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp)).\n\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS\n\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)\n\nEDIT:\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "< 0", "upper_75": "5.16", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be 4.14% in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp)).\n\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS\n\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)\n\nEDIT:\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "2.53", "median": "4.14", "upper_75": "5.40", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art performance on the MATH dataset will be 94.86% on June 30, 2024?", "desc": "The MATH dataset is a dataset of challenging high school mathematics problems constructed by [Hendrycks et al. (2021)](https://github.com/hendrycks/math). Hypermind forecasters were commissioned to predict state-of-the-art performance on June 30, 2022, '23, '24, and '25. The 2022 result of 50.3% was significantly outside forecasters' prediction intervals, so we're seeing what the updated forecasts are for 2023, '24, and '25.", "resc": "These questions should resolve identically to the [Hypermind forecasts](https://prod.hypermind.com/ngdp/en/showcase2/showcase.html?sc=JSAI):\n\n\"These questions resolve as the highest performance achieved on MATH by June 30 in the following years by an eligible model.\n\nEligible models may use scratch space before outputting an answer (if desired) and may be trained in any way that does not use the test set (few-shot, fine tuned, etc.). The model need not be publicly released, as long as the resulting performance itself is reported in a published paper (on arxiv or a major ML conference) or through an official communication channel of an industry lab (e.g. claimed in a research blog post on the OpenAI blog, or a press release). In case of ambiguity, the question will resolve according to [Jacob Steinhardt](https://jsteinhardt.stat.berkeley.edu/)'s expert judgement.", "lower_25": "85.90", "median": "90.74", "upper_75": "94.86", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that state-of-the-art performance on the MATH dataset will be 98.40% on June 30, 2025?", "desc": "The MATH dataset is a dataset of challenging high school mathematics problems constructed by [Hendrycks et al. (2021)](https://github.com/hendrycks/math). Hypermind forecasters were commissioned to predict state-of-the-art performance on June 30, 2022, '23, '24, and '25. The 2022 result of 50.3% was significantly outside forecasters' prediction intervals, so we're seeing what the updated forecasts are for 2023, '24, and '25.", "resc": "These questions should resolve identically to the [Hypermind forecasts](https://prod.hypermind.com/ngdp/en/showcase2/showcase.html?sc=JSAI):\n\n\"These questions resolve as the highest performance achieved on MATH by June 30 in the following years by an eligible model.\n\nEligible models may use scratch space before outputting an answer (if desired) and may be trained in any way that does not use the test set (few-shot, fine tuned, etc.). The model need not be publicly released, as long as the resulting performance itself is reported in a published paper (on arxiv or a major ML conference) or through an official communication channel of an industry lab (e.g. claimed in a research blog post on the OpenAI blog, or a press release). In case of ambiguity, the question will resolve according to [Jacob Steinhardt](https://jsteinhardt.stat.berkeley.edu/)'s expert judgement.", "lower_25": "89.40", "median": "94.86", "upper_75": "98.40", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be 2.45% in the year 2030?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp)).\n\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS\n\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)\n\nEDIT:\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "0.235", "upper_75": "2.45", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that state-of-the-art performance on the MATH dataset will be 98.40% on June 30, 2025?", "desc": "The MATH dataset is a dataset of challenging high school mathematics problems constructed by [Hendrycks et al. (2021)](https://github.com/hendrycks/math). Hypermind forecasters were commissioned to predict state-of-the-art performance on June 30, 2022, '23, '24, and '25. The 2022 result of 50.3% was significantly outside forecasters' prediction intervals, so we're seeing what the updated forecasts are for 2023, '24, and '25.", "resc": "These questions should resolve identically to the [Hypermind forecasts](https://prod.hypermind.com/ngdp/en/showcase2/showcase.html?sc=JSAI):\n\n\"These questions resolve as the highest performance achieved on MATH by June 30 in the following years by an eligible model.\n\nEligible models may use scratch space before outputting an answer (if desired) and may be trained in any way that does not use the test set (few-shot, fine tuned, etc.). The model need not be publicly released, as long as the resulting performance itself is reported in a published paper (on arxiv or a major ML conference) or through an official communication channel of an industry lab (e.g. claimed in a research blog post on the OpenAI blog, or a press release). In case of ambiguity, the question will resolve according to [Jacob Steinhardt](https://jsteinhardt.stat.berkeley.edu/)'s expert judgement.", "lower_25": "89.40", "median": "94.86", "upper_75": "98.40", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be 4.91% in the year 2035?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp)).\n\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS\n\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)\n\nEDIT:\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "0.650", "upper_75": "4.91", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art performance on the MATH dataset will be 94.86% on June 30, 2024?", "desc": "The MATH dataset is a dataset of challenging high school mathematics problems constructed by [Hendrycks et al. (2021)](https://github.com/hendrycks/math). Hypermind forecasters were commissioned to predict state-of-the-art performance on June 30, 2022, '23, '24, and '25. The 2022 result of 50.3% was significantly outside forecasters' prediction intervals, so we're seeing what the updated forecasts are for 2023, '24, and '25.", "resc": "These questions should resolve identically to the [Hypermind forecasts](https://prod.hypermind.com/ngdp/en/showcase2/showcase.html?sc=JSAI):\n\n\"These questions resolve as the highest performance achieved on MATH by June 30 in the following years by an eligible model.\n\nEligible models may use scratch space before outputting an answer (if desired) and may be trained in any way that does not use the test set (few-shot, fine tuned, etc.). The model need not be publicly released, as long as the resulting performance itself is reported in a published paper (on arxiv or a major ML conference) or through an official communication channel of an industry lab (e.g. claimed in a research blog post on the OpenAI blog, or a press release). In case of ambiguity, the question will resolve according to [Jacob Steinhardt](https://jsteinhardt.stat.berkeley.edu/)'s expert judgement.", "lower_25": "85.90", "median": "90.74", "upper_75": "94.86", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that state-of-the-art performance on the MATH dataset will be 98.40% on June 30, 2025?", "desc": "The MATH dataset is a dataset of challenging high school mathematics problems constructed by [Hendrycks et al. (2021)](https://github.com/hendrycks/math). Hypermind forecasters were commissioned to predict state-of-the-art performance on June 30, 2022, '23, '24, and '25. The 2022 result of 50.3% was significantly outside forecasters' prediction intervals, so we're seeing what the updated forecasts are for 2023, '24, and '25.", "resc": "These questions should resolve identically to the [Hypermind forecasts](https://prod.hypermind.com/ngdp/en/showcase2/showcase.html?sc=JSAI):\n\n\"These questions resolve as the highest performance achieved on MATH by June 30 in the following years by an eligible model.\n\nEligible models may use scratch space before outputting an answer (if desired) and may be trained in any way that does not use the test set (few-shot, fine tuned, etc.). The model need not be publicly released, as long as the resulting performance itself is reported in a published paper (on arxiv or a major ML conference) or through an official communication channel of an industry lab (e.g. claimed in a research blog post on the OpenAI blog, or a press release). In case of ambiguity, the question will resolve according to [Jacob Steinhardt](https://jsteinhardt.stat.berkeley.edu/)'s expert judgement.", "lower_25": "89.40", "median": "94.86", "upper_75": "98.40", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art accuracy on the Massive Multitask dataset will be 89.52% on June 30, 2024?", "desc": "The Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU) dataset is a dataset of high school, college, and professional multiple choice exams that test expert subject knowledge. It was constructed by [Hendrycks et al. (2021)](https://github.com/hendrycks/test). Hypermind forecasters were commissioned to predict state-of-the-art performance on June 30, 2022, '23, '24, and '25. The 2022 result of 67.5% was significantly outside forecasters' prediction intervals, so we're seeing what the updated forecasts are for 2023, '24, and '25.", "resc": "These questions should resolve identically to the [Hypermind forecasts](https://prod.hypermind.com/ngdp/en/showcase2/showcase.html?sc=JSAI):\n\n\"These questions resolve as the highest performance achieved on MMLU by June 30 in the following years by an eligible model. Eligible models must not have been specifically trained on data from the MMLU dataset. A model need not be publicly released, as long as the resulting performance itself is reported in a published paper (on arxiv or a major ML conference) or through an official communication channel of an industry lab (e.g. claimed in a research blog post on the OpenAI blog, or a press release). If there's uncertainty about whether something counts, we will defer to [this leaderboard](https://github.com/hendrycks/test).", "lower_25": "89.52", "median": "91.36", "upper_75": "94.05", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art accuracy on the Massive Multitask dataset will be 89.52% on June 30, 2024?", "desc": "The Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU) dataset is a dataset of high school, college, and professional multiple choice exams that test expert subject knowledge. It was constructed by [Hendrycks et al. (2021)](https://github.com/hendrycks/test). Hypermind forecasters were commissioned to predict state-of-the-art performance on June 30, 2022, '23, '24, and '25. The 2022 result of 67.5% was significantly outside forecasters' prediction intervals, so we're seeing what the updated forecasts are for 2023, '24, and '25.", "resc": "These questions should resolve identically to the [Hypermind forecasts](https://prod.hypermind.com/ngdp/en/showcase2/showcase.html?sc=JSAI):\n\n\"These questions resolve as the highest performance achieved on MMLU by June 30 in the following years by an eligible model. Eligible models must not have been specifically trained on data from the MMLU dataset. A model need not be publicly released, as long as the resulting performance itself is reported in a published paper (on arxiv or a major ML conference) or through an official communication channel of an industry lab (e.g. claimed in a research blog post on the OpenAI blog, or a press release). If there's uncertainty about whether something counts, we will defer to [this leaderboard](https://github.com/hendrycks/test).", "lower_25": "89.52", "median": "91.36", "upper_75": "94.05", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US effective fed funds rate will be less than 0% in the year 2040?", "desc": "The federal funds rate is the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. economy and broadly affects economic conditions e.g. inflation, employment, and economic growth. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the U.S. Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate as part of its monetary policy. (See [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp)).\n\nThe effective fed funds rate is the weighted average interest rate at which depository institutions trade federal funds, which is influenced by the Federal Reserve to meet its targets. The current and historical rates can be seen at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS\n\nThe Fed has sharply increased rates in recent months to combat high inflation. On the other hand, the Fed otherwise tends to decrease rates during downturns to help spur economic growth and recovery. In the near term, forecasts expect the Fed to continue increasing rates over the next several months. A summary of the median of the Fed's own projections is at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDTARMD. However, there are far fewer forecasts on its longer term trends.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the effective fed funds rate shown on [FRED](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS) for December 31 of each of the following years, expressed in percentage points. (Or an equivalent data source in the event this site changes.)\n\nEDIT:\nJune 6, 2023 Given that FRED doesn't publish daily data; this question will instead resolve as the effective fed fund rate published on the first reported day of the new year by the [New York Fed](https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/reference-rates/effr).", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "< 0", "upper_75": "5.16", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art accuracy on the Massive Multitask dataset will be 97.37% on June 30, 2025?", "desc": "The Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU) dataset is a dataset of high school, college, and professional multiple choice exams that test expert subject knowledge. It was constructed by [Hendrycks et al. (2021)](https://github.com/hendrycks/test). Hypermind forecasters were commissioned to predict state-of-the-art performance on June 30, 2022, '23, '24, and '25. The 2022 result of 67.5% was significantly outside forecasters' prediction intervals, so we're seeing what the updated forecasts are for 2023, '24, and '25.", "resc": "These questions should resolve identically to the [Hypermind forecasts](https://prod.hypermind.com/ngdp/en/showcase2/showcase.html?sc=JSAI):\n\n\"These questions resolve as the highest performance achieved on MMLU by June 30 in the following years by an eligible model. Eligible models must not have been specifically trained on data from the MMLU dataset. A model need not be publicly released, as long as the resulting performance itself is reported in a published paper (on arxiv or a major ML conference) or through an official communication channel of an industry lab (e.g. claimed in a research blog post on the OpenAI blog, or a press release). If there's uncertainty about whether something counts, we will defer to [this leaderboard](https://github.com/hendrycks/test).", "lower_25": "92.37", "median": "94.94", "upper_75": "97.37", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art accuracy on the Massive Multitask dataset will be 97.37% on June 30, 2025?", "desc": "The Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU) dataset is a dataset of high school, college, and professional multiple choice exams that test expert subject knowledge. It was constructed by [Hendrycks et al. (2021)](https://github.com/hendrycks/test). Hypermind forecasters were commissioned to predict state-of-the-art performance on June 30, 2022, '23, '24, and '25. The 2022 result of 67.5% was significantly outside forecasters' prediction intervals, so we're seeing what the updated forecasts are for 2023, '24, and '25.", "resc": "These questions should resolve identically to the [Hypermind forecasts](https://prod.hypermind.com/ngdp/en/showcase2/showcase.html?sc=JSAI):\n\n\"These questions resolve as the highest performance achieved on MMLU by June 30 in the following years by an eligible model. Eligible models must not have been specifically trained on data from the MMLU dataset. A model need not be publicly released, as long as the resulting performance itself is reported in a published paper (on arxiv or a major ML conference) or through an official communication channel of an industry lab (e.g. claimed in a research blog post on the OpenAI blog, or a press release). If there's uncertainty about whether something counts, we will defer to [this leaderboard](https://github.com/hendrycks/test).", "lower_25": "92.37", "median": "94.94", "upper_75": "97.37", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art accuracy on the Massive Multitask dataset will be 89.52% on June 30, 2024?", "desc": "The Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU) dataset is a dataset of high school, college, and professional multiple choice exams that test expert subject knowledge. It was constructed by [Hendrycks et al. (2021)](https://github.com/hendrycks/test). Hypermind forecasters were commissioned to predict state-of-the-art performance on June 30, 2022, '23, '24, and '25. The 2022 result of 67.5% was significantly outside forecasters' prediction intervals, so we're seeing what the updated forecasts are for 2023, '24, and '25.", "resc": "These questions should resolve identically to the [Hypermind forecasts](https://prod.hypermind.com/ngdp/en/showcase2/showcase.html?sc=JSAI):\n\n\"These questions resolve as the highest performance achieved on MMLU by June 30 in the following years by an eligible model. Eligible models must not have been specifically trained on data from the MMLU dataset. A model need not be publicly released, as long as the resulting performance itself is reported in a published paper (on arxiv or a major ML conference) or through an official communication channel of an industry lab (e.g. claimed in a research blog post on the OpenAI blog, or a press release). If there's uncertainty about whether something counts, we will defer to [this leaderboard](https://github.com/hendrycks/test).", "lower_25": "89.52", "median": "91.36", "upper_75": "94.05", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US will be 3.52 on the following dates?", "desc": "The US has seen record high prices of gasoline in 2022, reaching $5.00 per gallon [in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GASREGW). However, when adjusting for inflation, June's gas prices are comparable to [previous spikes](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) in 1981, 2008, and 2011-2014. The US Energy Information Agency [predicts](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) inflation-adjusted retail gas prices to fall by 22% from June 2022 to June 2023.\n\n[Energy prices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021–2022_global_energy_crisis) have increased in Europe and Asia, first from supply chain shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic, then from [sanctions on Russian oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\nIn [June 2022](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-for-a-three-month-federal-gas-tax-holiday/), US President Joe Biden asked Congress to suspend the federal gas tax for 3 months, and announced increased releases of oil from the [strategic petroleum reserves](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_typ_d_nus_SAS_mbbl_m.htm). The US government has made [recent visits](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-venezuela-colombia-ec798d70f4e19e05c88e6ae2b43a19e9) to oil-rich Venezuela, despite still [officially recognizing](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/) Maduro's government as illegitimate.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the price of gas per gallon (in Jan 2022 USD) in the US on the respective dates according to the [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m). Gas prices will be EIA's Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported monthly in USD per gallon. For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to the January 2022 [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL).", "lower_25": "3.22", "median": "3.52", "upper_75": "3.97", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US will be 3.52 on the following dates?", "desc": "The US has seen record high prices of gasoline in 2022, reaching $5.00 per gallon [in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GASREGW). However, when adjusting for inflation, June's gas prices are comparable to [previous spikes](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) in 1981, 2008, and 2011-2014. The US Energy Information Agency [predicts](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) inflation-adjusted retail gas prices to fall by 22% from June 2022 to June 2023.\n\n[Energy prices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021–2022_global_energy_crisis) have increased in Europe and Asia, first from supply chain shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic, then from [sanctions on Russian oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\nIn [June 2022](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-for-a-three-month-federal-gas-tax-holiday/), US President Joe Biden asked Congress to suspend the federal gas tax for 3 months, and announced increased releases of oil from the [strategic petroleum reserves](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_typ_d_nus_SAS_mbbl_m.htm). The US government has made [recent visits](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-venezuela-colombia-ec798d70f4e19e05c88e6ae2b43a19e9) to oil-rich Venezuela, despite still [officially recognizing](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/) Maduro's government as illegitimate.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the price of gas per gallon (in Jan 2022 USD) in the US on the respective dates according to the [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m). Gas prices will be EIA's Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported monthly in USD per gallon. For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to the January 2022 [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL).", "lower_25": "3.22", "median": "3.52", "upper_75": "3.97", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US will be 3.52 on the following dates?", "desc": "The US has seen record high prices of gasoline in 2022, reaching $5.00 per gallon [in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GASREGW). However, when adjusting for inflation, June's gas prices are comparable to [previous spikes](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) in 1981, 2008, and 2011-2014. The US Energy Information Agency [predicts](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) inflation-adjusted retail gas prices to fall by 22% from June 2022 to June 2023.\n\n[Energy prices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021–2022_global_energy_crisis) have increased in Europe and Asia, first from supply chain shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic, then from [sanctions on Russian oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\nIn [June 2022](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-for-a-three-month-federal-gas-tax-holiday/), US President Joe Biden asked Congress to suspend the federal gas tax for 3 months, and announced increased releases of oil from the [strategic petroleum reserves](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_typ_d_nus_SAS_mbbl_m.htm). The US government has made [recent visits](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-venezuela-colombia-ec798d70f4e19e05c88e6ae2b43a19e9) to oil-rich Venezuela, despite still [officially recognizing](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/) Maduro's government as illegitimate.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the price of gas per gallon (in Jan 2022 USD) in the US on the respective dates according to the [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m). Gas prices will be EIA's Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported monthly in USD per gallon. For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to the January 2022 [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL).", "lower_25": "3.22", "median": "3.52", "upper_75": "3.97", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US will be 5.16 on April 2026?", "desc": "The US has seen record high prices of gasoline in 2022, reaching $5.00 per gallon [in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GASREGW). However, when adjusting for inflation, June's gas prices are comparable to [previous spikes](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) in 1981, 2008, and 2011-2014. The US Energy Information Agency [predicts](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) inflation-adjusted retail gas prices to fall by 22% from June 2022 to June 2023.\n\n[Energy prices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021–2022_global_energy_crisis) have increased in Europe and Asia, first from supply chain shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic, then from [sanctions on Russian oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\nIn [June 2022](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-for-a-three-month-federal-gas-tax-holiday/), US President Joe Biden asked Congress to suspend the federal gas tax for 3 months, and announced increased releases of oil from the [strategic petroleum reserves](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_typ_d_nus_SAS_mbbl_m.htm). The US government has made [recent visits](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-venezuela-colombia-ec798d70f4e19e05c88e6ae2b43a19e9) to oil-rich Venezuela, despite still [officially recognizing](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/) Maduro's government as illegitimate.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the price of gas per gallon (in Jan 2022 USD) in the US on the respective dates according to the [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m). Gas prices will be EIA's Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported monthly in USD per gallon. For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to the January 2022 [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL).", "lower_25": "3.23", "median": "4.11", "upper_75": "5.16", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US will be 3.52 on April 2024?", "desc": "The US has seen record high prices of gasoline in 2022, reaching $5.00 per gallon [in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GASREGW). However, when adjusting for inflation, June's gas prices are comparable to [previous spikes](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) in 1981, 2008, and 2011-2014. The US Energy Information Agency [predicts](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) inflation-adjusted retail gas prices to fall by 22% from June 2022 to June 2023.\n\n[Energy prices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021–2022_global_energy_crisis) have increased in Europe and Asia, first from supply chain shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic, then from [sanctions on Russian oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\nIn [June 2022](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-for-a-three-month-federal-gas-tax-holiday/), US President Joe Biden asked Congress to suspend the federal gas tax for 3 months, and announced increased releases of oil from the [strategic petroleum reserves](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_typ_d_nus_SAS_mbbl_m.htm). The US government has made [recent visits](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-venezuela-colombia-ec798d70f4e19e05c88e6ae2b43a19e9) to oil-rich Venezuela, despite still [officially recognizing](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/) Maduro's government as illegitimate.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the price of gas per gallon (in Jan 2022 USD) in the US on the respective dates according to the [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m). Gas prices will be EIA's Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported monthly in USD per gallon. For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to the January 2022 [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL).", "lower_25": "3.22", "median": "3.52", "upper_75": "3.97", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 41.5M philanthropic funding will go to nuclear issues in 2025?", "desc": "The field of nuclear security is experiencing a major shake-up. Last summer, the MacArthur Foundation announced that it was withdrawing, which some observers called [\"a big blow'](https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/19/washington-arms-controllers-nuclear-weapons-500126) and others said came at [\"the worst possible time\"](https://www.vox.com/2022/3/17/22976981/nuclear-war-russia-ukraine-funding-macarthur-existential-risk-effective-altruism-carnegie). \n\nWith some new organizations (like [Longview](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/M7wNHbpqnLfDzmDK9/new-nuclear-security-grantmaking-programme-at-longview)) stepping in, however, the actual level of funding shortfall, if any, is unclear. \n\nThis question is designed to provide guidance to potential philanthropists looking to assess the overall funding levels of nuclear security 3 years into future.", "resc": "This question will resolve based on data from the [Peace and Security Funding Index](https://maps.foundationcenter.org/#/map/?subjects=all&popgroups=all&years=all&location=6295630&excludeLocation=0&geoScale=ADM0&layer=recip&boundingBox=-139.219,-31.354,135,66.513&gmOrgs=all&recipOrgs=all&tags=all&keywords=&pathwaysOrg=&pathwaysType=&acct=psfg&typesOfSupport=all&transactionTypes=all&amtRanges=all&minGrantAmt=0&maxGrantAmt=0&gmTypes=all&minAssetsAmt=0&maxAssetsAmt=0&minGivingAmt=0&maxGivingAmt=0&andOr=0&includeGov=1&custom=all&customArea=all&indicator=&dataSource=oecd&chartType=trends&multiSubject=1&listType=gm&windRoseAnd=undefined&zoom=2), for the total amount of funding in 2025, filtered by Subject Area to \"Nuclear Issues.\" Government funding will be excluded", "lower_25": "6.82M", "median": "17.3M", "upper_75": "41.5M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US will be 3.52 on April 2024?", "desc": "The US has seen record high prices of gasoline in 2022, reaching $5.00 per gallon [in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GASREGW). However, when adjusting for inflation, June's gas prices are comparable to [previous spikes](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) in 1981, 2008, and 2011-2014. The US Energy Information Agency [predicts](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) inflation-adjusted retail gas prices to fall by 22% from June 2022 to June 2023.\n\n[Energy prices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021–2022_global_energy_crisis) have increased in Europe and Asia, first from supply chain shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic, then from [sanctions on Russian oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\nIn [June 2022](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-for-a-three-month-federal-gas-tax-holiday/), US President Joe Biden asked Congress to suspend the federal gas tax for 3 months, and announced increased releases of oil from the [strategic petroleum reserves](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_typ_d_nus_SAS_mbbl_m.htm). The US government has made [recent visits](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-venezuela-colombia-ec798d70f4e19e05c88e6ae2b43a19e9) to oil-rich Venezuela, despite still [officially recognizing](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/) Maduro's government as illegitimate.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the price of gas per gallon (in Jan 2022 USD) in the US on the respective dates according to the [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m). Gas prices will be EIA's Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported monthly in USD per gallon. For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to the January 2022 [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL).", "lower_25": "3.22", "median": "3.52", "upper_75": "3.97", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the state-of-the-art accuracy on the Massive Multitask dataset will be 97.37% on June 30, 2025?", "desc": "The Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU) dataset is a dataset of high school, college, and professional multiple choice exams that test expert subject knowledge. It was constructed by [Hendrycks et al. (2021)](https://github.com/hendrycks/test). Hypermind forecasters were commissioned to predict state-of-the-art performance on June 30, 2022, '23, '24, and '25. The 2022 result of 67.5% was significantly outside forecasters' prediction intervals, so we're seeing what the updated forecasts are for 2023, '24, and '25.", "resc": "These questions should resolve identically to the [Hypermind forecasts](https://prod.hypermind.com/ngdp/en/showcase2/showcase.html?sc=JSAI):\n\n\"These questions resolve as the highest performance achieved on MMLU by June 30 in the following years by an eligible model. Eligible models must not have been specifically trained on data from the MMLU dataset. A model need not be publicly released, as long as the resulting performance itself is reported in a published paper (on arxiv or a major ML conference) or through an official communication channel of an industry lab (e.g. claimed in a research blog post on the OpenAI blog, or a press release). If there's uncertainty about whether something counts, we will defer to [this leaderboard](https://github.com/hendrycks/test).", "lower_25": "92.37", "median": "94.94", "upper_75": "97.37", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US will be 5.16 on April 2026?", "desc": "The US has seen record high prices of gasoline in 2022, reaching $5.00 per gallon [in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GASREGW). However, when adjusting for inflation, June's gas prices are comparable to [previous spikes](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) in 1981, 2008, and 2011-2014. The US Energy Information Agency [predicts](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) inflation-adjusted retail gas prices to fall by 22% from June 2022 to June 2023.\n\n[Energy prices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021–2022_global_energy_crisis) have increased in Europe and Asia, first from supply chain shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic, then from [sanctions on Russian oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\nIn [June 2022](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-for-a-three-month-federal-gas-tax-holiday/), US President Joe Biden asked Congress to suspend the federal gas tax for 3 months, and announced increased releases of oil from the [strategic petroleum reserves](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_typ_d_nus_SAS_mbbl_m.htm). The US government has made [recent visits](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-venezuela-colombia-ec798d70f4e19e05c88e6ae2b43a19e9) to oil-rich Venezuela, despite still [officially recognizing](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/) Maduro's government as illegitimate.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the price of gas per gallon (in Jan 2022 USD) in the US on the respective dates according to the [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m). Gas prices will be EIA's Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported monthly in USD per gallon. For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to the January 2022 [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL).", "lower_25": "3.23", "median": "4.11", "upper_75": "5.16", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 41.5M philanthropic funding will go to nuclear issues in 2025?", "desc": "The field of nuclear security is experiencing a major shake-up. Last summer, the MacArthur Foundation announced that it was withdrawing, which some observers called [\"a big blow'](https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/19/washington-arms-controllers-nuclear-weapons-500126) and others said came at [\"the worst possible time\"](https://www.vox.com/2022/3/17/22976981/nuclear-war-russia-ukraine-funding-macarthur-existential-risk-effective-altruism-carnegie). \n\nWith some new organizations (like [Longview](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/M7wNHbpqnLfDzmDK9/new-nuclear-security-grantmaking-programme-at-longview)) stepping in, however, the actual level of funding shortfall, if any, is unclear. \n\nThis question is designed to provide guidance to potential philanthropists looking to assess the overall funding levels of nuclear security 3 years into future.", "resc": "This question will resolve based on data from the [Peace and Security Funding Index](https://maps.foundationcenter.org/#/map/?subjects=all&popgroups=all&years=all&location=6295630&excludeLocation=0&geoScale=ADM0&layer=recip&boundingBox=-139.219,-31.354,135,66.513&gmOrgs=all&recipOrgs=all&tags=all&keywords=&pathwaysOrg=&pathwaysType=&acct=psfg&typesOfSupport=all&transactionTypes=all&amtRanges=all&minGrantAmt=0&maxGrantAmt=0&gmTypes=all&minAssetsAmt=0&maxAssetsAmt=0&minGivingAmt=0&maxGivingAmt=0&andOr=0&includeGov=1&custom=all&customArea=all&indicator=&dataSource=oecd&chartType=trends&multiSubject=1&listType=gm&windRoseAnd=undefined&zoom=2), for the total amount of funding in 2025, filtered by Subject Area to \"Nuclear Issues.\" Government funding will be excluded", "lower_25": "6.82M", "median": "17.3M", "upper_75": "41.5M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US will be 3.52 on April 2024?", "desc": "The US has seen record high prices of gasoline in 2022, reaching $5.00 per gallon [in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GASREGW). However, when adjusting for inflation, June's gas prices are comparable to [previous spikes](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) in 1981, 2008, and 2011-2014. The US Energy Information Agency [predicts](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) inflation-adjusted retail gas prices to fall by 22% from June 2022 to June 2023.\n\n[Energy prices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021–2022_global_energy_crisis) have increased in Europe and Asia, first from supply chain shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic, then from [sanctions on Russian oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\nIn [June 2022](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-for-a-three-month-federal-gas-tax-holiday/), US President Joe Biden asked Congress to suspend the federal gas tax for 3 months, and announced increased releases of oil from the [strategic petroleum reserves](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_typ_d_nus_SAS_mbbl_m.htm). The US government has made [recent visits](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-venezuela-colombia-ec798d70f4e19e05c88e6ae2b43a19e9) to oil-rich Venezuela, despite still [officially recognizing](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/) Maduro's government as illegitimate.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the price of gas per gallon (in Jan 2022 USD) in the US on the respective dates according to the [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m). Gas prices will be EIA's Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported monthly in USD per gallon. For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to the January 2022 [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL).", "lower_25": "3.22", "median": "3.52", "upper_75": "3.97", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many confirmed children will Elon Musk have by end of 2025?\n\nKeyword: 13.0\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that Elon Musk will have 13.0 confirmed children by end of 2025?", "desc": "Elon Musk is unusual among the super billionaires in having a large number of children. On July 7, 2022 was reported that [Musk Tweets About Underpopulation After Report He Fathered Twins With Employee](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-07/musk-fathered-children-with-neuralink-employee-report-says#l5anxl8zacol0i55yap=):\n\n>Billionaire Elon Musk is the father of eight-month-old twins born to a senior executive at his artificial intelligence startup Neuralink, Insider reported, citing a court document.\n>Musk and the executive asked a Texas judge in April to change the children's names to reflect both their surnames, Insider said. The request was granted, according to the report.\n>The two babies would bring Musk's total known children to nine. He has advocated for increasing the population as part of his vision for colonizing other planets. In a series of tweets after the news was widely reported, Elon Musk asked tweeted several times about underpopulation and even asked whether Tesla should design a “highly configurable Robovan for people & cargo.” \n\nThus, his current total now stands at 9.", "resc": "- Reputable source of Elon Musk's current number of confirmed children. Ongoing pregnancies do not count. Unconfirmed children do not count", "lower_25": "11.1", "median": "12.0", "upper_75": "13.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 41.5M philanthropic funding will go to nuclear issues in 2025?", "desc": "The field of nuclear security is experiencing a major shake-up. Last summer, the MacArthur Foundation announced that it was withdrawing, which some observers called [\"a big blow'](https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/19/washington-arms-controllers-nuclear-weapons-500126) and others said came at [\"the worst possible time\"](https://www.vox.com/2022/3/17/22976981/nuclear-war-russia-ukraine-funding-macarthur-existential-risk-effective-altruism-carnegie). \n\nWith some new organizations (like [Longview](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/M7wNHbpqnLfDzmDK9/new-nuclear-security-grantmaking-programme-at-longview)) stepping in, however, the actual level of funding shortfall, if any, is unclear. \n\nThis question is designed to provide guidance to potential philanthropists looking to assess the overall funding levels of nuclear security 3 years into future.", "resc": "This question will resolve based on data from the [Peace and Security Funding Index](https://maps.foundationcenter.org/#/map/?subjects=all&popgroups=all&years=all&location=6295630&excludeLocation=0&geoScale=ADM0&layer=recip&boundingBox=-139.219,-31.354,135,66.513&gmOrgs=all&recipOrgs=all&tags=all&keywords=&pathwaysOrg=&pathwaysType=&acct=psfg&typesOfSupport=all&transactionTypes=all&amtRanges=all&minGrantAmt=0&maxGrantAmt=0&gmTypes=all&minAssetsAmt=0&maxAssetsAmt=0&minGivingAmt=0&maxGivingAmt=0&andOr=0&includeGov=1&custom=all&customArea=all&indicator=&dataSource=oecd&chartType=trends&multiSubject=1&listType=gm&windRoseAnd=undefined&zoom=2), for the total amount of funding in 2025, filtered by Subject Area to \"Nuclear Issues.\" Government funding will be excluded", "lower_25": "6.82M", "median": "17.3M", "upper_75": "41.5M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US will be 7.53 on April 2030?", "desc": "The US has seen record high prices of gasoline in 2022, reaching $5.00 per gallon [in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GASREGW). However, when adjusting for inflation, June's gas prices are comparable to [previous spikes](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) in 1981, 2008, and 2011-2014. The US Energy Information Agency [predicts](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) inflation-adjusted retail gas prices to fall by 22% from June 2022 to June 2023.\n\n[Energy prices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021–2022_global_energy_crisis) have increased in Europe and Asia, first from supply chain shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic, then from [sanctions on Russian oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\nIn [June 2022](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-for-a-three-month-federal-gas-tax-holiday/), US President Joe Biden asked Congress to suspend the federal gas tax for 3 months, and announced increased releases of oil from the [strategic petroleum reserves](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_typ_d_nus_SAS_mbbl_m.htm). The US government has made [recent visits](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-venezuela-colombia-ec798d70f4e19e05c88e6ae2b43a19e9) to oil-rich Venezuela, despite still [officially recognizing](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/) Maduro's government as illegitimate.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the price of gas per gallon (in Jan 2022 USD) in the US on the respective dates according to the [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m). Gas prices will be EIA's Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported monthly in USD per gallon. For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to the January 2022 [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL).", "lower_25": "3.50", "median": "5.16", "upper_75": "7.53", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US will be 5.16 on April 2026?", "desc": "The US has seen record high prices of gasoline in 2022, reaching $5.00 per gallon [in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GASREGW). However, when adjusting for inflation, June's gas prices are comparable to [previous spikes](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) in 1981, 2008, and 2011-2014. The US Energy Information Agency [predicts](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) inflation-adjusted retail gas prices to fall by 22% from June 2022 to June 2023.\n\n[Energy prices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021–2022_global_energy_crisis) have increased in Europe and Asia, first from supply chain shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic, then from [sanctions on Russian oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\nIn [June 2022](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-for-a-three-month-federal-gas-tax-holiday/), US President Joe Biden asked Congress to suspend the federal gas tax for 3 months, and announced increased releases of oil from the [strategic petroleum reserves](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_typ_d_nus_SAS_mbbl_m.htm). The US government has made [recent visits](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-venezuela-colombia-ec798d70f4e19e05c88e6ae2b43a19e9) to oil-rich Venezuela, despite still [officially recognizing](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/) Maduro's government as illegitimate.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the price of gas per gallon (in Jan 2022 USD) in the US on the respective dates according to the [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m). Gas prices will be EIA's Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported monthly in USD per gallon. For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to the January 2022 [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL).", "lower_25": "3.23", "median": "4.11", "upper_75": "5.16", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US will be 7.53 on April 2030?", "desc": "The US has seen record high prices of gasoline in 2022, reaching $5.00 per gallon [in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GASREGW). However, when adjusting for inflation, June's gas prices are comparable to [previous spikes](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) in 1981, 2008, and 2011-2014. The US Energy Information Agency [predicts](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) inflation-adjusted retail gas prices to fall by 22% from June 2022 to June 2023.\n\n[Energy prices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021–2022_global_energy_crisis) have increased in Europe and Asia, first from supply chain shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic, then from [sanctions on Russian oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\nIn [June 2022](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-for-a-three-month-federal-gas-tax-holiday/), US President Joe Biden asked Congress to suspend the federal gas tax for 3 months, and announced increased releases of oil from the [strategic petroleum reserves](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_typ_d_nus_SAS_mbbl_m.htm). The US government has made [recent visits](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-venezuela-colombia-ec798d70f4e19e05c88e6ae2b43a19e9) to oil-rich Venezuela, despite still [officially recognizing](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/) Maduro's government as illegitimate.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the price of gas per gallon (in Jan 2022 USD) in the US on the respective dates according to the [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m). Gas prices will be EIA's Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported monthly in USD per gallon. For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to the January 2022 [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL).", "lower_25": "3.50", "median": "5.16", "upper_75": "7.53", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will first be revealed to be superhuman at the board game Diplomacy by Apr 2026?", "desc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy_(game)),\n\n> Diplomacy is an American strategic board game created by Allan B. Calhamer in 1954 and released commercially in the United States in 1959. Its main distinctions from most board wargames are its negotiation phases (players spend much of their time forming and betraying alliances with other players and forming beneficial strategies) and the absence of dice and other game elements that produce random effects.\n\nFrom [IEEE Spectrum](https://spectrum.ieee.org/ai-learns-diplomacy-gaming),\n\n> Now that DeepMind has taught AI to master the game of Go—and furthered its advantage in chess—they've turned their attention to another board game: Diplomacy. Unlike Go, it is seven-player, it requires a combination of competition and cooperation, and on each turn players make moves simultaneously, so they must reason about what others are reasoning about them, and so on.\n\n> “It's a qualitatively different problem from something like Go or chess,” says Andrea Tacchetti, a computer scientist at DeepMind. In December, Tacchetti and collaborators presented a paper at the NeurIPS conference on their system, which advances the state of the art, and may point the way toward AI systems with real-world diplomatic skills—in negotiating with strategic or commercial partners or simply scheduling your next team meeting.", "resc": "This question will resolve positively on the first date during which a credible public document reveals that a computer program has obtained superhuman performance at the board game Diplomacy, according to the then-current standard official rules (with no modifications, including any official suggestions), and with no handicaps or limitations that are not ordinarily present in tournaments. For the purpose of this question, a demonstration of superhuman performance will require at least one of the following conditions to be met,\n\n1. The AI has won a first-place spot on a well-known _international_ Diplomacy tournament. Eligible tournaments currently include WorldDipCon, and the Online Diplomacy Championship.\n\n2. Some highly-regarded ranking of Diplomacy players ranks the AI higher than any human player.\n\n3. A statement by a group of highly credible researchers indicates that they have obtained superhuman performance on Diplomacy to a very high degree of confidence", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Apr 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will first be revealed to be superhuman at the board game Diplomacy by Apr 2026?", "desc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy_(game)),\n\n> Diplomacy is an American strategic board game created by Allan B. Calhamer in 1954 and released commercially in the United States in 1959. Its main distinctions from most board wargames are its negotiation phases (players spend much of their time forming and betraying alliances with other players and forming beneficial strategies) and the absence of dice and other game elements that produce random effects.\n\nFrom [IEEE Spectrum](https://spectrum.ieee.org/ai-learns-diplomacy-gaming),\n\n> Now that DeepMind has taught AI to master the game of Go—and furthered its advantage in chess—they've turned their attention to another board game: Diplomacy. Unlike Go, it is seven-player, it requires a combination of competition and cooperation, and on each turn players make moves simultaneously, so they must reason about what others are reasoning about them, and so on.\n\n> “It's a qualitatively different problem from something like Go or chess,” says Andrea Tacchetti, a computer scientist at DeepMind. In December, Tacchetti and collaborators presented a paper at the NeurIPS conference on their system, which advances the state of the art, and may point the way toward AI systems with real-world diplomatic skills—in negotiating with strategic or commercial partners or simply scheduling your next team meeting.", "resc": "This question will resolve positively on the first date during which a credible public document reveals that a computer program has obtained superhuman performance at the board game Diplomacy, according to the then-current standard official rules (with no modifications, including any official suggestions), and with no handicaps or limitations that are not ordinarily present in tournaments. For the purpose of this question, a demonstration of superhuman performance will require at least one of the following conditions to be met,\n\n1. The AI has won a first-place spot on a well-known _international_ Diplomacy tournament. Eligible tournaments currently include WorldDipCon, and the Online Diplomacy Championship.\n\n2. Some highly-regarded ranking of Diplomacy players ranks the AI higher than any human player.\n\n3. A statement by a group of highly credible researchers indicates that they have obtained superhuman performance on Diplomacy to a very high degree of confidence", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Apr 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US will be 7.53 on April 2030?", "desc": "The US has seen record high prices of gasoline in 2022, reaching $5.00 per gallon [in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GASREGW). However, when adjusting for inflation, June's gas prices are comparable to [previous spikes](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) in 1981, 2008, and 2011-2014. The US Energy Information Agency [predicts](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) inflation-adjusted retail gas prices to fall by 22% from June 2022 to June 2023.\n\n[Energy prices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021–2022_global_energy_crisis) have increased in Europe and Asia, first from supply chain shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic, then from [sanctions on Russian oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\nIn [June 2022](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-for-a-three-month-federal-gas-tax-holiday/), US President Joe Biden asked Congress to suspend the federal gas tax for 3 months, and announced increased releases of oil from the [strategic petroleum reserves](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_typ_d_nus_SAS_mbbl_m.htm). The US government has made [recent visits](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-venezuela-colombia-ec798d70f4e19e05c88e6ae2b43a19e9) to oil-rich Venezuela, despite still [officially recognizing](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/) Maduro's government as illegitimate.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the price of gas per gallon (in Jan 2022 USD) in the US on the respective dates according to the [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m). Gas prices will be EIA's Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported monthly in USD per gallon. For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to the January 2022 [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL).", "lower_25": "3.50", "median": "5.16", "upper_75": "7.53", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will first be revealed to be superhuman at the board game Diplomacy by Apr 2026?", "desc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy_(game)),\n\n> Diplomacy is an American strategic board game created by Allan B. Calhamer in 1954 and released commercially in the United States in 1959. Its main distinctions from most board wargames are its negotiation phases (players spend much of their time forming and betraying alliances with other players and forming beneficial strategies) and the absence of dice and other game elements that produce random effects.\n\nFrom [IEEE Spectrum](https://spectrum.ieee.org/ai-learns-diplomacy-gaming),\n\n> Now that DeepMind has taught AI to master the game of Go—and furthered its advantage in chess—they've turned their attention to another board game: Diplomacy. Unlike Go, it is seven-player, it requires a combination of competition and cooperation, and on each turn players make moves simultaneously, so they must reason about what others are reasoning about them, and so on.\n\n> “It's a qualitatively different problem from something like Go or chess,” says Andrea Tacchetti, a computer scientist at DeepMind. In December, Tacchetti and collaborators presented a paper at the NeurIPS conference on their system, which advances the state of the art, and may point the way toward AI systems with real-world diplomatic skills—in negotiating with strategic or commercial partners or simply scheduling your next team meeting.", "resc": "This question will resolve positively on the first date during which a credible public document reveals that a computer program has obtained superhuman performance at the board game Diplomacy, according to the then-current standard official rules (with no modifications, including any official suggestions), and with no handicaps or limitations that are not ordinarily present in tournaments. For the purpose of this question, a demonstration of superhuman performance will require at least one of the following conditions to be met,\n\n1. The AI has won a first-place spot on a well-known _international_ Diplomacy tournament. Eligible tournaments currently include WorldDipCon, and the Online Diplomacy Championship.\n\n2. Some highly-regarded ranking of Diplomacy players ranks the AI higher than any human player.\n\n3. A statement by a group of highly credible researchers indicates that they have obtained superhuman performance on Diplomacy to a very high degree of confidence", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Apr 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many confirmed children will Elon Musk have by end of 2025?\n\nKeyword: 13.0\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that Elon Musk will have 13.0 confirmed children by end of 2025?", "desc": "Elon Musk is unusual among the super billionaires in having a large number of children. On July 7, 2022 was reported that [Musk Tweets About Underpopulation After Report He Fathered Twins With Employee](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-07/musk-fathered-children-with-neuralink-employee-report-says#l5anxl8zacol0i55yap=):\n\n>Billionaire Elon Musk is the father of eight-month-old twins born to a senior executive at his artificial intelligence startup Neuralink, Insider reported, citing a court document.\n>Musk and the executive asked a Texas judge in April to change the children's names to reflect both their surnames, Insider said. The request was granted, according to the report.\n>The two babies would bring Musk's total known children to nine. He has advocated for increasing the population as part of his vision for colonizing other planets. In a series of tweets after the news was widely reported, Elon Musk asked tweeted several times about underpopulation and even asked whether Tesla should design a “highly configurable Robovan for people & cargo.” \n\nThus, his current total now stands at 9.", "resc": "- Reputable source of Elon Musk's current number of confirmed children. Ongoing pregnancies do not count. Unconfirmed children do not count", "lower_25": "11.1", "median": "12.0", "upper_75": "13.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will cost 0.638 dollars per month to store 1 TB on S3 Glacier Deep Archive in 2030?", "desc": "Amazon S3 Glacier is a data storage medium that allows consumers to store large amounts of data cheaply on the cloud. From Amazon's page about [S3 Glacier](https://aws.amazon.com/s3/storage-classes/glacier/),\n\n> The Amazon S3 Glacier storage classes are purpose-built for data archiving, providing you with the highest performance, most retrieval flexibility, and the lowest cost archive storage in the cloud. All S3 Glacier storage classes provide virtually unlimited scalability and are designed for 99.999999999% (11 nines) of data durability. The S3 Glacier storage classes deliver options for the fastest access to your archive data and the lowest-cost archive storage in the cloud.\n\nTheir current cheapest option is S3 Glacier Deep Archive, which is for \"For long-term data archiving that is accessed once or twice in a year and can be restored within 12 hours\". It currently [costs](https://aws.amazon.com/s3/pricing/?nc=sn&loc=4) $0.99 per month to store 1 TB on S3 Glacier Deep Archive.\n\nSee also [this question about storing 1 TB on Google Archive on January 1st 2025](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7199/cost-to-store-1-tb-on-google-archive-2025/).", "resc": "This question resolves on the value, in US dollars per month, that it costs to store 1 terabyte of data on Amazon S3 Glacier Deep Archive on January 1st 2030. If multiple prices are available (for example, because you can choose different locations to store your data), then the lowest price option will be selected.\n\nIf S3 Glacier Deep Archive is discontinued by January 1st 2030, then this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "0.638", "median": "0.738", "upper_75": "0.861", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will cost 0.638 dollars per month to store 1 TB on S3 Glacier Deep Archive in 2030?", "desc": "Amazon S3 Glacier is a data storage medium that allows consumers to store large amounts of data cheaply on the cloud. From Amazon's page about [S3 Glacier](https://aws.amazon.com/s3/storage-classes/glacier/),\n\n> The Amazon S3 Glacier storage classes are purpose-built for data archiving, providing you with the highest performance, most retrieval flexibility, and the lowest cost archive storage in the cloud. All S3 Glacier storage classes provide virtually unlimited scalability and are designed for 99.999999999% (11 nines) of data durability. The S3 Glacier storage classes deliver options for the fastest access to your archive data and the lowest-cost archive storage in the cloud.\n\nTheir current cheapest option is S3 Glacier Deep Archive, which is for \"For long-term data archiving that is accessed once or twice in a year and can be restored within 12 hours\". It currently [costs](https://aws.amazon.com/s3/pricing/?nc=sn&loc=4) $0.99 per month to store 1 TB on S3 Glacier Deep Archive.\n\nSee also [this question about storing 1 TB on Google Archive on January 1st 2025](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7199/cost-to-store-1-tb-on-google-archive-2025/).", "resc": "This question resolves on the value, in US dollars per month, that it costs to store 1 terabyte of data on Amazon S3 Glacier Deep Archive on January 1st 2030. If multiple prices are available (for example, because you can choose different locations to store your data), then the lowest price option will be selected.\n\nIf S3 Glacier Deep Archive is discontinued by January 1st 2030, then this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "0.638", "median": "0.738", "upper_75": "0.861", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will first pass a long, informed, adversarial Turing test by 2025?", "desc": "The Turing test [is](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test),\n\n> a test of a machine's ability to exhibit intelligent behavior equivalent to, or indistinguishable from, that of a human. Turing proposed that a human evaluator would judge natural language conversations between a human and a machine designed to generate human-like responses. The evaluator would be aware that one of the two partners in conversation was a machine, and all participants would be separated from one another. \n\n[Alan Turing's original paper](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/LIX/236/433/986238) was, unfortunately, quite vague about the setup of the test. Since he devised the imitation game, a number real-life Turing tests have been conducted under various conditions. One such example is the now-defunct [Loebner Prize](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loebner_Prize), which used to hold a yearly competition.", "resc": "This question refers to a high quality subset of possible Turing tests that will, in theory, be extremely difficult for any AI to pass if the AI does not possess extensive knowledge of the world, mastery of natural language, common sense, a high level of skill at deception, and the ability to reason at least as well as humans do. Thus, Metaculus adminstrators should be careful not to resolve this question on the first date during which _any_ Turing test, no matter the quality, has been passed.\n\nThe following definitions are provided:\n\n* A Turing test is any trial during which an AI system is instructed to pretend to be a human participant while communicating with judges who are instructed to discriminate between the AI and human confederates in the trial. This trial may take any format, and may involve communication across a wide variety of media. However, it is essential that communication through natural language is permitted during the trial.\n\n* A Turing test is said to be \"long\" if the AI communicates with judges for a period of at least two consecutive hours.\n\n* A Turing test is said to be an \"informed\" test if all of the human judges possess a PhD-level understanding of contemporary AI, and the ways in which contemporary AI systems fail, _and_ each of the human confederates possesses a PhD-level understanding of at least one STEM field. Human judges and confederates without a relevant PhD are still eligible provided that Metaculus admins believe, in their sole discretion, that their expertise meets the threshold stated here, which can be determined by polling credible observers who know the participants.\n\n* A Turing test is said to be \"adversarial\" if the human judges make a good-faith attempt, in the best of their abilities, to successfully unmask the AI as an impostor among the participants, _and_ the human confederates make a good-faith attempt, in the best of their abilities, to demonstrate that they are humans. In other words, all of the human participants should be trying to ensure that the AI does not pass the test.\n\n* An AI is said to \"pass\" a Turing test if at least one half of judges rated the AI as more human than at least one third of the human confederates. This condition could be met in many different ways, so long as the final determination of the judges explicitly or implicitly yields a rating for how \"human\" the AI acted during the trial. Explicit final ratings will be used for resolution, if available, even if implicit ratings exist and contradict the explicit final rating. In case there is no explicit final rating, and the implicit ratings contradict each other, the Turing test will be ineligible for resolution, as there is no unambiguous way of triggering resolution. Each participant's rating will be taken to be the median of the judges' ratings for that participant, not mean. See the fine print for a sketched list of possible Turing test outcomes, and whether they would qualify the AI to \"pass\" under these criteria. All remaining ambiguities will be resolved by a consensus among Metaculus admins, in consultation with the community.\n\nThis question will resolve as the first date of publication of a credible document stating that a long, informed, adversarial Turing test was passed by some AI, so long as the test was well-designed and satisfied the criteria written here, according to the best judgement of Metaculus admins. Metaculus admins will also attempt to exclude tests that included cheating, conflicts of interest, or rogue participants who didn't follow the rules. All human judges and confederates should understand that their role is strictly to ensure the loss of the AI, and they collectively \"fail\" if the AI \"passes\".", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will first pass a long, informed, adversarial Turing test by 2025?", "desc": "The Turing test [is](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test),\n\n> a test of a machine's ability to exhibit intelligent behavior equivalent to, or indistinguishable from, that of a human. Turing proposed that a human evaluator would judge natural language conversations between a human and a machine designed to generate human-like responses. The evaluator would be aware that one of the two partners in conversation was a machine, and all participants would be separated from one another. \n\n[Alan Turing's original paper](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/LIX/236/433/986238) was, unfortunately, quite vague about the setup of the test. Since he devised the imitation game, a number real-life Turing tests have been conducted under various conditions. One such example is the now-defunct [Loebner Prize](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loebner_Prize), which used to hold a yearly competition.", "resc": "This question refers to a high quality subset of possible Turing tests that will, in theory, be extremely difficult for any AI to pass if the AI does not possess extensive knowledge of the world, mastery of natural language, common sense, a high level of skill at deception, and the ability to reason at least as well as humans do. Thus, Metaculus adminstrators should be careful not to resolve this question on the first date during which _any_ Turing test, no matter the quality, has been passed.\n\nThe following definitions are provided:\n\n* A Turing test is any trial during which an AI system is instructed to pretend to be a human participant while communicating with judges who are instructed to discriminate between the AI and human confederates in the trial. This trial may take any format, and may involve communication across a wide variety of media. However, it is essential that communication through natural language is permitted during the trial.\n\n* A Turing test is said to be \"long\" if the AI communicates with judges for a period of at least two consecutive hours.\n\n* A Turing test is said to be an \"informed\" test if all of the human judges possess a PhD-level understanding of contemporary AI, and the ways in which contemporary AI systems fail, _and_ each of the human confederates possesses a PhD-level understanding of at least one STEM field. Human judges and confederates without a relevant PhD are still eligible provided that Metaculus admins believe, in their sole discretion, that their expertise meets the threshold stated here, which can be determined by polling credible observers who know the participants.\n\n* A Turing test is said to be \"adversarial\" if the human judges make a good-faith attempt, in the best of their abilities, to successfully unmask the AI as an impostor among the participants, _and_ the human confederates make a good-faith attempt, in the best of their abilities, to demonstrate that they are humans. In other words, all of the human participants should be trying to ensure that the AI does not pass the test.\n\n* An AI is said to \"pass\" a Turing test if at least one half of judges rated the AI as more human than at least one third of the human confederates. This condition could be met in many different ways, so long as the final determination of the judges explicitly or implicitly yields a rating for how \"human\" the AI acted during the trial. Explicit final ratings will be used for resolution, if available, even if implicit ratings exist and contradict the explicit final rating. In case there is no explicit final rating, and the implicit ratings contradict each other, the Turing test will be ineligible for resolution, as there is no unambiguous way of triggering resolution. Each participant's rating will be taken to be the median of the judges' ratings for that participant, not mean. See the fine print for a sketched list of possible Turing test outcomes, and whether they would qualify the AI to \"pass\" under these criteria. All remaining ambiguities will be resolved by a consensus among Metaculus admins, in consultation with the community.\n\nThis question will resolve as the first date of publication of a credible document stating that a long, informed, adversarial Turing test was passed by some AI, so long as the test was well-designed and satisfied the criteria written here, according to the best judgement of Metaculus admins. Metaculus admins will also attempt to exclude tests that included cheating, conflicts of interest, or rogue participants who didn't follow the rules. All human judges and confederates should understand that their role is strictly to ensure the loss of the AI, and they collectively \"fail\" if the AI \"passes\".", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 26.20% of Congresspeople will be endorsed by the Democratic Socialists of America on January 4th, 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Democratic Socialists of America](https://www.dsausa.org/) is the largest socialist organization in the United States, with over 92,000 members and chapters in all 50 states.\n\nAs of July 2022 there are four Congresspeople in the House currently [endorsed by the organization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Democratic_Socialists_of_America_members_who_have_held_office_in_the_United_States): Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Rashida Tlaib, Cori Bush and Jamaal Bowman.\n\nJanuary 3, 2031 is expected to be the first day of the [122nd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_Congresses) Congress of the United States.\n\n***How many Congresspeople in the U.S. House of Representatives will be endorsed by the Democratic Socialists of America on January 4th, 2031?***\n\nCount the number of Congresspeople in the United States House of Representatives that are publicly endorsed by the organization on January 4th, 2031.\n\n[fine-print]\nThe congresspeople have to be actively endorsed by the organization to count. For example Danny K. Davis would not count as a current member, as the DSA have [endorsed his primary challenger](https://inthesetimes.com/article/congress-election-danny-davis-anthony-clark-cdsa).\n\nIf the DSA splits into multiple groups , merges with another organization or changes its name, the organization that retains at least 50% of the membership will count as it's legitimate successor for the purposes of this question. If the organization disbands or none of the subgroups meets that criteria the question will resolve as ambiguous.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "4.99", "median": "12.80", "upper_75": "26.20", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will first pass a long, informed, adversarial Turing test by 2025?", "desc": "The Turing test [is](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test),\n\n> a test of a machine's ability to exhibit intelligent behavior equivalent to, or indistinguishable from, that of a human. Turing proposed that a human evaluator would judge natural language conversations between a human and a machine designed to generate human-like responses. The evaluator would be aware that one of the two partners in conversation was a machine, and all participants would be separated from one another. \n\n[Alan Turing's original paper](https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/LIX/236/433/986238) was, unfortunately, quite vague about the setup of the test. Since he devised the imitation game, a number real-life Turing tests have been conducted under various conditions. One such example is the now-defunct [Loebner Prize](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loebner_Prize), which used to hold a yearly competition.", "resc": "This question refers to a high quality subset of possible Turing tests that will, in theory, be extremely difficult for any AI to pass if the AI does not possess extensive knowledge of the world, mastery of natural language, common sense, a high level of skill at deception, and the ability to reason at least as well as humans do. Thus, Metaculus adminstrators should be careful not to resolve this question on the first date during which _any_ Turing test, no matter the quality, has been passed.\n\nThe following definitions are provided:\n\n* A Turing test is any trial during which an AI system is instructed to pretend to be a human participant while communicating with judges who are instructed to discriminate between the AI and human confederates in the trial. This trial may take any format, and may involve communication across a wide variety of media. However, it is essential that communication through natural language is permitted during the trial.\n\n* A Turing test is said to be \"long\" if the AI communicates with judges for a period of at least two consecutive hours.\n\n* A Turing test is said to be an \"informed\" test if all of the human judges possess a PhD-level understanding of contemporary AI, and the ways in which contemporary AI systems fail, _and_ each of the human confederates possesses a PhD-level understanding of at least one STEM field. Human judges and confederates without a relevant PhD are still eligible provided that Metaculus admins believe, in their sole discretion, that their expertise meets the threshold stated here, which can be determined by polling credible observers who know the participants.\n\n* A Turing test is said to be \"adversarial\" if the human judges make a good-faith attempt, in the best of their abilities, to successfully unmask the AI as an impostor among the participants, _and_ the human confederates make a good-faith attempt, in the best of their abilities, to demonstrate that they are humans. In other words, all of the human participants should be trying to ensure that the AI does not pass the test.\n\n* An AI is said to \"pass\" a Turing test if at least one half of judges rated the AI as more human than at least one third of the human confederates. This condition could be met in many different ways, so long as the final determination of the judges explicitly or implicitly yields a rating for how \"human\" the AI acted during the trial. Explicit final ratings will be used for resolution, if available, even if implicit ratings exist and contradict the explicit final rating. In case there is no explicit final rating, and the implicit ratings contradict each other, the Turing test will be ineligible for resolution, as there is no unambiguous way of triggering resolution. Each participant's rating will be taken to be the median of the judges' ratings for that participant, not mean. See the fine print for a sketched list of possible Turing test outcomes, and whether they would qualify the AI to \"pass\" under these criteria. All remaining ambiguities will be resolved by a consensus among Metaculus admins, in consultation with the community.\n\nThis question will resolve as the first date of publication of a credible document stating that a long, informed, adversarial Turing test was passed by some AI, so long as the test was well-designed and satisfied the criteria written here, according to the best judgement of Metaculus admins. Metaculus admins will also attempt to exclude tests that included cheating, conflicts of interest, or rogue participants who didn't follow the rules. All human judges and confederates should understand that their role is strictly to ensure the loss of the AI, and they collectively \"fail\" if the AI \"passes\".", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2028", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that half of world leaders will be women by 2059?", "desc": "From zero in 1978, [the number of women in the position of leader of their country has gone up significantly](https://www.statista.com/statistics/1058345/countries-with-women-highest-position-executive-power-since-1960/). It is still far, though, from being close to their male counterparts among United Nations member states, with a record of 18 in 2019.\n\nThe World Population Review [tracks in real time](https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-with-female-leaders) the number of female leaders, although it is not limited to UN members.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the first day when for a whole week half the members of the United Nations will have a female leader.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the position of \"leader\" refers to a country's de facto highest position of executive power - this may include [heads of state, of government, or of both](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_current_heads_of_state_and_government).\n\nThis forecast will resolve ambiguously if the United Nations have less than 100 members for more than 100 days. If the United Nations organisation is dissolved, the forecast will resolve ambiguously unless a clear successor is created within 6 months", "lower_25": "2059", "median": "2079", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that it will cost 0.638 dollars per month to store 1 TB on S3 Glacier Deep Archive in 2030?", "desc": "Amazon S3 Glacier is a data storage medium that allows consumers to store large amounts of data cheaply on the cloud. From Amazon's page about [S3 Glacier](https://aws.amazon.com/s3/storage-classes/glacier/),\n\n> The Amazon S3 Glacier storage classes are purpose-built for data archiving, providing you with the highest performance, most retrieval flexibility, and the lowest cost archive storage in the cloud. All S3 Glacier storage classes provide virtually unlimited scalability and are designed for 99.999999999% (11 nines) of data durability. The S3 Glacier storage classes deliver options for the fastest access to your archive data and the lowest-cost archive storage in the cloud.\n\nTheir current cheapest option is S3 Glacier Deep Archive, which is for \"For long-term data archiving that is accessed once or twice in a year and can be restored within 12 hours\". It currently [costs](https://aws.amazon.com/s3/pricing/?nc=sn&loc=4) $0.99 per month to store 1 TB on S3 Glacier Deep Archive.\n\nSee also [this question about storing 1 TB on Google Archive on January 1st 2025](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7199/cost-to-store-1-tb-on-google-archive-2025/).", "resc": "This question resolves on the value, in US dollars per month, that it costs to store 1 terabyte of data on Amazon S3 Glacier Deep Archive on January 1st 2030. If multiple prices are available (for example, because you can choose different locations to store your data), then the lowest price option will be selected.\n\nIf S3 Glacier Deep Archive is discontinued by January 1st 2030, then this question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "0.638", "median": "0.738", "upper_75": "0.861", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.29 in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "The Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.49 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 5.05 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.\n\n", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total population on Earth for the respective years, according to the [UN Population Division](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) or other branch of the UN/WHO.\n\nIf no such estimate by the UN is available, Metaculus may select an alternate credible source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "2.04", "median": "2.17", "upper_75": "2.29", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that half of world leaders will be women by 2059?", "desc": "From zero in 1978, [the number of women in the position of leader of their country has gone up significantly](https://www.statista.com/statistics/1058345/countries-with-women-highest-position-executive-power-since-1960/). It is still far, though, from being close to their male counterparts among United Nations member states, with a record of 18 in 2019.\n\nThe World Population Review [tracks in real time](https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-with-female-leaders) the number of female leaders, although it is not limited to UN members.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the first day when for a whole week half the members of the United Nations will have a female leader.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the position of \"leader\" refers to a country's de facto highest position of executive power - this may include [heads of state, of government, or of both](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_current_heads_of_state_and_government).\n\nThis forecast will resolve ambiguously if the United Nations have less than 100 members for more than 100 days. If the United Nations organisation is dissolved, the forecast will resolve ambiguously unless a clear successor is created within 6 months", "lower_25": "2059", "median": "2079", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 26.20% of Congresspeople will be endorsed by the Democratic Socialists of America on January 4th, 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Democratic Socialists of America](https://www.dsausa.org/) is the largest socialist organization in the United States, with over 92,000 members and chapters in all 50 states.\n\nAs of July 2022 there are four Congresspeople in the House currently [endorsed by the organization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Democratic_Socialists_of_America_members_who_have_held_office_in_the_United_States): Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Rashida Tlaib, Cori Bush and Jamaal Bowman.\n\nJanuary 3, 2031 is expected to be the first day of the [122nd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_Congresses) Congress of the United States.\n\n***How many Congresspeople in the U.S. House of Representatives will be endorsed by the Democratic Socialists of America on January 4th, 2031?***\n\nCount the number of Congresspeople in the United States House of Representatives that are publicly endorsed by the organization on January 4th, 2031.\n\n[fine-print]\nThe congresspeople have to be actively endorsed by the organization to count. For example Danny K. Davis would not count as a current member, as the DSA have [endorsed his primary challenger](https://inthesetimes.com/article/congress-election-danny-davis-anthony-clark-cdsa).\n\nIf the DSA splits into multiple groups , merges with another organization or changes its name, the organization that retains at least 50% of the membership will count as it's legitimate successor for the purposes of this question. If the organization disbands or none of the subgroups meets that criteria the question will resolve as ambiguous.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "4.99", "median": "12.80", "upper_75": "26.20", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.17 in the following years?", "desc": "The Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.49 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 5.05 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.\n\n", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total population on Earth for the respective years, according to the [UN Population Division](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) or other branch of the UN/WHO.\n\nIf no such estimate by the UN is available, Metaculus may select an alternate credible source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "2.04", "median": "2.17", "upper_75": "2.29", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.17 in the following years?", "desc": "The Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.49 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 5.05 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.\n\n", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total population on Earth for the respective years, according to the [UN Population Division](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) or other branch of the UN/WHO.\n\nIf no such estimate by the UN is available, Metaculus may select an alternate credible source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "2.04", "median": "2.17", "upper_75": "2.29", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that half of world leaders will be women by 2059?", "desc": "From zero in 1978, [the number of women in the position of leader of their country has gone up significantly](https://www.statista.com/statistics/1058345/countries-with-women-highest-position-executive-power-since-1960/). It is still far, though, from being close to their male counterparts among United Nations member states, with a record of 18 in 2019.\n\nThe World Population Review [tracks in real time](https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-with-female-leaders) the number of female leaders, although it is not limited to UN members.", "resc": "This question will resolve to the first day when for a whole week half the members of the United Nations will have a female leader.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the position of \"leader\" refers to a country's de facto highest position of executive power - this may include [heads of state, of government, or of both](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_current_heads_of_state_and_government).\n\nThis forecast will resolve ambiguously if the United Nations have less than 100 members for more than 100 days. If the United Nations organisation is dissolved, the forecast will resolve ambiguously unless a clear successor is created within 6 months", "lower_25": "2059", "median": "2079", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.17 in the following years?", "desc": "The Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.49 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 5.05 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.\n\n", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total population on Earth for the respective years, according to the [UN Population Division](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) or other branch of the UN/WHO.\n\nIf no such estimate by the UN is available, Metaculus may select an alternate credible source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "2.04", "median": "2.17", "upper_75": "2.29", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.25 by the year 2030?", "desc": "The Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.49 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 5.05 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.\n\n", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total population on Earth for the respective years, according to the [UN Population Division](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) or other branch of the UN/WHO.\n\nIf no such estimate by the UN is available, Metaculus may select an alternate credible source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "1.89", "median": "2.07", "upper_75": "2.25", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.29 in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "The Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.49 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 5.05 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.\n\n", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total population on Earth for the respective years, according to the [UN Population Division](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) or other branch of the UN/WHO.\n\nIf no such estimate by the UN is available, Metaculus may select an alternate credible source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "2.04", "median": "2.17", "upper_75": "2.29", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.25 by the year 2030?", "desc": "The Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.49 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 5.05 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.\n\n", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total population on Earth for the respective years, according to the [UN Population Division](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) or other branch of the UN/WHO.\n\nIf no such estimate by the UN is available, Metaculus may select an alternate credible source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "1.89", "median": "2.07", "upper_75": "2.25", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.25 by the year 2030?", "desc": "The Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.49 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 5.05 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.\n\n", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total population on Earth for the respective years, according to the [UN Population Division](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) or other branch of the UN/WHO.\n\nIf no such estimate by the UN is available, Metaculus may select an alternate credible source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "1.89", "median": "2.07", "upper_75": "2.25", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.29 in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "The Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.49 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 5.05 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.\n\n", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total population on Earth for the respective years, according to the [UN Population Division](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) or other branch of the UN/WHO.\n\nIf no such estimate by the UN is available, Metaculus may select an alternate credible source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "2.04", "median": "2.17", "upper_75": "2.29", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.24 by the year 2075?", "desc": "The Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.49 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 5.05 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.\n\n", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total population on Earth for the respective years, according to the [UN Population Division](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) or other branch of the UN/WHO.\n\nIf no such estimate by the UN is available, Metaculus may select an alternate credible source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "1.50", "median": "1.86", "upper_75": "2.24", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.24 by the year 2075?", "desc": "The Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.49 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 5.05 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.\n\n", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total population on Earth for the respective years, according to the [UN Population Division](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) or other branch of the UN/WHO.\n\nIf no such estimate by the UN is available, Metaculus may select an alternate credible source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "1.50", "median": "1.86", "upper_75": "2.24", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 1.35 in the year 2100?", "desc": "The Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.49 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 5.05 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.\n\n", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total population on Earth for the respective years, according to the [UN Population Division](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) or other branch of the UN/WHO.\n\nIf no such estimate by the UN is available, Metaculus may select an alternate credible source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "1.35", "median": "1.79", "upper_75": "2.19", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.24 by the year 2075?", "desc": "The Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.49 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 5.05 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.\n\n", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total population on Earth for the respective years, according to the [UN Population Division](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) or other branch of the UN/WHO.\n\nIf no such estimate by the UN is available, Metaculus may select an alternate credible source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "1.50", "median": "1.86", "upper_75": "2.24", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 1.35 in the year 2100?", "desc": "The Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.49 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 5.05 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.\n\n", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total population on Earth for the respective years, according to the [UN Population Division](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) or other branch of the UN/WHO.\n\nIf no such estimate by the UN is available, Metaculus may select an alternate credible source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "1.35", "median": "1.79", "upper_75": "2.19", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 8.137 billion in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the world population on December 31, 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/587/world-population-in-2050/) *[closed]*\n\n* [What will be the peak human population before 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8107/peak-human-population-by-2100/)\n\n* [What will be the global total fertility rate in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11894/global-fertility-rates/)\n\n----\n\nThe [United Nations Population Division](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&hideControls=true&Metric=Population+growth+rate&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL) has found the world population to be growing at a decreasing rate. From a peak growth rate of 2.27% in 1963, world population growth declined to 0.82% in 2022.\n\nIn the UN Population Division's [2022 report](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf), they made these long-term forecasts:\n\n>Long-range population projections are highly uncertain, especially for high-fertility countries still in the early stages of the demographic transition. As mentioned in Part I, **there is a probability of 95 per cent** that the size of the global population will lie **between 9.4 and 10.0 billion in 2050** and **between 8.9 and 12.4 billion in 2100** (box III.1). Thus, the size of the world's population is almost certain to rise over the next several decades, as is the degree of uncertainty associated with these projections. Later in the century, there is about 50 per cent chance that the world's population will peak—that its size will stabilize or begin to decrease—before 2100.\n\n*(emphasis mine)*", "resc": "The questions below will resolve as the total human population on Earth on the following years, according to the [UN population division](https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population-dashboard). The resolution value will be the most recently updated estimate as of January 1 of the respective year.\n\nData will come from the primary United Nations agency responsible for producing world population statistics. If such an agency does not exist or have current data available, Metaculus may select a credible alternative source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "8.137B", "median": "8.185B", "upper_75": "8.235B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 8.137 billion in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the world population on December 31, 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/587/world-population-in-2050/) *[closed]*\n\n* [What will be the peak human population before 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8107/peak-human-population-by-2100/)\n\n* [What will be the global total fertility rate in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11894/global-fertility-rates/)\n\n----\n\nThe [United Nations Population Division](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&hideControls=true&Metric=Population+growth+rate&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL) has found the world population to be growing at a decreasing rate. From a peak growth rate of 2.27% in 1963, world population growth declined to 0.82% in 2022.\n\nIn the UN Population Division's [2022 report](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf), they made these long-term forecasts:\n\n>Long-range population projections are highly uncertain, especially for high-fertility countries still in the early stages of the demographic transition. As mentioned in Part I, **there is a probability of 95 per cent** that the size of the global population will lie **between 9.4 and 10.0 billion in 2050** and **between 8.9 and 12.4 billion in 2100** (box III.1). Thus, the size of the world's population is almost certain to rise over the next several decades, as is the degree of uncertainty associated with these projections. Later in the century, there is about 50 per cent chance that the world's population will peak—that its size will stabilize or begin to decrease—before 2100.\n\n*(emphasis mine)*", "resc": "The questions below will resolve as the total human population on Earth on the following years, according to the [UN population division](https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population-dashboard). The resolution value will be the most recently updated estimate as of January 1 of the respective year.\n\nData will come from the primary United Nations agency responsible for producing world population statistics. If such an agency does not exist or have current data available, Metaculus may select a credible alternative source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "8.137B", "median": "8.185B", "upper_75": "8.235B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 26.20% of Congresspeople will be endorsed by the Democratic Socialists of America on January 4th, 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "The [Democratic Socialists of America](https://www.dsausa.org/) is the largest socialist organization in the United States, with over 92,000 members and chapters in all 50 states.\n\nAs of July 2022 there are four Congresspeople in the House currently [endorsed by the organization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Democratic_Socialists_of_America_members_who_have_held_office_in_the_United_States): Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Rashida Tlaib, Cori Bush and Jamaal Bowman.\n\nJanuary 3, 2031 is expected to be the first day of the [122nd](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_Congresses) Congress of the United States.\n\n***How many Congresspeople in the U.S. House of Representatives will be endorsed by the Democratic Socialists of America on January 4th, 2031?***\n\nCount the number of Congresspeople in the United States House of Representatives that are publicly endorsed by the organization on January 4th, 2031.\n\n[fine-print]\nThe congresspeople have to be actively endorsed by the organization to count. For example Danny K. Davis would not count as a current member, as the DSA have [endorsed his primary challenger](https://inthesetimes.com/article/congress-election-danny-davis-anthony-clark-cdsa).\n\nIf the DSA splits into multiple groups , merges with another organization or changes its name, the organization that retains at least 50% of the membership will count as it's legitimate successor for the purposes of this question. If the organization disbands or none of the subgroups meets that criteria the question will resolve as ambiguous.\n[/fine-print]", "lower_25": "4.99", "median": "12.80", "upper_75": "26.20", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 8.137B by 2025?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the world population on December 31, 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/587/world-population-in-2050/) *[closed]*\n\n* [What will be the peak human population before 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8107/peak-human-population-by-2100/)\n\n* [What will be the global total fertility rate in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11894/global-fertility-rates/)\n\n----\n\nThe [United Nations Population Division](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&hideControls=true&Metric=Population+growth+rate&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL) has found the world population to be growing at a decreasing rate. From a peak growth rate of 2.27% in 1963, world population growth declined to 0.82% in 2022.\n\nIn the UN Population Division's [2022 report](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf), they made these long-term forecasts:\n\n>Long-range population projections are highly uncertain, especially for high-fertility countries still in the early stages of the demographic transition. As mentioned in Part I, **there is a probability of 95 per cent** that the size of the global population will lie **between 9.4 and 10.0 billion in 2050** and **between 8.9 and 12.4 billion in 2100** (box III.1). Thus, the size of the world's population is almost certain to rise over the next several decades, as is the degree of uncertainty associated with these projections. Later in the century, there is about 50 per cent chance that the world's population will peak—that its size will stabilize or begin to decrease—before 2100.\n\n*(emphasis mine)*", "resc": "The questions below will resolve as the total human population on Earth on the following years, according to the [UN population division](https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population-dashboard). The resolution value will be the most recently updated estimate as of January 1 of the respective year.\n\nData will come from the primary United Nations agency responsible for producing world population statistics. If such an agency does not exist or have current data available, Metaculus may select a credible alternative source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "8.137B", "median": "8.185B", "upper_75": "8.235B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 8.137B by 2025?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the world population on December 31, 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/587/world-population-in-2050/) *[closed]*\n\n* [What will be the peak human population before 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8107/peak-human-population-by-2100/)\n\n* [What will be the global total fertility rate in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11894/global-fertility-rates/)\n\n----\n\nThe [United Nations Population Division](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&hideControls=true&Metric=Population+growth+rate&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL) has found the world population to be growing at a decreasing rate. From a peak growth rate of 2.27% in 1963, world population growth declined to 0.82% in 2022.\n\nIn the UN Population Division's [2022 report](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf), they made these long-term forecasts:\n\n>Long-range population projections are highly uncertain, especially for high-fertility countries still in the early stages of the demographic transition. As mentioned in Part I, **there is a probability of 95 per cent** that the size of the global population will lie **between 9.4 and 10.0 billion in 2050** and **between 8.9 and 12.4 billion in 2100** (box III.1). Thus, the size of the world's population is almost certain to rise over the next several decades, as is the degree of uncertainty associated with these projections. Later in the century, there is about 50 per cent chance that the world's population will peak—that its size will stabilize or begin to decrease—before 2100.\n\n*(emphasis mine)*", "resc": "The questions below will resolve as the total human population on Earth on the following years, according to the [UN population division](https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population-dashboard). The resolution value will be the most recently updated estimate as of January 1 of the respective year.\n\nData will come from the primary United Nations agency responsible for producing world population statistics. If such an agency does not exist or have current data available, Metaculus may select a credible alternative source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "8.137B", "median": "8.185B", "upper_75": "8.235B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 8.137B by 2025?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the world population on December 31, 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/587/world-population-in-2050/) *[closed]*\n\n* [What will be the peak human population before 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8107/peak-human-population-by-2100/)\n\n* [What will be the global total fertility rate in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11894/global-fertility-rates/)\n\n----\n\nThe [United Nations Population Division](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&hideControls=true&Metric=Population+growth+rate&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL) has found the world population to be growing at a decreasing rate. From a peak growth rate of 2.27% in 1963, world population growth declined to 0.82% in 2022.\n\nIn the UN Population Division's [2022 report](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf), they made these long-term forecasts:\n\n>Long-range population projections are highly uncertain, especially for high-fertility countries still in the early stages of the demographic transition. As mentioned in Part I, **there is a probability of 95 per cent** that the size of the global population will lie **between 9.4 and 10.0 billion in 2050** and **between 8.9 and 12.4 billion in 2100** (box III.1). Thus, the size of the world's population is almost certain to rise over the next several decades, as is the degree of uncertainty associated with these projections. Later in the century, there is about 50 per cent chance that the world's population will peak—that its size will stabilize or begin to decrease—before 2100.\n\n*(emphasis mine)*", "resc": "The questions below will resolve as the total human population on Earth on the following years, according to the [UN population division](https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population-dashboard). The resolution value will be the most recently updated estimate as of January 1 of the respective year.\n\nData will come from the primary United Nations agency responsible for producing world population statistics. If such an agency does not exist or have current data available, Metaculus may select a credible alternative source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "8.137B", "median": "8.185B", "upper_75": "8.235B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 8.137 billion in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the world population on December 31, 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/587/world-population-in-2050/) *[closed]*\n\n* [What will be the peak human population before 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8107/peak-human-population-by-2100/)\n\n* [What will be the global total fertility rate in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11894/global-fertility-rates/)\n\n----\n\nThe [United Nations Population Division](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&hideControls=true&Metric=Population+growth+rate&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL) has found the world population to be growing at a decreasing rate. From a peak growth rate of 2.27% in 1963, world population growth declined to 0.82% in 2022.\n\nIn the UN Population Division's [2022 report](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf), they made these long-term forecasts:\n\n>Long-range population projections are highly uncertain, especially for high-fertility countries still in the early stages of the demographic transition. As mentioned in Part I, **there is a probability of 95 per cent** that the size of the global population will lie **between 9.4 and 10.0 billion in 2050** and **between 8.9 and 12.4 billion in 2100** (box III.1). Thus, the size of the world's population is almost certain to rise over the next several decades, as is the degree of uncertainty associated with these projections. Later in the century, there is about 50 per cent chance that the world's population will peak—that its size will stabilize or begin to decrease—before 2100.\n\n*(emphasis mine)*", "resc": "The questions below will resolve as the total human population on Earth on the following years, according to the [UN population division](https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population-dashboard). The resolution value will be the most recently updated estimate as of January 1 of the respective year.\n\nData will come from the primary United Nations agency responsible for producing world population statistics. If such an agency does not exist or have current data available, Metaculus may select a credible alternative source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "8.137B", "median": "8.185B", "upper_75": "8.235B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 1.35 in the year 2100?", "desc": "The Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.49 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 5.05 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.\n\n", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total population on Earth for the respective years, according to the [UN Population Division](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) or other branch of the UN/WHO.\n\nIf no such estimate by the UN is available, Metaculus may select an alternate credible source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion", "lower_25": "1.35", "median": "1.79", "upper_75": "2.19", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many confirmed children will Elon Musk have by end of 2025?\n\nKeyword: 13.0\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that Elon Musk will have 13.0 confirmed children by end of 2025?", "desc": "Elon Musk is unusual among the super billionaires in having a large number of children. On July 7, 2022 was reported that [Musk Tweets About Underpopulation After Report He Fathered Twins With Employee](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-07/musk-fathered-children-with-neuralink-employee-report-says#l5anxl8zacol0i55yap=):\n\n>Billionaire Elon Musk is the father of eight-month-old twins born to a senior executive at his artificial intelligence startup Neuralink, Insider reported, citing a court document.\n>Musk and the executive asked a Texas judge in April to change the children's names to reflect both their surnames, Insider said. The request was granted, according to the report.\n>The two babies would bring Musk's total known children to nine. He has advocated for increasing the population as part of his vision for colonizing other planets. In a series of tweets after the news was widely reported, Elon Musk asked tweeted several times about underpopulation and even asked whether Tesla should design a “highly configurable Robovan for people & cargo.” \n\nThus, his current total now stands at 9.", "resc": "- Reputable source of Elon Musk's current number of confirmed children. Ongoing pregnancies do not count. Unconfirmed children do not count", "lower_25": "11.1", "median": "12.0", "upper_75": "13.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 8.515 billion by the year 2030?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the world population on December 31, 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/587/world-population-in-2050/) *[closed]*\n\n* [What will be the peak human population before 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8107/peak-human-population-by-2100/)\n\n* [What will be the global total fertility rate in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11894/global-fertility-rates/)\n\n----\n\nThe [United Nations Population Division](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&hideControls=true&Metric=Population+growth+rate&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL) has found the world population to be growing at a decreasing rate. From a peak growth rate of 2.27% in 1963, world population growth declined to 0.82% in 2022.\n\nIn the UN Population Division's [2022 report](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf), they made these long-term forecasts:\n\n>Long-range population projections are highly uncertain, especially for high-fertility countries still in the early stages of the demographic transition. As mentioned in Part I, **there is a probability of 95 per cent** that the size of the global population will lie **between 9.4 and 10.0 billion in 2050** and **between 8.9 and 12.4 billion in 2100** (box III.1). Thus, the size of the world's population is almost certain to rise over the next several decades, as is the degree of uncertainty associated with these projections. Later in the century, there is about 50 per cent chance that the world's population will peak—that its size will stabilize or begin to decrease—before 2100.\n\n*(emphasis mine)*", "resc": "The questions below will resolve as the total human population on Earth on the following years, according to the [UN population division](https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population-dashboard). The resolution value will be the most recently updated estimate as of January 1 of the respective year.\n\nData will come from the primary United Nations agency responsible for producing world population statistics. If such an agency does not exist or have current data available, Metaculus may select a credible alternative source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "8.371B", "median": "8.515B", "upper_75": "8.659B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 8.515 billion by the year 2030?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the world population on December 31, 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/587/world-population-in-2050/) *[closed]*\n\n* [What will be the peak human population before 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8107/peak-human-population-by-2100/)\n\n* [What will be the global total fertility rate in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11894/global-fertility-rates/)\n\n----\n\nThe [United Nations Population Division](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&hideControls=true&Metric=Population+growth+rate&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL) has found the world population to be growing at a decreasing rate. From a peak growth rate of 2.27% in 1963, world population growth declined to 0.82% in 2022.\n\nIn the UN Population Division's [2022 report](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf), they made these long-term forecasts:\n\n>Long-range population projections are highly uncertain, especially for high-fertility countries still in the early stages of the demographic transition. As mentioned in Part I, **there is a probability of 95 per cent** that the size of the global population will lie **between 9.4 and 10.0 billion in 2050** and **between 8.9 and 12.4 billion in 2100** (box III.1). Thus, the size of the world's population is almost certain to rise over the next several decades, as is the degree of uncertainty associated with these projections. Later in the century, there is about 50 per cent chance that the world's population will peak—that its size will stabilize or begin to decrease—before 2100.\n\n*(emphasis mine)*", "resc": "The questions below will resolve as the total human population on Earth on the following years, according to the [UN population division](https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population-dashboard). The resolution value will be the most recently updated estimate as of January 1 of the respective year.\n\nData will come from the primary United Nations agency responsible for producing world population statistics. If such an agency does not exist or have current data available, Metaculus may select a credible alternative source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "8.371B", "median": "8.515B", "upper_75": "8.659B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 9.111B by the year 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.642B", "median": "9.111B", "upper_75": "9.599B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 10.6 billion by the year 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.76B", "median": "9.66B", "upper_75": "10.6B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 10.6 billion by the year 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.76B", "median": "9.66B", "upper_75": "10.6B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 9.111B by the year 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.642B", "median": "9.111B", "upper_75": "9.599B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 8.515 billion by the year 2030?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the world population on December 31, 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/587/world-population-in-2050/) *[closed]*\n\n* [What will be the peak human population before 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8107/peak-human-population-by-2100/)\n\n* [What will be the global total fertility rate in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11894/global-fertility-rates/)\n\n----\n\nThe [United Nations Population Division](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&hideControls=true&Metric=Population+growth+rate&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL) has found the world population to be growing at a decreasing rate. From a peak growth rate of 2.27% in 1963, world population growth declined to 0.82% in 2022.\n\nIn the UN Population Division's [2022 report](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.pd/files/wpp2022_summary_of_results.pdf), they made these long-term forecasts:\n\n>Long-range population projections are highly uncertain, especially for high-fertility countries still in the early stages of the demographic transition. As mentioned in Part I, **there is a probability of 95 per cent** that the size of the global population will lie **between 9.4 and 10.0 billion in 2050** and **between 8.9 and 12.4 billion in 2100** (box III.1). Thus, the size of the world's population is almost certain to rise over the next several decades, as is the degree of uncertainty associated with these projections. Later in the century, there is about 50 per cent chance that the world's population will peak—that its size will stabilize or begin to decrease—before 2100.\n\n*(emphasis mine)*", "resc": "The questions below will resolve as the total human population on Earth on the following years, according to the [UN population division](https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population-dashboard). The resolution value will be the most recently updated estimate as of January 1 of the respective year.\n\nData will come from the primary United Nations agency responsible for producing world population statistics. If such an agency does not exist or have current data available, Metaculus may select a credible alternative source, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "8.371B", "median": "8.515B", "upper_75": "8.659B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 10.2 billion by 2075?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.47B", "median": "10.2B", "upper_75": "12.3B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 10.2 billion by 2075?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.47B", "median": "10.2B", "upper_75": "12.3B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 10.2 billion by 2075?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.47B", "median": "10.2B", "upper_75": "12.3B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 13.5 billion by the year 2100?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "7.49B", "median": "10.2B", "upper_75": "13.5B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 13.5 billion by the year 2100?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "7.49B", "median": "10.2B", "upper_75": "13.5B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global CO2 emissions will peak by 2047?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2047", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI-written paper will first get published in a top 50 scientific journal according to the Scimago Journal rankings by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI-written paper will first get published in a top 50 scientific journal according to the Scimago Journal rankings by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global CO2 emissions will peak by 2047?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2047", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that LessWrong will first curate an AI-written post that was not revealed to have been AI-written at the time of curation by Jun 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jun 2024", "median": "Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Apr 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 13.5 billion by the year 2100?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "7.49B", "median": "10.2B", "upper_75": "13.5B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that inflation in the UK will be 8.43% if Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership candidate contest?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.00", "median": "7.30", "upper_75": "8.43", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 10.6 billion by the year 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.76B", "median": "9.66B", "upper_75": "10.6B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that inflation in the UK will be 8.43% if Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership candidate contest?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.00", "median": "7.30", "upper_75": "8.43", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that LessWrong will first curate an AI-written post that was not revealed to have been AI-written at the time of curation by Jun 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jun 2024", "median": "Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Apr 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will reach 9.111B by the year 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.642B", "median": "9.111B", "upper_75": "9.599B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that inflation in the UK will be 8.43% if Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership candidate contest?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.00", "median": "7.30", "upper_75": "8.43", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that LessWrong will first curate an AI-written post that was not revealed to have been AI-written at the time of curation by Jun 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jun 2024", "median": "Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Apr 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that inflation in the UK will be 5.93% if Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership candidate contest?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.08", "median": "3.89", "upper_75": "5.93", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global CO2 emissions will peak by 2047?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2047", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that inflation in the UK will be 1.42% if Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership candidate contest?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.42", "median": "2.97", "upper_75": "5.04", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that inflation in the UK will be 5.93% if Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership candidate contest?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.08", "median": "3.89", "upper_75": "5.93", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that inflation in the UK will be 5.93% if Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership candidate contest?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.08", "median": "3.89", "upper_75": "5.93", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the GDP of the UK will be 2.35k billion GBP, given Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership contest?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.23k", "median": "2.35k", "upper_75": "2.48k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the GDP of the UK will be 2.35k billion GBP, given Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership contest?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.23k", "median": "2.35k", "upper_75": "2.48k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI-written paper will first get published in a top 50 scientific journal according to the Scimago Journal rankings by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that inflation in the UK will be 1.42% if Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership candidate contest?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.42", "median": "2.97", "upper_75": "5.04", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the GDP of the UK will be 2.34k billion GBP by 2030, given Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership contest?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 500", "median": "2.34k", "upper_75": "2.95k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the GDP of the UK will be 2.34k billion GBP by 2030, given Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership contest?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 500", "median": "2.34k", "upper_75": "2.95k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the GDP of the UK will be 2.23k billion GBP if Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership contest by 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.23k", "median": "2.35k", "upper_75": "2.48k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population of NEOM will be 281k on December 31, 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "34.7k", "median": "107k", "upper_75": "281k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population of NEOM will be 281k on December 31, 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "34.7k", "median": "107k", "upper_75": "281k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the GDP of the UK will be 2.35k billion GBP, given Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership contest?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.23k", "median": "2.35k", "upper_75": "2.48k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the GDP of the UK will be 2.23k billion GBP if Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership contest by 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.23k", "median": "2.35k", "upper_75": "2.48k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the GDP of the UK will be less than 200 billion GBP by 2040, given Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership contest?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 200", "median": "3.30k", "upper_75": "10.9k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population of NEOM will be 281k on December 31, 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "34.7k", "median": "107k", "upper_75": "281k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that inflation in the UK will be 1.42% if Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership candidate contest?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.42", "median": "2.97", "upper_75": "5.04", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the GDP of the UK will be 2.34k billion GBP by 2030, given Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership contest?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 500", "median": "2.34k", "upper_75": "2.95k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the GDP of the UK will be less than 200 billion GBP by 2040, given Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership contest?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 200", "median": "3.30k", "upper_75": "10.9k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 100 movies will have made 1 billion dollars at the box office by 2037?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2037", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the GDP of the UK will be less than 200 billion GBP by 2040, given Liz Truss wins the Conservative Party leadership contest?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 200", "median": "3.30k", "upper_75": "10.9k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 100 movies will have made 1 billion dollars at the box office by 2037?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2037", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 100 movies will have made 1 billion dollars at the box office by 2037?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2037", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gross World Product (in trillions of 2020 USD) will be 108.1 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "100.2", "median": "104.1", "upper_75": "108.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the GDP of the UK will be 2.23k billion GBP if Liz Truss wins the Conservative 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"median": "104.1", "upper_75": "108.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gross World Product (in trillions of 2020 USD) will be 135% in the year 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "111", "median": "122", "upper_75": "135", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gross World Product (in trillions of 2020 USD) will be 642 in the year 2045?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "161", "median": "249", "upper_75": "642", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gross World Product (in trillions of 2020 USD) will be 190% in the year 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "146", "median": "190", "upper_75": "570", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gross World Product (in trillions of 2020 USD) will be 156 in the year 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "129", "median": "156", "upper_75": "218", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gross World Product (in trillions of 2020 USD) will be 642 in the year 2045?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "161", "median": "249", "upper_75": "642", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gross World Product (in trillions of 2020 USD) will be 135% in the year 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "111", "median": "122", "upper_75": "135", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gross World Product (in trillions of 2020 USD) will be 100.2 in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "100.2", "median": "104.1", "upper_75": "108.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gross World Product (in trillions of 2020 USD) will be 190% in the year 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "146", "median": "190", "upper_75": "570", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gross World Product (in trillions of 2020 USD) will be 190% in the year 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "146", "median": "190", "upper_75": "570", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gross World Product (in trillions of 2020 USD) will be 156 in the year 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "129", "median": "156", "upper_75": "218", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gross World Product (in trillions of 2020 USD) will be 156 in the year 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "129", "median": "156", "upper_75": "218", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gross World Product (in trillions of 2020 USD) will be 100.2 in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "100.2", "median": "104.1", "upper_75": "108.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Gross World Product (in trillions of 2020 USD) will be 642 in the year 2045?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "161", "median": "249", "upper_75": "642", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a movie will first gross 2031 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"lower_25": "45.5", "median": "49.3", "upper_75": "53.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Republican party will win 46.8% of the popular vote in the 2024 US Presidential Election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "43.6", "median": "46.8", "upper_75": "50.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 9.28k confirmed monkeypox (mpox) infections per year?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.50k", "median": "5.08k", "upper_75": "9.28k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Democratic party will win 53.1% of the popular vote in the 2024 US Presidential Election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "45.5", "median": "49.3", "upper_75": "53.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that these parties will win 0.806 percent of the popular vote in the 2024 US Presidential Election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.342", "median": "0.806", "upper_75": "1.660", "prediction": "50%"} 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1.930 percent of the popular vote in the 2024 US Presidential Election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.391", "median": "0.932", "upper_75": "1.930", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Green party will win 1.930 percent of the popular vote in the 2024 US Presidential Election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.391", "median": "0.932", "upper_75": "1.930", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Democratic party will win 53.1% of the popular vote in the 2024 US Presidential Election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "45.5", "median": "49.3", "upper_75": "53.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that these parties will win 0.806 percent of the popular vote in the 2024 US Presidential Election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.342", "median": "0.806", "upper_75": "1.660", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Republican party will win 46.8% of the popular vote in the 2024 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"desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.1", "median": "24.9", "upper_75": "30.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Green party will win 1.930 percent of the popular vote in the 2024 US Presidential Election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.391", "median": "0.932", "upper_75": "1.930", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 21.9% of Earth's land will be protected for wildlife by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "21.9", "median": "27.5", "upper_75": "33.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 30.0% of Earth's land will be protected for wildlife by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.1", "median": "24.9", "upper_75": "30.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 21.7% of Earth's land will be protected for wildlife on the following dates?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "15.1", "median": "18.3", "upper_75": "21.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance 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"8.76", "upper_75": "10.40", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that New Incentives' childhood vaccination program will reach 2.42M infants by the end of 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.42M", "median": "2.72M", "upper_75": "3.09M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 8.76% of Earth's marine area will be protected for wildlife by 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.80", "median": "8.76", "upper_75": "10.40", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.80 percent of Earth's marine area will be protected for wildlife on the following dates?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.80", "median": "8.76", "upper_75": "10.40", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 50.0% of Earth's marine area will be protected for wildlife by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "10.7", "median": "47.0", "upper_75": "50.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 24.9% of Earth's marine area will be protected for wildlife by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "15.1", "median": "20.0", "upper_75": "24.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 24.9% of Earth's marine area will be protected for wildlife by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "15.1", "median": "20.0", "upper_75": "24.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 8.76% of Earth's marine area will be protected for wildlife by 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.80", "median": "8.76", "upper_75": "10.40", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 39.8% of Earth's marine area will be protected for wildlife by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.4", "median": "30.0", "upper_75": "39.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 50.0% of Earth's marine area will be protected for wildlife by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "10.7", "median": "47.0", "upper_75": "50.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 8.76% of Earth's marine area will be protected for wildlife by 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.80", "median": "8.76", "upper_75": "10.40", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 50.0% of Earth's marine area will be protected for wildlife by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "10.7", "median": "47.0", "upper_75": "50.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 39.8% of Earth's marine area will be protected for wildlife by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.4", "median": "30.0", "upper_75": "39.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 879k deaths from Tuberculosis will occur globally in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "879k", "median": "1.03M", "upper_75": "1.26M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.03M deaths from Tuberculosis globally in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "879k", "median": "1.03M", "upper_75": "1.26M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.32M deaths from Tuberculosis will occur globally in the following years (2030)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "648k", "median": "956k", "upper_75": "1.32M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.03M deaths from Tuberculosis globally in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "879k", "median": "1.03M", "upper_75": "1.26M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.32M deaths from Tuberculosis will occur globally in the following years (2030)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "648k", "median": "956k", "upper_75": "1.32M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 39.8% of Earth's marine area will be protected for wildlife by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.4", "median": "30.0", "upper_75": "39.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 879k deaths from Tuberculosis will occur globally in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "879k", "median": "1.03M", "upper_75": "1.26M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 879k deaths from Tuberculosis will occur globally in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "879k", "median": "1.03M", "upper_75": "1.26M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 24.9% of Earth's marine area will be protected for wildlife by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "15.1", "median": "20.0", "upper_75": "24.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.03M deaths from Tuberculosis globally in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "879k", "median": "1.03M", "upper_75": "1.26M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 361k deaths from Tuberculosis globally in the following years (2035)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "361k", "median": "664k", "upper_75": "1.08M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 361k deaths from Tuberculosis globally in the following years (2035)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "361k", "median": "664k", "upper_75": "1.08M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.32M deaths from Tuberculosis will occur globally in the following years (2030)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "648k", "median": "956k", "upper_75": "1.32M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 78.7 Tuberculosis cases per 100k people globally in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "78.7", "median": "93.9", "upper_75": "105", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 361k deaths from Tuberculosis globally in the following years (2035)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "361k", "median": "664k", "upper_75": "1.08M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 78.7 Tuberculosis cases per 100k people globally in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "78.7", "median": "93.9", "upper_75": "105", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 105 Tuberculosis cases (per 100k people) globally in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "78.7", "median": "93.9", "upper_75": "105", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 78.7 Tuberculosis cases per 100k people globally in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "78.7", "median": "93.9", "upper_75": "105", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Turkey's inflation rate will be 56.0% on the following dates?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "35.5", "median": "56.0", "upper_75": "70.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Turkey's inflation rate will be 56.0% on the following dates?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "35.5", "median": "56.0", "upper_75": "70.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 105 Tuberculosis cases (per 100k people) globally in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "78.7", "median": "93.9", "upper_75": "105", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Turkey's inflation rate will be 38.5% on August 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "23.9", "median": "38.5", "upper_75": "54.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 58.1 Tuberculosis cases (per 100k people) globally in the following years (2030)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "58.1", "median": "80.1", "upper_75": "106", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 89.2 Tuberculosis cases (per 100k people) globally in the following years (2035)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "44.5", "median": "64.5", "upper_75": "89.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 58.1 Tuberculosis cases (per 100k people) globally in the following years (2030)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "58.1", "median": "80.1", "upper_75": "106", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 105 Tuberculosis cases (per 100k people) globally in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "78.7", "median": "93.9", "upper_75": "105", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Turkey's inflation rate will be 56.0% on the following dates?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "35.5", "median": "56.0", "upper_75": "70.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 89.2 Tuberculosis cases (per 100k people) globally in the following years (2035)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "44.5", "median": "64.5", "upper_75": "89.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 89.2 Tuberculosis cases (per 100k people) globally in the following years (2035)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "44.5", "median": "64.5", "upper_75": "89.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Turkey's inflation rate will be 38.5% on August 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "23.9", "median": "38.5", "upper_75": "54.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If China launches a full-scale invasion of Taiwan before 2035, what is the chance that China's real GDP (PPP) will grow by 25% over the next 4 quarters?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "−8.15", "median": "−2.69", "upper_75": "2.66", "prediction": "-8.15%"} -{"title": "What is the expected compound annual growth rate percentage of Chinese GDP (PPP) from 2022 to 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.29", "median": "5.00", "upper_75": "6.12", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If China launches a full-scale invasion of Taiwan before 2035, what is the chance that China's real GDP (PPP) will grow by 25% over the next 4 quarters?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "−8.15", "median": "−2.69", "upper_75": "2.66", "prediction": "-8.15%"} -{"title": "What is the expected compound annual growth rate percentage of Chinese GDP (PPP) from 2022 to 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.29", "median": "5.00", "upper_75": "6.12", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the expected compound annual growth rate percentage of Chinese GDP (PPP) from 2022 to 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.29", "median": "5.00", "upper_75": "6.12", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Turkey's inflation rate will be 38.5% on August 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "23.9", "median": "38.5", "upper_75": "54.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If China launches a full-scale invasion of Taiwan before 2035, what is the chance that China's real GDP (PPP) will grow by 25% over the next 4 quarters?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "−8.15", "median": "−2.69", "upper_75": "2.66", "prediction": "-8.15%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 50.0% of students enrolled in higher education will be White in 2028, depending on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "50.0", "median": "53.3", "upper_75": "56.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 58.1 Tuberculosis cases (per 100k people) globally in the following years (2030)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "58.1", "median": "80.1", "upper_75": "106", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.8% of US residents enrolled in higher education will be Black in 2028, depending on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "10.8", "median": "12.6", "upper_75": "14.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.8% of US residents enrolled in higher education will be Black in 2028, depending on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "10.8", "median": "12.6", "upper_75": "14.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 50.0% of students enrolled in higher education will be White in 2028, depending on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "50.0", "median": "53.3", "upper_75": "56.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 21.1% of US residents enrolled in higher education will be Hispanic in 2028, depending on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "18.6", "median": "21.1", "upper_75": "24.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.8% of US residents enrolled in higher education will be Black in 2028, depending on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "10.8", "median": "12.6", "upper_75": "14.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 21.1% of US residents enrolled in higher education will be Hispanic in 2028, depending on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "18.6", "median": "21.1", "upper_75": "24.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 75% of international students at US universities will be from Asia in 2028, depending on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "65.1", "median": "70.5", "upper_75": "76.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.43% of US residents enrolled in higher education will be Asian in 2028, depending on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.43", "median": "7.87", "upper_75": "9.30", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX will be taken public by 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Based on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions, what is the chance that 7.40 percent of international students at US universities will be from Europe in 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.93", "median": "7.40", "upper_75": "10.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX will be taken public by 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 50.0% of students enrolled in higher education will be White in 2028, depending on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "50.0", "median": "53.3", "upper_75": "56.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Based on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions, what is the chance that 7.40 percent of international students at US universities will be from Europe in 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.93", "median": "7.40", "upper_75": "10.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Based on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions, what is the chance that 7.40 percent of international students at US universities will be from Europe in 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.93", "median": "7.40", "upper_75": "10.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 75% of international students at US universities will be from Asia in 2028, depending on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "65.1", "median": "70.5", "upper_75": "76.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 75% of international students at US universities will be from Asia in 2028, depending on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "65.1", "median": "70.5", "upper_75": "76.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 50% of students enrolled in higher education will be international students in 2028, depending on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.32", "median": "5.59", "upper_75": "6.91", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that less than 0.1 GW of total space-based solar PV will be installed by the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "0.883", "upper_75": "4.08", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that less than 0.1 GW of total space-based solar PV will be installed by the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "0.883", "upper_75": "4.08", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 21.1% of US residents enrolled in higher education will be Hispanic in 2028, depending on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "18.6", "median": "21.1", "upper_75": "24.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 50% of students enrolled in higher education will be international students in 2028, depending on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.32", "median": "5.59", "upper_75": "6.91", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.43% of US residents enrolled in higher education will be Asian in 2028, depending on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.43", "median": "7.87", "upper_75": "9.30", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 50% of students enrolled in higher education will be international students in 2028, depending on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.32", "median": "5.59", "upper_75": "6.91", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SpaceX will be taken public by 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.43% of US residents enrolled in higher education will be Asian in 2028, depending on SCOTUS' ruling on racial preferences in university admissions?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.43", "median": "7.87", "upper_75": "9.30", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 35.2 GW of total space-based solar PV will be installed by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "5.99", "upper_75": "35.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.883 total space based solar PV (in GW) will be installed by the following years? (2030)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "0.883", "upper_75": "4.08", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that less than 0.1 GW of total space-based solar PV will be installed by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "9.01", "upper_75": "174", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 35.2 GW of total space-based solar PV will be installed by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "5.99", "upper_75": "35.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.883 total space based solar PV (in GW) will be installed by the following years? (2030)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "0.883", "upper_75": "4.08", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that less than 0.1 GW of total space-based solar PV will be installed by the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "0.883", "upper_75": "4.08", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that less than 0.1 GW of total space-based solar PV will be installed by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "9.01", "upper_75": "174", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Total Fertility Rate in the United States will reach 2.1 (the level conventionally associated with replacement fertility) by 2072?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2060", "median": "2072", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2073", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Total Fertility Rate in the United States will reach 2.1 (the level conventionally associated with replacement fertility) by 2072?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2060", "median": "2072", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2073", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.883 total space based solar PV (in GW) will be installed by the following years? (2030)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "0.883", "upper_75": "4.08", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Total Fertility Rate in the United States will reach 2.1 (the level conventionally associated with replacement fertility) by 2072?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2060", "median": "2072", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2073", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that state-of-the-art top-1 accuracy on the APPS Benchmark introductory problems will be 50.5% from 2022 to 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "50.5", "median": "63.0", "upper_75": "74.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that state-of-the-art top-1 accuracy on the APPS Benchmark introductory problems will be 50.5% from 2022 to 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "50.5", "median": "63.0", "upper_75": "74.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that state-of-the-art top-1 accuracy on the APPS Benchmark introductory problems will be 50.5% from 2022 to 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "50.5", "median": "63.0", "upper_75": "74.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that state-of-the-art top-1 accuracy on the APPS Benchmark introductory problems will be 63.0% from 2022 to 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "50.5", "median": "63.0", "upper_75": "74.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 35.2 GW of total space-based solar PV will be installed by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "5.99", "upper_75": "35.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that state-of-the-art top-1 accuracy on the APPS Benchmark introductory problems will be 87.5% from 2022 to 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "63.0", "median": "76.3", "upper_75": "87.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that state-of-the-art top-1 accuracy on the APPS Benchmark introductory problems will be 63.0% from 2022 to 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "50.5", "median": "63.0", "upper_75": "74.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that state-of-the-art top-1 accuracy on the APPS Benchmark introductory problems will be 87.5% from 2022 to 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "63.0", "median": "76.3", "upper_75": "87.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that state-of-the-art top-1 accuracy on the APPS Benchmark introductory problems will be 63.0% from 2022 to 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "50.5", "median": "63.0", "upper_75": "74.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 531 GW of total space-based solar PV will be installed by 2060?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "84.2", "upper_75": "531", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 531 GW of total space-based solar PV will be installed by 2060?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "84.2", "upper_75": "531", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 531 GW of total space-based solar PV will be installed by 2060?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "84.2", "upper_75": "531", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the 75th Percentile ACT score for new students admitted to all colleges in 2028 will be 27.03?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "25.75", "median": "26.45", "upper_75": "27.03", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the 75th Percentile ACT score for new students admitted to all colleges in 2028 will be 27.03?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "25.75", "median": "26.45", "upper_75": "27.03", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the 75th Percentile ACT score for new students admitted to all colleges in 2028 will be 27.03?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "25.75", "median": "26.45", "upper_75": "27.03", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the 25th Percentile ACT score for new students admitted to all colleges in 2028 will be 20.00?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.00", "median": "20.45", "upper_75": "20.88", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US life expectancy will be 78.30 in 2023?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "76.42", "median": "77.39", "upper_75": "78.30", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US life expectancy will be 78.30 in 2023?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "76.42", "median": "77.39", "upper_75": "78.30", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that artificial intelligence will be mentioned in the constitution of a major sovereign country by 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "2060", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that artificial intelligence will be mentioned in the constitution of a major sovereign country by 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "2060", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US life expectancy will be 78.30 in 2023?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "76.42", "median": "77.39", "upper_75": "78.30", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the 25th Percentile ACT score for new students admitted to all colleges in 2028 will be 20.00?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.00", "median": "20.45", "upper_75": "20.88", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the 25th Percentile ACT score for new students admitted to all colleges in 2028 will be 20.00?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.00", "median": "20.45", "upper_75": "20.88", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.63M predictions will have been made on Metaculus by October 1, 2025?", "desc": "As of June 6, 2022, 915,386 predictions have been made on Metaculus since being founded in late 2015.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cumulative number of predictions made on Metaculus on all public questions, on all public projects and domains, on the following dates at 17:00 GMT", "lower_25": "2.59M", "median": "3.39M", "upper_75": "4.63M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.63M predictions will have been made on Metaculus by October 1, 2025?", "desc": "As of June 6, 2022, 915,386 predictions have been made on Metaculus since being founded in late 2015.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cumulative number of predictions made on Metaculus on all public questions, on all public projects and domains, on the following dates at 17:00 GMT", "lower_25": "2.59M", "median": "3.39M", "upper_75": "4.63M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that state-of-the-art top-1 accuracy on the APPS Benchmark introductory problems will be 87.5% from 2022 to 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "63.0", "median": "76.3", "upper_75": "87.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.63M predictions will have been made on Metaculus by October 1, 2025?", "desc": "As of June 6, 2022, 915,386 predictions have been made on Metaculus since being founded in late 2015.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cumulative number of predictions made on Metaculus on all public questions, on all public projects and domains, on the following dates at 17:00 GMT", "lower_25": "2.59M", "median": "3.39M", "upper_75": "4.63M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.92M predictions will have been made on Metaculus by October 1, 2030?", "desc": "As of June 6, 2022, 915,386 predictions have been made on Metaculus since being founded in late 2015.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cumulative number of predictions made on Metaculus on all public questions, on all public projects and domains, on the following dates at 17:00 GMT", "lower_25": "4.92M", "median": "10.1M", "upper_75": "27.4M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States Dollar will represent 22.8% of all currency reserves as of Q1 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will the USD fraction of allocated global foreign exchange currencies be below 50% before the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14017/usd-foreign-exchange-currency-dominance/)\n* [Will the USD be the dominant global reserve currency in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3858/usd-dominant-reserve-currency-in-2050/)\n\n---\n\nSince the [end of World War II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_Conference), the United States Dollar has been the world's main reserve currency. Initially, its position was codified by the [Bretton Woods system](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system), in which the United States guaranteed convertibility of US Dollars to gold, while other states guaranteed convertibility of their currencies to the US Dollar. While this system was effectively abolished in the 1971 [Nixon shock](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nixon_shock), the US Dollar has remained the world's reserve currency thanks to the strength of the US economy and perception of US Treasury securities as the safest way to store money. For example, in [2022 Q1](https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4), the US Dollar accounted for .589 of the world's foreign exchange reserves, while the Euro was next largest with .201. However, in the future, this so-called \"exorbitant privilege\" of \"dollar hegemony\" may face increasing challenges, not least from the People's Republic of China and its renminbi.\n\n***What will the IMF report as the USD's percentage of world (and off-world) currency reserves as of Q1 2050?***\n\nIf practicable IMF data for the precise period of Q1 2050 is not available, but usable IMF figures *are* available for any date or date range centered within ½ y of any part of the range Q1 2050, the latter figures may be substituted according to admins' best considered judgment. This would for example potentially include figures for 2049 or 2051 as a whole, but not figures any further away in time.", "lower_25": "22.8", "median": "39.7", "upper_75": "52.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.92M predictions will have been made on Metaculus by October 1, 2030?", "desc": "As of June 6, 2022, 915,386 predictions have been made on Metaculus since being founded in late 2015.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cumulative number of predictions made on Metaculus on all public questions, on all public projects and domains, on the following dates at 17:00 GMT", "lower_25": "4.92M", "median": "10.1M", "upper_75": "27.4M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.92M predictions will have been made on Metaculus by October 1, 2030?", "desc": "As of June 6, 2022, 915,386 predictions have been made on Metaculus since being founded in late 2015.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cumulative number of predictions made on Metaculus on all public questions, on all public projects and domains, on the following dates at 17:00 GMT", "lower_25": "4.92M", "median": "10.1M", "upper_75": "27.4M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States Dollar will represent 22.8% of all currency reserves as of Q1 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will the USD fraction of allocated global foreign exchange currencies be below 50% before the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14017/usd-foreign-exchange-currency-dominance/)\n* [Will the USD be the dominant global reserve currency in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3858/usd-dominant-reserve-currency-in-2050/)\n\n---\n\nSince the [end of World War II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_Conference), the United States Dollar has been the world's main reserve currency. Initially, its position was codified by the [Bretton Woods system](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system), in which the United States guaranteed convertibility of US Dollars to gold, while other states guaranteed convertibility of their currencies to the US Dollar. While this system was effectively abolished in the 1971 [Nixon shock](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nixon_shock), the US Dollar has remained the world's reserve currency thanks to the strength of the US economy and perception of US Treasury securities as the safest way to store money. For example, in [2022 Q1](https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4), the US Dollar accounted for .589 of the world's foreign exchange reserves, while the Euro was next largest with .201. However, in the future, this so-called \"exorbitant privilege\" of \"dollar hegemony\" may face increasing challenges, not least from the People's Republic of China and its renminbi.\n\n***What will the IMF report as the USD's percentage of world (and off-world) currency reserves as of Q1 2050?***\n\nIf practicable IMF data for the precise period of Q1 2050 is not available, but usable IMF figures *are* available for any date or date range centered within ½ y of any part of the range Q1 2050, the latter figures may be substituted according to admins' best considered judgment. This would for example potentially include figures for 2049 or 2051 as a whole, but not figures any further away in time.", "lower_25": "22.8", "median": "39.7", "upper_75": "52.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that artificial intelligence will be mentioned in the constitution of a major sovereign country by 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "2060", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States Dollar will represent 22.8% of all currency reserves as of Q1 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [Will the USD fraction of allocated global foreign exchange currencies be below 50% before the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14017/usd-foreign-exchange-currency-dominance/)\n* [Will the USD be the dominant global reserve currency in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3858/usd-dominant-reserve-currency-in-2050/)\n\n---\n\nSince the [end of World War II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_Conference), the United States Dollar has been the world's main reserve currency. Initially, its position was codified by the [Bretton Woods system](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bretton_Woods_system), in which the United States guaranteed convertibility of US Dollars to gold, while other states guaranteed convertibility of their currencies to the US Dollar. While this system was effectively abolished in the 1971 [Nixon shock](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nixon_shock), the US Dollar has remained the world's reserve currency thanks to the strength of the US economy and perception of US Treasury securities as the safest way to store money. For example, in [2022 Q1](https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4), the US Dollar accounted for .589 of the world's foreign exchange reserves, while the Euro was next largest with .201. However, in the future, this so-called \"exorbitant privilege\" of \"dollar hegemony\" may face increasing challenges, not least from the People's Republic of China and its renminbi.\n\n***What will the IMF report as the USD's percentage of world (and off-world) currency reserves as of Q1 2050?***\n\nIf practicable IMF data for the precise period of Q1 2050 is not available, but usable IMF figures *are* available for any date or date range centered within ½ y of any part of the range Q1 2050, the latter figures may be substituted according to admins' best considered judgment. This would for example potentially include figures for 2049 or 2051 as a whole, but not figures any further away in time.", "lower_25": "22.8", "median": "39.7", "upper_75": "52.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will win a Gold Medal in the International Olympiad in Informatics (IOI) by 2031?", "desc": "The [International Olympiad in Informatics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Olympiad_in_Informatics) is the most prestigious computer science competition for students 20-and-under featuring difficult and novel competitive programming problems. Contestants complete a total of 6 problems over 2 days, with 5 hours each day to submit their solutions. Problems are graded on a 0 - 100 by an automated testing system. Usually, there are about 350 participants (up to 4 per participating country) and exactly 30 gold medals.\n\nIn the 2022 Olympiad, 416/600 score was enough to win a gold medal, and 2 participants scored a perfect 600 score.\n\nIn early 2022, DeepMind published [AlphaCode](https://www.deepmind.com/blog/competitive-programming-with-alphacode), an AI system for solving competitive programming challenges. It was evaluated on [Codeforces](codeforces.com), a popular online platform for programming competitions, and reached a rating of 1238, similar to a median participant.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date an AI system competes well enough on an IOI test to earn the equivalent of a gold medal. The IOI test must be the most current IOI test at the time the feat is completed (previous years do not qualify).\n\nAI must be evaluated under the following conditions, similarly to human competitors:\n\n* The AI has access to problem statements, test data and supplementary materials. \n* The AI can send up to 50 solutions and see limited feedback (such as \"correct answer\" or \"time limit exceeded\") for each submission.\n* The AI has 5 hours per set of 3 problems to compute, but there are no other limitations on computational resources.\n* The AI cannot have access to the internet during the test.\n* The AI must generally follow the latest official competition rules (see rules for [IOI 2022](https://ioi2022.id/competition-rules/)) unless it is obviously unsuitable for computer programs (e.g. \"each participant required to give a handshake to a member of jury before any submissions\"). If it is ambiguous whether a rule should apply to an AI participant, Metaculus will determine whether the rule should be excluded.\n\nThe AI must not have access to the problems before being evaluated on them, e.g. the problems cannot be included in the training set. It should also be reasonably verifiable, e.g. it should not use any data which was uploaded after the latest competition.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2080, this question will resolve as **> December 31, 2079**", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2031", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will win a Gold Medal in the International Olympiad in Informatics (IOI) by 2031?", "desc": "The [International Olympiad in Informatics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Olympiad_in_Informatics) is the most prestigious computer science competition for students 20-and-under featuring difficult and novel competitive programming problems. Contestants complete a total of 6 problems over 2 days, with 5 hours each day to submit their solutions. Problems are graded on a 0 - 100 by an automated testing system. Usually, there are about 350 participants (up to 4 per participating country) and exactly 30 gold medals.\n\nIn the 2022 Olympiad, 416/600 score was enough to win a gold medal, and 2 participants scored a perfect 600 score.\n\nIn early 2022, DeepMind published [AlphaCode](https://www.deepmind.com/blog/competitive-programming-with-alphacode), an AI system for solving competitive programming challenges. It was evaluated on [Codeforces](codeforces.com), a popular online platform for programming competitions, and reached a rating of 1238, similar to a median participant.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date an AI system competes well enough on an IOI test to earn the equivalent of a gold medal. The IOI test must be the most current IOI test at the time the feat is completed (previous years do not qualify).\n\nAI must be evaluated under the following conditions, similarly to human competitors:\n\n* The AI has access to problem statements, test data and supplementary materials. \n* The AI can send up to 50 solutions and see limited feedback (such as \"correct answer\" or \"time limit exceeded\") for each submission.\n* The AI has 5 hours per set of 3 problems to compute, but there are no other limitations on computational resources.\n* The AI cannot have access to the internet during the test.\n* The AI must generally follow the latest official competition rules (see rules for [IOI 2022](https://ioi2022.id/competition-rules/)) unless it is obviously unsuitable for computer programs (e.g. \"each participant required to give a handshake to a member of jury before any submissions\"). If it is ambiguous whether a rule should apply to an AI participant, Metaculus will determine whether the rule should be excluded.\n\nThe AI must not have access to the problems before being evaluated on them, e.g. the problems cannot be included in the training set. It should also be reasonably verifiable, e.g. it should not use any data which was uploaded after the latest competition.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2080, this question will resolve as **> December 31, 2079**", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2031", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next amendment to the US Constitution will be ratified by 2074?", "desc": "The [United States Constitution](https://uscode.house.gov/static/constitution.pdf) has been [amended 27 times](https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/amendments) since it was signed in 1787. \n\nThe [procedures for amending the US Constitution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_Five_of_the_United_States_Constitution#Procedures_for_amending_the_Constitution) are outlined in Article V:\n\n> The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.\n\nAll of the amendments that have been ratified have been through the first path outlined in Article V: they have first been passed by a 2/3 vote of the House and the Senate, and then have been ratified by 3/4 of the states. Six amendments have been approved by Congress, but [have not been ratified](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_United_States#Unratified_amendments) by the required number of states. Four of these amendments are still pending.\n\nThe last time the Constitution was amended was in 1992, when the [27th Amendment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twenty-seventh_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution), which was passed by the 1st Congress in 1789, was finally ratified by three fourths of the states.", "resc": "The question resolves to the date that the Office of the Federal Register of the [National Archives](https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/constitution) certifies that a 28th amendment to the US Constitution has been ratified.", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2052", "upper_75": "2074", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next amendment to the US Constitution will be ratified by 2074?", "desc": "The [United States Constitution](https://uscode.house.gov/static/constitution.pdf) has been [amended 27 times](https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/amendments) since it was signed in 1787. \n\nThe [procedures for amending the US Constitution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_Five_of_the_United_States_Constitution#Procedures_for_amending_the_Constitution) are outlined in Article V:\n\n> The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.\n\nAll of the amendments that have been ratified have been through the first path outlined in Article V: they have first been passed by a 2/3 vote of the House and the Senate, and then have been ratified by 3/4 of the states. Six amendments have been approved by Congress, but [have not been ratified](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_United_States#Unratified_amendments) by the required number of states. Four of these amendments are still pending.\n\nThe last time the Constitution was amended was in 1992, when the [27th Amendment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twenty-seventh_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution), which was passed by the 1st Congress in 1789, was finally ratified by three fourths of the states.", "resc": "The question resolves to the date that the Office of the Federal Register of the [National Archives](https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/constitution) certifies that a 28th amendment to the US Constitution has been ratified.", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2052", "upper_75": "2074", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that UK GDP per capita will be less than 50% of that of the world's leading major economy by 2034?", "desc": "According [to the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true), the UK had GDP per capita of $47,334 in 2021. This was 68% of the level of the USA at $69,287 in the same year. The UK had a higher GDP per capita than the US in 2007 but has fallen increasingly far behind since the 2008 financial crisis and 2016 Brexit vote.", "resc": "For the purpose of this question, the world's leading major economy is the country which has the highest GDP per capita out of all countries with a population greater than 25 million (using [World Bank population data](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?most_recent_value_desc=true)). At the time of writing (September 30, 2022), that country is the USA. GDP per capita will be measured at market exchange rates, not PPP.\n\nThis question resolves as **July 1st** of the year the United Kingdom has a GDP per capita less than 50% of the world's leading major economy as defined above, at market exchange rates, according to the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true) using the series *GDP per capita (current US$)* or equivalent, and using [World Bank population data](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?most_recent_value_desc=true) to determine the leading major economy as defined by this question. If the World Bank stops publishing data or becomes unreliable, Metaculus admins shall determine a credible replacement data source at their discretion.\n\nIf this has not occurred when the data for 2039 is released this question will resolve as **\"> July 1, 2039**\".", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will win a Gold Medal in the International Olympiad in Informatics (IOI) by 2031?", "desc": "The [International Olympiad in Informatics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Olympiad_in_Informatics) is the most prestigious computer science competition for students 20-and-under featuring difficult and novel competitive programming problems. Contestants complete a total of 6 problems over 2 days, with 5 hours each day to submit their solutions. Problems are graded on a 0 - 100 by an automated testing system. Usually, there are about 350 participants (up to 4 per participating country) and exactly 30 gold medals.\n\nIn the 2022 Olympiad, 416/600 score was enough to win a gold medal, and 2 participants scored a perfect 600 score.\n\nIn early 2022, DeepMind published [AlphaCode](https://www.deepmind.com/blog/competitive-programming-with-alphacode), an AI system for solving competitive programming challenges. It was evaluated on [Codeforces](codeforces.com), a popular online platform for programming competitions, and reached a rating of 1238, similar to a median participant.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date an AI system competes well enough on an IOI test to earn the equivalent of a gold medal. The IOI test must be the most current IOI test at the time the feat is completed (previous years do not qualify).\n\nAI must be evaluated under the following conditions, similarly to human competitors:\n\n* The AI has access to problem statements, test data and supplementary materials. \n* The AI can send up to 50 solutions and see limited feedback (such as \"correct answer\" or \"time limit exceeded\") for each submission.\n* The AI has 5 hours per set of 3 problems to compute, but there are no other limitations on computational resources.\n* The AI cannot have access to the internet during the test.\n* The AI must generally follow the latest official competition rules (see rules for [IOI 2022](https://ioi2022.id/competition-rules/)) unless it is obviously unsuitable for computer programs (e.g. \"each participant required to give a handshake to a member of jury before any submissions\"). If it is ambiguous whether a rule should apply to an AI participant, Metaculus will determine whether the rule should be excluded.\n\nThe AI must not have access to the problems before being evaluated on them, e.g. the problems cannot be included in the training set. It should also be reasonably verifiable, e.g. it should not use any data which was uploaded after the latest competition.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2080, this question will resolve as **> December 31, 2079**", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2031", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that total worldwide nuclear disarmament will occur by Not ≤ 2222?", "desc": "Currently, there are roughly [12,700 nuclear weapons](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/) in possession of the nations of the world. This number has decreased substantially since the height of the Cold War in the 1980s, leading some to believe that dismantlement of all nuclear weapons worldwide may occur sometime in the future. Formally, Article VI of the [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)](https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/) commits all declared nuclear weapons states to work towards general and complete nuclear disarmament under international control. Numerous organizations exist to promote this objective, and the topic frequently comes up at international summits such as [the Reykjavik summit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reykjav%C3%ADk_Summit) in 1986.", "resc": "This question will resolve when the Federation of American Scientists reports that zero nuclear weapons are in the direct control of any of the world's individual governments, or any other armed entity. If nuclear explosives are no longer in the possession of any military organizations, but are still held under strict international control for civilian purposes (e.g. geo-excavation, Orion-type spacecraft propulsion, or defense against naturally occurring Earth impactors), and this control is considered by international legal experts to fulfill Article VI of the NPT, the situation will still be considered one of total disarmament.\n\n\"Worldwide\" includes offshoots of our homeworld such as Lunar or Martian colonies.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2223, then this resolves as **\"> December 31, 2222\"**.", "lower_25": "2109", "median": "2190", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2222", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that peak oil production will be reached worldwide by 2021?", "desc": "\n\n[Peak oil is described as the moment at which economically viable extraction of petroleum starts to permanently decrease](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peak_oil). Since the amount of oil on Earth is limited, eventually peak oil production will be reached.\n\nThe concept of peak oil was introduced by the American geologist Marion King Hubbert in 1956. He predicted the peak oil production in the USA to happen between 1965 and not later than 1970. By the late 70s, there was a peak that functioned as a local peak. For the whole world, he predicted the peak oil production in 2000, with oil extraction of 12.5 billion barrels per year (34 million barrels per day). However, the oil production in 2000 was 75 million barrels per day, more than twice that amount, and continued to grow till at least 2019.\n\nIn the past, some experts have said that peak oil has already been reached or will soon be reached. For example, geologist Kenneth S. Deffayes [stated in February 2006 that world oil production peaked on December 16, 2005](https://web.archive.org/web/20071028114213/http://www.princeton.edu/hubbert/current-events-06-02.html). Colin Campbell, a British geologist, [predicted that the world oil production would peak in 2007](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colin_Campbell_(geologist)). On the other hand, as per 2007, [the U.S. Department of Energy predicted that the peak won't happen until 2037](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Peak_oil&oldid=143640664#Current_events).\n\nAccording to[ Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oil-production-by-country?country=~OWID_WRL), the historical maximum oil production of 52,182 TWh was achieved in 2018. In 2019-2021 it was 52,075, 48,508, and 49,094 TWh. Therefore, the peak was either reached in 2018 or will be reached in 2022 or later.", "resc": "For this question, the 'peak oil' year is the year when (i) the annual oil production is higher than for any previous year and (ii) higher than any of the next 10 years.\n\nThis question will resolve as **the relevant year** when both these criteria are met in that year.\n\nThe question will resolve as July 1 for the relevant year.\n\nIf peak oil is not reached by 2101, the question will be resolved as ***> Dec 31, 2100***.\n\nThe main resolution source for oil production is [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oil-production-by-country?country=~OWID_WRL). If it cannot be used, then [Statista](https://www.statista.com/statistics/265203/global-oil-production-since-in-barrels-per-day/) will be used instead as a secondary resolution source. If neither OWID nor Statista can be used, it is up to administrators to find equivalent data sources or to resolve the question ambiguously. \n\n\n[fine-print]\n\nThe site \"cannot be used\" if it no longer exists, the relevant information is missing, or it is out of date (data for year N-2 is not available by year N, preventing us from resolving the question).\n\nIf the URL of OWID or Statista is changed, that new URL will be used for resolution.\n\nIf neither OWID not Statista can be used and other reliable sites provide different conclusions about the peak oil year, the question will be resolved ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2021", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that UK GDP per capita will be less than 50% of that of the world's leading major economy by 2034?", "desc": "According [to the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true), the UK had GDP per capita of $47,334 in 2021. This was 68% of the level of the USA at $69,287 in the same year. The UK had a higher GDP per capita than the US in 2007 but has fallen increasingly far behind since the 2008 financial crisis and 2016 Brexit vote.", "resc": "For the purpose of this question, the world's leading major economy is the country which has the highest GDP per capita out of all countries with a population greater than 25 million (using [World Bank population data](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?most_recent_value_desc=true)). At the time of writing (September 30, 2022), that country is the USA. GDP per capita will be measured at market exchange rates, not PPP.\n\nThis question resolves as **July 1st** of the year the United Kingdom has a GDP per capita less than 50% of the world's leading major economy as defined above, at market exchange rates, according to the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true) using the series *GDP per capita (current US$)* or equivalent, and using [World Bank population data](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?most_recent_value_desc=true) to determine the leading major economy as defined by this question. If the World Bank stops publishing data or becomes unreliable, Metaculus admins shall determine a credible replacement data source at their discretion.\n\nIf this has not occurred when the data for 2039 is released this question will resolve as **\"> July 1, 2039**\".", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that UK GDP per capita will be less than 50% of that of the world's leading major economy by 2034?", "desc": "According [to the World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true), the UK had GDP per capita of $47,334 in 2021. This was 68% of the level of the USA at $69,287 in the same year. The UK had a higher GDP per capita than the US in 2007 but has fallen increasingly far behind since the 2008 financial crisis and 2016 Brexit vote.", "resc": "For the purpose of this question, the world's leading major economy is the country which has the highest GDP per capita out of all countries with a population greater than 25 million (using [World Bank population data](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?most_recent_value_desc=true)). At the time of writing (September 30, 2022), that country is the USA. GDP per capita will be measured at market exchange rates, not PPP.\n\nThis question resolves as **July 1st** of the year the United Kingdom has a GDP per capita less than 50% of the world's leading major economy as defined above, at market exchange rates, according to the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true) using the series *GDP per capita (current US$)* or equivalent, and using [World Bank population data](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?most_recent_value_desc=true) to determine the leading major economy as defined by this question. If the World Bank stops publishing data or becomes unreliable, Metaculus admins shall determine a credible replacement data source at their discretion.\n\nIf this has not occurred when the data for 2039 is released this question will resolve as **\"> July 1, 2039**\".", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that peak oil production will be reached worldwide by 2021?", "desc": "\n\n[Peak oil is described as the moment at which economically viable extraction of petroleum starts to permanently decrease](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peak_oil). Since the amount of oil on Earth is limited, eventually peak oil production will be reached.\n\nThe concept of peak oil was introduced by the American geologist Marion King Hubbert in 1956. He predicted the peak oil production in the USA to happen between 1965 and not later than 1970. By the late 70s, there was a peak that functioned as a local peak. For the whole world, he predicted the peak oil production in 2000, with oil extraction of 12.5 billion barrels per year (34 million barrels per day). However, the oil production in 2000 was 75 million barrels per day, more than twice that amount, and continued to grow till at least 2019.\n\nIn the past, some experts have said that peak oil has already been reached or will soon be reached. For example, geologist Kenneth S. Deffayes [stated in February 2006 that world oil production peaked on December 16, 2005](https://web.archive.org/web/20071028114213/http://www.princeton.edu/hubbert/current-events-06-02.html). Colin Campbell, a British geologist, [predicted that the world oil production would peak in 2007](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colin_Campbell_(geologist)). On the other hand, as per 2007, [the U.S. Department of Energy predicted that the peak won't happen until 2037](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Peak_oil&oldid=143640664#Current_events).\n\nAccording to[ Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oil-production-by-country?country=~OWID_WRL), the historical maximum oil production of 52,182 TWh was achieved in 2018. In 2019-2021 it was 52,075, 48,508, and 49,094 TWh. Therefore, the peak was either reached in 2018 or will be reached in 2022 or later.", "resc": "For this question, the 'peak oil' year is the year when (i) the annual oil production is higher than for any previous year and (ii) higher than any of the next 10 years.\n\nThis question will resolve as **the relevant year** when both these criteria are met in that year.\n\nThe question will resolve as July 1 for the relevant year.\n\nIf peak oil is not reached by 2101, the question will be resolved as ***> Dec 31, 2100***.\n\nThe main resolution source for oil production is [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oil-production-by-country?country=~OWID_WRL). If it cannot be used, then [Statista](https://www.statista.com/statistics/265203/global-oil-production-since-in-barrels-per-day/) will be used instead as a secondary resolution source. If neither OWID nor Statista can be used, it is up to administrators to find equivalent data sources or to resolve the question ambiguously. \n\n\n[fine-print]\n\nThe site \"cannot be used\" if it no longer exists, the relevant information is missing, or it is out of date (data for year N-2 is not available by year N, preventing us from resolving the question).\n\nIf the URL of OWID or Statista is changed, that new URL will be used for resolution.\n\nIf neither OWID not Statista can be used and other reliable sites provide different conclusions about the peak oil year, the question will be resolved ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2021", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the peak Covid-19 Hospitalization rate (new admissions per week per million) in the US will be 84.7% in these years?", "desc": "", "resc": "The peak weekly hospitalization rate for Covid-19 in the United States was 459/million on January 19, 2022 according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/current-covid-hospitalizations-per-million?country=~USA)._x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\n***What will be the peak Covid-19 Hospitalization rate (new admissions per week per million) in the US in 2023?***_x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese sub-questions will resolve as the highest hospitalization rate per million people per week reported between January 1 to December 31 (inclusive) for the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/current-covid-hospitalizations-per-million?time=2021-02-13..latest&country=~USA). If Our World in Data does not report this full set of data, an alternative source such as the [CDC](https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#new-hospital-admissions) may be used at Metaculus' discretion._x000D_\n_x000D_\nData will be considered official 21 days after the reported date to allow for error corrections and reporting delays.", "lower_25": "84.7", "median": "215", "upper_75": "406", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next amendment to the US Constitution will be ratified by 2074?", "desc": "The [United States Constitution](https://uscode.house.gov/static/constitution.pdf) has been [amended 27 times](https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/amendments) since it was signed in 1787. \n\nThe [procedures for amending the US Constitution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_Five_of_the_United_States_Constitution#Procedures_for_amending_the_Constitution) are outlined in Article V:\n\n> The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.\n\nAll of the amendments that have been ratified have been through the first path outlined in Article V: they have first been passed by a 2/3 vote of the House and the Senate, and then have been ratified by 3/4 of the states. Six amendments have been approved by Congress, but [have not been ratified](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_United_States#Unratified_amendments) by the required number of states. Four of these amendments are still pending.\n\nThe last time the Constitution was amended was in 1992, when the [27th Amendment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twenty-seventh_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution), which was passed by the 1st Congress in 1789, was finally ratified by three fourths of the states.", "resc": "The question resolves to the date that the Office of the Federal Register of the [National Archives](https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/constitution) certifies that a 28th amendment to the US Constitution has been ratified.", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2052", "upper_75": "2074", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the peak Covid-19 Hospitalization rate (new admissions per week per million) in the US will be 406 in the year 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "The peak weekly hospitalization rate for Covid-19 in the United States was 459/million on January 19, 2022 according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/current-covid-hospitalizations-per-million?country=~USA)._x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\n***What will be the peak Covid-19 Hospitalization rate (new admissions per week per million) in the US in 2023?***_x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese sub-questions will resolve as the highest hospitalization rate per million people per week reported between January 1 to December 31 (inclusive) for the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/current-covid-hospitalizations-per-million?time=2021-02-13..latest&country=~USA). If Our World in Data does not report this full set of data, an alternative source such as the [CDC](https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#new-hospital-admissions) may be used at Metaculus' discretion._x000D_\n_x000D_\nData will be considered official 21 days after the reported date to allow for error corrections and reporting delays.", "lower_25": "84.7", "median": "215", "upper_75": "406", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that peak oil production will be reached worldwide by 2021?", "desc": "\n\n[Peak oil is described as the moment at which economically viable extraction of petroleum starts to permanently decrease](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peak_oil). Since the amount of oil on Earth is limited, eventually peak oil production will be reached.\n\nThe concept of peak oil was introduced by the American geologist Marion King Hubbert in 1956. He predicted the peak oil production in the USA to happen between 1965 and not later than 1970. By the late 70s, there was a peak that functioned as a local peak. For the whole world, he predicted the peak oil production in 2000, with oil extraction of 12.5 billion barrels per year (34 million barrels per day). However, the oil production in 2000 was 75 million barrels per day, more than twice that amount, and continued to grow till at least 2019.\n\nIn the past, some experts have said that peak oil has already been reached or will soon be reached. For example, geologist Kenneth S. Deffayes [stated in February 2006 that world oil production peaked on December 16, 2005](https://web.archive.org/web/20071028114213/http://www.princeton.edu/hubbert/current-events-06-02.html). Colin Campbell, a British geologist, [predicted that the world oil production would peak in 2007](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colin_Campbell_(geologist)). On the other hand, as per 2007, [the U.S. Department of Energy predicted that the peak won't happen until 2037](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Peak_oil&oldid=143640664#Current_events).\n\nAccording to[ Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oil-production-by-country?country=~OWID_WRL), the historical maximum oil production of 52,182 TWh was achieved in 2018. In 2019-2021 it was 52,075, 48,508, and 49,094 TWh. Therefore, the peak was either reached in 2018 or will be reached in 2022 or later.", "resc": "For this question, the 'peak oil' year is the year when (i) the annual oil production is higher than for any previous year and (ii) higher than any of the next 10 years.\n\nThis question will resolve as **the relevant year** when both these criteria are met in that year.\n\nThe question will resolve as July 1 for the relevant year.\n\nIf peak oil is not reached by 2101, the question will be resolved as ***> Dec 31, 2100***.\n\nThe main resolution source for oil production is [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oil-production-by-country?country=~OWID_WRL). If it cannot be used, then [Statista](https://www.statista.com/statistics/265203/global-oil-production-since-in-barrels-per-day/) will be used instead as a secondary resolution source. If neither OWID nor Statista can be used, it is up to administrators to find equivalent data sources or to resolve the question ambiguously. \n\n\n[fine-print]\n\nThe site \"cannot be used\" if it no longer exists, the relevant information is missing, or it is out of date (data for year N-2 is not available by year N, preventing us from resolving the question).\n\nIf the URL of OWID or Statista is changed, that new URL will be used for resolution.\n\nIf neither OWID not Statista can be used and other reliable sites provide different conclusions about the peak oil year, the question will be resolved ambiguously.", "lower_25": "2021", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2032", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the peak Covid-19 Hospitalization rate (new admissions per week per million) in the US will be 84.7% in these years?", "desc": "", "resc": "The peak weekly hospitalization rate for Covid-19 in the United States was 459/million on January 19, 2022 according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/current-covid-hospitalizations-per-million?country=~USA)._x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\n***What will be the peak Covid-19 Hospitalization rate (new admissions per week per million) in the US in 2023?***_x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese sub-questions will resolve as the highest hospitalization rate per million people per week reported between January 1 to December 31 (inclusive) for the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/current-covid-hospitalizations-per-million?time=2021-02-13..latest&country=~USA). If Our World in Data does not report this full set of data, an alternative source such as the [CDC](https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#new-hospital-admissions) may be used at Metaculus' discretion._x000D_\n_x000D_\nData will be considered official 21 days after the reported date to allow for error corrections and reporting delays.", "lower_25": "84.7", "median": "215", "upper_75": "406", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that total worldwide nuclear disarmament will occur by Not ≤ 2222?", "desc": "Currently, there are roughly [12,700 nuclear weapons](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/) in possession of the nations of the world. This number has decreased substantially since the height of the Cold War in the 1980s, leading some to believe that dismantlement of all nuclear weapons worldwide may occur sometime in the future. Formally, Article VI of the [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)](https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/) commits all declared nuclear weapons states to work towards general and complete nuclear disarmament under international control. Numerous organizations exist to promote this objective, and the topic frequently comes up at international summits such as [the Reykjavik summit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reykjav%C3%ADk_Summit) in 1986.", "resc": "This question will resolve when the Federation of American Scientists reports that zero nuclear weapons are in the direct control of any of the world's individual governments, or any other armed entity. If nuclear explosives are no longer in the possession of any military organizations, but are still held under strict international control for civilian purposes (e.g. geo-excavation, Orion-type spacecraft propulsion, or defense against naturally occurring Earth impactors), and this control is considered by international legal experts to fulfill Article VI of the NPT, the situation will still be considered one of total disarmament.\n\n\"Worldwide\" includes offshoots of our homeworld such as Lunar or Martian colonies.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2223, then this resolves as **\"> December 31, 2222\"**.", "lower_25": "2109", "median": "2190", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2222", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that total worldwide nuclear disarmament will occur by Not ≤ 2222?", "desc": "Currently, there are roughly [12,700 nuclear weapons](https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/) in possession of the nations of the world. This number has decreased substantially since the height of the Cold War in the 1980s, leading some to believe that dismantlement of all nuclear weapons worldwide may occur sometime in the future. Formally, Article VI of the [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)](https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/) commits all declared nuclear weapons states to work towards general and complete nuclear disarmament under international control. Numerous organizations exist to promote this objective, and the topic frequently comes up at international summits such as [the Reykjavik summit](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reykjav%C3%ADk_Summit) in 1986.", "resc": "This question will resolve when the Federation of American Scientists reports that zero nuclear weapons are in the direct control of any of the world's individual governments, or any other armed entity. If nuclear explosives are no longer in the possession of any military organizations, but are still held under strict international control for civilian purposes (e.g. geo-excavation, Orion-type spacecraft propulsion, or defense against naturally occurring Earth impactors), and this control is considered by international legal experts to fulfill Article VI of the NPT, the situation will still be considered one of total disarmament.\n\n\"Worldwide\" includes offshoots of our homeworld such as Lunar or Martian colonies.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2223, then this resolves as **\"> December 31, 2222\"**.", "lower_25": "2109", "median": "2190", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2222", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the peak Covid-19 Hospitalization rate (new admissions per week per million) in the US will be 406 in the year 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "The peak weekly hospitalization rate for Covid-19 in the United States was 459/million on January 19, 2022 according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/current-covid-hospitalizations-per-million?country=~USA)._x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\n***What will be the peak Covid-19 Hospitalization rate (new admissions per week per million) in the US in 2023?***_x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese sub-questions will resolve as the highest hospitalization rate per million people per week reported between January 1 to December 31 (inclusive) for the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/current-covid-hospitalizations-per-million?time=2021-02-13..latest&country=~USA). If Our World in Data does not report this full set of data, an alternative source such as the [CDC](https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#new-hospital-admissions) may be used at Metaculus' discretion._x000D_\n_x000D_\nData will be considered official 21 days after the reported date to allow for error corrections and reporting delays.", "lower_25": "84.7", "median": "215", "upper_75": "406", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the peak Covid-19 Hospitalization rate (new admissions per week per million) in the US will be 54.2 in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "The peak weekly hospitalization rate for Covid-19 in the United States was 459/million on January 19, 2022 according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/current-covid-hospitalizations-per-million?country=~USA)._x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\n***What will be the peak Covid-19 Hospitalization rate (new admissions per week per million) in the US in 2023?***_x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese sub-questions will resolve as the highest hospitalization rate per million people per week reported between January 1 to December 31 (inclusive) for the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/current-covid-hospitalizations-per-million?time=2021-02-13..latest&country=~USA). If Our World in Data does not report this full set of data, an alternative source such as the [CDC](https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#new-hospital-admissions) may be used at Metaculus' discretion._x000D_\n_x000D_\nData will be considered official 21 days after the reported date to allow for error corrections and reporting delays.", "lower_25": "54.2", "median": "247", "upper_75": "481", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP growth per capita will be 1.98% in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nGross domestic product (GDP) is [defined by Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp) as\n\n>the total monetary or market value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period.\n\nGDP is useful as a measure of a country's overall economic output. GDP per capita is measured as a country's GDP divided by its population, which is an important measure of economic output per person and can be a useful indicator of general well-being in a country.\n\nGDP per capita is necessary for between-country comparisons due to different population sizes, but an additional adjustment must be made to truly compare between countries due to different exchange rates and currency values. This adjustment is known as purchasing power parity (PPP). The [World Bank describes its PPP adjustment as follows](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp):\n\n>PPPs are calculated based on the price of a common basket of goods and services in each participating economy and are a measure of what an economy's local currency can buy in another economy. Market exchange rate-based conversions reflect both price and volume differences in expenditures and are thus inappropriate for volume comparisons. PPP-based conversions of expenditures eliminate the effect of price level differences between economies and reflect only differences in the volume of economies.\n\nUsing GDP per capita adjusted by PPP allows for comparisons between countries (though note that GDP per capita is a measure of the average economic output per person and therefore cannot indicate inequality in well-being). The PPP adjustment currently used in the Our World in Data chart is calculated by the World Bank and converts the different currencies to constant 2017 international dollars. According to Our World in Data\n\n>An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071113/breaking-down-geometric-mean.asp) of the world real GDP growth in the respective year (also known as the compound annual growth rate, or CAGR), based on the GDP per capita data from [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-worldbank?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). OWID currently reports this data in real (inflation adjusted) values; if this changes, data will be indexed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US) for inflation and [purchasing power parity](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution value will be calculated according to the following formula, in percentage points, where X is the listed year. The GDP for 2020 will always be taken as the GDP shown on the chart for 2020 at the resolution time for each listed year.\n\n\\begin{align}\n\\left[\\left(\\frac{GDP_{X}}{GDP_{2020}}\\right)^{1/(X - 2020)} - 1 \\right]× 100\n\\end{align}\n\nFor example, if GDP per capita in 2025 was reported to be 18,000, and 2020 was 16,185; this question would resolve as 2.15 for the year 2025.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf no humans are left alive prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **below the lower boundary**.", "lower_25": "1.98", "median": "2.71", "upper_75": "3.39", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the peak Covid-19 Hospitalization rate (new admissions per week per million) in the US will be 84.7% in these years?", "desc": "", "resc": "The peak weekly hospitalization rate for Covid-19 in the United States was 459/million on January 19, 2022 according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/current-covid-hospitalizations-per-million?country=~USA)._x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\n***What will be the peak Covid-19 Hospitalization rate (new admissions per week per million) in the US in 2023?***_x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese sub-questions will resolve as the highest hospitalization rate per million people per week reported between January 1 to December 31 (inclusive) for the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/current-covid-hospitalizations-per-million?time=2021-02-13..latest&country=~USA). If Our World in Data does not report this full set of data, an alternative source such as the [CDC](https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#new-hospital-admissions) may be used at Metaculus' discretion._x000D_\n_x000D_\nData will be considered official 21 days after the reported date to allow for error corrections and reporting delays.", "lower_25": "84.7", "median": "215", "upper_75": "406", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will yield 166 bushels of corn (maize) per acre of land used to grow corn for human consumption in 2035?", "desc": "Historically, corn (maize) yields per area have significantly increased due to intensification of the production process, and higher yielding and more robust corn cultivars. Weather and climatological factors influence annual yields adding uncertainty to the forecast. Additionally, market dynamics and technological developments must also be considered in yield predictions. \nThe United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) releases statistical data of crop yields, including [corn](https://www.nass.usda.gov/Charts_and_Maps/Field_Crops/cornyld.php). The USDA publishes [a data visualization of corn yields here](https://www.nass.usda.gov/Data_Visualization/Commodity/index.php) using data from its [monthly crop production reports](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/tm70mv177).\n\n\"USDA", "resc": "This question resolves as the \"corn for grain\" yield in bushels per acre in the calendar year 2035 according to reporting from the USDA. Resolution will be determined according to the USDA's first estimate published after January 1, 2036, such as from its [monthly crop production report](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/tm70mv177) for January 2036", "lower_25": "166", "median": "190", "upper_75": "213", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the peak Covid-19 Hospitalization rate (new admissions per week per million) in the US will be 406 in the year 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "The peak weekly hospitalization rate for Covid-19 in the United States was 459/million on January 19, 2022 according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/current-covid-hospitalizations-per-million?country=~USA)._x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\n***What will be the peak Covid-19 Hospitalization rate (new admissions per week per million) in the US in 2023?***_x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese sub-questions will resolve as the highest hospitalization rate per million people per week reported between January 1 to December 31 (inclusive) for the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/current-covid-hospitalizations-per-million?time=2021-02-13..latest&country=~USA). If Our World in Data does not report this full set of data, an alternative source such as the [CDC](https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#new-hospital-admissions) may be used at Metaculus' discretion._x000D_\n_x000D_\nData will be considered official 21 days after the reported date to allow for error corrections and reporting delays.", "lower_25": "84.7", "median": "215", "upper_75": "406", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP growth per capita will be 1.98% in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nGross domestic product (GDP) is [defined by Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp) as\n\n>the total monetary or market value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period.\n\nGDP is useful as a measure of a country's overall economic output. GDP per capita is measured as a country's GDP divided by its population, which is an important measure of economic output per person and can be a useful indicator of general well-being in a country.\n\nGDP per capita is necessary for between-country comparisons due to different population sizes, but an additional adjustment must be made to truly compare between countries due to different exchange rates and currency values. This adjustment is known as purchasing power parity (PPP). The [World Bank describes its PPP adjustment as follows](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp):\n\n>PPPs are calculated based on the price of a common basket of goods and services in each participating economy and are a measure of what an economy's local currency can buy in another economy. Market exchange rate-based conversions reflect both price and volume differences in expenditures and are thus inappropriate for volume comparisons. PPP-based conversions of expenditures eliminate the effect of price level differences between economies and reflect only differences in the volume of economies.\n\nUsing GDP per capita adjusted by PPP allows for comparisons between countries (though note that GDP per capita is a measure of the average economic output per person and therefore cannot indicate inequality in well-being). The PPP adjustment currently used in the Our World in Data chart is calculated by the World Bank and converts the different currencies to constant 2017 international dollars. According to Our World in Data\n\n>An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071113/breaking-down-geometric-mean.asp) of the world real GDP growth in the respective year (also known as the compound annual growth rate, or CAGR), based on the GDP per capita data from [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-worldbank?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). OWID currently reports this data in real (inflation adjusted) values; if this changes, data will be indexed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US) for inflation and [purchasing power parity](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution value will be calculated according to the following formula, in percentage points, where X is the listed year. The GDP for 2020 will always be taken as the GDP shown on the chart for 2020 at the resolution time for each listed year.\n\n\\begin{align}\n\\left[\\left(\\frac{GDP_{X}}{GDP_{2020}}\\right)^{1/(X - 2020)} - 1 \\right]× 100\n\\end{align}\n\nFor example, if GDP per capita in 2025 was reported to be 18,000, and 2020 was 16,185; this question would resolve as 2.15 for the year 2025.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf no humans are left alive prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **below the lower boundary**.", "lower_25": "1.98", "median": "2.71", "upper_75": "3.39", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the peak Covid-19 Hospitalization rate (new admissions per week per million) in the US will be 54.2 in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "The peak weekly hospitalization rate for Covid-19 in the United States was 459/million on January 19, 2022 according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/current-covid-hospitalizations-per-million?country=~USA)._x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\n***What will be the peak Covid-19 Hospitalization rate (new admissions per week per million) in the US in 2023?***_x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese sub-questions will resolve as the highest hospitalization rate per million people per week reported between January 1 to December 31 (inclusive) for the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/current-covid-hospitalizations-per-million?time=2021-02-13..latest&country=~USA). If Our World in Data does not report this full set of data, an alternative source such as the [CDC](https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#new-hospital-admissions) may be used at Metaculus' discretion._x000D_\n_x000D_\nData will be considered official 21 days after the reported date to allow for error corrections and reporting delays.", "lower_25": "54.2", "median": "247", "upper_75": "481", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP growth per capita will be 3.41% in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nGross domestic product (GDP) is [defined by Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp) as\n\n>the total monetary or market value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period.\n\nGDP is useful as a measure of a country's overall economic output. GDP per capita is measured as a country's GDP divided by its population, which is an important measure of economic output per person and can be a useful indicator of general well-being in a country.\n\nGDP per capita is necessary for between-country comparisons due to different population sizes, but an additional adjustment must be made to truly compare between countries due to different exchange rates and currency values. This adjustment is known as purchasing power parity (PPP). The [World Bank describes its PPP adjustment as follows](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp):\n\n>PPPs are calculated based on the price of a common basket of goods and services in each participating economy and are a measure of what an economy's local currency can buy in another economy. Market exchange rate-based conversions reflect both price and volume differences in expenditures and are thus inappropriate for volume comparisons. PPP-based conversions of expenditures eliminate the effect of price level differences between economies and reflect only differences in the volume of economies.\n\nUsing GDP per capita adjusted by PPP allows for comparisons between countries (though note that GDP per capita is a measure of the average economic output per person and therefore cannot indicate inequality in well-being). The PPP adjustment currently used in the Our World in Data chart is calculated by the World Bank and converts the different currencies to constant 2017 international dollars. According to Our World in Data\n\n>An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071113/breaking-down-geometric-mean.asp) of the world real GDP growth in the respective year (also known as the compound annual growth rate, or CAGR), based on the GDP per capita data from [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-worldbank?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). OWID currently reports this data in real (inflation adjusted) values; if this changes, data will be indexed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US) for inflation and [purchasing power parity](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution value will be calculated according to the following formula, in percentage points, where X is the listed year. The GDP for 2020 will always be taken as the GDP shown on the chart for 2020 at the resolution time for each listed year.\n\n\\begin{align}\n\\left[\\left(\\frac{GDP_{X}}{GDP_{2020}}\\right)^{1/(X - 2020)} - 1 \\right]× 100\n\\end{align}\n\nFor example, if GDP per capita in 2025 was reported to be 18,000, and 2020 was 16,185; this question would resolve as 2.15 for the year 2025.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf no humans are left alive prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **below the lower boundary**.", "lower_25": "1.73", "median": "2.60", "upper_75": "3.41", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will yield 166 bushels of corn (maize) per acre of land used to grow corn for human consumption in 2035?", "desc": "Historically, corn (maize) yields per area have significantly increased due to intensification of the production process, and higher yielding and more robust corn cultivars. Weather and climatological factors influence annual yields adding uncertainty to the forecast. Additionally, market dynamics and technological developments must also be considered in yield predictions. \nThe United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) releases statistical data of crop yields, including [corn](https://www.nass.usda.gov/Charts_and_Maps/Field_Crops/cornyld.php). The USDA publishes [a data visualization of corn yields here](https://www.nass.usda.gov/Data_Visualization/Commodity/index.php) using data from its [monthly crop production reports](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/tm70mv177).\n\n\"USDA", "resc": "This question resolves as the \"corn for grain\" yield in bushels per acre in the calendar year 2035 according to reporting from the USDA. Resolution will be determined according to the USDA's first estimate published after January 1, 2036, such as from its [monthly crop production report](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/tm70mv177) for January 2036", "lower_25": "166", "median": "190", "upper_75": "213", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will yield 166 bushels of corn (maize) per acre of land used to grow corn for human consumption in 2035?", "desc": "Historically, corn (maize) yields per area have significantly increased due to intensification of the production process, and higher yielding and more robust corn cultivars. Weather and climatological factors influence annual yields adding uncertainty to the forecast. Additionally, market dynamics and technological developments must also be considered in yield predictions. \nThe United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) releases statistical data of crop yields, including [corn](https://www.nass.usda.gov/Charts_and_Maps/Field_Crops/cornyld.php). The USDA publishes [a data visualization of corn yields here](https://www.nass.usda.gov/Data_Visualization/Commodity/index.php) using data from its [monthly crop production reports](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/tm70mv177).\n\n\"USDA", "resc": "This question resolves as the \"corn for grain\" yield in bushels per acre in the calendar year 2035 according to reporting from the USDA. Resolution will be determined according to the USDA's first estimate published after January 1, 2036, such as from its [monthly crop production report](https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/tm70mv177) for January 2036", "lower_25": "166", "median": "190", "upper_75": "213", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP growth per capita will be 3.41% in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nGross domestic product (GDP) is [defined by Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp) as\n\n>the total monetary or market value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period.\n\nGDP is useful as a measure of a country's overall economic output. GDP per capita is measured as a country's GDP divided by its population, which is an important measure of economic output per person and can be a useful indicator of general well-being in a country.\n\nGDP per capita is necessary for between-country comparisons due to different population sizes, but an additional adjustment must be made to truly compare between countries due to different exchange rates and currency values. This adjustment is known as purchasing power parity (PPP). The [World Bank describes its PPP adjustment as follows](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp):\n\n>PPPs are calculated based on the price of a common basket of goods and services in each participating economy and are a measure of what an economy's local currency can buy in another economy. Market exchange rate-based conversions reflect both price and volume differences in expenditures and are thus inappropriate for volume comparisons. PPP-based conversions of expenditures eliminate the effect of price level differences between economies and reflect only differences in the volume of economies.\n\nUsing GDP per capita adjusted by PPP allows for comparisons between countries (though note that GDP per capita is a measure of the average economic output per person and therefore cannot indicate inequality in well-being). The PPP adjustment currently used in the Our World in Data chart is calculated by the World Bank and converts the different currencies to constant 2017 international dollars. According to Our World in Data\n\n>An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071113/breaking-down-geometric-mean.asp) of the world real GDP growth in the respective year (also known as the compound annual growth rate, or CAGR), based on the GDP per capita data from [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-worldbank?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). OWID currently reports this data in real (inflation adjusted) values; if this changes, data will be indexed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US) for inflation and [purchasing power parity](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution value will be calculated according to the following formula, in percentage points, where X is the listed year. The GDP for 2020 will always be taken as the GDP shown on the chart for 2020 at the resolution time for each listed year.\n\n\\begin{align}\n\\left[\\left(\\frac{GDP_{X}}{GDP_{2020}}\\right)^{1/(X - 2020)} - 1 \\right]× 100\n\\end{align}\n\nFor example, if GDP per capita in 2025 was reported to be 18,000, and 2020 was 16,185; this question would resolve as 2.15 for the year 2025.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf no humans are left alive prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **below the lower boundary**.", "lower_25": "1.73", "median": "2.60", "upper_75": "3.41", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP growth per capita will be 1.98% in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nGross domestic product (GDP) is [defined by Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp) as\n\n>the total monetary or market value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period.\n\nGDP is useful as a measure of a country's overall economic output. GDP per capita is measured as a country's GDP divided by its population, which is an important measure of economic output per person and can be a useful indicator of general well-being in a country.\n\nGDP per capita is necessary for between-country comparisons due to different population sizes, but an additional adjustment must be made to truly compare between countries due to different exchange rates and currency values. This adjustment is known as purchasing power parity (PPP). The [World Bank describes its PPP adjustment as follows](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp):\n\n>PPPs are calculated based on the price of a common basket of goods and services in each participating economy and are a measure of what an economy's local currency can buy in another economy. Market exchange rate-based conversions reflect both price and volume differences in expenditures and are thus inappropriate for volume comparisons. PPP-based conversions of expenditures eliminate the effect of price level differences between economies and reflect only differences in the volume of economies.\n\nUsing GDP per capita adjusted by PPP allows for comparisons between countries (though note that GDP per capita is a measure of the average economic output per person and therefore cannot indicate inequality in well-being). The PPP adjustment currently used in the Our World in Data chart is calculated by the World Bank and converts the different currencies to constant 2017 international dollars. According to Our World in Data\n\n>An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071113/breaking-down-geometric-mean.asp) of the world real GDP growth in the respective year (also known as the compound annual growth rate, or CAGR), based on the GDP per capita data from [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-worldbank?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). OWID currently reports this data in real (inflation adjusted) values; if this changes, data will be indexed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US) for inflation and [purchasing power parity](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution value will be calculated according to the following formula, in percentage points, where X is the listed year. The GDP for 2020 will always be taken as the GDP shown on the chart for 2020 at the resolution time for each listed year.\n\n\\begin{align}\n\\left[\\left(\\frac{GDP_{X}}{GDP_{2020}}\\right)^{1/(X - 2020)} - 1 \\right]× 100\n\\end{align}\n\nFor example, if GDP per capita in 2025 was reported to be 18,000, and 2020 was 16,185; this question would resolve as 2.15 for the year 2025.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf no humans are left alive prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **below the lower boundary**.", "lower_25": "1.98", "median": "2.71", "upper_75": "3.39", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP growth per capita will be 3.41% in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nGross domestic product (GDP) is [defined by Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp) as\n\n>the total monetary or market value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period.\n\nGDP is useful as a measure of a country's overall economic output. GDP per capita is measured as a country's GDP divided by its population, which is an important measure of economic output per person and can be a useful indicator of general well-being in a country.\n\nGDP per capita is necessary for between-country comparisons due to different population sizes, but an additional adjustment must be made to truly compare between countries due to different exchange rates and currency values. This adjustment is known as purchasing power parity (PPP). The [World Bank describes its PPP adjustment as follows](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp):\n\n>PPPs are calculated based on the price of a common basket of goods and services in each participating economy and are a measure of what an economy's local currency can buy in another economy. Market exchange rate-based conversions reflect both price and volume differences in expenditures and are thus inappropriate for volume comparisons. PPP-based conversions of expenditures eliminate the effect of price level differences between economies and reflect only differences in the volume of economies.\n\nUsing GDP per capita adjusted by PPP allows for comparisons between countries (though note that GDP per capita is a measure of the average economic output per person and therefore cannot indicate inequality in well-being). The PPP adjustment currently used in the Our World in Data chart is calculated by the World Bank and converts the different currencies to constant 2017 international dollars. According to Our World in Data\n\n>An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071113/breaking-down-geometric-mean.asp) of the world real GDP growth in the respective year (also known as the compound annual growth rate, or CAGR), based on the GDP per capita data from [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-worldbank?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). OWID currently reports this data in real (inflation adjusted) values; if this changes, data will be indexed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US) for inflation and [purchasing power parity](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution value will be calculated according to the following formula, in percentage points, where X is the listed year. The GDP for 2020 will always be taken as the GDP shown on the chart for 2020 at the resolution time for each listed year.\n\n\\begin{align}\n\\left[\\left(\\frac{GDP_{X}}{GDP_{2020}}\\right)^{1/(X - 2020)} - 1 \\right]× 100\n\\end{align}\n\nFor example, if GDP per capita in 2025 was reported to be 18,000, and 2020 was 16,185; this question would resolve as 2.15 for the year 2025.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf no humans are left alive prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **below the lower boundary**.", "lower_25": "1.73", "median": "2.60", "upper_75": "3.41", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP growth per capita will be 5.35% in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nGross domestic product (GDP) is [defined by Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp) as\n\n>the total monetary or market value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period.\n\nGDP is useful as a measure of a country's overall economic output. GDP per capita is measured as a country's GDP divided by its population, which is an important measure of economic output per person and can be a useful indicator of general well-being in a country.\n\nGDP per capita is necessary for between-country comparisons due to different population sizes, but an additional adjustment must be made to truly compare between countries due to different exchange rates and currency values. This adjustment is known as purchasing power parity (PPP). The [World Bank describes its PPP adjustment as follows](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp):\n\n>PPPs are calculated based on the price of a common basket of goods and services in each participating economy and are a measure of what an economy's local currency can buy in another economy. Market exchange rate-based conversions reflect both price and volume differences in expenditures and are thus inappropriate for volume comparisons. PPP-based conversions of expenditures eliminate the effect of price level differences between economies and reflect only differences in the volume of economies.\n\nUsing GDP per capita adjusted by PPP allows for comparisons between countries (though note that GDP per capita is a measure of the average economic output per person and therefore cannot indicate inequality in well-being). The PPP adjustment currently used in the Our World in Data chart is calculated by the World Bank and converts the different currencies to constant 2017 international dollars. According to Our World in Data\n\n>An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071113/breaking-down-geometric-mean.asp) of the world real GDP growth in the respective year (also known as the compound annual growth rate, or CAGR), based on the GDP per capita data from [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-worldbank?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). OWID currently reports this data in real (inflation adjusted) values; if this changes, data will be indexed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US) for inflation and [purchasing power parity](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution value will be calculated according to the following formula, in percentage points, where X is the listed year. The GDP for 2020 will always be taken as the GDP shown on the chart for 2020 at the resolution time for each listed year.\n\n\\begin{align}\n\\left[\\left(\\frac{GDP_{X}}{GDP_{2020}}\\right)^{1/(X - 2020)} - 1 \\right]× 100\n\\end{align}\n\nFor example, if GDP per capita in 2025 was reported to be 18,000, and 2020 was 16,185; this question would resolve as 2.15 for the year 2025.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf no humans are left alive prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **below the lower boundary**.", "lower_25": "1.18", "median": "3.24", "upper_75": "5.35", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP growth per capita will be 5.35% in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nGross domestic product (GDP) is [defined by Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp) as\n\n>the total monetary or market value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period.\n\nGDP is useful as a measure of a country's overall economic output. GDP per capita is measured as a country's GDP divided by its population, which is an important measure of economic output per person and can be a useful indicator of general well-being in a country.\n\nGDP per capita is necessary for between-country comparisons due to different population sizes, but an additional adjustment must be made to truly compare between countries due to different exchange rates and currency values. This adjustment is known as purchasing power parity (PPP). The [World Bank describes its PPP adjustment as follows](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp):\n\n>PPPs are calculated based on the price of a common basket of goods and services in each participating economy and are a measure of what an economy's local currency can buy in another economy. Market exchange rate-based conversions reflect both price and volume differences in expenditures and are thus inappropriate for volume comparisons. PPP-based conversions of expenditures eliminate the effect of price level differences between economies and reflect only differences in the volume of economies.\n\nUsing GDP per capita adjusted by PPP allows for comparisons between countries (though note that GDP per capita is a measure of the average economic output per person and therefore cannot indicate inequality in well-being). The PPP adjustment currently used in the Our World in Data chart is calculated by the World Bank and converts the different currencies to constant 2017 international dollars. According to Our World in Data\n\n>An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071113/breaking-down-geometric-mean.asp) of the world real GDP growth in the respective year (also known as the compound annual growth rate, or CAGR), based on the GDP per capita data from [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-worldbank?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). OWID currently reports this data in real (inflation adjusted) values; if this changes, data will be indexed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US) for inflation and [purchasing power parity](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution value will be calculated according to the following formula, in percentage points, where X is the listed year. The GDP for 2020 will always be taken as the GDP shown on the chart for 2020 at the resolution time for each listed year.\n\n\\begin{align}\n\\left[\\left(\\frac{GDP_{X}}{GDP_{2020}}\\right)^{1/(X - 2020)} - 1 \\right]× 100\n\\end{align}\n\nFor example, if GDP per capita in 2025 was reported to be 18,000, and 2020 was 16,185; this question would resolve as 2.15 for the year 2025.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf no humans are left alive prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **below the lower boundary**.", "lower_25": "1.18", "median": "3.24", "upper_75": "5.35", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP growth per capita will be 8.02% in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nGross domestic product (GDP) is [defined by Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp) as\n\n>the total monetary or market value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period.\n\nGDP is useful as a measure of a country's overall economic output. GDP per capita is measured as a country's GDP divided by its population, which is an important measure of economic output per person and can be a useful indicator of general well-being in a country.\n\nGDP per capita is necessary for between-country comparisons due to different population sizes, but an additional adjustment must be made to truly compare between countries due to different exchange rates and currency values. This adjustment is known as purchasing power parity (PPP). The [World Bank describes its PPP adjustment as follows](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp):\n\n>PPPs are calculated based on the price of a common basket of goods and services in each participating economy and are a measure of what an economy's local currency can buy in another economy. Market exchange rate-based conversions reflect both price and volume differences in expenditures and are thus inappropriate for volume comparisons. PPP-based conversions of expenditures eliminate the effect of price level differences between economies and reflect only differences in the volume of economies.\n\nUsing GDP per capita adjusted by PPP allows for comparisons between countries (though note that GDP per capita is a measure of the average economic output per person and therefore cannot indicate inequality in well-being). The PPP adjustment currently used in the Our World in Data chart is calculated by the World Bank and converts the different currencies to constant 2017 international dollars. According to Our World in Data\n\n>An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071113/breaking-down-geometric-mean.asp) of the world real GDP growth in the respective year (also known as the compound annual growth rate, or CAGR), based on the GDP per capita data from [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-worldbank?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). OWID currently reports this data in real (inflation adjusted) values; if this changes, data will be indexed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US) for inflation and [purchasing power parity](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution value will be calculated according to the following formula, in percentage points, where X is the listed year. The GDP for 2020 will always be taken as the GDP shown on the chart for 2020 at the resolution time for each listed year.\n\n\\begin{align}\n\\left[\\left(\\frac{GDP_{X}}{GDP_{2020}}\\right)^{1/(X - 2020)} - 1 \\right]× 100\n\\end{align}\n\nFor example, if GDP per capita in 2025 was reported to be 18,000, and 2020 was 16,185; this question would resolve as 2.15 for the year 2025.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf no humans are left alive prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **below the lower boundary**.", "lower_25": "0.082", "median": "3.43", "upper_75": "8.02", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP growth per capita will be 5.35% in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nGross domestic product (GDP) is [defined by Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp) as\n\n>the total monetary or market value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period.\n\nGDP is useful as a measure of a country's overall economic output. GDP per capita is measured as a country's GDP divided by its population, which is an important measure of economic output per person and can be a useful indicator of general well-being in a country.\n\nGDP per capita is necessary for between-country comparisons due to different population sizes, but an additional adjustment must be made to truly compare between countries due to different exchange rates and currency values. This adjustment is known as purchasing power parity (PPP). The [World Bank describes its PPP adjustment as follows](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp):\n\n>PPPs are calculated based on the price of a common basket of goods and services in each participating economy and are a measure of what an economy's local currency can buy in another economy. Market exchange rate-based conversions reflect both price and volume differences in expenditures and are thus inappropriate for volume comparisons. PPP-based conversions of expenditures eliminate the effect of price level differences between economies and reflect only differences in the volume of economies.\n\nUsing GDP per capita adjusted by PPP allows for comparisons between countries (though note that GDP per capita is a measure of the average economic output per person and therefore cannot indicate inequality in well-being). The PPP adjustment currently used in the Our World in Data chart is calculated by the World Bank and converts the different currencies to constant 2017 international dollars. According to Our World in Data\n\n>An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071113/breaking-down-geometric-mean.asp) of the world real GDP growth in the respective year (also known as the compound annual growth rate, or CAGR), based on the GDP per capita data from [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-worldbank?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). OWID currently reports this data in real (inflation adjusted) values; if this changes, data will be indexed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US) for inflation and [purchasing power parity](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution value will be calculated according to the following formula, in percentage points, where X is the listed year. The GDP for 2020 will always be taken as the GDP shown on the chart for 2020 at the resolution time for each listed year.\n\n\\begin{align}\n\\left[\\left(\\frac{GDP_{X}}{GDP_{2020}}\\right)^{1/(X - 2020)} - 1 \\right]× 100\n\\end{align}\n\nFor example, if GDP per capita in 2025 was reported to be 18,000, and 2020 was 16,185; this question would resolve as 2.15 for the year 2025.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf no humans are left alive prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **below the lower boundary**.", "lower_25": "1.18", "median": "3.24", "upper_75": "5.35", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the peak Covid-19 Hospitalization rate (new admissions per week per million) in the US will be 54.2 in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "The peak weekly hospitalization rate for Covid-19 in the United States was 459/million on January 19, 2022 according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/current-covid-hospitalizations-per-million?country=~USA)._x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\n***What will be the peak Covid-19 Hospitalization rate (new admissions per week per million) in the US in 2023?***_x000D_\n_x000D_\nThese sub-questions will resolve as the highest hospitalization rate per million people per week reported between January 1 to December 31 (inclusive) for the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/current-covid-hospitalizations-per-million?time=2021-02-13..latest&country=~USA). If Our World in Data does not report this full set of data, an alternative source such as the [CDC](https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#new-hospital-admissions) may be used at Metaculus' discretion._x000D_\n_x000D_\nData will be considered official 21 days after the reported date to allow for error corrections and reporting delays.", "lower_25": "54.2", "median": "247", "upper_75": "481", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP growth per capita will be 6.78% in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nGross domestic product (GDP) is [defined by Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp) as\n\n>the total monetary or market value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period.\n\nGDP is useful as a measure of a country's overall economic output. GDP per capita is measured as a country's GDP divided by its population, which is an important measure of economic output per person and can be a useful indicator of general well-being in a country.\n\nGDP per capita is necessary for between-country comparisons due to different population sizes, but an additional adjustment must be made to truly compare between countries due to different exchange rates and currency values. This adjustment is known as purchasing power parity (PPP). The [World Bank describes its PPP adjustment as follows](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp):\n\n>PPPs are calculated based on the price of a common basket of goods and services in each participating economy and are a measure of what an economy's local currency can buy in another economy. Market exchange rate-based conversions reflect both price and volume differences in expenditures and are thus inappropriate for volume comparisons. PPP-based conversions of expenditures eliminate the effect of price level differences between economies and reflect only differences in the volume of economies.\n\nUsing GDP per capita adjusted by PPP allows for comparisons between countries (though note that GDP per capita is a measure of the average economic output per person and therefore cannot indicate inequality in well-being). The PPP adjustment currently used in the Our World in Data chart is calculated by the World Bank and converts the different currencies to constant 2017 international dollars. According to Our World in Data\n\n>An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071113/breaking-down-geometric-mean.asp) of the world real GDP growth in the respective year (also known as the compound annual growth rate, or CAGR), based on the GDP per capita data from [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-worldbank?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). OWID currently reports this data in real (inflation adjusted) values; if this changes, data will be indexed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US) for inflation and [purchasing power parity](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution value will be calculated according to the following formula, in percentage points, where X is the listed year. The GDP for 2020 will always be taken as the GDP shown on the chart for 2020 at the resolution time for each listed year.\n\n\\begin{align}\n\\left[\\left(\\frac{GDP_{X}}{GDP_{2020}}\\right)^{1/(X - 2020)} - 1 \\right]× 100\n\\end{align}\n\nFor example, if GDP per capita in 2025 was reported to be 18,000, and 2020 was 16,185; this question would resolve as 2.15 for the year 2025.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf no humans are left alive prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **below the lower boundary**.", "lower_25": "0.384", "median": "3.27", "upper_75": "6.78", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What will be the percentage of people living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Pew](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/fact-sheet/gay-marriage-around-the-world/)\n>In December 2000, the Netherlands became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage when the Dutch parliament passed, by a three-to-one margin, a landmark bill allowing the practice.\n\nSince then a total of 29 countries have legalized same-sex marriage [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count).\n\nHistorically homosexuals have been the victims of persecution and [violence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violence_against_LGBT_people) around the world, continuing to the present in many places. In its 2020 report, [State-Sponsored Homophobia](https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_World_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_report_global_legislation_overview_update_December_2020.pdf), the [International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association](https://ilga.org/) (ILGA) found that 67 out of 193 UN member states have legislation criminalizing homosexuality, with an additional two states having de facto criminalization.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Number of countries where same-sex marriage is legal](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count) notes that England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland legalized same-sex marriage at different times, and counts UK legalization as the date when it became legal in England and Wales.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world population living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal in the listed year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-countries-legalized-sex-marriage?stackMode=relative&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2020 this figure was 14.88.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on August 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "15.01", "median": "15.34", "upper_75": "15.80", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP growth per capita will be 8.02% in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nGross domestic product (GDP) is [defined by Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp) as\n\n>the total monetary or market value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period.\n\nGDP is useful as a measure of a country's overall economic output. GDP per capita is measured as a country's GDP divided by its population, which is an important measure of economic output per person and can be a useful indicator of general well-being in a country.\n\nGDP per capita is necessary for between-country comparisons due to different population sizes, but an additional adjustment must be made to truly compare between countries due to different exchange rates and currency values. This adjustment is known as purchasing power parity (PPP). The [World Bank describes its PPP adjustment as follows](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp):\n\n>PPPs are calculated based on the price of a common basket of goods and services in each participating economy and are a measure of what an economy's local currency can buy in another economy. Market exchange rate-based conversions reflect both price and volume differences in expenditures and are thus inappropriate for volume comparisons. PPP-based conversions of expenditures eliminate the effect of price level differences between economies and reflect only differences in the volume of economies.\n\nUsing GDP per capita adjusted by PPP allows for comparisons between countries (though note that GDP per capita is a measure of the average economic output per person and therefore cannot indicate inequality in well-being). The PPP adjustment currently used in the Our World in Data chart is calculated by the World Bank and converts the different currencies to constant 2017 international dollars. According to Our World in Data\n\n>An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071113/breaking-down-geometric-mean.asp) of the world real GDP growth in the respective year (also known as the compound annual growth rate, or CAGR), based on the GDP per capita data from [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-worldbank?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). OWID currently reports this data in real (inflation adjusted) values; if this changes, data will be indexed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US) for inflation and [purchasing power parity](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution value will be calculated according to the following formula, in percentage points, where X is the listed year. The GDP for 2020 will always be taken as the GDP shown on the chart for 2020 at the resolution time for each listed year.\n\n\\begin{align}\n\\left[\\left(\\frac{GDP_{X}}{GDP_{2020}}\\right)^{1/(X - 2020)} - 1 \\right]× 100\n\\end{align}\n\nFor example, if GDP per capita in 2025 was reported to be 18,000, and 2020 was 16,185; this question would resolve as 2.15 for the year 2025.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf no humans are left alive prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **below the lower boundary**.", "lower_25": "0.082", "median": "3.43", "upper_75": "8.02", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 17.6 share of people living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal will be in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Pew](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/fact-sheet/gay-marriage-around-the-world/)\n>In December 2000, the Netherlands became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage when the Dutch parliament passed, by a three-to-one margin, a landmark bill allowing the practice.\n\nSince then a total of 29 countries have legalized same-sex marriage [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count).\n\nHistorically homosexuals have been the victims of persecution and [violence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violence_against_LGBT_people) around the world, continuing to the present in many places. In its 2020 report, [State-Sponsored Homophobia](https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_World_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_report_global_legislation_overview_update_December_2020.pdf), the [International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association](https://ilga.org/) (ILGA) found that 67 out of 193 UN member states have legislation criminalizing homosexuality, with an additional two states having de facto criminalization.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Number of countries where same-sex marriage is legal](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count) notes that England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland legalized same-sex marriage at different times, and counts UK legalization as the date when it became legal in England and Wales.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world population living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal in the listed year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-countries-legalized-sex-marriage?stackMode=relative&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2020 this figure was 14.88.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on August 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "15.0", "median": "16.1", "upper_75": "17.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 17.6 share of people living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal will be in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Pew](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/fact-sheet/gay-marriage-around-the-world/)\n>In December 2000, the Netherlands became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage when the Dutch parliament passed, by a three-to-one margin, a landmark bill allowing the practice.\n\nSince then a total of 29 countries have legalized same-sex marriage [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count).\n\nHistorically homosexuals have been the victims of persecution and [violence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violence_against_LGBT_people) around the world, continuing to the present in many places. In its 2020 report, [State-Sponsored Homophobia](https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_World_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_report_global_legislation_overview_update_December_2020.pdf), the [International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association](https://ilga.org/) (ILGA) found that 67 out of 193 UN member states have legislation criminalizing homosexuality, with an additional two states having de facto criminalization.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Number of countries where same-sex marriage is legal](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count) notes that England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland legalized same-sex marriage at different times, and counts UK legalization as the date when it became legal in England and Wales.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world population living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal in the listed year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-countries-legalized-sex-marriage?stackMode=relative&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2020 this figure was 14.88.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on August 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "15.0", "median": "16.1", "upper_75": "17.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 17.6 share of people living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal will be in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Pew](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/fact-sheet/gay-marriage-around-the-world/)\n>In December 2000, the Netherlands became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage when the Dutch parliament passed, by a three-to-one margin, a landmark bill allowing the practice.\n\nSince then a total of 29 countries have legalized same-sex marriage [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count).\n\nHistorically homosexuals have been the victims of persecution and [violence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violence_against_LGBT_people) around the world, continuing to the present in many places. In its 2020 report, [State-Sponsored Homophobia](https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_World_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_report_global_legislation_overview_update_December_2020.pdf), the [International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association](https://ilga.org/) (ILGA) found that 67 out of 193 UN member states have legislation criminalizing homosexuality, with an additional two states having de facto criminalization.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Number of countries where same-sex marriage is legal](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count) notes that England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland legalized same-sex marriage at different times, and counts UK legalization as the date when it became legal in England and Wales.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world population living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal in the listed year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-countries-legalized-sex-marriage?stackMode=relative&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2020 this figure was 14.88.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on August 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "15.0", "median": "16.1", "upper_75": "17.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What will be the percentage of people living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Pew](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/fact-sheet/gay-marriage-around-the-world/)\n>In December 2000, the Netherlands became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage when the Dutch parliament passed, by a three-to-one margin, a landmark bill allowing the practice.\n\nSince then a total of 29 countries have legalized same-sex marriage [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count).\n\nHistorically homosexuals have been the victims of persecution and [violence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violence_against_LGBT_people) around the world, continuing to the present in many places. In its 2020 report, [State-Sponsored Homophobia](https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_World_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_report_global_legislation_overview_update_December_2020.pdf), the [International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association](https://ilga.org/) (ILGA) found that 67 out of 193 UN member states have legislation criminalizing homosexuality, with an additional two states having de facto criminalization.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Number of countries where same-sex marriage is legal](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count) notes that England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland legalized same-sex marriage at different times, and counts UK legalization as the date when it became legal in England and Wales.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world population living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal in the listed year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-countries-legalized-sex-marriage?stackMode=relative&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2020 this figure was 14.88.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on August 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "15.01", "median": "15.34", "upper_75": "15.80", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 48.7% of people will live in countries where same-sex marriage is legal by 2052?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Pew](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/fact-sheet/gay-marriage-around-the-world/)\n>In December 2000, the Netherlands became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage when the Dutch parliament passed, by a three-to-one margin, a landmark bill allowing the practice.\n\nSince then a total of 29 countries have legalized same-sex marriage [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count).\n\nHistorically homosexuals have been the victims of persecution and [violence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violence_against_LGBT_people) around the world, continuing to the present in many places. In its 2020 report, [State-Sponsored Homophobia](https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_World_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_report_global_legislation_overview_update_December_2020.pdf), the [International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association](https://ilga.org/) (ILGA) found that 67 out of 193 UN member states have legislation criminalizing homosexuality, with an additional two states having de facto criminalization.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Number of countries where same-sex marriage is legal](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count) notes that England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland legalized same-sex marriage at different times, and counts UK legalization as the date when it became legal in England and Wales.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world population living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal in the listed year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-countries-legalized-sex-marriage?stackMode=relative&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2020 this figure was 14.88.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on August 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "22.6", "median": "35.9", "upper_75": "48.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP growth per capita will be 6.78% in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nGross domestic product (GDP) is [defined by Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp) as\n\n>the total monetary or market value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period.\n\nGDP is useful as a measure of a country's overall economic output. GDP per capita is measured as a country's GDP divided by its population, which is an important measure of economic output per person and can be a useful indicator of general well-being in a country.\n\nGDP per capita is necessary for between-country comparisons due to different population sizes, but an additional adjustment must be made to truly compare between countries due to different exchange rates and currency values. This adjustment is known as purchasing power parity (PPP). The [World Bank describes its PPP adjustment as follows](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp):\n\n>PPPs are calculated based on the price of a common basket of goods and services in each participating economy and are a measure of what an economy's local currency can buy in another economy. Market exchange rate-based conversions reflect both price and volume differences in expenditures and are thus inappropriate for volume comparisons. PPP-based conversions of expenditures eliminate the effect of price level differences between economies and reflect only differences in the volume of economies.\n\nUsing GDP per capita adjusted by PPP allows for comparisons between countries (though note that GDP per capita is a measure of the average economic output per person and therefore cannot indicate inequality in well-being). The PPP adjustment currently used in the Our World in Data chart is calculated by the World Bank and converts the different currencies to constant 2017 international dollars. According to Our World in Data\n\n>An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071113/breaking-down-geometric-mean.asp) of the world real GDP growth in the respective year (also known as the compound annual growth rate, or CAGR), based on the GDP per capita data from [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-worldbank?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). OWID currently reports this data in real (inflation adjusted) values; if this changes, data will be indexed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US) for inflation and [purchasing power parity](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution value will be calculated according to the following formula, in percentage points, where X is the listed year. The GDP for 2020 will always be taken as the GDP shown on the chart for 2020 at the resolution time for each listed year.\n\n\\begin{align}\n\\left[\\left(\\frac{GDP_{X}}{GDP_{2020}}\\right)^{1/(X - 2020)} - 1 \\right]× 100\n\\end{align}\n\nFor example, if GDP per capita in 2025 was reported to be 18,000, and 2020 was 16,185; this question would resolve as 2.15 for the year 2025.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf no humans are left alive prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **below the lower boundary**.", "lower_25": "0.384", "median": "3.27", "upper_75": "6.78", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 25.0 share of people will live in countries where same-sex marriage is legal by 2032?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Pew](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/fact-sheet/gay-marriage-around-the-world/)\n>In December 2000, the Netherlands became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage when the Dutch parliament passed, by a three-to-one margin, a landmark bill allowing the practice.\n\nSince then a total of 29 countries have legalized same-sex marriage [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count).\n\nHistorically homosexuals have been the victims of persecution and [violence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violence_against_LGBT_people) around the world, continuing to the present in many places. In its 2020 report, [State-Sponsored Homophobia](https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_World_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_report_global_legislation_overview_update_December_2020.pdf), the [International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association](https://ilga.org/) (ILGA) found that 67 out of 193 UN member states have legislation criminalizing homosexuality, with an additional two states having de facto criminalization.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Number of countries where same-sex marriage is legal](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count) notes that England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland legalized same-sex marriage at different times, and counts UK legalization as the date when it became legal in England and Wales.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world population living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal in the listed year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-countries-legalized-sex-marriage?stackMode=relative&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2020 this figure was 14.88.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on August 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "17.0", "median": "20.7", "upper_75": "25.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 25.0 share of people will live in countries where same-sex marriage is legal by 2032?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Pew](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/fact-sheet/gay-marriage-around-the-world/)\n>In December 2000, the Netherlands became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage when the Dutch parliament passed, by a three-to-one margin, a landmark bill allowing the practice.\n\nSince then a total of 29 countries have legalized same-sex marriage [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count).\n\nHistorically homosexuals have been the victims of persecution and [violence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violence_against_LGBT_people) around the world, continuing to the present in many places. In its 2020 report, [State-Sponsored Homophobia](https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_World_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_report_global_legislation_overview_update_December_2020.pdf), the [International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association](https://ilga.org/) (ILGA) found that 67 out of 193 UN member states have legislation criminalizing homosexuality, with an additional two states having de facto criminalization.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Number of countries where same-sex marriage is legal](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count) notes that England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland legalized same-sex marriage at different times, and counts UK legalization as the date when it became legal in England and Wales.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world population living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal in the listed year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-countries-legalized-sex-marriage?stackMode=relative&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2020 this figure was 14.88.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on August 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "17.0", "median": "20.7", "upper_75": "25.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 48.7% of people will live in countries where same-sex marriage is legal by 2052?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Pew](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/fact-sheet/gay-marriage-around-the-world/)\n>In December 2000, the Netherlands became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage when the Dutch parliament passed, by a three-to-one margin, a landmark bill allowing the practice.\n\nSince then a total of 29 countries have legalized same-sex marriage [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count).\n\nHistorically homosexuals have been the victims of persecution and [violence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violence_against_LGBT_people) around the world, continuing to the present in many places. In its 2020 report, [State-Sponsored Homophobia](https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_World_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_report_global_legislation_overview_update_December_2020.pdf), the [International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association](https://ilga.org/) (ILGA) found that 67 out of 193 UN member states have legislation criminalizing homosexuality, with an additional two states having de facto criminalization.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Number of countries where same-sex marriage is legal](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count) notes that England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland legalized same-sex marriage at different times, and counts UK legalization as the date when it became legal in England and Wales.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world population living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal in the listed year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-countries-legalized-sex-marriage?stackMode=relative&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2020 this figure was 14.88.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on August 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "22.6", "median": "35.9", "upper_75": "48.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 54.9 share of people will live in countries where same-sex marriage is legal in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Pew](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/fact-sheet/gay-marriage-around-the-world/)\n>In December 2000, the Netherlands became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage when the Dutch parliament passed, by a three-to-one margin, a landmark bill allowing the practice.\n\nSince then a total of 29 countries have legalized same-sex marriage [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count).\n\nHistorically homosexuals have been the victims of persecution and [violence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violence_against_LGBT_people) around the world, continuing to the present in many places. In its 2020 report, [State-Sponsored Homophobia](https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_World_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_report_global_legislation_overview_update_December_2020.pdf), the [International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association](https://ilga.org/) (ILGA) found that 67 out of 193 UN member states have legislation criminalizing homosexuality, with an additional two states having de facto criminalization.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Number of countries where same-sex marriage is legal](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count) notes that England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland legalized same-sex marriage at different times, and counts UK legalization as the date when it became legal in England and Wales.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world population living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal in the listed year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-countries-legalized-sex-marriage?stackMode=relative&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2020 this figure was 14.88.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on August 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "32.5", "median": "54.9", "upper_75": "75.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 25.0 share of people will live in countries where same-sex marriage is legal by 2032?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Pew](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/fact-sheet/gay-marriage-around-the-world/)\n>In December 2000, the Netherlands became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage when the Dutch parliament passed, by a three-to-one margin, a landmark bill allowing the practice.\n\nSince then a total of 29 countries have legalized same-sex marriage [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count).\n\nHistorically homosexuals have been the victims of persecution and [violence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violence_against_LGBT_people) around the world, continuing to the present in many places. In its 2020 report, [State-Sponsored Homophobia](https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_World_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_report_global_legislation_overview_update_December_2020.pdf), the [International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association](https://ilga.org/) (ILGA) found that 67 out of 193 UN member states have legislation criminalizing homosexuality, with an additional two states having de facto criminalization.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Number of countries where same-sex marriage is legal](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count) notes that England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland legalized same-sex marriage at different times, and counts UK legalization as the date when it became legal in England and Wales.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world population living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal in the listed year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-countries-legalized-sex-marriage?stackMode=relative&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2020 this figure was 14.88.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on August 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "17.0", "median": "20.7", "upper_75": "25.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 48.7% of people will live in countries where same-sex marriage is legal by 2052?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Pew](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/fact-sheet/gay-marriage-around-the-world/)\n>In December 2000, the Netherlands became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage when the Dutch parliament passed, by a three-to-one margin, a landmark bill allowing the practice.\n\nSince then a total of 29 countries have legalized same-sex marriage [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count).\n\nHistorically homosexuals have been the victims of persecution and [violence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violence_against_LGBT_people) around the world, continuing to the present in many places. In its 2020 report, [State-Sponsored Homophobia](https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_World_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_report_global_legislation_overview_update_December_2020.pdf), the [International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association](https://ilga.org/) (ILGA) found that 67 out of 193 UN member states have legislation criminalizing homosexuality, with an additional two states having de facto criminalization.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Number of countries where same-sex marriage is legal](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count) notes that England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland legalized same-sex marriage at different times, and counts UK legalization as the date when it became legal in England and Wales.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world population living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal in the listed year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-countries-legalized-sex-marriage?stackMode=relative&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2020 this figure was 14.88.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on August 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "22.6", "median": "35.9", "upper_75": "48.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP growth per capita will be 6.78% in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nGross domestic product (GDP) is [defined by Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp) as\n\n>the total monetary or market value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period.\n\nGDP is useful as a measure of a country's overall economic output. GDP per capita is measured as a country's GDP divided by its population, which is an important measure of economic output per person and can be a useful indicator of general well-being in a country.\n\nGDP per capita is necessary for between-country comparisons due to different population sizes, but an additional adjustment must be made to truly compare between countries due to different exchange rates and currency values. This adjustment is known as purchasing power parity (PPP). The [World Bank describes its PPP adjustment as follows](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp):\n\n>PPPs are calculated based on the price of a common basket of goods and services in each participating economy and are a measure of what an economy's local currency can buy in another economy. Market exchange rate-based conversions reflect both price and volume differences in expenditures and are thus inappropriate for volume comparisons. PPP-based conversions of expenditures eliminate the effect of price level differences between economies and reflect only differences in the volume of economies.\n\nUsing GDP per capita adjusted by PPP allows for comparisons between countries (though note that GDP per capita is a measure of the average economic output per person and therefore cannot indicate inequality in well-being). The PPP adjustment currently used in the Our World in Data chart is calculated by the World Bank and converts the different currencies to constant 2017 international dollars. According to Our World in Data\n\n>An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071113/breaking-down-geometric-mean.asp) of the world real GDP growth in the respective year (also known as the compound annual growth rate, or CAGR), based on the GDP per capita data from [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-worldbank?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). OWID currently reports this data in real (inflation adjusted) values; if this changes, data will be indexed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US) for inflation and [purchasing power parity](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution value will be calculated according to the following formula, in percentage points, where X is the listed year. The GDP for 2020 will always be taken as the GDP shown on the chart for 2020 at the resolution time for each listed year.\n\n\\begin{align}\n\\left[\\left(\\frac{GDP_{X}}{GDP_{2020}}\\right)^{1/(X - 2020)} - 1 \\right]× 100\n\\end{align}\n\nFor example, if GDP per capita in 2025 was reported to be 18,000, and 2020 was 16,185; this question would resolve as 2.15 for the year 2025.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf no humans are left alive prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **below the lower boundary**.", "lower_25": "0.384", "median": "3.27", "upper_75": "6.78", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What will be the percentage of people living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Pew](https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/fact-sheet/gay-marriage-around-the-world/)\n>In December 2000, the Netherlands became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage when the Dutch parliament passed, by a three-to-one margin, a landmark bill allowing the practice.\n\nSince then a total of 29 countries have legalized same-sex marriage [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count).\n\nHistorically homosexuals have been the victims of persecution and [violence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violence_against_LGBT_people) around the world, continuing to the present in many places. In its 2020 report, [State-Sponsored Homophobia](https://ilga.org/downloads/ILGA_World_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_report_global_legislation_overview_update_December_2020.pdf), the [International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association](https://ilga.org/) (ILGA) found that 67 out of 193 UN member states have legislation criminalizing homosexuality, with an additional two states having de facto criminalization.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Number of countries where same-sex marriage is legal](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/same-sex-marriage-country-count) notes that England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland legalized same-sex marriage at different times, and counts UK legalization as the date when it became legal in England and Wales.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world population living in countries where same-sex marriage is legal in the listed year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-countries-legalized-sex-marriage?stackMode=relative&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2020 this figure was 14.88.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on August 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "15.01", "median": "15.34", "upper_75": "15.80", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP growth per capita will be 8.02% in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nGross domestic product (GDP) is [defined by Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp) as\n\n>the total monetary or market value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period.\n\nGDP is useful as a measure of a country's overall economic output. GDP per capita is measured as a country's GDP divided by its population, which is an important measure of economic output per person and can be a useful indicator of general well-being in a country.\n\nGDP per capita is necessary for between-country comparisons due to different population sizes, but an additional adjustment must be made to truly compare between countries due to different exchange rates and currency values. This adjustment is known as purchasing power parity (PPP). The [World Bank describes its PPP adjustment as follows](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp):\n\n>PPPs are calculated based on the price of a common basket of goods and services in each participating economy and are a measure of what an economy's local currency can buy in another economy. Market exchange rate-based conversions reflect both price and volume differences in expenditures and are thus inappropriate for volume comparisons. PPP-based conversions of expenditures eliminate the effect of price level differences between economies and reflect only differences in the volume of economies.\n\nUsing GDP per capita adjusted by PPP allows for comparisons between countries (though note that GDP per capita is a measure of the average economic output per person and therefore cannot indicate inequality in well-being). The PPP adjustment currently used in the Our World in Data chart is calculated by the World Bank and converts the different currencies to constant 2017 international dollars. According to Our World in Data\n\n>An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the [geometric mean](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071113/breaking-down-geometric-mean.asp) of the world real GDP growth in the respective year (also known as the compound annual growth rate, or CAGR), based on the GDP per capita data from [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-worldbank?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). OWID currently reports this data in real (inflation adjusted) values; if this changes, data will be indexed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US) for inflation and [purchasing power parity](https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/icp), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution value will be calculated according to the following formula, in percentage points, where X is the listed year. The GDP for 2020 will always be taken as the GDP shown on the chart for 2020 at the resolution time for each listed year.\n\n\\begin{align}\n\\left[\\left(\\frac{GDP_{X}}{GDP_{2020}}\\right)^{1/(X - 2020)} - 1 \\right]× 100\n\\end{align}\n\nFor example, if GDP per capita in 2025 was reported to be 18,000, and 2020 was 16,185; this question would resolve as 2.15 for the year 2025.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf no humans are left alive prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **below the lower boundary**.", "lower_25": "0.082", "median": "3.43", "upper_75": "8.02", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth will be 80.95 in the G7 countries in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=At+birth&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR),\n\n>Life expectancy at birth is defined as the average number of years that a newborn could expect to live if he or she were to pass through life subject to the age-specific mortality rates of a given period.\n\nLife expectancy at birth accounts for the effects of child mortality, while other measures, such as [Life expectancy at age 15](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Aged+15&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR) measure the expected number of years remaining for someone who survives to the age of 15.\n\nThis question asks about life expectancy at birth in the [Group of Seven](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G7) (G7) countries, which consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.\n\nFor more information and data on life expectancy see the Our World in Data article [Life Expectancy](https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy). An abridged dataset from OWID on the G7 countries can be found [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mXMk0R9eUbh9ihsWnKGbswz3F1IumWQx/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth in G7 countries in the respective years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=At+birth&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR). For example, for 2020 this weighted average was 80.3 (whereas the unweighted average was 81.5).\n\nThe [G7](https://www.g7germany.de/g7-en/faq-g7) consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In the event any of these countries no longer exist or do not have credible life expectancy or population data, those countries will be excluded from calculations in this question. This question will calculate life expectancy in these 7 countries regardless of which countries are G7 members or whether the G7 group continues to exist.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "80.43", "median": "80.95", "upper_75": "81.53", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth in the G7 countries will be 80.58 in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "80.58", "median": "81.15", "upper_75": "81.75", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth will be 80.95 in the G7 countries in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=At+birth&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR),\n\n>Life expectancy at birth is defined as the average number of years that a newborn could expect to live if he or she were to pass through life subject to the age-specific mortality rates of a given period.\n\nLife expectancy at birth accounts for the effects of child mortality, while other measures, such as [Life expectancy at age 15](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Aged+15&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR) measure the expected number of years remaining for someone who survives to the age of 15.\n\nThis question asks about life expectancy at birth in the [Group of Seven](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G7) (G7) countries, which consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.\n\nFor more information and data on life expectancy see the Our World in Data article [Life Expectancy](https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy). An abridged dataset from OWID on the G7 countries can be found [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mXMk0R9eUbh9ihsWnKGbswz3F1IumWQx/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth in G7 countries in the respective years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=At+birth&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR). For example, for 2020 this weighted average was 80.3 (whereas the unweighted average was 81.5).\n\nThe [G7](https://www.g7germany.de/g7-en/faq-g7) consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In the event any of these countries no longer exist or do not have credible life expectancy or population data, those countries will be excluded from calculations in this question. This question will calculate life expectancy in these 7 countries regardless of which countries are G7 members or whether the G7 group continues to exist.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "80.43", "median": "80.95", "upper_75": "81.53", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth will be 80.95 in the G7 countries in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=At+birth&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR),\n\n>Life expectancy at birth is defined as the average number of years that a newborn could expect to live if he or she were to pass through life subject to the age-specific mortality rates of a given period.\n\nLife expectancy at birth accounts for the effects of child mortality, while other measures, such as [Life expectancy at age 15](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Aged+15&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR) measure the expected number of years remaining for someone who survives to the age of 15.\n\nThis question asks about life expectancy at birth in the [Group of Seven](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G7) (G7) countries, which consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.\n\nFor more information and data on life expectancy see the Our World in Data article [Life Expectancy](https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy). An abridged dataset from OWID on the G7 countries can be found [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mXMk0R9eUbh9ihsWnKGbswz3F1IumWQx/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth in G7 countries in the respective years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=At+birth&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR). For example, for 2020 this weighted average was 80.3 (whereas the unweighted average was 81.5).\n\nThe [G7](https://www.g7germany.de/g7-en/faq-g7) consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In the event any of these countries no longer exist or do not have credible life expectancy or population data, those countries will be excluded from calculations in this question. This question will calculate life expectancy in these 7 countries regardless of which countries are G7 members or whether the G7 group continues to exist.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "80.43", "median": "80.95", "upper_75": "81.53", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 75.22 billion chickens will be slaughtered for meat globally in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.88B", "median": "75.22B", "upper_75": "76.48B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth will be 80.40 in the G7 countries by 2032?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=At+birth&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR),\n\n>Life expectancy at birth is defined as the average number of years that a newborn could expect to live if he or she were to pass through life subject to the age-specific mortality rates of a given period.\n\nLife expectancy at birth accounts for the effects of child mortality, while other measures, such as [Life expectancy at age 15](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Aged+15&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR) measure the expected number of years remaining for someone who survives to the age of 15.\n\nThis question asks about life expectancy at birth in the [Group of Seven](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G7) (G7) countries, which consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.\n\nFor more information and data on life expectancy see the Our World in Data article [Life Expectancy](https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy). An abridged dataset from OWID on the G7 countries can be found [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mXMk0R9eUbh9ihsWnKGbswz3F1IumWQx/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth in G7 countries in the respective years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=At+birth&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR). For example, for 2020 this weighted average was 80.3 (whereas the unweighted average was 81.5).\n\nThe [G7](https://www.g7germany.de/g7-en/faq-g7) consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In the event any of these countries no longer exist or do not have credible life expectancy or population data, those countries will be excluded from calculations in this question. This question will calculate life expectancy in these 7 countries regardless of which countries are G7 members or whether the G7 group continues to exist.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "80.40", "median": "82.14", "upper_75": "83.95", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth will be 80.40 in the G7 countries by 2032?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=At+birth&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR),\n\n>Life expectancy at birth is defined as the average number of years that a newborn could expect to live if he or she were to pass through life subject to the age-specific mortality rates of a given period.\n\nLife expectancy at birth accounts for the effects of child mortality, while other measures, such as [Life expectancy at age 15](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Aged+15&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR) measure the expected number of years remaining for someone who survives to the age of 15.\n\nThis question asks about life expectancy at birth in the [Group of Seven](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G7) (G7) countries, which consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.\n\nFor more information and data on life expectancy see the Our World in Data article [Life Expectancy](https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy). An abridged dataset from OWID on the G7 countries can be found [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mXMk0R9eUbh9ihsWnKGbswz3F1IumWQx/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth in G7 countries in the respective years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=At+birth&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR). For example, for 2020 this weighted average was 80.3 (whereas the unweighted average was 81.5).\n\nThe [G7](https://www.g7germany.de/g7-en/faq-g7) consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In the event any of these countries no longer exist or do not have credible life expectancy or population data, those countries will be excluded from calculations in this question. This question will calculate life expectancy in these 7 countries regardless of which countries are G7 members or whether the G7 group continues to exist.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "80.40", "median": "82.14", "upper_75": "83.95", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth will be 86.0 in the G7 countries in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=At+birth&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR),\n\n>Life expectancy at birth is defined as the average number of years that a newborn could expect to live if he or she were to pass through life subject to the age-specific mortality rates of a given period.\n\nLife expectancy at birth accounts for the effects of child mortality, while other measures, such as [Life expectancy at age 15](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Aged+15&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR) measure the expected number of years remaining for someone who survives to the age of 15.\n\nThis question asks about life expectancy at birth in the [Group of Seven](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G7) (G7) countries, which consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.\n\nFor more information and data on life expectancy see the Our World in Data article [Life Expectancy](https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy). An abridged dataset from OWID on the G7 countries can be found [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mXMk0R9eUbh9ihsWnKGbswz3F1IumWQx/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth in G7 countries in the respective years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=At+birth&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR). For example, for 2020 this weighted average was 80.3 (whereas the unweighted average was 81.5).\n\nThe [G7](https://www.g7germany.de/g7-en/faq-g7) consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In the event any of these countries no longer exist or do not have credible life expectancy or population data, those countries will be excluded from calculations in this question. This question will calculate life expectancy in these 7 countries regardless of which countries are G7 members or whether the G7 group continues to exist.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "81.4", "median": "86.0", "upper_75": "92.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth will be 80.40 in the G7 countries by 2032?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=At+birth&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR),\n\n>Life expectancy at birth is defined as the average number of years that a newborn could expect to live if he or she were to pass through life subject to the age-specific mortality rates of a given period.\n\nLife expectancy at birth accounts for the effects of child mortality, while other measures, such as [Life expectancy at age 15](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Aged+15&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR) measure the expected number of years remaining for someone who survives to the age of 15.\n\nThis question asks about life expectancy at birth in the [Group of Seven](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G7) (G7) countries, which consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.\n\nFor more information and data on life expectancy see the Our World in Data article [Life Expectancy](https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy). An abridged dataset from OWID on the G7 countries can be found [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mXMk0R9eUbh9ihsWnKGbswz3F1IumWQx/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth in G7 countries in the respective years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=At+birth&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR). For example, for 2020 this weighted average was 80.3 (whereas the unweighted average was 81.5).\n\nThe [G7](https://www.g7germany.de/g7-en/faq-g7) consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In the event any of these countries no longer exist or do not have credible life expectancy or population data, those countries will be excluded from calculations in this question. This question will calculate life expectancy in these 7 countries regardless of which countries are G7 members or whether the G7 group continues to exist.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "80.40", "median": "82.14", "upper_75": "83.95", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 75.22 billion chickens will be slaughtered for meat globally in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.88B", "median": "75.22B", "upper_75": "76.48B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth will be 86.0 in the G7 countries in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=At+birth&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR),\n\n>Life expectancy at birth is defined as the average number of years that a newborn could expect to live if he or she were to pass through life subject to the age-specific mortality rates of a given period.\n\nLife expectancy at birth accounts for the effects of child mortality, while other measures, such as [Life expectancy at age 15](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Aged+15&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR) measure the expected number of years remaining for someone who survives to the age of 15.\n\nThis question asks about life expectancy at birth in the [Group of Seven](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G7) (G7) countries, which consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.\n\nFor more information and data on life expectancy see the Our World in Data article [Life Expectancy](https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy). An abridged dataset from OWID on the G7 countries can be found [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mXMk0R9eUbh9ihsWnKGbswz3F1IumWQx/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth in G7 countries in the respective years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=At+birth&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR). For example, for 2020 this weighted average was 80.3 (whereas the unweighted average was 81.5).\n\nThe [G7](https://www.g7germany.de/g7-en/faq-g7) consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In the event any of these countries no longer exist or do not have credible life expectancy or population data, those countries will be excluded from calculations in this question. This question will calculate life expectancy in these 7 countries regardless of which countries are G7 members or whether the G7 group continues to exist.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "81.4", "median": "86.0", "upper_75": "92.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth will be 86.0 in the G7 countries in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=At+birth&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR),\n\n>Life expectancy at birth is defined as the average number of years that a newborn could expect to live if he or she were to pass through life subject to the age-specific mortality rates of a given period.\n\nLife expectancy at birth accounts for the effects of child mortality, while other measures, such as [Life expectancy at age 15](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Aged+15&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR) measure the expected number of years remaining for someone who survives to the age of 15.\n\nThis question asks about life expectancy at birth in the [Group of Seven](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G7) (G7) countries, which consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.\n\nFor more information and data on life expectancy see the Our World in Data article [Life Expectancy](https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy). An abridged dataset from OWID on the G7 countries can be found [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mXMk0R9eUbh9ihsWnKGbswz3F1IumWQx/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth in G7 countries in the respective years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&Metric=Life+expectancy&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=At+birth&Projection+Scenario=None&country=USA~CAN~FRA~DEU~ITA~JPN~GBR). For example, for 2020 this weighted average was 80.3 (whereas the unweighted average was 81.5).\n\nThe [G7](https://www.g7germany.de/g7-en/faq-g7) consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In the event any of these countries no longer exist or do not have credible life expectancy or population data, those countries will be excluded from calculations in this question. This question will calculate life expectancy in these 7 countries regardless of which countries are G7 members or whether the G7 group continues to exist.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "81.4", "median": "86.0", "upper_75": "92.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth will be 93.3 years in the G7 countries in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "83.2", "median": "93.3", "upper_75": "111", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 75.22 billion chickens will be slaughtered for meat globally in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.88B", "median": "75.22B", "upper_75": "76.48B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 75.07B chickens will be slaughtered for meat globally in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "75.07B", "median": "77.66B", "upper_75": "80.01B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 75.07B chickens will be slaughtered for meat globally in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "75.07B", "median": "77.66B", "upper_75": "80.01B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth will be 93.3 years in the G7 countries in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "83.2", "median": "93.3", "upper_75": "111", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth will be 93.3 years in the G7 countries in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "83.2", "median": "93.3", "upper_75": "111", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 75.07B chickens will be slaughtered for meat globally in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "75.07B", "median": "77.66B", "upper_75": "80.01B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 80.5 billion chickens will be slaughtered for meat globally in the following years (2032)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "75.0B", "median": "80.5B", "upper_75": "86.8B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 93.8 billion chickens will be slaughtered for meat globally in the following years (2052)?", "desc": "\n\nIn 2020 over 70 billion chickens were slaughtered for meat, more than double the number slaughtered in 1996, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/animals-slaughtered-for-meat?time=1961..latest). Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of chickens slaughtered for meat in the respective year for the whole world according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/animals-slaughtered-for-meat?time=1961..latest). For example, this figure was 70.77 billion in the year 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "38.0B", "median": "62.7B", "upper_75": "93.8B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth in the G7 countries will be 80.58 in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "80.58", "median": "81.15", "upper_75": "81.75", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 80.5 billion chickens will be slaughtered for meat globally in the following years (2032)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "75.0B", "median": "80.5B", "upper_75": "86.8B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many chickens will be slaughtered for meat globally in the following years, considering that 8.58B is the total number of chickens slaughtered for meat globally?", "desc": "\n\nIn 2020 over 70 billion chickens were slaughtered for meat, more than double the number slaughtered in 1996, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/animals-slaughtered-for-meat?time=1961..latest). Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of chickens slaughtered for meat in the respective year for the whole world according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/animals-slaughtered-for-meat?time=1961..latest). For example, this figure was 70.77 billion in the year 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "110M", "median": "8.58B", "upper_75": "38.9B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 93.8 billion chickens will be slaughtered for meat globally in the following years (2052)?", "desc": "\n\nIn 2020 over 70 billion chickens were slaughtered for meat, more than double the number slaughtered in 1996, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/animals-slaughtered-for-meat?time=1961..latest). Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of chickens slaughtered for meat in the respective year for the whole world according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/animals-slaughtered-for-meat?time=1961..latest). For example, this figure was 70.77 billion in the year 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "38.0B", "median": "62.7B", "upper_75": "93.8B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world per capita primary energy consumption will be 20.82k in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Energy use per person](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world energy use per person in kilowatt-hours (kWh), according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption). For example, in 2020 this figure was 20,099 kWh per person.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "20.82k", "median": "21.15k", "upper_75": "21.45k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 93.8 billion chickens will be slaughtered for meat globally in the following years (2052)?", "desc": "\n\nIn 2020 over 70 billion chickens were slaughtered for meat, more than double the number slaughtered in 1996, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/animals-slaughtered-for-meat?time=1961..latest). Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of chickens slaughtered for meat in the respective year for the whole world according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/animals-slaughtered-for-meat?time=1961..latest). For example, this figure was 70.77 billion in the year 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "38.0B", "median": "62.7B", "upper_75": "93.8B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the population-weighted average life expectancy at birth in the G7 countries will be 80.58 in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "80.58", "median": "81.15", "upper_75": "81.75", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world per capita primary energy consumption will be 20.82k in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Energy use per person](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world energy use per person in kilowatt-hours (kWh), according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption). For example, in 2020 this figure was 20,099 kWh per person.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "20.82k", "median": "21.15k", "upper_75": "21.45k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many chickens will be slaughtered for meat globally in the following years, considering that 8.58B is the total number of chickens slaughtered for meat globally?", "desc": "\n\nIn 2020 over 70 billion chickens were slaughtered for meat, more than double the number slaughtered in 1996, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/animals-slaughtered-for-meat?time=1961..latest). Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of chickens slaughtered for meat in the respective year for the whole world according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/animals-slaughtered-for-meat?time=1961..latest). For example, this figure was 70.77 billion in the year 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "110M", "median": "8.58B", "upper_75": "38.9B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world per capita primary energy consumption will be 21.74k kWh in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Energy use per person](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world energy use per person in kilowatt-hours (kWh), according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption). For example, in 2020 this figure was 20,099 kWh per person.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "20.86k", "median": "21.31k", "upper_75": "21.74k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many chickens will be slaughtered for meat globally in the following years, considering that 8.58B is the total number of chickens slaughtered for meat globally?", "desc": "\n\nIn 2020 over 70 billion chickens were slaughtered for meat, more than double the number slaughtered in 1996, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/animals-slaughtered-for-meat?time=1961..latest). Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of chickens slaughtered for meat in the respective year for the whole world according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/animals-slaughtered-for-meat?time=1961..latest). For example, this figure was 70.77 billion in the year 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "110M", "median": "8.58B", "upper_75": "38.9B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world per capita primary energy consumption will be 20.82k in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Energy use per person](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world energy use per person in kilowatt-hours (kWh), according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption). For example, in 2020 this figure was 20,099 kWh per person.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "20.82k", "median": "21.15k", "upper_75": "21.45k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world per capita primary energy consumption will be 25.7k kWh in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Energy use per person](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world energy use per person in kilowatt-hours (kWh), according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption). For example, in 2020 this figure was 20,099 kWh per person.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "20.7k", "median": "23.1k", "upper_75": "25.7k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world per capita primary energy consumption will be 25.7k kWh in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Energy use per person](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world energy use per person in kilowatt-hours (kWh), according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption). For example, in 2020 this figure was 20,099 kWh per person.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "20.7k", "median": "23.1k", "upper_75": "25.7k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world per capita primary energy consumption will be 21.74k kWh in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Energy use per person](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world energy use per person in kilowatt-hours (kWh), according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption). For example, in 2020 this figure was 20,099 kWh per person.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "20.86k", "median": "21.31k", "upper_75": "21.74k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world per capita primary energy consumption will be 25.7k kWh in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Energy use per person](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world energy use per person in kilowatt-hours (kWh), according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption). For example, in 2020 this figure was 20,099 kWh per person.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "20.7k", "median": "23.1k", "upper_75": "25.7k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 80.5 billion chickens will be slaughtered for meat globally in the following years (2032)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "75.0B", "median": "80.5B", "upper_75": "86.8B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world per capita primary energy consumption will be 42.3k kWh in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Energy use per person](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world energy use per person in kilowatt-hours (kWh), according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption). For example, in 2020 this figure was 20,099 kWh per person.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "24.1k", "median": "42.3k", "upper_75": "67.9k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world per capita primary energy consumption will be 42.3k kWh in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Energy use per person](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world energy use per person in kilowatt-hours (kWh), according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption). For example, in 2020 this figure was 20,099 kWh per person.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "24.1k", "median": "42.3k", "upper_75": "67.9k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world per capita primary energy consumption (in kWh) will be 37.3k in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Energy use per person](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world energy use per person in kilowatt-hours (kWh), according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption). For example, in 2020 this figure was 20,099 kWh per person.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "37.3k", "median": "91.7k", "upper_75": "434k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.297 in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.52 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 4.86 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total world population for the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/children-per-woman-un?tab=chart&time=earliest..latest). For example, in 2020 this figure was 2.35.\n\nBabies born via [ectogenesis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ectogenesis), where the fetus is grown outside the human body, will not be included in the fertility estimates used to resolve this question, where feasible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.150", "median": "2.229", "upper_75": "2.297", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world per capita primary energy consumption will be 21.74k kWh in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Energy use per person](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world energy use per person in kilowatt-hours (kWh), according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption). For example, in 2020 this figure was 20,099 kWh per person.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "20.86k", "median": "21.31k", "upper_75": "21.74k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.297 in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.52 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 4.86 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total world population for the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/children-per-woman-un?tab=chart&time=earliest..latest). For example, in 2020 this figure was 2.35.\n\nBabies born via [ectogenesis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ectogenesis), where the fetus is grown outside the human body, will not be included in the fertility estimates used to resolve this question, where feasible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.150", "median": "2.229", "upper_75": "2.297", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.244 in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "\n\nThe Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.52 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 4.86 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total world population for the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/children-per-woman-un?tab=chart&time=earliest..latest). For example, in 2020 this figure was 2.35.\n\nBabies born via [ectogenesis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ectogenesis), where the fetus is grown outside the human body, will not be included in the fertility estimates used to resolve this question, where feasible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.072", "median": "2.162", "upper_75": "2.244", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 1.98 in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nThe Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.52 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 4.86 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total world population for the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/children-per-woman-un?tab=chart&time=earliest..latest). For example, in 2020 this figure was 2.35.\n\nBabies born via [ectogenesis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ectogenesis), where the fetus is grown outside the human body, will not be included in the fertility estimates used to resolve this question, where feasible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.84", "median": "1.98", "upper_75": "2.13", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world per capita primary energy consumption (in kWh) will be 37.3k in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Energy use per person](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world energy use per person in kilowatt-hours (kWh), according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption). For example, in 2020 this figure was 20,099 kWh per person.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "37.3k", "median": "91.7k", "upper_75": "434k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world per capita primary energy consumption will be 42.3k kWh in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Energy use per person](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world energy use per person in kilowatt-hours (kWh), according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption). For example, in 2020 this figure was 20,099 kWh per person.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "24.1k", "median": "42.3k", "upper_75": "67.9k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 1.98 in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nThe Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.52 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 4.86 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total world population for the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/children-per-woman-un?tab=chart&time=earliest..latest). For example, in 2020 this figure was 2.35.\n\nBabies born via [ectogenesis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ectogenesis), where the fetus is grown outside the human body, will not be included in the fertility estimates used to resolve this question, where feasible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.84", "median": "1.98", "upper_75": "2.13", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.297 in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.52 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 4.86 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total world population for the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/children-per-woman-un?tab=chart&time=earliest..latest). For example, in 2020 this figure was 2.35.\n\nBabies born via [ectogenesis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ectogenesis), where the fetus is grown outside the human body, will not be included in the fertility estimates used to resolve this question, where feasible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.150", "median": "2.229", "upper_75": "2.297", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world per capita primary energy consumption (in kWh) will be 37.3k in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Energy use per person](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world energy use per person in kilowatt-hours (kWh), according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Per+capita+consumption). For example, in 2020 this figure was 20,099 kWh per person.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "37.3k", "median": "91.7k", "upper_75": "434k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.244 in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "\n\nThe Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.52 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 4.86 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total world population for the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/children-per-woman-un?tab=chart&time=earliest..latest). For example, in 2020 this figure was 2.35.\n\nBabies born via [ectogenesis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ectogenesis), where the fetus is grown outside the human body, will not be included in the fertility estimates used to resolve this question, where feasible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.072", "median": "2.162", "upper_75": "2.244", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 1.24 in the year 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.24", "median": "1.65", "upper_75": "2.04", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 1.24 in the year 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.24", "median": "1.65", "upper_75": "2.04", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.244 in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "\n\nThe Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.52 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 4.86 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total world population for the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/children-per-woman-un?tab=chart&time=earliest..latest). For example, in 2020 this figure was 2.35.\n\nBabies born via [ectogenesis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ectogenesis), where the fetus is grown outside the human body, will not be included in the fertility estimates used to resolve this question, where feasible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.072", "median": "2.162", "upper_75": "2.244", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 1.98 in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nThe Total Fertility Rate is [defined](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate) as the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if:\n\n* she were to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) through her lifetime\n* she were to live from birth until the end of her reproductive life.\n\nGlobally, the total fertility rate was [2.52 children per woman](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate#50-years-ago-the-average-woman-had-five-children-since-then-the-number-has-halved) in 2015, down from 4.86 in 1950. This large decline is part of what is known as the [demographic transition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_transition) from high birth rates and high child mortality to low birth rates and low child mortality. From 1900 to 2000, more women recieved education, took jobs, and also had greater access to contraception. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/fertility-rate)'s 2017 article analyzes the multiple factors that have influenced global fertility rates.\n\nA 2020 [study](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-53409521) from the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation predicts that fertility rates will decline to 1.66 in 2100, with a 95% uncertainty interval of 1.33 to 2.08.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total fertility rate for the total world population for the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/children-per-woman-un?tab=chart&time=earliest..latest). For example, in 2020 this figure was 2.35.\n\nBabies born via [ectogenesis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ectogenesis), where the fetus is grown outside the human body, will not be included in the fertility estimates used to resolve this question, where feasible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.84", "median": "1.98", "upper_75": "2.13", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 1.24 in the year 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.24", "median": "1.65", "upper_75": "2.04", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.10 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.27", "median": "1.67", "upper_75": "2.10", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.10 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.27", "median": "1.67", "upper_75": "2.10", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global total fertility rate will be 2.10 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.27", "median": "1.67", "upper_75": "2.10", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 9.536k nuclear weapons in world stockpiles by 2025?", "desc": "\n\nTotal nuclear stockpiles are estimated to have peaked in 1986 with [64,000 nuclear warheads](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons#stockpiles-of-nuclear-weapons). The [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons#Second_pillar:_Disarmament) (NPT) includes requirements for all treaty members which possess nuclear weapons to pursue total nuclear disarmament. 5 states which possess nuclear weapons (including the US and Russia) are members of the NPT.\n\nUS President Barack Obama said in [a speech in 2009](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219):\n\n> if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.\n\nUS President Ronald Regan said in his [1984 State of the Union Address](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221140518/https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/26/world/reagan-reassures-russians-on-war.html):\n\n> People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy for your country and mine to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then, would it not be better to do away with them entirely?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of nuclear warheads in all stockpiles in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles). These estimates include warheads assigned to military forces, but exclude warheads queued for dismantlement. This question will also exclude \"[breakout capability](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation#Breakout_capability)\", ie. a state with the known resources to quickly assemble nuclear warheads, but no existing assembled warheads. For example, in 2020 there were 9,330 assembled warheads in global stockpiles, according to [OWID](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles).\n\nFor this question, a nuclear weapon is strictly defined as a bomb whose primary energy source is a [fission or fusion nuclear reaction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon), and excludes conventional weapons and \"[dirty bombs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb)\".\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on May 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "9.359k", "median": "9.536k", "upper_75": "9.720k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 9.536k nuclear weapons in world stockpiles by 2025?", "desc": "\n\nTotal nuclear stockpiles are estimated to have peaked in 1986 with [64,000 nuclear warheads](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons#stockpiles-of-nuclear-weapons). The [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons#Second_pillar:_Disarmament) (NPT) includes requirements for all treaty members which possess nuclear weapons to pursue total nuclear disarmament. 5 states which possess nuclear weapons (including the US and Russia) are members of the NPT.\n\nUS President Barack Obama said in [a speech in 2009](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219):\n\n> if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.\n\nUS President Ronald Regan said in his [1984 State of the Union Address](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221140518/https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/26/world/reagan-reassures-russians-on-war.html):\n\n> People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy for your country and mine to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then, would it not be better to do away with them entirely?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of nuclear warheads in all stockpiles in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles). These estimates include warheads assigned to military forces, but exclude warheads queued for dismantlement. This question will also exclude \"[breakout capability](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation#Breakout_capability)\", ie. a state with the known resources to quickly assemble nuclear warheads, but no existing assembled warheads. For example, in 2020 there were 9,330 assembled warheads in global stockpiles, according to [OWID](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles).\n\nFor this question, a nuclear weapon is strictly defined as a bomb whose primary energy source is a [fission or fusion nuclear reaction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon), and excludes conventional weapons and \"[dirty bombs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb)\".\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on May 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "9.359k", "median": "9.536k", "upper_75": "9.720k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 10.9k nuclear weapons in world stockpiles by 2032?", "desc": "\n\nTotal nuclear stockpiles are estimated to have peaked in 1986 with [64,000 nuclear warheads](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons#stockpiles-of-nuclear-weapons). The [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons#Second_pillar:_Disarmament) (NPT) includes requirements for all treaty members which possess nuclear weapons to pursue total nuclear disarmament. 5 states which possess nuclear weapons (including the US and Russia) are members of the NPT.\n\nUS President Barack Obama said in [a speech in 2009](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219):\n\n> if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.\n\nUS President Ronald Regan said in his [1984 State of the Union Address](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221140518/https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/26/world/reagan-reassures-russians-on-war.html):\n\n> People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy for your country and mine to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then, would it not be better to do away with them entirely?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of nuclear warheads in all stockpiles in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles). These estimates include warheads assigned to military forces, but exclude warheads queued for dismantlement. This question will also exclude \"[breakout capability](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation#Breakout_capability)\", ie. a state with the known resources to quickly assemble nuclear warheads, but no existing assembled warheads. For example, in 2020 there were 9,330 assembled warheads in global stockpiles, according to [OWID](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles).\n\nFor this question, a nuclear weapon is strictly defined as a bomb whose primary energy source is a [fission or fusion nuclear reaction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon), and excludes conventional weapons and \"[dirty bombs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb)\".\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on May 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "8.91k", "median": "9.88k", "upper_75": "10.9k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 9.720k nuclear weapons in world stockpiles in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.359k", "median": "9.536k", "upper_75": "9.720k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 9.720k nuclear weapons in world stockpiles in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.359k", "median": "9.536k", "upper_75": "9.720k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 10.9k nuclear weapons in world stockpiles by 2032?", "desc": "\n\nTotal nuclear stockpiles are estimated to have peaked in 1986 with [64,000 nuclear warheads](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons#stockpiles-of-nuclear-weapons). The [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons#Second_pillar:_Disarmament) (NPT) includes requirements for all treaty members which possess nuclear weapons to pursue total nuclear disarmament. 5 states which possess nuclear weapons (including the US and Russia) are members of the NPT.\n\nUS President Barack Obama said in [a speech in 2009](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219):\n\n> if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.\n\nUS President Ronald Regan said in his [1984 State of the Union Address](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221140518/https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/26/world/reagan-reassures-russians-on-war.html):\n\n> People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy for your country and mine to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then, would it not be better to do away with them entirely?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of nuclear warheads in all stockpiles in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles). These estimates include warheads assigned to military forces, but exclude warheads queued for dismantlement. This question will also exclude \"[breakout capability](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation#Breakout_capability)\", ie. a state with the known resources to quickly assemble nuclear warheads, but no existing assembled warheads. For example, in 2020 there were 9,330 assembled warheads in global stockpiles, according to [OWID](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles).\n\nFor this question, a nuclear weapon is strictly defined as a bomb whose primary energy source is a [fission or fusion nuclear reaction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon), and excludes conventional weapons and \"[dirty bombs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb)\".\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on May 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "8.91k", "median": "9.88k", "upper_75": "10.9k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 14.9k nuclear weapons in world stockpiles by 2052?", "desc": "\n\nTotal nuclear stockpiles are estimated to have peaked in 1986 with [64,000 nuclear warheads](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons#stockpiles-of-nuclear-weapons). The [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons#Second_pillar:_Disarmament) (NPT) includes requirements for all treaty members which possess nuclear weapons to pursue total nuclear disarmament. 5 states which possess nuclear weapons (including the US and Russia) are members of the NPT.\n\nUS President Barack Obama said in [a speech in 2009](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219):\n\n> if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.\n\nUS President Ronald Regan said in his [1984 State of the Union Address](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221140518/https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/26/world/reagan-reassures-russians-on-war.html):\n\n> People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy for your country and mine to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then, would it not be better to do away with them entirely?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of nuclear warheads in all stockpiles in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles). These estimates include warheads assigned to military forces, but exclude warheads queued for dismantlement. This question will also exclude \"[breakout capability](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation#Breakout_capability)\", ie. a state with the known resources to quickly assemble nuclear warheads, but no existing assembled warheads. For example, in 2020 there were 9,330 assembled warheads in global stockpiles, according to [OWID](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles).\n\nFor this question, a nuclear weapon is strictly defined as a bomb whose primary energy source is a [fission or fusion nuclear reaction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon), and excludes conventional weapons and \"[dirty bombs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb)\".\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on May 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "6.33k", "median": "9.47k", "upper_75": "14.9k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 10.9k nuclear weapons in world stockpiles by 2032?", "desc": "\n\nTotal nuclear stockpiles are estimated to have peaked in 1986 with [64,000 nuclear warheads](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons#stockpiles-of-nuclear-weapons). The [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons#Second_pillar:_Disarmament) (NPT) includes requirements for all treaty members which possess nuclear weapons to pursue total nuclear disarmament. 5 states which possess nuclear weapons (including the US and Russia) are members of the NPT.\n\nUS President Barack Obama said in [a speech in 2009](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219):\n\n> if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.\n\nUS President Ronald Regan said in his [1984 State of the Union Address](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221140518/https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/26/world/reagan-reassures-russians-on-war.html):\n\n> People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy for your country and mine to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then, would it not be better to do away with them entirely?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of nuclear warheads in all stockpiles in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles). These estimates include warheads assigned to military forces, but exclude warheads queued for dismantlement. This question will also exclude \"[breakout capability](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation#Breakout_capability)\", ie. a state with the known resources to quickly assemble nuclear warheads, but no existing assembled warheads. For example, in 2020 there were 9,330 assembled warheads in global stockpiles, according to [OWID](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles).\n\nFor this question, a nuclear weapon is strictly defined as a bomb whose primary energy source is a [fission or fusion nuclear reaction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon), and excludes conventional weapons and \"[dirty bombs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb)\".\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on May 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "8.91k", "median": "9.88k", "upper_75": "10.9k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 9.720k nuclear weapons in world stockpiles in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.359k", "median": "9.536k", "upper_75": "9.720k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 14.9k nuclear weapons in world stockpiles by 2052?", "desc": "\n\nTotal nuclear stockpiles are estimated to have peaked in 1986 with [64,000 nuclear warheads](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons#stockpiles-of-nuclear-weapons). The [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons#Second_pillar:_Disarmament) (NPT) includes requirements for all treaty members which possess nuclear weapons to pursue total nuclear disarmament. 5 states which possess nuclear weapons (including the US and Russia) are members of the NPT.\n\nUS President Barack Obama said in [a speech in 2009](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219):\n\n> if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.\n\nUS President Ronald Regan said in his [1984 State of the Union Address](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221140518/https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/26/world/reagan-reassures-russians-on-war.html):\n\n> People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy for your country and mine to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then, would it not be better to do away with them entirely?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of nuclear warheads in all stockpiles in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles). These estimates include warheads assigned to military forces, but exclude warheads queued for dismantlement. This question will also exclude \"[breakout capability](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation#Breakout_capability)\", ie. a state with the known resources to quickly assemble nuclear warheads, but no existing assembled warheads. For example, in 2020 there were 9,330 assembled warheads in global stockpiles, according to [OWID](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles).\n\nFor this question, a nuclear weapon is strictly defined as a bomb whose primary energy source is a [fission or fusion nuclear reaction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon), and excludes conventional weapons and \"[dirty bombs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb)\".\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on May 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "6.33k", "median": "9.47k", "upper_75": "14.9k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 14.9k nuclear weapons in world stockpiles by 2052?", "desc": "\n\nTotal nuclear stockpiles are estimated to have peaked in 1986 with [64,000 nuclear warheads](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons#stockpiles-of-nuclear-weapons). The [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons#Second_pillar:_Disarmament) (NPT) includes requirements for all treaty members which possess nuclear weapons to pursue total nuclear disarmament. 5 states which possess nuclear weapons (including the US and Russia) are members of the NPT.\n\nUS President Barack Obama said in [a speech in 2009](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219):\n\n> if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.\n\nUS President Ronald Regan said in his [1984 State of the Union Address](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221140518/https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/26/world/reagan-reassures-russians-on-war.html):\n\n> People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy for your country and mine to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then, would it not be better to do away with them entirely?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of nuclear warheads in all stockpiles in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles). These estimates include warheads assigned to military forces, but exclude warheads queued for dismantlement. This question will also exclude \"[breakout capability](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation#Breakout_capability)\", ie. a state with the known resources to quickly assemble nuclear warheads, but no existing assembled warheads. For example, in 2020 there were 9,330 assembled warheads in global stockpiles, according to [OWID](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles).\n\nFor this question, a nuclear weapon is strictly defined as a bomb whose primary energy source is a [fission or fusion nuclear reaction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon), and excludes conventional weapons and \"[dirty bombs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb)\".\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on May 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "6.33k", "median": "9.47k", "upper_75": "14.9k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 506 nuclear weapons in world stockpiles in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nTotal nuclear stockpiles are estimated to have peaked in 1986 with [64,000 nuclear warheads](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons#stockpiles-of-nuclear-weapons). The [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons#Second_pillar:_Disarmament) (NPT) includes requirements for all treaty members which possess nuclear weapons to pursue total nuclear disarmament. 5 states which possess nuclear weapons (including the US and Russia) are members of the NPT.\n\nUS President Barack Obama said in [a speech in 2009](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219):\n\n> if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.\n\nUS President Ronald Regan said in his [1984 State of the Union Address](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221140518/https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/26/world/reagan-reassures-russians-on-war.html):\n\n> People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy for your country and mine to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then, would it not be better to do away with them entirely?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of nuclear warheads in all stockpiles in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles). These estimates include warheads assigned to military forces, but exclude warheads queued for dismantlement. This question will also exclude \"[breakout capability](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation#Breakout_capability)\", ie. a state with the known resources to quickly assemble nuclear warheads, but no existing assembled warheads. For example, in 2020 there were 9,330 assembled warheads in global stockpiles, according to [OWID](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles).\n\nFor this question, a nuclear weapon is strictly defined as a bomb whose primary energy source is a [fission or fusion nuclear reaction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon), and excludes conventional weapons and \"[dirty bombs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb)\".\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on May 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "506", "median": "2.63k", "upper_75": "9.65k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that lead exposure will contribute to 75% of the total global disease burden (in DALYs) in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nOur World in Data [describes the disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/reducing-lead-poisoning) as follows:\n\n>Lead poisoning is estimated to account for about 1% of the global disease burden.\n>\n>This is a large burden for a problem that gets very little attention. On an individual level, being exposed to lead in the environment can hinder a child's brain development: it can result in a reduction in IQ; cognitive function; and has been linked to higher levels of antisocial behavior. These impacts are thought to be largely irreversible.\n>\n>It's not just damaging for individuals. It also comes at a large economic cost for society at large. Impacts on brain development, cognitive function, and productivity affect a country's output and earning potential. Researchers estimate that in some countries, the costs of lead exposure are equivalent to as much as 6% of GDP.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL) provides an estimate of the total [disability-adjusted life years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year) (DALYs) lost around the world due to lead exposure. The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME). The IHME defines a DALY as follows:\n\n>It is a universal metric that allows researchers and policymakers to compare very different populations and health conditions across time. DALYs equal the sum of years of life lost (YLLs) and years lived with disability (YLDs). One DALY equals one lost year of healthy life. DALYs allow us to estimate the total number of years lost due to specific causes and risk factors at the country, regional, and global levels.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total annual world disease burden from lead, measured in disability-adjusted life years ([DALYs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year)), in the respective year according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 21.68 million DALYs in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "21.64M", "median": "21.78M", "upper_75": "21.99M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 506 nuclear weapons in world stockpiles in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nTotal nuclear stockpiles are estimated to have peaked in 1986 with [64,000 nuclear warheads](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons#stockpiles-of-nuclear-weapons). The [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons#Second_pillar:_Disarmament) (NPT) includes requirements for all treaty members which possess nuclear weapons to pursue total nuclear disarmament. 5 states which possess nuclear weapons (including the US and Russia) are members of the NPT.\n\nUS President Barack Obama said in [a speech in 2009](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219):\n\n> if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.\n\nUS President Ronald Regan said in his [1984 State of the Union Address](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221140518/https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/26/world/reagan-reassures-russians-on-war.html):\n\n> People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy for your country and mine to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then, would it not be better to do away with them entirely?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of nuclear warheads in all stockpiles in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles). These estimates include warheads assigned to military forces, but exclude warheads queued for dismantlement. This question will also exclude \"[breakout capability](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation#Breakout_capability)\", ie. a state with the known resources to quickly assemble nuclear warheads, but no existing assembled warheads. For example, in 2020 there were 9,330 assembled warheads in global stockpiles, according to [OWID](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles).\n\nFor this question, a nuclear weapon is strictly defined as a bomb whose primary energy source is a [fission or fusion nuclear reaction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon), and excludes conventional weapons and \"[dirty bombs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb)\".\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on May 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "506", "median": "2.63k", "upper_75": "9.65k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 9.536k nuclear weapons in world stockpiles by 2025?", "desc": "\n\nTotal nuclear stockpiles are estimated to have peaked in 1986 with [64,000 nuclear warheads](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons#stockpiles-of-nuclear-weapons). The [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons#Second_pillar:_Disarmament) (NPT) includes requirements for all treaty members which possess nuclear weapons to pursue total nuclear disarmament. 5 states which possess nuclear weapons (including the US and Russia) are members of the NPT.\n\nUS President Barack Obama said in [a speech in 2009](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219):\n\n> if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.\n\nUS President Ronald Regan said in his [1984 State of the Union Address](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221140518/https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/26/world/reagan-reassures-russians-on-war.html):\n\n> People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy for your country and mine to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then, would it not be better to do away with them entirely?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of nuclear warheads in all stockpiles in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles). These estimates include warheads assigned to military forces, but exclude warheads queued for dismantlement. This question will also exclude \"[breakout capability](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation#Breakout_capability)\", ie. a state with the known resources to quickly assemble nuclear warheads, but no existing assembled warheads. For example, in 2020 there were 9,330 assembled warheads in global stockpiles, according to [OWID](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles).\n\nFor this question, a nuclear weapon is strictly defined as a bomb whose primary energy source is a [fission or fusion nuclear reaction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon), and excludes conventional weapons and \"[dirty bombs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb)\".\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on May 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "9.359k", "median": "9.536k", "upper_75": "9.720k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that lead exposure will contribute to 75% of the total global disease burden (in DALYs) in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nOur World in Data [describes the disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/reducing-lead-poisoning) as follows:\n\n>Lead poisoning is estimated to account for about 1% of the global disease burden.\n>\n>This is a large burden for a problem that gets very little attention. On an individual level, being exposed to lead in the environment can hinder a child's brain development: it can result in a reduction in IQ; cognitive function; and has been linked to higher levels of antisocial behavior. These impacts are thought to be largely irreversible.\n>\n>It's not just damaging for individuals. It also comes at a large economic cost for society at large. Impacts on brain development, cognitive function, and productivity affect a country's output and earning potential. Researchers estimate that in some countries, the costs of lead exposure are equivalent to as much as 6% of GDP.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL) provides an estimate of the total [disability-adjusted life years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year) (DALYs) lost around the world due to lead exposure. The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME). The IHME defines a DALY as follows:\n\n>It is a universal metric that allows researchers and policymakers to compare very different populations and health conditions across time. DALYs equal the sum of years of life lost (YLLs) and years lived with disability (YLDs). One DALY equals one lost year of healthy life. DALYs allow us to estimate the total number of years lost due to specific causes and risk factors at the country, regional, and global levels.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total annual world disease burden from lead, measured in disability-adjusted life years ([DALYs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year)), in the respective year according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 21.68 million DALYs in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "21.64M", "median": "21.78M", "upper_75": "21.99M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that lead exposure will contribute to 75% of the total global disease burden (in DALYs) in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nOur World in Data [describes the disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/reducing-lead-poisoning) as follows:\n\n>Lead poisoning is estimated to account for about 1% of the global disease burden.\n>\n>This is a large burden for a problem that gets very little attention. On an individual level, being exposed to lead in the environment can hinder a child's brain development: it can result in a reduction in IQ; cognitive function; and has been linked to higher levels of antisocial behavior. These impacts are thought to be largely irreversible.\n>\n>It's not just damaging for individuals. It also comes at a large economic cost for society at large. Impacts on brain development, cognitive function, and productivity affect a country's output and earning potential. Researchers estimate that in some countries, the costs of lead exposure are equivalent to as much as 6% of GDP.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL) provides an estimate of the total [disability-adjusted life years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year) (DALYs) lost around the world due to lead exposure. The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME). The IHME defines a DALY as follows:\n\n>It is a universal metric that allows researchers and policymakers to compare very different populations and health conditions across time. DALYs equal the sum of years of life lost (YLLs) and years lived with disability (YLDs). One DALY equals one lost year of healthy life. DALYs allow us to estimate the total number of years lost due to specific causes and risk factors at the country, regional, and global levels.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total annual world disease burden from lead, measured in disability-adjusted life years ([DALYs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year)), in the respective year according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 21.68 million DALYs in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "21.64M", "median": "21.78M", "upper_75": "21.99M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 506 nuclear weapons in world stockpiles in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nTotal nuclear stockpiles are estimated to have peaked in 1986 with [64,000 nuclear warheads](https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons#stockpiles-of-nuclear-weapons). The [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons#Second_pillar:_Disarmament) (NPT) includes requirements for all treaty members which possess nuclear weapons to pursue total nuclear disarmament. 5 states which possess nuclear weapons (including the US and Russia) are members of the NPT.\n\nUS President Barack Obama said in [a speech in 2009](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219):\n\n> if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.\n\nUS President Ronald Regan said in his [1984 State of the Union Address](https://web.archive.org/web/20220221140518/https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/26/world/reagan-reassures-russians-on-war.html):\n\n> People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy for your country and mine to preserve our civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then, would it not be better to do away with them entirely?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of nuclear warheads in all stockpiles in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles). These estimates include warheads assigned to military forces, but exclude warheads queued for dismantlement. This question will also exclude \"[breakout capability](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation#Breakout_capability)\", ie. a state with the known resources to quickly assemble nuclear warheads, but no existing assembled warheads. For example, in 2020 there were 9,330 assembled warheads in global stockpiles, according to [OWID](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/nuclear-warhead-stockpiles).\n\nFor this question, a nuclear weapon is strictly defined as a bomb whose primary energy source is a [fission or fusion nuclear reaction](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon), and excludes conventional weapons and \"[dirty bombs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty_bomb)\".\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined as the number provided by Our World in Data on May 1 of the year following the listed year; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "506", "median": "2.63k", "upper_75": "9.65k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that lead exposure will contribute to 75% of the total global disease burden (in DALYs) in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nOur World in Data [describes the disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/reducing-lead-poisoning) as follows:\n\n>Lead poisoning is estimated to account for about 1% of the global disease burden.\n>\n>This is a large burden for a problem that gets very little attention. On an individual level, being exposed to lead in the environment can hinder a child's brain development: it can result in a reduction in IQ; cognitive function; and has been linked to higher levels of antisocial behavior. These impacts are thought to be largely irreversible.\n>\n>It's not just damaging for individuals. It also comes at a large economic cost for society at large. Impacts on brain development, cognitive function, and productivity affect a country's output and earning potential. Researchers estimate that in some countries, the costs of lead exposure are equivalent to as much as 6% of GDP.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL) provides an estimate of the total [disability-adjusted life years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year) (DALYs) lost around the world due to lead exposure. The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME). The IHME defines a DALY as follows:\n\n>It is a universal metric that allows researchers and policymakers to compare very different populations and health conditions across time. DALYs equal the sum of years of life lost (YLLs) and years lived with disability (YLDs). One DALY equals one lost year of healthy life. DALYs allow us to estimate the total number of years lost due to specific causes and risk factors at the country, regional, and global levels.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total annual world disease burden from lead, measured in disability-adjusted life years ([DALYs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year)), in the respective year according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 21.68 million DALYs in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "21.50M", "median": "21.89M", "upper_75": "22.33M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that lead exposure will contribute to 75% of the total global disease burden (in DALYs) in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nOur World in Data [describes the disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/reducing-lead-poisoning) as follows:\n\n>Lead poisoning is estimated to account for about 1% of the global disease burden.\n>\n>This is a large burden for a problem that gets very little attention. On an individual level, being exposed to lead in the environment can hinder a child's brain development: it can result in a reduction in IQ; cognitive function; and has been linked to higher levels of antisocial behavior. These impacts are thought to be largely irreversible.\n>\n>It's not just damaging for individuals. It also comes at a large economic cost for society at large. Impacts on brain development, cognitive function, and productivity affect a country's output and earning potential. Researchers estimate that in some countries, the costs of lead exposure are equivalent to as much as 6% of GDP.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL) provides an estimate of the total [disability-adjusted life years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year) (DALYs) lost around the world due to lead exposure. The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME). The IHME defines a DALY as follows:\n\n>It is a universal metric that allows researchers and policymakers to compare very different populations and health conditions across time. DALYs equal the sum of years of life lost (YLLs) and years lived with disability (YLDs). One DALY equals one lost year of healthy life. DALYs allow us to estimate the total number of years lost due to specific causes and risk factors at the country, regional, and global levels.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total annual world disease burden from lead, measured in disability-adjusted life years ([DALYs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year)), in the respective year according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 21.68 million DALYs in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "21.50M", "median": "21.89M", "upper_75": "22.33M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 5.74k objects launched into space annually in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nOver 1,800 objects were launched into space in 2021 [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). The annual number has grown greatly in recent years, the first time more than 200 objects were launched into space in a single year was in 2013.\n\nOur World in Data uses the [United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html) as a data source, which is maintained by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). UNOOSA describes the history of the register as follows\n\n>Since 1962, the United Nations has maintained a Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Originally established as a mechanism to aid the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its discussions on the political, legal and technical issues concerning outer space, the evolution of international space law resulted in space object registration becoming a means of identifying which States' bear international responsibility and liability for space objects.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>To date over 88% of all satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecraft and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond have been registered with the Secretary-General.\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data the chart [Annual number of objects launched into space](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL) includes\n\n>satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecrafts, and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global number of objects launched into space in the respective year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,807 in 2021.\n\nFor this question, \"launching\" into space is not restricted to [conventional rocketry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expendable_launch_system), but includes [all means of travelling off Earth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-rocket_spacelaunch), including space elevators, mass drivers, space tethers/skyhooks, and other future launch methods.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.71k", "median": "3.83k", "upper_75": "5.74k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that lead exposure will contribute to 75% of the total global disease burden (in DALYs) in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nOur World in Data [describes the disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/reducing-lead-poisoning) as follows:\n\n>Lead poisoning is estimated to account for about 1% of the global disease burden.\n>\n>This is a large burden for a problem that gets very little attention. On an individual level, being exposed to lead in the environment can hinder a child's brain development: it can result in a reduction in IQ; cognitive function; and has been linked to higher levels of antisocial behavior. These impacts are thought to be largely irreversible.\n>\n>It's not just damaging for individuals. It also comes at a large economic cost for society at large. Impacts on brain development, cognitive function, and productivity affect a country's output and earning potential. Researchers estimate that in some countries, the costs of lead exposure are equivalent to as much as 6% of GDP.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL) provides an estimate of the total [disability-adjusted life years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year) (DALYs) lost around the world due to lead exposure. The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME). The IHME defines a DALY as follows:\n\n>It is a universal metric that allows researchers and policymakers to compare very different populations and health conditions across time. DALYs equal the sum of years of life lost (YLLs) and years lived with disability (YLDs). One DALY equals one lost year of healthy life. DALYs allow us to estimate the total number of years lost due to specific causes and risk factors at the country, regional, and global levels.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total annual world disease burden from lead, measured in disability-adjusted life years ([DALYs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year)), in the respective year according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 21.68 million DALYs in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "21.50M", "median": "21.89M", "upper_75": "22.33M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that lead exposure will contribute to 4.99M DALYs of total global disease burden in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nOur World in Data [describes the disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/reducing-lead-poisoning) as follows:\n\n>Lead poisoning is estimated to account for about 1% of the global disease burden.\n>\n>This is a large burden for a problem that gets very little attention. On an individual level, being exposed to lead in the environment can hinder a child's brain development: it can result in a reduction in IQ; cognitive function; and has been linked to higher levels of antisocial behavior. These impacts are thought to be largely irreversible.\n>\n>It's not just damaging for individuals. It also comes at a large economic cost for society at large. Impacts on brain development, cognitive function, and productivity affect a country's output and earning potential. Researchers estimate that in some countries, the costs of lead exposure are equivalent to as much as 6% of GDP.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL) provides an estimate of the total [disability-adjusted life years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year) (DALYs) lost around the world due to lead exposure. The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME). The IHME defines a DALY as follows:\n\n>It is a universal metric that allows researchers and policymakers to compare very different populations and health conditions across time. DALYs equal the sum of years of life lost (YLLs) and years lived with disability (YLDs). One DALY equals one lost year of healthy life. DALYs allow us to estimate the total number of years lost due to specific causes and risk factors at the country, regional, and global levels.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total annual world disease burden from lead, measured in disability-adjusted life years ([DALYs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year)), in the respective year according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 21.68 million DALYs in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.73M", "median": "4.99M", "upper_75": "7.26M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that lead exposure will contribute to 4.99M DALYs of total global disease burden in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nOur World in Data [describes the disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/reducing-lead-poisoning) as follows:\n\n>Lead poisoning is estimated to account for about 1% of the global disease burden.\n>\n>This is a large burden for a problem that gets very little attention. On an individual level, being exposed to lead in the environment can hinder a child's brain development: it can result in a reduction in IQ; cognitive function; and has been linked to higher levels of antisocial behavior. These impacts are thought to be largely irreversible.\n>\n>It's not just damaging for individuals. It also comes at a large economic cost for society at large. Impacts on brain development, cognitive function, and productivity affect a country's output and earning potential. Researchers estimate that in some countries, the costs of lead exposure are equivalent to as much as 6% of GDP.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL) provides an estimate of the total [disability-adjusted life years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year) (DALYs) lost around the world due to lead exposure. The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME). The IHME defines a DALY as follows:\n\n>It is a universal metric that allows researchers and policymakers to compare very different populations and health conditions across time. DALYs equal the sum of years of life lost (YLLs) and years lived with disability (YLDs). One DALY equals one lost year of healthy life. DALYs allow us to estimate the total number of years lost due to specific causes and risk factors at the country, regional, and global levels.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total annual world disease burden from lead, measured in disability-adjusted life years ([DALYs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year)), in the respective year according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 21.68 million DALYs in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.73M", "median": "4.99M", "upper_75": "7.26M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 5.74k objects launched into space annually in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nOver 1,800 objects were launched into space in 2021 [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). The annual number has grown greatly in recent years, the first time more than 200 objects were launched into space in a single year was in 2013.\n\nOur World in Data uses the [United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html) as a data source, which is maintained by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). UNOOSA describes the history of the register as follows\n\n>Since 1962, the United Nations has maintained a Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Originally established as a mechanism to aid the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its discussions on the political, legal and technical issues concerning outer space, the evolution of international space law resulted in space object registration becoming a means of identifying which States' bear international responsibility and liability for space objects.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>To date over 88% of all satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecraft and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond have been registered with the Secretary-General.\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data the chart [Annual number of objects launched into space](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL) includes\n\n>satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecrafts, and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global number of objects launched into space in the respective year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,807 in 2021.\n\nFor this question, \"launching\" into space is not restricted to [conventional rocketry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expendable_launch_system), but includes [all means of travelling off Earth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-rocket_spacelaunch), including space elevators, mass drivers, space tethers/skyhooks, and other future launch methods.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.71k", "median": "3.83k", "upper_75": "5.74k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that lead exposure will contribute 25% to the total global disease burden (in DALYs) by 2032?", "desc": "\n\nOur World in Data [describes the disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/reducing-lead-poisoning) as follows:\n\n>Lead poisoning is estimated to account for about 1% of the global disease burden.\n>\n>This is a large burden for a problem that gets very little attention. On an individual level, being exposed to lead in the environment can hinder a child's brain development: it can result in a reduction in IQ; cognitive function; and has been linked to higher levels of antisocial behavior. These impacts are thought to be largely irreversible.\n>\n>It's not just damaging for individuals. It also comes at a large economic cost for society at large. Impacts on brain development, cognitive function, and productivity affect a country's output and earning potential. Researchers estimate that in some countries, the costs of lead exposure are equivalent to as much as 6% of GDP.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL) provides an estimate of the total [disability-adjusted life years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year) (DALYs) lost around the world due to lead exposure. The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME). The IHME defines a DALY as follows:\n\n>It is a universal metric that allows researchers and policymakers to compare very different populations and health conditions across time. DALYs equal the sum of years of life lost (YLLs) and years lived with disability (YLDs). One DALY equals one lost year of healthy life. DALYs allow us to estimate the total number of years lost due to specific causes and risk factors at the country, regional, and global levels.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total annual world disease burden from lead, measured in disability-adjusted life years ([DALYs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year)), in the respective year according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 21.68 million DALYs in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "20.70M", "median": "21.59M", "upper_75": "22.44M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that lead exposure will contribute 25% to the total global disease burden (in DALYs) by 2032?", "desc": "\n\nOur World in Data [describes the disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/reducing-lead-poisoning) as follows:\n\n>Lead poisoning is estimated to account for about 1% of the global disease burden.\n>\n>This is a large burden for a problem that gets very little attention. On an individual level, being exposed to lead in the environment can hinder a child's brain development: it can result in a reduction in IQ; cognitive function; and has been linked to higher levels of antisocial behavior. These impacts are thought to be largely irreversible.\n>\n>It's not just damaging for individuals. It also comes at a large economic cost for society at large. Impacts on brain development, cognitive function, and productivity affect a country's output and earning potential. Researchers estimate that in some countries, the costs of lead exposure are equivalent to as much as 6% of GDP.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL) provides an estimate of the total [disability-adjusted life years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year) (DALYs) lost around the world due to lead exposure. The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME). The IHME defines a DALY as follows:\n\n>It is a universal metric that allows researchers and policymakers to compare very different populations and health conditions across time. DALYs equal the sum of years of life lost (YLLs) and years lived with disability (YLDs). One DALY equals one lost year of healthy life. DALYs allow us to estimate the total number of years lost due to specific causes and risk factors at the country, regional, and global levels.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total annual world disease burden from lead, measured in disability-adjusted life years ([DALYs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year)), in the respective year according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 21.68 million DALYs in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "20.70M", "median": "21.59M", "upper_75": "22.44M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that lead exposure will contribute to 4.99M DALYs of total global disease burden in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nOur World in Data [describes the disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/reducing-lead-poisoning) as follows:\n\n>Lead poisoning is estimated to account for about 1% of the global disease burden.\n>\n>This is a large burden for a problem that gets very little attention. On an individual level, being exposed to lead in the environment can hinder a child's brain development: it can result in a reduction in IQ; cognitive function; and has been linked to higher levels of antisocial behavior. These impacts are thought to be largely irreversible.\n>\n>It's not just damaging for individuals. It also comes at a large economic cost for society at large. Impacts on brain development, cognitive function, and productivity affect a country's output and earning potential. Researchers estimate that in some countries, the costs of lead exposure are equivalent to as much as 6% of GDP.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL) provides an estimate of the total [disability-adjusted life years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year) (DALYs) lost around the world due to lead exposure. The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME). The IHME defines a DALY as follows:\n\n>It is a universal metric that allows researchers and policymakers to compare very different populations and health conditions across time. DALYs equal the sum of years of life lost (YLLs) and years lived with disability (YLDs). One DALY equals one lost year of healthy life. DALYs allow us to estimate the total number of years lost due to specific causes and risk factors at the country, regional, and global levels.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total annual world disease burden from lead, measured in disability-adjusted life years ([DALYs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year)), in the respective year according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 21.68 million DALYs in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.73M", "median": "4.99M", "upper_75": "7.26M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that lead exposure will contribute to 75% of the total global disease burden (in DALYs) by 2052?", "desc": "\n\nOur World in Data [describes the disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/reducing-lead-poisoning) as follows:\n\n>Lead poisoning is estimated to account for about 1% of the global disease burden.\n>\n>This is a large burden for a problem that gets very little attention. On an individual level, being exposed to lead in the environment can hinder a child's brain development: it can result in a reduction in IQ; cognitive function; and has been linked to higher levels of antisocial behavior. These impacts are thought to be largely irreversible.\n>\n>It's not just damaging for individuals. It also comes at a large economic cost for society at large. Impacts on brain development, cognitive function, and productivity affect a country's output and earning potential. Researchers estimate that in some countries, the costs of lead exposure are equivalent to as much as 6% of GDP.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL) provides an estimate of the total [disability-adjusted life years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year) (DALYs) lost around the world due to lead exposure. The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME). The IHME defines a DALY as follows:\n\n>It is a universal metric that allows researchers and policymakers to compare very different populations and health conditions across time. DALYs equal the sum of years of life lost (YLLs) and years lived with disability (YLDs). One DALY equals one lost year of healthy life. DALYs allow us to estimate the total number of years lost due to specific causes and risk factors at the country, regional, and global levels.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total annual world disease burden from lead, measured in disability-adjusted life years ([DALYs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year)), in the respective year according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 21.68 million DALYs in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "13.7M", "median": "16.0M", "upper_75": "18.5M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that lead exposure will contribute to 75% of the total global disease burden (in DALYs) by 2052?", "desc": "\n\nOur World in Data [describes the disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/reducing-lead-poisoning) as follows:\n\n>Lead poisoning is estimated to account for about 1% of the global disease burden.\n>\n>This is a large burden for a problem that gets very little attention. On an individual level, being exposed to lead in the environment can hinder a child's brain development: it can result in a reduction in IQ; cognitive function; and has been linked to higher levels of antisocial behavior. These impacts are thought to be largely irreversible.\n>\n>It's not just damaging for individuals. It also comes at a large economic cost for society at large. Impacts on brain development, cognitive function, and productivity affect a country's output and earning potential. Researchers estimate that in some countries, the costs of lead exposure are equivalent to as much as 6% of GDP.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL) provides an estimate of the total [disability-adjusted life years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year) (DALYs) lost around the world due to lead exposure. The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME). The IHME defines a DALY as follows:\n\n>It is a universal metric that allows researchers and policymakers to compare very different populations and health conditions across time. DALYs equal the sum of years of life lost (YLLs) and years lived with disability (YLDs). One DALY equals one lost year of healthy life. DALYs allow us to estimate the total number of years lost due to specific causes and risk factors at the country, regional, and global levels.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total annual world disease burden from lead, measured in disability-adjusted life years ([DALYs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year)), in the respective year according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 21.68 million DALYs in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "13.7M", "median": "16.0M", "upper_75": "18.5M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.71k objects launched into space annually in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nOver 1,800 objects were launched into space in 2021 [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). The annual number has grown greatly in recent years, the first time more than 200 objects were launched into space in a single year was in 2013.\n\nOur World in Data uses the [United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html) as a data source, which is maintained by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). UNOOSA describes the history of the register as follows\n\n>Since 1962, the United Nations has maintained a Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Originally established as a mechanism to aid the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its discussions on the political, legal and technical issues concerning outer space, the evolution of international space law resulted in space object registration becoming a means of identifying which States' bear international responsibility and liability for space objects.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>To date over 88% of all satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecraft and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond have been registered with the Secretary-General.\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data the chart [Annual number of objects launched into space](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL) includes\n\n>satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecrafts, and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global number of objects launched into space in the respective year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,807 in 2021.\n\nFor this question, \"launching\" into space is not restricted to [conventional rocketry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expendable_launch_system), but includes [all means of travelling off Earth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-rocket_spacelaunch), including space elevators, mass drivers, space tethers/skyhooks, and other future launch methods.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.71k", "median": "3.83k", "upper_75": "5.74k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.71k objects launched into space annually in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nOver 1,800 objects were launched into space in 2021 [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). The annual number has grown greatly in recent years, the first time more than 200 objects were launched into space in a single year was in 2013.\n\nOur World in Data uses the [United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html) as a data source, which is maintained by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). UNOOSA describes the history of the register as follows\n\n>Since 1962, the United Nations has maintained a Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Originally established as a mechanism to aid the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its discussions on the political, legal and technical issues concerning outer space, the evolution of international space law resulted in space object registration becoming a means of identifying which States' bear international responsibility and liability for space objects.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>To date over 88% of all satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecraft and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond have been registered with the Secretary-General.\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data the chart [Annual number of objects launched into space](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL) includes\n\n>satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecrafts, and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global number of objects launched into space in the respective year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,807 in 2021.\n\nFor this question, \"launching\" into space is not restricted to [conventional rocketry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expendable_launch_system), but includes [all means of travelling off Earth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-rocket_spacelaunch), including space elevators, mass drivers, space tethers/skyhooks, and other future launch methods.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.71k", "median": "3.83k", "upper_75": "5.74k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that lead exposure will contribute to 75% of the total global disease burden (in DALYs) by 2052?", "desc": "\n\nOur World in Data [describes the disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/reducing-lead-poisoning) as follows:\n\n>Lead poisoning is estimated to account for about 1% of the global disease burden.\n>\n>This is a large burden for a problem that gets very little attention. On an individual level, being exposed to lead in the environment can hinder a child's brain development: it can result in a reduction in IQ; cognitive function; and has been linked to higher levels of antisocial behavior. These impacts are thought to be largely irreversible.\n>\n>It's not just damaging for individuals. It also comes at a large economic cost for society at large. Impacts on brain development, cognitive function, and productivity affect a country's output and earning potential. Researchers estimate that in some countries, the costs of lead exposure are equivalent to as much as 6% of GDP.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL) provides an estimate of the total [disability-adjusted life years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year) (DALYs) lost around the world due to lead exposure. The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME). The IHME defines a DALY as follows:\n\n>It is a universal metric that allows researchers and policymakers to compare very different populations and health conditions across time. DALYs equal the sum of years of life lost (YLLs) and years lived with disability (YLDs). One DALY equals one lost year of healthy life. DALYs allow us to estimate the total number of years lost due to specific causes and risk factors at the country, regional, and global levels.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total annual world disease burden from lead, measured in disability-adjusted life years ([DALYs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year)), in the respective year according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 21.68 million DALYs in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "13.7M", "median": "16.0M", "upper_75": "18.5M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 5.74k objects launched into space annually in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nOver 1,800 objects were launched into space in 2021 [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). The annual number has grown greatly in recent years, the first time more than 200 objects were launched into space in a single year was in 2013.\n\nOur World in Data uses the [United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html) as a data source, which is maintained by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). UNOOSA describes the history of the register as follows\n\n>Since 1962, the United Nations has maintained a Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Originally established as a mechanism to aid the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its discussions on the political, legal and technical issues concerning outer space, the evolution of international space law resulted in space object registration becoming a means of identifying which States' bear international responsibility and liability for space objects.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>To date over 88% of all satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecraft and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond have been registered with the Secretary-General.\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data the chart [Annual number of objects launched into space](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL) includes\n\n>satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecrafts, and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global number of objects launched into space in the respective year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,807 in 2021.\n\nFor this question, \"launching\" into space is not restricted to [conventional rocketry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expendable_launch_system), but includes [all means of travelling off Earth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-rocket_spacelaunch), including space elevators, mass drivers, space tethers/skyhooks, and other future launch methods.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.71k", "median": "3.83k", "upper_75": "5.74k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.71k objects launched into space annually in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nOver 1,800 objects were launched into space in 2021 [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). The annual number has grown greatly in recent years, the first time more than 200 objects were launched into space in a single year was in 2013.\n\nOur World in Data uses the [United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html) as a data source, which is maintained by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). UNOOSA describes the history of the register as follows\n\n>Since 1962, the United Nations has maintained a Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Originally established as a mechanism to aid the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its discussions on the political, legal and technical issues concerning outer space, the evolution of international space law resulted in space object registration becoming a means of identifying which States' bear international responsibility and liability for space objects.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>To date over 88% of all satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecraft and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond have been registered with the Secretary-General.\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data the chart [Annual number of objects launched into space](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL) includes\n\n>satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecrafts, and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global number of objects launched into space in the respective year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,807 in 2021.\n\nFor this question, \"launching\" into space is not restricted to [conventional rocketry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expendable_launch_system), but includes [all means of travelling off Earth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-rocket_spacelaunch), including space elevators, mass drivers, space tethers/skyhooks, and other future launch methods.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.71k", "median": "3.83k", "upper_75": "5.74k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that lead exposure will contribute 25% to the total global disease burden (in DALYs) by 2032?", "desc": "\n\nOur World in Data [describes the disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/reducing-lead-poisoning) as follows:\n\n>Lead poisoning is estimated to account for about 1% of the global disease burden.\n>\n>This is a large burden for a problem that gets very little attention. On an individual level, being exposed to lead in the environment can hinder a child's brain development: it can result in a reduction in IQ; cognitive function; and has been linked to higher levels of antisocial behavior. These impacts are thought to be largely irreversible.\n>\n>It's not just damaging for individuals. It also comes at a large economic cost for society at large. Impacts on brain development, cognitive function, and productivity affect a country's output and earning potential. Researchers estimate that in some countries, the costs of lead exposure are equivalent to as much as 6% of GDP.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Disease burden from lead exposure](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL) provides an estimate of the total [disability-adjusted life years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year) (DALYs) lost around the world due to lead exposure. The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME). The IHME defines a DALY as follows:\n\n>It is a universal metric that allows researchers and policymakers to compare very different populations and health conditions across time. DALYs equal the sum of years of life lost (YLLs) and years lived with disability (YLDs). One DALY equals one lost year of healthy life. DALYs allow us to estimate the total number of years lost due to specific causes and risk factors at the country, regional, and global levels.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total annual world disease burden from lead, measured in disability-adjusted life years ([DALYs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disability-adjusted_life_year)), in the respective year according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/disease-burden-lead?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 21.68 million DALYs in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "20.70M", "median": "21.59M", "upper_75": "22.44M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 19.3k objects launched into space annually by 2032?", "desc": "\n\nOver 1,800 objects were launched into space in 2021 [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). The annual number has grown greatly in recent years, the first time more than 200 objects were launched into space in a single year was in 2013.\n\nOur World in Data uses the [United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html) as a data source, which is maintained by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). UNOOSA describes the history of the register as follows\n\n>Since 1962, the United Nations has maintained a Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Originally established as a mechanism to aid the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its discussions on the political, legal and technical issues concerning outer space, the evolution of international space law resulted in space object registration becoming a means of identifying which States' bear international responsibility and liability for space objects.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>To date over 88% of all satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecraft and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond have been registered with the Secretary-General.\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data the chart [Annual number of objects launched into space](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL) includes\n\n>satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecrafts, and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global number of objects launched into space in the respective year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,807 in 2021.\n\nFor this question, \"launching\" into space is not restricted to [conventional rocketry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expendable_launch_system), but includes [all means of travelling off Earth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-rocket_spacelaunch), including space elevators, mass drivers, space tethers/skyhooks, and other future launch methods.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "5.28k", "median": "9.76k", "upper_75": "19.3k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 104k annual objects launched into space by 2052?", "desc": "\n\nOver 1,800 objects were launched into space in 2021 [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). The annual number has grown greatly in recent years, the first time more than 200 objects were launched into space in a single year was in 2013.\n\nOur World in Data uses the [United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html) as a data source, which is maintained by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). UNOOSA describes the history of the register as follows\n\n>Since 1962, the United Nations has maintained a Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Originally established as a mechanism to aid the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its discussions on the political, legal and technical issues concerning outer space, the evolution of international space law resulted in space object registration becoming a means of identifying which States' bear international responsibility and liability for space objects.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>To date over 88% of all satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecraft and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond have been registered with the Secretary-General.\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data the chart [Annual number of objects launched into space](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL) includes\n\n>satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecrafts, and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global number of objects launched into space in the respective year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,807 in 2021.\n\nFor this question, \"launching\" into space is not restricted to [conventional rocketry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expendable_launch_system), but includes [all means of travelling off Earth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-rocket_spacelaunch), including space elevators, mass drivers, space tethers/skyhooks, and other future launch methods.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "9.13k", "median": "30.4k", "upper_75": "104k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 104k annual objects launched into space by 2052?", "desc": "\n\nOver 1,800 objects were launched into space in 2021 [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). The annual number has grown greatly in recent years, the first time more than 200 objects were launched into space in a single year was in 2013.\n\nOur World in Data uses the [United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html) as a data source, which is maintained by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). UNOOSA describes the history of the register as follows\n\n>Since 1962, the United Nations has maintained a Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Originally established as a mechanism to aid the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its discussions on the political, legal and technical issues concerning outer space, the evolution of international space law resulted in space object registration becoming a means of identifying which States' bear international responsibility and liability for space objects.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>To date over 88% of all satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecraft and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond have been registered with the Secretary-General.\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data the chart [Annual number of objects launched into space](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL) includes\n\n>satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecrafts, and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global number of objects launched into space in the respective year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,807 in 2021.\n\nFor this question, \"launching\" into space is not restricted to [conventional rocketry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expendable_launch_system), but includes [all means of travelling off Earth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-rocket_spacelaunch), including space elevators, mass drivers, space tethers/skyhooks, and other future launch methods.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "9.13k", "median": "30.4k", "upper_75": "104k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 19.3k objects launched into space annually by 2032?", "desc": "\n\nOver 1,800 objects were launched into space in 2021 [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). The annual number has grown greatly in recent years, the first time more than 200 objects were launched into space in a single year was in 2013.\n\nOur World in Data uses the [United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html) as a data source, which is maintained by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). UNOOSA describes the history of the register as follows\n\n>Since 1962, the United Nations has maintained a Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Originally established as a mechanism to aid the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its discussions on the political, legal and technical issues concerning outer space, the evolution of international space law resulted in space object registration becoming a means of identifying which States' bear international responsibility and liability for space objects.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>To date over 88% of all satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecraft and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond have been registered with the Secretary-General.\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data the chart [Annual number of objects launched into space](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL) includes\n\n>satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecrafts, and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global number of objects launched into space in the respective year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,807 in 2021.\n\nFor this question, \"launching\" into space is not restricted to [conventional rocketry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expendable_launch_system), but includes [all means of travelling off Earth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-rocket_spacelaunch), including space elevators, mass drivers, space tethers/skyhooks, and other future launch methods.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "5.28k", "median": "9.76k", "upper_75": "19.3k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 19.3k objects launched into space annually by 2032?", "desc": "\n\nOver 1,800 objects were launched into space in 2021 [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). The annual number has grown greatly in recent years, the first time more than 200 objects were launched into space in a single year was in 2013.\n\nOur World in Data uses the [United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html) as a data source, which is maintained by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). UNOOSA describes the history of the register as follows\n\n>Since 1962, the United Nations has maintained a Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Originally established as a mechanism to aid the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its discussions on the political, legal and technical issues concerning outer space, the evolution of international space law resulted in space object registration becoming a means of identifying which States' bear international responsibility and liability for space objects.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>To date over 88% of all satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecraft and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond have been registered with the Secretary-General.\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data the chart [Annual number of objects launched into space](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL) includes\n\n>satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecrafts, and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global number of objects launched into space in the respective year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,807 in 2021.\n\nFor this question, \"launching\" into space is not restricted to [conventional rocketry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expendable_launch_system), but includes [all means of travelling off Earth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-rocket_spacelaunch), including space elevators, mass drivers, space tethers/skyhooks, and other future launch methods.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "5.28k", "median": "9.76k", "upper_75": "19.3k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 104k annual objects launched into space by 2052?", "desc": "\n\nOver 1,800 objects were launched into space in 2021 [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). The annual number has grown greatly in recent years, the first time more than 200 objects were launched into space in a single year was in 2013.\n\nOur World in Data uses the [United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html) as a data source, which is maintained by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). UNOOSA describes the history of the register as follows\n\n>Since 1962, the United Nations has maintained a Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Originally established as a mechanism to aid the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its discussions on the political, legal and technical issues concerning outer space, the evolution of international space law resulted in space object registration becoming a means of identifying which States' bear international responsibility and liability for space objects.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>To date over 88% of all satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecraft and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond have been registered with the Secretary-General.\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data the chart [Annual number of objects launched into space](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL) includes\n\n>satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecrafts, and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global number of objects launched into space in the respective year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,807 in 2021.\n\nFor this question, \"launching\" into space is not restricted to [conventional rocketry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expendable_launch_system), but includes [all means of travelling off Earth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-rocket_spacelaunch), including space elevators, mass drivers, space tethers/skyhooks, and other future launch methods.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "9.13k", "median": "30.4k", "upper_75": "104k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global mortality rate (in percent) for children under the age of 5 will be 3.682 in the following years?", "desc": "\n\n15,000 children under the age of five die every day according to the Our World in Data article [Child and Infant Mortality](https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality). Despite the substantial number of deaths still occurring there have been massive improvements over time.\n\n>Child mortality today is the lowest it has ever been. In less than three decades child mortality has more than halved — from [12.5 million in 1990 to 5.2 million in 2019](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-deaths-igme-data?tab=chart&facet=none).\n\nOne of the [UN Sustainable Development Goals](https://sdgs.un.org/goals) for the year 2030 is to [ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3). One target as part of this goal is to [end all preventable deaths under 5 years of age](https://sdg-tracker.org/good-health#3.2). Specifically defined as achieving the following by 2030:\n\n>Reduce child mortality to less than 25 deaths per 1,000 live births\n\nThis corresponds to a child mortality rate for children under five years old of 2.5%. Our World in Data tracks child mortality in its chart [Child mortality rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data comes from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global rate (in percent) of children, born alive, who die before they are five years old, for the listed year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 3.71 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.526", "median": "3.599", "upper_75": "3.682", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 198,000 objects launched into space annually in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nOver 1,800 objects were launched into space in 2021 [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). The annual number has grown greatly in recent years, the first time more than 200 objects were launched into space in a single year was in 2013.\n\nOur World in Data uses the [United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html) as a data source, which is maintained by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). UNOOSA describes the history of the register as follows\n\n>Since 1962, the United Nations has maintained a Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Originally established as a mechanism to aid the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its discussions on the political, legal and technical issues concerning outer space, the evolution of international space law resulted in space object registration becoming a means of identifying which States' bear international responsibility and liability for space objects.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>To date over 88% of all satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecraft and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond have been registered with the Secretary-General.\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data the chart [Annual number of objects launched into space](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL) includes\n\n>satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecrafts, and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global number of objects launched into space in the respective year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,807 in 2021.\n\nFor this question, \"launching\" into space is not restricted to [conventional rocketry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expendable_launch_system), but includes [all means of travelling off Earth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-rocket_spacelaunch), including space elevators, mass drivers, space tethers/skyhooks, and other future launch methods.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "5.63k", "median": "198k", "upper_75": "10.8M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global mortality rate (in percent) for children under the age of 5 will be 3.682 in the following years?", "desc": "\n\n15,000 children under the age of five die every day according to the Our World in Data article [Child and Infant Mortality](https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality). Despite the substantial number of deaths still occurring there have been massive improvements over time.\n\n>Child mortality today is the lowest it has ever been. In less than three decades child mortality has more than halved — from [12.5 million in 1990 to 5.2 million in 2019](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-deaths-igme-data?tab=chart&facet=none).\n\nOne of the [UN Sustainable Development Goals](https://sdgs.un.org/goals) for the year 2030 is to [ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3). One target as part of this goal is to [end all preventable deaths under 5 years of age](https://sdg-tracker.org/good-health#3.2). Specifically defined as achieving the following by 2030:\n\n>Reduce child mortality to less than 25 deaths per 1,000 live births\n\nThis corresponds to a child mortality rate for children under five years old of 2.5%. Our World in Data tracks child mortality in its chart [Child mortality rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data comes from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global rate (in percent) of children, born alive, who die before they are five years old, for the listed year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 3.71 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.526", "median": "3.599", "upper_75": "3.682", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global mortality rate (in percent) for children under the age of 5 will be 50% in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\n15,000 children under the age of five die every day according to the Our World in Data article [Child and Infant Mortality](https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality). Despite the substantial number of deaths still occurring there have been massive improvements over time.\n\n>Child mortality today is the lowest it has ever been. In less than three decades child mortality has more than halved — from [12.5 million in 1990 to 5.2 million in 2019](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-deaths-igme-data?tab=chart&facet=none).\n\nOne of the [UN Sustainable Development Goals](https://sdgs.un.org/goals) for the year 2030 is to [ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3). One target as part of this goal is to [end all preventable deaths under 5 years of age](https://sdg-tracker.org/good-health#3.2). Specifically defined as achieving the following by 2030:\n\n>Reduce child mortality to less than 25 deaths per 1,000 live births\n\nThis corresponds to a child mortality rate for children under five years old of 2.5%. Our World in Data tracks child mortality in its chart [Child mortality rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data comes from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global rate (in percent) of children, born alive, who die before they are five years old, for the listed year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 3.71 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.29", "median": "3.50", "upper_75": "3.68", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 198,000 objects launched into space annually in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nOver 1,800 objects were launched into space in 2021 [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). The annual number has grown greatly in recent years, the first time more than 200 objects were launched into space in a single year was in 2013.\n\nOur World in Data uses the [United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html) as a data source, which is maintained by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). UNOOSA describes the history of the register as follows\n\n>Since 1962, the United Nations has maintained a Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Originally established as a mechanism to aid the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its discussions on the political, legal and technical issues concerning outer space, the evolution of international space law resulted in space object registration becoming a means of identifying which States' bear international responsibility and liability for space objects.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>To date over 88% of all satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecraft and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond have been registered with the Secretary-General.\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data the chart [Annual number of objects launched into space](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL) includes\n\n>satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecrafts, and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global number of objects launched into space in the respective year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,807 in 2021.\n\nFor this question, \"launching\" into space is not restricted to [conventional rocketry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expendable_launch_system), but includes [all means of travelling off Earth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-rocket_spacelaunch), including space elevators, mass drivers, space tethers/skyhooks, and other future launch methods.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "5.63k", "median": "198k", "upper_75": "10.8M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global mortality rate (in percent) for children under the age of 5 will be 50% in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\n15,000 children under the age of five die every day according to the Our World in Data article [Child and Infant Mortality](https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality). Despite the substantial number of deaths still occurring there have been massive improvements over time.\n\n>Child mortality today is the lowest it has ever been. In less than three decades child mortality has more than halved — from [12.5 million in 1990 to 5.2 million in 2019](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-deaths-igme-data?tab=chart&facet=none).\n\nOne of the [UN Sustainable Development Goals](https://sdgs.un.org/goals) for the year 2030 is to [ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3). One target as part of this goal is to [end all preventable deaths under 5 years of age](https://sdg-tracker.org/good-health#3.2). Specifically defined as achieving the following by 2030:\n\n>Reduce child mortality to less than 25 deaths per 1,000 live births\n\nThis corresponds to a child mortality rate for children under five years old of 2.5%. Our World in Data tracks child mortality in its chart [Child mortality rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data comes from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global rate (in percent) of children, born alive, who die before they are five years old, for the listed year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 3.71 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.29", "median": "3.50", "upper_75": "3.68", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 198,000 objects launched into space annually in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nOver 1,800 objects were launched into space in 2021 [according to Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). The annual number has grown greatly in recent years, the first time more than 200 objects were launched into space in a single year was in 2013.\n\nOur World in Data uses the [United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space](https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html) as a data source, which is maintained by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). UNOOSA describes the history of the register as follows\n\n>Since 1962, the United Nations has maintained a Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Originally established as a mechanism to aid the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in its discussions on the political, legal and technical issues concerning outer space, the evolution of international space law resulted in space object registration becoming a means of identifying which States' bear international responsibility and liability for space objects.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>To date over 88% of all satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecraft and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond have been registered with the Secretary-General.\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data the chart [Annual number of objects launched into space](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL) includes\n\n>satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecrafts, and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global number of objects launched into space in the respective year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/yearly-number-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,807 in 2021.\n\nFor this question, \"launching\" into space is not restricted to [conventional rocketry](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expendable_launch_system), but includes [all means of travelling off Earth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-rocket_spacelaunch), including space elevators, mass drivers, space tethers/skyhooks, and other future launch methods.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "5.63k", "median": "198k", "upper_75": "10.8M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global mortality rate for children under the age of 5 will be 2.83% in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\n15,000 children under the age of five die every day according to the Our World in Data article [Child and Infant Mortality](https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality). Despite the substantial number of deaths still occurring there have been massive improvements over time.\n\n>Child mortality today is the lowest it has ever been. In less than three decades child mortality has more than halved — from [12.5 million in 1990 to 5.2 million in 2019](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-deaths-igme-data?tab=chart&facet=none).\n\nOne of the [UN Sustainable Development Goals](https://sdgs.un.org/goals) for the year 2030 is to [ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3). One target as part of this goal is to [end all preventable deaths under 5 years of age](https://sdg-tracker.org/good-health#3.2). Specifically defined as achieving the following by 2030:\n\n>Reduce child mortality to less than 25 deaths per 1,000 live births\n\nThis corresponds to a child mortality rate for children under five years old of 2.5%. Our World in Data tracks child mortality in its chart [Child mortality rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data comes from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global rate (in percent) of children, born alive, who die before they are five years old, for the listed year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 3.71 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.25", "median": "1.90", "upper_75": "2.83", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global mortality rate (in percent) for children under the age of 5 will be 50% in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\n15,000 children under the age of five die every day according to the Our World in Data article [Child and Infant Mortality](https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality). Despite the substantial number of deaths still occurring there have been massive improvements over time.\n\n>Child mortality today is the lowest it has ever been. In less than three decades child mortality has more than halved — from [12.5 million in 1990 to 5.2 million in 2019](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-deaths-igme-data?tab=chart&facet=none).\n\nOne of the [UN Sustainable Development Goals](https://sdgs.un.org/goals) for the year 2030 is to [ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3). One target as part of this goal is to [end all preventable deaths under 5 years of age](https://sdg-tracker.org/good-health#3.2). Specifically defined as achieving the following by 2030:\n\n>Reduce child mortality to less than 25 deaths per 1,000 live births\n\nThis corresponds to a child mortality rate for children under five years old of 2.5%. Our World in Data tracks child mortality in its chart [Child mortality rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data comes from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global rate (in percent) of children, born alive, who die before they are five years old, for the listed year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 3.71 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.29", "median": "3.50", "upper_75": "3.68", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global mortality rate (in percent) for children under the age of 5 will be 3.04 in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\n15,000 children under the age of five die every day according to the Our World in Data article [Child and Infant Mortality](https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality). Despite the substantial number of deaths still occurring there have been massive improvements over time.\n\n>Child mortality today is the lowest it has ever been. In less than three decades child mortality has more than halved — from [12.5 million in 1990 to 5.2 million in 2019](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-deaths-igme-data?tab=chart&facet=none).\n\nOne of the [UN Sustainable Development Goals](https://sdgs.un.org/goals) for the year 2030 is to [ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3). One target as part of this goal is to [end all preventable deaths under 5 years of age](https://sdg-tracker.org/good-health#3.2). Specifically defined as achieving the following by 2030:\n\n>Reduce child mortality to less than 25 deaths per 1,000 live births\n\nThis corresponds to a child mortality rate for children under five years old of 2.5%. Our World in Data tracks child mortality in its chart [Child mortality rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data comes from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global rate (in percent) of children, born alive, who die before they are five years old, for the listed year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 3.71 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.58", "median": "3.04", "upper_75": "3.58", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global mortality rate for children under the age of 5 will be 2.83% in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\n15,000 children under the age of five die every day according to the Our World in Data article [Child and Infant Mortality](https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality). Despite the substantial number of deaths still occurring there have been massive improvements over time.\n\n>Child mortality today is the lowest it has ever been. In less than three decades child mortality has more than halved — from [12.5 million in 1990 to 5.2 million in 2019](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-deaths-igme-data?tab=chart&facet=none).\n\nOne of the [UN Sustainable Development Goals](https://sdgs.un.org/goals) for the year 2030 is to [ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3). One target as part of this goal is to [end all preventable deaths under 5 years of age](https://sdg-tracker.org/good-health#3.2). Specifically defined as achieving the following by 2030:\n\n>Reduce child mortality to less than 25 deaths per 1,000 live births\n\nThis corresponds to a child mortality rate for children under five years old of 2.5%. Our World in Data tracks child mortality in its chart [Child mortality rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data comes from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global rate (in percent) of children, born alive, who die before they are five years old, for the listed year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 3.71 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.25", "median": "1.90", "upper_75": "2.83", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global mortality rate (in percent) for children under the age of 5 will be 0.610 in the following years?", "desc": "\n\n15,000 children under the age of five die every day according to the Our World in Data article [Child and Infant Mortality](https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality). Despite the substantial number of deaths still occurring there have been massive improvements over time.\n\n>Child mortality today is the lowest it has ever been. In less than three decades child mortality has more than halved — from [12.5 million in 1990 to 5.2 million in 2019](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-deaths-igme-data?tab=chart&facet=none).\n\nOne of the [UN Sustainable Development Goals](https://sdgs.un.org/goals) for the year 2030 is to [ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3). One target as part of this goal is to [end all preventable deaths under 5 years of age](https://sdg-tracker.org/good-health#3.2). Specifically defined as achieving the following by 2030:\n\n>Reduce child mortality to less than 25 deaths per 1,000 live births\n\nThis corresponds to a child mortality rate for children under five years old of 2.5%. Our World in Data tracks child mortality in its chart [Child mortality rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data comes from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global rate (in percent) of children, born alive, who die before they are five years old, for the listed year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 3.71 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "0.204", "median": "0.610", "upper_75": "1.52", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.67% of global primary energy will come from nuclear fission or fusion power in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "\n\nThe future of nuclear power [faces many uncertainties](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nuclear-power-looks-to-regain-its-footing-10-years-after-fukushima/), such as public support, regulatory burdens, costs, and the ongoing struggle to achieve commercial [nuclear fusion power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#2020s).\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from nuclear](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of primary energy from nuclear fission and fusion power in the listed year for the whole world, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 4.25 in 2021.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart (as of 2022) only includes nuclear fission power, but in the event nuclear fusion power is developed, this question will include both fission and fusion power.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.99", "median": "4.32", "upper_75": "4.67", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global mortality rate for children under the age of 5 will be 2.83% in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\n15,000 children under the age of five die every day according to the Our World in Data article [Child and Infant Mortality](https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality). Despite the substantial number of deaths still occurring there have been massive improvements over time.\n\n>Child mortality today is the lowest it has ever been. In less than three decades child mortality has more than halved — from [12.5 million in 1990 to 5.2 million in 2019](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-deaths-igme-data?tab=chart&facet=none).\n\nOne of the [UN Sustainable Development Goals](https://sdgs.un.org/goals) for the year 2030 is to [ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3). One target as part of this goal is to [end all preventable deaths under 5 years of age](https://sdg-tracker.org/good-health#3.2). Specifically defined as achieving the following by 2030:\n\n>Reduce child mortality to less than 25 deaths per 1,000 live births\n\nThis corresponds to a child mortality rate for children under five years old of 2.5%. Our World in Data tracks child mortality in its chart [Child mortality rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data comes from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global rate (in percent) of children, born alive, who die before they are five years old, for the listed year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 3.71 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.25", "median": "1.90", "upper_75": "2.83", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.16% of global primary energy will come from nuclear fission or fusion power in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe future of nuclear power [faces many uncertainties](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nuclear-power-looks-to-regain-its-footing-10-years-after-fukushima/), such as public support, regulatory burdens, costs, and the ongoing struggle to achieve commercial [nuclear fusion power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#2020s).\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from nuclear](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of primary energy from nuclear fission and fusion power in the listed year for the whole world, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 4.25 in 2021.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart (as of 2022) only includes nuclear fission power, but in the event nuclear fusion power is developed, this question will include both fission and fusion power.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.87", "median": "4.16", "upper_75": "4.43", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.16% of global primary energy will come from nuclear fission or fusion power in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe future of nuclear power [faces many uncertainties](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nuclear-power-looks-to-regain-its-footing-10-years-after-fukushima/), such as public support, regulatory burdens, costs, and the ongoing struggle to achieve commercial [nuclear fusion power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#2020s).\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from nuclear](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of primary energy from nuclear fission and fusion power in the listed year for the whole world, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 4.25 in 2021.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart (as of 2022) only includes nuclear fission power, but in the event nuclear fusion power is developed, this question will include both fission and fusion power.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.87", "median": "4.16", "upper_75": "4.43", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.16% of global primary energy will come from nuclear fission or fusion power in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe future of nuclear power [faces many uncertainties](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nuclear-power-looks-to-regain-its-footing-10-years-after-fukushima/), such as public support, regulatory burdens, costs, and the ongoing struggle to achieve commercial [nuclear fusion power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#2020s).\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from nuclear](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of primary energy from nuclear fission and fusion power in the listed year for the whole world, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 4.25 in 2021.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart (as of 2022) only includes nuclear fission power, but in the event nuclear fusion power is developed, this question will include both fission and fusion power.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.87", "median": "4.16", "upper_75": "4.43", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global mortality rate (in percent) for children under the age of 5 will be 3.682 in the following years?", "desc": "\n\n15,000 children under the age of five die every day according to the Our World in Data article [Child and Infant Mortality](https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality). Despite the substantial number of deaths still occurring there have been massive improvements over time.\n\n>Child mortality today is the lowest it has ever been. In less than three decades child mortality has more than halved — from [12.5 million in 1990 to 5.2 million in 2019](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-deaths-igme-data?tab=chart&facet=none).\n\nOne of the [UN Sustainable Development Goals](https://sdgs.un.org/goals) for the year 2030 is to [ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3). One target as part of this goal is to [end all preventable deaths under 5 years of age](https://sdg-tracker.org/good-health#3.2). Specifically defined as achieving the following by 2030:\n\n>Reduce child mortality to less than 25 deaths per 1,000 live births\n\nThis corresponds to a child mortality rate for children under five years old of 2.5%. Our World in Data tracks child mortality in its chart [Child mortality rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data comes from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global rate (in percent) of children, born alive, who die before they are five years old, for the listed year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 3.71 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.526", "median": "3.599", "upper_75": "3.682", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global mortality rate (in percent) for children under the age of 5 will be 0.610 in the following years?", "desc": "\n\n15,000 children under the age of five die every day according to the Our World in Data article [Child and Infant Mortality](https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality). Despite the substantial number of deaths still occurring there have been massive improvements over time.\n\n>Child mortality today is the lowest it has ever been. In less than three decades child mortality has more than halved — from [12.5 million in 1990 to 5.2 million in 2019](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-deaths-igme-data?tab=chart&facet=none).\n\nOne of the [UN Sustainable Development Goals](https://sdgs.un.org/goals) for the year 2030 is to [ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3). One target as part of this goal is to [end all preventable deaths under 5 years of age](https://sdg-tracker.org/good-health#3.2). Specifically defined as achieving the following by 2030:\n\n>Reduce child mortality to less than 25 deaths per 1,000 live births\n\nThis corresponds to a child mortality rate for children under five years old of 2.5%. Our World in Data tracks child mortality in its chart [Child mortality rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data comes from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global rate (in percent) of children, born alive, who die before they are five years old, for the listed year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 3.71 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "0.204", "median": "0.610", "upper_75": "1.52", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.67% of global primary energy will come from nuclear fission or fusion power in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "\n\nThe future of nuclear power [faces many uncertainties](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nuclear-power-looks-to-regain-its-footing-10-years-after-fukushima/), such as public support, regulatory burdens, costs, and the ongoing struggle to achieve commercial [nuclear fusion power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#2020s).\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from nuclear](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of primary energy from nuclear fission and fusion power in the listed year for the whole world, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 4.25 in 2021.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart (as of 2022) only includes nuclear fission power, but in the event nuclear fusion power is developed, this question will include both fission and fusion power.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.99", "median": "4.32", "upper_75": "4.67", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global mortality rate (in percent) for children under the age of 5 will be 3.04 in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\n15,000 children under the age of five die every day according to the Our World in Data article [Child and Infant Mortality](https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality). Despite the substantial number of deaths still occurring there have been massive improvements over time.\n\n>Child mortality today is the lowest it has ever been. In less than three decades child mortality has more than halved — from [12.5 million in 1990 to 5.2 million in 2019](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-deaths-igme-data?tab=chart&facet=none).\n\nOne of the [UN Sustainable Development Goals](https://sdgs.un.org/goals) for the year 2030 is to [ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3). One target as part of this goal is to [end all preventable deaths under 5 years of age](https://sdg-tracker.org/good-health#3.2). Specifically defined as achieving the following by 2030:\n\n>Reduce child mortality to less than 25 deaths per 1,000 live births\n\nThis corresponds to a child mortality rate for children under five years old of 2.5%. Our World in Data tracks child mortality in its chart [Child mortality rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data comes from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global rate (in percent) of children, born alive, who die before they are five years old, for the listed year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 3.71 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.58", "median": "3.04", "upper_75": "3.58", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.67% of global primary energy will come from nuclear fission or fusion power in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "\n\nThe future of nuclear power [faces many uncertainties](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nuclear-power-looks-to-regain-its-footing-10-years-after-fukushima/), such as public support, regulatory burdens, costs, and the ongoing struggle to achieve commercial [nuclear fusion power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#2020s).\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from nuclear](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of primary energy from nuclear fission and fusion power in the listed year for the whole world, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 4.25 in 2021.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart (as of 2022) only includes nuclear fission power, but in the event nuclear fusion power is developed, this question will include both fission and fusion power.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.99", "median": "4.32", "upper_75": "4.67", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global mortality rate (in percent) for children under the age of 5 will be 0.610 in the following years?", "desc": "\n\n15,000 children under the age of five die every day according to the Our World in Data article [Child and Infant Mortality](https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality). Despite the substantial number of deaths still occurring there have been massive improvements over time.\n\n>Child mortality today is the lowest it has ever been. In less than three decades child mortality has more than halved — from [12.5 million in 1990 to 5.2 million in 2019](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-deaths-igme-data?tab=chart&facet=none).\n\nOne of the [UN Sustainable Development Goals](https://sdgs.un.org/goals) for the year 2030 is to [ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3). One target as part of this goal is to [end all preventable deaths under 5 years of age](https://sdg-tracker.org/good-health#3.2). Specifically defined as achieving the following by 2030:\n\n>Reduce child mortality to less than 25 deaths per 1,000 live births\n\nThis corresponds to a child mortality rate for children under five years old of 2.5%. Our World in Data tracks child mortality in its chart [Child mortality rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data comes from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global rate (in percent) of children, born alive, who die before they are five years old, for the listed year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 3.71 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "0.204", "median": "0.610", "upper_75": "1.52", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.59% of global primary energy will come from nuclear fission or fusion power in the following years (2032)?", "desc": "\n\nThe future of nuclear power [faces many uncertainties](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nuclear-power-looks-to-regain-its-footing-10-years-after-fukushima/), such as public support, regulatory burdens, costs, and the ongoing struggle to achieve commercial [nuclear fusion power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#2020s).\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from nuclear](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of primary energy from nuclear fission and fusion power in the listed year for the whole world, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 4.25 in 2021.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart (as of 2022) only includes nuclear fission power, but in the event nuclear fusion power is developed, this question will include both fission and fusion power.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "4.59", "median": "5.74", "upper_75": "7.05", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 18.40 percent of global primary energy will come from nuclear fission or fusion power in the following years (2052)?", "desc": "\n\nThe future of nuclear power [faces many uncertainties](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nuclear-power-looks-to-regain-its-footing-10-years-after-fukushima/), such as public support, regulatory burdens, costs, and the ongoing struggle to achieve commercial [nuclear fusion power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#2020s).\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from nuclear](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of primary energy from nuclear fission and fusion power in the listed year for the whole world, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 4.25 in 2021.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart (as of 2022) only includes nuclear fission power, but in the event nuclear fusion power is developed, this question will include both fission and fusion power.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "9.17", "median": "18.40", "upper_75": "30.70", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global mortality rate (in percent) for children under the age of 5 will be 3.04 in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\n15,000 children under the age of five die every day according to the Our World in Data article [Child and Infant Mortality](https://ourworldindata.org/child-mortality). Despite the substantial number of deaths still occurring there have been massive improvements over time.\n\n>Child mortality today is the lowest it has ever been. In less than three decades child mortality has more than halved — from [12.5 million in 1990 to 5.2 million in 2019](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-deaths-igme-data?tab=chart&facet=none).\n\nOne of the [UN Sustainable Development Goals](https://sdgs.un.org/goals) for the year 2030 is to [ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages](https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal3). One target as part of this goal is to [end all preventable deaths under 5 years of age](https://sdg-tracker.org/good-health#3.2). Specifically defined as achieving the following by 2030:\n\n>Reduce child mortality to less than 25 deaths per 1,000 live births\n\nThis corresponds to a child mortality rate for children under five years old of 2.5%. Our World in Data tracks child mortality in its chart [Child mortality rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data comes from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the global rate (in percent) of children, born alive, who die before they are five years old, for the listed year according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/child-mortality-around-the-world?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 3.71 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.58", "median": "3.04", "upper_75": "3.58", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 18.40 percent of global primary energy will come from nuclear fission or fusion power in the following years (2052)?", "desc": "\n\nThe future of nuclear power [faces many uncertainties](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nuclear-power-looks-to-regain-its-footing-10-years-after-fukushima/), such as public support, regulatory burdens, costs, and the ongoing struggle to achieve commercial [nuclear fusion power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#2020s).\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from nuclear](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of primary energy from nuclear fission and fusion power in the listed year for the whole world, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 4.25 in 2021.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart (as of 2022) only includes nuclear fission power, but in the event nuclear fusion power is developed, this question will include both fission and fusion power.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "9.17", "median": "18.40", "upper_75": "30.70", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 38.3% of global primary energy will come from nuclear fission or fusion power in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe future of nuclear power [faces many uncertainties](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nuclear-power-looks-to-regain-its-footing-10-years-after-fukushima/), such as public support, regulatory burdens, costs, and the ongoing struggle to achieve commercial [nuclear fusion power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#2020s).\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from nuclear](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of primary energy from nuclear fission and fusion power in the listed year for the whole world, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 4.25 in 2021.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart (as of 2022) only includes nuclear fission power, but in the event nuclear fusion power is developed, this question will include both fission and fusion power.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "18.5", "median": "38.3", "upper_75": "66.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 38.3% of global primary energy will come from nuclear fission or fusion power in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe future of nuclear power [faces many uncertainties](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nuclear-power-looks-to-regain-its-footing-10-years-after-fukushima/), such as public support, regulatory burdens, costs, and the ongoing struggle to achieve commercial [nuclear fusion power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#2020s).\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from nuclear](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of primary energy from nuclear fission and fusion power in the listed year for the whole world, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 4.25 in 2021.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart (as of 2022) only includes nuclear fission power, but in the event nuclear fusion power is developed, this question will include both fission and fusion power.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "18.5", "median": "38.3", "upper_75": "66.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 18.40 percent of global primary energy will come from nuclear fission or fusion power in the following years (2052)?", "desc": "\n\nThe future of nuclear power [faces many uncertainties](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nuclear-power-looks-to-regain-its-footing-10-years-after-fukushima/), such as public support, regulatory burdens, costs, and the ongoing struggle to achieve commercial [nuclear fusion power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#2020s).\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from nuclear](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of primary energy from nuclear fission and fusion power in the listed year for the whole world, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 4.25 in 2021.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart (as of 2022) only includes nuclear fission power, but in the event nuclear fusion power is developed, this question will include both fission and fusion power.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "9.17", "median": "18.40", "upper_75": "30.70", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the rate of deaths (per 100,000 people) from global conflict will be 2.03 in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe prevalence of global violence is an important indicator of world stability and progress toward achieving widespread peace. In recent years an [academic debate about trends in global violence](https://www.vox.com/2015/5/21/8635369/pinker-taleb) has played out, with scholars such as Steven Pinker arguing that strengthened global connections and institutions, such as the increased prevalence of democracy and [international trade](https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/does-trade-integration-contribute-peace), have resulted in a decline in war and conflict in the long term. Others, such as Nassim Taleb, argue that Pinker underestimates the prevalence of violence and that we're more likely to be experiencing a temporary lull in major wars instead of a long term decline.\n\nOur World in Data tracks the rate of global conflict deaths in its chart [Global deaths in conflicts and one-sided violence per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data is sourced from the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program](https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia) (UCDP), and includes direct deaths from conflicts that involve at least one state actor, conflicts between at least two organizations with no state actors, and one-sided violence, which UCDP defines as\n\n>The deliberate use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.\n\nConflicts meeting the above categories are included in the figures when they result in at least 25 direct violent deaths in a calendar year, where direct violent deaths exclude secondary effects of violence such as disease and famine.\n\nFor more information about trends in global violence see the Our World in Data article [War and Peace](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace). For more on the differences between the UCDP measures of conflict deaths compared to other available measures see the Our World in Data article [Counting world conflict deaths: why do sources differ?](https://ourworldindata.org/counting-conflict-deaths), and [Notes on five sources of the world conflict death rate since 1989](https://ourworldindata.org/uploads/2018/09/Notes-on-five-sources-of-the-world-conflict-death-rate-since-1989.pdf).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of world conflict deaths in the listed year per 100,000 people, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.04 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.37", "median": "2.03", "upper_75": "2.87", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the rate of deaths (per 100,000 people) from global conflict will be 2.03 in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe prevalence of global violence is an important indicator of world stability and progress toward achieving widespread peace. In recent years an [academic debate about trends in global violence](https://www.vox.com/2015/5/21/8635369/pinker-taleb) has played out, with scholars such as Steven Pinker arguing that strengthened global connections and institutions, such as the increased prevalence of democracy and [international trade](https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/does-trade-integration-contribute-peace), have resulted in a decline in war and conflict in the long term. Others, such as Nassim Taleb, argue that Pinker underestimates the prevalence of violence and that we're more likely to be experiencing a temporary lull in major wars instead of a long term decline.\n\nOur World in Data tracks the rate of global conflict deaths in its chart [Global deaths in conflicts and one-sided violence per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data is sourced from the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program](https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia) (UCDP), and includes direct deaths from conflicts that involve at least one state actor, conflicts between at least two organizations with no state actors, and one-sided violence, which UCDP defines as\n\n>The deliberate use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.\n\nConflicts meeting the above categories are included in the figures when they result in at least 25 direct violent deaths in a calendar year, where direct violent deaths exclude secondary effects of violence such as disease and famine.\n\nFor more information about trends in global violence see the Our World in Data article [War and Peace](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace). For more on the differences between the UCDP measures of conflict deaths compared to other available measures see the Our World in Data article [Counting world conflict deaths: why do sources differ?](https://ourworldindata.org/counting-conflict-deaths), and [Notes on five sources of the world conflict death rate since 1989](https://ourworldindata.org/uploads/2018/09/Notes-on-five-sources-of-the-world-conflict-death-rate-since-1989.pdf).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of world conflict deaths in the listed year per 100,000 people, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.04 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.37", "median": "2.03", "upper_75": "2.87", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.59% of global primary energy will come from nuclear fission or fusion power in the following years (2032)?", "desc": "\n\nThe future of nuclear power [faces many uncertainties](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nuclear-power-looks-to-regain-its-footing-10-years-after-fukushima/), such as public support, regulatory burdens, costs, and the ongoing struggle to achieve commercial [nuclear fusion power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#2020s).\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from nuclear](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of primary energy from nuclear fission and fusion power in the listed year for the whole world, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 4.25 in 2021.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart (as of 2022) only includes nuclear fission power, but in the event nuclear fusion power is developed, this question will include both fission and fusion power.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "4.59", "median": "5.74", "upper_75": "7.05", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 38.3% of global primary energy will come from nuclear fission or fusion power in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe future of nuclear power [faces many uncertainties](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nuclear-power-looks-to-regain-its-footing-10-years-after-fukushima/), such as public support, regulatory burdens, costs, and the ongoing struggle to achieve commercial [nuclear fusion power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#2020s).\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from nuclear](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of primary energy from nuclear fission and fusion power in the listed year for the whole world, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 4.25 in 2021.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart (as of 2022) only includes nuclear fission power, but in the event nuclear fusion power is developed, this question will include both fission and fusion power.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "18.5", "median": "38.3", "upper_75": "66.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the rate of deaths (per 100,000 people) from global conflict will be 2.03 in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe prevalence of global violence is an important indicator of world stability and progress toward achieving widespread peace. In recent years an [academic debate about trends in global violence](https://www.vox.com/2015/5/21/8635369/pinker-taleb) has played out, with scholars such as Steven Pinker arguing that strengthened global connections and institutions, such as the increased prevalence of democracy and [international trade](https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/does-trade-integration-contribute-peace), have resulted in a decline in war and conflict in the long term. Others, such as Nassim Taleb, argue that Pinker underestimates the prevalence of violence and that we're more likely to be experiencing a temporary lull in major wars instead of a long term decline.\n\nOur World in Data tracks the rate of global conflict deaths in its chart [Global deaths in conflicts and one-sided violence per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data is sourced from the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program](https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia) (UCDP), and includes direct deaths from conflicts that involve at least one state actor, conflicts between at least two organizations with no state actors, and one-sided violence, which UCDP defines as\n\n>The deliberate use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.\n\nConflicts meeting the above categories are included in the figures when they result in at least 25 direct violent deaths in a calendar year, where direct violent deaths exclude secondary effects of violence such as disease and famine.\n\nFor more information about trends in global violence see the Our World in Data article [War and Peace](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace). For more on the differences between the UCDP measures of conflict deaths compared to other available measures see the Our World in Data article [Counting world conflict deaths: why do sources differ?](https://ourworldindata.org/counting-conflict-deaths), and [Notes on five sources of the world conflict death rate since 1989](https://ourworldindata.org/uploads/2018/09/Notes-on-five-sources-of-the-world-conflict-death-rate-since-1989.pdf).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of world conflict deaths in the listed year per 100,000 people, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.04 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.37", "median": "2.03", "upper_75": "2.87", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.59% of global primary energy will come from nuclear fission or fusion power in the following years (2032)?", "desc": "\n\nThe future of nuclear power [faces many uncertainties](https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nuclear-power-looks-to-regain-its-footing-10-years-after-fukushima/), such as public support, regulatory burdens, costs, and the ongoing struggle to achieve commercial [nuclear fusion power](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_power#2020s).\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from nuclear](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of primary energy from nuclear fission and fusion power in the listed year for the whole world, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Nuclear&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 4.25 in 2021.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart (as of 2022) only includes nuclear fission power, but in the event nuclear fusion power is developed, this question will include both fission and fusion power.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "4.59", "median": "5.74", "upper_75": "7.05", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the rate of deaths (per 100,000 people) from global conflict will be 1.29 in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nThe prevalence of global violence is an important indicator of world stability and progress toward achieving widespread peace. In recent years an [academic debate about trends in global violence](https://www.vox.com/2015/5/21/8635369/pinker-taleb) has played out, with scholars such as Steven Pinker arguing that strengthened global connections and institutions, such as the increased prevalence of democracy and [international trade](https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/does-trade-integration-contribute-peace), have resulted in a decline in war and conflict in the long term. Others, such as Nassim Taleb, argue that Pinker underestimates the prevalence of violence and that we're more likely to be experiencing a temporary lull in major wars instead of a long term decline.\n\nOur World in Data tracks the rate of global conflict deaths in its chart [Global deaths in conflicts and one-sided violence per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data is sourced from the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program](https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia) (UCDP), and includes direct deaths from conflicts that involve at least one state actor, conflicts between at least two organizations with no state actors, and one-sided violence, which UCDP defines as\n\n>The deliberate use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.\n\nConflicts meeting the above categories are included in the figures when they result in at least 25 direct violent deaths in a calendar year, where direct violent deaths exclude secondary effects of violence such as disease and famine.\n\nFor more information about trends in global violence see the Our World in Data article [War and Peace](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace). For more on the differences between the UCDP measures of conflict deaths compared to other available measures see the Our World in Data article [Counting world conflict deaths: why do sources differ?](https://ourworldindata.org/counting-conflict-deaths), and [Notes on five sources of the world conflict death rate since 1989](https://ourworldindata.org/uploads/2018/09/Notes-on-five-sources-of-the-world-conflict-death-rate-since-1989.pdf).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of world conflict deaths in the listed year per 100,000 people, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.04 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.29", "median": "1.80", "upper_75": "2.72", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the rate of deaths (per 100,000 people) from global conflict will be 1.29 in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nThe prevalence of global violence is an important indicator of world stability and progress toward achieving widespread peace. In recent years an [academic debate about trends in global violence](https://www.vox.com/2015/5/21/8635369/pinker-taleb) has played out, with scholars such as Steven Pinker arguing that strengthened global connections and institutions, such as the increased prevalence of democracy and [international trade](https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/does-trade-integration-contribute-peace), have resulted in a decline in war and conflict in the long term. Others, such as Nassim Taleb, argue that Pinker underestimates the prevalence of violence and that we're more likely to be experiencing a temporary lull in major wars instead of a long term decline.\n\nOur World in Data tracks the rate of global conflict deaths in its chart [Global deaths in conflicts and one-sided violence per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data is sourced from the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program](https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia) (UCDP), and includes direct deaths from conflicts that involve at least one state actor, conflicts between at least two organizations with no state actors, and one-sided violence, which UCDP defines as\n\n>The deliberate use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.\n\nConflicts meeting the above categories are included in the figures when they result in at least 25 direct violent deaths in a calendar year, where direct violent deaths exclude secondary effects of violence such as disease and famine.\n\nFor more information about trends in global violence see the Our World in Data article [War and Peace](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace). For more on the differences between the UCDP measures of conflict deaths compared to other available measures see the Our World in Data article [Counting world conflict deaths: why do sources differ?](https://ourworldindata.org/counting-conflict-deaths), and [Notes on five sources of the world conflict death rate since 1989](https://ourworldindata.org/uploads/2018/09/Notes-on-five-sources-of-the-world-conflict-death-rate-since-1989.pdf).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of world conflict deaths in the listed year per 100,000 people, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.04 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.29", "median": "1.80", "upper_75": "2.72", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the rate of deaths (per 100,000 people) from global conflict will be 0.572 in the year 2122?", "desc": "\n\nThe prevalence of global violence is an important indicator of world stability and progress toward achieving widespread peace. In recent years an [academic debate about trends in global violence](https://www.vox.com/2015/5/21/8635369/pinker-taleb) has played out, with scholars such as Steven Pinker arguing that strengthened global connections and institutions, such as the increased prevalence of democracy and [international trade](https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/does-trade-integration-contribute-peace), have resulted in a decline in war and conflict in the long term. Others, such as Nassim Taleb, argue that Pinker underestimates the prevalence of violence and that we're more likely to be experiencing a temporary lull in major wars instead of a long term decline.\n\nOur World in Data tracks the rate of global conflict deaths in its chart [Global deaths in conflicts and one-sided violence per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data is sourced from the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program](https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia) (UCDP), and includes direct deaths from conflicts that involve at least one state actor, conflicts between at least two organizations with no state actors, and one-sided violence, which UCDP defines as\n\n>The deliberate use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.\n\nConflicts meeting the above categories are included in the figures when they result in at least 25 direct violent deaths in a calendar year, where direct violent deaths exclude secondary effects of violence such as disease and famine.\n\nFor more information about trends in global violence see the Our World in Data article [War and Peace](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace). For more on the differences between the UCDP measures of conflict deaths compared to other available measures see the Our World in Data article [Counting world conflict deaths: why do sources differ?](https://ourworldindata.org/counting-conflict-deaths), and [Notes on five sources of the world conflict death rate since 1989](https://ourworldindata.org/uploads/2018/09/Notes-on-five-sources-of-the-world-conflict-death-rate-since-1989.pdf).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of world conflict deaths in the listed year per 100,000 people, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.04 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "0.066", "median": "0.572", "upper_75": "2.35", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the rate of deaths (per 100,000 people) from global conflict will be 1.12 in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nThe prevalence of global violence is an important indicator of world stability and progress toward achieving widespread peace. In recent years an [academic debate about trends in global violence](https://www.vox.com/2015/5/21/8635369/pinker-taleb) has played out, with scholars such as Steven Pinker arguing that strengthened global connections and institutions, such as the increased prevalence of democracy and [international trade](https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/does-trade-integration-contribute-peace), have resulted in a decline in war and conflict in the long term. Others, such as Nassim Taleb, argue that Pinker underestimates the prevalence of violence and that we're more likely to be experiencing a temporary lull in major wars instead of a long term decline.\n\nOur World in Data tracks the rate of global conflict deaths in its chart [Global deaths in conflicts and one-sided violence per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data is sourced from the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program](https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia) (UCDP), and includes direct deaths from conflicts that involve at least one state actor, conflicts between at least two organizations with no state actors, and one-sided violence, which UCDP defines as\n\n>The deliberate use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.\n\nConflicts meeting the above categories are included in the figures when they result in at least 25 direct violent deaths in a calendar year, where direct violent deaths exclude secondary effects of violence such as disease and famine.\n\nFor more information about trends in global violence see the Our World in Data article [War and Peace](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace). For more on the differences between the UCDP measures of conflict deaths compared to other available measures see the Our World in Data article [Counting world conflict deaths: why do sources differ?](https://ourworldindata.org/counting-conflict-deaths), and [Notes on five sources of the world conflict death rate since 1989](https://ourworldindata.org/uploads/2018/09/Notes-on-five-sources-of-the-world-conflict-death-rate-since-1989.pdf).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of world conflict deaths in the listed year per 100,000 people, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.04 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "0.411", "median": "1.12", "upper_75": "2.96", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the rate of deaths (per 100,000 people) from global conflict will be 1.78 in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nThe prevalence of global violence is an important indicator of world stability and progress toward achieving widespread peace. In recent years an [academic debate about trends in global violence](https://www.vox.com/2015/5/21/8635369/pinker-taleb) has played out, with scholars such as Steven Pinker arguing that strengthened global connections and institutions, such as the increased prevalence of democracy and [international trade](https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/does-trade-integration-contribute-peace), have resulted in a decline in war and conflict in the long term. Others, such as Nassim Taleb, argue that Pinker underestimates the prevalence of violence and that we're more likely to be experiencing a temporary lull in major wars instead of a long term decline.\n\nOur World in Data tracks the rate of global conflict deaths in its chart [Global deaths in conflicts and one-sided violence per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data is sourced from the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program](https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia) (UCDP), and includes direct deaths from conflicts that involve at least one state actor, conflicts between at least two organizations with no state actors, and one-sided violence, which UCDP defines as\n\n>The deliberate use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.\n\nConflicts meeting the above categories are included in the figures when they result in at least 25 direct violent deaths in a calendar year, where direct violent deaths exclude secondary effects of violence such as disease and famine.\n\nFor more information about trends in global violence see the Our World in Data article [War and Peace](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace). For more on the differences between the UCDP measures of conflict deaths compared to other available measures see the Our World in Data article [Counting world conflict deaths: why do sources differ?](https://ourworldindata.org/counting-conflict-deaths), and [Notes on five sources of the world conflict death rate since 1989](https://ourworldindata.org/uploads/2018/09/Notes-on-five-sources-of-the-world-conflict-death-rate-since-1989.pdf).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of world conflict deaths in the listed year per 100,000 people, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.04 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.04", "median": "1.78", "upper_75": "3.00", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the rate of deaths (per 100,000 people) from global conflict will be 1.12 in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nThe prevalence of global violence is an important indicator of world stability and progress toward achieving widespread peace. In recent years an [academic debate about trends in global violence](https://www.vox.com/2015/5/21/8635369/pinker-taleb) has played out, with scholars such as Steven Pinker arguing that strengthened global connections and institutions, such as the increased prevalence of democracy and [international trade](https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/does-trade-integration-contribute-peace), have resulted in a decline in war and conflict in the long term. Others, such as Nassim Taleb, argue that Pinker underestimates the prevalence of violence and that we're more likely to be experiencing a temporary lull in major wars instead of a long term decline.\n\nOur World in Data tracks the rate of global conflict deaths in its chart [Global deaths in conflicts and one-sided violence per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data is sourced from the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program](https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia) (UCDP), and includes direct deaths from conflicts that involve at least one state actor, conflicts between at least two organizations with no state actors, and one-sided violence, which UCDP defines as\n\n>The deliberate use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.\n\nConflicts meeting the above categories are included in the figures when they result in at least 25 direct violent deaths in a calendar year, where direct violent deaths exclude secondary effects of violence such as disease and famine.\n\nFor more information about trends in global violence see the Our World in Data article [War and Peace](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace). For more on the differences between the UCDP measures of conflict deaths compared to other available measures see the Our World in Data article [Counting world conflict deaths: why do sources differ?](https://ourworldindata.org/counting-conflict-deaths), and [Notes on five sources of the world conflict death rate since 1989](https://ourworldindata.org/uploads/2018/09/Notes-on-five-sources-of-the-world-conflict-death-rate-since-1989.pdf).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of world conflict deaths in the listed year per 100,000 people, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.04 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "0.411", "median": "1.12", "upper_75": "2.96", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the rate of deaths (per 100,000 people) from global conflict will be 1.78 in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nThe prevalence of global violence is an important indicator of world stability and progress toward achieving widespread peace. In recent years an [academic debate about trends in global violence](https://www.vox.com/2015/5/21/8635369/pinker-taleb) has played out, with scholars such as Steven Pinker arguing that strengthened global connections and institutions, such as the increased prevalence of democracy and [international trade](https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/does-trade-integration-contribute-peace), have resulted in a decline in war and conflict in the long term. Others, such as Nassim Taleb, argue that Pinker underestimates the prevalence of violence and that we're more likely to be experiencing a temporary lull in major wars instead of a long term decline.\n\nOur World in Data tracks the rate of global conflict deaths in its chart [Global deaths in conflicts and one-sided violence per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data is sourced from the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program](https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia) (UCDP), and includes direct deaths from conflicts that involve at least one state actor, conflicts between at least two organizations with no state actors, and one-sided violence, which UCDP defines as\n\n>The deliberate use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.\n\nConflicts meeting the above categories are included in the figures when they result in at least 25 direct violent deaths in a calendar year, where direct violent deaths exclude secondary effects of violence such as disease and famine.\n\nFor more information about trends in global violence see the Our World in Data article [War and Peace](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace). For more on the differences between the UCDP measures of conflict deaths compared to other available measures see the Our World in Data article [Counting world conflict deaths: why do sources differ?](https://ourworldindata.org/counting-conflict-deaths), and [Notes on five sources of the world conflict death rate since 1989](https://ourworldindata.org/uploads/2018/09/Notes-on-five-sources-of-the-world-conflict-death-rate-since-1989.pdf).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of world conflict deaths in the listed year per 100,000 people, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.04 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.04", "median": "1.78", "upper_75": "3.00", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.581 fraction of Canadian parliaments to 2050 will lack any party majority?", "desc": "", "resc": "In Canada's Westminster-style system of Parliamentary democracy, a [minority government or \"hung parliament\"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hung_parliament) is one in which no single party holds a majority of the seats. [From 1867 to 2000, Canada experienced twenty-six](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Canadian_federal_parliaments) majority governments in thirty-six general elections, and ten minority or hung parliaments, such that only ≃0.278 of elections resulted in no majority. However, since the turn of the millennium, eight more [general elections](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Canadian_federal_general_elections#Bar_graph_of_seats_from_1867_to_2021) in twenty-one years produced only three majorities, meaning that 0.625 of all Canadian parliaments since late 2000 were hung. A list of minority governments in Canada (not elections) is [available at Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minority_governments_in_Canada).\n\nThe [next Canadian general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/45th_Canadian_federal_election) is scheduled to be held no later than October, 2025.\n\n***What fraction of Canadian parliaments elected after October 20, 2022, and before January 1, 2051, will lack any party majority?***\n\nResolves as the proportion of Canadian parliaments which feature no parliamentary majority from the next occurring after October 20, 2022, (the forty-fifth federal election) through to every parliament elected before January 1, 2051.", "lower_25": "0.366", "median": "0.451", "upper_75": "0.581", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the rate of deaths (per 100,000 people) from global conflict will be 0.572 in the year 2122?", "desc": "\n\nThe prevalence of global violence is an important indicator of world stability and progress toward achieving widespread peace. In recent years an [academic debate about trends in global violence](https://www.vox.com/2015/5/21/8635369/pinker-taleb) has played out, with scholars such as Steven Pinker arguing that strengthened global connections and institutions, such as the increased prevalence of democracy and [international trade](https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/does-trade-integration-contribute-peace), have resulted in a decline in war and conflict in the long term. Others, such as Nassim Taleb, argue that Pinker underestimates the prevalence of violence and that we're more likely to be experiencing a temporary lull in major wars instead of a long term decline.\n\nOur World in Data tracks the rate of global conflict deaths in its chart [Global deaths in conflicts and one-sided violence per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data is sourced from the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program](https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia) (UCDP), and includes direct deaths from conflicts that involve at least one state actor, conflicts between at least two organizations with no state actors, and one-sided violence, which UCDP defines as\n\n>The deliberate use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.\n\nConflicts meeting the above categories are included in the figures when they result in at least 25 direct violent deaths in a calendar year, where direct violent deaths exclude secondary effects of violence such as disease and famine.\n\nFor more information about trends in global violence see the Our World in Data article [War and Peace](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace). For more on the differences between the UCDP measures of conflict deaths compared to other available measures see the Our World in Data article [Counting world conflict deaths: why do sources differ?](https://ourworldindata.org/counting-conflict-deaths), and [Notes on five sources of the world conflict death rate since 1989](https://ourworldindata.org/uploads/2018/09/Notes-on-five-sources-of-the-world-conflict-death-rate-since-1989.pdf).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of world conflict deaths in the listed year per 100,000 people, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.04 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "0.066", "median": "0.572", "upper_75": "2.35", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the FDA will approve the first disease-modifying treatment for Parkinson's disease by 2033?", "desc": "A [disease-modifying treatment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disease-modifying_treatment) is a treatment that delays or slows the progression of a disease by targeting its underlying cause. Disease-modifying treatments are distinguished from symptomatic treatments that treat the symptoms of a disease but do not address its underlying cause.\n\n[Parkinson's disease](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parkinson%27s_disease) is an incurable, progressive, neurodegenerative disease that predominantly affects older people; over 1% of those 60 years or older will experience it. As of 2022, no treatment is proven to slow the progression of Parkinson's disease in humans. According to [The Cure Parkinson's Trust](https://cureparkinsons.org.uk/2022/05/the-2022-parkinsons-drug-development-pipeline-report/), in 2021, there were 147 active clinical trials. 62% were evaluating symptom treatments, while 38% were testing potentially disease-modifying treatments for Parkinson's. Among the potentially disease-modifying treatments, only three were in the final phase 3 stage. Advancing such a treatment to full approval would be a [\"landmark achievement.\"](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4165487/)", "resc": "The question resolves as the date on which the FDA approves a disease-modifying treatment for Parkinson's disease. 'Treatment' means drugs, including over-the-counter (OTC) drugs, supplements, devices, or any therapy or intervention. The question resolves positively for new and existing treatments as long as the FDA specifically certifies the treatment to alter the progression of Parkinson's, or as disease-modifying in any other sense.\n\nApproval includes provisional or special approval, \"breakthrough\" approval, emergency use authorization, or any other FDA approval, authorization, or action that creates legal and practical availability of the treatment to at least one patient on the specific basis of its disease-modifying abilities.\n\nIf no treatment is approved by that time, the question resolves as \"**> 2049-12-31**\"", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.581 fraction of Canadian parliaments to 2050 will lack any party majority?", "desc": "", "resc": "In Canada's Westminster-style system of Parliamentary democracy, a [minority government or \"hung parliament\"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hung_parliament) is one in which no single party holds a majority of the seats. [From 1867 to 2000, Canada experienced twenty-six](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Canadian_federal_parliaments) majority governments in thirty-six general elections, and ten minority or hung parliaments, such that only ≃0.278 of elections resulted in no majority. However, since the turn of the millennium, eight more [general elections](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Canadian_federal_general_elections#Bar_graph_of_seats_from_1867_to_2021) in twenty-one years produced only three majorities, meaning that 0.625 of all Canadian parliaments since late 2000 were hung. A list of minority governments in Canada (not elections) is [available at Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minority_governments_in_Canada).\n\nThe [next Canadian general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/45th_Canadian_federal_election) is scheduled to be held no later than October, 2025.\n\n***What fraction of Canadian parliaments elected after October 20, 2022, and before January 1, 2051, will lack any party majority?***\n\nResolves as the proportion of Canadian parliaments which feature no parliamentary majority from the next occurring after October 20, 2022, (the forty-fifth federal election) through to every parliament elected before January 1, 2051.", "lower_25": "0.366", "median": "0.451", "upper_75": "0.581", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the rate of deaths (per 100,000 people) from global conflict will be 1.29 in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nThe prevalence of global violence is an important indicator of world stability and progress toward achieving widespread peace. In recent years an [academic debate about trends in global violence](https://www.vox.com/2015/5/21/8635369/pinker-taleb) has played out, with scholars such as Steven Pinker arguing that strengthened global connections and institutions, such as the increased prevalence of democracy and [international trade](https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/does-trade-integration-contribute-peace), have resulted in a decline in war and conflict in the long term. Others, such as Nassim Taleb, argue that Pinker underestimates the prevalence of violence and that we're more likely to be experiencing a temporary lull in major wars instead of a long term decline.\n\nOur World in Data tracks the rate of global conflict deaths in its chart [Global deaths in conflicts and one-sided violence per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data is sourced from the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program](https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia) (UCDP), and includes direct deaths from conflicts that involve at least one state actor, conflicts between at least two organizations with no state actors, and one-sided violence, which UCDP defines as\n\n>The deliberate use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.\n\nConflicts meeting the above categories are included in the figures when they result in at least 25 direct violent deaths in a calendar year, where direct violent deaths exclude secondary effects of violence such as disease and famine.\n\nFor more information about trends in global violence see the Our World in Data article [War and Peace](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace). For more on the differences between the UCDP measures of conflict deaths compared to other available measures see the Our World in Data article [Counting world conflict deaths: why do sources differ?](https://ourworldindata.org/counting-conflict-deaths), and [Notes on five sources of the world conflict death rate since 1989](https://ourworldindata.org/uploads/2018/09/Notes-on-five-sources-of-the-world-conflict-death-rate-since-1989.pdf).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of world conflict deaths in the listed year per 100,000 people, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.04 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.29", "median": "1.80", "upper_75": "2.72", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a full human genome in the following years will be 422 times the current cost in 2021 USD?", "desc": "\n\nA [genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome) consists of all the DNA in a cell nucleus. DNA is made up by four bases: G, A, T, and C. Genome sequencing ascertains the order of these bases to understand the biological information encoded by it. Whole genome sequencing involves determining the order of these bases for the entirety of an individual organism's genome.\n\nOne important marker of progress in genomic sequencing is how the cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen over time. [According](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost) to the US National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), the first high-quality 'draft' whole human genome sequence (covering ~90% of the genome at ~99.9% accuracy) was completed in 2000 and cost ~$300 million. The cost data, graphs, and methodology can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).\n\nNHGRI has historically reported costs several times each year, and the Our World in Data chart [Cost of sequencing a full human genome](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome) uses the lowest cost reported in a given year as the cost for that year. NHGRI's data is reported in nominal USD; an equivalent dataset indexed to 2021 USD is available [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kHPnBfEYGHao9fJeiMkT-QZtJu58P6IN/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a whole human genome in the respective years, **adjusted for inflation to 2021 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome). Inflation adjustment to 2021 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nFor example, in 2021 the cost of sequencing a full human genome was $454.05 (in 2021 USD).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID nor NHGRI no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "275", "median": "341", "upper_75": "422", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a full human genome in the following years will be 422 times the current cost in 2021 USD?", "desc": "\n\nA [genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome) consists of all the DNA in a cell nucleus. DNA is made up by four bases: G, A, T, and C. Genome sequencing ascertains the order of these bases to understand the biological information encoded by it. Whole genome sequencing involves determining the order of these bases for the entirety of an individual organism's genome.\n\nOne important marker of progress in genomic sequencing is how the cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen over time. [According](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost) to the US National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), the first high-quality 'draft' whole human genome sequence (covering ~90% of the genome at ~99.9% accuracy) was completed in 2000 and cost ~$300 million. The cost data, graphs, and methodology can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).\n\nNHGRI has historically reported costs several times each year, and the Our World in Data chart [Cost of sequencing a full human genome](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome) uses the lowest cost reported in a given year as the cost for that year. NHGRI's data is reported in nominal USD; an equivalent dataset indexed to 2021 USD is available [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kHPnBfEYGHao9fJeiMkT-QZtJu58P6IN/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a whole human genome in the respective years, **adjusted for inflation to 2021 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome). Inflation adjustment to 2021 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nFor example, in 2021 the cost of sequencing a full human genome was $454.05 (in 2021 USD).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID nor NHGRI no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "275", "median": "341", "upper_75": "422", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the FDA will approve the first disease-modifying treatment for Parkinson's disease by 2033?", "desc": "A [disease-modifying treatment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disease-modifying_treatment) is a treatment that delays or slows the progression of a disease by targeting its underlying cause. Disease-modifying treatments are distinguished from symptomatic treatments that treat the symptoms of a disease but do not address its underlying cause.\n\n[Parkinson's disease](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parkinson%27s_disease) is an incurable, progressive, neurodegenerative disease that predominantly affects older people; over 1% of those 60 years or older will experience it. As of 2022, no treatment is proven to slow the progression of Parkinson's disease in humans. According to [The Cure Parkinson's Trust](https://cureparkinsons.org.uk/2022/05/the-2022-parkinsons-drug-development-pipeline-report/), in 2021, there were 147 active clinical trials. 62% were evaluating symptom treatments, while 38% were testing potentially disease-modifying treatments for Parkinson's. Among the potentially disease-modifying treatments, only three were in the final phase 3 stage. Advancing such a treatment to full approval would be a [\"landmark achievement.\"](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4165487/)", "resc": "The question resolves as the date on which the FDA approves a disease-modifying treatment for Parkinson's disease. 'Treatment' means drugs, including over-the-counter (OTC) drugs, supplements, devices, or any therapy or intervention. The question resolves positively for new and existing treatments as long as the FDA specifically certifies the treatment to alter the progression of Parkinson's, or as disease-modifying in any other sense.\n\nApproval includes provisional or special approval, \"breakthrough\" approval, emergency use authorization, or any other FDA approval, authorization, or action that creates legal and practical availability of the treatment to at least one patient on the specific basis of its disease-modifying abilities.\n\nIf no treatment is approved by that time, the question resolves as \"**> 2049-12-31**\"", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the FDA will approve the first disease-modifying treatment for Parkinson's disease by 2033?", "desc": "A [disease-modifying treatment](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disease-modifying_treatment) is a treatment that delays or slows the progression of a disease by targeting its underlying cause. Disease-modifying treatments are distinguished from symptomatic treatments that treat the symptoms of a disease but do not address its underlying cause.\n\n[Parkinson's disease](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parkinson%27s_disease) is an incurable, progressive, neurodegenerative disease that predominantly affects older people; over 1% of those 60 years or older will experience it. As of 2022, no treatment is proven to slow the progression of Parkinson's disease in humans. According to [The Cure Parkinson's Trust](https://cureparkinsons.org.uk/2022/05/the-2022-parkinsons-drug-development-pipeline-report/), in 2021, there were 147 active clinical trials. 62% were evaluating symptom treatments, while 38% were testing potentially disease-modifying treatments for Parkinson's. Among the potentially disease-modifying treatments, only three were in the final phase 3 stage. Advancing such a treatment to full approval would be a [\"landmark achievement.\"](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4165487/)", "resc": "The question resolves as the date on which the FDA approves a disease-modifying treatment for Parkinson's disease. 'Treatment' means drugs, including over-the-counter (OTC) drugs, supplements, devices, or any therapy or intervention. The question resolves positively for new and existing treatments as long as the FDA specifically certifies the treatment to alter the progression of Parkinson's, or as disease-modifying in any other sense.\n\nApproval includes provisional or special approval, \"breakthrough\" approval, emergency use authorization, or any other FDA approval, authorization, or action that creates legal and practical availability of the treatment to at least one patient on the specific basis of its disease-modifying abilities.\n\nIf no treatment is approved by that time, the question resolves as \"**> 2049-12-31**\"", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the rate of deaths (per 100,000 people) from global conflict will be 1.78 in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nThe prevalence of global violence is an important indicator of world stability and progress toward achieving widespread peace. In recent years an [academic debate about trends in global violence](https://www.vox.com/2015/5/21/8635369/pinker-taleb) has played out, with scholars such as Steven Pinker arguing that strengthened global connections and institutions, such as the increased prevalence of democracy and [international trade](https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/does-trade-integration-contribute-peace), have resulted in a decline in war and conflict in the long term. Others, such as Nassim Taleb, argue that Pinker underestimates the prevalence of violence and that we're more likely to be experiencing a temporary lull in major wars instead of a long term decline.\n\nOur World in Data tracks the rate of global conflict deaths in its chart [Global deaths in conflicts and one-sided violence per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data is sourced from the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program](https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia) (UCDP), and includes direct deaths from conflicts that involve at least one state actor, conflicts between at least two organizations with no state actors, and one-sided violence, which UCDP defines as\n\n>The deliberate use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.\n\nConflicts meeting the above categories are included in the figures when they result in at least 25 direct violent deaths in a calendar year, where direct violent deaths exclude secondary effects of violence such as disease and famine.\n\nFor more information about trends in global violence see the Our World in Data article [War and Peace](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace). For more on the differences between the UCDP measures of conflict deaths compared to other available measures see the Our World in Data article [Counting world conflict deaths: why do sources differ?](https://ourworldindata.org/counting-conflict-deaths), and [Notes on five sources of the world conflict death rate since 1989](https://ourworldindata.org/uploads/2018/09/Notes-on-five-sources-of-the-world-conflict-death-rate-since-1989.pdf).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of world conflict deaths in the listed year per 100,000 people, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.04 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.04", "median": "1.78", "upper_75": "3.00", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 0.581 fraction of Canadian parliaments to 2050 will lack any party majority?", "desc": "", "resc": "In Canada's Westminster-style system of Parliamentary democracy, a [minority government or \"hung parliament\"](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hung_parliament) is one in which no single party holds a majority of the seats. [From 1867 to 2000, Canada experienced twenty-six](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Canadian_federal_parliaments) majority governments in thirty-six general elections, and ten minority or hung parliaments, such that only ≃0.278 of elections resulted in no majority. However, since the turn of the millennium, eight more [general elections](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Canadian_federal_general_elections#Bar_graph_of_seats_from_1867_to_2021) in twenty-one years produced only three majorities, meaning that 0.625 of all Canadian parliaments since late 2000 were hung. A list of minority governments in Canada (not elections) is [available at Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minority_governments_in_Canada).\n\nThe [next Canadian general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/45th_Canadian_federal_election) is scheduled to be held no later than October, 2025.\n\n***What fraction of Canadian parliaments elected after October 20, 2022, and before January 1, 2051, will lack any party majority?***\n\nResolves as the proportion of Canadian parliaments which feature no parliamentary majority from the next occurring after October 20, 2022, (the forty-fifth federal election) through to every parliament elected before January 1, 2051.", "lower_25": "0.366", "median": "0.451", "upper_75": "0.581", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a full human genome in 2025 will be 302 times higher than in 2021 USD?", "desc": "\n\nA [genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome) consists of all the DNA in a cell nucleus. DNA is made up by four bases: G, A, T, and C. Genome sequencing ascertains the order of these bases to understand the biological information encoded by it. Whole genome sequencing involves determining the order of these bases for the entirety of an individual organism's genome.\n\nOne important marker of progress in genomic sequencing is how the cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen over time. [According](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost) to the US National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), the first high-quality 'draft' whole human genome sequence (covering ~90% of the genome at ~99.9% accuracy) was completed in 2000 and cost ~$300 million. The cost data, graphs, and methodology can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).\n\nNHGRI has historically reported costs several times each year, and the Our World in Data chart [Cost of sequencing a full human genome](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome) uses the lowest cost reported in a given year as the cost for that year. NHGRI's data is reported in nominal USD; an equivalent dataset indexed to 2021 USD is available [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kHPnBfEYGHao9fJeiMkT-QZtJu58P6IN/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a whole human genome in the respective years, **adjusted for inflation to 2021 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome). Inflation adjustment to 2021 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nFor example, in 2021 the cost of sequencing a full human genome was $454.05 (in 2021 USD).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID nor NHGRI no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "159", "median": "221", "upper_75": "302", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a full human genome in 2032 will be 132 times higher than in 2021 USD?", "desc": "\n\nA [genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome) consists of all the DNA in a cell nucleus. DNA is made up by four bases: G, A, T, and C. Genome sequencing ascertains the order of these bases to understand the biological information encoded by it. Whole genome sequencing involves determining the order of these bases for the entirety of an individual organism's genome.\n\nOne important marker of progress in genomic sequencing is how the cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen over time. [According](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost) to the US National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), the first high-quality 'draft' whole human genome sequence (covering ~90% of the genome at ~99.9% accuracy) was completed in 2000 and cost ~$300 million. The cost data, graphs, and methodology can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).\n\nNHGRI has historically reported costs several times each year, and the Our World in Data chart [Cost of sequencing a full human genome](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome) uses the lowest cost reported in a given year as the cost for that year. NHGRI's data is reported in nominal USD; an equivalent dataset indexed to 2021 USD is available [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kHPnBfEYGHao9fJeiMkT-QZtJu58P6IN/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a whole human genome in the respective years, **adjusted for inflation to 2021 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome). Inflation adjustment to 2021 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nFor example, in 2021 the cost of sequencing a full human genome was $454.05 (in 2021 USD).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID nor NHGRI no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "32.5", "median": "67.1", "upper_75": "132", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the rate of deaths (per 100,000 people) from global conflict will be 1.12 in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nThe prevalence of global violence is an important indicator of world stability and progress toward achieving widespread peace. In recent years an [academic debate about trends in global violence](https://www.vox.com/2015/5/21/8635369/pinker-taleb) has played out, with scholars such as Steven Pinker arguing that strengthened global connections and institutions, such as the increased prevalence of democracy and [international trade](https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/does-trade-integration-contribute-peace), have resulted in a decline in war and conflict in the long term. Others, such as Nassim Taleb, argue that Pinker underestimates the prevalence of violence and that we're more likely to be experiencing a temporary lull in major wars instead of a long term decline.\n\nOur World in Data tracks the rate of global conflict deaths in its chart [Global deaths in conflicts and one-sided violence per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data is sourced from the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program](https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia) (UCDP), and includes direct deaths from conflicts that involve at least one state actor, conflicts between at least two organizations with no state actors, and one-sided violence, which UCDP defines as\n\n>The deliberate use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.\n\nConflicts meeting the above categories are included in the figures when they result in at least 25 direct violent deaths in a calendar year, where direct violent deaths exclude secondary effects of violence such as disease and famine.\n\nFor more information about trends in global violence see the Our World in Data article [War and Peace](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace). For more on the differences between the UCDP measures of conflict deaths compared to other available measures see the Our World in Data article [Counting world conflict deaths: why do sources differ?](https://ourworldindata.org/counting-conflict-deaths), and [Notes on five sources of the world conflict death rate since 1989](https://ourworldindata.org/uploads/2018/09/Notes-on-five-sources-of-the-world-conflict-death-rate-since-1989.pdf).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of world conflict deaths in the listed year per 100,000 people, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.04 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "0.411", "median": "1.12", "upper_75": "2.96", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a full human genome in 2025 will be 302 times higher than in 2021 USD?", "desc": "\n\nA [genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome) consists of all the DNA in a cell nucleus. DNA is made up by four bases: G, A, T, and C. Genome sequencing ascertains the order of these bases to understand the biological information encoded by it. Whole genome sequencing involves determining the order of these bases for the entirety of an individual organism's genome.\n\nOne important marker of progress in genomic sequencing is how the cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen over time. [According](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost) to the US National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), the first high-quality 'draft' whole human genome sequence (covering ~90% of the genome at ~99.9% accuracy) was completed in 2000 and cost ~$300 million. The cost data, graphs, and methodology can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).\n\nNHGRI has historically reported costs several times each year, and the Our World in Data chart [Cost of sequencing a full human genome](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome) uses the lowest cost reported in a given year as the cost for that year. NHGRI's data is reported in nominal USD; an equivalent dataset indexed to 2021 USD is available [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kHPnBfEYGHao9fJeiMkT-QZtJu58P6IN/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a whole human genome in the respective years, **adjusted for inflation to 2021 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome). Inflation adjustment to 2021 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nFor example, in 2021 the cost of sequencing a full human genome was $454.05 (in 2021 USD).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID nor NHGRI no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "159", "median": "221", "upper_75": "302", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a full human genome in 2025 will be 302 times higher than in 2021 USD?", "desc": "\n\nA [genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome) consists of all the DNA in a cell nucleus. DNA is made up by four bases: G, A, T, and C. Genome sequencing ascertains the order of these bases to understand the biological information encoded by it. Whole genome sequencing involves determining the order of these bases for the entirety of an individual organism's genome.\n\nOne important marker of progress in genomic sequencing is how the cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen over time. [According](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost) to the US National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), the first high-quality 'draft' whole human genome sequence (covering ~90% of the genome at ~99.9% accuracy) was completed in 2000 and cost ~$300 million. The cost data, graphs, and methodology can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).\n\nNHGRI has historically reported costs several times each year, and the Our World in Data chart [Cost of sequencing a full human genome](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome) uses the lowest cost reported in a given year as the cost for that year. NHGRI's data is reported in nominal USD; an equivalent dataset indexed to 2021 USD is available [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kHPnBfEYGHao9fJeiMkT-QZtJu58P6IN/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a whole human genome in the respective years, **adjusted for inflation to 2021 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome). Inflation adjustment to 2021 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nFor example, in 2021 the cost of sequencing a full human genome was $454.05 (in 2021 USD).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID nor NHGRI no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "159", "median": "221", "upper_75": "302", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a full human genome in the following years will be 422 times the current cost in 2021 USD?", "desc": "\n\nA [genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome) consists of all the DNA in a cell nucleus. DNA is made up by four bases: G, A, T, and C. Genome sequencing ascertains the order of these bases to understand the biological information encoded by it. Whole genome sequencing involves determining the order of these bases for the entirety of an individual organism's genome.\n\nOne important marker of progress in genomic sequencing is how the cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen over time. [According](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost) to the US National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), the first high-quality 'draft' whole human genome sequence (covering ~90% of the genome at ~99.9% accuracy) was completed in 2000 and cost ~$300 million. The cost data, graphs, and methodology can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).\n\nNHGRI has historically reported costs several times each year, and the Our World in Data chart [Cost of sequencing a full human genome](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome) uses the lowest cost reported in a given year as the cost for that year. NHGRI's data is reported in nominal USD; an equivalent dataset indexed to 2021 USD is available [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kHPnBfEYGHao9fJeiMkT-QZtJu58P6IN/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a whole human genome in the respective years, **adjusted for inflation to 2021 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome). Inflation adjustment to 2021 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nFor example, in 2021 the cost of sequencing a full human genome was $454.05 (in 2021 USD).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID nor NHGRI no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "275", "median": "341", "upper_75": "422", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a full human genome in 2032 will be 132 times higher than in 2021 USD?", "desc": "\n\nA [genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome) consists of all the DNA in a cell nucleus. DNA is made up by four bases: G, A, T, and C. Genome sequencing ascertains the order of these bases to understand the biological information encoded by it. Whole genome sequencing involves determining the order of these bases for the entirety of an individual organism's genome.\n\nOne important marker of progress in genomic sequencing is how the cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen over time. [According](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost) to the US National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), the first high-quality 'draft' whole human genome sequence (covering ~90% of the genome at ~99.9% accuracy) was completed in 2000 and cost ~$300 million. The cost data, graphs, and methodology can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).\n\nNHGRI has historically reported costs several times each year, and the Our World in Data chart [Cost of sequencing a full human genome](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome) uses the lowest cost reported in a given year as the cost for that year. NHGRI's data is reported in nominal USD; an equivalent dataset indexed to 2021 USD is available [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kHPnBfEYGHao9fJeiMkT-QZtJu58P6IN/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a whole human genome in the respective years, **adjusted for inflation to 2021 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome). Inflation adjustment to 2021 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nFor example, in 2021 the cost of sequencing a full human genome was $454.05 (in 2021 USD).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID nor NHGRI no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "32.5", "median": "67.1", "upper_75": "132", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the rate of deaths (per 100,000 people) from global conflict will be 0.572 in the year 2122?", "desc": "\n\nThe prevalence of global violence is an important indicator of world stability and progress toward achieving widespread peace. In recent years an [academic debate about trends in global violence](https://www.vox.com/2015/5/21/8635369/pinker-taleb) has played out, with scholars such as Steven Pinker arguing that strengthened global connections and institutions, such as the increased prevalence of democracy and [international trade](https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/does-trade-integration-contribute-peace), have resulted in a decline in war and conflict in the long term. Others, such as Nassim Taleb, argue that Pinker underestimates the prevalence of violence and that we're more likely to be experiencing a temporary lull in major wars instead of a long term decline.\n\nOur World in Data tracks the rate of global conflict deaths in its chart [Global deaths in conflicts and one-sided violence per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying data is sourced from the [Uppsala Conflict Data Program](https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia) (UCDP), and includes direct deaths from conflicts that involve at least one state actor, conflicts between at least two organizations with no state actors, and one-sided violence, which UCDP defines as\n\n>The deliberate use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.\n\nConflicts meeting the above categories are included in the figures when they result in at least 25 direct violent deaths in a calendar year, where direct violent deaths exclude secondary effects of violence such as disease and famine.\n\nFor more information about trends in global violence see the Our World in Data article [War and Peace](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace). For more on the differences between the UCDP measures of conflict deaths compared to other available measures see the Our World in Data article [Counting world conflict deaths: why do sources differ?](https://ourworldindata.org/counting-conflict-deaths), and [Notes on five sources of the world conflict death rate since 1989](https://ourworldindata.org/uploads/2018/09/Notes-on-five-sources-of-the-world-conflict-death-rate-since-1989.pdf).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of world conflict deaths in the listed year per 100,000 people, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/deaths-per-100000-in-conflicts-and-one-sided-violence?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.04 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "0.066", "median": "0.572", "upper_75": "2.35", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a full human genome in 2052 will be 57.7 times the current cost (in 2021 USD)?", "desc": "\n\nA [genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome) consists of all the DNA in a cell nucleus. DNA is made up by four bases: G, A, T, and C. Genome sequencing ascertains the order of these bases to understand the biological information encoded by it. Whole genome sequencing involves determining the order of these bases for the entirety of an individual organism's genome.\n\nOne important marker of progress in genomic sequencing is how the cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen over time. [According](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost) to the US National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), the first high-quality 'draft' whole human genome sequence (covering ~90% of the genome at ~99.9% accuracy) was completed in 2000 and cost ~$300 million. The cost data, graphs, and methodology can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).\n\nNHGRI has historically reported costs several times each year, and the Our World in Data chart [Cost of sequencing a full human genome](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome) uses the lowest cost reported in a given year as the cost for that year. NHGRI's data is reported in nominal USD; an equivalent dataset indexed to 2021 USD is available [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kHPnBfEYGHao9fJeiMkT-QZtJu58P6IN/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a whole human genome in the respective years, **adjusted for inflation to 2021 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome). Inflation adjustment to 2021 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nFor example, in 2021 the cost of sequencing a full human genome was $454.05 (in 2021 USD).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID nor NHGRI no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.98", "median": "16.7", "upper_75": "57.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a full human genome in 2032 will be 132 times higher than in 2021 USD?", "desc": "\n\nA [genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome) consists of all the DNA in a cell nucleus. DNA is made up by four bases: G, A, T, and C. Genome sequencing ascertains the order of these bases to understand the biological information encoded by it. Whole genome sequencing involves determining the order of these bases for the entirety of an individual organism's genome.\n\nOne important marker of progress in genomic sequencing is how the cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen over time. [According](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost) to the US National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), the first high-quality 'draft' whole human genome sequence (covering ~90% of the genome at ~99.9% accuracy) was completed in 2000 and cost ~$300 million. The cost data, graphs, and methodology can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).\n\nNHGRI has historically reported costs several times each year, and the Our World in Data chart [Cost of sequencing a full human genome](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome) uses the lowest cost reported in a given year as the cost for that year. NHGRI's data is reported in nominal USD; an equivalent dataset indexed to 2021 USD is available [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kHPnBfEYGHao9fJeiMkT-QZtJu58P6IN/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a whole human genome in the respective years, **adjusted for inflation to 2021 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome). Inflation adjustment to 2021 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nFor example, in 2021 the cost of sequencing a full human genome was $454.05 (in 2021 USD).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID nor NHGRI no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "32.5", "median": "67.1", "upper_75": "132", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a full human genome in 2052 will be 57.7 times the current cost (in 2021 USD)?", "desc": "\n\nA [genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome) consists of all the DNA in a cell nucleus. DNA is made up by four bases: G, A, T, and C. Genome sequencing ascertains the order of these bases to understand the biological information encoded by it. Whole genome sequencing involves determining the order of these bases for the entirety of an individual organism's genome.\n\nOne important marker of progress in genomic sequencing is how the cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen over time. [According](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost) to the US National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), the first high-quality 'draft' whole human genome sequence (covering ~90% of the genome at ~99.9% accuracy) was completed in 2000 and cost ~$300 million. The cost data, graphs, and methodology can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).\n\nNHGRI has historically reported costs several times each year, and the Our World in Data chart [Cost of sequencing a full human genome](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome) uses the lowest cost reported in a given year as the cost for that year. NHGRI's data is reported in nominal USD; an equivalent dataset indexed to 2021 USD is available [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kHPnBfEYGHao9fJeiMkT-QZtJu58P6IN/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a whole human genome in the respective years, **adjusted for inflation to 2021 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome). Inflation adjustment to 2021 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nFor example, in 2021 the cost of sequencing a full human genome was $454.05 (in 2021 USD).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID nor NHGRI no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.98", "median": "16.7", "upper_75": "57.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a total of 18.6k fatalities from terrorism in the world in the following years?", "desc": "\n\n[Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism) notes that \"terrorism\" is a difficult term to define:\n\n>The key problem is that terrorism is difficult to distinguish from other forms of political violence and violent crime, such as state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, hate crime, and homicide. The lines between these different forms of violence are often blurry.\n\nTo quantify casualties from global terrorism, OWID uses the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is maintained by the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ([START](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)). GTD uses [this definition](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf) of terrorism:\n\n>The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice this means in order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present:\n>\n> * **The incident must be intentional** – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.\n> * **The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence** -including property violence, as well as violence against people.\n> * **The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.** The database does not include acts of state terrorism.\n>\n>In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD:\n>\n> * **Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.** In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.\n> * **Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.** It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.\n> * **Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.** That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).\n\nOWID discusses some of the limitations of GTD and other sources in [this article](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#data-quality).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of fatalities caused by terrorism in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/incidence-of-terrorism?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2019 the total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in the world was 20,329.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "13.8k", "median": "18.6k", "upper_75": "25.0k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a full human genome in 2022 will be 16.0 times the cost in 2021 USD?", "desc": "\n\nA [genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome) consists of all the DNA in a cell nucleus. DNA is made up by four bases: G, A, T, and C. Genome sequencing ascertains the order of these bases to understand the biological information encoded by it. Whole genome sequencing involves determining the order of these bases for the entirety of an individual organism's genome.\n\nOne important marker of progress in genomic sequencing is how the cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen over time. [According](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost) to the US National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), the first high-quality 'draft' whole human genome sequence (covering ~90% of the genome at ~99.9% accuracy) was completed in 2000 and cost ~$300 million. The cost data, graphs, and methodology can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).\n\nNHGRI has historically reported costs several times each year, and the Our World in Data chart [Cost of sequencing a full human genome](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome) uses the lowest cost reported in a given year as the cost for that year. NHGRI's data is reported in nominal USD; an equivalent dataset indexed to 2021 USD is available [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kHPnBfEYGHao9fJeiMkT-QZtJu58P6IN/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a whole human genome in the respective years, **adjusted for inflation to 2021 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome). Inflation adjustment to 2021 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nFor example, in 2021 the cost of sequencing a full human genome was $454.05 (in 2021 USD).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID nor NHGRI no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "0.0578", "median": "1.29", "upper_75": "16.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a total of 20.8k fatalities from terrorism in the world by 2032?", "desc": "\n\n[Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism) notes that \"terrorism\" is a difficult term to define:\n\n>The key problem is that terrorism is difficult to distinguish from other forms of political violence and violent crime, such as state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, hate crime, and homicide. The lines between these different forms of violence are often blurry.\n\nTo quantify casualties from global terrorism, OWID uses the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is maintained by the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ([START](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)). GTD uses [this definition](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf) of terrorism:\n\n>The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice this means in order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present:\n>\n> * **The incident must be intentional** – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.\n> * **The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence** -including property violence, as well as violence against people.\n> * **The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.** The database does not include acts of state terrorism.\n>\n>In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD:\n>\n> * **Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.** In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.\n> * **Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.** It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.\n> * **Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.** That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).\n\nOWID discusses some of the limitations of GTD and other sources in [this article](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#data-quality).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of fatalities caused by terrorism in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/incidence-of-terrorism?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2019 the total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in the world was 20,329.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "12.9k", "median": "20.8k", "upper_75": "32.0k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a full human genome in 2022 will be 16.0 times the cost in 2021 USD?", "desc": "\n\nA [genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome) consists of all the DNA in a cell nucleus. DNA is made up by four bases: G, A, T, and C. Genome sequencing ascertains the order of these bases to understand the biological information encoded by it. Whole genome sequencing involves determining the order of these bases for the entirety of an individual organism's genome.\n\nOne important marker of progress in genomic sequencing is how the cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen over time. [According](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost) to the US National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), the first high-quality 'draft' whole human genome sequence (covering ~90% of the genome at ~99.9% accuracy) was completed in 2000 and cost ~$300 million. The cost data, graphs, and methodology can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).\n\nNHGRI has historically reported costs several times each year, and the Our World in Data chart [Cost of sequencing a full human genome](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome) uses the lowest cost reported in a given year as the cost for that year. NHGRI's data is reported in nominal USD; an equivalent dataset indexed to 2021 USD is available [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kHPnBfEYGHao9fJeiMkT-QZtJu58P6IN/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a whole human genome in the respective years, **adjusted for inflation to 2021 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome). Inflation adjustment to 2021 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nFor example, in 2021 the cost of sequencing a full human genome was $454.05 (in 2021 USD).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID nor NHGRI no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "0.0578", "median": "1.29", "upper_75": "16.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a total of 38.9k fatalities from terrorism in the world by 2052?", "desc": "\n\n[Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism) notes that \"terrorism\" is a difficult term to define:\n\n>The key problem is that terrorism is difficult to distinguish from other forms of political violence and violent crime, such as state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, hate crime, and homicide. The lines between these different forms of violence are often blurry.\n\nTo quantify casualties from global terrorism, OWID uses the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is maintained by the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ([START](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)). GTD uses [this definition](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf) of terrorism:\n\n>The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice this means in order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present:\n>\n> * **The incident must be intentional** – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.\n> * **The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence** -including property violence, as well as violence against people.\n> * **The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.** The database does not include acts of state terrorism.\n>\n>In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD:\n>\n> * **Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.** In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.\n> * **Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.** It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.\n> * **Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.** That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).\n\nOWID discusses some of the limitations of GTD and other sources in [this article](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#data-quality).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of fatalities caused by terrorism in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/incidence-of-terrorism?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2019 the total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in the world was 20,329.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "6.48k", "median": "16.8k", "upper_75": "38.9k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a total of 20.8k fatalities from terrorism in the world by 2032?", "desc": "\n\n[Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism) notes that \"terrorism\" is a difficult term to define:\n\n>The key problem is that terrorism is difficult to distinguish from other forms of political violence and violent crime, such as state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, hate crime, and homicide. The lines between these different forms of violence are often blurry.\n\nTo quantify casualties from global terrorism, OWID uses the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is maintained by the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ([START](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)). GTD uses [this definition](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf) of terrorism:\n\n>The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice this means in order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present:\n>\n> * **The incident must be intentional** – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.\n> * **The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence** -including property violence, as well as violence against people.\n> * **The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.** The database does not include acts of state terrorism.\n>\n>In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD:\n>\n> * **Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.** In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.\n> * **Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.** It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.\n> * **Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.** That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).\n\nOWID discusses some of the limitations of GTD and other sources in [this article](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#data-quality).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of fatalities caused by terrorism in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/incidence-of-terrorism?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2019 the total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in the world was 20,329.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "12.9k", "median": "20.8k", "upper_75": "32.0k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a total of 38.9k fatalities from terrorism in the world by 2052?", "desc": "\n\n[Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism) notes that \"terrorism\" is a difficult term to define:\n\n>The key problem is that terrorism is difficult to distinguish from other forms of political violence and violent crime, such as state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, hate crime, and homicide. The lines between these different forms of violence are often blurry.\n\nTo quantify casualties from global terrorism, OWID uses the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is maintained by the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ([START](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)). GTD uses [this definition](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf) of terrorism:\n\n>The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice this means in order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present:\n>\n> * **The incident must be intentional** – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.\n> * **The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence** -including property violence, as well as violence against people.\n> * **The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.** The database does not include acts of state terrorism.\n>\n>In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD:\n>\n> * **Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.** In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.\n> * **Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.** It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.\n> * **Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.** That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).\n\nOWID discusses some of the limitations of GTD and other sources in [this article](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#data-quality).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of fatalities caused by terrorism in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/incidence-of-terrorism?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2019 the total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in the world was 20,329.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "6.48k", "median": "16.8k", "upper_75": "38.9k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a full human genome in 2052 will be 57.7 times the current cost (in 2021 USD)?", "desc": "\n\nA [genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome) consists of all the DNA in a cell nucleus. DNA is made up by four bases: G, A, T, and C. Genome sequencing ascertains the order of these bases to understand the biological information encoded by it. Whole genome sequencing involves determining the order of these bases for the entirety of an individual organism's genome.\n\nOne important marker of progress in genomic sequencing is how the cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen over time. [According](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost) to the US National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), the first high-quality 'draft' whole human genome sequence (covering ~90% of the genome at ~99.9% accuracy) was completed in 2000 and cost ~$300 million. The cost data, graphs, and methodology can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).\n\nNHGRI has historically reported costs several times each year, and the Our World in Data chart [Cost of sequencing a full human genome](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome) uses the lowest cost reported in a given year as the cost for that year. NHGRI's data is reported in nominal USD; an equivalent dataset indexed to 2021 USD is available [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kHPnBfEYGHao9fJeiMkT-QZtJu58P6IN/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a whole human genome in the respective years, **adjusted for inflation to 2021 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome). Inflation adjustment to 2021 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nFor example, in 2021 the cost of sequencing a full human genome was $454.05 (in 2021 USD).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID nor NHGRI no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.98", "median": "16.7", "upper_75": "57.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 544 fatalities from terrorism in the world in the following years?", "desc": "\n\n[Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism) notes that \"terrorism\" is a difficult term to define:\n\n>The key problem is that terrorism is difficult to distinguish from other forms of political violence and violent crime, such as state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, hate crime, and homicide. The lines between these different forms of violence are often blurry.\n\nTo quantify casualties from global terrorism, OWID uses the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is maintained by the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ([START](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)). GTD uses [this definition](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf) of terrorism:\n\n>The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice this means in order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present:\n>\n> * **The incident must be intentional** – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.\n> * **The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence** -including property violence, as well as violence against people.\n> * **The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.** The database does not include acts of state terrorism.\n>\n>In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD:\n>\n> * **Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.** In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.\n> * **Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.** It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.\n> * **Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.** That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).\n\nOWID discusses some of the limitations of GTD and other sources in [this article](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#data-quality).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of fatalities caused by terrorism in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/incidence-of-terrorism?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2019 the total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in the world was 20,329.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "544", "median": "7.33k", "upper_75": "42.5k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 544 fatalities from terrorism in the world in the following years?", "desc": "\n\n[Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism) notes that \"terrorism\" is a difficult term to define:\n\n>The key problem is that terrorism is difficult to distinguish from other forms of political violence and violent crime, such as state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, hate crime, and homicide. The lines between these different forms of violence are often blurry.\n\nTo quantify casualties from global terrorism, OWID uses the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is maintained by the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ([START](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)). GTD uses [this definition](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf) of terrorism:\n\n>The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice this means in order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present:\n>\n> * **The incident must be intentional** – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.\n> * **The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence** -including property violence, as well as violence against people.\n> * **The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.** The database does not include acts of state terrorism.\n>\n>In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD:\n>\n> * **Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.** In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.\n> * **Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.** It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.\n> * **Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.** That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).\n\nOWID discusses some of the limitations of GTD and other sources in [this article](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#data-quality).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of fatalities caused by terrorism in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/incidence-of-terrorism?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2019 the total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in the world was 20,329.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "544", "median": "7.33k", "upper_75": "42.5k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that U.S. law will not recognize an artificial entity as a natural person before 2070?", "desc": "Brent Spiner's character on *Star Trek: The Next Generation* was called Mr. Data. Data was a construct engineered by Dr. Noonien Soong; an artificially intelligent humanoid robot possessed of a Starfleet officer's commission and a sophisticated positronic brain. In [one celebrated 2365 incident,](https://memory-alpha.fandom.com/wiki/The_Measure_Of_A_Man_%28episode%29) Mr. Data was able to fend off a contemplated court order which would have seen him stripped of his legal personhood and forcibly disassembled for scientific study. The court instead ruled that his nature as a machine was irrelevant in light of his capacities as an individual (\"we, too, are machines, just machines of a different type.\")\n\nNow we need to know something about legal personhood.\n\nIf the Acme Corporation refuses to pay me my wages owed, I can sue them, the Acme corporation itself. I don't need to identify the CEO, the paymaster, and/or the guy in the mailroom who has it in for me; the corporation itself, though incorporeal in that it lacks a physical body, is *legally* encorporated. It has an independent existence as a legal entity with its own rights and responsibilities, not subsumed by those of its various employees or owners. This is called legal personhood.\n\nThe law has long distinguished between natural persons and mere legal persons. A legal person is a social entity that is *granted* legal-person status. A natural person is someone entitled to rights and responsibilities in the light of their status as, historically, a flesh-and-blood human being. But this raises a natural question: What will happen if the moral space of extant persons expands to include artificial intelligences, like Mr. Data? Will the law follow suit?\n\nPerhaps surprisingly, the question has [already begun to come up in court cases.](https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/insight-patent-ruling-begs-the-question-what-is-a-natural-person)", "resc": "The question resolves as the date when an operative United States law (or a law operative in a legal successor state to the United States) recognizes artificial entities as potential natural persons, or as members of a class of persons closely analagous to natural persons. The law may be legislation or a legal ruling, but not a mere [obiter dictum.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obiter_dictum) It need not stand for any particular length of time or grant rights to any particular individual; an instantly-overruled judgment that a hypothetical Mr. Data would qualify as a natural person would be sufficient to trigger resolution.\n\nIf 2070 arrives before such a law, the question resolves as \"**>**\".", "lower_25": "2044", "median": "2054", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2070", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a total of 18.6k fatalities from terrorism in the world in the following years?", "desc": "\n\n[Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism) notes that \"terrorism\" is a difficult term to define:\n\n>The key problem is that terrorism is difficult to distinguish from other forms of political violence and violent crime, such as state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, hate crime, and homicide. The lines between these different forms of violence are often blurry.\n\nTo quantify casualties from global terrorism, OWID uses the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is maintained by the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ([START](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)). GTD uses [this definition](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf) of terrorism:\n\n>The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice this means in order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present:\n>\n> * **The incident must be intentional** – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.\n> * **The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence** -including property violence, as well as violence against people.\n> * **The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.** The database does not include acts of state terrorism.\n>\n>In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD:\n>\n> * **Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.** In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.\n> * **Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.** It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.\n> * **Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.** That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).\n\nOWID discusses some of the limitations of GTD and other sources in [this article](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#data-quality).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of fatalities caused by terrorism in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/incidence-of-terrorism?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2019 the total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in the world was 20,329.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "13.8k", "median": "18.6k", "upper_75": "25.0k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a total of 38.9k fatalities from terrorism in the world by 2052?", "desc": "\n\n[Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism) notes that \"terrorism\" is a difficult term to define:\n\n>The key problem is that terrorism is difficult to distinguish from other forms of political violence and violent crime, such as state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, hate crime, and homicide. The lines between these different forms of violence are often blurry.\n\nTo quantify casualties from global terrorism, OWID uses the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is maintained by the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ([START](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)). GTD uses [this definition](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf) of terrorism:\n\n>The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice this means in order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present:\n>\n> * **The incident must be intentional** – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.\n> * **The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence** -including property violence, as well as violence against people.\n> * **The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.** The database does not include acts of state terrorism.\n>\n>In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD:\n>\n> * **Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.** In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.\n> * **Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.** It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.\n> * **Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.** That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).\n\nOWID discusses some of the limitations of GTD and other sources in [this article](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#data-quality).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of fatalities caused by terrorism in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/incidence-of-terrorism?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2019 the total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in the world was 20,329.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "6.48k", "median": "16.8k", "upper_75": "38.9k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a total of 20.8k fatalities from terrorism in the world by 2032?", "desc": "\n\n[Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism) notes that \"terrorism\" is a difficult term to define:\n\n>The key problem is that terrorism is difficult to distinguish from other forms of political violence and violent crime, such as state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, hate crime, and homicide. The lines between these different forms of violence are often blurry.\n\nTo quantify casualties from global terrorism, OWID uses the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is maintained by the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ([START](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)). GTD uses [this definition](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf) of terrorism:\n\n>The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice this means in order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present:\n>\n> * **The incident must be intentional** – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.\n> * **The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence** -including property violence, as well as violence against people.\n> * **The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.** The database does not include acts of state terrorism.\n>\n>In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD:\n>\n> * **Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.** In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.\n> * **Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.** It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.\n> * **Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.** That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).\n\nOWID discusses some of the limitations of GTD and other sources in [this article](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#data-quality).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of fatalities caused by terrorism in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/incidence-of-terrorism?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2019 the total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in the world was 20,329.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "12.9k", "median": "20.8k", "upper_75": "32.0k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 544 fatalities from terrorism in the world in the following years?", "desc": "\n\n[Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism) notes that \"terrorism\" is a difficult term to define:\n\n>The key problem is that terrorism is difficult to distinguish from other forms of political violence and violent crime, such as state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, hate crime, and homicide. The lines between these different forms of violence are often blurry.\n\nTo quantify casualties from global terrorism, OWID uses the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is maintained by the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ([START](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)). GTD uses [this definition](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf) of terrorism:\n\n>The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice this means in order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present:\n>\n> * **The incident must be intentional** – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.\n> * **The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence** -including property violence, as well as violence against people.\n> * **The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.** The database does not include acts of state terrorism.\n>\n>In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD:\n>\n> * **Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.** In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.\n> * **Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.** It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.\n> * **Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.** That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).\n\nOWID discusses some of the limitations of GTD and other sources in [this article](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#data-quality).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of fatalities caused by terrorism in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/incidence-of-terrorism?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2019 the total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in the world was 20,329.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "544", "median": "7.33k", "upper_75": "42.5k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a total of 18.6k fatalities from terrorism in the world in the following years?", "desc": "\n\n[Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism) notes that \"terrorism\" is a difficult term to define:\n\n>The key problem is that terrorism is difficult to distinguish from other forms of political violence and violent crime, such as state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, hate crime, and homicide. The lines between these different forms of violence are often blurry.\n\nTo quantify casualties from global terrorism, OWID uses the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is maintained by the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ([START](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)). GTD uses [this definition](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf) of terrorism:\n\n>The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice this means in order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present:\n>\n> * **The incident must be intentional** – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.\n> * **The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence** -including property violence, as well as violence against people.\n> * **The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.** The database does not include acts of state terrorism.\n>\n>In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD:\n>\n> * **Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.** In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.\n> * **Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.** It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.\n> * **Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.** That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).\n\nOWID discusses some of the limitations of GTD and other sources in [this article](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#data-quality).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of fatalities caused by terrorism in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/incidence-of-terrorism?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2019 the total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in the world was 20,329.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "13.8k", "median": "18.6k", "upper_75": "25.0k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the cost of sequencing a full human genome in 2022 will be 16.0 times the cost in 2021 USD?", "desc": "\n\nA [genome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genome) consists of all the DNA in a cell nucleus. DNA is made up by four bases: G, A, T, and C. Genome sequencing ascertains the order of these bases to understand the biological information encoded by it. Whole genome sequencing involves determining the order of these bases for the entirety of an individual organism's genome.\n\nOne important marker of progress in genomic sequencing is how the cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen over time. [According](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost) to the US National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), the first high-quality 'draft' whole human genome sequence (covering ~90% of the genome at ~99.9% accuracy) was completed in 2000 and cost ~$300 million. The cost data, graphs, and methodology can be viewed [here](https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data).\n\nNHGRI has historically reported costs several times each year, and the Our World in Data chart [Cost of sequencing a full human genome](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome) uses the lowest cost reported in a given year as the cost for that year. NHGRI's data is reported in nominal USD; an equivalent dataset indexed to 2021 USD is available [here](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kHPnBfEYGHao9fJeiMkT-QZtJu58P6IN/view?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the cost to sequence a whole human genome in the respective years, **adjusted for inflation to 2021 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cost-of-sequencing-a-full-human-genome). Inflation adjustment to 2021 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nFor example, in 2021 the cost of sequencing a full human genome was $454.05 (in 2021 USD).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID nor NHGRI no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data, or resolve as **Ambiguous** at their discretion.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "0.0578", "median": "1.29", "upper_75": "16.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that U.S. law will not recognize an artificial entity as a natural person before 2070?", "desc": "Brent Spiner's character on *Star Trek: The Next Generation* was called Mr. Data. Data was a construct engineered by Dr. Noonien Soong; an artificially intelligent humanoid robot possessed of a Starfleet officer's commission and a sophisticated positronic brain. In [one celebrated 2365 incident,](https://memory-alpha.fandom.com/wiki/The_Measure_Of_A_Man_%28episode%29) Mr. Data was able to fend off a contemplated court order which would have seen him stripped of his legal personhood and forcibly disassembled for scientific study. The court instead ruled that his nature as a machine was irrelevant in light of his capacities as an individual (\"we, too, are machines, just machines of a different type.\")\n\nNow we need to know something about legal personhood.\n\nIf the Acme Corporation refuses to pay me my wages owed, I can sue them, the Acme corporation itself. I don't need to identify the CEO, the paymaster, and/or the guy in the mailroom who has it in for me; the corporation itself, though incorporeal in that it lacks a physical body, is *legally* encorporated. It has an independent existence as a legal entity with its own rights and responsibilities, not subsumed by those of its various employees or owners. This is called legal personhood.\n\nThe law has long distinguished between natural persons and mere legal persons. A legal person is a social entity that is *granted* legal-person status. A natural person is someone entitled to rights and responsibilities in the light of their status as, historically, a flesh-and-blood human being. But this raises a natural question: What will happen if the moral space of extant persons expands to include artificial intelligences, like Mr. Data? Will the law follow suit?\n\nPerhaps surprisingly, the question has [already begun to come up in court cases.](https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/insight-patent-ruling-begs-the-question-what-is-a-natural-person)", "resc": "The question resolves as the date when an operative United States law (or a law operative in a legal successor state to the United States) recognizes artificial entities as potential natural persons, or as members of a class of persons closely analagous to natural persons. The law may be legislation or a legal ruling, but not a mere [obiter dictum.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obiter_dictum) It need not stand for any particular length of time or grant rights to any particular individual; an instantly-overruled judgment that a hypothetical Mr. Data would qualify as a natural person would be sufficient to trigger resolution.\n\nIf 2070 arrives before such a law, the question resolves as \"**>**\".", "lower_25": "2044", "median": "2054", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2070", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that U.S. law will not recognize an artificial entity as a natural person before 2070?", "desc": "Brent Spiner's character on *Star Trek: The Next Generation* was called Mr. Data. Data was a construct engineered by Dr. Noonien Soong; an artificially intelligent humanoid robot possessed of a Starfleet officer's commission and a sophisticated positronic brain. In [one celebrated 2365 incident,](https://memory-alpha.fandom.com/wiki/The_Measure_Of_A_Man_%28episode%29) Mr. Data was able to fend off a contemplated court order which would have seen him stripped of his legal personhood and forcibly disassembled for scientific study. The court instead ruled that his nature as a machine was irrelevant in light of his capacities as an individual (\"we, too, are machines, just machines of a different type.\")\n\nNow we need to know something about legal personhood.\n\nIf the Acme Corporation refuses to pay me my wages owed, I can sue them, the Acme corporation itself. I don't need to identify the CEO, the paymaster, and/or the guy in the mailroom who has it in for me; the corporation itself, though incorporeal in that it lacks a physical body, is *legally* encorporated. It has an independent existence as a legal entity with its own rights and responsibilities, not subsumed by those of its various employees or owners. This is called legal personhood.\n\nThe law has long distinguished between natural persons and mere legal persons. A legal person is a social entity that is *granted* legal-person status. A natural person is someone entitled to rights and responsibilities in the light of their status as, historically, a flesh-and-blood human being. But this raises a natural question: What will happen if the moral space of extant persons expands to include artificial intelligences, like Mr. Data? Will the law follow suit?\n\nPerhaps surprisingly, the question has [already begun to come up in court cases.](https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/insight-patent-ruling-begs-the-question-what-is-a-natural-person)", "resc": "The question resolves as the date when an operative United States law (or a law operative in a legal successor state to the United States) recognizes artificial entities as potential natural persons, or as members of a class of persons closely analagous to natural persons. The law may be legislation or a legal ruling, but not a mere [obiter dictum.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obiter_dictum) It need not stand for any particular length of time or grant rights to any particular individual; an instantly-overruled judgment that a hypothetical Mr. Data would qualify as a natural person would be sufficient to trigger resolution.\n\nIf 2070 arrives before such a law, the question resolves as \"**>**\".", "lower_25": "2044", "median": "2054", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2070", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.62k people per 100,000 will be affected by natural disasters in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nIn describing the impact and loss of life from natural disasters the Our World in Data article [Natural Disasters](https://ourworldindata.org/natural-disasters) says the following\n\n>The number of deaths from natural disasters can be highly variable from year-to-year; some years pass with very few deaths before a large disaster event claims many lives.\n>\n>. . . \n>\n>Low-frequency, high-impact events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are not preventable, but such high losses of human life are. We know from historical data that the world has seen a significant reduction in disaster deaths through earlier prediction, more resilient infrastructure, emergency preparedness, and response systems.\n>\n>Those at low incomes are often the most vulnerable to disaster events: improving living standards, infrastructure and response systems in these regions will be key to preventing deaths from natural disasters in the coming decades.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Total number of people affected by disasters per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL) displays the rate of people affected by disasters each year.\n\nOur World in Data provides the following definitions:\n\n>– ‘All disasters' includes all geophysical, meteorological and climate events including earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides, drought, wildfires, storms, and flooding.\n>– People affected are those requiring immediate assistance during an emergency situation.\n>– The total number of people affected is the sum of injured, affected and homeless.\n\nThe underlying data comes from [EM-DAT](https://www.emdat.be/), an international disaster database published by the [Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters](https://www.cred.be/) (CRED). EM-DAT [says the following](https://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions) about its database:\n\n>The database is made up of information from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. Priority is given to data from UN agencies, governments, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of people (per 100,000) affected by natural disasters in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,356.09 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.15k", "median": "2.03k", "upper_75": "3.62k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.62k people per 100,000 will be affected by natural disasters in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nIn describing the impact and loss of life from natural disasters the Our World in Data article [Natural Disasters](https://ourworldindata.org/natural-disasters) says the following\n\n>The number of deaths from natural disasters can be highly variable from year-to-year; some years pass with very few deaths before a large disaster event claims many lives.\n>\n>. . . \n>\n>Low-frequency, high-impact events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are not preventable, but such high losses of human life are. We know from historical data that the world has seen a significant reduction in disaster deaths through earlier prediction, more resilient infrastructure, emergency preparedness, and response systems.\n>\n>Those at low incomes are often the most vulnerable to disaster events: improving living standards, infrastructure and response systems in these regions will be key to preventing deaths from natural disasters in the coming decades.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Total number of people affected by disasters per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL) displays the rate of people affected by disasters each year.\n\nOur World in Data provides the following definitions:\n\n>– ‘All disasters' includes all geophysical, meteorological and climate events including earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides, drought, wildfires, storms, and flooding.\n>– People affected are those requiring immediate assistance during an emergency situation.\n>– The total number of people affected is the sum of injured, affected and homeless.\n\nThe underlying data comes from [EM-DAT](https://www.emdat.be/), an international disaster database published by the [Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters](https://www.cred.be/) (CRED). EM-DAT [says the following](https://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions) about its database:\n\n>The database is made up of information from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. Priority is given to data from UN agencies, governments, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of people (per 100,000) affected by natural disasters in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,356.09 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.15k", "median": "2.03k", "upper_75": "3.62k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.62k people per 100,000 will be affected by natural disasters in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nIn describing the impact and loss of life from natural disasters the Our World in Data article [Natural Disasters](https://ourworldindata.org/natural-disasters) says the following\n\n>The number of deaths from natural disasters can be highly variable from year-to-year; some years pass with very few deaths before a large disaster event claims many lives.\n>\n>. . . \n>\n>Low-frequency, high-impact events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are not preventable, but such high losses of human life are. We know from historical data that the world has seen a significant reduction in disaster deaths through earlier prediction, more resilient infrastructure, emergency preparedness, and response systems.\n>\n>Those at low incomes are often the most vulnerable to disaster events: improving living standards, infrastructure and response systems in these regions will be key to preventing deaths from natural disasters in the coming decades.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Total number of people affected by disasters per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL) displays the rate of people affected by disasters each year.\n\nOur World in Data provides the following definitions:\n\n>– ‘All disasters' includes all geophysical, meteorological and climate events including earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides, drought, wildfires, storms, and flooding.\n>– People affected are those requiring immediate assistance during an emergency situation.\n>– The total number of people affected is the sum of injured, affected and homeless.\n\nThe underlying data comes from [EM-DAT](https://www.emdat.be/), an international disaster database published by the [Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters](https://www.cred.be/) (CRED). EM-DAT [says the following](https://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions) about its database:\n\n>The database is made up of information from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. Priority is given to data from UN agencies, governments, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of people (per 100,000) affected by natural disasters in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,356.09 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.15k", "median": "2.03k", "upper_75": "3.62k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.20k people per 100,000 will be affected by natural disasters in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nIn describing the impact and loss of life from natural disasters the Our World in Data article [Natural Disasters](https://ourworldindata.org/natural-disasters) says the following\n\n>The number of deaths from natural disasters can be highly variable from year-to-year; some years pass with very few deaths before a large disaster event claims many lives.\n>\n>. . . \n>\n>Low-frequency, high-impact events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are not preventable, but such high losses of human life are. We know from historical data that the world has seen a significant reduction in disaster deaths through earlier prediction, more resilient infrastructure, emergency preparedness, and response systems.\n>\n>Those at low incomes are often the most vulnerable to disaster events: improving living standards, infrastructure and response systems in these regions will be key to preventing deaths from natural disasters in the coming decades.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Total number of people affected by disasters per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL) displays the rate of people affected by disasters each year.\n\nOur World in Data provides the following definitions:\n\n>– ‘All disasters' includes all geophysical, meteorological and climate events including earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides, drought, wildfires, storms, and flooding.\n>– People affected are those requiring immediate assistance during an emergency situation.\n>– The total number of people affected is the sum of injured, affected and homeless.\n\nThe underlying data comes from [EM-DAT](https://www.emdat.be/), an international disaster database published by the [Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters](https://www.cred.be/) (CRED). EM-DAT [says the following](https://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions) about its database:\n\n>The database is made up of information from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. Priority is given to data from UN agencies, governments, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of people (per 100,000) affected by natural disasters in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,356.09 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.02k", "median": "4.20k", "upper_75": "11.4k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.25k people per 100,000 will be affected by natural disasters in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nIn describing the impact and loss of life from natural disasters the Our World in Data article [Natural Disasters](https://ourworldindata.org/natural-disasters) says the following\n\n>The number of deaths from natural disasters can be highly variable from year-to-year; some years pass with very few deaths before a large disaster event claims many lives.\n>\n>. . . \n>\n>Low-frequency, high-impact events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are not preventable, but such high losses of human life are. We know from historical data that the world has seen a significant reduction in disaster deaths through earlier prediction, more resilient infrastructure, emergency preparedness, and response systems.\n>\n>Those at low incomes are often the most vulnerable to disaster events: improving living standards, infrastructure and response systems in these regions will be key to preventing deaths from natural disasters in the coming decades.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Total number of people affected by disasters per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL) displays the rate of people affected by disasters each year.\n\nOur World in Data provides the following definitions:\n\n>– ‘All disasters' includes all geophysical, meteorological and climate events including earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides, drought, wildfires, storms, and flooding.\n>– People affected are those requiring immediate assistance during an emergency situation.\n>– The total number of people affected is the sum of injured, affected and homeless.\n\nThe underlying data comes from [EM-DAT](https://www.emdat.be/), an international disaster database published by the [Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters](https://www.cred.be/) (CRED). EM-DAT [says the following](https://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions) about its database:\n\n>The database is made up of information from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. Priority is given to data from UN agencies, governments, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of people (per 100,000) affected by natural disasters in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,356.09 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.25k", "median": "4.93k", "upper_75": "15.3k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.20k people per 100,000 will be affected by natural disasters in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nIn describing the impact and loss of life from natural disasters the Our World in Data article [Natural Disasters](https://ourworldindata.org/natural-disasters) says the following\n\n>The number of deaths from natural disasters can be highly variable from year-to-year; some years pass with very few deaths before a large disaster event claims many lives.\n>\n>. . . \n>\n>Low-frequency, high-impact events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are not preventable, but such high losses of human life are. We know from historical data that the world has seen a significant reduction in disaster deaths through earlier prediction, more resilient infrastructure, emergency preparedness, and response systems.\n>\n>Those at low incomes are often the most vulnerable to disaster events: improving living standards, infrastructure and response systems in these regions will be key to preventing deaths from natural disasters in the coming decades.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Total number of people affected by disasters per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL) displays the rate of people affected by disasters each year.\n\nOur World in Data provides the following definitions:\n\n>– ‘All disasters' includes all geophysical, meteorological and climate events including earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides, drought, wildfires, storms, and flooding.\n>– People affected are those requiring immediate assistance during an emergency situation.\n>– The total number of people affected is the sum of injured, affected and homeless.\n\nThe underlying data comes from [EM-DAT](https://www.emdat.be/), an international disaster database published by the [Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters](https://www.cred.be/) (CRED). EM-DAT [says the following](https://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions) about its database:\n\n>The database is made up of information from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. Priority is given to data from UN agencies, governments, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of people (per 100,000) affected by natural disasters in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,356.09 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.02k", "median": "4.20k", "upper_75": "11.4k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.98k people per 100,000 will be affected by natural disasters in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nIn describing the impact and loss of life from natural disasters the Our World in Data article [Natural Disasters](https://ourworldindata.org/natural-disasters) says the following\n\n>The number of deaths from natural disasters can be highly variable from year-to-year; some years pass with very few deaths before a large disaster event claims many lives.\n>\n>. . . \n>\n>Low-frequency, high-impact events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are not preventable, but such high losses of human life are. We know from historical data that the world has seen a significant reduction in disaster deaths through earlier prediction, more resilient infrastructure, emergency preparedness, and response systems.\n>\n>Those at low incomes are often the most vulnerable to disaster events: improving living standards, infrastructure and response systems in these regions will be key to preventing deaths from natural disasters in the coming decades.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Total number of people affected by disasters per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL) displays the rate of people affected by disasters each year.\n\nOur World in Data provides the following definitions:\n\n>– ‘All disasters' includes all geophysical, meteorological and climate events including earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides, drought, wildfires, storms, and flooding.\n>– People affected are those requiring immediate assistance during an emergency situation.\n>– The total number of people affected is the sum of injured, affected and homeless.\n\nThe underlying data comes from [EM-DAT](https://www.emdat.be/), an international disaster database published by the [Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters](https://www.cred.be/) (CRED). EM-DAT [says the following](https://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions) about its database:\n\n>The database is made up of information from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. Priority is given to data from UN agencies, governments, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of people (per 100,000) affected by natural disasters in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,356.09 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.65k", "median": "2.98k", "upper_75": "5.80k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.98k people per 100,000 will be affected by natural disasters in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nIn describing the impact and loss of life from natural disasters the Our World in Data article [Natural Disasters](https://ourworldindata.org/natural-disasters) says the following\n\n>The number of deaths from natural disasters can be highly variable from year-to-year; some years pass with very few deaths before a large disaster event claims many lives.\n>\n>. . . \n>\n>Low-frequency, high-impact events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are not preventable, but such high losses of human life are. We know from historical data that the world has seen a significant reduction in disaster deaths through earlier prediction, more resilient infrastructure, emergency preparedness, and response systems.\n>\n>Those at low incomes are often the most vulnerable to disaster events: improving living standards, infrastructure and response systems in these regions will be key to preventing deaths from natural disasters in the coming decades.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Total number of people affected by disasters per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL) displays the rate of people affected by disasters each year.\n\nOur World in Data provides the following definitions:\n\n>– ‘All disasters' includes all geophysical, meteorological and climate events including earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides, drought, wildfires, storms, and flooding.\n>– People affected are those requiring immediate assistance during an emergency situation.\n>– The total number of people affected is the sum of injured, affected and homeless.\n\nThe underlying data comes from [EM-DAT](https://www.emdat.be/), an international disaster database published by the [Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters](https://www.cred.be/) (CRED). EM-DAT [says the following](https://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions) about its database:\n\n>The database is made up of information from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. Priority is given to data from UN agencies, governments, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of people (per 100,000) affected by natural disasters in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,356.09 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.65k", "median": "2.98k", "upper_75": "5.80k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.25k people per 100,000 will be affected by natural disasters in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nIn describing the impact and loss of life from natural disasters the Our World in Data article [Natural Disasters](https://ourworldindata.org/natural-disasters) says the following\n\n>The number of deaths from natural disasters can be highly variable from year-to-year; some years pass with very few deaths before a large disaster event claims many lives.\n>\n>. . . \n>\n>Low-frequency, high-impact events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are not preventable, but such high losses of human life are. We know from historical data that the world has seen a significant reduction in disaster deaths through earlier prediction, more resilient infrastructure, emergency preparedness, and response systems.\n>\n>Those at low incomes are often the most vulnerable to disaster events: improving living standards, infrastructure and response systems in these regions will be key to preventing deaths from natural disasters in the coming decades.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Total number of people affected by disasters per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL) displays the rate of people affected by disasters each year.\n\nOur World in Data provides the following definitions:\n\n>– ‘All disasters' includes all geophysical, meteorological and climate events including earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides, drought, wildfires, storms, and flooding.\n>– People affected are those requiring immediate assistance during an emergency situation.\n>– The total number of people affected is the sum of injured, affected and homeless.\n\nThe underlying data comes from [EM-DAT](https://www.emdat.be/), an international disaster database published by the [Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters](https://www.cred.be/) (CRED). EM-DAT [says the following](https://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions) about its database:\n\n>The database is made up of information from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. Priority is given to data from UN agencies, governments, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of people (per 100,000) affected by natural disasters in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,356.09 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.25k", "median": "4.93k", "upper_75": "15.3k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world rice yield will be 4.684 tonnes per hectare in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data page [Crop Yields](https://ourworldindata.org/crop-yields#), \"crop yields\" are defined as \n\n>Harvested production per unit of harvested area for crop products. In most of the cases yield data are not recorded but obtained by dividing the production data by the data on area harvested.\n\nRice is one of the most commonly produced [cereal crops](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cereal#Trade_statistics) around the world, and is estimated to make up [around 19% of the average daily energy supply consumed by each person](https://www.nature.com/articles/514S50a).\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data chart [Rice yields](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield), the yield of rice (measured in tonnes per hectare) has more than doubled in the past 50 years. Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total world rice yield (in tonnes per hectare) according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield). For example, this figure was 4.58 in 2018.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\n[fine-print]\n* If humanity establishes off-Earth colonies and Our World in Data adds a \"Total Humanity\" measure (or equivalent) to the chart, that measure will be used instead of the \"World\" measure.\n* For the purposes of this question, humans will be considered to be extinct if the total human population is less than 5% of their previous peak population. \"Humans\" will be defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with medical assistance which could be available in the year 1900.\n* \"Ceasing to have a developed society\" will be defined as world GDP declining to below 100 billion USD (in [2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL), with adjustments for [Purchasing Power Parity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purchasing_power_parity))\n[/fine-print]\n\n", "lower_25": "4.590", "median": "4.684", "upper_75": "4.800", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.20k people per 100,000 will be affected by natural disasters in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nIn describing the impact and loss of life from natural disasters the Our World in Data article [Natural Disasters](https://ourworldindata.org/natural-disasters) says the following\n\n>The number of deaths from natural disasters can be highly variable from year-to-year; some years pass with very few deaths before a large disaster event claims many lives.\n>\n>. . . \n>\n>Low-frequency, high-impact events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are not preventable, but such high losses of human life are. We know from historical data that the world has seen a significant reduction in disaster deaths through earlier prediction, more resilient infrastructure, emergency preparedness, and response systems.\n>\n>Those at low incomes are often the most vulnerable to disaster events: improving living standards, infrastructure and response systems in these regions will be key to preventing deaths from natural disasters in the coming decades.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Total number of people affected by disasters per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL) displays the rate of people affected by disasters each year.\n\nOur World in Data provides the following definitions:\n\n>– ‘All disasters' includes all geophysical, meteorological and climate events including earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides, drought, wildfires, storms, and flooding.\n>– People affected are those requiring immediate assistance during an emergency situation.\n>– The total number of people affected is the sum of injured, affected and homeless.\n\nThe underlying data comes from [EM-DAT](https://www.emdat.be/), an international disaster database published by the [Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters](https://www.cred.be/) (CRED). EM-DAT [says the following](https://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions) about its database:\n\n>The database is made up of information from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. Priority is given to data from UN agencies, governments, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of people (per 100,000) affected by natural disasters in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,356.09 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.02k", "median": "4.20k", "upper_75": "11.4k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.98k people per 100,000 will be affected by natural disasters in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nIn describing the impact and loss of life from natural disasters the Our World in Data article [Natural Disasters](https://ourworldindata.org/natural-disasters) says the following\n\n>The number of deaths from natural disasters can be highly variable from year-to-year; some years pass with very few deaths before a large disaster event claims many lives.\n>\n>. . . \n>\n>Low-frequency, high-impact events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are not preventable, but such high losses of human life are. We know from historical data that the world has seen a significant reduction in disaster deaths through earlier prediction, more resilient infrastructure, emergency preparedness, and response systems.\n>\n>Those at low incomes are often the most vulnerable to disaster events: improving living standards, infrastructure and response systems in these regions will be key to preventing deaths from natural disasters in the coming decades.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Total number of people affected by disasters per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL) displays the rate of people affected by disasters each year.\n\nOur World in Data provides the following definitions:\n\n>– ‘All disasters' includes all geophysical, meteorological and climate events including earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides, drought, wildfires, storms, and flooding.\n>– People affected are those requiring immediate assistance during an emergency situation.\n>– The total number of people affected is the sum of injured, affected and homeless.\n\nThe underlying data comes from [EM-DAT](https://www.emdat.be/), an international disaster database published by the [Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters](https://www.cred.be/) (CRED). EM-DAT [says the following](https://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions) about its database:\n\n>The database is made up of information from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. Priority is given to data from UN agencies, governments, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of people (per 100,000) affected by natural disasters in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,356.09 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.65k", "median": "2.98k", "upper_75": "5.80k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 25.0k people per 100,000 will be affected by natural disasters in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nIn describing the impact and loss of life from natural disasters the Our World in Data article [Natural Disasters](https://ourworldindata.org/natural-disasters) says the following\n\n>The number of deaths from natural disasters can be highly variable from year-to-year; some years pass with very few deaths before a large disaster event claims many lives.\n>\n>. . . \n>\n>Low-frequency, high-impact events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are not preventable, but such high losses of human life are. We know from historical data that the world has seen a significant reduction in disaster deaths through earlier prediction, more resilient infrastructure, emergency preparedness, and response systems.\n>\n>Those at low incomes are often the most vulnerable to disaster events: improving living standards, infrastructure and response systems in these regions will be key to preventing deaths from natural disasters in the coming decades.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Total number of people affected by disasters per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL) displays the rate of people affected by disasters each year.\n\nOur World in Data provides the following definitions:\n\n>– ‘All disasters' includes all geophysical, meteorological and climate events including earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides, drought, wildfires, storms, and flooding.\n>– People affected are those requiring immediate assistance during an emergency situation.\n>– The total number of people affected is the sum of injured, affected and homeless.\n\nThe underlying data comes from [EM-DAT](https://www.emdat.be/), an international disaster database published by the [Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters](https://www.cred.be/) (CRED). EM-DAT [says the following](https://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions) about its database:\n\n>The database is made up of information from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. Priority is given to data from UN agencies, governments, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of people (per 100,000) affected by natural disasters in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,356.09 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "935", "median": "6.00k", "upper_75": "25.0k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world rice yield will be 4.684 tonnes per hectare in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data page [Crop Yields](https://ourworldindata.org/crop-yields#), \"crop yields\" are defined as \n\n>Harvested production per unit of harvested area for crop products. In most of the cases yield data are not recorded but obtained by dividing the production data by the data on area harvested.\n\nRice is one of the most commonly produced [cereal crops](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cereal#Trade_statistics) around the world, and is estimated to make up [around 19% of the average daily energy supply consumed by each person](https://www.nature.com/articles/514S50a).\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data chart [Rice yields](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield), the yield of rice (measured in tonnes per hectare) has more than doubled in the past 50 years. Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total world rice yield (in tonnes per hectare) according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield). For example, this figure was 4.58 in 2018.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\n[fine-print]\n* If humanity establishes off-Earth colonies and Our World in Data adds a \"Total Humanity\" measure (or equivalent) to the chart, that measure will be used instead of the \"World\" measure.\n* For the purposes of this question, humans will be considered to be extinct if the total human population is less than 5% of their previous peak population. \"Humans\" will be defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with medical assistance which could be available in the year 1900.\n* \"Ceasing to have a developed society\" will be defined as world GDP declining to below 100 billion USD (in [2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL), with adjustments for [Purchasing Power Parity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purchasing_power_parity))\n[/fine-print]\n\n", "lower_25": "4.590", "median": "4.684", "upper_75": "4.800", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 25.0k people per 100,000 will be affected by natural disasters in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nIn describing the impact and loss of life from natural disasters the Our World in Data article [Natural Disasters](https://ourworldindata.org/natural-disasters) says the following\n\n>The number of deaths from natural disasters can be highly variable from year-to-year; some years pass with very few deaths before a large disaster event claims many lives.\n>\n>. . . \n>\n>Low-frequency, high-impact events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are not preventable, but such high losses of human life are. We know from historical data that the world has seen a significant reduction in disaster deaths through earlier prediction, more resilient infrastructure, emergency preparedness, and response systems.\n>\n>Those at low incomes are often the most vulnerable to disaster events: improving living standards, infrastructure and response systems in these regions will be key to preventing deaths from natural disasters in the coming decades.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Total number of people affected by disasters per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL) displays the rate of people affected by disasters each year.\n\nOur World in Data provides the following definitions:\n\n>– ‘All disasters' includes all geophysical, meteorological and climate events including earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides, drought, wildfires, storms, and flooding.\n>– People affected are those requiring immediate assistance during an emergency situation.\n>– The total number of people affected is the sum of injured, affected and homeless.\n\nThe underlying data comes from [EM-DAT](https://www.emdat.be/), an international disaster database published by the [Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters](https://www.cred.be/) (CRED). EM-DAT [says the following](https://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions) about its database:\n\n>The database is made up of information from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. Priority is given to data from UN agencies, governments, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of people (per 100,000) affected by natural disasters in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,356.09 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "935", "median": "6.00k", "upper_75": "25.0k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 25.0k people per 100,000 will be affected by natural disasters in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nIn describing the impact and loss of life from natural disasters the Our World in Data article [Natural Disasters](https://ourworldindata.org/natural-disasters) says the following\n\n>The number of deaths from natural disasters can be highly variable from year-to-year; some years pass with very few deaths before a large disaster event claims many lives.\n>\n>. . . \n>\n>Low-frequency, high-impact events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are not preventable, but such high losses of human life are. We know from historical data that the world has seen a significant reduction in disaster deaths through earlier prediction, more resilient infrastructure, emergency preparedness, and response systems.\n>\n>Those at low incomes are often the most vulnerable to disaster events: improving living standards, infrastructure and response systems in these regions will be key to preventing deaths from natural disasters in the coming decades.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Total number of people affected by disasters per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL) displays the rate of people affected by disasters each year.\n\nOur World in Data provides the following definitions:\n\n>– ‘All disasters' includes all geophysical, meteorological and climate events including earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides, drought, wildfires, storms, and flooding.\n>– People affected are those requiring immediate assistance during an emergency situation.\n>– The total number of people affected is the sum of injured, affected and homeless.\n\nThe underlying data comes from [EM-DAT](https://www.emdat.be/), an international disaster database published by the [Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters](https://www.cred.be/) (CRED). EM-DAT [says the following](https://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions) about its database:\n\n>The database is made up of information from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. Priority is given to data from UN agencies, governments, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of people (per 100,000) affected by natural disasters in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,356.09 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "935", "median": "6.00k", "upper_75": "25.0k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world rice yield will be 4.684 tonnes per hectare in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data page [Crop Yields](https://ourworldindata.org/crop-yields#), \"crop yields\" are defined as \n\n>Harvested production per unit of harvested area for crop products. In most of the cases yield data are not recorded but obtained by dividing the production data by the data on area harvested.\n\nRice is one of the most commonly produced [cereal crops](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cereal#Trade_statistics) around the world, and is estimated to make up [around 19% of the average daily energy supply consumed by each person](https://www.nature.com/articles/514S50a).\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data chart [Rice yields](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield), the yield of rice (measured in tonnes per hectare) has more than doubled in the past 50 years. Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total world rice yield (in tonnes per hectare) according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield). For example, this figure was 4.58 in 2018.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\n[fine-print]\n* If humanity establishes off-Earth colonies and Our World in Data adds a \"Total Humanity\" measure (or equivalent) to the chart, that measure will be used instead of the \"World\" measure.\n* For the purposes of this question, humans will be considered to be extinct if the total human population is less than 5% of their previous peak population. \"Humans\" will be defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with medical assistance which could be available in the year 1900.\n* \"Ceasing to have a developed society\" will be defined as world GDP declining to below 100 billion USD (in [2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL), with adjustments for [Purchasing Power Parity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purchasing_power_parity))\n[/fine-print]\n\n", "lower_25": "4.590", "median": "4.684", "upper_75": "4.800", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.25k people per 100,000 will be affected by natural disasters in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nIn describing the impact and loss of life from natural disasters the Our World in Data article [Natural Disasters](https://ourworldindata.org/natural-disasters) says the following\n\n>The number of deaths from natural disasters can be highly variable from year-to-year; some years pass with very few deaths before a large disaster event claims many lives.\n>\n>. . . \n>\n>Low-frequency, high-impact events such as earthquakes and tsunamis are not preventable, but such high losses of human life are. We know from historical data that the world has seen a significant reduction in disaster deaths through earlier prediction, more resilient infrastructure, emergency preparedness, and response systems.\n>\n>Those at low incomes are often the most vulnerable to disaster events: improving living standards, infrastructure and response systems in these regions will be key to preventing deaths from natural disasters in the coming decades.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Total number of people affected by disasters per 100,000](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL) displays the rate of people affected by disasters each year.\n\nOur World in Data provides the following definitions:\n\n>– ‘All disasters' includes all geophysical, meteorological and climate events including earthquakes, volcanic activity, landslides, drought, wildfires, storms, and flooding.\n>– People affected are those requiring immediate assistance during an emergency situation.\n>– The total number of people affected is the sum of injured, affected and homeless.\n\nThe underlying data comes from [EM-DAT](https://www.emdat.be/), an international disaster database published by the [Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters](https://www.cred.be/) (CRED). EM-DAT [says the following](https://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions) about its database:\n\n>The database is made up of information from various sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies. Priority is given to data from UN agencies, governments, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the rate of people (per 100,000) affected by natural disasters in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/natural-disasters?facet=none&Disaster+Type=All+disasters&Impact=Total+affected&Timespan=Annual&Per+capita=true&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1,356.09 in 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.25k", "median": "4.93k", "upper_75": "15.3k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world rice yield will be (in tonnes per hectare) 4.558 in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data page [Crop Yields](https://ourworldindata.org/crop-yields#), \"crop yields\" are defined as \n\n>Harvested production per unit of harvested area for crop products. In most of the cases yield data are not recorded but obtained by dividing the production data by the data on area harvested.\n\nRice is one of the most commonly produced [cereal crops](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cereal#Trade_statistics) around the world, and is estimated to make up [around 19% of the average daily energy supply consumed by each person](https://www.nature.com/articles/514S50a).\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data chart [Rice yields](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield), the yield of rice (measured in tonnes per hectare) has more than doubled in the past 50 years. Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total world rice yield (in tonnes per hectare) according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield). For example, this figure was 4.58 in 2018.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\n[fine-print]\n* If humanity establishes off-Earth colonies and Our World in Data adds a \"Total Humanity\" measure (or equivalent) to the chart, that measure will be used instead of the \"World\" measure.\n* For the purposes of this question, humans will be considered to be extinct if the total human population is less than 5% of their previous peak population. \"Humans\" will be defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with medical assistance which could be available in the year 1900.\n* \"Ceasing to have a developed society\" will be defined as world GDP declining to below 100 billion USD (in [2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL), with adjustments for [Purchasing Power Parity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purchasing_power_parity))\n[/fine-print]\n\n", "lower_25": "4.558", "median": "4.715", "upper_75": "4.883", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world rice yield will be (in tonnes per hectare) 4.558 in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data page [Crop Yields](https://ourworldindata.org/crop-yields#), \"crop yields\" are defined as \n\n>Harvested production per unit of harvested area for crop products. In most of the cases yield data are not recorded but obtained by dividing the production data by the data on area harvested.\n\nRice is one of the most commonly produced [cereal crops](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cereal#Trade_statistics) around the world, and is estimated to make up [around 19% of the average daily energy supply consumed by each person](https://www.nature.com/articles/514S50a).\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data chart [Rice yields](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield), the yield of rice (measured in tonnes per hectare) has more than doubled in the past 50 years. Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total world rice yield (in tonnes per hectare) according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield). For example, this figure was 4.58 in 2018.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\n[fine-print]\n* If humanity establishes off-Earth colonies and Our World in Data adds a \"Total Humanity\" measure (or equivalent) to the chart, that measure will be used instead of the \"World\" measure.\n* For the purposes of this question, humans will be considered to be extinct if the total human population is less than 5% of their previous peak population. \"Humans\" will be defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with medical assistance which could be available in the year 1900.\n* \"Ceasing to have a developed society\" will be defined as world GDP declining to below 100 billion USD (in [2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL), with adjustments for [Purchasing Power Parity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purchasing_power_parity))\n[/fine-print]\n\n", "lower_25": "4.558", "median": "4.715", "upper_75": "4.883", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world rice yield will be 4.97 tonnes per hectare in 2032?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data page [Crop Yields](https://ourworldindata.org/crop-yields#), \"crop yields\" are defined as \n\n>Harvested production per unit of harvested area for crop products. In most of the cases yield data are not recorded but obtained by dividing the production data by the data on area harvested.\n\nRice is one of the most commonly produced [cereal crops](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cereal#Trade_statistics) around the world, and is estimated to make up [around 19% of the average daily energy supply consumed by each person](https://www.nature.com/articles/514S50a).\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data chart [Rice yields](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield), the yield of rice (measured in tonnes per hectare) has more than doubled in the past 50 years. Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total world rice yield (in tonnes per hectare) according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield). For example, this figure was 4.58 in 2018.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\n[fine-print]\n* If humanity establishes off-Earth colonies and Our World in Data adds a \"Total Humanity\" measure (or equivalent) to the chart, that measure will be used instead of the \"World\" measure.\n* For the purposes of this question, humans will be considered to be extinct if the total human population is less than 5% of their previous peak population. \"Humans\" will be defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with medical assistance which could be available in the year 1900.\n* \"Ceasing to have a developed society\" will be defined as world GDP declining to below 100 billion USD (in [2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL), with adjustments for [Purchasing Power Parity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purchasing_power_parity))\n[/fine-print]\n\n", "lower_25": "4.51", "median": "4.97", "upper_75": "5.48", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world rice yield will be (in tonnes per hectare) 4.558 in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data page [Crop Yields](https://ourworldindata.org/crop-yields#), \"crop yields\" are defined as \n\n>Harvested production per unit of harvested area for crop products. In most of the cases yield data are not recorded but obtained by dividing the production data by the data on area harvested.\n\nRice is one of the most commonly produced [cereal crops](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cereal#Trade_statistics) around the world, and is estimated to make up [around 19% of the average daily energy supply consumed by each person](https://www.nature.com/articles/514S50a).\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data chart [Rice yields](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield), the yield of rice (measured in tonnes per hectare) has more than doubled in the past 50 years. Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total world rice yield (in tonnes per hectare) according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield). For example, this figure was 4.58 in 2018.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\n[fine-print]\n* If humanity establishes off-Earth colonies and Our World in Data adds a \"Total Humanity\" measure (or equivalent) to the chart, that measure will be used instead of the \"World\" measure.\n* For the purposes of this question, humans will be considered to be extinct if the total human population is less than 5% of their previous peak population. \"Humans\" will be defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with medical assistance which could be available in the year 1900.\n* \"Ceasing to have a developed society\" will be defined as world GDP declining to below 100 billion USD (in [2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL), with adjustments for [Purchasing Power Parity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purchasing_power_parity))\n[/fine-print]\n\n", "lower_25": "4.558", "median": "4.715", "upper_75": "4.883", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world rice yield will be 4.97 tonnes per hectare in 2032?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data page [Crop Yields](https://ourworldindata.org/crop-yields#), \"crop yields\" are defined as \n\n>Harvested production per unit of harvested area for crop products. In most of the cases yield data are not recorded but obtained by dividing the production data by the data on area harvested.\n\nRice is one of the most commonly produced [cereal crops](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cereal#Trade_statistics) around the world, and is estimated to make up [around 19% of the average daily energy supply consumed by each person](https://www.nature.com/articles/514S50a).\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data chart [Rice yields](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield), the yield of rice (measured in tonnes per hectare) has more than doubled in the past 50 years. Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total world rice yield (in tonnes per hectare) according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield). For example, this figure was 4.58 in 2018.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\n[fine-print]\n* If humanity establishes off-Earth colonies and Our World in Data adds a \"Total Humanity\" measure (or equivalent) to the chart, that measure will be used instead of the \"World\" measure.\n* For the purposes of this question, humans will be considered to be extinct if the total human population is less than 5% of their previous peak population. \"Humans\" will be defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with medical assistance which could be available in the year 1900.\n* \"Ceasing to have a developed society\" will be defined as world GDP declining to below 100 billion USD (in [2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL), with adjustments for [Purchasing Power Parity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purchasing_power_parity))\n[/fine-print]\n\n", "lower_25": "4.51", "median": "4.97", "upper_75": "5.48", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world rice yield will be 7.62 tonnes per hectare in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data page [Crop Yields](https://ourworldindata.org/crop-yields#), \"crop yields\" are defined as \n\n>Harvested production per unit of harvested area for crop products. In most of the cases yield data are not recorded but obtained by dividing the production data by the data on area harvested.\n\nRice is one of the most commonly produced [cereal crops](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cereal#Trade_statistics) around the world, and is estimated to make up [around 19% of the average daily energy supply consumed by each person](https://www.nature.com/articles/514S50a).\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data chart [Rice yields](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield), the yield of rice (measured in tonnes per hectare) has more than doubled in the past 50 years. Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total world rice yield (in tonnes per hectare) according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield). For example, this figure was 4.58 in 2018.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\n[fine-print]\n* If humanity establishes off-Earth colonies and Our World in Data adds a \"Total Humanity\" measure (or equivalent) to the chart, that measure will be used instead of the \"World\" measure.\n* For the purposes of this question, humans will be considered to be extinct if the total human population is less than 5% of their previous peak population. \"Humans\" will be defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with medical assistance which could be available in the year 1900.\n* \"Ceasing to have a developed society\" will be defined as world GDP declining to below 100 billion USD (in [2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL), with adjustments for [Purchasing Power Parity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purchasing_power_parity))\n[/fine-print]\n\n", "lower_25": "5.51", "median": "6.51", "upper_75": "7.62", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world rice yield will be 16.1 tonnes per hectare in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data page [Crop Yields](https://ourworldindata.org/crop-yields#), \"crop yields\" are defined as \n\n>Harvested production per unit of harvested area for crop products. In most of the cases yield data are not recorded but obtained by dividing the production data by the data on area harvested.\n\nRice is one of the most commonly produced [cereal crops](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cereal#Trade_statistics) around the world, and is estimated to make up [around 19% of the average daily energy supply consumed by each person](https://www.nature.com/articles/514S50a).\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data chart [Rice yields](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield), the yield of rice (measured in tonnes per hectare) has more than doubled in the past 50 years. Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total world rice yield (in tonnes per hectare) according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield). For example, this figure was 4.58 in 2018.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\n[fine-print]\n* If humanity establishes off-Earth colonies and Our World in Data adds a \"Total Humanity\" measure (or equivalent) to the chart, that measure will be used instead of the \"World\" measure.\n* For the purposes of this question, humans will be considered to be extinct if the total human population is less than 5% of their previous peak population. \"Humans\" will be defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with medical assistance which could be available in the year 1900.\n* \"Ceasing to have a developed society\" will be defined as world GDP declining to below 100 billion USD (in [2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL), with adjustments for [Purchasing Power Parity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purchasing_power_parity))\n[/fine-print]\n\n", "lower_25": "8.75", "median": "11.7", "upper_75": "16.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world rice yield will be 4.97 tonnes per hectare in 2032?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data page [Crop Yields](https://ourworldindata.org/crop-yields#), \"crop yields\" are defined as \n\n>Harvested production per unit of harvested area for crop products. In most of the cases yield data are not recorded but obtained by dividing the production data by the data on area harvested.\n\nRice is one of the most commonly produced [cereal crops](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cereal#Trade_statistics) around the world, and is estimated to make up [around 19% of the average daily energy supply consumed by each person](https://www.nature.com/articles/514S50a).\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data chart [Rice yields](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield), the yield of rice (measured in tonnes per hectare) has more than doubled in the past 50 years. Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total world rice yield (in tonnes per hectare) according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield). For example, this figure was 4.58 in 2018.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\n[fine-print]\n* If humanity establishes off-Earth colonies and Our World in Data adds a \"Total Humanity\" measure (or equivalent) to the chart, that measure will be used instead of the \"World\" measure.\n* For the purposes of this question, humans will be considered to be extinct if the total human population is less than 5% of their previous peak population. \"Humans\" will be defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with medical assistance which could be available in the year 1900.\n* \"Ceasing to have a developed society\" will be defined as world GDP declining to below 100 billion USD (in [2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL), with adjustments for [Purchasing Power Parity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purchasing_power_parity))\n[/fine-print]\n\n", "lower_25": "4.51", "median": "4.97", "upper_75": "5.48", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 81.90 percent of the world's primary energy will come from fossil fuels in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from fossil fuels](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world's primary energy consumption which comes from fossil fuels in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 82.28 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "81.41", "median": "81.90", "upper_75": "82.34", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world rice yield will be 16.1 tonnes per hectare in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data page [Crop Yields](https://ourworldindata.org/crop-yields#), \"crop yields\" are defined as \n\n>Harvested production per unit of harvested area for crop products. In most of the cases yield data are not recorded but obtained by dividing the production data by the data on area harvested.\n\nRice is one of the most commonly produced [cereal crops](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cereal#Trade_statistics) around the world, and is estimated to make up [around 19% of the average daily energy supply consumed by each person](https://www.nature.com/articles/514S50a).\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data chart [Rice yields](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield), the yield of rice (measured in tonnes per hectare) has more than doubled in the past 50 years. Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total world rice yield (in tonnes per hectare) according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield). For example, this figure was 4.58 in 2018.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\n[fine-print]\n* If humanity establishes off-Earth colonies and Our World in Data adds a \"Total Humanity\" measure (or equivalent) to the chart, that measure will be used instead of the \"World\" measure.\n* For the purposes of this question, humans will be considered to be extinct if the total human population is less than 5% of their previous peak population. \"Humans\" will be defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with medical assistance which could be available in the year 1900.\n* \"Ceasing to have a developed society\" will be defined as world GDP declining to below 100 billion USD (in [2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL), with adjustments for [Purchasing Power Parity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purchasing_power_parity))\n[/fine-print]\n\n", "lower_25": "8.75", "median": "11.7", "upper_75": "16.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 81.90 percent of the world's primary energy will come from fossil fuels in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from fossil fuels](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world's primary energy consumption which comes from fossil fuels in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 82.28 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "81.41", "median": "81.90", "upper_75": "82.34", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world rice yield will be 7.62 tonnes per hectare in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data page [Crop Yields](https://ourworldindata.org/crop-yields#), \"crop yields\" are defined as \n\n>Harvested production per unit of harvested area for crop products. In most of the cases yield data are not recorded but obtained by dividing the production data by the data on area harvested.\n\nRice is one of the most commonly produced [cereal crops](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cereal#Trade_statistics) around the world, and is estimated to make up [around 19% of the average daily energy supply consumed by each person](https://www.nature.com/articles/514S50a).\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data chart [Rice yields](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield), the yield of rice (measured in tonnes per hectare) has more than doubled in the past 50 years. Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total world rice yield (in tonnes per hectare) according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield). For example, this figure was 4.58 in 2018.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\n[fine-print]\n* If humanity establishes off-Earth colonies and Our World in Data adds a \"Total Humanity\" measure (or equivalent) to the chart, that measure will be used instead of the \"World\" measure.\n* For the purposes of this question, humans will be considered to be extinct if the total human population is less than 5% of their previous peak population. \"Humans\" will be defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with medical assistance which could be available in the year 1900.\n* \"Ceasing to have a developed society\" will be defined as world GDP declining to below 100 billion USD (in [2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL), with adjustments for [Purchasing Power Parity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purchasing_power_parity))\n[/fine-print]\n\n", "lower_25": "5.51", "median": "6.51", "upper_75": "7.62", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world rice yield will be 16.1 tonnes per hectare in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data page [Crop Yields](https://ourworldindata.org/crop-yields#), \"crop yields\" are defined as \n\n>Harvested production per unit of harvested area for crop products. In most of the cases yield data are not recorded but obtained by dividing the production data by the data on area harvested.\n\nRice is one of the most commonly produced [cereal crops](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cereal#Trade_statistics) around the world, and is estimated to make up [around 19% of the average daily energy supply consumed by each person](https://www.nature.com/articles/514S50a).\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data chart [Rice yields](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield), the yield of rice (measured in tonnes per hectare) has more than doubled in the past 50 years. Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total world rice yield (in tonnes per hectare) according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield). For example, this figure was 4.58 in 2018.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\n[fine-print]\n* If humanity establishes off-Earth colonies and Our World in Data adds a \"Total Humanity\" measure (or equivalent) to the chart, that measure will be used instead of the \"World\" measure.\n* For the purposes of this question, humans will be considered to be extinct if the total human population is less than 5% of their previous peak population. \"Humans\" will be defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with medical assistance which could be available in the year 1900.\n* \"Ceasing to have a developed society\" will be defined as world GDP declining to below 100 billion USD (in [2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL), with adjustments for [Purchasing Power Parity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purchasing_power_parity))\n[/fine-print]\n\n", "lower_25": "8.75", "median": "11.7", "upper_75": "16.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 82.15% of the world's primary energy will come from fossil fuels in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from fossil fuels](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world's primary energy consumption which comes from fossil fuels in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 82.28 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "79.65", "median": "80.83", "upper_75": "82.15", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 82.15% of the world's primary energy will come from fossil fuels in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from fossil fuels](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world's primary energy consumption which comes from fossil fuels in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 82.28 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "79.65", "median": "80.83", "upper_75": "82.15", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 82.15% of the world's primary energy will come from fossil fuels in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from fossil fuels](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world's primary energy consumption which comes from fossil fuels in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 82.28 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "79.65", "median": "80.83", "upper_75": "82.15", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 81.90 percent of the world's primary energy will come from fossil fuels in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from fossil fuels](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world's primary energy consumption which comes from fossil fuels in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 82.28 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "81.41", "median": "81.90", "upper_75": "82.34", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 66.3% of the world's primary energy will come from fossil fuels in the following years (2032)?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from fossil fuels](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world's primary energy consumption which comes from fossil fuels in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 82.28 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "66.3", "median": "72.2", "upper_75": "77.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 66.3% of the world's primary energy will come from fossil fuels in the following years (2032)?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from fossil fuels](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world's primary energy consumption which comes from fossil fuels in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 82.28 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "66.3", "median": "72.2", "upper_75": "77.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 34.9% of the world's primary energy will come from fossil fuels in the following years (2052)?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from fossil fuels](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world's primary energy consumption which comes from fossil fuels in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 82.28 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "19.1", "median": "34.9", "upper_75": "50.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 34.9% of the world's primary energy will come from fossil fuels in the following years (2052)?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from fossil fuels](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world's primary energy consumption which comes from fossil fuels in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 82.28 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "19.1", "median": "34.9", "upper_75": "50.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 34.9% of the world's primary energy will come from fossil fuels in the following years (2052)?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from fossil fuels](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world's primary energy consumption which comes from fossil fuels in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 82.28 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "19.1", "median": "34.9", "upper_75": "50.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 13.40 percent of the world's primary energy will come from fossil fuels in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from fossil fuels](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world's primary energy consumption which comes from fossil fuels in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 82.28 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.07", "median": "6.28", "upper_75": "13.40", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will be 8.272 billion in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nBetween 1950 and 2021 world population has more than tripled. However, according to the Our World in Data article [World Population Growth](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth#)\n\n>One of the big lessons from the demographic history of countries is that population explosions are temporary. For many countries, the demographic transition has already ended, and as the global fertility rate has now halved we know that the world as a whole is approaching the end of rapid population growth.\n\nOur World in Data reports population estimates from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/about-the-un) in its [Population and Demography Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world population in the listed year, according to the Our World in Data chart [Population](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 7.91 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the total world population reaches 5% or less of its previous peak population, the sub-question for that year will resolve as **below the input boundary**.", "lower_25": "8.136B", "median": "8.202B", "upper_75": "8.272B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 13.40 percent of the world's primary energy will come from fossil fuels in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from fossil fuels](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world's primary energy consumption which comes from fossil fuels in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 82.28 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.07", "median": "6.28", "upper_75": "13.40", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world rice yield will be 7.62 tonnes per hectare in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data page [Crop Yields](https://ourworldindata.org/crop-yields#), \"crop yields\" are defined as \n\n>Harvested production per unit of harvested area for crop products. In most of the cases yield data are not recorded but obtained by dividing the production data by the data on area harvested.\n\nRice is one of the most commonly produced [cereal crops](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cereal#Trade_statistics) around the world, and is estimated to make up [around 19% of the average daily energy supply consumed by each person](https://www.nature.com/articles/514S50a).\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data chart [Rice yields](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield), the yield of rice (measured in tonnes per hectare) has more than doubled in the past 50 years. Our World in Data sources this data from the [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/?#data/QCL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total world rice yield (in tonnes per hectare) according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/crop-yields?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Crop=Rice&Metric=Actual+yield). For example, this figure was 4.58 in 2018.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\n[fine-print]\n* If humanity establishes off-Earth colonies and Our World in Data adds a \"Total Humanity\" measure (or equivalent) to the chart, that measure will be used instead of the \"World\" measure.\n* For the purposes of this question, humans will be considered to be extinct if the total human population is less than 5% of their previous peak population. \"Humans\" will be defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with medical assistance which could be available in the year 1900.\n* \"Ceasing to have a developed society\" will be defined as world GDP declining to below 100 billion USD (in [2021 USD](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL), with adjustments for [Purchasing Power Parity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purchasing_power_parity))\n[/fine-print]\n\n", "lower_25": "5.51", "median": "6.51", "upper_75": "7.62", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will be 8.272 billion in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nBetween 1950 and 2021 world population has more than tripled. However, according to the Our World in Data article [World Population Growth](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth#)\n\n>One of the big lessons from the demographic history of countries is that population explosions are temporary. For many countries, the demographic transition has already ended, and as the global fertility rate has now halved we know that the world as a whole is approaching the end of rapid population growth.\n\nOur World in Data reports population estimates from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/about-the-un) in its [Population and Demography Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world population in the listed year, according to the Our World in Data chart [Population](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 7.91 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the total world population reaches 5% or less of its previous peak population, the sub-question for that year will resolve as **below the input boundary**.", "lower_25": "8.136B", "median": "8.202B", "upper_75": "8.272B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will be 8.244B in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nBetween 1950 and 2021 world population has more than tripled. However, according to the Our World in Data article [World Population Growth](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth#)\n\n>One of the big lessons from the demographic history of countries is that population explosions are temporary. For many countries, the demographic transition has already ended, and as the global fertility rate has now halved we know that the world as a whole is approaching the end of rapid population growth.\n\nOur World in Data reports population estimates from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/about-the-un) in its [Population and Demography Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world population in the listed year, according to the Our World in Data chart [Population](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 7.91 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the total world population reaches 5% or less of its previous peak population, the sub-question for that year will resolve as **below the input boundary**.", "lower_25": "8.244B", "median": "8.586B", "upper_75": "8.878B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will be 8.024 billion in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nBetween 1950 and 2021 world population has more than tripled. However, according to the Our World in Data article [World Population Growth](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth#)\n\n>One of the big lessons from the demographic history of countries is that population explosions are temporary. For many countries, the demographic transition has already ended, and as the global fertility rate has now halved we know that the world as a whole is approaching the end of rapid population growth.\n\nOur World in Data reports population estimates from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/about-the-un) in its [Population and Demography Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world population in the listed year, according to the Our World in Data chart [Population](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 7.91 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the total world population reaches 5% or less of its previous peak population, the sub-question for that year will resolve as **below the input boundary**.", "lower_25": "8.024B", "median": "8.053B", "upper_75": "8.081B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will be 8.024 billion in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nBetween 1950 and 2021 world population has more than tripled. However, according to the Our World in Data article [World Population Growth](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth#)\n\n>One of the big lessons from the demographic history of countries is that population explosions are temporary. For many countries, the demographic transition has already ended, and as the global fertility rate has now halved we know that the world as a whole is approaching the end of rapid population growth.\n\nOur World in Data reports population estimates from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/about-the-un) in its [Population and Demography Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world population in the listed year, according to the Our World in Data chart [Population](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 7.91 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the total world population reaches 5% or less of its previous peak population, the sub-question for that year will resolve as **below the input boundary**.", "lower_25": "8.024B", "median": "8.053B", "upper_75": "8.081B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 13.40 percent of the world's primary energy will come from fossil fuels in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from fossil fuels](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world's primary energy consumption which comes from fossil fuels in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 82.28 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.07", "median": "6.28", "upper_75": "13.40", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will be 8.244B in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nBetween 1950 and 2021 world population has more than tripled. However, according to the Our World in Data article [World Population Growth](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth#)\n\n>One of the big lessons from the demographic history of countries is that population explosions are temporary. For many countries, the demographic transition has already ended, and as the global fertility rate has now halved we know that the world as a whole is approaching the end of rapid population growth.\n\nOur World in Data reports population estimates from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/about-the-un) in its [Population and Demography Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world population in the listed year, according to the Our World in Data chart [Population](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 7.91 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the total world population reaches 5% or less of its previous peak population, the sub-question for that year will resolve as **below the input boundary**.", "lower_25": "8.244B", "median": "8.586B", "upper_75": "8.878B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will be 8.272 billion in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nBetween 1950 and 2021 world population has more than tripled. However, according to the Our World in Data article [World Population Growth](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth#)\n\n>One of the big lessons from the demographic history of countries is that population explosions are temporary. For many countries, the demographic transition has already ended, and as the global fertility rate has now halved we know that the world as a whole is approaching the end of rapid population growth.\n\nOur World in Data reports population estimates from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/about-the-un) in its [Population and Demography Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world population in the listed year, according to the Our World in Data chart [Population](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 7.91 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the total world population reaches 5% or less of its previous peak population, the sub-question for that year will resolve as **below the input boundary**.", "lower_25": "8.136B", "median": "8.202B", "upper_75": "8.272B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will be 8.024 billion in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nBetween 1950 and 2021 world population has more than tripled. However, according to the Our World in Data article [World Population Growth](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth#)\n\n>One of the big lessons from the demographic history of countries is that population explosions are temporary. For many countries, the demographic transition has already ended, and as the global fertility rate has now halved we know that the world as a whole is approaching the end of rapid population growth.\n\nOur World in Data reports population estimates from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/about-the-un) in its [Population and Demography Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world population in the listed year, according to the Our World in Data chart [Population](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 7.91 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the total world population reaches 5% or less of its previous peak population, the sub-question for that year will resolve as **below the input boundary**.", "lower_25": "8.024B", "median": "8.053B", "upper_75": "8.081B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 66.3% of the world's primary energy will come from fossil fuels in the following years (2032)?", "desc": "\n\nSince 1952 BP has published annual editions of the [Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html), collecting and summarizing data about global energy sources. Our World in Data uses these publications as the underlying source for its [Energy Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?facet=none&country=USA~GBR~CHN~OWID_WRL~IND~BRA~ZAF&Total+or+Breakdown=Total&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Annual+consumption), which plots the data by country and fuel type, such as the chart [Share of primary energy from fossil fuels](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total).\n\nAccording to the [U.S. Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=Primary%20energy) primary energy is\n>Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy.\n\nAdditionally, the [2022 Statistical Review of World Energy](https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf) notes\n>In this Review, primary energy comprises commercially traded fuels, including modern renewables used to generate electricity. Energy from all sources of non-fossil power generation is accounted for on an input-equivalent basis.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percent of the world's primary energy consumption which comes from fossil fuels in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/energy?tab=chart&facet=none&country=~OWID_WRL&Total+or+Breakdown=Select+a+source&Select+a+source=Fossil+fuels&Energy+or+Electricity=Primary+energy&Metric=Share+of+total). For example, this figure was 82.28 in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "66.3", "median": "72.2", "upper_75": "77.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will be 9.48B in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nBetween 1950 and 2021 world population has more than tripled. However, according to the Our World in Data article [World Population Growth](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth#)\n\n>One of the big lessons from the demographic history of countries is that population explosions are temporary. For many countries, the demographic transition has already ended, and as the global fertility rate has now halved we know that the world as a whole is approaching the end of rapid population growth.\n\nOur World in Data reports population estimates from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/about-the-un) in its [Population and Demography Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world population in the listed year, according to the Our World in Data chart [Population](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 7.91 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the total world population reaches 5% or less of its previous peak population, the sub-question for that year will resolve as **below the input boundary**.", "lower_25": "8.51B", "median": "9.48B", "upper_75": "10.3B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will be 9.48B in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nBetween 1950 and 2021 world population has more than tripled. However, according to the Our World in Data article [World Population Growth](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth#)\n\n>One of the big lessons from the demographic history of countries is that population explosions are temporary. For many countries, the demographic transition has already ended, and as the global fertility rate has now halved we know that the world as a whole is approaching the end of rapid population growth.\n\nOur World in Data reports population estimates from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/about-the-un) in its [Population and Demography Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world population in the listed year, according to the Our World in Data chart [Population](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 7.91 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the total world population reaches 5% or less of its previous peak population, the sub-question for that year will resolve as **below the input boundary**.", "lower_25": "8.51B", "median": "9.48B", "upper_75": "10.3B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will be 8.244B in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nBetween 1950 and 2021 world population has more than tripled. However, according to the Our World in Data article [World Population Growth](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth#)\n\n>One of the big lessons from the demographic history of countries is that population explosions are temporary. For many countries, the demographic transition has already ended, and as the global fertility rate has now halved we know that the world as a whole is approaching the end of rapid population growth.\n\nOur World in Data reports population estimates from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/about-the-un) in its [Population and Demography Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world population in the listed year, according to the Our World in Data chart [Population](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 7.91 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the total world population reaches 5% or less of its previous peak population, the sub-question for that year will resolve as **below the input boundary**.", "lower_25": "8.244B", "median": "8.586B", "upper_75": "8.878B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will be 9.48B in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nBetween 1950 and 2021 world population has more than tripled. However, according to the Our World in Data article [World Population Growth](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth#)\n\n>One of the big lessons from the demographic history of countries is that population explosions are temporary. For many countries, the demographic transition has already ended, and as the global fertility rate has now halved we know that the world as a whole is approaching the end of rapid population growth.\n\nOur World in Data reports population estimates from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/about-the-un) in its [Population and Demography Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world population in the listed year, according to the Our World in Data chart [Population](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 7.91 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the total world population reaches 5% or less of its previous peak population, the sub-question for that year will resolve as **below the input boundary**.", "lower_25": "8.51B", "median": "9.48B", "upper_75": "10.3B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the reported trust in government averaged across OECD countries will be 40.54% in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization formed in 1961. As of October 2022 it has [38 member countries](https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/), eight of which joined after 2010. The OECD was formed out of [its predecessor](https://www.oecd.org/60-years/), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was originally created to facilitate the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.\n\nThe OECD is comprised primarily of high-income, developed countries, and provides policy knowledge and data to members and partners with the [goal of improving lives](https://www.oecd.org/about/how-we-work/).\n\nOur World in Data collects a population-weighted average of OECD member survey responses to a question about trust in government in its chart [Trust in government averaged across OECD countries](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). The underlying data is provided by the OECD, which describes it as follows\n\n>Trust in government refers to the share of people who report having confidence in the national government. The data shown reflect the share of respondents answering “yes” (the other response categories being “no”, and “don't know”) to the survey question: “In this country, do you have confidence in… national government?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the population which report confidence in the national governments of OECD countries, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). For example, this figure was 45.74% in 2020.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the OECD will consist of all official OECD member countries included in the survey data for the relevant year. This means that countries which have been added to the OECD after October 12, 2022 may be included, and countries who were members on October 12, 2022 but are no longer members prior to the survey in the relevant year will be excluded. In the event the OECD ceases to exist, this question may resolve using similar data from a successor organization. If neither the OECD nor a successor organization exist, or provide such data, the remaining sub-questions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "40.54", "median": "41.94", "upper_75": "44.07", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will be 9.44B in the year 2122?", "desc": "\n\nBetween 1950 and 2021 world population has more than tripled. However, according to the Our World in Data article [World Population Growth](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth#)\n\n>One of the big lessons from the demographic history of countries is that population explosions are temporary. For many countries, the demographic transition has already ended, and as the global fertility rate has now halved we know that the world as a whole is approaching the end of rapid population growth.\n\nOur World in Data reports population estimates from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/about-the-un) in its [Population and Demography Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world population in the listed year, according to the Our World in Data chart [Population](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 7.91 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the total world population reaches 5% or less of its previous peak population, the sub-question for that year will resolve as **below the input boundary**.", "lower_25": "7.61B", "median": "9.44B", "upper_75": "11.0B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will be 9.44B in the year 2122?", "desc": "\n\nBetween 1950 and 2021 world population has more than tripled. However, according to the Our World in Data article [World Population Growth](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth#)\n\n>One of the big lessons from the demographic history of countries is that population explosions are temporary. For many countries, the demographic transition has already ended, and as the global fertility rate has now halved we know that the world as a whole is approaching the end of rapid population growth.\n\nOur World in Data reports population estimates from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/about-the-un) in its [Population and Demography Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world population in the listed year, according to the Our World in Data chart [Population](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 7.91 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the total world population reaches 5% or less of its previous peak population, the sub-question for that year will resolve as **below the input boundary**.", "lower_25": "7.61B", "median": "9.44B", "upper_75": "11.0B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the reported trust in government averaged across OECD countries will be 44.6% in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization formed in 1961. As of October 2022 it has [38 member countries](https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/), eight of which joined after 2010. The OECD was formed out of [its predecessor](https://www.oecd.org/60-years/), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was originally created to facilitate the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.\n\nThe OECD is comprised primarily of high-income, developed countries, and provides policy knowledge and data to members and partners with the [goal of improving lives](https://www.oecd.org/about/how-we-work/).\n\nOur World in Data collects a population-weighted average of OECD member survey responses to a question about trust in government in its chart [Trust in government averaged across OECD countries](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). The underlying data is provided by the OECD, which describes it as follows\n\n>Trust in government refers to the share of people who report having confidence in the national government. The data shown reflect the share of respondents answering “yes” (the other response categories being “no”, and “don't know”) to the survey question: “In this country, do you have confidence in… national government?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the population which report confidence in the national governments of OECD countries, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). For example, this figure was 45.74% in 2020.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the OECD will consist of all official OECD member countries included in the survey data for the relevant year. This means that countries which have been added to the OECD after October 12, 2022 may be included, and countries who were members on October 12, 2022 but are no longer members prior to the survey in the relevant year will be excluded. In the event the OECD ceases to exist, this question may resolve using similar data from a successor organization. If neither the OECD nor a successor organization exist, or provide such data, the remaining sub-questions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "38.4", "median": "41.5", "upper_75": "44.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world population will be 9.44B in the year 2122?", "desc": "\n\nBetween 1950 and 2021 world population has more than tripled. However, according to the Our World in Data article [World Population Growth](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth#)\n\n>One of the big lessons from the demographic history of countries is that population explosions are temporary. For many countries, the demographic transition has already ended, and as the global fertility rate has now halved we know that the world as a whole is approaching the end of rapid population growth.\n\nOur World in Data reports population estimates from the [United Nations Population Division](https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/about-the-un) in its [Population and Demography Data Explorer](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world population in the listed year, according to the Our World in Data chart [Population](https://ourworldindata.org/explorers/population-and-demography?facet=none&pickerSort=desc&pickerMetric=population__all__all__records&hideControls=true&Metric=Population&Sex=Both+sexes&Age+group=Total&Projection+Scenario=None&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 7.91 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the total world population reaches 5% or less of its previous peak population, the sub-question for that year will resolve as **below the input boundary**.", "lower_25": "7.61B", "median": "9.44B", "upper_75": "11.0B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the reported trust in government averaged across OECD countries will be 44.6% in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization formed in 1961. As of October 2022 it has [38 member countries](https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/), eight of which joined after 2010. The OECD was formed out of [its predecessor](https://www.oecd.org/60-years/), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was originally created to facilitate the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.\n\nThe OECD is comprised primarily of high-income, developed countries, and provides policy knowledge and data to members and partners with the [goal of improving lives](https://www.oecd.org/about/how-we-work/).\n\nOur World in Data collects a population-weighted average of OECD member survey responses to a question about trust in government in its chart [Trust in government averaged across OECD countries](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). The underlying data is provided by the OECD, which describes it as follows\n\n>Trust in government refers to the share of people who report having confidence in the national government. The data shown reflect the share of respondents answering “yes” (the other response categories being “no”, and “don't know”) to the survey question: “In this country, do you have confidence in… national government?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the population which report confidence in the national governments of OECD countries, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). For example, this figure was 45.74% in 2020.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the OECD will consist of all official OECD member countries included in the survey data for the relevant year. This means that countries which have been added to the OECD after October 12, 2022 may be included, and countries who were members on October 12, 2022 but are no longer members prior to the survey in the relevant year will be excluded. In the event the OECD ceases to exist, this question may resolve using similar data from a successor organization. If neither the OECD nor a successor organization exist, or provide such data, the remaining sub-questions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "38.4", "median": "41.5", "upper_75": "44.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the reported trust in government averaged across OECD countries will be 35.0% in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nThe [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization formed in 1961. As of October 2022 it has [38 member countries](https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/), eight of which joined after 2010. The OECD was formed out of [its predecessor](https://www.oecd.org/60-years/), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was originally created to facilitate the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.\n\nThe OECD is comprised primarily of high-income, developed countries, and provides policy knowledge and data to members and partners with the [goal of improving lives](https://www.oecd.org/about/how-we-work/).\n\nOur World in Data collects a population-weighted average of OECD member survey responses to a question about trust in government in its chart [Trust in government averaged across OECD countries](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). The underlying data is provided by the OECD, which describes it as follows\n\n>Trust in government refers to the share of people who report having confidence in the national government. The data shown reflect the share of respondents answering “yes” (the other response categories being “no”, and “don't know”) to the survey question: “In this country, do you have confidence in… national government?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the population which report confidence in the national governments of OECD countries, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). For example, this figure was 45.74% in 2020.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the OECD will consist of all official OECD member countries included in the survey data for the relevant year. This means that countries which have been added to the OECD after October 12, 2022 may be included, and countries who were members on October 12, 2022 but are no longer members prior to the survey in the relevant year will be excluded. In the event the OECD ceases to exist, this question may resolve using similar data from a successor organization. If neither the OECD nor a successor organization exist, or provide such data, the remaining sub-questions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "35.0", "median": "42.5", "upper_75": "51.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the reported trust in government averaged across OECD countries will be 40.54% in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization formed in 1961. As of October 2022 it has [38 member countries](https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/), eight of which joined after 2010. The OECD was formed out of [its predecessor](https://www.oecd.org/60-years/), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was originally created to facilitate the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.\n\nThe OECD is comprised primarily of high-income, developed countries, and provides policy knowledge and data to members and partners with the [goal of improving lives](https://www.oecd.org/about/how-we-work/).\n\nOur World in Data collects a population-weighted average of OECD member survey responses to a question about trust in government in its chart [Trust in government averaged across OECD countries](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). The underlying data is provided by the OECD, which describes it as follows\n\n>Trust in government refers to the share of people who report having confidence in the national government. The data shown reflect the share of respondents answering “yes” (the other response categories being “no”, and “don't know”) to the survey question: “In this country, do you have confidence in… national government?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the population which report confidence in the national governments of OECD countries, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). For example, this figure was 45.74% in 2020.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the OECD will consist of all official OECD member countries included in the survey data for the relevant year. This means that countries which have been added to the OECD after October 12, 2022 may be included, and countries who were members on October 12, 2022 but are no longer members prior to the survey in the relevant year will be excluded. In the event the OECD ceases to exist, this question may resolve using similar data from a successor organization. If neither the OECD nor a successor organization exist, or provide such data, the remaining sub-questions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "40.54", "median": "41.94", "upper_75": "44.07", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the reported trust in government averaged across OECD countries will be 35.3% in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nThe [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization formed in 1961. As of October 2022 it has [38 member countries](https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/), eight of which joined after 2010. The OECD was formed out of [its predecessor](https://www.oecd.org/60-years/), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was originally created to facilitate the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.\n\nThe OECD is comprised primarily of high-income, developed countries, and provides policy knowledge and data to members and partners with the [goal of improving lives](https://www.oecd.org/about/how-we-work/).\n\nOur World in Data collects a population-weighted average of OECD member survey responses to a question about trust in government in its chart [Trust in government averaged across OECD countries](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). The underlying data is provided by the OECD, which describes it as follows\n\n>Trust in government refers to the share of people who report having confidence in the national government. The data shown reflect the share of respondents answering “yes” (the other response categories being “no”, and “don't know”) to the survey question: “In this country, do you have confidence in… national government?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the population which report confidence in the national governments of OECD countries, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). For example, this figure was 45.74% in 2020.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the OECD will consist of all official OECD member countries included in the survey data for the relevant year. This means that countries which have been added to the OECD after October 12, 2022 may be included, and countries who were members on October 12, 2022 but are no longer members prior to the survey in the relevant year will be excluded. In the event the OECD ceases to exist, this question may resolve using similar data from a successor organization. If neither the OECD nor a successor organization exist, or provide such data, the remaining sub-questions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "35.3", "median": "42.1", "upper_75": "49.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the reported trust in government averaged across OECD countries will be 40.54% in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization formed in 1961. As of October 2022 it has [38 member countries](https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/), eight of which joined after 2010. The OECD was formed out of [its predecessor](https://www.oecd.org/60-years/), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was originally created to facilitate the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.\n\nThe OECD is comprised primarily of high-income, developed countries, and provides policy knowledge and data to members and partners with the [goal of improving lives](https://www.oecd.org/about/how-we-work/).\n\nOur World in Data collects a population-weighted average of OECD member survey responses to a question about trust in government in its chart [Trust in government averaged across OECD countries](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). The underlying data is provided by the OECD, which describes it as follows\n\n>Trust in government refers to the share of people who report having confidence in the national government. The data shown reflect the share of respondents answering “yes” (the other response categories being “no”, and “don't know”) to the survey question: “In this country, do you have confidence in… national government?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the population which report confidence in the national governments of OECD countries, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). For example, this figure was 45.74% in 2020.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the OECD will consist of all official OECD member countries included in the survey data for the relevant year. This means that countries which have been added to the OECD after October 12, 2022 may be included, and countries who were members on October 12, 2022 but are no longer members prior to the survey in the relevant year will be excluded. In the event the OECD ceases to exist, this question may resolve using similar data from a successor organization. If neither the OECD nor a successor organization exist, or provide such data, the remaining sub-questions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "40.54", "median": "41.94", "upper_75": "44.07", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the reported trust in government averaged across OECD countries will be 35.3% in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nThe [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization formed in 1961. As of October 2022 it has [38 member countries](https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/), eight of which joined after 2010. The OECD was formed out of [its predecessor](https://www.oecd.org/60-years/), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was originally created to facilitate the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.\n\nThe OECD is comprised primarily of high-income, developed countries, and provides policy knowledge and data to members and partners with the [goal of improving lives](https://www.oecd.org/about/how-we-work/).\n\nOur World in Data collects a population-weighted average of OECD member survey responses to a question about trust in government in its chart [Trust in government averaged across OECD countries](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). The underlying data is provided by the OECD, which describes it as follows\n\n>Trust in government refers to the share of people who report having confidence in the national government. The data shown reflect the share of respondents answering “yes” (the other response categories being “no”, and “don't know”) to the survey question: “In this country, do you have confidence in… national government?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the population which report confidence in the national governments of OECD countries, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). For example, this figure was 45.74% in 2020.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the OECD will consist of all official OECD member countries included in the survey data for the relevant year. This means that countries which have been added to the OECD after October 12, 2022 may be included, and countries who were members on October 12, 2022 but are no longer members prior to the survey in the relevant year will be excluded. In the event the OECD ceases to exist, this question may resolve using similar data from a successor organization. If neither the OECD nor a successor organization exist, or provide such data, the remaining sub-questions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "35.3", "median": "42.1", "upper_75": "49.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the reported trust in government averaged across OECD countries will be 35.0% in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nThe [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization formed in 1961. As of October 2022 it has [38 member countries](https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/), eight of which joined after 2010. The OECD was formed out of [its predecessor](https://www.oecd.org/60-years/), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was originally created to facilitate the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.\n\nThe OECD is comprised primarily of high-income, developed countries, and provides policy knowledge and data to members and partners with the [goal of improving lives](https://www.oecd.org/about/how-we-work/).\n\nOur World in Data collects a population-weighted average of OECD member survey responses to a question about trust in government in its chart [Trust in government averaged across OECD countries](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). The underlying data is provided by the OECD, which describes it as follows\n\n>Trust in government refers to the share of people who report having confidence in the national government. The data shown reflect the share of respondents answering “yes” (the other response categories being “no”, and “don't know”) to the survey question: “In this country, do you have confidence in… national government?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the population which report confidence in the national governments of OECD countries, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). For example, this figure was 45.74% in 2020.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the OECD will consist of all official OECD member countries included in the survey data for the relevant year. This means that countries which have been added to the OECD after October 12, 2022 may be included, and countries who were members on October 12, 2022 but are no longer members prior to the survey in the relevant year will be excluded. In the event the OECD ceases to exist, this question may resolve using similar data from a successor organization. If neither the OECD nor a successor organization exist, or provide such data, the remaining sub-questions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "35.0", "median": "42.5", "upper_75": "51.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the reported trust in government averaged across OECD countries will be 59.2% in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization formed in 1961. As of October 2022 it has [38 member countries](https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/), eight of which joined after 2010. The OECD was formed out of [its predecessor](https://www.oecd.org/60-years/), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was originally created to facilitate the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.\n\nThe OECD is comprised primarily of high-income, developed countries, and provides policy knowledge and data to members and partners with the [goal of improving lives](https://www.oecd.org/about/how-we-work/).\n\nOur World in Data collects a population-weighted average of OECD member survey responses to a question about trust in government in its chart [Trust in government averaged across OECD countries](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). The underlying data is provided by the OECD, which describes it as follows\n\n>Trust in government refers to the share of people who report having confidence in the national government. The data shown reflect the share of respondents answering “yes” (the other response categories being “no”, and “don't know”) to the survey question: “In this country, do you have confidence in… national government?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the population which report confidence in the national governments of OECD countries, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). For example, this figure was 45.74% in 2020.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the OECD will consist of all official OECD member countries included in the survey data for the relevant year. This means that countries which have been added to the OECD after October 12, 2022 may be included, and countries who were members on October 12, 2022 but are no longer members prior to the survey in the relevant year will be excluded. In the event the OECD ceases to exist, this question may resolve using similar data from a successor organization. If neither the OECD nor a successor organization exist, or provide such data, the remaining sub-questions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "32.6", "median": "44.0", "upper_75": "59.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the reported trust in government averaged across OECD countries will be 35.3% in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\nThe [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization formed in 1961. As of October 2022 it has [38 member countries](https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/), eight of which joined after 2010. The OECD was formed out of [its predecessor](https://www.oecd.org/60-years/), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was originally created to facilitate the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.\n\nThe OECD is comprised primarily of high-income, developed countries, and provides policy knowledge and data to members and partners with the [goal of improving lives](https://www.oecd.org/about/how-we-work/).\n\nOur World in Data collects a population-weighted average of OECD member survey responses to a question about trust in government in its chart [Trust in government averaged across OECD countries](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). The underlying data is provided by the OECD, which describes it as follows\n\n>Trust in government refers to the share of people who report having confidence in the national government. The data shown reflect the share of respondents answering “yes” (the other response categories being “no”, and “don't know”) to the survey question: “In this country, do you have confidence in… national government?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the population which report confidence in the national governments of OECD countries, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). For example, this figure was 45.74% in 2020.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the OECD will consist of all official OECD member countries included in the survey data for the relevant year. This means that countries which have been added to the OECD after October 12, 2022 may be included, and countries who were members on October 12, 2022 but are no longer members prior to the survey in the relevant year will be excluded. In the event the OECD ceases to exist, this question may resolve using similar data from a successor organization. If neither the OECD nor a successor organization exist, or provide such data, the remaining sub-questions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "35.3", "median": "42.1", "upper_75": "49.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the reported trust in government averaged across OECD countries will be 59.2% in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization formed in 1961. As of October 2022 it has [38 member countries](https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/), eight of which joined after 2010. The OECD was formed out of [its predecessor](https://www.oecd.org/60-years/), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was originally created to facilitate the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.\n\nThe OECD is comprised primarily of high-income, developed countries, and provides policy knowledge and data to members and partners with the [goal of improving lives](https://www.oecd.org/about/how-we-work/).\n\nOur World in Data collects a population-weighted average of OECD member survey responses to a question about trust in government in its chart [Trust in government averaged across OECD countries](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). The underlying data is provided by the OECD, which describes it as follows\n\n>Trust in government refers to the share of people who report having confidence in the national government. The data shown reflect the share of respondents answering “yes” (the other response categories being “no”, and “don't know”) to the survey question: “In this country, do you have confidence in… national government?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the population which report confidence in the national governments of OECD countries, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). For example, this figure was 45.74% in 2020.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the OECD will consist of all official OECD member countries included in the survey data for the relevant year. This means that countries which have been added to the OECD after October 12, 2022 may be included, and countries who were members on October 12, 2022 but are no longer members prior to the survey in the relevant year will be excluded. In the event the OECD ceases to exist, this question may resolve using similar data from a successor organization. If neither the OECD nor a successor organization exist, or provide such data, the remaining sub-questions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "32.6", "median": "44.0", "upper_75": "59.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the reported trust in government averaged across OECD countries will be 35.0% in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nThe [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization formed in 1961. As of October 2022 it has [38 member countries](https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/), eight of which joined after 2010. The OECD was formed out of [its predecessor](https://www.oecd.org/60-years/), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was originally created to facilitate the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.\n\nThe OECD is comprised primarily of high-income, developed countries, and provides policy knowledge and data to members and partners with the [goal of improving lives](https://www.oecd.org/about/how-we-work/).\n\nOur World in Data collects a population-weighted average of OECD member survey responses to a question about trust in government in its chart [Trust in government averaged across OECD countries](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). The underlying data is provided by the OECD, which describes it as follows\n\n>Trust in government refers to the share of people who report having confidence in the national government. The data shown reflect the share of respondents answering “yes” (the other response categories being “no”, and “don't know”) to the survey question: “In this country, do you have confidence in… national government?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the population which report confidence in the national governments of OECD countries, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). For example, this figure was 45.74% in 2020.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the OECD will consist of all official OECD member countries included in the survey data for the relevant year. This means that countries which have been added to the OECD after October 12, 2022 may be included, and countries who were members on October 12, 2022 but are no longer members prior to the survey in the relevant year will be excluded. In the event the OECD ceases to exist, this question may resolve using similar data from a successor organization. If neither the OECD nor a successor organization exist, or provide such data, the remaining sub-questions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "35.0", "median": "42.5", "upper_75": "51.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the reported trust in government averaged across OECD countries will be 44.6% in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization formed in 1961. As of October 2022 it has [38 member countries](https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/), eight of which joined after 2010. The OECD was formed out of [its predecessor](https://www.oecd.org/60-years/), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was originally created to facilitate the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.\n\nThe OECD is comprised primarily of high-income, developed countries, and provides policy knowledge and data to members and partners with the [goal of improving lives](https://www.oecd.org/about/how-we-work/).\n\nOur World in Data collects a population-weighted average of OECD member survey responses to a question about trust in government in its chart [Trust in government averaged across OECD countries](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). The underlying data is provided by the OECD, which describes it as follows\n\n>Trust in government refers to the share of people who report having confidence in the national government. The data shown reflect the share of respondents answering “yes” (the other response categories being “no”, and “don't know”) to the survey question: “In this country, do you have confidence in… national government?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the population which report confidence in the national governments of OECD countries, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). For example, this figure was 45.74% in 2020.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the OECD will consist of all official OECD member countries included in the survey data for the relevant year. This means that countries which have been added to the OECD after October 12, 2022 may be included, and countries who were members on October 12, 2022 but are no longer members prior to the survey in the relevant year will be excluded. In the event the OECD ceases to exist, this question may resolve using similar data from a successor organization. If neither the OECD nor a successor organization exist, or provide such data, the remaining sub-questions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "38.4", "median": "41.5", "upper_75": "44.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the reported trust in government averaged across OECD countries will be 59.2% in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nThe [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OECD) (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization formed in 1961. As of October 2022 it has [38 member countries](https://www.oecd.org/about/members-and-partners/), eight of which joined after 2010. The OECD was formed out of [its predecessor](https://www.oecd.org/60-years/), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was originally created to facilitate the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.\n\nThe OECD is comprised primarily of high-income, developed countries, and provides policy knowledge and data to members and partners with the [goal of improving lives](https://www.oecd.org/about/how-we-work/).\n\nOur World in Data collects a population-weighted average of OECD member survey responses to a question about trust in government in its chart [Trust in government averaged across OECD countries](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). The underlying data is provided by the OECD, which describes it as follows\n\n>Trust in government refers to the share of people who report having confidence in the national government. The data shown reflect the share of respondents answering “yes” (the other response categories being “no”, and “don't know”) to the survey question: “In this country, do you have confidence in… national government?", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the population which report confidence in the national governments of OECD countries, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/oecd-average-trust-in-governments). For example, this figure was 45.74% in 2020.\n\nFor the purposes of this question, the OECD will consist of all official OECD member countries included in the survey data for the relevant year. This means that countries which have been added to the OECD after October 12, 2022 may be included, and countries who were members on October 12, 2022 but are no longer members prior to the survey in the relevant year will be excluded. In the event the OECD ceases to exist, this question may resolve using similar data from a successor organization. If neither the OECD nor a successor organization exist, or provide such data, the remaining sub-questions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "32.6", "median": "44.0", "upper_75": "59.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global rate of homicide deaths per 100,000 people will be 5.510 in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data article [Homicides](https://ourworldindata.org/homicides), homicide is one of the top ten causes of death in younger adults (ages 15 to 49) globally. Our World in Data reports the homicide rate in its chart [Homicide rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/homicide-rate?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world homicide rate per 100,000 in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/homicide-rate?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 5.4 in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "5.150", "median": "5.324", "upper_75": "5.510", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global rate of homicide deaths per 100,000 people will be 5.510 in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data article [Homicides](https://ourworldindata.org/homicides), homicide is one of the top ten causes of death in younger adults (ages 15 to 49) globally. Our World in Data reports the homicide rate in its chart [Homicide rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/homicide-rate?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world homicide rate per 100,000 in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/homicide-rate?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 5.4 in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "5.150", "median": "5.324", "upper_75": "5.510", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global rate of homicide deaths per 100,000 people will be 4.12 in the year 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.12", "median": "4.79", "upper_75": "5.62", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global rate of homicide deaths per 100,000 people will be 5.66 in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data article [Homicides](https://ourworldindata.org/homicides), homicide is one of the top ten causes of death in younger adults (ages 15 to 49) globally. Our World in Data reports the homicide rate in its chart [Homicide rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/homicide-rate?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world homicide rate per 100,000 in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/homicide-rate?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 5.4 in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "5.03", "median": "5.30", "upper_75": "5.66", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global rate of homicide deaths per 100,000 people will be 5.510 in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data article [Homicides](https://ourworldindata.org/homicides), homicide is one of the top ten causes of death in younger adults (ages 15 to 49) globally. Our World in Data reports the homicide rate in its chart [Homicide rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/homicide-rate?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world homicide rate per 100,000 in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/homicide-rate?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 5.4 in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "5.150", "median": "5.324", "upper_75": "5.510", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global rate of homicide deaths per 100,000 people will be 4.12 in the year 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.12", "median": "4.79", "upper_75": "5.62", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global rate of homicide deaths per 100,000 people will be 4.87 in the year 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.94", "median": "4.87", "upper_75": "8.00", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global rate of homicide deaths per 100,000 people will be 4.12 in the year 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.12", "median": "4.79", "upper_75": "5.62", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global rate of homicide deaths per 100,000 people will be 5.66 in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data article [Homicides](https://ourworldindata.org/homicides), homicide is one of the top ten causes of death in younger adults (ages 15 to 49) globally. Our World in Data reports the homicide rate in its chart [Homicide rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/homicide-rate?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world homicide rate per 100,000 in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/homicide-rate?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 5.4 in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "5.03", "median": "5.30", "upper_75": "5.66", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global rate of homicide deaths per 100,000 people will be 2.17 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.557", "median": "2.17", "upper_75": "5.85", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global rate of homicide deaths per 100,000 people will be 2.17 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.557", "median": "2.17", "upper_75": "5.85", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global rate of homicide deaths per 100,000 people will be 4.87 in the year 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.94", "median": "4.87", "upper_75": "8.00", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the fastest supercomputer on record will have a speed of 1.18×1018 FLOPS in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.18×1018", "median": "1.32×1018", "upper_75": "1.61×1018", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global rate of homicide deaths per 100,000 people will be 5.66 in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to the Our World in Data article [Homicides](https://ourworldindata.org/homicides), homicide is one of the top ten causes of death in younger adults (ages 15 to 49) globally. Our World in Data reports the homicide rate in its chart [Homicide rate](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/homicide-rate?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). The underlying source is the [Global Burden of Disease study](https://www.healthdata.org/gbd/about) published by the [Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation](https://www.healthdata.org/) (IHME).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the world homicide rate per 100,000 in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/homicide-rate?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 5.4 in 2019.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "5.03", "median": "5.30", "upper_75": "5.66", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the fastest supercomputer on record will have a speed of 1.18×1018 FLOPS in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.18×1018", "median": "1.32×1018", "upper_75": "1.61×1018", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global rate of homicide deaths per 100,000 people will be 4.87 in the year 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.94", "median": "4.87", "upper_75": "8.00", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the fastest supercomputer on record will have a speed of 1.18×1018 FLOPS in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.18×1018", "median": "1.32×1018", "upper_75": "1.61×1018", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global rate of homicide deaths per 100,000 people will be 2.17 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.557", "median": "2.17", "upper_75": "5.85", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the fastest supercomputer on record will have a speed of 2.77×1018 FLOPS by 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.07×1018", "median": "2.77×1018", "upper_75": "3.73×1018", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the fastest supercomputer on record will have a speed of 2.77×1018 FLOPS by 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.07×1018", "median": "2.77×1018", "upper_75": "3.73×1018", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the fastest supercomputer on record will have a speed of 9.02×1019 FLOPS by 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.39×1019", "median": "4.59×1019", "upper_75": "9.02×1019", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the fastest supercomputer on record will have a speed of 5.33×1022 FLOPS by 2052?", "desc": "\n\nSupercomputer performance is often measured in [floating point operations per second](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FLOPS) (FLOPS) as a means to assess the computational capacity of a computer system and to compare computational capacity between systems. The Our World in Data chart [Computational capacity of the fastest supercomputers](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/supercomputer-power-flops) provides the FLOPS of the fastest [supercomputer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supercomputer) each year. The underlying data comes from [Top500](https://www.top500.org/lists/top500/), a project that [began in 1993](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TOP500) which posts a list twice a year of the performance of the 500 fastest supercomputers.\n\nTop500 uses the [LINPACK benchmark](https://www.top500.org/project/linpack/) to estimate FLOPS performance, ranking the systems by the performance for the largest problem run on the machine, [\\(R_{max}\\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LINPACK_benchmarks#HPLinpack).\n\nIn June of 2022, the [Frontier supercomputer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frontier_(supercomputer)) was the first [exascale](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exascale_computing) supercomputer to appear on the Top500 list, with an \\(R{max}\\) of 1.102 quintillion FLOPS (1.102 exaFLOPS). China is also [reported to have developed exascale systems](https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/chinas-exascale-supercomputer-goes-up-against-us-frontier-for-gordon-bell-prize/), but these systems have not been submitted to the Top500.\n\nNote that 1 quintillion FLOPS is one [exaFLOP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exa-), which is \\(10^{18}\\) FLOPS.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the performance (measured in floating-point operations per second ([FLOPS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FLOPS))) of the fastest supercomputer ever reported as of December 31 of the respective years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/supercomputer-power-flops). For example, this figure was 4.42 * 10^17 (442 quadrillion) in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution. No later sub-question may resolve at a lower value than a previous sub-question in this series.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**. If OWID uses units other than FLOPs, Metaculus will convert the estimate into FLOPs if feasible.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "5.33×1022", "median": "8.38×1023", "upper_75": "2.97×1025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the fastest supercomputer on record will have a speed of 8.71×1034 FLOPS in the next 10 years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.71×1034", "median": "1.87×1042", "upper_75": "1.07×1052", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the fastest supercomputer on record will have a speed of 8.71×1034 FLOPS in the next 10 years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.71×1034", "median": "1.87×1042", "upper_75": "1.07×1052", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.619B people in the world will live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nWhile defining specific thresholds for poverty is inherently somewhat arbitrary, in studying broad trends of large populations, we see good news: for many definitions of poverty, the share of the world living in poverty [has declined](https://ourworldindata.org/no-matter-what-global-poverty-line). Over two centuries, the [majority of the world](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality#global-income-inequality) has moved out of extreme poverty (defined as living on less than $1.90 per day).\n\nIn 2022, OWID uses data from the World Bank's [Poverty and Inequality Platform](https://pip.worldbank.org/home), which accounts for the effect of [inflation](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#CPIs) over time, and for the differences in prices between countries with an estimated [Purchasing Power Parity](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#PPPs). The World Bank's estimate of \"living on $X per day\" is a [welfare aggregate](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html) which harmonizes data from different sources which variously survey individual income, consumption, or both. It is a measure of poverty, but not necessarily a measure of individual consumption or income, per se. The World Bank reports poverty rates [per individual](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html#equivalence-scale), not by household.\n\nIn 2022, the World Bank [updated their reference unit](https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updating-world-banks-societal-poverty-line-2017-purchasing-power-parities) to 2017 INT USD, bringing the poverty line for \"extreme poverty\" from 1.90 2011 USD to 2.15 2017 USD. In real terms, the poverty lines remain equivalent, however in re-evaluating past data the World Bank found the 2011 INT USD slightly underestimated the share of people living in extreme poverty.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the absolute number of people in the world who live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the respective year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/distribution-of-population-poverty-thresholds). For example, in 2019 this figure was 4.701 billion according to OWID.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If OWID reports global poverty rates in another reference unit, their data will be converted into 2011 international USD, if feasible.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. The estimates of people living in poverty should include all humans, where \"Humans\" are defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with no more medical assistance than would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "4.619B", "median": "4.669B", "upper_75": "4.711B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the fastest supercomputer on record will have a speed of 8.71×1034 FLOPS in the next 10 years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.71×1034", "median": "1.87×1042", "upper_75": "1.07×1052", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the fastest supercomputer on record will have a speed of 5.33×1022 FLOPS by 2052?", "desc": "\n\nSupercomputer performance is often measured in [floating point operations per second](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FLOPS) (FLOPS) as a means to assess the computational capacity of a computer system and to compare computational capacity between systems. The Our World in Data chart [Computational capacity of the fastest supercomputers](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/supercomputer-power-flops) provides the FLOPS of the fastest [supercomputer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supercomputer) each year. The underlying data comes from [Top500](https://www.top500.org/lists/top500/), a project that [began in 1993](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TOP500) which posts a list twice a year of the performance of the 500 fastest supercomputers.\n\nTop500 uses the [LINPACK benchmark](https://www.top500.org/project/linpack/) to estimate FLOPS performance, ranking the systems by the performance for the largest problem run on the machine, [\\(R_{max}\\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LINPACK_benchmarks#HPLinpack).\n\nIn June of 2022, the [Frontier supercomputer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frontier_(supercomputer)) was the first [exascale](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exascale_computing) supercomputer to appear on the Top500 list, with an \\(R{max}\\) of 1.102 quintillion FLOPS (1.102 exaFLOPS). China is also [reported to have developed exascale systems](https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/chinas-exascale-supercomputer-goes-up-against-us-frontier-for-gordon-bell-prize/), but these systems have not been submitted to the Top500.\n\nNote that 1 quintillion FLOPS is one [exaFLOP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exa-), which is \\(10^{18}\\) FLOPS.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the performance (measured in floating-point operations per second ([FLOPS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FLOPS))) of the fastest supercomputer ever reported as of December 31 of the respective years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/supercomputer-power-flops). For example, this figure was 4.42 * 10^17 (442 quadrillion) in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution. No later sub-question may resolve at a lower value than a previous sub-question in this series.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**. If OWID uses units other than FLOPs, Metaculus will convert the estimate into FLOPs if feasible.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "5.33×1022", "median": "8.38×1023", "upper_75": "2.97×1025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.619B people in the world will live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nWhile defining specific thresholds for poverty is inherently somewhat arbitrary, in studying broad trends of large populations, we see good news: for many definitions of poverty, the share of the world living in poverty [has declined](https://ourworldindata.org/no-matter-what-global-poverty-line). Over two centuries, the [majority of the world](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality#global-income-inequality) has moved out of extreme poverty (defined as living on less than $1.90 per day).\n\nIn 2022, OWID uses data from the World Bank's [Poverty and Inequality Platform](https://pip.worldbank.org/home), which accounts for the effect of [inflation](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#CPIs) over time, and for the differences in prices between countries with an estimated [Purchasing Power Parity](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#PPPs). The World Bank's estimate of \"living on $X per day\" is a [welfare aggregate](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html) which harmonizes data from different sources which variously survey individual income, consumption, or both. It is a measure of poverty, but not necessarily a measure of individual consumption or income, per se. The World Bank reports poverty rates [per individual](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html#equivalence-scale), not by household.\n\nIn 2022, the World Bank [updated their reference unit](https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updating-world-banks-societal-poverty-line-2017-purchasing-power-parities) to 2017 INT USD, bringing the poverty line for \"extreme poverty\" from 1.90 2011 USD to 2.15 2017 USD. In real terms, the poverty lines remain equivalent, however in re-evaluating past data the World Bank found the 2011 INT USD slightly underestimated the share of people living in extreme poverty.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the absolute number of people in the world who live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the respective year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/distribution-of-population-poverty-thresholds). For example, in 2019 this figure was 4.701 billion according to OWID.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If OWID reports global poverty rates in another reference unit, their data will be converted into 2011 international USD, if feasible.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. The estimates of people living in poverty should include all humans, where \"Humans\" are defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with no more medical assistance than would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "4.619B", "median": "4.669B", "upper_75": "4.711B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the fastest supercomputer on record will have a speed of 5.33×1022 FLOPS by 2052?", "desc": "\n\nSupercomputer performance is often measured in [floating point operations per second](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FLOPS) (FLOPS) as a means to assess the computational capacity of a computer system and to compare computational capacity between systems. The Our World in Data chart [Computational capacity of the fastest supercomputers](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/supercomputer-power-flops) provides the FLOPS of the fastest [supercomputer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supercomputer) each year. The underlying data comes from [Top500](https://www.top500.org/lists/top500/), a project that [began in 1993](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TOP500) which posts a list twice a year of the performance of the 500 fastest supercomputers.\n\nTop500 uses the [LINPACK benchmark](https://www.top500.org/project/linpack/) to estimate FLOPS performance, ranking the systems by the performance for the largest problem run on the machine, [\\(R_{max}\\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LINPACK_benchmarks#HPLinpack).\n\nIn June of 2022, the [Frontier supercomputer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frontier_(supercomputer)) was the first [exascale](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exascale_computing) supercomputer to appear on the Top500 list, with an \\(R{max}\\) of 1.102 quintillion FLOPS (1.102 exaFLOPS). China is also [reported to have developed exascale systems](https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/chinas-exascale-supercomputer-goes-up-against-us-frontier-for-gordon-bell-prize/), but these systems have not been submitted to the Top500.\n\nNote that 1 quintillion FLOPS is one [exaFLOP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exa-), which is \\(10^{18}\\) FLOPS.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the performance (measured in floating-point operations per second ([FLOPS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FLOPS))) of the fastest supercomputer ever reported as of December 31 of the respective years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/supercomputer-power-flops). For example, this figure was 4.42 * 10^17 (442 quadrillion) in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution. No later sub-question may resolve at a lower value than a previous sub-question in this series.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**. If OWID uses units other than FLOPs, Metaculus will convert the estimate into FLOPs if feasible.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "5.33×1022", "median": "8.38×1023", "upper_75": "2.97×1025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.701B people in the world will live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the following years? (2032)", "desc": "\n\nWhile defining specific thresholds for poverty is inherently somewhat arbitrary, in studying broad trends of large populations, we see good news: for many definitions of poverty, the share of the world living in poverty [has declined](https://ourworldindata.org/no-matter-what-global-poverty-line). Over two centuries, the [majority of the world](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality#global-income-inequality) has moved out of extreme poverty (defined as living on less than $1.90 per day).\n\nIn 2022, OWID uses data from the World Bank's [Poverty and Inequality Platform](https://pip.worldbank.org/home), which accounts for the effect of [inflation](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#CPIs) over time, and for the differences in prices between countries with an estimated [Purchasing Power Parity](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#PPPs). The World Bank's estimate of \"living on $X per day\" is a [welfare aggregate](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html) which harmonizes data from different sources which variously survey individual income, consumption, or both. It is a measure of poverty, but not necessarily a measure of individual consumption or income, per se. The World Bank reports poverty rates [per individual](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html#equivalence-scale), not by household.\n\nIn 2022, the World Bank [updated their reference unit](https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updating-world-banks-societal-poverty-line-2017-purchasing-power-parities) to 2017 INT USD, bringing the poverty line for \"extreme poverty\" from 1.90 2011 USD to 2.15 2017 USD. In real terms, the poverty lines remain equivalent, however in re-evaluating past data the World Bank found the 2011 INT USD slightly underestimated the share of people living in extreme poverty.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the absolute number of people in the world who live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the respective year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/distribution-of-population-poverty-thresholds). For example, in 2019 this figure was 4.701 billion according to OWID.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If OWID reports global poverty rates in another reference unit, their data will be converted into 2011 international USD, if feasible.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. The estimates of people living in poverty should include all humans, where \"Humans\" are defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with no more medical assistance than would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "4.260B", "median": "4.471B", "upper_75": "4.701B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.701B people in the world will live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the following years? (2032)", "desc": "\n\nWhile defining specific thresholds for poverty is inherently somewhat arbitrary, in studying broad trends of large populations, we see good news: for many definitions of poverty, the share of the world living in poverty [has declined](https://ourworldindata.org/no-matter-what-global-poverty-line). Over two centuries, the [majority of the world](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality#global-income-inequality) has moved out of extreme poverty (defined as living on less than $1.90 per day).\n\nIn 2022, OWID uses data from the World Bank's [Poverty and Inequality Platform](https://pip.worldbank.org/home), which accounts for the effect of [inflation](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#CPIs) over time, and for the differences in prices between countries with an estimated [Purchasing Power Parity](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#PPPs). The World Bank's estimate of \"living on $X per day\" is a [welfare aggregate](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html) which harmonizes data from different sources which variously survey individual income, consumption, or both. It is a measure of poverty, but not necessarily a measure of individual consumption or income, per se. The World Bank reports poverty rates [per individual](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html#equivalence-scale), not by household.\n\nIn 2022, the World Bank [updated their reference unit](https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updating-world-banks-societal-poverty-line-2017-purchasing-power-parities) to 2017 INT USD, bringing the poverty line for \"extreme poverty\" from 1.90 2011 USD to 2.15 2017 USD. In real terms, the poverty lines remain equivalent, however in re-evaluating past data the World Bank found the 2011 INT USD slightly underestimated the share of people living in extreme poverty.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the absolute number of people in the world who live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the respective year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/distribution-of-population-poverty-thresholds). For example, in 2019 this figure was 4.701 billion according to OWID.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If OWID reports global poverty rates in another reference unit, their data will be converted into 2011 international USD, if feasible.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. The estimates of people living in poverty should include all humans, where \"Humans\" are defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with no more medical assistance than would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "4.260B", "median": "4.471B", "upper_75": "4.701B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.701B people in the world will live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the following years? (2032)", "desc": "\n\nWhile defining specific thresholds for poverty is inherently somewhat arbitrary, in studying broad trends of large populations, we see good news: for many definitions of poverty, the share of the world living in poverty [has declined](https://ourworldindata.org/no-matter-what-global-poverty-line). Over two centuries, the [majority of the world](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality#global-income-inequality) has moved out of extreme poverty (defined as living on less than $1.90 per day).\n\nIn 2022, OWID uses data from the World Bank's [Poverty and Inequality Platform](https://pip.worldbank.org/home), which accounts for the effect of [inflation](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#CPIs) over time, and for the differences in prices between countries with an estimated [Purchasing Power Parity](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#PPPs). The World Bank's estimate of \"living on $X per day\" is a [welfare aggregate](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html) which harmonizes data from different sources which variously survey individual income, consumption, or both. It is a measure of poverty, but not necessarily a measure of individual consumption or income, per se. The World Bank reports poverty rates [per individual](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html#equivalence-scale), not by household.\n\nIn 2022, the World Bank [updated their reference unit](https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updating-world-banks-societal-poverty-line-2017-purchasing-power-parities) to 2017 INT USD, bringing the poverty line for \"extreme poverty\" from 1.90 2011 USD to 2.15 2017 USD. In real terms, the poverty lines remain equivalent, however in re-evaluating past data the World Bank found the 2011 INT USD slightly underestimated the share of people living in extreme poverty.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the absolute number of people in the world who live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the respective year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/distribution-of-population-poverty-thresholds). For example, in 2019 this figure was 4.701 billion according to OWID.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If OWID reports global poverty rates in another reference unit, their data will be converted into 2011 international USD, if feasible.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. The estimates of people living in poverty should include all humans, where \"Humans\" are defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with no more medical assistance than would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "4.260B", "median": "4.471B", "upper_75": "4.701B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.88B people in the world will live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nWhile defining specific thresholds for poverty is inherently somewhat arbitrary, in studying broad trends of large populations, we see good news: for many definitions of poverty, the share of the world living in poverty [has declined](https://ourworldindata.org/no-matter-what-global-poverty-line). Over two centuries, the [majority of the world](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality#global-income-inequality) has moved out of extreme poverty (defined as living on less than $1.90 per day).\n\nIn 2022, OWID uses data from the World Bank's [Poverty and Inequality Platform](https://pip.worldbank.org/home), which accounts for the effect of [inflation](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#CPIs) over time, and for the differences in prices between countries with an estimated [Purchasing Power Parity](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#PPPs). The World Bank's estimate of \"living on $X per day\" is a [welfare aggregate](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html) which harmonizes data from different sources which variously survey individual income, consumption, or both. It is a measure of poverty, but not necessarily a measure of individual consumption or income, per se. The World Bank reports poverty rates [per individual](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html#equivalence-scale), not by household.\n\nIn 2022, the World Bank [updated their reference unit](https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updating-world-banks-societal-poverty-line-2017-purchasing-power-parities) to 2017 INT USD, bringing the poverty line for \"extreme poverty\" from 1.90 2011 USD to 2.15 2017 USD. In real terms, the poverty lines remain equivalent, however in re-evaluating past data the World Bank found the 2011 INT USD slightly underestimated the share of people living in extreme poverty.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the absolute number of people in the world who live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the respective year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/distribution-of-population-poverty-thresholds). For example, in 2019 this figure was 4.701 billion according to OWID.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If OWID reports global poverty rates in another reference unit, their data will be converted into 2011 international USD, if feasible.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. The estimates of people living in poverty should include all humans, where \"Humans\" are defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with no more medical assistance than would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "3.26B", "median": "3.88B", "upper_75": "4.50B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.552B people in the world will live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the following years? (2025)", "desc": "\n\nWhile defining specific thresholds for poverty is inherently somewhat arbitrary, in studying broad trends of large populations, we see good news: for many definitions of poverty, the share of the world living in poverty [has declined](https://ourworldindata.org/no-matter-what-global-poverty-line). Over two centuries, the [majority of the world](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality#global-income-inequality) has moved out of extreme poverty (defined as living on less than $1.90 per day).\n\nIn 2022, OWID uses data from the World Bank's [Poverty and Inequality Platform](https://pip.worldbank.org/home), which accounts for the effect of [inflation](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#CPIs) over time, and for the differences in prices between countries with an estimated [Purchasing Power Parity](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#PPPs). The World Bank's estimate of \"living on $X per day\" is a [welfare aggregate](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html) which harmonizes data from different sources which variously survey individual income, consumption, or both. It is a measure of poverty, but not necessarily a measure of individual consumption or income, per se. The World Bank reports poverty rates [per individual](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html#equivalence-scale), not by household.\n\nIn 2022, the World Bank [updated their reference unit](https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updating-world-banks-societal-poverty-line-2017-purchasing-power-parities) to 2017 INT USD, bringing the poverty line for \"extreme poverty\" from 1.90 2011 USD to 2.15 2017 USD. In real terms, the poverty lines remain equivalent, however in re-evaluating past data the World Bank found the 2011 INT USD slightly underestimated the share of people living in extreme poverty.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the absolute number of people in the world who live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the respective year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/distribution-of-population-poverty-thresholds). For example, in 2019 this figure was 4.701 billion according to OWID.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If OWID reports global poverty rates in another reference unit, their data will be converted into 2011 international USD, if feasible.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. The estimates of people living in poverty should include all humans, where \"Humans\" are defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with no more medical assistance than would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "4.552B", "median": "4.617B", "upper_75": "4.690B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the fastest supercomputer on record will have a speed of 2.77×1018 FLOPS by 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.07×1018", "median": "2.77×1018", "upper_75": "3.73×1018", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.552B people in the world will live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the following years? (2025)", "desc": "\n\nWhile defining specific thresholds for poverty is inherently somewhat arbitrary, in studying broad trends of large populations, we see good news: for many definitions of poverty, the share of the world living in poverty [has declined](https://ourworldindata.org/no-matter-what-global-poverty-line). Over two centuries, the [majority of the world](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality#global-income-inequality) has moved out of extreme poverty (defined as living on less than $1.90 per day).\n\nIn 2022, OWID uses data from the World Bank's [Poverty and Inequality Platform](https://pip.worldbank.org/home), which accounts for the effect of [inflation](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#CPIs) over time, and for the differences in prices between countries with an estimated [Purchasing Power Parity](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#PPPs). The World Bank's estimate of \"living on $X per day\" is a [welfare aggregate](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html) which harmonizes data from different sources which variously survey individual income, consumption, or both. It is a measure of poverty, but not necessarily a measure of individual consumption or income, per se. The World Bank reports poverty rates [per individual](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html#equivalence-scale), not by household.\n\nIn 2022, the World Bank [updated their reference unit](https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updating-world-banks-societal-poverty-line-2017-purchasing-power-parities) to 2017 INT USD, bringing the poverty line for \"extreme poverty\" from 1.90 2011 USD to 2.15 2017 USD. In real terms, the poverty lines remain equivalent, however in re-evaluating past data the World Bank found the 2011 INT USD slightly underestimated the share of people living in extreme poverty.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the absolute number of people in the world who live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the respective year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/distribution-of-population-poverty-thresholds). For example, in 2019 this figure was 4.701 billion according to OWID.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If OWID reports global poverty rates in another reference unit, their data will be converted into 2011 international USD, if feasible.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. The estimates of people living in poverty should include all humans, where \"Humans\" are defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with no more medical assistance than would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "4.552B", "median": "4.617B", "upper_75": "4.690B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the fastest supercomputer on record will have a speed of 9.02×1019 FLOPS by 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.39×1019", "median": "4.59×1019", "upper_75": "9.02×1019", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the fastest supercomputer on record will have a speed of 9.02×1019 FLOPS by 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.39×1019", "median": "4.59×1019", "upper_75": "9.02×1019", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) will be 37.62B in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "36.41B", "median": "37.09B", "upper_75": "37.62B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.88B people in the world will live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nWhile defining specific thresholds for poverty is inherently somewhat arbitrary, in studying broad trends of large populations, we see good news: for many definitions of poverty, the share of the world living in poverty [has declined](https://ourworldindata.org/no-matter-what-global-poverty-line). Over two centuries, the [majority of the world](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality#global-income-inequality) has moved out of extreme poverty (defined as living on less than $1.90 per day).\n\nIn 2022, OWID uses data from the World Bank's [Poverty and Inequality Platform](https://pip.worldbank.org/home), which accounts for the effect of [inflation](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#CPIs) over time, and for the differences in prices between countries with an estimated [Purchasing Power Parity](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#PPPs). The World Bank's estimate of \"living on $X per day\" is a [welfare aggregate](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html) which harmonizes data from different sources which variously survey individual income, consumption, or both. It is a measure of poverty, but not necessarily a measure of individual consumption or income, per se. The World Bank reports poverty rates [per individual](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html#equivalence-scale), not by household.\n\nIn 2022, the World Bank [updated their reference unit](https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updating-world-banks-societal-poverty-line-2017-purchasing-power-parities) to 2017 INT USD, bringing the poverty line for \"extreme poverty\" from 1.90 2011 USD to 2.15 2017 USD. In real terms, the poverty lines remain equivalent, however in re-evaluating past data the World Bank found the 2011 INT USD slightly underestimated the share of people living in extreme poverty.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the absolute number of people in the world who live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the respective year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/distribution-of-population-poverty-thresholds). For example, in 2019 this figure was 4.701 billion according to OWID.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If OWID reports global poverty rates in another reference unit, their data will be converted into 2011 international USD, if feasible.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. The estimates of people living in poverty should include all humans, where \"Humans\" are defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with no more medical assistance than would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "3.26B", "median": "3.88B", "upper_75": "4.50B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.95B people in the world will live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "886M", "median": "1.95B", "upper_75": "3.82B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) will be 37.62B in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "36.41B", "median": "37.09B", "upper_75": "37.62B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.88B people in the world will live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\nWhile defining specific thresholds for poverty is inherently somewhat arbitrary, in studying broad trends of large populations, we see good news: for many definitions of poverty, the share of the world living in poverty [has declined](https://ourworldindata.org/no-matter-what-global-poverty-line). Over two centuries, the [majority of the world](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality#global-income-inequality) has moved out of extreme poverty (defined as living on less than $1.90 per day).\n\nIn 2022, OWID uses data from the World Bank's [Poverty and Inequality Platform](https://pip.worldbank.org/home), which accounts for the effect of [inflation](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#CPIs) over time, and for the differences in prices between countries with an estimated [Purchasing Power Parity](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#PPPs). The World Bank's estimate of \"living on $X per day\" is a [welfare aggregate](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html) which harmonizes data from different sources which variously survey individual income, consumption, or both. It is a measure of poverty, but not necessarily a measure of individual consumption or income, per se. The World Bank reports poverty rates [per individual](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html#equivalence-scale), not by household.\n\nIn 2022, the World Bank [updated their reference unit](https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updating-world-banks-societal-poverty-line-2017-purchasing-power-parities) to 2017 INT USD, bringing the poverty line for \"extreme poverty\" from 1.90 2011 USD to 2.15 2017 USD. In real terms, the poverty lines remain equivalent, however in re-evaluating past data the World Bank found the 2011 INT USD slightly underestimated the share of people living in extreme poverty.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the absolute number of people in the world who live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the respective year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/distribution-of-population-poverty-thresholds). For example, in 2019 this figure was 4.701 billion according to OWID.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If OWID reports global poverty rates in another reference unit, their data will be converted into 2011 international USD, if feasible.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. The estimates of people living in poverty should include all humans, where \"Humans\" are defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with no more medical assistance than would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "3.26B", "median": "3.88B", "upper_75": "4.50B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.95B people in the world will live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "886M", "median": "1.95B", "upper_75": "3.82B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) will be 37.62B in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "36.41B", "median": "37.09B", "upper_75": "37.62B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.95B people in the world will live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "886M", "median": "1.95B", "upper_75": "3.82B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) will be 38.09B in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes land use change. The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming current technology and policy trends continue) that global energy-related CO2 emissions would increase through 2050.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of CO2 (in tonnes) emitted by humanity on Earth in the following years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~OWID_WRL). This estimate will include all CO2 emissions from energy production (from coal, oil, gas and flaring) and direct industrial emissions from cement and steel production, but excludes emissions from land use change. For example, in 2020, global CO2 emissions were 34.807 billion tonnes.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "36.17B", "median": "37.07B", "upper_75": "38.09B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.619B people in the world will live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nWhile defining specific thresholds for poverty is inherently somewhat arbitrary, in studying broad trends of large populations, we see good news: for many definitions of poverty, the share of the world living in poverty [has declined](https://ourworldindata.org/no-matter-what-global-poverty-line). Over two centuries, the [majority of the world](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality#global-income-inequality) has moved out of extreme poverty (defined as living on less than $1.90 per day).\n\nIn 2022, OWID uses data from the World Bank's [Poverty and Inequality Platform](https://pip.worldbank.org/home), which accounts for the effect of [inflation](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#CPIs) over time, and for the differences in prices between countries with an estimated [Purchasing Power Parity](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#PPPs). The World Bank's estimate of \"living on $X per day\" is a [welfare aggregate](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html) which harmonizes data from different sources which variously survey individual income, consumption, or both. It is a measure of poverty, but not necessarily a measure of individual consumption or income, per se. The World Bank reports poverty rates [per individual](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html#equivalence-scale), not by household.\n\nIn 2022, the World Bank [updated their reference unit](https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updating-world-banks-societal-poverty-line-2017-purchasing-power-parities) to 2017 INT USD, bringing the poverty line for \"extreme poverty\" from 1.90 2011 USD to 2.15 2017 USD. In real terms, the poverty lines remain equivalent, however in re-evaluating past data the World Bank found the 2011 INT USD slightly underestimated the share of people living in extreme poverty.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the absolute number of people in the world who live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the respective year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/distribution-of-population-poverty-thresholds). For example, in 2019 this figure was 4.701 billion according to OWID.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If OWID reports global poverty rates in another reference unit, their data will be converted into 2011 international USD, if feasible.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. The estimates of people living in poverty should include all humans, where \"Humans\" are defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with no more medical assistance than would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "4.619B", "median": "4.669B", "upper_75": "4.711B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) will be 38.09B in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes land use change. The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming current technology and policy trends continue) that global energy-related CO2 emissions would increase through 2050.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of CO2 (in tonnes) emitted by humanity on Earth in the following years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~OWID_WRL). This estimate will include all CO2 emissions from energy production (from coal, oil, gas and flaring) and direct industrial emissions from cement and steel production, but excludes emissions from land use change. For example, in 2020, global CO2 emissions were 34.807 billion tonnes.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "36.17B", "median": "37.07B", "upper_75": "38.09B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) will be 38.8B in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes land use change. The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming current technology and policy trends continue) that global energy-related CO2 emissions would increase through 2050.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of CO2 (in tonnes) emitted by humanity on Earth in the following years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~OWID_WRL). This estimate will include all CO2 emissions from energy production (from coal, oil, gas and flaring) and direct industrial emissions from cement and steel production, but excludes emissions from land use change. For example, in 2020, global CO2 emissions were 34.807 billion tonnes.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "29.8B", "median": "34.4B", "upper_75": "38.8B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.552B people in the world will live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the following years? (2025)", "desc": "\n\nWhile defining specific thresholds for poverty is inherently somewhat arbitrary, in studying broad trends of large populations, we see good news: for many definitions of poverty, the share of the world living in poverty [has declined](https://ourworldindata.org/no-matter-what-global-poverty-line). Over two centuries, the [majority of the world](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality#global-income-inequality) has moved out of extreme poverty (defined as living on less than $1.90 per day).\n\nIn 2022, OWID uses data from the World Bank's [Poverty and Inequality Platform](https://pip.worldbank.org/home), which accounts for the effect of [inflation](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#CPIs) over time, and for the differences in prices between countries with an estimated [Purchasing Power Parity](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/convert.html#PPPs). The World Bank's estimate of \"living on $X per day\" is a [welfare aggregate](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html) which harmonizes data from different sources which variously survey individual income, consumption, or both. It is a measure of poverty, but not necessarily a measure of individual consumption or income, per se. The World Bank reports poverty rates [per individual](https://worldbank.github.io/PIP-Methodology/welfareaggregate.html#equivalence-scale), not by household.\n\nIn 2022, the World Bank [updated their reference unit](https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/updating-world-banks-societal-poverty-line-2017-purchasing-power-parities) to 2017 INT USD, bringing the poverty line for \"extreme poverty\" from 1.90 2011 USD to 2.15 2017 USD. In real terms, the poverty lines remain equivalent, however in re-evaluating past data the World Bank found the 2011 INT USD slightly underestimated the share of people living in extreme poverty.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the absolute number of people in the world who live on $10 (2011 INT USD) or less per day in the respective year, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/distribution-of-population-poverty-thresholds). For example, in 2019 this figure was 4.701 billion according to OWID.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If OWID reports global poverty rates in another reference unit, their data will be converted into 2011 international USD, if feasible.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**. The estimates of people living in poverty should include all humans, where \"Humans\" are defined as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2022 humans with no more medical assistance than would be available in the year 1900.", "lower_25": "4.552B", "median": "4.617B", "upper_75": "4.690B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) will be 17.2B in the following years?", "desc": "\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes land use change. The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming current technology and policy trends continue) that global energy-related CO2 emissions would increase through 2050.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of CO2 (in tonnes) emitted by humanity on Earth in the following years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~OWID_WRL). This estimate will include all CO2 emissions from energy production (from coal, oil, gas and flaring) and direct industrial emissions from cement and steel production, but excludes emissions from land use change. For example, in 2020, global CO2 emissions were 34.807 billion tonnes.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.99B", "median": "6.05B", "upper_75": "17.2B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) will be 11.3B in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes land use change. The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming current technology and policy trends continue) that global energy-related CO2 emissions would increase through 2050.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of CO2 (in tonnes) emitted by humanity on Earth in the following years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~OWID_WRL). This estimate will include all CO2 emissions from energy production (from coal, oil, gas and flaring) and direct industrial emissions from cement and steel production, but excludes emissions from land use change. For example, in 2020, global CO2 emissions were 34.807 billion tonnes.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "11.3B", "median": "18.4B", "upper_75": "30.9B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) will be 11.3B in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes land use change. The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming current technology and policy trends continue) that global energy-related CO2 emissions would increase through 2050.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of CO2 (in tonnes) emitted by humanity on Earth in the following years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~OWID_WRL). This estimate will include all CO2 emissions from energy production (from coal, oil, gas and flaring) and direct industrial emissions from cement and steel production, but excludes emissions from land use change. For example, in 2020, global CO2 emissions were 34.807 billion tonnes.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "11.3B", "median": "18.4B", "upper_75": "30.9B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that productivity in the United States will be 76.85% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "75.92", "median": "76.85", "upper_75": "77.72", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) will be 17.2B in the following years?", "desc": "\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes land use change. The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming current technology and policy trends continue) that global energy-related CO2 emissions would increase through 2050.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of CO2 (in tonnes) emitted by humanity on Earth in the following years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~OWID_WRL). This estimate will include all CO2 emissions from energy production (from coal, oil, gas and flaring) and direct industrial emissions from cement and steel production, but excludes emissions from land use change. For example, in 2020, global CO2 emissions were 34.807 billion tonnes.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.99B", "median": "6.05B", "upper_75": "17.2B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that productivity in the United States will be 80.03% in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "\n\n[Labor productivity](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/labor-productivity.asp) measures the economic output per hours worked. Labor productivity can increase due to new technologies that reduce the amount of labor required to output goods and services, and growing labor productivity can indicate growth in quality of life in a country.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Productivity: output per hour worked](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-productivity-per-hour-pennworldtable?tab=chart&country=~USA) shows the [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) per hour worked in the United States, in dollars per hour. The underlying source is the [Penn World Table](https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/), a database of economic information covering much of the world and with statistics dating back to 1950.\n\nIn version 10.0 of the Penn World Table the [reference year switched](https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/docs/pwt100-whatsnew.pdf) from using 2011 US dollars to 2017 US dollars.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the productivity, or gross domestic product (GDP) per hour of work, in the United States in the listed year in dollars per hour **adjusted for inflation to 2017 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-productivity-per-hour-pennworldtable?tab=chart&country=~USA). For example, this figure was 73.70 in 2019, in 2017 USD. Inflation adjustment to 2017 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "76.67", "median": "78.27", "upper_75": "80.03", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) will be 17.2B in the following years?", "desc": "\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes land use change. The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming current technology and policy trends continue) that global energy-related CO2 emissions would increase through 2050.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of CO2 (in tonnes) emitted by humanity on Earth in the following years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~OWID_WRL). This estimate will include all CO2 emissions from energy production (from coal, oil, gas and flaring) and direct industrial emissions from cement and steel production, but excludes emissions from land use change. For example, in 2020, global CO2 emissions were 34.807 billion tonnes.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.99B", "median": "6.05B", "upper_75": "17.2B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) will be 11.3B in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes land use change. The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming current technology and policy trends continue) that global energy-related CO2 emissions would increase through 2050.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of CO2 (in tonnes) emitted by humanity on Earth in the following years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~OWID_WRL). This estimate will include all CO2 emissions from energy production (from coal, oil, gas and flaring) and direct industrial emissions from cement and steel production, but excludes emissions from land use change. For example, in 2020, global CO2 emissions were 34.807 billion tonnes.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "11.3B", "median": "18.4B", "upper_75": "30.9B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) will be 38.8B in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes land use change. The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming current technology and policy trends continue) that global energy-related CO2 emissions would increase through 2050.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of CO2 (in tonnes) emitted by humanity on Earth in the following years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~OWID_WRL). This estimate will include all CO2 emissions from energy production (from coal, oil, gas and flaring) and direct industrial emissions from cement and steel production, but excludes emissions from land use change. For example, in 2020, global CO2 emissions were 34.807 billion tonnes.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "29.8B", "median": "34.4B", "upper_75": "38.8B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that productivity in the United States will be 96.8% in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\n[Labor productivity](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/labor-productivity.asp) measures the economic output per hours worked. Labor productivity can increase due to new technologies that reduce the amount of labor required to output goods and services, and growing labor productivity can indicate growth in quality of life in a country.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Productivity: output per hour worked](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-productivity-per-hour-pennworldtable?tab=chart&country=~USA) shows the [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) per hour worked in the United States, in dollars per hour. The underlying source is the [Penn World Table](https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/), a database of economic information covering much of the world and with statistics dating back to 1950.\n\nIn version 10.0 of the Penn World Table the [reference year switched](https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/docs/pwt100-whatsnew.pdf) from using 2011 US dollars to 2017 US dollars.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the productivity, or gross domestic product (GDP) per hour of work, in the United States in the listed year in dollars per hour **adjusted for inflation to 2017 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-productivity-per-hour-pennworldtable?tab=chart&country=~USA). For example, this figure was 73.70 in 2019, in 2017 USD. Inflation adjustment to 2017 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "83.4", "median": "89.3", "upper_75": "96.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that productivity in the United States will be 76.85% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "75.92", "median": "76.85", "upper_75": "77.72", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that productivity in the United States will be 76.85% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "75.92", "median": "76.85", "upper_75": "77.72", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that productivity in the United States will be 80.03% in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "\n\n[Labor productivity](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/labor-productivity.asp) measures the economic output per hours worked. Labor productivity can increase due to new technologies that reduce the amount of labor required to output goods and services, and growing labor productivity can indicate growth in quality of life in a country.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Productivity: output per hour worked](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-productivity-per-hour-pennworldtable?tab=chart&country=~USA) shows the [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) per hour worked in the United States, in dollars per hour. The underlying source is the [Penn World Table](https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/), a database of economic information covering much of the world and with statistics dating back to 1950.\n\nIn version 10.0 of the Penn World Table the [reference year switched](https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/docs/pwt100-whatsnew.pdf) from using 2011 US dollars to 2017 US dollars.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the productivity, or gross domestic product (GDP) per hour of work, in the United States in the listed year in dollars per hour **adjusted for inflation to 2017 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-productivity-per-hour-pennworldtable?tab=chart&country=~USA). For example, this figure was 73.70 in 2019, in 2017 USD. Inflation adjustment to 2017 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "76.67", "median": "78.27", "upper_75": "80.03", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that productivity in the United States will be 96.8% in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\n[Labor productivity](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/labor-productivity.asp) measures the economic output per hours worked. Labor productivity can increase due to new technologies that reduce the amount of labor required to output goods and services, and growing labor productivity can indicate growth in quality of life in a country.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Productivity: output per hour worked](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-productivity-per-hour-pennworldtable?tab=chart&country=~USA) shows the [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) per hour worked in the United States, in dollars per hour. The underlying source is the [Penn World Table](https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/), a database of economic information covering much of the world and with statistics dating back to 1950.\n\nIn version 10.0 of the Penn World Table the [reference year switched](https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/docs/pwt100-whatsnew.pdf) from using 2011 US dollars to 2017 US dollars.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the productivity, or gross domestic product (GDP) per hour of work, in the United States in the listed year in dollars per hour **adjusted for inflation to 2017 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-productivity-per-hour-pennworldtable?tab=chart&country=~USA). For example, this figure was 73.70 in 2019, in 2017 USD. Inflation adjustment to 2017 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "83.4", "median": "89.3", "upper_75": "96.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that productivity in the United States will be 96.8% in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\n[Labor productivity](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/labor-productivity.asp) measures the economic output per hours worked. Labor productivity can increase due to new technologies that reduce the amount of labor required to output goods and services, and growing labor productivity can indicate growth in quality of life in a country.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Productivity: output per hour worked](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-productivity-per-hour-pennworldtable?tab=chart&country=~USA) shows the [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) per hour worked in the United States, in dollars per hour. The underlying source is the [Penn World Table](https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/), a database of economic information covering much of the world and with statistics dating back to 1950.\n\nIn version 10.0 of the Penn World Table the [reference year switched](https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/docs/pwt100-whatsnew.pdf) from using 2011 US dollars to 2017 US dollars.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the productivity, or gross domestic product (GDP) per hour of work, in the United States in the listed year in dollars per hour **adjusted for inflation to 2017 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-productivity-per-hour-pennworldtable?tab=chart&country=~USA). For example, this figure was 73.70 in 2019, in 2017 USD. Inflation adjustment to 2017 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "83.4", "median": "89.3", "upper_75": "96.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that productivity in the United States will be 184% in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\n[Labor productivity](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/labor-productivity.asp) measures the economic output per hours worked. Labor productivity can increase due to new technologies that reduce the amount of labor required to output goods and services, and growing labor productivity can indicate growth in quality of life in a country.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Productivity: output per hour worked](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-productivity-per-hour-pennworldtable?tab=chart&country=~USA) shows the [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) per hour worked in the United States, in dollars per hour. The underlying source is the [Penn World Table](https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/), a database of economic information covering much of the world and with statistics dating back to 1950.\n\nIn version 10.0 of the Penn World Table the [reference year switched](https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/docs/pwt100-whatsnew.pdf) from using 2011 US dollars to 2017 US dollars.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the productivity, or gross domestic product (GDP) per hour of work, in the United States in the listed year in dollars per hour **adjusted for inflation to 2017 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-productivity-per-hour-pennworldtable?tab=chart&country=~USA). For example, this figure was 73.70 in 2019, in 2017 USD. Inflation adjustment to 2017 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "105", "median": "184", "upper_75": "364", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that productivity in the United States will be 80.03% in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "\n\n[Labor productivity](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/labor-productivity.asp) measures the economic output per hours worked. Labor productivity can increase due to new technologies that reduce the amount of labor required to output goods and services, and growing labor productivity can indicate growth in quality of life in a country.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Productivity: output per hour worked](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-productivity-per-hour-pennworldtable?tab=chart&country=~USA) shows the [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) per hour worked in the United States, in dollars per hour. The underlying source is the [Penn World Table](https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/), a database of economic information covering much of the world and with statistics dating back to 1950.\n\nIn version 10.0 of the Penn World Table the [reference year switched](https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/docs/pwt100-whatsnew.pdf) from using 2011 US dollars to 2017 US dollars.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the productivity, or gross domestic product (GDP) per hour of work, in the United States in the listed year in dollars per hour **adjusted for inflation to 2017 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-productivity-per-hour-pennworldtable?tab=chart&country=~USA). For example, this figure was 73.70 in 2019, in 2017 USD. Inflation adjustment to 2017 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "76.67", "median": "78.27", "upper_75": "80.03", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) will be 38.09B in the year 2025?", "desc": "\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes land use change. The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming current technology and policy trends continue) that global energy-related CO2 emissions would increase through 2050.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of CO2 (in tonnes) emitted by humanity on Earth in the following years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~OWID_WRL). This estimate will include all CO2 emissions from energy production (from coal, oil, gas and flaring) and direct industrial emissions from cement and steel production, but excludes emissions from land use change. For example, in 2020, global CO2 emissions were 34.807 billion tonnes.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "36.17B", "median": "37.07B", "upper_75": "38.09B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) will be 38.8B in the year 2032?", "desc": "\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes land use change. The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming current technology and policy trends continue) that global energy-related CO2 emissions would increase through 2050.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the amount of CO2 (in tonnes) emitted by humanity on Earth in the following years, according to [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~OWID_WRL). This estimate will include all CO2 emissions from energy production (from coal, oil, gas and flaring) and direct industrial emissions from cement and steel production, but excludes emissions from land use change. For example, in 2020, global CO2 emissions were 34.807 billion tonnes.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "29.8B", "median": "34.4B", "upper_75": "38.8B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that productivity in the United States will be 184% in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\n[Labor productivity](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/labor-productivity.asp) measures the economic output per hours worked. Labor productivity can increase due to new technologies that reduce the amount of labor required to output goods and services, and growing labor productivity can indicate growth in quality of life in a country.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Productivity: output per hour worked](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-productivity-per-hour-pennworldtable?tab=chart&country=~USA) shows the [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) per hour worked in the United States, in dollars per hour. The underlying source is the [Penn World Table](https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/), a database of economic information covering much of the world and with statistics dating back to 1950.\n\nIn version 10.0 of the Penn World Table the [reference year switched](https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/docs/pwt100-whatsnew.pdf) from using 2011 US dollars to 2017 US dollars.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the productivity, or gross domestic product (GDP) per hour of work, in the United States in the listed year in dollars per hour **adjusted for inflation to 2017 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-productivity-per-hour-pennworldtable?tab=chart&country=~USA). For example, this figure was 73.70 in 2019, in 2017 USD. Inflation adjustment to 2017 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "105", "median": "184", "upper_75": "364", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that productivity in the United States will be 29.3k in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "189", "median": "1.85k", "upper_75": "29.3k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that productivity in the United States will be 184% in the year 2052?", "desc": "\n\n[Labor productivity](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/labor-productivity.asp) measures the economic output per hours worked. Labor productivity can increase due to new technologies that reduce the amount of labor required to output goods and services, and growing labor productivity can indicate growth in quality of life in a country.\n\nThe Our World in Data chart [Productivity: output per hour worked](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-productivity-per-hour-pennworldtable?tab=chart&country=~USA) shows the [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) per hour worked in the United States, in dollars per hour. The underlying source is the [Penn World Table](https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/), a database of economic information covering much of the world and with statistics dating back to 1950.\n\nIn version 10.0 of the Penn World Table the [reference year switched](https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/docs/pwt100-whatsnew.pdf) from using 2011 US dollars to 2017 US dollars.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the productivity, or gross domestic product (GDP) per hour of work, in the United States in the listed year in dollars per hour **adjusted for inflation to 2017 US dollars**, based on the values provided by [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/labor-productivity-per-hour-pennworldtable?tab=chart&country=~USA). For example, this figure was 73.70 in 2019, in 2017 USD. Inflation adjustment to 2017 US dollars will be performed using the [World Bank's GDP deflator for the US](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=US), or a similar method if unavailable.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "105", "median": "184", "upper_75": "364", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that productivity in the United States will be 29.3k in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "189", "median": "1.85k", "upper_75": "29.3k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that productivity in the United States will be 29.3k in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "189", "median": "1.85k", "upper_75": "29.3k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.45B people will be living in liberal democracies in the world in the following years (2032)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "816M", "median": "1.10B", "upper_75": "1.45B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.08 billion people living in liberal democracies in the world by 2025?", "desc": "\n\nIn its article [Democracy](https://ourworldindata.org/democracy#), Our World in Data says the following about democratic rights\n\n>200 years ago, everyone lacked democratic rights. Now, [billions of people have them](https://ourworldindata.org/democratic-rights).\n>\n>But there are still large differences in the degree to which citizens enjoy political rights: most clearly between democracies and non-democracies, but also within these broad political regimes.\n>\n>To understand the extent of people's political rights, we shouldn't only look at whether a country is classified as a democracy or not. We should also look at smaller differences in *how democratic* countries are.\n\nIn the Our World in Data chart [People living in democracies and autocracies](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-in-democracies-autocracies?country=~OWID_WRL), the number of people around the world who are living in different types of political regimes are tracked. This chart uses data from the [Varieties of Democracy](https://v-dem.net/vdemds.html) (V-Dem) project, which Our World in Data describes as follows\n\n>The electoral democracy index from V-Dem tries to capture the extent to which [political leaders are elected](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/elected-political-leaders) under [comprehensive voting rights in free and fair elections](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/suffrage), and [freedoms of association](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/freedom-of-association?country=ARG~AUS~BWA~CHN) and [expression](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/freedom-of-expression) are guaranteed.\n\nThe classifications it uses are shown below, using a classification system from [Lührmann et al. (2018)](https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/1214)\n\n> * In **closed autocracies**, citizens do not have the right to choose either the chief executive of the government or the legislature through multi-party elections.\n> * In **electoral autocracies**, citizens have the right to choose the chief executive and the legislature through multi-party elections; but they lack some freedoms, such as the freedoms of association or expression, that make the elections meaningful, free, and fair.\n> * In **electoral democracies**, citizens have the right to participate in meaningful, free and fair, and multi-party elections.\n> * In **liberal democracies**, citizens have further individual and minority rights, are equal before the law, and the actions of the executive are constrained by the legislative and the courts.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the absolute number of people living in liberal democracies in the world in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-in-democracies-autocracies?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.05 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "969M", "median": "1.08B", "upper_75": "1.21B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.028 billion people living in liberal democracies in the world in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nIn its article [Democracy](https://ourworldindata.org/democracy#), Our World in Data says the following about democratic rights\n\n>200 years ago, everyone lacked democratic rights. Now, [billions of people have them](https://ourworldindata.org/democratic-rights).\n>\n>But there are still large differences in the degree to which citizens enjoy political rights: most clearly between democracies and non-democracies, but also within these broad political regimes.\n>\n>To understand the extent of people's political rights, we shouldn't only look at whether a country is classified as a democracy or not. We should also look at smaller differences in *how democratic* countries are.\n\nIn the Our World in Data chart [People living in democracies and autocracies](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-in-democracies-autocracies?country=~OWID_WRL), the number of people around the world who are living in different types of political regimes are tracked. This chart uses data from the [Varieties of Democracy](https://v-dem.net/vdemds.html) (V-Dem) project, which Our World in Data describes as follows\n\n>The electoral democracy index from V-Dem tries to capture the extent to which [political leaders are elected](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/elected-political-leaders) under [comprehensive voting rights in free and fair elections](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/suffrage), and [freedoms of association](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/freedom-of-association?country=ARG~AUS~BWA~CHN) and [expression](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/freedom-of-expression) are guaranteed.\n\nThe classifications it uses are shown below, using a classification system from [Lührmann et al. (2018)](https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/1214)\n\n> * In **closed autocracies**, citizens do not have the right to choose either the chief executive of the government or the legislature through multi-party elections.\n> * In **electoral autocracies**, citizens have the right to choose the chief executive and the legislature through multi-party elections; but they lack some freedoms, such as the freedoms of association or expression, that make the elections meaningful, free, and fair.\n> * In **electoral democracies**, citizens have the right to participate in meaningful, free and fair, and multi-party elections.\n> * In **liberal democracies**, citizens have further individual and minority rights, are equal before the law, and the actions of the executive are constrained by the legislative and the courts.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the absolute number of people living in liberal democracies in the world in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-in-democracies-autocracies?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.05 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "990.3M", "median": "1.028B", "upper_75": "1.082B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.16 billion people living in liberal democracies in the world by 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "623M", "median": "1.16B", "upper_75": "2.24B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 226 million people will be living in liberal democracies in the world in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "226M", "median": "1.32B", "upper_75": "3.46B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.08 billion people living in liberal democracies in the world by 2025?", "desc": "\n\nIn its article [Democracy](https://ourworldindata.org/democracy#), Our World in Data says the following about democratic rights\n\n>200 years ago, everyone lacked democratic rights. Now, [billions of people have them](https://ourworldindata.org/democratic-rights).\n>\n>But there are still large differences in the degree to which citizens enjoy political rights: most clearly between democracies and non-democracies, but also within these broad political regimes.\n>\n>To understand the extent of people's political rights, we shouldn't only look at whether a country is classified as a democracy or not. We should also look at smaller differences in *how democratic* countries are.\n\nIn the Our World in Data chart [People living in democracies and autocracies](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-in-democracies-autocracies?country=~OWID_WRL), the number of people around the world who are living in different types of political regimes are tracked. This chart uses data from the [Varieties of Democracy](https://v-dem.net/vdemds.html) (V-Dem) project, which Our World in Data describes as follows\n\n>The electoral democracy index from V-Dem tries to capture the extent to which [political leaders are elected](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/elected-political-leaders) under [comprehensive voting rights in free and fair elections](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/suffrage), and [freedoms of association](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/freedom-of-association?country=ARG~AUS~BWA~CHN) and [expression](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/freedom-of-expression) are guaranteed.\n\nThe classifications it uses are shown below, using a classification system from [Lührmann et al. (2018)](https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/1214)\n\n> * In **closed autocracies**, citizens do not have the right to choose either the chief executive of the government or the legislature through multi-party elections.\n> * In **electoral autocracies**, citizens have the right to choose the chief executive and the legislature through multi-party elections; but they lack some freedoms, such as the freedoms of association or expression, that make the elections meaningful, free, and fair.\n> * In **electoral democracies**, citizens have the right to participate in meaningful, free and fair, and multi-party elections.\n> * In **liberal democracies**, citizens have further individual and minority rights, are equal before the law, and the actions of the executive are constrained by the legislative and the courts.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the absolute number of people living in liberal democracies in the world in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-in-democracies-autocracies?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.05 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "969M", "median": "1.08B", "upper_75": "1.21B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.16 billion people living in liberal democracies in the world by 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "623M", "median": "1.16B", "upper_75": "2.24B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.028 billion people living in liberal democracies in the world in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nIn its article [Democracy](https://ourworldindata.org/democracy#), Our World in Data says the following about democratic rights\n\n>200 years ago, everyone lacked democratic rights. Now, [billions of people have them](https://ourworldindata.org/democratic-rights).\n>\n>But there are still large differences in the degree to which citizens enjoy political rights: most clearly between democracies and non-democracies, but also within these broad political regimes.\n>\n>To understand the extent of people's political rights, we shouldn't only look at whether a country is classified as a democracy or not. We should also look at smaller differences in *how democratic* countries are.\n\nIn the Our World in Data chart [People living in democracies and autocracies](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-in-democracies-autocracies?country=~OWID_WRL), the number of people around the world who are living in different types of political regimes are tracked. This chart uses data from the [Varieties of Democracy](https://v-dem.net/vdemds.html) (V-Dem) project, which Our World in Data describes as follows\n\n>The electoral democracy index from V-Dem tries to capture the extent to which [political leaders are elected](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/elected-political-leaders) under [comprehensive voting rights in free and fair elections](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/suffrage), and [freedoms of association](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/freedom-of-association?country=ARG~AUS~BWA~CHN) and [expression](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/freedom-of-expression) are guaranteed.\n\nThe classifications it uses are shown below, using a classification system from [Lührmann et al. (2018)](https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/1214)\n\n> * In **closed autocracies**, citizens do not have the right to choose either the chief executive of the government or the legislature through multi-party elections.\n> * In **electoral autocracies**, citizens have the right to choose the chief executive and the legislature through multi-party elections; but they lack some freedoms, such as the freedoms of association or expression, that make the elections meaningful, free, and fair.\n> * In **electoral democracies**, citizens have the right to participate in meaningful, free and fair, and multi-party elections.\n> * In **liberal democracies**, citizens have further individual and minority rights, are equal before the law, and the actions of the executive are constrained by the legislative and the courts.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the absolute number of people living in liberal democracies in the world in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-in-democracies-autocracies?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.05 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "990.3M", "median": "1.028B", "upper_75": "1.082B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.028 billion people living in liberal democracies in the world in the following years?", "desc": "\n\nIn its article [Democracy](https://ourworldindata.org/democracy#), Our World in Data says the following about democratic rights\n\n>200 years ago, everyone lacked democratic rights. Now, [billions of people have them](https://ourworldindata.org/democratic-rights).\n>\n>But there are still large differences in the degree to which citizens enjoy political rights: most clearly between democracies and non-democracies, but also within these broad political regimes.\n>\n>To understand the extent of people's political rights, we shouldn't only look at whether a country is classified as a democracy or not. We should also look at smaller differences in *how democratic* countries are.\n\nIn the Our World in Data chart [People living in democracies and autocracies](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-in-democracies-autocracies?country=~OWID_WRL), the number of people around the world who are living in different types of political regimes are tracked. This chart uses data from the [Varieties of Democracy](https://v-dem.net/vdemds.html) (V-Dem) project, which Our World in Data describes as follows\n\n>The electoral democracy index from V-Dem tries to capture the extent to which [political leaders are elected](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/elected-political-leaders) under [comprehensive voting rights in free and fair elections](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/suffrage), and [freedoms of association](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/freedom-of-association?country=ARG~AUS~BWA~CHN) and [expression](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/freedom-of-expression) are guaranteed.\n\nThe classifications it uses are shown below, using a classification system from [Lührmann et al. (2018)](https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/1214)\n\n> * In **closed autocracies**, citizens do not have the right to choose either the chief executive of the government or the legislature through multi-party elections.\n> * In **electoral autocracies**, citizens have the right to choose the chief executive and the legislature through multi-party elections; but they lack some freedoms, such as the freedoms of association or expression, that make the elections meaningful, free, and fair.\n> * In **electoral democracies**, citizens have the right to participate in meaningful, free and fair, and multi-party elections.\n> * In **liberal democracies**, citizens have further individual and minority rights, are equal before the law, and the actions of the executive are constrained by the legislative and the courts.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the absolute number of people living in liberal democracies in the world in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-in-democracies-autocracies?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.05 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "990.3M", "median": "1.028B", "upper_75": "1.082B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.45B people will be living in liberal democracies in the world in the following years (2032)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "816M", "median": "1.10B", "upper_75": "1.45B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total annual investment (in 2021 USD) in AI companies in the world will be 344B in the listed years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "240B", "median": "290B", "upper_75": "344B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.08 billion people living in liberal democracies in the world by 2025?", "desc": "\n\nIn its article [Democracy](https://ourworldindata.org/democracy#), Our World in Data says the following about democratic rights\n\n>200 years ago, everyone lacked democratic rights. Now, [billions of people have them](https://ourworldindata.org/democratic-rights).\n>\n>But there are still large differences in the degree to which citizens enjoy political rights: most clearly between democracies and non-democracies, but also within these broad political regimes.\n>\n>To understand the extent of people's political rights, we shouldn't only look at whether a country is classified as a democracy or not. We should also look at smaller differences in *how democratic* countries are.\n\nIn the Our World in Data chart [People living in democracies and autocracies](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-in-democracies-autocracies?country=~OWID_WRL), the number of people around the world who are living in different types of political regimes are tracked. This chart uses data from the [Varieties of Democracy](https://v-dem.net/vdemds.html) (V-Dem) project, which Our World in Data describes as follows\n\n>The electoral democracy index from V-Dem tries to capture the extent to which [political leaders are elected](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/elected-political-leaders) under [comprehensive voting rights in free and fair elections](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/suffrage), and [freedoms of association](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/freedom-of-association?country=ARG~AUS~BWA~CHN) and [expression](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/freedom-of-expression) are guaranteed.\n\nThe classifications it uses are shown below, using a classification system from [Lührmann et al. (2018)](https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/1214)\n\n> * In **closed autocracies**, citizens do not have the right to choose either the chief executive of the government or the legislature through multi-party elections.\n> * In **electoral autocracies**, citizens have the right to choose the chief executive and the legislature through multi-party elections; but they lack some freedoms, such as the freedoms of association or expression, that make the elections meaningful, free, and fair.\n> * In **electoral democracies**, citizens have the right to participate in meaningful, free and fair, and multi-party elections.\n> * In **liberal democracies**, citizens have further individual and minority rights, are equal before the law, and the actions of the executive are constrained by the legislative and the courts.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the absolute number of people living in liberal democracies in the world in the listed year, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/people-living-in-democracies-autocracies?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, this figure was 1.05 billion in 2021.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "969M", "median": "1.08B", "upper_75": "1.21B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 226 million people will be living in liberal democracies in the world in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "226M", "median": "1.32B", "upper_75": "3.46B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total annual investment (in 2021 USD) in AI companies in the world will be 344B in the listed years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "240B", "median": "290B", "upper_75": "344B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.16 billion people living in liberal democracies in the world by 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "623M", "median": "1.16B", "upper_75": "2.24B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total annual investment (in 2021 USD) in AI companies in the world will be 344B in the listed years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "240B", "median": "290B", "upper_75": "344B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 226 million people will be living in liberal democracies in the world in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "226M", "median": "1.32B", "upper_75": "3.46B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total annual investment (in 2021 USD) in AI companies in the world will be 837B in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "383B", "median": "574B", "upper_75": "837B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total annual investment (in 2021 USD) in AI companies in the world will be 837B in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "383B", "median": "574B", "upper_75": "837B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total annual investment (in 2021 USD) in AI companies in the world will be 3.40×1012 in the year 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "824B", "median": "1.64×1012", "upper_75": "3.40×1012", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total annual investment (in 2021 USD) in AI companies in the world will be 837B in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "383B", "median": "574B", "upper_75": "837B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.45B people will be living in liberal democracies in the world in the following years (2032)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "816M", "median": "1.10B", "upper_75": "1.45B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated chance that the highest computation (in FLOP) used in large AI training runs will be 9.21×1025 by the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.21×1025", "median": "2.65×1026", "upper_75": "8.36×1026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total annual investment (in 2021 USD) in AI companies in the world will be 3.40×1012 in the year 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "824B", "median": "1.64×1012", "upper_75": "3.40×1012", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total annual investment (in 2021 USD) in AI companies in the world in the listed years will be 1.99×1012?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.99×1012", "median": "3.51×1014", "upper_75": "1.31×1016", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest estimated computation (in FLOP) used in large AI training runs will be 1.34×1025 by the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.34×1025", "median": "2.00×1025", "upper_75": "3.04×1025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest estimated computation (in FLOP) used in large AI training runs will be 1.34×1025 by the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.34×1025", "median": "2.00×1025", "upper_75": "3.04×1025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total annual investment (in 2021 USD) in AI companies in the world in the listed years will be 1.99×1012?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.99×1012", "median": "3.51×1014", "upper_75": "1.31×1016", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total annual investment (in 2021 USD) in AI companies in the world in the listed years will be 1.32×1013?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.44×1012", "median": "4.11×1012", "upper_75": "1.32×1013", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total annual investment (in 2021 USD) in AI companies in the world will be 3.40×1012 in the year 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "824B", "median": "1.64×1012", "upper_75": "3.40×1012", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total annual investment (in 2021 USD) in AI companies in the world in the listed years will be 1.32×1013?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.44×1012", "median": "4.11×1012", "upper_75": "1.32×1013", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest estimated computation (in FLOP) used in large AI training runs will be 1.34×1025 by the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.34×1025", "median": "2.00×1025", "upper_75": "3.04×1025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated chance that the highest computation (in FLOP) used in large AI training runs will be 9.21×1025 by the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.21×1025", "median": "2.65×1026", "upper_75": "8.36×1026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated chance that the highest computation (in FLOP) used in large AI training runs will be 9.21×1025 by the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.21×1025", "median": "2.65×1026", "upper_75": "8.36×1026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest estimated computation (in FLOP) used in large AI training runs will be 8.50×1029 by the year 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.51×1027", "median": "4.19×1028", "upper_75": "8.50×1029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest estimated computation (in FLOP) used in large AI training runs will be 8.50×1029 by the year 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.51×1027", "median": "4.19×1028", "upper_75": "8.50×1029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest estimated computation (in FLOP) used in large AI training runs will be 8.50×1029 by the year 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.51×1027", "median": "4.19×1028", "upper_75": "8.50×1029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated chance that the highest computation (in FLOP) used in large AI training runs will be 2.21×1051 by the year 2122?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.54×1043", "median": "2.21×1051", "upper_75": "3.70×1066", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated chance that the highest computation (in FLOP) used in large AI training runs will be 2.21×1051 by the year 2122?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.54×1043", "median": "2.21×1051", "upper_75": "3.70×1066", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated chance that the highest computation (in FLOP) used in large AI training runs will be 8.93×1036 by the year 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.23×1034", "median": "8.93×1036", "upper_75": "4.38×1040", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.6 countries will have AAA-rated sovereign debt according to S&P in 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.23", "median": "10.6", "upper_75": "12.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a top celebrity musician will accuse AI of unfairly mimicking their style by Aug 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Aug 2024", "upper_75": "Feb 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated chance that the highest computation (in FLOP) used in large AI training runs will be 8.93×1036 by the year 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.23×1034", "median": "8.93×1036", "upper_75": "4.38×1040", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a top celebrity musician will accuse AI of unfairly mimicking their style by Aug 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Aug 2024", "upper_75": "Feb 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a top celebrity musician will accuse AI of unfairly mimicking their style by Aug 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Aug 2024", "upper_75": "Feb 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total annual investment (in 2021 USD) in AI companies in the world in the listed years will be 1.99×1012?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.99×1012", "median": "3.51×1014", "upper_75": "1.31×1016", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.6 countries will have AAA-rated sovereign debt according to S&P in 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.23", "median": "10.6", "upper_75": "12.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated chance that the highest computation (in FLOP) used in large AI training runs will be 2.21×1051 by the year 2122?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.54×1043", "median": "2.21×1051", "upper_75": "3.70×1066", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated chance that the highest computation (in FLOP) used in large AI training runs will be 8.93×1036 by the year 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.23×1034", "median": "8.93×1036", "upper_75": "4.38×1040", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 236 successful orbital rocket launches in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "204", "median": "236", "upper_75": "269", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.6 countries will have AAA-rated sovereign debt according to S&P in 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.23", "median": "10.6", "upper_75": "12.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total annual investment (in 2021 USD) in AI companies in the world in the listed years will be 1.32×1013?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.44×1012", "median": "4.11×1012", "upper_75": "1.32×1013", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 236 successful orbital rocket launches in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "204", "median": "236", "upper_75": "269", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 236 successful orbital rocket launches in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "204", "median": "236", "upper_75": "269", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global annual death rate (per 100,000 people) from infectious disease will be 103 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "96.5", "median": "103", "upper_75": "112", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global annual death rate (per 100,000 people) from infectious disease will be 103 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "96.5", "median": "103", "upper_75": "112", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global annual death rate (per 100,000 people) from infectious disease will be 113 in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "94.7", "median": "102", "upper_75": "113", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global annual death rate (per 100,000 people) from infectious disease will be 103 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "96.5", "median": "103", "upper_75": "112", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global annual death rate (per 100,000 people) from infectious disease will be 113 in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "94.7", "median": "102", "upper_75": "113", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many Falcon 9 failures will there be before 2026?\n\nKeyword: 1.26\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that there will be 1.26 Falcon 9 failures before 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.039", "median": "0.935", "upper_75": "1.26", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 69.79% of the world population will use the internet in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "66.10", "median": "67.88", "upper_75": "69.79", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global annual death rate (per 100,000 people) from infectious disease will be 67.4 in the year 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "40.3", "median": "67.4", "upper_75": "103", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many Falcon 9 failures will there be before 2026?\n\nKeyword: 1.26\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that there will be 1.26 Falcon 9 failures before 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.039", "median": "0.935", "upper_75": "1.26", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global annual death rate (per 100,000 people) from infectious disease will be 113 in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "94.7", "median": "102", "upper_75": "113", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 69.79% of the world population will use the internet in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "66.10", "median": "67.88", "upper_75": "69.79", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global annual death rate (per 100,000 people) from infectious disease will be 67.4 in the year 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "40.3", "median": "67.4", "upper_75": "103", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global annual death rate (per 100,000 people) from infectious disease will be 107 in the year 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.6", "median": "88.5", "upper_75": "107", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global annual death rate (per 100,000 people) from infectious disease will be 107 in the year 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.6", "median": "88.5", "upper_75": "107", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global annual death rate (per 100,000 people) from infectious disease will be 58.3 in the year 2122?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.06", "median": "19.1", "upper_75": "58.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global annual death rate (per 100,000 people) from infectious disease will be 58.3 in the year 2122?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.06", "median": "19.1", "upper_75": "58.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global annual death rate (per 100,000 people) from infectious disease will be 107 in the year 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.6", "median": "88.5", "upper_75": "107", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global annual death rate (per 100,000 people) from infectious disease will be 67.4 in the year 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "40.3", "median": "67.4", "upper_75": "103", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global annual death rate (per 100,000 people) from infectious disease will be 58.3 in the year 2122?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.06", "median": "19.1", "upper_75": "58.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 74.94% of the world population will use the internet in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "69.52", "median": "72.16", "upper_75": "74.94", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 69.79% of the world population will use the internet in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "66.10", "median": "67.88", "upper_75": "69.79", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many Falcon 9 failures will there be before 2026?\n\nKeyword: 1.26\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that there will be 1.26 Falcon 9 failures before 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.039", "median": "0.935", "upper_75": "1.26", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 90.6% of the world population will use the internet by 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "83.3", "median": "90.6", "upper_75": "95.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 90.6% of the world population will use the internet by 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "83.3", "median": "90.6", "upper_75": "95.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 69.7% of the world population will use the internet in the following years (2032)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "69.7", "median": "77.7", "upper_75": "83.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 69.7% of the world population will use the internet in the following years (2032)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "69.7", "median": "77.7", "upper_75": "83.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 12.57 active United Nations peacekeeping missions in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "11.51", "median": "12.01", "upper_75": "12.57", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 12.57 active United Nations peacekeeping missions in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "11.51", "median": "12.01", "upper_75": "12.57", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 90.6% of the world population will use the internet by 2052?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "83.3", "median": "90.6", "upper_75": "95.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 17.1 active United Nations peacekeeping missions in the following years (2032)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.51", "median": "12.6", "upper_75": "17.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 69.7% of the world population will use the internet in the following years (2032)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "69.7", "median": "77.7", "upper_75": "83.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 99.06% of the world population will use the internet in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "91.15", "median": "96.91", "upper_75": "99.06", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 99.06% of the world population will use the internet in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "91.15", "median": "96.91", "upper_75": "99.06", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 99.06% of the world population will use the internet in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "91.15", "median": "96.91", "upper_75": "99.06", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 12.57 active United Nations peacekeeping missions in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "11.51", "median": "12.01", "upper_75": "12.57", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many active United Nations peacekeeping missions will there be in the following years? (2025)\n\nKeyword: 12.0\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that there will be 12.0 active United Nations peacekeeping missions in the following years? (2025)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "10.5", "median": "12.0", "upper_75": "13.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 74.94% of the world population will use the internet in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "69.52", "median": "72.16", "upper_75": "74.94", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 17.1 active United Nations peacekeeping missions in the following years (2032)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.51", "median": "12.6", "upper_75": "17.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many active United Nations peacekeeping missions will there be in the following years? (2025)\n\nKeyword: 12.0\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that there will be 12.0 active United Nations peacekeeping missions in the following years? (2025)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "10.5", "median": "12.0", "upper_75": "13.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 74.94% of the world population will use the internet in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "69.52", "median": "72.16", "upper_75": "74.94", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 17.1 active United Nations peacekeeping missions in the following years (2032)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.51", "median": "12.6", "upper_75": "17.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many active United Nations peacekeeping missions will there be in the following years? (2025)\n\nKeyword: 12.0\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that there will be 12.0 active United Nations peacekeeping missions in the following years? 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-{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 13.7 active United Nations peacekeeping missions in the following years (2052)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.17", "median": "8.20", "upper_75": "13.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Armenia–Turkey border will reopen by Jan 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Dec 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 269 successful orbital rocket launches in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "204", "median": "236", "upper_75": "269", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 269 successful orbital rocket launches in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "204", "median": "236", "upper_75": "269", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many spacecraft are expected to land on the moon from 2022 through 2025, given that 4.64 spacecraft land on the 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"median": "36.6", "upper_75": "62.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Meta's yearly spending on Reality Labs will be 8.08B in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.08B", "median": "13.5B", "upper_75": "23.0B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Meta's yearly spending on Reality Labs will be 31.2B by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.47B", "median": "16.2B", "upper_75": "31.2B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Meta's yearly spending on Reality Labs will be 31.2B by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.47B", "median": "16.2B", "upper_75": "31.2B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Meta's yearly spending on Reality Labs will be 31.2B by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.47B", "median": "16.2B", "upper_75": "31.2B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum critical temperature (in Kelvin) for an ambient-pressure superconductor will be 271 before the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "149", "median": "180", "upper_75": "271", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum critical temperature (in Kelvin) for an ambient-pressure superconductor will be 271 before the given years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "149", "median": "180", "upper_75": "271", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Wikipedia will report Russia having procured 36.6 Su-57 fighter jets before 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "18.8", "median": "36.6", "upper_75": "62.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum critical temperature (in Kelvin) for an ambient-pressure superconductor will be 271 before the given years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "149", "median": "180", "upper_75": "271", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum critical temperature (in Kelvin) for an ambient-pressure superconductor will be 271 before the given years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "149", "median": "180", "upper_75": "271", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Meta's yearly spending on Reality Labs will be 8.08B in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.08B", "median": "13.5B", "upper_75": "23.0B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many months in prison will Sam Bankman-Fried be sentenced to before 2026?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that Sam Bankman-Fried will be sentenced to 305.2 months in prison before 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "290.4", "median": "299.4", "upper_75": "305.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum critical temperature (in Kelvin) for an ambient-pressure superconductor will be 271 before the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "149", "median": "180", "upper_75": "271", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the vehicles will launch into 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"What is the chance that the Starship will launch into orbit by Aug 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "May 2024", "upper_75": "Aug 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum critical temperature (in Kelvin) for an ambient-pressure superconductor will be 243 before the year 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "161", "median": "243", "upper_75": "389", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum critical temperature (in Kelvin) for an ambient-pressure superconductor will be 243 before the year 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "161", "median": "243", "upper_75": "389", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Starship will launch into orbit by Aug 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "May 2024", "upper_75": "Aug 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many North Atlantic hurricanes are expected to occur in the following years, based on historical data?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.13", "median": "12.2", "upper_75": "15.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many North Atlantic hurricanes are expected to occur in the following years, based on historical data?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.13", "median": "12.2", "upper_75": "15.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many North Atlantic hurricanes are expected to occur in the following years, based on historical data?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.13", "median": "12.2", "upper_75": "15.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the vehicles will launch into orbit by Aug 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "May 2024", "upper_75": "Aug 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum critical temperature (in Kelvin) for an ambient-pressure superconductor will be 286 before the year 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "157", "median": "205", 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"75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Starship will launch into orbit by Aug 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "May 2024", "upper_75": "Aug 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the New Glenn vehicle will launch into orbit by Apr 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2024", "median": "Dec 2024", "upper_75": "Apr 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Ariane 6 will launch into orbit by Oct 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jun 2024", "median": "Jul 2024", "upper_75": "Oct 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the New Glenn vehicle will launch into orbit by Apr 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2024", "median": "Dec 2024", "upper_75": "Apr 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Ariane 6 will launch into orbit by Oct 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jun 2024", "median": "Jul 2024", "upper_75": "Oct 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the New Glenn vehicle will launch into orbit by Apr 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2024", "median": "Dec 2024", "upper_75": "Apr 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Neutron vehicle will launch into orbit by Aug 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jan 2025", "median": "Apr 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Neutron vehicle will launch into orbit by Aug 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jan 2025", "median": "Apr 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 49.3% of the total rockets launched into space in each year will have been reused?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "29.4", "median": "38.7", "upper_75": "49.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Terran R vehicle will not launch into orbit before January 1, 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2026", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2026", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Terran R vehicle will not launch into orbit before January 1, 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2026", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2026", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 49.3% of the total rockets launched into space in each year will have been reused by 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "29.4", "median": "38.7", "upper_75": "49.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Ariane 6 will launch into orbit by Oct 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jun 2024", "median": "Jul 2024", "upper_75": "Oct 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Terran R vehicle will not launch into orbit before January 1, 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 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the chance that 49.3% of the total rockets launched into space in each year will have been reused by 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "29.4", "median": "38.7", "upper_75": "49.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 42.8% of the total rockets launched into space in each year will have been reused by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "42.8", "median": "53.6", "upper_75": "67.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 81.3% of the total rockets launched into space in each year will have been reused by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "58.0", "median": "70.0", "upper_75": "81.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 42.8% of the total rockets launched into space in each year will have been reused by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "42.8", "median": "53.6", "upper_75": "67.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 81.3% of the total rockets launched into space in each 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"What is the chance that 81.3% of the total rockets launched into space in each year will have been reused by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "58.0", "median": "70.0", "upper_75": "81.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that ISRO will launch a crewed mission by Sep 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 2026", "median": "Sep 2027", "upper_75": "Oct 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that JAXA will launch a crewed mission by Dec 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Dec 2029", "median": "Dec 2031", "upper_75": "Nov 2034", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that ESA will launch a crewed mission by Jun 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jun 2029", "median": "Oct 2031", "upper_75": "May 2034", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the space agencies will launch a crewed mission by Jun 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jun 2029", "median": "Oct 2031", "upper_75": 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"50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that ISRO will launch a crewed mission by Sep 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 2026", "median": "Sep 2027", "upper_75": "Oct 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a cumulative total of 104 private citizens visiting space for the first time by 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "39.5", "median": "68.5", "upper_75": "104", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a cumulative total of 502 private citizens visiting space for the first time by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "110", "median": "253", "upper_75": "502", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median cost of a visit to space for a private citizen will be $54.1M?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "16.6M", "median": "31.1M", "upper_75": "54.1M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a cumulative total of 502 private citizens 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"lower_25": "483", "median": "1.13k", "upper_75": "2.83k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a cumulative of 2.83k private citizens visiting space for the first time by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "483", "median": "1.13k", "upper_75": "2.83k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median cost of a visit to space for a private citizen in 2030 will be 24.4M?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.99M", "median": "11.4M", "upper_75": "24.4M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median cost of a visit to space for a private citizen will be $54.1M?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "16.6M", "median": "31.1M", "upper_75": "54.1M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median cost of a visit to space for a private citizen will be 54.1M in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "16.6M", "median": "31.1M", "upper_75": "54.1M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median cost of a visit to space for a private citizen in 2035 will be 2.12M?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "810k", "median": "2.12M", "upper_75": "6.89M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median cost of a visit to space for a private citizen will be 54.1M in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "16.6M", "median": "31.1M", "upper_75": "54.1M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Lunar Gateway will be first occupied by a crew by Jul 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 2027", "median": "Oct 2028", "upper_75": "Sep 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.28 spacecraft will land on the moon in each of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.28", "median": "2.56", "upper_75": "4.19", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.28 spacecraft will land on the moon in each of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", 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4.19 spacecraft will land on the moon in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.28", "median": "2.56", "upper_75": "4.19", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.27B petaFLOPs will be used to train GPT-4 if it is announced before 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.27B", "median": "4.69B", "upper_75": "11.0B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.19 spacecraft will land on the moon in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.28", "median": "2.56", "upper_75": "4.19", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.19 spacecraft will land on the moon in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.28", "median": "2.56", "upper_75": "4.19", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.27B petaFLOPs will be used to train GPT-4 if it is announced before 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.27B", "median": "4.69B", "upper_75": "11.0B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance 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-{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum number of on-Earth reuses for a single booster or other rocket stage in the following years (2025) will be 17.9?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.01", "median": "12.8", "upper_75": "17.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a single booster or other rocket stage will have a maximum of 9.01 on-Earth reuses in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.01", "median": "12.8", "upper_75": "17.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a single booster or rocket stage will have a maximum of 17.0 on-Earth reuses by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "17.0", "median": "28.8", "upper_75": "47.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum number of on-Earth reuses for a single booster or other rocket stage in the following years (2025) will be 17.9?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.01", "median": "12.8", "upper_75": "17.9", "prediction": 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"What is the chance that the largest payload capacity (in tons) of a successfully reused launch vehicle in the following years will be 89.9?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "56.7", "median": "69.0", "upper_75": "89.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest payload capacity (in tons) of a successfully reused launch vehicle in the following years (2025) will be 89.9?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "56.7", "median": "69.0", "upper_75": "89.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum number of on-Earth reuses for a single booster or other rocket stage in the following years (2025) will be 17.9?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.01", "median": "12.8", "upper_75": "17.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest payload capacity (in tons) of a successfully reused launch vehicle in the following years will be 89.9?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "56.7", "median": "69.0", 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"median": "15.6k", "upper_75": "28.2k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 32.4k operational satellites in the year 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "17.3k", "median": "32.4k", "upper_75": "71.1k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 465 successful orbital rocket launches in the following years (2035)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "465", "median": "652", "upper_75": "936", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 32.4k operational satellites in the year 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "17.3k", "median": "32.4k", "upper_75": "71.1k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 32.4k operational satellites in the year 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "17.3k", "median": "32.4k", "upper_75": "71.1k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.39k satellites will be launched in each of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.74k", "median": "3.39k", "upper_75": "4.16k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.16k satellites will be launched in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.74k", "median": "3.39k", "upper_75": "4.16k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.39k satellites will be launched in each of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.74k", "median": "3.39k", "upper_75": "4.16k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.16k satellites will be launched in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.74k", "median": "3.39k", "upper_75": "4.16k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.36k satellites will be launched in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.83k", "median": "6.36k", "upper_75": "8.19k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.36k satellites will be launched in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.83k", "median": "6.36k", "upper_75": "8.19k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 3.39k satellites will be launched in each of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.74k", "median": "3.39k", "upper_75": "4.16k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 8.88k satellites will be launched in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.88k", "median": "13.0k", "upper_75": "19.6k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.36k satellites will be launched in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.83k", "median": "6.36k", "upper_75": "8.19k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many ASAT tests will occur by 2030?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 3.24 ASAT tests will occur by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.26", "median": "3.24", "upper_75": "7.64", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many uncontrolled reentries will China conduct by 2025, given a 50% chance of occurrence?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.79", "median": "5.84", "upper_75": "7.58", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many ASAT tests will occur by 2030?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 3.24 ASAT tests will occur by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.26", "median": "3.24", "upper_75": "7.64", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 4.16k satellites will be launched in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.74k", "median": "3.39k", "upper_75": "4.16k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 8.88k satellites will be launched in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.88k", "median": "13.0k", "upper_75": "19.6k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will conduct 11.9 space exploration activities before 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.64", "median": "5.81", "upper_75": "11.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many uncontrolled reentries will China conduct by 2025, given a 50% chance of occurrence?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.79", "median": "5.84", "upper_75": "7.58", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many ASAT tests will occur by 2030?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 3.24 ASAT tests will occur by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.26", "median": "3.24", "upper_75": "7.64", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 8.88k satellites will be launched in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.88k", "median": "13.0k", "upper_75": "19.6k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will conduct 5.81 of the following space exploration activities before 2030? (Lunar exploration)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.64", "median": "5.81", "upper_75": "11.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that successful sample return missions will occur for the following destinations by Dec 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2031", "median": "Dec 2033", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many uncontrolled reentries will China conduct by 2025, given a 50% chance of occurrence?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.79", "median": "5.84", "upper_75": "7.58", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will conduct 11.9 space exploration activities before 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.64", "median": "5.81", "upper_75": "11.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will conduct 11.9 space exploration activities before 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.64", "median": "5.81", "upper_75": "11.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will conduct 36.2 space exploration activities before 2030, specifically crewed spaceflight?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "17.1", "median": "25.6", "upper_75": "36.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will conduct 36.2 space exploration activities before 2030, specifically crewed spaceflight?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "17.1", "median": "25.6", "upper_75": "36.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood of successful sample return missions occurring for the following destinations by Dec 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2031", "median": "Dec 2033", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will conduct 5.81 of the following space exploration activities before 2030? (Lunar exploration)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.64", "median": "5.81", "upper_75": "11.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will conduct 16.8 space station visits before 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.37", "median": "16.8", "upper_75": "27.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will conduct 16.8 space station visits before 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.37", "median": "16.8", "upper_75": "27.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that successful sample return missions will occur for the following destinations by Dec 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2031", "median": "Dec 2033", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will conduct 36.2 space exploration activities before 2030, specifically crewed spaceflight?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "17.1", "median": "25.6", "upper_75": "36.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that successful sample return missions will occur for the following destinations by Dec 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2031", "median": "Dec 2033", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood of successful sample return missions occurring for the following destinations by Dec 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2031", "median": "Dec 2033", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood of successful sample return missions occurring for the following destinations by Dec 2033?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2031", "median": "Dec 2033", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will conduct 5.81 of the following space exploration activities before 2030? (Lunar exploration)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.64", "median": "5.81", "upper_75": "11.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that successful sample return missions will not occur for Venus before January 2036?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 2034", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2036", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that successful sample return missions will not occur for Venus before January 2036?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 2034", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2036", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that successful sample return missions will not occur for the following destinations (Outer planets) before January 1, 2036?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2036", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2036", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum number of people in space simultaneously will be 22.1 for each of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "12.2", "median": "17.0", "upper_75": "22.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum number of people in space simultaneously will be 22.1 for each of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "12.2", "median": "17.0", "upper_75": "22.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum number of people in space simultaneously will be 22.1 for each of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "12.2", "median": "17.0", "upper_75": "22.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will conduct 16.8 space station visits before 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.37", "median": "16.8", "upper_75": "27.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that successful sample return missions will not occur for Venus before January 2036?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 2034", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2036", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that successful sample return missions will not occur for the following destinations (Outer planets) before January 1, 2036?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2036", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2036", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum number of people in space simultaneously will be 12.2 for each of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "12.2", "median": "17.0", "upper_75": "22.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that successful sample return missions will not occur for the following destinations (Outer planets) before January 1, 2036?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2036", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2036", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum number of people in space simultaneously will be 41.0 for each of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.0", "median": "41.0", "upper_75": "62.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum number of people in space simultaneously will be 12.2 for each of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "12.2", "median": "17.0", "upper_75": "22.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum number of people in space simultaneously will be 12.2 for each of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "12.2", "median": "17.0", "upper_75": "22.1", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum number of people in space simultaneously will be 41.0 for each of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.0", "median": "41.0", "upper_75": "62.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum number of people in space simultaneously will be 158 for each of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "50.4", "median": "91.2", "upper_75": "158", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that the first commercial in-orbit refueling will occur by February 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Feb 2026", "median": "Feb 2027", "upper_75": "May 2028", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that the first commercial in-orbit refueling will occur by February 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Feb 2026", "median": "Feb 2027", "upper_75": "May 2028", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum number of people in space simultaneously will be 158 for each of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "50.4", "median": "91.2", "upper_75": "158", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 21.1 toilets in space on January 1, 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.99", "median": "14.3", "upper_75": "21.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum number of people in space simultaneously will be 158 for each of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "50.4", "median": "91.2", "upper_75": "158", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 21.1 toilets in space on January 1, 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.99", "median": "14.3", "upper_75": "21.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that the first commercial in-orbit refueling will occur by February 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Feb 2026", "median": "Feb 2027", "upper_75": "May 2028", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum number of people in space simultaneously will be 41.0 for each of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.0", "median": "41.0", "upper_75": "62.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean consecutive length of stay by cumulative moon visitors will be 1.62 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.62", "median": "2.06", "upper_75": "2.22", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that nuclear power will be used for propulsion in space in a non-test capacity by 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2036", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 21.1 toilets in space on January 1, 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.99", "median": "14.3", "upper_75": "21.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that nuclear power will be used for propulsion in space in a non-test capacity by 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2036", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean consecutive length of stay by cumulative moon visitors will be 2.22 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.62", "median": "2.06", "upper_75": "2.22", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that nuclear power will be used for propulsion in space in a non-test capacity by 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2036", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean consecutive length of stay by cumulative moon visitors will be 1.62 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.62", "median": "2.06", "upper_75": "2.22", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean consecutive length of stay by cumulative moon visitors will be 2.22 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.62", "median": "2.06", "upper_75": "2.22", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean consecutive length of stay by cumulative moon visitors will be 8.88 years in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.79", "median": "5.08", "upper_75": "8.88", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean consecutive length of stay by cumulative moon visitors will be 8.88 years in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.79", "median": "5.08", "upper_75": "8.88", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean consecutive length of stay by cumulative moon visitors will be 86.3 years in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "10.4", "median": "30.8", "upper_75": "86.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean consecutive length of stay by cumulative moon visitors will be 2.22 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.62", "median": "2.06", "upper_75": "2.22", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean consecutive length of stay by cumulative moon visitors will be 86.3 years in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "10.4", "median": "30.8", "upper_75": "86.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a maximum of 5.84 people simultaneously on the moon in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.903", "median": "2.53", "upper_75": "5.84", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a maximum of 5.84 people simultaneously on the moon in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.903", "median": "2.53", "upper_75": "5.84", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 0.371 in the United States in the following quarters?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.371", "median": "1.49", "upper_75": "2.70", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean consecutive length of stay by cumulative moon visitors will be 8.88 years in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.79", "median": "5.08", "upper_75": "8.88", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.45 total number of nationalities will have visited the moon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.64", "median": "2.45", "upper_75": "4.12", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.45 total number of nationalities will have visited the moon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.64", "median": "2.45", "upper_75": "4.12", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a maximum of 5.84 people simultaneously on the moon in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.903", "median": "2.53", "upper_75": "5.84", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean consecutive length of stay by cumulative moon visitors will be 86.3 years in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "10.4", "median": "30.8", "upper_75": "86.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean consecutive length of stay by cumulative moon visitors will be 1.62 in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.62", "median": "2.06", "upper_75": "2.22", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 0.371 in the United States in the following quarters?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.371", "median": "1.49", "upper_75": "2.70", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 2.75% in the United States in the following quarters (2024 Q2)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.443", "median": "1.61", "upper_75": "2.75", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 2.75% in the United States in the following quarters (2024 Q2)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.443", "median": "1.61", "upper_75": "2.75", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 0.371 in the United States in the following quarters?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.371", "median": "1.49", "upper_75": "2.70", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.45 total number of nationalities will have visited the moon by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.64", "median": "2.45", "upper_75": "4.12", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 0.025 in the United States in the following quarters (2024 Q3)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.025", "median": "1.40", "upper_75": "2.40", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth in the United States will be 1.98% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.24", "median": "1.98", "upper_75": "2.75", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth in the United States will be 1.98% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.24", "median": "1.98", "upper_75": "2.75", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth will be 1.98% in the United States in the following years (2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.24", "median": "1.98", "upper_75": "2.75", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 0.025 in the United States in the following quarters (2024 Q3)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.025", "median": "1.40", "upper_75": "2.40", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 0.025 in the United States in the following quarters (2024 Q3)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.025", "median": "1.40", "upper_75": "2.40", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 2.75% in the United States in the following quarters (2024 Q2)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.443", "median": "1.61", "upper_75": "2.75", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth will be 1.98% in the United States in the following years (2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.24", "median": "1.98", "upper_75": "2.75", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 0.321 in the following months?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.173", "median": "0.321", "upper_75": "0.450", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth will be 1.98% in the United States in the following years (2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.24", "median": "1.98", "upper_75": "2.75", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real GDP growth in the United States will be 2.04% in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.12", "median": "2.04", "upper_75": "2.80", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth in the United States will be 1.98% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.24", "median": "1.98", "upper_75": "2.75", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real GDP growth in the United States will be 2.82% in the following years (2026)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.585", "median": "1.74", "upper_75": "2.82", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 4.30% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.21", "median": "3.06", "upper_75": "4.30", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 0.321 in the following months?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.173", "median": "0.321", "upper_75": "0.450", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 4.30% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.21", "median": "3.06", "upper_75": "4.30", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real GDP growth in the United States will be 2.82% in the following years (2026)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.585", "median": "1.74", "upper_75": "2.82", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 4.30% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.21", "median": "3.06", "upper_75": "4.30", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real GDP growth in the United States will be 2.04% in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.12", "median": "2.04", "upper_75": "2.80", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real GDP growth in the United States will be 2.04% in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.12", "median": "2.04", "upper_75": "2.80", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 0.321 in the following months?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.173", "median": "0.321", "upper_75": "0.450", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real GDP growth in the United States will be 2.82% in the following years (2026)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.585", "median": "1.74", "upper_75": "2.82", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 4.30% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.21", "median": "3.06", "upper_75": "4.30", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 4.56% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.98", "median": "3.17", "upper_75": "4.56", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 4.30% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.21", "median": "3.06", "upper_75": "4.30", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 4.56% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.98", "median": "3.17", "upper_75": "4.56", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 4.30% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.21", "median": "3.06", "upper_75": "4.30", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the labor force participation rate (total 16 and older) in the US will be 59.8% in January 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "45.1", "median": "54.5", "upper_75": "59.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 4.86% in the year 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.98", "median": "3.24", "upper_75": "4.86", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the labor force participation rate (total 16 and older) in the US will be 59.8% in January 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "45.1", "median": "54.5", "upper_75": "59.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that US seasonally adjusted annual CPI inflation will fall below 3% by May 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Dec 2023", "median": "May 2024", "upper_75": "Feb 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 4.86% in the year 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.98", "median": "3.24", "upper_75": "4.86", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 12.2 North Atlantic hurricanes in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.13", "median": "12.2", "upper_75": "15.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 4.56% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.98", "median": "3.17", "upper_75": "4.56", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many North Atlantic hurricanes are expected to occur in the following years (2025)? (11.8)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.32", "median": "9.20", "upper_75": "11.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many North Atlantic hurricanes are expected to occur in the following years (2025)? (11.8)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.32", "median": "9.20", "upper_75": "11.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 12.2 North Atlantic hurricanes in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.13", "median": "12.2", "upper_75": "15.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that US seasonally adjusted annual CPI inflation will fall below 3% by May 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Dec 2023", "median": "May 2024", "upper_75": "Feb 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 4.86% in the year 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.98", "median": "3.24", "upper_75": "4.86", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 3.769 in the following months?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the monthly U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "3.769", "median": "3.905", "upper_75": "4.072", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 12.2 North Atlantic hurricanes in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.13", "median": "12.2", "upper_75": "15.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 3.769 in the following months?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the monthly U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "3.769", "median": "3.905", "upper_75": "4.072", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many North Atlantic hurricanes are expected to occur in the following years (2025)? (11.8)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.32", "median": "9.20", "upper_75": "11.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that US seasonally adjusted annual CPI inflation will fall below 3% by May 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Dec 2023", "median": "May 2024", "upper_75": "Feb 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 12.7k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031?", "desc": "[The Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED)](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23300/) is a survey that collects data on individuals who have recently earned a research doctorate degree from a graduate program in the United States. The survey is conducted by the National Science Foundation (NSF) in collaboration with several other federal agencies and organizations, and its goal is to gather information on the characteristics, plans, and experiences of recent doctorate recipients. This information is used by the NSF and other organizations to study and support the U.S. graduate education system, as well as to inform policy and decision-making in a variety of fields. Over the past 63 years, the total number of doctorates awarded has increased from 8,773 in 1958 to 52,250 in 2021.\n\n| Year | Doctorates awarded |\n|------|------------|\n| 1961 | 10,413 |\n| 1966 | 17,949 |\n| 1971 | 31,867 |\n| 1976 | 32,946 |\n| 1981 | 31,355 |\n| 1986 | 31,897 |\n| 1991 | 37,530 |\n| 1996 | 42,437 |\n| 2001 | 40,744 |\n| 2006 | 45,620 |\n| 2011 | 48,909 |\n| 2016 | 54,809 |\n| 2021 | 52,250 |\n\nWhile the trend for the total number of doctoral degrees awarded is interesting, a relevant heterogeneity within these numbers is the proportion of degrees awarded in specific fields that may play a central role in important industries or research areas in the future, such as genomics research, artificial intelligence, advanced mathematics, global priorities research, pandemic prevention, and climate science, among others. \n\nAccording to their [most recent data](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23300/table/3-1) titled ‘Research doctorate recipients, by detailed field of doctorate: 2021', the following number of doctorates were awarded in the following disciplines (sometimes labelled at very high-level categories and other times at more granular level). \n\n| Field | Number of doctorates awarded |\n|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Engineering | 9,563 |\n| Physics | 1,750 |\n| Computer science | 1,545 |\n| Economics | 1,317 |\n| Geosciences, atmospheric, and ocean sciences | 1,044 |\n| Microbiology and immunology | 974 |\n| Mathematics | 827 |\n| Public health | 696 |\n| Philosophy | 399 |\n| Genetics and genomics | 398 |\n| Pharmacology and toxicology | 311 |\n| Artificial intelligence | 167 |\n\nUnderstanding the trend of future doctorates awarded and as such the change in supply for academic researchers may prove important over the next decade.", "resc": "This data will resolve based on the NSF/NCSES [Survey of Earned Doctorates](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23300/) for the 2031 data (though the final report may take one or two additional years to be released).\n\nIf any category listed here is no longer listed in future survey data, or if the survey series is discontinued, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "7.03k", "median": "10.6k", "upper_75": "12.7k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 3.769 in the following months?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the monthly U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "3.769", "median": "3.905", "upper_75": "4.072", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the labor force participation rate (total 16 and older) in the US will be 59.8% in January 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "45.1", "median": "54.5", "upper_75": "59.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 12.7k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031?", "desc": "[The Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED)](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23300/) is a survey that collects data on individuals who have recently earned a research doctorate degree from a graduate program in the United States. The survey is conducted by the National Science Foundation (NSF) in collaboration with several other federal agencies and organizations, and its goal is to gather information on the characteristics, plans, and experiences of recent doctorate recipients. This information is used by the NSF and other organizations to study and support the U.S. graduate education system, as well as to inform policy and decision-making in a variety of fields. Over the past 63 years, the total number of doctorates awarded has increased from 8,773 in 1958 to 52,250 in 2021.\n\n| Year | Doctorates awarded |\n|------|------------|\n| 1961 | 10,413 |\n| 1966 | 17,949 |\n| 1971 | 31,867 |\n| 1976 | 32,946 |\n| 1981 | 31,355 |\n| 1986 | 31,897 |\n| 1991 | 37,530 |\n| 1996 | 42,437 |\n| 2001 | 40,744 |\n| 2006 | 45,620 |\n| 2011 | 48,909 |\n| 2016 | 54,809 |\n| 2021 | 52,250 |\n\nWhile the trend for the total number of doctoral degrees awarded is interesting, a relevant heterogeneity within these numbers is the proportion of degrees awarded in specific fields that may play a central role in important industries or research areas in the future, such as genomics research, artificial intelligence, advanced mathematics, global priorities research, pandemic prevention, and climate science, among others. \n\nAccording to their [most recent data](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23300/table/3-1) titled ‘Research doctorate recipients, by detailed field of doctorate: 2021', the following number of doctorates were awarded in the following disciplines (sometimes labelled at very high-level categories and other times at more granular level). \n\n| Field | Number of doctorates awarded |\n|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Engineering | 9,563 |\n| Physics | 1,750 |\n| Computer science | 1,545 |\n| Economics | 1,317 |\n| Geosciences, atmospheric, and ocean sciences | 1,044 |\n| Microbiology and immunology | 974 |\n| Mathematics | 827 |\n| Public health | 696 |\n| Philosophy | 399 |\n| Genetics and genomics | 398 |\n| Pharmacology and toxicology | 311 |\n| Artificial intelligence | 167 |\n\nUnderstanding the trend of future doctorates awarded and as such the change in supply for academic researchers may prove important over the next decade.", "resc": "This data will resolve based on the NSF/NCSES [Survey of Earned Doctorates](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23300/) for the 2031 data (though the final report may take one or two additional years to be released).\n\nIf any category listed here is no longer listed in future survey data, or if the survey series is discontinued, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "7.03k", "median": "10.6k", "upper_75": "12.7k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 12.7k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in engineering?", "desc": "[The Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED)](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23300/) is a survey that collects data on individuals who have recently earned a research doctorate degree from a graduate program in the United States. The survey is conducted by the National Science Foundation (NSF) in collaboration with several other federal agencies and organizations, and its goal is to gather information on the characteristics, plans, and experiences of recent doctorate recipients. This information is used by the NSF and other organizations to study and support the U.S. graduate education system, as well as to inform policy and decision-making in a variety of fields. Over the past 63 years, the total number of doctorates awarded has increased from 8,773 in 1958 to 52,250 in 2021.\n\n| Year | Doctorates awarded |\n|------|------------|\n| 1961 | 10,413 |\n| 1966 | 17,949 |\n| 1971 | 31,867 |\n| 1976 | 32,946 |\n| 1981 | 31,355 |\n| 1986 | 31,897 |\n| 1991 | 37,530 |\n| 1996 | 42,437 |\n| 2001 | 40,744 |\n| 2006 | 45,620 |\n| 2011 | 48,909 |\n| 2016 | 54,809 |\n| 2021 | 52,250 |\n\nWhile the trend for the total number of doctoral degrees awarded is interesting, a relevant heterogeneity within these numbers is the proportion of degrees awarded in specific fields that may play a central role in important industries or research areas in the future, such as genomics research, artificial intelligence, advanced mathematics, global priorities research, pandemic prevention, and climate science, among others. \n\nAccording to their [most recent data](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23300/table/3-1) titled ‘Research doctorate recipients, by detailed field of doctorate: 2021', the following number of doctorates were awarded in the following disciplines (sometimes labelled at very high-level categories and other times at more granular level). \n\n| Field | Number of doctorates awarded |\n|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Engineering | 9,563 |\n| Physics | 1,750 |\n| Computer science | 1,545 |\n| Economics | 1,317 |\n| Geosciences, atmospheric, and ocean sciences | 1,044 |\n| Microbiology and immunology | 974 |\n| Mathematics | 827 |\n| Public health | 696 |\n| Philosophy | 399 |\n| Genetics and genomics | 398 |\n| Pharmacology and toxicology | 311 |\n| Artificial intelligence | 167 |\n\nUnderstanding the trend of future doctorates awarded and as such the change in supply for academic researchers may prove important over the next decade.", "resc": "This data will resolve based on the NSF/NCSES [Survey of Earned Doctorates](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23300/) for the 2031 data (though the final report may take one or two additional years to be released).\n\nIf any category listed here is no longer listed in future survey data, or if the survey series is discontinued, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "7.03k", "median": "10.6k", "upper_75": "12.7k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 12.7k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031?", "desc": "[The Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED)](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23300/) is a survey that collects data on individuals who have recently earned a research doctorate degree from a graduate program in the United States. The survey is conducted by the National Science Foundation (NSF) in collaboration with several other federal agencies and organizations, and its goal is to gather information on the characteristics, plans, and experiences of recent doctorate recipients. This information is used by the NSF and other organizations to study and support the U.S. graduate education system, as well as to inform policy and decision-making in a variety of fields. Over the past 63 years, the total number of doctorates awarded has increased from 8,773 in 1958 to 52,250 in 2021.\n\n| Year | Doctorates awarded |\n|------|------------|\n| 1961 | 10,413 |\n| 1966 | 17,949 |\n| 1971 | 31,867 |\n| 1976 | 32,946 |\n| 1981 | 31,355 |\n| 1986 | 31,897 |\n| 1991 | 37,530 |\n| 1996 | 42,437 |\n| 2001 | 40,744 |\n| 2006 | 45,620 |\n| 2011 | 48,909 |\n| 2016 | 54,809 |\n| 2021 | 52,250 |\n\nWhile the trend for the total number of doctoral degrees awarded is interesting, a relevant heterogeneity within these numbers is the proportion of degrees awarded in specific fields that may play a central role in important industries or research areas in the future, such as genomics research, artificial intelligence, advanced mathematics, global priorities research, pandemic prevention, and climate science, among others. \n\nAccording to their [most recent data](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23300/table/3-1) titled ‘Research doctorate recipients, by detailed field of doctorate: 2021', the following number of doctorates were awarded in the following disciplines (sometimes labelled at very high-level categories and other times at more granular level). \n\n| Field | Number of doctorates awarded |\n|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Engineering | 9,563 |\n| Physics | 1,750 |\n| Computer science | 1,545 |\n| Economics | 1,317 |\n| Geosciences, atmospheric, and ocean sciences | 1,044 |\n| Microbiology and immunology | 974 |\n| Mathematics | 827 |\n| Public health | 696 |\n| Philosophy | 399 |\n| Genetics and genomics | 398 |\n| Pharmacology and toxicology | 311 |\n| Artificial intelligence | 167 |\n\nUnderstanding the trend of future doctorates awarded and as such the change in supply for academic researchers may prove important over the next decade.", "resc": "This data will resolve based on the NSF/NCSES [Survey of Earned Doctorates](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23300/) for the 2031 data (though the final report may take one or two additional years to be released).\n\nIf any category listed here is no longer listed in future survey data, or if the survey series is discontinued, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "7.03k", "median": "10.6k", "upper_75": "12.7k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 556 doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in the field of economics?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "556", "median": "1.17k", "upper_75": "1.48k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 556 doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in the field of economics?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "556", "median": "1.17k", "upper_75": "1.48k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.24k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in Physics?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.17k", "median": "1.88k", "upper_75": "2.24k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 12.7k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in engineering?", "desc": "[The Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED)](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23300/) is a survey that collects data on individuals who have recently earned a research doctorate degree from a graduate program in the United States. The survey is conducted by the National Science Foundation (NSF) in collaboration with several other federal agencies and organizations, and its goal is to gather information on the characteristics, plans, and experiences of recent doctorate recipients. This information is used by the NSF and other organizations to study and support the U.S. graduate education system, as well as to inform policy and decision-making in a variety of fields. Over the past 63 years, the total number of doctorates awarded has increased from 8,773 in 1958 to 52,250 in 2021.\n\n| Year | Doctorates awarded |\n|------|------------|\n| 1961 | 10,413 |\n| 1966 | 17,949 |\n| 1971 | 31,867 |\n| 1976 | 32,946 |\n| 1981 | 31,355 |\n| 1986 | 31,897 |\n| 1991 | 37,530 |\n| 1996 | 42,437 |\n| 2001 | 40,744 |\n| 2006 | 45,620 |\n| 2011 | 48,909 |\n| 2016 | 54,809 |\n| 2021 | 52,250 |\n\nWhile the trend for the total number of doctoral degrees awarded is interesting, a relevant heterogeneity within these numbers is the proportion of degrees awarded in specific fields that may play a central role in important industries or research areas in the future, such as genomics research, artificial intelligence, advanced mathematics, global priorities research, pandemic prevention, and climate science, among others. \n\nAccording to their [most recent data](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23300/table/3-1) titled ‘Research doctorate recipients, by detailed field of doctorate: 2021', the following number of doctorates were awarded in the following disciplines (sometimes labelled at very high-level categories and other times at more granular level). \n\n| Field | Number of doctorates awarded |\n|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Engineering | 9,563 |\n| Physics | 1,750 |\n| Computer science | 1,545 |\n| Economics | 1,317 |\n| Geosciences, atmospheric, and ocean sciences | 1,044 |\n| Microbiology and immunology | 974 |\n| Mathematics | 827 |\n| Public health | 696 |\n| Philosophy | 399 |\n| Genetics and genomics | 398 |\n| Pharmacology and toxicology | 311 |\n| Artificial intelligence | 167 |\n\nUnderstanding the trend of future doctorates awarded and as such the change in supply for academic researchers may prove important over the next decade.", "resc": "This data will resolve based on the NSF/NCSES [Survey of Earned Doctorates](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23300/) for the 2031 data (though the final report may take one or two additional years to be released).\n\nIf any category listed here is no longer listed in future survey data, or if the survey series is discontinued, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "7.03k", "median": "10.6k", "upper_75": "12.7k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.49k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in Computer Science?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "761", "median": "1.85k", "upper_75": "2.49k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.49k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in Computer Science?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "761", "median": "1.85k", "upper_75": "2.49k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 12.7k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in engineering?", "desc": "[The Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED)](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23300/) is a survey that collects data on individuals who have recently earned a research doctorate degree from a graduate program in the United States. The survey is conducted by the National Science Foundation (NSF) in collaboration with several other federal agencies and organizations, and its goal is to gather information on the characteristics, plans, and experiences of recent doctorate recipients. This information is used by the NSF and other organizations to study and support the U.S. graduate education system, as well as to inform policy and decision-making in a variety of fields. Over the past 63 years, the total number of doctorates awarded has increased from 8,773 in 1958 to 52,250 in 2021.\n\n| Year | Doctorates awarded |\n|------|------------|\n| 1961 | 10,413 |\n| 1966 | 17,949 |\n| 1971 | 31,867 |\n| 1976 | 32,946 |\n| 1981 | 31,355 |\n| 1986 | 31,897 |\n| 1991 | 37,530 |\n| 1996 | 42,437 |\n| 2001 | 40,744 |\n| 2006 | 45,620 |\n| 2011 | 48,909 |\n| 2016 | 54,809 |\n| 2021 | 52,250 |\n\nWhile the trend for the total number of doctoral degrees awarded is interesting, a relevant heterogeneity within these numbers is the proportion of degrees awarded in specific fields that may play a central role in important industries or research areas in the future, such as genomics research, artificial intelligence, advanced mathematics, global priorities research, pandemic prevention, and climate science, among others. \n\nAccording to their [most recent data](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23300/table/3-1) titled ‘Research doctorate recipients, by detailed field of doctorate: 2021', the following number of doctorates were awarded in the following disciplines (sometimes labelled at very high-level categories and other times at more granular level). \n\n| Field | Number of doctorates awarded |\n|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Engineering | 9,563 |\n| Physics | 1,750 |\n| Computer science | 1,545 |\n| Economics | 1,317 |\n| Geosciences, atmospheric, and ocean sciences | 1,044 |\n| Microbiology and immunology | 974 |\n| Mathematics | 827 |\n| Public health | 696 |\n| Philosophy | 399 |\n| Genetics and genomics | 398 |\n| Pharmacology and toxicology | 311 |\n| Artificial intelligence | 167 |\n\nUnderstanding the trend of future doctorates awarded and as such the change in supply for academic researchers may prove important over the next decade.", "resc": "This data will resolve based on the NSF/NCSES [Survey of Earned Doctorates](https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf23300/) for the 2031 data (though the final report may take one or two additional years to be released).\n\nIf any category listed here is no longer listed in future survey data, or if the survey series is discontinued, the question resolves ambiguously", "lower_25": "7.03k", "median": "10.6k", "upper_75": "12.7k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.07k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in microbiology and immunology?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "757", "median": "1.07k", "upper_75": "1.22k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 556 doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in the field of economics?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "556", "median": "1.17k", "upper_75": "1.48k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.49k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in Computer Science?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "761", "median": "1.85k", "upper_75": "2.49k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.37k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in Geosciences, atmospheric, and ocean sciences?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "649", "median": "1.37k", "upper_75": "1.78k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.24k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in Physics?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.17k", "median": "1.88k", "upper_75": "2.24k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.24k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in Physics?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.17k", "median": "1.88k", "upper_75": "2.24k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.07k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in microbiology and immunology?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "757", "median": "1.07k", "upper_75": "1.22k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.37k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in Geosciences, atmospheric, and ocean sciences?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "649", "median": "1.37k", "upper_75": "1.78k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.01k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "539", "median": "853", "upper_75": "1.01k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.01k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "539", "median": "853", "upper_75": "1.01k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.37k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in Geosciences, atmospheric, and ocean sciences?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "649", "median": "1.37k", "upper_75": "1.78k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.07k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in microbiology and immunology?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "757", "median": "1.07k", "upper_75": "1.22k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 543 doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in public health?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "543", "median": "859", "upper_75": "1.02k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.01k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "539", "median": "853", "upper_75": "1.01k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 543 doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in public health?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "543", "median": "859", "upper_75": "1.02k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 368 doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in genetics and genomics?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "368", "median": "556", "upper_75": "649", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 543 doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in public health?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "543", "median": "859", "upper_75": "1.02k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 317 doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in the field of philosophy?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "138", "median": "317", "upper_75": "410", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 317 doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in the field of philosophy?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "138", "median": "317", "upper_75": "410", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 368 doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in genetics and genomics?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "368", "median": "556", "upper_75": "649", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 368 doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in genetics and genomics?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "368", "median": "556", "upper_75": "649", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 361 doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in pharmacology and toxicology?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "178", "median": "361", "upper_75": "454", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 361 doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in pharmacology and toxicology?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "178", "median": "361", "upper_75": "454", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.56k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "160", "median": "816", "upper_75": "1.56k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.56k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "160", "median": "816", "upper_75": "1.56k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that less than 50% of 20 to 24 year olds in the US will have a driver's license by 2047?", "desc": "It might be the case that new technologies such as driverless cars and ride-sharing apps could make it so that someday only a small share of people have driver's licenses, and given that driver's licenses are often acquired at a young age and new technology is typically first adopted by younger people, we might expect this change to first occur in younger people.\n\nAccording to the [Highway Statistics Series](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics.cfm) published by the [US Department of Transportation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Transportation), in 2020 there were 17.278 million people aged 20 to 24 who had driver's licenses. According to these figures the number in this age group with driver's licenses peaked at 19.948 million in 1983.\n\nAccording to the [US Census Bureau](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Census_Bureau), in 2020 the US population of 20 to 24 year-olds was [20.059 million](https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2020/demo/age-and-sex/2020-age-sex-composition.html). For 1983 this figure was [21.061 million](https://www.census.gov/data/tables/1983/demo/geographic-mobility/p20-393.html).\n\nThese figures correspond to a percentage of those aged 20 to 24 with a driver's license of approximately 86.14% for 2020 and 94.72% for 1983.", "resc": "This resolves to July 1 of the year when less than 25% of 20 to 24 year-olds in the United States have driver's licenses, using the number of 20 to 24 year-olds with driver's licenses according to data published in the [Highway Statistics Series](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics.cfm) and the total number of 20 to 24 year-olds according to data published by the [US Census Bureau](https://www.census.gov/topics/population/age-and-sex/data/tables.2020.List_897222059.html#list-tab-List_897222059). If this does not occur before January 1, 2080 this resolves as **\"> December 31, 2079\"**.\n\nIn the event these figures are no longer published by these sources Metaculus may use alternate credible sources of information or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2047", "upper_75": "2078", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 361 doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in pharmacology and toxicology?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "178", "median": "361", "upper_75": "454", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.56k doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "160", "median": "816", "upper_75": "1.56k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 317 doctorates will be awarded in various fields in 2031, specifically in the field of philosophy?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "138", "median": "317", "upper_75": "410", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted annual average U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 3.74% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.27", "median": "3.74", "upper_75": "4.21", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted annual average U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 3.74 in the following years?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual average seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the annual average U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed year. Resolution will be determined when the first estimate is published for December of the listed year by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm), and will resolve as the average unemployment for the 12 months in the year. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "3.27", "median": "3.74", "upper_75": "4.21", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that less than 50% of 20 to 24 year olds in the US will have a driver's license by 2047?", "desc": "It might be the case that new technologies such as driverless cars and ride-sharing apps could make it so that someday only a small share of people have driver's licenses, and given that driver's licenses are often acquired at a young age and new technology is typically first adopted by younger people, we might expect this change to first occur in younger people.\n\nAccording to the [Highway Statistics Series](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics.cfm) published by the [US Department of Transportation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Transportation), in 2020 there were 17.278 million people aged 20 to 24 who had driver's licenses. According to these figures the number in this age group with driver's licenses peaked at 19.948 million in 1983.\n\nAccording to the [US Census Bureau](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Census_Bureau), in 2020 the US population of 20 to 24 year-olds was [20.059 million](https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2020/demo/age-and-sex/2020-age-sex-composition.html). For 1983 this figure was [21.061 million](https://www.census.gov/data/tables/1983/demo/geographic-mobility/p20-393.html).\n\nThese figures correspond to a percentage of those aged 20 to 24 with a driver's license of approximately 86.14% for 2020 and 94.72% for 1983.", "resc": "This resolves to July 1 of the year when less than 25% of 20 to 24 year-olds in the United States have driver's licenses, using the number of 20 to 24 year-olds with driver's licenses according to data published in the [Highway Statistics Series](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics.cfm) and the total number of 20 to 24 year-olds according to data published by the [US Census Bureau](https://www.census.gov/topics/population/age-and-sex/data/tables.2020.List_897222059.html#list-tab-List_897222059). If this does not occur before January 1, 2080 this resolves as **\"> December 31, 2079\"**.\n\nIn the event these figures are no longer published by these sources Metaculus may use alternate credible sources of information or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2047", "upper_75": "2078", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that less than 50% of 20 to 24 year olds in the US will have a driver's license by 2047?", "desc": "It might be the case that new technologies such as driverless cars and ride-sharing apps could make it so that someday only a small share of people have driver's licenses, and given that driver's licenses are often acquired at a young age and new technology is typically first adopted by younger people, we might expect this change to first occur in younger people.\n\nAccording to the [Highway Statistics Series](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics.cfm) published by the [US Department of Transportation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Transportation), in 2020 there were 17.278 million people aged 20 to 24 who had driver's licenses. According to these figures the number in this age group with driver's licenses peaked at 19.948 million in 1983.\n\nAccording to the [US Census Bureau](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Census_Bureau), in 2020 the US population of 20 to 24 year-olds was [20.059 million](https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2020/demo/age-and-sex/2020-age-sex-composition.html). For 1983 this figure was [21.061 million](https://www.census.gov/data/tables/1983/demo/geographic-mobility/p20-393.html).\n\nThese figures correspond to a percentage of those aged 20 to 24 with a driver's license of approximately 86.14% for 2020 and 94.72% for 1983.", "resc": "This resolves to July 1 of the year when less than 25% of 20 to 24 year-olds in the United States have driver's licenses, using the number of 20 to 24 year-olds with driver's licenses according to data published in the [Highway Statistics Series](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics.cfm) and the total number of 20 to 24 year-olds according to data published by the [US Census Bureau](https://www.census.gov/topics/population/age-and-sex/data/tables.2020.List_897222059.html#list-tab-List_897222059). If this does not occur before January 1, 2080 this resolves as **\"> December 31, 2079\"**.\n\nIn the event these figures are no longer published by these sources Metaculus may use alternate credible sources of information or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2047", "upper_75": "2078", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted annual average U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 3.74 in the following years?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual average seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the annual average U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed year. Resolution will be determined when the first estimate is published for December of the listed year by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm), and will resolve as the average unemployment for the 12 months in the year. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "3.27", "median": "3.74", "upper_75": "4.21", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted annual average U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 3.74 in the following years?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual average seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the annual average U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed year. Resolution will be determined when the first estimate is published for December of the listed year by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm), and will resolve as the average unemployment for the 12 months in the year. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "3.27", "median": "3.74", "upper_75": "4.21", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted annual average U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 2.81 in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.81", "median": "3.80", "upper_75": "4.65", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted annual average U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 3.74% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.27", "median": "3.74", "upper_75": "4.21", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted annual average U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 3.74% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.27", "median": "3.74", "upper_75": "4.21", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 325.3 in the following months?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "307.5", "median": "316.9", "upper_75": "325.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 325.3 in the following months?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "307.5", "median": "316.9", "upper_75": "325.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted annual average U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 4.87% in the year 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.70", "median": "3.66", "upper_75": "4.87", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted annual average U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 4.87% in the year 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.70", "median": "3.66", "upper_75": "4.87", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted annual average U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 2.44% in the year 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.44", "median": "4.00", "upper_75": "5.76", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 325.3 in the following months?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "307.5", "median": "316.9", "upper_75": "325.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 281 in the year 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "281", "median": "310", "upper_75": "332", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 291% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "274", "median": "291", "upper_75": "305.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 291% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "274", "median": "291", "upper_75": "305.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted annual average U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 2.81 in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.81", "median": "3.80", "upper_75": "4.65", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted annual average U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 2.44% in the year 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.44", "median": "4.00", "upper_75": "5.76", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 281 in the year 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "281", "median": "310", "upper_75": "332", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted annual average U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 2.81 in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.81", "median": "3.80", "upper_75": "4.65", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted annual average U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 2.44% in the year 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.44", "median": "4.00", "upper_75": "5.76", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 334 in the year 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "290", "median": "334", "upper_75": "405", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 282 in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "282", "median": "318", "upper_75": "351", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted annual average U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 4.87% in the year 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.70", "median": "3.66", "upper_75": "4.87", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 282 in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "282", "median": "318", "upper_75": "351", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 327 in the year 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "288", "median": "327", "upper_75": "382", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 282 in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "282", "median": "318", "upper_75": "351", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 327 in the year 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "288", "median": "327", "upper_75": "382", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 334 in the year 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "290", "median": "334", "upper_75": "405", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 291% in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "274", "median": "291", "upper_75": "305.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 281 in the year 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "281", "median": "310", "upper_75": "332", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 334 in the year 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "290", "median": "334", "upper_75": "405", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many months in prison will Sam Bankman-Fried be sentenced to before 2030?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that Sam Bankman-Fried will be sentenced to 305.1 months in prison before 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "289.8", "median": "299.7", "upper_75": "305.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a fusion reactor will reach the following energy gain (Q) milestones by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a fusion reactor will reach the following energy gain (Q) milestones by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a fusion reactor will reach the following energy gain (Q) milestones by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a fusion reactor will reach the following energy gain (Q) milestones by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a fusion reactor will reach the following energy gain (Q) milestones by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a fusion reactor will reach the following energy gain (Q) milestones by 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a fusion reactor will reach the following energy gain (Q) milestones by 2057?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will a private fusion company first report a yearly profit?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3725/when-will-a-private-fusion-company-first-report-a-yearly-profit/)\n* [When will nuclear fusion provide >0.1% of the world's primary energy?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9464/nuclear-fusion-power-01-of-global-energy/)\n* [When will the first 100 Megawatt fusion-based electrical generation facility come into service?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/363/will-a-fusion-based-electrical-generation-facility-generation-100-mw-or-more-using-only-fusion-as-an-energy-source-come-into-service-by-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe concept of using nuclear fusion to produce usable energy has been explored [since the 1940s](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_nuclear_fusion). Currently there are [numerous fusion experiments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fusion_experiments) being explored, which can broadly be grouped into three main types\\(^1\\):\n\n* [Magnetic confinement fusion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnetic_confinement_fusion) (MCF)\n* [Inertial confinement fusion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inertial_confinement_fusion) (ICF)\n* Magneto-inertial fusion (MIF)\n\nThese methods all provide confining pressure to nuclear fuel to achieve a fusion reaction, but MCF uses magnetic fields to confine the fuel, while ICF typically uses energy beams, such as lasers, to heat an outer layer of fuel and producing a reaction where the fuel is forced inward where it compresses together into a fusion reaction. MCF and ICF are typically considered to be the most prominent, while MIF is another method that encompasses methods such as [Z-pinch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Z-pinch), where electric currents are used.\n\nDue to the different methods and approaches the terminology used for these methods can often be confusing. A common term in the field of fusion is \"ignition\" but the definition of ignition may very depending on the method used and the research group using it. For example, the [National Ignition Facility](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Ignition_Facility) (NIF) uses an ICF method and [defines ignition as](https://lasers.llnl.gov/education/glossary)\n\n>In laser fusion, ignition is defined as energy output equal to or greater than the amount of laser energy delivered to the target. As in an ordinary (chemical) fire, ignition is the point at which the temperature and confinement of heat in the fuel (plasma in the case of fusion) are such that energy released from ongoing reactions is sufficient to maintain the temperature of the system and no external heating is needed. An ignited fusion plasma produces so much energy from fusion reactions that the plasma is fully heated by the fusion reaction products (alpha particles in the case of deuterium–tritium fusion).\n\nHowever, the fusion research consortium [EUROfusion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EUROfusion) defines \"breakeven\" as\n\n>Energy breakeven occurs when the energy released by the fusion reaction equals the energy put in to heat the plasma (i.e. for a D-T plasma: alpha particle power plus neutron power).\n>\n>The fusion performance of a power plant is denoted by Q, which is the ratio of the energy of the fusion products to that used to heat the plasma. While breakeven corresponds to Q = 1, a burning plasma has Q > 1 and ignition corresponds to Q = infinity.\n\nThe breakeven definition used by EUROfusion is very similar to the ignition definition used by NIF, complicating the discussion and public understanding around fusion developments. To avoid confusing terms it is often better to discuss fusion performance, typically denoted as \\(Q\\). But even when discussing performance it's important to be careful, because there are [multiple measures](https://news.newenergytimes.net/2022/04/08/fusion-q-values-and-breakeven-explained/) of \\(Q\\) which are often of interest. Quoted portions of the definitions are from Wurzel and Hsu (2021).\\(^1\\)\n\n* \\(Q_{fuel}\\): Also referred to as the fuel gain, this is the \"ratio of fusion power to power absorbed by the fuel.\"\n* \\(Q_{sci}\\): Also referred to as the scientific gain, this is the \"ratio of fusion power to externally applied heating power\". Where \\(Q_{fuel}\\) compares the power actually absorbed by the fuel, \\(Q_{sci}\\) compares the power produced by the equipment, not just the portion absorbed by the fuel.\n* \\(Q_{eng}\\): Also referred to as the engineering gain, this is the \"ratio of electrical power to the grid to recirculating power\" or in other words its how much power can be captured from the fusion reaction and fed into the grid divided by the amount of electrical or mechanical recirculating power used to maintain the necessary energy inputs.\n* \\(Q_{wp}\\): Also referred to as the \"wall-plug\" gain, this is the \"ratio of the fusion power to input electrical power from the grid\". This compares the power produced from the fusion reaction to the power used from the electrical grid to operate all the equipment making the necessary energy inputs.\n* \\(Q_{econ}\\): The economic gain compares energy costs, and economic value may be demonstrated when the ratio of the cost of the produced energy to the cost to produce the energy exceeds 1.\n\n\"Diagram\n*Diagram of Fusion Inputs and Outputs*\\(^1\\)\n\nOn December 13, 2022, the NIF announced that they had [achieved a breakthrough](https://www.vox.com/recode/23505995/fusion-energy-breakthrough-announcement-ignition-nif), reporting that the fusion reaction produced [3.15 megajoules of fusion energy using 2.05 megajoules](https://www.llnl.gov/news/shot-ages-fusion-ignition-breakthrough-hailed-one-most-impressive-scientific-feats-21st) of laser energy applied to the target, corresponding to \\(Q_{sci}\\) of approximately 1.54.\n\nThe [reported](https://www.vox.com/recode/23505995/fusion-energy-breakthrough-announcement-ignition-nif) amount of energy used to charge and fire the lasers was approximately 300 megajoules, corresponding to a \\(Q_{wp}\\) of approximately 0.01.\n\nIn Wurzel and Hsu (2021)\\(^1\\) the authors state\n\n>We regard the eventual demonstration of \\(Q_{wp}\\) = 1 (not \\(Q_{fuel}\\) or \\(Q_{sci}\\) = 1) as the so-called “Kitty Hawk moment” for fusion energy.\n\n\\(^1\\) *Wurzel, Samuel E., and Scott C. Hsu. [\"Progress toward fusion energy breakeven and gain as measured against the Lawson criterion.\"](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.10954) Physics of Plasmas 29.6 (2022): 062103.*", "resc": "This resolves as the date when the listed energy gain is first achieved in a fusion reactor or experiment. This will resolve as the date that the threshold was first successfully crossed during the experiment, according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions). In the event the date of the qualifying experiment or reaction is not publicly available within 90 days of the official announcement that the threshold was passed, this will resolve to the date of the announcement.\n\nThe threshold used for this question for the scientific gain, \\(Q_{sci}\\), is meeting or exceeding a value of 5. For the purposes of this question the scientific gain will be considered to be the ratio of energy produced by the fusion reaction (over the duration of the fusion reaction) to the energy applied by the equipment to the boundary of the fusion experiment or reaction (over the duration of the experiment or reaction).\n\nThe threshold used for this question for the \"wall-plug\" gain, \\(Q_{wp}\\), is meeting or exceeding a value of 1. For the purposes of this question the \"wall-plug\" gain will be considered to be the ratio of energy produced by the fusion reaction (over the duration of the fusion reaction) to the grid energy used by the equipment to power the fusion experiment or reaction (over the duration of the experiment or reaction).\n\nIf no official announcement has been made before January 1, 2080, this resolves as **\"> December 31, 2079\"**, regardless of whether a later announcement would place the date before January 1, 2080.", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a fusion reactor will reach the following energy gain (Q) milestones by 2057?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will a private fusion company first report a yearly profit?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3725/when-will-a-private-fusion-company-first-report-a-yearly-profit/)\n* [When will nuclear fusion provide >0.1% of the world's primary energy?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9464/nuclear-fusion-power-01-of-global-energy/)\n* [When will the first 100 Megawatt fusion-based electrical generation facility come into service?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/363/will-a-fusion-based-electrical-generation-facility-generation-100-mw-or-more-using-only-fusion-as-an-energy-source-come-into-service-by-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe concept of using nuclear fusion to produce usable energy has been explored [since the 1940s](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_nuclear_fusion). Currently there are [numerous fusion experiments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fusion_experiments) being explored, which can broadly be grouped into three main types\\(^1\\):\n\n* [Magnetic confinement fusion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnetic_confinement_fusion) (MCF)\n* [Inertial confinement fusion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inertial_confinement_fusion) (ICF)\n* Magneto-inertial fusion (MIF)\n\nThese methods all provide confining pressure to nuclear fuel to achieve a fusion reaction, but MCF uses magnetic fields to confine the fuel, while ICF typically uses energy beams, such as lasers, to heat an outer layer of fuel and producing a reaction where the fuel is forced inward where it compresses together into a fusion reaction. MCF and ICF are typically considered to be the most prominent, while MIF is another method that encompasses methods such as [Z-pinch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Z-pinch), where electric currents are used.\n\nDue to the different methods and approaches the terminology used for these methods can often be confusing. A common term in the field of fusion is \"ignition\" but the definition of ignition may very depending on the method used and the research group using it. For example, the [National Ignition Facility](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Ignition_Facility) (NIF) uses an ICF method and [defines ignition as](https://lasers.llnl.gov/education/glossary)\n\n>In laser fusion, ignition is defined as energy output equal to or greater than the amount of laser energy delivered to the target. As in an ordinary (chemical) fire, ignition is the point at which the temperature and confinement of heat in the fuel (plasma in the case of fusion) are such that energy released from ongoing reactions is sufficient to maintain the temperature of the system and no external heating is needed. An ignited fusion plasma produces so much energy from fusion reactions that the plasma is fully heated by the fusion reaction products (alpha particles in the case of deuterium–tritium fusion).\n\nHowever, the fusion research consortium [EUROfusion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EUROfusion) defines \"breakeven\" as\n\n>Energy breakeven occurs when the energy released by the fusion reaction equals the energy put in to heat the plasma (i.e. for a D-T plasma: alpha particle power plus neutron power).\n>\n>The fusion performance of a power plant is denoted by Q, which is the ratio of the energy of the fusion products to that used to heat the plasma. While breakeven corresponds to Q = 1, a burning plasma has Q > 1 and ignition corresponds to Q = infinity.\n\nThe breakeven definition used by EUROfusion is very similar to the ignition definition used by NIF, complicating the discussion and public understanding around fusion developments. To avoid confusing terms it is often better to discuss fusion performance, typically denoted as \\(Q\\). But even when discussing performance it's important to be careful, because there are [multiple measures](https://news.newenergytimes.net/2022/04/08/fusion-q-values-and-breakeven-explained/) of \\(Q\\) which are often of interest. Quoted portions of the definitions are from Wurzel and Hsu (2021).\\(^1\\)\n\n* \\(Q_{fuel}\\): Also referred to as the fuel gain, this is the \"ratio of fusion power to power absorbed by the fuel.\"\n* \\(Q_{sci}\\): Also referred to as the scientific gain, this is the \"ratio of fusion power to externally applied heating power\". Where \\(Q_{fuel}\\) compares the power actually absorbed by the fuel, \\(Q_{sci}\\) compares the power produced by the equipment, not just the portion absorbed by the fuel.\n* \\(Q_{eng}\\): Also referred to as the engineering gain, this is the \"ratio of electrical power to the grid to recirculating power\" or in other words its how much power can be captured from the fusion reaction and fed into the grid divided by the amount of electrical or mechanical recirculating power used to maintain the necessary energy inputs.\n* \\(Q_{wp}\\): Also referred to as the \"wall-plug\" gain, this is the \"ratio of the fusion power to input electrical power from the grid\". This compares the power produced from the fusion reaction to the power used from the electrical grid to operate all the equipment making the necessary energy inputs.\n* \\(Q_{econ}\\): The economic gain compares energy costs, and economic value may be demonstrated when the ratio of the cost of the produced energy to the cost to produce the energy exceeds 1.\n\n\"Diagram\n*Diagram of Fusion Inputs and Outputs*\\(^1\\)\n\nOn December 13, 2022, the NIF announced that they had [achieved a breakthrough](https://www.vox.com/recode/23505995/fusion-energy-breakthrough-announcement-ignition-nif), reporting that the fusion reaction produced [3.15 megajoules of fusion energy using 2.05 megajoules](https://www.llnl.gov/news/shot-ages-fusion-ignition-breakthrough-hailed-one-most-impressive-scientific-feats-21st) of laser energy applied to the target, corresponding to \\(Q_{sci}\\) of approximately 1.54.\n\nThe [reported](https://www.vox.com/recode/23505995/fusion-energy-breakthrough-announcement-ignition-nif) amount of energy used to charge and fire the lasers was approximately 300 megajoules, corresponding to a \\(Q_{wp}\\) of approximately 0.01.\n\nIn Wurzel and Hsu (2021)\\(^1\\) the authors state\n\n>We regard the eventual demonstration of \\(Q_{wp}\\) = 1 (not \\(Q_{fuel}\\) or \\(Q_{sci}\\) = 1) as the so-called “Kitty Hawk moment” for fusion energy.\n\n\\(^1\\) *Wurzel, Samuel E., and Scott C. Hsu. [\"Progress toward fusion energy breakeven and gain as measured against the Lawson criterion.\"](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.10954) Physics of Plasmas 29.6 (2022): 062103.*", "resc": "This resolves as the date when the listed energy gain is first achieved in a fusion reactor or experiment. This will resolve as the date that the threshold was first successfully crossed during the experiment, according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions). In the event the date of the qualifying experiment or reaction is not publicly available within 90 days of the official announcement that the threshold was passed, this will resolve to the date of the announcement.\n\nThe threshold used for this question for the scientific gain, \\(Q_{sci}\\), is meeting or exceeding a value of 5. For the purposes of this question the scientific gain will be considered to be the ratio of energy produced by the fusion reaction (over the duration of the fusion reaction) to the energy applied by the equipment to the boundary of the fusion experiment or reaction (over the duration of the experiment or reaction).\n\nThe threshold used for this question for the \"wall-plug\" gain, \\(Q_{wp}\\), is meeting or exceeding a value of 1. For the purposes of this question the \"wall-plug\" gain will be considered to be the ratio of energy produced by the fusion reaction (over the duration of the fusion reaction) to the grid energy used by the equipment to power the fusion experiment or reaction (over the duration of the experiment or reaction).\n\nIf no official announcement has been made before January 1, 2080, this resolves as **\"> December 31, 2079\"**, regardless of whether a later announcement would place the date before January 1, 2080.", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 75% change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment in the following months?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.3k", "median": "142k", "upper_75": "215k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a fusion reactor will reach the following energy gain (Q) milestones by 2057?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will a private fusion company first report a yearly profit?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3725/when-will-a-private-fusion-company-first-report-a-yearly-profit/)\n* [When will nuclear fusion provide >0.1% of the world's primary energy?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/9464/nuclear-fusion-power-01-of-global-energy/)\n* [When will the first 100 Megawatt fusion-based electrical generation facility come into service?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/363/will-a-fusion-based-electrical-generation-facility-generation-100-mw-or-more-using-only-fusion-as-an-energy-source-come-into-service-by-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe concept of using nuclear fusion to produce usable energy has been explored [since the 1940s](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_nuclear_fusion). Currently there are [numerous fusion experiments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fusion_experiments) being explored, which can broadly be grouped into three main types\\(^1\\):\n\n* [Magnetic confinement fusion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnetic_confinement_fusion) (MCF)\n* [Inertial confinement fusion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inertial_confinement_fusion) (ICF)\n* Magneto-inertial fusion (MIF)\n\nThese methods all provide confining pressure to nuclear fuel to achieve a fusion reaction, but MCF uses magnetic fields to confine the fuel, while ICF typically uses energy beams, such as lasers, to heat an outer layer of fuel and producing a reaction where the fuel is forced inward where it compresses together into a fusion reaction. MCF and ICF are typically considered to be the most prominent, while MIF is another method that encompasses methods such as [Z-pinch](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Z-pinch), where electric currents are used.\n\nDue to the different methods and approaches the terminology used for these methods can often be confusing. A common term in the field of fusion is \"ignition\" but the definition of ignition may very depending on the method used and the research group using it. For example, the [National Ignition Facility](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Ignition_Facility) (NIF) uses an ICF method and [defines ignition as](https://lasers.llnl.gov/education/glossary)\n\n>In laser fusion, ignition is defined as energy output equal to or greater than the amount of laser energy delivered to the target. As in an ordinary (chemical) fire, ignition is the point at which the temperature and confinement of heat in the fuel (plasma in the case of fusion) are such that energy released from ongoing reactions is sufficient to maintain the temperature of the system and no external heating is needed. An ignited fusion plasma produces so much energy from fusion reactions that the plasma is fully heated by the fusion reaction products (alpha particles in the case of deuterium–tritium fusion).\n\nHowever, the fusion research consortium [EUROfusion](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EUROfusion) defines \"breakeven\" as\n\n>Energy breakeven occurs when the energy released by the fusion reaction equals the energy put in to heat the plasma (i.e. for a D-T plasma: alpha particle power plus neutron power).\n>\n>The fusion performance of a power plant is denoted by Q, which is the ratio of the energy of the fusion products to that used to heat the plasma. While breakeven corresponds to Q = 1, a burning plasma has Q > 1 and ignition corresponds to Q = infinity.\n\nThe breakeven definition used by EUROfusion is very similar to the ignition definition used by NIF, complicating the discussion and public understanding around fusion developments. To avoid confusing terms it is often better to discuss fusion performance, typically denoted as \\(Q\\). But even when discussing performance it's important to be careful, because there are [multiple measures](https://news.newenergytimes.net/2022/04/08/fusion-q-values-and-breakeven-explained/) of \\(Q\\) which are often of interest. Quoted portions of the definitions are from Wurzel and Hsu (2021).\\(^1\\)\n\n* \\(Q_{fuel}\\): Also referred to as the fuel gain, this is the \"ratio of fusion power to power absorbed by the fuel.\"\n* \\(Q_{sci}\\): Also referred to as the scientific gain, this is the \"ratio of fusion power to externally applied heating power\". Where \\(Q_{fuel}\\) compares the power actually absorbed by the fuel, \\(Q_{sci}\\) compares the power produced by the equipment, not just the portion absorbed by the fuel.\n* \\(Q_{eng}\\): Also referred to as the engineering gain, this is the \"ratio of electrical power to the grid to recirculating power\" or in other words its how much power can be captured from the fusion reaction and fed into the grid divided by the amount of electrical or mechanical recirculating power used to maintain the necessary energy inputs.\n* \\(Q_{wp}\\): Also referred to as the \"wall-plug\" gain, this is the \"ratio of the fusion power to input electrical power from the grid\". This compares the power produced from the fusion reaction to the power used from the electrical grid to operate all the equipment making the necessary energy inputs.\n* \\(Q_{econ}\\): The economic gain compares energy costs, and economic value may be demonstrated when the ratio of the cost of the produced energy to the cost to produce the energy exceeds 1.\n\n\"Diagram\n*Diagram of Fusion Inputs and Outputs*\\(^1\\)\n\nOn December 13, 2022, the NIF announced that they had [achieved a breakthrough](https://www.vox.com/recode/23505995/fusion-energy-breakthrough-announcement-ignition-nif), reporting that the fusion reaction produced [3.15 megajoules of fusion energy using 2.05 megajoules](https://www.llnl.gov/news/shot-ages-fusion-ignition-breakthrough-hailed-one-most-impressive-scientific-feats-21st) of laser energy applied to the target, corresponding to \\(Q_{sci}\\) of approximately 1.54.\n\nThe [reported](https://www.vox.com/recode/23505995/fusion-energy-breakthrough-announcement-ignition-nif) amount of energy used to charge and fire the lasers was approximately 300 megajoules, corresponding to a \\(Q_{wp}\\) of approximately 0.01.\n\nIn Wurzel and Hsu (2021)\\(^1\\) the authors state\n\n>We regard the eventual demonstration of \\(Q_{wp}\\) = 1 (not \\(Q_{fuel}\\) or \\(Q_{sci}\\) = 1) as the so-called “Kitty Hawk moment” for fusion energy.\n\n\\(^1\\) *Wurzel, Samuel E., and Scott C. Hsu. [\"Progress toward fusion energy breakeven and gain as measured against the Lawson criterion.\"](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.10954) Physics of Plasmas 29.6 (2022): 062103.*", "resc": "This resolves as the date when the listed energy gain is first achieved in a fusion reactor or experiment. This will resolve as the date that the threshold was first successfully crossed during the experiment, according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions). In the event the date of the qualifying experiment or reaction is not publicly available within 90 days of the official announcement that the threshold was passed, this will resolve to the date of the announcement.\n\nThe threshold used for this question for the scientific gain, \\(Q_{sci}\\), is meeting or exceeding a value of 5. For the purposes of this question the scientific gain will be considered to be the ratio of energy produced by the fusion reaction (over the duration of the fusion reaction) to the energy applied by the equipment to the boundary of the fusion experiment or reaction (over the duration of the experiment or reaction).\n\nThe threshold used for this question for the \"wall-plug\" gain, \\(Q_{wp}\\), is meeting or exceeding a value of 1. For the purposes of this question the \"wall-plug\" gain will be considered to be the ratio of energy produced by the fusion reaction (over the duration of the fusion reaction) to the grid energy used by the equipment to power the fusion experiment or reaction (over the duration of the experiment or reaction).\n\nIf no official announcement has been made before January 1, 2080, this resolves as **\"> December 31, 2079\"**, regardless of whether a later announcement would place the date before January 1, 2080.", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 75% change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment in the following months?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.3k", "median": "142k", "upper_75": "215k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global market for perovskite solar cells will be 144 million dollars in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "144", "median": "480", "upper_75": "6.65k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 327 in the year 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "288", "median": "327", "upper_75": "382", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global market for perovskite solar cells will be 144 million dollars in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "144", "median": "480", "upper_75": "6.65k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many months in prison will Sam Bankman-Fried be sentenced to before 2030?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that Sam Bankman-Fried will be sentenced to 305.1 months in prison before 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "289.8", "median": "299.7", "upper_75": "305.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many months in prison will Sam Bankman-Fried be sentenced to before 2030?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that Sam Bankman-Fried will be sentenced to 305.1 months in prison before 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "289.8", "median": "299.7", "upper_75": "305.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 5.555% on the following dates?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.380", "median": "5.484", "upper_75": "5.555", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 5.555% on the following dates?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.380", "median": "5.484", "upper_75": "5.555", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 75% change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment in the following months?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.3k", "median": "142k", "upper_75": "215k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 5.555% on the following dates?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.380", "median": "5.484", "upper_75": "5.555", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 5.33 on September 30, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.67", "median": "5.01", "upper_75": "5.33", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 5.33 on September 30, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.67", "median": "5.01", "upper_75": "5.33", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 5.510 on June 30, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.130", "median": "5.324", "upper_75": "5.510", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 4.62 on December 31, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.26", "median": "4.62", "upper_75": "5.02", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first fully automated McDonald's will open in the United States by 2034?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first fully automated McDonald's will open in the United States by 2034?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 4.62 on December 31, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.26", "median": "4.62", "upper_75": "5.02", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 5.33 on September 30, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.67", "median": "5.01", "upper_75": "5.33", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the global market for perovskite solar cells will be 144 million dollars in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "144", "median": "480", "upper_75": "6.65k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that England will win a FIFA men's or women's world cup by 2029?", "desc": "The [FIFA World Cup](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIFA_World_Cup) and [FIFA Women's World Cup](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIFA_Women%27s_World_Cup) are international association football tournaments held in intervals of 4 years.\n\nThe [England (men's) national football team](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/England_national_football_team) has previously won a World Cup exactly once, [in 1966](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/England_at_the_FIFA_World_Cup). The [England women's national football team](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/England_women%27s_national_football_team) have never won a World Cup, but they did win the [UEFA Women's Championship](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UEFA_Women%27s_Championship) in [2022](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UEFA_Women%27s_Euro_2022).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which the England national football team next wins the FIFA World Cup or the date on which the England women's national football team wins the FIFA Women's World Cup, whichever is earlier", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2043", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that England will win a FIFA men's or women's world cup by 2029?", "desc": "The [FIFA World Cup](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIFA_World_Cup) and [FIFA Women's World Cup](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIFA_Women%27s_World_Cup) are international association football tournaments held in intervals of 4 years.\n\nThe [England (men's) national football team](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/England_national_football_team) has previously won a World Cup exactly once, [in 1966](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/England_at_the_FIFA_World_Cup). The [England women's national football team](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/England_women%27s_national_football_team) have never won a World Cup, but they did win the [UEFA Women's Championship](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UEFA_Women%27s_Championship) in [2022](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UEFA_Women%27s_Euro_2022).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which the England national football team next wins the FIFA World Cup or the date on which the England women's national football team wins the FIFA Women's World Cup, whichever is earlier", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2043", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first fully automated McDonald's will open in the United States by 2034?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2034", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that England will win a FIFA men's or women's world cup by 2029?", "desc": "The [FIFA World Cup](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIFA_World_Cup) and [FIFA Women's World Cup](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIFA_Women%27s_World_Cup) are international association football tournaments held in intervals of 4 years.\n\nThe [England (men's) national football team](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/England_national_football_team) has previously won a World Cup exactly once, [in 1966](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/England_at_the_FIFA_World_Cup). The [England women's national football team](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/England_women%27s_national_football_team) have never won a World Cup, but they did win the [UEFA Women's Championship](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UEFA_Women%27s_Championship) in [2022](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UEFA_Women%27s_Euro_2022).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which the England national football team next wins the FIFA World Cup or the date on which the England women's national football team wins the FIFA Women's World Cup, whichever is earlier", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2035", "upper_75": "2043", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that North Korea will first put a person in space by 2057?", "desc": "[North Korea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea), officially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), is a country in East Asia. According to Article 1 of the state constitution, North Korea is an \"independent socialist state\". The country is a dictatorship that since 1948 has been led by members of the [Kim dynasty.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_family_(North_Korea)) \n\nIn recent decades, North Korea has invested heavily in developing [nuclear weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction) and [associated missiles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction#Operational_delivery_systems), including ICBMs. The country has also developed [a carrier rocket](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unha) that it has used to successfully place satellites in low Earth orbit.\n\nAs of December 2022, the country is not known to have a human spaceflight program.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which, according to credible media reports, North Korea has launched a living North Korean citizen on a North Korean rocket from North Korean soil (or a vessel in North Korean waters) to an altitude of at least 100 km above Earth's mean sea level, crossing the [Kármán line](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C3%A1rm%C3%A1n_line). The person launched must be alive at the time the Kármán line is crossed.\n\nThere is no requirement that the spacecraft achieves orbit, or that any persons launched are successfully recovered.\n\nThe resolution date is the date of the launch, rather than the date of the reports.", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2057", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2060", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that North Korea will first put a person in space by 2057?", "desc": "[North Korea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea), officially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), is a country in East Asia. According to Article 1 of the state constitution, North Korea is an \"independent socialist state\". The country is a dictatorship that since 1948 has been led by members of the [Kim dynasty.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_family_(North_Korea)) \n\nIn recent decades, North Korea has invested heavily in developing [nuclear weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction) and [associated missiles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction#Operational_delivery_systems), including ICBMs. The country has also developed [a carrier rocket](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unha) that it has used to successfully place satellites in low Earth orbit.\n\nAs of December 2022, the country is not known to have a human spaceflight program.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which, according to credible media reports, North Korea has launched a living North Korean citizen on a North Korean rocket from North Korean soil (or a vessel in North Korean waters) to an altitude of at least 100 km above Earth's mean sea level, crossing the [Kármán line](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C3%A1rm%C3%A1n_line). The person launched must be alive at the time the Kármán line is crossed.\n\nThere is no requirement that the spacecraft achieves orbit, or that any persons launched are successfully recovered.\n\nThe resolution date is the date of the launch, rather than the date of the reports.", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2057", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2060", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that North Korea will first put a person in space by 2057?", "desc": "[North Korea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea), officially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), is a country in East Asia. According to Article 1 of the state constitution, North Korea is an \"independent socialist state\". The country is a dictatorship that since 1948 has been led by members of the [Kim dynasty.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_family_(North_Korea)) \n\nIn recent decades, North Korea has invested heavily in developing [nuclear weapons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction) and [associated missiles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction#Operational_delivery_systems), including ICBMs. The country has also developed [a carrier rocket](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unha) that it has used to successfully place satellites in low Earth orbit.\n\nAs of December 2022, the country is not known to have a human spaceflight program.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which, according to credible media reports, North Korea has launched a living North Korean citizen on a North Korean rocket from North Korean soil (or a vessel in North Korean waters) to an altitude of at least 100 km above Earth's mean sea level, crossing the [Kármán line](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C3%A1rm%C3%A1n_line). The person launched must be alive at the time the Kármán line is crossed.\n\nThere is no requirement that the spacecraft achieves orbit, or that any persons launched are successfully recovered.\n\nThe resolution date is the date of the launch, rather than the date of the reports.", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2057", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2060", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 5.510 on June 30, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.130", "median": "5.324", "upper_75": "5.510", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 5.510 on June 30, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.130", "median": "5.324", "upper_75": "5.510", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many months in prison will Avraham Eisenberg be sentenced to before 2030?\n\nKeyword: 123\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that Avraham Eisenberg will be sentenced to 123 months in prison before 2030?", "desc": "From the [Jerusalem Post](https://www.jpost.com/business-and-innovation/banking-and-finance/article-725977),\n\n> US prosecutors have filed criminal charges of commodities fraud and manipulation against a man accused of trying to steal about $110 million in October by rigging the Mango Markets cryptocurrency exchange.\n\n> According to a complaint made public on Tuesday in Manhattan federal court, Avraham Eisenberg's trades in futures related to Mango's crypto token MNGO enabled him to withdraw $110 million in cryptocurrencies from other investors' deposits, with no apparent intention to repay the funds.\n\n> Eisenberg was arrested on Monday night in Puerto Rico, US Attorney Damian Williams in Manhattan said in a court filing.\n\nAvraham also has [an account on Metaculus](https://www.metaculus.com/accounts/profile/114222/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of months to which Avraham Eisenberg has been sentenced to serve consecutively by any competent court, before January 1st, 2030. Any appeals that change the length of a previously assigned sentence will be factored in according to the status of the sentence as of resolution time; overturned sentences will not count. If Avraham Eisenberg is not so sentenced, or all such sentences are overturned, or they total less than two months consecutively, then this question will resolve as \"**<**\". If the total sentence exceeds the upper bound, including life sentences, then this question will resolve as \"**>**\"", "lower_25": "42.3", "median": "78.0", "upper_75": "123", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 4.62 on December 31, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.26", "median": "4.62", "upper_75": "5.02", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US Senate will confirm 64.9 federal judges in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many judges will the US Senate confirm in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3514/how-many-judges-will-the-us-senate-confirm-in-2020/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2021?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6114/will-the-senate-confirm-many-judges-in-2021/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7500/us-federal-judges-confirmed-in-2022/)\n\n---\n\nThe number of federal judges each president can get confirmed in the US Senate is enormously consequential for US government and policy. The federal judiciary consists of [a number of courts](https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure) each [authorized under certain articles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_tribunals_in_the_United_States#List_of_Article_I,_Article_III_and_Article_IV_tribunals) of the [US Constitution](https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/full-text).\n\n* **Article I Courts:** Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to \"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court\". One such court is the [US Court of Federal Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Federal_Claims). Some courts established under Article I do not have full judicial power. These include the following courts:\n * [US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_Veterans_Claims)\n * [US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Armed_Forces)\n * [US Tax Court](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Tax_Court)\n* **Article III Courts:** Article III of the Constitution grants judicial power in \"one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.\" The [federal judiciary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_judiciary_of_the_United_States) established under Article III includes the US Supreme Court, US courts of appeals, US district courts, and the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade).\n* **Article IV Courts:** Article IV of the Constitution grants Congress the \"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States\". Under this clause the US may establish [territorial courts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_territorial_court) in US territories. The US currently has Article IV district courts in the territories of Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. District courts for Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are considered to be Article III courts.\n\nThe Constitutional status of courts is typically determined by Congress. For example, the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade) (originally named the US Customs Court until it was renamed in 1980) was an Article I tribunal [until 1956](https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-customs-court-legislative-history) when it became an Article III court.\n\nThe US Courts webpage maintains a [list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). Currently the list includes judges confirmed by the Senate to Article I courts with full judicial power, Article III courts, and Article IV courts. For example, confirmations to the US Tax Court are not included. The list also does not include [recess appointments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recess_appointment), but it does include recess appointments that are later confirmed by the Senate.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US federal judges confirmed by the Senate in the listed year according to [the US Courts' list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). If that source becomes unavailable, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) of comparable quality and methodology may be used instead.", "lower_25": "41.1", "median": "52.4", "upper_75": "64.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the oldest living person will be 120 years old in 2100?", "desc": "[Life expectancy has doubled since 1900](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/life-expectancy?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). This rising average masks great individual variation. As of early 2023 the oldest living person is [Maria Branyas](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maria_Branyas), born on March 4, 1907. At 115 years old, her current age is 1.6x the global average expectancy.\n\nAdvances in medicine and public health may continue to raise the global average [at a roughly linear rate](https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy#the-rise-of-maximum-life-expectancy), but the *maximum living age* may not follow the same trend.", "resc": "This resolves as the age of the oldest living human, in years, as of 0:00 on January 1, 2100. Resolution source is *Guiness Book of World Records*. If that source is no longer available in 2100, then admins will choose a credible alternative", "lower_25": "120", "median": "128", "upper_75": "142", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many months in prison will Avraham Eisenberg be sentenced to before 2030?\n\nKeyword: 123\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that Avraham Eisenberg will be sentenced to 123 months in prison before 2030?", "desc": "From the [Jerusalem Post](https://www.jpost.com/business-and-innovation/banking-and-finance/article-725977),\n\n> US prosecutors have filed criminal charges of commodities fraud and manipulation against a man accused of trying to steal about $110 million in October by rigging the Mango Markets cryptocurrency exchange.\n\n> According to a complaint made public on Tuesday in Manhattan federal court, Avraham Eisenberg's trades in futures related to Mango's crypto token MNGO enabled him to withdraw $110 million in cryptocurrencies from other investors' deposits, with no apparent intention to repay the funds.\n\n> Eisenberg was arrested on Monday night in Puerto Rico, US Attorney Damian Williams in Manhattan said in a court filing.\n\nAvraham also has [an account on Metaculus](https://www.metaculus.com/accounts/profile/114222/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of months to which Avraham Eisenberg has been sentenced to serve consecutively by any competent court, before January 1st, 2030. Any appeals that change the length of a previously assigned sentence will be factored in according to the status of the sentence as of resolution time; overturned sentences will not count. If Avraham Eisenberg is not so sentenced, or all such sentences are overturned, or they total less than two months consecutively, then this question will resolve as \"**<**\". If the total sentence exceeds the upper bound, including life sentences, then this question will resolve as \"**>**\"", "lower_25": "42.3", "median": "78.0", "upper_75": "123", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that GPT-4 will have 1.62k parameters if it is announced before 2025?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many parameters will GPT-4 have (if it is released), in billions of parameters?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4852/how-many-parameters-will-gpt-4-have-if-it-is-released-in-billions-of-parameters/)\n\n*The previous version of this question resolves as* ***Ambiguous*** *if GPT-4 is not released before 2023. This is a new version to replace it.*\n\n---\n\nMany have speculated about GPT-4 ever since [GPT-3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPT-3) was announced in June of 2020. In the fall of 2021 there were [rumors](https://www.wired.com/story/cerebras-chip-cluster-neural-networks-ai/) that GPT-4 would have 100 trillion parameters. However, since then it's [been reported](https://www.datacamp.com/blog/what-we-know-gpt4) that GPT-4 may not be much larger than GPT-3. As discussed in [this writeup](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/midXmMb2Xg37F2Kgn/new-scaling-laws-for-large-language-models) (and also [here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/6Fpvch8RR29qLEWNH/chinchilla-s-wild-implications)), research by DeepMind published in the spring of 2022, along with a model named [Chinchilla](https://www.deepmind.com/publications/an-empirical-analysis-of-compute-optimal-large-language-model-training), suggested that the importance of dataset size relative to parameter count had been underestimated in previous work.\n\n>On March 29th, DeepMind published a paper, \"Training Compute-Optimal Large Language Models\", that shows that essentially everyone -- OpenAI, DeepMind, Microsoft, etc. -- has been training large language models with a deeply suboptimal use of compute.\n>\n>Following the new scaling laws that they propose for the optimal use of compute, DeepMind trains a new, 70-billion parameter model that outperforms much larger language models, including the 175-billion parameter GPT-3 and DeepMind's own 270-billion parameter \"Gopher\".", "resc": "This resolves as the number of parameters (in billions) for GPT-4 according to information provided by OpenAI. If OpenAI does not release GPT-4 before January 1st 2025, this question resolves as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIn case OpenAI does not explicitly refer to the relevant model as GPT-4, members of the community, community moderators, or admins will do a strawpoll on the /r/openai subreddit and ask:\n\n>In your opinion, is it roughly correct to say that this model is the successor to GPT-3?\n\nAfter 1 week, the majority answer wins with a tie counting as \"yes\"", "lower_25": "1.62k", "median": "1.75k", "upper_75": "1.85k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US Senate will confirm 64.9 federal judges in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many judges will the US Senate confirm in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3514/how-many-judges-will-the-us-senate-confirm-in-2020/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2021?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6114/will-the-senate-confirm-many-judges-in-2021/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7500/us-federal-judges-confirmed-in-2022/)\n\n---\n\nThe number of federal judges each president can get confirmed in the US Senate is enormously consequential for US government and policy. The federal judiciary consists of [a number of courts](https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure) each [authorized under certain articles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_tribunals_in_the_United_States#List_of_Article_I,_Article_III_and_Article_IV_tribunals) of the [US Constitution](https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/full-text).\n\n* **Article I Courts:** Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to \"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court\". One such court is the [US Court of Federal Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Federal_Claims). Some courts established under Article I do not have full judicial power. These include the following courts:\n * [US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_Veterans_Claims)\n * [US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Armed_Forces)\n * [US Tax Court](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Tax_Court)\n* **Article III Courts:** Article III of the Constitution grants judicial power in \"one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.\" The [federal judiciary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_judiciary_of_the_United_States) established under Article III includes the US Supreme Court, US courts of appeals, US district courts, and the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade).\n* **Article IV Courts:** Article IV of the Constitution grants Congress the \"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States\". Under this clause the US may establish [territorial courts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_territorial_court) in US territories. The US currently has Article IV district courts in the territories of Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. District courts for Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are considered to be Article III courts.\n\nThe Constitutional status of courts is typically determined by Congress. For example, the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade) (originally named the US Customs Court until it was renamed in 1980) was an Article I tribunal [until 1956](https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-customs-court-legislative-history) when it became an Article III court.\n\nThe US Courts webpage maintains a [list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). Currently the list includes judges confirmed by the Senate to Article I courts with full judicial power, Article III courts, and Article IV courts. For example, confirmations to the US Tax Court are not included. The list also does not include [recess appointments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recess_appointment), but it does include recess appointments that are later confirmed by the Senate.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US federal judges confirmed by the Senate in the listed year according to [the US Courts' list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). If that source becomes unavailable, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) of comparable quality and methodology may be used instead.", "lower_25": "41.1", "median": "52.4", "upper_75": "64.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that GPT-4 will have 1.62k parameters if it is announced before 2025?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many parameters will GPT-4 have (if it is released), in billions of parameters?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4852/how-many-parameters-will-gpt-4-have-if-it-is-released-in-billions-of-parameters/)\n\n*The previous version of this question resolves as* ***Ambiguous*** *if GPT-4 is not released before 2023. This is a new version to replace it.*\n\n---\n\nMany have speculated about GPT-4 ever since [GPT-3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPT-3) was announced in June of 2020. In the fall of 2021 there were [rumors](https://www.wired.com/story/cerebras-chip-cluster-neural-networks-ai/) that GPT-4 would have 100 trillion parameters. However, since then it's [been reported](https://www.datacamp.com/blog/what-we-know-gpt4) that GPT-4 may not be much larger than GPT-3. As discussed in [this writeup](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/midXmMb2Xg37F2Kgn/new-scaling-laws-for-large-language-models) (and also [here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/6Fpvch8RR29qLEWNH/chinchilla-s-wild-implications)), research by DeepMind published in the spring of 2022, along with a model named [Chinchilla](https://www.deepmind.com/publications/an-empirical-analysis-of-compute-optimal-large-language-model-training), suggested that the importance of dataset size relative to parameter count had been underestimated in previous work.\n\n>On March 29th, DeepMind published a paper, \"Training Compute-Optimal Large Language Models\", that shows that essentially everyone -- OpenAI, DeepMind, Microsoft, etc. -- has been training large language models with a deeply suboptimal use of compute.\n>\n>Following the new scaling laws that they propose for the optimal use of compute, DeepMind trains a new, 70-billion parameter model that outperforms much larger language models, including the 175-billion parameter GPT-3 and DeepMind's own 270-billion parameter \"Gopher\".", "resc": "This resolves as the number of parameters (in billions) for GPT-4 according to information provided by OpenAI. If OpenAI does not release GPT-4 before January 1st 2025, this question resolves as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIn case OpenAI does not explicitly refer to the relevant model as GPT-4, members of the community, community moderators, or admins will do a strawpoll on the /r/openai subreddit and ask:\n\n>In your opinion, is it roughly correct to say that this model is the successor to GPT-3?\n\nAfter 1 week, the majority answer wins with a tie counting as \"yes\"", "lower_25": "1.62k", "median": "1.75k", "upper_75": "1.85k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Wilt Chamberlain's single-game NBA scoring record will not be broken by 2050?", "desc": "On March 2nd, 1962, Wilt Chamberlain famously [scored 100 points](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilt_Chamberlain%27s_100-point_game) in an NBA game against the New York Knicks. This record stands to this day, with the second most points being scored in a game being 81 by Kobe Bryant on January 22nd, 2006.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date player scores 101 or more points in a non-exhibition game, as determined by the NBA.\n\n\"NBA\" includes NBA's legal successor organizations or licensees, if any.\n\nRevised or corrected box scores from the NBA will be used for final resolution, re-resolving if necessary", "lower_25": "2042", "median": "Not ≤ 2050", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that GPT-4 will have 1.62k parameters if it is announced before 2025?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many parameters will GPT-4 have (if it is released), in billions of parameters?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/4852/how-many-parameters-will-gpt-4-have-if-it-is-released-in-billions-of-parameters/)\n\n*The previous version of this question resolves as* ***Ambiguous*** *if GPT-4 is not released before 2023. This is a new version to replace it.*\n\n---\n\nMany have speculated about GPT-4 ever since [GPT-3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPT-3) was announced in June of 2020. In the fall of 2021 there were [rumors](https://www.wired.com/story/cerebras-chip-cluster-neural-networks-ai/) that GPT-4 would have 100 trillion parameters. However, since then it's [been reported](https://www.datacamp.com/blog/what-we-know-gpt4) that GPT-4 may not be much larger than GPT-3. As discussed in [this writeup](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/midXmMb2Xg37F2Kgn/new-scaling-laws-for-large-language-models) (and also [here](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/6Fpvch8RR29qLEWNH/chinchilla-s-wild-implications)), research by DeepMind published in the spring of 2022, along with a model named [Chinchilla](https://www.deepmind.com/publications/an-empirical-analysis-of-compute-optimal-large-language-model-training), suggested that the importance of dataset size relative to parameter count had been underestimated in previous work.\n\n>On March 29th, DeepMind published a paper, \"Training Compute-Optimal Large Language Models\", that shows that essentially everyone -- OpenAI, DeepMind, Microsoft, etc. -- has been training large language models with a deeply suboptimal use of compute.\n>\n>Following the new scaling laws that they propose for the optimal use of compute, DeepMind trains a new, 70-billion parameter model that outperforms much larger language models, including the 175-billion parameter GPT-3 and DeepMind's own 270-billion parameter \"Gopher\".", "resc": "This resolves as the number of parameters (in billions) for GPT-4 according to information provided by OpenAI. If OpenAI does not release GPT-4 before January 1st 2025, this question resolves as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIn case OpenAI does not explicitly refer to the relevant model as GPT-4, members of the community, community moderators, or admins will do a strawpoll on the /r/openai subreddit and ask:\n\n>In your opinion, is it roughly correct to say that this model is the successor to GPT-3?\n\nAfter 1 week, the majority answer wins with a tie counting as \"yes\"", "lower_25": "1.62k", "median": "1.75k", "upper_75": "1.85k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Wilt Chamberlain's single-game NBA scoring record will not be broken by 2050?", "desc": "On March 2nd, 1962, Wilt Chamberlain famously [scored 100 points](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilt_Chamberlain%27s_100-point_game) in an NBA game against the New York Knicks. This record stands to this day, with the second most points being scored in a game being 81 by Kobe Bryant on January 22nd, 2006.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date player scores 101 or more points in a non-exhibition game, as determined by the NBA.\n\n\"NBA\" includes NBA's legal successor organizations or licensees, if any.\n\nRevised or corrected box scores from the NBA will be used for final resolution, re-resolving if necessary", "lower_25": "2042", "median": "Not ≤ 2050", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US Senate will confirm 64.9 federal judges in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many judges will the US Senate confirm in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3514/how-many-judges-will-the-us-senate-confirm-in-2020/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2021?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6114/will-the-senate-confirm-many-judges-in-2021/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7500/us-federal-judges-confirmed-in-2022/)\n\n---\n\nThe number of federal judges each president can get confirmed in the US Senate is enormously consequential for US government and policy. The federal judiciary consists of [a number of courts](https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure) each [authorized under certain articles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_tribunals_in_the_United_States#List_of_Article_I,_Article_III_and_Article_IV_tribunals) of the [US Constitution](https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/full-text).\n\n* **Article I Courts:** Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to \"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court\". One such court is the [US Court of Federal Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Federal_Claims). Some courts established under Article I do not have full judicial power. These include the following courts:\n * [US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_Veterans_Claims)\n * [US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Armed_Forces)\n * [US Tax Court](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Tax_Court)\n* **Article III Courts:** Article III of the Constitution grants judicial power in \"one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.\" The [federal judiciary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_judiciary_of_the_United_States) established under Article III includes the US Supreme Court, US courts of appeals, US district courts, and the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade).\n* **Article IV Courts:** Article IV of the Constitution grants Congress the \"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States\". Under this clause the US may establish [territorial courts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_territorial_court) in US territories. The US currently has Article IV district courts in the territories of Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. District courts for Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are considered to be Article III courts.\n\nThe Constitutional status of courts is typically determined by Congress. For example, the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade) (originally named the US Customs Court until it was renamed in 1980) was an Article I tribunal [until 1956](https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-customs-court-legislative-history) when it became an Article III court.\n\nThe US Courts webpage maintains a [list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). Currently the list includes judges confirmed by the Senate to Article I courts with full judicial power, Article III courts, and Article IV courts. For example, confirmations to the US Tax Court are not included. The list also does not include [recess appointments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recess_appointment), but it does include recess appointments that are later confirmed by the Senate.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US federal judges confirmed by the Senate in the listed year according to [the US Courts' list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). If that source becomes unavailable, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) of comparable quality and methodology may be used instead.", "lower_25": "41.1", "median": "52.4", "upper_75": "64.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the oldest living person will be 120 years old in 2100?", "desc": "[Life expectancy has doubled since 1900](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/life-expectancy?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). This rising average masks great individual variation. As of early 2023 the oldest living person is [Maria Branyas](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maria_Branyas), born on March 4, 1907. At 115 years old, her current age is 1.6x the global average expectancy.\n\nAdvances in medicine and public health may continue to raise the global average [at a roughly linear rate](https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy#the-rise-of-maximum-life-expectancy), but the *maximum living age* may not follow the same trend.", "resc": "This resolves as the age of the oldest living human, in years, as of 0:00 on January 1, 2100. Resolution source is *Guiness Book of World Records*. If that source is no longer available in 2100, then admins will choose a credible alternative", "lower_25": "120", "median": "128", "upper_75": "142", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Wilt Chamberlain's single-game NBA scoring record will not be broken by 2050?", "desc": "On March 2nd, 1962, Wilt Chamberlain famously [scored 100 points](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilt_Chamberlain%27s_100-point_game) in an NBA game against the New York Knicks. This record stands to this day, with the second most points being scored in a game being 81 by Kobe Bryant on January 22nd, 2006.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date player scores 101 or more points in a non-exhibition game, as determined by the NBA.\n\n\"NBA\" includes NBA's legal successor organizations or licensees, if any.\n\nRevised or corrected box scores from the NBA will be used for final resolution, re-resolving if necessary", "lower_25": "2042", "median": "Not ≤ 2050", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US Senate will confirm 41.1 federal judges in the following years (2024)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many judges will the US Senate confirm in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3514/how-many-judges-will-the-us-senate-confirm-in-2020/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2021?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6114/will-the-senate-confirm-many-judges-in-2021/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7500/us-federal-judges-confirmed-in-2022/)\n\n---\n\nThe number of federal judges each president can get confirmed in the US Senate is enormously consequential for US government and policy. The federal judiciary consists of [a number of courts](https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure) each [authorized under certain articles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_tribunals_in_the_United_States#List_of_Article_I,_Article_III_and_Article_IV_tribunals) of the [US Constitution](https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/full-text).\n\n* **Article I Courts:** Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to \"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court\". One such court is the [US Court of Federal Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Federal_Claims). Some courts established under Article I do not have full judicial power. These include the following courts:\n * [US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_Veterans_Claims)\n * [US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Armed_Forces)\n * [US Tax Court](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Tax_Court)\n* **Article III Courts:** Article III of the Constitution grants judicial power in \"one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.\" The [federal judiciary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_judiciary_of_the_United_States) established under Article III includes the US Supreme Court, US courts of appeals, US district courts, and the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade).\n* **Article IV Courts:** Article IV of the Constitution grants Congress the \"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States\". Under this clause the US may establish [territorial courts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_territorial_court) in US territories. The US currently has Article IV district courts in the territories of Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. District courts for Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are considered to be Article III courts.\n\nThe Constitutional status of courts is typically determined by Congress. For example, the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade) (originally named the US Customs Court until it was renamed in 1980) was an Article I tribunal [until 1956](https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-customs-court-legislative-history) when it became an Article III court.\n\nThe US Courts webpage maintains a [list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). Currently the list includes judges confirmed by the Senate to Article I courts with full judicial power, Article III courts, and Article IV courts. For example, confirmations to the US Tax Court are not included. The list also does not include [recess appointments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recess_appointment), but it does include recess appointments that are later confirmed by the Senate.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US federal judges confirmed by the Senate in the listed year according to [the US Courts' list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). If that source becomes unavailable, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) of comparable quality and methodology may be used instead.", "lower_25": "41.1", "median": "52.4", "upper_75": "64.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US Senate will confirm 39.6 federal judges in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many judges will the US Senate confirm in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3514/how-many-judges-will-the-us-senate-confirm-in-2020/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2021?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6114/will-the-senate-confirm-many-judges-in-2021/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7500/us-federal-judges-confirmed-in-2022/)\n\n---\n\nThe number of federal judges each president can get confirmed in the US Senate is enormously consequential for US government and policy. The federal judiciary consists of [a number of courts](https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure) each [authorized under certain articles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_tribunals_in_the_United_States#List_of_Article_I,_Article_III_and_Article_IV_tribunals) of the [US Constitution](https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/full-text).\n\n* **Article I Courts:** Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to \"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court\". One such court is the [US Court of Federal Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Federal_Claims). Some courts established under Article I do not have full judicial power. These include the following courts:\n * [US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_Veterans_Claims)\n * [US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Armed_Forces)\n * [US Tax Court](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Tax_Court)\n* **Article III Courts:** Article III of the Constitution grants judicial power in \"one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.\" The [federal judiciary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_judiciary_of_the_United_States) established under Article III includes the US Supreme Court, US courts of appeals, US district courts, and the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade).\n* **Article IV Courts:** Article IV of the Constitution grants Congress the \"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States\". Under this clause the US may establish [territorial courts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_territorial_court) in US territories. The US currently has Article IV district courts in the territories of Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. District courts for Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are considered to be Article III courts.\n\nThe Constitutional status of courts is typically determined by Congress. For example, the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade) (originally named the US Customs Court until it was renamed in 1980) was an Article I tribunal [until 1956](https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-customs-court-legislative-history) when it became an Article III court.\n\nThe US Courts webpage maintains a [list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). Currently the list includes judges confirmed by the Senate to Article I courts with full judicial power, Article III courts, and Article IV courts. For example, confirmations to the US Tax Court are not included. The list also does not include [recess appointments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recess_appointment), but it does include recess appointments that are later confirmed by the Senate.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US federal judges confirmed by the Senate in the listed year according to [the US Courts' list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). If that source becomes unavailable, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) of comparable quality and methodology may be used instead.", "lower_25": "39.6", "median": "48.9", "upper_75": "61.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US Senate will confirm 41.1 federal judges in the following years (2024)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many judges will the US Senate confirm in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3514/how-many-judges-will-the-us-senate-confirm-in-2020/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2021?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6114/will-the-senate-confirm-many-judges-in-2021/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7500/us-federal-judges-confirmed-in-2022/)\n\n---\n\nThe number of federal judges each president can get confirmed in the US Senate is enormously consequential for US government and policy. The federal judiciary consists of [a number of courts](https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure) each [authorized under certain articles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_tribunals_in_the_United_States#List_of_Article_I,_Article_III_and_Article_IV_tribunals) of the [US Constitution](https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/full-text).\n\n* **Article I Courts:** Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to \"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court\". One such court is the [US Court of Federal Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Federal_Claims). Some courts established under Article I do not have full judicial power. These include the following courts:\n * [US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_Veterans_Claims)\n * [US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Armed_Forces)\n * [US Tax Court](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Tax_Court)\n* **Article III Courts:** Article III of the Constitution grants judicial power in \"one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.\" The [federal judiciary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_judiciary_of_the_United_States) established under Article III includes the US Supreme Court, US courts of appeals, US district courts, and the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade).\n* **Article IV Courts:** Article IV of the Constitution grants Congress the \"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States\". Under this clause the US may establish [territorial courts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_territorial_court) in US territories. The US currently has Article IV district courts in the territories of Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. District courts for Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are considered to be Article III courts.\n\nThe Constitutional status of courts is typically determined by Congress. For example, the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade) (originally named the US Customs Court until it was renamed in 1980) was an Article I tribunal [until 1956](https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-customs-court-legislative-history) when it became an Article III court.\n\nThe US Courts webpage maintains a [list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). Currently the list includes judges confirmed by the Senate to Article I courts with full judicial power, Article III courts, and Article IV courts. For example, confirmations to the US Tax Court are not included. The list also does not include [recess appointments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recess_appointment), but it does include recess appointments that are later confirmed by the Senate.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US federal judges confirmed by the Senate in the listed year according to [the US Courts' list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). If that source becomes unavailable, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) of comparable quality and methodology may be used instead.", "lower_25": "41.1", "median": "52.4", "upper_75": "64.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the oldest living person will be 120 years old in 2100?", "desc": "[Life expectancy has doubled since 1900](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/life-expectancy?tab=chart&country=~OWID_WRL). This rising average masks great individual variation. As of early 2023 the oldest living person is [Maria Branyas](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maria_Branyas), born on March 4, 1907. At 115 years old, her current age is 1.6x the global average expectancy.\n\nAdvances in medicine and public health may continue to raise the global average [at a roughly linear rate](https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy#the-rise-of-maximum-life-expectancy), but the *maximum living age* may not follow the same trend.", "resc": "This resolves as the age of the oldest living human, in years, as of 0:00 on January 1, 2100. Resolution source is *Guiness Book of World Records*. If that source is no longer available in 2100, then admins will choose a credible alternative", "lower_25": "120", "median": "128", "upper_75": "142", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US Senate will confirm 41.1 federal judges in the following years (2024)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many judges will the US Senate confirm in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3514/how-many-judges-will-the-us-senate-confirm-in-2020/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2021?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6114/will-the-senate-confirm-many-judges-in-2021/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7500/us-federal-judges-confirmed-in-2022/)\n\n---\n\nThe number of federal judges each president can get confirmed in the US Senate is enormously consequential for US government and policy. The federal judiciary consists of [a number of courts](https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure) each [authorized under certain articles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_tribunals_in_the_United_States#List_of_Article_I,_Article_III_and_Article_IV_tribunals) of the [US Constitution](https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/full-text).\n\n* **Article I Courts:** Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to \"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court\". One such court is the [US Court of Federal Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Federal_Claims). Some courts established under Article I do not have full judicial power. These include the following courts:\n * [US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_Veterans_Claims)\n * [US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Armed_Forces)\n * [US Tax Court](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Tax_Court)\n* **Article III Courts:** Article III of the Constitution grants judicial power in \"one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.\" The [federal judiciary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_judiciary_of_the_United_States) established under Article III includes the US Supreme Court, US courts of appeals, US district courts, and the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade).\n* **Article IV Courts:** Article IV of the Constitution grants Congress the \"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States\". Under this clause the US may establish [territorial courts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_territorial_court) in US territories. The US currently has Article IV district courts in the territories of Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. District courts for Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are considered to be Article III courts.\n\nThe Constitutional status of courts is typically determined by Congress. For example, the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade) (originally named the US Customs Court until it was renamed in 1980) was an Article I tribunal [until 1956](https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-customs-court-legislative-history) when it became an Article III court.\n\nThe US Courts webpage maintains a [list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). Currently the list includes judges confirmed by the Senate to Article I courts with full judicial power, Article III courts, and Article IV courts. For example, confirmations to the US Tax Court are not included. The list also does not include [recess appointments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recess_appointment), but it does include recess appointments that are later confirmed by the Senate.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US federal judges confirmed by the Senate in the listed year according to [the US Courts' list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). If that source becomes unavailable, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) of comparable quality and methodology may be used instead.", "lower_25": "41.1", "median": "52.4", "upper_75": "64.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US Senate will confirm 39.6 federal judges in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many judges will the US Senate confirm in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3514/how-many-judges-will-the-us-senate-confirm-in-2020/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2021?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6114/will-the-senate-confirm-many-judges-in-2021/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7500/us-federal-judges-confirmed-in-2022/)\n\n---\n\nThe number of federal judges each president can get confirmed in the US Senate is enormously consequential for US government and policy. The federal judiciary consists of [a number of courts](https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure) each [authorized under certain articles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_tribunals_in_the_United_States#List_of_Article_I,_Article_III_and_Article_IV_tribunals) of the [US Constitution](https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/full-text).\n\n* **Article I Courts:** Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to \"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court\". One such court is the [US Court of Federal Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Federal_Claims). Some courts established under Article I do not have full judicial power. These include the following courts:\n * [US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_Veterans_Claims)\n * [US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Armed_Forces)\n * [US Tax Court](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Tax_Court)\n* **Article III Courts:** Article III of the Constitution grants judicial power in \"one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.\" The [federal judiciary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_judiciary_of_the_United_States) established under Article III includes the US Supreme Court, US courts of appeals, US district courts, and the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade).\n* **Article IV Courts:** Article IV of the Constitution grants Congress the \"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States\". Under this clause the US may establish [territorial courts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_territorial_court) in US territories. The US currently has Article IV district courts in the territories of Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. District courts for Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are considered to be Article III courts.\n\nThe Constitutional status of courts is typically determined by Congress. For example, the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade) (originally named the US Customs Court until it was renamed in 1980) was an Article I tribunal [until 1956](https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-customs-court-legislative-history) when it became an Article III court.\n\nThe US Courts webpage maintains a [list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). Currently the list includes judges confirmed by the Senate to Article I courts with full judicial power, Article III courts, and Article IV courts. For example, confirmations to the US Tax Court are not included. The list also does not include [recess appointments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recess_appointment), but it does include recess appointments that are later confirmed by the Senate.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US federal judges confirmed by the Senate in the listed year according to [the US Courts' list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). If that source becomes unavailable, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) of comparable quality and methodology may be used instead.", "lower_25": "39.6", "median": "48.9", "upper_75": "61.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many months in prison will Avraham Eisenberg be sentenced to before 2030?\n\nKeyword: 123\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that Avraham Eisenberg will be sentenced to 123 months in prison before 2030?", "desc": "From the [Jerusalem Post](https://www.jpost.com/business-and-innovation/banking-and-finance/article-725977),\n\n> US prosecutors have filed criminal charges of commodities fraud and manipulation against a man accused of trying to steal about $110 million in October by rigging the Mango Markets cryptocurrency exchange.\n\n> According to a complaint made public on Tuesday in Manhattan federal court, Avraham Eisenberg's trades in futures related to Mango's crypto token MNGO enabled him to withdraw $110 million in cryptocurrencies from other investors' deposits, with no apparent intention to repay the funds.\n\n> Eisenberg was arrested on Monday night in Puerto Rico, US Attorney Damian Williams in Manhattan said in a court filing.\n\nAvraham also has [an account on Metaculus](https://www.metaculus.com/accounts/profile/114222/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of months to which Avraham Eisenberg has been sentenced to serve consecutively by any competent court, before January 1st, 2030. Any appeals that change the length of a previously assigned sentence will be factored in according to the status of the sentence as of resolution time; overturned sentences will not count. If Avraham Eisenberg is not so sentenced, or all such sentences are overturned, or they total less than two months consecutively, then this question will resolve as \"**<**\". If the total sentence exceeds the upper bound, including life sentences, then this question will resolve as \"**>**\"", "lower_25": "42.3", "median": "78.0", "upper_75": "123", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US Senate will confirm 53.9 federal judges in the following years (2026)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many judges will the US Senate confirm in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3514/how-many-judges-will-the-us-senate-confirm-in-2020/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2021?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6114/will-the-senate-confirm-many-judges-in-2021/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7500/us-federal-judges-confirmed-in-2022/)\n\n---\n\nThe number of federal judges each president can get confirmed in the US Senate is enormously consequential for US government and policy. The federal judiciary consists of [a number of courts](https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure) each [authorized under certain articles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_tribunals_in_the_United_States#List_of_Article_I,_Article_III_and_Article_IV_tribunals) of the [US Constitution](https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/full-text).\n\n* **Article I Courts:** Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to \"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court\". One such court is the [US Court of Federal Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Federal_Claims). Some courts established under Article I do not have full judicial power. These include the following courts:\n * [US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_Veterans_Claims)\n * [US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Armed_Forces)\n * [US Tax Court](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Tax_Court)\n* **Article III Courts:** Article III of the Constitution grants judicial power in \"one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.\" The [federal judiciary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_judiciary_of_the_United_States) established under Article III includes the US Supreme Court, US courts of appeals, US district courts, and the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade).\n* **Article IV Courts:** Article IV of the Constitution grants Congress the \"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States\". Under this clause the US may establish [territorial courts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_territorial_court) in US territories. The US currently has Article IV district courts in the territories of Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. District courts for Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are considered to be Article III courts.\n\nThe Constitutional status of courts is typically determined by Congress. For example, the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade) (originally named the US Customs Court until it was renamed in 1980) was an Article I tribunal [until 1956](https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-customs-court-legislative-history) when it became an Article III court.\n\nThe US Courts webpage maintains a [list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). Currently the list includes judges confirmed by the Senate to Article I courts with full judicial power, Article III courts, and Article IV courts. For example, confirmations to the US Tax Court are not included. The list also does not include [recess appointments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recess_appointment), but it does include recess appointments that are later confirmed by the Senate.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US federal judges confirmed by the Senate in the listed year according to [the US Courts' list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). If that source becomes unavailable, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) of comparable quality and methodology may be used instead.", "lower_25": "36.8", "median": "44.4", "upper_75": "53.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US Senate will confirm 39.8 federal judges in the following years (2027)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many judges will the US Senate confirm in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3514/how-many-judges-will-the-us-senate-confirm-in-2020/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2021?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6114/will-the-senate-confirm-many-judges-in-2021/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7500/us-federal-judges-confirmed-in-2022/)\n\n---\n\nThe number of federal judges each president can get confirmed in the US Senate is enormously consequential for US government and policy. The federal judiciary consists of [a number of courts](https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure) each [authorized under certain articles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_tribunals_in_the_United_States#List_of_Article_I,_Article_III_and_Article_IV_tribunals) of the [US Constitution](https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/full-text).\n\n* **Article I Courts:** Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to \"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court\". One such court is the [US Court of Federal Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Federal_Claims). Some courts established under Article I do not have full judicial power. These include the following courts:\n * [US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_Veterans_Claims)\n * [US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Armed_Forces)\n * [US Tax Court](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Tax_Court)\n* **Article III Courts:** Article III of the Constitution grants judicial power in \"one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.\" The [federal judiciary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_judiciary_of_the_United_States) established under Article III includes the US Supreme Court, US courts of appeals, US district courts, and the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade).\n* **Article IV Courts:** Article IV of the Constitution grants Congress the \"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States\". Under this clause the US may establish [territorial courts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_territorial_court) in US territories. The US currently has Article IV district courts in the territories of Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. District courts for Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are considered to be Article III courts.\n\nThe Constitutional status of courts is typically determined by Congress. For example, the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade) (originally named the US Customs Court until it was renamed in 1980) was an Article I tribunal [until 1956](https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-customs-court-legislative-history) when it became an Article III court.\n\nThe US Courts webpage maintains a [list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). Currently the list includes judges confirmed by the Senate to Article I courts with full judicial power, Article III courts, and Article IV courts. For example, confirmations to the US Tax Court are not included. The list also does not include [recess appointments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recess_appointment), but it does include recess appointments that are later confirmed by the Senate.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US federal judges confirmed by the Senate in the listed year according to [the US Courts' list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). If that source becomes unavailable, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) of comparable quality and methodology may be used instead.", "lower_25": "39.8", "median": "48.7", "upper_75": "60.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that most Americans will personally know someone who has dated an AI by 2039?", "desc": "From [Vice](https://www.vice.com/en/article/93bqbp/can-you-be-in-relationship-with-replika),\n\n> According to market research firm Markets and Markets, the global conversational AI industry is predicted to increase from around £5bn in 2021 to £13.5bn by 2026, helped by a rising demand to stay connected during the pandemic. There's no going back now: Chatbots are only going to get chattier.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date during which a representative survey of Americans from a credible pollster finds that at least half of respondents said they knew someone who had dated an Artificially Intelligent virtual companion.\n\n\"Artificially Intelligent virtual companions\" is to include any type of chatbot, virtual personality, or fictional character, at the discretion of the survey, as long as it is interactive and alters its responses according to user input in some recognizable way. It is not literally restricted to actual general intelligences or \"true AI\" of any kind.\n\nDating includes \"dating\", any stronger romantic partnership previously reserved for human-to-human partnership such as romantic partner or spouse, and terms such as \"romantic\" or \"intimate\" \"companion.\"\n\nCredible pollsters will be determined at resolution time by admins according to credible sources, such as the pollsters most frequently cited by top-quality media outlets for surveys of American voting intentions and social attitudes, or the pollsters highest-rated by credible U.S. election-forecasters.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that most Americans will personally know someone who has dated an AI by 2039?", "desc": "From [Vice](https://www.vice.com/en/article/93bqbp/can-you-be-in-relationship-with-replika),\n\n> According to market research firm Markets and Markets, the global conversational AI industry is predicted to increase from around £5bn in 2021 to £13.5bn by 2026, helped by a rising demand to stay connected during the pandemic. There's no going back now: Chatbots are only going to get chattier.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date during which a representative survey of Americans from a credible pollster finds that at least half of respondents said they knew someone who had dated an Artificially Intelligent virtual companion.\n\n\"Artificially Intelligent virtual companions\" is to include any type of chatbot, virtual personality, or fictional character, at the discretion of the survey, as long as it is interactive and alters its responses according to user input in some recognizable way. It is not literally restricted to actual general intelligences or \"true AI\" of any kind.\n\nDating includes \"dating\", any stronger romantic partnership previously reserved for human-to-human partnership such as romantic partner or spouse, and terms such as \"romantic\" or \"intimate\" \"companion.\"\n\nCredible pollsters will be determined at resolution time by admins according to credible sources, such as the pollsters most frequently cited by top-quality media outlets for surveys of American voting intentions and social attitudes, or the pollsters highest-rated by credible U.S. election-forecasters.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that most Americans will personally know someone who has dated an AI by 2039?", "desc": "From [Vice](https://www.vice.com/en/article/93bqbp/can-you-be-in-relationship-with-replika),\n\n> According to market research firm Markets and Markets, the global conversational AI industry is predicted to increase from around £5bn in 2021 to £13.5bn by 2026, helped by a rising demand to stay connected during the pandemic. There's no going back now: Chatbots are only going to get chattier.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date during which a representative survey of Americans from a credible pollster finds that at least half of respondents said they knew someone who had dated an Artificially Intelligent virtual companion.\n\n\"Artificially Intelligent virtual companions\" is to include any type of chatbot, virtual personality, or fictional character, at the discretion of the survey, as long as it is interactive and alters its responses according to user input in some recognizable way. It is not literally restricted to actual general intelligences or \"true AI\" of any kind.\n\nDating includes \"dating\", any stronger romantic partnership previously reserved for human-to-human partnership such as romantic partner or spouse, and terms such as \"romantic\" or \"intimate\" \"companion.\"\n\nCredible pollsters will be determined at resolution time by admins according to credible sources, such as the pollsters most frequently cited by top-quality media outlets for surveys of American voting intentions and social attitudes, or the pollsters highest-rated by credible U.S. election-forecasters.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US Senate will confirm 39.8 federal judges in the following years (2027)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many judges will the US Senate confirm in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3514/how-many-judges-will-the-us-senate-confirm-in-2020/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2021?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6114/will-the-senate-confirm-many-judges-in-2021/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7500/us-federal-judges-confirmed-in-2022/)\n\n---\n\nThe number of federal judges each president can get confirmed in the US Senate is enormously consequential for US government and policy. The federal judiciary consists of [a number of courts](https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure) each [authorized under certain articles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_tribunals_in_the_United_States#List_of_Article_I,_Article_III_and_Article_IV_tribunals) of the [US Constitution](https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/full-text).\n\n* **Article I Courts:** Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to \"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court\". One such court is the [US Court of Federal Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Federal_Claims). Some courts established under Article I do not have full judicial power. These include the following courts:\n * [US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_Veterans_Claims)\n * [US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Armed_Forces)\n * [US Tax Court](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Tax_Court)\n* **Article III Courts:** Article III of the Constitution grants judicial power in \"one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.\" The [federal judiciary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_judiciary_of_the_United_States) established under Article III includes the US Supreme Court, US courts of appeals, US district courts, and the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade).\n* **Article IV Courts:** Article IV of the Constitution grants Congress the \"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States\". Under this clause the US may establish [territorial courts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_territorial_court) in US territories. The US currently has Article IV district courts in the territories of Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. District courts for Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are considered to be Article III courts.\n\nThe Constitutional status of courts is typically determined by Congress. For example, the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade) (originally named the US Customs Court until it was renamed in 1980) was an Article I tribunal [until 1956](https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-customs-court-legislative-history) when it became an Article III court.\n\nThe US Courts webpage maintains a [list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). Currently the list includes judges confirmed by the Senate to Article I courts with full judicial power, Article III courts, and Article IV courts. For example, confirmations to the US Tax Court are not included. The list also does not include [recess appointments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recess_appointment), but it does include recess appointments that are later confirmed by the Senate.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US federal judges confirmed by the Senate in the listed year according to [the US Courts' list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). If that source becomes unavailable, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) of comparable quality and methodology may be used instead.", "lower_25": "39.8", "median": "48.7", "upper_75": "60.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US Senate will confirm 53.9 federal judges in the following years (2026)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many judges will the US Senate confirm in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3514/how-many-judges-will-the-us-senate-confirm-in-2020/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2021?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6114/will-the-senate-confirm-many-judges-in-2021/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7500/us-federal-judges-confirmed-in-2022/)\n\n---\n\nThe number of federal judges each president can get confirmed in the US Senate is enormously consequential for US government and policy. The federal judiciary consists of [a number of courts](https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure) each [authorized under certain articles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_tribunals_in_the_United_States#List_of_Article_I,_Article_III_and_Article_IV_tribunals) of the [US Constitution](https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/full-text).\n\n* **Article I Courts:** Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to \"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court\". One such court is the [US Court of Federal Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Federal_Claims). Some courts established under Article I do not have full judicial power. These include the following courts:\n * [US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_Veterans_Claims)\n * [US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Armed_Forces)\n * [US Tax Court](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Tax_Court)\n* **Article III Courts:** Article III of the Constitution grants judicial power in \"one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.\" The [federal judiciary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_judiciary_of_the_United_States) established under Article III includes the US Supreme Court, US courts of appeals, US district courts, and the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade).\n* **Article IV Courts:** Article IV of the Constitution grants Congress the \"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States\". Under this clause the US may establish [territorial courts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_territorial_court) in US territories. The US currently has Article IV district courts in the territories of Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. District courts for Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are considered to be Article III courts.\n\nThe Constitutional status of courts is typically determined by Congress. For example, the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade) (originally named the US Customs Court until it was renamed in 1980) was an Article I tribunal [until 1956](https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-customs-court-legislative-history) when it became an Article III court.\n\nThe US Courts webpage maintains a [list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). Currently the list includes judges confirmed by the Senate to Article I courts with full judicial power, Article III courts, and Article IV courts. For example, confirmations to the US Tax Court are not included. The list also does not include [recess appointments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recess_appointment), but it does include recess appointments that are later confirmed by the Senate.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US federal judges confirmed by the Senate in the listed year according to [the US Courts' list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). If that source becomes unavailable, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) of comparable quality and methodology may be used instead.", "lower_25": "36.8", "median": "44.4", "upper_75": "53.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Sam Altman's net worth will be 21.1 billion dollars in January 2030?", "desc": "[Samuel H. Altman](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sam_Altman), born April 22, 1985, is an American entrepreneur, venture capitalist, programmer, and [blogger](https://blog.samaltman.com/). He is the CEO of [OpenAI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenAI) and the chairman of fusion energy startup [Helion Energy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helion_Energy), among other activities. \n\nAs of January 10, 2023, Altman is not listed by either the [Forbes real-time billionaires list](https://www.forbes.com/real-time-billionaires/#10d2ce3f3d78) or the [Bloomberg Billionaires Index](https://www.bloomberg.com/billionaires/). However, given his various investments and leadership roles in prominent high technology companies, it appears plausible that he will be later this decade.", "resc": "This question resolves as the median of the values reported as Sam Altman's net worth by the Forbes real-time billionaires list and the Bloomberg Billionaires Index as of January 10th, 2030, in billions of nominal US dollars. If neither of these sources exist in 2030, or if Altman is not ranked by either source in 2030, Metaculus administrators may, at their discretion, nominate an alternative resolution source that is considered comparable in credibility to the Bloomberg or Forbes lists.\n\nIf no recent (dated within the last year) credible estimate of Altman's net worth is available at resolution time in 2030, the question resolves ambiguously. The question also resolves ambiguously if Altman is not alive on January 10th, 2030", "lower_25": "1.58", "median": "4.26", "upper_75": "21.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US Senate will confirm 53.9 federal judges in the following years (2026)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many judges will the US Senate confirm in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3514/how-many-judges-will-the-us-senate-confirm-in-2020/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2021?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6114/will-the-senate-confirm-many-judges-in-2021/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7500/us-federal-judges-confirmed-in-2022/)\n\n---\n\nThe number of federal judges each president can get confirmed in the US Senate is enormously consequential for US government and policy. The federal judiciary consists of [a number of courts](https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure) each [authorized under certain articles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_tribunals_in_the_United_States#List_of_Article_I,_Article_III_and_Article_IV_tribunals) of the [US Constitution](https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/full-text).\n\n* **Article I Courts:** Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to \"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court\". One such court is the [US Court of Federal Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Federal_Claims). Some courts established under Article I do not have full judicial power. These include the following courts:\n * [US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_Veterans_Claims)\n * [US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Armed_Forces)\n * [US Tax Court](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Tax_Court)\n* **Article III Courts:** Article III of the Constitution grants judicial power in \"one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.\" The [federal judiciary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_judiciary_of_the_United_States) established under Article III includes the US Supreme Court, US courts of appeals, US district courts, and the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade).\n* **Article IV Courts:** Article IV of the Constitution grants Congress the \"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States\". Under this clause the US may establish [territorial courts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_territorial_court) in US territories. The US currently has Article IV district courts in the territories of Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. District courts for Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are considered to be Article III courts.\n\nThe Constitutional status of courts is typically determined by Congress. For example, the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade) (originally named the US Customs Court until it was renamed in 1980) was an Article I tribunal [until 1956](https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-customs-court-legislative-history) when it became an Article III court.\n\nThe US Courts webpage maintains a [list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). Currently the list includes judges confirmed by the Senate to Article I courts with full judicial power, Article III courts, and Article IV courts. For example, confirmations to the US Tax Court are not included. The list also does not include [recess appointments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recess_appointment), but it does include recess appointments that are later confirmed by the Senate.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US federal judges confirmed by the Senate in the listed year according to [the US Courts' list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). If that source becomes unavailable, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) of comparable quality and methodology may be used instead.", "lower_25": "36.8", "median": "44.4", "upper_75": "53.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Sam Altman's net worth will be 21.1 billion dollars in January 2030?", "desc": "[Samuel H. Altman](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sam_Altman), born April 22, 1985, is an American entrepreneur, venture capitalist, programmer, and [blogger](https://blog.samaltman.com/). He is the CEO of [OpenAI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenAI) and the chairman of fusion energy startup [Helion Energy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helion_Energy), among other activities. \n\nAs of January 10, 2023, Altman is not listed by either the [Forbes real-time billionaires list](https://www.forbes.com/real-time-billionaires/#10d2ce3f3d78) or the [Bloomberg Billionaires Index](https://www.bloomberg.com/billionaires/). However, given his various investments and leadership roles in prominent high technology companies, it appears plausible that he will be later this decade.", "resc": "This question resolves as the median of the values reported as Sam Altman's net worth by the Forbes real-time billionaires list and the Bloomberg Billionaires Index as of January 10th, 2030, in billions of nominal US dollars. If neither of these sources exist in 2030, or if Altman is not ranked by either source in 2030, Metaculus administrators may, at their discretion, nominate an alternative resolution source that is considered comparable in credibility to the Bloomberg or Forbes lists.\n\nIf no recent (dated within the last year) credible estimate of Altman's net worth is available at resolution time in 2030, the question resolves ambiguously. The question also resolves ambiguously if Altman is not alive on January 10th, 2030", "lower_25": "1.58", "median": "4.26", "upper_75": "21.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US Senate will confirm 39.8 federal judges in the following years (2027)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many judges will the US Senate confirm in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3514/how-many-judges-will-the-us-senate-confirm-in-2020/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2021?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6114/will-the-senate-confirm-many-judges-in-2021/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7500/us-federal-judges-confirmed-in-2022/)\n\n---\n\nThe number of federal judges each president can get confirmed in the US Senate is enormously consequential for US government and policy. The federal judiciary consists of [a number of courts](https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure) each [authorized under certain articles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_tribunals_in_the_United_States#List_of_Article_I,_Article_III_and_Article_IV_tribunals) of the [US Constitution](https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/full-text).\n\n* **Article I Courts:** Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to \"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court\". One such court is the [US Court of Federal Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Federal_Claims). Some courts established under Article I do not have full judicial power. These include the following courts:\n * [US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_Veterans_Claims)\n * [US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Armed_Forces)\n * [US Tax Court](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Tax_Court)\n* **Article III Courts:** Article III of the Constitution grants judicial power in \"one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.\" The [federal judiciary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_judiciary_of_the_United_States) established under Article III includes the US Supreme Court, US courts of appeals, US district courts, and the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade).\n* **Article IV Courts:** Article IV of the Constitution grants Congress the \"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States\". Under this clause the US may establish [territorial courts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_territorial_court) in US territories. The US currently has Article IV district courts in the territories of Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. District courts for Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are considered to be Article III courts.\n\nThe Constitutional status of courts is typically determined by Congress. For example, the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade) (originally named the US Customs Court until it was renamed in 1980) was an Article I tribunal [until 1956](https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-customs-court-legislative-history) when it became an Article III court.\n\nThe US Courts webpage maintains a [list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). Currently the list includes judges confirmed by the Senate to Article I courts with full judicial power, Article III courts, and Article IV courts. For example, confirmations to the US Tax Court are not included. The list also does not include [recess appointments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recess_appointment), but it does include recess appointments that are later confirmed by the Senate.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US federal judges confirmed by the Senate in the listed year according to [the US Courts' list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). If that source becomes unavailable, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) of comparable quality and methodology may be used instead.", "lower_25": "39.8", "median": "48.7", "upper_75": "60.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Sam Altman's net worth will be 21.1 billion dollars in January 2030?", "desc": "[Samuel H. Altman](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sam_Altman), born April 22, 1985, is an American entrepreneur, venture capitalist, programmer, and [blogger](https://blog.samaltman.com/). He is the CEO of [OpenAI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OpenAI) and the chairman of fusion energy startup [Helion Energy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helion_Energy), among other activities. \n\nAs of January 10, 2023, Altman is not listed by either the [Forbes real-time billionaires list](https://www.forbes.com/real-time-billionaires/#10d2ce3f3d78) or the [Bloomberg Billionaires Index](https://www.bloomberg.com/billionaires/). However, given his various investments and leadership roles in prominent high technology companies, it appears plausible that he will be later this decade.", "resc": "This question resolves as the median of the values reported as Sam Altman's net worth by the Forbes real-time billionaires list and the Bloomberg Billionaires Index as of January 10th, 2030, in billions of nominal US dollars. If neither of these sources exist in 2030, or if Altman is not ranked by either source in 2030, Metaculus administrators may, at their discretion, nominate an alternative resolution source that is considered comparable in credibility to the Bloomberg or Forbes lists.\n\nIf no recent (dated within the last year) credible estimate of Altman's net worth is available at resolution time in 2030, the question resolves ambiguously. The question also resolves ambiguously if Altman is not alive on January 10th, 2030", "lower_25": "1.58", "median": "4.26", "upper_75": "21.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US Senate will confirm 39.6 federal judges in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [How many judges will the US Senate confirm in 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3514/how-many-judges-will-the-us-senate-confirm-in-2020/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2021?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6114/will-the-senate-confirm-many-judges-in-2021/)\n* [How many federal judges will the US Senate confirm in 2022?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7500/us-federal-judges-confirmed-in-2022/)\n\n---\n\nThe number of federal judges each president can get confirmed in the US Senate is enormously consequential for US government and policy. The federal judiciary consists of [a number of courts](https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure) each [authorized under certain articles](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_tribunals_in_the_United_States#List_of_Article_I,_Article_III_and_Article_IV_tribunals) of the [US Constitution](https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/full-text).\n\n* **Article I Courts:** Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to \"constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court\". One such court is the [US Court of Federal Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Federal_Claims). Some courts established under Article I do not have full judicial power. These include the following courts:\n * [US Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_Veterans_Claims)\n * [US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Armed_Forces)\n * [US Tax Court](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Tax_Court)\n* **Article III Courts:** Article III of the Constitution grants judicial power in \"one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.\" The [federal judiciary](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_judiciary_of_the_United_States) established under Article III includes the US Supreme Court, US courts of appeals, US district courts, and the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade).\n* **Article IV Courts:** Article IV of the Constitution grants Congress the \"Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States\". Under this clause the US may establish [territorial courts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_territorial_court) in US territories. The US currently has Article IV district courts in the territories of Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. District courts for Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia are considered to be Article III courts.\n\nThe Constitutional status of courts is typically determined by Congress. For example, the [US Court of International Trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_International_Trade) (originally named the US Customs Court until it was renamed in 1980) was an Article I tribunal [until 1956](https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-customs-court-legislative-history) when it became an Article III court.\n\nThe US Courts webpage maintains a [list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). Currently the list includes judges confirmed by the Senate to Article I courts with full judicial power, Article III courts, and Article IV courts. For example, confirmations to the US Tax Court are not included. The list also does not include [recess appointments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recess_appointment), but it does include recess appointments that are later confirmed by the Senate.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US federal judges confirmed by the Senate in the listed year according to [the US Courts' list of judicial confirmations](https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing). If that source becomes unavailable, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) of comparable quality and methodology may be used instead.", "lower_25": "39.6", "median": "48.9", "upper_75": "61.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US government 10-year bond yields will next exceed the 2-year bond yields by Jul 2024?", "desc": "Under normal circumstances, long-term debt bears a higher interest rate than short-term debt. A plot with the term on the x-axis and yield on the y-axis typically shows an upward sloping curve, [such as this one](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a7/Yield_curve_20180513.png). But sometimes short-term debt is more expensive than long-term debt; that's when we see an *inverted yield curve*. There's some evidence that a yield curve inversion is a good predictor of recessions. (But see e.g. [this article](https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/dont-fear-the-yield-curve-20180628.html) for some pushback on the predictive value of interest spreads.) See [this 4-minute Khan Academy video](https://youtu.be/SwB9Fq5VRZY) for another illustration of the yield curve concept.\n\nFor the US, one commonly cited example is the spread between the 10-year rate and the 2-year rate. [FRED, a database run by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, has a series on this interest rate spread](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y2Y). The chart shows that inversions (i.e., periods when the curve dips below zero) tend to precede recessions (shaded regions in chart). See [this Treasury page](https://home.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/TextView?type=daily_treasury_yield_curve&field_tdr_date_value=all&data=yieldAll) for historical data on daily yields for all maturities (1 month to 30 years) going back to 1990. Note that FRED has data going back further for many of these series.\n\nAs of this writing, the 10-year rate is about 3.5% and the 2-year rate is about 4.2%. This means the spread is `3.5% - 4.2% = -0.7%`. That's an inversion.\n\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first date after January 1, 2023 on which FRED reports that the interest rate spread between 10-year and 2-year US government bonds is positive. The series can be found here: [ 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Minus 2-Year Treasury Constant Maturity](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y2Y).", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Jul 2024", "upper_75": "Nov 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US government 10-year bond yields will next exceed the 2-year bond yields by Jul 2024?", "desc": "Under normal circumstances, long-term debt bears a higher interest rate than short-term debt. A plot with the term on the x-axis and yield on the y-axis typically shows an upward sloping curve, [such as this one](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a7/Yield_curve_20180513.png). But sometimes short-term debt is more expensive than long-term debt; that's when we see an *inverted yield curve*. There's some evidence that a yield curve inversion is a good predictor of recessions. (But see e.g. [this article](https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/dont-fear-the-yield-curve-20180628.html) for some pushback on the predictive value of interest spreads.) See [this 4-minute Khan Academy video](https://youtu.be/SwB9Fq5VRZY) for another illustration of the yield curve concept.\n\nFor the US, one commonly cited example is the spread between the 10-year rate and the 2-year rate. [FRED, a database run by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, has a series on this interest rate spread](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y2Y). The chart shows that inversions (i.e., periods when the curve dips below zero) tend to precede recessions (shaded regions in chart). See [this Treasury page](https://home.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/TextView?type=daily_treasury_yield_curve&field_tdr_date_value=all&data=yieldAll) for historical data on daily yields for all maturities (1 month to 30 years) going back to 1990. Note that FRED has data going back further for many of these series.\n\nAs of this writing, the 10-year rate is about 3.5% and the 2-year rate is about 4.2%. This means the spread is `3.5% - 4.2% = -0.7%`. That's an inversion.\n\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first date after January 1, 2023 on which FRED reports that the interest rate spread between 10-year and 2-year US government bonds is positive. The series can be found here: [ 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Minus 2-Year Treasury Constant Maturity](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y2Y).", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Jul 2024", "upper_75": "Nov 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US government 10-year bond yields will next exceed the 2-year bond yields by Jul 2024?", "desc": "Under normal circumstances, long-term debt bears a higher interest rate than short-term debt. A plot with the term on the x-axis and yield on the y-axis typically shows an upward sloping curve, [such as this one](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a7/Yield_curve_20180513.png). But sometimes short-term debt is more expensive than long-term debt; that's when we see an *inverted yield curve*. There's some evidence that a yield curve inversion is a good predictor of recessions. (But see e.g. [this article](https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/dont-fear-the-yield-curve-20180628.html) for some pushback on the predictive value of interest spreads.) See [this 4-minute Khan Academy video](https://youtu.be/SwB9Fq5VRZY) for another illustration of the yield curve concept.\n\nFor the US, one commonly cited example is the spread between the 10-year rate and the 2-year rate. [FRED, a database run by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, has a series on this interest rate spread](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y2Y). The chart shows that inversions (i.e., periods when the curve dips below zero) tend to precede recessions (shaded regions in chart). See [this Treasury page](https://home.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/TextView?type=daily_treasury_yield_curve&field_tdr_date_value=all&data=yieldAll) for historical data on daily yields for all maturities (1 month to 30 years) going back to 1990. Note that FRED has data going back further for many of these series.\n\nAs of this writing, the 10-year rate is about 3.5% and the 2-year rate is about 4.2%. This means the spread is `3.5% - 4.2% = -0.7%`. That's an inversion.\n\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first date after January 1, 2023 on which FRED reports that the interest rate spread between 10-year and 2-year US government bonds is positive. The series can be found here: [ 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Minus 2-Year Treasury Constant Maturity](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y2Y).", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Jul 2024", "upper_75": "Nov 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Saudi riyal will lose its dollar peg by 2034?", "desc": "The value of the [Saudi riyal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_riyal) has been [pegged to the USD since 1986](https://www.aamcompany.com/insight/exploring-the-possibility-and-implications-of-saudi-arabia-abandoning-its-usd-currency-peg/). This decision by the Saudi government reflects (and reinforces) the role of the dollar in global trade, especially in crude oil. [Crude oil is generally traded in dollars](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/petrodollars.asp).\n\nReasons to think the peg might end include:\n\n* Maintaining a currency peg can be costly, especially in the face of domestic economic trouble.\n\n* The relative importance of the US in global affairs, including trade, may continue to diminish.", "resc": "Resolves as the first day of the first month in which USDSAR is more than 5% different from 3.75--that is, if it is less than 3.5625 or greater than 3.9375. Source is [OECD](https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/data/main-economic-indicators/main-economic-indicators-complete-database_data-00052-en), and is reported helpfully by FRED [here](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SAUCCUSMA02STM).", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2037", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Saudi riyal will lose its dollar peg by 2034?", "desc": "The value of the [Saudi riyal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_riyal) has been [pegged to the USD since 1986](https://www.aamcompany.com/insight/exploring-the-possibility-and-implications-of-saudi-arabia-abandoning-its-usd-currency-peg/). This decision by the Saudi government reflects (and reinforces) the role of the dollar in global trade, especially in crude oil. [Crude oil is generally traded in dollars](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/petrodollars.asp).\n\nReasons to think the peg might end include:\n\n* Maintaining a currency peg can be costly, especially in the face of domestic economic trouble.\n\n* The relative importance of the US in global affairs, including trade, may continue to diminish.", "resc": "Resolves as the first day of the first month in which USDSAR is more than 5% different from 3.75--that is, if it is less than 3.5625 or greater than 3.9375. Source is [OECD](https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/data/main-economic-indicators/main-economic-indicators-complete-database_data-00052-en), and is reported helpfully by FRED [here](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SAUCCUSMA02STM).", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2037", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Saudi riyal will lose its dollar peg by 2034?", "desc": "The value of the [Saudi riyal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_riyal) has been [pegged to the USD since 1986](https://www.aamcompany.com/insight/exploring-the-possibility-and-implications-of-saudi-arabia-abandoning-its-usd-currency-peg/). This decision by the Saudi government reflects (and reinforces) the role of the dollar in global trade, especially in crude oil. [Crude oil is generally traded in dollars](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/petrodollars.asp).\n\nReasons to think the peg might end include:\n\n* Maintaining a currency peg can be costly, especially in the face of domestic economic trouble.\n\n* The relative importance of the US in global affairs, including trade, may continue to diminish.", "resc": "Resolves as the first day of the first month in which USDSAR is more than 5% different from 3.75--that is, if it is less than 3.5625 or greater than 3.9375. Source is [OECD](https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/data/main-economic-indicators/main-economic-indicators-complete-database_data-00052-en), and is reported helpfully by FRED [here](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SAUCCUSMA02STM).", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2037", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Democratic or Republican party nominee for US president will receive fewer votes than a candidate not representing one of those parties by the year 2024?", "desc": "In every US presidential election from 1856 to 1908, the Republican and Democratic parties received the most or second-most popular votes. In 1912 former Republican president Theodore Roosevelt took second place, beating Republican nominee Taft. That feat has not since been repeated. See this [image](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/76/PartyVotes-Presidents.png).\n\nYet about 56% of Americans say the US would be better represented by a third party, [according to a September 2022 Gallup poll](https://news.gallup.com/poll/402515/public-interest-having-third-major-party-dips.aspx).", "resc": "This resolves as the first year after 2020 in which either the US presidential nominee for the Democratic party or that for the Republican party receives fewer popular votes in the general election, according to official [Federal Election Commission](https://www.fec.gov/introduction-campaign-finance/election-and-voting-information/) counts. If this does not occur by 2100, it resolves as >2100", "lower_25": "2043", "median": "2057", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Democratic or Republican party nominee for US president will receive fewer votes than a candidate not representing one of those parties by the year 2024?", "desc": "In every US presidential election from 1856 to 1908, the Republican and Democratic parties received the most or second-most popular votes. In 1912 former Republican president Theodore Roosevelt took second place, beating Republican nominee Taft. That feat has not since been repeated. See this [image](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/76/PartyVotes-Presidents.png).\n\nYet about 56% of Americans say the US would be better represented by a third party, [according to a September 2022 Gallup poll](https://news.gallup.com/poll/402515/public-interest-having-third-major-party-dips.aspx).", "resc": "This resolves as the first year after 2020 in which either the US presidential nominee for the Democratic party or that for the Republican party receives fewer popular votes in the general election, according to official [Federal Election Commission](https://www.fec.gov/introduction-campaign-finance/election-and-voting-information/) counts. If this does not occur by 2100, it resolves as >2100", "lower_25": "2043", "median": "2057", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will have a total export capacity of 148 billion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas (LNG) by the end of 2030?", "desc": "[Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is natural gas that has been cryogenically liquefied to facilitate transport or storage](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/liquefied-natural-gas.php). The United States was a net importer of LNG until 2016, when its first LNG export facility began commercial operation in 2016 at Sabine Pass, Louisiana. By the end of 2023, the US was the largest exporter of LNG in the world, with peak nameplate capacity of 98.47 MTPA (million tons per annum) spread over 7 facilities. As of the same time, 73.05 MTPA of additional capacity are at various stages of construction at these and 3 new facilities. In addition, at least 9 new projects have been approved by the US Department of Energy, and do not yet have proposed start dates.\n\nUS Energy Information Administration (EIA) publishes the following spreadsheet, updated quarterly: https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/U.S.liquefactioncapacity.xlsx\n\nFor additional background on increasing capacity, see [this EIA article](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/BTL/2023/07-LNG/article.php). For background on the geopolitical significance of LNG, see [this CSIS article](https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-lng-export-boom-defining-national-interests). For background on methane emissions during transport see [this American Chemical Society article from 2022](https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.est.2c01383).", "resc": "Resolves as the sum of the peak nameplate capacities of all LNG liquefaction trains in the US as of the most recently published EIA data on 2031-04-15. Unit is million tons per annum (MTPA). To calculate the currently available capacity, sum the figures in the \"Peak nameplate capacity per Train\" column that have the status \"Commercial operation\" in [this spreadsheet](https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/U.S.liquefactioncapacity.xlsx). If EIA moves the data source, or ceases publication, admins will use an alternative [credible source](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions).", "lower_25": "148", "median": "167", "upper_75": "189", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Democratic or Republican party nominee for US president will receive fewer votes than a candidate not representing one of those parties by the year 2024?", "desc": "In every US presidential election from 1856 to 1908, the Republican and Democratic parties received the most or second-most popular votes. In 1912 former Republican president Theodore Roosevelt took second place, beating Republican nominee Taft. That feat has not since been repeated. See this [image](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/76/PartyVotes-Presidents.png).\n\nYet about 56% of Americans say the US would be better represented by a third party, [according to a September 2022 Gallup poll](https://news.gallup.com/poll/402515/public-interest-having-third-major-party-dips.aspx).", "resc": "This resolves as the first year after 2020 in which either the US presidential nominee for the Democratic party or that for the Republican party receives fewer popular votes in the general election, according to official [Federal Election Commission](https://www.fec.gov/introduction-campaign-finance/election-and-voting-information/) counts. If this does not occur by 2100, it resolves as >2100", "lower_25": "2043", "median": "2057", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will have a total export capacity of 148 billion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas (LNG) by the end of 2030?", "desc": "[Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is natural gas that has been cryogenically liquefied to facilitate transport or storage](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/liquefied-natural-gas.php). The United States was a net importer of LNG until 2016, when its first LNG export facility began commercial operation in 2016 at Sabine Pass, Louisiana. By the end of 2023, the US was the largest exporter of LNG in the world, with peak nameplate capacity of 98.47 MTPA (million tons per annum) spread over 7 facilities. As of the same time, 73.05 MTPA of additional capacity are at various stages of construction at these and 3 new facilities. In addition, at least 9 new projects have been approved by the US Department of Energy, and do not yet have proposed start dates.\n\nUS Energy Information Administration (EIA) publishes the following spreadsheet, updated quarterly: https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/U.S.liquefactioncapacity.xlsx\n\nFor additional background on increasing capacity, see [this EIA article](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/BTL/2023/07-LNG/article.php). For background on the geopolitical significance of LNG, see [this CSIS article](https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-lng-export-boom-defining-national-interests). For background on methane emissions during transport see [this American Chemical Society article from 2022](https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.est.2c01383).", "resc": "Resolves as the sum of the peak nameplate capacities of all LNG liquefaction trains in the US as of the most recently published EIA data on 2031-04-15. Unit is million tons per annum (MTPA). To calculate the currently available capacity, sum the figures in the \"Peak nameplate capacity per Train\" column that have the status \"Commercial operation\" in [this spreadsheet](https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/U.S.liquefactioncapacity.xlsx). If EIA moves the data source, or ceases publication, admins will use an alternative [credible source](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions).", "lower_25": "148", "median": "167", "upper_75": "189", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Sahm rule will next imply recession in the US by Nov 2028?", "desc": "The \"Sahm rule\" is a recession indicator based on [a paper by American economist Claudia Sahm (PDF)](https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/Sahm_web_20190506.pdf). As described in FRED:\n\n> Sahm Recession Indicator signals the start of a recession when the three-month moving average of the national unemployment rate (U3) rises by 0.50 percentage points or more relative to the minimum of the three-month averages from the previous 12 months.\n\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first day of the month after January 2024 for which the 3-month moving average of the US U-3 unemployment rate exceeds the lowest level of that 3-month moving average from the previous 12 months by at least 0.5 percentage points. The primary resolution source for this question will be the [Sahm indicator](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SAHMCURRENT) in FRED, resolving as the first day of the month when that indicator reaches or exceeds 0.5%.", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "Jun 2026", "upper_75": "Nov 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Sahm rule will next imply recession in the US by Nov 2028?", "desc": "The \"Sahm rule\" is a recession indicator based on [a paper by American economist Claudia Sahm (PDF)](https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/Sahm_web_20190506.pdf). As described in FRED:\n\n> Sahm Recession Indicator signals the start of a recession when the three-month moving average of the national unemployment rate (U3) rises by 0.50 percentage points or more relative to the minimum of the three-month averages from the previous 12 months.\n\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first day of the month after January 2024 for which the 3-month moving average of the US U-3 unemployment rate exceeds the lowest level of that 3-month moving average from the previous 12 months by at least 0.5 percentage points. The primary resolution source for this question will be the [Sahm indicator](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SAHMCURRENT) in FRED, resolving as the first day of the month when that indicator reaches or exceeds 0.5%.", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "Jun 2026", "upper_75": "Nov 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US FDA will authorize 1,000 AI/ML-enabled medical devices by Jan 2025?", "desc": "As of October 2022, the [US Food and Drug Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Food_and_Drug_Administration) (FDA) has authorized 521 medical devices which use artificial intelligence (AI) or machine learning (ML) since 1995, with over half being authorized since 2020. The FDA tracks these devices in its list [AI/ML-Enabled Medical Devices](https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/software-medical-device-samd/artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning-aiml-enabled-medical-devices). [Recent regulations and guidance](https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/fda-s-latest-twist-on-digital-health-5979232/) from the FDA concerning [\"Software as a Medical Device\"](https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/digital-health-center-excellence/software-medical-device-samd) may affect this trend.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date the US FDA has approved 1,000 artificial intelligence (AI) or machine learning (ML) enabled medical devices. The date used will be the date of final decision of the 1,000th device, according to information published by the FDA in its [list of AI/ML-Enabled Medical Devices](https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/software-medical-device-samd/artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning-aiml-enabled-medical-devices).\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2030, this resolves as **\"> December 31, 2029\"**.", "lower_25": "Jan 2025", "median": "Oct 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US FDA will authorize 1,000 AI/ML-enabled medical devices by Jan 2025?", "desc": "As of October 2022, the [US Food and Drug Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Food_and_Drug_Administration) (FDA) has authorized 521 medical devices which use artificial intelligence (AI) or machine learning (ML) since 1995, with over half being authorized since 2020. The FDA tracks these devices in its list [AI/ML-Enabled Medical Devices](https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/software-medical-device-samd/artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning-aiml-enabled-medical-devices). [Recent regulations and guidance](https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/fda-s-latest-twist-on-digital-health-5979232/) from the FDA concerning [\"Software as a Medical Device\"](https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/digital-health-center-excellence/software-medical-device-samd) may affect this trend.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date the US FDA has approved 1,000 artificial intelligence (AI) or machine learning (ML) enabled medical devices. The date used will be the date of final decision of the 1,000th device, according to information published by the FDA in its [list of AI/ML-Enabled Medical Devices](https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/software-medical-device-samd/artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning-aiml-enabled-medical-devices).\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2030, this resolves as **\"> December 31, 2029\"**.", "lower_25": "Jan 2025", "median": "Oct 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US FDA will authorize 1,000 AI/ML-enabled medical devices by Jan 2025?", "desc": "As of October 2022, the [US Food and Drug Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Food_and_Drug_Administration) (FDA) has authorized 521 medical devices which use artificial intelligence (AI) or machine learning (ML) since 1995, with over half being authorized since 2020. The FDA tracks these devices in its list [AI/ML-Enabled Medical Devices](https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/software-medical-device-samd/artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning-aiml-enabled-medical-devices). [Recent regulations and guidance](https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/fda-s-latest-twist-on-digital-health-5979232/) from the FDA concerning [\"Software as a Medical Device\"](https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/digital-health-center-excellence/software-medical-device-samd) may affect this trend.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date the US FDA has approved 1,000 artificial intelligence (AI) or machine learning (ML) enabled medical devices. The date used will be the date of final decision of the 1,000th device, according to information published by the FDA in its [list of AI/ML-Enabled Medical Devices](https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/software-medical-device-samd/artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning-aiml-enabled-medical-devices).\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2030, this resolves as **\"> December 31, 2029\"**.", "lower_25": "Jan 2025", "median": "Oct 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first fully autonomous surgery or procedure will be performed on a human by 2033?", "desc": "Since the advent of the [assembly line](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assembly_line) humans have strived for increased automation and precision by deploying machines in historically human roles. In recent years we've seen these efforts bolstered by machine learning and cheaper technology, such as with [self-driving cars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car). The prospect for automated medicine has grown as well, particularly for cases where precision is needed. [Robot-assisted surgery](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robot-assisted_surgery) has allowed doctors precision control and steady movements, and recently fully automated implementations of these techniques [have been tested on animals](https://www.medgadget.com/2022/02/laparoscopic-robot-performs-first-autonomous-surgery.html). Tech companies have explored the potential for advancement in this field, such as [Neuralink's plan to automate the surgery needed to implant electrodes in the brain](https://www.freethink.com/hard-tech/neuralink-robot).", "resc": "This will resolve as the date the first fully autonomous surgery is reported to be performed on a human, according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions). A qualifying surgery must be invasive, involving incision or extraction of human tissue on the human body. To qualify as autonomous the surgery must not involve human intervention at any point post-incision to conclusion of surgery.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2050, this resolves as **\"> December 31, 2049\"**", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Sahm rule will next imply recession in the US by Nov 2028?", "desc": "The \"Sahm rule\" is a recession indicator based on [a paper by American economist Claudia Sahm (PDF)](https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/Sahm_web_20190506.pdf). As described in FRED:\n\n> Sahm Recession Indicator signals the start of a recession when the three-month moving average of the national unemployment rate (U3) rises by 0.50 percentage points or more relative to the minimum of the three-month averages from the previous 12 months.\n\n", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first day of the month after January 2024 for which the 3-month moving average of the US U-3 unemployment rate exceeds the lowest level of that 3-month moving average from the previous 12 months by at least 0.5 percentage points. The primary resolution source for this question will be the [Sahm indicator](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SAHMCURRENT) in FRED, resolving as the first day of the month when that indicator reaches or exceeds 0.5%.", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "Jun 2026", "upper_75": "Nov 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first fully autonomous surgery or procedure will be performed on a human by 2033?", "desc": "Since the advent of the [assembly line](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assembly_line) humans have strived for increased automation and precision by deploying machines in historically human roles. In recent years we've seen these efforts bolstered by machine learning and cheaper technology, such as with [self-driving cars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car). The prospect for automated medicine has grown as well, particularly for cases where precision is needed. [Robot-assisted surgery](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robot-assisted_surgery) has allowed doctors precision control and steady movements, and recently fully automated implementations of these techniques [have been tested on animals](https://www.medgadget.com/2022/02/laparoscopic-robot-performs-first-autonomous-surgery.html). Tech companies have explored the potential for advancement in this field, such as [Neuralink's plan to automate the surgery needed to implant electrodes in the brain](https://www.freethink.com/hard-tech/neuralink-robot).", "resc": "This will resolve as the date the first fully autonomous surgery is reported to be performed on a human, according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions). A qualifying surgery must be invasive, involving incision or extraction of human tissue on the human body. To qualify as autonomous the surgery must not involve human intervention at any point post-incision to conclusion of surgery.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2050, this resolves as **\"> December 31, 2049\"**", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 1% of global cement production will be carbon-neutral by 2033?", "desc": "[Concrete is the world's second most-consumed substance after water, with some three tonnes produced per year per every person in the world.](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1350630714000387) It consists of aggregate material such as gravel or crushed stone bound together with cement. Cement is made largely of calcium oxide (lime), which is produced by burning calcium carbonate (limestone). This process produces some 4% of humanity's carbon dioxide emissions and is a significant contributor to global warming. To [achieve the goal of Net Zero Carbon Emissions by 2050](https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/net-zero-coalition) will thus require very rapid development and deployment of carbon-neutral cement production technology.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when credible sources report that at least 1% of all global cement production is carbon-neutral in character, meaning that no carbon dioxide resulting from the chemical process of producing the cement escapes into the atmosphere. Emissions from e.g. transporting the finished cement will not be considered, nor will offsets or similar schemes, only the production process itself.\n\nIf less than 1% of global cement production is carbon-neutral by January 1, 2038, the question will resolve as **>January 1, 2038**.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 1% of global cement production will be carbon-neutral by 2033?", "desc": "[Concrete is the world's second most-consumed substance after water, with some three tonnes produced per year per every person in the world.](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1350630714000387) It consists of aggregate material such as gravel or crushed stone bound together with cement. Cement is made largely of calcium oxide (lime), which is produced by burning calcium carbonate (limestone). This process produces some 4% of humanity's carbon dioxide emissions and is a significant contributor to global warming. To [achieve the goal of Net Zero Carbon Emissions by 2050](https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/net-zero-coalition) will thus require very rapid development and deployment of carbon-neutral cement production technology.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when credible sources report that at least 1% of all global cement production is carbon-neutral in character, meaning that no carbon dioxide resulting from the chemical process of producing the cement escapes into the atmosphere. Emissions from e.g. transporting the finished cement will not be considered, nor will offsets or similar schemes, only the production process itself.\n\nIf less than 1% of global cement production is carbon-neutral by January 1, 2038, the question will resolve as **>January 1, 2038**.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 1% of global cement production will be carbon-neutral by 2033?", "desc": "[Concrete is the world's second most-consumed substance after water, with some three tonnes produced per year per every person in the world.](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1350630714000387) It consists of aggregate material such as gravel or crushed stone bound together with cement. Cement is made largely of calcium oxide (lime), which is produced by burning calcium carbonate (limestone). This process produces some 4% of humanity's carbon dioxide emissions and is a significant contributor to global warming. To [achieve the goal of Net Zero Carbon Emissions by 2050](https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/net-zero-coalition) will thus require very rapid development and deployment of carbon-neutral cement production technology.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when credible sources report that at least 1% of all global cement production is carbon-neutral in character, meaning that no carbon dioxide resulting from the chemical process of producing the cement escapes into the atmosphere. Emissions from e.g. transporting the finished cement will not be considered, nor will offsets or similar schemes, only the production process itself.\n\nIf less than 1% of global cement production is carbon-neutral by January 1, 2038, the question will resolve as **>January 1, 2038**.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will have a total export capacity of 148 billion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas (LNG) by the end of 2030?", "desc": "[Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is natural gas that has been cryogenically liquefied to facilitate transport or storage](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/liquefied-natural-gas.php). The United States was a net importer of LNG until 2016, when its first LNG export facility began commercial operation in 2016 at Sabine Pass, Louisiana. By the end of 2023, the US was the largest exporter of LNG in the world, with peak nameplate capacity of 98.47 MTPA (million tons per annum) spread over 7 facilities. As of the same time, 73.05 MTPA of additional capacity are at various stages of construction at these and 3 new facilities. In addition, at least 9 new projects have been approved by the US Department of Energy, and do not yet have proposed start dates.\n\nUS Energy Information Administration (EIA) publishes the following spreadsheet, updated quarterly: https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/U.S.liquefactioncapacity.xlsx\n\nFor additional background on increasing capacity, see [this EIA article](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/BTL/2023/07-LNG/article.php). For background on the geopolitical significance of LNG, see [this CSIS article](https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-lng-export-boom-defining-national-interests). For background on methane emissions during transport see [this American Chemical Society article from 2022](https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.est.2c01383).", "resc": "Resolves as the sum of the peak nameplate capacities of all LNG liquefaction trains in the US as of the most recently published EIA data on 2031-04-15. Unit is million tons per annum (MTPA). To calculate the currently available capacity, sum the figures in the \"Peak nameplate capacity per Train\" column that have the status \"Commercial operation\" in [this spreadsheet](https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/U.S.liquefactioncapacity.xlsx). If EIA moves the data source, or ceases publication, admins will use an alternative [credible source](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions).", "lower_25": "148", "median": "167", "upper_75": "189", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be 0.765 in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "−0.713", "median": "0.765", "upper_75": "1.92", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be −0.713 in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "−0.713", "median": "0.765", "upper_75": "1.92", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be −0.713 in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "−0.713", "median": "0.765", "upper_75": "1.92", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be 0.765 in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "−0.713", "median": "0.765", "upper_75": "1.92", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be 25% lower than the previous year in 2025?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "−0.618", "median": "0.941", "upper_75": "2.32", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be −2.81 in the year 2026?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "−2.81", "median": "0.629", "upper_75": "2.36", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be 0.765 in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "−0.713", "median": "0.765", "upper_75": "1.92", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be 2.54% in the year 2027?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "−3.30", "median": "0.682", "upper_75": "2.54", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be −2.81 in the year 2026?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "−2.81", "median": "0.629", "upper_75": "2.36", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be 0.469 in the year 2028?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "< −4", "median": "0.469", "upper_75": "2.65", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be 2.54% in the year 2027?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "−3.30", "median": "0.682", "upper_75": "2.54", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first fully autonomous surgery or procedure will be performed on a human by 2033?", "desc": "Since the advent of the [assembly line](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assembly_line) humans have strived for increased automation and precision by deploying machines in historically human roles. In recent years we've seen these efforts bolstered by machine learning and cheaper technology, such as with [self-driving cars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-driving_car). The prospect for automated medicine has grown as well, particularly for cases where precision is needed. [Robot-assisted surgery](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robot-assisted_surgery) has allowed doctors precision control and steady movements, and recently fully automated implementations of these techniques [have been tested on animals](https://www.medgadget.com/2022/02/laparoscopic-robot-performs-first-autonomous-surgery.html). Tech companies have explored the potential for advancement in this field, such as [Neuralink's plan to automate the surgery needed to implant electrodes in the brain](https://www.freethink.com/hard-tech/neuralink-robot).", "resc": "This will resolve as the date the first fully autonomous surgery is reported to be performed on a human, according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions). A qualifying surgery must be invasive, involving incision or extraction of human tissue on the human body. To qualify as autonomous the surgery must not involve human intervention at any point post-incision to conclusion of surgery.\n\nIf this does not occur before January 1, 2050, this resolves as **\"> December 31, 2049\"**", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2030", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 5.57% in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.57", "median": "7.01", "upper_75": "8.47", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 2.44% in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "2.44", "median": "4.09", "upper_75": "5.95", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be −0.713 in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "−0.713", "median": "0.765", "upper_75": "1.92", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be 0.637 in the year 2029?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "−3.64", "median": "0.637", "upper_75": "2.55", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 5.57% in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.57", "median": "7.01", "upper_75": "8.47", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be 2.54% in the year 2027?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "−3.30", "median": "0.682", "upper_75": "2.54", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be 0.469 in the year 2028?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "< −4", "median": "0.469", "upper_75": "2.65", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be 0.637 in the year 2029?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "−3.64", "median": "0.637", "upper_75": "2.55", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 2.44% in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "2.44", "median": "4.09", "upper_75": "5.95", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be 0.469 in the year 2028?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "< −4", "median": "0.469", "upper_75": "2.65", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be 25% lower than the previous year in 2025?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "−0.618", "median": "0.941", "upper_75": "2.32", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be 0.637 in the year 2029?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "−3.64", "median": "0.637", "upper_75": "2.55", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be −2.81 in the year 2026?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "−2.81", "median": "0.629", "upper_75": "2.36", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 2.44% in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "2.44", "median": "4.09", "upper_75": "5.95", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual real GDP growth rate in the eurozone will be 25% lower than the previous year in 2025?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [GDP data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en) and the EU collected from [national accounts data](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of real GDP growth on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone real GDP growth projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.YER.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using national accounts data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual real GDP growth rate (percentage change) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/bd526da2-8278-456a-a3a5-9bd81fb876f3?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "−0.618", "median": "0.941", "upper_75": "2.32", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 1.82% in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "1.82", "median": "2.72", "upper_75": "4.24", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 4.09% in the following years (2026)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "1.77", "median": "2.63", "upper_75": "4.09", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 4.09% in the following years (2026)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "1.77", "median": "2.63", "upper_75": "4.09", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 4.09% in the following years (2026)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "1.77", "median": "2.63", "upper_75": "4.09", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 1.85% in the year 2027?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "1.85", "median": "2.85", "upper_75": "4.54", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 2.89% in the year 2029?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "1.87", "median": "2.89", "upper_75": "4.85", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 6.94% in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "6.18", "median": "6.57", "upper_75": "6.94", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 5.57% in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.57", "median": "7.01", "upper_75": "8.47", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 1.65% in the following years (2028)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "1.65", "median": "2.59", "upper_75": "4.15", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 1.85% in the year 2027?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "1.85", "median": "2.85", "upper_75": "4.54", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 2.89% in the year 2029?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "1.87", "median": "2.89", "upper_75": "4.85", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 6.94% in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "6.18", "median": "6.57", "upper_75": "6.94", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 6.94% in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "6.18", "median": "6.57", "upper_75": "6.94", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 2.89% in the year 2029?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "1.87", "median": "2.89", "upper_75": "4.85", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 1.65% in the following years (2028)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "1.65", "median": "2.59", "upper_75": "4.15", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 6.47% in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.81", "median": "6.47", "upper_75": "7.07", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 7.02% in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.69", "median": "6.30", "upper_75": "7.02", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 7.02% in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.69", "median": "6.30", "upper_75": "7.02", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 6.18% in the following years (2026)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.64", "median": "6.18", "upper_75": "6.79", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 5.40% in the following years (2027)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.40", "median": "6.00", "upper_75": "6.76", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 6.18% in the following years (2026)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.64", "median": "6.18", "upper_75": "6.79", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 5.40% in the following years (2027)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.40", "median": "6.00", "upper_75": "6.76", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 6.18% in the following years (2026)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.64", "median": "6.18", "upper_75": "6.79", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 7.02% in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.69", "median": "6.30", "upper_75": "7.02", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 1.82% in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "1.82", "median": "2.72", "upper_75": "4.24", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 1.82% in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "1.82", "median": "2.72", "upper_75": "4.24", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 5.16% in the following years (2028)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.16", "median": "5.84", "upper_75": "6.71", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 5.16% in the following years (2028)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.16", "median": "5.84", "upper_75": "6.71", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 5.16% in the following years (2028)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.16", "median": "5.84", "upper_75": "6.71", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 5.40% in the following years (2027)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.40", "median": "6.00", "upper_75": "6.76", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 7.73% in the following years (2029)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.04", "median": "6.03", "upper_75": "7.73", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 7.73% in the following years (2029)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.04", "median": "6.03", "upper_75": "7.73", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 1.65% in the following years (2028)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "1.65", "median": "2.59", "upper_75": "4.15", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 3.30% in the year 2027?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [Consumer Price Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consumer_price_index) (CPI), a measure of inflation, for the United States. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/cpi.htm) its CPI estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nThere are [two versions](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/headline-inflation.asp) of CPI. One is typically known as headline CPI which is the full measure, while the other is typically known as core CPI, which doesn't include food and energy.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual change in CPI in the US, not seasonally adjusted, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). The annual change is measured from December of the year in question to the December of the prior year. **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the annual headline CPI inflation in the US, in percent, not seasonally adjusted, for each year. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for December of the listed year by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/). Resolution will be according to the value reported as the unadjusted 12 month change ending in December. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "1.98", "median": "3.30", "upper_75": "5.08", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual inflation in the eurozone will be 1.85% in the year 2027?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the unemployment rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14645/eurozone-unemployment/)\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [inflation data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en) and the EU using a [Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp) (HICP).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes [point forecasts](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/projections/html/ecb.projections202212_eurosystemstaff~6c1855c75b.en.html) of HICP inflation on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone inflation projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.HIC.A.A22.0000).\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual real GDP growth in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using HICP data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the annual HICP inflation values published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time, [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/9e76c34b-6f02-4679-a2b8-21a1c62fe345?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "1.85", "median": "2.85", "upper_75": "4.54", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 7.73% in the following years (2029)?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.04", "median": "6.03", "upper_75": "7.73", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 6.47% in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.81", "median": "6.47", "upper_75": "7.07", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.08% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "6.08", "median": "7.86", "upper_75": "9.60", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 3.30% in the year 2027?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [Consumer Price Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consumer_price_index) (CPI), a measure of inflation, for the United States. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/cpi.htm) its CPI estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nThere are [two versions](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/headline-inflation.asp) of CPI. One is typically known as headline CPI which is the full measure, while the other is typically known as core CPI, which doesn't include food and energy.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual change in CPI in the US, not seasonally adjusted, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). The annual change is measured from December of the year in question to the December of the prior year. **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the annual headline CPI inflation in the US, in percent, not seasonally adjusted, for each year. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for December of the listed year by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/). Resolution will be according to the value reported as the unadjusted 12 month change ending in December. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "1.98", "median": "3.30", "upper_75": "5.08", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 3.30% in the year 2027?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [Consumer Price Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consumer_price_index) (CPI), a measure of inflation, for the United States. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/cpi.htm) its CPI estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nThere are [two versions](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/headline-inflation.asp) of CPI. One is typically known as headline CPI which is the full measure, while the other is typically known as core CPI, which doesn't include food and energy.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual change in CPI in the US, not seasonally adjusted, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). The annual change is measured from December of the year in question to the December of the prior year. **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the annual headline CPI inflation in the US, in percent, not seasonally adjusted, for each year. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for December of the listed year by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/). Resolution will be according to the value reported as the unadjusted 12 month change ending in December. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "1.98", "median": "3.30", "upper_75": "5.08", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.08% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "6.08", "median": "7.86", "upper_75": "9.60", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the unemployment rate in the eurozone will be 6.47% in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the annual real GDP growth rate be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14629/eurozone-gdp-growth-2023-to-2030/)\n* [What will annual inflation be in the eurozone in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14637/eurozone-inflation-2023-to-2030/)\n\n---\n\nThe [eurozone](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurozone) or euro area consists of all countries that use the euro as a currency. From 2015 through 2022 the eurozone had 19 member states. The total became 20 on January 1, 2023 when [Croatia adopted the euro](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/focus/2023/html/ecb.ebbox202208_02~15fd36600a.en.html). The eurozone is distinct from the [European Union](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union#Member_states) (EU), which consists of 27 members, which with the [exception of Denmark](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/denmark-and-euro_en) are [technically obliged](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/enlargement-euro-area/who-can-join-and-when_en) to join the eurozone once they meet the [euro convergence criteria](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euro_convergence_criteria).\n\n[Eurostat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurostat), the [statistical office of the European Union](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/main/about-us/who-we-are), publishes [unemployment data about the eurozone](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en) and the EU collected from its [EU Labour Force Survey](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs).\n\nThe [European Central Bank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Central_Bank) (ECB) publishes point forecasts of the unemployment rate on an annual basis. All past projections used by the ECB can be accessed via the [Statistical Data Warehouse](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=5275746). Its eurozone unemployment projections from December of 2022 are [available here](https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=440.MPD.A.U2.URX.F.A22.0000). The ECB describes the unemployment data as follows:\n\n>The statistics on unemployment are published by the European Commission (Eurostat) and follow the guidelines of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Unemployed persons are defined as those aged 15 years and over who are without work, are available to start work within two weeks and have actively sought employment during the previous four weeks. It should be noted that this definition of unemployment can differ from those definitions used at the national level.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual unemployment rate in the eurozone, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the OECD using Labour Force Survey data and may not necessarily match the resolution source. The chart may update with subsequent published estimates and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "The question will resolve as the total unemployment rate (% of labour force unemployed, age 15 and over) in the eurozone published by Eurostat for the composition of the eurozone at the time. The 19 country series is [currently available here](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/bookmark/1a9de91f-2000-45a2-9f79-58d51c7c48de?lang=en). The first estimate published for the listed year will be used. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place.", "lower_25": "5.81", "median": "6.47", "upper_75": "7.07", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 6.08% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "6.08", "median": "7.86", "upper_75": "9.60", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 39.6% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles? (2028)", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "29.5", "median": "39.6", "upper_75": "49.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 39.6% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles? (2028)", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "29.5", "median": "39.6", "upper_75": "49.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 23.1% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles by 2026?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "18.1", "median": "23.1", "upper_75": "28.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 23.1% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles by 2026?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "18.1", "median": "23.1", "upper_75": "28.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 57.8% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "43.2", "median": "57.8", "upper_75": "73.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 57.8% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "43.2", "median": "57.8", "upper_75": "73.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 93.5% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles? (2035)", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "70.8", "median": "84.5", "upper_75": "93.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.0% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles? (2024)", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "7.60", "median": "10.0", "upper_75": "13.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 23.1% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles by 2026?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "18.1", "median": "23.1", "upper_75": "28.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 93.5% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles? (2035)", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "70.8", "median": "84.5", "upper_75": "93.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the energy transition metal index will have a 75% increase in value from December 2020 to December of the listed year?", "desc": "The [growth](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in electric vehicle (EV) market-share and [calls for growth to accelerate](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/05/biden-pushes-for-evs-to-make-up-40percent-or-more-of-us-auto-sales-by-2030.html) have raised concerns about the supply of critical minerals used in batteries. According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency)'s (IEA) [Global EV Outlook 2022](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022)\n\n>. . . the supply of some minerals such as lithium would need to rise by up to one-third by 2030 to match the demand for EV batteries to satisfy the pledges and announcements in the [Announced Pledges Scenario](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-and-climate-model/announced-pledges-scenario-aps) (APS). For example, demand for lithium – the commodity with the largest projected demand-supply gap – is projected to increase sixfold to 500 kilotonnes by 2030 in the APS, requiring the equivalent of 50 new average-sized mines.\n\nA [report](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47227) published by the [Congressional Research Service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Research_Service) in August of 2022 says the following about the critical mineral supply chain for EV batteries:\n\n>As the majority of EV manufacturing and sales occur outside the United States, so does the majority of EV battery production. While China accounts for over 70% of global EV battery production capacity, the United States has developed battery supply chains for some of its demand. China's dominance in EV battery manufacturing is similar to its dominance in mining and extraction of the minerals used in EV batteries. The potential for an accelerating global transition to EVs leads some to question the domestic availability of the minerals and materials for the domestic manufacture of EV batteries.\n>\n>Currently, lithium-ion batteries are the dominant type of rechargeable batteries used in EVs. The most commonly used varieties are lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), lithium manganese oxide (LMO), lithium iron phosphate (LFP), lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) and lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC). Graphite is currently widely used as the anode in lithium ion batteries. These EV battery chemistries depend on five critical minerals whose domestic supply is potentially at risk for disruption: lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite. The U.S. Geological Survey designated these and other minerals as “critical,” according to the methodology codified in the Energy Act of 2020.\n\nThe [International Monetary Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Monetary_Fund) (IMF) publishes an **Energy Transition Metal Index** in its [Primary Commodity Price System](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595). The monthly version of the index can be accessed by selecting it in the commodity dropdown, changing the time range to **monthly** and the unit to **index**. More information on the calculation of the index can be found in its [technical documentation](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Research/CommodityPrices/Monthly/pcps-technical-documentation.ashx) (link also available on the [IMF Primary Commodity Prices page](https://www.imf.org/en/Research/commodity-prices)). As of November 24, 2022, the Energy Transition Metal Index contains the following metals:\n\n`Aluminum, Chromium, Cobalt, Copper, Lead, Lithium, Manganese, Molybdenum, Nickel, Palladium, Platinum, Rare Earth Elements, Silicon, Silver, Vanadium, Zinc`", "resc": "This resolves as the percentage change of the Energy Transition Metal Index [published by the IMF](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595) for December of the listed year relative to December of 2020. The percentage change will be calculated as \\((Y - X)/X\\times 100\\) where Y is the index value in December of the listed year and X is the index value in December of 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IMF; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IMF no longer reports data for a relevant year the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe index or any equivalent indices published by the IMF will be used as provided, so long as the make-up of the index contains 8 or more of the metals listed in 2022 (see the background section for the 2022 list).", "lower_25": "22.8", "median": "63.6", "upper_75": "127", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.0% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles? (2024)", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "7.60", "median": "10.0", "upper_75": "13.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the energy transition metal index will have a 75% increase in value from December 2020 to December of the listed year?", "desc": "The [growth](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in electric vehicle (EV) market-share and [calls for growth to accelerate](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/05/biden-pushes-for-evs-to-make-up-40percent-or-more-of-us-auto-sales-by-2030.html) have raised concerns about the supply of critical minerals used in batteries. According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency)'s (IEA) [Global EV Outlook 2022](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022)\n\n>. . . the supply of some minerals such as lithium would need to rise by up to one-third by 2030 to match the demand for EV batteries to satisfy the pledges and announcements in the [Announced Pledges Scenario](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-and-climate-model/announced-pledges-scenario-aps) (APS). For example, demand for lithium – the commodity with the largest projected demand-supply gap – is projected to increase sixfold to 500 kilotonnes by 2030 in the APS, requiring the equivalent of 50 new average-sized mines.\n\nA [report](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47227) published by the [Congressional Research Service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Research_Service) in August of 2022 says the following about the critical mineral supply chain for EV batteries:\n\n>As the majority of EV manufacturing and sales occur outside the United States, so does the majority of EV battery production. While China accounts for over 70% of global EV battery production capacity, the United States has developed battery supply chains for some of its demand. China's dominance in EV battery manufacturing is similar to its dominance in mining and extraction of the minerals used in EV batteries. The potential for an accelerating global transition to EVs leads some to question the domestic availability of the minerals and materials for the domestic manufacture of EV batteries.\n>\n>Currently, lithium-ion batteries are the dominant type of rechargeable batteries used in EVs. The most commonly used varieties are lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), lithium manganese oxide (LMO), lithium iron phosphate (LFP), lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) and lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC). Graphite is currently widely used as the anode in lithium ion batteries. These EV battery chemistries depend on five critical minerals whose domestic supply is potentially at risk for disruption: lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite. The U.S. Geological Survey designated these and other minerals as “critical,” according to the methodology codified in the Energy Act of 2020.\n\nThe [International Monetary Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Monetary_Fund) (IMF) publishes an **Energy Transition Metal Index** in its [Primary Commodity Price System](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595). The monthly version of the index can be accessed by selecting it in the commodity dropdown, changing the time range to **monthly** and the unit to **index**. More information on the calculation of the index can be found in its [technical documentation](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Research/CommodityPrices/Monthly/pcps-technical-documentation.ashx) (link also available on the [IMF Primary Commodity Prices page](https://www.imf.org/en/Research/commodity-prices)). As of November 24, 2022, the Energy Transition Metal Index contains the following metals:\n\n`Aluminum, Chromium, Cobalt, Copper, Lead, Lithium, Manganese, Molybdenum, Nickel, Palladium, Platinum, Rare Earth Elements, Silicon, Silver, Vanadium, Zinc`", "resc": "This resolves as the percentage change of the Energy Transition Metal Index [published by the IMF](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595) for December of the listed year relative to December of 2020. The percentage change will be calculated as \\((Y - X)/X\\times 100\\) where Y is the index value in December of the listed year and X is the index value in December of 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IMF; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IMF no longer reports data for a relevant year the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe index or any equivalent indices published by the IMF will be used as provided, so long as the make-up of the index contains 8 or more of the metals listed in 2022 (see the background section for the 2022 list).", "lower_25": "22.8", "median": "63.6", "upper_75": "127", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 10.0% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles? (2024)", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "7.60", "median": "10.0", "upper_75": "13.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the energy transition metal index will have a 75% increase in value from December 2020 to December of the listed year?", "desc": "The [growth](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in electric vehicle (EV) market-share and [calls for growth to accelerate](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/05/biden-pushes-for-evs-to-make-up-40percent-or-more-of-us-auto-sales-by-2030.html) have raised concerns about the supply of critical minerals used in batteries. According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency)'s (IEA) [Global EV Outlook 2022](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022)\n\n>. . . the supply of some minerals such as lithium would need to rise by up to one-third by 2030 to match the demand for EV batteries to satisfy the pledges and announcements in the [Announced Pledges Scenario](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-and-climate-model/announced-pledges-scenario-aps) (APS). For example, demand for lithium – the commodity with the largest projected demand-supply gap – is projected to increase sixfold to 500 kilotonnes by 2030 in the APS, requiring the equivalent of 50 new average-sized mines.\n\nA [report](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47227) published by the [Congressional Research Service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Research_Service) in August of 2022 says the following about the critical mineral supply chain for EV batteries:\n\n>As the majority of EV manufacturing and sales occur outside the United States, so does the majority of EV battery production. While China accounts for over 70% of global EV battery production capacity, the United States has developed battery supply chains for some of its demand. China's dominance in EV battery manufacturing is similar to its dominance in mining and extraction of the minerals used in EV batteries. The potential for an accelerating global transition to EVs leads some to question the domestic availability of the minerals and materials for the domestic manufacture of EV batteries.\n>\n>Currently, lithium-ion batteries are the dominant type of rechargeable batteries used in EVs. The most commonly used varieties are lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), lithium manganese oxide (LMO), lithium iron phosphate (LFP), lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) and lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC). Graphite is currently widely used as the anode in lithium ion batteries. These EV battery chemistries depend on five critical minerals whose domestic supply is potentially at risk for disruption: lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite. The U.S. Geological Survey designated these and other minerals as “critical,” according to the methodology codified in the Energy Act of 2020.\n\nThe [International Monetary Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Monetary_Fund) (IMF) publishes an **Energy Transition Metal Index** in its [Primary Commodity Price System](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595). The monthly version of the index can be accessed by selecting it in the commodity dropdown, changing the time range to **monthly** and the unit to **index**. More information on the calculation of the index can be found in its [technical documentation](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Research/CommodityPrices/Monthly/pcps-technical-documentation.ashx) (link also available on the [IMF Primary Commodity Prices page](https://www.imf.org/en/Research/commodity-prices)). As of November 24, 2022, the Energy Transition Metal Index contains the following metals:\n\n`Aluminum, Chromium, Cobalt, Copper, Lead, Lithium, Manganese, Molybdenum, Nickel, Palladium, Platinum, Rare Earth Elements, Silicon, Silver, Vanadium, Zinc`", "resc": "This resolves as the percentage change of the Energy Transition Metal Index [published by the IMF](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595) for December of the listed year relative to December of 2020. The percentage change will be calculated as \\((Y - X)/X\\times 100\\) where Y is the index value in December of the listed year and X is the index value in December of 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IMF; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IMF no longer reports data for a relevant year the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe index or any equivalent indices published by the IMF will be used as provided, so long as the make-up of the index contains 8 or more of the metals listed in 2022 (see the background section for the 2022 list).", "lower_25": "22.8", "median": "63.6", "upper_75": "127", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the expected percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020? (2030)", "desc": "The [growth](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in electric vehicle (EV) market-share and [calls for growth to accelerate](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/05/biden-pushes-for-evs-to-make-up-40percent-or-more-of-us-auto-sales-by-2030.html) have raised concerns about the supply of critical minerals used in batteries. According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency)'s (IEA) [Global EV Outlook 2022](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022)\n\n>. . . the supply of some minerals such as lithium would need to rise by up to one-third by 2030 to match the demand for EV batteries to satisfy the pledges and announcements in the [Announced Pledges Scenario](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-and-climate-model/announced-pledges-scenario-aps) (APS). For example, demand for lithium – the commodity with the largest projected demand-supply gap – is projected to increase sixfold to 500 kilotonnes by 2030 in the APS, requiring the equivalent of 50 new average-sized mines.\n\nA [report](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47227) published by the [Congressional Research Service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Research_Service) in August of 2022 says the following about the critical mineral supply chain for EV batteries:\n\n>As the majority of EV manufacturing and sales occur outside the United States, so does the majority of EV battery production. While China accounts for over 70% of global EV battery production capacity, the United States has developed battery supply chains for some of its demand. China's dominance in EV battery manufacturing is similar to its dominance in mining and extraction of the minerals used in EV batteries. The potential for an accelerating global transition to EVs leads some to question the domestic availability of the minerals and materials for the domestic manufacture of EV batteries.\n>\n>Currently, lithium-ion batteries are the dominant type of rechargeable batteries used in EVs. The most commonly used varieties are lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), lithium manganese oxide (LMO), lithium iron phosphate (LFP), lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) and lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC). Graphite is currently widely used as the anode in lithium ion batteries. These EV battery chemistries depend on five critical minerals whose domestic supply is potentially at risk for disruption: lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite. The U.S. Geological Survey designated these and other minerals as “critical,” according to the methodology codified in the Energy Act of 2020.\n\nThe [International Monetary Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Monetary_Fund) (IMF) publishes an **Energy Transition Metal Index** in its [Primary Commodity Price System](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595). The monthly version of the index can be accessed by selecting it in the commodity dropdown, changing the time range to **monthly** and the unit to **index**. More information on the calculation of the index can be found in its [technical documentation](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Research/CommodityPrices/Monthly/pcps-technical-documentation.ashx) (link also available on the [IMF Primary Commodity Prices page](https://www.imf.org/en/Research/commodity-prices)). As of November 24, 2022, the Energy Transition Metal Index contains the following metals:\n\n`Aluminum, Chromium, Cobalt, Copper, Lead, Lithium, Manganese, Molybdenum, Nickel, Palladium, Platinum, Rare Earth Elements, Silicon, Silver, Vanadium, Zinc`", "resc": "This resolves as the percentage change of the Energy Transition Metal Index [published by the IMF](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595) for December of the listed year relative to December of 2020. The percentage change will be calculated as \\((Y - X)/X\\times 100\\) where Y is the index value in December of the listed year and X is the index value in December of 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IMF; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IMF no longer reports data for a relevant year the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe index or any equivalent indices published by the IMF will be used as provided, so long as the make-up of the index contains 8 or more of the metals listed in 2022 (see the background section for the 2022 list).", "lower_25": "211", "median": "422", "upper_75": "614", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the energy transition metal index will increase by 75% from December 2020 to December 2035?", "desc": "The [growth](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in electric vehicle (EV) market-share and [calls for growth to accelerate](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/05/biden-pushes-for-evs-to-make-up-40percent-or-more-of-us-auto-sales-by-2030.html) have raised concerns about the supply of critical minerals used in batteries. According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency)'s (IEA) [Global EV Outlook 2022](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022)\n\n>. . . the supply of some minerals such as lithium would need to rise by up to one-third by 2030 to match the demand for EV batteries to satisfy the pledges and announcements in the [Announced Pledges Scenario](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-and-climate-model/announced-pledges-scenario-aps) (APS). For example, demand for lithium – the commodity with the largest projected demand-supply gap – is projected to increase sixfold to 500 kilotonnes by 2030 in the APS, requiring the equivalent of 50 new average-sized mines.\n\nA [report](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47227) published by the [Congressional Research Service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Research_Service) in August of 2022 says the following about the critical mineral supply chain for EV batteries:\n\n>As the majority of EV manufacturing and sales occur outside the United States, so does the majority of EV battery production. While China accounts for over 70% of global EV battery production capacity, the United States has developed battery supply chains for some of its demand. China's dominance in EV battery manufacturing is similar to its dominance in mining and extraction of the minerals used in EV batteries. The potential for an accelerating global transition to EVs leads some to question the domestic availability of the minerals and materials for the domestic manufacture of EV batteries.\n>\n>Currently, lithium-ion batteries are the dominant type of rechargeable batteries used in EVs. The most commonly used varieties are lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), lithium manganese oxide (LMO), lithium iron phosphate (LFP), lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) and lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC). Graphite is currently widely used as the anode in lithium ion batteries. These EV battery chemistries depend on five critical minerals whose domestic supply is potentially at risk for disruption: lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite. The U.S. Geological Survey designated these and other minerals as “critical,” according to the methodology codified in the Energy Act of 2020.\n\nThe [International Monetary Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Monetary_Fund) (IMF) publishes an **Energy Transition Metal Index** in its [Primary Commodity Price System](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595). The monthly version of the index can be accessed by selecting it in the commodity dropdown, changing the time range to **monthly** and the unit to **index**. More information on the calculation of the index can be found in its [technical documentation](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Research/CommodityPrices/Monthly/pcps-technical-documentation.ashx) (link also available on the [IMF Primary Commodity Prices page](https://www.imf.org/en/Research/commodity-prices)). As of November 24, 2022, the Energy Transition Metal Index contains the following metals:\n\n`Aluminum, Chromium, Cobalt, Copper, Lead, Lithium, Manganese, Molybdenum, Nickel, Palladium, Platinum, Rare Earth Elements, Silicon, Silver, Vanadium, Zinc`", "resc": "This resolves as the percentage change of the Energy Transition Metal Index [published by the IMF](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595) for December of the listed year relative to December of 2020. The percentage change will be calculated as \\((Y - X)/X\\times 100\\) where Y is the index value in December of the listed year and X is the index value in December of 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IMF; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IMF no longer reports data for a relevant year the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe index or any equivalent indices published by the IMF will be used as provided, so long as the make-up of the index contains 8 or more of the metals listed in 2022 (see the background section for the 2022 list).", "lower_25": "462", "median": "589", "upper_75": "759", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the expected percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020? (2030)", "desc": "The [growth](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in electric vehicle (EV) market-share and [calls for growth to accelerate](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/05/biden-pushes-for-evs-to-make-up-40percent-or-more-of-us-auto-sales-by-2030.html) have raised concerns about the supply of critical minerals used in batteries. According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency)'s (IEA) [Global EV Outlook 2022](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022)\n\n>. . . the supply of some minerals such as lithium would need to rise by up to one-third by 2030 to match the demand for EV batteries to satisfy the pledges and announcements in the [Announced Pledges Scenario](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-and-climate-model/announced-pledges-scenario-aps) (APS). For example, demand for lithium – the commodity with the largest projected demand-supply gap – is projected to increase sixfold to 500 kilotonnes by 2030 in the APS, requiring the equivalent of 50 new average-sized mines.\n\nA [report](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47227) published by the [Congressional Research Service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Research_Service) in August of 2022 says the following about the critical mineral supply chain for EV batteries:\n\n>As the majority of EV manufacturing and sales occur outside the United States, so does the majority of EV battery production. While China accounts for over 70% of global EV battery production capacity, the United States has developed battery supply chains for some of its demand. China's dominance in EV battery manufacturing is similar to its dominance in mining and extraction of the minerals used in EV batteries. The potential for an accelerating global transition to EVs leads some to question the domestic availability of the minerals and materials for the domestic manufacture of EV batteries.\n>\n>Currently, lithium-ion batteries are the dominant type of rechargeable batteries used in EVs. The most commonly used varieties are lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), lithium manganese oxide (LMO), lithium iron phosphate (LFP), lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) and lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC). Graphite is currently widely used as the anode in lithium ion batteries. These EV battery chemistries depend on five critical minerals whose domestic supply is potentially at risk for disruption: lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite. The U.S. Geological Survey designated these and other minerals as “critical,” according to the methodology codified in the Energy Act of 2020.\n\nThe [International Monetary Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Monetary_Fund) (IMF) publishes an **Energy Transition Metal Index** in its [Primary Commodity Price System](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595). The monthly version of the index can be accessed by selecting it in the commodity dropdown, changing the time range to **monthly** and the unit to **index**. More information on the calculation of the index can be found in its [technical documentation](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Research/CommodityPrices/Monthly/pcps-technical-documentation.ashx) (link also available on the [IMF Primary Commodity Prices page](https://www.imf.org/en/Research/commodity-prices)). As of November 24, 2022, the Energy Transition Metal Index contains the following metals:\n\n`Aluminum, Chromium, Cobalt, Copper, Lead, Lithium, Manganese, Molybdenum, Nickel, Palladium, Platinum, Rare Earth Elements, Silicon, Silver, Vanadium, Zinc`", "resc": "This resolves as the percentage change of the Energy Transition Metal Index [published by the IMF](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595) for December of the listed year relative to December of 2020. The percentage change will be calculated as \\((Y - X)/X\\times 100\\) where Y is the index value in December of the listed year and X is the index value in December of 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IMF; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IMF no longer reports data for a relevant year the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe index or any equivalent indices published by the IMF will be used as provided, so long as the make-up of the index contains 8 or more of the metals listed in 2022 (see the background section for the 2022 list).", "lower_25": "211", "median": "422", "upper_75": "614", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the energy transition metal index will increase by 75% from December 2020 to December 2035?", "desc": "The [growth](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in electric vehicle (EV) market-share and [calls for growth to accelerate](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/05/biden-pushes-for-evs-to-make-up-40percent-or-more-of-us-auto-sales-by-2030.html) have raised concerns about the supply of critical minerals used in batteries. According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency)'s (IEA) [Global EV Outlook 2022](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022)\n\n>. . . the supply of some minerals such as lithium would need to rise by up to one-third by 2030 to match the demand for EV batteries to satisfy the pledges and announcements in the [Announced Pledges Scenario](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-and-climate-model/announced-pledges-scenario-aps) (APS). For example, demand for lithium – the commodity with the largest projected demand-supply gap – is projected to increase sixfold to 500 kilotonnes by 2030 in the APS, requiring the equivalent of 50 new average-sized mines.\n\nA [report](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47227) published by the [Congressional Research Service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Research_Service) in August of 2022 says the following about the critical mineral supply chain for EV batteries:\n\n>As the majority of EV manufacturing and sales occur outside the United States, so does the majority of EV battery production. While China accounts for over 70% of global EV battery production capacity, the United States has developed battery supply chains for some of its demand. China's dominance in EV battery manufacturing is similar to its dominance in mining and extraction of the minerals used in EV batteries. The potential for an accelerating global transition to EVs leads some to question the domestic availability of the minerals and materials for the domestic manufacture of EV batteries.\n>\n>Currently, lithium-ion batteries are the dominant type of rechargeable batteries used in EVs. The most commonly used varieties are lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), lithium manganese oxide (LMO), lithium iron phosphate (LFP), lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) and lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC). Graphite is currently widely used as the anode in lithium ion batteries. These EV battery chemistries depend on five critical minerals whose domestic supply is potentially at risk for disruption: lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite. The U.S. Geological Survey designated these and other minerals as “critical,” according to the methodology codified in the Energy Act of 2020.\n\nThe [International Monetary Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Monetary_Fund) (IMF) publishes an **Energy Transition Metal Index** in its [Primary Commodity Price System](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595). The monthly version of the index can be accessed by selecting it in the commodity dropdown, changing the time range to **monthly** and the unit to **index**. More information on the calculation of the index can be found in its [technical documentation](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Research/CommodityPrices/Monthly/pcps-technical-documentation.ashx) (link also available on the [IMF Primary Commodity Prices page](https://www.imf.org/en/Research/commodity-prices)). As of November 24, 2022, the Energy Transition Metal Index contains the following metals:\n\n`Aluminum, Chromium, Cobalt, Copper, Lead, Lithium, Manganese, Molybdenum, Nickel, Palladium, Platinum, Rare Earth Elements, Silicon, Silver, Vanadium, Zinc`", "resc": "This resolves as the percentage change of the Energy Transition Metal Index [published by the IMF](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595) for December of the listed year relative to December of 2020. The percentage change will be calculated as \\((Y - X)/X\\times 100\\) where Y is the index value in December of the listed year and X is the index value in December of 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IMF; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IMF no longer reports data for a relevant year the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe index or any equivalent indices published by the IMF will be used as provided, so long as the make-up of the index contains 8 or more of the metals listed in 2022 (see the background section for the 2022 list).", "lower_25": "462", "median": "589", "upper_75": "759", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What will be the chance that the energy transition metal index will increase by 50% from December 2020 to December 2025?", "desc": "The [growth](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in electric vehicle (EV) market-share and [calls for growth to accelerate](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/05/biden-pushes-for-evs-to-make-up-40percent-or-more-of-us-auto-sales-by-2030.html) have raised concerns about the supply of critical minerals used in batteries. According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency)'s (IEA) [Global EV Outlook 2022](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022)\n\n>. . . the supply of some minerals such as lithium would need to rise by up to one-third by 2030 to match the demand for EV batteries to satisfy the pledges and announcements in the [Announced Pledges Scenario](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-and-climate-model/announced-pledges-scenario-aps) (APS). For example, demand for lithium – the commodity with the largest projected demand-supply gap – is projected to increase sixfold to 500 kilotonnes by 2030 in the APS, requiring the equivalent of 50 new average-sized mines.\n\nA [report](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47227) published by the [Congressional Research Service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Research_Service) in August of 2022 says the following about the critical mineral supply chain for EV batteries:\n\n>As the majority of EV manufacturing and sales occur outside the United States, so does the majority of EV battery production. While China accounts for over 70% of global EV battery production capacity, the United States has developed battery supply chains for some of its demand. China's dominance in EV battery manufacturing is similar to its dominance in mining and extraction of the minerals used in EV batteries. The potential for an accelerating global transition to EVs leads some to question the domestic availability of the minerals and materials for the domestic manufacture of EV batteries.\n>\n>Currently, lithium-ion batteries are the dominant type of rechargeable batteries used in EVs. The most commonly used varieties are lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), lithium manganese oxide (LMO), lithium iron phosphate (LFP), lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) and lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC). Graphite is currently widely used as the anode in lithium ion batteries. These EV battery chemistries depend on five critical minerals whose domestic supply is potentially at risk for disruption: lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite. The U.S. Geological Survey designated these and other minerals as “critical,” according to the methodology codified in the Energy Act of 2020.\n\nThe [International Monetary Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Monetary_Fund) (IMF) publishes an **Energy Transition Metal Index** in its [Primary Commodity Price System](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595). The monthly version of the index can be accessed by selecting it in the commodity dropdown, changing the time range to **monthly** and the unit to **index**. More information on the calculation of the index can be found in its [technical documentation](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Research/CommodityPrices/Monthly/pcps-technical-documentation.ashx) (link also available on the [IMF Primary Commodity Prices page](https://www.imf.org/en/Research/commodity-prices)). As of November 24, 2022, the Energy Transition Metal Index contains the following metals:\n\n`Aluminum, Chromium, Cobalt, Copper, Lead, Lithium, Manganese, Molybdenum, Nickel, Palladium, Platinum, Rare Earth Elements, Silicon, Silver, Vanadium, Zinc`", "resc": "This resolves as the percentage change of the Energy Transition Metal Index [published by the IMF](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595) for December of the listed year relative to December of 2020. The percentage change will be calculated as \\((Y - X)/X\\times 100\\) where Y is the index value in December of the listed year and X is the index value in December of 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IMF; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IMF no longer reports data for a relevant year the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe index or any equivalent indices published by the IMF will be used as provided, so long as the make-up of the index contains 8 or more of the metals listed in 2022 (see the background section for the 2022 list).", "lower_25": "75.0", "median": "132", "upper_75": "249", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the expected percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020? (2030)", "desc": "The [growth](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in electric vehicle (EV) market-share and [calls for growth to accelerate](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/05/biden-pushes-for-evs-to-make-up-40percent-or-more-of-us-auto-sales-by-2030.html) have raised concerns about the supply of critical minerals used in batteries. According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency)'s (IEA) [Global EV Outlook 2022](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022)\n\n>. . . the supply of some minerals such as lithium would need to rise by up to one-third by 2030 to match the demand for EV batteries to satisfy the pledges and announcements in the [Announced Pledges Scenario](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-and-climate-model/announced-pledges-scenario-aps) (APS). For example, demand for lithium – the commodity with the largest projected demand-supply gap – is projected to increase sixfold to 500 kilotonnes by 2030 in the APS, requiring the equivalent of 50 new average-sized mines.\n\nA [report](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47227) published by the [Congressional Research Service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Research_Service) in August of 2022 says the following about the critical mineral supply chain for EV batteries:\n\n>As the majority of EV manufacturing and sales occur outside the United States, so does the majority of EV battery production. While China accounts for over 70% of global EV battery production capacity, the United States has developed battery supply chains for some of its demand. China's dominance in EV battery manufacturing is similar to its dominance in mining and extraction of the minerals used in EV batteries. The potential for an accelerating global transition to EVs leads some to question the domestic availability of the minerals and materials for the domestic manufacture of EV batteries.\n>\n>Currently, lithium-ion batteries are the dominant type of rechargeable batteries used in EVs. The most commonly used varieties are lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), lithium manganese oxide (LMO), lithium iron phosphate (LFP), lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) and lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC). Graphite is currently widely used as the anode in lithium ion batteries. These EV battery chemistries depend on five critical minerals whose domestic supply is potentially at risk for disruption: lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite. The U.S. Geological Survey designated these and other minerals as “critical,” according to the methodology codified in the Energy Act of 2020.\n\nThe [International Monetary Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Monetary_Fund) (IMF) publishes an **Energy Transition Metal Index** in its [Primary Commodity Price System](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595). The monthly version of the index can be accessed by selecting it in the commodity dropdown, changing the time range to **monthly** and the unit to **index**. More information on the calculation of the index can be found in its [technical documentation](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Research/CommodityPrices/Monthly/pcps-technical-documentation.ashx) (link also available on the [IMF Primary Commodity Prices page](https://www.imf.org/en/Research/commodity-prices)). As of November 24, 2022, the Energy Transition Metal Index contains the following metals:\n\n`Aluminum, Chromium, Cobalt, Copper, Lead, Lithium, Manganese, Molybdenum, Nickel, Palladium, Platinum, Rare Earth Elements, Silicon, Silver, Vanadium, Zinc`", "resc": "This resolves as the percentage change of the Energy Transition Metal Index [published by the IMF](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595) for December of the listed year relative to December of 2020. The percentage change will be calculated as \\((Y - X)/X\\times 100\\) where Y is the index value in December of the listed year and X is the index value in December of 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IMF; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IMF no longer reports data for a relevant year the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe index or any equivalent indices published by the IMF will be used as provided, so long as the make-up of the index contains 8 or more of the metals listed in 2022 (see the background section for the 2022 list).", "lower_25": "211", "median": "422", "upper_75": "614", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What will be the chance that the energy transition metal index will increase by 50% from December 2020 to December 2025?", "desc": "The [growth](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in electric vehicle (EV) market-share and [calls for growth to accelerate](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/05/biden-pushes-for-evs-to-make-up-40percent-or-more-of-us-auto-sales-by-2030.html) have raised concerns about the supply of critical minerals used in batteries. According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency)'s (IEA) [Global EV Outlook 2022](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022)\n\n>. . . the supply of some minerals such as lithium would need to rise by up to one-third by 2030 to match the demand for EV batteries to satisfy the pledges and announcements in the [Announced Pledges Scenario](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-and-climate-model/announced-pledges-scenario-aps) (APS). For example, demand for lithium – the commodity with the largest projected demand-supply gap – is projected to increase sixfold to 500 kilotonnes by 2030 in the APS, requiring the equivalent of 50 new average-sized mines.\n\nA [report](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47227) published by the [Congressional Research Service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Research_Service) in August of 2022 says the following about the critical mineral supply chain for EV batteries:\n\n>As the majority of EV manufacturing and sales occur outside the United States, so does the majority of EV battery production. While China accounts for over 70% of global EV battery production capacity, the United States has developed battery supply chains for some of its demand. China's dominance in EV battery manufacturing is similar to its dominance in mining and extraction of the minerals used in EV batteries. The potential for an accelerating global transition to EVs leads some to question the domestic availability of the minerals and materials for the domestic manufacture of EV batteries.\n>\n>Currently, lithium-ion batteries are the dominant type of rechargeable batteries used in EVs. The most commonly used varieties are lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), lithium manganese oxide (LMO), lithium iron phosphate (LFP), lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) and lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC). Graphite is currently widely used as the anode in lithium ion batteries. These EV battery chemistries depend on five critical minerals whose domestic supply is potentially at risk for disruption: lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite. The U.S. Geological Survey designated these and other minerals as “critical,” according to the methodology codified in the Energy Act of 2020.\n\nThe [International Monetary Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Monetary_Fund) (IMF) publishes an **Energy Transition Metal Index** in its [Primary Commodity Price System](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595). The monthly version of the index can be accessed by selecting it in the commodity dropdown, changing the time range to **monthly** and the unit to **index**. More information on the calculation of the index can be found in its [technical documentation](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Research/CommodityPrices/Monthly/pcps-technical-documentation.ashx) (link also available on the [IMF Primary Commodity Prices page](https://www.imf.org/en/Research/commodity-prices)). As of November 24, 2022, the Energy Transition Metal Index contains the following metals:\n\n`Aluminum, Chromium, Cobalt, Copper, Lead, Lithium, Manganese, Molybdenum, Nickel, Palladium, Platinum, Rare Earth Elements, Silicon, Silver, Vanadium, Zinc`", "resc": "This resolves as the percentage change of the Energy Transition Metal Index [published by the IMF](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595) for December of the listed year relative to December of 2020. The percentage change will be calculated as \\((Y - X)/X\\times 100\\) where Y is the index value in December of the listed year and X is the index value in December of 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IMF; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IMF no longer reports data for a relevant year the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe index or any equivalent indices published by the IMF will be used as provided, so long as the make-up of the index contains 8 or more of the metals listed in 2022 (see the background section for the 2022 list).", "lower_25": "75.0", "median": "132", "upper_75": "249", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What will be the chance that the energy transition metal index will increase by 50% from December 2020 to December 2025?", "desc": "The [growth](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in electric vehicle (EV) market-share and [calls for growth to accelerate](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/05/biden-pushes-for-evs-to-make-up-40percent-or-more-of-us-auto-sales-by-2030.html) have raised concerns about the supply of critical minerals used in batteries. According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency)'s (IEA) [Global EV Outlook 2022](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022)\n\n>. . . the supply of some minerals such as lithium would need to rise by up to one-third by 2030 to match the demand for EV batteries to satisfy the pledges and announcements in the [Announced Pledges Scenario](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-and-climate-model/announced-pledges-scenario-aps) (APS). For example, demand for lithium – the commodity with the largest projected demand-supply gap – is projected to increase sixfold to 500 kilotonnes by 2030 in the APS, requiring the equivalent of 50 new average-sized mines.\n\nA [report](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47227) published by the [Congressional Research Service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Research_Service) in August of 2022 says the following about the critical mineral supply chain for EV batteries:\n\n>As the majority of EV manufacturing and sales occur outside the United States, so does the majority of EV battery production. While China accounts for over 70% of global EV battery production capacity, the United States has developed battery supply chains for some of its demand. China's dominance in EV battery manufacturing is similar to its dominance in mining and extraction of the minerals used in EV batteries. The potential for an accelerating global transition to EVs leads some to question the domestic availability of the minerals and materials for the domestic manufacture of EV batteries.\n>\n>Currently, lithium-ion batteries are the dominant type of rechargeable batteries used in EVs. The most commonly used varieties are lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), lithium manganese oxide (LMO), lithium iron phosphate (LFP), lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) and lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC). Graphite is currently widely used as the anode in lithium ion batteries. These EV battery chemistries depend on five critical minerals whose domestic supply is potentially at risk for disruption: lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite. The U.S. Geological Survey designated these and other minerals as “critical,” according to the methodology codified in the Energy Act of 2020.\n\nThe [International Monetary Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Monetary_Fund) (IMF) publishes an **Energy Transition Metal Index** in its [Primary Commodity Price System](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595). The monthly version of the index can be accessed by selecting it in the commodity dropdown, changing the time range to **monthly** and the unit to **index**. More information on the calculation of the index can be found in its [technical documentation](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Research/CommodityPrices/Monthly/pcps-technical-documentation.ashx) (link also available on the [IMF Primary Commodity Prices page](https://www.imf.org/en/Research/commodity-prices)). As of November 24, 2022, the Energy Transition Metal Index contains the following metals:\n\n`Aluminum, Chromium, Cobalt, Copper, Lead, Lithium, Manganese, Molybdenum, Nickel, Palladium, Platinum, Rare Earth Elements, Silicon, Silver, Vanadium, Zinc`", "resc": "This resolves as the percentage change of the Energy Transition Metal Index [published by the IMF](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595) for December of the listed year relative to December of 2020. The percentage change will be calculated as \\((Y - X)/X\\times 100\\) where Y is the index value in December of the listed year and X is the index value in December of 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IMF; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IMF no longer reports data for a relevant year the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe index or any equivalent indices published by the IMF will be used as provided, so long as the make-up of the index contains 8 or more of the metals listed in 2022 (see the background section for the 2022 list).", "lower_25": "75.0", "median": "132", "upper_75": "249", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the energy transition metal index will increase by 75% from December 2020 to December 2035?", "desc": "The [growth](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in electric vehicle (EV) market-share and [calls for growth to accelerate](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/05/biden-pushes-for-evs-to-make-up-40percent-or-more-of-us-auto-sales-by-2030.html) have raised concerns about the supply of critical minerals used in batteries. According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency)'s (IEA) [Global EV Outlook 2022](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022)\n\n>. . . the supply of some minerals such as lithium would need to rise by up to one-third by 2030 to match the demand for EV batteries to satisfy the pledges and announcements in the [Announced Pledges Scenario](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-and-climate-model/announced-pledges-scenario-aps) (APS). For example, demand for lithium – the commodity with the largest projected demand-supply gap – is projected to increase sixfold to 500 kilotonnes by 2030 in the APS, requiring the equivalent of 50 new average-sized mines.\n\nA [report](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47227) published by the [Congressional Research Service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Research_Service) in August of 2022 says the following about the critical mineral supply chain for EV batteries:\n\n>As the majority of EV manufacturing and sales occur outside the United States, so does the majority of EV battery production. While China accounts for over 70% of global EV battery production capacity, the United States has developed battery supply chains for some of its demand. China's dominance in EV battery manufacturing is similar to its dominance in mining and extraction of the minerals used in EV batteries. The potential for an accelerating global transition to EVs leads some to question the domestic availability of the minerals and materials for the domestic manufacture of EV batteries.\n>\n>Currently, lithium-ion batteries are the dominant type of rechargeable batteries used in EVs. The most commonly used varieties are lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), lithium manganese oxide (LMO), lithium iron phosphate (LFP), lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) and lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC). Graphite is currently widely used as the anode in lithium ion batteries. These EV battery chemistries depend on five critical minerals whose domestic supply is potentially at risk for disruption: lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite. The U.S. Geological Survey designated these and other minerals as “critical,” according to the methodology codified in the Energy Act of 2020.\n\nThe [International Monetary Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Monetary_Fund) (IMF) publishes an **Energy Transition Metal Index** in its [Primary Commodity Price System](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595). The monthly version of the index can be accessed by selecting it in the commodity dropdown, changing the time range to **monthly** and the unit to **index**. More information on the calculation of the index can be found in its [technical documentation](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Research/CommodityPrices/Monthly/pcps-technical-documentation.ashx) (link also available on the [IMF Primary Commodity Prices page](https://www.imf.org/en/Research/commodity-prices)). As of November 24, 2022, the Energy Transition Metal Index contains the following metals:\n\n`Aluminum, Chromium, Cobalt, Copper, Lead, Lithium, Manganese, Molybdenum, Nickel, Palladium, Platinum, Rare Earth Elements, Silicon, Silver, Vanadium, Zinc`", "resc": "This resolves as the percentage change of the Energy Transition Metal Index [published by the IMF](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595) for December of the listed year relative to December of 2020. The percentage change will be calculated as \\((Y - X)/X\\times 100\\) where Y is the index value in December of the listed year and X is the index value in December of 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IMF; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IMF no longer reports data for a relevant year the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe index or any equivalent indices published by the IMF will be used as provided, so long as the make-up of the index contains 8 or more of the metals listed in 2022 (see the background section for the 2022 list).", "lower_25": "462", "median": "589", "upper_75": "759", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 71.6k or more level 2 or greater public charging stations for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?", "desc": "Electric vehicles have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in the United States, calling into question how quickly charging infrastructure will be built out. Recent legislation has [provided additional support](https://www.nelsonmullins.com/idea_exchange/blogs/megawatt-minute-blog/alternative-energy/reinventing-the-american-road-trip-what-the-inflation-reduction-act-means-for-electric-vehicle-infrastructure#_ftn5) for charging infrastructure expansion, though it remains to be seen how that impacts the overall trend.\n\n\n\nThe [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/about.html) (AFDC), a project of the US Department of Energy, has tracked the expansion of public charging infrastructure by type. They provide an overview of the charging terminology and types of chargers [on their website](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_infrastructure.html).\n\nNote that the large increase in 2021 is related to a methodology change, expand the fine print below for correspondence from AFDC from December of 2021 describing the change:\n\n[fine-print]\n>As you noted, there is a jump in EV charging station counts starting in February 2021 because the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is transitioning EV charging counting logic to align with the hierarchy defined in the Open Charge Point Interface (OCPI; https://evroaming.org/ocpi-background/) protocol: stations, electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) ports, and connectors. With this transition, the number of charging outlets in the Stations Locator is being updated to represent the number of EVSE ports (or number of vehicles that can charge simultaneously) at a station location, rather than the number of connectors previously counted. The Station Locator still identifies the available connector types. \n>\n>NREL imports networked EV charging data, including Blink, ChargePoint, Electrify America, EVgo, FLO, Greenlots, SemaConnect, OpConnect and Webasto, via each network's application programming interface (API). Most networks have adopted the OCPI protocol to support roaming agreements with other networks, and to date, NREL has integrated Electrify America, EVgo, Greenlots, and ChargePoint's OCPI-based APIs. Additionally, all non-networked charging data in the Station Locator follow the OCPI protocol.\n>\n>Greenlots and ChargePoint's OCPI APIs were integrated last in January 2021. This resulted in jumps in station counts because of the way that station data were shared under the protocol: in many cases, one station split out into several new stations to represent different physical locations of EVSE ports at one address. While the new stations shared the same street address, they have different coordinates. Additionally, jumps in station counts were attributed to new installations being added via the APIs. \n>\n>For more information about the data in the Station Locator, visit the following page: https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/find/nearest?show_about=true. \n[/fine-print]", "resc": "This resolves as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations available for light duty vehicles in the United States in the listed year. Data available from the [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_locations.html#/analyze?fuel=ELEC&country=US) (AFDC) on January 1st of the listed year will be used for resolution.\n\nCharging stations will be limited to those which can be used by at least one model of \"light duty vehicle\" which was generally available for purchase by US consumers prior to the time of resolution and which is accessible by light duty vehicles, where possible. For example, if a charging station with power output greater than level 2 is available for commercial trucks and no light duty vehicles have previously been available for purchase that can use such a charger, that charger will be excluded, if possible. Or, if a charging station is off-limits to light duty vehicles that station will be excluded, if possible. For the purposes of this question a \"light duty vehicle\" is defined as one with [gross vehicle weight rating](https://auto.howstuffworks.com/auto-parts/towing/towing-capacity/vehicle/gvwr.htm) (GVWR) below 10,000 pounds.\n\nIf AFDC no longer provides this data (or if it does not provide data in accordance with the requirements above) a superior or equivalent source may be used, or if no satisfactory alternate sources are available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "63.5k", "median": "71.6k", "upper_75": "81.0k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 71.6k or more level 2 or greater public charging stations for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?", "desc": "Electric vehicles have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in the United States, calling into question how quickly charging infrastructure will be built out. Recent legislation has [provided additional support](https://www.nelsonmullins.com/idea_exchange/blogs/megawatt-minute-blog/alternative-energy/reinventing-the-american-road-trip-what-the-inflation-reduction-act-means-for-electric-vehicle-infrastructure#_ftn5) for charging infrastructure expansion, though it remains to be seen how that impacts the overall trend.\n\n\n\nThe [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/about.html) (AFDC), a project of the US Department of Energy, has tracked the expansion of public charging infrastructure by type. They provide an overview of the charging terminology and types of chargers [on their website](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_infrastructure.html).\n\nNote that the large increase in 2021 is related to a methodology change, expand the fine print below for correspondence from AFDC from December of 2021 describing the change:\n\n[fine-print]\n>As you noted, there is a jump in EV charging station counts starting in February 2021 because the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is transitioning EV charging counting logic to align with the hierarchy defined in the Open Charge Point Interface (OCPI; https://evroaming.org/ocpi-background/) protocol: stations, electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) ports, and connectors. With this transition, the number of charging outlets in the Stations Locator is being updated to represent the number of EVSE ports (or number of vehicles that can charge simultaneously) at a station location, rather than the number of connectors previously counted. The Station Locator still identifies the available connector types. \n>\n>NREL imports networked EV charging data, including Blink, ChargePoint, Electrify America, EVgo, FLO, Greenlots, SemaConnect, OpConnect and Webasto, via each network's application programming interface (API). Most networks have adopted the OCPI protocol to support roaming agreements with other networks, and to date, NREL has integrated Electrify America, EVgo, Greenlots, and ChargePoint's OCPI-based APIs. Additionally, all non-networked charging data in the Station Locator follow the OCPI protocol.\n>\n>Greenlots and ChargePoint's OCPI APIs were integrated last in January 2021. This resulted in jumps in station counts because of the way that station data were shared under the protocol: in many cases, one station split out into several new stations to represent different physical locations of EVSE ports at one address. While the new stations shared the same street address, they have different coordinates. Additionally, jumps in station counts were attributed to new installations being added via the APIs. \n>\n>For more information about the data in the Station Locator, visit the following page: https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/find/nearest?show_about=true. \n[/fine-print]", "resc": "This resolves as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations available for light duty vehicles in the United States in the listed year. Data available from the [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_locations.html#/analyze?fuel=ELEC&country=US) (AFDC) on January 1st of the listed year will be used for resolution.\n\nCharging stations will be limited to those which can be used by at least one model of \"light duty vehicle\" which was generally available for purchase by US consumers prior to the time of resolution and which is accessible by light duty vehicles, where possible. For example, if a charging station with power output greater than level 2 is available for commercial trucks and no light duty vehicles have previously been available for purchase that can use such a charger, that charger will be excluded, if possible. Or, if a charging station is off-limits to light duty vehicles that station will be excluded, if possible. For the purposes of this question a \"light duty vehicle\" is defined as one with [gross vehicle weight rating](https://auto.howstuffworks.com/auto-parts/towing/towing-capacity/vehicle/gvwr.htm) (GVWR) below 10,000 pounds.\n\nIf AFDC no longer provides this data (or if it does not provide data in accordance with the requirements above) a superior or equivalent source may be used, or if no satisfactory alternate sources are available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "63.5k", "median": "71.6k", "upper_75": "81.0k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 208k level 2 or greater public charging stations available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of 2030?", "desc": "Electric vehicles have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in the United States, calling into question how quickly charging infrastructure will be built out. Recent legislation has [provided additional support](https://www.nelsonmullins.com/idea_exchange/blogs/megawatt-minute-blog/alternative-energy/reinventing-the-american-road-trip-what-the-inflation-reduction-act-means-for-electric-vehicle-infrastructure#_ftn5) for charging infrastructure expansion, though it remains to be seen how that impacts the overall trend.\n\n\n\nThe [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/about.html) (AFDC), a project of the US Department of Energy, has tracked the expansion of public charging infrastructure by type. They provide an overview of the charging terminology and types of chargers [on their website](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_infrastructure.html).\n\nNote that the large increase in 2021 is related to a methodology change, expand the fine print below for correspondence from AFDC from December of 2021 describing the change:\n\n[fine-print]\n>As you noted, there is a jump in EV charging station counts starting in February 2021 because the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is transitioning EV charging counting logic to align with the hierarchy defined in the Open Charge Point Interface (OCPI; https://evroaming.org/ocpi-background/) protocol: stations, electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) ports, and connectors. With this transition, the number of charging outlets in the Stations Locator is being updated to represent the number of EVSE ports (or number of vehicles that can charge simultaneously) at a station location, rather than the number of connectors previously counted. The Station Locator still identifies the available connector types. \n>\n>NREL imports networked EV charging data, including Blink, ChargePoint, Electrify America, EVgo, FLO, Greenlots, SemaConnect, OpConnect and Webasto, via each network's application programming interface (API). Most networks have adopted the OCPI protocol to support roaming agreements with other networks, and to date, NREL has integrated Electrify America, EVgo, Greenlots, and ChargePoint's OCPI-based APIs. Additionally, all non-networked charging data in the Station Locator follow the OCPI protocol.\n>\n>Greenlots and ChargePoint's OCPI APIs were integrated last in January 2021. This resulted in jumps in station counts because of the way that station data were shared under the protocol: in many cases, one station split out into several new stations to represent different physical locations of EVSE ports at one address. While the new stations shared the same street address, they have different coordinates. Additionally, jumps in station counts were attributed to new installations being added via the APIs. \n>\n>For more information about the data in the Station Locator, visit the following page: https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/find/nearest?show_about=true. \n[/fine-print]", "resc": "This resolves as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations available for light duty vehicles in the United States in the listed year. Data available from the [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_locations.html#/analyze?fuel=ELEC&country=US) (AFDC) on January 1st of the listed year will be used for resolution.\n\nCharging stations will be limited to those which can be used by at least one model of \"light duty vehicle\" which was generally available for purchase by US consumers prior to the time of resolution and which is accessible by light duty vehicles, where possible. For example, if a charging station with power output greater than level 2 is available for commercial trucks and no light duty vehicles have previously been available for purchase that can use such a charger, that charger will be excluded, if possible. Or, if a charging station is off-limits to light duty vehicles that station will be excluded, if possible. For the purposes of this question a \"light duty vehicle\" is defined as one with [gross vehicle weight rating](https://auto.howstuffworks.com/auto-parts/towing/towing-capacity/vehicle/gvwr.htm) (GVWR) below 10,000 pounds.\n\nIf AFDC no longer provides this data (or if it does not provide data in accordance with the requirements above) a superior or equivalent source may be used, or if no satisfactory alternate sources are available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "88.2k", "median": "208k", "upper_75": "341k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 208k level 2 or greater public charging stations available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of 2030?", "desc": "Electric vehicles have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in the United States, calling into question how quickly charging infrastructure will be built out. Recent legislation has [provided additional support](https://www.nelsonmullins.com/idea_exchange/blogs/megawatt-minute-blog/alternative-energy/reinventing-the-american-road-trip-what-the-inflation-reduction-act-means-for-electric-vehicle-infrastructure#_ftn5) for charging infrastructure expansion, though it remains to be seen how that impacts the overall trend.\n\n\n\nThe [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/about.html) (AFDC), a project of the US Department of Energy, has tracked the expansion of public charging infrastructure by type. They provide an overview of the charging terminology and types of chargers [on their website](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_infrastructure.html).\n\nNote that the large increase in 2021 is related to a methodology change, expand the fine print below for correspondence from AFDC from December of 2021 describing the change:\n\n[fine-print]\n>As you noted, there is a jump in EV charging station counts starting in February 2021 because the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is transitioning EV charging counting logic to align with the hierarchy defined in the Open Charge Point Interface (OCPI; https://evroaming.org/ocpi-background/) protocol: stations, electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) ports, and connectors. With this transition, the number of charging outlets in the Stations Locator is being updated to represent the number of EVSE ports (or number of vehicles that can charge simultaneously) at a station location, rather than the number of connectors previously counted. The Station Locator still identifies the available connector types. \n>\n>NREL imports networked EV charging data, including Blink, ChargePoint, Electrify America, EVgo, FLO, Greenlots, SemaConnect, OpConnect and Webasto, via each network's application programming interface (API). Most networks have adopted the OCPI protocol to support roaming agreements with other networks, and to date, NREL has integrated Electrify America, EVgo, Greenlots, and ChargePoint's OCPI-based APIs. Additionally, all non-networked charging data in the Station Locator follow the OCPI protocol.\n>\n>Greenlots and ChargePoint's OCPI APIs were integrated last in January 2021. This resulted in jumps in station counts because of the way that station data were shared under the protocol: in many cases, one station split out into several new stations to represent different physical locations of EVSE ports at one address. While the new stations shared the same street address, they have different coordinates. Additionally, jumps in station counts were attributed to new installations being added via the APIs. \n>\n>For more information about the data in the Station Locator, visit the following page: https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/find/nearest?show_about=true. \n[/fine-print]", "resc": "This resolves as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations available for light duty vehicles in the United States in the listed year. Data available from the [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_locations.html#/analyze?fuel=ELEC&country=US) (AFDC) on January 1st of the listed year will be used for resolution.\n\nCharging stations will be limited to those which can be used by at least one model of \"light duty vehicle\" which was generally available for purchase by US consumers prior to the time of resolution and which is accessible by light duty vehicles, where possible. For example, if a charging station with power output greater than level 2 is available for commercial trucks and no light duty vehicles have previously been available for purchase that can use such a charger, that charger will be excluded, if possible. Or, if a charging station is off-limits to light duty vehicles that station will be excluded, if possible. For the purposes of this question a \"light duty vehicle\" is defined as one with [gross vehicle weight rating](https://auto.howstuffworks.com/auto-parts/towing/towing-capacity/vehicle/gvwr.htm) (GVWR) below 10,000 pounds.\n\nIf AFDC no longer provides this data (or if it does not provide data in accordance with the requirements above) a superior or equivalent source may be used, or if no satisfactory alternate sources are available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "88.2k", "median": "208k", "upper_75": "341k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 71.6k or more level 2 or greater public charging stations for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?", "desc": "Electric vehicles have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in the United States, calling into question how quickly charging infrastructure will be built out. Recent legislation has [provided additional support](https://www.nelsonmullins.com/idea_exchange/blogs/megawatt-minute-blog/alternative-energy/reinventing-the-american-road-trip-what-the-inflation-reduction-act-means-for-electric-vehicle-infrastructure#_ftn5) for charging infrastructure expansion, though it remains to be seen how that impacts the overall trend.\n\n\n\nThe [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/about.html) (AFDC), a project of the US Department of Energy, has tracked the expansion of public charging infrastructure by type. They provide an overview of the charging terminology and types of chargers [on their website](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_infrastructure.html).\n\nNote that the large increase in 2021 is related to a methodology change, expand the fine print below for correspondence from AFDC from December of 2021 describing the change:\n\n[fine-print]\n>As you noted, there is a jump in EV charging station counts starting in February 2021 because the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is transitioning EV charging counting logic to align with the hierarchy defined in the Open Charge Point Interface (OCPI; https://evroaming.org/ocpi-background/) protocol: stations, electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) ports, and connectors. With this transition, the number of charging outlets in the Stations Locator is being updated to represent the number of EVSE ports (or number of vehicles that can charge simultaneously) at a station location, rather than the number of connectors previously counted. The Station Locator still identifies the available connector types. \n>\n>NREL imports networked EV charging data, including Blink, ChargePoint, Electrify America, EVgo, FLO, Greenlots, SemaConnect, OpConnect and Webasto, via each network's application programming interface (API). Most networks have adopted the OCPI protocol to support roaming agreements with other networks, and to date, NREL has integrated Electrify America, EVgo, Greenlots, and ChargePoint's OCPI-based APIs. Additionally, all non-networked charging data in the Station Locator follow the OCPI protocol.\n>\n>Greenlots and ChargePoint's OCPI APIs were integrated last in January 2021. This resulted in jumps in station counts because of the way that station data were shared under the protocol: in many cases, one station split out into several new stations to represent different physical locations of EVSE ports at one address. While the new stations shared the same street address, they have different coordinates. Additionally, jumps in station counts were attributed to new installations being added via the APIs. \n>\n>For more information about the data in the Station Locator, visit the following page: https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/find/nearest?show_about=true. \n[/fine-print]", "resc": "This resolves as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations available for light duty vehicles in the United States in the listed year. Data available from the [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_locations.html#/analyze?fuel=ELEC&country=US) (AFDC) on January 1st of the listed year will be used for resolution.\n\nCharging stations will be limited to those which can be used by at least one model of \"light duty vehicle\" which was generally available for purchase by US consumers prior to the time of resolution and which is accessible by light duty vehicles, where possible. For example, if a charging station with power output greater than level 2 is available for commercial trucks and no light duty vehicles have previously been available for purchase that can use such a charger, that charger will be excluded, if possible. Or, if a charging station is off-limits to light duty vehicles that station will be excluded, if possible. For the purposes of this question a \"light duty vehicle\" is defined as one with [gross vehicle weight rating](https://auto.howstuffworks.com/auto-parts/towing/towing-capacity/vehicle/gvwr.htm) (GVWR) below 10,000 pounds.\n\nIf AFDC no longer provides this data (or if it does not provide data in accordance with the requirements above) a superior or equivalent source may be used, or if no satisfactory alternate sources are available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "63.5k", "median": "71.6k", "upper_75": "81.0k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 81.0k level 2 or greater public charging stations for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of 2025?", "desc": "Electric vehicles have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in the United States, calling into question how quickly charging infrastructure will be built out. Recent legislation has [provided additional support](https://www.nelsonmullins.com/idea_exchange/blogs/megawatt-minute-blog/alternative-energy/reinventing-the-american-road-trip-what-the-inflation-reduction-act-means-for-electric-vehicle-infrastructure#_ftn5) for charging infrastructure expansion, though it remains to be seen how that impacts the overall trend.\n\n\n\nThe [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/about.html) (AFDC), a project of the US Department of Energy, has tracked the expansion of public charging infrastructure by type. They provide an overview of the charging terminology and types of chargers [on their website](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_infrastructure.html).\n\nNote that the large increase in 2021 is related to a methodology change, expand the fine print below for correspondence from AFDC from December of 2021 describing the change:\n\n[fine-print]\n>As you noted, there is a jump in EV charging station counts starting in February 2021 because the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is transitioning EV charging counting logic to align with the hierarchy defined in the Open Charge Point Interface (OCPI; https://evroaming.org/ocpi-background/) protocol: stations, electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) ports, and connectors. With this transition, the number of charging outlets in the Stations Locator is being updated to represent the number of EVSE ports (or number of vehicles that can charge simultaneously) at a station location, rather than the number of connectors previously counted. The Station Locator still identifies the available connector types. \n>\n>NREL imports networked EV charging data, including Blink, ChargePoint, Electrify America, EVgo, FLO, Greenlots, SemaConnect, OpConnect and Webasto, via each network's application programming interface (API). Most networks have adopted the OCPI protocol to support roaming agreements with other networks, and to date, NREL has integrated Electrify America, EVgo, Greenlots, and ChargePoint's OCPI-based APIs. Additionally, all non-networked charging data in the Station Locator follow the OCPI protocol.\n>\n>Greenlots and ChargePoint's OCPI APIs were integrated last in January 2021. This resulted in jumps in station counts because of the way that station data were shared under the protocol: in many cases, one station split out into several new stations to represent different physical locations of EVSE ports at one address. While the new stations shared the same street address, they have different coordinates. Additionally, jumps in station counts were attributed to new installations being added via the APIs. \n>\n>For more information about the data in the Station Locator, visit the following page: https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/find/nearest?show_about=true. \n[/fine-print]", "resc": "This resolves as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations available for light duty vehicles in the United States in the listed year. Data available from the [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_locations.html#/analyze?fuel=ELEC&country=US) (AFDC) on January 1st of the listed year will be used for resolution.\n\nCharging stations will be limited to those which can be used by at least one model of \"light duty vehicle\" which was generally available for purchase by US consumers prior to the time of resolution and which is accessible by light duty vehicles, where possible. For example, if a charging station with power output greater than level 2 is available for commercial trucks and no light duty vehicles have previously been available for purchase that can use such a charger, that charger will be excluded, if possible. Or, if a charging station is off-limits to light duty vehicles that station will be excluded, if possible. For the purposes of this question a \"light duty vehicle\" is defined as one with [gross vehicle weight rating](https://auto.howstuffworks.com/auto-parts/towing/towing-capacity/vehicle/gvwr.htm) (GVWR) below 10,000 pounds.\n\nIf AFDC no longer provides this data (or if it does not provide data in accordance with the requirements above) a superior or equivalent source may be used, or if no satisfactory alternate sources are available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "63.5k", "median": "71.6k", "upper_75": "81.0k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 273k level 2 or greater public charging stations available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of 2035?", "desc": "Electric vehicles have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in the United States, calling into question how quickly charging infrastructure will be built out. Recent legislation has [provided additional support](https://www.nelsonmullins.com/idea_exchange/blogs/megawatt-minute-blog/alternative-energy/reinventing-the-american-road-trip-what-the-inflation-reduction-act-means-for-electric-vehicle-infrastructure#_ftn5) for charging infrastructure expansion, though it remains to be seen how that impacts the overall trend.\n\n\n\nThe [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/about.html) (AFDC), a project of the US Department of Energy, has tracked the expansion of public charging infrastructure by type. They provide an overview of the charging terminology and types of chargers [on their website](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_infrastructure.html).\n\nNote that the large increase in 2021 is related to a methodology change, expand the fine print below for correspondence from AFDC from December of 2021 describing the change:\n\n[fine-print]\n>As you noted, there is a jump in EV charging station counts starting in February 2021 because the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is transitioning EV charging counting logic to align with the hierarchy defined in the Open Charge Point Interface (OCPI; https://evroaming.org/ocpi-background/) protocol: stations, electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) ports, and connectors. With this transition, the number of charging outlets in the Stations Locator is being updated to represent the number of EVSE ports (or number of vehicles that can charge simultaneously) at a station location, rather than the number of connectors previously counted. The Station Locator still identifies the available connector types. \n>\n>NREL imports networked EV charging data, including Blink, ChargePoint, Electrify America, EVgo, FLO, Greenlots, SemaConnect, OpConnect and Webasto, via each network's application programming interface (API). Most networks have adopted the OCPI protocol to support roaming agreements with other networks, and to date, NREL has integrated Electrify America, EVgo, Greenlots, and ChargePoint's OCPI-based APIs. Additionally, all non-networked charging data in the Station Locator follow the OCPI protocol.\n>\n>Greenlots and ChargePoint's OCPI APIs were integrated last in January 2021. This resulted in jumps in station counts because of the way that station data were shared under the protocol: in many cases, one station split out into several new stations to represent different physical locations of EVSE ports at one address. While the new stations shared the same street address, they have different coordinates. Additionally, jumps in station counts were attributed to new installations being added via the APIs. \n>\n>For more information about the data in the Station Locator, visit the following page: https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/find/nearest?show_about=true. \n[/fine-print]", "resc": "This resolves as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations available for light duty vehicles in the United States in the listed year. Data available from the [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_locations.html#/analyze?fuel=ELEC&country=US) (AFDC) on January 1st of the listed year will be used for resolution.\n\nCharging stations will be limited to those which can be used by at least one model of \"light duty vehicle\" which was generally available for purchase by US consumers prior to the time of resolution and which is accessible by light duty vehicles, where possible. For example, if a charging station with power output greater than level 2 is available for commercial trucks and no light duty vehicles have previously been available for purchase that can use such a charger, that charger will be excluded, if possible. Or, if a charging station is off-limits to light duty vehicles that station will be excluded, if possible. For the purposes of this question a \"light duty vehicle\" is defined as one with [gross vehicle weight rating](https://auto.howstuffworks.com/auto-parts/towing/towing-capacity/vehicle/gvwr.htm) (GVWR) below 10,000 pounds.\n\nIf AFDC no longer provides this data (or if it does not provide data in accordance with the requirements above) a superior or equivalent source may be used, or if no satisfactory alternate sources are available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "132k", "median": "273k", "upper_75": "433k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 273k level 2 or greater public charging stations available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of 2035?", "desc": "Electric vehicles have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in the United States, calling into question how quickly charging infrastructure will be built out. Recent legislation has [provided additional support](https://www.nelsonmullins.com/idea_exchange/blogs/megawatt-minute-blog/alternative-energy/reinventing-the-american-road-trip-what-the-inflation-reduction-act-means-for-electric-vehicle-infrastructure#_ftn5) for charging infrastructure expansion, though it remains to be seen how that impacts the overall trend.\n\n\n\nThe [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/about.html) (AFDC), a project of the US Department of Energy, has tracked the expansion of public charging infrastructure by type. They provide an overview of the charging terminology and types of chargers [on their website](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_infrastructure.html).\n\nNote that the large increase in 2021 is related to a methodology change, expand the fine print below for correspondence from AFDC from December of 2021 describing the change:\n\n[fine-print]\n>As you noted, there is a jump in EV charging station counts starting in February 2021 because the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is transitioning EV charging counting logic to align with the hierarchy defined in the Open Charge Point Interface (OCPI; https://evroaming.org/ocpi-background/) protocol: stations, electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) ports, and connectors. With this transition, the number of charging outlets in the Stations Locator is being updated to represent the number of EVSE ports (or number of vehicles that can charge simultaneously) at a station location, rather than the number of connectors previously counted. The Station Locator still identifies the available connector types. \n>\n>NREL imports networked EV charging data, including Blink, ChargePoint, Electrify America, EVgo, FLO, Greenlots, SemaConnect, OpConnect and Webasto, via each network's application programming interface (API). Most networks have adopted the OCPI protocol to support roaming agreements with other networks, and to date, NREL has integrated Electrify America, EVgo, Greenlots, and ChargePoint's OCPI-based APIs. Additionally, all non-networked charging data in the Station Locator follow the OCPI protocol.\n>\n>Greenlots and ChargePoint's OCPI APIs were integrated last in January 2021. This resulted in jumps in station counts because of the way that station data were shared under the protocol: in many cases, one station split out into several new stations to represent different physical locations of EVSE ports at one address. While the new stations shared the same street address, they have different coordinates. Additionally, jumps in station counts were attributed to new installations being added via the APIs. \n>\n>For more information about the data in the Station Locator, visit the following page: https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/find/nearest?show_about=true. \n[/fine-print]", "resc": "This resolves as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations available for light duty vehicles in the United States in the listed year. Data available from the [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_locations.html#/analyze?fuel=ELEC&country=US) (AFDC) on January 1st of the listed year will be used for resolution.\n\nCharging stations will be limited to those which can be used by at least one model of \"light duty vehicle\" which was generally available for purchase by US consumers prior to the time of resolution and which is accessible by light duty vehicles, where possible. For example, if a charging station with power output greater than level 2 is available for commercial trucks and no light duty vehicles have previously been available for purchase that can use such a charger, that charger will be excluded, if possible. Or, if a charging station is off-limits to light duty vehicles that station will be excluded, if possible. For the purposes of this question a \"light duty vehicle\" is defined as one with [gross vehicle weight rating](https://auto.howstuffworks.com/auto-parts/towing/towing-capacity/vehicle/gvwr.htm) (GVWR) below 10,000 pounds.\n\nIf AFDC no longer provides this data (or if it does not provide data in accordance with the requirements above) a superior or equivalent source may be used, or if no satisfactory alternate sources are available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "132k", "median": "273k", "upper_75": "433k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 273k level 2 or greater public charging stations available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of 2035?", "desc": "Electric vehicles have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in the United States, calling into question how quickly charging infrastructure will be built out. Recent legislation has [provided additional support](https://www.nelsonmullins.com/idea_exchange/blogs/megawatt-minute-blog/alternative-energy/reinventing-the-american-road-trip-what-the-inflation-reduction-act-means-for-electric-vehicle-infrastructure#_ftn5) for charging infrastructure expansion, though it remains to be seen how that impacts the overall trend.\n\n\n\nThe [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/about.html) (AFDC), a project of the US Department of Energy, has tracked the expansion of public charging infrastructure by type. They provide an overview of the charging terminology and types of chargers [on their website](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_infrastructure.html).\n\nNote that the large increase in 2021 is related to a methodology change, expand the fine print below for correspondence from AFDC from December of 2021 describing the change:\n\n[fine-print]\n>As you noted, there is a jump in EV charging station counts starting in February 2021 because the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is transitioning EV charging counting logic to align with the hierarchy defined in the Open Charge Point Interface (OCPI; https://evroaming.org/ocpi-background/) protocol: stations, electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) ports, and connectors. With this transition, the number of charging outlets in the Stations Locator is being updated to represent the number of EVSE ports (or number of vehicles that can charge simultaneously) at a station location, rather than the number of connectors previously counted. The Station Locator still identifies the available connector types. \n>\n>NREL imports networked EV charging data, including Blink, ChargePoint, Electrify America, EVgo, FLO, Greenlots, SemaConnect, OpConnect and Webasto, via each network's application programming interface (API). Most networks have adopted the OCPI protocol to support roaming agreements with other networks, and to date, NREL has integrated Electrify America, EVgo, Greenlots, and ChargePoint's OCPI-based APIs. Additionally, all non-networked charging data in the Station Locator follow the OCPI protocol.\n>\n>Greenlots and ChargePoint's OCPI APIs were integrated last in January 2021. This resulted in jumps in station counts because of the way that station data were shared under the protocol: in many cases, one station split out into several new stations to represent different physical locations of EVSE ports at one address. While the new stations shared the same street address, they have different coordinates. Additionally, jumps in station counts were attributed to new installations being added via the APIs. \n>\n>For more information about the data in the Station Locator, visit the following page: https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/find/nearest?show_about=true. \n[/fine-print]", "resc": "This resolves as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations available for light duty vehicles in the United States in the listed year. Data available from the [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_locations.html#/analyze?fuel=ELEC&country=US) (AFDC) on January 1st of the listed year will be used for resolution.\n\nCharging stations will be limited to those which can be used by at least one model of \"light duty vehicle\" which was generally available for purchase by US consumers prior to the time of resolution and which is accessible by light duty vehicles, where possible. For example, if a charging station with power output greater than level 2 is available for commercial trucks and no light duty vehicles have previously been available for purchase that can use such a charger, that charger will be excluded, if possible. Or, if a charging station is off-limits to light duty vehicles that station will be excluded, if possible. For the purposes of this question a \"light duty vehicle\" is defined as one with [gross vehicle weight rating](https://auto.howstuffworks.com/auto-parts/towing/towing-capacity/vehicle/gvwr.htm) (GVWR) below 10,000 pounds.\n\nIf AFDC no longer provides this data (or if it does not provide data in accordance with the requirements above) a superior or equivalent source may be used, or if no satisfactory alternate sources are available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "132k", "median": "273k", "upper_75": "433k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 81.0k level 2 or greater public charging stations for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of 2025?", "desc": "Electric vehicles have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in the United States, calling into question how quickly charging infrastructure will be built out. Recent legislation has [provided additional support](https://www.nelsonmullins.com/idea_exchange/blogs/megawatt-minute-blog/alternative-energy/reinventing-the-american-road-trip-what-the-inflation-reduction-act-means-for-electric-vehicle-infrastructure#_ftn5) for charging infrastructure expansion, though it remains to be seen how that impacts the overall trend.\n\n\n\nThe [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/about.html) (AFDC), a project of the US Department of Energy, has tracked the expansion of public charging infrastructure by type. They provide an overview of the charging terminology and types of chargers [on their website](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_infrastructure.html).\n\nNote that the large increase in 2021 is related to a methodology change, expand the fine print below for correspondence from AFDC from December of 2021 describing the change:\n\n[fine-print]\n>As you noted, there is a jump in EV charging station counts starting in February 2021 because the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is transitioning EV charging counting logic to align with the hierarchy defined in the Open Charge Point Interface (OCPI; https://evroaming.org/ocpi-background/) protocol: stations, electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) ports, and connectors. With this transition, the number of charging outlets in the Stations Locator is being updated to represent the number of EVSE ports (or number of vehicles that can charge simultaneously) at a station location, rather than the number of connectors previously counted. The Station Locator still identifies the available connector types. \n>\n>NREL imports networked EV charging data, including Blink, ChargePoint, Electrify America, EVgo, FLO, Greenlots, SemaConnect, OpConnect and Webasto, via each network's application programming interface (API). Most networks have adopted the OCPI protocol to support roaming agreements with other networks, and to date, NREL has integrated Electrify America, EVgo, Greenlots, and ChargePoint's OCPI-based APIs. Additionally, all non-networked charging data in the Station Locator follow the OCPI protocol.\n>\n>Greenlots and ChargePoint's OCPI APIs were integrated last in January 2021. This resulted in jumps in station counts because of the way that station data were shared under the protocol: in many cases, one station split out into several new stations to represent different physical locations of EVSE ports at one address. While the new stations shared the same street address, they have different coordinates. Additionally, jumps in station counts were attributed to new installations being added via the APIs. \n>\n>For more information about the data in the Station Locator, visit the following page: https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/find/nearest?show_about=true. \n[/fine-print]", "resc": "This resolves as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations available for light duty vehicles in the United States in the listed year. Data available from the [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_locations.html#/analyze?fuel=ELEC&country=US) (AFDC) on January 1st of the listed year will be used for resolution.\n\nCharging stations will be limited to those which can be used by at least one model of \"light duty vehicle\" which was generally available for purchase by US consumers prior to the time of resolution and which is accessible by light duty vehicles, where possible. For example, if a charging station with power output greater than level 2 is available for commercial trucks and no light duty vehicles have previously been available for purchase that can use such a charger, that charger will be excluded, if possible. Or, if a charging station is off-limits to light duty vehicles that station will be excluded, if possible. For the purposes of this question a \"light duty vehicle\" is defined as one with [gross vehicle weight rating](https://auto.howstuffworks.com/auto-parts/towing/towing-capacity/vehicle/gvwr.htm) (GVWR) below 10,000 pounds.\n\nIf AFDC no longer provides this data (or if it does not provide data in accordance with the requirements above) a superior or equivalent source may be used, or if no satisfactory alternate sources are available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "63.5k", "median": "71.6k", "upper_75": "81.0k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What will be the percentage of zero-emission vehicle federal fleet procurements in the United States in the following fiscal years?", "desc": "On December 8, 2021, President Biden signed [Executive Order 14057](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/12/08/executive-order-on-catalyzing-clean-energy-industries-and-jobs-through-federal-sustainability/), which set a goal that the Federal Government should achieve\n\n>100 percent zero-emission vehicle acquisitions by 2035, including 100 percent zero-emission light-duty vehicle acquisitions by 2027\n\nSpecifically for its 2027 goal the Executive Order states\n\n>Each agency's light-duty vehicle acquisitions shall be zero-emission vehicles by the end of fiscal year 2027.\n\nThe Federal Government publishes annual statistics about its fleet makeup and acquisitions in the [Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). Table 5-4 from the FFR Open Data Set provided for fiscal year 2021 shows vehicle acquisitions by fuel type for 2017 through 2021:\n\n| **Fuel Type** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** |\n| ----------------------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- |\n| Gasoline | 23,312 | 26,309 | 21,445 | 28,055 | 38,229 |\n| Diesel | 5,626 | 5,970 | 7,339 | 5,551 | 4,258 |\n| Gasoline Hybrid | 4,475 | 4,814 | 3,207 | 3,533 | 3,246 |\n| Diesel Hybrid | 10 | 23 | 8 | 12 | 29 |\n| Gasoline LGHG | 945 | 1,672 | 1,128 | 1,488 | 1,225 |\n| Diesel LGHG | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |\n| Gasoline Plug-in Hybrid | 191 | 302 | 212 | 188 | 119 |\n| Diesel Plug-in Hybrid | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Compressed Natural Gas | 12 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 8 |\n| E-85 | 24,110 | 15,252 | 17,306 | 10,366 | 8,565 |\n| Electric | 303 | 194 | 167 | 111 | 138 |\n| Hydrogen | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Natural Gas | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Petroleum Gas | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |\n| **Grand Total** | **58,986** | **54,549** | **50,830** | **49,315** | **55,818** |", "resc": "This resolves as the percent of United States federal fleet procurements in the listed fiscal year which are zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs), according to the [US Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). The number of zero-emission vehicles acquired in a fiscal year will be compared to the total number of vehicles acquired to arrive at the percentage. As of November 30, 2022, the fiscal year 2021 data set shows that for fiscal year 2021 this value would be 0.46% (138 electric vehicles plus 119 gasoline plug-in hybrid plus 0 diesel plug-in hybrid plus 0 hydrogen for a total of 257 ZEVs compared to 55,818 total vehicles acquired).\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. In the event the federal government no longer reports vehicle acquisitions by fuel type this question resolves as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.35", "median": "3.32", "upper_75": "6.16", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What will be the percentage of zero-emission vehicle federal fleet procurements in the United States in the following fiscal years?", "desc": "On December 8, 2021, President Biden signed [Executive Order 14057](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/12/08/executive-order-on-catalyzing-clean-energy-industries-and-jobs-through-federal-sustainability/), which set a goal that the Federal Government should achieve\n\n>100 percent zero-emission vehicle acquisitions by 2035, including 100 percent zero-emission light-duty vehicle acquisitions by 2027\n\nSpecifically for its 2027 goal the Executive Order states\n\n>Each agency's light-duty vehicle acquisitions shall be zero-emission vehicles by the end of fiscal year 2027.\n\nThe Federal Government publishes annual statistics about its fleet makeup and acquisitions in the [Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). Table 5-4 from the FFR Open Data Set provided for fiscal year 2021 shows vehicle acquisitions by fuel type for 2017 through 2021:\n\n| **Fuel Type** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** |\n| ----------------------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- |\n| Gasoline | 23,312 | 26,309 | 21,445 | 28,055 | 38,229 |\n| Diesel | 5,626 | 5,970 | 7,339 | 5,551 | 4,258 |\n| Gasoline Hybrid | 4,475 | 4,814 | 3,207 | 3,533 | 3,246 |\n| Diesel Hybrid | 10 | 23 | 8 | 12 | 29 |\n| Gasoline LGHG | 945 | 1,672 | 1,128 | 1,488 | 1,225 |\n| Diesel LGHG | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |\n| Gasoline Plug-in Hybrid | 191 | 302 | 212 | 188 | 119 |\n| Diesel Plug-in Hybrid | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Compressed Natural Gas | 12 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 8 |\n| E-85 | 24,110 | 15,252 | 17,306 | 10,366 | 8,565 |\n| Electric | 303 | 194 | 167 | 111 | 138 |\n| Hydrogen | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Natural Gas | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Petroleum Gas | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |\n| **Grand Total** | **58,986** | **54,549** | **50,830** | **49,315** | **55,818** |", "resc": "This resolves as the percent of United States federal fleet procurements in the listed fiscal year which are zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs), according to the [US Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). The number of zero-emission vehicles acquired in a fiscal year will be compared to the total number of vehicles acquired to arrive at the percentage. As of November 30, 2022, the fiscal year 2021 data set shows that for fiscal year 2021 this value would be 0.46% (138 electric vehicles plus 119 gasoline plug-in hybrid plus 0 diesel plug-in hybrid plus 0 hydrogen for a total of 257 ZEVs compared to 55,818 total vehicles acquired).\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. In the event the federal government no longer reports vehicle acquisitions by fuel type this question resolves as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.35", "median": "3.32", "upper_75": "6.16", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What will be the percentage of zero-emission vehicle federal fleet procurements in the United States in the following fiscal years?", "desc": "On December 8, 2021, President Biden signed [Executive Order 14057](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/12/08/executive-order-on-catalyzing-clean-energy-industries-and-jobs-through-federal-sustainability/), which set a goal that the Federal Government should achieve\n\n>100 percent zero-emission vehicle acquisitions by 2035, including 100 percent zero-emission light-duty vehicle acquisitions by 2027\n\nSpecifically for its 2027 goal the Executive Order states\n\n>Each agency's light-duty vehicle acquisitions shall be zero-emission vehicles by the end of fiscal year 2027.\n\nThe Federal Government publishes annual statistics about its fleet makeup and acquisitions in the [Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). Table 5-4 from the FFR Open Data Set provided for fiscal year 2021 shows vehicle acquisitions by fuel type for 2017 through 2021:\n\n| **Fuel Type** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** |\n| ----------------------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- |\n| Gasoline | 23,312 | 26,309 | 21,445 | 28,055 | 38,229 |\n| Diesel | 5,626 | 5,970 | 7,339 | 5,551 | 4,258 |\n| Gasoline Hybrid | 4,475 | 4,814 | 3,207 | 3,533 | 3,246 |\n| Diesel Hybrid | 10 | 23 | 8 | 12 | 29 |\n| Gasoline LGHG | 945 | 1,672 | 1,128 | 1,488 | 1,225 |\n| Diesel LGHG | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |\n| Gasoline Plug-in Hybrid | 191 | 302 | 212 | 188 | 119 |\n| Diesel Plug-in Hybrid | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Compressed Natural Gas | 12 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 8 |\n| E-85 | 24,110 | 15,252 | 17,306 | 10,366 | 8,565 |\n| Electric | 303 | 194 | 167 | 111 | 138 |\n| Hydrogen | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Natural Gas | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Petroleum Gas | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |\n| **Grand Total** | **58,986** | **54,549** | **50,830** | **49,315** | **55,818** |", "resc": "This resolves as the percent of United States federal fleet procurements in the listed fiscal year which are zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs), according to the [US Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). The number of zero-emission vehicles acquired in a fiscal year will be compared to the total number of vehicles acquired to arrive at the percentage. As of November 30, 2022, the fiscal year 2021 data set shows that for fiscal year 2021 this value would be 0.46% (138 electric vehicles plus 119 gasoline plug-in hybrid plus 0 diesel plug-in hybrid plus 0 hydrogen for a total of 257 ZEVs compared to 55,818 total vehicles acquired).\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. In the event the federal government no longer reports vehicle acquisitions by fuel type this question resolves as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.35", "median": "3.32", "upper_75": "6.16", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that zero-emission vehicle federal fleet procurements in the United States will account for 70.5% of the total procurements in the following fiscal years (2030)?", "desc": "On December 8, 2021, President Biden signed [Executive Order 14057](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/12/08/executive-order-on-catalyzing-clean-energy-industries-and-jobs-through-federal-sustainability/), which set a goal that the Federal Government should achieve\n\n>100 percent zero-emission vehicle acquisitions by 2035, including 100 percent zero-emission light-duty vehicle acquisitions by 2027\n\nSpecifically for its 2027 goal the Executive Order states\n\n>Each agency's light-duty vehicle acquisitions shall be zero-emission vehicles by the end of fiscal year 2027.\n\nThe Federal Government publishes annual statistics about its fleet makeup and acquisitions in the [Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). Table 5-4 from the FFR Open Data Set provided for fiscal year 2021 shows vehicle acquisitions by fuel type for 2017 through 2021:\n\n| **Fuel Type** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** |\n| ----------------------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- |\n| Gasoline | 23,312 | 26,309 | 21,445 | 28,055 | 38,229 |\n| Diesel | 5,626 | 5,970 | 7,339 | 5,551 | 4,258 |\n| Gasoline Hybrid | 4,475 | 4,814 | 3,207 | 3,533 | 3,246 |\n| Diesel Hybrid | 10 | 23 | 8 | 12 | 29 |\n| Gasoline LGHG | 945 | 1,672 | 1,128 | 1,488 | 1,225 |\n| Diesel LGHG | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |\n| Gasoline Plug-in Hybrid | 191 | 302 | 212 | 188 | 119 |\n| Diesel Plug-in Hybrid | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Compressed Natural Gas | 12 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 8 |\n| E-85 | 24,110 | 15,252 | 17,306 | 10,366 | 8,565 |\n| Electric | 303 | 194 | 167 | 111 | 138 |\n| Hydrogen | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Natural Gas | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Petroleum Gas | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |\n| **Grand Total** | **58,986** | **54,549** | **50,830** | **49,315** | **55,818** |", "resc": "This resolves as the percent of United States federal fleet procurements in the listed fiscal year which are zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs), according to the [US Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). The number of zero-emission vehicles acquired in a fiscal year will be compared to the total number of vehicles acquired to arrive at the percentage. As of November 30, 2022, the fiscal year 2021 data set shows that for fiscal year 2021 this value would be 0.46% (138 electric vehicles plus 119 gasoline plug-in hybrid plus 0 diesel plug-in hybrid plus 0 hydrogen for a total of 257 ZEVs compared to 55,818 total vehicles acquired).\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. In the event the federal government no longer reports vehicle acquisitions by fuel type this question resolves as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "49.6", "median": "59.8", "upper_75": "70.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that zero-emission vehicle federal fleet procurements in the United States will account for 21.9% of the total procurements in the following fiscal years (2025)?", "desc": "On December 8, 2021, President Biden signed [Executive Order 14057](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/12/08/executive-order-on-catalyzing-clean-energy-industries-and-jobs-through-federal-sustainability/), which set a goal that the Federal Government should achieve\n\n>100 percent zero-emission vehicle acquisitions by 2035, including 100 percent zero-emission light-duty vehicle acquisitions by 2027\n\nSpecifically for its 2027 goal the Executive Order states\n\n>Each agency's light-duty vehicle acquisitions shall be zero-emission vehicles by the end of fiscal year 2027.\n\nThe Federal Government publishes annual statistics about its fleet makeup and acquisitions in the [Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). Table 5-4 from the FFR Open Data Set provided for fiscal year 2021 shows vehicle acquisitions by fuel type for 2017 through 2021:\n\n| **Fuel Type** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** |\n| ----------------------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- |\n| Gasoline | 23,312 | 26,309 | 21,445 | 28,055 | 38,229 |\n| Diesel | 5,626 | 5,970 | 7,339 | 5,551 | 4,258 |\n| Gasoline Hybrid | 4,475 | 4,814 | 3,207 | 3,533 | 3,246 |\n| Diesel Hybrid | 10 | 23 | 8 | 12 | 29 |\n| Gasoline LGHG | 945 | 1,672 | 1,128 | 1,488 | 1,225 |\n| Diesel LGHG | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |\n| Gasoline Plug-in Hybrid | 191 | 302 | 212 | 188 | 119 |\n| Diesel Plug-in Hybrid | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Compressed Natural Gas | 12 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 8 |\n| E-85 | 24,110 | 15,252 | 17,306 | 10,366 | 8,565 |\n| Electric | 303 | 194 | 167 | 111 | 138 |\n| Hydrogen | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Natural Gas | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Petroleum Gas | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |\n| **Grand Total** | **58,986** | **54,549** | **50,830** | **49,315** | **55,818** |", "resc": "This resolves as the percent of United States federal fleet procurements in the listed fiscal year which are zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs), according to the [US Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). The number of zero-emission vehicles acquired in a fiscal year will be compared to the total number of vehicles acquired to arrive at the percentage. As of November 30, 2022, the fiscal year 2021 data set shows that for fiscal year 2021 this value would be 0.46% (138 electric vehicles plus 119 gasoline plug-in hybrid plus 0 diesel plug-in hybrid plus 0 hydrogen for a total of 257 ZEVs compared to 55,818 total vehicles acquired).\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. In the event the federal government no longer reports vehicle acquisitions by fuel type this question resolves as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "14.1", "median": "21.9", "upper_75": "34.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that zero-emission vehicle federal fleet procurements in the United States will account for 21.9% of the total procurements in the following fiscal years (2025)?", "desc": "On December 8, 2021, President Biden signed [Executive Order 14057](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/12/08/executive-order-on-catalyzing-clean-energy-industries-and-jobs-through-federal-sustainability/), which set a goal that the Federal Government should achieve\n\n>100 percent zero-emission vehicle acquisitions by 2035, including 100 percent zero-emission light-duty vehicle acquisitions by 2027\n\nSpecifically for its 2027 goal the Executive Order states\n\n>Each agency's light-duty vehicle acquisitions shall be zero-emission vehicles by the end of fiscal year 2027.\n\nThe Federal Government publishes annual statistics about its fleet makeup and acquisitions in the [Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). Table 5-4 from the FFR Open Data Set provided for fiscal year 2021 shows vehicle acquisitions by fuel type for 2017 through 2021:\n\n| **Fuel Type** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** |\n| ----------------------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- |\n| Gasoline | 23,312 | 26,309 | 21,445 | 28,055 | 38,229 |\n| Diesel | 5,626 | 5,970 | 7,339 | 5,551 | 4,258 |\n| Gasoline Hybrid | 4,475 | 4,814 | 3,207 | 3,533 | 3,246 |\n| Diesel Hybrid | 10 | 23 | 8 | 12 | 29 |\n| Gasoline LGHG | 945 | 1,672 | 1,128 | 1,488 | 1,225 |\n| Diesel LGHG | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |\n| Gasoline Plug-in Hybrid | 191 | 302 | 212 | 188 | 119 |\n| Diesel Plug-in Hybrid | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Compressed Natural Gas | 12 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 8 |\n| E-85 | 24,110 | 15,252 | 17,306 | 10,366 | 8,565 |\n| Electric | 303 | 194 | 167 | 111 | 138 |\n| Hydrogen | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Natural Gas | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Petroleum Gas | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |\n| **Grand Total** | **58,986** | **54,549** | **50,830** | **49,315** | **55,818** |", "resc": "This resolves as the percent of United States federal fleet procurements in the listed fiscal year which are zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs), according to the [US Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). The number of zero-emission vehicles acquired in a fiscal year will be compared to the total number of vehicles acquired to arrive at the percentage. As of November 30, 2022, the fiscal year 2021 data set shows that for fiscal year 2021 this value would be 0.46% (138 electric vehicles plus 119 gasoline plug-in hybrid plus 0 diesel plug-in hybrid plus 0 hydrogen for a total of 257 ZEVs compared to 55,818 total vehicles acquired).\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. In the event the federal government no longer reports vehicle acquisitions by fuel type this question resolves as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "14.1", "median": "21.9", "upper_75": "34.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that zero-emission vehicle federal fleet procurements in the United States will account for 70.5% of the total procurements in the following fiscal years (2030)?", "desc": "On December 8, 2021, President Biden signed [Executive Order 14057](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/12/08/executive-order-on-catalyzing-clean-energy-industries-and-jobs-through-federal-sustainability/), which set a goal that the Federal Government should achieve\n\n>100 percent zero-emission vehicle acquisitions by 2035, including 100 percent zero-emission light-duty vehicle acquisitions by 2027\n\nSpecifically for its 2027 goal the Executive Order states\n\n>Each agency's light-duty vehicle acquisitions shall be zero-emission vehicles by the end of fiscal year 2027.\n\nThe Federal Government publishes annual statistics about its fleet makeup and acquisitions in the [Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). Table 5-4 from the FFR Open Data Set provided for fiscal year 2021 shows vehicle acquisitions by fuel type for 2017 through 2021:\n\n| **Fuel Type** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** |\n| ----------------------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- |\n| Gasoline | 23,312 | 26,309 | 21,445 | 28,055 | 38,229 |\n| Diesel | 5,626 | 5,970 | 7,339 | 5,551 | 4,258 |\n| Gasoline Hybrid | 4,475 | 4,814 | 3,207 | 3,533 | 3,246 |\n| Diesel Hybrid | 10 | 23 | 8 | 12 | 29 |\n| Gasoline LGHG | 945 | 1,672 | 1,128 | 1,488 | 1,225 |\n| Diesel LGHG | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |\n| Gasoline Plug-in Hybrid | 191 | 302 | 212 | 188 | 119 |\n| Diesel Plug-in Hybrid | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Compressed Natural Gas | 12 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 8 |\n| E-85 | 24,110 | 15,252 | 17,306 | 10,366 | 8,565 |\n| Electric | 303 | 194 | 167 | 111 | 138 |\n| Hydrogen | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Natural Gas | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Petroleum Gas | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |\n| **Grand Total** | **58,986** | **54,549** | **50,830** | **49,315** | **55,818** |", "resc": "This resolves as the percent of United States federal fleet procurements in the listed fiscal year which are zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs), according to the [US Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). The number of zero-emission vehicles acquired in a fiscal year will be compared to the total number of vehicles acquired to arrive at the percentage. As of November 30, 2022, the fiscal year 2021 data set shows that for fiscal year 2021 this value would be 0.46% (138 electric vehicles plus 119 gasoline plug-in hybrid plus 0 diesel plug-in hybrid plus 0 hydrogen for a total of 257 ZEVs compared to 55,818 total vehicles acquired).\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. In the event the federal government no longer reports vehicle acquisitions by fuel type this question resolves as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "49.6", "median": "59.8", "upper_75": "70.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 81.0k level 2 or greater public charging stations for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of 2025?", "desc": "Electric vehicles have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in the United States, calling into question how quickly charging infrastructure will be built out. Recent legislation has [provided additional support](https://www.nelsonmullins.com/idea_exchange/blogs/megawatt-minute-blog/alternative-energy/reinventing-the-american-road-trip-what-the-inflation-reduction-act-means-for-electric-vehicle-infrastructure#_ftn5) for charging infrastructure expansion, though it remains to be seen how that impacts the overall trend.\n\n\n\nThe [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/about.html) (AFDC), a project of the US Department of Energy, has tracked the expansion of public charging infrastructure by type. They provide an overview of the charging terminology and types of chargers [on their website](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_infrastructure.html).\n\nNote that the large increase in 2021 is related to a methodology change, expand the fine print below for correspondence from AFDC from December of 2021 describing the change:\n\n[fine-print]\n>As you noted, there is a jump in EV charging station counts starting in February 2021 because the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is transitioning EV charging counting logic to align with the hierarchy defined in the Open Charge Point Interface (OCPI; https://evroaming.org/ocpi-background/) protocol: stations, electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) ports, and connectors. With this transition, the number of charging outlets in the Stations Locator is being updated to represent the number of EVSE ports (or number of vehicles that can charge simultaneously) at a station location, rather than the number of connectors previously counted. The Station Locator still identifies the available connector types. \n>\n>NREL imports networked EV charging data, including Blink, ChargePoint, Electrify America, EVgo, FLO, Greenlots, SemaConnect, OpConnect and Webasto, via each network's application programming interface (API). Most networks have adopted the OCPI protocol to support roaming agreements with other networks, and to date, NREL has integrated Electrify America, EVgo, Greenlots, and ChargePoint's OCPI-based APIs. Additionally, all non-networked charging data in the Station Locator follow the OCPI protocol.\n>\n>Greenlots and ChargePoint's OCPI APIs were integrated last in January 2021. This resulted in jumps in station counts because of the way that station data were shared under the protocol: in many cases, one station split out into several new stations to represent different physical locations of EVSE ports at one address. While the new stations shared the same street address, they have different coordinates. Additionally, jumps in station counts were attributed to new installations being added via the APIs. \n>\n>For more information about the data in the Station Locator, visit the following page: https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/find/nearest?show_about=true. \n[/fine-print]", "resc": "This resolves as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations available for light duty vehicles in the United States in the listed year. Data available from the [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_locations.html#/analyze?fuel=ELEC&country=US) (AFDC) on January 1st of the listed year will be used for resolution.\n\nCharging stations will be limited to those which can be used by at least one model of \"light duty vehicle\" which was generally available for purchase by US consumers prior to the time of resolution and which is accessible by light duty vehicles, where possible. For example, if a charging station with power output greater than level 2 is available for commercial trucks and no light duty vehicles have previously been available for purchase that can use such a charger, that charger will be excluded, if possible. Or, if a charging station is off-limits to light duty vehicles that station will be excluded, if possible. For the purposes of this question a \"light duty vehicle\" is defined as one with [gross vehicle weight rating](https://auto.howstuffworks.com/auto-parts/towing/towing-capacity/vehicle/gvwr.htm) (GVWR) below 10,000 pounds.\n\nIf AFDC no longer provides this data (or if it does not provide data in accordance with the requirements above) a superior or equivalent source may be used, or if no satisfactory alternate sources are available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "63.5k", "median": "71.6k", "upper_75": "81.0k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the share of zero-emission vehicle federal fleet procurements in the United States will be 82.4% in the following fiscal year (2035)?", "desc": "On December 8, 2021, President Biden signed [Executive Order 14057](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/12/08/executive-order-on-catalyzing-clean-energy-industries-and-jobs-through-federal-sustainability/), which set a goal that the Federal Government should achieve\n\n>100 percent zero-emission vehicle acquisitions by 2035, including 100 percent zero-emission light-duty vehicle acquisitions by 2027\n\nSpecifically for its 2027 goal the Executive Order states\n\n>Each agency's light-duty vehicle acquisitions shall be zero-emission vehicles by the end of fiscal year 2027.\n\nThe Federal Government publishes annual statistics about its fleet makeup and acquisitions in the [Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). Table 5-4 from the FFR Open Data Set provided for fiscal year 2021 shows vehicle acquisitions by fuel type for 2017 through 2021:\n\n| **Fuel Type** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** |\n| ----------------------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- |\n| Gasoline | 23,312 | 26,309 | 21,445 | 28,055 | 38,229 |\n| Diesel | 5,626 | 5,970 | 7,339 | 5,551 | 4,258 |\n| Gasoline Hybrid | 4,475 | 4,814 | 3,207 | 3,533 | 3,246 |\n| Diesel Hybrid | 10 | 23 | 8 | 12 | 29 |\n| Gasoline LGHG | 945 | 1,672 | 1,128 | 1,488 | 1,225 |\n| Diesel LGHG | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |\n| Gasoline Plug-in Hybrid | 191 | 302 | 212 | 188 | 119 |\n| Diesel Plug-in Hybrid | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Compressed Natural Gas | 12 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 8 |\n| E-85 | 24,110 | 15,252 | 17,306 | 10,366 | 8,565 |\n| Electric | 303 | 194 | 167 | 111 | 138 |\n| Hydrogen | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Natural Gas | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Petroleum Gas | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |\n| **Grand Total** | **58,986** | **54,549** | **50,830** | **49,315** | **55,818** |", "resc": "This resolves as the percent of United States federal fleet procurements in the listed fiscal year which are zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs), according to the [US Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). The number of zero-emission vehicles acquired in a fiscal year will be compared to the total number of vehicles acquired to arrive at the percentage. As of November 30, 2022, the fiscal year 2021 data set shows that for fiscal year 2021 this value would be 0.46% (138 electric vehicles plus 119 gasoline plug-in hybrid plus 0 diesel plug-in hybrid plus 0 hydrogen for a total of 257 ZEVs compared to 55,818 total vehicles acquired).\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. In the event the federal government no longer reports vehicle acquisitions by fuel type this question resolves as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "60.8", "median": "70.1", "upper_75": "82.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 127k people will be employed in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years?", "desc": "The [growth of electric vehicles](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) may have significant effects on the US auto industry, including employment. The impact on US employment in the electric vehicle industry may [depend on trade policy](https://www.epi.org/press/the-shift-to-all-electric-vehicles-could-create-over-150000-jobs-by-2030-if-policymakers-make-smart-investments-to-secure-u-s-leadership-in-the-auto-sector/) and [domestic manufacturing incentives](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/19/fact-sheet-the-inflation-reduction-act-supports-workers-and-families/).\n\nThe US Department of Energy publishes the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER), a report tracking US employment in the energy industry. The USEER was first published in 2016 and has been published annually since, though the 2018 through 2020 USEER was not published by the Department of Energy but was instead [published by a collaboration between non-governmental organizations](https://www.usenergyjobs.org/about).\n\nThe USEER [2021](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/USEER%202021%20Main%20Body.pdf) and [2022](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/USEER%202022%20National%20Report_1.pdf) reports published electric vehicle industry employment figures for the previous year as shown:\n\n* 2020: 83,733\n* 2021: 105,694", "resc": "This resolves as the number of employees in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years, according to the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER). The first value reported by USEER for a listed year will be used, later revisions will be immaterial.\n\nIn the event the USEER is no longer published or does not publish employment data specific to the electric vehicle industry an alternate source producing comparable estimates to the last available data may be used. If no satisfactory alternate source is available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "110k", "median": "118k", "upper_75": "127k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 127k people will be employed in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years?", "desc": "The [growth of electric vehicles](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) may have significant effects on the US auto industry, including employment. The impact on US employment in the electric vehicle industry may [depend on trade policy](https://www.epi.org/press/the-shift-to-all-electric-vehicles-could-create-over-150000-jobs-by-2030-if-policymakers-make-smart-investments-to-secure-u-s-leadership-in-the-auto-sector/) and [domestic manufacturing incentives](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/19/fact-sheet-the-inflation-reduction-act-supports-workers-and-families/).\n\nThe US Department of Energy publishes the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER), a report tracking US employment in the energy industry. The USEER was first published in 2016 and has been published annually since, though the 2018 through 2020 USEER was not published by the Department of Energy but was instead [published by a collaboration between non-governmental organizations](https://www.usenergyjobs.org/about).\n\nThe USEER [2021](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/USEER%202021%20Main%20Body.pdf) and [2022](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/USEER%202022%20National%20Report_1.pdf) reports published electric vehicle industry employment figures for the previous year as shown:\n\n* 2020: 83,733\n* 2021: 105,694", "resc": "This resolves as the number of employees in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years, according to the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER). The first value reported by USEER for a listed year will be used, later revisions will be immaterial.\n\nIn the event the USEER is no longer published or does not publish employment data specific to the electric vehicle industry an alternate source producing comparable estimates to the last available data may be used. If no satisfactory alternate source is available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "110k", "median": "118k", "upper_75": "127k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the share of zero-emission vehicle federal fleet procurements in the United States will be 82.4% in the following fiscal year (2035)?", "desc": "On December 8, 2021, President Biden signed [Executive Order 14057](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/12/08/executive-order-on-catalyzing-clean-energy-industries-and-jobs-through-federal-sustainability/), which set a goal that the Federal Government should achieve\n\n>100 percent zero-emission vehicle acquisitions by 2035, including 100 percent zero-emission light-duty vehicle acquisitions by 2027\n\nSpecifically for its 2027 goal the Executive Order states\n\n>Each agency's light-duty vehicle acquisitions shall be zero-emission vehicles by the end of fiscal year 2027.\n\nThe Federal Government publishes annual statistics about its fleet makeup and acquisitions in the [Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). Table 5-4 from the FFR Open Data Set provided for fiscal year 2021 shows vehicle acquisitions by fuel type for 2017 through 2021:\n\n| **Fuel Type** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** |\n| ----------------------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- |\n| Gasoline | 23,312 | 26,309 | 21,445 | 28,055 | 38,229 |\n| Diesel | 5,626 | 5,970 | 7,339 | 5,551 | 4,258 |\n| Gasoline Hybrid | 4,475 | 4,814 | 3,207 | 3,533 | 3,246 |\n| Diesel Hybrid | 10 | 23 | 8 | 12 | 29 |\n| Gasoline LGHG | 945 | 1,672 | 1,128 | 1,488 | 1,225 |\n| Diesel LGHG | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |\n| Gasoline Plug-in Hybrid | 191 | 302 | 212 | 188 | 119 |\n| Diesel Plug-in Hybrid | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Compressed Natural Gas | 12 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 8 |\n| E-85 | 24,110 | 15,252 | 17,306 | 10,366 | 8,565 |\n| Electric | 303 | 194 | 167 | 111 | 138 |\n| Hydrogen | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Natural Gas | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Petroleum Gas | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |\n| **Grand Total** | **58,986** | **54,549** | **50,830** | **49,315** | **55,818** |", "resc": "This resolves as the percent of United States federal fleet procurements in the listed fiscal year which are zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs), according to the [US Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). The number of zero-emission vehicles acquired in a fiscal year will be compared to the total number of vehicles acquired to arrive at the percentage. As of November 30, 2022, the fiscal year 2021 data set shows that for fiscal year 2021 this value would be 0.46% (138 electric vehicles plus 119 gasoline plug-in hybrid plus 0 diesel plug-in hybrid plus 0 hydrogen for a total of 257 ZEVs compared to 55,818 total vehicles acquired).\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. In the event the federal government no longer reports vehicle acquisitions by fuel type this question resolves as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "60.8", "median": "70.1", "upper_75": "82.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 223k people will be employed in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years (2030)?", "desc": "The [growth of electric vehicles](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) may have significant effects on the US auto industry, including employment. The impact on US employment in the electric vehicle industry may [depend on trade policy](https://www.epi.org/press/the-shift-to-all-electric-vehicles-could-create-over-150000-jobs-by-2030-if-policymakers-make-smart-investments-to-secure-u-s-leadership-in-the-auto-sector/) and [domestic manufacturing incentives](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/19/fact-sheet-the-inflation-reduction-act-supports-workers-and-families/).\n\nThe US Department of Energy publishes the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER), a report tracking US employment in the energy industry. The USEER was first published in 2016 and has been published annually since, though the 2018 through 2020 USEER was not published by the Department of Energy but was instead [published by a collaboration between non-governmental organizations](https://www.usenergyjobs.org/about).\n\nThe USEER [2021](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/USEER%202021%20Main%20Body.pdf) and [2022](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/USEER%202022%20National%20Report_1.pdf) reports published electric vehicle industry employment figures for the previous year as shown:\n\n* 2020: 83,733\n* 2021: 105,694", "resc": "This resolves as the number of employees in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years, according to the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER). The first value reported by USEER for a listed year will be used, later revisions will be immaterial.\n\nIn the event the USEER is no longer published or does not publish employment data specific to the electric vehicle industry an alternate source producing comparable estimates to the last available data may be used. If no satisfactory alternate source is available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "129k", "median": "174k", "upper_75": "223k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 127k people will be employed in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years?", "desc": "The [growth of electric vehicles](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) may have significant effects on the US auto industry, including employment. The impact on US employment in the electric vehicle industry may [depend on trade policy](https://www.epi.org/press/the-shift-to-all-electric-vehicles-could-create-over-150000-jobs-by-2030-if-policymakers-make-smart-investments-to-secure-u-s-leadership-in-the-auto-sector/) and [domestic manufacturing incentives](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/19/fact-sheet-the-inflation-reduction-act-supports-workers-and-families/).\n\nThe US Department of Energy publishes the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER), a report tracking US employment in the energy industry. The USEER was first published in 2016 and has been published annually since, though the 2018 through 2020 USEER was not published by the Department of Energy but was instead [published by a collaboration between non-governmental organizations](https://www.usenergyjobs.org/about).\n\nThe USEER [2021](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/USEER%202021%20Main%20Body.pdf) and [2022](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/USEER%202022%20National%20Report_1.pdf) reports published electric vehicle industry employment figures for the previous year as shown:\n\n* 2020: 83,733\n* 2021: 105,694", "resc": "This resolves as the number of employees in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years, according to the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER). The first value reported by USEER for a listed year will be used, later revisions will be immaterial.\n\nIn the event the USEER is no longer published or does not publish employment data specific to the electric vehicle industry an alternate source producing comparable estimates to the last available data may be used. If no satisfactory alternate source is available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "110k", "median": "118k", "upper_75": "127k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 223k people will be employed in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years (2030)?", "desc": "The [growth of electric vehicles](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) may have significant effects on the US auto industry, including employment. The impact on US employment in the electric vehicle industry may [depend on trade policy](https://www.epi.org/press/the-shift-to-all-electric-vehicles-could-create-over-150000-jobs-by-2030-if-policymakers-make-smart-investments-to-secure-u-s-leadership-in-the-auto-sector/) and [domestic manufacturing incentives](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/19/fact-sheet-the-inflation-reduction-act-supports-workers-and-families/).\n\nThe US Department of Energy publishes the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER), a report tracking US employment in the energy industry. The USEER was first published in 2016 and has been published annually since, though the 2018 through 2020 USEER was not published by the Department of Energy but was instead [published by a collaboration between non-governmental organizations](https://www.usenergyjobs.org/about).\n\nThe USEER [2021](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/USEER%202021%20Main%20Body.pdf) and [2022](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/USEER%202022%20National%20Report_1.pdf) reports published electric vehicle industry employment figures for the previous year as shown:\n\n* 2020: 83,733\n* 2021: 105,694", "resc": "This resolves as the number of employees in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years, according to the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER). The first value reported by USEER for a listed year will be used, later revisions will be immaterial.\n\nIn the event the USEER is no longer published or does not publish employment data specific to the electric vehicle industry an alternate source producing comparable estimates to the last available data may be used. If no satisfactory alternate source is available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "129k", "median": "174k", "upper_75": "223k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that zero-emission vehicle federal fleet procurements in the United States will account for 70.5% of the total procurements in the following fiscal years (2030)?", "desc": "On December 8, 2021, President Biden signed [Executive Order 14057](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/12/08/executive-order-on-catalyzing-clean-energy-industries-and-jobs-through-federal-sustainability/), which set a goal that the Federal Government should achieve\n\n>100 percent zero-emission vehicle acquisitions by 2035, including 100 percent zero-emission light-duty vehicle acquisitions by 2027\n\nSpecifically for its 2027 goal the Executive Order states\n\n>Each agency's light-duty vehicle acquisitions shall be zero-emission vehicles by the end of fiscal year 2027.\n\nThe Federal Government publishes annual statistics about its fleet makeup and acquisitions in the [Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). Table 5-4 from the FFR Open Data Set provided for fiscal year 2021 shows vehicle acquisitions by fuel type for 2017 through 2021:\n\n| **Fuel Type** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** |\n| ----------------------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- |\n| Gasoline | 23,312 | 26,309 | 21,445 | 28,055 | 38,229 |\n| Diesel | 5,626 | 5,970 | 7,339 | 5,551 | 4,258 |\n| Gasoline Hybrid | 4,475 | 4,814 | 3,207 | 3,533 | 3,246 |\n| Diesel Hybrid | 10 | 23 | 8 | 12 | 29 |\n| Gasoline LGHG | 945 | 1,672 | 1,128 | 1,488 | 1,225 |\n| Diesel LGHG | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |\n| Gasoline Plug-in Hybrid | 191 | 302 | 212 | 188 | 119 |\n| Diesel Plug-in Hybrid | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Compressed Natural Gas | 12 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 8 |\n| E-85 | 24,110 | 15,252 | 17,306 | 10,366 | 8,565 |\n| Electric | 303 | 194 | 167 | 111 | 138 |\n| Hydrogen | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Natural Gas | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Petroleum Gas | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |\n| **Grand Total** | **58,986** | **54,549** | **50,830** | **49,315** | **55,818** |", "resc": "This resolves as the percent of United States federal fleet procurements in the listed fiscal year which are zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs), according to the [US Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). The number of zero-emission vehicles acquired in a fiscal year will be compared to the total number of vehicles acquired to arrive at the percentage. As of November 30, 2022, the fiscal year 2021 data set shows that for fiscal year 2021 this value would be 0.46% (138 electric vehicles plus 119 gasoline plug-in hybrid plus 0 diesel plug-in hybrid plus 0 hydrogen for a total of 257 ZEVs compared to 55,818 total vehicles acquired).\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. In the event the federal government no longer reports vehicle acquisitions by fuel type this question resolves as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "49.6", "median": "59.8", "upper_75": "70.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the share of zero-emission vehicle federal fleet procurements in the United States will be 82.4% in the following fiscal year (2035)?", "desc": "On December 8, 2021, President Biden signed [Executive Order 14057](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/12/08/executive-order-on-catalyzing-clean-energy-industries-and-jobs-through-federal-sustainability/), which set a goal that the Federal Government should achieve\n\n>100 percent zero-emission vehicle acquisitions by 2035, including 100 percent zero-emission light-duty vehicle acquisitions by 2027\n\nSpecifically for its 2027 goal the Executive Order states\n\n>Each agency's light-duty vehicle acquisitions shall be zero-emission vehicles by the end of fiscal year 2027.\n\nThe Federal Government publishes annual statistics about its fleet makeup and acquisitions in the [Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). Table 5-4 from the FFR Open Data Set provided for fiscal year 2021 shows vehicle acquisitions by fuel type for 2017 through 2021:\n\n| **Fuel Type** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** |\n| ----------------------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- |\n| Gasoline | 23,312 | 26,309 | 21,445 | 28,055 | 38,229 |\n| Diesel | 5,626 | 5,970 | 7,339 | 5,551 | 4,258 |\n| Gasoline Hybrid | 4,475 | 4,814 | 3,207 | 3,533 | 3,246 |\n| Diesel Hybrid | 10 | 23 | 8 | 12 | 29 |\n| Gasoline LGHG | 945 | 1,672 | 1,128 | 1,488 | 1,225 |\n| Diesel LGHG | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |\n| Gasoline Plug-in Hybrid | 191 | 302 | 212 | 188 | 119 |\n| Diesel Plug-in Hybrid | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Compressed Natural Gas | 12 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 8 |\n| E-85 | 24,110 | 15,252 | 17,306 | 10,366 | 8,565 |\n| Electric | 303 | 194 | 167 | 111 | 138 |\n| Hydrogen | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Natural Gas | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Petroleum Gas | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |\n| **Grand Total** | **58,986** | **54,549** | **50,830** | **49,315** | **55,818** |", "resc": "This resolves as the percent of United States federal fleet procurements in the listed fiscal year which are zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs), according to the [US Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). The number of zero-emission vehicles acquired in a fiscal year will be compared to the total number of vehicles acquired to arrive at the percentage. As of November 30, 2022, the fiscal year 2021 data set shows that for fiscal year 2021 this value would be 0.46% (138 electric vehicles plus 119 gasoline plug-in hybrid plus 0 diesel plug-in hybrid plus 0 hydrogen for a total of 257 ZEVs compared to 55,818 total vehicles acquired).\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. In the event the federal government no longer reports vehicle acquisitions by fuel type this question resolves as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "60.8", "median": "70.1", "upper_75": "82.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 93.5% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles? (2035)", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "70.8", "median": "84.5", "upper_75": "93.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 548k people will be employed in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years (2035)?", "desc": "The [growth of electric vehicles](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) may have significant effects on the US auto industry, including employment. The impact on US employment in the electric vehicle industry may [depend on trade policy](https://www.epi.org/press/the-shift-to-all-electric-vehicles-could-create-over-150000-jobs-by-2030-if-policymakers-make-smart-investments-to-secure-u-s-leadership-in-the-auto-sector/) and [domestic manufacturing incentives](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/19/fact-sheet-the-inflation-reduction-act-supports-workers-and-families/).\n\nThe US Department of Energy publishes the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER), a report tracking US employment in the energy industry. The USEER was first published in 2016 and has been published annually since, though the 2018 through 2020 USEER was not published by the Department of Energy but was instead [published by a collaboration between non-governmental organizations](https://www.usenergyjobs.org/about).\n\nThe USEER [2021](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/USEER%202021%20Main%20Body.pdf) and [2022](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/USEER%202022%20National%20Report_1.pdf) reports published electric vehicle industry employment figures for the previous year as shown:\n\n* 2020: 83,733\n* 2021: 105,694", "resc": "This resolves as the number of employees in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years, according to the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER). The first value reported by USEER for a listed year will be used, later revisions will be immaterial.\n\nIn the event the USEER is no longer published or does not publish employment data specific to the electric vehicle industry an alternate source producing comparable estimates to the last available data may be used. If no satisfactory alternate source is available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "264k", "median": "411k", "upper_75": "548k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 548k people will be employed in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years (2035)?", "desc": "The [growth of electric vehicles](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) may have significant effects on the US auto industry, including employment. The impact on US employment in the electric vehicle industry may [depend on trade policy](https://www.epi.org/press/the-shift-to-all-electric-vehicles-could-create-over-150000-jobs-by-2030-if-policymakers-make-smart-investments-to-secure-u-s-leadership-in-the-auto-sector/) and [domestic manufacturing incentives](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/19/fact-sheet-the-inflation-reduction-act-supports-workers-and-families/).\n\nThe US Department of Energy publishes the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER), a report tracking US employment in the energy industry. The USEER was first published in 2016 and has been published annually since, though the 2018 through 2020 USEER was not published by the Department of Energy but was instead [published by a collaboration between non-governmental organizations](https://www.usenergyjobs.org/about).\n\nThe USEER [2021](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/USEER%202021%20Main%20Body.pdf) and [2022](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/USEER%202022%20National%20Report_1.pdf) reports published electric vehicle industry employment figures for the previous year as shown:\n\n* 2020: 83,733\n* 2021: 105,694", "resc": "This resolves as the number of employees in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years, according to the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER). The first value reported by USEER for a listed year will be used, later revisions will be immaterial.\n\nIn the event the USEER is no longer published or does not publish employment data specific to the electric vehicle industry an alternate source producing comparable estimates to the last available data may be used. If no satisfactory alternate source is available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "264k", "median": "411k", "upper_75": "548k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 223k people will be employed in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years (2030)?", "desc": "The [growth of electric vehicles](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) may have significant effects on the US auto industry, including employment. The impact on US employment in the electric vehicle industry may [depend on trade policy](https://www.epi.org/press/the-shift-to-all-electric-vehicles-could-create-over-150000-jobs-by-2030-if-policymakers-make-smart-investments-to-secure-u-s-leadership-in-the-auto-sector/) and [domestic manufacturing incentives](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/19/fact-sheet-the-inflation-reduction-act-supports-workers-and-families/).\n\nThe US Department of Energy publishes the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER), a report tracking US employment in the energy industry. The USEER was first published in 2016 and has been published annually since, though the 2018 through 2020 USEER was not published by the Department of Energy but was instead [published by a collaboration between non-governmental organizations](https://www.usenergyjobs.org/about).\n\nThe USEER [2021](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/USEER%202021%20Main%20Body.pdf) and [2022](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/USEER%202022%20National%20Report_1.pdf) reports published electric vehicle industry employment figures for the previous year as shown:\n\n* 2020: 83,733\n* 2021: 105,694", "resc": "This resolves as the number of employees in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years, according to the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER). The first value reported by USEER for a listed year will be used, later revisions will be immaterial.\n\nIn the event the USEER is no longer published or does not publish employment data specific to the electric vehicle industry an alternate source producing comparable estimates to the last available data may be used. If no satisfactory alternate source is available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "129k", "median": "174k", "upper_75": "223k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 548k people will be employed in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years (2035)?", "desc": "The [growth of electric vehicles](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) may have significant effects on the US auto industry, including employment. The impact on US employment in the electric vehicle industry may [depend on trade policy](https://www.epi.org/press/the-shift-to-all-electric-vehicles-could-create-over-150000-jobs-by-2030-if-policymakers-make-smart-investments-to-secure-u-s-leadership-in-the-auto-sector/) and [domestic manufacturing incentives](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/19/fact-sheet-the-inflation-reduction-act-supports-workers-and-families/).\n\nThe US Department of Energy publishes the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER), a report tracking US employment in the energy industry. The USEER was first published in 2016 and has been published annually since, though the 2018 through 2020 USEER was not published by the Department of Energy but was instead [published by a collaboration between non-governmental organizations](https://www.usenergyjobs.org/about).\n\nThe USEER [2021](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/USEER%202021%20Main%20Body.pdf) and [2022](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/USEER%202022%20National%20Report_1.pdf) reports published electric vehicle industry employment figures for the previous year as shown:\n\n* 2020: 83,733\n* 2021: 105,694", "resc": "This resolves as the number of employees in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years, according to the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER). The first value reported by USEER for a listed year will be used, later revisions will be immaterial.\n\nIn the event the USEER is no longer published or does not publish employment data specific to the electric vehicle industry an alternate source producing comparable estimates to the last available data may be used. If no satisfactory alternate source is available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "264k", "median": "411k", "upper_75": "548k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 136k people will be employed in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "The [growth of electric vehicles](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) may have significant effects on the US auto industry, including employment. The impact on US employment in the electric vehicle industry may [depend on trade policy](https://www.epi.org/press/the-shift-to-all-electric-vehicles-could-create-over-150000-jobs-by-2030-if-policymakers-make-smart-investments-to-secure-u-s-leadership-in-the-auto-sector/) and [domestic manufacturing incentives](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/19/fact-sheet-the-inflation-reduction-act-supports-workers-and-families/).\n\nThe US Department of Energy publishes the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER), a report tracking US employment in the energy industry. The USEER was first published in 2016 and has been published annually since, though the 2018 through 2020 USEER was not published by the Department of Energy but was instead [published by a collaboration between non-governmental organizations](https://www.usenergyjobs.org/about).\n\nThe USEER [2021](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/USEER%202021%20Main%20Body.pdf) and [2022](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/USEER%202022%20National%20Report_1.pdf) reports published electric vehicle industry employment figures for the previous year as shown:\n\n* 2020: 83,733\n* 2021: 105,694", "resc": "This resolves as the number of employees in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years, according to the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER). The first value reported by USEER for a listed year will be used, later revisions will be immaterial.\n\nIn the event the USEER is no longer published or does not publish employment data specific to the electric vehicle industry an alternate source producing comparable estimates to the last available data may be used. If no satisfactory alternate source is available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "121k", "median": "136k", "upper_75": "154k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated chance that a regulatory agency in the United States will impose a fleet average fuel economy of 49.5 mpg for light vehicles manufactured in the following years?", "desc": "Currently in the United States vehicle fuel economy is regulated by the the [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Highway_Traffic_Safety_Administration) (NHTSA) and the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Regulations apply to vehicles sold in the US on the basis of the average fuel economy and emissions of the manufacturer's fleet, and manufacturers may face penalties for not complying with the regulations. The Union of Concerned Scientists describes the [origin of fuel efficiency standards in the United States](https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/brief-history-us-fuel-efficiency) as follows:\n\n>Congress first established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in 1975, largely in response to the 1973 oil embargo. CAFE standards set the average new vehicle fuel economy, as weighted by sales, that a manufacturer's fleet must achieve. \n>\n>Through the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Congress established fuel economy standards for new passenger cars starting with model year (MY) 1978. These standards were intended to roughly double the average fuel economy of the new car fleet to 27.5 mpg by model year (MY) 1985.\n\nThe EPA [began regulating greenhouse gases](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulation_of_greenhouse_gases_under_the_Clean_Air_Act) after the Supreme Court ruled in *Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency* that the EPA has the statutory authority to do so under the [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss). According to a [report from the Congressional Research Service](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45204) (CRS) the NHTSA is required to establish fuel economy standards at\n\n>the maximum feasible average fuel economy level that it decides the manufacturers can achieve in that model year\n\nwith consideration of the following four factors\n\n>technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to conserve energy\n\nAccording to the CRS report, under its regulatory authority the EPA must consider\n\n>issues of technical feasibility, cost, and available lead time\n\nUnder the Obama administration, the NHTSA and EPA jointly published Phase 1 fuel economy regulations in 2010 and Phase 2 in 2012, covering model years 2012 through 2025. In 2020, under the Trump administration, the agencies lowered the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2021 through 2026. In 2021, under the Biden administration, the EPA [issued revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-12-30/pdf/2021-27854.pdf) reducing the acceptable level of vehicle emissions for model years 2023 and later. In 2022 the NHTSA [issued separate revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf) which raised the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2024 through 2026.\n\nFrom table II-4 of the NHTSA final rule and table 4-43 of a [Regulatory Impact Analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf) of the EPA's final rule, the fuel economy estimates corresponding to each rule on the overall light vehicle fleet is shown below:\n\n| Year | NHTSA | EPA |\n|--|--|--|\n| 2023 | N/A | 41 |\n| 2024 | 40.6 | 43 |\n| 2025 | 44.2 | 46 |\n| 2026 | 49.1 | 50 |", "resc": "This resolves as the most stringent estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy (in miles per gallon) imposed by a regulatory agency in the United States in effect on January 1 of the listed year. The regulation must apply to light vehicles for sale in the United States in a comparable manner in breadth and scope to those released by the NHTSA and EPA in 2021, in the judgment of Metaculus. The value will be rounded to the nearest integer.\n\nIn the case of multiple qualifying regulations (such as those issued by NHTSA and EPA) the most stringent of the two will be used. Regulations must be enforceable, guidelines without any financial or monetary penalty, civil or criminal, will not qualify. The estimated industry-wide average used will be that characterized by the estimating agency as most reflective of the fuel economy required by the imposed CAFE rules including any allowances expected to be taken, as interpreted by Metaculus. For example, the usage of AC leakage credits would be included, where possible, as described in section 4.2.1 of the [EPA's regulatory impact analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf), but estimates of the \"real-world\" values would not be used, where possible.\n\nIf no such regulation exists this resolves as **0**. In the event the estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy requirement associated with a regulation is not reported by the regulatory agency for a listed year Metaculus may use estimates from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that are comparable in methodology to the past NHTSA or EPA estimates, or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**. If fuel economy is reported in a unit other than miles per gallon Metaculus may convert it to miles per gallon or [miles per gallon gasoline equivalent](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miles_per_gallon_gasoline_equivalent) (MPGe).", "lower_25": "41.3", "median": "45.1", "upper_75": "49.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 208k level 2 or greater public charging stations available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of 2030?", "desc": "Electric vehicles have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in the United States, calling into question how quickly charging infrastructure will be built out. Recent legislation has [provided additional support](https://www.nelsonmullins.com/idea_exchange/blogs/megawatt-minute-blog/alternative-energy/reinventing-the-american-road-trip-what-the-inflation-reduction-act-means-for-electric-vehicle-infrastructure#_ftn5) for charging infrastructure expansion, though it remains to be seen how that impacts the overall trend.\n\n\n\nThe [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/about.html) (AFDC), a project of the US Department of Energy, has tracked the expansion of public charging infrastructure by type. They provide an overview of the charging terminology and types of chargers [on their website](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_infrastructure.html).\n\nNote that the large increase in 2021 is related to a methodology change, expand the fine print below for correspondence from AFDC from December of 2021 describing the change:\n\n[fine-print]\n>As you noted, there is a jump in EV charging station counts starting in February 2021 because the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is transitioning EV charging counting logic to align with the hierarchy defined in the Open Charge Point Interface (OCPI; https://evroaming.org/ocpi-background/) protocol: stations, electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) ports, and connectors. With this transition, the number of charging outlets in the Stations Locator is being updated to represent the number of EVSE ports (or number of vehicles that can charge simultaneously) at a station location, rather than the number of connectors previously counted. The Station Locator still identifies the available connector types. \n>\n>NREL imports networked EV charging data, including Blink, ChargePoint, Electrify America, EVgo, FLO, Greenlots, SemaConnect, OpConnect and Webasto, via each network's application programming interface (API). Most networks have adopted the OCPI protocol to support roaming agreements with other networks, and to date, NREL has integrated Electrify America, EVgo, Greenlots, and ChargePoint's OCPI-based APIs. Additionally, all non-networked charging data in the Station Locator follow the OCPI protocol.\n>\n>Greenlots and ChargePoint's OCPI APIs were integrated last in January 2021. This resulted in jumps in station counts because of the way that station data were shared under the protocol: in many cases, one station split out into several new stations to represent different physical locations of EVSE ports at one address. While the new stations shared the same street address, they have different coordinates. Additionally, jumps in station counts were attributed to new installations being added via the APIs. \n>\n>For more information about the data in the Station Locator, visit the following page: https://afdc.energy.gov/stations/#/find/nearest?show_about=true. \n[/fine-print]", "resc": "This resolves as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations available for light duty vehicles in the United States in the listed year. Data available from the [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/fuels/electricity_locations.html#/analyze?fuel=ELEC&country=US) (AFDC) on January 1st of the listed year will be used for resolution.\n\nCharging stations will be limited to those which can be used by at least one model of \"light duty vehicle\" which was generally available for purchase by US consumers prior to the time of resolution and which is accessible by light duty vehicles, where possible. For example, if a charging station with power output greater than level 2 is available for commercial trucks and no light duty vehicles have previously been available for purchase that can use such a charger, that charger will be excluded, if possible. Or, if a charging station is off-limits to light duty vehicles that station will be excluded, if possible. For the purposes of this question a \"light duty vehicle\" is defined as one with [gross vehicle weight rating](https://auto.howstuffworks.com/auto-parts/towing/towing-capacity/vehicle/gvwr.htm) (GVWR) below 10,000 pounds.\n\nIf AFDC no longer provides this data (or if it does not provide data in accordance with the requirements above) a superior or equivalent source may be used, or if no satisfactory alternate sources are available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "88.2k", "median": "208k", "upper_75": "341k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated fleet average fuel economy (in mpg) imposed by a regulatory agency in the United States for light vehicles manufactured in the following years? (2025)\n\nKeyword: 41.3\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that a regulatory agency in the United States will impose a fleet average fuel economy of 41.3 mpg for light vehicles manufactured in the following years? (2025)", "desc": "Currently in the United States vehicle fuel economy is regulated by the the [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Highway_Traffic_Safety_Administration) (NHTSA) and the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Regulations apply to vehicles sold in the US on the basis of the average fuel economy and emissions of the manufacturer's fleet, and manufacturers may face penalties for not complying with the regulations. The Union of Concerned Scientists describes the [origin of fuel efficiency standards in the United States](https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/brief-history-us-fuel-efficiency) as follows:\n\n>Congress first established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in 1975, largely in response to the 1973 oil embargo. CAFE standards set the average new vehicle fuel economy, as weighted by sales, that a manufacturer's fleet must achieve. \n>\n>Through the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Congress established fuel economy standards for new passenger cars starting with model year (MY) 1978. These standards were intended to roughly double the average fuel economy of the new car fleet to 27.5 mpg by model year (MY) 1985.\n\nThe EPA [began regulating greenhouse gases](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulation_of_greenhouse_gases_under_the_Clean_Air_Act) after the Supreme Court ruled in *Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency* that the EPA has the statutory authority to do so under the [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss). According to a [report from the Congressional Research Service](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45204) (CRS) the NHTSA is required to establish fuel economy standards at\n\n>the maximum feasible average fuel economy level that it decides the manufacturers can achieve in that model year\n\nwith consideration of the following four factors\n\n>technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to conserve energy\n\nAccording to the CRS report, under its regulatory authority the EPA must consider\n\n>issues of technical feasibility, cost, and available lead time\n\nUnder the Obama administration, the NHTSA and EPA jointly published Phase 1 fuel economy regulations in 2010 and Phase 2 in 2012, covering model years 2012 through 2025. In 2020, under the Trump administration, the agencies lowered the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2021 through 2026. In 2021, under the Biden administration, the EPA [issued revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-12-30/pdf/2021-27854.pdf) reducing the acceptable level of vehicle emissions for model years 2023 and later. In 2022 the NHTSA [issued separate revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf) which raised the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2024 through 2026.\n\nFrom table II-4 of the NHTSA final rule and table 4-43 of a [Regulatory Impact Analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf) of the EPA's final rule, the fuel economy estimates corresponding to each rule on the overall light vehicle fleet is shown below:\n\n| Year | NHTSA | EPA |\n|--|--|--|\n| 2023 | N/A | 41 |\n| 2024 | 40.6 | 43 |\n| 2025 | 44.2 | 46 |\n| 2026 | 49.1 | 50 |", "resc": "This resolves as the most stringent estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy (in miles per gallon) imposed by a regulatory agency in the United States in effect on January 1 of the listed year. The regulation must apply to light vehicles for sale in the United States in a comparable manner in breadth and scope to those released by the NHTSA and EPA in 2021, in the judgment of Metaculus. The value will be rounded to the nearest integer.\n\nIn the case of multiple qualifying regulations (such as those issued by NHTSA and EPA) the most stringent of the two will be used. Regulations must be enforceable, guidelines without any financial or monetary penalty, civil or criminal, will not qualify. The estimated industry-wide average used will be that characterized by the estimating agency as most reflective of the fuel economy required by the imposed CAFE rules including any allowances expected to be taken, as interpreted by Metaculus. For example, the usage of AC leakage credits would be included, where possible, as described in section 4.2.1 of the [EPA's regulatory impact analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf), but estimates of the \"real-world\" values would not be used, where possible.\n\nIf no such regulation exists this resolves as **0**. In the event the estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy requirement associated with a regulation is not reported by the regulatory agency for a listed year Metaculus may use estimates from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that are comparable in methodology to the past NHTSA or EPA estimates, or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**. If fuel economy is reported in a unit other than miles per gallon Metaculus may convert it to miles per gallon or [miles per gallon gasoline equivalent](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miles_per_gallon_gasoline_equivalent) (MPGe).", "lower_25": "41.3", "median": "45.1", "upper_75": "49.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 136k people will be employed in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "The [growth of electric vehicles](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) may have significant effects on the US auto industry, including employment. The impact on US employment in the electric vehicle industry may [depend on trade policy](https://www.epi.org/press/the-shift-to-all-electric-vehicles-could-create-over-150000-jobs-by-2030-if-policymakers-make-smart-investments-to-secure-u-s-leadership-in-the-auto-sector/) and [domestic manufacturing incentives](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/19/fact-sheet-the-inflation-reduction-act-supports-workers-and-families/).\n\nThe US Department of Energy publishes the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER), a report tracking US employment in the energy industry. The USEER was first published in 2016 and has been published annually since, though the 2018 through 2020 USEER was not published by the Department of Energy but was instead [published by a collaboration between non-governmental organizations](https://www.usenergyjobs.org/about).\n\nThe USEER [2021](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/USEER%202021%20Main%20Body.pdf) and [2022](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/USEER%202022%20National%20Report_1.pdf) reports published electric vehicle industry employment figures for the previous year as shown:\n\n* 2020: 83,733\n* 2021: 105,694", "resc": "This resolves as the number of employees in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years, according to the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER). The first value reported by USEER for a listed year will be used, later revisions will be immaterial.\n\nIn the event the USEER is no longer published or does not publish employment data specific to the electric vehicle industry an alternate source producing comparable estimates to the last available data may be used. If no satisfactory alternate source is available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "121k", "median": "136k", "upper_75": "154k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated chance that a regulatory agency in the United States will impose a fleet average fuel economy of 47.2 mpg for light vehicles manufactured in the year 2035?", "desc": "Currently in the United States vehicle fuel economy is regulated by the the [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Highway_Traffic_Safety_Administration) (NHTSA) and the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Regulations apply to vehicles sold in the US on the basis of the average fuel economy and emissions of the manufacturer's fleet, and manufacturers may face penalties for not complying with the regulations. The Union of Concerned Scientists describes the [origin of fuel efficiency standards in the United States](https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/brief-history-us-fuel-efficiency) as follows:\n\n>Congress first established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in 1975, largely in response to the 1973 oil embargo. CAFE standards set the average new vehicle fuel economy, as weighted by sales, that a manufacturer's fleet must achieve. \n>\n>Through the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Congress established fuel economy standards for new passenger cars starting with model year (MY) 1978. These standards were intended to roughly double the average fuel economy of the new car fleet to 27.5 mpg by model year (MY) 1985.\n\nThe EPA [began regulating greenhouse gases](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulation_of_greenhouse_gases_under_the_Clean_Air_Act) after the Supreme Court ruled in *Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency* that the EPA has the statutory authority to do so under the [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss). According to a [report from the Congressional Research Service](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45204) (CRS) the NHTSA is required to establish fuel economy standards at\n\n>the maximum feasible average fuel economy level that it decides the manufacturers can achieve in that model year\n\nwith consideration of the following four factors\n\n>technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to conserve energy\n\nAccording to the CRS report, under its regulatory authority the EPA must consider\n\n>issues of technical feasibility, cost, and available lead time\n\nUnder the Obama administration, the NHTSA and EPA jointly published Phase 1 fuel economy regulations in 2010 and Phase 2 in 2012, covering model years 2012 through 2025. In 2020, under the Trump administration, the agencies lowered the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2021 through 2026. In 2021, under the Biden administration, the EPA [issued revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-12-30/pdf/2021-27854.pdf) reducing the acceptable level of vehicle emissions for model years 2023 and later. In 2022 the NHTSA [issued separate revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf) which raised the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2024 through 2026.\n\nFrom table II-4 of the NHTSA final rule and table 4-43 of a [Regulatory Impact Analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf) of the EPA's final rule, the fuel economy estimates corresponding to each rule on the overall light vehicle fleet is shown below:\n\n| Year | NHTSA | EPA |\n|--|--|--|\n| 2023 | N/A | 41 |\n| 2024 | 40.6 | 43 |\n| 2025 | 44.2 | 46 |\n| 2026 | 49.1 | 50 |", "resc": "This resolves as the most stringent estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy (in miles per gallon) imposed by a regulatory agency in the United States in effect on January 1 of the listed year. The regulation must apply to light vehicles for sale in the United States in a comparable manner in breadth and scope to those released by the NHTSA and EPA in 2021, in the judgment of Metaculus. The value will be rounded to the nearest integer.\n\nIn the case of multiple qualifying regulations (such as those issued by NHTSA and EPA) the most stringent of the two will be used. Regulations must be enforceable, guidelines without any financial or monetary penalty, civil or criminal, will not qualify. The estimated industry-wide average used will be that characterized by the estimating agency as most reflective of the fuel economy required by the imposed CAFE rules including any allowances expected to be taken, as interpreted by Metaculus. For example, the usage of AC leakage credits would be included, where possible, as described in section 4.2.1 of the [EPA's regulatory impact analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf), but estimates of the \"real-world\" values would not be used, where possible.\n\nIf no such regulation exists this resolves as **0**. In the event the estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy requirement associated with a regulation is not reported by the regulatory agency for a listed year Metaculus may use estimates from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that are comparable in methodology to the past NHTSA or EPA estimates, or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**. If fuel economy is reported in a unit other than miles per gallon Metaculus may convert it to miles per gallon or [miles per gallon gasoline equivalent](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miles_per_gallon_gasoline_equivalent) (MPGe).", "lower_25": "47.2", "median": "56.0", "upper_75": "63.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 136k people will be employed in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "The [growth of electric vehicles](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) may have significant effects on the US auto industry, including employment. The impact on US employment in the electric vehicle industry may [depend on trade policy](https://www.epi.org/press/the-shift-to-all-electric-vehicles-could-create-over-150000-jobs-by-2030-if-policymakers-make-smart-investments-to-secure-u-s-leadership-in-the-auto-sector/) and [domestic manufacturing incentives](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/19/fact-sheet-the-inflation-reduction-act-supports-workers-and-families/).\n\nThe US Department of Energy publishes the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER), a report tracking US employment in the energy industry. The USEER was first published in 2016 and has been published annually since, though the 2018 through 2020 USEER was not published by the Department of Energy but was instead [published by a collaboration between non-governmental organizations](https://www.usenergyjobs.org/about).\n\nThe USEER [2021](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/USEER%202021%20Main%20Body.pdf) and [2022](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/USEER%202022%20National%20Report_1.pdf) reports published electric vehicle industry employment figures for the previous year as shown:\n\n* 2020: 83,733\n* 2021: 105,694", "resc": "This resolves as the number of employees in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years, according to the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER). The first value reported by USEER for a listed year will be used, later revisions will be immaterial.\n\nIn the event the USEER is no longer published or does not publish employment data specific to the electric vehicle industry an alternate source producing comparable estimates to the last available data may be used. If no satisfactory alternate source is available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "121k", "median": "136k", "upper_75": "154k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 33.8% of light vehicles sold in California in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopts its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.\n\nIn 2021, 12.41% of light-duty vehicle sales in California were ZEVs (9.12% battery electric, 3.13% plug-in hybrid, and 0.16% hydrogen fuel cell). The ZEV share for 2022 through the first three quarters is 17.70%. A light-duty vehicle is one with a [gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) up to 10,000 pounds](https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/light-duty-vehicle-emissions#:~:text=The%20light%20duty%20smog%20regulations%20cover%20passenger%20vehicles%20with%20a%20gross%20vehicle%20weight%20rating%20(GVWR)%20up%20to%2010%2C000%20pounds).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percentage of light vehicles sold in California in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the [California Energy Commission](https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/zero-emission-vehicle-and-infrastructure-statistics/new-zev-sales). Zero-emission vehicles will be battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the California energy commission; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the California Energy commission no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "24.9", "median": "29.2", "upper_75": "33.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that zero-emission vehicle federal fleet procurements in the United States will account for 21.9% of the total procurements in the following fiscal years (2025)?", "desc": "On December 8, 2021, President Biden signed [Executive Order 14057](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/12/08/executive-order-on-catalyzing-clean-energy-industries-and-jobs-through-federal-sustainability/), which set a goal that the Federal Government should achieve\n\n>100 percent zero-emission vehicle acquisitions by 2035, including 100 percent zero-emission light-duty vehicle acquisitions by 2027\n\nSpecifically for its 2027 goal the Executive Order states\n\n>Each agency's light-duty vehicle acquisitions shall be zero-emission vehicles by the end of fiscal year 2027.\n\nThe Federal Government publishes annual statistics about its fleet makeup and acquisitions in the [Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). Table 5-4 from the FFR Open Data Set provided for fiscal year 2021 shows vehicle acquisitions by fuel type for 2017 through 2021:\n\n| **Fuel Type** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** |\n| ----------------------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- |\n| Gasoline | 23,312 | 26,309 | 21,445 | 28,055 | 38,229 |\n| Diesel | 5,626 | 5,970 | 7,339 | 5,551 | 4,258 |\n| Gasoline Hybrid | 4,475 | 4,814 | 3,207 | 3,533 | 3,246 |\n| Diesel Hybrid | 10 | 23 | 8 | 12 | 29 |\n| Gasoline LGHG | 945 | 1,672 | 1,128 | 1,488 | 1,225 |\n| Diesel LGHG | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |\n| Gasoline Plug-in Hybrid | 191 | 302 | 212 | 188 | 119 |\n| Diesel Plug-in Hybrid | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Compressed Natural Gas | 12 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 8 |\n| E-85 | 24,110 | 15,252 | 17,306 | 10,366 | 8,565 |\n| Electric | 303 | 194 | 167 | 111 | 138 |\n| Hydrogen | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Natural Gas | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Petroleum Gas | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |\n| **Grand Total** | **58,986** | **54,549** | **50,830** | **49,315** | **55,818** |", "resc": "This resolves as the percent of United States federal fleet procurements in the listed fiscal year which are zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs), according to the [US Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). The number of zero-emission vehicles acquired in a fiscal year will be compared to the total number of vehicles acquired to arrive at the percentage. As of November 30, 2022, the fiscal year 2021 data set shows that for fiscal year 2021 this value would be 0.46% (138 electric vehicles plus 119 gasoline plug-in hybrid plus 0 diesel plug-in hybrid plus 0 hydrogen for a total of 257 ZEVs compared to 55,818 total vehicles acquired).\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. In the event the federal government no longer reports vehicle acquisitions by fuel type this question resolves as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "14.1", "median": "21.9", "upper_75": "34.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated chance that a regulatory agency in the United States will impose a fleet average fuel economy of 49.5 mpg for light vehicles manufactured in the following years?", "desc": "Currently in the United States vehicle fuel economy is regulated by the the [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Highway_Traffic_Safety_Administration) (NHTSA) and the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Regulations apply to vehicles sold in the US on the basis of the average fuel economy and emissions of the manufacturer's fleet, and manufacturers may face penalties for not complying with the regulations. The Union of Concerned Scientists describes the [origin of fuel efficiency standards in the United States](https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/brief-history-us-fuel-efficiency) as follows:\n\n>Congress first established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in 1975, largely in response to the 1973 oil embargo. CAFE standards set the average new vehicle fuel economy, as weighted by sales, that a manufacturer's fleet must achieve. \n>\n>Through the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Congress established fuel economy standards for new passenger cars starting with model year (MY) 1978. These standards were intended to roughly double the average fuel economy of the new car fleet to 27.5 mpg by model year (MY) 1985.\n\nThe EPA [began regulating greenhouse gases](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulation_of_greenhouse_gases_under_the_Clean_Air_Act) after the Supreme Court ruled in *Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency* that the EPA has the statutory authority to do so under the [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss). According to a [report from the Congressional Research Service](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45204) (CRS) the NHTSA is required to establish fuel economy standards at\n\n>the maximum feasible average fuel economy level that it decides the manufacturers can achieve in that model year\n\nwith consideration of the following four factors\n\n>technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to conserve energy\n\nAccording to the CRS report, under its regulatory authority the EPA must consider\n\n>issues of technical feasibility, cost, and available lead time\n\nUnder the Obama administration, the NHTSA and EPA jointly published Phase 1 fuel economy regulations in 2010 and Phase 2 in 2012, covering model years 2012 through 2025. In 2020, under the Trump administration, the agencies lowered the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2021 through 2026. In 2021, under the Biden administration, the EPA [issued revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-12-30/pdf/2021-27854.pdf) reducing the acceptable level of vehicle emissions for model years 2023 and later. In 2022 the NHTSA [issued separate revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf) which raised the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2024 through 2026.\n\nFrom table II-4 of the NHTSA final rule and table 4-43 of a [Regulatory Impact Analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf) of the EPA's final rule, the fuel economy estimates corresponding to each rule on the overall light vehicle fleet is shown below:\n\n| Year | NHTSA | EPA |\n|--|--|--|\n| 2023 | N/A | 41 |\n| 2024 | 40.6 | 43 |\n| 2025 | 44.2 | 46 |\n| 2026 | 49.1 | 50 |", "resc": "This resolves as the most stringent estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy (in miles per gallon) imposed by a regulatory agency in the United States in effect on January 1 of the listed year. The regulation must apply to light vehicles for sale in the United States in a comparable manner in breadth and scope to those released by the NHTSA and EPA in 2021, in the judgment of Metaculus. The value will be rounded to the nearest integer.\n\nIn the case of multiple qualifying regulations (such as those issued by NHTSA and EPA) the most stringent of the two will be used. Regulations must be enforceable, guidelines without any financial or monetary penalty, civil or criminal, will not qualify. The estimated industry-wide average used will be that characterized by the estimating agency as most reflective of the fuel economy required by the imposed CAFE rules including any allowances expected to be taken, as interpreted by Metaculus. For example, the usage of AC leakage credits would be included, where possible, as described in section 4.2.1 of the [EPA's regulatory impact analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf), but estimates of the \"real-world\" values would not be used, where possible.\n\nIf no such regulation exists this resolves as **0**. In the event the estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy requirement associated with a regulation is not reported by the regulatory agency for a listed year Metaculus may use estimates from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that are comparable in methodology to the past NHTSA or EPA estimates, or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**. If fuel economy is reported in a unit other than miles per gallon Metaculus may convert it to miles per gallon or [miles per gallon gasoline equivalent](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miles_per_gallon_gasoline_equivalent) (MPGe).", "lower_25": "41.3", "median": "45.1", "upper_75": "49.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated chance that a regulatory agency in the United States will impose a fleet average fuel economy of 49.5 mpg for light vehicles manufactured in the following years?", "desc": "Currently in the United States vehicle fuel economy is regulated by the the [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Highway_Traffic_Safety_Administration) (NHTSA) and the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Regulations apply to vehicles sold in the US on the basis of the average fuel economy and emissions of the manufacturer's fleet, and manufacturers may face penalties for not complying with the regulations. The Union of Concerned Scientists describes the [origin of fuel efficiency standards in the United States](https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/brief-history-us-fuel-efficiency) as follows:\n\n>Congress first established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in 1975, largely in response to the 1973 oil embargo. CAFE standards set the average new vehicle fuel economy, as weighted by sales, that a manufacturer's fleet must achieve. \n>\n>Through the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Congress established fuel economy standards for new passenger cars starting with model year (MY) 1978. These standards were intended to roughly double the average fuel economy of the new car fleet to 27.5 mpg by model year (MY) 1985.\n\nThe EPA [began regulating greenhouse gases](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulation_of_greenhouse_gases_under_the_Clean_Air_Act) after the Supreme Court ruled in *Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency* that the EPA has the statutory authority to do so under the [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss). According to a [report from the Congressional Research Service](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45204) (CRS) the NHTSA is required to establish fuel economy standards at\n\n>the maximum feasible average fuel economy level that it decides the manufacturers can achieve in that model year\n\nwith consideration of the following four factors\n\n>technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to conserve energy\n\nAccording to the CRS report, under its regulatory authority the EPA must consider\n\n>issues of technical feasibility, cost, and available lead time\n\nUnder the Obama administration, the NHTSA and EPA jointly published Phase 1 fuel economy regulations in 2010 and Phase 2 in 2012, covering model years 2012 through 2025. In 2020, under the Trump administration, the agencies lowered the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2021 through 2026. In 2021, under the Biden administration, the EPA [issued revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-12-30/pdf/2021-27854.pdf) reducing the acceptable level of vehicle emissions for model years 2023 and later. In 2022 the NHTSA [issued separate revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf) which raised the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2024 through 2026.\n\nFrom table II-4 of the NHTSA final rule and table 4-43 of a [Regulatory Impact Analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf) of the EPA's final rule, the fuel economy estimates corresponding to each rule on the overall light vehicle fleet is shown below:\n\n| Year | NHTSA | EPA |\n|--|--|--|\n| 2023 | N/A | 41 |\n| 2024 | 40.6 | 43 |\n| 2025 | 44.2 | 46 |\n| 2026 | 49.1 | 50 |", "resc": "This resolves as the most stringent estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy (in miles per gallon) imposed by a regulatory agency in the United States in effect on January 1 of the listed year. The regulation must apply to light vehicles for sale in the United States in a comparable manner in breadth and scope to those released by the NHTSA and EPA in 2021, in the judgment of Metaculus. The value will be rounded to the nearest integer.\n\nIn the case of multiple qualifying regulations (such as those issued by NHTSA and EPA) the most stringent of the two will be used. Regulations must be enforceable, guidelines without any financial or monetary penalty, civil or criminal, will not qualify. The estimated industry-wide average used will be that characterized by the estimating agency as most reflective of the fuel economy required by the imposed CAFE rules including any allowances expected to be taken, as interpreted by Metaculus. For example, the usage of AC leakage credits would be included, where possible, as described in section 4.2.1 of the [EPA's regulatory impact analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf), but estimates of the \"real-world\" values would not be used, where possible.\n\nIf no such regulation exists this resolves as **0**. In the event the estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy requirement associated with a regulation is not reported by the regulatory agency for a listed year Metaculus may use estimates from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that are comparable in methodology to the past NHTSA or EPA estimates, or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**. If fuel economy is reported in a unit other than miles per gallon Metaculus may convert it to miles per gallon or [miles per gallon gasoline equivalent](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miles_per_gallon_gasoline_equivalent) (MPGe).", "lower_25": "41.3", "median": "45.1", "upper_75": "49.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated fleet average fuel economy (in mpg) imposed by a regulatory agency in the United States for light vehicles manufactured in the following years? (2030)\n\nKeyword: 42.4\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that a regulatory agency in the United States will impose a fleet average fuel economy of 42.4 mpg for light vehicles manufactured in the following years? (2030)", "desc": "Currently in the United States vehicle fuel economy is regulated by the the [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Highway_Traffic_Safety_Administration) (NHTSA) and the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Regulations apply to vehicles sold in the US on the basis of the average fuel economy and emissions of the manufacturer's fleet, and manufacturers may face penalties for not complying with the regulations. The Union of Concerned Scientists describes the [origin of fuel efficiency standards in the United States](https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/brief-history-us-fuel-efficiency) as follows:\n\n>Congress first established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in 1975, largely in response to the 1973 oil embargo. CAFE standards set the average new vehicle fuel economy, as weighted by sales, that a manufacturer's fleet must achieve. \n>\n>Through the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Congress established fuel economy standards for new passenger cars starting with model year (MY) 1978. These standards were intended to roughly double the average fuel economy of the new car fleet to 27.5 mpg by model year (MY) 1985.\n\nThe EPA [began regulating greenhouse gases](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulation_of_greenhouse_gases_under_the_Clean_Air_Act) after the Supreme Court ruled in *Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency* that the EPA has the statutory authority to do so under the [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss). According to a [report from the Congressional Research Service](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45204) (CRS) the NHTSA is required to establish fuel economy standards at\n\n>the maximum feasible average fuel economy level that it decides the manufacturers can achieve in that model year\n\nwith consideration of the following four factors\n\n>technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to conserve energy\n\nAccording to the CRS report, under its regulatory authority the EPA must consider\n\n>issues of technical feasibility, cost, and available lead time\n\nUnder the Obama administration, the NHTSA and EPA jointly published Phase 1 fuel economy regulations in 2010 and Phase 2 in 2012, covering model years 2012 through 2025. In 2020, under the Trump administration, the agencies lowered the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2021 through 2026. In 2021, under the Biden administration, the EPA [issued revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-12-30/pdf/2021-27854.pdf) reducing the acceptable level of vehicle emissions for model years 2023 and later. In 2022 the NHTSA [issued separate revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf) which raised the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2024 through 2026.\n\nFrom table II-4 of the NHTSA final rule and table 4-43 of a [Regulatory Impact Analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf) of the EPA's final rule, the fuel economy estimates corresponding to each rule on the overall light vehicle fleet is shown below:\n\n| Year | NHTSA | EPA |\n|--|--|--|\n| 2023 | N/A | 41 |\n| 2024 | 40.6 | 43 |\n| 2025 | 44.2 | 46 |\n| 2026 | 49.1 | 50 |", "resc": "This resolves as the most stringent estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy (in miles per gallon) imposed by a regulatory agency in the United States in effect on January 1 of the listed year. The regulation must apply to light vehicles for sale in the United States in a comparable manner in breadth and scope to those released by the NHTSA and EPA in 2021, in the judgment of Metaculus. The value will be rounded to the nearest integer.\n\nIn the case of multiple qualifying regulations (such as those issued by NHTSA and EPA) the most stringent of the two will be used. Regulations must be enforceable, guidelines without any financial or monetary penalty, civil or criminal, will not qualify. The estimated industry-wide average used will be that characterized by the estimating agency as most reflective of the fuel economy required by the imposed CAFE rules including any allowances expected to be taken, as interpreted by Metaculus. For example, the usage of AC leakage credits would be included, where possible, as described in section 4.2.1 of the [EPA's regulatory impact analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf), but estimates of the \"real-world\" values would not be used, where possible.\n\nIf no such regulation exists this resolves as **0**. In the event the estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy requirement associated with a regulation is not reported by the regulatory agency for a listed year Metaculus may use estimates from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that are comparable in methodology to the past NHTSA or EPA estimates, or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**. If fuel economy is reported in a unit other than miles per gallon Metaculus may convert it to miles per gallon or [miles per gallon gasoline equivalent](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miles_per_gallon_gasoline_equivalent) (MPGe).", "lower_25": "42.4", "median": "50.2", "upper_75": "56.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated fleet average fuel economy (in mpg) imposed by a regulatory agency in the United States for light vehicles manufactured in the following years? (2025)\n\nKeyword: 41.3\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that a regulatory agency in the United States will impose a fleet average fuel economy of 41.3 mpg for light vehicles manufactured in the following years? (2025)", "desc": "Currently in the United States vehicle fuel economy is regulated by the the [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Highway_Traffic_Safety_Administration) (NHTSA) and the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Regulations apply to vehicles sold in the US on the basis of the average fuel economy and emissions of the manufacturer's fleet, and manufacturers may face penalties for not complying with the regulations. The Union of Concerned Scientists describes the [origin of fuel efficiency standards in the United States](https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/brief-history-us-fuel-efficiency) as follows:\n\n>Congress first established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in 1975, largely in response to the 1973 oil embargo. CAFE standards set the average new vehicle fuel economy, as weighted by sales, that a manufacturer's fleet must achieve. \n>\n>Through the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Congress established fuel economy standards for new passenger cars starting with model year (MY) 1978. These standards were intended to roughly double the average fuel economy of the new car fleet to 27.5 mpg by model year (MY) 1985.\n\nThe EPA [began regulating greenhouse gases](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulation_of_greenhouse_gases_under_the_Clean_Air_Act) after the Supreme Court ruled in *Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency* that the EPA has the statutory authority to do so under the [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss). According to a [report from the Congressional Research Service](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45204) (CRS) the NHTSA is required to establish fuel economy standards at\n\n>the maximum feasible average fuel economy level that it decides the manufacturers can achieve in that model year\n\nwith consideration of the following four factors\n\n>technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to conserve energy\n\nAccording to the CRS report, under its regulatory authority the EPA must consider\n\n>issues of technical feasibility, cost, and available lead time\n\nUnder the Obama administration, the NHTSA and EPA jointly published Phase 1 fuel economy regulations in 2010 and Phase 2 in 2012, covering model years 2012 through 2025. In 2020, under the Trump administration, the agencies lowered the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2021 through 2026. In 2021, under the Biden administration, the EPA [issued revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-12-30/pdf/2021-27854.pdf) reducing the acceptable level of vehicle emissions for model years 2023 and later. In 2022 the NHTSA [issued separate revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf) which raised the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2024 through 2026.\n\nFrom table II-4 of the NHTSA final rule and table 4-43 of a [Regulatory Impact Analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf) of the EPA's final rule, the fuel economy estimates corresponding to each rule on the overall light vehicle fleet is shown below:\n\n| Year | NHTSA | EPA |\n|--|--|--|\n| 2023 | N/A | 41 |\n| 2024 | 40.6 | 43 |\n| 2025 | 44.2 | 46 |\n| 2026 | 49.1 | 50 |", "resc": "This resolves as the most stringent estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy (in miles per gallon) imposed by a regulatory agency in the United States in effect on January 1 of the listed year. The regulation must apply to light vehicles for sale in the United States in a comparable manner in breadth and scope to those released by the NHTSA and EPA in 2021, in the judgment of Metaculus. The value will be rounded to the nearest integer.\n\nIn the case of multiple qualifying regulations (such as those issued by NHTSA and EPA) the most stringent of the two will be used. Regulations must be enforceable, guidelines without any financial or monetary penalty, civil or criminal, will not qualify. The estimated industry-wide average used will be that characterized by the estimating agency as most reflective of the fuel economy required by the imposed CAFE rules including any allowances expected to be taken, as interpreted by Metaculus. For example, the usage of AC leakage credits would be included, where possible, as described in section 4.2.1 of the [EPA's regulatory impact analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf), but estimates of the \"real-world\" values would not be used, where possible.\n\nIf no such regulation exists this resolves as **0**. In the event the estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy requirement associated with a regulation is not reported by the regulatory agency for a listed year Metaculus may use estimates from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that are comparable in methodology to the past NHTSA or EPA estimates, or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**. If fuel economy is reported in a unit other than miles per gallon Metaculus may convert it to miles per gallon or [miles per gallon gasoline equivalent](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miles_per_gallon_gasoline_equivalent) (MPGe).", "lower_25": "41.3", "median": "45.1", "upper_75": "49.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 33.8% of light vehicles sold in California in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopts its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.\n\nIn 2021, 12.41% of light-duty vehicle sales in California were ZEVs (9.12% battery electric, 3.13% plug-in hybrid, and 0.16% hydrogen fuel cell). The ZEV share for 2022 through the first three quarters is 17.70%. A light-duty vehicle is one with a [gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) up to 10,000 pounds](https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/light-duty-vehicle-emissions#:~:text=The%20light%20duty%20smog%20regulations%20cover%20passenger%20vehicles%20with%20a%20gross%20vehicle%20weight%20rating%20(GVWR)%20up%20to%2010%2C000%20pounds).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percentage of light vehicles sold in California in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the [California Energy Commission](https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/zero-emission-vehicle-and-infrastructure-statistics/new-zev-sales). Zero-emission vehicles will be battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the California energy commission; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the California Energy commission no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "24.9", "median": "29.2", "upper_75": "33.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 96.6% of light vehicles sold in California in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles? (2035)", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopts its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.\n\nIn 2021, 12.41% of light-duty vehicle sales in California were ZEVs (9.12% battery electric, 3.13% plug-in hybrid, and 0.16% hydrogen fuel cell). The ZEV share for 2022 through the first three quarters is 17.70%. A light-duty vehicle is one with a [gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) up to 10,000 pounds](https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/light-duty-vehicle-emissions#:~:text=The%20light%20duty%20smog%20regulations%20cover%20passenger%20vehicles%20with%20a%20gross%20vehicle%20weight%20rating%20(GVWR)%20up%20to%2010%2C000%20pounds).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percentage of light vehicles sold in California in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the [California Energy Commission](https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/zero-emission-vehicle-and-infrastructure-statistics/new-zev-sales). Zero-emission vehicles will be battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the California energy commission; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the California Energy commission no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "83.9", "median": "91.9", "upper_75": "96.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated fleet average fuel economy (in mpg) imposed by a regulatory agency in the United States for light vehicles manufactured in the following years? (2030)\n\nKeyword: 42.4\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that a regulatory agency in the United States will impose a fleet average fuel economy of 42.4 mpg for light vehicles manufactured in the following years? (2030)", "desc": "Currently in the United States vehicle fuel economy is regulated by the the [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Highway_Traffic_Safety_Administration) (NHTSA) and the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Regulations apply to vehicles sold in the US on the basis of the average fuel economy and emissions of the manufacturer's fleet, and manufacturers may face penalties for not complying with the regulations. The Union of Concerned Scientists describes the [origin of fuel efficiency standards in the United States](https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/brief-history-us-fuel-efficiency) as follows:\n\n>Congress first established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in 1975, largely in response to the 1973 oil embargo. CAFE standards set the average new vehicle fuel economy, as weighted by sales, that a manufacturer's fleet must achieve. \n>\n>Through the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Congress established fuel economy standards for new passenger cars starting with model year (MY) 1978. These standards were intended to roughly double the average fuel economy of the new car fleet to 27.5 mpg by model year (MY) 1985.\n\nThe EPA [began regulating greenhouse gases](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulation_of_greenhouse_gases_under_the_Clean_Air_Act) after the Supreme Court ruled in *Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency* that the EPA has the statutory authority to do so under the [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss). According to a [report from the Congressional Research Service](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45204) (CRS) the NHTSA is required to establish fuel economy standards at\n\n>the maximum feasible average fuel economy level that it decides the manufacturers can achieve in that model year\n\nwith consideration of the following four factors\n\n>technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to conserve energy\n\nAccording to the CRS report, under its regulatory authority the EPA must consider\n\n>issues of technical feasibility, cost, and available lead time\n\nUnder the Obama administration, the NHTSA and EPA jointly published Phase 1 fuel economy regulations in 2010 and Phase 2 in 2012, covering model years 2012 through 2025. In 2020, under the Trump administration, the agencies lowered the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2021 through 2026. In 2021, under the Biden administration, the EPA [issued revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-12-30/pdf/2021-27854.pdf) reducing the acceptable level of vehicle emissions for model years 2023 and later. In 2022 the NHTSA [issued separate revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf) which raised the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2024 through 2026.\n\nFrom table II-4 of the NHTSA final rule and table 4-43 of a [Regulatory Impact Analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf) of the EPA's final rule, the fuel economy estimates corresponding to each rule on the overall light vehicle fleet is shown below:\n\n| Year | NHTSA | EPA |\n|--|--|--|\n| 2023 | N/A | 41 |\n| 2024 | 40.6 | 43 |\n| 2025 | 44.2 | 46 |\n| 2026 | 49.1 | 50 |", "resc": "This resolves as the most stringent estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy (in miles per gallon) imposed by a regulatory agency in the United States in effect on January 1 of the listed year. The regulation must apply to light vehicles for sale in the United States in a comparable manner in breadth and scope to those released by the NHTSA and EPA in 2021, in the judgment of Metaculus. The value will be rounded to the nearest integer.\n\nIn the case of multiple qualifying regulations (such as those issued by NHTSA and EPA) the most stringent of the two will be used. Regulations must be enforceable, guidelines without any financial or monetary penalty, civil or criminal, will not qualify. The estimated industry-wide average used will be that characterized by the estimating agency as most reflective of the fuel economy required by the imposed CAFE rules including any allowances expected to be taken, as interpreted by Metaculus. For example, the usage of AC leakage credits would be included, where possible, as described in section 4.2.1 of the [EPA's regulatory impact analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf), but estimates of the \"real-world\" values would not be used, where possible.\n\nIf no such regulation exists this resolves as **0**. In the event the estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy requirement associated with a regulation is not reported by the regulatory agency for a listed year Metaculus may use estimates from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that are comparable in methodology to the past NHTSA or EPA estimates, or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**. If fuel economy is reported in a unit other than miles per gallon Metaculus may convert it to miles per gallon or [miles per gallon gasoline equivalent](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miles_per_gallon_gasoline_equivalent) (MPGe).", "lower_25": "42.4", "median": "50.2", "upper_75": "56.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 89.2% of light vehicles sold in California in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles? (2030)", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopts its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.\n\nIn 2021, 12.41% of light-duty vehicle sales in California were ZEVs (9.12% battery electric, 3.13% plug-in hybrid, and 0.16% hydrogen fuel cell). The ZEV share for 2022 through the first three quarters is 17.70%. A light-duty vehicle is one with a [gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) up to 10,000 pounds](https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/light-duty-vehicle-emissions#:~:text=The%20light%20duty%20smog%20regulations%20cover%20passenger%20vehicles%20with%20a%20gross%20vehicle%20weight%20rating%20(GVWR)%20up%20to%2010%2C000%20pounds).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percentage of light vehicles sold in California in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the [California Energy Commission](https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/zero-emission-vehicle-and-infrastructure-statistics/new-zev-sales). Zero-emission vehicles will be battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the California energy commission; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the California Energy commission no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "65.2", "median": "75.7", "upper_75": "89.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated fleet average fuel economy (in mpg) imposed by a regulatory agency in the United States for light vehicles manufactured in the following years? (2030)\n\nKeyword: 42.4\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that a regulatory agency in the United States will impose a fleet average fuel economy of 42.4 mpg for light vehicles manufactured in the following years? (2030)", "desc": "Currently in the United States vehicle fuel economy is regulated by the the [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Highway_Traffic_Safety_Administration) (NHTSA) and the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Regulations apply to vehicles sold in the US on the basis of the average fuel economy and emissions of the manufacturer's fleet, and manufacturers may face penalties for not complying with the regulations. The Union of Concerned Scientists describes the [origin of fuel efficiency standards in the United States](https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/brief-history-us-fuel-efficiency) as follows:\n\n>Congress first established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in 1975, largely in response to the 1973 oil embargo. CAFE standards set the average new vehicle fuel economy, as weighted by sales, that a manufacturer's fleet must achieve. \n>\n>Through the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Congress established fuel economy standards for new passenger cars starting with model year (MY) 1978. These standards were intended to roughly double the average fuel economy of the new car fleet to 27.5 mpg by model year (MY) 1985.\n\nThe EPA [began regulating greenhouse gases](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulation_of_greenhouse_gases_under_the_Clean_Air_Act) after the Supreme Court ruled in *Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency* that the EPA has the statutory authority to do so under the [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss). According to a [report from the Congressional Research Service](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45204) (CRS) the NHTSA is required to establish fuel economy standards at\n\n>the maximum feasible average fuel economy level that it decides the manufacturers can achieve in that model year\n\nwith consideration of the following four factors\n\n>technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to conserve energy\n\nAccording to the CRS report, under its regulatory authority the EPA must consider\n\n>issues of technical feasibility, cost, and available lead time\n\nUnder the Obama administration, the NHTSA and EPA jointly published Phase 1 fuel economy regulations in 2010 and Phase 2 in 2012, covering model years 2012 through 2025. In 2020, under the Trump administration, the agencies lowered the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2021 through 2026. In 2021, under the Biden administration, the EPA [issued revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-12-30/pdf/2021-27854.pdf) reducing the acceptable level of vehicle emissions for model years 2023 and later. In 2022 the NHTSA [issued separate revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf) which raised the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2024 through 2026.\n\nFrom table II-4 of the NHTSA final rule and table 4-43 of a [Regulatory Impact Analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf) of the EPA's final rule, the fuel economy estimates corresponding to each rule on the overall light vehicle fleet is shown below:\n\n| Year | NHTSA | EPA |\n|--|--|--|\n| 2023 | N/A | 41 |\n| 2024 | 40.6 | 43 |\n| 2025 | 44.2 | 46 |\n| 2026 | 49.1 | 50 |", "resc": "This resolves as the most stringent estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy (in miles per gallon) imposed by a regulatory agency in the United States in effect on January 1 of the listed year. The regulation must apply to light vehicles for sale in the United States in a comparable manner in breadth and scope to those released by the NHTSA and EPA in 2021, in the judgment of Metaculus. The value will be rounded to the nearest integer.\n\nIn the case of multiple qualifying regulations (such as those issued by NHTSA and EPA) the most stringent of the two will be used. Regulations must be enforceable, guidelines without any financial or monetary penalty, civil or criminal, will not qualify. The estimated industry-wide average used will be that characterized by the estimating agency as most reflective of the fuel economy required by the imposed CAFE rules including any allowances expected to be taken, as interpreted by Metaculus. For example, the usage of AC leakage credits would be included, where possible, as described in section 4.2.1 of the [EPA's regulatory impact analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf), but estimates of the \"real-world\" values would not be used, where possible.\n\nIf no such regulation exists this resolves as **0**. In the event the estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy requirement associated with a regulation is not reported by the regulatory agency for a listed year Metaculus may use estimates from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that are comparable in methodology to the past NHTSA or EPA estimates, or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**. If fuel economy is reported in a unit other than miles per gallon Metaculus may convert it to miles per gallon or [miles per gallon gasoline equivalent](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miles_per_gallon_gasoline_equivalent) (MPGe).", "lower_25": "42.4", "median": "50.2", "upper_75": "56.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated fleet average fuel economy (in mpg) imposed by a regulatory agency in the United States for light vehicles manufactured in the following years? (2025)\n\nKeyword: 41.3\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that a regulatory agency in the United States will impose a fleet average fuel economy of 41.3 mpg for light vehicles manufactured in the following years? (2025)", "desc": "Currently in the United States vehicle fuel economy is regulated by the the [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Highway_Traffic_Safety_Administration) (NHTSA) and the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Regulations apply to vehicles sold in the US on the basis of the average fuel economy and emissions of the manufacturer's fleet, and manufacturers may face penalties for not complying with the regulations. The Union of Concerned Scientists describes the [origin of fuel efficiency standards in the United States](https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/brief-history-us-fuel-efficiency) as follows:\n\n>Congress first established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in 1975, largely in response to the 1973 oil embargo. CAFE standards set the average new vehicle fuel economy, as weighted by sales, that a manufacturer's fleet must achieve. \n>\n>Through the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Congress established fuel economy standards for new passenger cars starting with model year (MY) 1978. These standards were intended to roughly double the average fuel economy of the new car fleet to 27.5 mpg by model year (MY) 1985.\n\nThe EPA [began regulating greenhouse gases](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulation_of_greenhouse_gases_under_the_Clean_Air_Act) after the Supreme Court ruled in *Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency* that the EPA has the statutory authority to do so under the [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss). According to a [report from the Congressional Research Service](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45204) (CRS) the NHTSA is required to establish fuel economy standards at\n\n>the maximum feasible average fuel economy level that it decides the manufacturers can achieve in that model year\n\nwith consideration of the following four factors\n\n>technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to conserve energy\n\nAccording to the CRS report, under its regulatory authority the EPA must consider\n\n>issues of technical feasibility, cost, and available lead time\n\nUnder the Obama administration, the NHTSA and EPA jointly published Phase 1 fuel economy regulations in 2010 and Phase 2 in 2012, covering model years 2012 through 2025. In 2020, under the Trump administration, the agencies lowered the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2021 through 2026. In 2021, under the Biden administration, the EPA [issued revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-12-30/pdf/2021-27854.pdf) reducing the acceptable level of vehicle emissions for model years 2023 and later. In 2022 the NHTSA [issued separate revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf) which raised the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2024 through 2026.\n\nFrom table II-4 of the NHTSA final rule and table 4-43 of a [Regulatory Impact Analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf) of the EPA's final rule, the fuel economy estimates corresponding to each rule on the overall light vehicle fleet is shown below:\n\n| Year | NHTSA | EPA |\n|--|--|--|\n| 2023 | N/A | 41 |\n| 2024 | 40.6 | 43 |\n| 2025 | 44.2 | 46 |\n| 2026 | 49.1 | 50 |", "resc": "This resolves as the most stringent estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy (in miles per gallon) imposed by a regulatory agency in the United States in effect on January 1 of the listed year. The regulation must apply to light vehicles for sale in the United States in a comparable manner in breadth and scope to those released by the NHTSA and EPA in 2021, in the judgment of Metaculus. The value will be rounded to the nearest integer.\n\nIn the case of multiple qualifying regulations (such as those issued by NHTSA and EPA) the most stringent of the two will be used. Regulations must be enforceable, guidelines without any financial or monetary penalty, civil or criminal, will not qualify. The estimated industry-wide average used will be that characterized by the estimating agency as most reflective of the fuel economy required by the imposed CAFE rules including any allowances expected to be taken, as interpreted by Metaculus. For example, the usage of AC leakage credits would be included, where possible, as described in section 4.2.1 of the [EPA's regulatory impact analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf), but estimates of the \"real-world\" values would not be used, where possible.\n\nIf no such regulation exists this resolves as **0**. In the event the estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy requirement associated with a regulation is not reported by the regulatory agency for a listed year Metaculus may use estimates from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that are comparable in methodology to the past NHTSA or EPA estimates, or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**. If fuel economy is reported in a unit other than miles per gallon Metaculus may convert it to miles per gallon or [miles per gallon gasoline equivalent](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miles_per_gallon_gasoline_equivalent) (MPGe).", "lower_25": "41.3", "median": "45.1", "upper_75": "49.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated chance that a regulatory agency in the United States will impose a fleet average fuel economy of 47.2 mpg for light vehicles manufactured in the year 2035?", "desc": "Currently in the United States vehicle fuel economy is regulated by the the [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Highway_Traffic_Safety_Administration) (NHTSA) and the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Regulations apply to vehicles sold in the US on the basis of the average fuel economy and emissions of the manufacturer's fleet, and manufacturers may face penalties for not complying with the regulations. The Union of Concerned Scientists describes the [origin of fuel efficiency standards in the United States](https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/brief-history-us-fuel-efficiency) as follows:\n\n>Congress first established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in 1975, largely in response to the 1973 oil embargo. CAFE standards set the average new vehicle fuel economy, as weighted by sales, that a manufacturer's fleet must achieve. \n>\n>Through the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Congress established fuel economy standards for new passenger cars starting with model year (MY) 1978. These standards were intended to roughly double the average fuel economy of the new car fleet to 27.5 mpg by model year (MY) 1985.\n\nThe EPA [began regulating greenhouse gases](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulation_of_greenhouse_gases_under_the_Clean_Air_Act) after the Supreme Court ruled in *Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency* that the EPA has the statutory authority to do so under the [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss). According to a [report from the Congressional Research Service](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45204) (CRS) the NHTSA is required to establish fuel economy standards at\n\n>the maximum feasible average fuel economy level that it decides the manufacturers can achieve in that model year\n\nwith consideration of the following four factors\n\n>technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to conserve energy\n\nAccording to the CRS report, under its regulatory authority the EPA must consider\n\n>issues of technical feasibility, cost, and available lead time\n\nUnder the Obama administration, the NHTSA and EPA jointly published Phase 1 fuel economy regulations in 2010 and Phase 2 in 2012, covering model years 2012 through 2025. In 2020, under the Trump administration, the agencies lowered the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2021 through 2026. In 2021, under the Biden administration, the EPA [issued revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-12-30/pdf/2021-27854.pdf) reducing the acceptable level of vehicle emissions for model years 2023 and later. In 2022 the NHTSA [issued separate revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf) which raised the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2024 through 2026.\n\nFrom table II-4 of the NHTSA final rule and table 4-43 of a [Regulatory Impact Analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf) of the EPA's final rule, the fuel economy estimates corresponding to each rule on the overall light vehicle fleet is shown below:\n\n| Year | NHTSA | EPA |\n|--|--|--|\n| 2023 | N/A | 41 |\n| 2024 | 40.6 | 43 |\n| 2025 | 44.2 | 46 |\n| 2026 | 49.1 | 50 |", "resc": "This resolves as the most stringent estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy (in miles per gallon) imposed by a regulatory agency in the United States in effect on January 1 of the listed year. The regulation must apply to light vehicles for sale in the United States in a comparable manner in breadth and scope to those released by the NHTSA and EPA in 2021, in the judgment of Metaculus. The value will be rounded to the nearest integer.\n\nIn the case of multiple qualifying regulations (such as those issued by NHTSA and EPA) the most stringent of the two will be used. Regulations must be enforceable, guidelines without any financial or monetary penalty, civil or criminal, will not qualify. The estimated industry-wide average used will be that characterized by the estimating agency as most reflective of the fuel economy required by the imposed CAFE rules including any allowances expected to be taken, as interpreted by Metaculus. For example, the usage of AC leakage credits would be included, where possible, as described in section 4.2.1 of the [EPA's regulatory impact analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf), but estimates of the \"real-world\" values would not be used, where possible.\n\nIf no such regulation exists this resolves as **0**. In the event the estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy requirement associated with a regulation is not reported by the regulatory agency for a listed year Metaculus may use estimates from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that are comparable in methodology to the past NHTSA or EPA estimates, or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**. If fuel economy is reported in a unit other than miles per gallon Metaculus may convert it to miles per gallon or [miles per gallon gasoline equivalent](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miles_per_gallon_gasoline_equivalent) (MPGe).", "lower_25": "47.2", "median": "56.0", "upper_75": "63.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 96.6% of light vehicles sold in California in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles? (2035)", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopts its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.\n\nIn 2021, 12.41% of light-duty vehicle sales in California were ZEVs (9.12% battery electric, 3.13% plug-in hybrid, and 0.16% hydrogen fuel cell). The ZEV share for 2022 through the first three quarters is 17.70%. A light-duty vehicle is one with a [gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) up to 10,000 pounds](https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/light-duty-vehicle-emissions#:~:text=The%20light%20duty%20smog%20regulations%20cover%20passenger%20vehicles%20with%20a%20gross%20vehicle%20weight%20rating%20(GVWR)%20up%20to%2010%2C000%20pounds).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percentage of light vehicles sold in California in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the [California Energy Commission](https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/zero-emission-vehicle-and-infrastructure-statistics/new-zev-sales). Zero-emission vehicles will be battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the California energy commission; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the California Energy commission no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "83.9", "median": "91.9", "upper_75": "96.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 41.7% of light vehicles sold in California in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopts its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.\n\nIn 2021, 12.41% of light-duty vehicle sales in California were ZEVs (9.12% battery electric, 3.13% plug-in hybrid, and 0.16% hydrogen fuel cell). The ZEV share for 2022 through the first three quarters is 17.70%. A light-duty vehicle is one with a [gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) up to 10,000 pounds](https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/light-duty-vehicle-emissions#:~:text=The%20light%20duty%20smog%20regulations%20cover%20passenger%20vehicles%20with%20a%20gross%20vehicle%20weight%20rating%20(GVWR)%20up%20to%2010%2C000%20pounds).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percentage of light vehicles sold in California in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the [California Energy Commission](https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/zero-emission-vehicle-and-infrastructure-statistics/new-zev-sales). Zero-emission vehicles will be battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the California energy commission; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the California Energy commission no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "27.1", "median": "34.0", "upper_75": "41.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States will be 3.05 in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US on the following dates?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11763/real-price-of-gas-in-us-over-time/)\n\n---\n\nSome observers have noted a potential relationship between gas prices and electric vehicle adoption, where [high gas prices may increase interest in purchasing an electric vehicle](https://time.com/6173178/high-gas-prices-electric-vehicles/). In addition to currently having a lower fuel cost per mile in most US states, electricity rates are generally more stable than gas prices. In its [Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), Argonne National Laboratory provides the chart below, showing hybrid electric vehicle (HEV), plug-in electric vehicle (PEV), and gasoline prices over time.\n\n\"Monthly\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail gasoline prices in its chart [US Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/gas_proc-methods.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a weekly survey of retail gasoline outlets, with prices weighted by the annual volume sold by each outlet. According to the notes section of the [tabular data](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_GND_DCUS_NUS_A.htm), monthly and annual figures are simple averages of the weekly data.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the price of gas (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined by the Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported annually, provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.05", "median": "3.44", "upper_75": "3.84", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States will be 4.86 in the year 2035?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US on the following dates?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11763/real-price-of-gas-in-us-over-time/)\n\n---\n\nSome observers have noted a potential relationship between gas prices and electric vehicle adoption, where [high gas prices may increase interest in purchasing an electric vehicle](https://time.com/6173178/high-gas-prices-electric-vehicles/). In addition to currently having a lower fuel cost per mile in most US states, electricity rates are generally more stable than gas prices. In its [Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), Argonne National Laboratory provides the chart below, showing hybrid electric vehicle (HEV), plug-in electric vehicle (PEV), and gasoline prices over time.\n\n\"Monthly\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail gasoline prices in its chart [US Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/gas_proc-methods.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a weekly survey of retail gasoline outlets, with prices weighted by the annual volume sold by each outlet. According to the notes section of the [tabular data](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_GND_DCUS_NUS_A.htm), monthly and annual figures are simple averages of the weekly data.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the price of gas (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined by the Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported annually, provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.08", "median": "4.86", "upper_75": "6.43", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States will be 3.05 in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US on the following dates?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11763/real-price-of-gas-in-us-over-time/)\n\n---\n\nSome observers have noted a potential relationship between gas prices and electric vehicle adoption, where [high gas prices may increase interest in purchasing an electric vehicle](https://time.com/6173178/high-gas-prices-electric-vehicles/). In addition to currently having a lower fuel cost per mile in most US states, electricity rates are generally more stable than gas prices. In its [Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), Argonne National Laboratory provides the chart below, showing hybrid electric vehicle (HEV), plug-in electric vehicle (PEV), and gasoline prices over time.\n\n\"Monthly\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail gasoline prices in its chart [US Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/gas_proc-methods.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a weekly survey of retail gasoline outlets, with prices weighted by the annual volume sold by each outlet. According to the notes section of the [tabular data](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_GND_DCUS_NUS_A.htm), monthly and annual figures are simple averages of the weekly data.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the price of gas (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined by the Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported annually, provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.05", "median": "3.44", "upper_75": "3.84", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States will be 4.22 in the year 2025?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US on the following dates?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11763/real-price-of-gas-in-us-over-time/)\n\n---\n\nSome observers have noted a potential relationship between gas prices and electric vehicle adoption, where [high gas prices may increase interest in purchasing an electric vehicle](https://time.com/6173178/high-gas-prices-electric-vehicles/). In addition to currently having a lower fuel cost per mile in most US states, electricity rates are generally more stable than gas prices. In its [Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), Argonne National Laboratory provides the chart below, showing hybrid electric vehicle (HEV), plug-in electric vehicle (PEV), and gasoline prices over time.\n\n\"Monthly\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail gasoline prices in its chart [US Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/gas_proc-methods.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a weekly survey of retail gasoline outlets, with prices weighted by the annual volume sold by each outlet. According to the notes section of the [tabular data](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_GND_DCUS_NUS_A.htm), monthly and annual figures are simple averages of the weekly data.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the price of gas (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined by the Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported annually, provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.20", "median": "3.72", "upper_75": "4.22", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States will be 4.22 in the year 2025?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US on the following dates?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11763/real-price-of-gas-in-us-over-time/)\n\n---\n\nSome observers have noted a potential relationship between gas prices and electric vehicle adoption, where [high gas prices may increase interest in purchasing an electric vehicle](https://time.com/6173178/high-gas-prices-electric-vehicles/). In addition to currently having a lower fuel cost per mile in most US states, electricity rates are generally more stable than gas prices. In its [Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), Argonne National Laboratory provides the chart below, showing hybrid electric vehicle (HEV), plug-in electric vehicle (PEV), and gasoline prices over time.\n\n\"Monthly\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail gasoline prices in its chart [US Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/gas_proc-methods.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a weekly survey of retail gasoline outlets, with prices weighted by the annual volume sold by each outlet. According to the notes section of the [tabular data](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_GND_DCUS_NUS_A.htm), monthly and annual figures are simple averages of the weekly data.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the price of gas (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined by the Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported annually, provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.20", "median": "3.72", "upper_75": "4.22", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States will be 5.71 in the year 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US on the following dates?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11763/real-price-of-gas-in-us-over-time/)\n\n---\n\nSome observers have noted a potential relationship between gas prices and electric vehicle adoption, where [high gas prices may increase interest in purchasing an electric vehicle](https://time.com/6173178/high-gas-prices-electric-vehicles/). In addition to currently having a lower fuel cost per mile in most US states, electricity rates are generally more stable than gas prices. In its [Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), Argonne National Laboratory provides the chart below, showing hybrid electric vehicle (HEV), plug-in electric vehicle (PEV), and gasoline prices over time.\n\n\"Monthly\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail gasoline prices in its chart [US Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/gas_proc-methods.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a weekly survey of retail gasoline outlets, with prices weighted by the annual volume sold by each outlet. According to the notes section of the [tabular data](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_GND_DCUS_NUS_A.htm), monthly and annual figures are simple averages of the weekly data.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the price of gas (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined by the Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported annually, provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.26", "median": "4.54", "upper_75": "5.71", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States will be 5.71 in the year 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US on the following dates?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11763/real-price-of-gas-in-us-over-time/)\n\n---\n\nSome observers have noted a potential relationship between gas prices and electric vehicle adoption, where [high gas prices may increase interest in purchasing an electric vehicle](https://time.com/6173178/high-gas-prices-electric-vehicles/). In addition to currently having a lower fuel cost per mile in most US states, electricity rates are generally more stable than gas prices. In its [Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), Argonne National Laboratory provides the chart below, showing hybrid electric vehicle (HEV), plug-in electric vehicle (PEV), and gasoline prices over time.\n\n\"Monthly\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail gasoline prices in its chart [US Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/gas_proc-methods.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a weekly survey of retail gasoline outlets, with prices weighted by the annual volume sold by each outlet. According to the notes section of the [tabular data](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_GND_DCUS_NUS_A.htm), monthly and annual figures are simple averages of the weekly data.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the price of gas (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined by the Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported annually, provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.26", "median": "4.54", "upper_75": "5.71", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated chance that a regulatory agency in the United States will impose a fleet average fuel economy of 47.2 mpg for light vehicles manufactured in the year 2035?", "desc": "Currently in the United States vehicle fuel economy is regulated by the the [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Highway_Traffic_Safety_Administration) (NHTSA) and the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Regulations apply to vehicles sold in the US on the basis of the average fuel economy and emissions of the manufacturer's fleet, and manufacturers may face penalties for not complying with the regulations. The Union of Concerned Scientists describes the [origin of fuel efficiency standards in the United States](https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/brief-history-us-fuel-efficiency) as follows:\n\n>Congress first established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in 1975, largely in response to the 1973 oil embargo. CAFE standards set the average new vehicle fuel economy, as weighted by sales, that a manufacturer's fleet must achieve. \n>\n>Through the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Congress established fuel economy standards for new passenger cars starting with model year (MY) 1978. These standards were intended to roughly double the average fuel economy of the new car fleet to 27.5 mpg by model year (MY) 1985.\n\nThe EPA [began regulating greenhouse gases](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulation_of_greenhouse_gases_under_the_Clean_Air_Act) after the Supreme Court ruled in *Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency* that the EPA has the statutory authority to do so under the [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss). According to a [report from the Congressional Research Service](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45204) (CRS) the NHTSA is required to establish fuel economy standards at\n\n>the maximum feasible average fuel economy level that it decides the manufacturers can achieve in that model year\n\nwith consideration of the following four factors\n\n>technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to conserve energy\n\nAccording to the CRS report, under its regulatory authority the EPA must consider\n\n>issues of technical feasibility, cost, and available lead time\n\nUnder the Obama administration, the NHTSA and EPA jointly published Phase 1 fuel economy regulations in 2010 and Phase 2 in 2012, covering model years 2012 through 2025. In 2020, under the Trump administration, the agencies lowered the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2021 through 2026. In 2021, under the Biden administration, the EPA [issued revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-12-30/pdf/2021-27854.pdf) reducing the acceptable level of vehicle emissions for model years 2023 and later. In 2022 the NHTSA [issued separate revised rules](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf) which raised the average fuel economy requirement for model years 2024 through 2026.\n\nFrom table II-4 of the NHTSA final rule and table 4-43 of a [Regulatory Impact Analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf) of the EPA's final rule, the fuel economy estimates corresponding to each rule on the overall light vehicle fleet is shown below:\n\n| Year | NHTSA | EPA |\n|--|--|--|\n| 2023 | N/A | 41 |\n| 2024 | 40.6 | 43 |\n| 2025 | 44.2 | 46 |\n| 2026 | 49.1 | 50 |", "resc": "This resolves as the most stringent estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy (in miles per gallon) imposed by a regulatory agency in the United States in effect on January 1 of the listed year. The regulation must apply to light vehicles for sale in the United States in a comparable manner in breadth and scope to those released by the NHTSA and EPA in 2021, in the judgment of Metaculus. The value will be rounded to the nearest integer.\n\nIn the case of multiple qualifying regulations (such as those issued by NHTSA and EPA) the most stringent of the two will be used. Regulations must be enforceable, guidelines without any financial or monetary penalty, civil or criminal, will not qualify. The estimated industry-wide average used will be that characterized by the estimating agency as most reflective of the fuel economy required by the imposed CAFE rules including any allowances expected to be taken, as interpreted by Metaculus. For example, the usage of AC leakage credits would be included, where possible, as described in section 4.2.1 of the [EPA's regulatory impact analysis](https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1013ORN.pdf), but estimates of the \"real-world\" values would not be used, where possible.\n\nIf no such regulation exists this resolves as **0**. In the event the estimated industry-wide fleet average fuel economy requirement associated with a regulation is not reported by the regulatory agency for a listed year Metaculus may use estimates from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that are comparable in methodology to the past NHTSA or EPA estimates, or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**. If fuel economy is reported in a unit other than miles per gallon Metaculus may convert it to miles per gallon or [miles per gallon gasoline equivalent](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miles_per_gallon_gasoline_equivalent) (MPGe).", "lower_25": "47.2", "median": "56.0", "upper_75": "63.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 33.8% of light vehicles sold in California in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopts its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.\n\nIn 2021, 12.41% of light-duty vehicle sales in California were ZEVs (9.12% battery electric, 3.13% plug-in hybrid, and 0.16% hydrogen fuel cell). The ZEV share for 2022 through the first three quarters is 17.70%. A light-duty vehicle is one with a [gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) up to 10,000 pounds](https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/light-duty-vehicle-emissions#:~:text=The%20light%20duty%20smog%20regulations%20cover%20passenger%20vehicles%20with%20a%20gross%20vehicle%20weight%20rating%20(GVWR)%20up%20to%2010%2C000%20pounds).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percentage of light vehicles sold in California in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the [California Energy Commission](https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/zero-emission-vehicle-and-infrastructure-statistics/new-zev-sales). Zero-emission vehicles will be battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the California energy commission; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the California Energy commission no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "24.9", "median": "29.2", "upper_75": "33.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States will be 4.86 in the year 2035?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US on the following dates?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11763/real-price-of-gas-in-us-over-time/)\n\n---\n\nSome observers have noted a potential relationship between gas prices and electric vehicle adoption, where [high gas prices may increase interest in purchasing an electric vehicle](https://time.com/6173178/high-gas-prices-electric-vehicles/). In addition to currently having a lower fuel cost per mile in most US states, electricity rates are generally more stable than gas prices. In its [Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), Argonne National Laboratory provides the chart below, showing hybrid electric vehicle (HEV), plug-in electric vehicle (PEV), and gasoline prices over time.\n\n\"Monthly\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail gasoline prices in its chart [US Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/gas_proc-methods.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a weekly survey of retail gasoline outlets, with prices weighted by the annual volume sold by each outlet. According to the notes section of the [tabular data](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_GND_DCUS_NUS_A.htm), monthly and annual figures are simple averages of the weekly data.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the price of gas (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined by the Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported annually, provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.08", "median": "4.86", "upper_75": "6.43", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail electricity price (in 2022 US cents per kWh) in the United States will be 50% higher than the current price of 11.78 cents per kWh in the following years?", "desc": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), calling into question what factors may influence future trends in electric vehicle adoption. One possible factor is the [effect of electricity prices](https://www.ucits.org/research-project/2020-12/). Electricity prices may not only influence EV adoption, but also be influenced by EV adoption if it creates a significant increase in electricity demand.\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail electricity prices in its chart [Average retail price of electricity](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/methodology.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a monthly survey of electric retailers.", "resc": "This resolves as the price of electricity (in 2022 US cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh)) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined according to data provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). The annual price for \"all sectors\" will be used.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "11.16", "median": "11.78", "upper_75": "12.37", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States will be 4.22 in the year 2025?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US on the following dates?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11763/real-price-of-gas-in-us-over-time/)\n\n---\n\nSome observers have noted a potential relationship between gas prices and electric vehicle adoption, where [high gas prices may increase interest in purchasing an electric vehicle](https://time.com/6173178/high-gas-prices-electric-vehicles/). In addition to currently having a lower fuel cost per mile in most US states, electricity rates are generally more stable than gas prices. In its [Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), Argonne National Laboratory provides the chart below, showing hybrid electric vehicle (HEV), plug-in electric vehicle (PEV), and gasoline prices over time.\n\n\"Monthly\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail gasoline prices in its chart [US Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/gas_proc-methods.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a weekly survey of retail gasoline outlets, with prices weighted by the annual volume sold by each outlet. According to the notes section of the [tabular data](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_GND_DCUS_NUS_A.htm), monthly and annual figures are simple averages of the weekly data.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the price of gas (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined by the Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported annually, provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.20", "median": "3.72", "upper_75": "4.22", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States will be 5.71 in the year 2030?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US on the following dates?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11763/real-price-of-gas-in-us-over-time/)\n\n---\n\nSome observers have noted a potential relationship between gas prices and electric vehicle adoption, where [high gas prices may increase interest in purchasing an electric vehicle](https://time.com/6173178/high-gas-prices-electric-vehicles/). In addition to currently having a lower fuel cost per mile in most US states, electricity rates are generally more stable than gas prices. In its [Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), Argonne National Laboratory provides the chart below, showing hybrid electric vehicle (HEV), plug-in electric vehicle (PEV), and gasoline prices over time.\n\n\"Monthly\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail gasoline prices in its chart [US Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/gas_proc-methods.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a weekly survey of retail gasoline outlets, with prices weighted by the annual volume sold by each outlet. According to the notes section of the [tabular data](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_GND_DCUS_NUS_A.htm), monthly and annual figures are simple averages of the weekly data.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the price of gas (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined by the Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported annually, provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.26", "median": "4.54", "upper_75": "5.71", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail electricity price (in 2022 US cents per kWh) in the United States will be 50% higher than the current price of 11.78 cents per kWh in the following years?", "desc": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), calling into question what factors may influence future trends in electric vehicle adoption. One possible factor is the [effect of electricity prices](https://www.ucits.org/research-project/2020-12/). Electricity prices may not only influence EV adoption, but also be influenced by EV adoption if it creates a significant increase in electricity demand.\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail electricity prices in its chart [Average retail price of electricity](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/methodology.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a monthly survey of electric retailers.", "resc": "This resolves as the price of electricity (in 2022 US cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh)) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined according to data provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). The annual price for \"all sectors\" will be used.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "11.16", "median": "11.78", "upper_75": "12.37", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail electricity price (in 2022 US cents per kWh) in the United States will be 50% higher than the current price of 11.78 cents per kWh in the following years?", "desc": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), calling into question what factors may influence future trends in electric vehicle adoption. One possible factor is the [effect of electricity prices](https://www.ucits.org/research-project/2020-12/). Electricity prices may not only influence EV adoption, but also be influenced by EV adoption if it creates a significant increase in electricity demand.\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail electricity prices in its chart [Average retail price of electricity](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/methodology.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a monthly survey of electric retailers.", "resc": "This resolves as the price of electricity (in 2022 US cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh)) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined according to data provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). The annual price for \"all sectors\" will be used.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "11.16", "median": "11.78", "upper_75": "12.37", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail electricity price (in 2022 US cents per kWh) in the United States will be 12.8 cents in the year 2035?", "desc": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), calling into question what factors may influence future trends in electric vehicle adoption. One possible factor is the [effect of electricity prices](https://www.ucits.org/research-project/2020-12/). Electricity prices may not only influence EV adoption, but also be influenced by EV adoption if it creates a significant increase in electricity demand.\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail electricity prices in its chart [Average retail price of electricity](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/methodology.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a monthly survey of electric retailers.", "resc": "This resolves as the price of electricity (in 2022 US cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh)) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined according to data provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). The annual price for \"all sectors\" will be used.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "6.10", "median": "8.59", "upper_75": "12.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail electricity price (in 2022 US cents per kWh) in the United States will be 50% higher than the current price of 9.20 cents per kWh by 2030?", "desc": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), calling into question what factors may influence future trends in electric vehicle adoption. One possible factor is the [effect of electricity prices](https://www.ucits.org/research-project/2020-12/). Electricity prices may not only influence EV adoption, but also be influenced by EV adoption if it creates a significant increase in electricity demand.\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail electricity prices in its chart [Average retail price of electricity](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/methodology.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a monthly survey of electric retailers.", "resc": "This resolves as the price of electricity (in 2022 US cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh)) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined according to data provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). The annual price for \"all sectors\" will be used.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "6.70", "median": "9.20", "upper_75": "13.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail electricity price (in 2022 US cents per kWh) in the United States will be 12.9 cents in the year 2025?", "desc": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), calling into question what factors may influence future trends in electric vehicle adoption. One possible factor is the [effect of electricity prices](https://www.ucits.org/research-project/2020-12/). Electricity prices may not only influence EV adoption, but also be influenced by EV adoption if it creates a significant increase in electricity demand.\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail electricity prices in its chart [Average retail price of electricity](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/methodology.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a monthly survey of electric retailers.", "resc": "This resolves as the price of electricity (in 2022 US cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh)) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined according to data provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). The annual price for \"all sectors\" will be used.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "9.81", "median": "11.4", "upper_75": "12.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail electricity price (in 2022 US cents per kWh) in the United States will be 50% higher than the current price of 9.20 cents per kWh by 2030?", "desc": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), calling into question what factors may influence future trends in electric vehicle adoption. One possible factor is the [effect of electricity prices](https://www.ucits.org/research-project/2020-12/). Electricity prices may not only influence EV adoption, but also be influenced by EV adoption if it creates a significant increase in electricity demand.\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail electricity prices in its chart [Average retail price of electricity](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/methodology.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a monthly survey of electric retailers.", "resc": "This resolves as the price of electricity (in 2022 US cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh)) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined according to data provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). The annual price for \"all sectors\" will be used.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "6.70", "median": "9.20", "upper_75": "13.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail electricity price (in 2022 US cents per kWh) in the United States will be 12.8 cents in the year 2035?", "desc": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), calling into question what factors may influence future trends in electric vehicle adoption. One possible factor is the [effect of electricity prices](https://www.ucits.org/research-project/2020-12/). Electricity prices may not only influence EV adoption, but also be influenced by EV adoption if it creates a significant increase in electricity demand.\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail electricity prices in its chart [Average retail price of electricity](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/methodology.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a monthly survey of electric retailers.", "resc": "This resolves as the price of electricity (in 2022 US cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh)) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined according to data provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). The annual price for \"all sectors\" will be used.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "6.10", "median": "8.59", "upper_75": "12.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail electricity price (in 2022 US cents per kWh) in the United States will be 12.8 cents in the year 2035?", "desc": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), calling into question what factors may influence future trends in electric vehicle adoption. One possible factor is the [effect of electricity prices](https://www.ucits.org/research-project/2020-12/). Electricity prices may not only influence EV adoption, but also be influenced by EV adoption if it creates a significant increase in electricity demand.\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail electricity prices in its chart [Average retail price of electricity](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/methodology.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a monthly survey of electric retailers.", "resc": "This resolves as the price of electricity (in 2022 US cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh)) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined according to data provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). The annual price for \"all sectors\" will be used.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "6.10", "median": "8.59", "upper_75": "12.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 24.0 zero emission light vehicles will be available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the following model years?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. An increase in the variety of affordable EVs may be a significant factor in the rate of adoption of EVs. As stated in the paper [Evidence for a global electric vehicle tipping point](https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/globalsystemsinstitute/documents/Lam_et_al_Evidence_for_a_global_EV_TP.pdf)\n\n>Widespread adoption requires the availability of a diverse set of vehicles that collectively cover the needs of highly heterogeneous consumers.\n\nOne resource for assessing the diversity of zero emission vehicle (ZEV) models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).", "resc": "This resolves as the number of unique zero emission light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for zero emission vehicles and totaling the number of models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of five thousand dollars.\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The count of qualifying vehicles will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "11.8", "median": "15.7", "upper_75": "24.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail electricity price (in 2022 US cents per kWh) in the United States will be 50% higher than the current price of 9.20 cents per kWh by 2030?", "desc": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), calling into question what factors may influence future trends in electric vehicle adoption. One possible factor is the [effect of electricity prices](https://www.ucits.org/research-project/2020-12/). Electricity prices may not only influence EV adoption, but also be influenced by EV adoption if it creates a significant increase in electricity demand.\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail electricity prices in its chart [Average retail price of electricity](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/methodology.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a monthly survey of electric retailers.", "resc": "This resolves as the price of electricity (in 2022 US cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh)) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined according to data provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). The annual price for \"all sectors\" will be used.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "6.70", "median": "9.20", "upper_75": "13.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 41.7% of light vehicles sold in California in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopts its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.\n\nIn 2021, 12.41% of light-duty vehicle sales in California were ZEVs (9.12% battery electric, 3.13% plug-in hybrid, and 0.16% hydrogen fuel cell). The ZEV share for 2022 through the first three quarters is 17.70%. A light-duty vehicle is one with a [gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) up to 10,000 pounds](https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/light-duty-vehicle-emissions#:~:text=The%20light%20duty%20smog%20regulations%20cover%20passenger%20vehicles%20with%20a%20gross%20vehicle%20weight%20rating%20(GVWR)%20up%20to%2010%2C000%20pounds).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percentage of light vehicles sold in California in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the [California Energy Commission](https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/zero-emission-vehicle-and-infrastructure-statistics/new-zev-sales). Zero-emission vehicles will be battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the California energy commission; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the California Energy commission no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "27.1", "median": "34.0", "upper_75": "41.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail electricity price (in 2022 US cents per kWh) in the United States will be 12.9 cents in the year 2025?", "desc": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), calling into question what factors may influence future trends in electric vehicle adoption. One possible factor is the [effect of electricity prices](https://www.ucits.org/research-project/2020-12/). Electricity prices may not only influence EV adoption, but also be influenced by EV adoption if it creates a significant increase in electricity demand.\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail electricity prices in its chart [Average retail price of electricity](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/methodology.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a monthly survey of electric retailers.", "resc": "This resolves as the price of electricity (in 2022 US cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh)) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined according to data provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). The annual price for \"all sectors\" will be used.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "9.81", "median": "11.4", "upper_75": "12.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 24.0 zero emission light vehicles will be available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the following model years?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. An increase in the variety of affordable EVs may be a significant factor in the rate of adoption of EVs. As stated in the paper [Evidence for a global electric vehicle tipping point](https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/globalsystemsinstitute/documents/Lam_et_al_Evidence_for_a_global_EV_TP.pdf)\n\n>Widespread adoption requires the availability of a diverse set of vehicles that collectively cover the needs of highly heterogeneous consumers.\n\nOne resource for assessing the diversity of zero emission vehicle (ZEV) models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).", "resc": "This resolves as the number of unique zero emission light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for zero emission vehicles and totaling the number of models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of five thousand dollars.\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The count of qualifying vehicles will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "11.8", "median": "15.7", "upper_75": "24.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 96.6% of light vehicles sold in California in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles? (2035)", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopts its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.\n\nIn 2021, 12.41% of light-duty vehicle sales in California were ZEVs (9.12% battery electric, 3.13% plug-in hybrid, and 0.16% hydrogen fuel cell). The ZEV share for 2022 through the first three quarters is 17.70%. A light-duty vehicle is one with a [gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) up to 10,000 pounds](https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/light-duty-vehicle-emissions#:~:text=The%20light%20duty%20smog%20regulations%20cover%20passenger%20vehicles%20with%20a%20gross%20vehicle%20weight%20rating%20(GVWR)%20up%20to%2010%2C000%20pounds).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percentage of light vehicles sold in California in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the [California Energy Commission](https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/zero-emission-vehicle-and-infrastructure-statistics/new-zev-sales). Zero-emission vehicles will be battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the California energy commission; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the California Energy commission no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "83.9", "median": "91.9", "upper_75": "96.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 89.2% of light vehicles sold in California in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles? (2030)", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopts its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.\n\nIn 2021, 12.41% of light-duty vehicle sales in California were ZEVs (9.12% battery electric, 3.13% plug-in hybrid, and 0.16% hydrogen fuel cell). The ZEV share for 2022 through the first three quarters is 17.70%. A light-duty vehicle is one with a [gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) up to 10,000 pounds](https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/light-duty-vehicle-emissions#:~:text=The%20light%20duty%20smog%20regulations%20cover%20passenger%20vehicles%20with%20a%20gross%20vehicle%20weight%20rating%20(GVWR)%20up%20to%2010%2C000%20pounds).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percentage of light vehicles sold in California in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the [California Energy Commission](https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/zero-emission-vehicle-and-infrastructure-statistics/new-zev-sales). Zero-emission vehicles will be battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the California energy commission; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the California Energy commission no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "65.2", "median": "75.7", "upper_75": "89.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 40.3 zero emission light vehicles will be available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the following model years (2025)?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. An increase in the variety of affordable EVs may be a significant factor in the rate of adoption of EVs. As stated in the paper [Evidence for a global electric vehicle tipping point](https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/globalsystemsinstitute/documents/Lam_et_al_Evidence_for_a_global_EV_TP.pdf)\n\n>Widespread adoption requires the availability of a diverse set of vehicles that collectively cover the needs of highly heterogeneous consumers.\n\nOne resource for assessing the diversity of zero emission vehicle (ZEV) models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).", "resc": "This resolves as the number of unique zero emission light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for zero emission vehicles and totaling the number of models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of five thousand dollars.\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The count of qualifying vehicles will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "14.6", "median": "23.6", "upper_75": "40.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 89.2% of light vehicles sold in California in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles? (2030)", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopts its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.\n\nIn 2021, 12.41% of light-duty vehicle sales in California were ZEVs (9.12% battery electric, 3.13% plug-in hybrid, and 0.16% hydrogen fuel cell). The ZEV share for 2022 through the first three quarters is 17.70%. A light-duty vehicle is one with a [gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) up to 10,000 pounds](https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/light-duty-vehicle-emissions#:~:text=The%20light%20duty%20smog%20regulations%20cover%20passenger%20vehicles%20with%20a%20gross%20vehicle%20weight%20rating%20(GVWR)%20up%20to%2010%2C000%20pounds).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percentage of light vehicles sold in California in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the [California Energy Commission](https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/zero-emission-vehicle-and-infrastructure-statistics/new-zev-sales). Zero-emission vehicles will be battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the California energy commission; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the California Energy commission no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "65.2", "median": "75.7", "upper_75": "89.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 41.7% of light vehicles sold in California in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopts its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.\n\nIn 2021, 12.41% of light-duty vehicle sales in California were ZEVs (9.12% battery electric, 3.13% plug-in hybrid, and 0.16% hydrogen fuel cell). The ZEV share for 2022 through the first three quarters is 17.70%. A light-duty vehicle is one with a [gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) up to 10,000 pounds](https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/light-duty-vehicle-emissions#:~:text=The%20light%20duty%20smog%20regulations%20cover%20passenger%20vehicles%20with%20a%20gross%20vehicle%20weight%20rating%20(GVWR)%20up%20to%2010%2C000%20pounds).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percentage of light vehicles sold in California in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the [California Energy Commission](https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/zero-emission-vehicle-and-infrastructure-statistics/new-zev-sales). Zero-emission vehicles will be battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the California energy commission; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the California Energy commission no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "27.1", "median": "34.0", "upper_75": "41.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the share of global light vehicles sold which are zero-emission vehicles will be 13.8 in the following years?", "desc": "According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA) the global market share of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) [more than doubled](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/global-ev-data-explorer) from 2020 to 2021, from 4% to 8.6%. This data includes cars which are battery-electric and plug-in hybrid electric (but does not consider fuel cell electric vehicles). According to its [Global Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ad8fb04c-4f75-42fc-973a-6e54c8a4449a/GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf), the IEA charts define \"cars\" as passenger light-duty vehicles.\n\n\"IEA\n\nThe IEA also provides data on regional adoption of EVs on its page [Trends in electric light-duty vehicles](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022/trends-in-electric-light-duty-vehicles).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold globally in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the International Energy Agency (IEA).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The IEA currently does not include sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the IEA will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the IEA, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IEA; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IEA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "13.8", "median": "16.2", "upper_75": "18.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 40.3 zero emission light vehicles will be available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the following model years (2025)?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. An increase in the variety of affordable EVs may be a significant factor in the rate of adoption of EVs. As stated in the paper [Evidence for a global electric vehicle tipping point](https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/globalsystemsinstitute/documents/Lam_et_al_Evidence_for_a_global_EV_TP.pdf)\n\n>Widespread adoption requires the availability of a diverse set of vehicles that collectively cover the needs of highly heterogeneous consumers.\n\nOne resource for assessing the diversity of zero emission vehicle (ZEV) models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).", "resc": "This resolves as the number of unique zero emission light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for zero emission vehicles and totaling the number of models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of five thousand dollars.\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The count of qualifying vehicles will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "14.6", "median": "23.6", "upper_75": "40.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 62.6 zero emission light vehicles will be available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the following model years (2030)?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. An increase in the variety of affordable EVs may be a significant factor in the rate of adoption of EVs. As stated in the paper [Evidence for a global electric vehicle tipping point](https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/globalsystemsinstitute/documents/Lam_et_al_Evidence_for_a_global_EV_TP.pdf)\n\n>Widespread adoption requires the availability of a diverse set of vehicles that collectively cover the needs of highly heterogeneous consumers.\n\nOne resource for assessing the diversity of zero emission vehicle (ZEV) models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).", "resc": "This resolves as the number of unique zero emission light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for zero emission vehicles and totaling the number of models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of five thousand dollars.\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The count of qualifying vehicles will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "20.5", "median": "37.6", "upper_75": "62.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States will be 3.05 in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US on the following dates?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11763/real-price-of-gas-in-us-over-time/)\n\n---\n\nSome observers have noted a potential relationship between gas prices and electric vehicle adoption, where [high gas prices may increase interest in purchasing an electric vehicle](https://time.com/6173178/high-gas-prices-electric-vehicles/). In addition to currently having a lower fuel cost per mile in most US states, electricity rates are generally more stable than gas prices. In its [Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), Argonne National Laboratory provides the chart below, showing hybrid electric vehicle (HEV), plug-in electric vehicle (PEV), and gasoline prices over time.\n\n\"Monthly\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail gasoline prices in its chart [US Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/gas_proc-methods.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a weekly survey of retail gasoline outlets, with prices weighted by the annual volume sold by each outlet. According to the notes section of the [tabular data](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_GND_DCUS_NUS_A.htm), monthly and annual figures are simple averages of the weekly data.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the price of gas (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined by the Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported annually, provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.05", "median": "3.44", "upper_75": "3.84", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the share of global light vehicles sold which are zero-emission vehicles will be 13.8 in the following years?", "desc": "According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA) the global market share of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) [more than doubled](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/global-ev-data-explorer) from 2020 to 2021, from 4% to 8.6%. This data includes cars which are battery-electric and plug-in hybrid electric (but does not consider fuel cell electric vehicles). According to its [Global Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ad8fb04c-4f75-42fc-973a-6e54c8a4449a/GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf), the IEA charts define \"cars\" as passenger light-duty vehicles.\n\n\"IEA\n\nThe IEA also provides data on regional adoption of EVs on its page [Trends in electric light-duty vehicles](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022/trends-in-electric-light-duty-vehicles).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold globally in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the International Energy Agency (IEA).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The IEA currently does not include sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the IEA will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the IEA, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IEA; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IEA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "13.8", "median": "16.2", "upper_75": "18.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 40.3 zero emission light vehicles will be available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the following model years (2025)?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. An increase in the variety of affordable EVs may be a significant factor in the rate of adoption of EVs. As stated in the paper [Evidence for a global electric vehicle tipping point](https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/globalsystemsinstitute/documents/Lam_et_al_Evidence_for_a_global_EV_TP.pdf)\n\n>Widespread adoption requires the availability of a diverse set of vehicles that collectively cover the needs of highly heterogeneous consumers.\n\nOne resource for assessing the diversity of zero emission vehicle (ZEV) models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).", "resc": "This resolves as the number of unique zero emission light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for zero emission vehicles and totaling the number of models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of five thousand dollars.\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The count of qualifying vehicles will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "14.6", "median": "23.6", "upper_75": "40.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 62.6 zero emission light vehicles will be available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the following model years (2030)?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. An increase in the variety of affordable EVs may be a significant factor in the rate of adoption of EVs. As stated in the paper [Evidence for a global electric vehicle tipping point](https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/globalsystemsinstitute/documents/Lam_et_al_Evidence_for_a_global_EV_TP.pdf)\n\n>Widespread adoption requires the availability of a diverse set of vehicles that collectively cover the needs of highly heterogeneous consumers.\n\nOne resource for assessing the diversity of zero emission vehicle (ZEV) models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).", "resc": "This resolves as the number of unique zero emission light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for zero emission vehicles and totaling the number of models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of five thousand dollars.\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The count of qualifying vehicles will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "20.5", "median": "37.6", "upper_75": "62.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 34.4 zero emission light vehicles will be available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the following model years? (2035)", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. An increase in the variety of affordable EVs may be a significant factor in the rate of adoption of EVs. As stated in the paper [Evidence for a global electric vehicle tipping point](https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/globalsystemsinstitute/documents/Lam_et_al_Evidence_for_a_global_EV_TP.pdf)\n\n>Widespread adoption requires the availability of a diverse set of vehicles that collectively cover the needs of highly heterogeneous consumers.\n\nOne resource for assessing the diversity of zero emission vehicle (ZEV) models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).", "resc": "This resolves as the number of unique zero emission light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for zero emission vehicles and totaling the number of models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of five thousand dollars.\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The count of qualifying vehicles will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "34.4", "median": "54.0", "upper_75": "84.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the share of global light vehicles sold which are zero-emission vehicles will be 13.8 in the following years?", "desc": "According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA) the global market share of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) [more than doubled](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/global-ev-data-explorer) from 2020 to 2021, from 4% to 8.6%. This data includes cars which are battery-electric and plug-in hybrid electric (but does not consider fuel cell electric vehicles). According to its [Global Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ad8fb04c-4f75-42fc-973a-6e54c8a4449a/GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf), the IEA charts define \"cars\" as passenger light-duty vehicles.\n\n\"IEA\n\nThe IEA also provides data on regional adoption of EVs on its page [Trends in electric light-duty vehicles](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022/trends-in-electric-light-duty-vehicles).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold globally in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the International Energy Agency (IEA).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The IEA currently does not include sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the IEA will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the IEA, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IEA; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IEA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "13.8", "median": "16.2", "upper_75": "18.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 62.6 zero emission light vehicles will be available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the following model years (2030)?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. An increase in the variety of affordable EVs may be a significant factor in the rate of adoption of EVs. As stated in the paper [Evidence for a global electric vehicle tipping point](https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/globalsystemsinstitute/documents/Lam_et_al_Evidence_for_a_global_EV_TP.pdf)\n\n>Widespread adoption requires the availability of a diverse set of vehicles that collectively cover the needs of highly heterogeneous consumers.\n\nOne resource for assessing the diversity of zero emission vehicle (ZEV) models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).", "resc": "This resolves as the number of unique zero emission light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for zero emission vehicles and totaling the number of models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of five thousand dollars.\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The count of qualifying vehicles will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "20.5", "median": "37.6", "upper_75": "62.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 34.4 zero emission light vehicles will be available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the following model years? (2035)", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. An increase in the variety of affordable EVs may be a significant factor in the rate of adoption of EVs. As stated in the paper [Evidence for a global electric vehicle tipping point](https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/globalsystemsinstitute/documents/Lam_et_al_Evidence_for_a_global_EV_TP.pdf)\n\n>Widespread adoption requires the availability of a diverse set of vehicles that collectively cover the needs of highly heterogeneous consumers.\n\nOne resource for assessing the diversity of zero emission vehicle (ZEV) models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).", "resc": "This resolves as the number of unique zero emission light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for zero emission vehicles and totaling the number of models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of five thousand dollars.\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The count of qualifying vehicles will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "34.4", "median": "54.0", "upper_75": "84.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What will be the share of global light vehicles sold which are zero-emission vehicles in the following years? (2025)\n\nKeyword: 23.8\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 50% of global light vehicles sold in the following years (2025) will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA) the global market share of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) [more than doubled](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/global-ev-data-explorer) from 2020 to 2021, from 4% to 8.6%. This data includes cars which are battery-electric and plug-in hybrid electric (but does not consider fuel cell electric vehicles). According to its [Global Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ad8fb04c-4f75-42fc-973a-6e54c8a4449a/GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf), the IEA charts define \"cars\" as passenger light-duty vehicles.\n\n\"IEA\n\nThe IEA also provides data on regional adoption of EVs on its page [Trends in electric light-duty vehicles](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022/trends-in-electric-light-duty-vehicles).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold globally in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the International Energy Agency (IEA).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The IEA currently does not include sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the IEA will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the IEA, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IEA; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IEA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "19.0", "median": "23.8", "upper_75": "29.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What will be the share of global light vehicles sold which are zero-emission vehicles in the following years? (2025)\n\nKeyword: 23.8\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 50% of global light vehicles sold in the following years (2025) will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA) the global market share of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) [more than doubled](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/global-ev-data-explorer) from 2020 to 2021, from 4% to 8.6%. This data includes cars which are battery-electric and plug-in hybrid electric (but does not consider fuel cell electric vehicles). According to its [Global Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ad8fb04c-4f75-42fc-973a-6e54c8a4449a/GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf), the IEA charts define \"cars\" as passenger light-duty vehicles.\n\n\"IEA\n\nThe IEA also provides data on regional adoption of EVs on its page [Trends in electric light-duty vehicles](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022/trends-in-electric-light-duty-vehicles).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold globally in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the International Energy Agency (IEA).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The IEA currently does not include sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the IEA will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the IEA, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IEA; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IEA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "19.0", "median": "23.8", "upper_75": "29.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States will be 4.86 in the year 2035?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US on the following dates?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11763/real-price-of-gas-in-us-over-time/)\n\n---\n\nSome observers have noted a potential relationship between gas prices and electric vehicle adoption, where [high gas prices may increase interest in purchasing an electric vehicle](https://time.com/6173178/high-gas-prices-electric-vehicles/). In addition to currently having a lower fuel cost per mile in most US states, electricity rates are generally more stable than gas prices. In its [Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), Argonne National Laboratory provides the chart below, showing hybrid electric vehicle (HEV), plug-in electric vehicle (PEV), and gasoline prices over time.\n\n\"Monthly\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail gasoline prices in its chart [US Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/gas_proc-methods.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a weekly survey of retail gasoline outlets, with prices weighted by the annual volume sold by each outlet. According to the notes section of the [tabular data](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_GND_DCUS_NUS_A.htm), monthly and annual figures are simple averages of the weekly data.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the price of gas (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined by the Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported annually, provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.08", "median": "4.86", "upper_75": "6.43", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What will be the percentage of global light vehicles sold which are zero-emission vehicles in the year 2035?", "desc": "According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA) the global market share of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) [more than doubled](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/global-ev-data-explorer) from 2020 to 2021, from 4% to 8.6%. This data includes cars which are battery-electric and plug-in hybrid electric (but does not consider fuel cell electric vehicles). According to its [Global Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ad8fb04c-4f75-42fc-973a-6e54c8a4449a/GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf), the IEA charts define \"cars\" as passenger light-duty vehicles.\n\n\"IEA\n\nThe IEA also provides data on regional adoption of EVs on its page [Trends in electric light-duty vehicles](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022/trends-in-electric-light-duty-vehicles).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold globally in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the International Energy Agency (IEA).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The IEA currently does not include sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the IEA will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the IEA, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IEA; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IEA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "59.6", "median": "71.2", "upper_75": "83.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the share of global light vehicles sold which are zero-emission vehicles will be 66.9% in the year 2030?", "desc": "According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA) the global market share of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) [more than doubled](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/global-ev-data-explorer) from 2020 to 2021, from 4% to 8.6%. This data includes cars which are battery-electric and plug-in hybrid electric (but does not consider fuel cell electric vehicles). According to its [Global Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ad8fb04c-4f75-42fc-973a-6e54c8a4449a/GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf), the IEA charts define \"cars\" as passenger light-duty vehicles.\n\n\"IEA\n\nThe IEA also provides data on regional adoption of EVs on its page [Trends in electric light-duty vehicles](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022/trends-in-electric-light-duty-vehicles).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold globally in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the International Energy Agency (IEA).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The IEA currently does not include sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the IEA will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the IEA, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IEA; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IEA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "38.4", "median": "51.1", "upper_75": "66.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years will be 261 miles?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. The median range for EVs [has been increasing over the years](https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1167-january-4-2021-median-driving-range-all-electric-vehicles-tops-250?fbclid=IwAR0uiP036VT4eX23MJOjJncoWxlel8AgntKorX8ftbv4hx1ROe7ZVPBUlN0) *(note that the methodology used in the linked figure is different than that used by this question)*, and further increases in range could spur increased EV adoption in the future.\n\nOne resource for assessing the range of EV models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).\n\nAs of January 27, 2022, model year 2021 has 2 qualifying unique all-electric vehicles with a median range of 192.5 miles, using the methodology described in the resolution criteria below . [See here for calculation](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1EQ-8xPDUZrqH_nCN6D64TqawHpBjv5NgecZGg-FN3mQ/edit?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This resolves as the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for all-electric vehicles and finding the median estimated range of the models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of 5 thousand dollars.\n\nThe median range will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "227", "median": "244", "upper_75": "261", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the share of global light vehicles sold which are zero-emission vehicles will be 66.9% in the year 2030?", "desc": "According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA) the global market share of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) [more than doubled](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/global-ev-data-explorer) from 2020 to 2021, from 4% to 8.6%. This data includes cars which are battery-electric and plug-in hybrid electric (but does not consider fuel cell electric vehicles). According to its [Global Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ad8fb04c-4f75-42fc-973a-6e54c8a4449a/GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf), the IEA charts define \"cars\" as passenger light-duty vehicles.\n\n\"IEA\n\nThe IEA also provides data on regional adoption of EVs on its page [Trends in electric light-duty vehicles](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022/trends-in-electric-light-duty-vehicles).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold globally in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the International Energy Agency (IEA).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The IEA currently does not include sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the IEA will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the IEA, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IEA; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IEA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "38.4", "median": "51.1", "upper_75": "66.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the share of global light vehicles sold which are zero-emission vehicles will be 66.9% in the year 2030?", "desc": "According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA) the global market share of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) [more than doubled](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/global-ev-data-explorer) from 2020 to 2021, from 4% to 8.6%. This data includes cars which are battery-electric and plug-in hybrid electric (but does not consider fuel cell electric vehicles). According to its [Global Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ad8fb04c-4f75-42fc-973a-6e54c8a4449a/GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf), the IEA charts define \"cars\" as passenger light-duty vehicles.\n\n\"IEA\n\nThe IEA also provides data on regional adoption of EVs on its page [Trends in electric light-duty vehicles](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022/trends-in-electric-light-duty-vehicles).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold globally in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the International Energy Agency (IEA).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The IEA currently does not include sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the IEA will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the IEA, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IEA; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IEA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "38.4", "median": "51.1", "upper_75": "66.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What will be the percentage of global light vehicles sold which are zero-emission vehicles in the year 2035?", "desc": "According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA) the global market share of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) [more than doubled](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/global-ev-data-explorer) from 2020 to 2021, from 4% to 8.6%. This data includes cars which are battery-electric and plug-in hybrid electric (but does not consider fuel cell electric vehicles). According to its [Global Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ad8fb04c-4f75-42fc-973a-6e54c8a4449a/GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf), the IEA charts define \"cars\" as passenger light-duty vehicles.\n\n\"IEA\n\nThe IEA also provides data on regional adoption of EVs on its page [Trends in electric light-duty vehicles](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022/trends-in-electric-light-duty-vehicles).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold globally in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the International Energy Agency (IEA).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The IEA currently does not include sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the IEA will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the IEA, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IEA; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IEA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "59.6", "median": "71.2", "upper_75": "83.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years will be 366 miles?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. The median range for EVs [has been increasing over the years](https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1167-january-4-2021-median-driving-range-all-electric-vehicles-tops-250?fbclid=IwAR0uiP036VT4eX23MJOjJncoWxlel8AgntKorX8ftbv4hx1ROe7ZVPBUlN0) *(note that the methodology used in the linked figure is different than that used by this question)*, and further increases in range could spur increased EV adoption in the future.\n\nOne resource for assessing the range of EV models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).\n\nAs of January 27, 2022, model year 2021 has 2 qualifying unique all-electric vehicles with a median range of 192.5 miles, using the methodology described in the resolution criteria below . [See here for calculation](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1EQ-8xPDUZrqH_nCN6D64TqawHpBjv5NgecZGg-FN3mQ/edit?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This resolves as the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for all-electric vehicles and finding the median estimated range of the models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of 5 thousand dollars.\n\nThe median range will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "299", "median": "366", "upper_75": "448", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years will be 366 miles?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. The median range for EVs [has been increasing over the years](https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1167-january-4-2021-median-driving-range-all-electric-vehicles-tops-250?fbclid=IwAR0uiP036VT4eX23MJOjJncoWxlel8AgntKorX8ftbv4hx1ROe7ZVPBUlN0) *(note that the methodology used in the linked figure is different than that used by this question)*, and further increases in range could spur increased EV adoption in the future.\n\nOne resource for assessing the range of EV models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).\n\nAs of January 27, 2022, model year 2021 has 2 qualifying unique all-electric vehicles with a median range of 192.5 miles, using the methodology described in the resolution criteria below . [See here for calculation](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1EQ-8xPDUZrqH_nCN6D64TqawHpBjv5NgecZGg-FN3mQ/edit?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This resolves as the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for all-electric vehicles and finding the median estimated range of the models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of 5 thousand dollars.\n\nThe median range will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "299", "median": "366", "upper_75": "448", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years will be 261 miles?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. The median range for EVs [has been increasing over the years](https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1167-january-4-2021-median-driving-range-all-electric-vehicles-tops-250?fbclid=IwAR0uiP036VT4eX23MJOjJncoWxlel8AgntKorX8ftbv4hx1ROe7ZVPBUlN0) *(note that the methodology used in the linked figure is different than that used by this question)*, and further increases in range could spur increased EV adoption in the future.\n\nOne resource for assessing the range of EV models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).\n\nAs of January 27, 2022, model year 2021 has 2 qualifying unique all-electric vehicles with a median range of 192.5 miles, using the methodology described in the resolution criteria below . [See here for calculation](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1EQ-8xPDUZrqH_nCN6D64TqawHpBjv5NgecZGg-FN3mQ/edit?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This resolves as the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for all-electric vehicles and finding the median estimated range of the models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of 5 thousand dollars.\n\nThe median range will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "227", "median": "244", "upper_75": "261", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What will be the share of global light vehicles sold which are zero-emission vehicles in the following years? (2025)\n\nKeyword: 23.8\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 50% of global light vehicles sold in the following years (2025) will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA) the global market share of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) [more than doubled](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/global-ev-data-explorer) from 2020 to 2021, from 4% to 8.6%. This data includes cars which are battery-electric and plug-in hybrid electric (but does not consider fuel cell electric vehicles). According to its [Global Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ad8fb04c-4f75-42fc-973a-6e54c8a4449a/GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf), the IEA charts define \"cars\" as passenger light-duty vehicles.\n\n\"IEA\n\nThe IEA also provides data on regional adoption of EVs on its page [Trends in electric light-duty vehicles](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022/trends-in-electric-light-duty-vehicles).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold globally in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the International Energy Agency (IEA).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The IEA currently does not include sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the IEA will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the IEA, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IEA; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IEA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "19.0", "median": "23.8", "upper_75": "29.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years will be 261 miles?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. The median range for EVs [has been increasing over the years](https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1167-january-4-2021-median-driving-range-all-electric-vehicles-tops-250?fbclid=IwAR0uiP036VT4eX23MJOjJncoWxlel8AgntKorX8ftbv4hx1ROe7ZVPBUlN0) *(note that the methodology used in the linked figure is different than that used by this question)*, and further increases in range could spur increased EV adoption in the future.\n\nOne resource for assessing the range of EV models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).\n\nAs of January 27, 2022, model year 2021 has 2 qualifying unique all-electric vehicles with a median range of 192.5 miles, using the methodology described in the resolution criteria below . [See here for calculation](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1EQ-8xPDUZrqH_nCN6D64TqawHpBjv5NgecZGg-FN3mQ/edit?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This resolves as the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for all-electric vehicles and finding the median estimated range of the models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of 5 thousand dollars.\n\nThe median range will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "227", "median": "244", "upper_75": "261", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail electricity price (in 2022 US cents per kWh) in the United States will be 12.9 cents in the year 2025?", "desc": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), calling into question what factors may influence future trends in electric vehicle adoption. One possible factor is the [effect of electricity prices](https://www.ucits.org/research-project/2020-12/). Electricity prices may not only influence EV adoption, but also be influenced by EV adoption if it creates a significant increase in electricity demand.\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail electricity prices in its chart [Average retail price of electricity](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/methodology.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a monthly survey of electric retailers.", "resc": "This resolves as the price of electricity (in 2022 US cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh)) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined according to data provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). The annual price for \"all sectors\" will be used.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "9.81", "median": "11.4", "upper_75": "12.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years will be 366 miles?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. The median range for EVs [has been increasing over the years](https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1167-january-4-2021-median-driving-range-all-electric-vehicles-tops-250?fbclid=IwAR0uiP036VT4eX23MJOjJncoWxlel8AgntKorX8ftbv4hx1ROe7ZVPBUlN0) *(note that the methodology used in the linked figure is different than that used by this question)*, and further increases in range could spur increased EV adoption in the future.\n\nOne resource for assessing the range of EV models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).\n\nAs of January 27, 2022, model year 2021 has 2 qualifying unique all-electric vehicles with a median range of 192.5 miles, using the methodology described in the resolution criteria below . [See here for calculation](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1EQ-8xPDUZrqH_nCN6D64TqawHpBjv5NgecZGg-FN3mQ/edit?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This resolves as the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for all-electric vehicles and finding the median estimated range of the models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of 5 thousand dollars.\n\nThe median range will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "299", "median": "366", "upper_75": "448", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years will be 244 miles?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. The median range for EVs [has been increasing over the years](https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1167-january-4-2021-median-driving-range-all-electric-vehicles-tops-250?fbclid=IwAR0uiP036VT4eX23MJOjJncoWxlel8AgntKorX8ftbv4hx1ROe7ZVPBUlN0) *(note that the methodology used in the linked figure is different than that used by this question)*, and further increases in range could spur increased EV adoption in the future.\n\nOne resource for assessing the range of EV models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).\n\nAs of January 27, 2022, model year 2021 has 2 qualifying unique all-electric vehicles with a median range of 192.5 miles, using the methodology described in the resolution criteria below . [See here for calculation](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1EQ-8xPDUZrqH_nCN6D64TqawHpBjv5NgecZGg-FN3mQ/edit?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This resolves as the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for all-electric vehicles and finding the median estimated range of the models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of 5 thousand dollars.\n\nThe median range will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "244", "median": "276", "upper_75": "309", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years will be 244 miles?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. The median range for EVs [has been increasing over the years](https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1167-january-4-2021-median-driving-range-all-electric-vehicles-tops-250?fbclid=IwAR0uiP036VT4eX23MJOjJncoWxlel8AgntKorX8ftbv4hx1ROe7ZVPBUlN0) *(note that the methodology used in the linked figure is different than that used by this question)*, and further increases in range could spur increased EV adoption in the future.\n\nOne resource for assessing the range of EV models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).\n\nAs of January 27, 2022, model year 2021 has 2 qualifying unique all-electric vehicles with a median range of 192.5 miles, using the methodology described in the resolution criteria below . [See here for calculation](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1EQ-8xPDUZrqH_nCN6D64TqawHpBjv5NgecZGg-FN3mQ/edit?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This resolves as the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for all-electric vehicles and finding the median estimated range of the models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of 5 thousand dollars.\n\nThe median range will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "244", "median": "276", "upper_75": "309", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years will be 244 miles?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. The median range for EVs [has been increasing over the years](https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1167-january-4-2021-median-driving-range-all-electric-vehicles-tops-250?fbclid=IwAR0uiP036VT4eX23MJOjJncoWxlel8AgntKorX8ftbv4hx1ROe7ZVPBUlN0) *(note that the methodology used in the linked figure is different than that used by this question)*, and further increases in range could spur increased EV adoption in the future.\n\nOne resource for assessing the range of EV models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).\n\nAs of January 27, 2022, model year 2021 has 2 qualifying unique all-electric vehicles with a median range of 192.5 miles, using the methodology described in the resolution criteria below . [See here for calculation](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1EQ-8xPDUZrqH_nCN6D64TqawHpBjv5NgecZGg-FN3mQ/edit?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This resolves as the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for all-electric vehicles and finding the median estimated range of the models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of 5 thousand dollars.\n\nThe median range will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "244", "median": "276", "upper_75": "309", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 24.0 zero emission light vehicles will be available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the following model years?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. An increase in the variety of affordable EVs may be a significant factor in the rate of adoption of EVs. As stated in the paper [Evidence for a global electric vehicle tipping point](https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/globalsystemsinstitute/documents/Lam_et_al_Evidence_for_a_global_EV_TP.pdf)\n\n>Widespread adoption requires the availability of a diverse set of vehicles that collectively cover the needs of highly heterogeneous consumers.\n\nOne resource for assessing the diversity of zero emission vehicle (ZEV) models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).", "resc": "This resolves as the number of unique zero emission light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for zero emission vehicles and totaling the number of models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of five thousand dollars.\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The count of qualifying vehicles will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "11.8", "median": "15.7", "upper_75": "24.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 9.80 states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years?", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)s) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopt its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.", "resc": "This resolves as the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1 of the listed year. Rules will be considered to be at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II if they mandate all new light car sales in 2035 must be zero-emission vehicles, and [set thresholds in preceding years](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/advanced-clean-cars-ii), in a similar or more stringent manner to California's proposed rule.\n\nRules will be considered to be legally enforceable in a state if the mandate exists in the legal codes and regulations of the state and it is legally recognized by the US federal government. A mandate will **not** be considered to be legally enforceable if it is under a stay or legal injunction from the state or federal government but **will** be considered to be enforceable if there are ongoing legal challenges to the rule that do not otherwise inhibit enforcement or interpretation as standing law.\n\nIn the event California and other states are no longer legally able to enforce their own rules and the federal government does not impose rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II as described above, then this resolves as **0**. If 50 or more states adopt the relevant rules, or the federal government imposes national rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II then this resolves as **\"> 49\"**.", "lower_25": "9.80", "median": "16.7", "upper_75": "21.6", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 34.4 zero emission light vehicles will be available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the following model years? (2035)", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. An increase in the variety of affordable EVs may be a significant factor in the rate of adoption of EVs. As stated in the paper [Evidence for a global electric vehicle tipping point](https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/globalsystemsinstitute/documents/Lam_et_al_Evidence_for_a_global_EV_TP.pdf)\n\n>Widespread adoption requires the availability of a diverse set of vehicles that collectively cover the needs of highly heterogeneous consumers.\n\nOne resource for assessing the diversity of zero emission vehicle (ZEV) models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).", "resc": "This resolves as the number of unique zero emission light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for zero emission vehicles and totaling the number of models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of five thousand dollars.\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The count of qualifying vehicles will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "34.4", "median": "54.0", "upper_75": "84.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 19.3 states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years? (2030)", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)s) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopt its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.", "resc": "This resolves as the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1 of the listed year. Rules will be considered to be at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II if they mandate all new light car sales in 2035 must be zero-emission vehicles, and [set thresholds in preceding years](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/advanced-clean-cars-ii), in a similar or more stringent manner to California's proposed rule.\n\nRules will be considered to be legally enforceable in a state if the mandate exists in the legal codes and regulations of the state and it is legally recognized by the US federal government. A mandate will **not** be considered to be legally enforceable if it is under a stay or legal injunction from the state or federal government but **will** be considered to be enforceable if there are ongoing legal challenges to the rule that do not otherwise inhibit enforcement or interpretation as standing law.\n\nIn the event California and other states are no longer legally able to enforce their own rules and the federal government does not impose rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II as described above, then this resolves as **0**. If 50 or more states adopt the relevant rules, or the federal government imposes national rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II then this resolves as **\"> 49\"**.", "lower_25": "9.84", "median": "19.3", "upper_75": "27.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What will be the percentage of global light vehicles sold which are zero-emission vehicles in the year 2035?", "desc": "According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA) the global market share of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) [more than doubled](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/global-ev-data-explorer) from 2020 to 2021, from 4% to 8.6%. This data includes cars which are battery-electric and plug-in hybrid electric (but does not consider fuel cell electric vehicles). According to its [Global Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ad8fb04c-4f75-42fc-973a-6e54c8a4449a/GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf), the IEA charts define \"cars\" as passenger light-duty vehicles.\n\n\"IEA\n\nThe IEA also provides data on regional adoption of EVs on its page [Trends in electric light-duty vehicles](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022/trends-in-electric-light-duty-vehicles).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold globally in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the International Energy Agency (IEA).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The IEA currently does not include sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the IEA will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the IEA, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IEA; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IEA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "59.6", "median": "71.2", "upper_75": "83.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 19.3 states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years? (2030)", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)s) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopt its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.", "resc": "This resolves as the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1 of the listed year. Rules will be considered to be at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II if they mandate all new light car sales in 2035 must be zero-emission vehicles, and [set thresholds in preceding years](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/advanced-clean-cars-ii), in a similar or more stringent manner to California's proposed rule.\n\nRules will be considered to be legally enforceable in a state if the mandate exists in the legal codes and regulations of the state and it is legally recognized by the US federal government. A mandate will **not** be considered to be legally enforceable if it is under a stay or legal injunction from the state or federal government but **will** be considered to be enforceable if there are ongoing legal challenges to the rule that do not otherwise inhibit enforcement or interpretation as standing law.\n\nIn the event California and other states are no longer legally able to enforce their own rules and the federal government does not impose rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II as described above, then this resolves as **0**. If 50 or more states adopt the relevant rules, or the federal government imposes national rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II then this resolves as **\"> 49\"**.", "lower_25": "9.84", "median": "19.3", "upper_75": "27.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 19.3 states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years? (2030)", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)s) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopt its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.", "resc": "This resolves as the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1 of the listed year. Rules will be considered to be at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II if they mandate all new light car sales in 2035 must be zero-emission vehicles, and [set thresholds in preceding years](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/advanced-clean-cars-ii), in a similar or more stringent manner to California's proposed rule.\n\nRules will be considered to be legally enforceable in a state if the mandate exists in the legal codes and regulations of the state and it is legally recognized by the US federal government. A mandate will **not** be considered to be legally enforceable if it is under a stay or legal injunction from the state or federal government but **will** be considered to be enforceable if there are ongoing legal challenges to the rule that do not otherwise inhibit enforcement or interpretation as standing law.\n\nIn the event California and other states are no longer legally able to enforce their own rules and the federal government does not impose rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II as described above, then this resolves as **0**. If 50 or more states adopt the relevant rules, or the federal government imposes national rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II then this resolves as **\"> 49\"**.", "lower_25": "9.84", "median": "19.3", "upper_75": "27.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years will be 373 miles?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. The median range for EVs [has been increasing over the years](https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1167-january-4-2021-median-driving-range-all-electric-vehicles-tops-250?fbclid=IwAR0uiP036VT4eX23MJOjJncoWxlel8AgntKorX8ftbv4hx1ROe7ZVPBUlN0) *(note that the methodology used in the linked figure is different than that used by this question)*, and further increases in range could spur increased EV adoption in the future.\n\nOne resource for assessing the range of EV models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).\n\nAs of January 27, 2022, model year 2021 has 2 qualifying unique all-electric vehicles with a median range of 192.5 miles, using the methodology described in the resolution criteria below . [See here for calculation](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1EQ-8xPDUZrqH_nCN6D64TqawHpBjv5NgecZGg-FN3mQ/edit?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This resolves as the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for all-electric vehicles and finding the median estimated range of the models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of 5 thousand dollars.\n\nThe median range will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "301", "median": "373", "upper_75": "517", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 16.7 states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years?", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)s) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopt its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.", "resc": "This resolves as the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1 of the listed year. Rules will be considered to be at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II if they mandate all new light car sales in 2035 must be zero-emission vehicles, and [set thresholds in preceding years](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/advanced-clean-cars-ii), in a similar or more stringent manner to California's proposed rule.\n\nRules will be considered to be legally enforceable in a state if the mandate exists in the legal codes and regulations of the state and it is legally recognized by the US federal government. A mandate will **not** be considered to be legally enforceable if it is under a stay or legal injunction from the state or federal government but **will** be considered to be enforceable if there are ongoing legal challenges to the rule that do not otherwise inhibit enforcement or interpretation as standing law.\n\nIn the event California and other states are no longer legally able to enforce their own rules and the federal government does not impose rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II as described above, then this resolves as **0**. If 50 or more states adopt the relevant rules, or the federal government imposes national rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II then this resolves as **\"> 49\"**.", "lower_25": "9.80", "median": "16.7", "upper_75": "21.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 15.8 states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years? (2035)", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)s) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopt its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.", "resc": "This resolves as the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1 of the listed year. Rules will be considered to be at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II if they mandate all new light car sales in 2035 must be zero-emission vehicles, and [set thresholds in preceding years](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/advanced-clean-cars-ii), in a similar or more stringent manner to California's proposed rule.\n\nRules will be considered to be legally enforceable in a state if the mandate exists in the legal codes and regulations of the state and it is legally recognized by the US federal government. A mandate will **not** be considered to be legally enforceable if it is under a stay or legal injunction from the state or federal government but **will** be considered to be enforceable if there are ongoing legal challenges to the rule that do not otherwise inhibit enforcement or interpretation as standing law.\n\nIn the event California and other states are no longer legally able to enforce their own rules and the federal government does not impose rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II as described above, then this resolves as **0**. If 50 or more states adopt the relevant rules, or the federal government imposes national rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II then this resolves as **\"> 49\"**.", "lower_25": "15.8", "median": "27.1", "upper_75": "32.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 16.7 states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years?", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)s) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopt its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.", "resc": "This resolves as the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1 of the listed year. Rules will be considered to be at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II if they mandate all new light car sales in 2035 must be zero-emission vehicles, and [set thresholds in preceding years](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/advanced-clean-cars-ii), in a similar or more stringent manner to California's proposed rule.\n\nRules will be considered to be legally enforceable in a state if the mandate exists in the legal codes and regulations of the state and it is legally recognized by the US federal government. A mandate will **not** be considered to be legally enforceable if it is under a stay or legal injunction from the state or federal government but **will** be considered to be enforceable if there are ongoing legal challenges to the rule that do not otherwise inhibit enforcement or interpretation as standing law.\n\nIn the event California and other states are no longer legally able to enforce their own rules and the federal government does not impose rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II as described above, then this resolves as **0**. If 50 or more states adopt the relevant rules, or the federal government imposes national rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II then this resolves as **\"> 49\"**.", "lower_25": "9.80", "median": "16.7", "upper_75": "21.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 9.80 states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years?", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)s) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopt its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.", "resc": "This resolves as the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1 of the listed year. Rules will be considered to be at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II if they mandate all new light car sales in 2035 must be zero-emission vehicles, and [set thresholds in preceding years](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/advanced-clean-cars-ii), in a similar or more stringent manner to California's proposed rule.\n\nRules will be considered to be legally enforceable in a state if the mandate exists in the legal codes and regulations of the state and it is legally recognized by the US federal government. A mandate will **not** be considered to be legally enforceable if it is under a stay or legal injunction from the state or federal government but **will** be considered to be enforceable if there are ongoing legal challenges to the rule that do not otherwise inhibit enforcement or interpretation as standing law.\n\nIn the event California and other states are no longer legally able to enforce their own rules and the federal government does not impose rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II as described above, then this resolves as **0**. If 50 or more states adopt the relevant rules, or the federal government imposes national rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II then this resolves as **\"> 49\"**.", "lower_25": "9.80", "median": "16.7", "upper_75": "21.6", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 15.8 states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years? (2035)", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)s) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopt its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.", "resc": "This resolves as the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1 of the listed year. Rules will be considered to be at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II if they mandate all new light car sales in 2035 must be zero-emission vehicles, and [set thresholds in preceding years](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/advanced-clean-cars-ii), in a similar or more stringent manner to California's proposed rule.\n\nRules will be considered to be legally enforceable in a state if the mandate exists in the legal codes and regulations of the state and it is legally recognized by the US federal government. A mandate will **not** be considered to be legally enforceable if it is under a stay or legal injunction from the state or federal government but **will** be considered to be enforceable if there are ongoing legal challenges to the rule that do not otherwise inhibit enforcement or interpretation as standing law.\n\nIn the event California and other states are no longer legally able to enforce their own rules and the federal government does not impose rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II as described above, then this resolves as **0**. If 50 or more states adopt the relevant rules, or the federal government imposes national rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II then this resolves as **\"> 49\"**.", "lower_25": "15.8", "median": "27.1", "upper_75": "32.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States (in tonnes) will be 4.36B in the year 2040?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.58B", "median": "3.44B", "upper_75": "4.36B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 9.80 states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years?", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)s) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopt its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.", "resc": "This resolves as the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1 of the listed year. Rules will be considered to be at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II if they mandate all new light car sales in 2035 must be zero-emission vehicles, and [set thresholds in preceding years](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/advanced-clean-cars-ii), in a similar or more stringent manner to California's proposed rule.\n\nRules will be considered to be legally enforceable in a state if the mandate exists in the legal codes and regulations of the state and it is legally recognized by the US federal government. A mandate will **not** be considered to be legally enforceable if it is under a stay or legal injunction from the state or federal government but **will** be considered to be enforceable if there are ongoing legal challenges to the rule that do not otherwise inhibit enforcement or interpretation as standing law.\n\nIn the event California and other states are no longer legally able to enforce their own rules and the federal government does not impose rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II as described above, then this resolves as **0**. If 50 or more states adopt the relevant rules, or the federal government imposes national rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II then this resolves as **\"> 49\"**.", "lower_25": "9.80", "median": "16.7", "upper_75": "21.6", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 16.7 states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years?", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)s) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopt its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.", "resc": "This resolves as the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1 of the listed year. Rules will be considered to be at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II if they mandate all new light car sales in 2035 must be zero-emission vehicles, and [set thresholds in preceding years](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/advanced-clean-cars-ii), in a similar or more stringent manner to California's proposed rule.\n\nRules will be considered to be legally enforceable in a state if the mandate exists in the legal codes and regulations of the state and it is legally recognized by the US federal government. A mandate will **not** be considered to be legally enforceable if it is under a stay or legal injunction from the state or federal government but **will** be considered to be enforceable if there are ongoing legal challenges to the rule that do not otherwise inhibit enforcement or interpretation as standing law.\n\nIn the event California and other states are no longer legally able to enforce their own rules and the federal government does not impose rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II as described above, then this resolves as **0**. If 50 or more states adopt the relevant rules, or the federal government imposes national rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II then this resolves as **\"> 49\"**.", "lower_25": "9.80", "median": "16.7", "upper_75": "21.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years will be 373 miles?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. The median range for EVs [has been increasing over the years](https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1167-january-4-2021-median-driving-range-all-electric-vehicles-tops-250?fbclid=IwAR0uiP036VT4eX23MJOjJncoWxlel8AgntKorX8ftbv4hx1ROe7ZVPBUlN0) *(note that the methodology used in the linked figure is different than that used by this question)*, and further increases in range could spur increased EV adoption in the future.\n\nOne resource for assessing the range of EV models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).\n\nAs of January 27, 2022, model year 2021 has 2 qualifying unique all-electric vehicles with a median range of 192.5 miles, using the methodology described in the resolution criteria below . [See here for calculation](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1EQ-8xPDUZrqH_nCN6D64TqawHpBjv5NgecZGg-FN3mQ/edit?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This resolves as the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for all-electric vehicles and finding the median estimated range of the models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of 5 thousand dollars.\n\nThe median range will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "301", "median": "373", "upper_75": "517", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years will be 373 miles?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. The median range for EVs [has been increasing over the years](https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1167-january-4-2021-median-driving-range-all-electric-vehicles-tops-250?fbclid=IwAR0uiP036VT4eX23MJOjJncoWxlel8AgntKorX8ftbv4hx1ROe7ZVPBUlN0) *(note that the methodology used in the linked figure is different than that used by this question)*, and further increases in range could spur increased EV adoption in the future.\n\nOne resource for assessing the range of EV models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).\n\nAs of January 27, 2022, model year 2021 has 2 qualifying unique all-electric vehicles with a median range of 192.5 miles, using the methodology described in the resolution criteria below . [See here for calculation](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1EQ-8xPDUZrqH_nCN6D64TqawHpBjv5NgecZGg-FN3mQ/edit?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This resolves as the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for all-electric vehicles and finding the median estimated range of the models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of 5 thousand dollars.\n\nThe median range will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "301", "median": "373", "upper_75": "517", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States (in tonnes) will be 4.36B in the year 2040?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.58B", "median": "3.44B", "upper_75": "4.36B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States (in tonnes) will be 4.36B in the year 2040?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.58B", "median": "3.44B", "upper_75": "4.36B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States (in tonnes) will be 4.03B in the year 2045?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.26B", "median": "3.11B", "upper_75": "4.03B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States (in tonnes) will be 4.03B in the year 2045?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.26B", "median": "3.11B", "upper_75": "4.03B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States (in tonnes) will be 4.03B in the year 2045?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "2.26B", "median": "3.11B", "upper_75": "4.03B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States (in tonnes) will be 4.13B in the year 2030?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "4.13B", "median": "4.74B", "upper_75": "5.40B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States (in tonnes) will be 4.13B in the year 2030?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "4.13B", "median": "4.74B", "upper_75": "5.40B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States (in tonnes) will be 4.13B in the year 2030?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "4.13B", "median": "4.74B", "upper_75": "5.40B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States will be 4.907B tonnes in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "4.907B", "median": "5.026B", "upper_75": "5.157B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States (in tonnes) will be 4.27B in 2035?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.53B", "median": "4.27B", "upper_75": "5.02B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States (in tonnes) will be 4.27B in 2035?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.53B", "median": "4.27B", "upper_75": "5.02B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States (in tonnes) will be 5.154B in the year 2024?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "4.873B", "median": "5.015B", "upper_75": "5.154B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States will be 4.907B tonnes in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "4.907B", "median": "5.026B", "upper_75": "5.157B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States (in tonnes) will be 5.154B in the year 2024?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "4.873B", "median": "5.015B", "upper_75": "5.154B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States (in tonnes) will be 4.962B in the year 2025?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "4.814B", "median": "4.962B", "upper_75": "5.109B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States (in tonnes) will be 4.962B in the year 2025?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "4.814B", "median": "4.962B", "upper_75": "5.109B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States (in tonnes) will be 5.154B in the year 2024?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "4.873B", "median": "5.015B", "upper_75": "5.154B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 15.8 states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years? (2035)", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)s) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopt its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.", "resc": "This resolves as the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1 of the listed year. Rules will be considered to be at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II if they mandate all new light car sales in 2035 must be zero-emission vehicles, and [set thresholds in preceding years](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advanced-clean-cars-program/advanced-clean-cars-ii), in a similar or more stringent manner to California's proposed rule.\n\nRules will be considered to be legally enforceable in a state if the mandate exists in the legal codes and regulations of the state and it is legally recognized by the US federal government. A mandate will **not** be considered to be legally enforceable if it is under a stay or legal injunction from the state or federal government but **will** be considered to be enforceable if there are ongoing legal challenges to the rule that do not otherwise inhibit enforcement or interpretation as standing law.\n\nIn the event California and other states are no longer legally able to enforce their own rules and the federal government does not impose rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II as described above, then this resolves as **0**. If 50 or more states adopt the relevant rules, or the federal government imposes national rules at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II then this resolves as **\"> 49\"**.", "lower_25": "15.8", "median": "27.1", "upper_75": "32.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States will be 4.907B tonnes in the following years?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "4.907B", "median": "5.026B", "upper_75": "5.157B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 24.0 zero emission light vehicles will be available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the following model years? (2024)", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. An increase in the variety of affordable EVs may be a significant factor in the rate of adoption of EVs. As stated in the paper [Evidence for a global electric vehicle tipping point](https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/globalsystemsinstitute/documents/Lam_et_al_Evidence_for_a_global_EV_TP.pdf)\n\n>Widespread adoption requires the availability of a diverse set of vehicles that collectively cover the needs of highly heterogeneous consumers.\n\nOne resource for assessing the diversity of zero emission vehicle (ZEV) models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).", "resc": "This resolves as the number of unique zero emission light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for zero emission vehicles and totaling the number of models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of five thousand dollars.\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The count of qualifying vehicles will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "11.8", "median": "15.7", "upper_75": "24.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States (in tonnes) will be 4.962B in the year 2025?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "4.814B", "median": "4.962B", "upper_75": "5.109B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 24.0 zero emission light vehicles will be available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the following model years? (2024)", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. An increase in the variety of affordable EVs may be a significant factor in the rate of adoption of EVs. As stated in the paper [Evidence for a global electric vehicle tipping point](https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/globalsystemsinstitute/documents/Lam_et_al_Evidence_for_a_global_EV_TP.pdf)\n\n>Widespread adoption requires the availability of a diverse set of vehicles that collectively cover the needs of highly heterogeneous consumers.\n\nOne resource for assessing the diversity of zero emission vehicle (ZEV) models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).", "resc": "This resolves as the number of unique zero emission light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for zero emission vehicles and totaling the number of models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of five thousand dollars.\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The count of qualifying vehicles will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "11.8", "median": "15.7", "upper_75": "24.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What will be the share of global light vehicles sold which are zero-emission vehicles in the following years? (2024)\n\nKeyword: 19.6\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 19.6 share of global light vehicles sold will be zero-emission vehicles in the following years? (2024)", "desc": "According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA) the global market share of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) [more than doubled](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/global-ev-data-explorer) from 2020 to 2021, from 4% to 8.6%. This data includes cars which are battery-electric and plug-in hybrid electric (but does not consider fuel cell electric vehicles). According to its [Global Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ad8fb04c-4f75-42fc-973a-6e54c8a4449a/GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf), the IEA charts define \"cars\" as passenger light-duty vehicles.\n\n\"IEA\n\nThe IEA also provides data on regional adoption of EVs on its page [Trends in electric light-duty vehicles](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022/trends-in-electric-light-duty-vehicles).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold globally in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the International Energy Agency (IEA).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The IEA currently does not include sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the IEA will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the IEA, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IEA; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IEA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "15.3", "median": "19.6", "upper_75": "24.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 29.2% of light vehicles sold in California in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopts its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.\n\nIn 2021, 12.41% of light-duty vehicle sales in California were ZEVs (9.12% battery electric, 3.13% plug-in hybrid, and 0.16% hydrogen fuel cell). The ZEV share for 2022 through the first three quarters is 17.70%. A light-duty vehicle is one with a [gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) up to 10,000 pounds](https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/light-duty-vehicle-emissions#:~:text=The%20light%20duty%20smog%20regulations%20cover%20passenger%20vehicles%20with%20a%20gross%20vehicle%20weight%20rating%20(GVWR)%20up%20to%2010%2C000%20pounds).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percentage of light vehicles sold in California in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the [California Energy Commission](https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/zero-emission-vehicle-and-infrastructure-statistics/new-zev-sales). Zero-emission vehicles will be battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the California energy commission; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the California Energy commission no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "24.9", "median": "29.2", "upper_75": "33.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model year (2024) will be 244 miles?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. The median range for EVs [has been increasing over the years](https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1167-january-4-2021-median-driving-range-all-electric-vehicles-tops-250?fbclid=IwAR0uiP036VT4eX23MJOjJncoWxlel8AgntKorX8ftbv4hx1ROe7ZVPBUlN0) *(note that the methodology used in the linked figure is different than that used by this question)*, and further increases in range could spur increased EV adoption in the future.\n\nOne resource for assessing the range of EV models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).\n\nAs of January 27, 2022, model year 2021 has 2 qualifying unique all-electric vehicles with a median range of 192.5 miles, using the methodology described in the resolution criteria below . [See here for calculation](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1EQ-8xPDUZrqH_nCN6D64TqawHpBjv5NgecZGg-FN3mQ/edit?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This resolves as the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for all-electric vehicles and finding the median estimated range of the models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of 5 thousand dollars.\n\nThe median range will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "227", "median": "244", "upper_75": "261", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 140k people will be employed in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years? (2024)", "desc": "The [growth of electric vehicles](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) may have significant effects on the US auto industry, including employment. The impact on US employment in the electric vehicle industry may [depend on trade policy](https://www.epi.org/press/the-shift-to-all-electric-vehicles-could-create-over-150000-jobs-by-2030-if-policymakers-make-smart-investments-to-secure-u-s-leadership-in-the-auto-sector/) and [domestic manufacturing incentives](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/19/fact-sheet-the-inflation-reduction-act-supports-workers-and-families/).\n\nThe US Department of Energy publishes the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER), a report tracking US employment in the energy industry. The USEER was first published in 2016 and has been published annually since, though the 2018 through 2020 USEER was not published by the Department of Energy but was instead [published by a collaboration between non-governmental organizations](https://www.usenergyjobs.org/about).\n\nThe USEER [2021](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/USEER%202021%20Main%20Body.pdf) and [2022](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/USEER%202022%20National%20Report_1.pdf) reports published electric vehicle industry employment figures for the previous year as shown:\n\n* 2020: 83,733\n* 2021: 105,694", "resc": "This resolves as the number of employees in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years, according to the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER). The first value reported by USEER for a listed year will be used, later revisions will be immaterial.\n\nIn the event the USEER is no longer published or does not publish employment data specific to the electric vehicle industry an alternate source producing comparable estimates to the last available data may be used. If no satisfactory alternate source is available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "111k", "median": "124k", "upper_75": "140k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Before the first year in which GWP growth exceeds 30%, what is the chance that 6.90×1029 FLOP will be used in the largest ML training run?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [In particular this question asks, what will be the first year when world real GDP exceeds 130% of all prior years, as reported by a reputable organization such as the World Bank?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5159/when-will-economic-growth-accelerate/)\n\n---\n\nThe concept of transformative AI was first introduced by Holden Karnofsky in [this blog post from 2016](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/research/some-background-on-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence/),\n\n> Roughly and conceptually, transformative AI is AI that precipitates a transition comparable to (or more significant than) the agricultural or industrial revolution.\n\nSince then, multiple operationalizations of transformative AI have focused on growth in Gross World Product, with the most common figure being 30%. For example, see [this question on Metaculus](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5159/when-will-economic-growth-accelerate/) about when transformative growth will occur.", "resc": "This question will resolve according to the total number of floating point operations used during the largest training run for a machine learning model (training FLOP) that was trained, and publicly documented as having been trained, prior to the first year during which Gross World Product growth rate exceeds 30%, as measured by a prior peak (rather than the previous year). The training FLOP and GWP growth rate will be determined according to the most credible estimates that Metaculus is aware of at the time of resolution. Training FLOP should include any fine-tuning of the model, as well as pre-training. If GWP growth does not exceed 30% before January 1, 2200 this question resolves as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "1.26×1028", "median": "6.90×1029", "upper_75": "1.32×1032", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Before the first year in which GWP growth exceeds 30%, what is the chance that 6.90×1029 FLOP will be used in the largest ML training run?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [In particular this question asks, what will be the first year when world real GDP exceeds 130% of all prior years, as reported by a reputable organization such as the World Bank?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5159/when-will-economic-growth-accelerate/)\n\n---\n\nThe concept of transformative AI was first introduced by Holden Karnofsky in [this blog post from 2016](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/research/some-background-on-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence/),\n\n> Roughly and conceptually, transformative AI is AI that precipitates a transition comparable to (or more significant than) the agricultural or industrial revolution.\n\nSince then, multiple operationalizations of transformative AI have focused on growth in Gross World Product, with the most common figure being 30%. For example, see [this question on Metaculus](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5159/when-will-economic-growth-accelerate/) about when transformative growth will occur.", "resc": "This question will resolve according to the total number of floating point operations used during the largest training run for a machine learning model (training FLOP) that was trained, and publicly documented as having been trained, prior to the first year during which Gross World Product growth rate exceeds 30%, as measured by a prior peak (rather than the previous year). The training FLOP and GWP growth rate will be determined according to the most credible estimates that Metaculus is aware of at the time of resolution. Training FLOP should include any fine-tuning of the model, as well as pre-training. If GWP growth does not exceed 30% before January 1, 2200 this question resolves as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "1.26×1028", "median": "6.90×1029", "upper_75": "1.32×1032", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 24.0 zero emission light vehicles will be available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the following model years? (2024)", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. An increase in the variety of affordable EVs may be a significant factor in the rate of adoption of EVs. As stated in the paper [Evidence for a global electric vehicle tipping point](https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/globalsystemsinstitute/documents/Lam_et_al_Evidence_for_a_global_EV_TP.pdf)\n\n>Widespread adoption requires the availability of a diverse set of vehicles that collectively cover the needs of highly heterogeneous consumers.\n\nOne resource for assessing the diversity of zero emission vehicle (ZEV) models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).", "resc": "This resolves as the number of unique zero emission light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for zero emission vehicles and totaling the number of models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of five thousand dollars.\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The count of qualifying vehicles will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "11.8", "median": "15.7", "upper_75": "24.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail electricity price (in 2022 US cents per kWh) in the United States will be 11.16% in the year 2024?", "desc": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), calling into question what factors may influence future trends in electric vehicle adoption. One possible factor is the [effect of electricity prices](https://www.ucits.org/research-project/2020-12/). Electricity prices may not only influence EV adoption, but also be influenced by EV adoption if it creates a significant increase in electricity demand.\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail electricity prices in its chart [Average retail price of electricity](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/methodology.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a monthly survey of electric retailers.", "resc": "This resolves as the price of electricity (in 2022 US cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh)) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined according to data provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). The annual price for \"all sectors\" will be used.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "11.16", "median": "11.78", "upper_75": "12.37", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail electricity price (in 2022 US cents per kWh) in the United States will be 11.16% in the year 2024?", "desc": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), calling into question what factors may influence future trends in electric vehicle adoption. One possible factor is the [effect of electricity prices](https://www.ucits.org/research-project/2020-12/). Electricity prices may not only influence EV adoption, but also be influenced by EV adoption if it creates a significant increase in electricity demand.\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail electricity prices in its chart [Average retail price of electricity](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/methodology.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a monthly survey of electric retailers.", "resc": "This resolves as the price of electricity (in 2022 US cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh)) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined according to data provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). The annual price for \"all sectors\" will be used.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "11.16", "median": "11.78", "upper_75": "12.37", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that annual CO2 emissions in the United States (in tonnes) will be 4.27B in 2035?", "desc": "*Related Questons on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/2563/what-will-the-atmospheric-co2-concentration-be-in-2030/)\n* [What will the atmospheric CO2 concentration be in 2100?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7801/co2-in-atmosphere-in-2100/)\n* [When will global CO2 emissions peak?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11933/global-co2-emissions-peak-year/)\n* [How much greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2030, in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3678/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-in-2030/)\n* [What will global CO2 emissions (in tonnes) be in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/)\n\n*Background for this question has been copied from [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12910/global-co2-emissions/) with minor edits*.\n\n----\n\n[Carbon Dioxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_dioxide) (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted by humanity and the primary driver of climate change, as of 2016. [Our World In Data](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#by-gas-how-much-does-each-contribute-to-total-greenhouse-gas-emissions) estimated that in 2016 CO2 made up 74% of humanity's total greenhouse gas emissions (when weighting each greenhouse gas by the [amount of warming](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) they cause over 100 years).\n\nAs of 2022, Our World in Data relies on [The Global Carbon Project](https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/) for data on CO2 emissions since 1959.\n\nIn November 2021, [Climate Action Tracker](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/) forecasted the future amount of greenhouse gas emissions and warming anomaly under different scenarios:\n\n\n\nNote that this graph includes other greenhouse gases in [CO2 equivalents](https://ourworldindata.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions#how-do-we-account-for-the-warming-of-different-gases) and includes [land use change](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change,_and_forestry#:~:text=Land%2Duse%20change%20can%20be,per%20year%20to%20the%20atmosphere.). The \"policies and action scenario\" assumes that governments maintain their climate policies as of November 2021; \"2030 targets\" and \"pledges and targets\" assume that governments achieve (respectively) their 2030 emissions targets and all targets and commitments submitted to the [UNFCCC](https://unfccc.int/) under the Paris Agreement, while the \"optimistic scenario\" assumes full implementation and achivement of all targets and policies announced by all countries. The goal of 1.5C of warming is shown as the target of the [2015 Paris Climate Agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_Agreement).\n\nThe US [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/outlook-for-future-emissions.php) forecasted in October 2021 (assuming laws and regulations were to remain unchanged and following existing demographic and technological trends) that US energy-related CO2 emissions would be 2% lower in 2050 relative to 2021 levels.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the United States' CO2 emissions (in tonnes) in the following years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=~USA).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.53B", "median": "4.27B", "upper_75": "5.02B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 29.2% of light vehicles sold in California in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopts its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.\n\nIn 2021, 12.41% of light-duty vehicle sales in California were ZEVs (9.12% battery electric, 3.13% plug-in hybrid, and 0.16% hydrogen fuel cell). The ZEV share for 2022 through the first three quarters is 17.70%. A light-duty vehicle is one with a [gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) up to 10,000 pounds](https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/light-duty-vehicle-emissions#:~:text=The%20light%20duty%20smog%20regulations%20cover%20passenger%20vehicles%20with%20a%20gross%20vehicle%20weight%20rating%20(GVWR)%20up%20to%2010%2C000%20pounds).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percentage of light vehicles sold in California in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the [California Energy Commission](https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/zero-emission-vehicle-and-infrastructure-statistics/new-zev-sales). Zero-emission vehicles will be battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the California energy commission; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the California Energy commission no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "24.9", "median": "29.2", "upper_75": "33.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail electricity price (in 2022 US cents per kWh) in the United States will be 11.16% in the year 2024?", "desc": "Electric vehicles (EVs) have seen recent [increases in market share](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), calling into question what factors may influence future trends in electric vehicle adoption. One possible factor is the [effect of electricity prices](https://www.ucits.org/research-project/2020-12/). Electricity prices may not only influence EV adoption, but also be influenced by EV adoption if it creates a significant increase in electricity demand.\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail electricity prices in its chart [Average retail price of electricity](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/update/methodology.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a monthly survey of electric retailers.", "resc": "This resolves as the price of electricity (in 2022 US cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh)) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined according to data provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g&endsec=vg&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~~~~~&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-RES.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-COM.A~ELEC.PRICE.US-IND.A&map=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&ctype=linechart<ype=pin&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). The annual price for \"all sectors\" will be used.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "11.16", "median": "11.78", "upper_75": "12.37", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 140k people will be employed in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years? (2024)", "desc": "The [growth of electric vehicles](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) may have significant effects on the US auto industry, including employment. The impact on US employment in the electric vehicle industry may [depend on trade policy](https://www.epi.org/press/the-shift-to-all-electric-vehicles-could-create-over-150000-jobs-by-2030-if-policymakers-make-smart-investments-to-secure-u-s-leadership-in-the-auto-sector/) and [domestic manufacturing incentives](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/19/fact-sheet-the-inflation-reduction-act-supports-workers-and-families/).\n\nThe US Department of Energy publishes the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER), a report tracking US employment in the energy industry. The USEER was first published in 2016 and has been published annually since, though the 2018 through 2020 USEER was not published by the Department of Energy but was instead [published by a collaboration between non-governmental organizations](https://www.usenergyjobs.org/about).\n\nThe USEER [2021](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/USEER%202021%20Main%20Body.pdf) and [2022](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/USEER%202022%20National%20Report_1.pdf) reports published electric vehicle industry employment figures for the previous year as shown:\n\n* 2020: 83,733\n* 2021: 105,694", "resc": "This resolves as the number of employees in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years, according to the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER). The first value reported by USEER for a listed year will be used, later revisions will be immaterial.\n\nIn the event the USEER is no longer published or does not publish employment data specific to the electric vehicle industry an alternate source producing comparable estimates to the last available data may be used. If no satisfactory alternate source is available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "111k", "median": "124k", "upper_75": "140k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States will be 3.05 in the year 2024?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US on the following dates?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11763/real-price-of-gas-in-us-over-time/)\n\n---\n\nSome observers have noted a potential relationship between gas prices and electric vehicle adoption, where [high gas prices may increase interest in purchasing an electric vehicle](https://time.com/6173178/high-gas-prices-electric-vehicles/). In addition to currently having a lower fuel cost per mile in most US states, electricity rates are generally more stable than gas prices. In its [Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), Argonne National Laboratory provides the chart below, showing hybrid electric vehicle (HEV), plug-in electric vehicle (PEV), and gasoline prices over time.\n\n\"Monthly\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail gasoline prices in its chart [US Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/gas_proc-methods.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a weekly survey of retail gasoline outlets, with prices weighted by the annual volume sold by each outlet. According to the notes section of the [tabular data](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_GND_DCUS_NUS_A.htm), monthly and annual figures are simple averages of the weekly data.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the price of gas (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined by the Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported annually, provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.05", "median": "3.44", "upper_75": "3.84", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States will be 3.05 in the year 2024?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US on the following dates?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11763/real-price-of-gas-in-us-over-time/)\n\n---\n\nSome observers have noted a potential relationship between gas prices and electric vehicle adoption, where [high gas prices may increase interest in purchasing an electric vehicle](https://time.com/6173178/high-gas-prices-electric-vehicles/). In addition to currently having a lower fuel cost per mile in most US states, electricity rates are generally more stable than gas prices. In its [Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), Argonne National Laboratory provides the chart below, showing hybrid electric vehicle (HEV), plug-in electric vehicle (PEV), and gasoline prices over time.\n\n\"Monthly\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail gasoline prices in its chart [US Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/gas_proc-methods.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a weekly survey of retail gasoline outlets, with prices weighted by the annual volume sold by each outlet. According to the notes section of the [tabular data](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_GND_DCUS_NUS_A.htm), monthly and annual figures are simple averages of the weekly data.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the price of gas (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined by the Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported annually, provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.05", "median": "3.44", "upper_75": "3.84", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Before the first year in which GWP growth exceeds 30%, what is the chance that 6.90×1029 FLOP will be used in the largest ML training run?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [In particular this question asks, what will be the first year when world real GDP exceeds 130% of all prior years, as reported by a reputable organization such as the World Bank?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5159/when-will-economic-growth-accelerate/)\n\n---\n\nThe concept of transformative AI was first introduced by Holden Karnofsky in [this blog post from 2016](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/research/some-background-on-our-views-regarding-advanced-artificial-intelligence/),\n\n> Roughly and conceptually, transformative AI is AI that precipitates a transition comparable to (or more significant than) the agricultural or industrial revolution.\n\nSince then, multiple operationalizations of transformative AI have focused on growth in Gross World Product, with the most common figure being 30%. For example, see [this question on Metaculus](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5159/when-will-economic-growth-accelerate/) about when transformative growth will occur.", "resc": "This question will resolve according to the total number of floating point operations used during the largest training run for a machine learning model (training FLOP) that was trained, and publicly documented as having been trained, prior to the first year during which Gross World Product growth rate exceeds 30%, as measured by a prior peak (rather than the previous year). The training FLOP and GWP growth rate will be determined according to the most credible estimates that Metaculus is aware of at the time of resolution. Training FLOP should include any fine-tuning of the model, as well as pre-training. If GWP growth does not exceed 30% before January 1, 2200 this question resolves as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "1.26×1028", "median": "6.90×1029", "upper_75": "1.32×1032", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 140k people will be employed in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years? (2024)", "desc": "The [growth of electric vehicles](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) may have significant effects on the US auto industry, including employment. The impact on US employment in the electric vehicle industry may [depend on trade policy](https://www.epi.org/press/the-shift-to-all-electric-vehicles-could-create-over-150000-jobs-by-2030-if-policymakers-make-smart-investments-to-secure-u-s-leadership-in-the-auto-sector/) and [domestic manufacturing incentives](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/19/fact-sheet-the-inflation-reduction-act-supports-workers-and-families/).\n\nThe US Department of Energy publishes the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER), a report tracking US employment in the energy industry. The USEER was first published in 2016 and has been published annually since, though the 2018 through 2020 USEER was not published by the Department of Energy but was instead [published by a collaboration between non-governmental organizations](https://www.usenergyjobs.org/about).\n\nThe USEER [2021](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/USEER%202021%20Main%20Body.pdf) and [2022](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-06/USEER%202022%20National%20Report_1.pdf) reports published electric vehicle industry employment figures for the previous year as shown:\n\n* 2020: 83,733\n* 2021: 105,694", "resc": "This resolves as the number of employees in the electric vehicle industry in the United States in the following years, according to the [US Energy and Employment Jobs Report](https://www.energy.gov/policy/us-energy-employment-jobs-report-useer) (USEER). The first value reported by USEER for a listed year will be used, later revisions will be immaterial.\n\nIn the event the USEER is no longer published or does not publish employment data specific to the electric vehicle industry an alternate source producing comparable estimates to the last available data may be used. If no satisfactory alternate source is available Metaculus may resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "111k", "median": "124k", "upper_75": "140k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the share of zero-emission vehicle federal fleet procurements in the United States will be 14.6 in the following fiscal year (2024)?", "desc": "On December 8, 2021, President Biden signed [Executive Order 14057](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/12/08/executive-order-on-catalyzing-clean-energy-industries-and-jobs-through-federal-sustainability/), which set a goal that the Federal Government should achieve\n\n>100 percent zero-emission vehicle acquisitions by 2035, including 100 percent zero-emission light-duty vehicle acquisitions by 2027\n\nSpecifically for its 2027 goal the Executive Order states\n\n>Each agency's light-duty vehicle acquisitions shall be zero-emission vehicles by the end of fiscal year 2027.\n\nThe Federal Government publishes annual statistics about its fleet makeup and acquisitions in the [Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). Table 5-4 from the FFR Open Data Set provided for fiscal year 2021 shows vehicle acquisitions by fuel type for 2017 through 2021:\n\n| **Fuel Type** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** |\n| ----------------------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- |\n| Gasoline | 23,312 | 26,309 | 21,445 | 28,055 | 38,229 |\n| Diesel | 5,626 | 5,970 | 7,339 | 5,551 | 4,258 |\n| Gasoline Hybrid | 4,475 | 4,814 | 3,207 | 3,533 | 3,246 |\n| Diesel Hybrid | 10 | 23 | 8 | 12 | 29 |\n| Gasoline LGHG | 945 | 1,672 | 1,128 | 1,488 | 1,225 |\n| Diesel LGHG | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |\n| Gasoline Plug-in Hybrid | 191 | 302 | 212 | 188 | 119 |\n| Diesel Plug-in Hybrid | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Compressed Natural Gas | 12 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 8 |\n| E-85 | 24,110 | 15,252 | 17,306 | 10,366 | 8,565 |\n| Electric | 303 | 194 | 167 | 111 | 138 |\n| Hydrogen | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Natural Gas | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Petroleum Gas | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |\n| **Grand Total** | **58,986** | **54,549** | **50,830** | **49,315** | **55,818** |", "resc": "This resolves as the percent of United States federal fleet procurements in the listed fiscal year which are zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs), according to the [US Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). The number of zero-emission vehicles acquired in a fiscal year will be compared to the total number of vehicles acquired to arrive at the percentage. As of November 30, 2022, the fiscal year 2021 data set shows that for fiscal year 2021 this value would be 0.46% (138 electric vehicles plus 119 gasoline plug-in hybrid plus 0 diesel plug-in hybrid plus 0 hydrogen for a total of 257 ZEVs compared to 55,818 total vehicles acquired).\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. In the event the federal government no longer reports vehicle acquisitions by fuel type this question resolves as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "6.44", "median": "9.00", "upper_75": "14.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the energy transition metal index will increase by 75% from December 2020 to December 2024?", "desc": "The [growth](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in electric vehicle (EV) market-share and [calls for growth to accelerate](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/05/biden-pushes-for-evs-to-make-up-40percent-or-more-of-us-auto-sales-by-2030.html) have raised concerns about the supply of critical minerals used in batteries. According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency)'s (IEA) [Global EV Outlook 2022](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022)\n\n>. . . the supply of some minerals such as lithium would need to rise by up to one-third by 2030 to match the demand for EV batteries to satisfy the pledges and announcements in the [Announced Pledges Scenario](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-and-climate-model/announced-pledges-scenario-aps) (APS). For example, demand for lithium – the commodity with the largest projected demand-supply gap – is projected to increase sixfold to 500 kilotonnes by 2030 in the APS, requiring the equivalent of 50 new average-sized mines.\n\nA [report](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47227) published by the [Congressional Research Service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Research_Service) in August of 2022 says the following about the critical mineral supply chain for EV batteries:\n\n>As the majority of EV manufacturing and sales occur outside the United States, so does the majority of EV battery production. While China accounts for over 70% of global EV battery production capacity, the United States has developed battery supply chains for some of its demand. China's dominance in EV battery manufacturing is similar to its dominance in mining and extraction of the minerals used in EV batteries. The potential for an accelerating global transition to EVs leads some to question the domestic availability of the minerals and materials for the domestic manufacture of EV batteries.\n>\n>Currently, lithium-ion batteries are the dominant type of rechargeable batteries used in EVs. The most commonly used varieties are lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), lithium manganese oxide (LMO), lithium iron phosphate (LFP), lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) and lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC). Graphite is currently widely used as the anode in lithium ion batteries. These EV battery chemistries depend on five critical minerals whose domestic supply is potentially at risk for disruption: lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite. The U.S. Geological Survey designated these and other minerals as “critical,” according to the methodology codified in the Energy Act of 2020.\n\nThe [International Monetary Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Monetary_Fund) (IMF) publishes an **Energy Transition Metal Index** in its [Primary Commodity Price System](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595). The monthly version of the index can be accessed by selecting it in the commodity dropdown, changing the time range to **monthly** and the unit to **index**. More information on the calculation of the index can be found in its [technical documentation](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Research/CommodityPrices/Monthly/pcps-technical-documentation.ashx) (link also available on the [IMF Primary Commodity Prices page](https://www.imf.org/en/Research/commodity-prices)). As of November 24, 2022, the Energy Transition Metal Index contains the following metals:\n\n`Aluminum, Chromium, Cobalt, Copper, Lead, Lithium, Manganese, Molybdenum, Nickel, Palladium, Platinum, Rare Earth Elements, Silicon, Silver, Vanadium, Zinc`", "resc": "This resolves as the percentage change of the Energy Transition Metal Index [published by the IMF](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595) for December of the listed year relative to December of 2020. The percentage change will be calculated as \\((Y - X)/X\\times 100\\) where Y is the index value in December of the listed year and X is the index value in December of 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IMF; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IMF no longer reports data for a relevant year the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe index or any equivalent indices published by the IMF will be used as provided, so long as the make-up of the index contains 8 or more of the metals listed in 2022 (see the background section for the 2022 list).", "lower_25": "22.8", "median": "63.6", "upper_75": "127", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the share of zero-emission vehicle federal fleet procurements in the United States will be 14.6 in the following fiscal year (2024)?", "desc": "On December 8, 2021, President Biden signed [Executive Order 14057](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/12/08/executive-order-on-catalyzing-clean-energy-industries-and-jobs-through-federal-sustainability/), which set a goal that the Federal Government should achieve\n\n>100 percent zero-emission vehicle acquisitions by 2035, including 100 percent zero-emission light-duty vehicle acquisitions by 2027\n\nSpecifically for its 2027 goal the Executive Order states\n\n>Each agency's light-duty vehicle acquisitions shall be zero-emission vehicles by the end of fiscal year 2027.\n\nThe Federal Government publishes annual statistics about its fleet makeup and acquisitions in the [Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). Table 5-4 from the FFR Open Data Set provided for fiscal year 2021 shows vehicle acquisitions by fuel type for 2017 through 2021:\n\n| **Fuel Type** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** |\n| ----------------------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- |\n| Gasoline | 23,312 | 26,309 | 21,445 | 28,055 | 38,229 |\n| Diesel | 5,626 | 5,970 | 7,339 | 5,551 | 4,258 |\n| Gasoline Hybrid | 4,475 | 4,814 | 3,207 | 3,533 | 3,246 |\n| Diesel Hybrid | 10 | 23 | 8 | 12 | 29 |\n| Gasoline LGHG | 945 | 1,672 | 1,128 | 1,488 | 1,225 |\n| Diesel LGHG | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |\n| Gasoline Plug-in Hybrid | 191 | 302 | 212 | 188 | 119 |\n| Diesel Plug-in Hybrid | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Compressed Natural Gas | 12 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 8 |\n| E-85 | 24,110 | 15,252 | 17,306 | 10,366 | 8,565 |\n| Electric | 303 | 194 | 167 | 111 | 138 |\n| Hydrogen | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Natural Gas | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Petroleum Gas | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |\n| **Grand Total** | **58,986** | **54,549** | **50,830** | **49,315** | **55,818** |", "resc": "This resolves as the percent of United States federal fleet procurements in the listed fiscal year which are zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs), according to the [US Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). The number of zero-emission vehicles acquired in a fiscal year will be compared to the total number of vehicles acquired to arrive at the percentage. As of November 30, 2022, the fiscal year 2021 data set shows that for fiscal year 2021 this value would be 0.46% (138 electric vehicles plus 119 gasoline plug-in hybrid plus 0 diesel plug-in hybrid plus 0 hydrogen for a total of 257 ZEVs compared to 55,818 total vehicles acquired).\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. In the event the federal government no longer reports vehicle acquisitions by fuel type this question resolves as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "6.44", "median": "9.00", "upper_75": "14.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the energy transition metal index will increase by 75% from December 2020 to December 2024?", "desc": "The [growth](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in electric vehicle (EV) market-share and [calls for growth to accelerate](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/05/biden-pushes-for-evs-to-make-up-40percent-or-more-of-us-auto-sales-by-2030.html) have raised concerns about the supply of critical minerals used in batteries. According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency)'s (IEA) [Global EV Outlook 2022](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022)\n\n>. . . the supply of some minerals such as lithium would need to rise by up to one-third by 2030 to match the demand for EV batteries to satisfy the pledges and announcements in the [Announced Pledges Scenario](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-and-climate-model/announced-pledges-scenario-aps) (APS). For example, demand for lithium – the commodity with the largest projected demand-supply gap – is projected to increase sixfold to 500 kilotonnes by 2030 in the APS, requiring the equivalent of 50 new average-sized mines.\n\nA [report](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47227) published by the [Congressional Research Service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Research_Service) in August of 2022 says the following about the critical mineral supply chain for EV batteries:\n\n>As the majority of EV manufacturing and sales occur outside the United States, so does the majority of EV battery production. While China accounts for over 70% of global EV battery production capacity, the United States has developed battery supply chains for some of its demand. China's dominance in EV battery manufacturing is similar to its dominance in mining and extraction of the minerals used in EV batteries. The potential for an accelerating global transition to EVs leads some to question the domestic availability of the minerals and materials for the domestic manufacture of EV batteries.\n>\n>Currently, lithium-ion batteries are the dominant type of rechargeable batteries used in EVs. The most commonly used varieties are lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), lithium manganese oxide (LMO), lithium iron phosphate (LFP), lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) and lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC). Graphite is currently widely used as the anode in lithium ion batteries. These EV battery chemistries depend on five critical minerals whose domestic supply is potentially at risk for disruption: lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite. The U.S. Geological Survey designated these and other minerals as “critical,” according to the methodology codified in the Energy Act of 2020.\n\nThe [International Monetary Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Monetary_Fund) (IMF) publishes an **Energy Transition Metal Index** in its [Primary Commodity Price System](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595). The monthly version of the index can be accessed by selecting it in the commodity dropdown, changing the time range to **monthly** and the unit to **index**. More information on the calculation of the index can be found in its [technical documentation](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Research/CommodityPrices/Monthly/pcps-technical-documentation.ashx) (link also available on the [IMF Primary Commodity Prices page](https://www.imf.org/en/Research/commodity-prices)). As of November 24, 2022, the Energy Transition Metal Index contains the following metals:\n\n`Aluminum, Chromium, Cobalt, Copper, Lead, Lithium, Manganese, Molybdenum, Nickel, Palladium, Platinum, Rare Earth Elements, Silicon, Silver, Vanadium, Zinc`", "resc": "This resolves as the percentage change of the Energy Transition Metal Index [published by the IMF](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595) for December of the listed year relative to December of 2020. The percentage change will be calculated as \\((Y - X)/X\\times 100\\) where Y is the index value in December of the listed year and X is the index value in December of 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IMF; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IMF no longer reports data for a relevant year the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe index or any equivalent indices published by the IMF will be used as provided, so long as the make-up of the index contains 8 or more of the metals listed in 2022 (see the background section for the 2022 list).", "lower_25": "22.8", "median": "63.6", "upper_75": "127", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the share of zero-emission vehicle federal fleet procurements in the United States will be 14.6 in the following fiscal year (2024)?", "desc": "On December 8, 2021, President Biden signed [Executive Order 14057](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/12/08/executive-order-on-catalyzing-clean-energy-industries-and-jobs-through-federal-sustainability/), which set a goal that the Federal Government should achieve\n\n>100 percent zero-emission vehicle acquisitions by 2035, including 100 percent zero-emission light-duty vehicle acquisitions by 2027\n\nSpecifically for its 2027 goal the Executive Order states\n\n>Each agency's light-duty vehicle acquisitions shall be zero-emission vehicles by the end of fiscal year 2027.\n\nThe Federal Government publishes annual statistics about its fleet makeup and acquisitions in the [Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). Table 5-4 from the FFR Open Data Set provided for fiscal year 2021 shows vehicle acquisitions by fuel type for 2017 through 2021:\n\n| **Fuel Type** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** |\n| ----------------------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- | ----------- |\n| Gasoline | 23,312 | 26,309 | 21,445 | 28,055 | 38,229 |\n| Diesel | 5,626 | 5,970 | 7,339 | 5,551 | 4,258 |\n| Gasoline Hybrid | 4,475 | 4,814 | 3,207 | 3,533 | 3,246 |\n| Diesel Hybrid | 10 | 23 | 8 | 12 | 29 |\n| Gasoline LGHG | 945 | 1,672 | 1,128 | 1,488 | 1,225 |\n| Diesel LGHG | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 |\n| Gasoline Plug-in Hybrid | 191 | 302 | 212 | 188 | 119 |\n| Diesel Plug-in Hybrid | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Compressed Natural Gas | 12 | 11 | 14 | 11 | 8 |\n| E-85 | 24,110 | 15,252 | 17,306 | 10,366 | 8,565 |\n| Electric | 303 | 194 | 167 | 111 | 138 |\n| Hydrogen | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Natural Gas | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |\n| Liquefied Petroleum Gas | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |\n| **Grand Total** | **58,986** | **54,549** | **50,830** | **49,315** | **55,818** |", "resc": "This resolves as the percent of United States federal fleet procurements in the listed fiscal year which are zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs), according to the [US Federal Fleet Report](https://www.gsa.gov/policy-regulations/policy/vehicle-management-policy/federal-fleet-report-ffr) (FFR). The number of zero-emission vehicles acquired in a fiscal year will be compared to the total number of vehicles acquired to arrive at the percentage. As of November 30, 2022, the fiscal year 2021 data set shows that for fiscal year 2021 this value would be 0.46% (138 electric vehicles plus 119 gasoline plug-in hybrid plus 0 diesel plug-in hybrid plus 0 hydrogen for a total of 257 ZEVs compared to 55,818 total vehicles acquired).\n\nZero emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. In the event the federal government no longer reports vehicle acquisitions by fuel type this question resolves as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "6.44", "median": "9.00", "upper_75": "14.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the energy transition metal index will increase by 75% from December 2020 to December 2024?", "desc": "The [growth](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) in electric vehicle (EV) market-share and [calls for growth to accelerate](https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/05/biden-pushes-for-evs-to-make-up-40percent-or-more-of-us-auto-sales-by-2030.html) have raised concerns about the supply of critical minerals used in batteries. According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency)'s (IEA) [Global EV Outlook 2022](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022)\n\n>. . . the supply of some minerals such as lithium would need to rise by up to one-third by 2030 to match the demand for EV batteries to satisfy the pledges and announcements in the [Announced Pledges Scenario](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-and-climate-model/announced-pledges-scenario-aps) (APS). For example, demand for lithium – the commodity with the largest projected demand-supply gap – is projected to increase sixfold to 500 kilotonnes by 2030 in the APS, requiring the equivalent of 50 new average-sized mines.\n\nA [report](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47227) published by the [Congressional Research Service](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressional_Research_Service) in August of 2022 says the following about the critical mineral supply chain for EV batteries:\n\n>As the majority of EV manufacturing and sales occur outside the United States, so does the majority of EV battery production. While China accounts for over 70% of global EV battery production capacity, the United States has developed battery supply chains for some of its demand. China's dominance in EV battery manufacturing is similar to its dominance in mining and extraction of the minerals used in EV batteries. The potential for an accelerating global transition to EVs leads some to question the domestic availability of the minerals and materials for the domestic manufacture of EV batteries.\n>\n>Currently, lithium-ion batteries are the dominant type of rechargeable batteries used in EVs. The most commonly used varieties are lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), lithium manganese oxide (LMO), lithium iron phosphate (LFP), lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) and lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC). Graphite is currently widely used as the anode in lithium ion batteries. These EV battery chemistries depend on five critical minerals whose domestic supply is potentially at risk for disruption: lithium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, and graphite. The U.S. Geological Survey designated these and other minerals as “critical,” according to the methodology codified in the Energy Act of 2020.\n\nThe [International Monetary Fund](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Monetary_Fund) (IMF) publishes an **Energy Transition Metal Index** in its [Primary Commodity Price System](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595). The monthly version of the index can be accessed by selecting it in the commodity dropdown, changing the time range to **monthly** and the unit to **index**. More information on the calculation of the index can be found in its [technical documentation](https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Research/CommodityPrices/Monthly/pcps-technical-documentation.ashx) (link also available on the [IMF Primary Commodity Prices page](https://www.imf.org/en/Research/commodity-prices)). As of November 24, 2022, the Energy Transition Metal Index contains the following metals:\n\n`Aluminum, Chromium, Cobalt, Copper, Lead, Lithium, Manganese, Molybdenum, Nickel, Palladium, Platinum, Rare Earth Elements, Silicon, Silver, Vanadium, Zinc`", "resc": "This resolves as the percentage change of the Energy Transition Metal Index [published by the IMF](https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595) for December of the listed year relative to December of 2020. The percentage change will be calculated as \\((Y - X)/X\\times 100\\) where Y is the index value in December of the listed year and X is the index value in December of 2020.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IMF; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IMF no longer reports data for a relevant year the question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe index or any equivalent indices published by the IMF will be used as provided, so long as the make-up of the index contains 8 or more of the metals listed in 2022 (see the background section for the 2022 list).", "lower_25": "22.8", "median": "63.6", "upper_75": "127", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What will be the share of global light vehicles sold which are zero-emission vehicles in the following years? (2024)\n\nKeyword: 19.6\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 19.6 share of global light vehicles sold will be zero-emission vehicles in the following years? (2024)", "desc": "According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA) the global market share of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) [more than doubled](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/global-ev-data-explorer) from 2020 to 2021, from 4% to 8.6%. This data includes cars which are battery-electric and plug-in hybrid electric (but does not consider fuel cell electric vehicles). According to its [Global Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ad8fb04c-4f75-42fc-973a-6e54c8a4449a/GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf), the IEA charts define \"cars\" as passenger light-duty vehicles.\n\n\"IEA\n\nThe IEA also provides data on regional adoption of EVs on its page [Trends in electric light-duty vehicles](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022/trends-in-electric-light-duty-vehicles).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold globally in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the International Energy Agency (IEA).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The IEA currently does not include sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the IEA will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the IEA, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IEA; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IEA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "15.3", "median": "19.6", "upper_75": "24.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 18.6% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "10.9", "median": "14.6", "upper_75": "18.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model year (2024) will be 244 miles?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. The median range for EVs [has been increasing over the years](https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1167-january-4-2021-median-driving-range-all-electric-vehicles-tops-250?fbclid=IwAR0uiP036VT4eX23MJOjJncoWxlel8AgntKorX8ftbv4hx1ROe7ZVPBUlN0) *(note that the methodology used in the linked figure is different than that used by this question)*, and further increases in range could spur increased EV adoption in the future.\n\nOne resource for assessing the range of EV models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).\n\nAs of January 27, 2022, model year 2021 has 2 qualifying unique all-electric vehicles with a median range of 192.5 miles, using the methodology described in the resolution criteria below . [See here for calculation](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1EQ-8xPDUZrqH_nCN6D64TqawHpBjv5NgecZGg-FN3mQ/edit?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This resolves as the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for all-electric vehicles and finding the median estimated range of the models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of 5 thousand dollars.\n\nThe median range will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "227", "median": "244", "upper_75": "261", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 18.6% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "10.9", "median": "14.6", "upper_75": "18.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States will be 3.05 in the year 2024?", "desc": "*Related Question on Metaculus:*\n\n* [What will be the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US on the following dates?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11763/real-price-of-gas-in-us-over-time/)\n\n---\n\nSome observers have noted a potential relationship between gas prices and electric vehicle adoption, where [high gas prices may increase interest in purchasing an electric vehicle](https://time.com/6173178/high-gas-prices-electric-vehicles/). In addition to currently having a lower fuel cost per mile in most US states, electricity rates are generally more stable than gas prices. In its [Light Duty Electric Drive Vehicles Monthly Sales Updates](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates), Argonne National Laboratory provides the chart below, showing hybrid electric vehicle (HEV), plug-in electric vehicle (PEV), and gasoline prices over time.\n\n\"Monthly\n\nThe [US Energy Information Administration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Information_Administration) (EIA) tracks retail gasoline prices in its chart [US Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a). According to its [methodology](https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/gas_proc-methods.php), the EIA creates these estimates from a weekly survey of retail gasoline outlets, with prices weighted by the annual volume sold by each outlet. According to the notes section of the [tabular data](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_GND_DCUS_NUS_A.htm), monthly and annual figures are simple averages of the weekly data.\n\n", "resc": "This resolves as the price of gas (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in the listed years. Resolution will be determined by the Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported annually, provided by the [US Energy Information Administration](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=a) (EIA). For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to 2022 US dollars using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs).\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by the EIA on March 1st of the following year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the EIA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "3.05", "median": "3.44", "upper_75": "3.84", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model year (2024) will be 244 miles?", "desc": "Automakers [have announced](https://www.caranddriver.com/news/g29994375/future-electric-cars-trucks/) significant increases in the number of electric vehicle (EV) models in the coming years. The median range for EVs [has been increasing over the years](https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/articles/fotw-1167-january-4-2021-median-driving-range-all-electric-vehicles-tops-250?fbclid=IwAR0uiP036VT4eX23MJOjJncoWxlel8AgntKorX8ftbv4hx1ROe7ZVPBUlN0) *(note that the methodology used in the linked figure is different than that used by this question)*, and further increases in range could spur increased EV adoption in the future.\n\nOne resource for assessing the range of EV models available is [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/), which is described in its [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) as a\n\n>federal government website that helps consumers make informed fuel economy choices when purchasing a vehicle and helps them achieve the best fuel economy possible from the cars they own.\n>\n>FuelEconomy.gov is maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy with data provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The site helps fulfill DOE and EPA's responsibility under the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to provide accurate fuel economy information to consumers.\n\nThe fueleconomy.gov [power search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/powerSearch.jsp) allows for filtering available models by model year, manufacturer recommended retail price (MSRP), vehicle type, and more. MSRP data on fueleconomy.gov is provided by [Edmunds](https://www.edmunds.com/).\n\nAs of January 27, 2022, model year 2021 has 2 qualifying unique all-electric vehicles with a median range of 192.5 miles, using the methodology described in the resolution criteria below . [See here for calculation](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1EQ-8xPDUZrqH_nCN6D64TqawHpBjv5NgecZGg-FN3mQ/edit?usp=sharing).", "resc": "This resolves as the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for the listed model year. Resolution will be determined by searching [fueleconomy.gov](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/info.shtml) for all-electric vehicles and finding the median estimated range of the models available (for example, [here's a link to a search](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=PowerSearch&year1=2021&year2=2021&minmsrpsel=0&maxmsrpsel=40000&city=0&highway=0&combined=0&cbvtelectric=Electric&YearSel=2021&MakeSel=&MarClassSel=&FuelTypeSel=&VehTypeSel=Electric&TranySel=&DriveTypeSel=&CylindersSel=&MpgSel=000&sortBy=Comb&Units=&url=SearchServlet&opt=new&minmsrp=0&maxmsrp=40000&minmpg=0&maxmpg=0&sCharge=&tCharge=&startstop=&cylDeact=&rowLimit=50) for model year 2021 for all-electric vehicles). MSRP will be inflation adjusted by computing the value of 40 thousand US 2022 dollars in the listed model year and rounding to the nearest increment available on fueleconomy.gov. Inflation adjustment will be performed using the [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=WYRs). Currently fueleconomy.gov uses MSRP increments of 5 thousand dollars.\n\nThe median range will be determined according to unique make and model. For example, only one model will be counted even if there are variants of it listed in the search results. The list which meets the criteria according to the fueleconomy.gov filters will be used, excluding any vehicles where the MSRP is not listed or where the lower end of the provided range is not below 40 thousand US dollars. The vehicles listed on fueleconomy.gov are [currently only light vehicles](https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/which_tested.shtml), and resolution will be determined using similar criteria, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by data reported by fueleconomy.gov on March 1st of the year after the listed model year; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the fueleconomy.gov no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "227", "median": "244", "upper_75": "261", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 29.2% of light vehicles sold in California in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "The [Clean Air Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Air_Act_(United_States)ss) (CAA) is the broad name given to the United States' air quality laws, which are administered by the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA). Originally passed in 1963, the CAA has been [amended numerous times](https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act). The CAA prevents states from imposing their own emissions regulations for new vehicles, with an exception that states [which had imposed vehicle emissions regulations prior to March 30, 1966](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30853) may apply for a waiver to enforce their own emissions regulations contingent on the regulations being more stringent than the national regulations, along with several other conditions.\n\nAs the only state meeting the date requirement, California is uniquely positioned to adopts its own emissions regulations. Additionally, the [CAA permits other states](https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-and-authorizations#:~:text=subpart%20B%2C%20%C2%A7%201074.105.-,State%20Adoption%20of%20California%20Standards,-The%20Clean%20Air) to adopt, without federal review, emissions regulations imposed by California which have been granted a waiver by the EPA.\n\nDespite [recent legal challenges](https://www.natlawreview.com/article/epa-restores-california-s-clean-air-act-waiver-allowing-state-to-set-its-own-motor), California has been granted numerous waivers from the EPA, allowing it to have the most stringent emissions regulations in the country. In 2022, California [proposed a new rule](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/news/california-moves-accelerate-100-new-zero-emission-vehicle-sales-2035) which would mandate that 100% of new light vehicle sales in the state be zero emission vehicles (ZEVs, which includes all-electric, plug-in hybrid, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles) by 2035. The proposed rules are still [pending a waiver](https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2364839-california-adopts-zev-mandate) from the EPA.\n\nAs of [May 2022](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/states-have-adopted-californias-vehicle-standards-under-section-177-federal), 17 other states have adopted California's emissions regulations (though [not all intend to adopt California's new ZEV policy](https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/californias-zero-emissions-vehicle-rule-and-its-nationwide-impacts/)).\n\nCalifornia's regulations apply to a significant share of light-duty vehicle sales in the US. According to [data provided by California](https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/%C2%A7177_states_05132022_NADA_sales_r2_ac.pdf), California made up 11% of sales of new light duty vehicles in 2020, and states adopting California's emissions regulations (though not necessarily the ZEV regulations) made up 40.1% of light-duty sales in the US.\n\nIn 2021, 12.41% of light-duty vehicle sales in California were ZEVs (9.12% battery electric, 3.13% plug-in hybrid, and 0.16% hydrogen fuel cell). The ZEV share for 2022 through the first three quarters is 17.70%. A light-duty vehicle is one with a [gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) up to 10,000 pounds](https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/light-duty-vehicle-emissions#:~:text=The%20light%20duty%20smog%20regulations%20cover%20passenger%20vehicles%20with%20a%20gross%20vehicle%20weight%20rating%20(GVWR)%20up%20to%2010%2C000%20pounds).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percentage of light vehicles sold in California in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the [California Energy Commission](https://www.energy.ca.gov/data-reports/energy-almanac/zero-emission-vehicle-and-infrastructure-statistics/new-zev-sales). Zero-emission vehicles will be battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the California energy commission; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the California Energy commission no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "24.9", "median": "29.2", "upper_75": "33.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 2.16% in the United States in the following quarters (2024 Q4)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Economic Analysis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Economic_Analysis) (BEA) provides quarterly estimates of [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) in the United States. The BEA typically releases [three GDP estimates](https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2020-08/quick-guide-gdp.pdf), an advance estimate, a second estimate, and a third and final estimate. The advance estimate is typically released in the month following the end of the quarter.\n\nBelow is a graph of quarter over quarter GDP growth rates in the US, adjusted for inflation and seasonal effects, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BEA, but it updates with each estimate published by the BEA so it does not reflect the advanced estimate in each quarter.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the quarter over quarter GDP growth rate in the US, adjusted for inflation and seasonal effects and using an annual rate, in percent. Resolution will be determined according to the BEA's advance estimate, typically found [here](https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product)", "lower_25": "−0.125", "median": "1.19", "upper_75": "2.16", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What will be the share of global light vehicles sold which are zero-emission vehicles in the following years? (2024)\n\nKeyword: 19.6\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 19.6 share of global light vehicles sold will be zero-emission vehicles in the following years? (2024)", "desc": "According to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA) the global market share of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) [more than doubled](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/global-ev-data-explorer) from 2020 to 2021, from 4% to 8.6%. This data includes cars which are battery-electric and plug-in hybrid electric (but does not consider fuel cell electric vehicles). According to its [Global Electric Vehicle Outlook 2022](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ad8fb04c-4f75-42fc-973a-6e54c8a4449a/GlobalElectricVehicleOutlook2022.pdf), the IEA charts define \"cars\" as passenger light-duty vehicles.\n\n\"IEA\n\nThe IEA also provides data on regional adoption of EVs on its page [Trends in electric light-duty vehicles](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2022/trends-in-electric-light-duty-vehicles).", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold globally in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published by the International Energy Agency (IEA).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The IEA currently does not include sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the IEA will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the IEA, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the IEA; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the IEA no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "15.3", "median": "19.6", "upper_75": "24.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 2.16% in the United States in the following quarters (2024 Q4)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Economic Analysis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Economic_Analysis) (BEA) provides quarterly estimates of [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) in the United States. The BEA typically releases [three GDP estimates](https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2020-08/quick-guide-gdp.pdf), an advance estimate, a second estimate, and a third and final estimate. The advance estimate is typically released in the month following the end of the quarter.\n\nBelow is a graph of quarter over quarter GDP growth rates in the US, adjusted for inflation and seasonal effects, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BEA, but it updates with each estimate published by the BEA so it does not reflect the advanced estimate in each quarter.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the quarter over quarter GDP growth rate in the US, adjusted for inflation and seasonal effects and using an annual rate, in percent. Resolution will be determined according to the BEA's advance estimate, typically found [here](https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product)", "lower_25": "−0.125", "median": "1.19", "upper_75": "2.16", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 2.16% in the United States in the following quarters (2024 Q4)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Economic Analysis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Economic_Analysis) (BEA) provides quarterly estimates of [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) in the United States. The BEA typically releases [three GDP estimates](https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2020-08/quick-guide-gdp.pdf), an advance estimate, a second estimate, and a third and final estimate. The advance estimate is typically released in the month following the end of the quarter.\n\nBelow is a graph of quarter over quarter GDP growth rates in the US, adjusted for inflation and seasonal effects, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BEA, but it updates with each estimate published by the BEA so it does not reflect the advanced estimate in each quarter.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the quarter over quarter GDP growth rate in the US, adjusted for inflation and seasonal effects and using an annual rate, in percent. Resolution will be determined according to the BEA's advance estimate, typically found [here](https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product)", "lower_25": "−0.125", "median": "1.19", "upper_75": "2.16", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 18.6% of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "*Related questions on Metaculus:*\n\n* [When will US EV sales equal or exceed 10% of the number of US ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) sales within a year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5681/when-will-us-ev-sales-overtake-ice-sales/)\n* [What percentage of new vehicle production will be electric in the US in 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8734/electric-vehicle-production-in-the-us-in-2027/)\n* [What percentage of US car sales will be all-electric in 2050?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/8538/-of-car-sales-all-electric-in-us-2050/)\n\n---\n\nAccording to the [Environmental Protection Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Environmental_Protection_Agency) (EPA), [27% of CO2 emissions](https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions) came from the transportation sector in 2020. In an [executive order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/08/05/executive-order-on-strengthening-american-leadership-in-clean-cars-and-trucks/) (and in an [accompanying fact sheet](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/05/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-steps-to-drive-american-leadership-forward-on-clean-cars-and-trucks/)) published in August of 2021, President Biden set the following goal:\n\n>that 50 percent of all new passenger cars and light trucks sold in 2030 be zero-emission vehicles, including battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, or fuel cell electric vehicles.\n\nAccording to the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB), published by the [Oak Ridge National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oak_Ridge_National_Laboratory) (ORNL), in 2021 all-electric vehicles (EVs) were 3.2% of light vehicle sales and plug-in hybrids were 1.2%, for a combined total of 4.4%. [Monthly data](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates) published by the [Argonne National Laboratory](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argonne_National_Laboratory) (ANL) shows the sales share of EVs and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) growing substantially in 2022.\n\nIn edition 40 of the TEDB (which includes data through 2021), the relevant table is [table 6.2](https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/TEDB_Ed_40.pdf#page=182). The table describes its source as the Transportation Research Center at ANL and notes that light vehicles include cars and trucks up to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.", "resc": "This will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the listed year which are zero-emission vehicles, according to data published in the [Transportation Energy Data Book](https://tedb.ornl.gov/) (TEDB).\n\nZero-emission vehicles will be all-electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The TEDB currently does not show sales of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The data provided by the TEDB will be used excluding fuel cell vehicles, unless Metaculus estimates that hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make up at least 1% of light vehicle sales in which case efforts will be made to account for these vehicles if not provided by the TEDB, if possible.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by the TEDB; later updates or revisions will be irrelevant to the question resolution. If reported data contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If the TEDB no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "10.9", "median": "14.6", "upper_75": "18.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) will be 1.005k at the end of July in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.005k", "median": "1.035k", "upper_75": "1.058k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real GDP growth in the United States will be 3.06% in the year 2027?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Economic Analysis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Economic_Analysis) (BEA) provides quarterly estimates of [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) in the United States. The BEA typically releases [three GDP estimates](https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2020-08/quick-guide-gdp.pdf), an advance estimate, a second estimate, and a third and final estimate. The advance estimate is typically released in the month following the end of the quarter.\n\nBelow is a graph of annual GDP growth rates in the US, adjusted for inflation, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BEA, but it updates with each estimate published by the BEA so it does not necessarily reflect the advanced estimate.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the annual GDP growth rate in the US, adjusted for inflation, in percent. Resolution will be determined according to the BEA's advance estimate, typically found [here](https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product). Note that the BEA computes annual growth [using the average growth in each year](https://www.bea.gov/news/2024/gross-domestic-product-fourth-quarter-and-year-2023-advance-estimate#:~:text=(from%20the%202022%20annual%20level%20to%20the%202023%20annual%20level)), which is what is used to resolve this question.", "lower_25": "0.413", "median": "1.76", "upper_75": "3.06", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) will be 1.005k at the end of July in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.005k", "median": "1.035k", "upper_75": "1.058k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real GDP growth in the United States will be 3.06% in the year 2027?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Economic Analysis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Economic_Analysis) (BEA) provides quarterly estimates of [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) in the United States. The BEA typically releases [three GDP estimates](https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2020-08/quick-guide-gdp.pdf), an advance estimate, a second estimate, and a third and final estimate. The advance estimate is typically released in the month following the end of the quarter.\n\nBelow is a graph of annual GDP growth rates in the US, adjusted for inflation, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BEA, but it updates with each estimate published by the BEA so it does not necessarily reflect the advanced estimate.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the annual GDP growth rate in the US, adjusted for inflation, in percent. Resolution will be determined according to the BEA's advance estimate, typically found [here](https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product). Note that the BEA computes annual growth [using the average growth in each year](https://www.bea.gov/news/2024/gross-domestic-product-fourth-quarter-and-year-2023-advance-estimate#:~:text=(from%20the%202022%20annual%20level%20to%20the%202023%20annual%20level)), which is what is used to resolve this question.", "lower_25": "0.413", "median": "1.76", "upper_75": "3.06", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real GDP growth in the United States will be 3.06% in the year 2027?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Economic Analysis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Economic_Analysis) (BEA) provides quarterly estimates of [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) in the United States. The BEA typically releases [three GDP estimates](https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2020-08/quick-guide-gdp.pdf), an advance estimate, a second estimate, and a third and final estimate. The advance estimate is typically released in the month following the end of the quarter.\n\nBelow is a graph of annual GDP growth rates in the US, adjusted for inflation, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BEA, but it updates with each estimate published by the BEA so it does not necessarily reflect the advanced estimate.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the annual GDP growth rate in the US, adjusted for inflation, in percent. Resolution will be determined according to the BEA's advance estimate, typically found [here](https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product). Note that the BEA computes annual growth [using the average growth in each year](https://www.bea.gov/news/2024/gross-domestic-product-fourth-quarter-and-year-2023-advance-estimate#:~:text=(from%20the%202022%20annual%20level%20to%20the%202023%20annual%20level)), which is what is used to resolve this question.", "lower_25": "0.413", "median": "1.76", "upper_75": "3.06", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) will be at 1.032k at the end of July in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "996.3", "median": "1.032k", "upper_75": "1.065k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) will be at 1.035k at the end of July in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.005k", "median": "1.035k", "upper_75": "1.058k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) will be at 1.035k at the end of July in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.005k", "median": "1.035k", "upper_75": "1.058k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) at the end of July of the following years will be 1.028k?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "982.8", "median": "1.028k", "upper_75": "1.067k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) will be at 1.035k at the end of July in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.005k", "median": "1.035k", "upper_75": "1.058k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) will be at 1.029k at the end of July in 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "992.1", "median": "1.029k", "upper_75": "1.061k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) will be 1.005k at the end of July in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.005k", "median": "1.035k", "upper_75": "1.058k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) will be at 1.032k at the end of July in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "996.3", "median": "1.032k", "upper_75": "1.065k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) will be at 1.029k at the end of July in 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "992.1", "median": "1.029k", "upper_75": "1.061k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) will be at 1.029k at the end of July in 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "992.1", "median": "1.029k", "upper_75": "1.061k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) at the end of July of the following years will be 1.028k?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "982.8", "median": "1.028k", "upper_75": "1.067k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) at the end of July of the following years will be 1.028k?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "982.8", "median": "1.028k", "upper_75": "1.067k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) will be at 1.032k at the end of July in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "996.3", "median": "1.032k", "upper_75": "1.065k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) will be at 1.074k at the end of July in 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "971", "median": "1.03k", "upper_75": "1.074k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) will be at 1.074k at the end of July in 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "971", "median": "1.03k", "upper_75": "1.074k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that DeepMind Sparrow chatbot will be available outside Alphabet by Oct 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2024", "median": "Jul 2024", "upper_75": "Oct 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) will be at 1.07k feet at the end of July in 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "955", "median": "1.02k", "upper_75": "1.07k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Lake Mead's water level will be at 1.08k feet (75% of its capacity) at the end of July in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "942", "median": "1.03k", "upper_75": "1.08k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) will be at 1.07k feet at the end of July in 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "955", "median": "1.02k", "upper_75": "1.07k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a sitting US President will make a declaration about AI that meets the following criterion by Aug 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "Aug 2028", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) will be at 1.074k at the end of July in 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "971", "median": "1.03k", "upper_75": "1.074k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a sitting US President will make a declaration about AI that meets the following criterion by Aug 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "Aug 2028", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Lake Mead's water level will be at 1.08k feet (75% of its capacity) at the end of July in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "942", "median": "1.03k", "upper_75": "1.08k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that DeepMind Sparrow chatbot will be available outside Alphabet by Oct 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2024", "median": "Jul 2024", "upper_75": "Oct 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will announce the retirement of the Lockheed U-2 by 2046?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2046", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the water level of Lake Mead (in feet) will be at 1.07k feet at the end of July in 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "955", "median": "1.02k", "upper_75": "1.07k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will lift the requirement that international visitors be vaccinated against COVID-19 by Aug 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Oct 2023", "median": "May 2024", "upper_75": "Aug 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will lift the requirement that international visitors be vaccinated against COVID-19 by Aug 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Oct 2023", "median": "May 2024", "upper_75": "Aug 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will announce the retirement of the Lockheed U-2 by 2046?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2046", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Lake Mead's water level will be at 1.08k feet (75% of its capacity) at the end of July in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "942", "median": "1.03k", "upper_75": "1.08k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a sitting US President will make a declaration about AI that meets the following criterion by Aug 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "Aug 2028", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will announce the retirement of the Lockheed U-2 by 2046?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2046", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that DeepMind Sparrow chatbot will be available outside Alphabet by Oct 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2024", "median": "Jul 2024", "upper_75": "Oct 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will lift the requirement that international visitors be vaccinated against COVID-19 by Aug 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Oct 2023", "median": "May 2024", "upper_75": "Aug 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a club from a continent other than Europe or South America will win the FIFA Club World Cup by 2054?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2054", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first same-sex couple will have a child that is produced by the sperm of one parent and the egg of the other by 2048?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2048", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2063", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first same-sex couple will have a child that is produced by the sperm of one parent and the egg of the other by 2048?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2048", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2063", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a sitting US President will make a declaration about AI as WMDs by Apr 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2024", "median": "Jul 2025", "upper_75": "Apr 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a sitting US President will make a declaration about AI as WMDs by Apr 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2024", "median": "Jul 2025", "upper_75": "Apr 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a sitting US President will make a declaration about AI that meets the following criterion (AI theft force) before 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Oct 2029", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a sitting US President will make a declaration about AI that meets the following criterion (AI weapon) by Aug 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Dec 2023", "median": "Aug 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a sitting US President will make a declaration about AI that meets the following criterion (AI theft sanctions) by 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "Aug 2028", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first same-sex couple will have a child that is produced by the sperm of one parent and the egg of the other by 2048?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2048", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2063", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a club from a continent other than Europe or South America will win the FIFA Club World Cup by 2054?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2054", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a club from a continent other than Europe or South America will win the FIFA Club World Cup by 2054?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "2054", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a sitting US President will make a declaration about AI that meets the following criterion (AI theft force) before 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Oct 2029", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a sitting US President will make a declaration about AI that meets the following criterion (AI theft sanctions) by 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "Aug 2028", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a sitting US President will make a declaration about AI as WMDs by Apr 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2024", "median": "Jul 2025", "upper_75": "Apr 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a sitting US President will make a declaration about AI that meets the following criterion (AI theft force) before 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Oct 2029", "median": "2038", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US life expectancy at birth will exceed 78.8 by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a sitting US President will make a declaration about AI that meets the following criterion (AI theft sanctions) by 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "Aug 2028", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a sitting US President will make a declaration about AI that meets the following criterion (AI weapon) by Aug 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Dec 2023", "median": "Aug 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will have a 37.4% share of high impact AI publications in 2027?", "desc": "[China has been at the forefront of AI research](https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/quantumblack/our-insights/the-next-frontier-for-ai-in-china-could-add-600-billion-to-its-economy) and has significant potential for continued growth in AI research and development.\n\nTo quantify AI research, this question uses data from the [OECD AI Policy Observatory](https://oecd.ai/en/) (OECD.AI), which provides policy analysis and data relevant to the global growth and development of artificial intelligence. This question refers to AI publication data provided by OECD.AI, collected from [Elsevier's Scopus research database](https://service.elsevier.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/15100/supporthub/scopus/related/1/session/L2F2LzEvdGltZS8xNjYyNDcyNTc4L2dlbi8xNjYyNDcyNTc4L3NpZC9mVW9XXzZfcTlTTDBZbW1LM01wRlJJNWpXQ2NlbHlpenFaa016N0hwczQ3NjVKdDAzNDZhRXJSSHJaNzRrcHhUY01raXBrVFQ3ZXIyV1BFbUdVV3ZqZnRxVXlhZUxYeUtuRGpMaWdXa1VXOExmbW9jOG1hZkNuUEElMjElMjE%3D/), which aggregates data from numerous research publications around the world.\n\nSee the [linked methodology page](https://oecd.ai/en/elsevier) for information from OECD.AI about their AI research data collected from Scopus. More information about how Scopus identifies and aggregates artificial intelligence research is available in Chapter 1 of Elsevier's report [Artificial Intelligence: How knowledge is created, transferred, and used](https://www.elsevier.com/?a=823654).\n\nOECD.AI uses Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FCWI) to evaluate the quality or impact of publications. The value represents the number of citations for the paper divided by average number of citations for papers in the field as a whole. High impact as defined by the OECD chart is FCWI > 1.5. Note that because citations occur after a paper is published, FCWI measurements may fluctuate over time, particularly for periods close to the publication date.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the share of high impact publications from China in the year 2027. Resolution will be based on data for 2027 shown on the [AI scientific publications time series by country](https://oecd.ai/en/data?selectedArea=ai-research&selectedVisualization=scientific-publications-time-series-by-country-2) chart as of July 1, 2031.\n\nThe number of high impact papers will be found by setting the quality setting on the chart to \"High impact: FCWI > 1.5\". The indicator shall be set to \"Publications\" and the publication type to \"All\". The \"Percentage\" checkbox will also be selected.\n\nIn the event the available selections and filters change, Metaculus may use their discretion to determine if the available selections and filters are similar to those currently available and may use the new versions. If the data source is no longer available, Metaculus may determine if a methodologically similar source is available and use that instead, or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "37.4", "median": "46.6", "upper_75": "54.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will have a 37.4% share of high impact AI publications in 2027?", "desc": "[China has been at the forefront of AI research](https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/quantumblack/our-insights/the-next-frontier-for-ai-in-china-could-add-600-billion-to-its-economy) and has significant potential for continued growth in AI research and development.\n\nTo quantify AI research, this question uses data from the [OECD AI Policy Observatory](https://oecd.ai/en/) (OECD.AI), which provides policy analysis and data relevant to the global growth and development of artificial intelligence. This question refers to AI publication data provided by OECD.AI, collected from [Elsevier's Scopus research database](https://service.elsevier.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/15100/supporthub/scopus/related/1/session/L2F2LzEvdGltZS8xNjYyNDcyNTc4L2dlbi8xNjYyNDcyNTc4L3NpZC9mVW9XXzZfcTlTTDBZbW1LM01wRlJJNWpXQ2NlbHlpenFaa016N0hwczQ3NjVKdDAzNDZhRXJSSHJaNzRrcHhUY01raXBrVFQ3ZXIyV1BFbUdVV3ZqZnRxVXlhZUxYeUtuRGpMaWdXa1VXOExmbW9jOG1hZkNuUEElMjElMjE%3D/), which aggregates data from numerous research publications around the world.\n\nSee the [linked methodology page](https://oecd.ai/en/elsevier) for information from OECD.AI about their AI research data collected from Scopus. More information about how Scopus identifies and aggregates artificial intelligence research is available in Chapter 1 of Elsevier's report [Artificial Intelligence: How knowledge is created, transferred, and used](https://www.elsevier.com/?a=823654).\n\nOECD.AI uses Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FCWI) to evaluate the quality or impact of publications. The value represents the number of citations for the paper divided by average number of citations for papers in the field as a whole. High impact as defined by the OECD chart is FCWI > 1.5. Note that because citations occur after a paper is published, FCWI measurements may fluctuate over time, particularly for periods close to the publication date.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the share of high impact publications from China in the year 2027. Resolution will be based on data for 2027 shown on the [AI scientific publications time series by country](https://oecd.ai/en/data?selectedArea=ai-research&selectedVisualization=scientific-publications-time-series-by-country-2) chart as of July 1, 2031.\n\nThe number of high impact papers will be found by setting the quality setting on the chart to \"High impact: FCWI > 1.5\". The indicator shall be set to \"Publications\" and the publication type to \"All\". The \"Percentage\" checkbox will also be selected.\n\nIn the event the available selections and filters change, Metaculus may use their discretion to determine if the available selections and filters are similar to those currently available and may use the new versions. If the data source is no longer available, Metaculus may determine if a methodologically similar source is available and use that instead, or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "37.4", "median": "46.6", "upper_75": "54.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US life expectancy at birth will exceed 78.8 by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average NAEP long-term trend mathematics score for 9-year old students will be 241.3 in 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "238.2", "median": "241.3", "upper_75": "244.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average NAEP long-term trend mathematics score for 9-year old students will be 241.3 in 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "238.2", "median": "241.3", "upper_75": "244.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a sitting US President will make a declaration about AI that meets the following criterion (AI weapon) by Aug 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Dec 2023", "median": "Aug 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve will hold 75% of 367.4M barrels of crude oil on the following dates?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "354.3M", "median": "361.3M", "upper_75": "367.4M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve will hold 75% of 367.4M barrels of crude oil on the following dates?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "354.3M", "median": "361.3M", "upper_75": "367.4M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US life expectancy at birth will exceed 78.8 by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2027", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve will hold 75% of 367.4M barrels of crude oil on the following dates?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "354.3M", "median": "361.3M", "upper_75": "367.4M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will have a 37.4% share of high impact AI publications in 2027?", "desc": "[China has been at the forefront of AI research](https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/quantumblack/our-insights/the-next-frontier-for-ai-in-china-could-add-600-billion-to-its-economy) and has significant potential for continued growth in AI research and development.\n\nTo quantify AI research, this question uses data from the [OECD AI Policy Observatory](https://oecd.ai/en/) (OECD.AI), which provides policy analysis and data relevant to the global growth and development of artificial intelligence. This question refers to AI publication data provided by OECD.AI, collected from [Elsevier's Scopus research database](https://service.elsevier.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/15100/supporthub/scopus/related/1/session/L2F2LzEvdGltZS8xNjYyNDcyNTc4L2dlbi8xNjYyNDcyNTc4L3NpZC9mVW9XXzZfcTlTTDBZbW1LM01wRlJJNWpXQ2NlbHlpenFaa016N0hwczQ3NjVKdDAzNDZhRXJSSHJaNzRrcHhUY01raXBrVFQ3ZXIyV1BFbUdVV3ZqZnRxVXlhZUxYeUtuRGpMaWdXa1VXOExmbW9jOG1hZkNuUEElMjElMjE%3D/), which aggregates data from numerous research publications around the world.\n\nSee the [linked methodology page](https://oecd.ai/en/elsevier) for information from OECD.AI about their AI research data collected from Scopus. More information about how Scopus identifies and aggregates artificial intelligence research is available in Chapter 1 of Elsevier's report [Artificial Intelligence: How knowledge is created, transferred, and used](https://www.elsevier.com/?a=823654).\n\nOECD.AI uses Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FCWI) to evaluate the quality or impact of publications. The value represents the number of citations for the paper divided by average number of citations for papers in the field as a whole. High impact as defined by the OECD chart is FCWI > 1.5. Note that because citations occur after a paper is published, FCWI measurements may fluctuate over time, particularly for periods close to the publication date.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the share of high impact publications from China in the year 2027. Resolution will be based on data for 2027 shown on the [AI scientific publications time series by country](https://oecd.ai/en/data?selectedArea=ai-research&selectedVisualization=scientific-publications-time-series-by-country-2) chart as of July 1, 2031.\n\nThe number of high impact papers will be found by setting the quality setting on the chart to \"High impact: FCWI > 1.5\". The indicator shall be set to \"Publications\" and the publication type to \"All\". The \"Percentage\" checkbox will also be selected.\n\nIn the event the available selections and filters change, Metaculus may use their discretion to determine if the available selections and filters are similar to those currently available and may use the new versions. If the data source is no longer available, Metaculus may determine if a methodologically similar source is available and use that instead, or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "37.4", "median": "46.6", "upper_75": "54.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average NAEP long-term trend mathematics score for 9-year old students will be 241.3 in 2029?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "238.2", "median": "241.3", "upper_75": "244.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total quantity of space debris orbiting Earth will be 39.6k in 2025?", "desc": "*This question replaces a [previous version of the question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/13744/total-quantity-of-space-debris-by-year/) which was resolved as* ***Ambiguous*** *so that the ranges could be improved. Note that because this replaces a previous version this question will not have a hidden period or [coverage weight](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#coverage_weight).*_x000D_\n_x000D_\n---_x000D_\n_x000D_\nSpace debris pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and traveling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. The number of debris keeps growing as space gets more crowded and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use.", "resc": "For each of the following years, this question will resolve as the number of space debris pieces larger than 10cm estimated to be in orbit, according to the [ESA's Space Debris Office](https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers). The quantity for a given year will be determined by the most current number reported as of December 31 of that year. For reference, as of November 7, 2022, the ESA reported 36,500 pieces of debris larger than 10cm to be in orbit. If the ESA no longer reports this data, a similar authority for monitoring orbital space debris will be used, or the question may resolve as **Ambiguous** at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "35.9k", "median": "39.6k", "upper_75": "45.5k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total quantity of space debris orbiting Earth will be 45.5k in each year?", "desc": "*This question replaces a [previous version of the question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/13744/total-quantity-of-space-debris-by-year/) which was resolved as* ***Ambiguous*** *so that the ranges could be improved. Note that because this replaces a previous version this question will not have a hidden period or [coverage weight](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#coverage_weight).*_x000D_\n_x000D_\n---_x000D_\n_x000D_\nSpace debris pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and traveling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. The number of debris keeps growing as space gets more crowded and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use.", "resc": "For each of the following years, this question will resolve as the number of space debris pieces larger than 10cm estimated to be in orbit, according to the [ESA's Space Debris Office](https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers). The quantity for a given year will be determined by the most current number reported as of December 31 of that year. For reference, as of November 7, 2022, the ESA reported 36,500 pieces of debris larger than 10cm to be in orbit. If the ESA no longer reports this data, a similar authority for monitoring orbital space debris will be used, or the question may resolve as **Ambiguous** at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "35.9k", "median": "39.6k", "upper_75": "45.5k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total quantity of space debris orbiting Earth will be 45.5k in each year?", "desc": "*This question replaces a [previous version of the question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/13744/total-quantity-of-space-debris-by-year/) which was resolved as* ***Ambiguous*** *so that the ranges could be improved. Note that because this replaces a previous version this question will not have a hidden period or [coverage weight](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#coverage_weight).*_x000D_\n_x000D_\n---_x000D_\n_x000D_\nSpace debris pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and traveling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. The number of debris keeps growing as space gets more crowded and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use.", "resc": "For each of the following years, this question will resolve as the number of space debris pieces larger than 10cm estimated to be in orbit, according to the [ESA's Space Debris Office](https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers). The quantity for a given year will be determined by the most current number reported as of December 31 of that year. For reference, as of November 7, 2022, the ESA reported 36,500 pieces of debris larger than 10cm to be in orbit. If the ESA no longer reports this data, a similar authority for monitoring orbital space debris will be used, or the question may resolve as **Ambiguous** at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "35.9k", "median": "39.6k", "upper_75": "45.5k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total quantity of space debris orbiting Earth will be 39.6k in 2025?", "desc": "*This question replaces a [previous version of the question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/13744/total-quantity-of-space-debris-by-year/) which was resolved as* ***Ambiguous*** *so that the ranges could be improved. Note that because this replaces a previous version this question will not have a hidden period or [coverage weight](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#coverage_weight).*_x000D_\n_x000D_\n---_x000D_\n_x000D_\nSpace debris pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and traveling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. The number of debris keeps growing as space gets more crowded and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use.", "resc": "For each of the following years, this question will resolve as the number of space debris pieces larger than 10cm estimated to be in orbit, according to the [ESA's Space Debris Office](https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers). The quantity for a given year will be determined by the most current number reported as of December 31 of that year. For reference, as of November 7, 2022, the ESA reported 36,500 pieces of debris larger than 10cm to be in orbit. If the ESA no longer reports this data, a similar authority for monitoring orbital space debris will be used, or the question may resolve as **Ambiguous** at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "35.9k", "median": "39.6k", "upper_75": "45.5k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total quantity of space debris orbiting Earth will be 39.6k in 2025?", "desc": "*This question replaces a [previous version of the question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/13744/total-quantity-of-space-debris-by-year/) which was resolved as* ***Ambiguous*** *so that the ranges could be improved. Note that because this replaces a previous version this question will not have a hidden period or [coverage weight](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#coverage_weight).*_x000D_\n_x000D_\n---_x000D_\n_x000D_\nSpace debris pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and traveling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. The number of debris keeps growing as space gets more crowded and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use.", "resc": "For each of the following years, this question will resolve as the number of space debris pieces larger than 10cm estimated to be in orbit, according to the [ESA's Space Debris Office](https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers). The quantity for a given year will be determined by the most current number reported as of December 31 of that year. For reference, as of November 7, 2022, the ESA reported 36,500 pieces of debris larger than 10cm to be in orbit. If the ESA no longer reports this data, a similar authority for monitoring orbital space debris will be used, or the question may resolve as **Ambiguous** at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "35.9k", "median": "39.6k", "upper_75": "45.5k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total quantity of space debris orbiting Earth will be 45.5k in each year?", "desc": "*This question replaces a [previous version of the question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/13744/total-quantity-of-space-debris-by-year/) which was resolved as* ***Ambiguous*** *so that the ranges could be improved. Note that because this replaces a previous version this question will not have a hidden period or [coverage weight](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#coverage_weight).*_x000D_\n_x000D_\n---_x000D_\n_x000D_\nSpace debris pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and traveling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. The number of debris keeps growing as space gets more crowded and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use.", "resc": "For each of the following years, this question will resolve as the number of space debris pieces larger than 10cm estimated to be in orbit, according to the [ESA's Space Debris Office](https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers). The quantity for a given year will be determined by the most current number reported as of December 31 of that year. For reference, as of November 7, 2022, the ESA reported 36,500 pieces of debris larger than 10cm to be in orbit. If the ESA no longer reports this data, a similar authority for monitoring orbital space debris will be used, or the question may resolve as **Ambiguous** at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "35.9k", "median": "39.6k", "upper_75": "45.5k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a total of 47.8k space debris orbiting Earth in 2030?", "desc": "*This question replaces a [previous version of the question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/13744/total-quantity-of-space-debris-by-year/) which was resolved as* ***Ambiguous*** *so that the ranges could be improved. Note that because this replaces a previous version this question will not have a hidden period or [coverage weight](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#coverage_weight).*_x000D_\n_x000D_\n---_x000D_\n_x000D_\nSpace debris pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and traveling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. The number of debris keeps growing as space gets more crowded and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use.", "resc": "For each of the following years, this question will resolve as the number of space debris pieces larger than 10cm estimated to be in orbit, according to the [ESA's Space Debris Office](https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers). The quantity for a given year will be determined by the most current number reported as of December 31 of that year. For reference, as of November 7, 2022, the ESA reported 36,500 pieces of debris larger than 10cm to be in orbit. If the ESA no longer reports this data, a similar authority for monitoring orbital space debris will be used, or the question may resolve as **Ambiguous** at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "37.6k", "median": "47.8k", "upper_75": "62.7k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Andrew Tate will be sentenced to 66.5 months in prison before 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "31.8", "median": "66.5", "upper_75": "148", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a total of 47.8k space debris orbiting Earth in 2030?", "desc": "*This question replaces a [previous version of the question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/13744/total-quantity-of-space-debris-by-year/) which was resolved as* ***Ambiguous*** *so that the ranges could be improved. Note that because this replaces a previous version this question will not have a hidden period or [coverage weight](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#coverage_weight).*_x000D_\n_x000D_\n---_x000D_\n_x000D_\nSpace debris pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and traveling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. The number of debris keeps growing as space gets more crowded and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use.", "resc": "For each of the following years, this question will resolve as the number of space debris pieces larger than 10cm estimated to be in orbit, according to the [ESA's Space Debris Office](https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers). The quantity for a given year will be determined by the most current number reported as of December 31 of that year. For reference, as of November 7, 2022, the ESA reported 36,500 pieces of debris larger than 10cm to be in orbit. If the ESA no longer reports this data, a similar authority for monitoring orbital space debris will be used, or the question may resolve as **Ambiguous** at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "37.6k", "median": "47.8k", "upper_75": "62.7k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total quantity of space debris orbiting Earth will be 68.6k in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "42.0k", "median": "68.6k", "upper_75": "107k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total quantity of space debris orbiting Earth will be 68.6k in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "42.0k", "median": "68.6k", "upper_75": "107k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the price of ETH will be 10.0k USD on December 31, 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.44k", "median": "5.21k", "upper_75": "10.0k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total quantity of space debris orbiting Earth will be 68.6k in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "42.0k", "median": "68.6k", "upper_75": "107k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Andrew Tate will be sentenced to 66.5 months in prison before 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "31.8", "median": "66.5", "upper_75": "148", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the price of ETH will be 10.0k USD on December 31, 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.44k", "median": "5.21k", "upper_75": "10.0k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Andrew Tate will be sentenced to 66.5 months in prison before 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "31.8", "median": "66.5", "upper_75": "148", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the probability that the US government will assign a credence of 9.71×10−3 to existential risk from AI in the next 30 years before 2025?", "desc": "A recent [blog post](https://adaptresearchwriting.com/2023/02/05/us-takes-action-to-avert-human-existential-catastrophe-the-global-catastrophic-risk-management-act-2022/) from Adapt Research explains,\n\n> Recognising the potentially unbearable impact of global catastrophic risks, the US has just passed the Global Catastrophic Risk Management Act.\n\n> The Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to coordinate an assessment of GCRs within one year, and every ten years thereafter.\n\nThe text of the law can be found [here](https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr7776/BILLS-117hr7776enr.pdf#page=1290). In it, the law states that,\n\n> Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 10 years thereafter, the Secretary, in coordination with the Administrator, shall submit... (1) expert estimates of cumulative global catastrophic and existential risk in the next 30 years, including separate estimates for the likelihood of occurrence and potential consequences; (2) expert-informed analyses of the risk of the most concerning specific global catastrophic and existential threats, including separate estimates, where reasonably feasible and credible, of each threat for its likelihood of occurrence and its potential consequences, as well as associated uncertainties", "resc": "This question will resolve as the most recent salient estimate in the most salient report published and revealed to the public after January 1, 2023 and before January 1, 2025 by the United States government of the probability of AI causing humanity to go extinct in roughly the next 30 years after the report is published. If such a report is published and revealed to the public as detailed in the Global Catastrophic Risk Management Act of 2022, then this question resolve on the day that the report was revealed to the public. If no such report is published and revealed to the public before 2025, then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\n\"The most salient report\" will be the report that was ordered to be published according to the Global Catastrophic Risk Management Act of 2022, or if no such report exists, the most relevant similar report, if one exists. In the case that multiple such reports are published, this question will resolve according to the first such report published, or, if they were published at the same time, then this question will resolve according to the report that appears most authoritative to Metaculus admins.\n\nIn the case that multiple estimates are proposed in the report, this question will resolve on the basis of an \"all things considered\" estimate, if provided. For example, if an aggregate of expert estimates is provided, and the authors rate the overall risk to be slightly higher than the aggregate of expert estimates, then this question will resolve based on the overall estimate, rather than the aggregate of expert estimates.\n\nIn case no \"all things considered\" estimate is provided, then an aggregate of expert estimates will be used, if provided. If an aggregate of estimates is used, then this question resolves according to the median of those estimates, if available. If the median of estimates is not available in the report, then the mean and mode will be used to resolve this question, respectively.\n\nIf neither an \"all things considered\" estimate nor aggregate of expert estimates is provided, then Metaculus admins will use their judgement to resolve this question, with the following principles in mind: (1) the most relevant, prominent estimate in the report should be used, (2) if there are multiple estimates of equal relevance and prominence, the first of these estimates should be used, (3) if no clear estimate is provided, then this question should resolve ambiguously.\n\nIn the case that a numerical range is provided, rather than a point estimate of AI x-risk, then this question will resolve according to the geometric mean of the range, provided that the boundaries of this range are well-defined. If only a qualitative rather than numerical estimate is provided, then this question must resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "1.88×10−3", "median": "9.71×10−3", "upper_75": "0.0413", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that OpenAI will announce GPT-5 by Jul 2024?", "desc": "On 14 March 2023, [OpenAI](https://openai.com/) announced their latest model in the [GPT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPT-3) family, GPT-4. In the [product announcement post for GPT-4](https://openai.com/product/gpt-4), OpenAI wrote: \n\n> Following the research path from GPT, GPT-2, and GPT-3, our deep learning approach leverages more data and more computation to create increasingly sophisticated and capable language models.\n\n> We spent 6 months making GPT-4 safer and more aligned. GPT-4 is 82% less likely to respond to requests for disallowed content and 40% more likely to produce factual responses than GPT-3.5 on our internal evaluations.\n\nAnd in the [research announcement post](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4), they begin with the following paragraphs: \n\n> We've created GPT-4, the latest milestone in OpenAI's effort in scaling up deep learning. GPT-4 is a large multimodal model (accepting image and text inputs, emitting text outputs) that, while less capable than humans in many real-world scenarios, exhibits human-level performance on various professional and academic benchmarks. For example, it passes a simulated bar exam with a score around the top 10% of test takers; in contrast, GPT-3.5's score was around the bottom 10%. We've spent 6 months iteratively aligning GPT-4 using lessons from our adversarial testing program as well as ChatGPT, resulting in our best-ever results (though far from perfect) on factuality, steerability, and refusing to go outside of guardrails.\n> \n> Over the past two years, we rebuilt our entire deep learning stack and, together with Azure, co-designed a supercomputer from the ground up for our workload. A year ago, we trained GPT-3.5 as a first “test run” of the system. We found and fixed some bugs and improved our theoretical foundations. As a result, our GPT-4 training run was (for us at least!) unprecedentedly stable, becoming our first large model whose training performance we were able to accurately predict ahead of time. As we continue to focus on reliable scaling, we aim to hone our methodology to help us predict and prepare for future capabilities increasingly far in advance—something we view as critical for safety.\n\nFor historical context, here is a brief overview and history of OpenAI's GPT systems from the recently resolved Metaculus question _[When will GPT-4 be announced?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14305/when-will-gpt-4-be-announced/)_: \n\n> GPT stands for \"Generative Pre-Training\" and was introduced in [this paper](https://cdn.openai.com/research-covers/language-unsupervised/language_understanding_paper.pdf) from OpenAI in 2018. On February 14th 2019, OpenAI announced [GPT-2](https://openai.com/blog/better-language-models/), which became famous within the machine learning community for producing surprisingly coherent written text samples. It used 1.5 billion parameters.\n>\n> On the 28th of May, 2020, OpenAI released [GPT-3](https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.14165), a 175 billion parameter model, widely regarded to have impressive language generation abilities, and in Dec 2022, OpenAI released [ChatGPT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ChatGPT), widely considered to be \"GPT-3.5\".", "resc": "This question resolves as the date that OpenAI publishes a document (e.g., a blog post, paper, or video, but not a tweet) announcing the existence of GPT-5. Metaculus admins will be consulted should there be any ambiguity.", "lower_25": "Jul 2024", "median": "Oct 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 2025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that OpenAI will not make the GPT-4 model available for free ChatGPT users by January 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2024", "median": "Dec 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the price of ETH will be 10.0k USD on December 31, 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.44k", "median": "5.21k", "upper_75": "10.0k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that OpenAI will not make the GPT-4 model available for free ChatGPT users by January 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2024", "median": "Dec 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a humanoid robot will be created by 2035 that the general public judges as indistinguishable from humans?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2047", "upper_75": "2073", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that OpenAI will announce GPT-5 by Jul 2024?", "desc": "On 14 March 2023, [OpenAI](https://openai.com/) announced their latest model in the [GPT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPT-3) family, GPT-4. In the [product announcement post for GPT-4](https://openai.com/product/gpt-4), OpenAI wrote: \n\n> Following the research path from GPT, GPT-2, and GPT-3, our deep learning approach leverages more data and more computation to create increasingly sophisticated and capable language models.\n\n> We spent 6 months making GPT-4 safer and more aligned. GPT-4 is 82% less likely to respond to requests for disallowed content and 40% more likely to produce factual responses than GPT-3.5 on our internal evaluations.\n\nAnd in the [research announcement post](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4), they begin with the following paragraphs: \n\n> We've created GPT-4, the latest milestone in OpenAI's effort in scaling up deep learning. GPT-4 is a large multimodal model (accepting image and text inputs, emitting text outputs) that, while less capable than humans in many real-world scenarios, exhibits human-level performance on various professional and academic benchmarks. For example, it passes a simulated bar exam with a score around the top 10% of test takers; in contrast, GPT-3.5's score was around the bottom 10%. We've spent 6 months iteratively aligning GPT-4 using lessons from our adversarial testing program as well as ChatGPT, resulting in our best-ever results (though far from perfect) on factuality, steerability, and refusing to go outside of guardrails.\n> \n> Over the past two years, we rebuilt our entire deep learning stack and, together with Azure, co-designed a supercomputer from the ground up for our workload. A year ago, we trained GPT-3.5 as a first “test run” of the system. We found and fixed some bugs and improved our theoretical foundations. As a result, our GPT-4 training run was (for us at least!) unprecedentedly stable, becoming our first large model whose training performance we were able to accurately predict ahead of time. As we continue to focus on reliable scaling, we aim to hone our methodology to help us predict and prepare for future capabilities increasingly far in advance—something we view as critical for safety.\n\nFor historical context, here is a brief overview and history of OpenAI's GPT systems from the recently resolved Metaculus question _[When will GPT-4 be announced?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14305/when-will-gpt-4-be-announced/)_: \n\n> GPT stands for \"Generative Pre-Training\" and was introduced in [this paper](https://cdn.openai.com/research-covers/language-unsupervised/language_understanding_paper.pdf) from OpenAI in 2018. On February 14th 2019, OpenAI announced [GPT-2](https://openai.com/blog/better-language-models/), which became famous within the machine learning community for producing surprisingly coherent written text samples. It used 1.5 billion parameters.\n>\n> On the 28th of May, 2020, OpenAI released [GPT-3](https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.14165), a 175 billion parameter model, widely regarded to have impressive language generation abilities, and in Dec 2022, OpenAI released [ChatGPT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ChatGPT), widely considered to be \"GPT-3.5\".", "resc": "This question resolves as the date that OpenAI publishes a document (e.g., a blog post, paper, or video, but not a tweet) announcing the existence of GPT-5. Metaculus admins will be consulted should there be any ambiguity.", "lower_25": "Jul 2024", "median": "Oct 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 2025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total supply of Ether on the Ethereum blockchain will be 75% of 118.9M on Dec 15, 2029 at 11:59pm?", "desc": "[Ethereum](https://ethereum.org/en/) is a decentralized, open-source blockchain platform that enables the creation and execution of smart contracts and decentralized applications (DApps). The platform's native cryptocurrency is Ether [(ETH)](https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/ethereum/), which is used to pay for transaction fees and computational services on the network.\n\nDuring the [London hard fork in 2022](https://originstamp.com/blog/what-is-the-ethereum-london-hard-fork-and-how-does-it-impact-token-holders/), EIP 1559 introduced several changes: The first changes are concerned with how gas fees work, which should make Ethereum transactions cheaper. The second second relates to the burning of these fees instead of sending them to miners.\n\nThis can result in deflation in the supply of Ether if the demand for block space is high enough. A summary of how this has behaved since the Merge can be found at [ultrasound.money](https://ultrasound.money/).\n\nWith the take off of L2s such as [Optimism](https://www.optimism.io/) and [Arbitrum](https://l2beat.com/scaling/projects/arbitrum), it's unclear how much demand on Ethereum block space there will be in the future.\n\nAs of 8/03/2023 the Ether supply on the Ethereum blockchain is 120,472,297", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total supply of Ether on the Ethereum Blockchain at 11:59 UTC on December 15, 2029.\n\nThe resolution source for this is the [EtherScan](https://etherscan.io/stat/supply) for 'Total Ether Supply'.\n\nIf this resolution source is not available, others such as [ultrasound.money](https://ultrasound.money/) may be used", "lower_25": "110.4M", "median": "117.9M", "upper_75": "118.9M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a humanoid robot will be created by 2035 that the general public judges as indistinguishable from humans?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2047", "upper_75": "2073", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Chinese entity will develop a model surpassing GPT-4's few-shot performance on MMLU by Jun 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jun 2024", "median": "Nov 2024", "upper_75": "Jul 2025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that a Chinese organization will train a large model on GPUs that deliver more than 1500 TFLOPs@FP16 by October 2024?", "desc": "During the Autumn of 2022, the Biden administration introduced comprehensive export controls targeting China's AI efforts. The restrictions cover high-end GPUs, electronic design automation software, semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME), and SME components [[1](https://www.csis.org/analysis/choking-chinas-access-future-ai)].\n\nAt the time the controls were introduced, the highest-performing GPU on the market was NVIDIA's A100 80G, delivering 312 TFLOPs@FP16 [[2](https://www.nvidia.com/en-gb/data-center/a100/)]. This is slated to be surpassed in 2023 by the H100 SXM, which will deliver 1979 TFLOPs@FP16 [[3](https://www.nvidia.com/en-gb/data-center/h100/)]. China's best-performing domestic AI chip, the Ascend 910, delivers either [320 TFLOPs@FP16](https://e.huawei.com/uk/products/cloud-computing-dc/atlas/ascend-910) or [256 TFLOPs@FP16](https://www.huawei.com/en/news/2019/8/huawei-ascend-910-most-powerful-ai-processor), depending on which of Huawei's web pages you read.", "resc": "This question resolves as publication date of a paper or technical report by a Chinese organization describing the training of a machine learning model having > 100B parameters using chips that deliver > 1500 TFLOPs@FP16.", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Oct 2024", "upper_75": "May 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that a Chinese organization will train a large model on GPUs that deliver more than 1500 TFLOPs@FP16 by October 2024?", "desc": "During the Autumn of 2022, the Biden administration introduced comprehensive export controls targeting China's AI efforts. The restrictions cover high-end GPUs, electronic design automation software, semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME), and SME components [[1](https://www.csis.org/analysis/choking-chinas-access-future-ai)].\n\nAt the time the controls were introduced, the highest-performing GPU on the market was NVIDIA's A100 80G, delivering 312 TFLOPs@FP16 [[2](https://www.nvidia.com/en-gb/data-center/a100/)]. This is slated to be surpassed in 2023 by the H100 SXM, which will deliver 1979 TFLOPs@FP16 [[3](https://www.nvidia.com/en-gb/data-center/h100/)]. China's best-performing domestic AI chip, the Ascend 910, delivers either [320 TFLOPs@FP16](https://e.huawei.com/uk/products/cloud-computing-dc/atlas/ascend-910) or [256 TFLOPs@FP16](https://www.huawei.com/en/news/2019/8/huawei-ascend-910-most-powerful-ai-processor), depending on which of Huawei's web pages you read.", "resc": "This question resolves as publication date of a paper or technical report by a Chinese organization describing the training of a machine learning model having > 100B parameters using chips that deliver > 1500 TFLOPs@FP16.", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Oct 2024", "upper_75": "May 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the change in the transition metal index, what is the chance that 35.6% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "For background on the energy transition metal index see the **parent question**: [What will be the percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020 **increases by more than 55%**, then the subquestion \"> +55%\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020 **increases by less than or equal to 55%**, then the subquestion \"≤ +55%\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe change in the energy transition metal index in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [energy transition index question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "25.4", "median": "35.6", "upper_75": "45.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the change in the transition metal index, what is the chance that 45.8% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "For background on the energy transition metal index see the **parent question**: [What will be the percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020 **increases by more than 55%**, then the subquestion \"> +55%\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020 **increases by less than or equal to 55%**, then the subquestion \"≤ +55%\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe change in the energy transition metal index in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [energy transition index question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "25.4", "median": "35.6", "upper_75": "45.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the change in the transition metal index, what is the chance that 35.6% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "For background on the energy transition metal index see the **parent question**: [What will be the percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020 **increases by more than 55%**, then the subquestion \"> +55%\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020 **increases by less than or equal to 55%**, then the subquestion \"≤ +55%\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe change in the energy transition metal index in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [energy transition index question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "25.4", "median": "35.6", "upper_75": "45.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a total of 47.8k space debris orbiting Earth in 2030?", "desc": "*This question replaces a [previous version of the question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/13744/total-quantity-of-space-debris-by-year/) which was resolved as* ***Ambiguous*** *so that the ranges could be improved. Note that because this replaces a previous version this question will not have a hidden period or [coverage weight](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#coverage_weight).*_x000D_\n_x000D_\n---_x000D_\n_x000D_\nSpace debris pose a significant threat to spacecraft in Earth orbit. Varying in size from tiny collision fragments to large non-operational satellites, and traveling at high velocities, a collision even with a small piece of debris can knock a satellite out of commission. The number of debris keeps growing as space gets more crowded and collisions between them cause pieces of debris to further fragment. If this trend continues unabated and a critical debris density is reached, a run-away effect may happen where collisions between objects cause a cascade, a sort of space debris chain reaction. This scenario is called the [Kessler syndrome](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome) and can make low Earth orbit exceedingly difficult to use.", "resc": "For each of the following years, this question will resolve as the number of space debris pieces larger than 10cm estimated to be in orbit, according to the [ESA's Space Debris Office](https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers). The quantity for a given year will be determined by the most current number reported as of December 31 of that year. For reference, as of November 7, 2022, the ESA reported 36,500 pieces of debris larger than 10cm to be in orbit. If the ESA no longer reports this data, a similar authority for monitoring orbital space debris will be used, or the question may resolve as **Ambiguous** at the discretion of Metaculus Admins", "lower_25": "37.6k", "median": "47.8k", "upper_75": "62.7k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total supply of Ether on the Ethereum blockchain will be 75% of 118.9M on Dec 15, 2029 at 11:59pm?", "desc": "[Ethereum](https://ethereum.org/en/) is a decentralized, open-source blockchain platform that enables the creation and execution of smart contracts and decentralized applications (DApps). The platform's native cryptocurrency is Ether [(ETH)](https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/ethereum/), which is used to pay for transaction fees and computational services on the network.\n\nDuring the [London hard fork in 2022](https://originstamp.com/blog/what-is-the-ethereum-london-hard-fork-and-how-does-it-impact-token-holders/), EIP 1559 introduced several changes: The first changes are concerned with how gas fees work, which should make Ethereum transactions cheaper. The second second relates to the burning of these fees instead of sending them to miners.\n\nThis can result in deflation in the supply of Ether if the demand for block space is high enough. A summary of how this has behaved since the Merge can be found at [ultrasound.money](https://ultrasound.money/).\n\nWith the take off of L2s such as [Optimism](https://www.optimism.io/) and [Arbitrum](https://l2beat.com/scaling/projects/arbitrum), it's unclear how much demand on Ethereum block space there will be in the future.\n\nAs of 8/03/2023 the Ether supply on the Ethereum blockchain is 120,472,297", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total supply of Ether on the Ethereum Blockchain at 11:59 UTC on December 15, 2029.\n\nThe resolution source for this is the [EtherScan](https://etherscan.io/stat/supply) for 'Total Ether Supply'.\n\nIf this resolution source is not available, others such as [ultrasound.money](https://ultrasound.money/) may be used", "lower_25": "110.4M", "median": "117.9M", "upper_75": "118.9M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the change in the transition metal index, what is the chance that 35.6% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "For background on the energy transition metal index see the **parent question**: [What will be the percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020 **increases by more than 55%**, then the subquestion \"> +55%\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020 **increases by less than or equal to 55%**, then the subquestion \"≤ +55%\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe change in the energy transition metal index in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [energy transition index question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "25.4", "median": "35.6", "upper_75": "45.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that OpenAI will announce GPT-5 by Jul 2024?", "desc": "On 14 March 2023, [OpenAI](https://openai.com/) announced their latest model in the [GPT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPT-3) family, GPT-4. In the [product announcement post for GPT-4](https://openai.com/product/gpt-4), OpenAI wrote: \n\n> Following the research path from GPT, GPT-2, and GPT-3, our deep learning approach leverages more data and more computation to create increasingly sophisticated and capable language models.\n\n> We spent 6 months making GPT-4 safer and more aligned. GPT-4 is 82% less likely to respond to requests for disallowed content and 40% more likely to produce factual responses than GPT-3.5 on our internal evaluations.\n\nAnd in the [research announcement post](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4), they begin with the following paragraphs: \n\n> We've created GPT-4, the latest milestone in OpenAI's effort in scaling up deep learning. GPT-4 is a large multimodal model (accepting image and text inputs, emitting text outputs) that, while less capable than humans in many real-world scenarios, exhibits human-level performance on various professional and academic benchmarks. For example, it passes a simulated bar exam with a score around the top 10% of test takers; in contrast, GPT-3.5's score was around the bottom 10%. We've spent 6 months iteratively aligning GPT-4 using lessons from our adversarial testing program as well as ChatGPT, resulting in our best-ever results (though far from perfect) on factuality, steerability, and refusing to go outside of guardrails.\n> \n> Over the past two years, we rebuilt our entire deep learning stack and, together with Azure, co-designed a supercomputer from the ground up for our workload. A year ago, we trained GPT-3.5 as a first “test run” of the system. We found and fixed some bugs and improved our theoretical foundations. As a result, our GPT-4 training run was (for us at least!) unprecedentedly stable, becoming our first large model whose training performance we were able to accurately predict ahead of time. As we continue to focus on reliable scaling, we aim to hone our methodology to help us predict and prepare for future capabilities increasingly far in advance—something we view as critical for safety.\n\nFor historical context, here is a brief overview and history of OpenAI's GPT systems from the recently resolved Metaculus question _[When will GPT-4 be announced?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14305/when-will-gpt-4-be-announced/)_: \n\n> GPT stands for \"Generative Pre-Training\" and was introduced in [this paper](https://cdn.openai.com/research-covers/language-unsupervised/language_understanding_paper.pdf) from OpenAI in 2018. On February 14th 2019, OpenAI announced [GPT-2](https://openai.com/blog/better-language-models/), which became famous within the machine learning community for producing surprisingly coherent written text samples. It used 1.5 billion parameters.\n>\n> On the 28th of May, 2020, OpenAI released [GPT-3](https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.14165), a 175 billion parameter model, widely regarded to have impressive language generation abilities, and in Dec 2022, OpenAI released [ChatGPT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ChatGPT), widely considered to be \"GPT-3.5\".", "resc": "This question resolves as the date that OpenAI publishes a document (e.g., a blog post, paper, or video, but not a tweet) announcing the existence of GPT-5. Metaculus admins will be consulted should there be any ambiguity.", "lower_25": "Jul 2024", "median": "Oct 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 2025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Chinese entity will develop a model surpassing GPT-4's few-shot performance on MMLU by Jun 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jun 2024", "median": "Nov 2024", "upper_75": "Jul 2025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a humanoid robot will be created by 2035 that the general public judges as indistinguishable from humans?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2047", "upper_75": "2073", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Chinese entity will develop a model surpassing GPT-4's few-shot performance on MMLU by Jun 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jun 2024", "median": "Nov 2024", "upper_75": "Jul 2025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 39.6% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles, given a change in the transition metal index?", "desc": "For background on the energy transition metal index see the **parent question**: [What will be the percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020 **increases by more than 55%**, then the subquestion \"> +55%\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020 **increases by less than or equal to 55%**, then the subquestion \"≤ +55%\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe change in the energy transition metal index in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [energy transition index question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "23.1", "median": "31.8", "upper_75": "39.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that OpenAI will not make the GPT-4 model available for free ChatGPT users by January 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2024", "median": "Dec 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the number of public charging stations, what is the chance that 34.5% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles? (≤ 185k)", "desc": "For background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **parent question**: [How many level 2 or greater public charging stations will be available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 is **more than 185,000**, then the subquestion \"> 185k\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 is **less than or equal to 185,000**, then the subquestion \"≤ 185k\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "25.3", "median": "34.5", "upper_75": "43.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the probability that the US government will assign a credence of 9.71×10−3 to existential risk from AI in the next 30 years before 2025?", "desc": "A recent [blog post](https://adaptresearchwriting.com/2023/02/05/us-takes-action-to-avert-human-existential-catastrophe-the-global-catastrophic-risk-management-act-2022/) from Adapt Research explains,\n\n> Recognising the potentially unbearable impact of global catastrophic risks, the US has just passed the Global Catastrophic Risk Management Act.\n\n> The Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to coordinate an assessment of GCRs within one year, and every ten years thereafter.\n\nThe text of the law can be found [here](https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr7776/BILLS-117hr7776enr.pdf#page=1290). In it, the law states that,\n\n> Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 10 years thereafter, the Secretary, in coordination with the Administrator, shall submit... (1) expert estimates of cumulative global catastrophic and existential risk in the next 30 years, including separate estimates for the likelihood of occurrence and potential consequences; (2) expert-informed analyses of the risk of the most concerning specific global catastrophic and existential threats, including separate estimates, where reasonably feasible and credible, of each threat for its likelihood of occurrence and its potential consequences, as well as associated uncertainties", "resc": "This question will resolve as the most recent salient estimate in the most salient report published and revealed to the public after January 1, 2023 and before January 1, 2025 by the United States government of the probability of AI causing humanity to go extinct in roughly the next 30 years after the report is published. If such a report is published and revealed to the public as detailed in the Global Catastrophic Risk Management Act of 2022, then this question resolve on the day that the report was revealed to the public. If no such report is published and revealed to the public before 2025, then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\n\"The most salient report\" will be the report that was ordered to be published according to the Global Catastrophic Risk Management Act of 2022, or if no such report exists, the most relevant similar report, if one exists. In the case that multiple such reports are published, this question will resolve according to the first such report published, or, if they were published at the same time, then this question will resolve according to the report that appears most authoritative to Metaculus admins.\n\nIn the case that multiple estimates are proposed in the report, this question will resolve on the basis of an \"all things considered\" estimate, if provided. For example, if an aggregate of expert estimates is provided, and the authors rate the overall risk to be slightly higher than the aggregate of expert estimates, then this question will resolve based on the overall estimate, rather than the aggregate of expert estimates.\n\nIn case no \"all things considered\" estimate is provided, then an aggregate of expert estimates will be used, if provided. If an aggregate of estimates is used, then this question resolves according to the median of those estimates, if available. If the median of estimates is not available in the report, then the mean and mode will be used to resolve this question, respectively.\n\nIf neither an \"all things considered\" estimate nor aggregate of expert estimates is provided, then Metaculus admins will use their judgement to resolve this question, with the following principles in mind: (1) the most relevant, prominent estimate in the report should be used, (2) if there are multiple estimates of equal relevance and prominence, the first of these estimates should be used, (3) if no clear estimate is provided, then this question should resolve ambiguously.\n\nIn the case that a numerical range is provided, rather than a point estimate of AI x-risk, then this question will resolve according to the geometric mean of the range, provided that the boundaries of this range are well-defined. If only a qualitative rather than numerical estimate is provided, then this question must resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "1.88×10−3", "median": "9.71×10−3", "upper_75": "0.0413", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the number of public charging stations, what is the chance that 37.4% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "For background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **parent question**: [How many level 2 or greater public charging stations will be available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 is **more than 185,000**, then the subquestion \"> 185k\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 is **less than or equal to 185,000**, then the subquestion \"≤ 185k\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "37.4", "median": "48.7", "upper_75": "63.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 39.6% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles, given a change in the transition metal index?", "desc": "For background on the energy transition metal index see the **parent question**: [What will be the percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020 **increases by more than 55%**, then the subquestion \"> +55%\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020 **increases by less than or equal to 55%**, then the subquestion \"≤ +55%\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe change in the energy transition metal index in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [energy transition index question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "23.1", "median": "31.8", "upper_75": "39.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the number of public charging stations, what is the chance that 37.4% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "For background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **parent question**: [How many level 2 or greater public charging stations will be available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 is **more than 185,000**, then the subquestion \"> 185k\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 is **less than or equal to 185,000**, then the subquestion \"≤ 185k\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "37.4", "median": "48.7", "upper_75": "63.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the probability that the US government will assign a credence of 9.71×10−3 to existential risk from AI in the next 30 years before 2025?", "desc": "A recent [blog post](https://adaptresearchwriting.com/2023/02/05/us-takes-action-to-avert-human-existential-catastrophe-the-global-catastrophic-risk-management-act-2022/) from Adapt Research explains,\n\n> Recognising the potentially unbearable impact of global catastrophic risks, the US has just passed the Global Catastrophic Risk Management Act.\n\n> The Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to coordinate an assessment of GCRs within one year, and every ten years thereafter.\n\nThe text of the law can be found [here](https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr7776/BILLS-117hr7776enr.pdf#page=1290). In it, the law states that,\n\n> Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 10 years thereafter, the Secretary, in coordination with the Administrator, shall submit... (1) expert estimates of cumulative global catastrophic and existential risk in the next 30 years, including separate estimates for the likelihood of occurrence and potential consequences; (2) expert-informed analyses of the risk of the most concerning specific global catastrophic and existential threats, including separate estimates, where reasonably feasible and credible, of each threat for its likelihood of occurrence and its potential consequences, as well as associated uncertainties", "resc": "This question will resolve as the most recent salient estimate in the most salient report published and revealed to the public after January 1, 2023 and before January 1, 2025 by the United States government of the probability of AI causing humanity to go extinct in roughly the next 30 years after the report is published. If such a report is published and revealed to the public as detailed in the Global Catastrophic Risk Management Act of 2022, then this question resolve on the day that the report was revealed to the public. If no such report is published and revealed to the public before 2025, then this question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\n\"The most salient report\" will be the report that was ordered to be published according to the Global Catastrophic Risk Management Act of 2022, or if no such report exists, the most relevant similar report, if one exists. In the case that multiple such reports are published, this question will resolve according to the first such report published, or, if they were published at the same time, then this question will resolve according to the report that appears most authoritative to Metaculus admins.\n\nIn the case that multiple estimates are proposed in the report, this question will resolve on the basis of an \"all things considered\" estimate, if provided. For example, if an aggregate of expert estimates is provided, and the authors rate the overall risk to be slightly higher than the aggregate of expert estimates, then this question will resolve based on the overall estimate, rather than the aggregate of expert estimates.\n\nIn case no \"all things considered\" estimate is provided, then an aggregate of expert estimates will be used, if provided. If an aggregate of estimates is used, then this question resolves according to the median of those estimates, if available. If the median of estimates is not available in the report, then the mean and mode will be used to resolve this question, respectively.\n\nIf neither an \"all things considered\" estimate nor aggregate of expert estimates is provided, then Metaculus admins will use their judgement to resolve this question, with the following principles in mind: (1) the most relevant, prominent estimate in the report should be used, (2) if there are multiple estimates of equal relevance and prominence, the first of these estimates should be used, (3) if no clear estimate is provided, then this question should resolve ambiguously.\n\nIn the case that a numerical range is provided, rather than a point estimate of AI x-risk, then this question will resolve according to the geometric mean of the range, provided that the boundaries of this range are well-defined. If only a qualitative rather than numerical estimate is provided, then this question must resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "1.88×10−3", "median": "9.71×10−3", "upper_75": "0.0413", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the number of public charging stations, what is the chance that 63.0% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles? (> 185k)", "desc": "For background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **parent question**: [How many level 2 or greater public charging stations will be available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 is **more than 185,000**, then the subquestion \"> 185k\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 is **less than or equal to 185,000**, then the subquestion \"≤ 185k\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "37.4", "median": "48.7", "upper_75": "63.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the change in the transition metal index, what is the chance that 45.8% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "For background on the energy transition metal index see the **parent question**: [What will be the percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020 **increases by more than 55%**, then the subquestion \"> +55%\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020 **increases by less than or equal to 55%**, then the subquestion \"≤ +55%\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe change in the energy transition metal index in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [energy transition index question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "25.4", "median": "35.6", "upper_75": "45.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the number of public charging stations, what is the chance that 63.0% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles? (> 185k)", "desc": "For background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **parent question**: [How many level 2 or greater public charging stations will be available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 is **more than 185,000**, then the subquestion \"> 185k\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 is **less than or equal to 185,000**, then the subquestion \"≤ 185k\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "37.4", "median": "48.7", "upper_75": "63.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total supply of Ether on the Ethereum blockchain will be 75% of 118.9M on Dec 15, 2029 at 11:59pm?", "desc": "[Ethereum](https://ethereum.org/en/) is a decentralized, open-source blockchain platform that enables the creation and execution of smart contracts and decentralized applications (DApps). The platform's native cryptocurrency is Ether [(ETH)](https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/ethereum/), which is used to pay for transaction fees and computational services on the network.\n\nDuring the [London hard fork in 2022](https://originstamp.com/blog/what-is-the-ethereum-london-hard-fork-and-how-does-it-impact-token-holders/), EIP 1559 introduced several changes: The first changes are concerned with how gas fees work, which should make Ethereum transactions cheaper. The second second relates to the burning of these fees instead of sending them to miners.\n\nThis can result in deflation in the supply of Ether if the demand for block space is high enough. A summary of how this has behaved since the Merge can be found at [ultrasound.money](https://ultrasound.money/).\n\nWith the take off of L2s such as [Optimism](https://www.optimism.io/) and [Arbitrum](https://l2beat.com/scaling/projects/arbitrum), it's unclear how much demand on Ethereum block space there will be in the future.\n\nAs of 8/03/2023 the Ether supply on the Ethereum blockchain is 120,472,297", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total supply of Ether on the Ethereum Blockchain at 11:59 UTC on December 15, 2029.\n\nThe resolution source for this is the [EtherScan](https://etherscan.io/stat/supply) for 'Total Ether Supply'.\n\nIf this resolution source is not available, others such as [ultrasound.money](https://ultrasound.money/) may be used", "lower_25": "110.4M", "median": "117.9M", "upper_75": "118.9M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that a Chinese organization will train a large model on GPUs that deliver more than 1500 TFLOPs@FP16 by October 2024?", "desc": "During the Autumn of 2022, the Biden administration introduced comprehensive export controls targeting China's AI efforts. The restrictions cover high-end GPUs, electronic design automation software, semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME), and SME components [[1](https://www.csis.org/analysis/choking-chinas-access-future-ai)].\n\nAt the time the controls were introduced, the highest-performing GPU on the market was NVIDIA's A100 80G, delivering 312 TFLOPs@FP16 [[2](https://www.nvidia.com/en-gb/data-center/a100/)]. This is slated to be surpassed in 2023 by the H100 SXM, which will deliver 1979 TFLOPs@FP16 [[3](https://www.nvidia.com/en-gb/data-center/h100/)]. China's best-performing domestic AI chip, the Ascend 910, delivers either [320 TFLOPs@FP16](https://e.huawei.com/uk/products/cloud-computing-dc/atlas/ascend-910) or [256 TFLOPs@FP16](https://www.huawei.com/en/news/2019/8/huawei-ascend-910-most-powerful-ai-processor), depending on which of Huawei's web pages you read.", "resc": "This question resolves as publication date of a paper or technical report by a Chinese organization describing the training of a machine learning model having > 100B parameters using chips that deliver > 1500 TFLOPs@FP16.", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Oct 2024", "upper_75": "May 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the number of public charging stations, what is the chance that 63.0% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles? (> 185k)", "desc": "For background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **parent question**: [How many level 2 or greater public charging stations will be available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 is **more than 185,000**, then the subquestion \"> 185k\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 is **less than or equal to 185,000**, then the subquestion \"≤ 185k\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "37.4", "median": "48.7", "upper_75": "63.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on gas prices, what is the chance that 20.0% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "For background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **parent question**: [What will be the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14766/annual-average-gasoline-prices-in-us/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 is **more than $3.30**, then the subquestion \"> $3.30\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 is **less than or equal to $3.30**, then the subquestion \"≤ $3.30\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [gas price question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14766/annual-average-gasoline-prices-in-us/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "20.0", "median": "25.7", "upper_75": "32.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on gas prices, what is the chance that 20.0% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "For background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **parent question**: [What will be the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14766/annual-average-gasoline-prices-in-us/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 is **more than $3.30**, then the subquestion \"> $3.30\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 is **less than or equal to $3.30**, then the subquestion \"≤ $3.30\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [gas price question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14766/annual-average-gasoline-prices-in-us/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "20.0", "median": "25.7", "upper_75": "32.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the number of public charging stations, what is the chance that 37.4% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "For background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **parent question**: [How many level 2 or greater public charging stations will be available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 is **more than 185,000**, then the subquestion \"> 185k\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 is **less than or equal to 185,000**, then the subquestion \"≤ 185k\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "37.4", "median": "48.7", "upper_75": "63.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on gas prices, what is the chance that 20.0% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "For background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **parent question**: [What will be the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14766/annual-average-gasoline-prices-in-us/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 is **more than $3.30**, then the subquestion \"> $3.30\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 is **less than or equal to $3.30**, then the subquestion \"≤ $3.30\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [gas price question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14766/annual-average-gasoline-prices-in-us/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "20.0", "median": "25.7", "upper_75": "32.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on gas prices, what is the chance that 75% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles if gas prices are ≤ $3.30?", "desc": "For background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **parent question**: [What will be the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14766/annual-average-gasoline-prices-in-us/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 is **more than $3.30**, then the subquestion \"> $3.30\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 is **less than or equal to $3.30**, then the subquestion \"≤ $3.30\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [gas price question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14766/annual-average-gasoline-prices-in-us/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "20.0", "median": "25.7", "upper_75": "32.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on gas prices, what is the chance that 61.2% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles if gas prices are greater than $3.30?", "desc": "For background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **parent question**: [What will be the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14766/annual-average-gasoline-prices-in-us/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 is **more than $3.30**, then the subquestion \"> $3.30\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 is **less than or equal to $3.30**, then the subquestion \"≤ $3.30\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [gas price question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14766/annual-average-gasoline-prices-in-us/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "40.7", "median": "50.4", "upper_75": "61.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on gas prices, what is the chance that 75% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles if gas prices are ≤ $3.30?", "desc": "For background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **parent question**: [What will be the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14766/annual-average-gasoline-prices-in-us/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 is **more than $3.30**, then the subquestion \"> $3.30\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 is **less than or equal to $3.30**, then the subquestion \"≤ $3.30\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [gas price question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14766/annual-average-gasoline-prices-in-us/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "20.0", "median": "25.7", "upper_75": "32.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on gas prices, what is the chance that 75% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles if gas prices are ≤ $3.30?", "desc": "For background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **parent question**: [What will be the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14766/annual-average-gasoline-prices-in-us/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 is **more than $3.30**, then the subquestion \"> $3.30\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 is **less than or equal to $3.30**, then the subquestion \"≤ $3.30\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [gas price question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14766/annual-average-gasoline-prices-in-us/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "20.0", "median": "25.7", "upper_75": "32.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on EV median range, what is the chance that 27.9% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "For background on EV median range see the **parent question**: [What will be the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14782/median-range-of-evs-below-40k-msrp/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for model year 2027 is **more than 325**, then the subquestion \"> 325\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for model year 2027 is **less than or equal to 325**, then the subquestion \"≤ 325\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe median estimated range (in miles) will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [EV median range question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14782/median-range-of-evs-below-40k-msrp/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "27.9", "median": "38.9", "upper_75": "50.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on EV median range, what is the chance that 50.8% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "For background on EV median range see the **parent question**: [What will be the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14782/median-range-of-evs-below-40k-msrp/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for model year 2027 is **more than 325**, then the subquestion \"> 325\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for model year 2027 is **less than or equal to 325**, then the subquestion \"≤ 325\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe median estimated range (in miles) will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [EV median range question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14782/median-range-of-evs-below-40k-msrp/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "27.9", "median": "38.9", "upper_75": "50.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on EV median range, what is the chance that 27.9% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "For background on EV median range see the **parent question**: [What will be the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14782/median-range-of-evs-below-40k-msrp/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for model year 2027 is **more than 325**, then the subquestion \"> 325\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for model year 2027 is **less than or equal to 325**, then the subquestion \"≤ 325\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe median estimated range (in miles) will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [EV median range question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14782/median-range-of-evs-below-40k-msrp/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "27.9", "median": "38.9", "upper_75": "50.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on EV median range, what is the chance that 13.9% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles? (≤ 325)", "desc": "For background on EV median range see the **parent question**: [What will be the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14782/median-range-of-evs-below-40k-msrp/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for model year 2027 is **more than 325**, then the subquestion \"> 325\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for model year 2027 is **less than or equal to 325**, then the subquestion \"≤ 325\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe median estimated range (in miles) will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [EV median range question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14782/median-range-of-evs-below-40k-msrp/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "13.9", "median": "20.3", "upper_75": "26.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on EV median range, what is the chance that 27.9% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "For background on EV median range see the **parent question**: [What will be the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14782/median-range-of-evs-below-40k-msrp/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for model year 2027 is **more than 325**, then the subquestion \"> 325\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for model year 2027 is **less than or equal to 325**, then the subquestion \"≤ 325\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe median estimated range (in miles) will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [EV median range question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14782/median-range-of-evs-below-40k-msrp/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "27.9", "median": "38.9", "upper_75": "50.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on gas prices, what is the chance that 61.2% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles if gas prices are greater than $3.30?", "desc": "For background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **parent question**: [What will be the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14766/annual-average-gasoline-prices-in-us/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 is **more than $3.30**, then the subquestion \"> $3.30\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 is **less than or equal to $3.30**, then the subquestion \"≤ $3.30\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [gas price question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14766/annual-average-gasoline-prices-in-us/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "40.7", "median": "50.4", "upper_75": "61.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on gas prices, what is the chance that 61.2% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles if gas prices are greater than $3.30?", "desc": "For background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **parent question**: [What will be the annual average retail gasoline price (in 2022 USD per gallon) in the United States in the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14766/annual-average-gasoline-prices-in-us/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 is **more than $3.30**, then the subquestion \"> $3.30\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 is **less than or equal to $3.30**, then the subquestion \"≤ $3.30\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe annual average gas price (in 2022 US dollars per gallon) in the United States in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [gas price question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14766/annual-average-gasoline-prices-in-us/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "40.7", "median": "50.4", "upper_75": "61.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on EV median range, what is the chance that 50.8% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles?", "desc": "For background on EV median range see the **parent question**: [What will be the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14782/median-range-of-evs-below-40k-msrp/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for model year 2027 is **more than 325**, then the subquestion \"> 325\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for model year 2027 is **less than or equal to 325**, then the subquestion \"≤ 325\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe median estimated range (in miles) will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [EV median range question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14782/median-range-of-evs-below-40k-msrp/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "27.9", "median": "38.9", "upper_75": "50.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 58.6% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles, given the number of states adopting ZEV mandates?", "desc": "For background on the number of states adopting ZEV mandates see the **parent question**: [How many states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14786/number-of-states-with-zev-mandates/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1, 2027 is **more than 14**, then the subquestion \"> 14\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1, 2027 is **less than or equal to 14**, then the subquestion \"≤ 14\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe number of states with enforceable mandates on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [number of states with ZEV mandates question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14786/number-of-states-with-zev-mandates/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "43.6", "median": "52.0", "upper_75": "58.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 58.6% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles, given the number of states adopting ZEV mandates?", "desc": "For background on the number of states adopting ZEV mandates see the **parent question**: [How many states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14786/number-of-states-with-zev-mandates/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1, 2027 is **more than 14**, then the subquestion \"> 14\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1, 2027 is **less than or equal to 14**, then the subquestion \"≤ 14\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe number of states with enforceable mandates on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [number of states with ZEV mandates question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14786/number-of-states-with-zev-mandates/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "43.6", "median": "52.0", "upper_75": "58.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on EV median range, what is the chance that 13.9% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles? (≤ 325)", "desc": "For background on EV median range see the **parent question**: [What will be the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric vehicles available for under 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) for the following model years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14782/median-range-of-evs-below-40k-msrp/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for model year 2027 is **more than 325**, then the subquestion \"> 325\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the median estimated range (in miles) of all-electric light vehicles available for sale with MSRP below 40 thousand dollars (in 2022 US dollars) in the United States for model year 2027 is **less than or equal to 325**, then the subquestion \"≤ 325\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe median estimated range (in miles) will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [EV median range question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14782/median-range-of-evs-below-40k-msrp/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "13.9", "median": "20.3", "upper_75": "26.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.44 share of lithium consumption in the United States in 2030 will be met by lithium that was recycled or repurposed in the United States?", "desc": "[Projections of increasing demand](https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions/executive-summary) for lithium have called into question what can be done to keep up with that demand and to keep prices down. One potential contributor to future lithium supplies could be from reuse and recycling. The [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA) [has projected](https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions/reliable-supply-of-minerals) that recycling and reuse will supply 0.4% of global demand of lithium in 2030 in its Sustainable Development Scenario.\n\n\"mineral\n*IEA, [Contribution of recycling and reuse of batteries to reducing primary supply requirement for selected minerals by Sustainable Development Scenario, 2030-2040](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/contribution-of-recycling-and-reuse-of-batteries-to-reducing-primary-supply-requirement-for-selected-minerals-by-sustainable-development-scenario-2030-2040), IEA, Paris. Licence: CC BY 4.0*\n\nAn [analysis by McKinsey](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/metals-and-mining/our-insights/lithium-mining-how-new-production-technologies-could-fuel-the-global-ev-revolution) has estimated that lithium reuse and recycling could account for approximately 6% of the global lithium supply in 2030, saying\n\n>A frequently asked question is whether L-ion batteries can be recycled. With expected battery lifetimes of around ten to 15 years for passenger vehicles, and the possibility of extending EV battery life through use in the energy-storage sector, battery recycling is expected to increase during the current decade, but not to game-changing levels. Depending on the recycling process employed, it is possible to recover between zero and 80 percent of the lithium contained in end-of-life batteries. By 2030, such secondary supply is expected to account for slightly more than 6 percent of total lithium production [. . .].\n\n\"McKinsey", "resc": "This question will resolve as the share of lithium consumption in 2030 in the United States met by lithium that was recycled or repurposed in the United States, according to estimates from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions). This will resolve using sources publicly available before January 1, 2033.\n\nWhere estimates differ Metaculus will use the estimate which in its judgement is best in accordance with the preferences listed below. A selected estimate need not meet these preferences if deemed the best available. Where estimates are broadly similar on satisfying these preferences but the estimates differ Metaculus may use their judgment to select the most credible estimate or use an average of several estimates.\n\n* The estimate accounts for both recycled lithium as well as repurposed lithium, in consistent units such as tons of lithium carbonate equivalent.\n* The estimate is for the overall US supply in 2030. Credible estimates published using a sample of data from 2030 may be used if overall information is not available.\n\nIf a sufficient credible estimate is not published before January 1, 2033 this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.44", "median": "3.84", "upper_75": "6.73", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 52.0 percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles, given the number of states adopting ZEV mandates?", "desc": "For background on the number of states adopting ZEV mandates see the **parent question**: [How many states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14786/number-of-states-with-zev-mandates/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1, 2027 is **more than 14**, then the subquestion \"> 14\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1, 2027 is **less than or equal to 14**, then the subquestion \"≤ 14\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe number of states with enforceable mandates on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [number of states with ZEV mandates question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14786/number-of-states-with-zev-mandates/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "43.6", "median": "52.0", "upper_75": "58.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 52.0 percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles, given the number of states adopting ZEV mandates?", "desc": "For background on the number of states adopting ZEV mandates see the **parent question**: [How many states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14786/number-of-states-with-zev-mandates/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1, 2027 is **more than 14**, then the subquestion \"> 14\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1, 2027 is **less than or equal to 14**, then the subquestion \"≤ 14\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe number of states with enforceable mandates on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [number of states with ZEV mandates question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14786/number-of-states-with-zev-mandates/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "43.6", "median": "52.0", "upper_75": "58.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 14.5 US states with \"right to charge\" regulations in 2025?", "desc": "[According to Plug In America](https://pluginamerica.org/policy/right-to-charge-policies-for-electric-vehicles/)\n\n>Homeowners in apartments, condominiums, and even single-family houses in developments are sometimes restricted by homeowners associations (HOAs) from installing EV chargers. Renters can have an even harder time accessing charging stations, since many leases and rental agreements prohibit material changes to property such as installing a charging station.\n\n\"Right to charge\" describes a class of policies aimed at reducing the barriers for renters and homeowners to install electric vehicle (EV) chargers.\n\nThe [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/about.html) (AFDC) is a program operated by the [US Department of Energy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Energy) to provide data and information about alternative fuels and vehicles, such as electric vehicles and other low-carbon transportation technology. The AFDC also [tracks federal and state laws and regulations](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws) pertaining to these vehicles. As of March 9, 2023 the AFDC's [regulations summary table](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/matrix?sort_by=reg) shows 10 states with at least one \"right to charge\" regulation.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US states with \"right to charge\" regulations according to the [laws and incentives summary provided by the Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/matrix?sort_by=reg) (AFDC) on July 1, 2025. No distinction will be made between the types or requirements within such regulations, only the number of states with one or more regulations as provided by AFDC will be counted. If Metaculus determines that AFDC is no longer tracking these regulations or has not updated in a timely manner Metaculus may use alternate credible sources or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf at the time of resolution more than 49 states have \"right to charge\" regulations or the US has a Federal \"right to charge\" regulation that applies to the states then this resolves as **\"Not ≤ 49\"**.", "lower_25": "14.5", "median": "17.3", "upper_75": "20.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 17.4 number of US states will have building code requirements related to electric vehicles in 2025?", "desc": "A report from the [International Code Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Building_Code) (ICC) titled [Electric Vehicles and Building Codes: A Strategy for Greenhouse Gas Reductions](https://www.iccsafe.org/wp-content/uploads/21-20604_COMM_EV_Strategy_RPT_v5.pdf) says the following:\n\n>The built environment will need to facilitate charging infrastructure that supports the increasing deployment of all classes (light-duty, medium-duty and heavy-duty) of EVs across the nation to meet GHG reduction targets. Buildings and building codes have been identified as important components in comprehensive, community-wide strategies to advance the deployment of EV charging infrastructure.\n>\n>EV infrastructure requirements in building codes support the transition towards EV ownership by increasing access to parking spaces with charging stations. Current EV charging provisions in some state and local building codes typically require new buildings and major renovations to include a mixture of parking spaces with installed EV charging infrastructure and some with the necessary electrical equipment to support the future installation of EV charging equipment as EV use continues to grow. Published studies show that the installation of EV electrical equipment into new buildings can decrease installation costs of charging stations by up to 75 percent compared to installation during a building retrofit.\n\nThe [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/about.html) (AFDC) is a program operated by the [US Department of Energy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Energy) to provide data and information about alternative fuels and vehicles, such as electric vehicles and other low-carbon transportation technology. The AFDC also [tracks federal and state laws and regulations](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws) pertaining to these vehicles. As of March 14, 2023 the AFDC's [federal and state laws and incentives search](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/search?keyword=&select_all_loc=all&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=US&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AL&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AK&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AZ&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AR&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=CA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=CO&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=CT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=DE&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=DC&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=FL&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=GA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=HI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=ID&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=IL&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=IN&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=IA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=KS&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=KY&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=LA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=ME&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MD&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MN&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MS&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MO&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NE&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NV&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NH&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NJ&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NM&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NY&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NC&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=ND&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=OH&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=OK&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=OR&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=PA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=RI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=SC&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=SD&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=TN&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=TX&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=UT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=VT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=VA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WV&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WY&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=ELEC&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=BUILD&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&select_all_user=y&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=FLEET&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=GOV&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=TRIBAL&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=IND&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=STATION&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=AFP&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=PURCH&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=MAN&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=MUD&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=TRANS&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=OTHER) shows 9 states with at least one EV building regulation.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles according to the [laws and incentives search provided by the Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/search?keyword=&select_all_loc=all&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=US&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AL&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AK&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AZ&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AR&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=CA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=CO&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=CT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=DE&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=DC&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=FL&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=GA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=HI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=ID&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=IL&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=IN&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=IA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=KS&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=KY&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=LA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=ME&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MD&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MN&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MS&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MO&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NE&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NV&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NH&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NJ&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NM&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NY&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NC&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=ND&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=OH&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=OK&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=OR&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=PA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=RI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=SC&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=SD&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=TN&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=TX&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=UT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=VT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=VA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WV&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WY&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=ELEC&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=BUILD&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&select_all_user=y&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=FLEET&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=GOV&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=TRIBAL&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=IND&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=STATION&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=AFP&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=PURCH&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=MAN&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=MUD&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=TRANS&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=OTHER) (AFDC) on July 1, 2025. The search will be conducted by selecting \"All\" jurisdictions, \"EVs\" for the technology/fuel filter, \"Building Codes\" for the regulation selector, and \"All\" for the user selection. No distinction will be made between the types or requirements within such regulations, only the number of states with one or more regulations as provided by AFDC will be counted. If Metaculus determines that AFDC is no longer tracking these regulations or has not updated in a timely manner Metaculus may use alternate credible sources or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf at the time of resolution more than 49 states have building code regulations related to electric vehicles or the US has a Federal building code regulation related to electric vehicles that applies to the states, then this resolves as **\"Not ≤ 49\"**.", "lower_25": "11.8", "median": "14.5", "upper_75": "17.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 17.4 number of US states will have building code requirements related to electric vehicles in 2025?", "desc": "A report from the [International Code Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Building_Code) (ICC) titled [Electric Vehicles and Building Codes: A Strategy for Greenhouse Gas Reductions](https://www.iccsafe.org/wp-content/uploads/21-20604_COMM_EV_Strategy_RPT_v5.pdf) says the following:\n\n>The built environment will need to facilitate charging infrastructure that supports the increasing deployment of all classes (light-duty, medium-duty and heavy-duty) of EVs across the nation to meet GHG reduction targets. Buildings and building codes have been identified as important components in comprehensive, community-wide strategies to advance the deployment of EV charging infrastructure.\n>\n>EV infrastructure requirements in building codes support the transition towards EV ownership by increasing access to parking spaces with charging stations. Current EV charging provisions in some state and local building codes typically require new buildings and major renovations to include a mixture of parking spaces with installed EV charging infrastructure and some with the necessary electrical equipment to support the future installation of EV charging equipment as EV use continues to grow. Published studies show that the installation of EV electrical equipment into new buildings can decrease installation costs of charging stations by up to 75 percent compared to installation during a building retrofit.\n\nThe [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/about.html) (AFDC) is a program operated by the [US Department of Energy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Energy) to provide data and information about alternative fuels and vehicles, such as electric vehicles and other low-carbon transportation technology. The AFDC also [tracks federal and state laws and regulations](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws) pertaining to these vehicles. As of March 14, 2023 the AFDC's [federal and state laws and incentives search](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/search?keyword=&select_all_loc=all&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=US&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AL&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AK&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AZ&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AR&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=CA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=CO&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=CT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=DE&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=DC&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=FL&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=GA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=HI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=ID&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=IL&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=IN&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=IA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=KS&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=KY&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=LA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=ME&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MD&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MN&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MS&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MO&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NE&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NV&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NH&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NJ&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NM&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NY&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NC&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=ND&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=OH&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=OK&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=OR&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=PA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=RI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=SC&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=SD&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=TN&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=TX&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=UT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=VT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=VA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WV&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WY&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=ELEC&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=BUILD&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&select_all_user=y&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=FLEET&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=GOV&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=TRIBAL&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=IND&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=STATION&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=AFP&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=PURCH&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=MAN&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=MUD&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=TRANS&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=OTHER) shows 9 states with at least one EV building regulation.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles according to the [laws and incentives search provided by the Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/search?keyword=&select_all_loc=all&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=US&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AL&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AK&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AZ&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AR&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=CA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=CO&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=CT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=DE&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=DC&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=FL&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=GA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=HI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=ID&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=IL&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=IN&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=IA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=KS&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=KY&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=LA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=ME&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MD&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MN&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MS&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MO&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NE&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NV&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NH&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NJ&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NM&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NY&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NC&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=ND&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=OH&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=OK&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=OR&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=PA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=RI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=SC&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=SD&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=TN&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=TX&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=UT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=VT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=VA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WV&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WY&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=ELEC&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=BUILD&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&select_all_user=y&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=FLEET&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=GOV&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=TRIBAL&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=IND&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=STATION&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=AFP&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=PURCH&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=MAN&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=MUD&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=TRANS&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=OTHER) (AFDC) on July 1, 2025. The search will be conducted by selecting \"All\" jurisdictions, \"EVs\" for the technology/fuel filter, \"Building Codes\" for the regulation selector, and \"All\" for the user selection. No distinction will be made between the types or requirements within such regulations, only the number of states with one or more regulations as provided by AFDC will be counted. If Metaculus determines that AFDC is no longer tracking these regulations or has not updated in a timely manner Metaculus may use alternate credible sources or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf at the time of resolution more than 49 states have building code regulations related to electric vehicles or the US has a Federal building code regulation related to electric vehicles that applies to the states, then this resolves as **\"Not ≤ 49\"**.", "lower_25": "11.8", "median": "14.5", "upper_75": "17.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the number of states adopting ZEV mandates, what is the chance that 34.9% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles? (≤ 14)", "desc": "For background on the number of states adopting ZEV mandates see the **parent question**: [How many states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14786/number-of-states-with-zev-mandates/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1, 2027 is **more than 14**, then the subquestion \"> 14\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1, 2027 is **less than or equal to 14**, then the subquestion \"≤ 14\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe number of states with enforceable mandates on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [number of states with ZEV mandates question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14786/number-of-states-with-zev-mandates/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "21.6", "median": "28.2", "upper_75": "34.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 14.5 US states with \"right to charge\" regulations in 2025?", "desc": "[According to Plug In America](https://pluginamerica.org/policy/right-to-charge-policies-for-electric-vehicles/)\n\n>Homeowners in apartments, condominiums, and even single-family houses in developments are sometimes restricted by homeowners associations (HOAs) from installing EV chargers. Renters can have an even harder time accessing charging stations, since many leases and rental agreements prohibit material changes to property such as installing a charging station.\n\n\"Right to charge\" describes a class of policies aimed at reducing the barriers for renters and homeowners to install electric vehicle (EV) chargers.\n\nThe [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/about.html) (AFDC) is a program operated by the [US Department of Energy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Energy) to provide data and information about alternative fuels and vehicles, such as electric vehicles and other low-carbon transportation technology. The AFDC also [tracks federal and state laws and regulations](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws) pertaining to these vehicles. As of March 9, 2023 the AFDC's [regulations summary table](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/matrix?sort_by=reg) shows 10 states with at least one \"right to charge\" regulation.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US states with \"right to charge\" regulations according to the [laws and incentives summary provided by the Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/matrix?sort_by=reg) (AFDC) on July 1, 2025. No distinction will be made between the types or requirements within such regulations, only the number of states with one or more regulations as provided by AFDC will be counted. If Metaculus determines that AFDC is no longer tracking these regulations or has not updated in a timely manner Metaculus may use alternate credible sources or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf at the time of resolution more than 49 states have \"right to charge\" regulations or the US has a Federal \"right to charge\" regulation that applies to the states then this resolves as **\"Not �� 49\"**.", "lower_25": "14.5", "median": "17.3", "upper_75": "20.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What will be the share of lithium processed in China in 2030?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that China will process 59.6% of lithium in 2030?", "desc": "The demand for [lithium-ion batteries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium-ion_battery) is projected to grow substantially as electric cars [gain in popularity](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates). As a core component of lithium-ion batteries, the demand for lithium is a key uncertainty expected to impact the price and adoption of electric cars.\n\n\"minerals\n*IEA, [Minerals used in electric cars compared to conventional cars](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/minerals-used-in-electric-cars-compared-to-conventional-cars), IEA, Paris. Licence: CC BY 4.0*\n\nLithium is typically extracted in the form of brines or ores. Australia extracts the most lithium with 52% of the global share in 2019 according to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA), followed by Chile at 22% and China at 13%. Australia's lithium is mined in the form of an ore known as [spodumene](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spodumene) which is [approximately 8% lithium](https://www.sgs.com/-/media/sgscorp/documents/corporate/brochures/sgs-min-wa109-hard-rock-lithium-processing-en.cdn.en.pdf). Chile primarily [produces its lithium from brines](https://www.mining-technology.com/features/australia-lithium-production/#:~:text=Sources%20and%20spodumene,60%25%20of%20the%20world's%20lithium.).\n\n\"mineral\n*IEA, [Share of top producing countries in extraction of selected minerals and fossil fuels, 2019](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/share-of-top-producing-countries-in-extraction-of-selected-minerals-and-fossil-fuels-2019), IEA, Paris. Licence: CC BY 4.0*\n\nThe lithium processing industry is even more concentrated, with an [estimated 58%](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/share-of-top-producing-countries-in-total-processing-of-selected-minerals-and-fossil-fuels-2019) of extracted lithium being processed in China in 2019. During processing the lithium is often turned into [lithium carbonate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium_carbonate) or [lithium hydroxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium_hydroxide) both common components of lithium-ion batteries.\n\n\"mineral\n*IEA, [Share of top producing countries in total processing of selected minerals and fossil fuels, 2019](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/share-of-top-producing-countries-in-total-processing-of-selected-minerals-and-fossil-fuels-2019), IEA, Paris. Licence: CC BY 4.0*\n\nDemand for lithium is projected to grow, with the [IEA projecting](https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions/executive-summary) that clean energy technology would account for 92% of global lithium demand in its 2040 Sustainable Development Scenario, up from an estimated 29% in 2020. [An analysis from McKinsey](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/metals-and-mining/our-insights/lithium-mining-how-new-production-technologies-could-fuel-the-global-ev-revolution) suggests there could be a lithium supply gap in 2030, especially if demand is on the higher end of projections.\n\n\"McKinsey\n\nThe United States has free trade agreements [with both Australia and Chile](https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/industry-manufacturing/industrial-tariffs/free-trade-agreements), but [trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China%E2%80%93United_States_trade_war) and general relations with China have often been considered to be [deteriorating](https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/28/politics/us-china-relations-ukraine-covid/index.html). The amount of lithium processing done in China in the future therefore may have implications for perceptions of supply-chain resiliency and US domestic lithium supply.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the share of total lithium production processed in China in the year 2030 according to estimates from the International Energy Agency (IEA) or similar [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions). The estimate should be based on the share by country where lithium was processed, not where lithium was extracted. If it's not clear what time period the estimate was produced for or if there is no estimate available based on 2030 data then estimates which were first published in 2030, 2031, or 2032 may be used, so long as the estimate is based on data from the years 2029, 2030, or 2031.\n\nWhere estimates differ Metaculus will use the estimate which in its judgement is best in accordance with the criteria above. Where estimates are broadly similar on satisfying these criteria but the estimates differ Metaculus may use their judgment to select the most credible estimate or use an average of several estimates.\n\nIf a sufficient credible estimate is not publicly available before January 1, 2033, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "51.1", "median": "59.6", "upper_75": "67.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 14.5 US states with \"right to charge\" regulations in 2025?", "desc": "[According to Plug In America](https://pluginamerica.org/policy/right-to-charge-policies-for-electric-vehicles/)\n\n>Homeowners in apartments, condominiums, and even single-family houses in developments are sometimes restricted by homeowners associations (HOAs) from installing EV chargers. Renters can have an even harder time accessing charging stations, since many leases and rental agreements prohibit material changes to property such as installing a charging station.\n\n\"Right to charge\" describes a class of policies aimed at reducing the barriers for renters and homeowners to install electric vehicle (EV) chargers.\n\nThe [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/about.html) (AFDC) is a program operated by the [US Department of Energy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Energy) to provide data and information about alternative fuels and vehicles, such as electric vehicles and other low-carbon transportation technology. The AFDC also [tracks federal and state laws and regulations](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws) pertaining to these vehicles. As of March 9, 2023 the AFDC's [regulations summary table](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/matrix?sort_by=reg) shows 10 states with at least one \"right to charge\" regulation.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US states with \"right to charge\" regulations according to the [laws and incentives summary provided by the Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/matrix?sort_by=reg) (AFDC) on July 1, 2025. No distinction will be made between the types or requirements within such regulations, only the number of states with one or more regulations as provided by AFDC will be counted. If Metaculus determines that AFDC is no longer tracking these regulations or has not updated in a timely manner Metaculus may use alternate credible sources or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf at the time of resolution more than 49 states have \"right to charge\" regulations or the US has a Federal \"right to charge\" regulation that applies to the states then this resolves as **\"Not ≤ 49\"**.", "lower_25": "14.5", "median": "17.3", "upper_75": "20.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What will be the share of lithium processed in China in 2030?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that China will process 59.6% of lithium in 2030?", "desc": "The demand for [lithium-ion batteries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium-ion_battery) is projected to grow substantially as electric cars [gain in popularity](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates). As a core component of lithium-ion batteries, the demand for lithium is a key uncertainty expected to impact the price and adoption of electric cars.\n\n\"minerals\n*IEA, [Minerals used in electric cars compared to conventional cars](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/minerals-used-in-electric-cars-compared-to-conventional-cars), IEA, Paris. Licence: CC BY 4.0*\n\nLithium is typically extracted in the form of brines or ores. Australia extracts the most lithium with 52% of the global share in 2019 according to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA), followed by Chile at 22% and China at 13%. Australia's lithium is mined in the form of an ore known as [spodumene](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spodumene) which is [approximately 8% lithium](https://www.sgs.com/-/media/sgscorp/documents/corporate/brochures/sgs-min-wa109-hard-rock-lithium-processing-en.cdn.en.pdf). Chile primarily [produces its lithium from brines](https://www.mining-technology.com/features/australia-lithium-production/#:~:text=Sources%20and%20spodumene,60%25%20of%20the%20world's%20lithium.).\n\n\"mineral\n*IEA, [Share of top producing countries in extraction of selected minerals and fossil fuels, 2019](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/share-of-top-producing-countries-in-extraction-of-selected-minerals-and-fossil-fuels-2019), IEA, Paris. Licence: CC BY 4.0*\n\nThe lithium processing industry is even more concentrated, with an [estimated 58%](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/share-of-top-producing-countries-in-total-processing-of-selected-minerals-and-fossil-fuels-2019) of extracted lithium being processed in China in 2019. During processing the lithium is often turned into [lithium carbonate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium_carbonate) or [lithium hydroxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium_hydroxide) both common components of lithium-ion batteries.\n\n\"mineral\n*IEA, [Share of top producing countries in total processing of selected minerals and fossil fuels, 2019](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/share-of-top-producing-countries-in-total-processing-of-selected-minerals-and-fossil-fuels-2019), IEA, Paris. Licence: CC BY 4.0*\n\nDemand for lithium is projected to grow, with the [IEA projecting](https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions/executive-summary) that clean energy technology would account for 92% of global lithium demand in its 2040 Sustainable Development Scenario, up from an estimated 29% in 2020. [An analysis from McKinsey](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/metals-and-mining/our-insights/lithium-mining-how-new-production-technologies-could-fuel-the-global-ev-revolution) suggests there could be a lithium supply gap in 2030, especially if demand is on the higher end of projections.\n\n\"McKinsey\n\nThe United States has free trade agreements [with both Australia and Chile](https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/industry-manufacturing/industrial-tariffs/free-trade-agreements), but [trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China%E2%80%93United_States_trade_war) and general relations with China have often been considered to be [deteriorating](https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/28/politics/us-china-relations-ukraine-covid/index.html). The amount of lithium processing done in China in the future therefore may have implications for perceptions of supply-chain resiliency and US domestic lithium supply.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the share of total lithium production processed in China in the year 2030 according to estimates from the International Energy Agency (IEA) or similar [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions). The estimate should be based on the share by country where lithium was processed, not where lithium was extracted. If it's not clear what time period the estimate was produced for or if there is no estimate available based on 2030 data then estimates which were first published in 2030, 2031, or 2032 may be used, so long as the estimate is based on data from the years 2029, 2030, or 2031.\n\nWhere estimates differ Metaculus will use the estimate which in its judgement is best in accordance with the criteria above. Where estimates are broadly similar on satisfying these criteria but the estimates differ Metaculus may use their judgment to select the most credible estimate or use an average of several estimates.\n\nIf a sufficient credible estimate is not publicly available before January 1, 2033, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "51.1", "median": "59.6", "upper_75": "67.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 58.6% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles, given the number of states adopting ZEV mandates?", "desc": "For background on the number of states adopting ZEV mandates see the **parent question**: [How many states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14786/number-of-states-with-zev-mandates/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1, 2027 is **more than 14**, then the subquestion \"> 14\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1, 2027 is **less than or equal to 14**, then the subquestion \"≤ 14\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe number of states with enforceable mandates on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [number of states with ZEV mandates question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14786/number-of-states-with-zev-mandates/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "43.6", "median": "52.0", "upper_75": "58.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What will be the share of lithium processed in China in 2030?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that China will process 59.6% of lithium in 2030?", "desc": "The demand for [lithium-ion batteries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium-ion_battery) is projected to grow substantially as electric cars [gain in popularity](https://www.anl.gov/esia/light-duty-electric-drive-vehicles-monthly-sales-updates). As a core component of lithium-ion batteries, the demand for lithium is a key uncertainty expected to impact the price and adoption of electric cars.\n\n\"minerals\n*IEA, [Minerals used in electric cars compared to conventional cars](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/minerals-used-in-electric-cars-compared-to-conventional-cars), IEA, Paris. Licence: CC BY 4.0*\n\nLithium is typically extracted in the form of brines or ores. Australia extracts the most lithium with 52% of the global share in 2019 according to the [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA), followed by Chile at 22% and China at 13%. Australia's lithium is mined in the form of an ore known as [spodumene](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spodumene) which is [approximately 8% lithium](https://www.sgs.com/-/media/sgscorp/documents/corporate/brochures/sgs-min-wa109-hard-rock-lithium-processing-en.cdn.en.pdf). Chile primarily [produces its lithium from brines](https://www.mining-technology.com/features/australia-lithium-production/#:~:text=Sources%20and%20spodumene,60%25%20of%20the%20world's%20lithium.).\n\n\"mineral\n*IEA, [Share of top producing countries in extraction of selected minerals and fossil fuels, 2019](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/share-of-top-producing-countries-in-extraction-of-selected-minerals-and-fossil-fuels-2019), IEA, Paris. Licence: CC BY 4.0*\n\nThe lithium processing industry is even more concentrated, with an [estimated 58%](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/share-of-top-producing-countries-in-total-processing-of-selected-minerals-and-fossil-fuels-2019) of extracted lithium being processed in China in 2019. During processing the lithium is often turned into [lithium carbonate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium_carbonate) or [lithium hydroxide](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium_hydroxide) both common components of lithium-ion batteries.\n\n\"mineral\n*IEA, [Share of top producing countries in total processing of selected minerals and fossil fuels, 2019](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/share-of-top-producing-countries-in-total-processing-of-selected-minerals-and-fossil-fuels-2019), IEA, Paris. Licence: CC BY 4.0*\n\nDemand for lithium is projected to grow, with the [IEA projecting](https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions/executive-summary) that clean energy technology would account for 92% of global lithium demand in its 2040 Sustainable Development Scenario, up from an estimated 29% in 2020. [An analysis from McKinsey](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/metals-and-mining/our-insights/lithium-mining-how-new-production-technologies-could-fuel-the-global-ev-revolution) suggests there could be a lithium supply gap in 2030, especially if demand is on the higher end of projections.\n\n\"McKinsey\n\nThe United States has free trade agreements [with both Australia and Chile](https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/industry-manufacturing/industrial-tariffs/free-trade-agreements), but [trade](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China%E2%80%93United_States_trade_war) and general relations with China have often been considered to be [deteriorating](https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/28/politics/us-china-relations-ukraine-covid/index.html). The amount of lithium processing done in China in the future therefore may have implications for perceptions of supply-chain resiliency and US domestic lithium supply.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the share of total lithium production processed in China in the year 2030 according to estimates from the International Energy Agency (IEA) or similar [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions). The estimate should be based on the share by country where lithium was processed, not where lithium was extracted. If it's not clear what time period the estimate was produced for or if there is no estimate available based on 2030 data then estimates which were first published in 2030, 2031, or 2032 may be used, so long as the estimate is based on data from the years 2029, 2030, or 2031.\n\nWhere estimates differ Metaculus will use the estimate which in its judgement is best in accordance with the criteria above. Where estimates are broadly similar on satisfying these criteria but the estimates differ Metaculus may use their judgment to select the most credible estimate or use an average of several estimates.\n\nIf a sufficient credible estimate is not publicly available before January 1, 2033, this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "51.1", "median": "59.6", "upper_75": "67.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the number of public charging stations, what is the chance that 34.5% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles? (≤ 185k)", "desc": "For background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **parent question**: [How many level 2 or greater public charging stations will be available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 is **more than 185,000**, then the subquestion \"> 185k\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 is **less than or equal to 185,000**, then the subquestion \"≤ 185k\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "25.3", "median": "34.5", "upper_75": "43.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 17.4 number of US states will have building code requirements related to electric vehicles in 2025?", "desc": "A report from the [International Code Council](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Building_Code) (ICC) titled [Electric Vehicles and Building Codes: A Strategy for Greenhouse Gas Reductions](https://www.iccsafe.org/wp-content/uploads/21-20604_COMM_EV_Strategy_RPT_v5.pdf) says the following:\n\n>The built environment will need to facilitate charging infrastructure that supports the increasing deployment of all classes (light-duty, medium-duty and heavy-duty) of EVs across the nation to meet GHG reduction targets. Buildings and building codes have been identified as important components in comprehensive, community-wide strategies to advance the deployment of EV charging infrastructure.\n>\n>EV infrastructure requirements in building codes support the transition towards EV ownership by increasing access to parking spaces with charging stations. Current EV charging provisions in some state and local building codes typically require new buildings and major renovations to include a mixture of parking spaces with installed EV charging infrastructure and some with the necessary electrical equipment to support the future installation of EV charging equipment as EV use continues to grow. Published studies show that the installation of EV electrical equipment into new buildings can decrease installation costs of charging stations by up to 75 percent compared to installation during a building retrofit.\n\nThe [Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/about.html) (AFDC) is a program operated by the [US Department of Energy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Energy) to provide data and information about alternative fuels and vehicles, such as electric vehicles and other low-carbon transportation technology. The AFDC also [tracks federal and state laws and regulations](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws) pertaining to these vehicles. As of March 14, 2023 the AFDC's [federal and state laws and incentives search](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/search?keyword=&select_all_loc=all&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=US&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AL&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AK&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AZ&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AR&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=CA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=CO&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=CT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=DE&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=DC&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=FL&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=GA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=HI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=ID&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=IL&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=IN&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=IA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=KS&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=KY&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=LA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=ME&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MD&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MN&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MS&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MO&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NE&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NV&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NH&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NJ&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NM&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NY&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NC&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=ND&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=OH&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=OK&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=OR&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=PA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=RI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=SC&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=SD&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=TN&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=TX&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=UT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=VT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=VA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WV&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WY&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=ELEC&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=BUILD&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&select_all_user=y&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=FLEET&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=GOV&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=TRIBAL&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=IND&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=STATION&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=AFP&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=PURCH&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=MAN&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=MUD&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=TRANS&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=OTHER) shows 9 states with at least one EV building regulation.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles according to the [laws and incentives search provided by the Alternative Fuels Data Center](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/search?keyword=&select_all_loc=all&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=US&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AL&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AK&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AZ&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=AR&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=CA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=CO&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=CT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=DE&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=DC&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=FL&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=GA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=HI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=ID&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=IL&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=IN&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=IA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=KS&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=KY&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=LA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=ME&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MD&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MN&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MS&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MO&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=MT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NE&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NV&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NH&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NJ&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NM&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NY&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=NC&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=ND&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=OH&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=OK&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=OR&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=PA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=RI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=SC&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=SD&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=TN&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=TX&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=UT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=VT&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=VA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WA&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WV&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WI&loc%5B%5D=0&loc%5B%5D=WY&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=ELEC&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&tech%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=BUILD&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bincentive%5D%5B%5D=0&ir%5Bregulation%5D%5B%5D=0&select_all_user=y&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=FLEET&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=GOV&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=TRIBAL&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=IND&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=STATION&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=AFP&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=PURCH&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=MAN&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=MUD&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=TRANS&user%5B%5D=0&user%5B%5D=OTHER) (AFDC) on July 1, 2025. The search will be conducted by selecting \"All\" jurisdictions, \"EVs\" for the technology/fuel filter, \"Building Codes\" for the regulation selector, and \"All\" for the user selection. No distinction will be made between the types or requirements within such regulations, only the number of states with one or more regulations as provided by AFDC will be counted. If Metaculus determines that AFDC is no longer tracking these regulations or has not updated in a timely manner Metaculus may use alternate credible sources or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf at the time of resolution more than 49 states have building code regulations related to electric vehicles or the US has a Federal building code regulation related to electric vehicles that applies to the states, then this resolves as **\"Not ≤ 49\"**.", "lower_25": "11.8", "median": "14.5", "upper_75": "17.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the number of public charging stations, what is the chance that 34.5% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles? (≤ 185k)", "desc": "For background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **parent question**: [How many level 2 or greater public charging stations will be available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 is **more than 185,000**, then the subquestion \"> 185k\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 is **less than or equal to 185,000**, then the subquestion \"≤ 185k\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "25.3", "median": "34.5", "upper_75": "43.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.44 share of lithium consumption in the United States in 2030 will be met by lithium that was recycled or repurposed in the United States?", "desc": "[Projections of increasing demand](https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions/executive-summary) for lithium have called into question what can be done to keep up with that demand and to keep prices down. One potential contributor to future lithium supplies could be from reuse and recycling. The [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA) [has projected](https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions/reliable-supply-of-minerals) that recycling and reuse will supply 0.4% of global demand of lithium in 2030 in its Sustainable Development Scenario.\n\n\"mineral\n*IEA, [Contribution of recycling and reuse of batteries to reducing primary supply requirement for selected minerals by Sustainable Development Scenario, 2030-2040](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/contribution-of-recycling-and-reuse-of-batteries-to-reducing-primary-supply-requirement-for-selected-minerals-by-sustainable-development-scenario-2030-2040), IEA, Paris. Licence: CC BY 4.0*\n\nAn [analysis by McKinsey](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/metals-and-mining/our-insights/lithium-mining-how-new-production-technologies-could-fuel-the-global-ev-revolution) has estimated that lithium reuse and recycling could account for approximately 6% of the global lithium supply in 2030, saying\n\n>A frequently asked question is whether L-ion batteries can be recycled. With expected battery lifetimes of around ten to 15 years for passenger vehicles, and the possibility of extending EV battery life through use in the energy-storage sector, battery recycling is expected to increase during the current decade, but not to game-changing levels. Depending on the recycling process employed, it is possible to recover between zero and 80 percent of the lithium contained in end-of-life batteries. By 2030, such secondary supply is expected to account for slightly more than 6 percent of total lithium production [. . .].\n\n\"McKinsey", "resc": "This question will resolve as the share of lithium consumption in 2030 in the United States met by lithium that was recycled or repurposed in the United States, according to estimates from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions). This will resolve using sources publicly available before January 1, 2033.\n\nWhere estimates differ Metaculus will use the estimate which in its judgement is best in accordance with the preferences listed below. A selected estimate need not meet these preferences if deemed the best available. Where estimates are broadly similar on satisfying these preferences but the estimates differ Metaculus may use their judgment to select the most credible estimate or use an average of several estimates.\n\n* The estimate accounts for both recycled lithium as well as repurposed lithium, in consistent units such as tons of lithium carbonate equivalent.\n* The estimate is for the overall US supply in 2030. Credible estimates published using a sample of data from 2030 may be used if overall information is not available.\n\nIf a sufficient credible estimate is not published before January 1, 2033 this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.44", "median": "3.84", "upper_75": "6.73", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US eliminating EV sourcing requirements, what is the chance that 38.5% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be ZEVs?", "desc": "For background on the US sourcing requirements see the **parent question**: [Will the US eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement for electric vehicle tax credit eligibility before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Eliminated\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Not eliminated\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "25.8", "median": "32.1", "upper_75": "38.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.44 share of lithium consumption in the United States in 2030 will be met by lithium that was recycled or repurposed in the United States?", "desc": "[Projections of increasing demand](https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions/executive-summary) for lithium have called into question what can be done to keep up with that demand and to keep prices down. One potential contributor to future lithium supplies could be from reuse and recycling. The [International Energy Agency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Energy_Agency) (IEA) [has projected](https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions/reliable-supply-of-minerals) that recycling and reuse will supply 0.4% of global demand of lithium in 2030 in its Sustainable Development Scenario.\n\n\"mineral\n*IEA, [Contribution of recycling and reuse of batteries to reducing primary supply requirement for selected minerals by Sustainable Development Scenario, 2030-2040](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/contribution-of-recycling-and-reuse-of-batteries-to-reducing-primary-supply-requirement-for-selected-minerals-by-sustainable-development-scenario-2030-2040), IEA, Paris. Licence: CC BY 4.0*\n\nAn [analysis by McKinsey](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/metals-and-mining/our-insights/lithium-mining-how-new-production-technologies-could-fuel-the-global-ev-revolution) has estimated that lithium reuse and recycling could account for approximately 6% of the global lithium supply in 2030, saying\n\n>A frequently asked question is whether L-ion batteries can be recycled. With expected battery lifetimes of around ten to 15 years for passenger vehicles, and the possibility of extending EV battery life through use in the energy-storage sector, battery recycling is expected to increase during the current decade, but not to game-changing levels. Depending on the recycling process employed, it is possible to recover between zero and 80 percent of the lithium contained in end-of-life batteries. By 2030, such secondary supply is expected to account for slightly more than 6 percent of total lithium production [. . .].\n\n\"McKinsey", "resc": "This question will resolve as the share of lithium consumption in 2030 in the United States met by lithium that was recycled or repurposed in the United States, according to estimates from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions). This will resolve using sources publicly available before January 1, 2033.\n\nWhere estimates differ Metaculus will use the estimate which in its judgement is best in accordance with the preferences listed below. A selected estimate need not meet these preferences if deemed the best available. Where estimates are broadly similar on satisfying these preferences but the estimates differ Metaculus may use their judgment to select the most credible estimate or use an average of several estimates.\n\n* The estimate accounts for both recycled lithium as well as repurposed lithium, in consistent units such as tons of lithium carbonate equivalent.\n* The estimate is for the overall US supply in 2030. Credible estimates published using a sample of data from 2030 may be used if overall information is not available.\n\nIf a sufficient credible estimate is not published before January 1, 2033 this question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.44", "median": "3.84", "upper_75": "6.73", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US eliminating EV sourcing requirements, what is the chance that 38.5% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be ZEVs?", "desc": "For background on the US sourcing requirements see the **parent question**: [Will the US eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement for electric vehicle tax credit eligibility before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Eliminated\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Not eliminated\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "25.8", "median": "32.1", "upper_75": "38.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 52.0 percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles, given the number of states adopting ZEV mandates?", "desc": "For background on the number of states adopting ZEV mandates see the **parent question**: [How many states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14786/number-of-states-with-zev-mandates/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1, 2027 is **more than 14**, then the subquestion \"> 14\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1, 2027 is **less than or equal to 14**, then the subquestion \"≤ 14\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe number of states with enforceable mandates on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [number of states with ZEV mandates question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14786/number-of-states-with-zev-mandates/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "43.6", "median": "52.0", "upper_75": "58.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US eliminating EV sourcing requirements, what is the chance that 38.5% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be ZEVs?", "desc": "For background on the US sourcing requirements see the **parent question**: [Will the US eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement for electric vehicle tax credit eligibility before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Eliminated\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Not eliminated\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "25.8", "median": "32.1", "upper_75": "38.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the number of states adopting ZEV mandates, what is the chance that 34.9% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be zero-emission vehicles? (≤ 14)", "desc": "For background on the number of states adopting ZEV mandates see the **parent question**: [How many states will have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as Advanced Clean Cars II on January 1 of the following years?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14786/number-of-states-with-zev-mandates/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1, 2027 is **more than 14**, then the subquestion \"> 14\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the number of states, including California, which have legally enforceable rules that are at least as stringent as California's proposed Advanced Clean Cars II as of January 1, 2027 is **less than or equal to 14**, then the subquestion \"≤ 14\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe number of states with enforceable mandates on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [number of states with ZEV mandates question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14786/number-of-states-with-zev-mandates/). US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "21.6", "median": "28.2", "upper_75": "34.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US eliminating EV sourcing requirements, what is the chance that 25.8% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be ZEVs? (Not eliminated)", "desc": "For background on the US sourcing requirements see the **parent question**: [Will the US eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement for electric vehicle tax credit eligibility before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Eliminated\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Not eliminated\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "25.8", "median": "32.1", "upper_75": "38.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US implementing NEPA reform, what is the chance that the energy transition metal index for December of 2027 will be 75% higher than the index for December 2020?", "desc": "For background on NEPA reform see the **parent question**: [Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/)\n\nFor background on the energy transition metals index see the **child question**: [What will be the percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Law passed\" will resolve as the change in the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Law not passed\" will resolve as the change in the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe change in the energy transition metal index in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [energy transition metals index question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)", "lower_25": "293", "median": "381", "upper_75": "469", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 47.0% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be ZEVs, given that the US eliminates EV sourcing requirements?", "desc": "For background on the US sourcing requirements see the **parent question**: [Will the US eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement for electric vehicle tax credit eligibility before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Eliminated\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Not eliminated\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "41.0", "median": "47.0", "upper_75": "53.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US eliminating EV sourcing requirements, what is the chance that 25.8% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be ZEVs? (Not eliminated)", "desc": "For background on the US sourcing requirements see the **parent question**: [Will the US eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement for electric vehicle tax credit eligibility before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Eliminated\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Not eliminated\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "25.8", "median": "32.1", "upper_75": "38.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 47.0% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be ZEVs, given that the US eliminates EV sourcing requirements?", "desc": "For background on the US sourcing requirements see the **parent question**: [Will the US eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement for electric vehicle tax credit eligibility before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Eliminated\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Not eliminated\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "41.0", "median": "47.0", "upper_75": "53.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US eliminating EV sourcing requirements, what is the chance that 25.8% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be ZEVs? (Not eliminated)", "desc": "For background on the US sourcing requirements see the **parent question**: [Will the US eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement for electric vehicle tax credit eligibility before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Eliminated\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Not eliminated\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "25.8", "median": "32.1", "upper_75": "38.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US implementing NEPA reform, what is the chance that the energy transition metal index for December of 2027 will be 469% higher than the index for December 2020? (Law not passed)", "desc": "For background on NEPA reform see the **parent question**: [Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/)\n\nFor background on the energy transition metals index see the **child question**: [What will be the percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Law passed\" will resolve as the change in the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Law not passed\" will resolve as the change in the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe change in the energy transition metal index in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [energy transition metals index question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)", "lower_25": "293", "median": "381", "upper_75": "469", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 47.0% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be ZEVs, given that the US eliminates EV sourcing requirements?", "desc": "For background on the US sourcing requirements see the **parent question**: [Will the US eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement for electric vehicle tax credit eligibility before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Eliminated\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** eliminate or delay the critical mineral and battery component requirement before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15495/us-removes-source-requirements-for-ev-credit/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Not eliminated\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "41.0", "median": "47.0", "upper_75": "53.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US implementing NEPA reform, what is the chance that the energy transition metal index for December of 2027 will be 75% higher than the index for December 2020?", "desc": "For background on NEPA reform see the **parent question**: [Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/)\n\nFor background on the energy transition metals index see the **child question**: [What will be the percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Law passed\" will resolve as the change in the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Law not passed\" will resolve as the change in the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe change in the energy transition metal index in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [energy transition metals index question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)", "lower_25": "293", "median": "381", "upper_75": "469", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 822.2k registrations for the FY2024 H1B cap lottery?", "desc": "The H1B visa program in the United States allows employers to temporarily employ foreign workers in specialty occupations. There is an annual cap of 65,000 visas for regular applicants and an additional 20,000 visas reserved for those with a master's degree or higher from a U.S. institution. When the number of registrations exceeds the annual cap, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) conducts a lottery to select the recipients of these visas. The number of registrations for the H1B cap lottery can vary each year based on factors such as demand for foreign workers, changes in immigration policies, and economic conditions.", "resc": "This question will resolve based on the total number of registrations received for the FY2024 H1B cap lottery, as reported by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) or credible media sources. The resolution should be a single integer value, representing the total number of registrations.\nThe question will close on the last day of the registration period for the FY2024 H1B cap lottery, and will resolve when official or credible sources report the total number of registrations. If no such information is made available by the end of the FY2024 fiscal year (September 30, 2024), the question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "784.1k", "median": "797.2k", "upper_75": "822.2k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US implementing NEPA reform, what is the chance that the energy transition metal index for December of 2027 will be 75% higher than the index for December 2020?", "desc": "For background on NEPA reform see the **parent question**: [Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/)\n\nFor background on the energy transition metals index see the **child question**: [What will be the percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Law passed\" will resolve as the change in the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Law not passed\" will resolve as the change in the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe change in the energy transition metal index in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [energy transition metals index question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)", "lower_25": "293", "median": "381", "upper_75": "469", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 822.2k registrations for the FY2024 H1B cap lottery?", "desc": "The H1B visa program in the United States allows employers to temporarily employ foreign workers in specialty occupations. There is an annual cap of 65,000 visas for regular applicants and an additional 20,000 visas reserved for those with a master's degree or higher from a U.S. institution. When the number of registrations exceeds the annual cap, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) conducts a lottery to select the recipients of these visas. The number of registrations for the H1B cap lottery can vary each year based on factors such as demand for foreign workers, changes in immigration policies, and economic conditions.", "resc": "This question will resolve based on the total number of registrations received for the FY2024 H1B cap lottery, as reported by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) or credible media sources. The resolution should be a single integer value, representing the total number of registrations.\nThe question will close on the last day of the registration period for the FY2024 H1B cap lottery, and will resolve when official or credible sources report the total number of registrations. If no such information is made available by the end of the FY2024 fiscal year (September 30, 2024), the question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "784.1k", "median": "797.2k", "upper_75": "822.2k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US implementing NEPA reform, what is the chance that the energy transition metal index for December of 2027 will be 469% higher than the index for December 2020? (Law not passed)", "desc": "For background on NEPA reform see the **parent question**: [Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/)\n\nFor background on the energy transition metals index see the **child question**: [What will be the percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Law passed\" will resolve as the change in the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Law not passed\" will resolve as the change in the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe change in the energy transition metal index in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [energy transition metals index question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)", "lower_25": "293", "median": "381", "upper_75": "469", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 822.2k registrations for the FY2024 H1B cap lottery?", "desc": "The H1B visa program in the United States allows employers to temporarily employ foreign workers in specialty occupations. There is an annual cap of 65,000 visas for regular applicants and an additional 20,000 visas reserved for those with a master's degree or higher from a U.S. institution. When the number of registrations exceeds the annual cap, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) conducts a lottery to select the recipients of these visas. The number of registrations for the H1B cap lottery can vary each year based on factors such as demand for foreign workers, changes in immigration policies, and economic conditions.", "resc": "This question will resolve based on the total number of registrations received for the FY2024 H1B cap lottery, as reported by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) or credible media sources. The resolution should be a single integer value, representing the total number of registrations.\nThe question will close on the last day of the registration period for the FY2024 H1B cap lottery, and will resolve when official or credible sources report the total number of registrations. If no such information is made available by the end of the FY2024 fiscal year (September 30, 2024), the question will resolve ambiguously", "lower_25": "784.1k", "median": "797.2k", "upper_75": "822.2k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will manufacture extreme ultraviolet lithography equipment domestically by Feb 2026?", "desc": "Lithography is a stage in the semiconductor fabrication process where the features comprising an integrated circuit are etched into a silicon wafer. Chip performance is affected by the size of these features – smaller features give better performance, but require more advanced lithography techniques.\n\nAs of March 2023, extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography is the state-of-the-art technique. It is required for the manufacture of cutting-edge AI chips such as those from NVIDIA's H100 series [[1](https://www.tsmc.com/english/dedicatedFoundry/technology/logic/l_5nm), [2](https://www.tweaktown.com/news/85246/nvidia-h100-gpu-full-details-tsmc-n4-hbm3-pcie-5-0-700w-tdp-more/index.html)].\n\nOnly a single Dutch company, ASML, has the ability to manufacture EUV equipment, and, since 2019, the Dutch government has refused to grant ASML a license to export this equipment to China [[3](https://www.verdict.co.uk/dutch-chip-firm-asml-in-the-middle-of-us-china-export-row/)]. Furthermore, on 1 September 2022, the US announced export controls preventing the sale of high-end AI chips to China [[4](https://www.csis.org/analysis/choking-chinas-access-future-ai)].\n\nUnable to purchase high-end chips or the lithography equipment required to make them from abroad, if China is to achieve its ambitious goal of global AI leadership, it may find it necessary to manufacture advanced lithography equipment domestically.", "resc": "This question resolves as the earliest date on which a credible media source reports that a Chinese organization has developed a fully functional EUV lithography machine.", "lower_25": "Feb 2026", "median": "Feb 2028", "upper_75": "Aug 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US implementing NEPA reform, what is the chance that the energy transition metal index for December of 2027 will be 527% higher than the index for December 2020? (Law passed)", "desc": "For background on NEPA reform see the **parent question**: [Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/)\n\nFor background on the energy transition metals index see the **child question**: [What will be the percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Law passed\" will resolve as the change in the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Law not passed\" will resolve as the change in the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe change in the energy transition metal index in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [energy transition metals index question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)", "lower_25": "430", "median": "527", "upper_75": "614", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US implementing NEPA reform, what is the chance that the energy transition metal index for December of 2027 will be 469% higher than the index for December 2020? (Law not passed)", "desc": "For background on NEPA reform see the **parent question**: [Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/)\n\nFor background on the energy transition metals index see the **child question**: [What will be the percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Law passed\" will resolve as the change in the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Law not passed\" will resolve as the change in the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe change in the energy transition metal index in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [energy transition metals index question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)", "lower_25": "293", "median": "381", "upper_75": "469", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will manufacture extreme ultraviolet lithography equipment domestically by Feb 2026?", "desc": "Lithography is a stage in the semiconductor fabrication process where the features comprising an integrated circuit are etched into a silicon wafer. Chip performance is affected by the size of these features – smaller features give better performance, but require more advanced lithography techniques.\n\nAs of March 2023, extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography is the state-of-the-art technique. It is required for the manufacture of cutting-edge AI chips such as those from NVIDIA's H100 series [[1](https://www.tsmc.com/english/dedicatedFoundry/technology/logic/l_5nm), [2](https://www.tweaktown.com/news/85246/nvidia-h100-gpu-full-details-tsmc-n4-hbm3-pcie-5-0-700w-tdp-more/index.html)].\n\nOnly a single Dutch company, ASML, has the ability to manufacture EUV equipment, and, since 2019, the Dutch government has refused to grant ASML a license to export this equipment to China [[3](https://www.verdict.co.uk/dutch-chip-firm-asml-in-the-middle-of-us-china-export-row/)]. Furthermore, on 1 September 2022, the US announced export controls preventing the sale of high-end AI chips to China [[4](https://www.csis.org/analysis/choking-chinas-access-future-ai)].\n\nUnable to purchase high-end chips or the lithography equipment required to make them from abroad, if China is to achieve its ambitious goal of global AI leadership, it may find it necessary to manufacture advanced lithography equipment domestically.", "resc": "This question resolves as the earliest date on which a credible media source reports that a Chinese organization has developed a fully functional EUV lithography machine.", "lower_25": "Feb 2026", "median": "Feb 2028", "upper_75": "Aug 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will solve half the questions on a Miklós Schweitzer competition by Mar 2027?", "desc": "\"The Schweitzer contest is uniquely high-level among mathematics competitions. The problems, written by prominent Hungarian mathematicians, are challenging and require in-depth knowledge of the fields represented. The competition is open-book and competitors are allowed ten days to come up with solutions.\" from [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikl%C3%B3s_Schweitzer_Competition). \n\nMetaculite Matthew Barnett previously [asked](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11674/the-ultimate-mathematics-benchmark-for-ai/) 'When will AI achieve a perfect score on the Schweitzer competition?' In that context, this question will inform our understanding of take-off speeds: How long will we have to work with competent research assistants (capable of answering scope-limited math research questions), before a super-intelligent AI is created?", "resc": "Resolves to the date on which an AI system is first publicly demonstrated to have solved over 50% of the questions on a recent year's Schweitzer competition.", "lower_25": "Mar 2025", "median": "Mar 2027", "upper_75": "Feb 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next Nankai megathrust earthquake will occur before 2049?", "desc": "[According to wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nankai_megathrust_earthquakes):\n\n>The [Nankai megathrust](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-022-26455-w) is thought to have caused at least 12 major earthquakes in the last 1300 years. . . The northeasternmost part of the megathrust, segment E, has not ruptured since 1854.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>The Japanese government [estimates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nankai_megathrust_earthquakes) that a major earthquake on the Nankai Trough would cause 169.5 trillion yen in direct damage and 50.8 trillion yen in economic losses for the following year. . . It is predicted that the economic damage is likely to be 10 times higher than for the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami. A death toll as high as 230,000 has been suggested for such an event.\n\nThe Greater Tokyo Area would suffer the largest amount of damage if that occurred.\n\n[According to nippon.com](https://www.nippon.com/en/news/fnn20190524001/a-disaster-to-dwarf-311-the-predicted-nankai-quake.html):\n\n>In the past, the Nankai Trough has experienced repeated earthquakes at regular 100- to 150-year intervals. Over 70 years have passed since the most recent megathrust earthquakes, the 1944 Tōnankai earthquake and the 1946 Nankai earthquake. Thus, another quake is considered imminent and, in accordance with the typical frequency, has a 70% to 80% probability of occurring by 2050.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when the next Nankai megathrust earthquake occurs at a magnitude of 8.0 or greater at the [Nankai Trough](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nankai_Trough).\n\nThis question resolves based on either the [following list](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nankai_megathrust_earthquakes) or on credible reports of such an earthquake of magnitude 8.0 or above along the Nankai megathrust.", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2045", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2049", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US implementing NEPA reform, what is the chance that the energy transition metal index for December of 2027 will be 527% higher than the index for December 2020? (Law passed)", "desc": "For background on NEPA reform see the **parent question**: [Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/)\n\nFor background on the energy transition metals index see the **child question**: [What will be the percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Law passed\" will resolve as the change in the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Law not passed\" will resolve as the change in the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe change in the energy transition metal index in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [energy transition metals index question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)", "lower_25": "430", "median": "527", "upper_75": "614", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next Nankai megathrust earthquake will occur before 2049?", "desc": "[According to wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nankai_megathrust_earthquakes):\n\n>The [Nankai megathrust](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-022-26455-w) is thought to have caused at least 12 major earthquakes in the last 1300 years. . . The northeasternmost part of the megathrust, segment E, has not ruptured since 1854.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>The Japanese government [estimates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nankai_megathrust_earthquakes) that a major earthquake on the Nankai Trough would cause 169.5 trillion yen in direct damage and 50.8 trillion yen in economic losses for the following year. . . It is predicted that the economic damage is likely to be 10 times higher than for the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami. A death toll as high as 230,000 has been suggested for such an event.\n\nThe Greater Tokyo Area would suffer the largest amount of damage if that occurred.\n\n[According to nippon.com](https://www.nippon.com/en/news/fnn20190524001/a-disaster-to-dwarf-311-the-predicted-nankai-quake.html):\n\n>In the past, the Nankai Trough has experienced repeated earthquakes at regular 100- to 150-year intervals. Over 70 years have passed since the most recent megathrust earthquakes, the 1944 Tōnankai earthquake and the 1946 Nankai earthquake. Thus, another quake is considered imminent and, in accordance with the typical frequency, has a 70% to 80% probability of occurring by 2050.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when the next Nankai megathrust earthquake occurs at a magnitude of 8.0 or greater at the [Nankai Trough](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nankai_Trough).\n\nThis question resolves based on either the [following list](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nankai_megathrust_earthquakes) or on credible reports of such an earthquake of magnitude 8.0 or above along the Nankai megathrust.", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2045", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2049", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US implementing NEPA reform, what is the chance that the energy transition metal index for December of 2027 will be 527% higher than the index for December 2020? (Law passed)", "desc": "For background on NEPA reform see the **parent question**: [Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/)\n\nFor background on the energy transition metals index see the **child question**: [What will be the percentage change in the energy transition metal index for the value in December of the listed year relative to the value in December 2020?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Law passed\" will resolve as the change in the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Law not passed\" will resolve as the change in the energy transition metal index in December of 2027 relative to December of 2020. Otherwise that subquestion will resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nThe change in the energy transition metal index in 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [energy transition metals index question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14738/change-in-energy-transition-metal-index/)", "lower_25": "430", "median": "527", "upper_75": "614", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will solve half the questions on a Miklós Schweitzer competition by Mar 2027?", "desc": "\"The Schweitzer contest is uniquely high-level among mathematics competitions. The problems, written by prominent Hungarian mathematicians, are challenging and require in-depth knowledge of the fields represented. The competition is open-book and competitors are allowed ten days to come up with solutions.\" from [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikl%C3%B3s_Schweitzer_Competition). \n\nMetaculite Matthew Barnett previously [asked](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11674/the-ultimate-mathematics-benchmark-for-ai/) 'When will AI achieve a perfect score on the Schweitzer competition?' In that context, this question will inform our understanding of take-off speeds: How long will we have to work with competent research assistants (capable of answering scope-limited math research questions), before a super-intelligent AI is created?", "resc": "Resolves to the date on which an AI system is first publicly demonstrated to have solved over 50% of the questions on a recent year's Schweitzer competition.", "lower_25": "Mar 2025", "median": "Mar 2027", "upper_75": "Feb 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next Nankai megathrust earthquake will occur before 2049?", "desc": "[According to wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nankai_megathrust_earthquakes):\n\n>The [Nankai megathrust](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-022-26455-w) is thought to have caused at least 12 major earthquakes in the last 1300 years. . . The northeasternmost part of the megathrust, segment E, has not ruptured since 1854.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>The Japanese government [estimates](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nankai_megathrust_earthquakes) that a major earthquake on the Nankai Trough would cause 169.5 trillion yen in direct damage and 50.8 trillion yen in economic losses for the following year. . . It is predicted that the economic damage is likely to be 10 times higher than for the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami. A death toll as high as 230,000 has been suggested for such an event.\n\nThe Greater Tokyo Area would suffer the largest amount of damage if that occurred.\n\n[According to nippon.com](https://www.nippon.com/en/news/fnn20190524001/a-disaster-to-dwarf-311-the-predicted-nankai-quake.html):\n\n>In the past, the Nankai Trough has experienced repeated earthquakes at regular 100- to 150-year intervals. Over 70 years have passed since the most recent megathrust earthquakes, the 1944 Tōnankai earthquake and the 1946 Nankai earthquake. Thus, another quake is considered imminent and, in accordance with the typical frequency, has a 70% to 80% probability of occurring by 2050.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when the next Nankai megathrust earthquake occurs at a magnitude of 8.0 or greater at the [Nankai Trough](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nankai_Trough).\n\nThis question resolves based on either the [following list](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nankai_megathrust_earthquakes) or on credible reports of such an earthquake of magnitude 8.0 or above along the Nankai megathrust.", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2045", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2049", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI will solve half the questions on a Miklós Schweitzer competition by Mar 2027?", "desc": "\"The Schweitzer contest is uniquely high-level among mathematics competitions. The problems, written by prominent Hungarian mathematicians, are challenging and require in-depth knowledge of the fields represented. The competition is open-book and competitors are allowed ten days to come up with solutions.\" from [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikl%C3%B3s_Schweitzer_Competition). \n\nMetaculite Matthew Barnett previously [asked](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11674/the-ultimate-mathematics-benchmark-for-ai/) 'When will AI achieve a perfect score on the Schweitzer competition?' In that context, this question will inform our understanding of take-off speeds: How long will we have to work with competent research assistants (capable of answering scope-limited math research questions), before a super-intelligent AI is created?", "resc": "Resolves to the date on which an AI system is first publicly demonstrated to have solved over 50% of the questions on a recent year's Schweitzer competition.", "lower_25": "Mar 2025", "median": "Mar 2027", "upper_75": "Feb 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.414B in these years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "1.414B", "median": "1.424B", "upper_75": "1.432B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China will manufacture extreme ultraviolet lithography equipment domestically by Feb 2026?", "desc": "Lithography is a stage in the semiconductor fabrication process where the features comprising an integrated circuit are etched into a silicon wafer. Chip performance is affected by the size of these features – smaller features give better performance, but require more advanced lithography techniques.\n\nAs of March 2023, extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography is the state-of-the-art technique. It is required for the manufacture of cutting-edge AI chips such as those from NVIDIA's H100 series [[1](https://www.tsmc.com/english/dedicatedFoundry/technology/logic/l_5nm), [2](https://www.tweaktown.com/news/85246/nvidia-h100-gpu-full-details-tsmc-n4-hbm3-pcie-5-0-700w-tdp-more/index.html)].\n\nOnly a single Dutch company, ASML, has the ability to manufacture EUV equipment, and, since 2019, the Dutch government has refused to grant ASML a license to export this equipment to China [[3](https://www.verdict.co.uk/dutch-chip-firm-asml-in-the-middle-of-us-china-export-row/)]. Furthermore, on 1 September 2022, the US announced export controls preventing the sale of high-end AI chips to China [[4](https://www.csis.org/analysis/choking-chinas-access-future-ai)].\n\nUnable to purchase high-end chips or the lithography equipment required to make them from abroad, if China is to achieve its ambitious goal of global AI leadership, it may find it necessary to manufacture advanced lithography equipment domestically.", "resc": "This question resolves as the earliest date on which a credible media source reports that a Chinese organization has developed a fully functional EUV lithography machine.", "lower_25": "Feb 2026", "median": "Feb 2028", "upper_75": "Aug 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.414B in these years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "1.414B", "median": "1.424B", "upper_75": "1.432B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.414B in these years?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "1.414B", "median": "1.424B", "upper_75": "1.432B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.391B in 2030?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "1.364B", "median": "1.391B", "upper_75": "1.416B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.417B in 2023?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "1.406B", "median": "1.417B", "upper_75": "1.428B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.417B in 2023?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "1.406B", "median": "1.417B", "upper_75": "1.428B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.391B in 2030?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "1.364B", "median": "1.391B", "upper_75": "1.416B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.391B in 2030?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "1.364B", "median": "1.391B", "upper_75": "1.416B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.296 billion in the year 2040?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "1.296B", "median": "1.366B", "upper_75": "1.432B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.296 billion in the year 2040?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "1.296B", "median": "1.366B", "upper_75": "1.432B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.296 billion in the year 2040?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "1.296B", "median": "1.366B", "upper_75": "1.432B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.37B in the year 2050?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "1.11B", "median": "1.21B", "upper_75": "1.37B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 550 million in 2100?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "550M", "median": "770M", "upper_75": "1.23B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.417B in 2023?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "1.406B", "median": "1.417B", "upper_75": "1.428B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.37B in the year 2050?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "1.11B", "median": "1.21B", "upper_75": "1.37B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.28B in 2075?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "728M", "median": "930M", "upper_75": "1.28B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 550 million in 2100?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "550M", "median": "770M", "upper_75": "1.23B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.37B in the year 2050?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "1.11B", "median": "1.21B", "upper_75": "1.37B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.28B in 2075?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "728M", "median": "930M", "upper_75": "1.28B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 550 million in 2100?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "550M", "median": "770M", "upper_75": "1.23B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 3.47% on March 31, 2025?", "desc": "The [Federal Open Market Committee](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Open_Market_Committee) (FOMC) oversees [open market operations](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm) for the United States [Federal Reserve](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve). Open market operations include the buying and selling of securities to influence liquidity in financial markets. The FOMC meets eight times a year at [regularly scheduled meetings](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm). Periodically the FOMC will announce changes in the [federal funds rate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_funds_rate) at these meetings, which sets a target range for interest rates on reserves. The Federal Reserve Banks conduct open market operations to influence the effective federal funds rate to bring it within the target range.\n\nBelow is a graph of the upper limit of the federal funds target range, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis).\n", "resc": "This resolves as the upper limit of the target range at 11:59 PM ET on the listed date, [according to the FOMC](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm)", "lower_25": "3.47", "median": "4.15", "upper_75": "4.86", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 3.47% on March 31, 2025?", "desc": "The [Federal Open Market Committee](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Open_Market_Committee) (FOMC) oversees [open market operations](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm) for the United States [Federal Reserve](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve). Open market operations include the buying and selling of securities to influence liquidity in financial markets. The FOMC meets eight times a year at [regularly scheduled meetings](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm). Periodically the FOMC will announce changes in the [federal funds rate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_funds_rate) at these meetings, which sets a target range for interest rates on reserves. The Federal Reserve Banks conduct open market operations to influence the effective federal funds rate to bring it within the target range.\n\nBelow is a graph of the upper limit of the federal funds target range, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis).\n", "resc": "This resolves as the upper limit of the target range at 11:59 PM ET on the listed date, [according to the FOMC](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm)", "lower_25": "3.47", "median": "4.15", "upper_75": "4.86", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.28B in 2075?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "728M", "median": "930M", "upper_75": "1.28B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 3.47% on March 31, 2025?", "desc": "The [Federal Open Market Committee](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Open_Market_Committee) (FOMC) oversees [open market operations](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm) for the United States [Federal Reserve](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve). Open market operations include the buying and selling of securities to influence liquidity in financial markets. The FOMC meets eight times a year at [regularly scheduled meetings](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm). Periodically the FOMC will announce changes in the [federal funds rate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_funds_rate) at these meetings, which sets a target range for interest rates on reserves. The Federal Reserve Banks conduct open market operations to influence the effective federal funds rate to bring it within the target range.\n\nBelow is a graph of the upper limit of the federal funds target range, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis).\n", "resc": "This resolves as the upper limit of the target range at 11:59 PM ET on the listed date, [according to the FOMC](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm)", "lower_25": "3.47", "median": "4.15", "upper_75": "4.86", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 156k public charging stations in 2027, given that at least $3.75 billion is disbursed for the NEVI Formula Program before 2027?", "desc": "Over the past two and a half years, Congress authorized over $1 trillion in new resources to catalyze the US climate response and clean energy transition through the passing of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. Yet despite these historic Congressional commitments, whether or not newly funded programs achieve their intended outcomes will depend on their successful implementation by federal agencies. Agencies have been tasked with managing unprecedented amounts of money and not all are currently equipped to run Requests for Proposals and disburse this money in a timely and effective manner. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these new programs will have their full intended impact on the EV transition.\n\nThe IIJA appropriates $5B ($1B per fiscal year) to establish a [National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bipartisan-infrastructure-law/nevi_formula_program.cfm) at the Department of Transportation (DOT) to [provide states with funding to](https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit/ev-infrastructure-funding-and-financing/federal-funding-programs)\n\n>strategically deploy EV charging infrastructure and establish an interconnected network to facilitate data collection, access, and reliability.\n\nCharging stations must be along a Federal Highway Administration designated [Alternative Fueling Corridor](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/11675). The IIJA also establishes a Joint Office of Energy and Transportation at the DOT and DOE to help guide and coordinate state plans.\n\nThe law also establishes [minimum standards](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/22/2022-12704/national-electric-vehicle-infrastructure-formula-program) for charging infrastructure. To qualify for the funding, states [must submit an EV Infrastructure Deployment Plan](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/), which [all 50 states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia have done](https://highways.dot.gov/newsroom/biden-harris-administration-announces-all-50-states-dc-and-puerto-rico-have-submitted). The funding schedule [calls for $4.155 billion](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bipartisan-infrastructure-law/evs_5year_nevi_funding_by_state.cfm) to be disbursed to the states from fiscal year 2022 through fiscal year 2026.", "resc": "If, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program has disbursed at least $3.75 billion (75% of the $5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"≥ $3.75B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program has disbursed less than $3.75 billion (75% of the $5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"< $3.75B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nDisbursement will be considered to be any money distributed under this program, not just to states but for all programs for which the $5 billion has been appropriated. The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).\n\nIf it is unclear from reporting available on January 1, 2027, how much has been disbursed under the NEVI Program then both subquestions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "66.7k", "median": "107k", "upper_75": "156k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 156k public charging stations in 2027, given that at least $3.75 billion is disbursed for the NEVI Formula Program before 2027?", "desc": "Over the past two and a half years, Congress authorized over $1 trillion in new resources to catalyze the US climate response and clean energy transition through the passing of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. Yet despite these historic Congressional commitments, whether or not newly funded programs achieve their intended outcomes will depend on their successful implementation by federal agencies. Agencies have been tasked with managing unprecedented amounts of money and not all are currently equipped to run Requests for Proposals and disburse this money in a timely and effective manner. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these new programs will have their full intended impact on the EV transition.\n\nThe IIJA appropriates $5B ($1B per fiscal year) to establish a [National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bipartisan-infrastructure-law/nevi_formula_program.cfm) at the Department of Transportation (DOT) to [provide states with funding to](https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit/ev-infrastructure-funding-and-financing/federal-funding-programs)\n\n>strategically deploy EV charging infrastructure and establish an interconnected network to facilitate data collection, access, and reliability.\n\nCharging stations must be along a Federal Highway Administration designated [Alternative Fueling Corridor](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/11675). The IIJA also establishes a Joint Office of Energy and Transportation at the DOT and DOE to help guide and coordinate state plans.\n\nThe law also establishes [minimum standards](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/22/2022-12704/national-electric-vehicle-infrastructure-formula-program) for charging infrastructure. To qualify for the funding, states [must submit an EV Infrastructure Deployment Plan](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/), which [all 50 states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia have done](https://highways.dot.gov/newsroom/biden-harris-administration-announces-all-50-states-dc-and-puerto-rico-have-submitted). The funding schedule [calls for $4.155 billion](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bipartisan-infrastructure-law/evs_5year_nevi_funding_by_state.cfm) to be disbursed to the states from fiscal year 2022 through fiscal year 2026.", "resc": "If, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program has disbursed at least $3.75 billion (75% of the $5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"≥ $3.75B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program has disbursed less than $3.75 billion (75% of the $5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"< $3.75B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nDisbursement will be considered to be any money distributed under this program, not just to states but for all programs for which the $5 billion has been appropriated. The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).\n\nIf it is unclear from reporting available on January 1, 2027, how much has been disbursed under the NEVI Program then both subquestions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "66.7k", "median": "107k", "upper_75": "156k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 156k public charging stations in 2027, given that at least $3.75 billion is disbursed for the NEVI Formula Program before 2027?", "desc": "Over the past two and a half years, Congress authorized over $1 trillion in new resources to catalyze the US climate response and clean energy transition through the passing of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. Yet despite these historic Congressional commitments, whether or not newly funded programs achieve their intended outcomes will depend on their successful implementation by federal agencies. Agencies have been tasked with managing unprecedented amounts of money and not all are currently equipped to run Requests for Proposals and disburse this money in a timely and effective manner. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these new programs will have their full intended impact on the EV transition.\n\nThe IIJA appropriates $5B ($1B per fiscal year) to establish a [National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bipartisan-infrastructure-law/nevi_formula_program.cfm) at the Department of Transportation (DOT) to [provide states with funding to](https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit/ev-infrastructure-funding-and-financing/federal-funding-programs)\n\n>strategically deploy EV charging infrastructure and establish an interconnected network to facilitate data collection, access, and reliability.\n\nCharging stations must be along a Federal Highway Administration designated [Alternative Fueling Corridor](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/11675). The IIJA also establishes a Joint Office of Energy and Transportation at the DOT and DOE to help guide and coordinate state plans.\n\nThe law also establishes [minimum standards](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/22/2022-12704/national-electric-vehicle-infrastructure-formula-program) for charging infrastructure. To qualify for the funding, states [must submit an EV Infrastructure Deployment Plan](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/), which [all 50 states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia have done](https://highways.dot.gov/newsroom/biden-harris-administration-announces-all-50-states-dc-and-puerto-rico-have-submitted). The funding schedule [calls for $4.155 billion](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bipartisan-infrastructure-law/evs_5year_nevi_funding_by_state.cfm) to be disbursed to the states from fiscal year 2022 through fiscal year 2026.", "resc": "If, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program has disbursed at least $3.75 billion (75% of the $5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"≥ $3.75B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program has disbursed less than $3.75 billion (75% of the $5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"< $3.75B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nDisbursement will be considered to be any money distributed under this program, not just to states but for all programs for which the $5 billion has been appropriated. The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).\n\nIf it is unclear from reporting available on January 1, 2027, how much has been disbursed under the NEVI Program then both subquestions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "66.7k", "median": "107k", "upper_75": "156k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the disbursement before 2027 of at least $3.75 billion for the NEVI Formula Program, what is the chance that there will be 107,000 public charging stations in 2027? (≥ $3.75B)", "desc": "Over the past two and a half years, Congress authorized over $1 trillion in new resources to catalyze the US climate response and clean energy transition through the passing of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. Yet despite these historic Congressional commitments, whether or not newly funded programs achieve their intended outcomes will depend on their successful implementation by federal agencies. Agencies have been tasked with managing unprecedented amounts of money and not all are currently equipped to run Requests for Proposals and disburse this money in a timely and effective manner. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these new programs will have their full intended impact on the EV transition.\n\nThe IIJA appropriates $5B ($1B per fiscal year) to establish a [National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bipartisan-infrastructure-law/nevi_formula_program.cfm) at the Department of Transportation (DOT) to [provide states with funding to](https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit/ev-infrastructure-funding-and-financing/federal-funding-programs)\n\n>strategically deploy EV charging infrastructure and establish an interconnected network to facilitate data collection, access, and reliability.\n\nCharging stations must be along a Federal Highway Administration designated [Alternative Fueling Corridor](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/11675). The IIJA also establishes a Joint Office of Energy and Transportation at the DOT and DOE to help guide and coordinate state plans.\n\nThe law also establishes [minimum standards](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/22/2022-12704/national-electric-vehicle-infrastructure-formula-program) for charging infrastructure. To qualify for the funding, states [must submit an EV Infrastructure Deployment Plan](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/), which [all 50 states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia have done](https://highways.dot.gov/newsroom/biden-harris-administration-announces-all-50-states-dc-and-puerto-rico-have-submitted). The funding schedule [calls for $4.155 billion](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bipartisan-infrastructure-law/evs_5year_nevi_funding_by_state.cfm) to be disbursed to the states from fiscal year 2022 through fiscal year 2026.", "resc": "If, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program has disbursed at least $3.75 billion (75% of the $5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"≥ $3.75B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program has disbursed less than $3.75 billion (75% of the $5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"< $3.75B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nDisbursement will be considered to be any money distributed under this program, not just to states but for all programs for which the $5 billion has been appropriated. The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).\n\nIf it is unclear from reporting available on January 1, 2027, how much has been disbursed under the NEVI Program then both subquestions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "66.7k", "median": "107k", "upper_75": "156k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on a new \"cash for clunkers\" program, what is the chance that 42.5% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be ZEVs?", "desc": "For background on the \"Cash for Clunkers\" policy see the **parent question**: [Will a new federal \"Cash for Clunkers\" program be passed into law before 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** implement a new \"Cash for Clunkers\" program before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/) resolving as **Yes** then the subquestion \"Implemented\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** implement a new \"Cash for Clunkers\" program before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/) resolving as **No** then the subquestion \"Not implemented\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "42.5", "median": "49.3", "upper_75": "55.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on a new \"cash for clunkers\" program, what is the chance that 42.5% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be ZEVs?", "desc": "For background on the \"Cash for Clunkers\" policy see the **parent question**: [Will a new federal \"Cash for Clunkers\" program be passed into law before 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** implement a new \"Cash for Clunkers\" program before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/) resolving as **Yes** then the subquestion \"Implemented\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** implement a new \"Cash for Clunkers\" program before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/) resolving as **No** then the subquestion \"Not implemented\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "42.5", "median": "49.3", "upper_75": "55.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the disbursement before 2027 of at least $3.75 billion for the NEVI Formula Program, what is the chance that there will be 107,000 public charging stations in 2027? (≥ $3.75B)", "desc": "Over the past two and a half years, Congress authorized over $1 trillion in new resources to catalyze the US climate response and clean energy transition through the passing of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. Yet despite these historic Congressional commitments, whether or not newly funded programs achieve their intended outcomes will depend on their successful implementation by federal agencies. Agencies have been tasked with managing unprecedented amounts of money and not all are currently equipped to run Requests for Proposals and disburse this money in a timely and effective manner. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these new programs will have their full intended impact on the EV transition.\n\nThe IIJA appropriates $5B ($1B per fiscal year) to establish a [National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bipartisan-infrastructure-law/nevi_formula_program.cfm) at the Department of Transportation (DOT) to [provide states with funding to](https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit/ev-infrastructure-funding-and-financing/federal-funding-programs)\n\n>strategically deploy EV charging infrastructure and establish an interconnected network to facilitate data collection, access, and reliability.\n\nCharging stations must be along a Federal Highway Administration designated [Alternative Fueling Corridor](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/11675). The IIJA also establishes a Joint Office of Energy and Transportation at the DOT and DOE to help guide and coordinate state plans.\n\nThe law also establishes [minimum standards](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/22/2022-12704/national-electric-vehicle-infrastructure-formula-program) for charging infrastructure. To qualify for the funding, states [must submit an EV Infrastructure Deployment Plan](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/), which [all 50 states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia have done](https://highways.dot.gov/newsroom/biden-harris-administration-announces-all-50-states-dc-and-puerto-rico-have-submitted). The funding schedule [calls for $4.155 billion](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bipartisan-infrastructure-law/evs_5year_nevi_funding_by_state.cfm) to be disbursed to the states from fiscal year 2022 through fiscal year 2026.", "resc": "If, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program has disbursed at least $3.75 billion (75% of the $5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"≥ $3.75B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program has disbursed less than $3.75 billion (75% of the $5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"< $3.75B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nDisbursement will be considered to be any money distributed under this program, not just to states but for all programs for which the $5 billion has been appropriated. The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).\n\nIf it is unclear from reporting available on January 1, 2027, how much has been disbursed under the NEVI Program then both subquestions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "66.7k", "median": "107k", "upper_75": "156k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the disbursement before 2027 of at least $3.75 billion for the NEVI Formula Program, what is the chance that there will be 107,000 public charging stations in 2027? (≥ $3.75B)", "desc": "Over the past two and a half years, Congress authorized over $1 trillion in new resources to catalyze the US climate response and clean energy transition through the passing of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. Yet despite these historic Congressional commitments, whether or not newly funded programs achieve their intended outcomes will depend on their successful implementation by federal agencies. Agencies have been tasked with managing unprecedented amounts of money and not all are currently equipped to run Requests for Proposals and disburse this money in a timely and effective manner. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these new programs will have their full intended impact on the EV transition.\n\nThe IIJA appropriates $5B ($1B per fiscal year) to establish a [National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bipartisan-infrastructure-law/nevi_formula_program.cfm) at the Department of Transportation (DOT) to [provide states with funding to](https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit/ev-infrastructure-funding-and-financing/federal-funding-programs)\n\n>strategically deploy EV charging infrastructure and establish an interconnected network to facilitate data collection, access, and reliability.\n\nCharging stations must be along a Federal Highway Administration designated [Alternative Fueling Corridor](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/11675). The IIJA also establishes a Joint Office of Energy and Transportation at the DOT and DOE to help guide and coordinate state plans.\n\nThe law also establishes [minimum standards](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/22/2022-12704/national-electric-vehicle-infrastructure-formula-program) for charging infrastructure. To qualify for the funding, states [must submit an EV Infrastructure Deployment Plan](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/), which [all 50 states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia have done](https://highways.dot.gov/newsroom/biden-harris-administration-announces-all-50-states-dc-and-puerto-rico-have-submitted). The funding schedule [calls for $4.155 billion](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bipartisan-infrastructure-law/evs_5year_nevi_funding_by_state.cfm) to be disbursed to the states from fiscal year 2022 through fiscal year 2026.", "resc": "If, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program has disbursed at least $3.75 billion (75% of the $5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"≥ $3.75B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program has disbursed less than $3.75 billion (75% of the $5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"< $3.75B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nDisbursement will be considered to be any money distributed under this program, not just to states but for all programs for which the $5 billion has been appropriated. The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).\n\nIf it is unclear from reporting available on January 1, 2027, how much has been disbursed under the NEVI Program then both subquestions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "66.7k", "median": "107k", "upper_75": "156k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the disbursement before 2027 of at least $3.75 billion for the NEVI Formula Program, what is the chance that there will be 123,000 public charging stations in 2027? (< $3.75B)", "desc": "Over the past two and a half years, Congress authorized over $1 trillion in new resources to catalyze the US climate response and clean energy transition through the passing of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. Yet despite these historic Congressional commitments, whether or not newly funded programs achieve their intended outcomes will depend on their successful implementation by federal agencies. Agencies have been tasked with managing unprecedented amounts of money and not all are currently equipped to run Requests for Proposals and disburse this money in a timely and effective manner. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these new programs will have their full intended impact on the EV transition.\n\nThe IIJA appropriates $5B ($1B per fiscal year) to establish a [National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bipartisan-infrastructure-law/nevi_formula_program.cfm) at the Department of Transportation (DOT) to [provide states with funding to](https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit/ev-infrastructure-funding-and-financing/federal-funding-programs)\n\n>strategically deploy EV charging infrastructure and establish an interconnected network to facilitate data collection, access, and reliability.\n\nCharging stations must be along a Federal Highway Administration designated [Alternative Fueling Corridor](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/11675). The IIJA also establishes a Joint Office of Energy and Transportation at the DOT and DOE to help guide and coordinate state plans.\n\nThe law also establishes [minimum standards](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/22/2022-12704/national-electric-vehicle-infrastructure-formula-program) for charging infrastructure. To qualify for the funding, states [must submit an EV Infrastructure Deployment Plan](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/), which [all 50 states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia have done](https://highways.dot.gov/newsroom/biden-harris-administration-announces-all-50-states-dc-and-puerto-rico-have-submitted). The funding schedule [calls for $4.155 billion](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bipartisan-infrastructure-law/evs_5year_nevi_funding_by_state.cfm) to be disbursed to the states from fiscal year 2022 through fiscal year 2026.", "resc": "If, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program has disbursed at least $3.75 billion (75% of the $5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"≥ $3.75B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program has disbursed less than $3.75 billion (75% of the $5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"< $3.75B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nDisbursement will be considered to be any money distributed under this program, not just to states but for all programs for which the $5 billion has been appropriated. The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).\n\nIf it is unclear from reporting available on January 1, 2027, how much has been disbursed under the NEVI Program then both subquestions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "40.9k", "median": "81.3k", "upper_75": "123k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the disbursement before 2027 of at least $3.75 billion for the NEVI Formula Program, what is the chance that there will be 123,000 public charging stations in 2027? (< $3.75B)", "desc": "Over the past two and a half years, Congress authorized over $1 trillion in new resources to catalyze the US climate response and clean energy transition through the passing of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. Yet despite these historic Congressional commitments, whether or not newly funded programs achieve their intended outcomes will depend on their successful implementation by federal agencies. Agencies have been tasked with managing unprecedented amounts of money and not all are currently equipped to run Requests for Proposals and disburse this money in a timely and effective manner. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these new programs will have their full intended impact on the EV transition.\n\nThe IIJA appropriates $5B ($1B per fiscal year) to establish a [National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bipartisan-infrastructure-law/nevi_formula_program.cfm) at the Department of Transportation (DOT) to [provide states with funding to](https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit/ev-infrastructure-funding-and-financing/federal-funding-programs)\n\n>strategically deploy EV charging infrastructure and establish an interconnected network to facilitate data collection, access, and reliability.\n\nCharging stations must be along a Federal Highway Administration designated [Alternative Fueling Corridor](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/11675). The IIJA also establishes a Joint Office of Energy and Transportation at the DOT and DOE to help guide and coordinate state plans.\n\nThe law also establishes [minimum standards](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/22/2022-12704/national-electric-vehicle-infrastructure-formula-program) for charging infrastructure. To qualify for the funding, states [must submit an EV Infrastructure Deployment Plan](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/), which [all 50 states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia have done](https://highways.dot.gov/newsroom/biden-harris-administration-announces-all-50-states-dc-and-puerto-rico-have-submitted). The funding schedule [calls for $4.155 billion](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bipartisan-infrastructure-law/evs_5year_nevi_funding_by_state.cfm) to be disbursed to the states from fiscal year 2022 through fiscal year 2026.", "resc": "If, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program has disbursed at least $3.75 billion (75% of the $5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"≥ $3.75B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program has disbursed less than $3.75 billion (75% of the $5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"< $3.75B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nDisbursement will be considered to be any money distributed under this program, not just to states but for all programs for which the $5 billion has been appropriated. The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).\n\nIf it is unclear from reporting available on January 1, 2027, how much has been disbursed under the NEVI Program then both subquestions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "40.9k", "median": "81.3k", "upper_75": "123k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the disbursement before 2027 of at least $3.75 billion for the NEVI Formula Program, what is the chance that there will be 123,000 public charging stations in 2027? (< $3.75B)", "desc": "Over the past two and a half years, Congress authorized over $1 trillion in new resources to catalyze the US climate response and clean energy transition through the passing of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. Yet despite these historic Congressional commitments, whether or not newly funded programs achieve their intended outcomes will depend on their successful implementation by federal agencies. Agencies have been tasked with managing unprecedented amounts of money and not all are currently equipped to run Requests for Proposals and disburse this money in a timely and effective manner. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these new programs will have their full intended impact on the EV transition.\n\nThe IIJA appropriates $5B ($1B per fiscal year) to establish a [National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bipartisan-infrastructure-law/nevi_formula_program.cfm) at the Department of Transportation (DOT) to [provide states with funding to](https://www.transportation.gov/rural/ev/toolkit/ev-infrastructure-funding-and-financing/federal-funding-programs)\n\n>strategically deploy EV charging infrastructure and establish an interconnected network to facilitate data collection, access, and reliability.\n\nCharging stations must be along a Federal Highway Administration designated [Alternative Fueling Corridor](https://afdc.energy.gov/laws/11675). The IIJA also establishes a Joint Office of Energy and Transportation at the DOT and DOE to help guide and coordinate state plans.\n\nThe law also establishes [minimum standards](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/22/2022-12704/national-electric-vehicle-infrastructure-formula-program) for charging infrastructure. To qualify for the funding, states [must submit an EV Infrastructure Deployment Plan](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/nevi/ev_deployment_plans/), which [all 50 states plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia have done](https://highways.dot.gov/newsroom/biden-harris-administration-announces-all-50-states-dc-and-puerto-rico-have-submitted). The funding schedule [calls for $4.155 billion](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bipartisan-infrastructure-law/evs_5year_nevi_funding_by_state.cfm) to be disbursed to the states from fiscal year 2022 through fiscal year 2026.", "resc": "If, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program has disbursed at least $3.75 billion (75% of the $5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"≥ $3.75B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the National Electric Vehicle Infrastructure (NEVI) Formula Program has disbursed less than $3.75 billion (75% of the $5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"< $3.75B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nDisbursement will be considered to be any money distributed under this program, not just to states but for all programs for which the $5 billion has been appropriated. The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).\n\nIf it is unclear from reporting available on January 1, 2027, how much has been disbursed under the NEVI Program then both subquestions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "40.9k", "median": "81.3k", "upper_75": "123k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on a new \"cash for clunkers\" program, what is the chance that 49.3% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be ZEVs? (Implemented)", "desc": "For background on the \"Cash for Clunkers\" policy see the **parent question**: [Will a new federal \"Cash for Clunkers\" program be passed into law before 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** implement a new \"Cash for Clunkers\" program before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/) resolving as **Yes** then the subquestion \"Implemented\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** implement a new \"Cash for Clunkers\" program before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/) resolving as **No** then the subquestion \"Not implemented\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "42.5", "median": "49.3", "upper_75": "55.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on a new \"cash for clunkers\" program, what is the chance that 42.5% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be ZEVs?", "desc": "For background on the \"Cash for Clunkers\" policy see the **parent question**: [Will a new federal \"Cash for Clunkers\" program be passed into law before 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** implement a new \"Cash for Clunkers\" program before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/) resolving as **Yes** then the subquestion \"Implemented\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** implement a new \"Cash for Clunkers\" program before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/) resolving as **No** then the subquestion \"Not implemented\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "42.5", "median": "49.3", "upper_75": "55.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on a new \"cash for clunkers\" program, what is the chance that 27.7% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be ZEVs?", "desc": "For background on the \"Cash for Clunkers\" policy see the **parent question**: [Will a new federal \"Cash for Clunkers\" program be passed into law before 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** implement a new \"Cash for Clunkers\" program before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/) resolving as **Yes** then the subquestion \"Implemented\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** implement a new \"Cash for Clunkers\" program before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/) resolving as **No** then the subquestion \"Not implemented\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "27.7", "median": "33.8", "upper_75": "39.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on a new \"cash for clunkers\" program, what is the chance that 49.3% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be ZEVs? (Implemented)", "desc": "For background on the \"Cash for Clunkers\" policy see the **parent question**: [Will a new federal \"Cash for Clunkers\" program be passed into law before 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** implement a new \"Cash for Clunkers\" program before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/) resolving as **Yes** then the subquestion \"Implemented\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** implement a new \"Cash for Clunkers\" program before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/) resolving as **No** then the subquestion \"Not implemented\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "42.5", "median": "49.3", "upper_75": "55.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on a new \"cash for clunkers\" program, what is the chance that 27.7% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be ZEVs?", "desc": "For background on the \"Cash for Clunkers\" policy see the **parent question**: [Will a new federal \"Cash for Clunkers\" program be passed into law before 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** implement a new \"Cash for Clunkers\" program before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/) resolving as **Yes** then the subquestion \"Implemented\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** implement a new \"Cash for Clunkers\" program before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/) resolving as **No** then the subquestion \"Not implemented\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "27.7", "median": "33.8", "upper_75": "39.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on a new \"cash for clunkers\" program, what is the chance that 49.3% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be ZEVs? (Implemented)", "desc": "For background on the \"Cash for Clunkers\" policy see the **parent question**: [Will a new federal \"Cash for Clunkers\" program be passed into law before 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** implement a new \"Cash for Clunkers\" program before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/) resolving as **Yes** then the subquestion \"Implemented\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** implement a new \"Cash for Clunkers\" program before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/) resolving as **No** then the subquestion \"Not implemented\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "42.5", "median": "49.3", "upper_75": "55.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US implementing NEPA reform, what is the chance that 4.21 mines will produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030?", "desc": "For background on NEPA reform see the **parent question**: [Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/)\n\nFor background on the number of mines producing cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the US in 2030 see the **child question**: [How many mines will produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15807/number-of-us-critical-mineral-mines-2030/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Law passed\" will resolve as the number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Law not passed\" will resolve as the number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [number of critical minerals mines questions here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15807/number-of-us-critical-mineral-mines-2030/).", "lower_25": "2.02", "median": "3.10", "upper_75": "4.21", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US implementing NEPA reform, what is the chance that 4.21 mines will produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030? (Law passed)", "desc": "For background on NEPA reform see the **parent question**: [Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/)\n\nFor background on the number of mines producing cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the US in 2030 see the **child question**: [How many mines will produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15807/number-of-us-critical-mineral-mines-2030/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Law passed\" will resolve as the number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Law not passed\" will resolve as the number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [number of critical minerals mines questions here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15807/number-of-us-critical-mineral-mines-2030/).", "lower_25": "2.02", "median": "3.10", "upper_75": "4.21", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US implementing NEPA reform, what is the chance that 4.21 mines will produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030?", "desc": "For background on NEPA reform see the **parent question**: [Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/)\n\nFor background on the number of mines producing cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the US in 2030 see the **child question**: [How many mines will produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15807/number-of-us-critical-mineral-mines-2030/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Law passed\" will resolve as the number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Law not passed\" will resolve as the number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [number of critical minerals mines questions here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15807/number-of-us-critical-mineral-mines-2030/).", "lower_25": "2.02", "median": "3.10", "upper_75": "4.21", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.52 million mines in the United States will produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in 2030, given that the US implements NEPA reform?", "desc": "For background on NEPA reform see the **parent question**: [Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/)\n\nFor background on the number of mines producing cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the US in 2030 see the **child question**: [How many mines will produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15807/number-of-us-critical-mineral-mines-2030/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Law passed\" will resolve as the number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Law not passed\" will resolve as the number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [number of critical minerals mines questions here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15807/number-of-us-critical-mineral-mines-2030/).", "lower_25": "0.783", "median": "1.52", "upper_75": "2.50", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025, what is the chance that there will be 50% of public charging stations in 2027?", "desc": "For background on the number of states with electric vehicle (EV) building code requirements see the **parent question**: [What will be the number of US states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles in 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15494/states-with-ev-building-code-regulations/)\n\nFor background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **child question**: [How many level 2 or greater public charging stations will be available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/)", "resc": "If the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025 is **more than 16**, then the subquestion \"> 16\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations in the United States on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025 is **less than or equal to 16**, then the subquestion \"≤ 16\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations in the United States on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe number of states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles on July 1, 2025 will be determined according to the resolution of the [EV building code question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15494/states-with-ev-building-code-regulations/). The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging stations question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).", "lower_25": "76.1k", "median": "128k", "upper_75": "185k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025, what is the chance that there will be 50% of public charging stations in 2027?", "desc": "For background on the number of states with electric vehicle (EV) building code requirements see the **parent question**: [What will be the number of US states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles in 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15494/states-with-ev-building-code-regulations/)\n\nFor background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **child question**: [How many level 2 or greater public charging stations will be available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/)", "resc": "If the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025 is **more than 16**, then the subquestion \"> 16\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations in the United States on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025 is **less than or equal to 16**, then the subquestion \"≤ 16\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations in the United States on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe number of states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles on July 1, 2025 will be determined according to the resolution of the [EV building code question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15494/states-with-ev-building-code-regulations/). The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging stations question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).", "lower_25": "76.1k", "median": "128k", "upper_75": "185k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025, what is the chance that there will be at least 76,100 public charging stations in 2027?", "desc": "For background on the number of states with electric vehicle (EV) building code requirements see the **parent question**: [What will be the number of US states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles in 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15494/states-with-ev-building-code-regulations/)\n\nFor background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **child question**: [How many level 2 or greater public charging stations will be available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/)", "resc": "If the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025 is **more than 16**, then the subquestion \"> 16\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations in the United States on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025 is **less than or equal to 16**, then the subquestion \"≤ 16\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations in the United States on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe number of states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles on July 1, 2025 will be determined according to the resolution of the [EV building code question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15494/states-with-ev-building-code-regulations/). The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging stations question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).", "lower_25": "76.1k", "median": "128k", "upper_75": "185k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on a new \"cash for clunkers\" program, what is the chance that 27.7% of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 will be ZEVs?", "desc": "For background on the \"Cash for Clunkers\" policy see the **parent question**: [Will a new federal \"Cash for Clunkers\" program be passed into law before 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/)\n\nFor background on the US zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) sales share see the **child question**: [What will be the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in the following years which are zero-emission vehicles?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** implement a new \"Cash for Clunkers\" program before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/) resolving as **Yes** then the subquestion \"Implemented\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** implement a new \"Cash for Clunkers\" program before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15490/federal-cash-for-clunkers-before-2027/) resolving as **No** then the subquestion \"Not implemented\" will resolve as the percent of light vehicles sold in the United States in 2030 which are zero-emission vehicles. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe US zero-emission vehicle sale share in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution of the [2030 subquestion here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14732/zev-share-of-us-light-duty-vehicle-sales/)", "lower_25": "27.7", "median": "33.8", "upper_75": "39.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025, what is the chance that there will be at least 76,100 public charging stations in 2027?", "desc": "For background on the number of states with electric vehicle (EV) building code requirements see the **parent question**: [What will be the number of US states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles in 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15494/states-with-ev-building-code-regulations/)\n\nFor background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **child question**: [How many level 2 or greater public charging stations will be available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/)", "resc": "If the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025 is **more than 16**, then the subquestion \"> 16\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations in the United States on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025 is **less than or equal to 16**, then the subquestion \"≤ 16\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations in the United States on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe number of states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles on July 1, 2025 will be determined according to the resolution of the [EV building code question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15494/states-with-ev-building-code-regulations/). The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging stations question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).", "lower_25": "76.1k", "median": "128k", "upper_75": "185k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025, what is the chance that there will be 50% of public charging stations in 2027?", "desc": "For background on the number of states with electric vehicle (EV) building code requirements see the **parent question**: [What will be the number of US states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles in 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15494/states-with-ev-building-code-regulations/)\n\nFor background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **child question**: [How many level 2 or greater public charging stations will be available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/)", "resc": "If the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025 is **more than 16**, then the subquestion \"> 16\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations in the United States on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025 is **less than or equal to 16**, then the subquestion \"≤ 16\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations in the United States on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe number of states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles on July 1, 2025 will be determined according to the resolution of the [EV building code question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15494/states-with-ev-building-code-regulations/). The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging stations question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).", "lower_25": "76.1k", "median": "128k", "upper_75": "185k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Given that there are 139,000 states with EV building code requirements in 2025, what is the chance that there will be 75% or more public charging stations in 2027?", "desc": "For background on the number of states with electric vehicle (EV) building code requirements see the **parent question**: [What will be the number of US states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles in 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15494/states-with-ev-building-code-regulations/)\n\nFor background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **child question**: [How many level 2 or greater public charging stations will be available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/)", "resc": "If the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025 is **more than 16**, then the subquestion \"> 16\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations in the United States on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025 is **less than or equal to 16**, then the subquestion \"≤ 16\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations in the United States on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe number of states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles on July 1, 2025 will be determined according to the resolution of the [EV building code question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15494/states-with-ev-building-code-regulations/). The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging stations question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).", "lower_25": "53.2k", "median": "92.7k", "upper_75": "139k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Given that there are 139,000 states with EV building code requirements in 2025, what is the chance that there will be 75% or more public charging stations in 2027?", "desc": "For background on the number of states with electric vehicle (EV) building code requirements see the **parent question**: [What will be the number of US states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles in 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15494/states-with-ev-building-code-regulations/)\n\nFor background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **child question**: [How many level 2 or greater public charging stations will be available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/)", "resc": "If the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025 is **more than 16**, then the subquestion \"> 16\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations in the United States on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025 is **less than or equal to 16**, then the subquestion \"≤ 16\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations in the United States on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe number of states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles on July 1, 2025 will be determined according to the resolution of the [EV building code question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15494/states-with-ev-building-code-regulations/). The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging stations question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).", "lower_25": "53.2k", "median": "92.7k", "upper_75": "139k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average preparation time (in days) of environmental impact statements completed in 2025 will be 50% of 1.54k?", "desc": "The [National Environmental Policy Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Environmental_Policy_Act) (NEPA) was enacted in 1970 and established a process for review of the environmental impact of projects within the federal purview. It also established the [Council on Environmental Quality](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Environmental_Quality) (CEQ), an office of the executive branch tasked with overseeing NEPA implementation. The law requires that Federal agencies prepare environmental assessments (EAs) and (if required) environmental impact statements (EISs) for projects to assess their environmental impact.\n\nWhile the law emphasizes environmental protection, it has [been criticized](https://progress.institute/environmental-review/) for slowing the transition to renewable energy by causing delays in projects related to clean energy technology. Section 4.3 of the National Association of Environmental Professionals [2021 Annual NEPA Report](https://naep.memberclicks.net/assets/annual-report/NEPA_Annual_Report_2021.pdf) says the following about the length of time for EISs completed in 2021 (NOI refers to notice of intent to prepare an EIS and NOA refers to the notice of availability of the EIS):\n\n>. . . final EISs prepared by all agencies combined had an average preparation time (from the Federal Register NOI to the EPA NOA for the final EIS) of 1,678 ± 1,589 days (4.6 ± 4.4 years[)].", "resc": "This question will resolve as the average preparation time (from the Federal Register notice of intent to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) notice of approval for the final environmental impact statement (EIS)) of EISs completed in 2025, according to the [National Association of Environmental Professionals 2025 Annual NEPA Report](https://www.naep.org/nepa-annual-reports). If the report is not available before February 1, 2027, Metaculus may use alternate sources or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.41k", "median": "1.54k", "upper_75": "1.67k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average preparation time (in days) of environmental impact statements completed in 2025 will be 50% of 1.54k?", "desc": "The [National Environmental Policy Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Environmental_Policy_Act) (NEPA) was enacted in 1970 and established a process for review of the environmental impact of projects within the federal purview. It also established the [Council on Environmental Quality](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Environmental_Quality) (CEQ), an office of the executive branch tasked with overseeing NEPA implementation. The law requires that Federal agencies prepare environmental assessments (EAs) and (if required) environmental impact statements (EISs) for projects to assess their environmental impact.\n\nWhile the law emphasizes environmental protection, it has [been criticized](https://progress.institute/environmental-review/) for slowing the transition to renewable energy by causing delays in projects related to clean energy technology. Section 4.3 of the National Association of Environmental Professionals [2021 Annual NEPA Report](https://naep.memberclicks.net/assets/annual-report/NEPA_Annual_Report_2021.pdf) says the following about the length of time for EISs completed in 2021 (NOI refers to notice of intent to prepare an EIS and NOA refers to the notice of availability of the EIS):\n\n>. . . final EISs prepared by all agencies combined had an average preparation time (from the Federal Register NOI to the EPA NOA for the final EIS) of 1,678 ± 1,589 days (4.6 ± 4.4 years[)].", "resc": "This question will resolve as the average preparation time (from the Federal Register notice of intent to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) notice of approval for the final environmental impact statement (EIS)) of EISs completed in 2025, according to the [National Association of Environmental Professionals 2025 Annual NEPA Report](https://www.naep.org/nepa-annual-reports). If the report is not available before February 1, 2027, Metaculus may use alternate sources or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.41k", "median": "1.54k", "upper_75": "1.67k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.52 million mines in the United States will produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in 2030, given that the US implements NEPA reform?", "desc": "For background on NEPA reform see the **parent question**: [Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/)\n\nFor background on the number of mines producing cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the US in 2030 see the **child question**: [How many mines will produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15807/number-of-us-critical-mineral-mines-2030/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Law passed\" will resolve as the number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Law not passed\" will resolve as the number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [number of critical minerals mines questions here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15807/number-of-us-critical-mineral-mines-2030/).", "lower_25": "0.783", "median": "1.52", "upper_75": "2.50", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US implementing NEPA reform, what is the chance that 4.21 mines will produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030?", "desc": "For background on NEPA reform see the **parent question**: [Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/)\n\nFor background on the number of mines producing cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the US in 2030 see the **child question**: [How many mines will produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15807/number-of-us-critical-mineral-mines-2030/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Law passed\" will resolve as the number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Law not passed\" will resolve as the number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [number of critical minerals mines questions here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15807/number-of-us-critical-mineral-mines-2030/).", "lower_25": "2.02", "median": "3.10", "upper_75": "4.21", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025, what is the chance that there will be at least 76,100 public charging stations in 2027?", "desc": "For background on the number of states with electric vehicle (EV) building code requirements see the **parent question**: [What will be the number of US states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles in 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15494/states-with-ev-building-code-regulations/)\n\nFor background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **child question**: [How many level 2 or greater public charging stations will be available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/)", "resc": "If the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025 is **more than 16**, then the subquestion \"> 16\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations in the United States on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025 is **less than or equal to 16**, then the subquestion \"≤ 16\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations in the United States on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe number of states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles on July 1, 2025 will be determined according to the resolution of the [EV building code question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15494/states-with-ev-building-code-regulations/). The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging stations question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).", "lower_25": "76.1k", "median": "128k", "upper_75": "185k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US implementing NEPA reform, what is the chance that 4.21 mines will produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030? (Law passed)", "desc": "For background on NEPA reform see the **parent question**: [Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/)\n\nFor background on the number of mines producing cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the US in 2030 see the **child question**: [How many mines will produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15807/number-of-us-critical-mineral-mines-2030/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Law passed\" will resolve as the number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Law not passed\" will resolve as the number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [number of critical minerals mines questions here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15807/number-of-us-critical-mineral-mines-2030/).", "lower_25": "2.02", "median": "3.10", "upper_75": "4.21", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average preparation time (in days) of environmental impact statements completed in 2025 will be 50% of 1.54k?", "desc": "The [National Environmental Policy Act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Environmental_Policy_Act) (NEPA) was enacted in 1970 and established a process for review of the environmental impact of projects within the federal purview. It also established the [Council on Environmental Quality](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Environmental_Quality) (CEQ), an office of the executive branch tasked with overseeing NEPA implementation. The law requires that Federal agencies prepare environmental assessments (EAs) and (if required) environmental impact statements (EISs) for projects to assess their environmental impact.\n\nWhile the law emphasizes environmental protection, it has [been criticized](https://progress.institute/environmental-review/) for slowing the transition to renewable energy by causing delays in projects related to clean energy technology. Section 4.3 of the National Association of Environmental Professionals [2021 Annual NEPA Report](https://naep.memberclicks.net/assets/annual-report/NEPA_Annual_Report_2021.pdf) says the following about the length of time for EISs completed in 2021 (NOI refers to notice of intent to prepare an EIS and NOA refers to the notice of availability of the EIS):\n\n>. . . final EISs prepared by all agencies combined had an average preparation time (from the Federal Register NOI to the EPA NOA for the final EIS) of 1,678 ± 1,589 days (4.6 ± 4.4 years[)].", "resc": "This question will resolve as the average preparation time (from the Federal Register notice of intent to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) notice of approval for the final environmental impact statement (EIS)) of EISs completed in 2025, according to the [National Association of Environmental Professionals 2025 Annual NEPA Report](https://www.naep.org/nepa-annual-reports). If the report is not available before February 1, 2027, Metaculus may use alternate sources or resolve the question as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "1.41k", "median": "1.54k", "upper_75": "1.67k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the US implementing NEPA reform, what is the chance that 4.21 mines will produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030? (Law passed)", "desc": "For background on NEPA reform see the **parent question**: [Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/)\n\nFor background on the number of mines producing cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the US in 2030 see the **child question**: [How many mines will produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15807/number-of-us-critical-mineral-mines-2030/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Law passed\" will resolve as the number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Law not passed\" will resolve as the number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [number of critical minerals mines questions here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15807/number-of-us-critical-mineral-mines-2030/).", "lower_25": "2.02", "median": "3.10", "upper_75": "4.21", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Given that there are 139,000 states with EV building code requirements in 2025, what is the chance that there will be 75% or more public charging stations in 2027?", "desc": "For background on the number of states with electric vehicle (EV) building code requirements see the **parent question**: [What will be the number of US states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles in 2025?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15494/states-with-ev-building-code-regulations/)\n\nFor background on the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations see the **child question**: [How many level 2 or greater public charging stations will be available for light vehicles in the United States at the beginning of the listed year?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/)", "resc": "If the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025 is **more than 16**, then the subquestion \"> 16\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations in the United States on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the number of states with EV building code requirements in 2025 is **less than or equal to 16**, then the subquestion \"≤ 16\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations in the United States on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe number of states with building code requirements related to electric vehicles on July 1, 2025 will be determined according to the resolution of the [EV building code question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15494/states-with-ev-building-code-regulations/). The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging stations question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).", "lower_25": "53.2k", "median": "92.7k", "upper_75": "139k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.52 million mines in the United States will produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in 2030, given that the US implements NEPA reform?", "desc": "For background on NEPA reform see the **parent question**: [Will the United States pass a law setting deadlines on NEPA review before January 1, 2027?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/)\n\nFor background on the number of mines producing cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the US in 2030 see the **child question**: [How many mines will produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15807/number-of-us-critical-mineral-mines-2030/)", "resc": "If the United States **does** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **Yes**, then the subquestion \"Law passed\" will resolve as the number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf the United States **does not** pass a law setting NEPA deadlines before January 1, 2027 as determined by [the relevant question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15489/us-passes-law-setting-nepa-schedules/) resolving as **No**, then the subquestion \"Law not passed\" will resolve as the number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nThe number of mines which produce either cobalt, nickel, manganese, or graphite in the United States in 2030 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [number of critical minerals mines questions here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15807/number-of-us-critical-mineral-mines-2030/).", "lower_25": "0.783", "median": "1.52", "upper_75": "2.50", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the disbursement of $1.8 billion in grants for charging infrastructure before 2027, what is the chance that there will be 272k public charging stations in 2027?", "desc": "Over the past two and a half years, Congress authorized over $1 trillion in new resources to catalyze the US climate response and clean energy transition through the passing of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. Yet despite these historic Congressional commitments, whether or not newly funded programs achieve their intended outcomes will depend on their successful implementation by federal agencies. Agencies have been tasked with managing unprecedented amounts of money and not all are currently equipped to run Requests for Proposals and disburse this money in a timely and effective manner. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these new programs will have their full intended impact on the EV transition.\n\nThe IIJA established the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program, which the [Joint Office of Energy and Transportation](https://driveelectric.gov/about/) describes [as follows](https://driveelectric.gov/states-communities/):\n\n>The [CFI Discretionary Grant Program](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/cfi/) provides $2.5 billion through two $1.25 billion discretionary grant programs to strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging and alternative fueling infrastructure in communities where people live and work and along designated AFCs:\n>\n>* **Community Charging and Fueling Grants:** This program will strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging infrastructure and hydrogen, propane, and natural gas fueling infrastructure in urban and rural communities.\n> * **Alternative Fuel Corridor Grants:** This program will strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging infrastructure and hydrogen, propane, and natural gas fueling infrastructure along designated AFCs.\n>\n>These programs will ensure infrastructure deployments meet priorities such as increasing access in underserved and overburdened communities (also referred to as disadvantaged communities), supporting rural areas, building resilient infrastructure, addressing climate change, and improving AFC networks.\n\nThe CFI grants are appropriated annually, [starting at $300 million in fiscal year 2022 and increasing to $700 million in fiscal year 2026](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3684/text#:~:text=Charging%20and%20fueling%20infrastructure%20grants).", "resc": "If, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program has disbursed at least $1.8 billion (~75% of the $2.5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"≥ $1.8B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program has disbursed less than $1.8 billion (~75% of the $2.55 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"< $1.8B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nDisbursement will be considered to be any money distributed under this program for all purposes for which the $2.5 billion has been appropriated. The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).\n\nIf it is unclear from reporting available on January 1, 2027, how much has been disbursed under the CFI program then both subquestions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "205k", "median": "272k", "upper_75": "341k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the disbursement of $1.8 billion in grants for charging infrastructure before 2027, what is the chance that there will be 272k public charging stations in 2027?", "desc": "Over the past two and a half years, Congress authorized over $1 trillion in new resources to catalyze the US climate response and clean energy transition through the passing of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. Yet despite these historic Congressional commitments, whether or not newly funded programs achieve their intended outcomes will depend on their successful implementation by federal agencies. Agencies have been tasked with managing unprecedented amounts of money and not all are currently equipped to run Requests for Proposals and disburse this money in a timely and effective manner. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these new programs will have their full intended impact on the EV transition.\n\nThe IIJA established the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program, which the [Joint Office of Energy and Transportation](https://driveelectric.gov/about/) describes [as follows](https://driveelectric.gov/states-communities/):\n\n>The [CFI Discretionary Grant Program](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/cfi/) provides $2.5 billion through two $1.25 billion discretionary grant programs to strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging and alternative fueling infrastructure in communities where people live and work and along designated AFCs:\n>\n>* **Community Charging and Fueling Grants:** This program will strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging infrastructure and hydrogen, propane, and natural gas fueling infrastructure in urban and rural communities.\n> * **Alternative Fuel Corridor Grants:** This program will strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging infrastructure and hydrogen, propane, and natural gas fueling infrastructure along designated AFCs.\n>\n>These programs will ensure infrastructure deployments meet priorities such as increasing access in underserved and overburdened communities (also referred to as disadvantaged communities), supporting rural areas, building resilient infrastructure, addressing climate change, and improving AFC networks.\n\nThe CFI grants are appropriated annually, [starting at $300 million in fiscal year 2022 and increasing to $700 million in fiscal year 2026](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3684/text#:~:text=Charging%20and%20fueling%20infrastructure%20grants).", "resc": "If, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program has disbursed at least $1.8 billion (~75% of the $2.5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"≥ $1.8B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program has disbursed less than $1.8 billion (~75% of the $2.55 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"< $1.8B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nDisbursement will be considered to be any money distributed under this program for all purposes for which the $2.5 billion has been appropriated. The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).\n\nIf it is unclear from reporting available on January 1, 2027, how much has been disbursed under the CFI program then both subquestions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "205k", "median": "272k", "upper_75": "341k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 341,000 public charging stations in 2027, given the disbursement of $1.8 billion in grants for charging infrastructure before 2027? (≥ $1.8B)", "desc": "Over the past two and a half years, Congress authorized over $1 trillion in new resources to catalyze the US climate response and clean energy transition through the passing of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. Yet despite these historic Congressional commitments, whether or not newly funded programs achieve their intended outcomes will depend on their successful implementation by federal agencies. Agencies have been tasked with managing unprecedented amounts of money and not all are currently equipped to run Requests for Proposals and disburse this money in a timely and effective manner. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these new programs will have their full intended impact on the EV transition.\n\nThe IIJA established the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program, which the [Joint Office of Energy and Transportation](https://driveelectric.gov/about/) describes [as follows](https://driveelectric.gov/states-communities/):\n\n>The [CFI Discretionary Grant Program](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/cfi/) provides $2.5 billion through two $1.25 billion discretionary grant programs to strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging and alternative fueling infrastructure in communities where people live and work and along designated AFCs:\n>\n>* **Community Charging and Fueling Grants:** This program will strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging infrastructure and hydrogen, propane, and natural gas fueling infrastructure in urban and rural communities.\n> * **Alternative Fuel Corridor Grants:** This program will strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging infrastructure and hydrogen, propane, and natural gas fueling infrastructure along designated AFCs.\n>\n>These programs will ensure infrastructure deployments meet priorities such as increasing access in underserved and overburdened communities (also referred to as disadvantaged communities), supporting rural areas, building resilient infrastructure, addressing climate change, and improving AFC networks.\n\nThe CFI grants are appropriated annually, [starting at $300 million in fiscal year 2022 and increasing to $700 million in fiscal year 2026](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3684/text#:~:text=Charging%20and%20fueling%20infrastructure%20grants).", "resc": "If, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program has disbursed at least $1.8 billion (~75% of the $2.5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"≥ $1.8B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program has disbursed less than $1.8 billion (~75% of the $2.55 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"< $1.8B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nDisbursement will be considered to be any money distributed under this program for all purposes for which the $2.5 billion has been appropriated. The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).\n\nIf it is unclear from reporting available on January 1, 2027, how much has been disbursed under the CFI program then both subquestions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "205k", "median": "272k", "upper_75": "341k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 341,000 public charging stations in 2027, given the disbursement of $1.8 billion in grants for charging infrastructure before 2027? (≥ $1.8B)", "desc": "Over the past two and a half years, Congress authorized over $1 trillion in new resources to catalyze the US climate response and clean energy transition through the passing of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. Yet despite these historic Congressional commitments, whether or not newly funded programs achieve their intended outcomes will depend on their successful implementation by federal agencies. Agencies have been tasked with managing unprecedented amounts of money and not all are currently equipped to run Requests for Proposals and disburse this money in a timely and effective manner. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these new programs will have their full intended impact on the EV transition.\n\nThe IIJA established the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program, which the [Joint Office of Energy and Transportation](https://driveelectric.gov/about/) describes [as follows](https://driveelectric.gov/states-communities/):\n\n>The [CFI Discretionary Grant Program](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/cfi/) provides $2.5 billion through two $1.25 billion discretionary grant programs to strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging and alternative fueling infrastructure in communities where people live and work and along designated AFCs:\n>\n>* **Community Charging and Fueling Grants:** This program will strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging infrastructure and hydrogen, propane, and natural gas fueling infrastructure in urban and rural communities.\n> * **Alternative Fuel Corridor Grants:** This program will strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging infrastructure and hydrogen, propane, and natural gas fueling infrastructure along designated AFCs.\n>\n>These programs will ensure infrastructure deployments meet priorities such as increasing access in underserved and overburdened communities (also referred to as disadvantaged communities), supporting rural areas, building resilient infrastructure, addressing climate change, and improving AFC networks.\n\nThe CFI grants are appropriated annually, [starting at $300 million in fiscal year 2022 and increasing to $700 million in fiscal year 2026](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3684/text#:~:text=Charging%20and%20fueling%20infrastructure%20grants).", "resc": "If, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program has disbursed at least $1.8 billion (~75% of the $2.5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"≥ $1.8B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program has disbursed less than $1.8 billion (~75% of the $2.55 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"< $1.8B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nDisbursement will be considered to be any money distributed under this program for all purposes for which the $2.5 billion has been appropriated. The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).\n\nIf it is unclear from reporting available on January 1, 2027, how much has been disbursed under the CFI program then both subquestions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "205k", "median": "272k", "upper_75": "341k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems will be solved by 2041?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2059", "upper_75": "2080", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems, including Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer conjecture, will be solved by 2059?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2059", "upper_75": "2080", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems, including the Hodge conjecture, will be solved by 2067?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2055", "upper_75": "2067", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems, including the Hodge conjecture, will be solved by 2067?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2055", "upper_75": "2067", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems, including Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer conjecture, will be solved by 2059?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2059", "upper_75": "2080", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the disbursement of $1.8 billion in grants for charging infrastructure before 2027, what is the chance that there will be 95.7k public charging stations in 2027? (< $1.8B)", "desc": "Over the past two and a half years, Congress authorized over $1 trillion in new resources to catalyze the US climate response and clean energy transition through the passing of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. Yet despite these historic Congressional commitments, whether or not newly funded programs achieve their intended outcomes will depend on their successful implementation by federal agencies. Agencies have been tasked with managing unprecedented amounts of money and not all are currently equipped to run Requests for Proposals and disburse this money in a timely and effective manner. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these new programs will have their full intended impact on the EV transition.\n\nThe IIJA established the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program, which the [Joint Office of Energy and Transportation](https://driveelectric.gov/about/) describes [as follows](https://driveelectric.gov/states-communities/):\n\n>The [CFI Discretionary Grant Program](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/cfi/) provides $2.5 billion through two $1.25 billion discretionary grant programs to strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging and alternative fueling infrastructure in communities where people live and work and along designated AFCs:\n>\n>* **Community Charging and Fueling Grants:** This program will strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging infrastructure and hydrogen, propane, and natural gas fueling infrastructure in urban and rural communities.\n> * **Alternative Fuel Corridor Grants:** This program will strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging infrastructure and hydrogen, propane, and natural gas fueling infrastructure along designated AFCs.\n>\n>These programs will ensure infrastructure deployments meet priorities such as increasing access in underserved and overburdened communities (also referred to as disadvantaged communities), supporting rural areas, building resilient infrastructure, addressing climate change, and improving AFC networks.\n\nThe CFI grants are appropriated annually, [starting at $300 million in fiscal year 2022 and increasing to $700 million in fiscal year 2026](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3684/text#:~:text=Charging%20and%20fueling%20infrastructure%20grants).", "resc": "If, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program has disbursed at least $1.8 billion (~75% of the $2.5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"≥ $1.8B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program has disbursed less than $1.8 billion (~75% of the $2.55 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"< $1.8B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nDisbursement will be considered to be any money distributed under this program for all purposes for which the $2.5 billion has been appropriated. The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).\n\nIf it is unclear from reporting available on January 1, 2027, how much has been disbursed under the CFI program then both subquestions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "56.4k", "median": "95.7k", "upper_75": "138k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems, including Birch and Swinnerton-Dyer conjecture, will be solved by 2059?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2059", "upper_75": "2080", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems will be solved by 2041?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2059", "upper_75": "2080", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems, including the Hodge conjecture, will be solved by 2067?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2055", "upper_75": "2067", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems, specifically the Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness problem, will be solved by 2064?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2045", "upper_75": "2064", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems will be solved by 2041?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2059", "upper_75": "2080", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the disbursement of $1.8 billion in grants for charging infrastructure before 2027, what is the chance that there will be 272k public charging stations in 2027?", "desc": "Over the past two and a half years, Congress authorized over $1 trillion in new resources to catalyze the US climate response and clean energy transition through the passing of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. Yet despite these historic Congressional commitments, whether or not newly funded programs achieve their intended outcomes will depend on their successful implementation by federal agencies. Agencies have been tasked with managing unprecedented amounts of money and not all are currently equipped to run Requests for Proposals and disburse this money in a timely and effective manner. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these new programs will have their full intended impact on the EV transition.\n\nThe IIJA established the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program, which the [Joint Office of Energy and Transportation](https://driveelectric.gov/about/) describes [as follows](https://driveelectric.gov/states-communities/):\n\n>The [CFI Discretionary Grant Program](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/cfi/) provides $2.5 billion through two $1.25 billion discretionary grant programs to strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging and alternative fueling infrastructure in communities where people live and work and along designated AFCs:\n>\n>* **Community Charging and Fueling Grants:** This program will strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging infrastructure and hydrogen, propane, and natural gas fueling infrastructure in urban and rural communities.\n> * **Alternative Fuel Corridor Grants:** This program will strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging infrastructure and hydrogen, propane, and natural gas fueling infrastructure along designated AFCs.\n>\n>These programs will ensure infrastructure deployments meet priorities such as increasing access in underserved and overburdened communities (also referred to as disadvantaged communities), supporting rural areas, building resilient infrastructure, addressing climate change, and improving AFC networks.\n\nThe CFI grants are appropriated annually, [starting at $300 million in fiscal year 2022 and increasing to $700 million in fiscal year 2026](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3684/text#:~:text=Charging%20and%20fueling%20infrastructure%20grants).", "resc": "If, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program has disbursed at least $1.8 billion (~75% of the $2.5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"≥ $1.8B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program has disbursed less than $1.8 billion (~75% of the $2.55 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"< $1.8B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nDisbursement will be considered to be any money distributed under this program for all purposes for which the $2.5 billion has been appropriated. The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).\n\nIf it is unclear from reporting available on January 1, 2027, how much has been disbursed under the CFI program then both subquestions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "205k", "median": "272k", "upper_75": "341k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the disbursement of $1.8 billion in grants for charging infrastructure before 2027, what is the chance that there will be 95.7k public charging stations in 2027? (< $1.8B)", "desc": "Over the past two and a half years, Congress authorized over $1 trillion in new resources to catalyze the US climate response and clean energy transition through the passing of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. Yet despite these historic Congressional commitments, whether or not newly funded programs achieve their intended outcomes will depend on their successful implementation by federal agencies. Agencies have been tasked with managing unprecedented amounts of money and not all are currently equipped to run Requests for Proposals and disburse this money in a timely and effective manner. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these new programs will have their full intended impact on the EV transition.\n\nThe IIJA established the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program, which the [Joint Office of Energy and Transportation](https://driveelectric.gov/about/) describes [as follows](https://driveelectric.gov/states-communities/):\n\n>The [CFI Discretionary Grant Program](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/cfi/) provides $2.5 billion through two $1.25 billion discretionary grant programs to strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging and alternative fueling infrastructure in communities where people live and work and along designated AFCs:\n>\n>* **Community Charging and Fueling Grants:** This program will strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging infrastructure and hydrogen, propane, and natural gas fueling infrastructure in urban and rural communities.\n> * **Alternative Fuel Corridor Grants:** This program will strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging infrastructure and hydrogen, propane, and natural gas fueling infrastructure along designated AFCs.\n>\n>These programs will ensure infrastructure deployments meet priorities such as increasing access in underserved and overburdened communities (also referred to as disadvantaged communities), supporting rural areas, building resilient infrastructure, addressing climate change, and improving AFC networks.\n\nThe CFI grants are appropriated annually, [starting at $300 million in fiscal year 2022 and increasing to $700 million in fiscal year 2026](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3684/text#:~:text=Charging%20and%20fueling%20infrastructure%20grants).", "resc": "If, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program has disbursed at least $1.8 billion (~75% of the $2.5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"≥ $1.8B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program has disbursed less than $1.8 billion (~75% of the $2.55 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"< $1.8B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nDisbursement will be considered to be any money distributed under this program for all purposes for which the $2.5 billion has been appropriated. The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).\n\nIf it is unclear from reporting available on January 1, 2027, how much has been disbursed under the CFI program then both subquestions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "56.4k", "median": "95.7k", "upper_75": "138k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 341,000 public charging stations in 2027, given the disbursement of $1.8 billion in grants for charging infrastructure before 2027? (≥ $1.8B)", "desc": "Over the past two and a half years, Congress authorized over $1 trillion in new resources to catalyze the US climate response and clean energy transition through the passing of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. Yet despite these historic Congressional commitments, whether or not newly funded programs achieve their intended outcomes will depend on their successful implementation by federal agencies. Agencies have been tasked with managing unprecedented amounts of money and not all are currently equipped to run Requests for Proposals and disburse this money in a timely and effective manner. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these new programs will have their full intended impact on the EV transition.\n\nThe IIJA established the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program, which the [Joint Office of Energy and Transportation](https://driveelectric.gov/about/) describes [as follows](https://driveelectric.gov/states-communities/):\n\n>The [CFI Discretionary Grant Program](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/cfi/) provides $2.5 billion through two $1.25 billion discretionary grant programs to strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging and alternative fueling infrastructure in communities where people live and work and along designated AFCs:\n>\n>* **Community Charging and Fueling Grants:** This program will strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging infrastructure and hydrogen, propane, and natural gas fueling infrastructure in urban and rural communities.\n> * **Alternative Fuel Corridor Grants:** This program will strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging infrastructure and hydrogen, propane, and natural gas fueling infrastructure along designated AFCs.\n>\n>These programs will ensure infrastructure deployments meet priorities such as increasing access in underserved and overburdened communities (also referred to as disadvantaged communities), supporting rural areas, building resilient infrastructure, addressing climate change, and improving AFC networks.\n\nThe CFI grants are appropriated annually, [starting at $300 million in fiscal year 2022 and increasing to $700 million in fiscal year 2026](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3684/text#:~:text=Charging%20and%20fueling%20infrastructure%20grants).", "resc": "If, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program has disbursed at least $1.8 billion (~75% of the $2.5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"≥ $1.8B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program has disbursed less than $1.8 billion (~75% of the $2.55 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"< $1.8B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nDisbursement will be considered to be any money distributed under this program for all purposes for which the $2.5 billion has been appropriated. The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).\n\nIf it is unclear from reporting available on January 1, 2027, how much has been disbursed under the CFI program then both subquestions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "205k", "median": "272k", "upper_75": "341k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Conditional on the disbursement of $1.8 billion in grants for charging infrastructure before 2027, what is the chance that there will be 95.7k public charging stations in 2027? (< $1.8B)", "desc": "Over the past two and a half years, Congress authorized over $1 trillion in new resources to catalyze the US climate response and clean energy transition through the passing of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act. Yet despite these historic Congressional commitments, whether or not newly funded programs achieve their intended outcomes will depend on their successful implementation by federal agencies. Agencies have been tasked with managing unprecedented amounts of money and not all are currently equipped to run Requests for Proposals and disburse this money in a timely and effective manner. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these new programs will have their full intended impact on the EV transition.\n\nThe IIJA established the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program, which the [Joint Office of Energy and Transportation](https://driveelectric.gov/about/) describes [as follows](https://driveelectric.gov/states-communities/):\n\n>The [CFI Discretionary Grant Program](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/cfi/) provides $2.5 billion through two $1.25 billion discretionary grant programs to strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging and alternative fueling infrastructure in communities where people live and work and along designated AFCs:\n>\n>* **Community Charging and Fueling Grants:** This program will strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging infrastructure and hydrogen, propane, and natural gas fueling infrastructure in urban and rural communities.\n> * **Alternative Fuel Corridor Grants:** This program will strategically deploy publicly accessible EV charging infrastructure and hydrogen, propane, and natural gas fueling infrastructure along designated AFCs.\n>\n>These programs will ensure infrastructure deployments meet priorities such as increasing access in underserved and overburdened communities (also referred to as disadvantaged communities), supporting rural areas, building resilient infrastructure, addressing climate change, and improving AFC networks.\n\nThe CFI grants are appropriated annually, [starting at $300 million in fiscal year 2022 and increasing to $700 million in fiscal year 2026](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3684/text#:~:text=Charging%20and%20fueling%20infrastructure%20grants).", "resc": "If, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program has disbursed at least $1.8 billion (~75% of the $2.5 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"≥ $1.8B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nIf, according to information available on or before January 1, 2027, credible sources report that the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure (CFI) Discretionary Grant Program has disbursed less than $1.8 billion (~75% of the $2.55 billion appropriated), then the subquestion \"< $1.8B\" will resolve as the number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027. Otherwise that subquestion will be **Annulled**.\n\nDisbursement will be considered to be any money distributed under this program for all purposes for which the $2.5 billion has been appropriated. The number of level 2 or greater public charging stations on January 1, 2027 will be determined according to the resolution criteria of the [public charging station question here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/14746/level-2-or-greater-public-charging-stations/).\n\nIf it is unclear from reporting available on January 1, 2027, how much has been disbursed under the CFI program then both subquestions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "56.4k", "median": "95.7k", "upper_75": "138k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems, specifically the Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness problem, will be solved by 2064?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2045", "upper_75": "2064", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems (P versus NP) will be solved by 2095?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2072", "median": "2086", "upper_75": "2095", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems, specifically the Navier-Stokes existence and smoothness problem, will be solved by 2064?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2035", "median": "2045", "upper_75": "2064", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems (P versus NP) will be solved by 2095?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2072", "median": "2086", "upper_75": "2095", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems (P versus NP) will be solved by 2095?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2072", "median": "2086", "upper_75": "2095", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems, including the Riemann Hypothesis, will be solved by 2094?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2075", "upper_75": "2094", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will have an AI president by 2274?", "desc": "The concept of an AI head of state frequently appears in science fiction. So far, this has not occurred in any country. With advances in artificial intelligence, [some have speculated](https://futurism.com/could-an-ai-ever-be-elected-president) that the United States may someday be ruled by such a leader.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which an artificial intelligence program holds the office of President of the United States, according to whitehouse.gov. If this does not occur prior to January 1, 2300, this question resolves as **Not ≤ Dec 31, 2299**. Metaculus admins will choose an appropriate replacement source if whitehouse.gov becomes defunct prior to this question being resolved.", "lower_25": "2274", "median": "Not ≤ 2299", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2299", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will have an AI president by 2274?", "desc": "The concept of an AI head of state frequently appears in science fiction. So far, this has not occurred in any country. With advances in artificial intelligence, [some have speculated](https://futurism.com/could-an-ai-ever-be-elected-president) that the United States may someday be ruled by such a leader.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which an artificial intelligence program holds the office of President of the United States, according to whitehouse.gov. If this does not occur prior to January 1, 2300, this question resolves as **Not ≤ Dec 31, 2299**. Metaculus admins will choose an appropriate replacement source if whitehouse.gov becomes defunct prior to this question being resolved.", "lower_25": "2274", "median": "Not ≤ 2299", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2299", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States will have an AI president by 2274?", "desc": "The concept of an AI head of state frequently appears in science fiction. So far, this has not occurred in any country. With advances in artificial intelligence, [some have speculated](https://futurism.com/could-an-ai-ever-be-elected-president) that the United States may someday be ruled by such a leader.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which an artificial intelligence program holds the office of President of the United States, according to whitehouse.gov. If this does not occur prior to January 1, 2300, this question resolves as **Not ≤ Dec 31, 2299**. Metaculus admins will choose an appropriate replacement source if whitehouse.gov becomes defunct prior to this question being resolved.", "lower_25": "2274", "median": "Not ≤ 2299", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2299", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems, including the Riemann Hypothesis, will be solved by 2094?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2075", "upper_75": "2094", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems, including Yang–Mills existence and mass gap, will be solved by 2084?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2053", "median": "2065", "upper_75": "2084", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems, including Yang–Mills existence and mass gap, will be solved by 2084?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2053", "median": "2065", "upper_75": "2084", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems, including the Riemann Hypothesis, will be solved by 2094?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2075", "upper_75": "2094", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US : China ratio for private investment in AI will be 3.44 in the following years?", "desc": "According to the [latest AI Index report](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/report/#individual-chapters) (ch. 4, “Private investment in AI by geographic area, 2013–21”), the United States led the world in private investment in AI companies in 2021, at $52.87 billion, or about three times Chinese private investments ($17.21 billion).\n\nUnderstanding which country will have a larger investment scene may be important for understanding the US and China's positions as AI powers relative to each other as AI gets more and more powerful.\n\n[Private Investment in AI by Geographic Area, 2013-21](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JWWYUH5vYjeJGiZzqVfyjn1J5y1libKq/view?usp=sharing)", "resc": "The question will resolve according to the figures reported in the [AI Index](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/). It will be resolved as {US investment} / {China investment}, e.g. it would currently resolve as 52.87/17.21 = 3.07. If the AI Index is discontinued before the relevant report is published, the question will be resolved based on either credible sources reporting a continuation of the data series or N/A.", "lower_25": "2.81", "median": "3.44", "upper_75": "4.47", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US : China ratio for private investment in AI will be 3.44 in the following years?", "desc": "According to the [latest AI Index report](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/report/#individual-chapters) (ch. 4, “Private investment in AI by geographic area, 2013–21”), the United States led the world in private investment in AI companies in 2021, at $52.87 billion, or about three times Chinese private investments ($17.21 billion).\n\nUnderstanding which country will have a larger investment scene may be important for understanding the US and China's positions as AI powers relative to each other as AI gets more and more powerful.\n\n[Private Investment in AI by Geographic Area, 2013-21](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JWWYUH5vYjeJGiZzqVfyjn1J5y1libKq/view?usp=sharing)", "resc": "The question will resolve according to the figures reported in the [AI Index](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/). It will be resolved as {US investment} / {China investment}, e.g. it would currently resolve as 52.87/17.21 = 3.07. If the AI Index is discontinued before the relevant report is published, the question will be resolved based on either credible sources reporting a continuation of the data series or N/A.", "lower_25": "2.81", "median": "3.44", "upper_75": "4.47", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the remaining six Millennium Prize problems, including Yang–Mills existence and mass gap, will be solved by 2084?", "desc": "The [Millennium Prize problems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems) are some of the hardest and most famous problems in mathematics. The [Clay Mathematics Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Mathematics_Institute) has offered a one million dollar prize for solving each problem. So far, only one problem (the [Poincaré conjecture\n](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_conjecture)) has been solved in 2002; the prover has refused to accept the prize. Solving each Millennium Prize problem will have profound effects on mathematics and possibly other disciplines as well.", "resc": "The resolution source is the [Clay Mathematics Institute CMI website](https://www.claymath.org/millennium-problems). Each sub-question will resolve based on the respective designation as 'solved' and 'unsolved' on the resolution source, specifically the date at which it is designated as 'solved'. The solver's decision to accept or reject the prize will bear no weight on the resolution of the subquestion.\n\nShould the Clay Mathematics Institute cease existing or no longer track the resolution of the Millennium Problems, this question will resolve ambiguous unless a successor resolution source is established within 5 years of the cessation of the Clay Mathematics Institute. A successor resolution source will be one that lists the Millennium Problems, is linked as the major source at the [Wikipedia entry]( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Prize_Problems), and is cited in at least one academic paper or book (peer-reviewed journals or academic press). \n\nShould a particular Millennium Prize problem not be resolved before 2100, the subquestion will resolve as \"after 2100.\"", "lower_25": "2053", "median": "2065", "upper_75": "2084", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US : China ratio for private investment in AI will be 3.01 in the following years (2026)?", "desc": "According to the [latest AI Index report](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/report/#individual-chapters) (ch. 4, “Private investment in AI by geographic area, 2013–21”), the United States led the world in private investment in AI companies in 2021, at $52.87 billion, or about three times Chinese private investments ($17.21 billion).\n\nUnderstanding which country will have a larger investment scene may be important for understanding the US and China's positions as AI powers relative to each other as AI gets more and more powerful.\n\n[Private Investment in AI by Geographic Area, 2013-21](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JWWYUH5vYjeJGiZzqVfyjn1J5y1libKq/view?usp=sharing)", "resc": "The question will resolve according to the figures reported in the [AI Index](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/). It will be resolved as {US investment} / {China investment}, e.g. it would currently resolve as 52.87/17.21 = 3.07. If the AI Index is discontinued before the relevant report is published, the question will be resolved based on either credible sources reporting a continuation of the data series or N/A.", "lower_25": "2.14", "median": "3.01", "upper_75": "4.30", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What will be the US : China ratio for private investment in AI in the following years (2024)? (3.17)\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the US : China ratio for private investment in AI in the following years (2024) will be 3.17?", "desc": "According to the [latest AI Index report](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/report/#individual-chapters) (ch. 4, “Private investment in AI by geographic area, 2013–21”), the United States led the world in private investment in AI companies in 2021, at $52.87 billion, or about three times Chinese private investments ($17.21 billion).\n\nUnderstanding which country will have a larger investment scene may be important for understanding the US and China's positions as AI powers relative to each other as AI gets more and more powerful.\n\n[Private Investment in AI by Geographic Area, 2013-21](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JWWYUH5vYjeJGiZzqVfyjn1J5y1libKq/view?usp=sharing)", "resc": "The question will resolve according to the figures reported in the [AI Index](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/). It will be resolved as {US investment} / {China investment}, e.g. it would currently resolve as 52.87/17.21 = 3.07. If the AI Index is discontinued before the relevant report is published, the question will be resolved based on either credible sources reporting a continuation of the data series or N/A.", "lower_25": "2.53", "median": "3.17", "upper_75": "3.87", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US : China ratio for private investment in AI will be 3.44 in the following years?", "desc": "According to the [latest AI Index report](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/report/#individual-chapters) (ch. 4, “Private investment in AI by geographic area, 2013–21”), the United States led the world in private investment in AI companies in 2021, at $52.87 billion, or about three times Chinese private investments ($17.21 billion).\n\nUnderstanding which country will have a larger investment scene may be important for understanding the US and China's positions as AI powers relative to each other as AI gets more and more powerful.\n\n[Private Investment in AI by Geographic Area, 2013-21](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JWWYUH5vYjeJGiZzqVfyjn1J5y1libKq/view?usp=sharing)", "resc": "The question will resolve according to the figures reported in the [AI Index](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/). It will be resolved as {US investment} / {China investment}, e.g. it would currently resolve as 52.87/17.21 = 3.07. If the AI Index is discontinued before the relevant report is published, the question will be resolved based on either credible sources reporting a continuation of the data series or N/A.", "lower_25": "2.81", "median": "3.44", "upper_75": "4.47", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US : China ratio for private investment in AI will be 3.01 in the following years (2026)?", "desc": "According to the [latest AI Index report](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/report/#individual-chapters) (ch. 4, “Private investment in AI by geographic area, 2013–21”), the United States led the world in private investment in AI companies in 2021, at $52.87 billion, or about three times Chinese private investments ($17.21 billion).\n\nUnderstanding which country will have a larger investment scene may be important for understanding the US and China's positions as AI powers relative to each other as AI gets more and more powerful.\n\n[Private Investment in AI by Geographic Area, 2013-21](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JWWYUH5vYjeJGiZzqVfyjn1J5y1libKq/view?usp=sharing)", "resc": "The question will resolve according to the figures reported in the [AI Index](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/). It will be resolved as {US investment} / {China investment}, e.g. it would currently resolve as 52.87/17.21 = 3.07. If the AI Index is discontinued before the relevant report is published, the question will be resolved based on either credible sources reporting a continuation of the data series or N/A.", "lower_25": "2.14", "median": "3.01", "upper_75": "4.30", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What will be the US : China ratio for private investment in AI in the following years (2024)? (3.17)\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the US : China ratio for private investment in AI in the following years (2024) will be 3.17?", "desc": "According to the [latest AI Index report](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/report/#individual-chapters) (ch. 4, “Private investment in AI by geographic area, 2013–21”), the United States led the world in private investment in AI companies in 2021, at $52.87 billion, or about three times Chinese private investments ($17.21 billion).\n\nUnderstanding which country will have a larger investment scene may be important for understanding the US and China's positions as AI powers relative to each other as AI gets more and more powerful.\n\n[Private Investment in AI by Geographic Area, 2013-21](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JWWYUH5vYjeJGiZzqVfyjn1J5y1libKq/view?usp=sharing)", "resc": "The question will resolve according to the figures reported in the [AI Index](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/). It will be resolved as {US investment} / {China investment}, e.g. it would currently resolve as 52.87/17.21 = 3.07. If the AI Index is discontinued before the relevant report is published, the question will be resolved based on either credible sources reporting a continuation of the data series or N/A.", "lower_25": "2.53", "median": "3.17", "upper_75": "3.87", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US : China ratio for private investment in AI will be 3.01 in the following years (2026)?", "desc": "According to the [latest AI Index report](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/report/#individual-chapters) (ch. 4, “Private investment in AI by geographic area, 2013–21”), the United States led the world in private investment in AI companies in 2021, at $52.87 billion, or about three times Chinese private investments ($17.21 billion).\n\nUnderstanding which country will have a larger investment scene may be important for understanding the US and China's positions as AI powers relative to each other as AI gets more and more powerful.\n\n[Private Investment in AI by Geographic Area, 2013-21](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JWWYUH5vYjeJGiZzqVfyjn1J5y1libKq/view?usp=sharing)", "resc": "The question will resolve according to the figures reported in the [AI Index](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/). It will be resolved as {US investment} / {China investment}, e.g. it would currently resolve as 52.87/17.21 = 3.07. If the AI Index is discontinued before the relevant report is published, the question will be resolved based on either credible sources reporting a continuation of the data series or N/A.", "lower_25": "2.14", "median": "3.01", "upper_75": "4.30", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What will be the US : China ratio for private investment in AI in the following years (2030)? (2.56)\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the US : China ratio for private investment in AI in the following years (2030) will be 2.56?", "desc": "According to the [latest AI Index report](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/report/#individual-chapters) (ch. 4, “Private investment in AI by geographic area, 2013–21”), the United States led the world in private investment in AI companies in 2021, at $52.87 billion, or about three times Chinese private investments ($17.21 billion).\n\nUnderstanding which country will have a larger investment scene may be important for understanding the US and China's positions as AI powers relative to each other as AI gets more and more powerful.\n\n[Private Investment in AI by Geographic Area, 2013-21](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JWWYUH5vYjeJGiZzqVfyjn1J5y1libKq/view?usp=sharing)", "resc": "The question will resolve according to the figures reported in the [AI Index](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/). It will be resolved as {US investment} / {China investment}, e.g. it would currently resolve as 52.87/17.21 = 3.07. If the AI Index is discontinued before the relevant report is published, the question will be resolved based on either credible sources reporting a continuation of the data series or N/A.", "lower_25": "1.67", "median": "2.56", "upper_75": "4.00", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What will be the US : China ratio for private investment in AI in the following years (2024)? (3.17)\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the US : China ratio for private investment in AI in the following years (2024) will be 3.17?", "desc": "According to the [latest AI Index report](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/report/#individual-chapters) (ch. 4, “Private investment in AI by geographic area, 2013–21”), the United States led the world in private investment in AI companies in 2021, at $52.87 billion, or about three times Chinese private investments ($17.21 billion).\n\nUnderstanding which country will have a larger investment scene may be important for understanding the US and China's positions as AI powers relative to each other as AI gets more and more powerful.\n\n[Private Investment in AI by Geographic Area, 2013-21](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JWWYUH5vYjeJGiZzqVfyjn1J5y1libKq/view?usp=sharing)", "resc": "The question will resolve according to the figures reported in the [AI Index](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/). It will be resolved as {US investment} / {China investment}, e.g. it would currently resolve as 52.87/17.21 = 3.07. If the AI Index is discontinued before the relevant report is published, the question will be resolved based on either credible sources reporting a continuation of the data series or N/A.", "lower_25": "2.53", "median": "3.17", "upper_75": "3.87", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a free and public AI will be able to write working programs of 50k or more lines of code by Sep 2026?", "desc": "The development of artificial intelligence (AI) has been growing at an impressive rate in recent years, and its impact on different industries and fields is becoming increasingly significant. One area where AI could revolutionize the way we work is programming. As AI systems become more sophisticated, they may be able to generate code that meets specific requirements and design specifications. However, the question of when an AI will be able to write working programs of any level of complexity of 50k or more lines of code remains unanswered.", "resc": "The resolution date will be based on the date when a free and public AI system, capable of generating working programs of 50k or more lines of code of any level of complexity, is released and made available for public use without any waitlist or subscription.\n\nThe programs generated by the AI system must be able to run and perform the tasks it was designed for, even if they may have some errors.\n\nThe AI system must be capable of generating code in four programming languages: Java, Python, C++, and JavaScript.", "lower_25": "Jun 2025", "median": "Sep 2026", "upper_75": "Dec 2028", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that anthropogenic methane emissions will be 9.14% higher in 2050 compared to current levels?", "desc": "Anthropogenic methane is methane that is directly emitted into the atmosphere due to human activities. Methane (CH4) is a [potent greenhouse gas](https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/oil-gas-and-coal/methane-emissions_en), and while it has a [shorter lifetime in the atmosphere](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-methane-tracker-2022/methane-and-climate-change) compared to carbon dioxide (CO2), it is much more effective at trapping heat. Methane is [>25 times more potent than carbon dioxide](https://www.epa.gov/gmi/importance-methane#:~:text=Methane%20is%20emitted%20from%20a,treatment%2C%20and%20certain%20industrial%20processes.) at trapping heat in the atmosphere. As a result, understanding and mitigating anthropogenic methane emissions is crucial for addressing climate change.\n\nThe [main sources](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/sources-of-methane-emissions-2) of anthropogenic methane emissions are agriculture, waste management, and the extraction, processing, and distribution of fossil fuels. In [agriculture](https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/methane-emissions-are-driving-climate-change-heres-how-reduce-them), methane is primarily emitted by enteric fermentation in the digestive systems of ruminant animals (e.g., cattle, sheep, and goats) and by anaerobic decomposition in rice paddies. Waste management contributes to methane emissions through the decomposition of organic waste in landfills and the treatment of wastewater. In the energy sector, methane emissions occur during the extraction, processing, and transportation of natural gas, coal, and oil. We do not count methane emitted by wetlands towards this total, except where this is used for agriculture.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the gigatons of CO2 equivalent methane emissions for the year 2050 (GtCO2e/year), as reported by the [Climate Watch (CAIT) database](https://www.climatewatchdata.org/ghg-emissions?breakBy=regions&end_year=2019&gases=ch4&start_year=1990).", "lower_25": "9.14", "median": "10.2", "upper_75": "12.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that anthropogenic methane emissions will be 9.14% higher in 2050 compared to current levels?", "desc": "Anthropogenic methane is methane that is directly emitted into the atmosphere due to human activities. Methane (CH4) is a [potent greenhouse gas](https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/oil-gas-and-coal/methane-emissions_en), and while it has a [shorter lifetime in the atmosphere](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-methane-tracker-2022/methane-and-climate-change) compared to carbon dioxide (CO2), it is much more effective at trapping heat. Methane is [>25 times more potent than carbon dioxide](https://www.epa.gov/gmi/importance-methane#:~:text=Methane%20is%20emitted%20from%20a,treatment%2C%20and%20certain%20industrial%20processes.) at trapping heat in the atmosphere. As a result, understanding and mitigating anthropogenic methane emissions is crucial for addressing climate change.\n\nThe [main sources](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/sources-of-methane-emissions-2) of anthropogenic methane emissions are agriculture, waste management, and the extraction, processing, and distribution of fossil fuels. In [agriculture](https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/methane-emissions-are-driving-climate-change-heres-how-reduce-them), methane is primarily emitted by enteric fermentation in the digestive systems of ruminant animals (e.g., cattle, sheep, and goats) and by anaerobic decomposition in rice paddies. Waste management contributes to methane emissions through the decomposition of organic waste in landfills and the treatment of wastewater. In the energy sector, methane emissions occur during the extraction, processing, and transportation of natural gas, coal, and oil. We do not count methane emitted by wetlands towards this total, except where this is used for agriculture.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the gigatons of CO2 equivalent methane emissions for the year 2050 (GtCO2e/year), as reported by the [Climate Watch (CAIT) database](https://www.climatewatchdata.org/ghg-emissions?breakBy=regions&end_year=2019&gases=ch4&start_year=1990).", "lower_25": "9.14", "median": "10.2", "upper_75": "12.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a runner will break the 2-hour mark in a competitive marathon by Jun 2029?", "desc": "In 2019, Eliud Kipchoge became the only person to successfully [run a marathon distance in less than 2 hours](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ineos_1:59_Challenge) under *non-competitive conditions*. He was assisted by 41 pacemakers, along with pacing lasers, hydration provided by bicycle and a very flat course designed to minimise wind.\n\nHowever, this question concerns *competitive* marathons. In open events, Kipchoge [set a world record](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Berlin_Marathon) at the Berlin Marathon in 2022 with a time of 2:01:09. More recently, on April 23, 2023, 23-year-old Kelvin Kiptum ran the [second-fastest time in marathon history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_London_Marathon), with a 2:01:25, over a minute faster than Kipchoge's record on the same course. \n\n[This 2019 statistical study](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6613719/), for instance, suggests May 2032 as the most likely time that the sub 2-hour marathon will be broken in competition.", "resc": "The question will resolve as the date of the first marathon with a time under 2:00:00, given that the associated world record is ratified by World Athletics (or the commonly accepted successor to World Athletics), signified by a ratification press release [like this](https://www.worldathletics.org/news/press-releases/ratified-record-kipchoge-marathon-tebogo-jamaica).", "lower_25": "Jul 2025", "median": "Dec 2026", "upper_75": "Jun 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that anthropogenic methane emissions will be 9.14% higher in 2050 compared to current levels?", "desc": "Anthropogenic methane is methane that is directly emitted into the atmosphere due to human activities. Methane (CH4) is a [potent greenhouse gas](https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/oil-gas-and-coal/methane-emissions_en), and while it has a [shorter lifetime in the atmosphere](https://www.iea.org/reports/global-methane-tracker-2022/methane-and-climate-change) compared to carbon dioxide (CO2), it is much more effective at trapping heat. Methane is [>25 times more potent than carbon dioxide](https://www.epa.gov/gmi/importance-methane#:~:text=Methane%20is%20emitted%20from%20a,treatment%2C%20and%20certain%20industrial%20processes.) at trapping heat in the atmosphere. As a result, understanding and mitigating anthropogenic methane emissions is crucial for addressing climate change.\n\nThe [main sources](https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/sources-of-methane-emissions-2) of anthropogenic methane emissions are agriculture, waste management, and the extraction, processing, and distribution of fossil fuels. In [agriculture](https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/methane-emissions-are-driving-climate-change-heres-how-reduce-them), methane is primarily emitted by enteric fermentation in the digestive systems of ruminant animals (e.g., cattle, sheep, and goats) and by anaerobic decomposition in rice paddies. Waste management contributes to methane emissions through the decomposition of organic waste in landfills and the treatment of wastewater. In the energy sector, methane emissions occur during the extraction, processing, and transportation of natural gas, coal, and oil. We do not count methane emitted by wetlands towards this total, except where this is used for agriculture.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the gigatons of CO2 equivalent methane emissions for the year 2050 (GtCO2e/year), as reported by the [Climate Watch (CAIT) database](https://www.climatewatchdata.org/ghg-emissions?breakBy=regions&end_year=2019&gases=ch4&start_year=1990).", "lower_25": "9.14", "median": "10.2", "upper_75": "12.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What will be the US : China ratio for private investment in AI in the following years (2030)? (2.56)\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the US : China ratio for private investment in AI in the following years (2030) will be 2.56?", "desc": "According to the [latest AI Index report](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/report/#individual-chapters) (ch. 4, “Private investment in AI by geographic area, 2013–21”), the United States led the world in private investment in AI companies in 2021, at $52.87 billion, or about three times Chinese private investments ($17.21 billion).\n\nUnderstanding which country will have a larger investment scene may be important for understanding the US and China's positions as AI powers relative to each other as AI gets more and more powerful.\n\n[Private Investment in AI by Geographic Area, 2013-21](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JWWYUH5vYjeJGiZzqVfyjn1J5y1libKq/view?usp=sharing)", "resc": "The question will resolve according to the figures reported in the [AI Index](https://aiindex.stanford.edu/). It will be resolved as {US investment} / {China investment}, e.g. it would currently resolve as 52.87/17.21 = 3.07. If the AI Index is discontinued before the relevant report is published, the question will be resolved based on either credible sources reporting a continuation of the data series or N/A.", "lower_25": "1.67", "median": "2.56", "upper_75": "4.00", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 334.9 in the following months (Feb-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "307.3", "median": "322.4", "upper_75": "334.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a reliable and general household robot will be developed by 2034?", "desc": "The development of general-purpose robots capable of performing household chores has been a long-standing goal in the field of robotics. Such a robot would need to be versatile, adaptable, and capable of handling a wide range of tasks and environments commonly found in American homes. Achieving this level of capability remains a significant challenge.", "resc": "This question will resolve positively on the date on the first date during which a general household robot has been publicly and credibly documented to have:\n\nDemonstrated the ability to autonomously navigate and operate within a variety of residential environments, including:\n\n1. Identifying and avoiding obstacles, such as furniture and pets. \n2. Maneuvering through doorways, hallways, and multi-level spaces. \n3. Adapting to different floor types and surface conditions (e.g., carpet, tile, hardwood). \n4. Recognizing and safely handling fragile objects, such as glassware or delicate appliances.\n\nExhibited proficiency in performing a comprehensive range of standard household chores, including at least 5 of these tasks:\n\n1. Cleaning tasks, such as vacuuming, sweeping, mopping, dusting, and tidying up clutter. \n2. Laundry tasks, including sorting, washing, drying, folding, ironing, and putting away clothes. \n3. Dishwashing tasks, like loading and unloading a dishwasher, or washing, drying, and putting away dishes by hand. \n4. Cooking tasks, such as meal planning, ingredient preparation, cooking, and serving. \n5. Maintaining indoor plants, including watering, pruning, and repotting. \n6. Basic pet care, such as feeding, grooming, and cleaning up after pets.\n\nShown the ability to adapt to user preferences and instructions, including:\n\n1. Learning and adjusting to individual household routines and schedules. \n2. Following specific instructions regarding cleaning methods, food preparation, or pet care. \n3. Recognizing and responding to verbal and non-verbal cues from household members.\n\nDemonstrated a high level of reliability and safety while performing these tasks, with:\n\n1. Consistently high-quality results that meet or exceed the performance of most humans performing the same tasks, within 500% of the average time it takes humans to perform these tasks.\n2. A low rate of errors, accidents, or damages to the home or its contents. More specificially, it is required that, when given full instructions, the robot can fail no more than 5% of the time on average while completing a designated chore. A fail counts as any error that would require human intervention to fix, as otherwise the chore would not be completed to even a minimum level of satisfaction.\n3. The ability to recognize and avoid potentially dangerous situations, such as electrical hazards or fire risks.\n\nThe development must be accompanied by independent reviews, testimonials, or high-quality case studies documenting the robot's performance in real-world residential settings, demonstrating its ability to perform tasks consistently and effectively, with a high level of satisfaction among consumers.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 2.48% in the United States in the following quarters (2025 Q1)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Economic Analysis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Economic_Analysis) (BEA) provides quarterly estimates of [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) in the United States. The BEA typically releases [three GDP estimates](https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2020-08/quick-guide-gdp.pdf), an advance estimate, a second estimate, and a third and final estimate. The advance estimate is typically released in the month following the end of the quarter.\n\nBelow is a graph of quarter over quarter GDP growth rates in the US, adjusted for inflation and seasonal effects, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BEA, but it updates with each estimate published by the BEA so it does not reflect the advanced estimate in each quarter.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the quarter over quarter GDP growth rate in the US, adjusted for inflation and seasonal effects and using an annual rate, in percent. Resolution will be determined according to the BEA's advance estimate, typically found [here](https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product)", "lower_25": "0.669", "median": "1.65", "upper_75": "2.48", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a reliable and general household robot will be developed by 2034?", "desc": "The development of general-purpose robots capable of performing household chores has been a long-standing goal in the field of robotics. Such a robot would need to be versatile, adaptable, and capable of handling a wide range of tasks and environments commonly found in American homes. Achieving this level of capability remains a significant challenge.", "resc": "This question will resolve positively on the date on the first date during which a general household robot has been publicly and credibly documented to have:\n\nDemonstrated the ability to autonomously navigate and operate within a variety of residential environments, including:\n\n1. Identifying and avoiding obstacles, such as furniture and pets. \n2. Maneuvering through doorways, hallways, and multi-level spaces. \n3. Adapting to different floor types and surface conditions (e.g., carpet, tile, hardwood). \n4. Recognizing and safely handling fragile objects, such as glassware or delicate appliances.\n\nExhibited proficiency in performing a comprehensive range of standard household chores, including at least 5 of these tasks:\n\n1. Cleaning tasks, such as vacuuming, sweeping, mopping, dusting, and tidying up clutter. \n2. Laundry tasks, including sorting, washing, drying, folding, ironing, and putting away clothes. \n3. Dishwashing tasks, like loading and unloading a dishwasher, or washing, drying, and putting away dishes by hand. \n4. Cooking tasks, such as meal planning, ingredient preparation, cooking, and serving. \n5. Maintaining indoor plants, including watering, pruning, and repotting. \n6. Basic pet care, such as feeding, grooming, and cleaning up after pets.\n\nShown the ability to adapt to user preferences and instructions, including:\n\n1. Learning and adjusting to individual household routines and schedules. \n2. Following specific instructions regarding cleaning methods, food preparation, or pet care. \n3. Recognizing and responding to verbal and non-verbal cues from household members.\n\nDemonstrated a high level of reliability and safety while performing these tasks, with:\n\n1. Consistently high-quality results that meet or exceed the performance of most humans performing the same tasks, within 500% of the average time it takes humans to perform these tasks.\n2. A low rate of errors, accidents, or damages to the home or its contents. More specificially, it is required that, when given full instructions, the robot can fail no more than 5% of the time on average while completing a designated chore. A fail counts as any error that would require human intervention to fix, as otherwise the chore would not be completed to even a minimum level of satisfaction.\n3. The ability to recognize and avoid potentially dangerous situations, such as electrical hazards or fire risks.\n\nThe development must be accompanied by independent reviews, testimonials, or high-quality case studies documenting the robot's performance in real-world residential settings, demonstrating its ability to perform tasks consistently and effectively, with a high level of satisfaction among consumers.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a reliable and general household robot will be developed by 2034?", "desc": "The development of general-purpose robots capable of performing household chores has been a long-standing goal in the field of robotics. Such a robot would need to be versatile, adaptable, and capable of handling a wide range of tasks and environments commonly found in American homes. Achieving this level of capability remains a significant challenge.", "resc": "This question will resolve positively on the date on the first date during which a general household robot has been publicly and credibly documented to have:\n\nDemonstrated the ability to autonomously navigate and operate within a variety of residential environments, including:\n\n1. Identifying and avoiding obstacles, such as furniture and pets. \n2. Maneuvering through doorways, hallways, and multi-level spaces. \n3. Adapting to different floor types and surface conditions (e.g., carpet, tile, hardwood). \n4. Recognizing and safely handling fragile objects, such as glassware or delicate appliances.\n\nExhibited proficiency in performing a comprehensive range of standard household chores, including at least 5 of these tasks:\n\n1. Cleaning tasks, such as vacuuming, sweeping, mopping, dusting, and tidying up clutter. \n2. Laundry tasks, including sorting, washing, drying, folding, ironing, and putting away clothes. \n3. Dishwashing tasks, like loading and unloading a dishwasher, or washing, drying, and putting away dishes by hand. \n4. Cooking tasks, such as meal planning, ingredient preparation, cooking, and serving. \n5. Maintaining indoor plants, including watering, pruning, and repotting. \n6. Basic pet care, such as feeding, grooming, and cleaning up after pets.\n\nShown the ability to adapt to user preferences and instructions, including:\n\n1. Learning and adjusting to individual household routines and schedules. \n2. Following specific instructions regarding cleaning methods, food preparation, or pet care. \n3. Recognizing and responding to verbal and non-verbal cues from household members.\n\nDemonstrated a high level of reliability and safety while performing these tasks, with:\n\n1. Consistently high-quality results that meet or exceed the performance of most humans performing the same tasks, within 500% of the average time it takes humans to perform these tasks.\n2. A low rate of errors, accidents, or damages to the home or its contents. More specificially, it is required that, when given full instructions, the robot can fail no more than 5% of the time on average while completing a designated chore. A fail counts as any error that would require human intervention to fix, as otherwise the chore would not be completed to even a minimum level of satisfaction.\n3. The ability to recognize and avoid potentially dangerous situations, such as electrical hazards or fire risks.\n\nThe development must be accompanied by independent reviews, testimonials, or high-quality case studies documenting the robot's performance in real-world residential settings, demonstrating its ability to perform tasks consistently and effectively, with a high level of satisfaction among consumers.", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2040", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a runner will break the 2-hour mark in a competitive marathon by Jun 2029?", "desc": "In 2019, Eliud Kipchoge became the only person to successfully [run a marathon distance in less than 2 hours](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ineos_1:59_Challenge) under *non-competitive conditions*. He was assisted by 41 pacemakers, along with pacing lasers, hydration provided by bicycle and a very flat course designed to minimise wind.\n\nHowever, this question concerns *competitive* marathons. In open events, Kipchoge [set a world record](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Berlin_Marathon) at the Berlin Marathon in 2022 with a time of 2:01:09. More recently, on April 23, 2023, 23-year-old Kelvin Kiptum ran the [second-fastest time in marathon history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_London_Marathon), with a 2:01:25, over a minute faster than Kipchoge's record on the same course. \n\n[This 2019 statistical study](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6613719/), for instance, suggests May 2032 as the most likely time that the sub 2-hour marathon will be broken in competition.", "resc": "The question will resolve as the date of the first marathon with a time under 2:00:00, given that the associated world record is ratified by World Athletics (or the commonly accepted successor to World Athletics), signified by a ratification press release [like this](https://www.worldathletics.org/news/press-releases/ratified-record-kipchoge-marathon-tebogo-jamaica).", "lower_25": "Jul 2025", "median": "Dec 2026", "upper_75": "Jun 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 334.9 in the following months (Feb-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "307.3", "median": "322.4", "upper_75": "334.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a runner will break the 2-hour mark in a competitive marathon by Jun 2029?", "desc": "In 2019, Eliud Kipchoge became the only person to successfully [run a marathon distance in less than 2 hours](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ineos_1:59_Challenge) under *non-competitive conditions*. He was assisted by 41 pacemakers, along with pacing lasers, hydration provided by bicycle and a very flat course designed to minimise wind.\n\nHowever, this question concerns *competitive* marathons. In open events, Kipchoge [set a world record](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Berlin_Marathon) at the Berlin Marathon in 2022 with a time of 2:01:09. More recently, on April 23, 2023, 23-year-old Kelvin Kiptum ran the [second-fastest time in marathon history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_London_Marathon), with a 2:01:25, over a minute faster than Kipchoge's record on the same course. \n\n[This 2019 statistical study](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6613719/), for instance, suggests May 2032 as the most likely time that the sub 2-hour marathon will be broken in competition.", "resc": "The question will resolve as the date of the first marathon with a time under 2:00:00, given that the associated world record is ratified by World Athletics (or the commonly accepted successor to World Athletics), signified by a ratification press release [like this](https://www.worldathletics.org/news/press-releases/ratified-record-kipchoge-marathon-tebogo-jamaica).", "lower_25": "Jul 2025", "median": "Dec 2026", "upper_75": "Jun 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a free and public AI will be able to write working programs of 50k or more lines of code by Sep 2026?", "desc": "The development of artificial intelligence (AI) has been growing at an impressive rate in recent years, and its impact on different industries and fields is becoming increasingly significant. One area where AI could revolutionize the way we work is programming. As AI systems become more sophisticated, they may be able to generate code that meets specific requirements and design specifications. However, the question of when an AI will be able to write working programs of any level of complexity of 50k or more lines of code remains unanswered.", "resc": "The resolution date will be based on the date when a free and public AI system, capable of generating working programs of 50k or more lines of code of any level of complexity, is released and made available for public use without any waitlist or subscription.\n\nThe programs generated by the AI system must be able to run and perform the tasks it was designed for, even if they may have some errors.\n\nThe AI system must be capable of generating code in four programming languages: Java, Python, C++, and JavaScript.", "lower_25": "Jun 2025", "median": "Sep 2026", "upper_75": "Dec 2028", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a free and public AI will be able to write working programs of 50k or more lines of code by Sep 2026?", "desc": "The development of artificial intelligence (AI) has been growing at an impressive rate in recent years, and its impact on different industries and fields is becoming increasingly significant. One area where AI could revolutionize the way we work is programming. As AI systems become more sophisticated, they may be able to generate code that meets specific requirements and design specifications. However, the question of when an AI will be able to write working programs of any level of complexity of 50k or more lines of code remains unanswered.", "resc": "The resolution date will be based on the date when a free and public AI system, capable of generating working programs of 50k or more lines of code of any level of complexity, is released and made available for public use without any waitlist or subscription.\n\nThe programs generated by the AI system must be able to run and perform the tasks it was designed for, even if they may have some errors.\n\nThe AI system must be capable of generating code in four programming languages: Java, Python, C++, and JavaScript.", "lower_25": "Jun 2025", "median": "Sep 2026", "upper_75": "Dec 2028", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 334.9 in the following months (Feb-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "307.3", "median": "322.4", "upper_75": "334.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 2.48% in the United States in the following quarters (2025 Q1)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Economic Analysis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Economic_Analysis) (BEA) provides quarterly estimates of [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) in the United States. The BEA typically releases [three GDP estimates](https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2020-08/quick-guide-gdp.pdf), an advance estimate, a second estimate, and a third and final estimate. The advance estimate is typically released in the month following the end of the quarter.\n\nBelow is a graph of quarter over quarter GDP growth rates in the US, adjusted for inflation and seasonal effects, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BEA, but it updates with each estimate published by the BEA so it does not reflect the advanced estimate in each quarter.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the quarter over quarter GDP growth rate in the US, adjusted for inflation and seasonal effects and using an annual rate, in percent. Resolution will be determined according to the BEA's advance estimate, typically found [here](https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product)", "lower_25": "0.669", "median": "1.65", "upper_75": "2.48", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Starlink will be spun out from SpaceX by Oct 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 2025", "median": "Aug 2026", "upper_75": "Oct 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 2.48% in the United States in the following quarters (2025 Q1)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Economic Analysis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Economic_Analysis) (BEA) provides quarterly estimates of [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) in the United States. The BEA typically releases [three GDP estimates](https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2020-08/quick-guide-gdp.pdf), an advance estimate, a second estimate, and a third and final estimate. The advance estimate is typically released in the month following the end of the quarter.\n\nBelow is a graph of quarter over quarter GDP growth rates in the US, adjusted for inflation and seasonal effects, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BEA, but it updates with each estimate published by the BEA so it does not reflect the advanced estimate in each quarter.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the quarter over quarter GDP growth rate in the US, adjusted for inflation and seasonal effects and using an annual rate, in percent. Resolution will be determined according to the BEA's advance estimate, typically found [here](https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product)", "lower_25": "0.669", "median": "1.65", "upper_75": "2.48", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Starlink will be spun out from SpaceX by Oct 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 2025", "median": "Aug 2026", "upper_75": "Oct 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the lowest number of annual births in Japan through the year 2100 will be 730k?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "430k", "median": "576k", "upper_75": "730k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.66M software developers in the US in the following years?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the number of software developers in the US will change over time. Many factors will contribute to the changing number of software developers including, to an unknown extent, the advent of software developing artificial intelligence._x000D_\n_x000D_\nAn overview of the number of software developers in the U.S. as per BLS data over the last five years is as follows:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| Year | Occupation Code | Number of Employees | Job Title |_x000D_\n|------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------|_x000D_\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | 1,534,790 | Software Developers |_x000D_\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | 1,364,180 | Software Developers |_x000D_\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | 1,476,800 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |_x000D_\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | 1,406,870 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |_x000D_\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | 1,666,270 | Software Developers and Programmers |_x000D_\n_x000D_\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\". _x000D_\n_x000D_\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [employment estimate for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year.", "lower_25": "1.50M", "median": "1.66M", "upper_75": "1.82M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the lowest number of annual births in Japan through the year 2100 will be 730k?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "430k", "median": "576k", "upper_75": "730k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many software developers will there be in the US in the following years? (2024)\n\nWhat is the chance that there will be 1.66M software developers in the US by 2024?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the number of software developers in the US will change over time. Many factors will contribute to the changing number of software developers including, to an unknown extent, the advent of software developing artificial intelligence.\n\nAn overview of the number of software developers in the U.S. as per BLS data over the last five years is as follows:\n\n| Year | Occupation Code | Number of Employees | Job Title |\n|------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------|\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | 1,534,790 | Software Developers |\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | 1,364,180 | Software Developers |\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | 1,476,800 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | 1,406,870 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | 1,666,270 | Software Developers and Programmers |\n\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\". \n\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [employment estimate for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year.", "lower_25": "1.50M", "median": "1.66M", "upper_75": "1.82M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many software developers will there be in the US in the following years? (2024)\n\nWhat is the chance that there will be 1.66M software developers in the US by 2024?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the number of software developers in the US will change over time. Many factors will contribute to the changing number of software developers including, to an unknown extent, the advent of software developing artificial intelligence.\n\nAn overview of the number of software developers in the U.S. as per BLS data over the last five years is as follows:\n\n| Year | Occupation Code | Number of Employees | Job Title |\n|------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------|\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | 1,534,790 | Software Developers |\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | 1,364,180 | Software Developers |\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | 1,476,800 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | 1,406,870 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | 1,666,270 | Software Developers and Programmers |\n\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\". \n\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [employment estimate for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year.", "lower_25": "1.50M", "median": "1.66M", "upper_75": "1.82M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.66M software developers in the US in the following years?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the number of software developers in the US will change over time. Many factors will contribute to the changing number of software developers including, to an unknown extent, the advent of software developing artificial intelligence._x000D_\n_x000D_\nAn overview of the number of software developers in the U.S. as per BLS data over the last five years is as follows:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| Year | Occupation Code | Number of Employees | Job Title |_x000D_\n|------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------|_x000D_\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | 1,534,790 | Software Developers |_x000D_\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | 1,364,180 | Software Developers |_x000D_\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | 1,476,800 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |_x000D_\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | 1,406,870 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |_x000D_\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | 1,666,270 | Software Developers and Programmers |_x000D_\n_x000D_\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\". _x000D_\n_x000D_\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [employment estimate for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year.", "lower_25": "1.50M", "median": "1.66M", "upper_75": "1.82M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.00M software developers in the US by 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.82M", "median": "2.00M", "upper_75": "2.17M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.00M software developers in the US by 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.82M", "median": "2.00M", "upper_75": "2.17M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.00M software developers in the US by 2026?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the number of software developers in the US will change over time. Many factors will contribute to the changing number of software developers including, to an unknown extent, the advent of software developing artificial intelligence.\n\nAn overview of the number of software developers in the U.S. as per BLS data over the last five years is as follows:\n\n| Year | Occupation Code | Number of Employees | Job Title |\n|------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------|\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | 1,534,790 | Software Developers |\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | 1,364,180 | Software Developers |\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | 1,476,800 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | 1,406,870 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | 1,666,270 | Software Developers and Programmers |\n\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\". \n\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [employment estimate for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year.", "lower_25": "1.62M", "median": "1.81M", "upper_75": "2.00M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.00M software developers in the US by 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.82M", "median": "2.00M", "upper_75": "2.17M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.00M software developers in the US by 2026?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the number of software developers in the US will change over time. Many factors will contribute to the changing number of software developers including, to an unknown extent, the advent of software developing artificial intelligence.\n\nAn overview of the number of software developers in the U.S. as per BLS data over the last five years is as follows:\n\n| Year | Occupation Code | Number of Employees | Job Title |\n|------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------|\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | 1,534,790 | Software Developers |\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | 1,364,180 | Software Developers |\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | 1,476,800 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | 1,406,870 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | 1,666,270 | Software Developers and Programmers |\n\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\". \n\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [employment estimate for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year.", "lower_25": "1.62M", "median": "1.81M", "upper_75": "2.00M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the lowest number of annual births in Japan through the year 2100 will be 730k?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "430k", "median": "576k", "upper_75": "730k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.00M software developers in the US by 2026?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the number of software developers in the US will change over time. Many factors will contribute to the changing number of software developers including, to an unknown extent, the advent of software developing artificial intelligence.\n\nAn overview of the number of software developers in the U.S. as per BLS data over the last five years is as follows:\n\n| Year | Occupation Code | Number of Employees | Job Title |\n|------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------|\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | 1,534,790 | Software Developers |\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | 1,364,180 | Software Developers |\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | 1,476,800 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | 1,406,870 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | 1,666,270 | Software Developers and Programmers |\n\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\". \n\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [employment estimate for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year.", "lower_25": "1.62M", "median": "1.81M", "upper_75": "2.00M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.34M software developers in the US by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.52M", "median": "1.93M", "upper_75": "2.34M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.66M software developers in the US in the following years?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the number of software developers in the US will change over time. Many factors will contribute to the changing number of software developers including, to an unknown extent, the advent of software developing artificial intelligence._x000D_\n_x000D_\nAn overview of the number of software developers in the U.S. as per BLS data over the last five years is as follows:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| Year | Occupation Code | Number of Employees | Job Title |_x000D_\n|------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------|_x000D_\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | 1,534,790 | Software Developers |_x000D_\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | 1,364,180 | Software Developers |_x000D_\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | 1,476,800 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |_x000D_\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | 1,406,870 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |_x000D_\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | 1,666,270 | Software Developers and Programmers |_x000D_\n_x000D_\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\". _x000D_\n_x000D_\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [employment estimate for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year.", "lower_25": "1.50M", "median": "1.66M", "upper_75": "1.82M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.34M software developers in the US by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.52M", "median": "1.93M", "upper_75": "2.34M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.58 million software developers in the US by 2035?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the number of software developers in the US will change over time. Many factors will contribute to the changing number of software developers including, to an unknown extent, the advent of software developing artificial intelligence.\n\nAn overview of the number of software developers in the U.S. as per BLS data over the last five years is as follows:\n\n| Year | Occupation Code | Number of Employees | Job Title |\n|------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------|\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | 1,534,790 | Software Developers |\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | 1,364,180 | Software Developers |\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | 1,476,800 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | 1,406,870 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | 1,666,270 | Software Developers and Programmers |\n\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\". \n\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [employment estimate for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year.", "lower_25": "1.43M", "median": "2.01M", "upper_75": "2.58M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Starlink will be spun out from SpaceX by Oct 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 2025", "median": "Aug 2026", "upper_75": "Oct 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.46M software developers in the US by 2032?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the number of software developers in the US will change over time. Many factors will contribute to the changing number of software developers including, to an unknown extent, the advent of software developing artificial intelligence.\n\nAn overview of the number of software developers in the U.S. as per BLS data over the last five years is as follows:\n\n| Year | Occupation Code | Number of Employees | Job Title |\n|------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------|\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | 1,534,790 | Software Developers |\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | 1,364,180 | Software Developers |\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | 1,476,800 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | 1,406,870 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | 1,666,270 | Software Developers and Programmers |\n\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\". \n\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [employment estimate for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year.", "lower_25": "1.54M", "median": "2.00M", "upper_75": "2.46M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.58 million software developers in the US by 2035?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the number of software developers in the US will change over time. Many factors will contribute to the changing number of software developers including, to an unknown extent, the advent of software developing artificial intelligence.\n\nAn overview of the number of software developers in the U.S. as per BLS data over the last five years is as follows:\n\n| Year | Occupation Code | Number of Employees | Job Title |\n|------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------|\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | 1,534,790 | Software Developers |\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | 1,364,180 | Software Developers |\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | 1,476,800 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | 1,406,870 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | 1,666,270 | Software Developers and Programmers |\n\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\". \n\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [employment estimate for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year.", "lower_25": "1.43M", "median": "2.01M", "upper_75": "2.58M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.46M software developers in the US by 2032?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the number of software developers in the US will change over time. Many factors will contribute to the changing number of software developers including, to an unknown extent, the advent of software developing artificial intelligence.\n\nAn overview of the number of software developers in the U.S. as per BLS data over the last five years is as follows:\n\n| Year | Occupation Code | Number of Employees | Job Title |\n|------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------|\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | 1,534,790 | Software Developers |\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | 1,364,180 | Software Developers |\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | 1,476,800 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | 1,406,870 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | 1,666,270 | Software Developers and Programmers |\n\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\". \n\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [employment estimate for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year.", "lower_25": "1.54M", "median": "2.00M", "upper_75": "2.46M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.34M software developers in the US by 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.52M", "median": "1.93M", "upper_75": "2.34M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.58 million software developers in the US by 2035?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the number of software developers in the US will change over time. Many factors will contribute to the changing number of software developers including, to an unknown extent, the advent of software developing artificial intelligence.\n\nAn overview of the number of software developers in the U.S. as per BLS data over the last five years is as follows:\n\n| Year | Occupation Code | Number of Employees | Job Title |\n|------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------|\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | 1,534,790 | Software Developers |\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | 1,364,180 | Software Developers |\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | 1,476,800 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | 1,406,870 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | 1,666,270 | Software Developers and Programmers |\n\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\". \n\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [employment estimate for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year.", "lower_25": "1.43M", "median": "2.01M", "upper_75": "2.58M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.39M software developers in the US by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.39M", "median": "2.00M", "upper_75": "2.61M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many software developers will there be in the US in the following years? (2024)\n\nWhat is the chance that there will be 1.66M software developers in the US by 2024?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the number of software developers in the US will change over time. Many factors will contribute to the changing number of software developers including, to an unknown extent, the advent of software developing artificial intelligence.\n\nAn overview of the number of software developers in the U.S. as per BLS data over the last five years is as follows:\n\n| Year | Occupation Code | Number of Employees | Job Title |\n|------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------|\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | 1,534,790 | Software Developers |\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | 1,364,180 | Software Developers |\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | 1,476,800 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | 1,406,870 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | 1,666,270 | Software Developers and Programmers |\n\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\". \n\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [employment estimate for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year.", "lower_25": "1.50M", "median": "1.66M", "upper_75": "1.82M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.39M software developers in the US by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.39M", "median": "2.00M", "upper_75": "2.61M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.39M software developers in the US by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.39M", "median": "2.00M", "upper_75": "2.61M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be $152,000 in the following years using May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "130k", "median": "139k", "upper_75": "152k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be $152,000 in the following years using May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "130k", "median": "139k", "upper_75": "152k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be $152,000 in the following years using May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "130k", "median": "139k", "upper_75": "152k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be 159k in the following years using May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "137k", "median": "148k", "upper_75": "159k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be 139k in the following years using May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "130k", "median": "139k", "upper_75": "152k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be 139k in the following years using May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "130k", "median": "139k", "upper_75": "152k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be 159k in the following years using May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "137k", "median": "148k", "upper_75": "159k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be 139k in the following years using May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "130k", "median": "139k", "upper_75": "152k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be 145k in the following years using May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "145k", "median": "154k", "upper_75": "163k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be 174k in the year 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "154k", "median": "163k", "upper_75": "174k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be 145k in the following years using May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "145k", "median": "154k", "upper_75": "163k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be 174k in the year 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "154k", "median": "163k", "upper_75": "174k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be 174k in the year 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "154k", "median": "163k", "upper_75": "174k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be 159k in the following years using May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "137k", "median": "148k", "upper_75": "159k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be 145k in the following years using May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "145k", "median": "154k", "upper_75": "163k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be $163,000 in 2032 using May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the wages of software developers in the US will change over time, controlled for inflation using May 2023 dollars and CPI-U. Many factors will affect the wages of software developers, including the advent of software developing artificial intelligence.\n\nAn overview of the BLS data over the last five years is as follows:\n\n| Year | Occupation Code | Salary | Job Title |\n|------|-----------------|--------|-----------|\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | $132,930 | Software Developers |\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | $120,990 | Software Developers |\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | $114,270 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | $111,620 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | $104,480 | Software Developers and Programmers |\n\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\", and this question resolves based on the data for Software Developers. \n\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"\n\n2022 BLS Definition for Computer Programmer's role: \"Create, modify, and test the code and scripts that allow computer applications to run. Work from specifications drawn up by software and web developers or other individuals. May develop and write computer programs to store, locate, and retrieve specific documents, data, and information.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve by first obtaining the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [mean annual wage for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year, and then using the [CPI Inflation Calculator](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm) provided by the BLS to then convert this mean average wage into May 2023 dollars.", "lower_25": "163k", "median": "171.3k", "upper_75": "180.1k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be $163,000 in 2032 using May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the wages of software developers in the US will change over time, controlled for inflation using May 2023 dollars and CPI-U. Many factors will affect the wages of software developers, including the advent of software developing artificial intelligence.\n\nAn overview of the BLS data over the last five years is as follows:\n\n| Year | Occupation Code | Salary | Job Title |\n|------|-----------------|--------|-----------|\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | $132,930 | Software Developers |\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | $120,990 | Software Developers |\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | $114,270 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | $111,620 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | $104,480 | Software Developers and Programmers |\n\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\", and this question resolves based on the data for Software Developers. \n\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"\n\n2022 BLS Definition for Computer Programmer's role: \"Create, modify, and test the code and scripts that allow computer applications to run. Work from specifications drawn up by software and web developers or other individuals. May develop and write computer programs to store, locate, and retrieve specific documents, data, and information.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve by first obtaining the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [mean annual wage for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year, and then using the [CPI Inflation Calculator](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm) provided by the BLS to then convert this mean average wage into May 2023 dollars.", "lower_25": "163k", "median": "171.3k", "upper_75": "180.1k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Miegakure will not be released before January 2030?", "desc": "[Miegakure](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miegakure) is a puzzle-platform video game by Marc ten Bosch set in a world with four spatial dimensions. While it has not yet been released, early versions of the game have won or been nominated for [numerous awards](https://miegakure.com/). Its development begun [in 2009](https://web.archive.org/web/20200730233549/https://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/27041/Road_To_The_IGF_Miegakures_Marc_Ten_Bosch.php), with the creator currently having a [Patreon](https://www.patreon.com/marctenbosch) page where he posts frequent updates, including sneak peeks of some levels. His latest update (April 2023) talked about improving the visuals and finalizing the look of the game, however no release date has been announced yet. There have also been frequent mentions to a private beta, which has not yet started.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which Miegakure is released to the public in at least one country. Early access and pre-orders would not resolve this question.", "lower_25": "Jan 2026", "median": "Nov 2027", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States in 2040 will be 75% higher than May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be $163,000 in 2032 using May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the wages of software developers in the US will change over time, controlled for inflation using May 2023 dollars and CPI-U. Many factors will affect the wages of software developers, including the advent of software developing artificial intelligence.\n\nAn overview of the BLS data over the last five years is as follows:\n\n| Year | Occupation Code | Salary | Job Title |\n|------|-----------------|--------|-----------|\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | $132,930 | Software Developers |\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | $120,990 | Software Developers |\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | $114,270 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | $111,620 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | $104,480 | Software Developers and Programmers |\n\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\", and this question resolves based on the data for Software Developers. \n\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"\n\n2022 BLS Definition for Computer Programmer's role: \"Create, modify, and test the code and scripts that allow computer applications to run. Work from specifications drawn up by software and web developers or other individuals. May develop and write computer programs to store, locate, and retrieve specific documents, data, and information.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve by first obtaining the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [mean annual wage for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year, and then using the [CPI Inflation Calculator](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm) provided by the BLS to then convert this mean average wage into May 2023 dollars.", "lower_25": "163k", "median": "171.3k", "upper_75": "180.1k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Miegakure will not be released before January 2030?", "desc": "[Miegakure](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miegakure) is a puzzle-platform video game by Marc ten Bosch set in a world with four spatial dimensions. While it has not yet been released, early versions of the game have won or been nominated for [numerous awards](https://miegakure.com/). Its development begun [in 2009](https://web.archive.org/web/20200730233549/https://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/27041/Road_To_The_IGF_Miegakures_Marc_Ten_Bosch.php), with the creator currently having a [Patreon](https://www.patreon.com/marctenbosch) page where he posts frequent updates, including sneak peeks of some levels. His latest update (April 2023) talked about improving the visuals and finalizing the look of the game, however no release date has been announced yet. There have also been frequent mentions to a private beta, which has not yet started.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which Miegakure is released to the public in at least one country. Early access and pre-orders would not resolve this question.", "lower_25": "Jan 2026", "median": "Nov 2027", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be 187k in 2035 using May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the wages of software developers in the US will change over time, controlled for inflation using May 2023 dollars and CPI-U. Many factors will affect the wages of software developers, including the advent of software developing artificial intelligence.\n\nAn overview of the BLS data over the last five years is as follows:\n\n| Year | Occupation Code | Salary | Job Title |\n|------|-----------------|--------|-----------|\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | $132,930 | Software Developers |\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | $120,990 | Software Developers |\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | $114,270 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | $111,620 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | $104,480 | Software Developers and Programmers |\n\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\", and this question resolves based on the data for Software Developers. \n\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"\n\n2022 BLS Definition for Computer Programmer's role: \"Create, modify, and test the code and scripts that allow computer applications to run. Work from specifications drawn up by software and web developers or other individuals. May develop and write computer programs to store, locate, and retrieve specific documents, data, and information.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve by first obtaining the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [mean annual wage for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year, and then using the [CPI Inflation Calculator](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm) provided by the BLS to then convert this mean average wage into May 2023 dollars.", "lower_25": "162k", "median": "187k", "upper_75": "212k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States in 2040 will be 75% higher than May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be 187k in 2035 using May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the wages of software developers in the US will change over time, controlled for inflation using May 2023 dollars and CPI-U. Many factors will affect the wages of software developers, including the advent of software developing artificial intelligence.\n\nAn overview of the BLS data over the last five years is as follows:\n\n| Year | Occupation Code | Salary | Job Title |\n|------|-----------------|--------|-----------|\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | $132,930 | Software Developers |\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | $120,990 | Software Developers |\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | $114,270 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | $111,620 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | $104,480 | Software Developers and Programmers |\n\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\", and this question resolves based on the data for Software Developers. \n\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"\n\n2022 BLS Definition for Computer Programmer's role: \"Create, modify, and test the code and scripts that allow computer applications to run. Work from specifications drawn up by software and web developers or other individuals. May develop and write computer programs to store, locate, and retrieve specific documents, data, and information.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve by first obtaining the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [mean annual wage for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year, and then using the [CPI Inflation Calculator](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm) provided by the BLS to then convert this mean average wage into May 2023 dollars.", "lower_25": "162k", "median": "187k", "upper_75": "212k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Miegakure will not be released before January 2030?", "desc": "[Miegakure](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miegakure) is a puzzle-platform video game by Marc ten Bosch set in a world with four spatial dimensions. While it has not yet been released, early versions of the game have won or been nominated for [numerous awards](https://miegakure.com/). Its development begun [in 2009](https://web.archive.org/web/20200730233549/https://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/27041/Road_To_The_IGF_Miegakures_Marc_Ten_Bosch.php), with the creator currently having a [Patreon](https://www.patreon.com/marctenbosch) page where he posts frequent updates, including sneak peeks of some levels. His latest update (April 2023) talked about improving the visuals and finalizing the look of the game, however no release date has been announced yet. There have also been frequent mentions to a private beta, which has not yet started.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which Miegakure is released to the public in at least one country. Early access and pre-orders would not resolve this question.", "lower_25": "Jan 2026", "median": "Nov 2027", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States will be 187k in 2035 using May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "This question aims to quantify the extent to which the wages of software developers in the US will change over time, controlled for inflation using May 2023 dollars and CPI-U. Many factors will affect the wages of software developers, including the advent of software developing artificial intelligence.\n\nAn overview of the BLS data over the last five years is as follows:\n\n| Year | Occupation Code | Salary | Job Title |\n|------|-----------------|--------|-----------|\n| 2022 | 15-1251 | $132,930 | Software Developers |\n| 2021 | 15-1251 | $120,990 | Software Developers |\n| 2020 | 15-1251 | $114,270 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2019 | 15-1251 | $111,620 | Software Developers and Software Quality Assurance Analysts and Testers |\n| 2018 | 15-1130 | $104,480 | Software Developers and Programmers |\n\nNote that Occupation code 15-1251 didn't exist in 2018. Also note that the job title / inclusion criteria for Occupation code 15-1251 has changed over time. Note as of the currently most recent year during the time of this writing, 2022, there are separate job codes for \"Software Developers\" and \"Computer Programmers\", and this question resolves based on the data for Software Developers. \n\n2022 BLS Definition for Software Developer's role: \"Research, design, and develop computer and network software or specialized utility programs. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions, applying principles and techniques of computer science, engineering, and mathematical analysis. Update software or enhance existing software capabilities. May work with computer hardware engineers to integrate hardware and software systems, and develop specifications and performance requirements. May maintain databases within an application area, working individually or coordinating database development as part of a team.\"\n\n2022 BLS Definition for Computer Programmer's role: \"Create, modify, and test the code and scripts that allow computer applications to run. Work from specifications drawn up by software and web developers or other individuals. May develop and write computer programs to store, locate, and retrieve specific documents, data, and information.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve by first obtaining the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [mean annual wage for Software Developers](https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes151252.htm#(1)) (job code 15-1252) as reported in May of the relevant calendar year, and then using the [CPI Inflation Calculator](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm) provided by the BLS to then convert this mean average wage into May 2023 dollars.", "lower_25": "162k", "median": "187k", "upper_75": "212k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many Frontier AI labs will there be on Dec 31, 2025?\n\nKeyword: 6.40\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that there will be 6.40 Frontier AI labs on Dec 31, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.17", "median": "4.64", "upper_75": "6.40", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 3.918 in the following months (Apr-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.786", "median": "3.918", "upper_75": "4.095", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 3.918 in the following months (Apr-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.786", "median": "3.918", "upper_75": "4.095", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many Frontier AI labs will there be on Dec 31, 2025?\n\nKeyword: 6.40\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that there will be 6.40 Frontier AI labs on Dec 31, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.17", "median": "4.64", "upper_75": "6.40", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 3.918 in the following months (Apr-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.786", "median": "3.918", "upper_75": "4.095", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 18.5% of American adults in 2070 will identify as LGBTQ?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.11", "median": "13.5", "upper_75": "18.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the mean inflation adjusted annual wage of software developers in the United States in 2040 will be 75% higher than May 2023 dollars?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will independently prescribe the majority of medication in the U.S. by 2072?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2051", "upper_75": "2072", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will independently prescribe the majority of medication in the U.S. by 2072?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2051", "upper_75": "2072", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will independently prescribe the majority of medication in the U.S. by 2072?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2051", "upper_75": "2072", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 18.5% of American adults in 2070 will identify as LGBTQ?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.11", "median": "13.5", "upper_75": "18.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What will be the US : China ratio for the number of significant ML systems in these years (2024)? (4.74)\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the US : China ratio for the number of significant ML systems in these years (2024) will be 4.74?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.74", "median": "4.74", "upper_75": "5.84", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US : China ratio for the number of significant ML systems will be 6.92:1 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.96", "median": "5.18", "upper_75": "6.92", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US : China ratio for the number of significant ML systems will be 4.18 in these years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.06", "median": "4.18", "upper_75": "5.79", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many Frontier AI labs will there be on Dec 31, 2025?\n\nKeyword: 6.40\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that there will be 6.40 Frontier AI labs on Dec 31, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.17", "median": "4.64", "upper_75": "6.40", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What will be the US : China ratio for the number of significant ML systems in these years (2024)? (4.74)\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the US : China ratio for the number of significant ML systems in these years (2024) will be 4.74?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.74", "median": "4.74", "upper_75": "5.84", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US : China ratio for the number of significant ML systems will be 6.92:1 in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.96", "median": "5.18", "upper_75": "6.92", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US : China ratio for the number of significant ML systems will be 4.18 in these years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.06", "median": "4.18", "upper_75": "5.79", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US : China ratio for the number of significant ML systems will be 4.18 in these years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.06", "median": "4.18", "upper_75": "5.79", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What will be the US : China ratio for the number of significant ML systems in these years (2026)? (4.82)\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the US : China ratio for the number of significant ML systems in these years (2026) will be 4.82?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.39", "median": "4.82", "upper_75": "6.31", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What will be the US : China ratio for the number of significant ML systems in these years (2024)? (4.74)\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the US : China ratio for the number of significant ML systems in these years (2024) will be 4.74?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.74", "median": "4.74", "upper_75": "5.84", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Chinese AI Lab will train a model with at least 2.1E+24 FLOPs (~10% of GPT-4) by Jan 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Feb 2024", "median": "Jul 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the record for log quantum volume will be 24.8 over the next five years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.4", "median": "22.2", "upper_75": "24.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the record for log quantum volume will be 24.8 over the next five years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.4", "median": "22.2", "upper_75": "24.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Chinese AI Lab will train a model with at least 2.1E+24 FLOPs (~10% of GPT-4) by Jan 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Feb 2024", "median": "Jul 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the record for log quantum volume will be 24.8 over the next five years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.4", "median": "22.2", "upper_75": "24.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the record for log quantum volume will be 24.8 over the next five years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.4", "median": "22.2", "upper_75": "24.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a Chinese AI Lab will train a model with at least 2.1E+24 FLOPs (~10% of GPT-4) by Jan 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Feb 2024", "median": "Jul 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the record for log quantum volume will be 24.8 over the next five years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.4", "median": "22.2", "upper_75": "24.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What will be the US : China ratio for the number of significant ML systems in these years (2026)? (4.82)\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the US : China ratio for the number of significant ML systems in these years (2026) will be 4.82?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.39", "median": "4.82", "upper_75": "6.31", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the record for log quantum volume will be 21.3 over the next five years (2025)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "21.3", "median": "23.7", "upper_75": "27.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the record for log quantum volume will be 21.3 over the next five years (2025)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "21.3", "median": "23.7", "upper_75": "27.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the record for log quantum volume will be greater than 30 over the next five years (2026)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "24.0", "median": "27.3", "upper_75": "> 30", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the record for log quantum volume will be greater than 30 over the next five years (2026)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "24.0", "median": "27.3", "upper_75": "> 30", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the record for log quantum volume will be greater than 30 over the next five years (2026)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "24.0", "median": "27.3", "upper_75": "> 30", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the record for log quantum volume will be 24.8 over the next five years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.4", "median": "22.2", "upper_75": "24.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the record for log quantum volume will be 21.3 over the next five years (2025)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "21.3", "median": "23.7", "upper_75": "27.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the record for log quantum volume will be 26.4 over the next five years (2027)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.4", "median": "29.8", "upper_75": "> 30", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the record for log quantum volume will be 26.4 over the next five years (2027)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.4", "median": "29.8", "upper_75": "> 30", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the record for log quantum volume will be 28.17 over the next five years (2028)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "28.17", "median": "> 30", "upper_75": "> 30", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the record for log quantum volume will be 28.17 over the next five years (2028)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "28.17", "median": "> 30", "upper_75": "> 30", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the record for log quantum volume will be 26.4 over the next five years (2027)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.4", "median": "29.8", "upper_75": "> 30", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 0.329 in the following months (Apr-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.187", "median": "0.329", "upper_75": "0.456", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the record for log quantum volume will be 28.17 over the next five years (2028)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "28.17", "median": "> 30", "upper_75": "> 30", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 0.329 in the following months (Apr-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.187", "median": "0.329", "upper_75": "0.456", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 73.3k change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment in the following months (Apr-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.3k", "median": "142k", "upper_75": "215k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 73.3k change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment in the following months (Apr-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.3k", "median": "142k", "upper_75": "215k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 73.3k change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment in the following months (Apr-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.3k", "median": "142k", "upper_75": "215k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 0.329 in the following months (Apr-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.187", "median": "0.329", "upper_75": "0.456", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 337.6 in the following months (Mar-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "307.9", "median": "323.4", "upper_75": "337.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 337.6 in the following months (Mar-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "307.9", "median": "323.4", "upper_75": "337.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the male-to-female ratio in the global population will be 1.005 by the year 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.001", "median": "1.005", "upper_75": "1.009", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the USAF's Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter aircraft will reach initial operating capability by 2035?", "desc": "The US Air Force's [Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_Generation_Air_Dominance) fighter program is a military research project currently being undertaken by the United States. The NGAD is meant to replace the F-22 as America's most advanced air superiority stealth fighter. While numerous aspects of the program are currently classified, the US Air Force [claims](https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/09/27/the-air-force-wants-to-start-delivering-ngad-by-2030-can-it-be-done/) that the NGAD will be delivered to the branch by 2030.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which the United States announces [initial operating capability (IOC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Initial_operating_capability) of the fighter aircraft being developed by the NGAD program, or any variant of it. An official declaration of IOC by any branch of the US Armed Forces is sufficient to resolve this question. As the actual name and designation of this aircraft are not yet public, this question will resolve based on future information provided by the United States of its development.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the male-to-female ratio in the global population will be 1.005 by the year 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.001", "median": "1.005", "upper_75": "1.009", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the USAF's Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter aircraft will reach initial operating capability by 2035?", "desc": "The US Air Force's [Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_Generation_Air_Dominance) fighter program is a military research project currently being undertaken by the United States. The NGAD is meant to replace the F-22 as America's most advanced air superiority stealth fighter. While numerous aspects of the program are currently classified, the US Air Force [claims](https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/09/27/the-air-force-wants-to-start-delivering-ngad-by-2030-can-it-be-done/) that the NGAD will be delivered to the branch by 2030.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which the United States announces [initial operating capability (IOC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Initial_operating_capability) of the fighter aircraft being developed by the NGAD program, or any variant of it. An official declaration of IOC by any branch of the US Armed Forces is sufficient to resolve this question. As the actual name and designation of this aircraft are not yet public, this question will resolve based on future information provided by the United States of its development.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 337.6 in the following months (Mar-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "307.9", "median": "323.4", "upper_75": "337.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first baby of an extinct vertebrate species will be born or hatched naturally by 2063?", "desc": "There are multiple projects underway to reverse the extinction of species including the [woolly mammoth](https://colossal.com/mammoth/), passenger pigeon, [Tasmanian tiger aka thylacine](https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20230113-how-extinct-animals-could-be-brought-back-from-the-dead) and more.\n\nMetaculus has questions regarding the de-extinction of the [mammoth](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6499/when-will-the-mammoth-be-revived/), [thylacine](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12264/thylacine-de-extinction-before-2035/), and [Neanderthal](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7479/bringing-back-the-neanderthal/) as well as a [binary question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/228/will-a-species-extinct-for--1000-years-be-brought-back-by-2025/) with a 2025 cutoff date. This question is more general: when will *any* vertebrate species be de-extincted? It also requires that members of the formerly extinct species successfully breed, not just exist.", "resc": "This question resolves **Yes** when two credible reports indicate a member of the formerly-extinct species has produced a live offspring through biological processes and the infant has survived for at least one week after being born or hatched. \n\nThe new baby has to be a genuine member of the extinct species, not a hybrid or selectively bred variation of a non-extinct species. If in doubt, genuine member means it must have at least 90% of the genome of the extinct species.\n\nThe new baby doesn't have to be wild - it can be born/hatched in a zoo or lab, provided that it's born through biological processes.\n\nExamples of positive resolution: \n\n - A cloned female mammoth mates with a cloned male mammoth and gives birth to a live baby\n\n - A cloned reptile parthegonetically lays eggs without scientific assistance and at least one of them produces a live baby\n\nNot sufficient for positive resolution:\n\n - Scientists clone a member of an extinct species, the baby promptly dies. This already happened with the [Pyrenean ibex](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-25052233) in 2003.\n\n - Scientists clone a female mammoth then artificially inseminate her or implant her with a clone. (The baby has to be produced by biological processes which in the case of mammoths means a male mammoth.)\n\n - Scientists develop an artificial womb and gestate the infant of an extinct species. (But if two infants born from artificial wombs grow up and produce an offspring the old-fashioned way, that counts.)\n\n - Scientists back-breed a non-extinct species to be more similar to an extinct species eg [this programme](https://rewildingeurope.com/rewilding-in-action/wildlife-comeback/tauros/#:~:text=The%20principal%20technique%20is%20“back,of%20Europe%27s%20original%20wild%20auroch.) to reintroduce the European aurochs", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2045", "upper_75": "2063", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first baby of an extinct vertebrate species will be born or hatched naturally by 2063?", "desc": "There are multiple projects underway to reverse the extinction of species including the [woolly mammoth](https://colossal.com/mammoth/), passenger pigeon, [Tasmanian tiger aka thylacine](https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20230113-how-extinct-animals-could-be-brought-back-from-the-dead) and more.\n\nMetaculus has questions regarding the de-extinction of the [mammoth](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6499/when-will-the-mammoth-be-revived/), [thylacine](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12264/thylacine-de-extinction-before-2035/), and [Neanderthal](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7479/bringing-back-the-neanderthal/) as well as a [binary question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/228/will-a-species-extinct-for--1000-years-be-brought-back-by-2025/) with a 2025 cutoff date. This question is more general: when will *any* vertebrate species be de-extincted? It also requires that members of the formerly extinct species successfully breed, not just exist.", "resc": "This question resolves **Yes** when two credible reports indicate a member of the formerly-extinct species has produced a live offspring through biological processes and the infant has survived for at least one week after being born or hatched. \n\nThe new baby has to be a genuine member of the extinct species, not a hybrid or selectively bred variation of a non-extinct species. If in doubt, genuine member means it must have at least 90% of the genome of the extinct species.\n\nThe new baby doesn't have to be wild - it can be born/hatched in a zoo or lab, provided that it's born through biological processes.\n\nExamples of positive resolution: \n\n - A cloned female mammoth mates with a cloned male mammoth and gives birth to a live baby\n\n - A cloned reptile parthegonetically lays eggs without scientific assistance and at least one of them produces a live baby\n\nNot sufficient for positive resolution:\n\n - Scientists clone a member of an extinct species, the baby promptly dies. This already happened with the [Pyrenean ibex](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-25052233) in 2003.\n\n - Scientists clone a female mammoth then artificially inseminate her or implant her with a clone. (The baby has to be produced by biological processes which in the case of mammoths means a male mammoth.)\n\n - Scientists develop an artificial womb and gestate the infant of an extinct species. (But if two infants born from artificial wombs grow up and produce an offspring the old-fashioned way, that counts.)\n\n - Scientists back-breed a non-extinct species to be more similar to an extinct species eg [this programme](https://rewildingeurope.com/rewilding-in-action/wildlife-comeback/tauros/#:~:text=The%20principal%20technique%20is%20“back,of%20Europe%27s%20original%20wild%20auroch.) to reintroduce the European aurochs", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2045", "upper_75": "2063", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will wholly create an original, critically-acclaimed feature film by 2026?", "desc": "Artificial Intelligence (AI) is already being used in various aspects of filmmaking, such as scriptwriting, pre-production, formulating release strategies, predicting success at the box office, casting, and promotion. AI is also [becoming](https://massive.io/filmmaking/6-ai-tools-for-filmmaking/) increasingly popular for video editing, coloring, and music creation. AI algorithms can study the script storyline, bring forward possible questions, uncertainties, and suggestions, thus making the process of script analysis much easier and faster. AI [can also](https://smartclick.ai/articles/how-artificial-intelligence-is-used-in-the-film-industry/) analyze video footage to identify locations, objects, actors, and activities throughout a scene, allowing editors to access the information they need while editing quickly. AI tools for filmmakers are essentially intelligent, always available, high-tech assistants that work at breakneck speed – are a great way of amplifying creativity. They help speed up and scale mundane tasks, giving filmmakers, video editors, colorists, and other professionals more time to focus on their core skill[1]. AI can potentially create a situation in which jobs are lost as fewer manual tasks require human labor. This [could potentially have a detrimental effect](https://neilchasefilm.com/artificial-intelligence-in-film/) on people previously employed in related roles, such as post-production technicians, editors, VFX (visual effects) artists, actors, and other creatives. Overall, AI is providing filmmakers with [new tools and techniques](https://www.desktop-documentaries.com/ai-tools-for-filmmakers.html) to enhance their storytelling capabilities and create truly innovative applications across the industry, along with many benefits it delivers for the world of movie-making. As technology continues to advance, we can expect to see even more exciting developments in the field of AI for filmmakers [in the future](https://nofilmschool.com/must-use-ai-tools-filmmakers). However, it is still [unclear](https://raindance.org/how-ai-is-revolutionising-the-film-industry-and-what-it-means-for-the-future/\n) when AI systems will be able to make films better than any human film that has ever been made.\n\n> very soon in a few years AI systems might write generate animate edit and produce an entire feature film which would be better than any human film that's ever been made and it will be seen by no one because there will be so many films made like that that it'd just be made and lost like tears in the rain the debris accumulating at the feet of the angel of history as she is blown backwards into the future and of course I will be surprised if that film is not made in the next five years or sooner\n>\n> — [\nAGI-22 | Ed Keller - Advanced AI in VQ-GAN Creativity\n](https://youtube.com/watch?v=KUnOd21uj4k&t=490s)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a film generated wholly by an artificial intelligence receives a rating of 80% or higher from critics on [Rotten Tomatoes](https://www.rottentomatoes.com). The film must be rated by at least 20 critics and the rating must be above 80% at least one month after the film's release date.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the male-to-female ratio in the global population will be 1.005 by the year 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.001", "median": "1.005", "upper_75": "1.009", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first baby of an extinct vertebrate species will be born or hatched naturally by 2063?", "desc": "There are multiple projects underway to reverse the extinction of species including the [woolly mammoth](https://colossal.com/mammoth/), passenger pigeon, [Tasmanian tiger aka thylacine](https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20230113-how-extinct-animals-could-be-brought-back-from-the-dead) and more.\n\nMetaculus has questions regarding the de-extinction of the [mammoth](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6499/when-will-the-mammoth-be-revived/), [thylacine](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/12264/thylacine-de-extinction-before-2035/), and [Neanderthal](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/7479/bringing-back-the-neanderthal/) as well as a [binary question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/228/will-a-species-extinct-for--1000-years-be-brought-back-by-2025/) with a 2025 cutoff date. This question is more general: when will *any* vertebrate species be de-extincted? It also requires that members of the formerly extinct species successfully breed, not just exist.", "resc": "This question resolves **Yes** when two credible reports indicate a member of the formerly-extinct species has produced a live offspring through biological processes and the infant has survived for at least one week after being born or hatched. \n\nThe new baby has to be a genuine member of the extinct species, not a hybrid or selectively bred variation of a non-extinct species. If in doubt, genuine member means it must have at least 90% of the genome of the extinct species.\n\nThe new baby doesn't have to be wild - it can be born/hatched in a zoo or lab, provided that it's born through biological processes.\n\nExamples of positive resolution: \n\n - A cloned female mammoth mates with a cloned male mammoth and gives birth to a live baby\n\n - A cloned reptile parthegonetically lays eggs without scientific assistance and at least one of them produces a live baby\n\nNot sufficient for positive resolution:\n\n - Scientists clone a member of an extinct species, the baby promptly dies. This already happened with the [Pyrenean ibex](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-25052233) in 2003.\n\n - Scientists clone a female mammoth then artificially inseminate her or implant her with a clone. (The baby has to be produced by biological processes which in the case of mammoths means a male mammoth.)\n\n - Scientists develop an artificial womb and gestate the infant of an extinct species. (But if two infants born from artificial wombs grow up and produce an offspring the old-fashioned way, that counts.)\n\n - Scientists back-breed a non-extinct species to be more similar to an extinct species eg [this programme](https://rewildingeurope.com/rewilding-in-action/wildlife-comeback/tauros/#:~:text=The%20principal%20technique%20is%20“back,of%20Europe%27s%20original%20wild%20auroch.) to reintroduce the European aurochs", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2045", "upper_75": "2063", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will wholly create an original, critically-acclaimed feature film by 2026?", "desc": "Artificial Intelligence (AI) is already being used in various aspects of filmmaking, such as scriptwriting, pre-production, formulating release strategies, predicting success at the box office, casting, and promotion. AI is also [becoming](https://massive.io/filmmaking/6-ai-tools-for-filmmaking/) increasingly popular for video editing, coloring, and music creation. AI algorithms can study the script storyline, bring forward possible questions, uncertainties, and suggestions, thus making the process of script analysis much easier and faster. AI [can also](https://smartclick.ai/articles/how-artificial-intelligence-is-used-in-the-film-industry/) analyze video footage to identify locations, objects, actors, and activities throughout a scene, allowing editors to access the information they need while editing quickly. AI tools for filmmakers are essentially intelligent, always available, high-tech assistants that work at breakneck speed – are a great way of amplifying creativity. They help speed up and scale mundane tasks, giving filmmakers, video editors, colorists, and other professionals more time to focus on their core skill[1]. AI can potentially create a situation in which jobs are lost as fewer manual tasks require human labor. This [could potentially have a detrimental effect](https://neilchasefilm.com/artificial-intelligence-in-film/) on people previously employed in related roles, such as post-production technicians, editors, VFX (visual effects) artists, actors, and other creatives. Overall, AI is providing filmmakers with [new tools and techniques](https://www.desktop-documentaries.com/ai-tools-for-filmmakers.html) to enhance their storytelling capabilities and create truly innovative applications across the industry, along with many benefits it delivers for the world of movie-making. As technology continues to advance, we can expect to see even more exciting developments in the field of AI for filmmakers [in the future](https://nofilmschool.com/must-use-ai-tools-filmmakers). However, it is still [unclear](https://raindance.org/how-ai-is-revolutionising-the-film-industry-and-what-it-means-for-the-future/\n) when AI systems will be able to make films better than any human film that has ever been made.\n\n> very soon in a few years AI systems might write generate animate edit and produce an entire feature film which would be better than any human film that's ever been made and it will be seen by no one because there will be so many films made like that that it'd just be made and lost like tears in the rain the debris accumulating at the feet of the angel of history as she is blown backwards into the future and of course I will be surprised if that film is not made in the next five years or sooner\n>\n> — [\nAGI-22 | Ed Keller - Advanced AI in VQ-GAN Creativity\n](https://youtube.com/watch?v=KUnOd21uj4k&t=490s)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a film generated wholly by an artificial intelligence receives a rating of 80% or higher from critics on [Rotten Tomatoes](https://www.rottentomatoes.com). The film must be rated by at least 20 critics and the rating must be above 80% at least one month after the film's release date.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first human genome will be artificially synthesized by 2050?", "desc": "A haploid human genome is 3.19 billion base pairs (Gbp). As of June 15th, 2023, the [largest genome synthesized](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1192-5) was a recoded E. coli genome (~4 million base pairs, Mbp) in 2019.\n\nThe synthesis involved solid-phase oligonucleotide synthesis of 409 regions between 4-15 thousand base pairs (kbp). The regions were assembled into 37 bacterial artificial chromosomes, which were incorporated iteratively into an E. coli genome using lambda-red-mediated recombination.\n\nModern DNA synthesis involves both chemical synthesis (solid-phase oligonucleotide synthesis) and chemoenzymatic synthesis (enzyme-catalyzed chemical synthesis). Fragments are then joined; this is a challenging task as fragments get longer and the number of fragments increases.\n\nThe goal of [Genome Project-Write](https://engineeringbiologycenter.org/about/) (GP-Write) is to synthesize a complete human genome.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of publication of a reputable manuscript, generally accepted by the scientific community, which reports the total synthesis of a human genome (non-templated).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, we restrict resolution to non-templated synthesis. i.e. one cannot copy an existing DNA template (e.g. PCR). However, one can use a enzyme for ligation or appending nucleotides to an oligo.", "lower_25": "2037", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2065", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI will wholly create an original, critically-acclaimed feature film by 2026?", "desc": "Artificial Intelligence (AI) is already being used in various aspects of filmmaking, such as scriptwriting, pre-production, formulating release strategies, predicting success at the box office, casting, and promotion. AI is also [becoming](https://massive.io/filmmaking/6-ai-tools-for-filmmaking/) increasingly popular for video editing, coloring, and music creation. AI algorithms can study the script storyline, bring forward possible questions, uncertainties, and suggestions, thus making the process of script analysis much easier and faster. AI [can also](https://smartclick.ai/articles/how-artificial-intelligence-is-used-in-the-film-industry/) analyze video footage to identify locations, objects, actors, and activities throughout a scene, allowing editors to access the information they need while editing quickly. AI tools for filmmakers are essentially intelligent, always available, high-tech assistants that work at breakneck speed – are a great way of amplifying creativity. They help speed up and scale mundane tasks, giving filmmakers, video editors, colorists, and other professionals more time to focus on their core skill[1]. AI can potentially create a situation in which jobs are lost as fewer manual tasks require human labor. This [could potentially have a detrimental effect](https://neilchasefilm.com/artificial-intelligence-in-film/) on people previously employed in related roles, such as post-production technicians, editors, VFX (visual effects) artists, actors, and other creatives. Overall, AI is providing filmmakers with [new tools and techniques](https://www.desktop-documentaries.com/ai-tools-for-filmmakers.html) to enhance their storytelling capabilities and create truly innovative applications across the industry, along with many benefits it delivers for the world of movie-making. As technology continues to advance, we can expect to see even more exciting developments in the field of AI for filmmakers [in the future](https://nofilmschool.com/must-use-ai-tools-filmmakers). However, it is still [unclear](https://raindance.org/how-ai-is-revolutionising-the-film-industry-and-what-it-means-for-the-future/\n) when AI systems will be able to make films better than any human film that has ever been made.\n\n> very soon in a few years AI systems might write generate animate edit and produce an entire feature film which would be better than any human film that's ever been made and it will be seen by no one because there will be so many films made like that that it'd just be made and lost like tears in the rain the debris accumulating at the feet of the angel of history as she is blown backwards into the future and of course I will be surprised if that film is not made in the next five years or sooner\n>\n> — [\nAGI-22 | Ed Keller - Advanced AI in VQ-GAN Creativity\n](https://youtube.com/watch?v=KUnOd21uj4k&t=490s)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when a film generated wholly by an artificial intelligence receives a rating of 80% or higher from critics on [Rotten Tomatoes](https://www.rottentomatoes.com). The film must be rated by at least 20 critics and the rating must be above 80% at least one month after the film's release date.", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2029", "upper_75": "2033", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the USAF's Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter aircraft will reach initial operating capability by 2035?", "desc": "The US Air Force's [Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_Generation_Air_Dominance) fighter program is a military research project currently being undertaken by the United States. The NGAD is meant to replace the F-22 as America's most advanced air superiority stealth fighter. While numerous aspects of the program are currently classified, the US Air Force [claims](https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/09/27/the-air-force-wants-to-start-delivering-ngad-by-2030-can-it-be-done/) that the NGAD will be delivered to the branch by 2030.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which the United States announces [initial operating capability (IOC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Initial_operating_capability) of the fighter aircraft being developed by the NGAD program, or any variant of it. An official declaration of IOC by any branch of the US Armed Forces is sufficient to resolve this question. As the actual name and designation of this aircraft are not yet public, this question will resolve based on future information provided by the United States of its development.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Apple's twelve-month sales for the Vision Pro in Q1 2025 will be 1.01k in millions of dollars?", "desc": "On June 5, 2023 Apple announced a new product for \"spatial computing\" called [Vision Pro](https://www.apple.com/apple-vision-pro/) – an AR headset for home and work purposes. It is priced at $3,499, and it is scheduled to be available in early 2024.", "resc": "The question resolves as the **Net Sales By Category** for the Vision Pro, in millions of dollars, for the most recent 12 month period on Apple's Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements for Q1, 2025. For example, here are Apple's [Q1 2023 Financial Statements](https://www.apple.com/newsroom/pdfs/FY23_Q1_Consolidated_Financial_Statements.pdf).\n\nApple's Q1 2025 Financial Statements will cover a 12-month period ending at the end of December, 2024.\n\nIf Apple does not report net sales for the Vision Pro the question will resolve ambiguously.", "lower_25": "557", "median": "752", "upper_75": "1.01k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Apple's twelve-month sales for the Vision Pro in Q1 2025 will be 1.01k in millions of dollars?", "desc": "On June 5, 2023 Apple announced a new product for \"spatial computing\" called [Vision Pro](https://www.apple.com/apple-vision-pro/) – an AR headset for home and work purposes. It is priced at $3,499, and it is scheduled to be available in early 2024.", "resc": "The question resolves as the **Net Sales By Category** for the Vision Pro, in millions of dollars, for the most recent 12 month period on Apple's Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements for Q1, 2025. For example, here are Apple's [Q1 2023 Financial Statements](https://www.apple.com/newsroom/pdfs/FY23_Q1_Consolidated_Financial_Statements.pdf).\n\nApple's Q1 2025 Financial Statements will cover a 12-month period ending at the end of December, 2024.\n\nIf Apple does not report net sales for the Vision Pro the question will resolve ambiguously.", "lower_25": "557", "median": "752", "upper_75": "1.01k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first human genome will be artificially synthesized by 2050?", "desc": "A haploid human genome is 3.19 billion base pairs (Gbp). As of June 15th, 2023, the [largest genome synthesized](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1192-5) was a recoded E. coli genome (~4 million base pairs, Mbp) in 2019.\n\nThe synthesis involved solid-phase oligonucleotide synthesis of 409 regions between 4-15 thousand base pairs (kbp). The regions were assembled into 37 bacterial artificial chromosomes, which were incorporated iteratively into an E. coli genome using lambda-red-mediated recombination.\n\nModern DNA synthesis involves both chemical synthesis (solid-phase oligonucleotide synthesis) and chemoenzymatic synthesis (enzyme-catalyzed chemical synthesis). Fragments are then joined; this is a challenging task as fragments get longer and the number of fragments increases.\n\nThe goal of [Genome Project-Write](https://engineeringbiologycenter.org/about/) (GP-Write) is to synthesize a complete human genome.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of publication of a reputable manuscript, generally accepted by the scientific community, which reports the total synthesis of a human genome (non-templated).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, we restrict resolution to non-templated synthesis. i.e. one cannot copy an existing DNA template (e.g. PCR). However, one can use a enzyme for ligation or appending nucleotides to an oligo.", "lower_25": "2037", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2065", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first human genome will be artificially synthesized by 2050?", "desc": "A haploid human genome is 3.19 billion base pairs (Gbp). As of June 15th, 2023, the [largest genome synthesized](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1192-5) was a recoded E. coli genome (~4 million base pairs, Mbp) in 2019.\n\nThe synthesis involved solid-phase oligonucleotide synthesis of 409 regions between 4-15 thousand base pairs (kbp). The regions were assembled into 37 bacterial artificial chromosomes, which were incorporated iteratively into an E. coli genome using lambda-red-mediated recombination.\n\nModern DNA synthesis involves both chemical synthesis (solid-phase oligonucleotide synthesis) and chemoenzymatic synthesis (enzyme-catalyzed chemical synthesis). Fragments are then joined; this is a challenging task as fragments get longer and the number of fragments increases.\n\nThe goal of [Genome Project-Write](https://engineeringbiologycenter.org/about/) (GP-Write) is to synthesize a complete human genome.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of publication of a reputable manuscript, generally accepted by the scientific community, which reports the total synthesis of a human genome (non-templated).\n\nFor the purposes of this question, we restrict resolution to non-templated synthesis. i.e. one cannot copy an existing DNA template (e.g. PCR). However, one can use a enzyme for ligation or appending nucleotides to an oligo.", "lower_25": "2037", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2065", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the most expensive AI training run in the following years will be 661 million USD?", "desc": "In June 2023, [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/) reports the most expensive training run to have been $40 million ([source, see p. 7](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18egmiHWx8fnWQExSOJcux0Us5zkAKPnh/view?usp=sharing)), their estimated cost for OpenAI's final training run of GPT-4. See Epoch's data points and trend [here](https://epochai.org/trends#investment-trends-section), where they report the most expensive training run has increased an average of 3.1x annually from 2009 to the present.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the value, in millions of 2023 USD, that [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/trends) reports as the most expensive training run, as of Dec 31 of that year (so inclusive of that year).\n\nIf Epoch AI no longer reports this value, and there is no other supremely reliable set of estimates, then subsequent subquestions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "286", "median": "444", "upper_75": "661", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Apple's twelve-month sales for the Vision Pro in Q1 2025 will be 1.01k in millions of dollars?", "desc": "On June 5, 2023 Apple announced a new product for \"spatial computing\" called [Vision Pro](https://www.apple.com/apple-vision-pro/) – an AR headset for home and work purposes. It is priced at $3,499, and it is scheduled to be available in early 2024.", "resc": "The question resolves as the **Net Sales By Category** for the Vision Pro, in millions of dollars, for the most recent 12 month period on Apple's Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements for Q1, 2025. For example, here are Apple's [Q1 2023 Financial Statements](https://www.apple.com/newsroom/pdfs/FY23_Q1_Consolidated_Financial_Statements.pdf).\n\nApple's Q1 2025 Financial Statements will cover a 12-month period ending at the end of December, 2024.\n\nIf Apple does not report net sales for the Vision Pro the question will resolve ambiguously.", "lower_25": "557", "median": "752", "upper_75": "1.01k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the most expensive AI training run in the following years will be 661 million USD?", "desc": "In June 2023, [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/) reports the most expensive training run to have been $40 million ([source, see p. 7](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18egmiHWx8fnWQExSOJcux0Us5zkAKPnh/view?usp=sharing)), their estimated cost for OpenAI's final training run of GPT-4. See Epoch's data points and trend [here](https://epochai.org/trends#investment-trends-section), where they report the most expensive training run has increased an average of 3.1x annually from 2009 to the present.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the value, in millions of 2023 USD, that [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/trends) reports as the most expensive training run, as of Dec 31 of that year (so inclusive of that year).\n\nIf Epoch AI no longer reports this value, and there is no other supremely reliable set of estimates, then subsequent subquestions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "286", "median": "444", "upper_75": "661", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Sergei Shoigu will cease to hold the office of Minister of Defense of Russia by Jun 2025?", "desc": "[Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Shoigu) is the current Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. He was appointed to this position by President Vladimir Putin on November 6, 2012. Prior to this, he served as Minister of Emergency Situations from 1991 until 2012.\n\nShoigu has faced criticism by the Russian right because of his handling of the Russian invasion in Ukraine. Despite the Russian leadership replacing the commander of the Russian troops in Ukraine multiple times, Shoigu has retained his position as the defense minister.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which Sergei Shoigu ceases to be defense Minister of Defense of Russia according to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Shoigu). \n\nShoigu may cease to be minister for any reason, including but not limited to resignation, dismissal, death in office, incapacity to serve, or removal from office via either a legal process or in the wake of a coup.\n\nIn the event that while Shoigu is serving as minister of defense, some other individual is temporarily acting as in his stead, e.g. in the event that Shoigu has to undergo surgery or some other medical procedure, this shall not be considered Shoigu 'ceasing to be defense minister of Russia' unless Shoigu has not, within 30 days, resumed his duties as defense minister.", "lower_25": "Jul 2024", "median": "Jun 2025", "upper_75": "Oct 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Sergei Shoigu will cease to hold the office of Minister of Defense of Russia by Jun 2025?", "desc": "[Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Shoigu) is the current Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. He was appointed to this position by President Vladimir Putin on November 6, 2012. Prior to this, he served as Minister of Emergency Situations from 1991 until 2012.\n\nShoigu has faced criticism by the Russian right because of his handling of the Russian invasion in Ukraine. Despite the Russian leadership replacing the commander of the Russian troops in Ukraine multiple times, Shoigu has retained his position as the defense minister.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which Sergei Shoigu ceases to be defense Minister of Defense of Russia according to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Shoigu). \n\nShoigu may cease to be minister for any reason, including but not limited to resignation, dismissal, death in office, incapacity to serve, or removal from office via either a legal process or in the wake of a coup.\n\nIn the event that while Shoigu is serving as minister of defense, some other individual is temporarily acting as in his stead, e.g. in the event that Shoigu has to undergo surgery or some other medical procedure, this shall not be considered Shoigu 'ceasing to be defense minister of Russia' unless Shoigu has not, within 30 days, resumed his duties as defense minister.", "lower_25": "Jul 2024", "median": "Jun 2025", "upper_75": "Oct 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Sergei Shoigu will cease to hold the office of Minister of Defense of Russia by Jun 2025?", "desc": "[Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Shoigu) is the current Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. He was appointed to this position by President Vladimir Putin on November 6, 2012. Prior to this, he served as Minister of Emergency Situations from 1991 until 2012.\n\nShoigu has faced criticism by the Russian right because of his handling of the Russian invasion in Ukraine. Despite the Russian leadership replacing the commander of the Russian troops in Ukraine multiple times, Shoigu has retained his position as the defense minister.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which Sergei Shoigu ceases to be defense Minister of Defense of Russia according to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Shoigu). \n\nShoigu may cease to be minister for any reason, including but not limited to resignation, dismissal, death in office, incapacity to serve, or removal from office via either a legal process or in the wake of a coup.\n\nIn the event that while Shoigu is serving as minister of defense, some other individual is temporarily acting as in his stead, e.g. in the event that Shoigu has to undergo surgery or some other medical procedure, this shall not be considered Shoigu 'ceasing to be defense minister of Russia' unless Shoigu has not, within 30 days, resumed his duties as defense minister.", "lower_25": "Jul 2024", "median": "Jun 2025", "upper_75": "Oct 2026", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "If Donald J. Trump is convicted in the classified documents case, what is the chance that he will be sentenced to 27.5 months of imprisonment?", "desc": "In June 2023, former president of the United States Donald J. Trump was [indicted](https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23839677/govuscourtsflsd64865330.pdf) by a federal grand jury on 37 felony charges, including 31 counts of willful retention of national defense information, and one count each for conspiracy to obstruct justice, withholding a document or record, corruptly concealing a document or record, concealing a document in a federal investigation, being party to a scheme to conceal, and making false statements and representations. The charges relate to his alleged unlawful retention of various documents that he had access to during his term as president of the United States, and alleged efforts to obstruct an investigation into his possession of those records. \n\nTrump has [indicated](https://www.politico.com/news/2023/06/09/trump-indictment-not-guilty-classified-records-00101213) that he will plead not guilty.\n\nIt has been [reported](https://nypost.com/2023/06/09/trump-faces-a-maximum-of-400-years-in-prison-and-a-9m-fine/) that if Trump were to be convicted on all counts, sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment for each count, and sentenced to serve those terms of imprisonment consecutively, his total term of imprisonment would be 400 years (4,800 months); however, it is not standard practice for convicted defendants to be sentenced to serve consecutive terms of imprisonment.\n\nThe maximum penalty permitted by law for any of the charges is 20 years' imprisonment for the charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice, withholding a document or record, corruptly concealing a document or record, and concealing a document in a federal investigation. \n\nNone of the charges in the indictment carry mandatory minimum terms, so it is possible that Trump would not be sentenced to any term of imprisonment even if convicted on all counts.\n\nNote that it is possible that Trump could be charged with additional crimes connected to this matter, and this question concerns any conviction of Donald J. Trump in connection with his alleged unlawful retention of classified documents, or any efforts to obstruct or otherwise interfere with relevant investigations, including any additional charges that may be included in any superseding indictment(s).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of **MONTHS** of imprisonment Donald J. Trump is sentenced to serve in a penal facility as a result of his first federal criminal trial related to his alleged retention of classified documents, and/or his efforts to obstruct, frustrate, or otherwise interfere with a relevant investigation, which results in **a conviction on at least one count.** Resolution should cite credible media reports or a relevant court document. \n\nOnly sentenced months of incarceration in a penal facility will count towards resolution; any sentence to a period of home confinement shall not count as a term of 'imprisonment.'\n\nWhether all or part of any sentence is suspended or deferred shall be irrelevant to resolution; the question shall resolve as if no part of the sentence was suspended or deferred.\n\nThe effect of any appeals, pardons, commutations, any other grant of clemency, or post-sentencing ruling of any court shall be irrelevant to the resolution of this question.\n\nThis question concerns only terms of incarceration that result from convictions on criminal charges for which Trump has been indicted, not any term of detention or incarceration Trump may be subject to if he is found in contempt of court.\n\nIf Trump is not convicted in the first such trial, either because he is acquitted, all charges are dismissed, the jury is unable to reach a verdict, a mistrial of any sort occurs, or for any other reason, this question shall resolve **ambiguously.**\n\nIf no trial concludes before January 1, 2026, the question shall also resolve **ambiguously.**", "lower_25": "3.31", "median": "10.2", "upper_75": "27.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the most expensive AI training run in the following years will be 661 million USD?", "desc": "In June 2023, [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/) reports the most expensive training run to have been $40 million ([source, see p. 7](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18egmiHWx8fnWQExSOJcux0Us5zkAKPnh/view?usp=sharing)), their estimated cost for OpenAI's final training run of GPT-4. See Epoch's data points and trend [here](https://epochai.org/trends#investment-trends-section), where they report the most expensive training run has increased an average of 3.1x annually from 2009 to the present.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the value, in millions of 2023 USD, that [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/trends) reports as the most expensive training run, as of Dec 31 of that year (so inclusive of that year).\n\nIf Epoch AI no longer reports this value, and there is no other supremely reliable set of estimates, then subsequent subquestions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "286", "median": "444", "upper_75": "661", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If Donald J. Trump is convicted in the classified documents case, what is the chance that he will be sentenced to 27.5 months of imprisonment?", "desc": "In June 2023, former president of the United States Donald J. Trump was [indicted](https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23839677/govuscourtsflsd64865330.pdf) by a federal grand jury on 37 felony charges, including 31 counts of willful retention of national defense information, and one count each for conspiracy to obstruct justice, withholding a document or record, corruptly concealing a document or record, concealing a document in a federal investigation, being party to a scheme to conceal, and making false statements and representations. The charges relate to his alleged unlawful retention of various documents that he had access to during his term as president of the United States, and alleged efforts to obstruct an investigation into his possession of those records. \n\nTrump has [indicated](https://www.politico.com/news/2023/06/09/trump-indictment-not-guilty-classified-records-00101213) that he will plead not guilty.\n\nIt has been [reported](https://nypost.com/2023/06/09/trump-faces-a-maximum-of-400-years-in-prison-and-a-9m-fine/) that if Trump were to be convicted on all counts, sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment for each count, and sentenced to serve those terms of imprisonment consecutively, his total term of imprisonment would be 400 years (4,800 months); however, it is not standard practice for convicted defendants to be sentenced to serve consecutive terms of imprisonment.\n\nThe maximum penalty permitted by law for any of the charges is 20 years' imprisonment for the charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice, withholding a document or record, corruptly concealing a document or record, and concealing a document in a federal investigation. \n\nNone of the charges in the indictment carry mandatory minimum terms, so it is possible that Trump would not be sentenced to any term of imprisonment even if convicted on all counts.\n\nNote that it is possible that Trump could be charged with additional crimes connected to this matter, and this question concerns any conviction of Donald J. Trump in connection with his alleged unlawful retention of classified documents, or any efforts to obstruct or otherwise interfere with relevant investigations, including any additional charges that may be included in any superseding indictment(s).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of **MONTHS** of imprisonment Donald J. Trump is sentenced to serve in a penal facility as a result of his first federal criminal trial related to his alleged retention of classified documents, and/or his efforts to obstruct, frustrate, or otherwise interfere with a relevant investigation, which results in **a conviction on at least one count.** Resolution should cite credible media reports or a relevant court document. \n\nOnly sentenced months of incarceration in a penal facility will count towards resolution; any sentence to a period of home confinement shall not count as a term of 'imprisonment.'\n\nWhether all or part of any sentence is suspended or deferred shall be irrelevant to resolution; the question shall resolve as if no part of the sentence was suspended or deferred.\n\nThe effect of any appeals, pardons, commutations, any other grant of clemency, or post-sentencing ruling of any court shall be irrelevant to the resolution of this question.\n\nThis question concerns only terms of incarceration that result from convictions on criminal charges for which Trump has been indicted, not any term of detention or incarceration Trump may be subject to if he is found in contempt of court.\n\nIf Trump is not convicted in the first such trial, either because he is acquitted, all charges are dismissed, the jury is unable to reach a verdict, a mistrial of any sort occurs, or for any other reason, this question shall resolve **ambiguously.**\n\nIf no trial concludes before January 1, 2026, the question shall also resolve **ambiguously.**", "lower_25": "3.31", "median": "10.2", "upper_75": "27.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a primarily-AI-made movie will accomplish these types of success by Mar 2028?", "desc": "AI technology has been increasing rapidly and could eventually create movies. [Avengers' Director Joe Russo predicted AI \"could be making movies in two years\"](https://variety.com/2023/film/news/joe-russo-artificial-intelligence-create-movies-two-years-1235593319/) and [Netflix is potentially training AI to do some editing](https://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/ent/netflix-training-ai.html). \n\nEach part of the film-making process - acting, voice, music, animations, script - could conceivably be done by AI. See the resolution criteria for how much is required for this question.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date, per credible media reporting, that the accomplishments are met by a movie with **ALL** of the following:\n\n1. No non-AI voice actors are hired for the film (using recordings is ok)\n\n2. No live action / motion capture from any non-AI actors is used in the film\n\n3. An AI gets the primary credit in script writing\n\n4. A majority of the visuals are AI generated, though possibly with minor human editing & input\n\n5. A majority of the music is AI generated and human contribution to score is minor\n\nThe subquestion definitions for the accomplishments are defined as:\n\n1. _\">$10M box office\"_ means making >$10M in 2022 US dollars on the opening weekend of a theatrical release ([one such source](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/)).\n\n2. _\"Award nomination\"_ means nominated for an Oscar or Golden Globe, in the feature film category.\n\n3. _\"Festival feature\"_ means shown as one of the feature films (but not necessarily \"in competition\") at one of the following Film Festivals: Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Toronto, or Sundance.\n\n4. _\"Animated feature\"_ means shown as a feature film in one of the following Animation Film Festivals: Annecy International Animated Film Festival, Animafest Zagreb, Ottawa International Animation Film Festival, Stuttgart Festival of Animated Film, Holland Animation Film Festival, and/or Hiroshima International Animation Festival.\n\n5. _\"Tops Netflix\"_ means listed in the [Netflix top 10 list for English language](https://www.netflix.com/tudum/top10/). If Netflix is not among the top streaming services during this question, will replace this with an admin-chosen top streaming service with a clear top list.", "lower_25": "Dec 2025", "median": "Oct 2026", "upper_75": "Mar 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many months after a Western actor trains a 1e26 FLOP model (~5x GPT-4) will a Chinese actor do so?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that a Chinese actor will train a 1e26 FLOP model (~5x GPT-4) 13.5 months after a Western actor does so?", "desc": "Epoch AI estimates that the compute used in the final training run of GPT-4, the most compute-intensive model to date, was 2e25 FLOP ([source](https://epochai.org/trends)).\n\nSeparately, Ben Cottier (who was at Rethink Priorities at the time he published this report, though he is now at Epoch) finds that it took 16 months for the first Chinese lab to replicate GPT-3. This model, PanGu-a, performed worse than GPT-3 ([source](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/s/8rYkpiFhbb4HsbzFc/p/FANYsqzPM9Yht3KM2)).\n\nAI governance proposals, such as The Future of Life Institute's [Pause Giant AI Experiments: An Open Letter](https://futureoflife.org/open-letter/pause-giant-ai-experiments/), often face an objection along the lines of, \"In an ideal world, we would slow down and regulate AI. However, we're not in that ideal world. China is close behind, and they won't slow down.\" Therefore, to better evaluate the potential of many AI governance proposals in the West (notably, in the U.S.), it would be very helpful to gain a more accurate understanding of how large or small the China-West AI capabilities gap really is.", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of months between it becoming publicly known that a Western actor trained a 1e26 FLOP model, and it becoming publicly known that a Chinese actor trained a model of this size. (Will be a negative number if China does it first.)\n\n\"Publicly known\" refers to both statements from the labs themselves, as well as strongly credible reporting, such as by [Epoch](https://epochai.org/trends).", "lower_25": "5.28", "median": "13.5", "upper_75": "18.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a primarily-AI-made movie will accomplish these types of success by Mar 2028?", "desc": "AI technology has been increasing rapidly and could eventually create movies. [Avengers' Director Joe Russo predicted AI \"could be making movies in two years\"](https://variety.com/2023/film/news/joe-russo-artificial-intelligence-create-movies-two-years-1235593319/) and [Netflix is potentially training AI to do some editing](https://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/ent/netflix-training-ai.html). \n\nEach part of the film-making process - acting, voice, music, animations, script - could conceivably be done by AI. See the resolution criteria for how much is required for this question.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date, per credible media reporting, that the accomplishments are met by a movie with **ALL** of the following:\n\n1. No non-AI voice actors are hired for the film (using recordings is ok)\n\n2. No live action / motion capture from any non-AI actors is used in the film\n\n3. An AI gets the primary credit in script writing\n\n4. A majority of the visuals are AI generated, though possibly with minor human editing & input\n\n5. A majority of the music is AI generated and human contribution to score is minor\n\nThe subquestion definitions for the accomplishments are defined as:\n\n1. _\">$10M box office\"_ means making >$10M in 2022 US dollars on the opening weekend of a theatrical release ([one such source](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/)).\n\n2. _\"Award nomination\"_ means nominated for an Oscar or Golden Globe, in the feature film category.\n\n3. _\"Festival feature\"_ means shown as one of the feature films (but not necessarily \"in competition\") at one of the following Film Festivals: Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Toronto, or Sundance.\n\n4. _\"Animated feature\"_ means shown as a feature film in one of the following Animation Film Festivals: Annecy International Animated Film Festival, Animafest Zagreb, Ottawa International Animation Film Festival, Stuttgart Festival of Animated Film, Holland Animation Film Festival, and/or Hiroshima International Animation Festival.\n\n5. _\"Tops Netflix\"_ means listed in the [Netflix top 10 list for English language](https://www.netflix.com/tudum/top10/). If Netflix is not among the top streaming services during this question, will replace this with an admin-chosen top streaming service with a clear top list.", "lower_25": "Dec 2025", "median": "Oct 2026", "upper_75": "Mar 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If Donald J. Trump is convicted in the classified documents case, what is the chance that he will be sentenced to 27.5 months of imprisonment?", "desc": "In June 2023, former president of the United States Donald J. Trump was [indicted](https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23839677/govuscourtsflsd64865330.pdf) by a federal grand jury on 37 felony charges, including 31 counts of willful retention of national defense information, and one count each for conspiracy to obstruct justice, withholding a document or record, corruptly concealing a document or record, concealing a document in a federal investigation, being party to a scheme to conceal, and making false statements and representations. The charges relate to his alleged unlawful retention of various documents that he had access to during his term as president of the United States, and alleged efforts to obstruct an investigation into his possession of those records. \n\nTrump has [indicated](https://www.politico.com/news/2023/06/09/trump-indictment-not-guilty-classified-records-00101213) that he will plead not guilty.\n\nIt has been [reported](https://nypost.com/2023/06/09/trump-faces-a-maximum-of-400-years-in-prison-and-a-9m-fine/) that if Trump were to be convicted on all counts, sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment for each count, and sentenced to serve those terms of imprisonment consecutively, his total term of imprisonment would be 400 years (4,800 months); however, it is not standard practice for convicted defendants to be sentenced to serve consecutive terms of imprisonment.\n\nThe maximum penalty permitted by law for any of the charges is 20 years' imprisonment for the charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice, withholding a document or record, corruptly concealing a document or record, and concealing a document in a federal investigation. \n\nNone of the charges in the indictment carry mandatory minimum terms, so it is possible that Trump would not be sentenced to any term of imprisonment even if convicted on all counts.\n\nNote that it is possible that Trump could be charged with additional crimes connected to this matter, and this question concerns any conviction of Donald J. Trump in connection with his alleged unlawful retention of classified documents, or any efforts to obstruct or otherwise interfere with relevant investigations, including any additional charges that may be included in any superseding indictment(s).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of **MONTHS** of imprisonment Donald J. Trump is sentenced to serve in a penal facility as a result of his first federal criminal trial related to his alleged retention of classified documents, and/or his efforts to obstruct, frustrate, or otherwise interfere with a relevant investigation, which results in **a conviction on at least one count.** Resolution should cite credible media reports or a relevant court document. \n\nOnly sentenced months of incarceration in a penal facility will count towards resolution; any sentence to a period of home confinement shall not count as a term of 'imprisonment.'\n\nWhether all or part of any sentence is suspended or deferred shall be irrelevant to resolution; the question shall resolve as if no part of the sentence was suspended or deferred.\n\nThe effect of any appeals, pardons, commutations, any other grant of clemency, or post-sentencing ruling of any court shall be irrelevant to the resolution of this question.\n\nThis question concerns only terms of incarceration that result from convictions on criminal charges for which Trump has been indicted, not any term of detention or incarceration Trump may be subject to if he is found in contempt of court.\n\nIf Trump is not convicted in the first such trial, either because he is acquitted, all charges are dismissed, the jury is unable to reach a verdict, a mistrial of any sort occurs, or for any other reason, this question shall resolve **ambiguously.**\n\nIf no trial concludes before January 1, 2026, the question shall also resolve **ambiguously.**", "lower_25": "3.31", "median": "10.2", "upper_75": "27.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that OpenAI will release an LLM product or API that hallucinates 2x less than GPT-4 did when it was released by May 2024?", "desc": "On June 10, 2023, Mustafa Suleyman, cofounder of DeepMind, [tweeted](https://twitter.com/mustafasuleymn/status/1667340253584297992) that \"LLM hallucinations will be largely eliminated by 2025.\" He elaborated this meant 80% accuracy by June 30, 2025, though Gary Marcus, Riley Goodside, and others responded this bar was way too low - current accuracy is ~75% or ~59% depending on the benchmark.\n\nThe [GPT-4 paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2303.08774.pdf), in section 5 on \"Limitations\", describes the problem of hallucinations, i.e. producing seemingly-reasonable text that is factually incorrect.\n\nGPT-4 uses two evals for factuality. One is an internal OpenAI set of \"adversarially-designed factuality evaluations\", Figure 6, on which GPT-4 scored ~75% across 9 domains, compared to ~55% for GPT-3.5.\n\nThe other is a public benchmark, TruthfulQA, which \"tests the model's ability to separate fact from an adversarially-selected set of incorrect statements\", in Figure 7, on which GPT-4 scored ~59%, compared to ~47% for GPT-3.5-turbo.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date that OpenAI releases an LLM product or API that claims it scores >=87% on its internal factual eval, _OR_ >= 80% on TruthfulQA.\n\n\"LLM product or API\" here will be interpreted broadly. For example, if the system that reaches this eval does so by first generating LLM output, and then subsequently verifying that output before showing it to users or returning it in the API, that would qualify.\n\n\"Releases\" means the product or API must be available to the public in some capacity. A limited beta suffices as long as third party users can verify the claims OpenAI makes. A paper alone, or a model without an interface or API, are not sufficient.", "lower_25": "May 2024", "median": "Sep 2024", "upper_75": "Feb 2025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many months after a Western actor trains a 1e26 FLOP model (~5x GPT-4) will a Chinese actor do so?\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that a Chinese actor will train a 1e26 FLOP model (~5x GPT-4) 13.5 months after a Western actor does so?", "desc": "Epoch AI estimates that the compute used in the final training run of GPT-4, the most compute-intensive model to date, was 2e25 FLOP ([source](https://epochai.org/trends)).\n\nSeparately, Ben Cottier (who was at Rethink Priorities at the time he published this report, though he is now at Epoch) finds that it took 16 months for the first Chinese lab to replicate GPT-3. This model, PanGu-a, performed worse than GPT-3 ([source](https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/s/8rYkpiFhbb4HsbzFc/p/FANYsqzPM9Yht3KM2)).\n\nAI governance proposals, such as The Future of Life Institute's [Pause Giant AI Experiments: An Open Letter](https://futureoflife.org/open-letter/pause-giant-ai-experiments/), often face an objection along the lines of, \"In an ideal world, we would slow down and regulate AI. However, we're not in that ideal world. China is close behind, and they won't slow down.\" Therefore, to better evaluate the potential of many AI governance proposals in the West (notably, in the U.S.), it would be very helpful to gain a more accurate understanding of how large or small the China-West AI capabilities gap really is.", "resc": "This question resolves as the number of months between it becoming publicly known that a Western actor trained a 1e26 FLOP model, and it becoming publicly known that a Chinese actor trained a model of this size. (Will be a negative number if China does it first.)\n\n\"Publicly known\" refers to both statements from the labs themselves, as well as strongly credible reporting, such as by [Epoch](https://epochai.org/trends).", "lower_25": "5.28", "median": "13.5", "upper_75": "18.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that OpenAI will release an LLM product or API that hallucinates 2x less than GPT-4 did when it was released by May 2024?", "desc": "On June 10, 2023, Mustafa Suleyman, cofounder of DeepMind, [tweeted](https://twitter.com/mustafasuleymn/status/1667340253584297992) that \"LLM hallucinations will be largely eliminated by 2025.\" He elaborated this meant 80% accuracy by June 30, 2025, though Gary Marcus, Riley Goodside, and others responded this bar was way too low - current accuracy is ~75% or ~59% depending on the benchmark.\n\nThe [GPT-4 paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2303.08774.pdf), in section 5 on \"Limitations\", describes the problem of hallucinations, i.e. producing seemingly-reasonable text that is factually incorrect.\n\nGPT-4 uses two evals for factuality. One is an internal OpenAI set of \"adversarially-designed factuality evaluations\", Figure 6, on which GPT-4 scored ~75% across 9 domains, compared to ~55% for GPT-3.5.\n\nThe other is a public benchmark, TruthfulQA, which \"tests the model's ability to separate fact from an adversarially-selected set of incorrect statements\", in Figure 7, on which GPT-4 scored ~59%, compared to ~47% for GPT-3.5-turbo.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date that OpenAI releases an LLM product or API that claims it scores >=87% on its internal factual eval, _OR_ >= 80% on TruthfulQA.\n\n\"LLM product or API\" here will be interpreted broadly. For example, if the system that reaches this eval does so by first generating LLM output, and then subsequently verifying that output before showing it to users or returning it in the API, that would qualify.\n\n\"Releases\" means the product or API must be available to the public in some capacity. A limited beta suffices as long as third party users can verify the claims OpenAI makes. A paper alone, or a model without an interface or API, are not sufficient.", "lower_25": "May 2024", "median": "Sep 2024", "upper_75": "Feb 2025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1K GPT-4 API tokens will cost less than $10^3 in January 2025?", "desc": "[GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) was announced in March 2023. The API is not yet public as of June 2023 but is available to some users. Current pricing is as follows:\n\n| Model | Input | Output |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| 8K context | $0.03 / 1K tokens | $0.06 / 1K tokens |\n| 32K context | $0.06 / 1K tokens | $0.12 / 1K tokens |", "resc": "The question resolves as the [price](https://openai.com/pricing), in US dollars, to query the public GPT-4 API in the US on 01/01/2025 for the relevant token type.\n\nThe \"750 Input, 250 Output (Lowest Cost)\" sub question resolves as the cost of 750 input tokens plus 250 output tokens for the lowest-cost API model. Currently, that is the 8K context model. At current prices of $0.03 / 1K tokens Input and $0.06 / 1K tokens Output, this option would resolve as:\n\n\\[ $0.03 \\cdot \\frac{750}{1000} + $0.06 \\cdot \\frac{250}{1000} = $0.0375 \\]", "lower_25": "< 10−3", "median": "< 10−3", "upper_75": "0.0164", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that OpenAI will release an LLM product or API that hallucinates 2x less than GPT-4 did when it was released by May 2024?", "desc": "On June 10, 2023, Mustafa Suleyman, cofounder of DeepMind, [tweeted](https://twitter.com/mustafasuleymn/status/1667340253584297992) that \"LLM hallucinations will be largely eliminated by 2025.\" He elaborated this meant 80% accuracy by June 30, 2025, though Gary Marcus, Riley Goodside, and others responded this bar was way too low - current accuracy is ~75% or ~59% depending on the benchmark.\n\nThe [GPT-4 paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2303.08774.pdf), in section 5 on \"Limitations\", describes the problem of hallucinations, i.e. producing seemingly-reasonable text that is factually incorrect.\n\nGPT-4 uses two evals for factuality. One is an internal OpenAI set of \"adversarially-designed factuality evaluations\", Figure 6, on which GPT-4 scored ~75% across 9 domains, compared to ~55% for GPT-3.5.\n\nThe other is a public benchmark, TruthfulQA, which \"tests the model's ability to separate fact from an adversarially-selected set of incorrect statements\", in Figure 7, on which GPT-4 scored ~59%, compared to ~47% for GPT-3.5-turbo.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date that OpenAI releases an LLM product or API that claims it scores >=87% on its internal factual eval, _OR_ >= 80% on TruthfulQA.\n\n\"LLM product or API\" here will be interpreted broadly. For example, if the system that reaches this eval does so by first generating LLM output, and then subsequently verifying that output before showing it to users or returning it in the API, that would qualify.\n\n\"Releases\" means the product or API must be available to the public in some capacity. A limited beta suffices as long as third party users can verify the claims OpenAI makes. A paper alone, or a model without an interface or API, are not sufficient.", "lower_25": "May 2024", "median": "Sep 2024", "upper_75": "Feb 2025", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a primarily-AI-made movie will accomplish these types of success (Award Nomination) by Feb 2028?", "desc": "AI technology has been increasing rapidly and could eventually create movies. [Avengers' Director Joe Russo predicted AI \"could be making movies in two years\"](https://variety.com/2023/film/news/joe-russo-artificial-intelligence-create-movies-two-years-1235593319/) and [Netflix is potentially training AI to do some editing](https://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/ent/netflix-training-ai.html). \n\nEach part of the film-making process - acting, voice, music, animations, script - could conceivably be done by AI. See the resolution criteria for how much is required for this question.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date, per credible media reporting, that the accomplishments are met by a movie with **ALL** of the following:\n\n1. No non-AI voice actors are hired for the film (using recordings is ok)\n\n2. No live action / motion capture from any non-AI actors is used in the film\n\n3. An AI gets the primary credit in script writing\n\n4. A majority of the visuals are AI generated, though possibly with minor human editing & input\n\n5. A majority of the music is AI generated and human contribution to score is minor\n\nThe subquestion definitions for the accomplishments are defined as:\n\n1. _\">$10M box office\"_ means making >$10M in 2022 US dollars on the opening weekend of a theatrical release ([one such source](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/)).\n\n2. _\"Award nomination\"_ means nominated for an Oscar or Golden Globe, in the feature film category.\n\n3. _\"Festival feature\"_ means shown as one of the feature films (but not necessarily \"in competition\") at one of the following Film Festivals: Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Toronto, or Sundance.\n\n4. _\"Animated feature\"_ means shown as a feature film in one of the following Animation Film Festivals: Annecy International Animated Film Festival, Animafest Zagreb, Ottawa International Animation Film Festival, Stuttgart Festival of Animated Film, Holland Animation Film Festival, and/or Hiroshima International Animation Festival.\n\n5. _\"Tops Netflix\"_ means listed in the [Netflix top 10 list for English language](https://www.netflix.com/tudum/top10/). If Netflix is not among the top streaming services during this question, will replace this with an admin-chosen top streaming service with a clear top list.", "lower_25": "Dec 2026", "median": "Feb 2028", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a primarily-AI-made movie will accomplish these types of success by Mar 2028?", "desc": "AI technology has been increasing rapidly and could eventually create movies. [Avengers' Director Joe Russo predicted AI \"could be making movies in two years\"](https://variety.com/2023/film/news/joe-russo-artificial-intelligence-create-movies-two-years-1235593319/) and [Netflix is potentially training AI to do some editing](https://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/ent/netflix-training-ai.html). \n\nEach part of the film-making process - acting, voice, music, animations, script - could conceivably be done by AI. See the resolution criteria for how much is required for this question.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date, per credible media reporting, that the accomplishments are met by a movie with **ALL** of the following:\n\n1. No non-AI voice actors are hired for the film (using recordings is ok)\n\n2. No live action / motion capture from any non-AI actors is used in the film\n\n3. An AI gets the primary credit in script writing\n\n4. A majority of the visuals are AI generated, though possibly with minor human editing & input\n\n5. A majority of the music is AI generated and human contribution to score is minor\n\nThe subquestion definitions for the accomplishments are defined as:\n\n1. _\">$10M box office\"_ means making >$10M in 2022 US dollars on the opening weekend of a theatrical release ([one such source](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/)).\n\n2. _\"Award nomination\"_ means nominated for an Oscar or Golden Globe, in the feature film category.\n\n3. _\"Festival feature\"_ means shown as one of the feature films (but not necessarily \"in competition\") at one of the following Film Festivals: Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Toronto, or Sundance.\n\n4. _\"Animated feature\"_ means shown as a feature film in one of the following Animation Film Festivals: Annecy International Animated Film Festival, Animafest Zagreb, Ottawa International Animation Film Festival, Stuttgart Festival of Animated Film, Holland Animation Film Festival, and/or Hiroshima International Animation Festival.\n\n5. _\"Tops Netflix\"_ means listed in the [Netflix top 10 list for English language](https://www.netflix.com/tudum/top10/). If Netflix is not among the top streaming services during this question, will replace this with an admin-chosen top streaming service with a clear top list.", "lower_25": "Dec 2025", "median": "Oct 2026", "upper_75": "Mar 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a primarily-AI-made movie will accomplish these types of success (>$10M Box Office) by Oct 2026?", "desc": "AI technology has been increasing rapidly and could eventually create movies. [Avengers' Director Joe Russo predicted AI \"could be making movies in two years\"](https://variety.com/2023/film/news/joe-russo-artificial-intelligence-create-movies-two-years-1235593319/) and [Netflix is potentially training AI to do some editing](https://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/ent/netflix-training-ai.html). \n\nEach part of the film-making process - acting, voice, music, animations, script - could conceivably be done by AI. See the resolution criteria for how much is required for this question.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date, per credible media reporting, that the accomplishments are met by a movie with **ALL** of the following:\n\n1. No non-AI voice actors are hired for the film (using recordings is ok)\n\n2. No live action / motion capture from any non-AI actors is used in the film\n\n3. An AI gets the primary credit in script writing\n\n4. A majority of the visuals are AI generated, though possibly with minor human editing & input\n\n5. A majority of the music is AI generated and human contribution to score is minor\n\nThe subquestion definitions for the accomplishments are defined as:\n\n1. _\">$10M box office\"_ means making >$10M in 2022 US dollars on the opening weekend of a theatrical release ([one such source](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/)).\n\n2. _\"Award nomination\"_ means nominated for an Oscar or Golden Globe, in the feature film category.\n\n3. _\"Festival feature\"_ means shown as one of the feature films (but not necessarily \"in competition\") at one of the following Film Festivals: Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Toronto, or Sundance.\n\n4. _\"Animated feature\"_ means shown as a feature film in one of the following Animation Film Festivals: Annecy International Animated Film Festival, Animafest Zagreb, Ottawa International Animation Film Festival, Stuttgart Festival of Animated Film, Holland Animation Film Festival, and/or Hiroshima International Animation Festival.\n\n5. _\"Tops Netflix\"_ means listed in the [Netflix top 10 list for English language](https://www.netflix.com/tudum/top10/). If Netflix is not among the top streaming services during this question, will replace this with an admin-chosen top streaming service with a clear top list.", "lower_25": "Dec 2025", "median": "Oct 2026", "upper_75": "Mar 2028", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1K GPT-4 API tokens will cost less than $10^3 in January 2025?", "desc": "[GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) was announced in March 2023. The API is not yet public as of June 2023 but is available to some users. Current pricing is as follows:\n\n| Model | Input | Output |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| 8K context | $0.03 / 1K tokens | $0.06 / 1K tokens |\n| 32K context | $0.06 / 1K tokens | $0.12 / 1K tokens |", "resc": "The question resolves as the [price](https://openai.com/pricing), in US dollars, to query the public GPT-4 API in the US on 01/01/2025 for the relevant token type.\n\nThe \"750 Input, 250 Output (Lowest Cost)\" sub question resolves as the cost of 750 input tokens plus 250 output tokens for the lowest-cost API model. Currently, that is the 8K context model. At current prices of $0.03 / 1K tokens Input and $0.06 / 1K tokens Output, this option would resolve as:\n\n\\[ $0.03 \\cdot \\frac{750}{1000} + $0.06 \\cdot \\frac{250}{1000} = $0.0375 \\]", "lower_25": "< 10−3", "median": "< 10−3", "upper_75": "0.0164", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a primarily-AI-made movie will accomplish these types of success (>$10M Box Office) by Oct 2026?", "desc": "AI technology has been increasing rapidly and could eventually create movies. [Avengers' Director Joe Russo predicted AI \"could be making movies in two years\"](https://variety.com/2023/film/news/joe-russo-artificial-intelligence-create-movies-two-years-1235593319/) and [Netflix is potentially training AI to do some editing](https://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/ent/netflix-training-ai.html). \n\nEach part of the film-making process - acting, voice, music, animations, script - could conceivably be done by AI. See the resolution criteria for how much is required for this question.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date, per credible media reporting, that the accomplishments are met by a movie with **ALL** of the following:\n\n1. No non-AI voice actors are hired for the film (using recordings is ok)\n\n2. No live action / motion capture from any non-AI actors is used in the film\n\n3. An AI gets the primary credit in script writing\n\n4. A majority of the visuals are AI generated, though possibly with minor human editing & input\n\n5. A majority of the music is AI generated and human contribution to score is minor\n\nThe subquestion definitions for the accomplishments are defined as:\n\n1. _\">$10M box office\"_ means making >$10M in 2022 US dollars on the opening weekend of a theatrical release ([one such source](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/)).\n\n2. _\"Award nomination\"_ means nominated for an Oscar or Golden Globe, in the feature film category.\n\n3. _\"Festival feature\"_ means shown as one of the feature films (but not necessarily \"in competition\") at one of the following Film Festivals: Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Toronto, or Sundance.\n\n4. _\"Animated feature\"_ means shown as a feature film in one of the following Animation Film Festivals: Annecy International Animated Film Festival, Animafest Zagreb, Ottawa International Animation Film Festival, Stuttgart Festival of Animated Film, Holland Animation Film Festival, and/or Hiroshima International Animation Festival.\n\n5. _\"Tops Netflix\"_ means listed in the [Netflix top 10 list for English language](https://www.netflix.com/tudum/top10/). If Netflix is not among the top streaming services during this question, will replace this with an admin-chosen top streaming service with a clear top list.", "lower_25": "Dec 2025", "median": "Oct 2026", "upper_75": "Mar 2028", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a primarily-AI-made movie will accomplish these types of success (Award Nomination) by Feb 2028?", "desc": "AI technology has been increasing rapidly and could eventually create movies. [Avengers' Director Joe Russo predicted AI \"could be making movies in two years\"](https://variety.com/2023/film/news/joe-russo-artificial-intelligence-create-movies-two-years-1235593319/) and [Netflix is potentially training AI to do some editing](https://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/ent/netflix-training-ai.html). \n\nEach part of the film-making process - acting, voice, music, animations, script - could conceivably be done by AI. See the resolution criteria for how much is required for this question.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date, per credible media reporting, that the accomplishments are met by a movie with **ALL** of the following:\n\n1. No non-AI voice actors are hired for the film (using recordings is ok)\n\n2. No live action / motion capture from any non-AI actors is used in the film\n\n3. An AI gets the primary credit in script writing\n\n4. A majority of the visuals are AI generated, though possibly with minor human editing & input\n\n5. A majority of the music is AI generated and human contribution to score is minor\n\nThe subquestion definitions for the accomplishments are defined as:\n\n1. _\">$10M box office\"_ means making >$10M in 2022 US dollars on the opening weekend of a theatrical release ([one such source](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/)).\n\n2. _\"Award nomination\"_ means nominated for an Oscar or Golden Globe, in the feature film category.\n\n3. _\"Festival feature\"_ means shown as one of the feature films (but not necessarily \"in competition\") at one of the following Film Festivals: Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Toronto, or Sundance.\n\n4. _\"Animated feature\"_ means shown as a feature film in one of the following Animation Film Festivals: Annecy International Animated Film Festival, Animafest Zagreb, Ottawa International Animation Film Festival, Stuttgart Festival of Animated Film, Holland Animation Film Festival, and/or Hiroshima International Animation Festival.\n\n5. _\"Tops Netflix\"_ means listed in the [Netflix top 10 list for English language](https://www.netflix.com/tudum/top10/). If Netflix is not among the top streaming services during this question, will replace this with an admin-chosen top streaming service with a clear top list.", "lower_25": "Dec 2026", "median": "Feb 2028", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a primarily-AI-made movie will accomplish festival feature success by Nov 2025?", "desc": "AI technology has been increasing rapidly and could eventually create movies. [Avengers' Director Joe Russo predicted AI \"could be making movies in two years\"](https://variety.com/2023/film/news/joe-russo-artificial-intelligence-create-movies-two-years-1235593319/) and [Netflix is potentially training AI to do some editing](https://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/ent/netflix-training-ai.html). \n\nEach part of the film-making process - acting, voice, music, animations, script - could conceivably be done by AI. See the resolution criteria for how much is required for this question.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date, per credible media reporting, that the accomplishments are met by a movie with **ALL** of the following:\n\n1. No non-AI voice actors are hired for the film (using recordings is ok)\n\n2. No live action / motion capture from any non-AI actors is used in the film\n\n3. An AI gets the primary credit in script writing\n\n4. A majority of the visuals are AI generated, though possibly with minor human editing & input\n\n5. A majority of the music is AI generated and human contribution to score is minor\n\nThe subquestion definitions for the accomplishments are defined as:\n\n1. _\">$10M box office\"_ means making >$10M in 2022 US dollars on the opening weekend of a theatrical release ([one such source](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/)).\n\n2. _\"Award nomination\"_ means nominated for an Oscar or Golden Globe, in the feature film category.\n\n3. _\"Festival feature\"_ means shown as one of the feature films (but not necessarily \"in competition\") at one of the following Film Festivals: Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Toronto, or Sundance.\n\n4. _\"Animated feature\"_ means shown as a feature film in one of the following Animation Film Festivals: Annecy International Animated Film Festival, Animafest Zagreb, Ottawa International Animation Film Festival, Stuttgart Festival of Animated Film, Holland Animation Film Festival, and/or Hiroshima International Animation Festival.\n\n5. _\"Tops Netflix\"_ means listed in the [Netflix top 10 list for English language](https://www.netflix.com/tudum/top10/). If Netflix is not among the top streaming services during this question, will replace this with an admin-chosen top streaming service with a clear top list.", "lower_25": "Nov 2025", "median": "Apr 2026", "upper_75": "Oct 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a primarily-AI-made movie will accomplish these types of success (>$10M Box Office) by Oct 2026?", "desc": "AI technology has been increasing rapidly and could eventually create movies. [Avengers' Director Joe Russo predicted AI \"could be making movies in two years\"](https://variety.com/2023/film/news/joe-russo-artificial-intelligence-create-movies-two-years-1235593319/) and [Netflix is potentially training AI to do some editing](https://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/ent/netflix-training-ai.html). \n\nEach part of the film-making process - acting, voice, music, animations, script - could conceivably be done by AI. See the resolution criteria for how much is required for this question.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date, per credible media reporting, that the accomplishments are met by a movie with **ALL** of the following:\n\n1. No non-AI voice actors are hired for the film (using recordings is ok)\n\n2. No live action / motion capture from any non-AI actors is used in the film\n\n3. An AI gets the primary credit in script writing\n\n4. A majority of the visuals are AI generated, though possibly with minor human editing & input\n\n5. A majority of the music is AI generated and human contribution to score is minor\n\nThe subquestion definitions for the accomplishments are defined as:\n\n1. _\">$10M box office\"_ means making >$10M in 2022 US dollars on the opening weekend of a theatrical release ([one such source](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/)).\n\n2. _\"Award nomination\"_ means nominated for an Oscar or Golden Globe, in the feature film category.\n\n3. _\"Festival feature\"_ means shown as one of the feature films (but not necessarily \"in competition\") at one of the following Film Festivals: Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Toronto, or Sundance.\n\n4. _\"Animated feature\"_ means shown as a feature film in one of the following Animation Film Festivals: Annecy International Animated Film Festival, Animafest Zagreb, Ottawa International Animation Film Festival, Stuttgart Festival of Animated Film, Holland Animation Film Festival, and/or Hiroshima International Animation Festival.\n\n5. _\"Tops Netflix\"_ means listed in the [Netflix top 10 list for English language](https://www.netflix.com/tudum/top10/). If Netflix is not among the top streaming services during this question, will replace this with an admin-chosen top streaming service with a clear top list.", "lower_25": "Dec 2025", "median": "Oct 2026", "upper_75": "Mar 2028", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a primarily-AI-made movie will accomplish festival feature success by Nov 2025?", "desc": "AI technology has been increasing rapidly and could eventually create movies. [Avengers' Director Joe Russo predicted AI \"could be making movies in two years\"](https://variety.com/2023/film/news/joe-russo-artificial-intelligence-create-movies-two-years-1235593319/) and [Netflix is potentially training AI to do some editing](https://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/ent/netflix-training-ai.html). \n\nEach part of the film-making process - acting, voice, music, animations, script - could conceivably be done by AI. See the resolution criteria for how much is required for this question.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date, per credible media reporting, that the accomplishments are met by a movie with **ALL** of the following:\n\n1. No non-AI voice actors are hired for the film (using recordings is ok)\n\n2. No live action / motion capture from any non-AI actors is used in the film\n\n3. An AI gets the primary credit in script writing\n\n4. A majority of the visuals are AI generated, though possibly with minor human editing & input\n\n5. A majority of the music is AI generated and human contribution to score is minor\n\nThe subquestion definitions for the accomplishments are defined as:\n\n1. _\">$10M box office\"_ means making >$10M in 2022 US dollars on the opening weekend of a theatrical release ([one such source](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/)).\n\n2. _\"Award nomination\"_ means nominated for an Oscar or Golden Globe, in the feature film category.\n\n3. _\"Festival feature\"_ means shown as one of the feature films (but not necessarily \"in competition\") at one of the following Film Festivals: Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Toronto, or Sundance.\n\n4. _\"Animated feature\"_ means shown as a feature film in one of the following Animation Film Festivals: Annecy International Animated Film Festival, Animafest Zagreb, Ottawa International Animation Film Festival, Stuttgart Festival of Animated Film, Holland Animation Film Festival, and/or Hiroshima International Animation Festival.\n\n5. _\"Tops Netflix\"_ means listed in the [Netflix top 10 list for English language](https://www.netflix.com/tudum/top10/). If Netflix is not among the top streaming services during this question, will replace this with an admin-chosen top streaming service with a clear top list.", "lower_25": "Nov 2025", "median": "Apr 2026", "upper_75": "Oct 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a primarily-AI-made movie will accomplish these types of success in animated features by Apr 2025?", "desc": "AI technology has been increasing rapidly and could eventually create movies. [Avengers' Director Joe Russo predicted AI \"could be making movies in two years\"](https://variety.com/2023/film/news/joe-russo-artificial-intelligence-create-movies-two-years-1235593319/) and [Netflix is potentially training AI to do some editing](https://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/ent/netflix-training-ai.html). \n\nEach part of the film-making process - acting, voice, music, animations, script - could conceivably be done by AI. See the resolution criteria for how much is required for this question.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date, per credible media reporting, that the accomplishments are met by a movie with **ALL** of the following:\n\n1. No non-AI voice actors are hired for the film (using recordings is ok)\n\n2. No live action / motion capture from any non-AI actors is used in the film\n\n3. An AI gets the primary credit in script writing\n\n4. A majority of the visuals are AI generated, though possibly with minor human editing & input\n\n5. A majority of the music is AI generated and human contribution to score is minor\n\nThe subquestion definitions for the accomplishments are defined as:\n\n1. _\">$10M box office\"_ means making >$10M in 2022 US dollars on the opening weekend of a theatrical release ([one such source](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/)).\n\n2. _\"Award nomination\"_ means nominated for an Oscar or Golden Globe, in the feature film category.\n\n3. _\"Festival feature\"_ means shown as one of the feature films (but not necessarily \"in competition\") at one of the following Film Festivals: Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Toronto, or Sundance.\n\n4. _\"Animated feature\"_ means shown as a feature film in one of the following Animation Film Festivals: Annecy International Animated Film Festival, Animafest Zagreb, Ottawa International Animation Film Festival, Stuttgart Festival of Animated Film, Holland Animation Film Festival, and/or Hiroshima International Animation Festival.\n\n5. _\"Tops Netflix\"_ means listed in the [Netflix top 10 list for English language](https://www.netflix.com/tudum/top10/). If Netflix is not among the top streaming services during this question, will replace this with an admin-chosen top streaming service with a clear top list.", "lower_25": "Apr 2025", "median": "Nov 2025", "upper_75": "Jun 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a primarily-AI-made movie will top Netflix by August 2027?", "desc": "AI technology has been increasing rapidly and could eventually create movies. [Avengers' Director Joe Russo predicted AI \"could be making movies in two years\"](https://variety.com/2023/film/news/joe-russo-artificial-intelligence-create-movies-two-years-1235593319/) and [Netflix is potentially training AI to do some editing](https://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/ent/netflix-training-ai.html). \n\nEach part of the film-making process - acting, voice, music, animations, script - could conceivably be done by AI. See the resolution criteria for how much is required for this question.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date, per credible media reporting, that the accomplishments are met by a movie with **ALL** of the following:\n\n1. No non-AI voice actors are hired for the film (using recordings is ok)\n\n2. No live action / motion capture from any non-AI actors is used in the film\n\n3. An AI gets the primary credit in script writing\n\n4. A majority of the visuals are AI generated, though possibly with minor human editing & input\n\n5. A majority of the music is AI generated and human contribution to score is minor\n\nThe subquestion definitions for the accomplishments are defined as:\n\n1. _\">$10M box office\"_ means making >$10M in 2022 US dollars on the opening weekend of a theatrical release ([one such source](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/)).\n\n2. _\"Award nomination\"_ means nominated for an Oscar or Golden Globe, in the feature film category.\n\n3. _\"Festival feature\"_ means shown as one of the feature films (but not necessarily \"in competition\") at one of the following Film Festivals: Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Toronto, or Sundance.\n\n4. _\"Animated feature\"_ means shown as a feature film in one of the following Animation Film Festivals: Annecy International Animated Film Festival, Animafest Zagreb, Ottawa International Animation Film Festival, Stuttgart Festival of Animated Film, Holland Animation Film Festival, and/or Hiroshima International Animation Festival.\n\n5. _\"Tops Netflix\"_ means listed in the [Netflix top 10 list for English language](https://www.netflix.com/tudum/top10/). If Netflix is not among the top streaming services during this question, will replace this with an admin-chosen top streaming service with a clear top list.", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "May 2026", "upper_75": "Aug 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a primarily-AI-made movie will accomplish these types of success in animated features by Apr 2025?", "desc": "AI technology has been increasing rapidly and could eventually create movies. [Avengers' Director Joe Russo predicted AI \"could be making movies in two years\"](https://variety.com/2023/film/news/joe-russo-artificial-intelligence-create-movies-two-years-1235593319/) and [Netflix is potentially training AI to do some editing](https://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/ent/netflix-training-ai.html). \n\nEach part of the film-making process - acting, voice, music, animations, script - could conceivably be done by AI. See the resolution criteria for how much is required for this question.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date, per credible media reporting, that the accomplishments are met by a movie with **ALL** of the following:\n\n1. No non-AI voice actors are hired for the film (using recordings is ok)\n\n2. No live action / motion capture from any non-AI actors is used in the film\n\n3. An AI gets the primary credit in script writing\n\n4. A majority of the visuals are AI generated, though possibly with minor human editing & input\n\n5. A majority of the music is AI generated and human contribution to score is minor\n\nThe subquestion definitions for the accomplishments are defined as:\n\n1. _\">$10M box office\"_ means making >$10M in 2022 US dollars on the opening weekend of a theatrical release ([one such source](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/)).\n\n2. _\"Award nomination\"_ means nominated for an Oscar or Golden Globe, in the feature film category.\n\n3. _\"Festival feature\"_ means shown as one of the feature films (but not necessarily \"in competition\") at one of the following Film Festivals: Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Toronto, or Sundance.\n\n4. _\"Animated feature\"_ means shown as a feature film in one of the following Animation Film Festivals: Annecy International Animated Film Festival, Animafest Zagreb, Ottawa International Animation Film Festival, Stuttgart Festival of Animated Film, Holland Animation Film Festival, and/or Hiroshima International Animation Festival.\n\n5. _\"Tops Netflix\"_ means listed in the [Netflix top 10 list for English language](https://www.netflix.com/tudum/top10/). If Netflix is not among the top streaming services during this question, will replace this with an admin-chosen top streaming service with a clear top list.", "lower_25": "Apr 2025", "median": "Nov 2025", "upper_75": "Jun 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a primarily-AI-made movie will accomplish these types of success (Award Nomination) by Feb 2028?", "desc": "AI technology has been increasing rapidly and could eventually create movies. [Avengers' Director Joe Russo predicted AI \"could be making movies in two years\"](https://variety.com/2023/film/news/joe-russo-artificial-intelligence-create-movies-two-years-1235593319/) and [Netflix is potentially training AI to do some editing](https://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/ent/netflix-training-ai.html). \n\nEach part of the film-making process - acting, voice, music, animations, script - could conceivably be done by AI. See the resolution criteria for how much is required for this question.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date, per credible media reporting, that the accomplishments are met by a movie with **ALL** of the following:\n\n1. No non-AI voice actors are hired for the film (using recordings is ok)\n\n2. No live action / motion capture from any non-AI actors is used in the film\n\n3. An AI gets the primary credit in script writing\n\n4. A majority of the visuals are AI generated, though possibly with minor human editing & input\n\n5. A majority of the music is AI generated and human contribution to score is minor\n\nThe subquestion definitions for the accomplishments are defined as:\n\n1. _\">$10M box office\"_ means making >$10M in 2022 US dollars on the opening weekend of a theatrical release ([one such source](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/)).\n\n2. _\"Award nomination\"_ means nominated for an Oscar or Golden Globe, in the feature film category.\n\n3. _\"Festival feature\"_ means shown as one of the feature films (but not necessarily \"in competition\") at one of the following Film Festivals: Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Toronto, or Sundance.\n\n4. _\"Animated feature\"_ means shown as a feature film in one of the following Animation Film Festivals: Annecy International Animated Film Festival, Animafest Zagreb, Ottawa International Animation Film Festival, Stuttgart Festival of Animated Film, Holland Animation Film Festival, and/or Hiroshima International Animation Festival.\n\n5. _\"Tops Netflix\"_ means listed in the [Netflix top 10 list for English language](https://www.netflix.com/tudum/top10/). If Netflix is not among the top streaming services during this question, will replace this with an admin-chosen top streaming service with a clear top list.", "lower_25": "Dec 2026", "median": "Feb 2028", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a primarily-AI-made movie will accomplish festival feature success by Nov 2025?", "desc": "AI technology has been increasing rapidly and could eventually create movies. [Avengers' Director Joe Russo predicted AI \"could be making movies in two years\"](https://variety.com/2023/film/news/joe-russo-artificial-intelligence-create-movies-two-years-1235593319/) and [Netflix is potentially training AI to do some editing](https://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/ent/netflix-training-ai.html). \n\nEach part of the film-making process - acting, voice, music, animations, script - could conceivably be done by AI. See the resolution criteria for how much is required for this question.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date, per credible media reporting, that the accomplishments are met by a movie with **ALL** of the following:\n\n1. No non-AI voice actors are hired for the film (using recordings is ok)\n\n2. No live action / motion capture from any non-AI actors is used in the film\n\n3. An AI gets the primary credit in script writing\n\n4. A majority of the visuals are AI generated, though possibly with minor human editing & input\n\n5. A majority of the music is AI generated and human contribution to score is minor\n\nThe subquestion definitions for the accomplishments are defined as:\n\n1. _\">$10M box office\"_ means making >$10M in 2022 US dollars on the opening weekend of a theatrical release ([one such source](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/)).\n\n2. _\"Award nomination\"_ means nominated for an Oscar or Golden Globe, in the feature film category.\n\n3. _\"Festival feature\"_ means shown as one of the feature films (but not necessarily \"in competition\") at one of the following Film Festivals: Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Toronto, or Sundance.\n\n4. _\"Animated feature\"_ means shown as a feature film in one of the following Animation Film Festivals: Annecy International Animated Film Festival, Animafest Zagreb, Ottawa International Animation Film Festival, Stuttgart Festival of Animated Film, Holland Animation Film Festival, and/or Hiroshima International Animation Festival.\n\n5. _\"Tops Netflix\"_ means listed in the [Netflix top 10 list for English language](https://www.netflix.com/tudum/top10/). If Netflix is not among the top streaming services during this question, will replace this with an admin-chosen top streaming service with a clear top list.", "lower_25": "Nov 2025", "median": "Apr 2026", "upper_75": "Oct 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a primarily-AI-made movie will top Netflix by August 2027?", "desc": "AI technology has been increasing rapidly and could eventually create movies. [Avengers' Director Joe Russo predicted AI \"could be making movies in two years\"](https://variety.com/2023/film/news/joe-russo-artificial-intelligence-create-movies-two-years-1235593319/) and [Netflix is potentially training AI to do some editing](https://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/ent/netflix-training-ai.html). \n\nEach part of the film-making process - acting, voice, music, animations, script - could conceivably be done by AI. See the resolution criteria for how much is required for this question.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date, per credible media reporting, that the accomplishments are met by a movie with **ALL** of the following:\n\n1. No non-AI voice actors are hired for the film (using recordings is ok)\n\n2. No live action / motion capture from any non-AI actors is used in the film\n\n3. An AI gets the primary credit in script writing\n\n4. A majority of the visuals are AI generated, though possibly with minor human editing & input\n\n5. A majority of the music is AI generated and human contribution to score is minor\n\nThe subquestion definitions for the accomplishments are defined as:\n\n1. _\">$10M box office\"_ means making >$10M in 2022 US dollars on the opening weekend of a theatrical release ([one such source](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/)).\n\n2. _\"Award nomination\"_ means nominated for an Oscar or Golden Globe, in the feature film category.\n\n3. _\"Festival feature\"_ means shown as one of the feature films (but not necessarily \"in competition\") at one of the following Film Festivals: Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Toronto, or Sundance.\n\n4. _\"Animated feature\"_ means shown as a feature film in one of the following Animation Film Festivals: Annecy International Animated Film Festival, Animafest Zagreb, Ottawa International Animation Film Festival, Stuttgart Festival of Animated Film, Holland Animation Film Festival, and/or Hiroshima International Animation Festival.\n\n5. _\"Tops Netflix\"_ means listed in the [Netflix top 10 list for English language](https://www.netflix.com/tudum/top10/). If Netflix is not among the top streaming services during this question, will replace this with an admin-chosen top streaming service with a clear top list.", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "May 2026", "upper_75": "Aug 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a primarily-AI-made movie will accomplish these types of success in animated features by Apr 2025?", "desc": "AI technology has been increasing rapidly and could eventually create movies. [Avengers' Director Joe Russo predicted AI \"could be making movies in two years\"](https://variety.com/2023/film/news/joe-russo-artificial-intelligence-create-movies-two-years-1235593319/) and [Netflix is potentially training AI to do some editing](https://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/ent/netflix-training-ai.html). \n\nEach part of the film-making process - acting, voice, music, animations, script - could conceivably be done by AI. See the resolution criteria for how much is required for this question.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date, per credible media reporting, that the accomplishments are met by a movie with **ALL** of the following:\n\n1. No non-AI voice actors are hired for the film (using recordings is ok)\n\n2. No live action / motion capture from any non-AI actors is used in the film\n\n3. An AI gets the primary credit in script writing\n\n4. A majority of the visuals are AI generated, though possibly with minor human editing & input\n\n5. A majority of the music is AI generated and human contribution to score is minor\n\nThe subquestion definitions for the accomplishments are defined as:\n\n1. _\">$10M box office\"_ means making >$10M in 2022 US dollars on the opening weekend of a theatrical release ([one such source](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/)).\n\n2. _\"Award nomination\"_ means nominated for an Oscar or Golden Globe, in the feature film category.\n\n3. _\"Festival feature\"_ means shown as one of the feature films (but not necessarily \"in competition\") at one of the following Film Festivals: Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Toronto, or Sundance.\n\n4. _\"Animated feature\"_ means shown as a feature film in one of the following Animation Film Festivals: Annecy International Animated Film Festival, Animafest Zagreb, Ottawa International Animation Film Festival, Stuttgart Festival of Animated Film, Holland Animation Film Festival, and/or Hiroshima International Animation Festival.\n\n5. _\"Tops Netflix\"_ means listed in the [Netflix top 10 list for English language](https://www.netflix.com/tudum/top10/). If Netflix is not among the top streaming services during this question, will replace this with an admin-chosen top streaming service with a clear top list.", "lower_25": "Apr 2025", "median": "Nov 2025", "upper_75": "Jun 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a primarily-AI-made movie will top Netflix by August 2027?", "desc": "AI technology has been increasing rapidly and could eventually create movies. [Avengers' Director Joe Russo predicted AI \"could be making movies in two years\"](https://variety.com/2023/film/news/joe-russo-artificial-intelligence-create-movies-two-years-1235593319/) and [Netflix is potentially training AI to do some editing](https://www.giantfreakinrobot.com/ent/netflix-training-ai.html). \n\nEach part of the film-making process - acting, voice, music, animations, script - could conceivably be done by AI. See the resolution criteria for how much is required for this question.", "resc": "This question resolves as the first date, per credible media reporting, that the accomplishments are met by a movie with **ALL** of the following:\n\n1. No non-AI voice actors are hired for the film (using recordings is ok)\n\n2. No live action / motion capture from any non-AI actors is used in the film\n\n3. An AI gets the primary credit in script writing\n\n4. A majority of the visuals are AI generated, though possibly with minor human editing & input\n\n5. A majority of the music is AI generated and human contribution to score is minor\n\nThe subquestion definitions for the accomplishments are defined as:\n\n1. _\">$10M box office\"_ means making >$10M in 2022 US dollars on the opening weekend of a theatrical release ([one such source](https://www.boxofficemojo.com/)).\n\n2. _\"Award nomination\"_ means nominated for an Oscar or Golden Globe, in the feature film category.\n\n3. _\"Festival feature\"_ means shown as one of the feature films (but not necessarily \"in competition\") at one of the following Film Festivals: Cannes, Berlin, Venice, Toronto, or Sundance.\n\n4. _\"Animated feature\"_ means shown as a feature film in one of the following Animation Film Festivals: Annecy International Animated Film Festival, Animafest Zagreb, Ottawa International Animation Film Festival, Stuttgart Festival of Animated Film, Holland Animation Film Festival, and/or Hiroshima International Animation Festival.\n\n5. _\"Tops Netflix\"_ means listed in the [Netflix top 10 list for English language](https://www.netflix.com/tudum/top10/). If Netflix is not among the top streaming services during this question, will replace this with an admin-chosen top streaming service with a clear top list.", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "May 2026", "upper_75": "Aug 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the \"state of the art\" for these quantum computing metrics will be 380M in March, 2028?", "desc": "[Metriq](https://metriq.info/) is a crowd-sourced website for tracking advancements in quantum computing metrics. This question group asks what the best values for the following metrics will be, according to Metriq.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)](https://metriq.info/Task/51). The current state of the art is 57,000,000 microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) More info about T1 and T2 times can be found in [this stack answer](https://quantumcomputing.stackexchange.com/a/9756). The current state of the art is 21 seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38). The current state of the art is 0.00078.", "resc": "Each question resolves as the headline value listed as the \"state-of-the-art\" by [Metriq](https://metriq.info/) as of March 31, 2028, in the following units.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)(μs)](https://metriq.info/Task/51) in microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) in seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38), using \"infidelity\" as the metric.", "lower_25": "243M", "median": "380M", "upper_75": "509M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the \"state of the art\" for these quantum computing metrics in March, 2028 will be a single-qubit relaxation time (T1) of 509M?", "desc": "[Metriq](https://metriq.info/) is a crowd-sourced website for tracking advancements in quantum computing metrics. This question group asks what the best values for the following metrics will be, according to Metriq.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)](https://metriq.info/Task/51). The current state of the art is 57,000,000 microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) More info about T1 and T2 times can be found in [this stack answer](https://quantumcomputing.stackexchange.com/a/9756). The current state of the art is 21 seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38). The current state of the art is 0.00078.", "resc": "Each question resolves as the headline value listed as the \"state-of-the-art\" by [Metriq](https://metriq.info/) as of March 31, 2028, in the following units.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)(μs)](https://metriq.info/Task/51) in microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) in seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38), using \"infidelity\" as the metric.", "lower_25": "243M", "median": "380M", "upper_75": "509M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the \"state of the art\" for these quantum computing metrics will be 380M in March, 2028?", "desc": "[Metriq](https://metriq.info/) is a crowd-sourced website for tracking advancements in quantum computing metrics. This question group asks what the best values for the following metrics will be, according to Metriq.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)](https://metriq.info/Task/51). The current state of the art is 57,000,000 microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) More info about T1 and T2 times can be found in [this stack answer](https://quantumcomputing.stackexchange.com/a/9756). The current state of the art is 21 seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38). The current state of the art is 0.00078.", "resc": "Each question resolves as the headline value listed as the \"state-of-the-art\" by [Metriq](https://metriq.info/) as of March 31, 2028, in the following units.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)(μs)](https://metriq.info/Task/51) in microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) in seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38), using \"infidelity\" as the metric.", "lower_25": "243M", "median": "380M", "upper_75": "509M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the \"state of the art\" for these quantum computing metrics in March, 2028 will have a coherence time (T2) of 61.6 seconds?", "desc": "[Metriq](https://metriq.info/) is a crowd-sourced website for tracking advancements in quantum computing metrics. This question group asks what the best values for the following metrics will be, according to Metriq.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)](https://metriq.info/Task/51). The current state of the art is 57,000,000 microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) More info about T1 and T2 times can be found in [this stack answer](https://quantumcomputing.stackexchange.com/a/9756). The current state of the art is 21 seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38). The current state of the art is 0.00078.", "resc": "Each question resolves as the headline value listed as the \"state-of-the-art\" by [Metriq](https://metriq.info/) as of March 31, 2028, in the following units.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)(μs)](https://metriq.info/Task/51) in microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) in seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38), using \"infidelity\" as the metric.", "lower_25": "61.6", "median": "91.2", "upper_75": "153", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the \"state of the art\" for these quantum computing metrics will be 380M in March, 2028?", "desc": "[Metriq](https://metriq.info/) is a crowd-sourced website for tracking advancements in quantum computing metrics. This question group asks what the best values for the following metrics will be, according to Metriq.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)](https://metriq.info/Task/51). The current state of the art is 57,000,000 microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) More info about T1 and T2 times can be found in [this stack answer](https://quantumcomputing.stackexchange.com/a/9756). The current state of the art is 21 seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38). The current state of the art is 0.00078.", "resc": "Each question resolves as the headline value listed as the \"state-of-the-art\" by [Metriq](https://metriq.info/) as of March 31, 2028, in the following units.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)(μs)](https://metriq.info/Task/51) in microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) in seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38), using \"infidelity\" as the metric.", "lower_25": "243M", "median": "380M", "upper_75": "509M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the \"state of the art\" for 2-qubit gate infidelity in quantum computing will be 9.89×10−5 in March, 2028?", "desc": "[Metriq](https://metriq.info/) is a crowd-sourced website for tracking advancements in quantum computing metrics. This question group asks what the best values for the following metrics will be, according to Metriq.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)](https://metriq.info/Task/51). The current state of the art is 57,000,000 microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) More info about T1 and T2 times can be found in [this stack answer](https://quantumcomputing.stackexchange.com/a/9756). The current state of the art is 21 seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38). The current state of the art is 0.00078.", "resc": "Each question resolves as the headline value listed as the \"state-of-the-art\" by [Metriq](https://metriq.info/) as of March 31, 2028, in the following units.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)(μs)](https://metriq.info/Task/51) in microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) in seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38), using \"infidelity\" as the metric.", "lower_25": "9.89×10−5", "median": "2.05×10−4", "upper_75": "3.66×10−4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the African National Congress will get 47.97% of the popular vote in the 2024 South African general election?", "desc": "The ANC (African National Congress) is the ruling party in South African and has won every democratic national election by a margin of greater than 50% (last election 2019 57.58%).\n\nSouth Africa is currently experiencing a range of issues including:\n\n- [Power Disruptions due to a lack of capacity](https://www.joburg.org.za/departments_/Pages/MOEs/city%20power/What-is-load-shedding.aspx)\n- [Geo-political issues due the perceived support for Russian in its conflict with the Ukraine](https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/russia-may-bankrupt-sa-dire-warnings-after-us-fires-warning-shot-over-agoa-20230614)\n- [Large scale migration of skilled labor and wealthy individuals](https://businesstech.co.za/news/trending/668067/big-jump-in-emigration-inquiries-in-south-africa/)\n\nIn spite of the above it is expected that the ANC will still receive a large percentage of the votes.", "resc": "This question resolves as the percentage of the popular vote for the ANC in the 2024 general election as reported by the [Electoral Commission of South Africa](https://www.elections.org.za/pw/) and its [election results page](https://results.elections.org.za/home/). \n\nIf the resolution source does not post the results, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) reporting on the election may instead be used to determine the vote share of the ANC.\n\nIf the election is held prior to 2024 or postponed into 2025 (or later), or if the election is not held at all, this question resolves as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "< 45", "median": "< 45", "upper_75": "47.97", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the \"state of the art\" for these quantum computing metrics in March, 2028 will be a single-qubit relaxation time (T1) of 509M?", "desc": "[Metriq](https://metriq.info/) is a crowd-sourced website for tracking advancements in quantum computing metrics. This question group asks what the best values for the following metrics will be, according to Metriq.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)](https://metriq.info/Task/51). The current state of the art is 57,000,000 microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) More info about T1 and T2 times can be found in [this stack answer](https://quantumcomputing.stackexchange.com/a/9756). The current state of the art is 21 seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38). The current state of the art is 0.00078.", "resc": "Each question resolves as the headline value listed as the \"state-of-the-art\" by [Metriq](https://metriq.info/) as of March 31, 2028, in the following units.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)(μs)](https://metriq.info/Task/51) in microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) in seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38), using \"infidelity\" as the metric.", "lower_25": "243M", "median": "380M", "upper_75": "509M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the \"state of the art\" for 2-qubit gate infidelity in quantum computing will be 9.89×10−5 in March, 2028?", "desc": "[Metriq](https://metriq.info/) is a crowd-sourced website for tracking advancements in quantum computing metrics. This question group asks what the best values for the following metrics will be, according to Metriq.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)](https://metriq.info/Task/51). The current state of the art is 57,000,000 microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) More info about T1 and T2 times can be found in [this stack answer](https://quantumcomputing.stackexchange.com/a/9756). The current state of the art is 21 seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38). The current state of the art is 0.00078.", "resc": "Each question resolves as the headline value listed as the \"state-of-the-art\" by [Metriq](https://metriq.info/) as of March 31, 2028, in the following units.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)(μs)](https://metriq.info/Task/51) in microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) in seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38), using \"infidelity\" as the metric.", "lower_25": "9.89×10−5", "median": "2.05×10−4", "upper_75": "3.66×10−4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the \"state of the art\" for these quantum computing metrics in March, 2028 will be a single-qubit relaxation time (T1) of 509M?", "desc": "[Metriq](https://metriq.info/) is a crowd-sourced website for tracking advancements in quantum computing metrics. This question group asks what the best values for the following metrics will be, according to Metriq.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)](https://metriq.info/Task/51). The current state of the art is 57,000,000 microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) More info about T1 and T2 times can be found in [this stack answer](https://quantumcomputing.stackexchange.com/a/9756). The current state of the art is 21 seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38). The current state of the art is 0.00078.", "resc": "Each question resolves as the headline value listed as the \"state-of-the-art\" by [Metriq](https://metriq.info/) as of March 31, 2028, in the following units.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)(μs)](https://metriq.info/Task/51) in microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) in seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38), using \"infidelity\" as the metric.", "lower_25": "243M", "median": "380M", "upper_75": "509M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the African National Congress will get 47.97% of the popular vote in the 2024 South African general election?", "desc": "The ANC (African National Congress) is the ruling party in South African and has won every democratic national election by a margin of greater than 50% (last election 2019 57.58%).\n\nSouth Africa is currently experiencing a range of issues including:\n\n- [Power Disruptions due to a lack of capacity](https://www.joburg.org.za/departments_/Pages/MOEs/city%20power/What-is-load-shedding.aspx)\n- [Geo-political issues due the perceived support for Russian in its conflict with the Ukraine](https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/russia-may-bankrupt-sa-dire-warnings-after-us-fires-warning-shot-over-agoa-20230614)\n- [Large scale migration of skilled labor and wealthy individuals](https://businesstech.co.za/news/trending/668067/big-jump-in-emigration-inquiries-in-south-africa/)\n\nIn spite of the above it is expected that the ANC will still receive a large percentage of the votes.", "resc": "This question resolves as the percentage of the popular vote for the ANC in the 2024 general election as reported by the [Electoral Commission of South Africa](https://www.elections.org.za/pw/) and its [election results page](https://results.elections.org.za/home/). \n\nIf the resolution source does not post the results, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) reporting on the election may instead be used to determine the vote share of the ANC.\n\nIf the election is held prior to 2024 or postponed into 2025 (or later), or if the election is not held at all, this question resolves as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "< 45", "median": "< 45", "upper_75": "47.97", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the \"state of the art\" for 2-qubit gate infidelity in quantum computing will be 9.89×10−5 in March, 2028?", "desc": "[Metriq](https://metriq.info/) is a crowd-sourced website for tracking advancements in quantum computing metrics. This question group asks what the best values for the following metrics will be, according to Metriq.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)](https://metriq.info/Task/51). The current state of the art is 57,000,000 microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) More info about T1 and T2 times can be found in [this stack answer](https://quantumcomputing.stackexchange.com/a/9756). The current state of the art is 21 seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38). The current state of the art is 0.00078.", "resc": "Each question resolves as the headline value listed as the \"state-of-the-art\" by [Metriq](https://metriq.info/) as of March 31, 2028, in the following units.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)(μs)](https://metriq.info/Task/51) in microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) in seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38), using \"infidelity\" as the metric.", "lower_25": "9.89×10−5", "median": "2.05×10−4", "upper_75": "3.66×10−4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the \"state of the art\" for these quantum computing metrics in March, 2028 will have a coherence time (T2) of 61.6 seconds?", "desc": "[Metriq](https://metriq.info/) is a crowd-sourced website for tracking advancements in quantum computing metrics. This question group asks what the best values for the following metrics will be, according to Metriq.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)](https://metriq.info/Task/51). The current state of the art is 57,000,000 microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) More info about T1 and T2 times can be found in [this stack answer](https://quantumcomputing.stackexchange.com/a/9756). The current state of the art is 21 seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38). The current state of the art is 0.00078.", "resc": "Each question resolves as the headline value listed as the \"state-of-the-art\" by [Metriq](https://metriq.info/) as of March 31, 2028, in the following units.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)(μs)](https://metriq.info/Task/51) in microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) in seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38), using \"infidelity\" as the metric.", "lower_25": "61.6", "median": "91.2", "upper_75": "153", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the \"state of the art\" for these quantum computing metrics in March, 2028 will have a coherence time (T2) of 61.6 seconds?", "desc": "[Metriq](https://metriq.info/) is a crowd-sourced website for tracking advancements in quantum computing metrics. This question group asks what the best values for the following metrics will be, according to Metriq.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)](https://metriq.info/Task/51). The current state of the art is 57,000,000 microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) More info about T1 and T2 times can be found in [this stack answer](https://quantumcomputing.stackexchange.com/a/9756). The current state of the art is 21 seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38). The current state of the art is 0.00078.", "resc": "Each question resolves as the headline value listed as the \"state-of-the-art\" by [Metriq](https://metriq.info/) as of March 31, 2028, in the following units.\n\n- [Single-qubit relaxation time (T1)(μs)](https://metriq.info/Task/51) in microseconds.\n- [Coherence time (T2)](https://metriq.info/Task/50) in seconds.\n- [2-qubit gate fidelity](https://metriq.info/Task/38), using \"infidelity\" as the metric.", "lower_25": "61.6", "median": "91.2", "upper_75": "153", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the African National Congress will get 47.97% of the popular vote in the 2024 South African general election?", "desc": "The ANC (African National Congress) is the ruling party in South African and has won every democratic national election by a margin of greater than 50% (last election 2019 57.58%).\n\nSouth Africa is currently experiencing a range of issues including:\n\n- [Power Disruptions due to a lack of capacity](https://www.joburg.org.za/departments_/Pages/MOEs/city%20power/What-is-load-shedding.aspx)\n- [Geo-political issues due the perceived support for Russian in its conflict with the Ukraine](https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/russia-may-bankrupt-sa-dire-warnings-after-us-fires-warning-shot-over-agoa-20230614)\n- [Large scale migration of skilled labor and wealthy individuals](https://businesstech.co.za/news/trending/668067/big-jump-in-emigration-inquiries-in-south-africa/)\n\nIn spite of the above it is expected that the ANC will still receive a large percentage of the votes.", "resc": "This question resolves as the percentage of the popular vote for the ANC in the 2024 general election as reported by the [Electoral Commission of South Africa](https://www.elections.org.za/pw/) and its [election results page](https://results.elections.org.za/home/). \n\nIf the resolution source does not post the results, [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) reporting on the election may instead be used to determine the vote share of the ANC.\n\nIf the election is held prior to 2024 or postponed into 2025 (or later), or if the election is not held at all, this question resolves as **Ambiguous**", "lower_25": "< 45", "median": "< 45", "upper_75": "47.97", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How much will 1K GPT-4 API tokens cost in January 2025? (Input (8K context))\n\nKeyword: < 10−3\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 1K GPT-4 API tokens will cost less than 10−3 in January 2025?", "desc": "[GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) was announced in March 2023. The API is not yet public as of June 2023 but is available to some users. Current pricing is as follows:\n\n| Model | Input | Output |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| 8K context | $0.03 / 1K tokens | $0.06 / 1K tokens |\n| 32K context | $0.06 / 1K tokens | $0.12 / 1K tokens |", "resc": "The question resolves as the [price](https://openai.com/pricing), in US dollars, to query the public GPT-4 API in the US on 01/01/2025 for the relevant token type.\n\nThe \"750 Input, 250 Output (Lowest Cost)\" sub question resolves as the cost of 750 input tokens plus 250 output tokens for the lowest-cost API model. Currently, that is the 8K context model. At current prices of $0.03 / 1K tokens Input and $0.06 / 1K tokens Output, this option would resolve as:\n\n\\[ $0.03 \\cdot \\frac{750}{1000} + $0.06 \\cdot \\frac{250}{1000} = $0.0375 \\]", "lower_25": "< 10−3", "median": "< 10−3", "upper_75": "0.0164", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How much will 1K GPT-4 API tokens cost in January 2025? (Output (8K context))\n\nKeyword: < 10−3\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 1K GPT-4 API tokens will cost less than 10−3 in January 2025?", "desc": "[GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) was announced in March 2023. The API is not yet public as of June 2023 but is available to some users. Current pricing is as follows:\n\n| Model | Input | Output |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| 8K context | $0.03 / 1K tokens | $0.06 / 1K tokens |\n| 32K context | $0.06 / 1K tokens | $0.12 / 1K tokens |", "resc": "The question resolves as the [price](https://openai.com/pricing), in US dollars, to query the public GPT-4 API in the US on 01/01/2025 for the relevant token type.\n\nThe \"750 Input, 250 Output (Lowest Cost)\" sub question resolves as the cost of 750 input tokens plus 250 output tokens for the lowest-cost API model. Currently, that is the 8K context model. At current prices of $0.03 / 1K tokens Input and $0.06 / 1K tokens Output, this option would resolve as:\n\n\\[ $0.03 \\cdot \\frac{750}{1000} + $0.06 \\cdot \\frac{250}{1000} = $0.0375 \\]", "lower_25": "< 10−3", "median": "2.17×10−3", "upper_75": "0.0341", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How much will 1K GPT-4 API tokens cost in January 2025? (Input (8K context))\n\nKeyword: < 10−3\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 1K GPT-4 API tokens will cost less than 10−3 in January 2025?", "desc": "[GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) was announced in March 2023. The API is not yet public as of June 2023 but is available to some users. Current pricing is as follows:\n\n| Model | Input | Output |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| 8K context | $0.03 / 1K tokens | $0.06 / 1K tokens |\n| 32K context | $0.06 / 1K tokens | $0.12 / 1K tokens |", "resc": "The question resolves as the [price](https://openai.com/pricing), in US dollars, to query the public GPT-4 API in the US on 01/01/2025 for the relevant token type.\n\nThe \"750 Input, 250 Output (Lowest Cost)\" sub question resolves as the cost of 750 input tokens plus 250 output tokens for the lowest-cost API model. Currently, that is the 8K context model. At current prices of $0.03 / 1K tokens Input and $0.06 / 1K tokens Output, this option would resolve as:\n\n\\[ $0.03 \\cdot \\frac{750}{1000} + $0.06 \\cdot \\frac{250}{1000} = $0.0375 \\]", "lower_25": "< 10−3", "median": "< 10−3", "upper_75": "0.0164", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How much will 1K GPT-4 API tokens cost in January 2025? (Output (32K context))\n\nKeyword: < 10−3\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 1K GPT-4 API tokens will cost less than 10−3 in January 2025?", "desc": "[GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) was announced in March 2023. The API is not yet public as of June 2023 but is available to some users. Current pricing is as follows:\n\n| Model | Input | Output |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| 8K context | $0.03 / 1K tokens | $0.06 / 1K tokens |\n| 32K context | $0.06 / 1K tokens | $0.12 / 1K tokens |", "resc": "The question resolves as the [price](https://openai.com/pricing), in US dollars, to query the public GPT-4 API in the US on 01/01/2025 for the relevant token type.\n\nThe \"750 Input, 250 Output (Lowest Cost)\" sub question resolves as the cost of 750 input tokens plus 250 output tokens for the lowest-cost API model. Currently, that is the 8K context model. At current prices of $0.03 / 1K tokens Input and $0.06 / 1K tokens Output, this option would resolve as:\n\n\\[ $0.03 \\cdot \\frac{750}{1000} + $0.06 \\cdot \\frac{250}{1000} = $0.0375 \\]", "lower_25": "< 10−3", "median": "6.67×10−3", "upper_75": "0.0714", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How much will 1K GPT-4 API tokens cost in January 2025? (Input (32K context))\n\nKeyword: < 10−3\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 1K GPT-4 API tokens will cost less than 10−3 in January 2025?", "desc": "[GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) was announced in March 2023. The API is not yet public as of June 2023 but is available to some users. Current pricing is as follows:\n\n| Model | Input | Output |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| 8K context | $0.03 / 1K tokens | $0.06 / 1K tokens |\n| 32K context | $0.06 / 1K tokens | $0.12 / 1K tokens |", "resc": "The question resolves as the [price](https://openai.com/pricing), in US dollars, to query the public GPT-4 API in the US on 01/01/2025 for the relevant token type.\n\nThe \"750 Input, 250 Output (Lowest Cost)\" sub question resolves as the cost of 750 input tokens plus 250 output tokens for the lowest-cost API model. Currently, that is the 8K context model. At current prices of $0.03 / 1K tokens Input and $0.06 / 1K tokens Output, this option would resolve as:\n\n\\[ $0.03 \\cdot \\frac{750}{1000} + $0.06 \\cdot \\frac{250}{1000} = $0.0375 \\]", "lower_25": "< 10−3", "median": "3.11×10−3", "upper_75": "0.0387", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the following countries will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Nov 2028?", "desc": "Many definitions exist for _civil war_. Wikipedia's page on [civil war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_war), provides the following \n\n> A **civil war** is a [war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War \"War\") between organized groups within the same [state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_state \"Sovereign state\") (or [country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Country \"Country\")). The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve [independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence \"Independence\") for a region, or to change government policies. The term is a [calque](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calque \"Calque\") of Latin *[bellum civile](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/bellum_civile \"wikt:bellum civile\")* which was used to refer to the various [civil wars of the Roman Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_civil_wars \"Roman civil wars\") in the 1st century BC. \n\nand Britannica, on its [civil war page](https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-war) offers this definition: \n\n> **civil war**, a violent conflict between a [state](https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity) and one or more organized non-state actors in the state's territory. Civil wars are thus distinguished from interstate conflicts (in which states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving states (sometimes labeled intercommunal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an organized or [cohesive](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cohesive) group, including [genocides](https://www.britannica.com/topic/genocide), and similar [violence](https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence) by non-state actors, such as [terrorism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism) or violent crime.\n> \n> The definition of civil [war](https://www.britannica.com/topic/war) clearly [encompasses](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/encompasses) many different forms of conflict. Some analysts distinguish between civil wars in which [insurgents](https://www.britannica.com/topic/insurgency) seek territorial secession or [autonomy](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy) and conflicts in which insurgents aim for control of the central government. Conflicts over government control may involve insurgents originating from within the centre or state apparatus, as in [military](https://www.britannica.com/topic/armed-force) [coups](https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat), or challengers from outside the political establishment. Other analysts distinguish between [ethnic civil wars](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-conflict), in which the insurgents and individuals in control of the central government have separate ethnic identities, and revolutionary conflicts, in which insurgents aim for major social transformation. [Colonial](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-colonialism) conflicts are sometimes singled out as a type distinct from civil wars on a state's core territory. Notwithstanding those distinctions, a given civil war will often combine several elements. For example, insurgencies may be both ethnic and ideologically based, and the insurgents' aims can shift over time from secession for a limited territory to controlling the entire state.\n\nFor further reading on civil war, refer to these resources:\n\n* [What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its Definition and (Econometric) Consequences](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21428/wbro_28_2_159.pdf;sequence=1) (2013; GS citations = 70)\n* [What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition](https://www.academia.edu/download/36055369/Algeria_civil_war.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 1399)\n* [Civil War](https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D83J3Q5J/download) (2010; GS citations = 2889)\n* [What do we know about natural resources and civil war?](https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/articles/whatdoweknow.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 2172)\n\n---\n\nThe Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)[1], [2] is a well embedded organization within international geopolitical systems, and while Wikipedia has pages for [tracking civil wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_civil_wars) and [ongoing armed conflicts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_armed_conflicts) (as do [other sites](https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2023)), the CFR's [Conflict Tracker](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/), which tracks things such as transnational terrorism, civil war, criminal violence, territorial disputes, and political instability, is a well regarded source for monitoring civil wars. \n \nPresently[3], six nations are in a state of civil war according to CFR's Conflict Tracker: \n\n* [Libya](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya)\n* [Myanmar](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar)\n* [Yemen](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen)\n* [Central African Republic](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic)\n* [South Sudan](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan)\n* [Syria](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria)\n\n---\n\n[1]: From [their website](https://www.cfr.org/about): \"_The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy._\"\n\n[2]: From Wikipedia's [page on the CFR](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations): \"_CFR meetings convene government officials, global business leaders and prominent members of the intelligence and foreign-policy communities to discuss international issues. CFR has published the bi-monthly journal *[Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Affairs \"Foreign Affairs\")* since 1922. It also runs the [David Rockefeller](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Rockefeller \"David Rockefeller\") Studies Program, which influences foreign policy by making recommendations to the presidential administration and [diplomatic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy \"Diplomacy\") community, testifying before [Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress \"United States Congress\"), interacting with the media, and publishing research on foreign policy issues._\"\n\n[3]: Information (e.g., links, quotes, the status of the Conflicts) in this post is up to date as of 17 June 2023, 13:21 EST.", "resc": "For each country listed, this question resolves as the date when the Council on Foreign Relations no longer lists that country under the category of Civil War. This country must cease to be listed by CFR as being in Civil War continuously for at least 1 week for the question to resolve.", "lower_25": "Feb 2027", "median": "Nov 2028", "upper_75": "Jan 2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the following countries will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Nov 2028?", "desc": "Many definitions exist for _civil war_. Wikipedia's page on [civil war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_war), provides the following \n\n> A **civil war** is a [war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War \"War\") between organized groups within the same [state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_state \"Sovereign state\") (or [country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Country \"Country\")). The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve [independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence \"Independence\") for a region, or to change government policies. The term is a [calque](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calque \"Calque\") of Latin *[bellum civile](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/bellum_civile \"wikt:bellum civile\")* which was used to refer to the various [civil wars of the Roman Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_civil_wars \"Roman civil wars\") in the 1st century BC. \n\nand Britannica, on its [civil war page](https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-war) offers this definition: \n\n> **civil war**, a violent conflict between a [state](https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity) and one or more organized non-state actors in the state's territory. Civil wars are thus distinguished from interstate conflicts (in which states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving states (sometimes labeled intercommunal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an organized or [cohesive](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cohesive) group, including [genocides](https://www.britannica.com/topic/genocide), and similar [violence](https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence) by non-state actors, such as [terrorism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism) or violent crime.\n> \n> The definition of civil [war](https://www.britannica.com/topic/war) clearly [encompasses](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/encompasses) many different forms of conflict. Some analysts distinguish between civil wars in which [insurgents](https://www.britannica.com/topic/insurgency) seek territorial secession or [autonomy](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy) and conflicts in which insurgents aim for control of the central government. Conflicts over government control may involve insurgents originating from within the centre or state apparatus, as in [military](https://www.britannica.com/topic/armed-force) [coups](https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat), or challengers from outside the political establishment. Other analysts distinguish between [ethnic civil wars](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-conflict), in which the insurgents and individuals in control of the central government have separate ethnic identities, and revolutionary conflicts, in which insurgents aim for major social transformation. [Colonial](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-colonialism) conflicts are sometimes singled out as a type distinct from civil wars on a state's core territory. Notwithstanding those distinctions, a given civil war will often combine several elements. For example, insurgencies may be both ethnic and ideologically based, and the insurgents' aims can shift over time from secession for a limited territory to controlling the entire state.\n\nFor further reading on civil war, refer to these resources:\n\n* [What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its Definition and (Econometric) Consequences](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21428/wbro_28_2_159.pdf;sequence=1) (2013; GS citations = 70)\n* [What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition](https://www.academia.edu/download/36055369/Algeria_civil_war.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 1399)\n* [Civil War](https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D83J3Q5J/download) (2010; GS citations = 2889)\n* [What do we know about natural resources and civil war?](https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/articles/whatdoweknow.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 2172)\n\n---\n\nThe Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)[1], [2] is a well embedded organization within international geopolitical systems, and while Wikipedia has pages for [tracking civil wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_civil_wars) and [ongoing armed conflicts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_armed_conflicts) (as do [other sites](https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2023)), the CFR's [Conflict Tracker](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/), which tracks things such as transnational terrorism, civil war, criminal violence, territorial disputes, and political instability, is a well regarded source for monitoring civil wars. \n \nPresently[3], six nations are in a state of civil war according to CFR's Conflict Tracker: \n\n* [Libya](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya)\n* [Myanmar](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar)\n* [Yemen](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen)\n* [Central African Republic](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic)\n* [South Sudan](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan)\n* [Syria](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria)\n\n---\n\n[1]: From [their website](https://www.cfr.org/about): \"_The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy._\"\n\n[2]: From Wikipedia's [page on the CFR](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations): \"_CFR meetings convene government officials, global business leaders and prominent members of the intelligence and foreign-policy communities to discuss international issues. CFR has published the bi-monthly journal *[Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Affairs \"Foreign Affairs\")* since 1922. It also runs the [David Rockefeller](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Rockefeller \"David Rockefeller\") Studies Program, which influences foreign policy by making recommendations to the presidential administration and [diplomatic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy \"Diplomacy\") community, testifying before [Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress \"United States Congress\"), interacting with the media, and publishing research on foreign policy issues._\"\n\n[3]: Information (e.g., links, quotes, the status of the Conflicts) in this post is up to date as of 17 June 2023, 13:21 EST.", "resc": "For each country listed, this question resolves as the date when the Council on Foreign Relations no longer lists that country under the category of Civil War. This country must cease to be listed by CFR as being in Civil War continuously for at least 1 week for the question to resolve.", "lower_25": "Feb 2027", "median": "Nov 2028", "upper_75": "Jan 2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the following countries will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Nov 2028?", "desc": "Many definitions exist for _civil war_. Wikipedia's page on [civil war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_war), provides the following \n\n> A **civil war** is a [war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War \"War\") between organized groups within the same [state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_state \"Sovereign state\") (or [country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Country \"Country\")). The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve [independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence \"Independence\") for a region, or to change government policies. The term is a [calque](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calque \"Calque\") of Latin *[bellum civile](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/bellum_civile \"wikt:bellum civile\")* which was used to refer to the various [civil wars of the Roman Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_civil_wars \"Roman civil wars\") in the 1st century BC. \n\nand Britannica, on its [civil war page](https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-war) offers this definition: \n\n> **civil war**, a violent conflict between a [state](https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity) and one or more organized non-state actors in the state's territory. Civil wars are thus distinguished from interstate conflicts (in which states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving states (sometimes labeled intercommunal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an organized or [cohesive](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cohesive) group, including [genocides](https://www.britannica.com/topic/genocide), and similar [violence](https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence) by non-state actors, such as [terrorism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism) or violent crime.\n> \n> The definition of civil [war](https://www.britannica.com/topic/war) clearly [encompasses](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/encompasses) many different forms of conflict. Some analysts distinguish between civil wars in which [insurgents](https://www.britannica.com/topic/insurgency) seek territorial secession or [autonomy](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy) and conflicts in which insurgents aim for control of the central government. Conflicts over government control may involve insurgents originating from within the centre or state apparatus, as in [military](https://www.britannica.com/topic/armed-force) [coups](https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat), or challengers from outside the political establishment. Other analysts distinguish between [ethnic civil wars](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-conflict), in which the insurgents and individuals in control of the central government have separate ethnic identities, and revolutionary conflicts, in which insurgents aim for major social transformation. [Colonial](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-colonialism) conflicts are sometimes singled out as a type distinct from civil wars on a state's core territory. Notwithstanding those distinctions, a given civil war will often combine several elements. For example, insurgencies may be both ethnic and ideologically based, and the insurgents' aims can shift over time from secession for a limited territory to controlling the entire state.\n\nFor further reading on civil war, refer to these resources:\n\n* [What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its Definition and (Econometric) Consequences](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21428/wbro_28_2_159.pdf;sequence=1) (2013; GS citations = 70)\n* [What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition](https://www.academia.edu/download/36055369/Algeria_civil_war.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 1399)\n* [Civil War](https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D83J3Q5J/download) (2010; GS citations = 2889)\n* [What do we know about natural resources and civil war?](https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/articles/whatdoweknow.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 2172)\n\n---\n\nThe Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)[1], [2] is a well embedded organization within international geopolitical systems, and while Wikipedia has pages for [tracking civil wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_civil_wars) and [ongoing armed conflicts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_armed_conflicts) (as do [other sites](https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2023)), the CFR's [Conflict Tracker](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/), which tracks things such as transnational terrorism, civil war, criminal violence, territorial disputes, and political instability, is a well regarded source for monitoring civil wars. \n \nPresently[3], six nations are in a state of civil war according to CFR's Conflict Tracker: \n\n* [Libya](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya)\n* [Myanmar](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar)\n* [Yemen](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen)\n* [Central African Republic](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic)\n* [South Sudan](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan)\n* [Syria](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria)\n\n---\n\n[1]: From [their website](https://www.cfr.org/about): \"_The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy._\"\n\n[2]: From Wikipedia's [page on the CFR](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations): \"_CFR meetings convene government officials, global business leaders and prominent members of the intelligence and foreign-policy communities to discuss international issues. CFR has published the bi-monthly journal *[Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Affairs \"Foreign Affairs\")* since 1922. It also runs the [David Rockefeller](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Rockefeller \"David Rockefeller\") Studies Program, which influences foreign policy by making recommendations to the presidential administration and [diplomatic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy \"Diplomacy\") community, testifying before [Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress \"United States Congress\"), interacting with the media, and publishing research on foreign policy issues._\"\n\n[3]: Information (e.g., links, quotes, the status of the Conflicts) in this post is up to date as of 17 June 2023, 13:21 EST.", "resc": "For each country listed, this question resolves as the date when the Council on Foreign Relations no longer lists that country under the category of Civil War. This country must cease to be listed by CFR as being in Civil War continuously for at least 1 week for the question to resolve.", "lower_25": "Feb 2027", "median": "Nov 2028", "upper_75": "Jan 2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How much will 1K GPT-4 API tokens cost in January 2025? (Output (32K context))\n\nKeyword: < 10−3\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 1K GPT-4 API tokens will cost less than 10−3 in January 2025?", "desc": "[GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) was announced in March 2023. The API is not yet public as of June 2023 but is available to some users. Current pricing is as follows:\n\n| Model | Input | Output |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| 8K context | $0.03 / 1K tokens | $0.06 / 1K tokens |\n| 32K context | $0.06 / 1K tokens | $0.12 / 1K tokens |", "resc": "The question resolves as the [price](https://openai.com/pricing), in US dollars, to query the public GPT-4 API in the US on 01/01/2025 for the relevant token type.\n\nThe \"750 Input, 250 Output (Lowest Cost)\" sub question resolves as the cost of 750 input tokens plus 250 output tokens for the lowest-cost API model. Currently, that is the 8K context model. At current prices of $0.03 / 1K tokens Input and $0.06 / 1K tokens Output, this option would resolve as:\n\n\\[ $0.03 \\cdot \\frac{750}{1000} + $0.06 \\cdot \\frac{250}{1000} = $0.0375 \\]", "lower_25": "< 10−3", "median": "6.67×10−3", "upper_75": "0.0714", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Libya will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Jan 2031?", "desc": "Many definitions exist for _civil war_. Wikipedia's page on [civil war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_war), provides the following \n\n> A **civil war** is a [war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War \"War\") between organized groups within the same [state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_state \"Sovereign state\") (or [country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Country \"Country\")). The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve [independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence \"Independence\") for a region, or to change government policies. The term is a [calque](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calque \"Calque\") of Latin *[bellum civile](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/bellum_civile \"wikt:bellum civile\")* which was used to refer to the various [civil wars of the Roman Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_civil_wars \"Roman civil wars\") in the 1st century BC. \n\nand Britannica, on its [civil war page](https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-war) offers this definition: \n\n> **civil war**, a violent conflict between a [state](https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity) and one or more organized non-state actors in the state's territory. Civil wars are thus distinguished from interstate conflicts (in which states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving states (sometimes labeled intercommunal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an organized or [cohesive](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cohesive) group, including [genocides](https://www.britannica.com/topic/genocide), and similar [violence](https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence) by non-state actors, such as [terrorism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism) or violent crime.\n> \n> The definition of civil [war](https://www.britannica.com/topic/war) clearly [encompasses](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/encompasses) many different forms of conflict. Some analysts distinguish between civil wars in which [insurgents](https://www.britannica.com/topic/insurgency) seek territorial secession or [autonomy](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy) and conflicts in which insurgents aim for control of the central government. Conflicts over government control may involve insurgents originating from within the centre or state apparatus, as in [military](https://www.britannica.com/topic/armed-force) [coups](https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat), or challengers from outside the political establishment. Other analysts distinguish between [ethnic civil wars](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-conflict), in which the insurgents and individuals in control of the central government have separate ethnic identities, and revolutionary conflicts, in which insurgents aim for major social transformation. [Colonial](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-colonialism) conflicts are sometimes singled out as a type distinct from civil wars on a state's core territory. Notwithstanding those distinctions, a given civil war will often combine several elements. For example, insurgencies may be both ethnic and ideologically based, and the insurgents' aims can shift over time from secession for a limited territory to controlling the entire state.\n\nFor further reading on civil war, refer to these resources:\n\n* [What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its Definition and (Econometric) Consequences](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21428/wbro_28_2_159.pdf;sequence=1) (2013; GS citations = 70)\n* [What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition](https://www.academia.edu/download/36055369/Algeria_civil_war.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 1399)\n* [Civil War](https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D83J3Q5J/download) (2010; GS citations = 2889)\n* [What do we know about natural resources and civil war?](https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/articles/whatdoweknow.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 2172)\n\n---\n\nThe Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)[1], [2] is a well embedded organization within international geopolitical systems, and while Wikipedia has pages for [tracking civil wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_civil_wars) and [ongoing armed conflicts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_armed_conflicts) (as do [other sites](https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2023)), the CFR's [Conflict Tracker](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/), which tracks things such as transnational terrorism, civil war, criminal violence, territorial disputes, and political instability, is a well regarded source for monitoring civil wars. \n \nPresently[3], six nations are in a state of civil war according to CFR's Conflict Tracker: \n\n* [Libya](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya)\n* [Myanmar](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar)\n* [Yemen](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen)\n* [Central African Republic](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic)\n* [South Sudan](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan)\n* [Syria](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria)\n\n---\n\n[1]: From [their website](https://www.cfr.org/about): \"_The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy._\"\n\n[2]: From Wikipedia's [page on the CFR](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations): \"_CFR meetings convene government officials, global business leaders and prominent members of the intelligence and foreign-policy communities to discuss international issues. CFR has published the bi-monthly journal *[Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Affairs \"Foreign Affairs\")* since 1922. It also runs the [David Rockefeller](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Rockefeller \"David Rockefeller\") Studies Program, which influences foreign policy by making recommendations to the presidential administration and [diplomatic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy \"Diplomacy\") community, testifying before [Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress \"United States Congress\"), interacting with the media, and publishing research on foreign policy issues._\"\n\n[3]: Information (e.g., links, quotes, the status of the Conflicts) in this post is up to date as of 17 June 2023, 13:21 EST.", "resc": "For each country listed, this question resolves as the date when the Council on Foreign Relations no longer lists that country under the category of Civil War. This country must cease to be listed by CFR as being in Civil War continuously for at least 1 week for the question to resolve.", "lower_25": "Feb 2027", "median": "Nov 2028", "upper_75": "Jan 2031", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Libya will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Jan 2031?", "desc": "Many definitions exist for _civil war_. Wikipedia's page on [civil war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_war), provides the following \n\n> A **civil war** is a [war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War \"War\") between organized groups within the same [state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_state \"Sovereign state\") (or [country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Country \"Country\")). The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve [independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence \"Independence\") for a region, or to change government policies. The term is a [calque](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calque \"Calque\") of Latin *[bellum civile](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/bellum_civile \"wikt:bellum civile\")* which was used to refer to the various [civil wars of the Roman Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_civil_wars \"Roman civil wars\") in the 1st century BC. \n\nand Britannica, on its [civil war page](https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-war) offers this definition: \n\n> **civil war**, a violent conflict between a [state](https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity) and one or more organized non-state actors in the state's territory. Civil wars are thus distinguished from interstate conflicts (in which states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving states (sometimes labeled intercommunal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an organized or [cohesive](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cohesive) group, including [genocides](https://www.britannica.com/topic/genocide), and similar [violence](https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence) by non-state actors, such as [terrorism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism) or violent crime.\n> \n> The definition of civil [war](https://www.britannica.com/topic/war) clearly [encompasses](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/encompasses) many different forms of conflict. Some analysts distinguish between civil wars in which [insurgents](https://www.britannica.com/topic/insurgency) seek territorial secession or [autonomy](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy) and conflicts in which insurgents aim for control of the central government. Conflicts over government control may involve insurgents originating from within the centre or state apparatus, as in [military](https://www.britannica.com/topic/armed-force) [coups](https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat), or challengers from outside the political establishment. Other analysts distinguish between [ethnic civil wars](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-conflict), in which the insurgents and individuals in control of the central government have separate ethnic identities, and revolutionary conflicts, in which insurgents aim for major social transformation. [Colonial](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-colonialism) conflicts are sometimes singled out as a type distinct from civil wars on a state's core territory. Notwithstanding those distinctions, a given civil war will often combine several elements. For example, insurgencies may be both ethnic and ideologically based, and the insurgents' aims can shift over time from secession for a limited territory to controlling the entire state.\n\nFor further reading on civil war, refer to these resources:\n\n* [What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its Definition and (Econometric) Consequences](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21428/wbro_28_2_159.pdf;sequence=1) (2013; GS citations = 70)\n* [What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition](https://www.academia.edu/download/36055369/Algeria_civil_war.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 1399)\n* [Civil War](https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D83J3Q5J/download) (2010; GS citations = 2889)\n* [What do we know about natural resources and civil war?](https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/articles/whatdoweknow.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 2172)\n\n---\n\nThe Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)[1], [2] is a well embedded organization within international geopolitical systems, and while Wikipedia has pages for [tracking civil wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_civil_wars) and [ongoing armed conflicts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_armed_conflicts) (as do [other sites](https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2023)), the CFR's [Conflict Tracker](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/), which tracks things such as transnational terrorism, civil war, criminal violence, territorial disputes, and political instability, is a well regarded source for monitoring civil wars. \n \nPresently[3], six nations are in a state of civil war according to CFR's Conflict Tracker: \n\n* [Libya](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya)\n* [Myanmar](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar)\n* [Yemen](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen)\n* [Central African Republic](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic)\n* [South Sudan](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan)\n* [Syria](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria)\n\n---\n\n[1]: From [their website](https://www.cfr.org/about): \"_The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy._\"\n\n[2]: From Wikipedia's [page on the CFR](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations): \"_CFR meetings convene government officials, global business leaders and prominent members of the intelligence and foreign-policy communities to discuss international issues. CFR has published the bi-monthly journal *[Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Affairs \"Foreign Affairs\")* since 1922. It also runs the [David Rockefeller](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Rockefeller \"David Rockefeller\") Studies Program, which influences foreign policy by making recommendations to the presidential administration and [diplomatic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy \"Diplomacy\") community, testifying before [Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress \"United States Congress\"), interacting with the media, and publishing research on foreign policy issues._\"\n\n[3]: Information (e.g., links, quotes, the status of the Conflicts) in this post is up to date as of 17 June 2023, 13:21 EST.", "resc": "For each country listed, this question resolves as the date when the Council on Foreign Relations no longer lists that country under the category of Civil War. This country must cease to be listed by CFR as being in Civil War continuously for at least 1 week for the question to resolve.", "lower_25": "Feb 2027", "median": "Nov 2028", "upper_75": "Jan 2031", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How much will 1K GPT-4 API tokens cost in January 2025? (Input (32K context))\n\nKeyword: < 10−3\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 1K GPT-4 API tokens will cost less than 10−3 in January 2025?", "desc": "[GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) was announced in March 2023. The API is not yet public as of June 2023 but is available to some users. Current pricing is as follows:\n\n| Model | Input | Output |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| 8K context | $0.03 / 1K tokens | $0.06 / 1K tokens |\n| 32K context | $0.06 / 1K tokens | $0.12 / 1K tokens |", "resc": "The question resolves as the [price](https://openai.com/pricing), in US dollars, to query the public GPT-4 API in the US on 01/01/2025 for the relevant token type.\n\nThe \"750 Input, 250 Output (Lowest Cost)\" sub question resolves as the cost of 750 input tokens plus 250 output tokens for the lowest-cost API model. Currently, that is the 8K context model. At current prices of $0.03 / 1K tokens Input and $0.06 / 1K tokens Output, this option would resolve as:\n\n\\[ $0.03 \\cdot \\frac{750}{1000} + $0.06 \\cdot \\frac{250}{1000} = $0.0375 \\]", "lower_25": "< 10−3", "median": "3.11×10−3", "upper_75": "0.0387", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How much will 1K GPT-4 API tokens cost in January 2025? (750 Input Tokens + 250 Output Tokens)\n\nKeyword: < 10−3\n\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 1K GPT-4 API tokens will cost less than 10−3 in January 2025?", "desc": "[GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) was announced in March 2023. The API is not yet public as of June 2023 but is available to some users. Current pricing is as follows:\n\n| Model | Input | Output |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| 8K context | $0.03 / 1K tokens | $0.06 / 1K tokens |\n| 32K context | $0.06 / 1K tokens | $0.12 / 1K tokens |", "resc": "The question resolves as the [price](https://openai.com/pricing), in US dollars, to query the public GPT-4 API in the US on 01/01/2025 for the relevant token type.\n\nThe \"750 Input, 250 Output (Lowest Cost)\" sub question resolves as the cost of 750 input tokens plus 250 output tokens for the lowest-cost API model. Currently, that is the 8K context model. At current prices of $0.03 / 1K tokens Input and $0.06 / 1K tokens Output, this option would resolve as:\n\n\\[ $0.03 \\cdot \\frac{750}{1000} + $0.06 \\cdot \\frac{250}{1000} = $0.0375 \\]", "lower_25": "< 10−3", "median": "1.58×10−3", "upper_75": "0.0218", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How much will 1K GPT-4 API tokens cost in January 2025? (750 Input Tokens + 250 Output Tokens)\n\nKeyword: < 10−3\n\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 1K GPT-4 API tokens will cost less than 10−3 in January 2025?", "desc": "[GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) was announced in March 2023. The API is not yet public as of June 2023 but is available to some users. Current pricing is as follows:\n\n| Model | Input | Output |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| 8K context | $0.03 / 1K tokens | $0.06 / 1K tokens |\n| 32K context | $0.06 / 1K tokens | $0.12 / 1K tokens |", "resc": "The question resolves as the [price](https://openai.com/pricing), in US dollars, to query the public GPT-4 API in the US on 01/01/2025 for the relevant token type.\n\nThe \"750 Input, 250 Output (Lowest Cost)\" sub question resolves as the cost of 750 input tokens plus 250 output tokens for the lowest-cost API model. Currently, that is the 8K context model. At current prices of $0.03 / 1K tokens Input and $0.06 / 1K tokens Output, this option would resolve as:\n\n\\[ $0.03 \\cdot \\frac{750}{1000} + $0.06 \\cdot \\frac{250}{1000} = $0.0375 \\]", "lower_25": "< 10−3", "median": "1.58×10−3", "upper_75": "0.0218", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How much will 1K GPT-4 API tokens cost in January 2025? (Output (32K context))\n\nKeyword: < 10−3\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 1K GPT-4 API tokens will cost less than 10−3 in January 2025?", "desc": "[GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) was announced in March 2023. The API is not yet public as of June 2023 but is available to some users. Current pricing is as follows:\n\n| Model | Input | Output |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| 8K context | $0.03 / 1K tokens | $0.06 / 1K tokens |\n| 32K context | $0.06 / 1K tokens | $0.12 / 1K tokens |", "resc": "The question resolves as the [price](https://openai.com/pricing), in US dollars, to query the public GPT-4 API in the US on 01/01/2025 for the relevant token type.\n\nThe \"750 Input, 250 Output (Lowest Cost)\" sub question resolves as the cost of 750 input tokens plus 250 output tokens for the lowest-cost API model. Currently, that is the 8K context model. At current prices of $0.03 / 1K tokens Input and $0.06 / 1K tokens Output, this option would resolve as:\n\n\\[ $0.03 \\cdot \\frac{750}{1000} + $0.06 \\cdot \\frac{250}{1000} = $0.0375 \\]", "lower_25": "< 10−3", "median": "6.67×10−3", "upper_75": "0.0714", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Libya will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Jan 2031?", "desc": "Many definitions exist for _civil war_. Wikipedia's page on [civil war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_war), provides the following \n\n> A **civil war** is a [war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War \"War\") between organized groups within the same [state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_state \"Sovereign state\") (or [country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Country \"Country\")). The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve [independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence \"Independence\") for a region, or to change government policies. The term is a [calque](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calque \"Calque\") of Latin *[bellum civile](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/bellum_civile \"wikt:bellum civile\")* which was used to refer to the various [civil wars of the Roman Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_civil_wars \"Roman civil wars\") in the 1st century BC. \n\nand Britannica, on its [civil war page](https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-war) offers this definition: \n\n> **civil war**, a violent conflict between a [state](https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity) and one or more organized non-state actors in the state's territory. Civil wars are thus distinguished from interstate conflicts (in which states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving states (sometimes labeled intercommunal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an organized or [cohesive](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cohesive) group, including [genocides](https://www.britannica.com/topic/genocide), and similar [violence](https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence) by non-state actors, such as [terrorism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism) or violent crime.\n> \n> The definition of civil [war](https://www.britannica.com/topic/war) clearly [encompasses](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/encompasses) many different forms of conflict. Some analysts distinguish between civil wars in which [insurgents](https://www.britannica.com/topic/insurgency) seek territorial secession or [autonomy](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy) and conflicts in which insurgents aim for control of the central government. Conflicts over government control may involve insurgents originating from within the centre or state apparatus, as in [military](https://www.britannica.com/topic/armed-force) [coups](https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat), or challengers from outside the political establishment. Other analysts distinguish between [ethnic civil wars](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-conflict), in which the insurgents and individuals in control of the central government have separate ethnic identities, and revolutionary conflicts, in which insurgents aim for major social transformation. [Colonial](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-colonialism) conflicts are sometimes singled out as a type distinct from civil wars on a state's core territory. Notwithstanding those distinctions, a given civil war will often combine several elements. For example, insurgencies may be both ethnic and ideologically based, and the insurgents' aims can shift over time from secession for a limited territory to controlling the entire state.\n\nFor further reading on civil war, refer to these resources:\n\n* [What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its Definition and (Econometric) Consequences](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21428/wbro_28_2_159.pdf;sequence=1) (2013; GS citations = 70)\n* [What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition](https://www.academia.edu/download/36055369/Algeria_civil_war.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 1399)\n* [Civil War](https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D83J3Q5J/download) (2010; GS citations = 2889)\n* [What do we know about natural resources and civil war?](https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/articles/whatdoweknow.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 2172)\n\n---\n\nThe Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)[1], [2] is a well embedded organization within international geopolitical systems, and while Wikipedia has pages for [tracking civil wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_civil_wars) and [ongoing armed conflicts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_armed_conflicts) (as do [other sites](https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2023)), the CFR's [Conflict Tracker](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/), which tracks things such as transnational terrorism, civil war, criminal violence, territorial disputes, and political instability, is a well regarded source for monitoring civil wars. \n \nPresently[3], six nations are in a state of civil war according to CFR's Conflict Tracker: \n\n* [Libya](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya)\n* [Myanmar](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar)\n* [Yemen](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen)\n* [Central African Republic](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic)\n* [South Sudan](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan)\n* [Syria](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria)\n\n---\n\n[1]: From [their website](https://www.cfr.org/about): \"_The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy._\"\n\n[2]: From Wikipedia's [page on the CFR](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations): \"_CFR meetings convene government officials, global business leaders and prominent members of the intelligence and foreign-policy communities to discuss international issues. CFR has published the bi-monthly journal *[Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Affairs \"Foreign Affairs\")* since 1922. It also runs the [David Rockefeller](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Rockefeller \"David Rockefeller\") Studies Program, which influences foreign policy by making recommendations to the presidential administration and [diplomatic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy \"Diplomacy\") community, testifying before [Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress \"United States Congress\"), interacting with the media, and publishing research on foreign policy issues._\"\n\n[3]: Information (e.g., links, quotes, the status of the Conflicts) in this post is up to date as of 17 June 2023, 13:21 EST.", "resc": "For each country listed, this question resolves as the date when the Council on Foreign Relations no longer lists that country under the category of Civil War. This country must cease to be listed by CFR as being in Civil War continuously for at least 1 week for the question to resolve.", "lower_25": "Feb 2027", "median": "Nov 2028", "upper_75": "Jan 2031", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Syria will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Sep 2029?", "desc": "Many definitions exist for _civil war_. Wikipedia's page on [civil war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_war), provides the following \n\n> A **civil war** is a [war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War \"War\") between organized groups within the same [state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_state \"Sovereign state\") (or [country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Country \"Country\")). The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve [independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence \"Independence\") for a region, or to change government policies. The term is a [calque](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calque \"Calque\") of Latin *[bellum civile](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/bellum_civile \"wikt:bellum civile\")* which was used to refer to the various [civil wars of the Roman Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_civil_wars \"Roman civil wars\") in the 1st century BC. \n\nand Britannica, on its [civil war page](https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-war) offers this definition: \n\n> **civil war**, a violent conflict between a [state](https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity) and one or more organized non-state actors in the state's territory. Civil wars are thus distinguished from interstate conflicts (in which states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving states (sometimes labeled intercommunal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an organized or [cohesive](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cohesive) group, including [genocides](https://www.britannica.com/topic/genocide), and similar [violence](https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence) by non-state actors, such as [terrorism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism) or violent crime.\n> \n> The definition of civil [war](https://www.britannica.com/topic/war) clearly [encompasses](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/encompasses) many different forms of conflict. Some analysts distinguish between civil wars in which [insurgents](https://www.britannica.com/topic/insurgency) seek territorial secession or [autonomy](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy) and conflicts in which insurgents aim for control of the central government. Conflicts over government control may involve insurgents originating from within the centre or state apparatus, as in [military](https://www.britannica.com/topic/armed-force) [coups](https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat), or challengers from outside the political establishment. Other analysts distinguish between [ethnic civil wars](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-conflict), in which the insurgents and individuals in control of the central government have separate ethnic identities, and revolutionary conflicts, in which insurgents aim for major social transformation. [Colonial](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-colonialism) conflicts are sometimes singled out as a type distinct from civil wars on a state's core territory. Notwithstanding those distinctions, a given civil war will often combine several elements. For example, insurgencies may be both ethnic and ideologically based, and the insurgents' aims can shift over time from secession for a limited territory to controlling the entire state.\n\nFor further reading on civil war, refer to these resources:\n\n* [What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its Definition and (Econometric) Consequences](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21428/wbro_28_2_159.pdf;sequence=1) (2013; GS citations = 70)\n* [What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition](https://www.academia.edu/download/36055369/Algeria_civil_war.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 1399)\n* [Civil War](https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D83J3Q5J/download) (2010; GS citations = 2889)\n* [What do we know about natural resources and civil war?](https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/articles/whatdoweknow.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 2172)\n\n---\n\nThe Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)[1], [2] is a well embedded organization within international geopolitical systems, and while Wikipedia has pages for [tracking civil wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_civil_wars) and [ongoing armed conflicts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_armed_conflicts) (as do [other sites](https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2023)), the CFR's [Conflict Tracker](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/), which tracks things such as transnational terrorism, civil war, criminal violence, territorial disputes, and political instability, is a well regarded source for monitoring civil wars. \n \nPresently[3], six nations are in a state of civil war according to CFR's Conflict Tracker: \n\n* [Libya](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya)\n* [Myanmar](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar)\n* [Yemen](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen)\n* [Central African Republic](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic)\n* [South Sudan](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan)\n* [Syria](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria)\n\n---\n\n[1]: From [their website](https://www.cfr.org/about): \"_The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy._\"\n\n[2]: From Wikipedia's [page on the CFR](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations): \"_CFR meetings convene government officials, global business leaders and prominent members of the intelligence and foreign-policy communities to discuss international issues. CFR has published the bi-monthly journal *[Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Affairs \"Foreign Affairs\")* since 1922. It also runs the [David Rockefeller](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Rockefeller \"David Rockefeller\") Studies Program, which influences foreign policy by making recommendations to the presidential administration and [diplomatic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy \"Diplomacy\") community, testifying before [Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress \"United States Congress\"), interacting with the media, and publishing research on foreign policy issues._\"\n\n[3]: Information (e.g., links, quotes, the status of the Conflicts) in this post is up to date as of 17 June 2023, 13:21 EST.", "resc": "For each country listed, this question resolves as the date when the Council on Foreign Relations no longer lists that country under the category of Civil War. This country must cease to be listed by CFR as being in Civil War continuously for at least 1 week for the question to resolve.", "lower_25": "Nov 2026", "median": "Feb 2028", "upper_75": "Sep 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Syria will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Sep 2029?", "desc": "Many definitions exist for _civil war_. Wikipedia's page on [civil war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_war), provides the following \n\n> A **civil war** is a [war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War \"War\") between organized groups within the same [state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_state \"Sovereign state\") (or [country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Country \"Country\")). The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve [independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence \"Independence\") for a region, or to change government policies. The term is a [calque](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calque \"Calque\") of Latin *[bellum civile](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/bellum_civile \"wikt:bellum civile\")* which was used to refer to the various [civil wars of the Roman Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_civil_wars \"Roman civil wars\") in the 1st century BC. \n\nand Britannica, on its [civil war page](https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-war) offers this definition: \n\n> **civil war**, a violent conflict between a [state](https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity) and one or more organized non-state actors in the state's territory. Civil wars are thus distinguished from interstate conflicts (in which states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving states (sometimes labeled intercommunal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an organized or [cohesive](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cohesive) group, including [genocides](https://www.britannica.com/topic/genocide), and similar [violence](https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence) by non-state actors, such as [terrorism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism) or violent crime.\n> \n> The definition of civil [war](https://www.britannica.com/topic/war) clearly [encompasses](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/encompasses) many different forms of conflict. Some analysts distinguish between civil wars in which [insurgents](https://www.britannica.com/topic/insurgency) seek territorial secession or [autonomy](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy) and conflicts in which insurgents aim for control of the central government. Conflicts over government control may involve insurgents originating from within the centre or state apparatus, as in [military](https://www.britannica.com/topic/armed-force) [coups](https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat), or challengers from outside the political establishment. Other analysts distinguish between [ethnic civil wars](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-conflict), in which the insurgents and individuals in control of the central government have separate ethnic identities, and revolutionary conflicts, in which insurgents aim for major social transformation. [Colonial](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-colonialism) conflicts are sometimes singled out as a type distinct from civil wars on a state's core territory. Notwithstanding those distinctions, a given civil war will often combine several elements. For example, insurgencies may be both ethnic and ideologically based, and the insurgents' aims can shift over time from secession for a limited territory to controlling the entire state.\n\nFor further reading on civil war, refer to these resources:\n\n* [What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its Definition and (Econometric) Consequences](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21428/wbro_28_2_159.pdf;sequence=1) (2013; GS citations = 70)\n* [What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition](https://www.academia.edu/download/36055369/Algeria_civil_war.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 1399)\n* [Civil War](https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D83J3Q5J/download) (2010; GS citations = 2889)\n* [What do we know about natural resources and civil war?](https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/articles/whatdoweknow.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 2172)\n\n---\n\nThe Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)[1], [2] is a well embedded organization within international geopolitical systems, and while Wikipedia has pages for [tracking civil wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_civil_wars) and [ongoing armed conflicts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_armed_conflicts) (as do [other sites](https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2023)), the CFR's [Conflict Tracker](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/), which tracks things such as transnational terrorism, civil war, criminal violence, territorial disputes, and political instability, is a well regarded source for monitoring civil wars. \n \nPresently[3], six nations are in a state of civil war according to CFR's Conflict Tracker: \n\n* [Libya](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya)\n* [Myanmar](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar)\n* [Yemen](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen)\n* [Central African Republic](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic)\n* [South Sudan](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan)\n* [Syria](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria)\n\n---\n\n[1]: From [their website](https://www.cfr.org/about): \"_The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy._\"\n\n[2]: From Wikipedia's [page on the CFR](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations): \"_CFR meetings convene government officials, global business leaders and prominent members of the intelligence and foreign-policy communities to discuss international issues. CFR has published the bi-monthly journal *[Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Affairs \"Foreign Affairs\")* since 1922. It also runs the [David Rockefeller](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Rockefeller \"David Rockefeller\") Studies Program, which influences foreign policy by making recommendations to the presidential administration and [diplomatic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy \"Diplomacy\") community, testifying before [Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress \"United States Congress\"), interacting with the media, and publishing research on foreign policy issues._\"\n\n[3]: Information (e.g., links, quotes, the status of the Conflicts) in this post is up to date as of 17 June 2023, 13:21 EST.", "resc": "For each country listed, this question resolves as the date when the Council on Foreign Relations no longer lists that country under the category of Civil War. This country must cease to be listed by CFR as being in Civil War continuously for at least 1 week for the question to resolve.", "lower_25": "Nov 2026", "median": "Feb 2028", "upper_75": "Sep 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Syria will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Sep 2029?", "desc": "Many definitions exist for _civil war_. Wikipedia's page on [civil war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_war), provides the following \n\n> A **civil war** is a [war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War \"War\") between organized groups within the same [state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_state \"Sovereign state\") (or [country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Country \"Country\")). The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve [independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence \"Independence\") for a region, or to change government policies. The term is a [calque](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calque \"Calque\") of Latin *[bellum civile](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/bellum_civile \"wikt:bellum civile\")* which was used to refer to the various [civil wars of the Roman Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_civil_wars \"Roman civil wars\") in the 1st century BC. \n\nand Britannica, on its [civil war page](https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-war) offers this definition: \n\n> **civil war**, a violent conflict between a [state](https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity) and one or more organized non-state actors in the state's territory. Civil wars are thus distinguished from interstate conflicts (in which states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving states (sometimes labeled intercommunal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an organized or [cohesive](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cohesive) group, including [genocides](https://www.britannica.com/topic/genocide), and similar [violence](https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence) by non-state actors, such as [terrorism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism) or violent crime.\n> \n> The definition of civil [war](https://www.britannica.com/topic/war) clearly [encompasses](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/encompasses) many different forms of conflict. Some analysts distinguish between civil wars in which [insurgents](https://www.britannica.com/topic/insurgency) seek territorial secession or [autonomy](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy) and conflicts in which insurgents aim for control of the central government. Conflicts over government control may involve insurgents originating from within the centre or state apparatus, as in [military](https://www.britannica.com/topic/armed-force) [coups](https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat), or challengers from outside the political establishment. Other analysts distinguish between [ethnic civil wars](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-conflict), in which the insurgents and individuals in control of the central government have separate ethnic identities, and revolutionary conflicts, in which insurgents aim for major social transformation. [Colonial](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-colonialism) conflicts are sometimes singled out as a type distinct from civil wars on a state's core territory. Notwithstanding those distinctions, a given civil war will often combine several elements. For example, insurgencies may be both ethnic and ideologically based, and the insurgents' aims can shift over time from secession for a limited territory to controlling the entire state.\n\nFor further reading on civil war, refer to these resources:\n\n* [What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its Definition and (Econometric) Consequences](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21428/wbro_28_2_159.pdf;sequence=1) (2013; GS citations = 70)\n* [What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition](https://www.academia.edu/download/36055369/Algeria_civil_war.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 1399)\n* [Civil War](https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D83J3Q5J/download) (2010; GS citations = 2889)\n* [What do we know about natural resources and civil war?](https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/articles/whatdoweknow.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 2172)\n\n---\n\nThe Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)[1], [2] is a well embedded organization within international geopolitical systems, and while Wikipedia has pages for [tracking civil wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_civil_wars) and [ongoing armed conflicts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_armed_conflicts) (as do [other sites](https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2023)), the CFR's [Conflict Tracker](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/), which tracks things such as transnational terrorism, civil war, criminal violence, territorial disputes, and political instability, is a well regarded source for monitoring civil wars. \n \nPresently[3], six nations are in a state of civil war according to CFR's Conflict Tracker: \n\n* [Libya](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya)\n* [Myanmar](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar)\n* [Yemen](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen)\n* [Central African Republic](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic)\n* [South Sudan](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan)\n* [Syria](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria)\n\n---\n\n[1]: From [their website](https://www.cfr.org/about): \"_The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy._\"\n\n[2]: From Wikipedia's [page on the CFR](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations): \"_CFR meetings convene government officials, global business leaders and prominent members of the intelligence and foreign-policy communities to discuss international issues. CFR has published the bi-monthly journal *[Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Affairs \"Foreign Affairs\")* since 1922. It also runs the [David Rockefeller](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Rockefeller \"David Rockefeller\") Studies Program, which influences foreign policy by making recommendations to the presidential administration and [diplomatic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy \"Diplomacy\") community, testifying before [Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress \"United States Congress\"), interacting with the media, and publishing research on foreign policy issues._\"\n\n[3]: Information (e.g., links, quotes, the status of the Conflicts) in this post is up to date as of 17 June 2023, 13:21 EST.", "resc": "For each country listed, this question resolves as the date when the Council on Foreign Relations no longer lists that country under the category of Civil War. This country must cease to be listed by CFR as being in Civil War continuously for at least 1 week for the question to resolve.", "lower_25": "Nov 2026", "median": "Feb 2028", "upper_75": "Sep 2029", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that South Sudan will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Jul 2028?", "desc": "Many definitions exist for _civil war_. Wikipedia's page on [civil war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_war), provides the following \n\n> A **civil war** is a [war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War \"War\") between organized groups within the same [state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_state \"Sovereign state\") (or [country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Country \"Country\")). The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve [independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence \"Independence\") for a region, or to change government policies. The term is a [calque](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calque \"Calque\") of Latin *[bellum civile](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/bellum_civile \"wikt:bellum civile\")* which was used to refer to the various [civil wars of the Roman Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_civil_wars \"Roman civil wars\") in the 1st century BC. \n\nand Britannica, on its [civil war page](https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-war) offers this definition: \n\n> **civil war**, a violent conflict between a [state](https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity) and one or more organized non-state actors in the state's territory. Civil wars are thus distinguished from interstate conflicts (in which states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving states (sometimes labeled intercommunal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an organized or [cohesive](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cohesive) group, including [genocides](https://www.britannica.com/topic/genocide), and similar [violence](https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence) by non-state actors, such as [terrorism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism) or violent crime.\n> \n> The definition of civil [war](https://www.britannica.com/topic/war) clearly [encompasses](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/encompasses) many different forms of conflict. Some analysts distinguish between civil wars in which [insurgents](https://www.britannica.com/topic/insurgency) seek territorial secession or [autonomy](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy) and conflicts in which insurgents aim for control of the central government. Conflicts over government control may involve insurgents originating from within the centre or state apparatus, as in [military](https://www.britannica.com/topic/armed-force) [coups](https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat), or challengers from outside the political establishment. Other analysts distinguish between [ethnic civil wars](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-conflict), in which the insurgents and individuals in control of the central government have separate ethnic identities, and revolutionary conflicts, in which insurgents aim for major social transformation. [Colonial](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-colonialism) conflicts are sometimes singled out as a type distinct from civil wars on a state's core territory. Notwithstanding those distinctions, a given civil war will often combine several elements. For example, insurgencies may be both ethnic and ideologically based, and the insurgents' aims can shift over time from secession for a limited territory to controlling the entire state.\n\nFor further reading on civil war, refer to these resources:\n\n* [What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its Definition and (Econometric) Consequences](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21428/wbro_28_2_159.pdf;sequence=1) (2013; GS citations = 70)\n* [What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition](https://www.academia.edu/download/36055369/Algeria_civil_war.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 1399)\n* [Civil War](https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D83J3Q5J/download) (2010; GS citations = 2889)\n* [What do we know about natural resources and civil war?](https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/articles/whatdoweknow.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 2172)\n\n---\n\nThe Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)[1], [2] is a well embedded organization within international geopolitical systems, and while Wikipedia has pages for [tracking civil wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_civil_wars) and [ongoing armed conflicts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_armed_conflicts) (as do [other sites](https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2023)), the CFR's [Conflict Tracker](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/), which tracks things such as transnational terrorism, civil war, criminal violence, territorial disputes, and political instability, is a well regarded source for monitoring civil wars. \n \nPresently[3], six nations are in a state of civil war according to CFR's Conflict Tracker: \n\n* [Libya](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya)\n* [Myanmar](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar)\n* [Yemen](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen)\n* [Central African Republic](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic)\n* [South Sudan](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan)\n* [Syria](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria)\n\n---\n\n[1]: From [their website](https://www.cfr.org/about): \"_The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy._\"\n\n[2]: From Wikipedia's [page on the CFR](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations): \"_CFR meetings convene government officials, global business leaders and prominent members of the intelligence and foreign-policy communities to discuss international issues. CFR has published the bi-monthly journal *[Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Affairs \"Foreign Affairs\")* since 1922. It also runs the [David Rockefeller](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Rockefeller \"David Rockefeller\") Studies Program, which influences foreign policy by making recommendations to the presidential administration and [diplomatic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy \"Diplomacy\") community, testifying before [Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress \"United States Congress\"), interacting with the media, and publishing research on foreign policy issues._\"\n\n[3]: Information (e.g., links, quotes, the status of the Conflicts) in this post is up to date as of 17 June 2023, 13:21 EST.", "resc": "For each country listed, this question resolves as the date when the Council on Foreign Relations no longer lists that country under the category of Civil War. This country must cease to be listed by CFR as being in Civil War continuously for at least 1 week for the question to resolve.", "lower_25": "Nov 2026", "median": "Jul 2028", "upper_75": "Nov 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that South Sudan will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Jul 2028?", "desc": "Many definitions exist for _civil war_. Wikipedia's page on [civil war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_war), provides the following \n\n> A **civil war** is a [war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War \"War\") between organized groups within the same [state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_state \"Sovereign state\") (or [country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Country \"Country\")). The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve [independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence \"Independence\") for a region, or to change government policies. The term is a [calque](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calque \"Calque\") of Latin *[bellum civile](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/bellum_civile \"wikt:bellum civile\")* which was used to refer to the various [civil wars of the Roman Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_civil_wars \"Roman civil wars\") in the 1st century BC. \n\nand Britannica, on its [civil war page](https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-war) offers this definition: \n\n> **civil war**, a violent conflict between a [state](https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity) and one or more organized non-state actors in the state's territory. Civil wars are thus distinguished from interstate conflicts (in which states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving states (sometimes labeled intercommunal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an organized or [cohesive](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cohesive) group, including [genocides](https://www.britannica.com/topic/genocide), and similar [violence](https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence) by non-state actors, such as [terrorism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism) or violent crime.\n> \n> The definition of civil [war](https://www.britannica.com/topic/war) clearly [encompasses](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/encompasses) many different forms of conflict. Some analysts distinguish between civil wars in which [insurgents](https://www.britannica.com/topic/insurgency) seek territorial secession or [autonomy](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy) and conflicts in which insurgents aim for control of the central government. Conflicts over government control may involve insurgents originating from within the centre or state apparatus, as in [military](https://www.britannica.com/topic/armed-force) [coups](https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat), or challengers from outside the political establishment. Other analysts distinguish between [ethnic civil wars](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-conflict), in which the insurgents and individuals in control of the central government have separate ethnic identities, and revolutionary conflicts, in which insurgents aim for major social transformation. [Colonial](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-colonialism) conflicts are sometimes singled out as a type distinct from civil wars on a state's core territory. Notwithstanding those distinctions, a given civil war will often combine several elements. For example, insurgencies may be both ethnic and ideologically based, and the insurgents' aims can shift over time from secession for a limited territory to controlling the entire state.\n\nFor further reading on civil war, refer to these resources:\n\n* [What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its Definition and (Econometric) Consequences](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21428/wbro_28_2_159.pdf;sequence=1) (2013; GS citations = 70)\n* [What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition](https://www.academia.edu/download/36055369/Algeria_civil_war.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 1399)\n* [Civil War](https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D83J3Q5J/download) (2010; GS citations = 2889)\n* [What do we know about natural resources and civil war?](https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/articles/whatdoweknow.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 2172)\n\n---\n\nThe Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)[1], [2] is a well embedded organization within international geopolitical systems, and while Wikipedia has pages for [tracking civil wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_civil_wars) and [ongoing armed conflicts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_armed_conflicts) (as do [other sites](https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2023)), the CFR's [Conflict Tracker](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/), which tracks things such as transnational terrorism, civil war, criminal violence, territorial disputes, and political instability, is a well regarded source for monitoring civil wars. \n \nPresently[3], six nations are in a state of civil war according to CFR's Conflict Tracker: \n\n* [Libya](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya)\n* [Myanmar](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar)\n* [Yemen](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen)\n* [Central African Republic](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic)\n* [South Sudan](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan)\n* [Syria](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria)\n\n---\n\n[1]: From [their website](https://www.cfr.org/about): \"_The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy._\"\n\n[2]: From Wikipedia's [page on the CFR](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations): \"_CFR meetings convene government officials, global business leaders and prominent members of the intelligence and foreign-policy communities to discuss international issues. CFR has published the bi-monthly journal *[Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Affairs \"Foreign Affairs\")* since 1922. It also runs the [David Rockefeller](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Rockefeller \"David Rockefeller\") Studies Program, which influences foreign policy by making recommendations to the presidential administration and [diplomatic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy \"Diplomacy\") community, testifying before [Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress \"United States Congress\"), interacting with the media, and publishing research on foreign policy issues._\"\n\n[3]: Information (e.g., links, quotes, the status of the Conflicts) in this post is up to date as of 17 June 2023, 13:21 EST.", "resc": "For each country listed, this question resolves as the date when the Council on Foreign Relations no longer lists that country under the category of Civil War. This country must cease to be listed by CFR as being in Civil War continuously for at least 1 week for the question to resolve.", "lower_25": "Nov 2026", "median": "Jul 2028", "upper_75": "Nov 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that South Sudan will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Jul 2028?", "desc": "Many definitions exist for _civil war_. Wikipedia's page on [civil war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_war), provides the following \n\n> A **civil war** is a [war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War \"War\") between organized groups within the same [state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_state \"Sovereign state\") (or [country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Country \"Country\")). The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve [independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence \"Independence\") for a region, or to change government policies. The term is a [calque](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calque \"Calque\") of Latin *[bellum civile](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/bellum_civile \"wikt:bellum civile\")* which was used to refer to the various [civil wars of the Roman Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_civil_wars \"Roman civil wars\") in the 1st century BC. \n\nand Britannica, on its [civil war page](https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-war) offers this definition: \n\n> **civil war**, a violent conflict between a [state](https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity) and one or more organized non-state actors in the state's territory. Civil wars are thus distinguished from interstate conflicts (in which states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving states (sometimes labeled intercommunal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an organized or [cohesive](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cohesive) group, including [genocides](https://www.britannica.com/topic/genocide), and similar [violence](https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence) by non-state actors, such as [terrorism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism) or violent crime.\n> \n> The definition of civil [war](https://www.britannica.com/topic/war) clearly [encompasses](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/encompasses) many different forms of conflict. Some analysts distinguish between civil wars in which [insurgents](https://www.britannica.com/topic/insurgency) seek territorial secession or [autonomy](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy) and conflicts in which insurgents aim for control of the central government. Conflicts over government control may involve insurgents originating from within the centre or state apparatus, as in [military](https://www.britannica.com/topic/armed-force) [coups](https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat), or challengers from outside the political establishment. Other analysts distinguish between [ethnic civil wars](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-conflict), in which the insurgents and individuals in control of the central government have separate ethnic identities, and revolutionary conflicts, in which insurgents aim for major social transformation. [Colonial](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-colonialism) conflicts are sometimes singled out as a type distinct from civil wars on a state's core territory. Notwithstanding those distinctions, a given civil war will often combine several elements. For example, insurgencies may be both ethnic and ideologically based, and the insurgents' aims can shift over time from secession for a limited territory to controlling the entire state.\n\nFor further reading on civil war, refer to these resources:\n\n* [What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its Definition and (Econometric) Consequences](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21428/wbro_28_2_159.pdf;sequence=1) (2013; GS citations = 70)\n* [What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition](https://www.academia.edu/download/36055369/Algeria_civil_war.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 1399)\n* [Civil War](https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D83J3Q5J/download) (2010; GS citations = 2889)\n* [What do we know about natural resources and civil war?](https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/articles/whatdoweknow.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 2172)\n\n---\n\nThe Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)[1], [2] is a well embedded organization within international geopolitical systems, and while Wikipedia has pages for [tracking civil wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_civil_wars) and [ongoing armed conflicts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_armed_conflicts) (as do [other sites](https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2023)), the CFR's [Conflict Tracker](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/), which tracks things such as transnational terrorism, civil war, criminal violence, territorial disputes, and political instability, is a well regarded source for monitoring civil wars. \n \nPresently[3], six nations are in a state of civil war according to CFR's Conflict Tracker: \n\n* [Libya](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya)\n* [Myanmar](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar)\n* [Yemen](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen)\n* [Central African Republic](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic)\n* [South Sudan](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan)\n* [Syria](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria)\n\n---\n\n[1]: From [their website](https://www.cfr.org/about): \"_The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy._\"\n\n[2]: From Wikipedia's [page on the CFR](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations): \"_CFR meetings convene government officials, global business leaders and prominent members of the intelligence and foreign-policy communities to discuss international issues. CFR has published the bi-monthly journal *[Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Affairs \"Foreign Affairs\")* since 1922. It also runs the [David Rockefeller](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Rockefeller \"David Rockefeller\") Studies Program, which influences foreign policy by making recommendations to the presidential administration and [diplomatic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy \"Diplomacy\") community, testifying before [Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress \"United States Congress\"), interacting with the media, and publishing research on foreign policy issues._\"\n\n[3]: Information (e.g., links, quotes, the status of the Conflicts) in this post is up to date as of 17 June 2023, 13:21 EST.", "resc": "For each country listed, this question resolves as the date when the Council on Foreign Relations no longer lists that country under the category of Civil War. This country must cease to be listed by CFR as being in Civil War continuously for at least 1 week for the question to resolve.", "lower_25": "Nov 2026", "median": "Jul 2028", "upper_75": "Nov 2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Myanmar will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Dec 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Oct 2026", "median": "Dec 2028", "upper_75": "May 2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How much will 1K GPT-4 API tokens cost in January 2025? (750 Input Tokens + 250 Output Tokens)\n\nKeyword: < 10−3\n\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 1K GPT-4 API tokens will cost less than 10−3 in January 2025?", "desc": "[GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) was announced in March 2023. The API is not yet public as of June 2023 but is available to some users. Current pricing is as follows:\n\n| Model | Input | Output |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| 8K context | $0.03 / 1K tokens | $0.06 / 1K tokens |\n| 32K context | $0.06 / 1K tokens | $0.12 / 1K tokens |", "resc": "The question resolves as the [price](https://openai.com/pricing), in US dollars, to query the public GPT-4 API in the US on 01/01/2025 for the relevant token type.\n\nThe \"750 Input, 250 Output (Lowest Cost)\" sub question resolves as the cost of 750 input tokens plus 250 output tokens for the lowest-cost API model. Currently, that is the 8K context model. At current prices of $0.03 / 1K tokens Input and $0.06 / 1K tokens Output, this option would resolve as:\n\n\\[ $0.03 \\cdot \\frac{750}{1000} + $0.06 \\cdot \\frac{250}{1000} = $0.0375 \\]", "lower_25": "< 10−3", "median": "1.58×10−3", "upper_75": "0.0218", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Yemen will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Nov 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2026", "median": "Jan 2028", "upper_75": "Sep 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Yemen will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Nov 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2026", "median": "Jan 2028", "upper_75": "Sep 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Myanmar will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Dec 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Oct 2026", "median": "Dec 2028", "upper_75": "May 2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the most expensive AI training run will be 286 million USD in the following years?", "desc": "In June 2023, [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/) reports the most expensive training run to have been $40 million ([source, see p. 7](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18egmiHWx8fnWQExSOJcux0Us5zkAKPnh/view?usp=sharing)), their estimated cost for OpenAI's final training run of GPT-4. See Epoch's data points and trend [here](https://epochai.org/trends#investment-trends-section), where they report the most expensive training run has increased an average of 3.1x annually from 2009 to the present.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the value, in millions of 2023 USD, that [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/trends) reports as the most expensive training run, as of Dec 31 of that year (so inclusive of that year).\n\nIf Epoch AI no longer reports this value, and there is no other supremely reliable set of estimates, then subsequent subquestions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "286", "median": "444", "upper_75": "661", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Central African Republic will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Jul 2027?", "desc": "Many definitions exist for _civil war_. Wikipedia's page on [civil war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_war), provides the following \n\n> A **civil war** is a [war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War \"War\") between organized groups within the same [state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_state \"Sovereign state\") (or [country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Country \"Country\")). The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve [independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence \"Independence\") for a region, or to change government policies. The term is a [calque](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calque \"Calque\") of Latin *[bellum civile](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/bellum_civile \"wikt:bellum civile\")* which was used to refer to the various [civil wars of the Roman Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_civil_wars \"Roman civil wars\") in the 1st century BC. \n\nand Britannica, on its [civil war page](https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-war) offers this definition: \n\n> **civil war**, a violent conflict between a [state](https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity) and one or more organized non-state actors in the state's territory. Civil wars are thus distinguished from interstate conflicts (in which states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving states (sometimes labeled intercommunal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an organized or [cohesive](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cohesive) group, including [genocides](https://www.britannica.com/topic/genocide), and similar [violence](https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence) by non-state actors, such as [terrorism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism) or violent crime.\n> \n> The definition of civil [war](https://www.britannica.com/topic/war) clearly [encompasses](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/encompasses) many different forms of conflict. Some analysts distinguish between civil wars in which [insurgents](https://www.britannica.com/topic/insurgency) seek territorial secession or [autonomy](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy) and conflicts in which insurgents aim for control of the central government. Conflicts over government control may involve insurgents originating from within the centre or state apparatus, as in [military](https://www.britannica.com/topic/armed-force) [coups](https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat), or challengers from outside the political establishment. Other analysts distinguish between [ethnic civil wars](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-conflict), in which the insurgents and individuals in control of the central government have separate ethnic identities, and revolutionary conflicts, in which insurgents aim for major social transformation. [Colonial](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-colonialism) conflicts are sometimes singled out as a type distinct from civil wars on a state's core territory. Notwithstanding those distinctions, a given civil war will often combine several elements. For example, insurgencies may be both ethnic and ideologically based, and the insurgents' aims can shift over time from secession for a limited territory to controlling the entire state.\n\nFor further reading on civil war, refer to these resources:\n\n* [What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its Definition and (Econometric) Consequences](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21428/wbro_28_2_159.pdf;sequence=1) (2013; GS citations = 70)\n* [What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition](https://www.academia.edu/download/36055369/Algeria_civil_war.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 1399)\n* [Civil War](https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D83J3Q5J/download) (2010; GS citations = 2889)\n* [What do we know about natural resources and civil war?](https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/articles/whatdoweknow.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 2172)\n\n---\n\nThe Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)[1], [2] is a well embedded organization within international geopolitical systems, and while Wikipedia has pages for [tracking civil wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_civil_wars) and [ongoing armed conflicts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_armed_conflicts) (as do [other sites](https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2023)), the CFR's [Conflict Tracker](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/), which tracks things such as transnational terrorism, civil war, criminal violence, territorial disputes, and political instability, is a well regarded source for monitoring civil wars. \n \nPresently[3], six nations are in a state of civil war according to CFR's Conflict Tracker: \n\n* [Libya](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya)\n* [Myanmar](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar)\n* [Yemen](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen)\n* [Central African Republic](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic)\n* [South Sudan](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan)\n* [Syria](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria)\n\n---\n\n[1]: From [their website](https://www.cfr.org/about): \"_The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy._\"\n\n[2]: From Wikipedia's [page on the CFR](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations): \"_CFR meetings convene government officials, global business leaders and prominent members of the intelligence and foreign-policy communities to discuss international issues. CFR has published the bi-monthly journal *[Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Affairs \"Foreign Affairs\")* since 1922. It also runs the [David Rockefeller](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Rockefeller \"David Rockefeller\") Studies Program, which influences foreign policy by making recommendations to the presidential administration and [diplomatic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy \"Diplomacy\") community, testifying before [Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress \"United States Congress\"), interacting with the media, and publishing research on foreign policy issues._\"\n\n[3]: Information (e.g., links, quotes, the status of the Conflicts) in this post is up to date as of 17 June 2023, 13:21 EST.", "resc": "For each country listed, this question resolves as the date when the Council on Foreign Relations no longer lists that country under the category of Civil War. This country must cease to be listed by CFR as being in Civil War continuously for at least 1 week for the question to resolve.", "lower_25": "Nov 2025", "median": "Jul 2027", "upper_75": "Sep 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Central African Republic will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Jul 2027?", "desc": "Many definitions exist for _civil war_. Wikipedia's page on [civil war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_war), provides the following \n\n> A **civil war** is a [war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War \"War\") between organized groups within the same [state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_state \"Sovereign state\") (or [country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Country \"Country\")). The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve [independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence \"Independence\") for a region, or to change government policies. The term is a [calque](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calque \"Calque\") of Latin *[bellum civile](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/bellum_civile \"wikt:bellum civile\")* which was used to refer to the various [civil wars of the Roman Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_civil_wars \"Roman civil wars\") in the 1st century BC. \n\nand Britannica, on its [civil war page](https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-war) offers this definition: \n\n> **civil war**, a violent conflict between a [state](https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity) and one or more organized non-state actors in the state's territory. Civil wars are thus distinguished from interstate conflicts (in which states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving states (sometimes labeled intercommunal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an organized or [cohesive](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cohesive) group, including [genocides](https://www.britannica.com/topic/genocide), and similar [violence](https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence) by non-state actors, such as [terrorism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism) or violent crime.\n> \n> The definition of civil [war](https://www.britannica.com/topic/war) clearly [encompasses](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/encompasses) many different forms of conflict. Some analysts distinguish between civil wars in which [insurgents](https://www.britannica.com/topic/insurgency) seek territorial secession or [autonomy](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy) and conflicts in which insurgents aim for control of the central government. Conflicts over government control may involve insurgents originating from within the centre or state apparatus, as in [military](https://www.britannica.com/topic/armed-force) [coups](https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat), or challengers from outside the political establishment. Other analysts distinguish between [ethnic civil wars](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-conflict), in which the insurgents and individuals in control of the central government have separate ethnic identities, and revolutionary conflicts, in which insurgents aim for major social transformation. [Colonial](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-colonialism) conflicts are sometimes singled out as a type distinct from civil wars on a state's core territory. Notwithstanding those distinctions, a given civil war will often combine several elements. For example, insurgencies may be both ethnic and ideologically based, and the insurgents' aims can shift over time from secession for a limited territory to controlling the entire state.\n\nFor further reading on civil war, refer to these resources:\n\n* [What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its Definition and (Econometric) Consequences](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21428/wbro_28_2_159.pdf;sequence=1) (2013; GS citations = 70)\n* [What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition](https://www.academia.edu/download/36055369/Algeria_civil_war.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 1399)\n* [Civil War](https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D83J3Q5J/download) (2010; GS citations = 2889)\n* [What do we know about natural resources and civil war?](https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/articles/whatdoweknow.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 2172)\n\n---\n\nThe Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)[1], [2] is a well embedded organization within international geopolitical systems, and while Wikipedia has pages for [tracking civil wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_civil_wars) and [ongoing armed conflicts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_armed_conflicts) (as do [other sites](https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2023)), the CFR's [Conflict Tracker](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/), which tracks things such as transnational terrorism, civil war, criminal violence, territorial disputes, and political instability, is a well regarded source for monitoring civil wars. \n \nPresently[3], six nations are in a state of civil war according to CFR's Conflict Tracker: \n\n* [Libya](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya)\n* [Myanmar](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar)\n* [Yemen](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen)\n* [Central African Republic](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic)\n* [South Sudan](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan)\n* [Syria](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria)\n\n---\n\n[1]: From [their website](https://www.cfr.org/about): \"_The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy._\"\n\n[2]: From Wikipedia's [page on the CFR](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations): \"_CFR meetings convene government officials, global business leaders and prominent members of the intelligence and foreign-policy communities to discuss international issues. CFR has published the bi-monthly journal *[Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Affairs \"Foreign Affairs\")* since 1922. It also runs the [David Rockefeller](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Rockefeller \"David Rockefeller\") Studies Program, which influences foreign policy by making recommendations to the presidential administration and [diplomatic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy \"Diplomacy\") community, testifying before [Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress \"United States Congress\"), interacting with the media, and publishing research on foreign policy issues._\"\n\n[3]: Information (e.g., links, quotes, the status of the Conflicts) in this post is up to date as of 17 June 2023, 13:21 EST.", "resc": "For each country listed, this question resolves as the date when the Council on Foreign Relations no longer lists that country under the category of Civil War. This country must cease to be listed by CFR as being in Civil War continuously for at least 1 week for the question to resolve.", "lower_25": "Nov 2025", "median": "Jul 2027", "upper_75": "Sep 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Yemen will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Nov 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2026", "median": "Jan 2028", "upper_75": "Sep 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the most expensive AI training run in the following years will be over 1 million USD, in percentage?", "desc": "In June 2023, [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/) reports the most expensive training run to have been $40 million ([source, see p. 7](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18egmiHWx8fnWQExSOJcux0Us5zkAKPnh/view?usp=sharing)), their estimated cost for OpenAI's final training run of GPT-4. See Epoch's data points and trend [here](https://epochai.org/trends#investment-trends-section), where they report the most expensive training run has increased an average of 3.1x annually from 2009 to the present.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the value, in millions of 2023 USD, that [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/trends) reports as the most expensive training run, as of Dec 31 of that year (so inclusive of that year).\n\nIf Epoch AI no longer reports this value, and there is no other supremely reliable set of estimates, then subsequent subquestions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "759", "median": "993", "upper_75": "> 1k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the most expensive AI training run will be 286 million USD in the following years?", "desc": "In June 2023, [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/) reports the most expensive training run to have been $40 million ([source, see p. 7](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18egmiHWx8fnWQExSOJcux0Us5zkAKPnh/view?usp=sharing)), their estimated cost for OpenAI's final training run of GPT-4. See Epoch's data points and trend [here](https://epochai.org/trends#investment-trends-section), where they report the most expensive training run has increased an average of 3.1x annually from 2009 to the present.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the value, in millions of 2023 USD, that [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/trends) reports as the most expensive training run, as of Dec 31 of that year (so inclusive of that year).\n\nIf Epoch AI no longer reports this value, and there is no other supremely reliable set of estimates, then subsequent subquestions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "286", "median": "444", "upper_75": "661", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the most expensive AI training run in the following years will be over 1 million USD, in percentage?", "desc": "In June 2023, [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/) reports the most expensive training run to have been $40 million ([source, see p. 7](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18egmiHWx8fnWQExSOJcux0Us5zkAKPnh/view?usp=sharing)), their estimated cost for OpenAI's final training run of GPT-4. See Epoch's data points and trend [here](https://epochai.org/trends#investment-trends-section), where they report the most expensive training run has increased an average of 3.1x annually from 2009 to the present.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the value, in millions of 2023 USD, that [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/trends) reports as the most expensive training run, as of Dec 31 of that year (so inclusive of that year).\n\nIf Epoch AI no longer reports this value, and there is no other supremely reliable set of estimates, then subsequent subquestions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "759", "median": "993", "upper_75": "> 1k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the most expensive AI training run in the following years will be 699 million USD?", "desc": "In June 2023, [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/) reports the most expensive training run to have been $40 million ([source, see p. 7](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18egmiHWx8fnWQExSOJcux0Us5zkAKPnh/view?usp=sharing)), their estimated cost for OpenAI's final training run of GPT-4. See Epoch's data points and trend [here](https://epochai.org/trends#investment-trends-section), where they report the most expensive training run has increased an average of 3.1x annually from 2009 to the present.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the value, in millions of 2023 USD, that [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/trends) reports as the most expensive training run, as of Dec 31 of that year (so inclusive of that year).\n\nIf Epoch AI no longer reports this value, and there is no other supremely reliable set of estimates, then subsequent subquestions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "432", "median": "699", "upper_75": "969", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Central African Republic will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Jul 2027?", "desc": "Many definitions exist for _civil war_. Wikipedia's page on [civil war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_war), provides the following \n\n> A **civil war** is a [war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War \"War\") between organized groups within the same [state](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_state \"Sovereign state\") (or [country](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Country \"Country\")). The aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve [independence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence \"Independence\") for a region, or to change government policies. The term is a [calque](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calque \"Calque\") of Latin *[bellum civile](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/bellum_civile \"wikt:bellum civile\")* which was used to refer to the various [civil wars of the Roman Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_civil_wars \"Roman civil wars\") in the 1st century BC. \n\nand Britannica, on its [civil war page](https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-war) offers this definition: \n\n> **civil war**, a violent conflict between a [state](https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity) and one or more organized non-state actors in the state's territory. Civil wars are thus distinguished from interstate conflicts (in which states fight other states), violent conflicts or riots not involving states (sometimes labeled intercommunal conflicts), and state repression against individuals who cannot be considered an organized or [cohesive](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cohesive) group, including [genocides](https://www.britannica.com/topic/genocide), and similar [violence](https://www.britannica.com/topic/violence) by non-state actors, such as [terrorism](https://www.britannica.com/topic/terrorism) or violent crime.\n> \n> The definition of civil [war](https://www.britannica.com/topic/war) clearly [encompasses](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/encompasses) many different forms of conflict. Some analysts distinguish between civil wars in which [insurgents](https://www.britannica.com/topic/insurgency) seek territorial secession or [autonomy](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autonomy) and conflicts in which insurgents aim for control of the central government. Conflicts over government control may involve insurgents originating from within the centre or state apparatus, as in [military](https://www.britannica.com/topic/armed-force) [coups](https://www.britannica.com/topic/coup-detat), or challengers from outside the political establishment. Other analysts distinguish between [ethnic civil wars](https://www.britannica.com/topic/ethnic-conflict), in which the insurgents and individuals in control of the central government have separate ethnic identities, and revolutionary conflicts, in which insurgents aim for major social transformation. [Colonial](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-colonialism) conflicts are sometimes singled out as a type distinct from civil wars on a state's core territory. Notwithstanding those distinctions, a given civil war will often combine several elements. For example, insurgencies may be both ethnic and ideologically based, and the insurgents' aims can shift over time from secession for a limited territory to controlling the entire state.\n\nFor further reading on civil war, refer to these resources:\n\n* [What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its Definition and (Econometric) Consequences](https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/21428/wbro_28_2_159.pdf;sequence=1) (2013; GS citations = 70)\n* [What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition](https://www.academia.edu/download/36055369/Algeria_civil_war.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 1399)\n* [Civil War](https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D83J3Q5J/download) (2010; GS citations = 2889)\n* [What do we know about natural resources and civil war?](https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/papers/articles/whatdoweknow.pdf) (2004; GS citations = 2172)\n\n---\n\nThe Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)[1], [2] is a well embedded organization within international geopolitical systems, and while Wikipedia has pages for [tracking civil wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_civil_wars) and [ongoing armed conflicts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ongoing_armed_conflicts) (as do [other sites](https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2023)), the CFR's [Conflict Tracker](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/), which tracks things such as transnational terrorism, civil war, criminal violence, territorial disputes, and political instability, is a well regarded source for monitoring civil wars. \n \nPresently[3], six nations are in a state of civil war according to CFR's Conflict Tracker: \n\n* [Libya](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-libya)\n* [Myanmar](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar)\n* [Yemen](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen)\n* [Central African Republic](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-central-african-republic)\n* [South Sudan](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan)\n* [Syria](https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria)\n\n---\n\n[1]: From [their website](https://www.cfr.org/about): \"_The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. Founded in 1921, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy._\"\n\n[2]: From Wikipedia's [page on the CFR](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_on_Foreign_Relations): \"_CFR meetings convene government officials, global business leaders and prominent members of the intelligence and foreign-policy communities to discuss international issues. CFR has published the bi-monthly journal *[Foreign Affairs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Affairs \"Foreign Affairs\")* since 1922. It also runs the [David Rockefeller](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Rockefeller \"David Rockefeller\") Studies Program, which influences foreign policy by making recommendations to the presidential administration and [diplomatic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy \"Diplomacy\") community, testifying before [Congress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress \"United States Congress\"), interacting with the media, and publishing research on foreign policy issues._\"\n\n[3]: Information (e.g., links, quotes, the status of the Conflicts) in this post is up to date as of 17 June 2023, 13:21 EST.", "resc": "For each country listed, this question resolves as the date when the Council on Foreign Relations no longer lists that country under the category of Civil War. This country must cease to be listed by CFR as being in Civil War continuously for at least 1 week for the question to resolve.", "lower_25": "Nov 2025", "median": "Jul 2027", "upper_75": "Sep 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the most expensive AI training run in the following years will be 699 million USD?", "desc": "In June 2023, [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/) reports the most expensive training run to have been $40 million ([source, see p. 7](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18egmiHWx8fnWQExSOJcux0Us5zkAKPnh/view?usp=sharing)), their estimated cost for OpenAI's final training run of GPT-4. See Epoch's data points and trend [here](https://epochai.org/trends#investment-trends-section), where they report the most expensive training run has increased an average of 3.1x annually from 2009 to the present.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the value, in millions of 2023 USD, that [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/trends) reports as the most expensive training run, as of Dec 31 of that year (so inclusive of that year).\n\nIf Epoch AI no longer reports this value, and there is no other supremely reliable set of estimates, then subsequent subquestions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "432", "median": "699", "upper_75": "969", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Myanmar will no longer be classified as being in a state of civil war by Dec 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Oct 2026", "median": "Dec 2028", "upper_75": "May 2031", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the most expensive AI training run in the following years will be 699 million USD?", "desc": "In June 2023, [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/) reports the most expensive training run to have been $40 million ([source, see p. 7](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18egmiHWx8fnWQExSOJcux0Us5zkAKPnh/view?usp=sharing)), their estimated cost for OpenAI's final training run of GPT-4. See Epoch's data points and trend [here](https://epochai.org/trends#investment-trends-section), where they report the most expensive training run has increased an average of 3.1x annually from 2009 to the present.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the value, in millions of 2023 USD, that [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/trends) reports as the most expensive training run, as of Dec 31 of that year (so inclusive of that year).\n\nIf Epoch AI no longer reports this value, and there is no other supremely reliable set of estimates, then subsequent subquestions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "432", "median": "699", "upper_75": "969", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the federal criminal trial of Donald J. Trump (classified documents case) will not begin before January 2026?", "desc": "[United States v. Donald J. Trump and Waltine Nauta](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_prosecution_of_Donald_Trump) is a pending federal criminal case against Donald Trump, the 45th president of the United States, and his personal aide and valet, Waltine Nauta, on allegations that Trump improperly retained government documents after the end of his presidency, obstructed an investigation into that matter, and was involved in a related criminal conspiracy. Trump has [pleaded not guilty](https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/13/politics/trump-indictment-federal-court-appearance/index.html) to all of the charges against him in the case.\n\nIn mid-June 2023, US district judge Aileen Cannon [set an initial trial date](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/jun/20/trump-trial-date-set-august-retaining-documents-obstructing-justice) of 14 August in the case.\n\nLater that month, special counsel Jack Smith [asked the court](https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/special-counsel-trump-classified-docs-case-asks-judge/story?id=100347756&cid=social_twitter_abcn) to delay the start of the trial until December 2023.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which the prosecution in the first federal criminal trial of Donald J. Trump, related to his alleged unlawful retention of government documents and/or efforts to obstruct an investigation related to his retention of government documents, **begins its opening statement** to the jury (or, in the event of a bench trial, to the judge); or, in the event that the prosecution declines to make an opening statement after being invited to do so, the date on which the prosecution declines to make an opening statement.\n\nIf none of the above events occur before 1 January 2026, the question resolves as Not Before 1 January 2026.", "lower_25": "Oct 2024", "median": "Jun 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the most expensive AI training run will be 286 million USD in the following years?", "desc": "In June 2023, [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/) reports the most expensive training run to have been $40 million ([source, see p. 7](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18egmiHWx8fnWQExSOJcux0Us5zkAKPnh/view?usp=sharing)), their estimated cost for OpenAI's final training run of GPT-4. See Epoch's data points and trend [here](https://epochai.org/trends#investment-trends-section), where they report the most expensive training run has increased an average of 3.1x annually from 2009 to the present.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the value, in millions of 2023 USD, that [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/trends) reports as the most expensive training run, as of Dec 31 of that year (so inclusive of that year).\n\nIf Epoch AI no longer reports this value, and there is no other supremely reliable set of estimates, then subsequent subquestions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "286", "median": "444", "upper_75": "661", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the women's world record for a competitive marathon will not be below 2 hours by Jan 1, 2061?", "desc": "The men's world record for a competitive marathon is held at 2:01:09 by Eliud Kipchoge at the Berlin Marathon in [2022](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Berlin_Marathon). There is much discussion around when a runner in general will run a [sub two hour competitive marathon](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/16484/sub-2-hour-marathon/), but this question is specific to when a female athlete will achieve this feat. \n\nThe current women's world record is held at 2:14:04 by Brigid Kosgei at the Chicago Marathon in [2019](https://worldathletics.org/records/all-time-toplists/road-running/marathon/outdoor/women/senior?regionType=world&drop=regular&fiftyPercentRule=regular&page=1&bestResultsOnly=true&firstDay=1899-12-31&lastDay=2023-06-22).", "resc": "The question will resolve as the date of the first marathon with a time under 2:00:00, given that the associated world record is ratified by [World Athletics](https://worldathletics.org/) (or the commonly accepted successor to World Athletics), signified by a ratification press release.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2061", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2061", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2061", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the most expensive AI training run in the following years will be over 1 million USD, in percentage?", "desc": "In June 2023, [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/) reports the most expensive training run to have been $40 million ([source, see p. 7](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18egmiHWx8fnWQExSOJcux0Us5zkAKPnh/view?usp=sharing)), their estimated cost for OpenAI's final training run of GPT-4. See Epoch's data points and trend [here](https://epochai.org/trends#investment-trends-section), where they report the most expensive training run has increased an average of 3.1x annually from 2009 to the present.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the value, in millions of 2023 USD, that [Epoch AI](https://epochai.org/trends) reports as the most expensive training run, as of Dec 31 of that year (so inclusive of that year).\n\nIf Epoch AI no longer reports this value, and there is no other supremely reliable set of estimates, then subsequent subquestions will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "759", "median": "993", "upper_75": "> 1k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the women's world record for a competitive marathon will not be below 2 hours by Jan 1, 2061?", "desc": "The men's world record for a competitive marathon is held at 2:01:09 by Eliud Kipchoge at the Berlin Marathon in [2022](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Berlin_Marathon). There is much discussion around when a runner in general will run a [sub two hour competitive marathon](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/16484/sub-2-hour-marathon/), but this question is specific to when a female athlete will achieve this feat. \n\nThe current women's world record is held at 2:14:04 by Brigid Kosgei at the Chicago Marathon in [2019](https://worldathletics.org/records/all-time-toplists/road-running/marathon/outdoor/women/senior?regionType=world&drop=regular&fiftyPercentRule=regular&page=1&bestResultsOnly=true&firstDay=1899-12-31&lastDay=2023-06-22).", "resc": "The question will resolve as the date of the first marathon with a time under 2:00:00, given that the associated world record is ratified by [World Athletics](https://worldathletics.org/) (or the commonly accepted successor to World Athletics), signified by a ratification press release.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2061", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2061", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2061", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the federal criminal trial of Donald J. Trump (classified documents case) will not begin before January 2026?", "desc": "[United States v. Donald J. Trump and Waltine Nauta](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_prosecution_of_Donald_Trump) is a pending federal criminal case against Donald Trump, the 45th president of the United States, and his personal aide and valet, Waltine Nauta, on allegations that Trump improperly retained government documents after the end of his presidency, obstructed an investigation into that matter, and was involved in a related criminal conspiracy. Trump has [pleaded not guilty](https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/13/politics/trump-indictment-federal-court-appearance/index.html) to all of the charges against him in the case.\n\nIn mid-June 2023, US district judge Aileen Cannon [set an initial trial date](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/jun/20/trump-trial-date-set-august-retaining-documents-obstructing-justice) of 14 August in the case.\n\nLater that month, special counsel Jack Smith [asked the court](https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/special-counsel-trump-classified-docs-case-asks-judge/story?id=100347756&cid=social_twitter_abcn) to delay the start of the trial until December 2023.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which the prosecution in the first federal criminal trial of Donald J. Trump, related to his alleged unlawful retention of government documents and/or efforts to obstruct an investigation related to his retention of government documents, **begins its opening statement** to the jury (or, in the event of a bench trial, to the judge); or, in the event that the prosecution declines to make an opening statement after being invited to do so, the date on which the prosecution declines to make an opening statement.\n\nIf none of the above events occur before 1 January 2026, the question resolves as Not Before 1 January 2026.", "lower_25": "Oct 2024", "median": "Jun 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the women's world record for a competitive marathon will not be below 2 hours by Jan 1, 2061?", "desc": "The men's world record for a competitive marathon is held at 2:01:09 by Eliud Kipchoge at the Berlin Marathon in [2022](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Berlin_Marathon). There is much discussion around when a runner in general will run a [sub two hour competitive marathon](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/16484/sub-2-hour-marathon/), but this question is specific to when a female athlete will achieve this feat. \n\nThe current women's world record is held at 2:14:04 by Brigid Kosgei at the Chicago Marathon in [2019](https://worldathletics.org/records/all-time-toplists/road-running/marathon/outdoor/women/senior?regionType=world&drop=regular&fiftyPercentRule=regular&page=1&bestResultsOnly=true&firstDay=1899-12-31&lastDay=2023-06-22).", "resc": "The question will resolve as the date of the first marathon with a time under 2:00:00, given that the associated world record is ratified by [World Athletics](https://worldathletics.org/) (or the commonly accepted successor to World Athletics), signified by a ratification press release.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2061", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2061", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 1, 2061", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 3.62% on June 30, 2025?", "desc": "The [Federal Open Market Committee](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Open_Market_Committee) (FOMC) oversees [open market operations](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm) for the United States [Federal Reserve](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve). Open market operations include the buying and selling of securities to influence liquidity in financial markets. The FOMC meets eight times a year at [regularly scheduled meetings](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm). Periodically the FOMC will announce changes in the [federal funds rate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_funds_rate) at these meetings, which sets a target range for interest rates on reserves. The Federal Reserve Banks conduct open market operations to influence the effective federal funds rate to bring it within the target range.\n\nBelow is a graph of the upper limit of the federal funds target range, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis).\n", "resc": "This resolves as the upper limit of the target range at 11:59 PM ET on the listed date, [according to the FOMC](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm)", "lower_25": "2.92", "median": "3.62", "upper_75": "4.28", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 342.1 in the following months (Apr-24)?", "desc": "The S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index provides a measure of national home prices in the US. The [published methodology](https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/documents/methodologies/methodology-sp-corelogic-cs-home-price-indices.pdf) summarizes the methods as follows:\n\n>The S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller Home Price Indices are based on observed changes in home prices. They are designed to measure increases or decreases in the market value of residential real estate in 20 defined MSAs and three price tiers – low, middle, and high (see Tables 1 and 1a on the following pages). In contrast, the indices are, specifically, not intended to measure recovery costs after disasters, construction or repair costs, or other such related items.\n>\n>The indices are calculated monthly, using a three-month moving average algorithm. Home sales pairs are accumulated in rolling three-month periods, on which the repeat sales methodology is applied. The index point for each reporting month is based on sales pairs found for that month and the preceding two months. For example, the December 2005 index point is based on repeat sales data for October, November, and December of 2005. This averaging methodology is used to offset delays that can occur in the flow of sales price data from county deed recorders and to keep sample sizes large enough to create meaningful price change averages.\n\nBelow is a graph of the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the underlying source and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the value of the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published as shown on this [FRED chart](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPISA#0) (also provided in the background). The value will resolve to a precision of two decimal places", "lower_25": "314.5", "median": "328.4", "upper_75": "342.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 342.1 in the following months (Apr-24)?", "desc": "The S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index provides a measure of national home prices in the US. The [published methodology](https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/documents/methodologies/methodology-sp-corelogic-cs-home-price-indices.pdf) summarizes the methods as follows:\n\n>The S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller Home Price Indices are based on observed changes in home prices. They are designed to measure increases or decreases in the market value of residential real estate in 20 defined MSAs and three price tiers – low, middle, and high (see Tables 1 and 1a on the following pages). In contrast, the indices are, specifically, not intended to measure recovery costs after disasters, construction or repair costs, or other such related items.\n>\n>The indices are calculated monthly, using a three-month moving average algorithm. Home sales pairs are accumulated in rolling three-month periods, on which the repeat sales methodology is applied. The index point for each reporting month is based on sales pairs found for that month and the preceding two months. For example, the December 2005 index point is based on repeat sales data for October, November, and December of 2005. This averaging methodology is used to offset delays that can occur in the flow of sales price data from county deed recorders and to keep sample sizes large enough to create meaningful price change averages.\n\nBelow is a graph of the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the underlying source and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the value of the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published as shown on this [FRED chart](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPISA#0) (also provided in the background). The value will resolve to a precision of two decimal places", "lower_25": "314.5", "median": "328.4", "upper_75": "342.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 3.62% on June 30, 2025?", "desc": "The [Federal Open Market Committee](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Open_Market_Committee) (FOMC) oversees [open market operations](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm) for the United States [Federal Reserve](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve). Open market operations include the buying and selling of securities to influence liquidity in financial markets. The FOMC meets eight times a year at [regularly scheduled meetings](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm). Periodically the FOMC will announce changes in the [federal funds rate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_funds_rate) at these meetings, which sets a target range for interest rates on reserves. The Federal Reserve Banks conduct open market operations to influence the effective federal funds rate to bring it within the target range.\n\nBelow is a graph of the upper limit of the federal funds target range, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis).\n", "resc": "This resolves as the upper limit of the target range at 11:59 PM ET on the listed date, [according to the FOMC](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm)", "lower_25": "2.92", "median": "3.62", "upper_75": "4.28", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 342.1 in the following months (Apr-24)?", "desc": "The S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index provides a measure of national home prices in the US. The [published methodology](https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/documents/methodologies/methodology-sp-corelogic-cs-home-price-indices.pdf) summarizes the methods as follows:\n\n>The S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller Home Price Indices are based on observed changes in home prices. They are designed to measure increases or decreases in the market value of residential real estate in 20 defined MSAs and three price tiers – low, middle, and high (see Tables 1 and 1a on the following pages). In contrast, the indices are, specifically, not intended to measure recovery costs after disasters, construction or repair costs, or other such related items.\n>\n>The indices are calculated monthly, using a three-month moving average algorithm. Home sales pairs are accumulated in rolling three-month periods, on which the repeat sales methodology is applied. The index point for each reporting month is based on sales pairs found for that month and the preceding two months. For example, the December 2005 index point is based on repeat sales data for October, November, and December of 2005. This averaging methodology is used to offset delays that can occur in the flow of sales price data from county deed recorders and to keep sample sizes large enough to create meaningful price change averages.\n\nBelow is a graph of the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the underlying source and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the value of the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published as shown on this [FRED chart](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CSUSHPISA#0) (also provided in the background). The value will resolve to a precision of two decimal places", "lower_25": "314.5", "median": "328.4", "upper_75": "342.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the federal criminal trial of Donald J. Trump (classified documents case) will not begin before January 2026?", "desc": "[United States v. Donald J. Trump and Waltine Nauta](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_prosecution_of_Donald_Trump) is a pending federal criminal case against Donald Trump, the 45th president of the United States, and his personal aide and valet, Waltine Nauta, on allegations that Trump improperly retained government documents after the end of his presidency, obstructed an investigation into that matter, and was involved in a related criminal conspiracy. Trump has [pleaded not guilty](https://edition.cnn.com/2023/06/13/politics/trump-indictment-federal-court-appearance/index.html) to all of the charges against him in the case.\n\nIn mid-June 2023, US district judge Aileen Cannon [set an initial trial date](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/jun/20/trump-trial-date-set-august-retaining-documents-obstructing-justice) of 14 August in the case.\n\nLater that month, special counsel Jack Smith [asked the court](https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/special-counsel-trump-classified-docs-case-asks-judge/story?id=100347756&cid=social_twitter_abcn) to delay the start of the trial until December 2023.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which the prosecution in the first federal criminal trial of Donald J. Trump, related to his alleged unlawful retention of government documents and/or efforts to obstruct an investigation related to his retention of government documents, **begins its opening statement** to the jury (or, in the event of a bench trial, to the judge); or, in the event that the prosecution declines to make an opening statement after being invited to do so, the date on which the prosecution declines to make an opening statement.\n\nIf none of the above events occur before 1 January 2026, the question resolves as Not Before 1 January 2026.", "lower_25": "Oct 2024", "median": "Jun 2025", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the exchange rate for the Swedish Krona (SEK) to the US Dollar (USD) will be 11.5 on June 30, 2024?", "desc": "10 years ago, one US Dollar (USD) cost 6,67 Swedish Krona (SEK). Today, June 26 2023, it costs 11,1 SEK. Several academic studies have tried to explain the declining value of SEK using established theories, but come to the conclusion that the SEK is increasingly undervalued during the last 10 years.\n\nIn 2021 the currency experts Philippe Bacchetta and Pauline Chikhani published [\"On the weakness of the Swedish krona\"](https://www.riksbank.se/globalassets/media/rapporter/pov/artiklar/engelska/2021/210319/2021_1-on-the-weakness-of-the-swedish-krona_er.pdf) (Comissioned by The Swedish Riksbank)\n\nBacchetta is Swiss Finance Institute Professor of Macroeconomics at the University of Lausanne, and Program Director of the International Macroeconomics and Finance program of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR, London). Chikhani is a doctoral student at the University of Lausanne.\n\nIn 2019 Christos Papahristodoulou published \"Is There Any Theory that Explains the Swedish Krona (SEK)?\" (Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, ISSN 2393-5162, Vol. XIV, nr 3(65), s. 760-782)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the price of one US Dollar (USD) in Swedish Kronas (SEK) on June 30 2024, 13.00, as published on the cross-rate website of the Swedish Riksbank [National Bank](https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/statistics/search-interest--exchange-rates/cross-rates)", "lower_25": "10.1", "median": "10.8", "upper_75": "11.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the exchange rate for the Swedish Krona (SEK) to the US Dollar (USD) will be 11.5 on June 30, 2024?", "desc": "10 years ago, one US Dollar (USD) cost 6,67 Swedish Krona (SEK). Today, June 26 2023, it costs 11,1 SEK. Several academic studies have tried to explain the declining value of SEK using established theories, but come to the conclusion that the SEK is increasingly undervalued during the last 10 years.\n\nIn 2021 the currency experts Philippe Bacchetta and Pauline Chikhani published [\"On the weakness of the Swedish krona\"](https://www.riksbank.se/globalassets/media/rapporter/pov/artiklar/engelska/2021/210319/2021_1-on-the-weakness-of-the-swedish-krona_er.pdf) (Comissioned by The Swedish Riksbank)\n\nBacchetta is Swiss Finance Institute Professor of Macroeconomics at the University of Lausanne, and Program Director of the International Macroeconomics and Finance program of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR, London). Chikhani is a doctoral student at the University of Lausanne.\n\nIn 2019 Christos Papahristodoulou published \"Is There Any Theory that Explains the Swedish Krona (SEK)?\" (Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, ISSN 2393-5162, Vol. XIV, nr 3(65), s. 760-782)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the price of one US Dollar (USD) in Swedish Kronas (SEK) on June 30 2024, 13.00, as published on the cross-rate website of the Swedish Riksbank [National Bank](https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/statistics/search-interest--exchange-rates/cross-rates)", "lower_25": "10.1", "median": "10.8", "upper_75": "11.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 3.62% on June 30, 2025?", "desc": "The [Federal Open Market Committee](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Open_Market_Committee) (FOMC) oversees [open market operations](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm) for the United States [Federal Reserve](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve). Open market operations include the buying and selling of securities to influence liquidity in financial markets. The FOMC meets eight times a year at [regularly scheduled meetings](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm). Periodically the FOMC will announce changes in the [federal funds rate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_funds_rate) at these meetings, which sets a target range for interest rates on reserves. The Federal Reserve Banks conduct open market operations to influence the effective federal funds rate to bring it within the target range.\n\nBelow is a graph of the upper limit of the federal funds target range, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis).\n", "resc": "This resolves as the upper limit of the target range at 11:59 PM ET on the listed date, [according to the FOMC](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm)", "lower_25": "2.92", "median": "3.62", "upper_75": "4.28", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the exchange rate for the Swedish Krona (SEK) to the US Dollar (USD) will be 11.5 on June 30, 2024?", "desc": "10 years ago, one US Dollar (USD) cost 6,67 Swedish Krona (SEK). Today, June 26 2023, it costs 11,1 SEK. Several academic studies have tried to explain the declining value of SEK using established theories, but come to the conclusion that the SEK is increasingly undervalued during the last 10 years.\n\nIn 2021 the currency experts Philippe Bacchetta and Pauline Chikhani published [\"On the weakness of the Swedish krona\"](https://www.riksbank.se/globalassets/media/rapporter/pov/artiklar/engelska/2021/210319/2021_1-on-the-weakness-of-the-swedish-krona_er.pdf) (Comissioned by The Swedish Riksbank)\n\nBacchetta is Swiss Finance Institute Professor of Macroeconomics at the University of Lausanne, and Program Director of the International Macroeconomics and Finance program of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR, London). Chikhani is a doctoral student at the University of Lausanne.\n\nIn 2019 Christos Papahristodoulou published \"Is There Any Theory that Explains the Swedish Krona (SEK)?\" (Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, ISSN 2393-5162, Vol. XIV, nr 3(65), s. 760-782)", "resc": "This question will resolve as the price of one US Dollar (USD) in Swedish Kronas (SEK) on June 30 2024, 13.00, as published on the cross-rate website of the Swedish Riksbank [National Bank](https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/statistics/search-interest--exchange-rates/cross-rates)", "lower_25": "10.1", "median": "10.8", "upper_75": "11.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Utility Fog will be a commercial product available to consumers in the United States by 2040?", "desc": "According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utility_fog), Utility Fog is \"is a hypothetical collection of tiny nanobots that can replicate a physical structure.\"\n\nThe specs for Utility Fog can be found at: [Utility Fog: The Stuff that Dreams Are Made Of](https://www.thekurzweillibrary.com/utility-fog-the-stuff-that-dreams-are-made-of).\n\nWe can think of [smartdust](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smartdust) as a precursor of Utility Fog. Dust Networks was a company that worked towards making smartdust a reality but didn't get there.", "resc": "This question resolves as Yes when any of the following occurs:\n\n- There's a company that has a commercially available product in the United States that meets or exceeds [Utility Fog specifications](https://www.thekurzweillibrary.com/utility-fog-the-stuff-that-dreams-are-made-of).\n\n- The Federal Trade Commission, or another widely recognised regulatory body, approves a product that meets or exceeds the Utility Fog specifications.\n\n- The IEEE Spectrum magazine reports that a company has made Utility Fog available to consumers in the United States.", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2060", "upper_75": "2097", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Utility Fog will be a commercial product available to consumers in the United States by 2040?", "desc": "According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utility_fog), Utility Fog is \"is a hypothetical collection of tiny nanobots that can replicate a physical structure.\"\n\nThe specs for Utility Fog can be found at: [Utility Fog: The Stuff that Dreams Are Made Of](https://www.thekurzweillibrary.com/utility-fog-the-stuff-that-dreams-are-made-of).\n\nWe can think of [smartdust](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smartdust) as a precursor of Utility Fog. Dust Networks was a company that worked towards making smartdust a reality but didn't get there.", "resc": "This question resolves as Yes when any of the following occurs:\n\n- There's a company that has a commercially available product in the United States that meets or exceeds [Utility Fog specifications](https://www.thekurzweillibrary.com/utility-fog-the-stuff-that-dreams-are-made-of).\n\n- The Federal Trade Commission, or another widely recognised regulatory body, approves a product that meets or exceeds the Utility Fog specifications.\n\n- The IEEE Spectrum magazine reports that a company has made Utility Fog available to consumers in the United States.", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2060", "upper_75": "2097", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 39.8 gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2050?", "desc": "At the Paris climate conference (COP21) in December 2015, 195 countries adopted the first-ever universal, legally binding global climate deal. One of the key elements of the Paris agreement is global average temperature targeting: \n\n> Governments agreed to reduce emissions: with a long-term goal of keeping the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to aim to limit the increase to 1.5°C, since this would significantly reduce risks and the impacts of climate change.\n\nThe annual [UN Environment Emissions Gap Report](https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018) presents an assessment of current national mitigation efforts and the ambitions countries have presented in their Nationally Determined Contributions, which form the foundation of the Paris Agreement. It also identifies the trajectory of annual greenhouse gas emissions consistent with achieving the mean global average temperature levels targeted by the Paris Agreement.\n\nAccording to [its 2018 scenario estimates](https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/26895/EGR2018_FullReport_EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y), the trajectory required to achieve the 2°C target with a 66% chance is one in which emissions of all GHGs should not exceed 40 (range 38–45) gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent (GtCO₂e) in the year 2030. It provides a snapshots for the year 2030 of the relevant abatement paths:\n\n- 40 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 38–45) emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 2.0°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance)\n- 34 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 30–40) emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 1.8°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance) \n- 24 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 22–30) emitted in 2030 emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 1.5°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance)", "resc": "----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the amount of global GHG emissions in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent emitted in the 2050 calendar year, according to credible estimates, such as those reported by the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.GHGT.KT.CE). Other sources of data on global emissions may be used, provided it estimates are <25% removed from those displayed by the World Bank for the 2009 to 2012 period.\n\n**Data**\n\nWorld Bank data can be [accessed here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1j7vBfP8CD1Q_MIHqW_AxTgRlC2ThS0pxhthhuDDp4ZI/edit?usp=sharing). Please make a copy by clicking \"file\" and then \"make a copy\" if you wish to edit it. If you make useful additions to the dataset, please share the file in the comments.\n\n----\n*Carbon dioxide equivalency (CO₂e) describes, for a given mixture and amount of greenhouse gases, the amount of CO2 that would have the same global warming ability, when measured over a specified time period. For our purposes, greenhouse gas emissions are the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, expressed as CO2e assuming a 100-year global warming potential", "lower_25": "18.5", "median": "28.6", "upper_75": "39.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 39.8 gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2050?", "desc": "At the Paris climate conference (COP21) in December 2015, 195 countries adopted the first-ever universal, legally binding global climate deal. One of the key elements of the Paris agreement is global average temperature targeting: \n\n> Governments agreed to reduce emissions: with a long-term goal of keeping the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to aim to limit the increase to 1.5°C, since this would significantly reduce risks and the impacts of climate change.\n\nThe annual [UN Environment Emissions Gap Report](https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018) presents an assessment of current national mitigation efforts and the ambitions countries have presented in their Nationally Determined Contributions, which form the foundation of the Paris Agreement. It also identifies the trajectory of annual greenhouse gas emissions consistent with achieving the mean global average temperature levels targeted by the Paris Agreement.\n\nAccording to [its 2018 scenario estimates](https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/26895/EGR2018_FullReport_EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y), the trajectory required to achieve the 2°C target with a 66% chance is one in which emissions of all GHGs should not exceed 40 (range 38–45) gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent (GtCO₂e) in the year 2030. It provides a snapshots for the year 2030 of the relevant abatement paths:\n\n- 40 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 38–45) emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 2.0°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance)\n- 34 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 30–40) emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 1.8°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance) \n- 24 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 22–30) emitted in 2030 emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 1.5°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance)", "resc": "----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the amount of global GHG emissions in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent emitted in the 2050 calendar year, according to credible estimates, such as those reported by the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.GHGT.KT.CE). Other sources of data on global emissions may be used, provided it estimates are <25% removed from those displayed by the World Bank for the 2009 to 2012 period.\n\n**Data**\n\nWorld Bank data can be [accessed here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1j7vBfP8CD1Q_MIHqW_AxTgRlC2ThS0pxhthhuDDp4ZI/edit?usp=sharing). Please make a copy by clicking \"file\" and then \"make a copy\" if you wish to edit it. If you make useful additions to the dataset, please share the file in the comments.\n\n----\n*Carbon dioxide equivalency (CO₂e) describes, for a given mixture and amount of greenhouse gases, the amount of CO2 that would have the same global warming ability, when measured over a specified time period. For our purposes, greenhouse gas emissions are the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, expressed as CO2e assuming a 100-year global warming potential", "lower_25": "18.5", "median": "28.6", "upper_75": "39.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 20.9 gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2100?", "desc": "At the Paris climate conference (COP21) in December 2015, 195 countries adopted the first-ever universal, legally binding global climate deal. One of the key elements of the Paris agreement is global average temperature targeting: \n\n> Governments agreed to reduce emissions: with a long-term goal of keeping the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to aim to limit the increase to 1.5°C, since this would significantly reduce risks and the impacts of climate change.\n\nThe annual [UN Environment Emissions Gap Report](https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018) presents an assessment of current national mitigation efforts and the ambitions countries have presented in their Nationally Determined Contributions, which form the foundation of the Paris Agreement. It also identifies the trajectory of annual greenhouse gas emissions consistent with achieving the mean global average temperature levels targeted by the Paris Agreement.\n\nAccording to [its 2018 scenario estimates](https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/26895/EGR2018_FullReport_EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y), the trajectory required to achieve the 2°C target with a 66% chance is one in which emissions of all GHGs should not exceed 40 (range 38–45) gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent (GtCO₂e) in the year 2030. It provides a snapshots for the year 2030 of the relevant abatement paths:\n\n- 40 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 38–45) emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 2.0°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance)\n- 34 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 30–40) emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 1.8°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance) \n- 24 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 22–30) emitted in 2030 emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 1.5°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance)", "resc": "----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the amount of global GHG emissions in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent emitted in the 2100 calendar year, according to credible estimates, such as those reported by the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.GHGT.KT.CE). Other sources of data on global emissions may be used, provided it estimates are <25% removed from those displayed by the World Bank for the 2009 to 2012 period.\n\n**Data**\n\nWorld Bank data can be [accessed here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1j7vBfP8CD1Q_MIHqW_AxTgRlC2ThS0pxhthhuDDp4ZI/edit?usp=sharing). Please make a copy by clicking \"file\" and then \"make a copy\" if you wish to edit it. If you make useful additions to the dataset, please share the file in the comments.\n\n----\n*Carbon dioxide equivalency (CO₂e) describes, for a given mixture and amount of greenhouse gases, the amount of CO2 that would have the same global warming ability, when measured over a specified time period. For our purposes, greenhouse gas emissions are the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, expressed as CO2e assuming a 100-year global warming potential", "lower_25": "4.89", "median": "11.5", "upper_75": "20.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Utility Fog will be a commercial product available to consumers in the United States by 2040?", "desc": "According to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utility_fog), Utility Fog is \"is a hypothetical collection of tiny nanobots that can replicate a physical structure.\"\n\nThe specs for Utility Fog can be found at: [Utility Fog: The Stuff that Dreams Are Made Of](https://www.thekurzweillibrary.com/utility-fog-the-stuff-that-dreams-are-made-of).\n\nWe can think of [smartdust](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smartdust) as a precursor of Utility Fog. Dust Networks was a company that worked towards making smartdust a reality but didn't get there.", "resc": "This question resolves as Yes when any of the following occurs:\n\n- There's a company that has a commercially available product in the United States that meets or exceeds [Utility Fog specifications](https://www.thekurzweillibrary.com/utility-fog-the-stuff-that-dreams-are-made-of).\n\n- The Federal Trade Commission, or another widely recognised regulatory body, approves a product that meets or exceeds the Utility Fog specifications.\n\n- The IEEE Spectrum magazine reports that a company has made Utility Fog available to consumers in the United States.", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2060", "upper_75": "2097", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 39.8 gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2050?", "desc": "At the Paris climate conference (COP21) in December 2015, 195 countries adopted the first-ever universal, legally binding global climate deal. One of the key elements of the Paris agreement is global average temperature targeting: \n\n> Governments agreed to reduce emissions: with a long-term goal of keeping the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to aim to limit the increase to 1.5°C, since this would significantly reduce risks and the impacts of climate change.\n\nThe annual [UN Environment Emissions Gap Report](https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018) presents an assessment of current national mitigation efforts and the ambitions countries have presented in their Nationally Determined Contributions, which form the foundation of the Paris Agreement. It also identifies the trajectory of annual greenhouse gas emissions consistent with achieving the mean global average temperature levels targeted by the Paris Agreement.\n\nAccording to [its 2018 scenario estimates](https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/26895/EGR2018_FullReport_EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y), the trajectory required to achieve the 2°C target with a 66% chance is one in which emissions of all GHGs should not exceed 40 (range 38–45) gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent (GtCO₂e) in the year 2030. It provides a snapshots for the year 2030 of the relevant abatement paths:\n\n- 40 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 38–45) emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 2.0°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance)\n- 34 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 30–40) emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 1.8°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance) \n- 24 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 22–30) emitted in 2030 emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 1.5°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance)", "resc": "----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the amount of global GHG emissions in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent emitted in the 2050 calendar year, according to credible estimates, such as those reported by the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.GHGT.KT.CE). Other sources of data on global emissions may be used, provided it estimates are <25% removed from those displayed by the World Bank for the 2009 to 2012 period.\n\n**Data**\n\nWorld Bank data can be [accessed here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1j7vBfP8CD1Q_MIHqW_AxTgRlC2ThS0pxhthhuDDp4ZI/edit?usp=sharing). Please make a copy by clicking \"file\" and then \"make a copy\" if you wish to edit it. If you make useful additions to the dataset, please share the file in the comments.\n\n----\n*Carbon dioxide equivalency (CO₂e) describes, for a given mixture and amount of greenhouse gases, the amount of CO2 that would have the same global warming ability, when measured over a specified time period. For our purposes, greenhouse gas emissions are the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, expressed as CO2e assuming a 100-year global warming potential", "lower_25": "18.5", "median": "28.6", "upper_75": "39.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 20.9 gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2100?", "desc": "At the Paris climate conference (COP21) in December 2015, 195 countries adopted the first-ever universal, legally binding global climate deal. One of the key elements of the Paris agreement is global average temperature targeting: \n\n> Governments agreed to reduce emissions: with a long-term goal of keeping the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to aim to limit the increase to 1.5°C, since this would significantly reduce risks and the impacts of climate change.\n\nThe annual [UN Environment Emissions Gap Report](https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018) presents an assessment of current national mitigation efforts and the ambitions countries have presented in their Nationally Determined Contributions, which form the foundation of the Paris Agreement. It also identifies the trajectory of annual greenhouse gas emissions consistent with achieving the mean global average temperature levels targeted by the Paris Agreement.\n\nAccording to [its 2018 scenario estimates](https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/26895/EGR2018_FullReport_EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y), the trajectory required to achieve the 2°C target with a 66% chance is one in which emissions of all GHGs should not exceed 40 (range 38–45) gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent (GtCO₂e) in the year 2030. It provides a snapshots for the year 2030 of the relevant abatement paths:\n\n- 40 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 38–45) emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 2.0°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance)\n- 34 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 30–40) emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 1.8°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance) \n- 24 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 22–30) emitted in 2030 emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 1.5°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance)", "resc": "----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the amount of global GHG emissions in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent emitted in the 2100 calendar year, according to credible estimates, such as those reported by the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.GHGT.KT.CE). Other sources of data on global emissions may be used, provided it estimates are <25% removed from those displayed by the World Bank for the 2009 to 2012 period.\n\n**Data**\n\nWorld Bank data can be [accessed here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1j7vBfP8CD1Q_MIHqW_AxTgRlC2ThS0pxhthhuDDp4ZI/edit?usp=sharing). Please make a copy by clicking \"file\" and then \"make a copy\" if you wish to edit it. If you make useful additions to the dataset, please share the file in the comments.\n\n----\n*Carbon dioxide equivalency (CO₂e) describes, for a given mixture and amount of greenhouse gases, the amount of CO2 that would have the same global warming ability, when measured over a specified time period. For our purposes, greenhouse gas emissions are the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, expressed as CO2e assuming a 100-year global warming potential", "lower_25": "4.89", "median": "11.5", "upper_75": "20.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 20.9 gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent greenhouse gas will be emitted globally in 2100?", "desc": "At the Paris climate conference (COP21) in December 2015, 195 countries adopted the first-ever universal, legally binding global climate deal. One of the key elements of the Paris agreement is global average temperature targeting: \n\n> Governments agreed to reduce emissions: with a long-term goal of keeping the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to aim to limit the increase to 1.5°C, since this would significantly reduce risks and the impacts of climate change.\n\nThe annual [UN Environment Emissions Gap Report](https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2018) presents an assessment of current national mitigation efforts and the ambitions countries have presented in their Nationally Determined Contributions, which form the foundation of the Paris Agreement. It also identifies the trajectory of annual greenhouse gas emissions consistent with achieving the mean global average temperature levels targeted by the Paris Agreement.\n\nAccording to [its 2018 scenario estimates](https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/26895/EGR2018_FullReport_EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y), the trajectory required to achieve the 2°C target with a 66% chance is one in which emissions of all GHGs should not exceed 40 (range 38–45) gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent (GtCO₂e) in the year 2030. It provides a snapshots for the year 2030 of the relevant abatement paths:\n\n- 40 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 38–45) emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 2.0°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance)\n- 34 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 30–40) emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 1.8°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance) \n- 24 GtCO₂e (90% CI: 22–30) emitted in 2030 emitted in 2030 is consistent with path that achieves below 1.5°C temperature rise in 2100 (66% chance)", "resc": "----\n\n**Resolution**\n\nThis question resolves as the amount of global GHG emissions in gigatonnes of CO₂ equivalent emitted in the 2100 calendar year, according to credible estimates, such as those reported by the [World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.GHGT.KT.CE). Other sources of data on global emissions may be used, provided it estimates are <25% removed from those displayed by the World Bank for the 2009 to 2012 period.\n\n**Data**\n\nWorld Bank data can be [accessed here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1j7vBfP8CD1Q_MIHqW_AxTgRlC2ThS0pxhthhuDDp4ZI/edit?usp=sharing). Please make a copy by clicking \"file\" and then \"make a copy\" if you wish to edit it. If you make useful additions to the dataset, please share the file in the comments.\n\n----\n*Carbon dioxide equivalency (CO₂e) describes, for a given mixture and amount of greenhouse gases, the amount of CO2 that would have the same global warming ability, when measured over a specified time period. For our purposes, greenhouse gas emissions are the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases listed in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, expressed as CO2e assuming a 100-year global warming potential", "lower_25": "4.89", "median": "11.5", "upper_75": "20.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that President Joe Biden's net approval rating will be 50% lower than it is now on November 1, 2024?", "desc": "[Joseph Robinette Biden Jr.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_Biden), born November 20, 1942, is an American politician who is the 46th and current president of the United States. Biden is seeking re-election in [the 60th quadrennial presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election), which is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024.\n\nFiveThirtyEight.com maintains a page tracking Biden's approval rating: '[How popular is Joe Biden?](https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/biden-approval-rating/)'. This page is described as providing 'An updating calculation of the president's approval rating, accounting for each poll's recency, sample size, methodology and house effects.'\n\nAs of July 7 2023, the tracker indicates that according to its methodology, 40.5% approve and 54.2% disapprove, giving a net approval of -13.7% for President Biden.", "resc": "This question will resolve as President Biden's net approval (percentage approving minus percentage disapproving) rating according to the FiveThirtyEight approval rating tracker as of 12:00 PM ET on November 1, 2024, conditional on Biden holding the office of President of the United States at that time.\n\nIf Biden is not President at that time, or if FiveThirtyEight no longer maintains a page that tracks Biden's approval rating, this question shall be annulled.", "lower_25": "−15.1", "median": "−11.3", "upper_75": "−7.37", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 125k change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment from June 2024 to the end of the year?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the change in [nonfarm payroll employment](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nonfarmpayroll.asp) in the United States. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its nonfarm payroll estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally change in nonfarm payrolls, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm).", "lower_25": "45.1k", "median": "125k", "upper_75": "210k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 212k change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment in the following months (May-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the change in [nonfarm payroll employment](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nonfarmpayroll.asp) in the United States. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its nonfarm payroll estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally change in nonfarm payrolls, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm).", "lower_25": "75.4k", "median": "143k", "upper_75": "212k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 212k change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment in the following months (May-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the change in [nonfarm payroll employment](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nonfarmpayroll.asp) in the United States. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its nonfarm payroll estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally change in nonfarm payrolls, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm).", "lower_25": "75.4k", "median": "143k", "upper_75": "212k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Russia's Democracy Index will be 3.23 in the 2030 report by the Economist Intelligence Unit?", "desc": "The Democracy Index is an index compiled by the [Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)](https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/) that aims to measure the state of democracy in 167 countries, of which 166 are sovereign states and 164 are UN member states. The index ranges from 0 - 10 for countries, where 0 theoretically represents an autocracy with no democratic freedoms, and 10 represents a perfect democracy. There are also four categories a nation may be placed under depending on its score: authoritarian regime (0-4), hybrid regime (4-6), flawed democracy (6-8), and full democracy (8-10).\n\nRussia, the world's largest country by land area, has been ruled by President Vladimir Putin since 2000. In recent years, Russia has faced criticism for its crackdown on free speech, civil liberties, and political opposition. As of the [2022 Democracy Index by the EIU](https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/), Russia had an overall score of 2.28, making it an authoritarian regime.", "resc": "The question will resolve as the Democracy Index score for Russia in the 2030 Democracy Index published by the Economist Intelligence Unit.", "lower_25": "1.56", "median": "2.28", "upper_75": "3.23", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Russia's Democracy Index will be 3.23 in the 2030 report by the Economist Intelligence Unit?", "desc": "The Democracy Index is an index compiled by the [Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)](https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/) that aims to measure the state of democracy in 167 countries, of which 166 are sovereign states and 164 are UN member states. The index ranges from 0 - 10 for countries, where 0 theoretically represents an autocracy with no democratic freedoms, and 10 represents a perfect democracy. There are also four categories a nation may be placed under depending on its score: authoritarian regime (0-4), hybrid regime (4-6), flawed democracy (6-8), and full democracy (8-10).\n\nRussia, the world's largest country by land area, has been ruled by President Vladimir Putin since 2000. In recent years, Russia has faced criticism for its crackdown on free speech, civil liberties, and political opposition. As of the [2022 Democracy Index by the EIU](https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/), Russia had an overall score of 2.28, making it an authoritarian regime.", "resc": "The question will resolve as the Democracy Index score for Russia in the 2030 Democracy Index published by the Economist Intelligence Unit.", "lower_25": "1.56", "median": "2.28", "upper_75": "3.23", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 125k change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment from June 2024 to the end of the year?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the change in [nonfarm payroll employment](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nonfarmpayroll.asp) in the United States. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its nonfarm payroll estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally change in nonfarm payrolls, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm).", "lower_25": "45.1k", "median": "125k", "upper_75": "210k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that President Joe Biden's net approval rating will be 50% lower than it is now on November 1, 2024?", "desc": "[Joseph Robinette Biden Jr.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_Biden), born November 20, 1942, is an American politician who is the 46th and current president of the United States. Biden is seeking re-election in [the 60th quadrennial presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election), which is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024.\n\nFiveThirtyEight.com maintains a page tracking Biden's approval rating: '[How popular is Joe Biden?](https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/biden-approval-rating/)'. This page is described as providing 'An updating calculation of the president's approval rating, accounting for each poll's recency, sample size, methodology and house effects.'\n\nAs of July 7 2023, the tracker indicates that according to its methodology, 40.5% approve and 54.2% disapprove, giving a net approval of -13.7% for President Biden.", "resc": "This question will resolve as President Biden's net approval (percentage approving minus percentage disapproving) rating according to the FiveThirtyEight approval rating tracker as of 12:00 PM ET on November 1, 2024, conditional on Biden holding the office of President of the United States at that time.\n\nIf Biden is not President at that time, or if FiveThirtyEight no longer maintains a page that tracks Biden's approval rating, this question shall be annulled.", "lower_25": "−15.1", "median": "−11.3", "upper_75": "−7.37", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that President Joe Biden's net approval rating will be 50% lower than it is now on November 1, 2024?", "desc": "[Joseph Robinette Biden Jr.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joe_Biden), born November 20, 1942, is an American politician who is the 46th and current president of the United States. Biden is seeking re-election in [the 60th quadrennial presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election), which is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024.\n\nFiveThirtyEight.com maintains a page tracking Biden's approval rating: '[How popular is Joe Biden?](https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/biden-approval-rating/)'. This page is described as providing 'An updating calculation of the president's approval rating, accounting for each poll's recency, sample size, methodology and house effects.'\n\nAs of July 7 2023, the tracker indicates that according to its methodology, 40.5% approve and 54.2% disapprove, giving a net approval of -13.7% for President Biden.", "resc": "This question will resolve as President Biden's net approval (percentage approving minus percentage disapproving) rating according to the FiveThirtyEight approval rating tracker as of 12:00 PM ET on November 1, 2024, conditional on Biden holding the office of President of the United States at that time.\n\nIf Biden is not President at that time, or if FiveThirtyEight no longer maintains a page that tracks Biden's approval rating, this question shall be annulled.", "lower_25": "−15.1", "median": "−11.3", "upper_75": "−7.37", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 212k change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment in the following months (May-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the change in [nonfarm payroll employment](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nonfarmpayroll.asp) in the United States. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its nonfarm payroll estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally change in nonfarm payrolls, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm).", "lower_25": "75.4k", "median": "143k", "upper_75": "212k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Russia's Democracy Index will be 3.23 in the 2030 report by the Economist Intelligence Unit?", "desc": "The Democracy Index is an index compiled by the [Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)](https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/) that aims to measure the state of democracy in 167 countries, of which 166 are sovereign states and 164 are UN member states. The index ranges from 0 - 10 for countries, where 0 theoretically represents an autocracy with no democratic freedoms, and 10 represents a perfect democracy. There are also four categories a nation may be placed under depending on its score: authoritarian regime (0-4), hybrid regime (4-6), flawed democracy (6-8), and full democracy (8-10).\n\nRussia, the world's largest country by land area, has been ruled by President Vladimir Putin since 2000. In recent years, Russia has faced criticism for its crackdown on free speech, civil liberties, and political opposition. As of the [2022 Democracy Index by the EIU](https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/), Russia had an overall score of 2.28, making it an authoritarian regime.", "resc": "The question will resolve as the Democracy Index score for Russia in the 2030 Democracy Index published by the Economist Intelligence Unit.", "lower_25": "1.56", "median": "2.28", "upper_75": "3.23", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If Sahra Wagenknecht founds a new party, what is the chance that this party will get 8.92% of the votes in the next German federal elections?", "desc": "[Sahra Wagenknecht](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahra_Wagenknecht) (born 1969 in then East Germany) is a German politician of the party Die Linke (The Left) and member of the Bundestag. \n\nWhile formerly well known for her far-left positions on economic policy and being a member of the party's communist platform, a membership which she suspended in 2010, Sahra Wagenknecht has in recent years received lots of media attention for her conservative stances on several issues:\nWagenknecht opposes the German policy on refugees and immigration, demanding that the number of immigrants be limited. She favours peace talks with Russia over weapon deliveries to Ukraine.\nAfter the publication of her book \"The Self-Righteous\", in which she criticises the \"lifestyle left\" for its focus on identity politics and neglecting workers' interests, some members of The Left demanded she be thrown out of the party, but an internal party commission decided otherwise.\n\nIn March 2023, Wagenknecht announced that she would not run again for The Left and has publicly contemplated founding a new party, stating that she would reach a decision on that matter until the end of 2023, which prompted the party leadership to demand her resignation ([source](https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-left-party-declares-figurehead-persona-non-grata-sahra-wagenknecht-plunges-crisis/)).\n\nIn polls, she often has favorable approval rankings, with German newspaper Focus [reporting](https://www.focus.de/magazin/archiv/parteigruendung-wagenknecht-partei-haette-potenzial-von-19-prozent_id_187583689.html) that 19% of voters would consider voting for her potential new party. However, historically most new parties in Germany have failed to gain traction as well as Wagenknecht's previous attempt to found a left-wing [cross-party movement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aufstehen) in 2019, hence this question.", "resc": "This question this resolves as the share of second quotes (which determines what fraction of the seats in parliament a party receives) a party founded by Sahra Wagenknecht will receive in the [next German federal election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_German_federal_election), which will be held on or before 26 October 2025. If Sahra Wagenknecht does not found a new party or said party dissolves again, this question will resolve as ambiguous.", "lower_25": "4.24", "median": "6.67", "upper_75": "8.92", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the following countries will have open borders with all Schengen Area members by Nov 2026?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Aug 2024", "median": "Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Nov 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the following countries will have open borders with all Schengen Area members by Nov 2026?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Aug 2024", "median": "Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Nov 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 125k change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment from June 2024 to the end of the year?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the change in [nonfarm payroll employment](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nonfarmpayroll.asp) in the United States. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its nonfarm payroll estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally change in nonfarm payrolls, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm).", "lower_25": "45.1k", "median": "125k", "upper_75": "210k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Romania will have open borders with all Schengen Area members by Nov 2026?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Aug 2024", "median": "Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Nov 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the following countries will have open borders with all Schengen Area members by Nov 2026?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Aug 2024", "median": "Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Nov 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If Sahra Wagenknecht founds a new party, what is the chance that this party will get 8.92% of the votes in the next German federal elections?", "desc": "[Sahra Wagenknecht](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahra_Wagenknecht) (born 1969 in then East Germany) is a German politician of the party Die Linke (The Left) and member of the Bundestag. \n\nWhile formerly well known for her far-left positions on economic policy and being a member of the party's communist platform, a membership which she suspended in 2010, Sahra Wagenknecht has in recent years received lots of media attention for her conservative stances on several issues:\nWagenknecht opposes the German policy on refugees and immigration, demanding that the number of immigrants be limited. She favours peace talks with Russia over weapon deliveries to Ukraine.\nAfter the publication of her book \"The Self-Righteous\", in which she criticises the \"lifestyle left\" for its focus on identity politics and neglecting workers' interests, some members of The Left demanded she be thrown out of the party, but an internal party commission decided otherwise.\n\nIn March 2023, Wagenknecht announced that she would not run again for The Left and has publicly contemplated founding a new party, stating that she would reach a decision on that matter until the end of 2023, which prompted the party leadership to demand her resignation ([source](https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-left-party-declares-figurehead-persona-non-grata-sahra-wagenknecht-plunges-crisis/)).\n\nIn polls, she often has favorable approval rankings, with German newspaper Focus [reporting](https://www.focus.de/magazin/archiv/parteigruendung-wagenknecht-partei-haette-potenzial-von-19-prozent_id_187583689.html) that 19% of voters would consider voting for her potential new party. However, historically most new parties in Germany have failed to gain traction as well as Wagenknecht's previous attempt to found a left-wing [cross-party movement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aufstehen) in 2019, hence this question.", "resc": "This question this resolves as the share of second quotes (which determines what fraction of the seats in parliament a party receives) a party founded by Sahra Wagenknecht will receive in the [next German federal election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_German_federal_election), which will be held on or before 26 October 2025. If Sahra Wagenknecht does not found a new party or said party dissolves again, this question will resolve as ambiguous.", "lower_25": "4.24", "median": "6.67", "upper_75": "8.92", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "If Sahra Wagenknecht founds a new party, what is the chance that this party will get 8.92% of the votes in the next German federal elections?", "desc": "[Sahra Wagenknecht](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahra_Wagenknecht) (born 1969 in then East Germany) is a German politician of the party Die Linke (The Left) and member of the Bundestag. \n\nWhile formerly well known for her far-left positions on economic policy and being a member of the party's communist platform, a membership which she suspended in 2010, Sahra Wagenknecht has in recent years received lots of media attention for her conservative stances on several issues:\nWagenknecht opposes the German policy on refugees and immigration, demanding that the number of immigrants be limited. She favours peace talks with Russia over weapon deliveries to Ukraine.\nAfter the publication of her book \"The Self-Righteous\", in which she criticises the \"lifestyle left\" for its focus on identity politics and neglecting workers' interests, some members of The Left demanded she be thrown out of the party, but an internal party commission decided otherwise.\n\nIn March 2023, Wagenknecht announced that she would not run again for The Left and has publicly contemplated founding a new party, stating that she would reach a decision on that matter until the end of 2023, which prompted the party leadership to demand her resignation ([source](https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-left-party-declares-figurehead-persona-non-grata-sahra-wagenknecht-plunges-crisis/)).\n\nIn polls, she often has favorable approval rankings, with German newspaper Focus [reporting](https://www.focus.de/magazin/archiv/parteigruendung-wagenknecht-partei-haette-potenzial-von-19-prozent_id_187583689.html) that 19% of voters would consider voting for her potential new party. However, historically most new parties in Germany have failed to gain traction as well as Wagenknecht's previous attempt to found a left-wing [cross-party movement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aufstehen) in 2019, hence this question.", "resc": "This question this resolves as the share of second quotes (which determines what fraction of the seats in parliament a party receives) a party founded by Sahra Wagenknecht will receive in the [next German federal election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_German_federal_election), which will be held on or before 26 October 2025. If Sahra Wagenknecht does not found a new party or said party dissolves again, this question will resolve as ambiguous.", "lower_25": "4.24", "median": "6.67", "upper_75": "8.92", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Romania will have open borders with all Schengen Area members by Nov 2026?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Aug 2024", "median": "Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Nov 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Bulgaria will have open borders with all Schengen Area members by Feb 2027?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Aug 2024", "median": "Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Feb 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Albania will have open borders with all Schengen Area members by Aug 2034?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Aug 2034", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Bulgaria will have open borders with all Schengen Area members by Feb 2027?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Aug 2024", "median": "Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Feb 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Romania will have open borders with all Schengen Area members by Nov 2026?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Aug 2024", "median": "Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Nov 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Cyprus will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "May 2032", "median": "Feb 2034", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Cyprus will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "May 2032", "median": "Feb 2034", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Albania will have open borders with all Schengen Area members by Aug 2034?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Aug 2034", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Cyprus will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "May 2032", "median": "Feb 2034", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Montenegro will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Feb 2032", "median": "May 2034", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that North Macedonia will have open borders with all Schengen Area members by May 2032?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "May 2032", "median": "Apr 2034", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that North Macedonia will have open borders with all Schengen Area members by May 2032?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "May 2032", "median": "Apr 2034", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Albania will have open borders with all Schengen Area members by Aug 2034?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Aug 2034", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Montenegro will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Feb 2032", "median": "May 2034", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Serbia will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Bulgaria will have open borders with all Schengen Area members by Feb 2027?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Aug 2024", "median": "Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Feb 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Bosnia and Herzegovina will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Montenegro will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Feb 2032", "median": "May 2034", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Bosnia and Herzegovina will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Bosnia and Herzegovina will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Moldova will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Oct 2033", "median": "Dec 2034", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Moldova will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Oct 2033", "median": "Dec 2034", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Moldova will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Oct 2033", "median": "Dec 2034", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Ukraine will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Apr 2033", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Georgia will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Georgia will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Georgia will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Ukraine will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Apr 2033", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Ukraine will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Apr 2033", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Turkey will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Turkey will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that North Macedonia will have open borders with all Schengen Area members by May 2032?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "May 2032", "median": "Apr 2034", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Ireland will have open borders with all Schengen Area members by Apr 2034?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Sep 2031", "median": "Feb 2033", "upper_75": "Apr 2034", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Serbia will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Serbia will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Ireland will have open borders with all Schengen Area members by Apr 2034?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Sep 2031", "median": "Feb 2033", "upper_75": "Apr 2034", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Ireland will have open borders with all Schengen Area members by Apr 2034?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Sep 2031", "median": "Feb 2033", "upper_75": "Apr 2034", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Turkey will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Kosovo will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United Kingdom will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Nov 2033", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United Kingdom will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Nov 2033", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Kosovo will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Kosovo will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Armenia will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United Kingdom will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Nov 2033", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2035", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Armenia will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Armenia will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Belarus will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Belarus will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Belarus will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Russia will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Sweden Democrats will win 81.2 parliamentary seats in the Swedish 2026 general election?", "desc": "The [Sweden Democrats](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sweden_Democrats) are a nationalist populist political party currently holding 20.5 % of the 349 seats of the Swedish parliament. Seats are awarded to political parties in proportion to their popular vote in the general elections, with parties that get less than 4 % of the vote excluded.\n\nDespite being the second-most popular party in the previous (2022) election, the Sweden Democrats don't hold any cabinet positions in the Swedish government, instead being in a confidence-and-supply agreement with the third most popular party, allowing it to rule as a minority government in coalition with two other smaller parties.\n\nThis is possibly in part because of the controversial history of the party, where they are only just gaining mainstream acceptance.\n\nThe Sweden Democrats had early influences from white nationalist and neo-nazi organisations, and because of this were not invited to participate in much of the maintsream media in runup to the 2010 election, including not being part of the traditional TV broadcast debates. In the 2010 election, the party for the first time passed the 4 % threshold and earned 20 parliamentary seats, which came with increased media participation – but not universally, with party supporters complaining that never before had a party with seats in parliament been denied media participation.\n\nIn the 2014 election, the Sweden Democrats increased in popularity rapidly. Other Swedish political parties started adopting some of their political ideas around immigration and crime, among other things, but there was still a general unwillingness of coopeartion with the Sweden Democrats. After the 2018 election, other right-wing parties started negotiating with the Sweden Democrats, ending with the current situation where they are providing confidence to a minority government headed by a party less popular than themselves.\n\nSome speculate that the Sweden Democrats are popular specifically *because* they have (until the 2022 election) always been in opposition. In opposition, they have been able to criticise the current governments without needing to face the problem of themselves making executive decisions that are unpopular with their voter base. Under that hypothesis, it would make sense for the Sweden Democrats to prefer the current confidence-and-supply agreement to cabinet positions, because it gives them claim to plausible deniability over unpopular decisions.\n\nThat said, nobody really knows how the popularity of the Sweden Democrats will change now that they are no longer in opposition – hence this question.\n\n[Early polling indicates the Sweden Democrats have declined in popularity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_2026_Swedish_general_election) but on the other hand, they have in the past four elections gained more votes than early polling would suggest.", "resc": "The question will resolve to the number of parliamentary seats won by the Sweden Democrats according to [the Wikipedia article on the 2026 Swedish general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Swedish_general_election) or another credible source, whichever has published a result when it is first looked up after September 24, 2026.\n\nIf the Sweden Democrats do not run at all in the 2026 election, or there is no general election before September 14, 2026, the question will resolve **ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "63.1", "median": "72.8", "upper_75": "81.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Sweden Democrats will win 81.2 parliamentary seats in the Swedish 2026 general election?", "desc": "The [Sweden Democrats](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sweden_Democrats) are a nationalist populist political party currently holding 20.5 % of the 349 seats of the Swedish parliament. Seats are awarded to political parties in proportion to their popular vote in the general elections, with parties that get less than 4 % of the vote excluded.\n\nDespite being the second-most popular party in the previous (2022) election, the Sweden Democrats don't hold any cabinet positions in the Swedish government, instead being in a confidence-and-supply agreement with the third most popular party, allowing it to rule as a minority government in coalition with two other smaller parties.\n\nThis is possibly in part because of the controversial history of the party, where they are only just gaining mainstream acceptance.\n\nThe Sweden Democrats had early influences from white nationalist and neo-nazi organisations, and because of this were not invited to participate in much of the maintsream media in runup to the 2010 election, including not being part of the traditional TV broadcast debates. In the 2010 election, the party for the first time passed the 4 % threshold and earned 20 parliamentary seats, which came with increased media participation – but not universally, with party supporters complaining that never before had a party with seats in parliament been denied media participation.\n\nIn the 2014 election, the Sweden Democrats increased in popularity rapidly. Other Swedish political parties started adopting some of their political ideas around immigration and crime, among other things, but there was still a general unwillingness of coopeartion with the Sweden Democrats. After the 2018 election, other right-wing parties started negotiating with the Sweden Democrats, ending with the current situation where they are providing confidence to a minority government headed by a party less popular than themselves.\n\nSome speculate that the Sweden Democrats are popular specifically *because* they have (until the 2022 election) always been in opposition. In opposition, they have been able to criticise the current governments without needing to face the problem of themselves making executive decisions that are unpopular with their voter base. Under that hypothesis, it would make sense for the Sweden Democrats to prefer the current confidence-and-supply agreement to cabinet positions, because it gives them claim to plausible deniability over unpopular decisions.\n\nThat said, nobody really knows how the popularity of the Sweden Democrats will change now that they are no longer in opposition – hence this question.\n\n[Early polling indicates the Sweden Democrats have declined in popularity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_2026_Swedish_general_election) but on the other hand, they have in the past four elections gained more votes than early polling would suggest.", "resc": "The question will resolve to the number of parliamentary seats won by the Sweden Democrats according to [the Wikipedia article on the 2026 Swedish general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Swedish_general_election) or another credible source, whichever has published a result when it is first looked up after September 24, 2026.\n\nIf the Sweden Democrats do not run at all in the 2026 election, or there is no general election before September 14, 2026, the question will resolve **ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "63.1", "median": "72.8", "upper_75": "81.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Sweden Democrats will win 81.2 parliamentary seats in the Swedish 2026 general election?", "desc": "The [Sweden Democrats](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sweden_Democrats) are a nationalist populist political party currently holding 20.5 % of the 349 seats of the Swedish parliament. Seats are awarded to political parties in proportion to their popular vote in the general elections, with parties that get less than 4 % of the vote excluded.\n\nDespite being the second-most popular party in the previous (2022) election, the Sweden Democrats don't hold any cabinet positions in the Swedish government, instead being in a confidence-and-supply agreement with the third most popular party, allowing it to rule as a minority government in coalition with two other smaller parties.\n\nThis is possibly in part because of the controversial history of the party, where they are only just gaining mainstream acceptance.\n\nThe Sweden Democrats had early influences from white nationalist and neo-nazi organisations, and because of this were not invited to participate in much of the maintsream media in runup to the 2010 election, including not being part of the traditional TV broadcast debates. In the 2010 election, the party for the first time passed the 4 % threshold and earned 20 parliamentary seats, which came with increased media participation – but not universally, with party supporters complaining that never before had a party with seats in parliament been denied media participation.\n\nIn the 2014 election, the Sweden Democrats increased in popularity rapidly. Other Swedish political parties started adopting some of their political ideas around immigration and crime, among other things, but there was still a general unwillingness of coopeartion with the Sweden Democrats. After the 2018 election, other right-wing parties started negotiating with the Sweden Democrats, ending with the current situation where they are providing confidence to a minority government headed by a party less popular than themselves.\n\nSome speculate that the Sweden Democrats are popular specifically *because* they have (until the 2022 election) always been in opposition. In opposition, they have been able to criticise the current governments without needing to face the problem of themselves making executive decisions that are unpopular with their voter base. Under that hypothesis, it would make sense for the Sweden Democrats to prefer the current confidence-and-supply agreement to cabinet positions, because it gives them claim to plausible deniability over unpopular decisions.\n\nThat said, nobody really knows how the popularity of the Sweden Democrats will change now that they are no longer in opposition – hence this question.\n\n[Early polling indicates the Sweden Democrats have declined in popularity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_2026_Swedish_general_election) but on the other hand, they have in the past four elections gained more votes than early polling would suggest.", "resc": "The question will resolve to the number of parliamentary seats won by the Sweden Democrats according to [the Wikipedia article on the 2026 Swedish general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Swedish_general_election) or another credible source, whichever has published a result when it is first looked up after September 24, 2026.\n\nIf the Sweden Democrats do not run at all in the 2026 election, or there is no general election before September 14, 2026, the question will resolve **ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "63.1", "median": "72.8", "upper_75": "81.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Germany will decide about its nuclear waste repository by 2040?", "desc": "So far, Germany only has intermediate storage facilities for nuclear waste but no ultimate disposal place (Endlager). The german parliament (Bundestag) intended to make a decision by 2031 but the organization looking for a place (BASE) [now targets 2046-2068](https://www.base.bund.de/SharedDocs/Kurzmeldungen/BASE/EN/2022/timetable-repository-search.html) for such a decision. [Recently, the BASE president asked for urgency](https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/atommuellendlager-suche-benchmark-2046-100.html).", "resc": "Resolves to the date where the parliament makes a decision. [Minutes of plenary proceedings are available here](https://www.bundestag.de/en/documents/minutes).", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2048", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next UK general election will take place on Nov 11, 2024?", "desc": "When [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6368/next-uk-general-election/) was created, May 2024 was the latest possible date for a UK general election.\n\nSince then, election law was changed, moving that latest possible date to 2025-01-28. With his Conservative Party badly trailing in the polls, PM Rishi Sunak has an incentive to hold off on calling an election for as long as possible. The electoral calculus might, of course, change so that elections are held in the spring of 2024 or even earlier.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when the next UK general election is held.", "lower_25": "Sep 24, 2024", "median": "Oct 16, 2024", "upper_75": "Nov 11, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Germany will decide about its nuclear waste repository by 2040?", "desc": "So far, Germany only has intermediate storage facilities for nuclear waste but no ultimate disposal place (Endlager). The german parliament (Bundestag) intended to make a decision by 2031 but the organization looking for a place (BASE) [now targets 2046-2068](https://www.base.bund.de/SharedDocs/Kurzmeldungen/BASE/EN/2022/timetable-repository-search.html) for such a decision. [Recently, the BASE president asked for urgency](https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/atommuellendlager-suche-benchmark-2046-100.html).", "resc": "Resolves to the date where the parliament makes a decision. [Minutes of plenary proceedings are available here](https://www.bundestag.de/en/documents/minutes).", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2048", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Russia will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next UK general election will take place on Nov 11, 2024?", "desc": "When [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6368/next-uk-general-election/) was created, May 2024 was the latest possible date for a UK general election.\n\nSince then, election law was changed, moving that latest possible date to 2025-01-28. With his Conservative Party badly trailing in the polls, PM Rishi Sunak has an incentive to hold off on calling an election for as long as possible. The electoral calculus might, of course, change so that elections are held in the spring of 2024 or even earlier.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when the next UK general election is held.", "lower_25": "Sep 24, 2024", "median": "Oct 16, 2024", "upper_75": "Nov 11, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Russia will not have open borders with all Schengen Area members by January 11, 2035?", "desc": "The [Schengen Area](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area) is formed by a group of European countries that have agreed to abolish border control at their mutual borders.\n\nCountries may join Schengen as a result of European Union accession, membership in the European Free Trade Association, or via another mechanism. \n\nAs of July 2023 the Schengen Area consists of 27 countries, of which 23 are EU states and four are members of EFTA. \n\nTwenty three of the 27 EU states participate in the Schengen Area. Of the four EU members that are not part of the Schengen Area, three—Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania—are legally obligated to join the area in the future. Ireland maintains an opt-out, and instead operates its own visa policy. \n\nThe four [European Free Trade Association (EFTA)](https://www.efta.int/) member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, are not members of the EU, but have signed agreements in association with the Schengen Agreement and have open Schengen borders.\n\nAdditionally, three European microstates—Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City—maintain open borders for passenger traffic with their neighbours, and are therefore considered de facto members of the Schengen Area due to the practical impossibility of travelling to or from them without transiting through at least one Schengen member country.", "resc": "For each listed country, the question resolves as date at which the country eliminates border controls with all Schengen Area nations. \n\nThe question resolves based on credible reports, verified by the date of first implementation [provided here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_Area#Current_members). \n\nThe question does not resolve as soon as a nation agrees to join the Schengen Area, but rather resolves when border controls are first eliminated.", "lower_25": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "median": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 11, 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Germany will decide about its nuclear waste repository by 2040?", "desc": "So far, Germany only has intermediate storage facilities for nuclear waste but no ultimate disposal place (Endlager). The german parliament (Bundestag) intended to make a decision by 2031 but the organization looking for a place (BASE) [now targets 2046-2068](https://www.base.bund.de/SharedDocs/Kurzmeldungen/BASE/EN/2022/timetable-repository-search.html) for such a decision. [Recently, the BASE president asked for urgency](https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/atommuellendlager-suche-benchmark-2046-100.html).", "resc": "Resolves to the date where the parliament makes a decision. [Minutes of plenary proceedings are available here](https://www.bundestag.de/en/documents/minutes).", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2040", "upper_75": "2048", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the next UK general election will take place on Nov 11, 2024?", "desc": "When [this question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6368/next-uk-general-election/) was created, May 2024 was the latest possible date for a UK general election.\n\nSince then, election law was changed, moving that latest possible date to 2025-01-28. With his Conservative Party badly trailing in the polls, PM Rishi Sunak has an incentive to hold off on calling an election for as long as possible. The electoral calculus might, of course, change so that elections are held in the spring of 2024 or even earlier.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when the next UK general election is held.", "lower_25": "Sep 24, 2024", "median": "Oct 16, 2024", "upper_75": "Nov 11, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Climate Clock will hit zero by Nov 2028?", "desc": "The [Climate Clock](https://climateclock.world/) tracks the amount of time remaining before the [carbon budget estimated by the IPCC](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/) to limit global warming to 1.5ºC runs out. Put differently, the Clock shows how much time is left before 1.5 degrees of global warming is \"locked-in.\" The clock is [updated yearly](https://theconversation.com/the-climate-clock-counting-down-to-1-5-107498) based on global emissions trends.\n\n> [Data for the deadline](https://climateclock.world/science#deadline) is sourced from the [Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change](https://www.mcc-berlin.net/en/research/co2-budget.html). The MCC's carbon clock assumes an average annual rate of 42.2 Gt of carbon emissions in order to calculate the time remaining on the clock. However, if rates of global emissions continue to rise, our carbon budget will run out even faster. If we cut the rate of global carbon emissions, time on the clock would hypothetically begin to increase.", "resc": "The question will resolve as the first date when the [Climate Clock](https://climateclock.world/) reaches zero, meaning that there is no time left to limit global warming to 1.5°C. The resolution will occur either when the [Climate Clock](https://climateclock.world/) displays zero, a negative time, or when the Climate Clock organizers announce that the threshold has passed.", "lower_25": "Oct 2026", "median": "Nov 2028", "upper_75": "Oct 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 299 FDIC banks will fail in 2023 through 2030?", "desc": "This question is identical to [one authored by Anastasia on March 11, 2023](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15416/how-many-fdic-banks-will-fail-in-2023/). The only difference is that I have extended the time horizon to include the entire remaining decade of the 2020s. I thought a longer view might yield interesting results.\n \nThe [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)]( https://www.fdic.gov/about/history/) was established in 1933 in response to the widespread bank failures that occurred during the Great Depression. The FDIC is a US government agency that provides deposit insurance to protect depositors in case of bank failures. FDIC-insured banks are required to follow certain regulations and guidelines, such as maintaining a minimum level of capital, to ensure their safety and soundness. Since its establishment, the FDIC has played a crucial role in maintaining public confidence in the banking system and preventing bank runs.\n\nIn March of 2023, a bank run on Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) caused the FDIC to [intervene]( https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/2023/pr23016.html) and [take control]( https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/svb-financial-pulls-capital-raise-explores-alternatives-including-possible-sale-sources-say-11de7522) of SVB, in the second largest bank failure in US history. Bank runs are nothing new. [There are concerns]( https://www.newsweek.com/will-there-run-banks-these-are-warning-signs-1787212) that the failure of SVB could cause contagion in the greater banking industry.\n\nThe FDIC maintains a [Failed Bank](https://www.fdic.gov/resources/resolutions/bank-failures/failed-bank-list/) List tracking bank failures as well as a page [plotting them over time]( https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of FDIC insured failed banks closed in the years 2023 through 2030, inclusive, [according to the FDIC](https://www.fdic.gov/resources/resolutions/bank-failures/failed-bank-list/). It will resolve based on the banks appearing in the list with a closing date in the years 2023 through 2030, inclusive, on January 15, 2031.\n\nIf this dataset is not available, an equivalent statistic will be used, preferably published by the [FDIC](https://www.fdic.gov/resources/resolutions/bank-failures/failed-bank-list/) or another government body, or by an industry association.", "lower_25": "74.5", "median": "138", "upper_75": "299", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 299 FDIC banks will fail in 2023 through 2030?", "desc": "This question is identical to [one authored by Anastasia on March 11, 2023](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15416/how-many-fdic-banks-will-fail-in-2023/). The only difference is that I have extended the time horizon to include the entire remaining decade of the 2020s. I thought a longer view might yield interesting results.\n \nThe [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)]( https://www.fdic.gov/about/history/) was established in 1933 in response to the widespread bank failures that occurred during the Great Depression. The FDIC is a US government agency that provides deposit insurance to protect depositors in case of bank failures. FDIC-insured banks are required to follow certain regulations and guidelines, such as maintaining a minimum level of capital, to ensure their safety and soundness. Since its establishment, the FDIC has played a crucial role in maintaining public confidence in the banking system and preventing bank runs.\n\nIn March of 2023, a bank run on Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) caused the FDIC to [intervene]( https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/2023/pr23016.html) and [take control]( https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/svb-financial-pulls-capital-raise-explores-alternatives-including-possible-sale-sources-say-11de7522) of SVB, in the second largest bank failure in US history. Bank runs are nothing new. [There are concerns]( https://www.newsweek.com/will-there-run-banks-these-are-warning-signs-1787212) that the failure of SVB could cause contagion in the greater banking industry.\n\nThe FDIC maintains a [Failed Bank](https://www.fdic.gov/resources/resolutions/bank-failures/failed-bank-list/) List tracking bank failures as well as a page [plotting them over time]( https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of FDIC insured failed banks closed in the years 2023 through 2030, inclusive, [according to the FDIC](https://www.fdic.gov/resources/resolutions/bank-failures/failed-bank-list/). It will resolve based on the banks appearing in the list with a closing date in the years 2023 through 2030, inclusive, on January 15, 2031.\n\nIf this dataset is not available, an equivalent statistic will be used, preferably published by the [FDIC](https://www.fdic.gov/resources/resolutions/bank-failures/failed-bank-list/) or another government body, or by an industry association.", "lower_25": "74.5", "median": "138", "upper_75": "299", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 299 FDIC banks will fail in 2023 through 2030?", "desc": "This question is identical to [one authored by Anastasia on March 11, 2023](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/15416/how-many-fdic-banks-will-fail-in-2023/). The only difference is that I have extended the time horizon to include the entire remaining decade of the 2020s. I thought a longer view might yield interesting results.\n \nThe [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)]( https://www.fdic.gov/about/history/) was established in 1933 in response to the widespread bank failures that occurred during the Great Depression. The FDIC is a US government agency that provides deposit insurance to protect depositors in case of bank failures. FDIC-insured banks are required to follow certain regulations and guidelines, such as maintaining a minimum level of capital, to ensure their safety and soundness. Since its establishment, the FDIC has played a crucial role in maintaining public confidence in the banking system and preventing bank runs.\n\nIn March of 2023, a bank run on Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) caused the FDIC to [intervene]( https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/2023/pr23016.html) and [take control]( https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/svb-financial-pulls-capital-raise-explores-alternatives-including-possible-sale-sources-say-11de7522) of SVB, in the second largest bank failure in US history. Bank runs are nothing new. [There are concerns]( https://www.newsweek.com/will-there-run-banks-these-are-warning-signs-1787212) that the failure of SVB could cause contagion in the greater banking industry.\n\nThe FDIC maintains a [Failed Bank](https://www.fdic.gov/resources/resolutions/bank-failures/failed-bank-list/) List tracking bank failures as well as a page [plotting them over time]( https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of FDIC insured failed banks closed in the years 2023 through 2030, inclusive, [according to the FDIC](https://www.fdic.gov/resources/resolutions/bank-failures/failed-bank-list/). It will resolve based on the banks appearing in the list with a closing date in the years 2023 through 2030, inclusive, on January 15, 2031.\n\nIf this dataset is not available, an equivalent statistic will be used, preferably published by the [FDIC](https://www.fdic.gov/resources/resolutions/bank-failures/failed-bank-list/) or another government body, or by an industry association.", "lower_25": "74.5", "median": "138", "upper_75": "299", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Climate Clock will hit zero by Nov 2028?", "desc": "The [Climate Clock](https://climateclock.world/) tracks the amount of time remaining before the [carbon budget estimated by the IPCC](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/) to limit global warming to 1.5ºC runs out. Put differently, the Clock shows how much time is left before 1.5 degrees of global warming is \"locked-in.\" The clock is [updated yearly](https://theconversation.com/the-climate-clock-counting-down-to-1-5-107498) based on global emissions trends.\n\n> [Data for the deadline](https://climateclock.world/science#deadline) is sourced from the [Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change](https://www.mcc-berlin.net/en/research/co2-budget.html). The MCC's carbon clock assumes an average annual rate of 42.2 Gt of carbon emissions in order to calculate the time remaining on the clock. However, if rates of global emissions continue to rise, our carbon budget will run out even faster. If we cut the rate of global carbon emissions, time on the clock would hypothetically begin to increase.", "resc": "The question will resolve as the first date when the [Climate Clock](https://climateclock.world/) reaches zero, meaning that there is no time left to limit global warming to 1.5°C. The resolution will occur either when the [Climate Clock](https://climateclock.world/) displays zero, a negative time, or when the Climate Clock organizers announce that the threshold has passed.", "lower_25": "Oct 2026", "median": "Nov 2028", "upper_75": "Oct 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Climate Clock will hit zero by Nov 2028?", "desc": "The [Climate Clock](https://climateclock.world/) tracks the amount of time remaining before the [carbon budget estimated by the IPCC](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/) to limit global warming to 1.5ºC runs out. Put differently, the Clock shows how much time is left before 1.5 degrees of global warming is \"locked-in.\" The clock is [updated yearly](https://theconversation.com/the-climate-clock-counting-down-to-1-5-107498) based on global emissions trends.\n\n> [Data for the deadline](https://climateclock.world/science#deadline) is sourced from the [Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change](https://www.mcc-berlin.net/en/research/co2-budget.html). The MCC's carbon clock assumes an average annual rate of 42.2 Gt of carbon emissions in order to calculate the time remaining on the clock. However, if rates of global emissions continue to rise, our carbon budget will run out even faster. If we cut the rate of global carbon emissions, time on the clock would hypothetically begin to increase.", "resc": "The question will resolve as the first date when the [Climate Clock](https://climateclock.world/) reaches zero, meaning that there is no time left to limit global warming to 1.5°C. The resolution will occur either when the [Climate Clock](https://climateclock.world/) displays zero, a negative time, or when the Climate Clock organizers announce that the threshold has passed.", "lower_25": "Oct 2026", "median": "Nov 2028", "upper_75": "Oct 2029", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) will collapse by 2049?", "desc": "The Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation is \"[a system of ocean currents that circulates water within the Atlantic Ocean, bringing warm water north and cold water south.](https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/amoc.html).\" The AMOC is [responsible for the relative warmth of the northern hemisphere](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlantic_meridional_overturning_circulation#Effects_on_climate), particularly Northwest Europe, and influences climate around the world.\n\nThe shutdown of AMOC could be a [significant climate tipping point](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/sep/08/world-on-brink-five-climate-tipping-points-study-finds). The AMOC \"[collapsed and restarted repeatedly in the cycle of ice ages that occurred from 115,000 to 12,000 years ago](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jul/25/gulf-stream-could-collapse-as-early-as-2025-study-suggests).\" Shutdown of the AMOC could have [global impacts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlantic_meridional_overturning_circulation#Impacts_of_a_shutdown).\n\n\"Image\n\n\nA [2018 study](https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-43713719) found the AMOC is \"[weaker than it has ever been](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-65120327).\"\n\nA [July 2023 study in Nature](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-023-39810-w) concluded that the AMOC could [turn off by mid-century](https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2023/07/25/atlantic-ocean-amoc-climate-change/), with 95% confidence intervals of 2025-2095. This is contrary to the [most recent IPCC report](https://www.ipcc.ch/srocc/chapter/chapter-4-sea-level-rise-and-implications-for-low-lying-islands-coasts-and-communities/4-4-responding-to-sea-level-rise/4-4-1introduction/ipcc-srocc-ch_6_9/), which expects the AMOC to weaken but not cease in most emissions scenarios.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date after August 1, 2023 that the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) has stopped, according to multiple credible scientific reports.", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "2067", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) will collapse by 2049?", "desc": "The Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation is \"[a system of ocean currents that circulates water within the Atlantic Ocean, bringing warm water north and cold water south.](https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/amoc.html).\" The AMOC is [responsible for the relative warmth of the northern hemisphere](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlantic_meridional_overturning_circulation#Effects_on_climate), particularly Northwest Europe, and influences climate around the world.\n\nThe shutdown of AMOC could be a [significant climate tipping point](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/sep/08/world-on-brink-five-climate-tipping-points-study-finds). The AMOC \"[collapsed and restarted repeatedly in the cycle of ice ages that occurred from 115,000 to 12,000 years ago](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jul/25/gulf-stream-could-collapse-as-early-as-2025-study-suggests).\" Shutdown of the AMOC could have [global impacts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlantic_meridional_overturning_circulation#Impacts_of_a_shutdown).\n\n\"Image\n\n\nA [2018 study](https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-43713719) found the AMOC is \"[weaker than it has ever been](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-65120327).\"\n\nA [July 2023 study in Nature](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-023-39810-w) concluded that the AMOC could [turn off by mid-century](https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2023/07/25/atlantic-ocean-amoc-climate-change/), with 95% confidence intervals of 2025-2095. This is contrary to the [most recent IPCC report](https://www.ipcc.ch/srocc/chapter/chapter-4-sea-level-rise-and-implications-for-low-lying-islands-coasts-and-communities/4-4-responding-to-sea-level-rise/4-4-1introduction/ipcc-srocc-ch_6_9/), which expects the AMOC to weaken but not cease in most emissions scenarios.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date after August 1, 2023 that the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) has stopped, according to multiple credible scientific reports.", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "2067", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that room-temperature and -pressure superconductivity will be achieved by 2079?", "desc": "Recently, South Korean scientists uploaded an [unreviewed paper](https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.12008) claiming to have synthesized a material, LK-99, that is superconductive at room temperature and pressure. The implications of this, if true, are monumentous.\n\nHowever, the paper has come under fire for being either fraudulent, mistaken, shoddy, or some combination of all three. There is currently an [active question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/18090/room-temp-superconductor-pre-print-replicated/) on Metaculus about whether the LK-99 paper will replicate.\n\nBut whether or not that first paper replicates, this question asks something broader: when, if ever, will superconductivity at ambient temperature and pressure be achieved?", "resc": "For positive resolution, a material must be developed or discovered that demonstrates reliable superconductivity at a temperature between -5° and 105° C and at a pressure between 0.8 and 1.2 standard atmosphere.\n\nOne initial paper and a successful, credible replication appearing in a reputable peer-reviewed journal will suffice for positive resolution, and will resolve as the date of the publication of the replication paper.", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2047", "upper_75": "2079", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that satellite-based monitoring systems will first accurately measure global CO2 and CH4 emissions in real-time by 2027?", "desc": "Satellite-based monitoring systems have emerged as a vital tool in the fight against climate change. These systems [can collect invaluable data](https://cosmosmagazine.com/earth/carbon-dioxide-satellites-measurements-emissions-ghg/) on greenhouse gas emissions, providing a bird's-eye view of the global carbon footprint. However, while [current technologies](https://climate.nasa.gov/climate_resources/99/graphic-measuring-carbon-dioxide-from-space/) can provide estimates, there are significant challenges in measuring global greenhouse gas emissions accurately and in real time.\n\nReal-time, accurate measurement would enable a much quicker response to changes in emission levels, support climate research, inform policy decisions, and facilitate the enforcement of climate agreements. This leads to the question: By what year will satellite-based monitoring systems be able to measure global greenhouse gas emissions in real-time accurately?\n\nThe answer could be crucial in defining the timelines and strategies for global climate action, international agreements, and investment in monitoring technologies.", "resc": "1. The question will resolve as July 1st of the first year when credible organizations or scientific sources (e.g., scientific journals, space agencies, and international bodies like the IPCC or WMO) report that satellite-based monitoring systems can measure global CO2 and CH4 greenhouse gas emissions accurately and in real time.\n2. \"Accurately\" means that the measurements should be within a reasonable margin of error relative to estimates produced by other sources (+/- 5%), or reported to be more accurate than estimates produced by other sources. If no quantification of accuracy is provided then statements indicating that the satellite monitoring is of comparable accuracy to estimates produced by other methods will be sufficient.\n3. \"Real-time\" means that the data collected should be available for analysis and interpretation within a few hours of collection, allowing for near-instantaneous awareness and response.\n4. This ability must cover global emissions (whether in a global constellation or with constellations and modeling to fill in gaps), including all significant sources of CO2 and CH4 emissions such as industry, power generation, transportation, and deforestation.\n5. If there is ambiguity or conflicting reports, the resolution should err on the side of caution, resolving only when multiple independent credible organizations or scientific sources produce confirmatory reports, using the date of the first credible report.", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that room-temperature and -pressure superconductivity will be achieved by 2079?", "desc": "Recently, South Korean scientists uploaded an [unreviewed paper](https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.12008) claiming to have synthesized a material, LK-99, that is superconductive at room temperature and pressure. The implications of this, if true, are monumentous.\n\nHowever, the paper has come under fire for being either fraudulent, mistaken, shoddy, or some combination of all three. There is currently an [active question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/18090/room-temp-superconductor-pre-print-replicated/) on Metaculus about whether the LK-99 paper will replicate.\n\nBut whether or not that first paper replicates, this question asks something broader: when, if ever, will superconductivity at ambient temperature and pressure be achieved?", "resc": "For positive resolution, a material must be developed or discovered that demonstrates reliable superconductivity at a temperature between -5° and 105° C and at a pressure between 0.8 and 1.2 standard atmosphere.\n\nOne initial paper and a successful, credible replication appearing in a reputable peer-reviewed journal will suffice for positive resolution, and will resolve as the date of the publication of the replication paper.", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2047", "upper_75": "2079", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that room-temperature and -pressure superconductivity will be achieved by 2079?", "desc": "Recently, South Korean scientists uploaded an [unreviewed paper](https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.12008) claiming to have synthesized a material, LK-99, that is superconductive at room temperature and pressure. The implications of this, if true, are monumentous.\n\nHowever, the paper has come under fire for being either fraudulent, mistaken, shoddy, or some combination of all three. There is currently an [active question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/18090/room-temp-superconductor-pre-print-replicated/) on Metaculus about whether the LK-99 paper will replicate.\n\nBut whether or not that first paper replicates, this question asks something broader: when, if ever, will superconductivity at ambient temperature and pressure be achieved?", "resc": "For positive resolution, a material must be developed or discovered that demonstrates reliable superconductivity at a temperature between -5° and 105° C and at a pressure between 0.8 and 1.2 standard atmosphere.\n\nOne initial paper and a successful, credible replication appearing in a reputable peer-reviewed journal will suffice for positive resolution, and will resolve as the date of the publication of the replication paper.", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2047", "upper_75": "2079", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) will collapse by 2049?", "desc": "The Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation is \"[a system of ocean currents that circulates water within the Atlantic Ocean, bringing warm water north and cold water south.](https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/amoc.html).\" The AMOC is [responsible for the relative warmth of the northern hemisphere](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlantic_meridional_overturning_circulation#Effects_on_climate), particularly Northwest Europe, and influences climate around the world.\n\nThe shutdown of AMOC could be a [significant climate tipping point](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/sep/08/world-on-brink-five-climate-tipping-points-study-finds). The AMOC \"[collapsed and restarted repeatedly in the cycle of ice ages that occurred from 115,000 to 12,000 years ago](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jul/25/gulf-stream-could-collapse-as-early-as-2025-study-suggests).\" Shutdown of the AMOC could have [global impacts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlantic_meridional_overturning_circulation#Impacts_of_a_shutdown).\n\n\"Image\n\n\nA [2018 study](https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-43713719) found the AMOC is \"[weaker than it has ever been](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-65120327).\"\n\nA [July 2023 study in Nature](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-023-39810-w) concluded that the AMOC could [turn off by mid-century](https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2023/07/25/atlantic-ocean-amoc-climate-change/), with 95% confidence intervals of 2025-2095. This is contrary to the [most recent IPCC report](https://www.ipcc.ch/srocc/chapter/chapter-4-sea-level-rise-and-implications-for-low-lying-islands-coasts-and-communities/4-4-responding-to-sea-level-rise/4-4-1introduction/ipcc-srocc-ch_6_9/), which expects the AMOC to weaken but not cease in most emissions scenarios.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date after August 1, 2023 that the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) has stopped, according to multiple credible scientific reports.", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "2067", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that satellite-based monitoring systems will first accurately measure global CO2 and CH4 emissions in real-time by 2027?", "desc": "Satellite-based monitoring systems have emerged as a vital tool in the fight against climate change. These systems [can collect invaluable data](https://cosmosmagazine.com/earth/carbon-dioxide-satellites-measurements-emissions-ghg/) on greenhouse gas emissions, providing a bird's-eye view of the global carbon footprint. However, while [current technologies](https://climate.nasa.gov/climate_resources/99/graphic-measuring-carbon-dioxide-from-space/) can provide estimates, there are significant challenges in measuring global greenhouse gas emissions accurately and in real time.\n\nReal-time, accurate measurement would enable a much quicker response to changes in emission levels, support climate research, inform policy decisions, and facilitate the enforcement of climate agreements. This leads to the question: By what year will satellite-based monitoring systems be able to measure global greenhouse gas emissions in real-time accurately?\n\nThe answer could be crucial in defining the timelines and strategies for global climate action, international agreements, and investment in monitoring technologies.", "resc": "1. The question will resolve as July 1st of the first year when credible organizations or scientific sources (e.g., scientific journals, space agencies, and international bodies like the IPCC or WMO) report that satellite-based monitoring systems can measure global CO2 and CH4 greenhouse gas emissions accurately and in real time.\n2. \"Accurately\" means that the measurements should be within a reasonable margin of error relative to estimates produced by other sources (+/- 5%), or reported to be more accurate than estimates produced by other sources. If no quantification of accuracy is provided then statements indicating that the satellite monitoring is of comparable accuracy to estimates produced by other methods will be sufficient.\n3. \"Real-time\" means that the data collected should be available for analysis and interpretation within a few hours of collection, allowing for near-instantaneous awareness and response.\n4. This ability must cover global emissions (whether in a global constellation or with constellations and modeling to fill in gaps), including all significant sources of CO2 and CH4 emissions such as industry, power generation, transportation, and deforestation.\n5. If there is ambiguity or conflicting reports, the resolution should err on the side of caution, resolving only when multiple independent credible organizations or scientific sources produce confirmatory reports, using the date of the first credible report.", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that satellite-based monitoring systems will first accurately measure global CO2 and CH4 emissions in real-time by 2027?", "desc": "Satellite-based monitoring systems have emerged as a vital tool in the fight against climate change. These systems [can collect invaluable data](https://cosmosmagazine.com/earth/carbon-dioxide-satellites-measurements-emissions-ghg/) on greenhouse gas emissions, providing a bird's-eye view of the global carbon footprint. However, while [current technologies](https://climate.nasa.gov/climate_resources/99/graphic-measuring-carbon-dioxide-from-space/) can provide estimates, there are significant challenges in measuring global greenhouse gas emissions accurately and in real time.\n\nReal-time, accurate measurement would enable a much quicker response to changes in emission levels, support climate research, inform policy decisions, and facilitate the enforcement of climate agreements. This leads to the question: By what year will satellite-based monitoring systems be able to measure global greenhouse gas emissions in real-time accurately?\n\nThe answer could be crucial in defining the timelines and strategies for global climate action, international agreements, and investment in monitoring technologies.", "resc": "1. The question will resolve as July 1st of the first year when credible organizations or scientific sources (e.g., scientific journals, space agencies, and international bodies like the IPCC or WMO) report that satellite-based monitoring systems can measure global CO2 and CH4 greenhouse gas emissions accurately and in real time.\n2. \"Accurately\" means that the measurements should be within a reasonable margin of error relative to estimates produced by other sources (+/- 5%), or reported to be more accurate than estimates produced by other sources. If no quantification of accuracy is provided then statements indicating that the satellite monitoring is of comparable accuracy to estimates produced by other methods will be sufficient.\n3. \"Real-time\" means that the data collected should be available for analysis and interpretation within a few hours of collection, allowing for near-instantaneous awareness and response.\n4. This ability must cover global emissions (whether in a global constellation or with constellations and modeling to fill in gaps), including all significant sources of CO2 and CH4 emissions such as industry, power generation, transportation, and deforestation.\n5. If there is ambiguity or conflicting reports, the resolution should err on the side of caution, resolving only when multiple independent credible organizations or scientific sources produce confirmatory reports, using the date of the first credible report.", "lower_25": "2025", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2030", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will end daylight savings time by Oct 2028?", "desc": "[Daylight savings time](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daylight_saving_time_in_the_United_States) (DST) is when clocks get moved one hour ahead of where they would have been.\n\nIn the US every year (as of 2023) it:\n\n- starts on the second Sunday in March at 2:00 AM local time (so the new time is 3:00 AM)\n- ends on the first Sunday in November at 2:00 AM local time (so the new time is 1:00 AM)\n\nDST was created because it aims to let people work closer to the times when the sun is out. DST is [alleged to have a number of downsides](https://theweek.com/health-and-science/1021630/the-pros-and-cons-of-permanent-daylight-saving-time) most notably increased complexity and affected sleep schedule.\n\nThere are two main proposals to change the observation of DST.\n\na. Stop observing DST\n\nb. Observe DST year-round", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when there is either no federal policy in place or no states follow a policy to change the timing of clocks at any time during the year at either. If the federal daylight savings policy is eliminated this will still qualify even if some states enact or maintain policies to follow daylight savings.\n\nThe date of resolution will be the date of enactment of the law that makes the above true, whether state or federal.", "lower_25": "Oct 2028", "median": "Feb 2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jun 2032", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will end daylight savings time by Oct 2028?", "desc": "[Daylight savings time](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daylight_saving_time_in_the_United_States) (DST) is when clocks get moved one hour ahead of where they would have been.\n\nIn the US every year (as of 2023) it:\n\n- starts on the second Sunday in March at 2:00 AM local time (so the new time is 3:00 AM)\n- ends on the first Sunday in November at 2:00 AM local time (so the new time is 1:00 AM)\n\nDST was created because it aims to let people work closer to the times when the sun is out. DST is [alleged to have a number of downsides](https://theweek.com/health-and-science/1021630/the-pros-and-cons-of-permanent-daylight-saving-time) most notably increased complexity and affected sleep schedule.\n\nThere are two main proposals to change the observation of DST.\n\na. Stop observing DST\n\nb. Observe DST year-round", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when there is either no federal policy in place or no states follow a policy to change the timing of clocks at any time during the year at either. If the federal daylight savings policy is eliminated this will still qualify even if some states enact or maintain policies to follow daylight savings.\n\nThe date of resolution will be the date of enactment of the law that makes the above true, whether state or federal.", "lower_25": "Oct 2028", "median": "Feb 2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jun 2032", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the novel Luna avocado strain will capture 5% of the US avocado market by Jul 2040?", "desc": "Today, Hass avocados dominate the avocado market, commanding [around 95%](https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/global-hass-avocado-market) of the US market share. The Hass avocado is thought of by most people alive today as the 'classic' avocado, but it's a fairly new variety, developed in the 1920s.\n\nIn July 2023, agricultural scientists at the University of California, Riverside, announced they had developed [a new type of avocado, the Luna UCR](https://www.axios.com/2023/07/24/avocado-guacamole-luna-hass-chipotle). This avocado is purported to compete with the Hass variety on taste and size, but grows in smaller, more slender trees, which is likely to increase ease and safety of harvesting, lowering costs for producers, increasing availability for consumers, and diversifying the avocado market.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that the Luna strain of avocado (and/or its direct descendants) has attained 5% or higher US market share for avocados.", "lower_25": "Nov 2038", "median": "Not ≤ Jul 2040", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jul 2040", "prediction": "75% (since the keyword is \"Not ≤ Jul 2040\", which means that the chance is less than 100%, or 75% in this case)"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the novel Luna avocado strain will capture 5% of the US avocado market by Jul 2040?", "desc": "Today, Hass avocados dominate the avocado market, commanding [around 95%](https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/global-hass-avocado-market) of the US market share. The Hass avocado is thought of by most people alive today as the 'classic' avocado, but it's a fairly new variety, developed in the 1920s.\n\nIn July 2023, agricultural scientists at the University of California, Riverside, announced they had developed [a new type of avocado, the Luna UCR](https://www.axios.com/2023/07/24/avocado-guacamole-luna-hass-chipotle). This avocado is purported to compete with the Hass variety on taste and size, but grows in smaller, more slender trees, which is likely to increase ease and safety of harvesting, lowering costs for producers, increasing availability for consumers, and diversifying the avocado market.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that the Luna strain of avocado (and/or its direct descendants) has attained 5% or higher US market share for avocados.", "lower_25": "Nov 2038", "median": "Not ≤ Jul 2040", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jul 2040", "prediction": "75% (since the keyword is \"Not ≤ Jul 2040\", which means that the chance is less than 100%, or 75% in this case)"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum critical temperature (in Kelvin) for an ambient-pressure superconductor will be 179 before the year 2080?", "desc": "[High temperature superconductors](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-temperature_superconductivity) have been an area of active research since their discovery in 1986.\n\nSuperconductors have many applications, with the most prominent being [high-power magnets](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superconducting_magnet) in MRI machines, fusion research, [particle accelerators](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Large_Hadron_Collider), and more. Advantages come from reduced power losses (leading to increased efficiency), denser currents (allowing more compact magnets), and higher maximum sustained fields at practical levels of power consumption and cooling.\n\nThe critical temperature is the temperature below which a superconductor functions; above this temperature, it no longer exhibits superconducting behavior. Higher critical temperatures are much easier to manage, and enable more economical systems. Liquid nitrogen cooled superconductors are vastly more practical than lower-temperature systems requiring liquid helium refrigeration.\n\nSuperconducting [motors](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superconducting_electric_machine) and generators have been proposed for marine propulsion, wind power generation, and more. Higher performance will be important to [enable](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7822827/) magnetic confinement fusion systems. At [room temperature](,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room-temperature_superconductor) superconductors may enable even more efficient electric power transmission, whether for grid transmission or exotic applications like [space elevators](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/917/space-elevator-by-2100/).\n\nOther important parameters for superconductor operation include the maximum current density of the resulting wire, and the maximum field strength at which it can operate. These parameters often improve with reduced temperature, so increases in critical temperature can provide performance improvement even without an increase in operating temperature.\n\nThe current highest critical temperature reported for bulk material is [138K](https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1995PhyC..243..201D/abstract).", "resc": "This will resolve as the highest critical temperature for a superconductor at ambient pressure reported in a peer-reviewed paper in a credible scientific journal before January 1 of the specified year, as measured in degrees Kelvin.", "lower_25": "179", "median": "305", "upper_75": "514", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a room-temperature and ambient-pressure superconductor will not be used in a medical MRI before December 2039?", "desc": "In late July, 2023, a research group [claimed in a preprint](https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.12008) to have developed the first room-temperature and ambient-pressure [superconductor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superconductivity). Superconductors have a [variety of uses](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technological_applications_of_superconductivity) in circuitry and magnetics, though current superconductors require either low temperatures or high pressures, or both.\n\n[Magnetic resonance imaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnetic_resonance_imaging) (MRI) is a technology that can produce images of living tissue and which is valuable in the field of medicine [to identify and diagnose a number of medical issues](https://www.betterhealth.vic.gov.au/health/conditionsandtreatments/mri-scan) such as the presence of tumors or injury to internal organs.\n\nMRI machines typically use superconductors to provide the strong magnetic field required. Given the temperature requirement of superconductors, MRIs typically require liquid helium cooling, which adds expense and also raises concerns due to the [volatility and supply uncertainty regarding helium](https://www.rsna.org/news/2023/january/helium-shortage-for-mri). MRIs exist which [do not use superconductors](https://radiopaedia.org/articles/magnets-types?lang=us), but these have lower imaging strength than typical MRIs. In healthcare MRI machines [typically have a magnetic-field strength](https://www.dmshealth.com/05/how-strong-does-mri-magnet-need-to-be/) of 1.5 [teslas](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tesla_(unit)) or higher. \"Helium-free\" MRI machines [have been introduced](https://healthimaging.com/topics/medical-imaging/magnetic-resonance-imaging-mri/top-mri-trends-include-helium-free-systems) though these machines still contain smaller amounts of helium in a closed system. The development of MRIs that utilize room-temperature and ambient-pressure superconductors [could significantly reduce the cost of MRI machines](https://twitter.com/Andercot/status/1685088647853604864) and produce savings in healthcare costs.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) first report that a room-temperature and ambient-pressure superconductor has been first used in a medical magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machine. To qualify, all of the following criteria must be met:\n\n* The superconductor must operate at typical atmospheric pressure in its implementation in the MRI\n* The superconductor must operate at a temperature above 50 degrees Fahrenheit in its implementation in the MRI\n* The MRI must have a magnetic-field strength of 1.0 teslas or larger\n* The MRI must be commercially available for use in a medical setting (functional MRI machines in testing or research and design do not qualify, the MRI must be available for commercial sale in any country and able to be used in a healthcare setting to scan patients)", "lower_25": "Jul 2039", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2039", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum critical temperature (in Kelvin) for an ambient-pressure superconductor will be 179 before the year 2080?", "desc": "[High temperature superconductors](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-temperature_superconductivity) have been an area of active research since their discovery in 1986.\n\nSuperconductors have many applications, with the most prominent being [high-power magnets](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superconducting_magnet) in MRI machines, fusion research, [particle accelerators](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Large_Hadron_Collider), and more. Advantages come from reduced power losses (leading to increased efficiency), denser currents (allowing more compact magnets), and higher maximum sustained fields at practical levels of power consumption and cooling.\n\nThe critical temperature is the temperature below which a superconductor functions; above this temperature, it no longer exhibits superconducting behavior. Higher critical temperatures are much easier to manage, and enable more economical systems. Liquid nitrogen cooled superconductors are vastly more practical than lower-temperature systems requiring liquid helium refrigeration.\n\nSuperconducting [motors](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superconducting_electric_machine) and generators have been proposed for marine propulsion, wind power generation, and more. Higher performance will be important to [enable](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7822827/) magnetic confinement fusion systems. At [room temperature](,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room-temperature_superconductor) superconductors may enable even more efficient electric power transmission, whether for grid transmission or exotic applications like [space elevators](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/917/space-elevator-by-2100/).\n\nOther important parameters for superconductor operation include the maximum current density of the resulting wire, and the maximum field strength at which it can operate. These parameters often improve with reduced temperature, so increases in critical temperature can provide performance improvement even without an increase in operating temperature.\n\nThe current highest critical temperature reported for bulk material is [138K](https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1995PhyC..243..201D/abstract).", "resc": "This will resolve as the highest critical temperature for a superconductor at ambient pressure reported in a peer-reviewed paper in a credible scientific journal before January 1 of the specified year, as measured in degrees Kelvin.", "lower_25": "179", "median": "305", "upper_75": "514", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum critical temperature (in Kelvin) for an ambient-pressure superconductor will be 179 before the year 2080?", "desc": "[High temperature superconductors](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-temperature_superconductivity) have been an area of active research since their discovery in 1986.\n\nSuperconductors have many applications, with the most prominent being [high-power magnets](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superconducting_magnet) in MRI machines, fusion research, [particle accelerators](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Large_Hadron_Collider), and more. Advantages come from reduced power losses (leading to increased efficiency), denser currents (allowing more compact magnets), and higher maximum sustained fields at practical levels of power consumption and cooling.\n\nThe critical temperature is the temperature below which a superconductor functions; above this temperature, it no longer exhibits superconducting behavior. Higher critical temperatures are much easier to manage, and enable more economical systems. Liquid nitrogen cooled superconductors are vastly more practical than lower-temperature systems requiring liquid helium refrigeration.\n\nSuperconducting [motors](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superconducting_electric_machine) and generators have been proposed for marine propulsion, wind power generation, and more. Higher performance will be important to [enable](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7822827/) magnetic confinement fusion systems. At [room temperature](,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room-temperature_superconductor) superconductors may enable even more efficient electric power transmission, whether for grid transmission or exotic applications like [space elevators](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/917/space-elevator-by-2100/).\n\nOther important parameters for superconductor operation include the maximum current density of the resulting wire, and the maximum field strength at which it can operate. These parameters often improve with reduced temperature, so increases in critical temperature can provide performance improvement even without an increase in operating temperature.\n\nThe current highest critical temperature reported for bulk material is [138K](https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1995PhyC..243..201D/abstract).", "resc": "This will resolve as the highest critical temperature for a superconductor at ambient pressure reported in a peer-reviewed paper in a credible scientific journal before January 1 of the specified year, as measured in degrees Kelvin.", "lower_25": "179", "median": "305", "upper_75": "514", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US will end daylight savings time by Oct 2028?", "desc": "[Daylight savings time](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daylight_saving_time_in_the_United_States) (DST) is when clocks get moved one hour ahead of where they would have been.\n\nIn the US every year (as of 2023) it:\n\n- starts on the second Sunday in March at 2:00 AM local time (so the new time is 3:00 AM)\n- ends on the first Sunday in November at 2:00 AM local time (so the new time is 1:00 AM)\n\nDST was created because it aims to let people work closer to the times when the sun is out. DST is [alleged to have a number of downsides](https://theweek.com/health-and-science/1021630/the-pros-and-cons-of-permanent-daylight-saving-time) most notably increased complexity and affected sleep schedule.\n\nThere are two main proposals to change the observation of DST.\n\na. Stop observing DST\n\nb. Observe DST year-round", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when there is either no federal policy in place or no states follow a policy to change the timing of clocks at any time during the year at either. If the federal daylight savings policy is eliminated this will still qualify even if some states enact or maintain policies to follow daylight savings.\n\nThe date of resolution will be the date of enactment of the law that makes the above true, whether state or federal.", "lower_25": "Oct 2028", "median": "Feb 2030", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jun 2032", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 3.97% in the following months (May-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the monthly U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "3.77", "median": "3.97", "upper_75": "4.20", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a room-temperature and ambient-pressure superconductor will not be used in a medical MRI before December 2039?", "desc": "In late July, 2023, a research group [claimed in a preprint](https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.12008) to have developed the first room-temperature and ambient-pressure [superconductor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superconductivity). Superconductors have a [variety of uses](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technological_applications_of_superconductivity) in circuitry and magnetics, though current superconductors require either low temperatures or high pressures, or both.\n\n[Magnetic resonance imaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnetic_resonance_imaging) (MRI) is a technology that can produce images of living tissue and which is valuable in the field of medicine [to identify and diagnose a number of medical issues](https://www.betterhealth.vic.gov.au/health/conditionsandtreatments/mri-scan) such as the presence of tumors or injury to internal organs.\n\nMRI machines typically use superconductors to provide the strong magnetic field required. Given the temperature requirement of superconductors, MRIs typically require liquid helium cooling, which adds expense and also raises concerns due to the [volatility and supply uncertainty regarding helium](https://www.rsna.org/news/2023/january/helium-shortage-for-mri). MRIs exist which [do not use superconductors](https://radiopaedia.org/articles/magnets-types?lang=us), but these have lower imaging strength than typical MRIs. In healthcare MRI machines [typically have a magnetic-field strength](https://www.dmshealth.com/05/how-strong-does-mri-magnet-need-to-be/) of 1.5 [teslas](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tesla_(unit)) or higher. \"Helium-free\" MRI machines [have been introduced](https://healthimaging.com/topics/medical-imaging/magnetic-resonance-imaging-mri/top-mri-trends-include-helium-free-systems) though these machines still contain smaller amounts of helium in a closed system. The development of MRIs that utilize room-temperature and ambient-pressure superconductors [could significantly reduce the cost of MRI machines](https://twitter.com/Andercot/status/1685088647853604864) and produce savings in healthcare costs.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) first report that a room-temperature and ambient-pressure superconductor has been first used in a medical magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machine. To qualify, all of the following criteria must be met:\n\n* The superconductor must operate at typical atmospheric pressure in its implementation in the MRI\n* The superconductor must operate at a temperature above 50 degrees Fahrenheit in its implementation in the MRI\n* The MRI must have a magnetic-field strength of 1.0 teslas or larger\n* The MRI must be commercially available for use in a medical setting (functional MRI machines in testing or research and design do not qualify, the MRI must be available for commercial sale in any country and able to be used in a healthcare setting to scan patients)", "lower_25": "Jul 2039", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2039", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 3.97% in the following months (May-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the monthly U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "3.77", "median": "3.97", "upper_75": "4.20", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a room-temperature and ambient-pressure superconductor will not be used in a medical MRI before December 2039?", "desc": "In late July, 2023, a research group [claimed in a preprint](https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.12008) to have developed the first room-temperature and ambient-pressure [superconductor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superconductivity). Superconductors have a [variety of uses](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technological_applications_of_superconductivity) in circuitry and magnetics, though current superconductors require either low temperatures or high pressures, or both.\n\n[Magnetic resonance imaging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnetic_resonance_imaging) (MRI) is a technology that can produce images of living tissue and which is valuable in the field of medicine [to identify and diagnose a number of medical issues](https://www.betterhealth.vic.gov.au/health/conditionsandtreatments/mri-scan) such as the presence of tumors or injury to internal organs.\n\nMRI machines typically use superconductors to provide the strong magnetic field required. Given the temperature requirement of superconductors, MRIs typically require liquid helium cooling, which adds expense and also raises concerns due to the [volatility and supply uncertainty regarding helium](https://www.rsna.org/news/2023/january/helium-shortage-for-mri). MRIs exist which [do not use superconductors](https://radiopaedia.org/articles/magnets-types?lang=us), but these have lower imaging strength than typical MRIs. In healthcare MRI machines [typically have a magnetic-field strength](https://www.dmshealth.com/05/how-strong-does-mri-magnet-need-to-be/) of 1.5 [teslas](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tesla_(unit)) or higher. \"Helium-free\" MRI machines [have been introduced](https://healthimaging.com/topics/medical-imaging/magnetic-resonance-imaging-mri/top-mri-trends-include-helium-free-systems) though these machines still contain smaller amounts of helium in a closed system. The development of MRIs that utilize room-temperature and ambient-pressure superconductors [could significantly reduce the cost of MRI machines](https://twitter.com/Andercot/status/1685088647853604864) and produce savings in healthcare costs.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) first report that a room-temperature and ambient-pressure superconductor has been first used in a medical magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machine. To qualify, all of the following criteria must be met:\n\n* The superconductor must operate at typical atmospheric pressure in its implementation in the MRI\n* The superconductor must operate at a temperature above 50 degrees Fahrenheit in its implementation in the MRI\n* The MRI must have a magnetic-field strength of 1.0 teslas or larger\n* The MRI must be commercially available for use in a medical setting (functional MRI machines in testing or research and design do not qualify, the MRI must be available for commercial sale in any country and able to be used in a healthcare setting to scan patients)", "lower_25": "Jul 2039", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2039", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 3.97% in the following months (May-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the monthly U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "3.77", "median": "3.97", "upper_75": "4.20", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the novel Luna avocado strain will capture 5% of the US avocado market by Jul 2040?", "desc": "Today, Hass avocados dominate the avocado market, commanding [around 95%](https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/global-hass-avocado-market) of the US market share. The Hass avocado is thought of by most people alive today as the 'classic' avocado, but it's a fairly new variety, developed in the 1920s.\n\nIn July 2023, agricultural scientists at the University of California, Riverside, announced they had developed [a new type of avocado, the Luna UCR](https://www.axios.com/2023/07/24/avocado-guacamole-luna-hass-chipotle). This avocado is purported to compete with the Hass variety on taste and size, but grows in smaller, more slender trees, which is likely to increase ease and safety of harvesting, lowering costs for producers, increasing availability for consumers, and diversifying the avocado market.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report that the Luna strain of avocado (and/or its direct descendants) has attained 5% or higher US market share for avocados.", "lower_25": "Nov 2038", "median": "Not ≤ Jul 2040", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jul 2040", "prediction": "75% (since the keyword is \"Not ≤ Jul 2040\", which means that the chance is less than 100%, or 75% in this case)"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 4.02 in the following months (June-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the monthly U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "3.77", "median": "4.02", "upper_75": "4.30", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 4.06 in the following months (July-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the monthly U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "3.75", "median": "4.06", "upper_75": "4.41", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 4.02 in the following months (June-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the monthly U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "3.77", "median": "4.02", "upper_75": "4.30", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 4.02 in the following months (June-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the monthly U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "3.77", "median": "4.02", "upper_75": "4.30", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 4.06 in the following months (July-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the monthly U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "3.75", "median": "4.06", "upper_75": "4.41", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest cluster used to train an AI model will be 92.1k by the end of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "49.4k", "median": "71.4k", "upper_75": "92.1k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 4.06 in the following months (July-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the monthly U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "3.75", "median": "4.06", "upper_75": "4.41", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest cluster used to train an AI model will be 92.1k by the end of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "49.4k", "median": "71.4k", "upper_75": "92.1k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest cluster used to train an AI model will be 49.4k by the end of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "49.4k", "median": "71.4k", "upper_75": "92.1k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest cluster used to train an AI model will be 92.1k by the end of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "49.4k", "median": "71.4k", "upper_75": "92.1k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest cluster used to train an AI model will be 49.4k by the end of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "49.4k", "median": "71.4k", "upper_75": "92.1k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How large will the largest cluster used to train an AI model be, by the end of the following years? (2025)\n\nKeyword: 116k\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the largest cluster used to train an AI model will be 116k by the end of the following years? (2025)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.4k", "median": "116k", "upper_75": "159k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the largest cluster used to train an AI model will be 49.4k by the end of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "49.4k", "median": "71.4k", "upper_75": "92.1k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How large will the largest cluster used to train an AI model be, by the end of the following years? (2025)\n\nKeyword: 116k\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the largest cluster used to train an AI model will be 116k by the end of the following years? (2025)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.4k", "median": "116k", "upper_75": "159k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S. government will spend 39.6% of GDP in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "35.2", "median": "37.4", "upper_75": "39.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many countries from the list below will establish space agencies or dedicated space programs specifically focused on addressing climate change and sustainable development before 2026? What is the chance that 1.200 countries will do so?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.162", "median": "1.200", "upper_75": "2.510", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S. government will spend 39.6% of GDP in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "35.2", "median": "37.4", "upper_75": "39.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S. government will spend 39.6% of GDP in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "35.2", "median": "37.4", "upper_75": "39.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many countries from the list below will establish space agencies or dedicated space programs specifically focused on addressing climate change and sustainable development before 2026? What is the chance that 1.200 countries will do so?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.162", "median": "1.200", "upper_75": "2.510", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How large will the largest cluster used to train an AI model be, by the end of the following years? (2025)\n\nKeyword: 116k\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that the largest cluster used to train an AI model will be 116k by the end of the following years? (2025)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.4k", "median": "116k", "upper_75": "159k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Apple will incorporate continuous glucose monitoring into the Apple Watch by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2031", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Apple will incorporate continuous glucose monitoring into the Apple Watch by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2031", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 51.0% in these years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "51.0", "median": "75.5", "upper_75": "83.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Apple will incorporate continuous glucose monitoring into the Apple Watch by 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2027", "upper_75": "2031", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 83.2% in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "51.0", "median": "75.5", "upper_75": "83.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 83.2% in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "51.0", "median": "75.5", "upper_75": "83.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 51.0% in these years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "51.0", "median": "75.5", "upper_75": "83.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 51.0% in these years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "51.0", "median": "75.5", "upper_75": "83.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 75.2% in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "75.2", "median": "79.4", "upper_75": "83.6", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 75.2% in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "75.2", "median": "79.4", "upper_75": "83.6", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 83.2% in 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "51.0", "median": "75.5", "upper_75": "83.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 64.7% in 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "46.0", "median": "55.5", "upper_75": "64.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 65.6% in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "57.8", "median": "65.6", "upper_75": "72.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 65.6% in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "57.8", "median": "65.6", "upper_75": "72.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 75.2% in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "75.2", "median": "79.4", "upper_75": "83.6", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 57.2% in 2045?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "36.6", "median": "46.7", "upper_75": "57.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 65.6% in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "57.8", "median": "65.6", "upper_75": "72.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 64.7% in 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "46.0", "median": "55.5", "upper_75": "64.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 57.2% in 2045?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "36.6", "median": "46.7", "upper_75": "57.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 51.6% in the year 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.3", "median": "39.1", "upper_75": "51.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 64.7% in 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "46.0", "median": "55.5", "upper_75": "64.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 51.6% in the year 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.3", "median": "39.1", "upper_75": "51.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 16.30% in 2075?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.32", "median": "16.30", "upper_75": "26.50", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 57.2% in 2045?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "36.6", "median": "46.7", "upper_75": "57.2", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 9.34 in the year 2125?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.50", "median": "5.33", "upper_75": "9.34", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 16.30% in 2075?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.32", "median": "16.30", "upper_75": "26.50", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 7.23% in the year 2100?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.52", "median": "7.23", "upper_75": "12.30", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 7.23% in the year 2100?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.52", "median": "7.23", "upper_75": "12.30", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 51.6% in the year 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.3", "median": "39.1", "upper_75": "51.6", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 16.30% in 2075?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.32", "median": "16.30", "upper_75": "26.50", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 50% in the following months (May-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 50% in the following months (Jun-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 9.34 in the year 2125?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.50", "median": "5.33", "upper_75": "9.34", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 9.34 in the year 2125?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.50", "median": "5.33", "upper_75": "9.34", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate in the United States will be 7.23% in the year 2100?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.52", "median": "7.23", "upper_75": "12.30", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 50% in the following months (May-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 50% in the following months (May-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 50% in the following months (Jun-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 50% in the following months (Jul-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 235k change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment from July to August?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "43.1k", "median": "140k", "upper_75": "235k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 235k change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment from July to August?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "43.1k", "median": "140k", "upper_75": "235k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 50% in the following months (Jul-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 50% in the following months (Jul-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the European Union will have 28.3 member states by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "28.3", "median": "31.7", "upper_75": "35.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 319.4 in the following months (May-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "319.4", "median": "333.2", "upper_75": "347.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the European Union will have 28.3 member states by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "28.3", "median": "31.7", "upper_75": "35.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the European Union will have 28.3 member states by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "28.3", "median": "31.7", "upper_75": "35.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 235k change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment from July to August?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "43.1k", "median": "140k", "upper_75": "235k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the hyperspectral satellite imagery market will be worth 56.4M USD in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "39.4M", "median": "47.1M", "upper_75": "56.4M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 0.290 in the United States in the following quarters (2025 Q2)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.290", "median": "1.53", "upper_75": "2.69", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 0.290 in the United States in the following quarters (2025 Q2)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.290", "median": "1.53", "upper_75": "2.69", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI-generated audiobooks will include illustrations, multiple voices, dramatization, sound effects, and soundtrack by Nov 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2024", "median": "Feb 2026", "upper_75": "May 2028", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the hyperspectral satellite imagery market will be worth 56.4M USD in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "39.4M", "median": "47.1M", "upper_75": "56.4M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI-generated audiobooks will include illustrations, multiple voices, dramatization, sound effects, and soundtrack by Nov 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2024", "median": "Feb 2026", "upper_75": "May 2028", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that AI-generated audiobooks will include illustrations, multiple voices, dramatization, sound effects, and soundtrack by Nov 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2024", "median": "Feb 2026", "upper_75": "May 2028", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 319.4 in the following months (May-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "319.4", "median": "333.2", "upper_75": "347.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 0.290 in the United States in the following quarters (2025 Q2)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.290", "median": "1.53", "upper_75": "2.69", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the hyperspectral satellite imagery market will be worth 56.4M USD in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "39.4M", "median": "47.1M", "upper_75": "56.4M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an open-source software capable of tagging images and videos with 99% accuracy and processing images at a rate of at least one image per second on Orange Pi 5 will be available by Jun 2030?", "desc": "Orange Pi 5 is a single-board computer that has been used in various applications, including image and video processing. Currently, there is no open-source software that can tag images and videos with 99% accuracy and process images at a rate of at least one image per second on Orange Pi 5. This question seeks to predict when such a software will become available, as it would be a significant milestone in the field of computer vision and could have various applications in areas like surveillance, robotics, and content management.", "resc": "This question will resolve when an open-source software meeting the following criteria becomes available for Orange Pi 5:\n\n1. Capable of tagging images and videos with at least 99% accuracy, as measured by a standard benchmark dataset (e.g., ImageNet, COCO, or a similar dataset).\n2. Able to process images at a rate of at least one image per second on a Raspberry Pi 4.\n3. The software must be open-source and available for public use.\n\nThe resolution date will be the date when the software is officially released or announced on a reputable platform (e.g., GitHub, arXiv, or a similar platform).", "lower_25": "Jun 2028", "median": "Jun 2029", "upper_75": "Jun 2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index will be 319.4 in the following months (May-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "319.4", "median": "333.2", "upper_75": "347.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 41.9% of people in Africa will be using the internet by 2025?", "desc": "Space-based communications infrastructure, including satellites, has the potential to dramatically improve connectivity and access to information, particularly in remote and underserved regions of the world. This could play a vital role in sustainable development efforts, especially in developing countries. However, the adoption and utilization of such technology can be hindered by various challenges, including costs, technical expertise, and regulatory issues.\n\nThe International Telecommunication Union (ITU) tracks the share of the population using the internet and [reported for 2022](https://www.itu.int/itu-d/reports/statistics/2022/11/24/ff22-internet-use/) that the share of the population in Africa using the internet was 40%. ITU's report for 2022 [was published](https://www.itu.int/en/mediacentre/Pages/PR-2022-11-30-Facts-Figures-2022.aspx) on November 30, 2022.\n\n\"ITU", "resc": "The question will resolve as the share of people in Africa using the internet in the year 2025, according to the [International Telecommunication Union (ITU)](https://www.itu.int/itu-d/reports/statistics/2022/11/24/ff22-internet-use/).", "lower_25": "41.9", "median": "45.8", "upper_75": "49.6", "prediction": "41.9%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an open-source software capable of tagging images and videos with 99% accuracy and processing images at a rate of at least one image per second on Orange Pi 5 will be available by Jun 2030?", "desc": "Orange Pi 5 is a single-board computer that has been used in various applications, including image and video processing. Currently, there is no open-source software that can tag images and videos with 99% accuracy and process images at a rate of at least one image per second on Orange Pi 5. This question seeks to predict when such a software will become available, as it would be a significant milestone in the field of computer vision and could have various applications in areas like surveillance, robotics, and content management.", "resc": "This question will resolve when an open-source software meeting the following criteria becomes available for Orange Pi 5:\n\n1. Capable of tagging images and videos with at least 99% accuracy, as measured by a standard benchmark dataset (e.g., ImageNet, COCO, or a similar dataset).\n2. Able to process images at a rate of at least one image per second on a Raspberry Pi 4.\n3. The software must be open-source and available for public use.\n\nThe resolution date will be the date when the software is officially released or announced on a reputable platform (e.g., GitHub, arXiv, or a similar platform).", "lower_25": "Jun 2028", "median": "Jun 2029", "upper_75": "Jun 2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood of a bilateral ceasefire or peace agreement in the Russo-Ukraine conflict by May 2026?", "desc": "On February 24, 2022, Russia began a [\"special military operation\"](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-authorises-military-operations-donbass-domestic-media-2022-02-24/) in Ukraine. This decision has been criticized internationally, particularly by Western countries, as an unprovoked invasion. Peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine took place on February 28, March 3, and March 7, 2022, on the Belarus–Ukraine border, with further talks held on March 10 in Turkey prior to a fourth round of negotiations which began on March 14. The Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba stated on July 13 that peace talks are [frozen](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-rules-out-ceding-territory-russia-secure-peace-2022-07-13/) for the time being. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is ongoing as of August 25, 2023.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which a bilateral ceasefire has gone into effect and stood for 30 days (the first day of such a ceasefire). A ceasefire is bilateral if it applies to the majorities of combatants on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides, respectively. A cease-fire is deemed to have stood as long as no reliable sources report that the cease-fire has broken down or is no longer effective. If no such ceasefire has gone into effect before January 1, 2030, the question resolves as **Not < January 1, 2030**.\n\nThe ceasefire must apply to all military operations in all official and disputed Ukrainian and Russian territory. In other words, a limited ceasefire (such as granting safety to humanitarian corridors or specific regions) is insufficient to resolve the question.", "lower_25": "Jul 2025", "median": "May 2026", "upper_75": "Sep 2027", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood of a bilateral ceasefire or peace agreement in the Russo-Ukraine conflict by May 2026?", "desc": "On February 24, 2022, Russia began a [\"special military operation\"](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-authorises-military-operations-donbass-domestic-media-2022-02-24/) in Ukraine. This decision has been criticized internationally, particularly by Western countries, as an unprovoked invasion. Peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine took place on February 28, March 3, and March 7, 2022, on the Belarus–Ukraine border, with further talks held on March 10 in Turkey prior to a fourth round of negotiations which began on March 14. The Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba stated on July 13 that peace talks are [frozen](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-rules-out-ceding-territory-russia-secure-peace-2022-07-13/) for the time being. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is ongoing as of August 25, 2023.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which a bilateral ceasefire has gone into effect and stood for 30 days (the first day of such a ceasefire). A ceasefire is bilateral if it applies to the majorities of combatants on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides, respectively. A cease-fire is deemed to have stood as long as no reliable sources report that the cease-fire has broken down or is no longer effective. If no such ceasefire has gone into effect before January 1, 2030, the question resolves as **Not < January 1, 2030**.\n\nThe ceasefire must apply to all military operations in all official and disputed Ukrainian and Russian territory. In other words, a limited ceasefire (such as granting safety to humanitarian corridors or specific regions) is insufficient to resolve the question.", "lower_25": "Jul 2025", "median": "May 2026", "upper_75": "Sep 2027", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US will be 3.43 on July 2024?", "desc": "The US has seen record high prices of gasoline in 2022, reaching $5.00 per gallon [in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GASREGW). However, when adjusting for inflation, June's gas prices are comparable to [previous spikes](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) in 1981, 2008, and 2011-2014. The US Energy Information Agency [predicts](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) inflation-adjusted retail gas prices to fall by 22% from June 2022 to June 2023.\n\n[Energy prices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021–2022_global_energy_crisis) have increased in Europe and Asia, first from supply chain shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic, then from [sanctions on Russian oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\nIn [June 2022](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-for-a-three-month-federal-gas-tax-holiday/), US President Joe Biden asked Congress to suspend the federal gas tax for 3 months, and announced increased releases of oil from the [strategic petroleum reserves](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_typ_d_nus_SAS_mbbl_m.htm). The US government has made [recent visits](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-venezuela-colombia-ec798d70f4e19e05c88e6ae2b43a19e9) to oil-rich Venezuela, despite still [officially recognizing](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/) Maduro's government as illegitimate.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the price of gas per gallon (in Jan 2022 USD) in the US on the respective dates according to the [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m). Gas prices will be EIA's Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported monthly in USD per gallon. For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to the January 2022 [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL).", "lower_25": "3.12", "median": "3.43", "upper_75": "3.76", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an open-source software capable of tagging images and videos with 99% accuracy and processing images at a rate of at least one image per second on Orange Pi 5 will be available by Jun 2030?", "desc": "Orange Pi 5 is a single-board computer that has been used in various applications, including image and video processing. Currently, there is no open-source software that can tag images and videos with 99% accuracy and process images at a rate of at least one image per second on Orange Pi 5. This question seeks to predict when such a software will become available, as it would be a significant milestone in the field of computer vision and could have various applications in areas like surveillance, robotics, and content management.", "resc": "This question will resolve when an open-source software meeting the following criteria becomes available for Orange Pi 5:\n\n1. Capable of tagging images and videos with at least 99% accuracy, as measured by a standard benchmark dataset (e.g., ImageNet, COCO, or a similar dataset).\n2. Able to process images at a rate of at least one image per second on a Raspberry Pi 4.\n3. The software must be open-source and available for public use.\n\nThe resolution date will be the date when the software is officially released or announced on a reputable platform (e.g., GitHub, arXiv, or a similar platform).", "lower_25": "Jun 2028", "median": "Jun 2029", "upper_75": "Jun 2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 41.9% of people in Africa will be using the internet by 2025?", "desc": "Space-based communications infrastructure, including satellites, has the potential to dramatically improve connectivity and access to information, particularly in remote and underserved regions of the world. This could play a vital role in sustainable development efforts, especially in developing countries. However, the adoption and utilization of such technology can be hindered by various challenges, including costs, technical expertise, and regulatory issues.\n\nThe International Telecommunication Union (ITU) tracks the share of the population using the internet and [reported for 2022](https://www.itu.int/itu-d/reports/statistics/2022/11/24/ff22-internet-use/) that the share of the population in Africa using the internet was 40%. ITU's report for 2022 [was published](https://www.itu.int/en/mediacentre/Pages/PR-2022-11-30-Facts-Figures-2022.aspx) on November 30, 2022.\n\n\"ITU", "resc": "The question will resolve as the share of people in Africa using the internet in the year 2025, according to the [International Telecommunication Union (ITU)](https://www.itu.int/itu-d/reports/statistics/2022/11/24/ff22-internet-use/).", "lower_25": "41.9", "median": "45.8", "upper_75": "49.6", "prediction": "41.9%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood of a bilateral ceasefire or peace agreement in the Russo-Ukraine conflict by May 2026?", "desc": "On February 24, 2022, Russia began a [\"special military operation\"](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-authorises-military-operations-donbass-domestic-media-2022-02-24/) in Ukraine. This decision has been criticized internationally, particularly by Western countries, as an unprovoked invasion. Peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine took place on February 28, March 3, and March 7, 2022, on the Belarus–Ukraine border, with further talks held on March 10 in Turkey prior to a fourth round of negotiations which began on March 14. The Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba stated on July 13 that peace talks are [frozen](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-rules-out-ceding-territory-russia-secure-peace-2022-07-13/) for the time being. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is ongoing as of August 25, 2023.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date on which a bilateral ceasefire has gone into effect and stood for 30 days (the first day of such a ceasefire). A ceasefire is bilateral if it applies to the majorities of combatants on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides, respectively. A cease-fire is deemed to have stood as long as no reliable sources report that the cease-fire has broken down or is no longer effective. If no such ceasefire has gone into effect before January 1, 2030, the question resolves as **Not < January 1, 2030**.\n\nThe ceasefire must apply to all military operations in all official and disputed Ukrainian and Russian territory. In other words, a limited ceasefire (such as granting safety to humanitarian corridors or specific regions) is insufficient to resolve the question.", "lower_25": "Jul 2025", "median": "May 2026", "upper_75": "Sep 2027", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an airborne SARS-CoV-2 virus monitor will be commercially available by Apr 2026?", "desc": "According to a Washington University in St. Louis [article published on July 10, 2023](https://source.wustl.edu/2023/07/air-monitor-can-detect-covid-19-virus-variants-in-about-5-minutes/):\n\n>. . . scientists are looking at ways to surveil indoor environments in real time for viruses. By combining recent advances in aerosol sampling technology and an ultrasensitive biosensing technique, researchers at Washington University in St. Louis have created a real-time monitor that can detect any of the SARS-CoV-2 virus variants in a room in about 5 minutes.\n>\n>The inexpensive, proof-of-concept device could be used in hospitals and health care facilities, schools and public places to help detect CoV-2 and potentially monitor for other respiratory virus aerosols, such as influenza and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV). Results of their work on the monitor, which they say is the most sensitive detector available, are published July 10 in Nature Communications.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>“There is nothing at the moment that tells us how safe a room is,” Cirrito said. “If you are in a room with 100 people, you don't want to find out five days later whether you could be sick or not. The idea with this device is that you can know essentially in real time, or every 5 minutes, if there is a live virus in the air.”\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>“We are starting with SARS-CoV-2, but there are plans to also measure influenza, RSV, rhinovirus and other top pathogens that routinely infect people,” Cirrito said. “In a hospital setting, the monitor could be used to measure for staph or strep, which cause all kinds of complications for patients. This could really have a major impact on people's health.”\n\nThe team is working to commercialize the air quality monitor.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of publication of the first report from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that such a device is commercially available. The device must be able to detect at least one variant of SARS-CoV-2 in the air without a person needing to exhale or blow directly into the device via a straw or other means. \n\nThe device must have a detection sensitivity of 70% or greater for one or more variants as published in an English language peer reviewed academic journal, or be recommended by Consumer Reports, The New York Times, or Harvard University.\n\n\"Commercially available\" means that any member of the general public can purchase the device in the United States.", "lower_25": "Oct 2024", "median": "Jun 2025", "upper_75": "Apr 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an airborne SARS-CoV-2 virus monitor will be commercially available by Apr 2026?", "desc": "According to a Washington University in St. Louis [article published on July 10, 2023](https://source.wustl.edu/2023/07/air-monitor-can-detect-covid-19-virus-variants-in-about-5-minutes/):\n\n>. . . scientists are looking at ways to surveil indoor environments in real time for viruses. By combining recent advances in aerosol sampling technology and an ultrasensitive biosensing technique, researchers at Washington University in St. Louis have created a real-time monitor that can detect any of the SARS-CoV-2 virus variants in a room in about 5 minutes.\n>\n>The inexpensive, proof-of-concept device could be used in hospitals and health care facilities, schools and public places to help detect CoV-2 and potentially monitor for other respiratory virus aerosols, such as influenza and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV). Results of their work on the monitor, which they say is the most sensitive detector available, are published July 10 in Nature Communications.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>“There is nothing at the moment that tells us how safe a room is,” Cirrito said. “If you are in a room with 100 people, you don't want to find out five days later whether you could be sick or not. The idea with this device is that you can know essentially in real time, or every 5 minutes, if there is a live virus in the air.”\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>“We are starting with SARS-CoV-2, but there are plans to also measure influenza, RSV, rhinovirus and other top pathogens that routinely infect people,” Cirrito said. “In a hospital setting, the monitor could be used to measure for staph or strep, which cause all kinds of complications for patients. This could really have a major impact on people's health.”\n\nThe team is working to commercialize the air quality monitor.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of publication of the first report from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that such a device is commercially available. The device must be able to detect at least one variant of SARS-CoV-2 in the air without a person needing to exhale or blow directly into the device via a straw or other means. \n\nThe device must have a detection sensitivity of 70% or greater for one or more variants as published in an English language peer reviewed academic journal, or be recommended by Consumer Reports, The New York Times, or Harvard University.\n\n\"Commercially available\" means that any member of the general public can purchase the device in the United States.", "lower_25": "Oct 2024", "median": "Jun 2025", "upper_75": "Apr 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US will be 2.87 on October 2024?", "desc": "The US has seen record high prices of gasoline in 2022, reaching $5.00 per gallon [in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GASREGW). However, when adjusting for inflation, June's gas prices are comparable to [previous spikes](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) in 1981, 2008, and 2011-2014. The US Energy Information Agency [predicts](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) inflation-adjusted retail gas prices to fall by 22% from June 2022 to June 2023.\n\n[Energy prices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021–2022_global_energy_crisis) have increased in Europe and Asia, first from supply chain shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic, then from [sanctions on Russian oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\nIn [June 2022](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-for-a-three-month-federal-gas-tax-holiday/), US President Joe Biden asked Congress to suspend the federal gas tax for 3 months, and announced increased releases of oil from the [strategic petroleum reserves](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_typ_d_nus_SAS_mbbl_m.htm). The US government has made [recent visits](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-venezuela-colombia-ec798d70f4e19e05c88e6ae2b43a19e9) to oil-rich Venezuela, despite still [officially recognizing](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/) Maduro's government as illegitimate.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the price of gas per gallon (in Jan 2022 USD) in the US on the respective dates according to the [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m). Gas prices will be EIA's Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported monthly in USD per gallon. For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to the January 2022 [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL).", "lower_25": "2.87", "median": "3.24", "upper_75": "3.64", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 41.9% of people in Africa will be using the internet by 2025?", "desc": "Space-based communications infrastructure, including satellites, has the potential to dramatically improve connectivity and access to information, particularly in remote and underserved regions of the world. This could play a vital role in sustainable development efforts, especially in developing countries. However, the adoption and utilization of such technology can be hindered by various challenges, including costs, technical expertise, and regulatory issues.\n\nThe International Telecommunication Union (ITU) tracks the share of the population using the internet and [reported for 2022](https://www.itu.int/itu-d/reports/statistics/2022/11/24/ff22-internet-use/) that the share of the population in Africa using the internet was 40%. ITU's report for 2022 [was published](https://www.itu.int/en/mediacentre/Pages/PR-2022-11-30-Facts-Figures-2022.aspx) on November 30, 2022.\n\n\"ITU", "resc": "The question will resolve as the share of people in Africa using the internet in the year 2025, according to the [International Telecommunication Union (ITU)](https://www.itu.int/itu-d/reports/statistics/2022/11/24/ff22-internet-use/).", "lower_25": "41.9", "median": "45.8", "upper_75": "49.6", "prediction": "41.9%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US will be 3.43 on July 2024?", "desc": "The US has seen record high prices of gasoline in 2022, reaching $5.00 per gallon [in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GASREGW). However, when adjusting for inflation, June's gas prices are comparable to [previous spikes](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) in 1981, 2008, and 2011-2014. The US Energy Information Agency [predicts](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) inflation-adjusted retail gas prices to fall by 22% from June 2022 to June 2023.\n\n[Energy prices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021–2022_global_energy_crisis) have increased in Europe and Asia, first from supply chain shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic, then from [sanctions on Russian oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\nIn [June 2022](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-for-a-three-month-federal-gas-tax-holiday/), US President Joe Biden asked Congress to suspend the federal gas tax for 3 months, and announced increased releases of oil from the [strategic petroleum reserves](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_typ_d_nus_SAS_mbbl_m.htm). The US government has made [recent visits](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-venezuela-colombia-ec798d70f4e19e05c88e6ae2b43a19e9) to oil-rich Venezuela, despite still [officially recognizing](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/) Maduro's government as illegitimate.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the price of gas per gallon (in Jan 2022 USD) in the US on the respective dates according to the [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m). Gas prices will be EIA's Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported monthly in USD per gallon. For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to the January 2022 [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL).", "lower_25": "3.12", "median": "3.43", "upper_75": "3.76", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US will be 2.87 on October 2024?", "desc": "The US has seen record high prices of gasoline in 2022, reaching $5.00 per gallon [in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GASREGW). However, when adjusting for inflation, June's gas prices are comparable to [previous spikes](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) in 1981, 2008, and 2011-2014. The US Energy Information Agency [predicts](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) inflation-adjusted retail gas prices to fall by 22% from June 2022 to June 2023.\n\n[Energy prices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021–2022_global_energy_crisis) have increased in Europe and Asia, first from supply chain shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic, then from [sanctions on Russian oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\nIn [June 2022](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-for-a-three-month-federal-gas-tax-holiday/), US President Joe Biden asked Congress to suspend the federal gas tax for 3 months, and announced increased releases of oil from the [strategic petroleum reserves](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_typ_d_nus_SAS_mbbl_m.htm). The US government has made [recent visits](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-venezuela-colombia-ec798d70f4e19e05c88e6ae2b43a19e9) to oil-rich Venezuela, despite still [officially recognizing](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/) Maduro's government as illegitimate.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the price of gas per gallon (in Jan 2022 USD) in the US on the respective dates according to the [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m). Gas prices will be EIA's Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported monthly in USD per gallon. For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to the January 2022 [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL).", "lower_25": "2.87", "median": "3.24", "upper_75": "3.64", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an airborne SARS-CoV-2 virus monitor will be commercially available by Apr 2026?", "desc": "According to a Washington University in St. Louis [article published on July 10, 2023](https://source.wustl.edu/2023/07/air-monitor-can-detect-covid-19-virus-variants-in-about-5-minutes/):\n\n>. . . scientists are looking at ways to surveil indoor environments in real time for viruses. By combining recent advances in aerosol sampling technology and an ultrasensitive biosensing technique, researchers at Washington University in St. Louis have created a real-time monitor that can detect any of the SARS-CoV-2 virus variants in a room in about 5 minutes.\n>\n>The inexpensive, proof-of-concept device could be used in hospitals and health care facilities, schools and public places to help detect CoV-2 and potentially monitor for other respiratory virus aerosols, such as influenza and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV). Results of their work on the monitor, which they say is the most sensitive detector available, are published July 10 in Nature Communications.\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>“There is nothing at the moment that tells us how safe a room is,” Cirrito said. “If you are in a room with 100 people, you don't want to find out five days later whether you could be sick or not. The idea with this device is that you can know essentially in real time, or every 5 minutes, if there is a live virus in the air.”\n>\n>. . .\n>\n>“We are starting with SARS-CoV-2, but there are plans to also measure influenza, RSV, rhinovirus and other top pathogens that routinely infect people,” Cirrito said. “In a hospital setting, the monitor could be used to measure for staph or strep, which cause all kinds of complications for patients. This could really have a major impact on people's health.”\n\nThe team is working to commercialize the air quality monitor.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date of publication of the first report from [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) that such a device is commercially available. The device must be able to detect at least one variant of SARS-CoV-2 in the air without a person needing to exhale or blow directly into the device via a straw or other means. \n\nThe device must have a detection sensitivity of 70% or greater for one or more variants as published in an English language peer reviewed academic journal, or be recommended by Consumer Reports, The New York Times, or Harvard University.\n\n\"Commercially available\" means that any member of the general public can purchase the device in the United States.", "lower_25": "Oct 2024", "median": "Jun 2025", "upper_75": "Apr 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US will be 2.87 on October 2024?", "desc": "The US has seen record high prices of gasoline in 2022, reaching $5.00 per gallon [in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GASREGW). However, when adjusting for inflation, June's gas prices are comparable to [previous spikes](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) in 1981, 2008, and 2011-2014. The US Energy Information Agency [predicts](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) inflation-adjusted retail gas prices to fall by 22% from June 2022 to June 2023.\n\n[Energy prices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021–2022_global_energy_crisis) have increased in Europe and Asia, first from supply chain shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic, then from [sanctions on Russian oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\nIn [June 2022](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-for-a-three-month-federal-gas-tax-holiday/), US President Joe Biden asked Congress to suspend the federal gas tax for 3 months, and announced increased releases of oil from the [strategic petroleum reserves](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_typ_d_nus_SAS_mbbl_m.htm). The US government has made [recent visits](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-venezuela-colombia-ec798d70f4e19e05c88e6ae2b43a19e9) to oil-rich Venezuela, despite still [officially recognizing](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/) Maduro's government as illegitimate.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the price of gas per gallon (in Jan 2022 USD) in the US on the respective dates according to the [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m). Gas prices will be EIA's Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported monthly in USD per gallon. For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to the January 2022 [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL).", "lower_25": "2.87", "median": "3.24", "upper_75": "3.64", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the real price of gas (per gallon, 2022 USD) in the US will be 3.43 on July 2024?", "desc": "The US has seen record high prices of gasoline in 2022, reaching $5.00 per gallon [in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GASREGW). However, when adjusting for inflation, June's gas prices are comparable to [previous spikes](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) in 1981, 2008, and 2011-2014. The US Energy Information Agency [predicts](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/realprices/) inflation-adjusted retail gas prices to fall by 22% from June 2022 to June 2023.\n\n[Energy prices](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021–2022_global_energy_crisis) have increased in Europe and Asia, first from supply chain shortages following the COVID-19 pandemic, then from [sanctions on Russian oil](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.\n\nIn [June 2022](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-for-a-three-month-federal-gas-tax-holiday/), US President Joe Biden asked Congress to suspend the federal gas tax for 3 months, and announced increased releases of oil from the [strategic petroleum reserves](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_typ_d_nus_SAS_mbbl_m.htm). The US government has made [recent visits](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-venezuela-colombia-ec798d70f4e19e05c88e6ae2b43a19e9) to oil-rich Venezuela, despite still [officially recognizing](https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-venezuela/) Maduro's government as illegitimate.", "resc": "The sub-questions below will resolve as the price of gas per gallon (in Jan 2022 USD) in the US on the respective dates according to the [Energy Information Agency](https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=emm_epmr_pte_nus_dpg&f=m). Gas prices will be EIA's Regular All Formulations Retail Gasoline Prices, reported monthly in USD per gallon. For this question, prices will be inflation indexed to the January 2022 [Consumer Price Index](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL).", "lower_25": "3.12", "median": "3.43", "upper_75": "3.76", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 75% according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months?", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "−2.32", "median": "−0.794", "upper_75": "0.874", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 75% according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months?", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "−2.32", "median": "−0.794", "upper_75": "0.874", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 75% according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months?", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "−2.32", "median": "−0.794", "upper_75": "0.874", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 50% according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months?", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "−2.28", "median": "−0.510", "upper_75": "1.35", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 75% according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months?", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "−2.32", "median": "−0.794", "upper_75": "0.874", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 75% according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months?", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "−2.32", "median": "−0.794", "upper_75": "0.874", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 75% according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months?", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "−2.32", "median": "−0.794", "upper_75": "0.874", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 75% according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months?", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 75% according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months?", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 50% according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months?", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "−2.28", "median": "−0.510", "upper_75": "1.35", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 75% according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months? (Sept-2024)", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 50% according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months?", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "−2.28", "median": "−0.510", "upper_75": "1.35", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 75% according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months?", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 25% according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months?", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 75% according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months? (Sept-2024)", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 2.38 points according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months?", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "−1.64", "median": "0.474", "upper_75": "2.38", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Massachusetts on Jan 4, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Jan 4, 2024", "median": "Jan 6, 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 9, 2024", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in New York on Jan 4, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 4, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in New York on Jan 4, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 4, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 25% according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months?", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Massachusetts on Jan 4, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Jan 4, 2024", "median": "Jan 6, 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 9, 2024", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in New York on Jan 4, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 4, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Massachusetts on Jan 4, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Jan 4, 2024", "median": "Jan 6, 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 9, 2024", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Pennsylvania on Jan 2, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 2, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Pennsylvania on Jan 2, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 2, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 2.38 points according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months?", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "−1.64", "median": "0.474", "upper_75": "2.38", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in the following states on Jan 4, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Jan 4, 2024", "median": "Jan 6, 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 9, 2024", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Biden's polling margin over Trump will be 2.38 points according to RealClearPolitics' 2024 election polling average in these months?", "desc": "The [2024 United States presidential election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_United_States_presidential_election) will be the 60th quadrennial presidential election, and is scheduled for Tuesday, November 5, 2024. Incumbent president Joe Biden and former president Donald Trump are running, and as of late August 2023, both have large leads in polling for the primaries of their parties. \n\nHowever, as of August 29, 2023, polling for a hypothetical Biden v Trump 2024 matchup is much less clear, with Biden having a 1.1 point lead over Trump according to a [polling average maintained by RealClearPolitics](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html).", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as Joe Biden's poll lead or deficit relative to Donald Trump, in percentage points, according to the [RealClearPolitics polling average](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html) as of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. For example, on September 1, 2023, Biden's average was 44.6, and Trump's average was 43.8; a question for September 1, 2023 would have resolved as **+0.8**.\n\nIn the event that the RCP average is unavailable or clearly erroneous (due to a software or clerical error, etc) at that time, Metaculus administrators may resolve the question as the most recent available value believed to be correct that is dated within 24 hours of 12 PM Eastern on the first day of the relevant month. If no such value is available from the RCP polling average, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous.**\n\nIn the event that either Joe Biden or Donald Trump declare that they are officially terminating their campaigns for the presidency, or are precluded from running by incapacity or death, all unresolved sub-questions for future months will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "−1.64", "median": "0.474", "upper_75": "2.38", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Pennsylvania on Jan 2, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 2, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in the following states on Jan 4, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Jan 4, 2024", "median": "Jan 6, 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 9, 2024", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Florida on Jan 4, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Jan 4, 2024", "median": "Jan 6, 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 10, 2024", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in the following states on Jan 4, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Jan 4, 2024", "median": "Jan 6, 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 9, 2024", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Illinois on Dec 31, 2023?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 2, 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Florida on Jan 4, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Jan 4, 2024", "median": "Jan 6, 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 10, 2024", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Florida on Jan 4, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Jan 4, 2024", "median": "Jan 6, 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 10, 2024", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Illinois on Dec 31, 2023?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 2, 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Illinois on Dec 31, 2023?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 2, 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Texas on Jan 9, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Jan 4, 2024", "median": "Jan 6, 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 9, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Texas on Jan 9, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Jan 4, 2024", "median": "Jan 6, 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 9, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Colorado on Dec 29, 2023?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 3, 2024", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Colorado on Dec 29, 2023?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 3, 2024", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Colorado on Dec 29, 2023?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 3, 2024", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Missouri on Feb 26, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Feb 18, 2024", "median": "Feb 23, 2024", "upper_75": "Feb 26, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in California on Jan 2, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 2, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Missouri on Feb 26, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Feb 18, 2024", "median": "Feb 23, 2024", "upper_75": "Feb 26, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in California on Jan 2, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 2, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Missouri on Feb 26, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Feb 18, 2024", "median": "Feb 23, 2024", "upper_75": "Feb 26, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Texas on Jan 9, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Jan 4, 2024", "median": "Jan 6, 2024", "upper_75": "Jan 9, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Washington on Dec 31, 2023?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 4, 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in California on Jan 2, 2024?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 2, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first medical treatment based on nanorobots will happen by 2039?", "desc": "Nanorobotics is an emerging technology field creating machines or robots whose components are at or near the scale of a nanometer. Among their potential uses, nanorobots could revolutionize medicine, even though as of today there is \"still a long way to go before their commercialization and clinical applications can be achieved.\"\n\nSee also [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanorobotics) and a recent review focused on [nanorobotics for cancer treatments](https://jhoonline.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13045-023-01463-z)", "resc": "-A medical treatment using nanorobots is performed on a human patient. Any treatment counts (drug delivery, precision surgery, etc.)\n\nFor the sake of this forecast, nanorobots are defined by the following criteria:\n\n1. They have an active power system (perhaps using external power sources such as near-infrared light, ultrasound, or magnetic driving forces)\n\n2. They are capable of propulsion.\n\n3. They have at least 1 of the following options a,b,c:\n\na. They have sensors (These are devices that allow a nanorobot to detect changes in the body, such as temperature, pH, or the presence of specific molecules)\n\nb. They have actuators (These are devices that enable the nanorobot to physically interact with the body, such as moving through the bloodstream, releasing drugs, or performing surgery)\n\nc. They can communicate (Medical nanorobots may need to communicate with each other or with external devices, such as an antenna of a computer or a remote control system)\n\nIn case of ambiguity, the description of nanorobots given in this [paper on nanorobotics for cancer treatments](https://jhoonline.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13045-023-01463-z) will be used.", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first medical treatment based on nanorobots will happen by 2039?", "desc": "Nanorobotics is an emerging technology field creating machines or robots whose components are at or near the scale of a nanometer. Among their potential uses, nanorobots could revolutionize medicine, even though as of today there is \"still a long way to go before their commercialization and clinical applications can be achieved.\"\n\nSee also [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanorobotics) and a recent review focused on [nanorobotics for cancer treatments](https://jhoonline.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13045-023-01463-z)", "resc": "-A medical treatment using nanorobots is performed on a human patient. Any treatment counts (drug delivery, precision surgery, etc.)\n\nFor the sake of this forecast, nanorobots are defined by the following criteria:\n\n1. They have an active power system (perhaps using external power sources such as near-infrared light, ultrasound, or magnetic driving forces)\n\n2. They are capable of propulsion.\n\n3. They have at least 1 of the following options a,b,c:\n\na. They have sensors (These are devices that allow a nanorobot to detect changes in the body, such as temperature, pH, or the presence of specific molecules)\n\nb. They have actuators (These are devices that enable the nanorobot to physically interact with the body, such as moving through the bloodstream, releasing drugs, or performing surgery)\n\nc. They can communicate (Medical nanorobots may need to communicate with each other or with external devices, such as an antenna of a computer or a remote control system)\n\nIn case of ambiguity, the description of nanorobots given in this [paper on nanorobotics for cancer treatments](https://jhoonline.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13045-023-01463-z) will be used.", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Washington on Dec 31, 2023?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 4, 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first medical treatment based on nanorobots will happen by 2039?", "desc": "Nanorobotics is an emerging technology field creating machines or robots whose components are at or near the scale of a nanometer. Among their potential uses, nanorobots could revolutionize medicine, even though as of today there is \"still a long way to go before their commercialization and clinical applications can be achieved.\"\n\nSee also [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanorobotics) and a recent review focused on [nanorobotics for cancer treatments](https://jhoonline.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13045-023-01463-z)", "resc": "-A medical treatment using nanorobots is performed on a human patient. Any treatment counts (drug delivery, precision surgery, etc.)\n\nFor the sake of this forecast, nanorobots are defined by the following criteria:\n\n1. They have an active power system (perhaps using external power sources such as near-infrared light, ultrasound, or magnetic driving forces)\n\n2. They are capable of propulsion.\n\n3. They have at least 1 of the following options a,b,c:\n\na. They have sensors (These are devices that allow a nanorobot to detect changes in the body, such as temperature, pH, or the presence of specific molecules)\n\nb. They have actuators (These are devices that enable the nanorobot to physically interact with the body, such as moving through the bloodstream, releasing drugs, or performing surgery)\n\nc. They can communicate (Medical nanorobots may need to communicate with each other or with external devices, such as an antenna of a computer or a remote control system)\n\nIn case of ambiguity, the description of nanorobots given in this [paper on nanorobotics for cancer treatments](https://jhoonline.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13045-023-01463-z) will be used.", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2039", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations will occur in Washington on Dec 31, 2023?", "desc": "Confirmed hospitalizations due to influenza is an indicator of the overall burden of influenza in the United States and predictions of confirmed hospitalizations can help public health planning and interventions.", "resc": "For each of the listed US states, this question will resolve as the date of the maximum weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations during the 2023/24 flu season, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday, and the resolution will use the week end date of the peak week.\n\nThe 2023/24 flu season will be considered to run from the week ending October 14, 2023, to the week ending May 4, 2024, inclusive. To allow for data revisions and reporting delays, resolution will be determined according to data published on May 18, 2024.\n\nPlots of state-by-state hospitalizations for all states can be found [here](https://github.com/computationalUncertaintyLab/FluHospPlot) (*note that these do not use the same data as the resolution source*).", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 4, 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment will increase by 229k in the following months (Aug-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the change in [nonfarm payroll employment](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nonfarmpayroll.asp) in the United States. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its nonfarm payroll estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally change in nonfarm payrolls, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm).", "lower_25": "35.3k", "median": "134k", "upper_75": "229k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment will increase by 229k in the following months (Aug-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the change in [nonfarm payroll employment](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nonfarmpayroll.asp) in the United States. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its nonfarm payroll estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally change in nonfarm payrolls, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm).", "lower_25": "35.3k", "median": "134k", "upper_75": "229k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment will increase by 229k in the following months (Aug-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the change in [nonfarm payroll employment](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nonfarmpayroll.asp) in the United States. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its nonfarm payroll estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally change in nonfarm payrolls, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm).", "lower_25": "35.3k", "median": "134k", "upper_75": "229k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S. government will spend 37.4% of GDP in the year 2031?", "desc": "#### FRED Graphs of Federal Spending, State & Local Spending, and GDP\n\n\n\n#### FRED graphs of (Federal government total expenditures + State and local government total expenditures)/Gross Domestic Product\n\n", "resc": "This question resolves as the amount of US government spending (Federal plus State & Local) as a percentage of US GDP in the following years: 2031, 2051, and 2091.\n\nThe question will be resolved using the following data sources for US Government Spending:\n\n- the FRED data series for [Federal government total expenditures](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W019RCQ027SBEA) measured on an annual average frequency\n- the FRED data series for [State and local government total expenditures](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W079RC1A027NBEA) measured on an annual average frequency\n- the FRED data series for [US Gross Domestic Product](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDP) measured on an annual average frequency\n\nTo the percentage will be calculated as the sum of federal government total expenditures and state and local government total expenditures, divided by the US Gross Domestic product for the year in question.", "lower_25": "35.2", "median": "37.4", "upper_75": "39.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 50% in the following months (Aug-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [Consumer Price Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consumer_price_index) (CPI), a measure of inflation, for the United States. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/cpi.htm) its CPI estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nThere are [two versions](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/headline-inflation.asp) of CPI. One is typically known as headline CPI which is the full measure, while the other is typically known as core CPI, which doesn't include food and energy.\n\nBelow is a graph of the month over month change in CPI in the US, seasonally adjusted, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initial estimate from each month.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the US, in percent, for each month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 3.83% in the following months (Aug-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the monthly U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "3.83", "median": "4.13", "upper_75": "4.49", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S. government will spend 37.4% of GDP in the year 2031?", "desc": "#### FRED Graphs of Federal Spending, State & Local Spending, and GDP\n\n\n\n#### FRED graphs of (Federal government total expenditures + State and local government total expenditures)/Gross Domestic Product\n\n", "resc": "This question resolves as the amount of US government spending (Federal plus State & Local) as a percentage of US GDP in the following years: 2031, 2051, and 2091.\n\nThe question will be resolved using the following data sources for US Government Spending:\n\n- the FRED data series for [Federal government total expenditures](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W019RCQ027SBEA) measured on an annual average frequency\n- the FRED data series for [State and local government total expenditures](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W079RC1A027NBEA) measured on an annual average frequency\n- the FRED data series for [US Gross Domestic Product](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDP) measured on an annual average frequency\n\nTo the percentage will be calculated as the sum of federal government total expenditures and state and local government total expenditures, divided by the US Gross Domestic product for the year in question.", "lower_25": "35.2", "median": "37.4", "upper_75": "39.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 3.83% in the following months (Aug-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the monthly U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "3.83", "median": "4.13", "upper_75": "4.49", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 3.83% in the following months (Aug-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the monthly seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the monthly U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published for the listed month by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "3.83", "median": "4.13", "upper_75": "4.49", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S. government will spend 34.3% of GDP in the year 2051?", "desc": "#### FRED Graphs of Federal Spending, State & Local Spending, and GDP\n\n\n\n#### FRED graphs of (Federal government total expenditures + State and local government total expenditures)/Gross Domestic Product\n\n", "resc": "This question resolves as the amount of US government spending (Federal plus State & Local) as a percentage of US GDP in the following years: 2031, 2051, and 2091.\n\nThe question will be resolved using the following data sources for US Government Spending:\n\n- the FRED data series for [Federal government total expenditures](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W019RCQ027SBEA) measured on an annual average frequency\n- the FRED data series for [State and local government total expenditures](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W079RC1A027NBEA) measured on an annual average frequency\n- the FRED data series for [US Gross Domestic Product](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDP) measured on an annual average frequency\n\nTo the percentage will be calculated as the sum of federal government total expenditures and state and local government total expenditures, divided by the US Gross Domestic product for the year in question.", "lower_25": "34.3", "median": "38.1", "upper_75": "41.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S. government will spend 37.4% of GDP in the year 2031?", "desc": "#### FRED Graphs of Federal Spending, State & Local Spending, and GDP\n\n\n\n#### FRED graphs of (Federal government total expenditures + State and local government total expenditures)/Gross Domestic Product\n\n", "resc": "This question resolves as the amount of US government spending (Federal plus State & Local) as a percentage of US GDP in the following years: 2031, 2051, and 2091.\n\nThe question will be resolved using the following data sources for US Government Spending:\n\n- the FRED data series for [Federal government total expenditures](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W019RCQ027SBEA) measured on an annual average frequency\n- the FRED data series for [State and local government total expenditures](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W079RC1A027NBEA) measured on an annual average frequency\n- the FRED data series for [US Gross Domestic Product](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDP) measured on an annual average frequency\n\nTo the percentage will be calculated as the sum of federal government total expenditures and state and local government total expenditures, divided by the US Gross Domestic product for the year in question.", "lower_25": "35.2", "median": "37.4", "upper_75": "39.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S. government will spend 40.1% of GDP in the year 2091?", "desc": "#### FRED Graphs of Federal Spending, State & Local Spending, and GDP\n\n\n\n#### FRED graphs of (Federal government total expenditures + State and local government total expenditures)/Gross Domestic Product\n\n", "resc": "This question resolves as the amount of US government spending (Federal plus State & Local) as a percentage of US GDP in the following years: 2031, 2051, and 2091.\n\nThe question will be resolved using the following data sources for US Government Spending:\n\n- the FRED data series for [Federal government total expenditures](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W019RCQ027SBEA) measured on an annual average frequency\n- the FRED data series for [State and local government total expenditures](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W079RC1A027NBEA) measured on an annual average frequency\n- the FRED data series for [US Gross Domestic Product](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDP) measured on an annual average frequency\n\nTo the percentage will be calculated as the sum of federal government total expenditures and state and local government total expenditures, divided by the US Gross Domestic product for the year in question.", "lower_25": "35.1", "median": "40.1", "upper_75": "44.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S. government will spend 40.1% of GDP in the year 2091?", "desc": "#### FRED Graphs of Federal Spending, State & Local Spending, and GDP\n\n\n\n#### FRED graphs of (Federal government total expenditures + State and local government total expenditures)/Gross Domestic Product\n\n", "resc": "This question resolves as the amount of US government spending (Federal plus State & Local) as a percentage of US GDP in the following years: 2031, 2051, and 2091.\n\nThe question will be resolved using the following data sources for US Government Spending:\n\n- the FRED data series for [Federal government total expenditures](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W019RCQ027SBEA) measured on an annual average frequency\n- the FRED data series for [State and local government total expenditures](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W079RC1A027NBEA) measured on an annual average frequency\n- the FRED data series for [US Gross Domestic Product](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDP) measured on an annual average frequency\n\nTo the percentage will be calculated as the sum of federal government total expenditures and state and local government total expenditures, divided by the US Gross Domestic product for the year in question.", "lower_25": "35.1", "median": "40.1", "upper_75": "44.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S. government will spend 34.3% of GDP in the year 2051?", "desc": "#### FRED Graphs of Federal Spending, State & Local Spending, and GDP\n\n\n\n#### FRED graphs of (Federal government total expenditures + State and local government total expenditures)/Gross Domestic Product\n\n", "resc": "This question resolves as the amount of US government spending (Federal plus State & Local) as a percentage of US GDP in the following years: 2031, 2051, and 2091.\n\nThe question will be resolved using the following data sources for US Government Spending:\n\n- the FRED data series for [Federal government total expenditures](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W019RCQ027SBEA) measured on an annual average frequency\n- the FRED data series for [State and local government total expenditures](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W079RC1A027NBEA) measured on an annual average frequency\n- the FRED data series for [US Gross Domestic Product](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDP) measured on an annual average frequency\n\nTo the percentage will be calculated as the sum of federal government total expenditures and state and local government total expenditures, divided by the US Gross Domestic product for the year in question.", "lower_25": "34.3", "median": "38.1", "upper_75": "41.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S. government will spend 40.1% of GDP in the year 2091?", "desc": "#### FRED Graphs of Federal Spending, State & Local Spending, and GDP\n\n\n\n#### FRED graphs of (Federal government total expenditures + State and local government total expenditures)/Gross Domestic Product\n\n", "resc": "This question resolves as the amount of US government spending (Federal plus State & Local) as a percentage of US GDP in the following years: 2031, 2051, and 2091.\n\nThe question will be resolved using the following data sources for US Government Spending:\n\n- the FRED data series for [Federal government total expenditures](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W019RCQ027SBEA) measured on an annual average frequency\n- the FRED data series for [State and local government total expenditures](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W079RC1A027NBEA) measured on an annual average frequency\n- the FRED data series for [US Gross Domestic Product](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDP) measured on an annual average frequency\n\nTo the percentage will be calculated as the sum of federal government total expenditures and state and local government total expenditures, divided by the US Gross Domestic product for the year in question.", "lower_25": "35.1", "median": "40.1", "upper_75": "44.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the U.S. government will spend 34.3% of GDP in the year 2051?", "desc": "#### FRED Graphs of Federal Spending, State & Local Spending, and GDP\n\n\n\n#### FRED graphs of (Federal government total expenditures + State and local government total expenditures)/Gross Domestic Product\n\n", "resc": "This question resolves as the amount of US government spending (Federal plus State & Local) as a percentage of US GDP in the following years: 2031, 2051, and 2091.\n\nThe question will be resolved using the following data sources for US Government Spending:\n\n- the FRED data series for [Federal government total expenditures](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W019RCQ027SBEA) measured on an annual average frequency\n- the FRED data series for [State and local government total expenditures](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/W079RC1A027NBEA) measured on an annual average frequency\n- the FRED data series for [US Gross Domestic Product](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDP) measured on an annual average frequency\n\nTo the percentage will be calculated as the sum of federal government total expenditures and state and local government total expenditures, divided by the US Gross Domestic product for the year in question.", "lower_25": "34.3", "median": "38.1", "upper_75": "41.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 50% in the following months (Aug-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [Consumer Price Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consumer_price_index) (CPI), a measure of inflation, for the United States. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/cpi.htm) its CPI estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nThere are [two versions](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/headline-inflation.asp) of CPI. One is typically known as headline CPI which is the full measure, while the other is typically known as core CPI, which doesn't include food and energy.\n\nBelow is a graph of the month over month change in CPI in the US, seasonally adjusted, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initial estimate from each month.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the US, in percent, for each month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Dodge will sell 65,100 BEV Challengers and Chargers in 2026?", "desc": "[In 2021, Dodge made the announcement](https://www.gearpatrol.com/cars/a41351963/dodge-electric-muscle-car-delayed/) that 2023 would be the last year that internal combustion engine Chargers and Challengers would be made. They would be replaced with battery electric vehicle equivalents sometime in 2024, but reportedly the debut of these BEVs could be delayed until 2025.\n\n[This decision has proved controversial.](https://www.thestreet.com/investing/people-sound-off-about-dodge-evs-muscle-car-roar) [Ford has committed to keeping the rival Mustang ICE-only at least for the near future,](https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/14/business/new-ford-mustang/index.html) [and the S650 generation of the Mustang has recently gone on sale.](https://www.ford.com/cars/mustang/) [The future of the rival Camaro remains unknown,](https://media.chevrolet.com/media/us/en/chevrolet/home.detail.html/content/Pages/news/us/en/2023/mar/0322-camaro.html) with vague assurances from Chevrolet that \"this is not the end of the Camaro's story\".", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of combined sales for the [Dodge Charger](https://www.goodcarbadcar.net/dodge-charger-sales-figures/) and [Challenger](https://www.goodcarbadcar.net/dodge-challenger-sales-figures/) in the year 2026, as reported by GoodCarBadCar.net.", "lower_25": "40.5k", "median": "52.9k", "upper_75": "65.1k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 50% in the following months (Aug-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [Consumer Price Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consumer_price_index) (CPI), a measure of inflation, for the United States. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/cpi.htm) its CPI estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nThere are [two versions](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/headline-inflation.asp) of CPI. One is typically known as headline CPI which is the full measure, while the other is typically known as core CPI, which doesn't include food and energy.\n\nBelow is a graph of the month over month change in CPI in the US, seasonally adjusted, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initial estimate from each month.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the US, in percent, for each month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Dodge will sell 65,100 BEV Challengers and Chargers in 2026?", "desc": "[In 2021, Dodge made the announcement](https://www.gearpatrol.com/cars/a41351963/dodge-electric-muscle-car-delayed/) that 2023 would be the last year that internal combustion engine Chargers and Challengers would be made. They would be replaced with battery electric vehicle equivalents sometime in 2024, but reportedly the debut of these BEVs could be delayed until 2025.\n\n[This decision has proved controversial.](https://www.thestreet.com/investing/people-sound-off-about-dodge-evs-muscle-car-roar) [Ford has committed to keeping the rival Mustang ICE-only at least for the near future,](https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/14/business/new-ford-mustang/index.html) [and the S650 generation of the Mustang has recently gone on sale.](https://www.ford.com/cars/mustang/) [The future of the rival Camaro remains unknown,](https://media.chevrolet.com/media/us/en/chevrolet/home.detail.html/content/Pages/news/us/en/2023/mar/0322-camaro.html) with vague assurances from Chevrolet that \"this is not the end of the Camaro's story\".", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of combined sales for the [Dodge Charger](https://www.goodcarbadcar.net/dodge-charger-sales-figures/) and [Challenger](https://www.goodcarbadcar.net/dodge-challenger-sales-figures/) in the year 2026, as reported by GoodCarBadCar.net.", "lower_25": "40.5k", "median": "52.9k", "upper_75": "65.1k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Dodge will sell 65,100 BEV Challengers and Chargers in 2026?", "desc": "[In 2021, Dodge made the announcement](https://www.gearpatrol.com/cars/a41351963/dodge-electric-muscle-car-delayed/) that 2023 would be the last year that internal combustion engine Chargers and Challengers would be made. They would be replaced with battery electric vehicle equivalents sometime in 2024, but reportedly the debut of these BEVs could be delayed until 2025.\n\n[This decision has proved controversial.](https://www.thestreet.com/investing/people-sound-off-about-dodge-evs-muscle-car-roar) [Ford has committed to keeping the rival Mustang ICE-only at least for the near future,](https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/14/business/new-ford-mustang/index.html) [and the S650 generation of the Mustang has recently gone on sale.](https://www.ford.com/cars/mustang/) [The future of the rival Camaro remains unknown,](https://media.chevrolet.com/media/us/en/chevrolet/home.detail.html/content/Pages/news/us/en/2023/mar/0322-camaro.html) with vague assurances from Chevrolet that \"this is not the end of the Camaro's story\".", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of combined sales for the [Dodge Charger](https://www.goodcarbadcar.net/dodge-charger-sales-figures/) and [Challenger](https://www.goodcarbadcar.net/dodge-challenger-sales-figures/) in the year 2026, as reported by GoodCarBadCar.net.", "lower_25": "40.5k", "median": "52.9k", "upper_75": "65.1k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first post-2022 direct flight between Russia and Europe (EU or UK ) will take place by Jul 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 2026", "median": "Jun 2028", "upper_75": "Jul 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 582.5 weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Massachusetts during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "582.5", "median": "608.5", "upper_75": "636.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 582.5 weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Massachusetts during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "582.5", "median": "608.5", "upper_75": "636.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.358k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in New York for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.305k", "median": "1.358k", "upper_75": "1.428k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 75% of weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Massachusetts for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "582.5", "median": "608.5", "upper_75": "636.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 75% of weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Massachusetts for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "582.5", "median": "608.5", "upper_75": "636.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 75% of weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Massachusetts for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "582.5", "median": "608.5", "upper_75": "636.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first post-2022 direct flight between Russia and Europe (EU or UK ) will take place by Jul 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 2026", "median": "Jun 2028", "upper_75": "Jul 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 582.5 weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Massachusetts during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "582.5", "median": "608.5", "upper_75": "636.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first post-2022 direct flight between Russia and Europe (EU or UK ) will take place by Jul 2026?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 2026", "median": "Jun 2028", "upper_75": "Jul 2030", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.358k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in New York for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.305k", "median": "1.358k", "upper_75": "1.428k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.305k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in New York for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.305k", "median": "1.358k", "upper_75": "1.428k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.358k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in New York for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.305k", "median": "1.358k", "upper_75": "1.428k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.305k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in New York for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.305k", "median": "1.358k", "upper_75": "1.428k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.030k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Pennsylvania for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "987.6", "median": "1.030k", "upper_75": "1.070k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.030k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Pennsylvania for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "987.6", "median": "1.030k", "upper_75": "1.070k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.305k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in New York for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.305k", "median": "1.358k", "upper_75": "1.428k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 50% of weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Pennsylvania during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "987.6", "median": "1.030k", "upper_75": "1.070k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 50% of weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Pennsylvania during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "987.6", "median": "1.030k", "upper_75": "1.070k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.030k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Pennsylvania for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "987.6", "median": "1.030k", "upper_75": "1.070k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.428k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Florida for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.376k", "median": "1.428k", "upper_75": "1.491k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.491k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Florida during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.376k", "median": "1.428k", "upper_75": "1.491k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.491k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Florida during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.376k", "median": "1.428k", "upper_75": "1.491k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 50% of weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Pennsylvania during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "987.6", "median": "1.030k", "upper_75": "1.070k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.428k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Florida for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.376k", "median": "1.428k", "upper_75": "1.491k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 575.9 weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Illinois for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "552.6", "median": "575.9", "upper_75": "597.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.428k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Florida for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.376k", "median": "1.428k", "upper_75": "1.491k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 552.6 weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Illinois during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "552.6", "median": "575.9", "upper_75": "597.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 552.6 weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Illinois during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "552.6", "median": "575.9", "upper_75": "597.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.608k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Texas for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.548k", "median": "1.608k", "upper_75": "1.691k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.491k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Florida during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.376k", "median": "1.428k", "upper_75": "1.491k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 575.9 weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Illinois for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "552.6", "median": "575.9", "upper_75": "597.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.608k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Texas for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.548k", "median": "1.608k", "upper_75": "1.691k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.608k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Texas for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.548k", "median": "1.608k", "upper_75": "1.691k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 552.6 weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Illinois during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "552.6", "median": "575.9", "upper_75": "597.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 575.9 weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Illinois for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "552.6", "median": "575.9", "upper_75": "597.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 448.3 weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Missouri for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "433.1", "median": "448.3", "upper_75": "464.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.608k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Texas during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.548k", "median": "1.608k", "upper_75": "1.691k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.608k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Texas during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.548k", "median": "1.608k", "upper_75": "1.691k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.608k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Texas during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.548k", "median": "1.608k", "upper_75": "1.691k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 448.3 weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Missouri for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "433.1", "median": "448.3", "upper_75": "464.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 75% of weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Missouri during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "433.1", "median": "448.3", "upper_75": "464.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 448.3 weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Missouri for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "433.1", "median": "448.3", "upper_75": "464.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 75% of weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Missouri during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "433.1", "median": "448.3", "upper_75": "464.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 337.0 weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Colorado for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "337.0", "median": "350.5", "upper_75": "367.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 75% of weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Colorado during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "337.0", "median": "350.5", "upper_75": "367.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 337.0 weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Colorado for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "337.0", "median": "350.5", "upper_75": "367.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 75% of weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Colorado during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "337.0", "median": "350.5", "upper_75": "367.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 337.0 weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Colorado for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "337.0", "median": "350.5", "upper_75": "367.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 75% of weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Missouri during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "433.1", "median": "448.3", "upper_75": "464.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.853k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in California for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.712k", "median": "1.775k", "upper_75": "1.853k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 75% of weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Colorado during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "337.0", "median": "350.5", "upper_75": "367.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.853k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in California for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.712k", "median": "1.775k", "upper_75": "1.853k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.712k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in California during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.712k", "median": "1.775k", "upper_75": "1.853k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.853k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in California for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.712k", "median": "1.775k", "upper_75": "1.853k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.712k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in California during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.712k", "median": "1.775k", "upper_75": "1.853k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.712k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in California during the peak period?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.712k", "median": "1.775k", "upper_75": "1.853k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Cardano will surpass Ethereum's market cap by Not ≤ Dec 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2034", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 75% of weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Washington for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "206.4", "median": "214.0", "upper_75": "223.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 75% of weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Washington for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "206.4", "median": "214.0", "upper_75": "223.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 214.0 weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Washington for these periods (Peak)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "206.4", "median": "214.0", "upper_75": "223.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a retail supermarket will operate fully with A.I by 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 214.0 weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Washington for these periods (Peak)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "206.4", "median": "214.0", "upper_75": "223.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Cardano will surpass Ethereum's market cap by Not ≤ Dec 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2034", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a retail supermarket will operate fully with A.I by 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 214.0 weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Washington for these periods (Peak)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "206.4", "median": "214.0", "upper_75": "223.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Cardano will surpass Ethereum's market cap by Not ≤ Dec 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2034", "median": "Not ≤ Dec 2035", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Dec 2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Russia will have no laws banning \"LGBT propaganda\" by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2065", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 75% of weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations in Washington for these periods?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "206.4", "median": "214.0", "upper_75": "223.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a retail supermarket will operate fully with A.I by 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Russia will have no laws banning \"LGBT propaganda\" by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2065", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Russia will repeal or amend its laws that prohibit gender-affirming health care by 2036?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2044", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Russia will have no laws banning \"LGBT propaganda\" by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2050", "upper_75": "2065", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 4.95 false keys in the 2024 edition of \"The Keys to the White House\"?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.52", "median": "4.04", "upper_75": "4.95", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a crewed mission will orbit around Neptune's moon Triton by 2119?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2078", "median": "2119", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2200", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a crewed mission will orbit around Neptune's moon Triton by 2119?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2078", "median": "2119", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2200", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Russia will repeal or amend its laws that prohibit gender-affirming health care by 2036?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2044", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 4.95 false keys in the 2024 edition of \"The Keys to the White House\"?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.52", "median": "4.04", "upper_75": "4.95", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Russia will repeal or amend its laws that prohibit gender-affirming health care by 2036?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2044", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a crewed mission will orbit around Neptune's moon Triton by 2119?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2078", "median": "2119", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2200", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 4.95 false keys in the 2024 edition of \"The Keys to the White House\"?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.52", "median": "4.04", "upper_75": "4.95", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum arctic sea ice extent in the following years (2040) will be 2.41?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 1.5", "median": "2.41", "upper_75": "3.64", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum arctic sea ice extent in the following years (2050) will be 3.63?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 1.5", "median": "1.72", "upper_75": "3.63", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum arctic sea ice extent in the following years (2040) will be 2.41?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 1.5", "median": "2.41", "upper_75": "3.64", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum arctic sea ice extent in the following years (2040) will be 2.41?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 1.5", "median": "2.41", "upper_75": "3.64", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that more than 50 Flex Alerts will be issued in California in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.73", "median": "10.7", "upper_75": "> 50", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that more than 50 Flex Alerts will be issued in California in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.73", "median": "10.7", "upper_75": "> 50", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum arctic sea ice extent in the following years (2050) will be 3.63?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 1.5", "median": "1.72", "upper_75": "3.63", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the minimum arctic sea ice extent in the following years (2050) will be 3.63?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 1.5", "median": "1.72", "upper_75": "3.63", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that more than 50 Flex Alerts will be issued in California in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.73", "median": "10.7", "upper_75": "> 50", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a high-speed rail line will not open between Pakistan and China by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2044", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a high-speed rail line will not open between Pakistan and China by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2044", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a high-speed rail line will not open between Pakistan and China by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2044", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will not be a round trip crewed mission to Neptune's orbit within the next 2200 years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2081", "median": "2119", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2200", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that conscripted Ukrainians will be able to demobilize by May 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "Dec 2025", "upper_75": "Oct 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will not be a round trip crewed mission to Neptune's orbit within the next 2200 years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2081", "median": "2119", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2200", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that conscripted Ukrainians will be able to demobilize by May 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "Dec 2025", "upper_75": "Oct 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Volodymyr Zelensky will cease to hold the office of President of Ukraine by Mar 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2025", "median": "Sep 2027", "upper_75": "Mar 2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that conscripted Ukrainians will be able to demobilize by May 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "Dec 2025", "upper_75": "Oct 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 436 gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "392", "median": "414", "upper_75": "436", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Volodymyr Zelensky will cease to hold the office of President of Ukraine by Mar 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2025", "median": "Sep 2027", "upper_75": "Mar 2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will not be a round trip crewed mission to Neptune's orbit within the next 2200 years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2081", "median": "2119", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2200", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 436 gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "392", "median": "414", "upper_75": "436", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 954 gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "691", "median": "804", "upper_75": "954", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 421 gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "421", "median": "530", "upper_75": "677", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 954 gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "691", "median": "804", "upper_75": "954", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Volodymyr Zelensky will cease to hold the office of President of Ukraine by Mar 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2025", "median": "Sep 2027", "upper_75": "Mar 2030", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 421 gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "421", "median": "530", "upper_75": "677", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 954 gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "691", "median": "804", "upper_75": "954", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 436 gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "392", "median": "414", "upper_75": "436", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.50k gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.18k", "median": "1.32k", "upper_75": "1.50k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 421 gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "421", "median": "530", "upper_75": "677", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.84k gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.42k", "median": "1.60k", "upper_75": "1.84k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.84k gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.42k", "median": "1.60k", "upper_75": "1.84k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.50k gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.18k", "median": "1.32k", "upper_75": "1.50k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.50k gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.18k", "median": "1.32k", "upper_75": "1.50k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How much solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030 in gigawatts? (2030)\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 4.00k gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.60k", "median": "4.00k", "upper_75": "4.54k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How much solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030 in gigawatts? (2029)\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 2.86k gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.86k", "median": "3.16k", "upper_75": "3.55k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.06k gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.83k", "median": "2.06k", "upper_75": "2.36k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the expected change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment in the following months (Sep-24)? (128k)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "−1.03k", "median": "128k", "upper_75": "247k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.84k gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.42k", "median": "1.60k", "upper_75": "1.84k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the expected change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment in the following months (Sep-24)? (128k)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "−1.03k", "median": "128k", "upper_75": "247k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the expected change in seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment in the following months (Sep-24)? (128k)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "−1.03k", "median": "128k", "upper_75": "247k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.06k gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.83k", "median": "2.06k", "upper_75": "2.36k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How much solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030 in gigawatts? (2030)\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 4.00k gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.60k", "median": "4.00k", "upper_75": "4.54k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that we will have transformative AI by 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "2061", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 4.60% in the following months (Sep-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.93", "median": "4.24", "upper_75": "4.60", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 2.06k gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.83k", "median": "2.06k", "upper_75": "2.36k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 4.60% in the following months (Sep-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.93", "median": "4.24", "upper_75": "4.60", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that we will have transformative AI by 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "2061", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that we will have transformative AI by 2039?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2031", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "2061", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How much solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030 in gigawatts? (2030)\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 4.00k gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.60k", "median": "4.00k", "upper_75": "4.54k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 3.99 on September 30, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.45", "median": "3.27", "upper_75": "3.99", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 3.99 on September 30, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.45", "median": "3.27", "upper_75": "3.99", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How much solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030 in gigawatts? (2029)\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 2.86k gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.86k", "median": "3.16k", "upper_75": "3.55k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the upper limit of the federal funds target range will be 3.99 on September 30, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.45", "median": "3.27", "upper_75": "3.99", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 4.60% in the following months (Sep-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.93", "median": "4.24", "upper_75": "4.60", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be more than 50,000 civilian deaths in the Israel-Gaza conflict before July 1, 2024? (Palestinian civilians)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "35.5k", "median": "> 50k", "upper_75": "> 50k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How much solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030 in gigawatts? (2029)\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 2.86k gigawatts of solar PV energy capacity will be installed each year from 2023-2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.86k", "median": "3.16k", "upper_75": "3.55k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 35.5k civilian deaths in the Israel-Gaza conflict before July 1, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "35.5k", "median": "> 50k", "upper_75": "> 50k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 35.5k civilian deaths in the Israel-Gaza conflict before July 1, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "35.5k", "median": "> 50k", "upper_75": "> 50k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be more than 50,000 civilian deaths in the Israel-Gaza conflict before July 1, 2024? (Palestinian civilians)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "35.5k", "median": "> 50k", "upper_75": "> 50k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.27k Israeli civilian deaths in the Israel-Gaza conflict before July 1, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.27k", "median": "1.56k", "upper_75": "1.99k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 35.5k civilian deaths in the Israel-Gaza conflict before July 1, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "35.5k", "median": "> 50k", "upper_75": "> 50k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.27k Israeli civilian deaths in the Israel-Gaza conflict before July 1, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.27k", "median": "1.56k", "upper_75": "1.99k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be more than 50,000 civilian deaths in the Israel-Gaza conflict before July 1, 2024? (Palestinian civilians)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "35.5k", "median": "> 50k", "upper_75": "> 50k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that LLaMA-3 will be released by May 10, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 10, 2024", "median": "Apr 24, 2024", "upper_75": "May 10, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.27k Israeli civilian deaths in the Israel-Gaza conflict before July 1, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.27k", "median": "1.56k", "upper_75": "1.99k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a country will completely ban civilian tobacco consumption/smoking by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that LLaMA-3 will be released by May 10, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 10, 2024", "median": "Apr 24, 2024", "upper_75": "May 10, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 50% in the following months (Sep-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Great Britain's maximum solar power capacity (MW) will be 16.06k for October 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "15.78k", "median": "16.06k", "upper_75": "16.30k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that LLaMA-3 will be released by May 10, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Apr 10, 2024", "median": "Apr 24, 2024", "upper_75": "May 10, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 50% in the following months (Sep-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 50% in the following months (Sep-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a round trip crewed mission to Jupiter's orbit by 2085?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2068", "median": "2085", "upper_75": "2110", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Great Britain's maximum solar power capacity (MW) will be 16.06k for October 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "15.78k", "median": "16.06k", "upper_75": "16.30k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a country will completely ban civilian tobacco consumption/smoking by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a round trip crewed mission to Jupiter's orbit by 2085?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2068", "median": "2085", "upper_75": "2110", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Great Britain's maximum solar power capacity (MW) will be 16.06k for October 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "15.78k", "median": "16.06k", "upper_75": "16.30k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that congestion pricing will go into effect in New York City by Jan 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Jul 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a round trip crewed mission to Jupiter's orbit by 2085?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2068", "median": "2085", "upper_75": "2110", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that congestion pricing will go into effect in New York City by Jan 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Jul 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a country will completely ban civilian tobacco consumption/smoking by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2029", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2040", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that congestion pricing will go into effect in New York City by Jan 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Jul 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a large language model with a context window of at least 5 million tokens will be freely accessible to anyone by Jan 2027?", "desc": "LLM technology has been advancing rapidly in recent years, and there are many companies and organizations working to make LLM more accessible to the general public. However, there are still many barriers to entry, such as waitlists, subscriptions, and paid APIs. The question is asking when a LLM with at least a 5 million token context window will be freely accessible to anyone, without any of these barriers.", "resc": "The question will resolve to the first date at which a large language model with at least a 5 million token context window is freely accessible.\n\nBy freely accessible, we mean:\n\n- The LLM must be available to anyone with internet access and a modern desktop or laptop computer.\n- It must offer, at minimum, a demo with at least two free uses per day that can be used right away without barriers like waitlist, subscription, or paid API. \n\nThe system may have a subscription or paid API as long as it can be tried for free right away.\n\nTo resolve, the system must be freely accessible in at least one country in the continents of Europe, North America, South America, Africa, and Asia.", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Jan 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that these teams will score 75.8 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "64.9", "median": "70.8", "upper_75": "75.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a large language model with a context window of at least 5 million tokens will be freely accessible to anyone by Jan 2027?", "desc": "LLM technology has been advancing rapidly in recent years, and there are many companies and organizations working to make LLM more accessible to the general public. However, there are still many barriers to entry, such as waitlists, subscriptions, and paid APIs. The question is asking when a LLM with at least a 5 million token context window will be freely accessible to anyone, without any of these barriers.", "resc": "The question will resolve to the first date at which a large language model with at least a 5 million token context window is freely accessible.\n\nBy freely accessible, we mean:\n\n- The LLM must be available to anyone with internet access and a modern desktop or laptop computer.\n- It must offer, at minimum, a demo with at least two free uses per day that can be used right away without barriers like waitlist, subscription, or paid API. \n\nThe system may have a subscription or paid API as long as it can be tried for free right away.\n\nTo resolve, the system must be freely accessible in at least one country in the continents of Europe, North America, South America, Africa, and Asia.", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Jan 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that these teams will score 75.8 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "64.9", "median": "70.8", "upper_75": "75.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that these teams will score 75.8 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "64.9", "median": "70.8", "upper_75": "75.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Manchester City will score 91.31 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "84.31", "median": "87.94", "upper_75": "91.31", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Manchester City will score 91.31 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "84.31", "median": "87.94", "upper_75": "91.31", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Tottenham Hotspur will score 75.8 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "64.9", "median": "70.8", "upper_75": "75.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Tottenham Hotspur will score 75.8 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "64.9", "median": "70.8", "upper_75": "75.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a large language model with a context window of at least 5 million tokens will be freely accessible to anyone by Jan 2027?", "desc": "LLM technology has been advancing rapidly in recent years, and there are many companies and organizations working to make LLM more accessible to the general public. However, there are still many barriers to entry, such as waitlists, subscriptions, and paid APIs. The question is asking when a LLM with at least a 5 million token context window will be freely accessible to anyone, without any of these barriers.", "resc": "The question will resolve to the first date at which a large language model with at least a 5 million token context window is freely accessible.\n\nBy freely accessible, we mean:\n\n- The LLM must be available to anyone with internet access and a modern desktop or laptop computer.\n- It must offer, at minimum, a demo with at least two free uses per day that can be used right away without barriers like waitlist, subscription, or paid API. \n\nThe system may have a subscription or paid API as long as it can be tried for free right away.\n\nTo resolve, the system must be freely accessible in at least one country in the continents of Europe, North America, South America, Africa, and Asia.", "lower_25": "Apr 2024", "median": "Mar 2025", "upper_75": "Jan 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Arsenal will score 86.80 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "82.76", "median": "86.80", "upper_75": "90.53", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Arsenal will score 86.80 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "82.76", "median": "86.80", "upper_75": "90.53", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Liverpool will score 92.31 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "85.01", "median": "88.71", "upper_75": "92.31", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Liverpool will score 92.31 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "85.01", "median": "88.71", "upper_75": "92.31", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Liverpool will score 92.31 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "85.01", "median": "88.71", "upper_75": "92.31", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Arsenal will score 86.80 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "82.76", "median": "86.80", "upper_75": "90.53", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Newcastle United will score 61.0 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "55.3", "median": "61.0", "upper_75": "67.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Tottenham Hotspur will score 75.8 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "64.9", "median": "70.8", "upper_75": "75.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Aston Villa will score 78.9 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "68.8", "median": "74.4", "upper_75": "78.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Aston Villa will score 78.9 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "68.8", "median": "74.4", "upper_75": "78.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Manchester City will score 91.31 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "84.31", "median": "87.94", "upper_75": "91.31", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Newcastle United will score 61.0 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "55.3", "median": "61.0", "upper_75": "67.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Newcastle United will score 61.0 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "55.3", "median": "61.0", "upper_75": "67.8", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Aston Villa will score 78.9 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "68.8", "median": "74.4", "upper_75": "78.9", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Manchester United will score 69.8 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "59.8", "median": "64.5", "upper_75": "69.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that West Ham United will score 57.6 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "53.5", "median": "57.6", "upper_75": "62.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Brighton And Hove Albion will score 56.4 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "47.7", "median": "51.8", "upper_75": "56.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Manchester United will score 69.8 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "59.8", "median": "64.5", "upper_75": "69.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Brighton And Hove Albion will score 56.4 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "47.7", "median": "51.8", "upper_75": "56.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Brighton And Hove Albion will score 56.4 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "47.7", "median": "51.8", "upper_75": "56.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Manchester United will score 69.8 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "59.8", "median": "64.5", "upper_75": "69.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Chelsea will score 55.8 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "49.9", "median": "55.8", "upper_75": "62.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Crystal Palace will score 35.6 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "35.6", "median": "40.6", "upper_75": "45.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that West Ham United will score 57.6 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "53.5", "median": "57.6", "upper_75": "62.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that West Ham United will score 57.6 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "53.5", "median": "57.6", "upper_75": "62.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Chelsea will score 55.8 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "49.9", "median": "55.8", "upper_75": "62.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Crystal Palace will score 35.6 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "35.6", "median": "40.6", "upper_75": "45.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Crystal Palace will score 35.6 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "35.6", "median": "40.6", "upper_75": "45.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Fulham will score 50.8 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "42.3", "median": "46.7", "upper_75": "50.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Wolverhampton Wanderers will score 46.8 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "46.8", "median": "51.2", "upper_75": "55.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Chelsea will score 55.8 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "49.9", "median": "55.8", "upper_75": "62.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Wolverhampton Wanderers will score 46.8 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "46.8", "median": "51.2", "upper_75": "55.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Fulham will score 50.8 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "42.3", "median": "46.7", "upper_75": "50.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Wolverhampton Wanderers will score 46.8 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "46.8", "median": "51.2", "upper_75": "55.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Everton will score 43.4 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "36.1", "median": "39.7", "upper_75": "43.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Fulham will score 50.8 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "42.3", "median": "46.7", "upper_75": "50.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Everton will score 43.4 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "36.1", "median": "39.7", "upper_75": "43.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Brentford will score 41.4 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "33.9", "median": "37.7", "upper_75": "41.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Luton Town will score 32.5 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.0", "median": "29.5", "upper_75": "32.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Nottingham Forest will score 32.9 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "32.9", "median": "38.2", "upper_75": "44.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Nottingham Forest will score 32.9 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "32.9", "median": "38.2", "upper_75": "44.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Brentford will score 41.4 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "33.9", "median": "37.7", "upper_75": "41.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Everton will score 43.4 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "36.1", "median": "39.7", "upper_75": "43.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Nottingham Forest will score 32.9 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "32.9", "median": "38.2", "upper_75": "44.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Brentford will score 41.4 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "The [Premier League](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League) is the highest division of professional English [football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football). It is one of the most-watched contemporary sports with 14 million total attendees in the [2018-2019 season](https://global.espn.com/soccer/stats/_/league/ENG.1/season/2018/view/performance). The 2023-2024 season is scheduled to be held from August 11, 2023 to May 19, 2024.\n\nTeams compete in a double [round-robin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_tournament) tournament, each team typically playing 38 games total. Winning a game earns a team 3 points, a draw earns 1 point, and a loss earns 0 points. The total scores determine the league ranking, which team is the league champion, and which teams are relegated to lower divisions.\n\nIn the [2017-2018](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Premier_League_records_and_statistics#Points) season, Manchester City set a record for winning 100 points in a single season of the Premier League, the most points won by a team in any season.", "resc": "Each question below will resolve as the total points won by the respective team in the 2023-2024 season, according to the [Premier League's](https://www.premierleague.com/tables) official score at the conclusion of the 2023-2024 season", "lower_25": "33.9", "median": "37.7", "upper_75": "41.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Luton Town will score 32.5 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.0", "median": "29.5", "upper_75": "32.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Burnley will score 25.6 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "21.7", "median": "25.6", "upper_75": "29.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Luton Town will score 32.5 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "26.0", "median": "29.5", "upper_75": "32.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Bournemouth will score 36.0 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "36.0", "median": "44.0", "upper_75": "49.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Sheffield United will score 23.5 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.0", "median": "23.5", "upper_75": "27.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Bournemouth will score 36.0 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "36.0", "median": "44.0", "upper_75": "49.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Sheffield United will score 23.5 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.0", "median": "23.5", "upper_75": "27.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Artemis 3 will successfully take astronauts to the Lunar Gateway by Apr 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2026", "median": "Jul 2027", "upper_75": "Apr 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Bournemouth will score 36.0 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "36.0", "median": "44.0", "upper_75": "49.9", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Burnley will score 25.6 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "21.7", "median": "25.6", "upper_75": "29.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Artemis 2 will successfully complete its mission by Mar 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2025", "median": "May 2026", "upper_75": "Mar 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Burnley will score 25.6 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "21.7", "median": "25.6", "upper_75": "29.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Artemis 2 will successfully complete its mission by Mar 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2025", "median": "May 2026", "upper_75": "Mar 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Artemis 3 will successfully take astronauts to the Lunar Gateway by Apr 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2026", "median": "Jul 2027", "upper_75": "Apr 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 9.44k alcohol-impaired driving fatalities will be reported in the US in 2039?", "desc": "For perspective, the reported number of alcohol impaired driving fatalities in 2020 and 2021 are 11,718 (out of 39,007) and 13,384 (out of 42,939). [Source:](https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/813435) (table 11, page 28)\n\nHaving a blood alcohol level of 0.05 percent is associated with a [doubling of the risk of a vehicle crash](https://www.dovepress.com/how-tired-is-too-tired-to-drive-a-systematic-review-assessing-the-use--peer-reviewed-fulltext-article-NSS). The legal limit in the US, as of this posting, is 0.08 percent.\n\nIt would be expected that the widespread diffusion of autonomous vehicle technology will substantially reduce the number of drunk driving fatalities, especially if such technology would be very cheap and more competent than the median human driver.\n\nHence, this question is another proxy for the development of self-driving car technology at a given time (here 2039). Perhaps such technology would be mature by then. Other factors that can influence the number of alcohol-impaired driving fatalities would include changing moral sensibilities to drinking, reintroduction and effective enforcement of prohibition, and better mass transit.", "resc": "The question will resolve as the number of alcohol-impaired driving fatalities reported by the US National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) for the 2039 calendar year.\n\nNHTSA's [2021 report](https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/813435) was released in April 2023 and the [2020 report](https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/Publication/813266) came out in March 2022. Resolution will occur when a similar report is available for 2039, or when an official summary furnishing the relevant information is released.", "lower_25": "3.71k", "median": "5.95k", "upper_75": "9.44k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Sheffield United will score 23.5 points in the 2023-2024 Premier League?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "20.0", "median": "23.5", "upper_75": "27.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Shiller P/E Ratio of the S&P 500 will be 23.9 on January 1, 2030?", "desc": "The Shiller P/E Ratio (also known as cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio or the CAPE) is a measure of valuation of the S&P 500. The ratio is calculated by dividing the price of the S&P 500 index by the average inflation-adjusted earnings of the previous 10 years.\n\nThe Shiller P/E Ratio is often used as an indicator of the valuation of the S&P 500. When the ratio is high, it is said to be an indication that the market may be overvalued and when it is low it is said to be an indication that the market is undervalued.", "resc": "The answer will be the reported Shiller P/E ratio at market close taken from the [Multpl website](https://www.multpl.com/shiller-pe) on January 1st, 2030. If Multpl is no longer available, an alternate credible source may be used.", "lower_25": "23.9", "median": "27.3", "upper_75": "30.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Artemis 2 will successfully complete its mission by Mar 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2025", "median": "May 2026", "upper_75": "Mar 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 9.44k alcohol-impaired driving fatalities will be reported in the US in 2039?", "desc": "For perspective, the reported number of alcohol impaired driving fatalities in 2020 and 2021 are 11,718 (out of 39,007) and 13,384 (out of 42,939). [Source:](https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/813435) (table 11, page 28)\n\nHaving a blood alcohol level of 0.05 percent is associated with a [doubling of the risk of a vehicle crash](https://www.dovepress.com/how-tired-is-too-tired-to-drive-a-systematic-review-assessing-the-use--peer-reviewed-fulltext-article-NSS). The legal limit in the US, as of this posting, is 0.08 percent.\n\nIt would be expected that the widespread diffusion of autonomous vehicle technology will substantially reduce the number of drunk driving fatalities, especially if such technology would be very cheap and more competent than the median human driver.\n\nHence, this question is another proxy for the development of self-driving car technology at a given time (here 2039). Perhaps such technology would be mature by then. Other factors that can influence the number of alcohol-impaired driving fatalities would include changing moral sensibilities to drinking, reintroduction and effective enforcement of prohibition, and better mass transit.", "resc": "The question will resolve as the number of alcohol-impaired driving fatalities reported by the US National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) for the 2039 calendar year.\n\nNHTSA's [2021 report](https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/813435) was released in April 2023 and the [2020 report](https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/Publication/813266) came out in March 2022. Resolution will occur when a similar report is available for 2039, or when an official summary furnishing the relevant information is released.", "lower_25": "3.71k", "median": "5.95k", "upper_75": "9.44k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Artemis 3 will successfully take astronauts to the Lunar Gateway by Apr 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Nov 2026", "median": "Jul 2027", "upper_75": "Apr 2028", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Shiller P/E Ratio of the S&P 500 will be 23.9 on January 1, 2030?", "desc": "The Shiller P/E Ratio (also known as cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio or the CAPE) is a measure of valuation of the S&P 500. The ratio is calculated by dividing the price of the S&P 500 index by the average inflation-adjusted earnings of the previous 10 years.\n\nThe Shiller P/E Ratio is often used as an indicator of the valuation of the S&P 500. When the ratio is high, it is said to be an indication that the market may be overvalued and when it is low it is said to be an indication that the market is undervalued.", "resc": "The answer will be the reported Shiller P/E ratio at market close taken from the [Multpl website](https://www.multpl.com/shiller-pe) on January 1st, 2030. If Multpl is no longer available, an alternate credible source may be used.", "lower_25": "23.9", "median": "27.3", "upper_75": "30.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Shiller P/E Ratio of the S&P 500 will be 23.9 on January 1, 2030?", "desc": "The Shiller P/E Ratio (also known as cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio or the CAPE) is a measure of valuation of the S&P 500. The ratio is calculated by dividing the price of the S&P 500 index by the average inflation-adjusted earnings of the previous 10 years.\n\nThe Shiller P/E Ratio is often used as an indicator of the valuation of the S&P 500. When the ratio is high, it is said to be an indication that the market may be overvalued and when it is low it is said to be an indication that the market is undervalued.", "resc": "The answer will be the reported Shiller P/E ratio at market close taken from the [Multpl website](https://www.multpl.com/shiller-pe) on January 1st, 2030. If Multpl is no longer available, an alternate credible source may be used.", "lower_25": "23.9", "median": "27.3", "upper_75": "30.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.25k Palestinian fatalities in the West Bank will be caused by Israeli forces before July 1, 2024?", "desc": "On October 7, 2023, [Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/martin-indyk-why-hamas-attacked-and-why-israel-was-taken-surprise). While Israel's response and the focus of the conflict have been on Gaza, the West Bank has also seen a [surge in violence and death](https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-west-bank-settler-violence-gaza-war-68debe29dcc2f5a58bd899e1e424911c). The [potential for more violence and escalation in the West Bank](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BEcOve4xpNU) may pose a significant source of uncertainty.\n\nThe United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) maintains an [Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) page](https://www.ochaopt.org/) where information and statistics are reported for the ongoing [Israel-Palestine conflict](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli%E2%80%93Palestinian_conflict). UN OCHA OPT maintains a [data page](https://www.ochaopt.org/data) reporting information on casualties, displacements, and other humanitarian indicators. Following the Hamas attack and Israel's airstrike campaign it has issued [flash updates](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-23) reporting recent developments and humanitarian needs, as well as casualties reported by the Ministry of Health in Gaza and by Israel, as well as for the West Bank. **Please note that the methodology for deaths that UN OCHA OPT reports on its data page may differ from what is reported in the flash updates**.", "resc": "This question will resolve the number of Palestinian deaths in the West Bank, after October 6, 2023, and before July 1, 2024, that are caused by Israeli forces, according to the [United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)](https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties) casualties data.", "lower_25": "569", "median": "812", "upper_75": "1.25k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.25k Palestinian fatalities in the West Bank will be caused by Israeli forces before July 1, 2024?", "desc": "On October 7, 2023, [Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/martin-indyk-why-hamas-attacked-and-why-israel-was-taken-surprise). While Israel's response and the focus of the conflict have been on Gaza, the West Bank has also seen a [surge in violence and death](https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-west-bank-settler-violence-gaza-war-68debe29dcc2f5a58bd899e1e424911c). The [potential for more violence and escalation in the West Bank](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BEcOve4xpNU) may pose a significant source of uncertainty.\n\nThe United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) maintains an [Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) page](https://www.ochaopt.org/) where information and statistics are reported for the ongoing [Israel-Palestine conflict](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli%E2%80%93Palestinian_conflict). UN OCHA OPT maintains a [data page](https://www.ochaopt.org/data) reporting information on casualties, displacements, and other humanitarian indicators. Following the Hamas attack and Israel's airstrike campaign it has issued [flash updates](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-23) reporting recent developments and humanitarian needs, as well as casualties reported by the Ministry of Health in Gaza and by Israel, as well as for the West Bank. **Please note that the methodology for deaths that UN OCHA OPT reports on its data page may differ from what is reported in the flash updates**.", "resc": "This question will resolve the number of Palestinian deaths in the West Bank, after October 6, 2023, and before July 1, 2024, that are caused by Israeli forces, according to the [United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)](https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties) casualties data.", "lower_25": "569", "median": "812", "upper_75": "1.25k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Donald Trump will be incarcerated or put under house arrest for over 30 days before Aug 2025?", "desc": "[Trump's current indictments (Wikipeida)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indictments_against_Donald_Trump):\n>In 2023, four criminal indictments were filed against Donald Trump, the president of the United States from 2017 to 2021. Two indictments are on state charges (one in New York and one in Georgia) and two indictments (as well as one superseding indictment) are on federal charges. These indictments amount to a total of 91 felony charges. Trials are scheduled to begin in March and May 2024, while the Georgia trial has not yet been scheduled.\n\n> Trump has pleaded not guilty to all charges against him.\n\n> ####March 2023 indictment in New York:\n> A March 2023 indictment in New York, in which Trump faces 34 criminal charges of falsifying business records in the first degree related to payments made to Stormy Daniels before the 2016 presidential election. The trial is scheduled for March 25, 2024.\n\n> ####June 2023 federal indictment in Florida:\n> A June 2023 federal indictment related to classified government documents, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in which Trump faces 40 criminal charges alleging mishandling of sensitive documents and conspiracy to obstruct the government in retrieving these documents. The trial is scheduled for May 20, 2024.\n\n> ####August 2023 federal indictment in Washington, D.C.:\n> An August 2023 federal indictment related to attempts to overturn the 2020 presidential election, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in which Trump faces four criminal charges of conspiring to defraud the government and disenfranchise voters, and corruptly obstructing an official proceeding. The trial is scheduled for March 4, 2024.\n\n> ####August 2023 indictment in Georgia:\n> An August 2023 indictment in Georgia, in which Trump faces 13 criminal charges related to alleged attempts to overturn Joe Biden's victory in Georgia, alongside 18 accused co-conspirators. The trial is not yet scheduled.", "resc": "This question retroactively resolves as the first day that Donald J. Trump is held in jail or prison, or is placed under house arrest, for more than 30 days. \n\nIf Donald J. Trump has not spent more than 30 days in confinement before 2030 then this question is annulled. The entirety of the 30 days must be served before 2030 for this question to resolve.", "lower_25": "Sep 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 9.44k alcohol-impaired driving fatalities will be reported in the US in 2039?", "desc": "For perspective, the reported number of alcohol impaired driving fatalities in 2020 and 2021 are 11,718 (out of 39,007) and 13,384 (out of 42,939). [Source:](https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/813435) (table 11, page 28)\n\nHaving a blood alcohol level of 0.05 percent is associated with a [doubling of the risk of a vehicle crash](https://www.dovepress.com/how-tired-is-too-tired-to-drive-a-systematic-review-assessing-the-use--peer-reviewed-fulltext-article-NSS). The legal limit in the US, as of this posting, is 0.08 percent.\n\nIt would be expected that the widespread diffusion of autonomous vehicle technology will substantially reduce the number of drunk driving fatalities, especially if such technology would be very cheap and more competent than the median human driver.\n\nHence, this question is another proxy for the development of self-driving car technology at a given time (here 2039). Perhaps such technology would be mature by then. Other factors that can influence the number of alcohol-impaired driving fatalities would include changing moral sensibilities to drinking, reintroduction and effective enforcement of prohibition, and better mass transit.", "resc": "The question will resolve as the number of alcohol-impaired driving fatalities reported by the US National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) for the 2039 calendar year.\n\nNHTSA's [2021 report](https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/813435) was released in April 2023 and the [2020 report](https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/Publication/813266) came out in March 2022. Resolution will occur when a similar report is available for 2039, or when an official summary furnishing the relevant information is released.", "lower_25": "3.71k", "median": "5.95k", "upper_75": "9.44k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an intranasal SARS-CoV-2 vaccine will be approved by the US by Nov 2027?", "desc": "According to an October 2023 [article in Science.org](https://www.science.org/content/article/billions-boost-next-generation-covid-19-vaccine-and-treatments), \"Current COVID-19 vaccines only prevent symptomatic disease for a few months and are even less effective at preventing infection. Among the new awardees [of U.S. government funding] hoping to do better are CastleVax and Codagenix, which have developed vaccine candidates that will be sprayed into the nose. The goal is to stimulate immunity at the mucosal membranes, a strategy that might prove better at thwarting SARS-CoV-2 than current shots.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date the [US government](https://www.fda.gov/) approves a SARS-CoV-2 intranasal vaccine, regardless of any demonstrated efficacy or safety. Any kind of approval, including emergency approval, would count.\n\nNote: This question is similar to [another question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11436/intranasal-sars-cov-2-vaccine-authorized/), but focuses only on the United States (rather than several countries) and is a date-range forecast (rather than a binary yes/no question by a particular date).", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "Nov 2025", "upper_75": "Nov 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Donald Trump will be incarcerated or put under house arrest for over 30 days before Aug 2025?", "desc": "[Trump's current indictments (Wikipeida)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indictments_against_Donald_Trump):\n>In 2023, four criminal indictments were filed against Donald Trump, the president of the United States from 2017 to 2021. Two indictments are on state charges (one in New York and one in Georgia) and two indictments (as well as one superseding indictment) are on federal charges. These indictments amount to a total of 91 felony charges. Trials are scheduled to begin in March and May 2024, while the Georgia trial has not yet been scheduled.\n\n> Trump has pleaded not guilty to all charges against him.\n\n> ####March 2023 indictment in New York:\n> A March 2023 indictment in New York, in which Trump faces 34 criminal charges of falsifying business records in the first degree related to payments made to Stormy Daniels before the 2016 presidential election. The trial is scheduled for March 25, 2024.\n\n> ####June 2023 federal indictment in Florida:\n> A June 2023 federal indictment related to classified government documents, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in which Trump faces 40 criminal charges alleging mishandling of sensitive documents and conspiracy to obstruct the government in retrieving these documents. The trial is scheduled for May 20, 2024.\n\n> ####August 2023 federal indictment in Washington, D.C.:\n> An August 2023 federal indictment related to attempts to overturn the 2020 presidential election, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in which Trump faces four criminal charges of conspiring to defraud the government and disenfranchise voters, and corruptly obstructing an official proceeding. The trial is scheduled for March 4, 2024.\n\n> ####August 2023 indictment in Georgia:\n> An August 2023 indictment in Georgia, in which Trump faces 13 criminal charges related to alleged attempts to overturn Joe Biden's victory in Georgia, alongside 18 accused co-conspirators. The trial is not yet scheduled.", "resc": "This question retroactively resolves as the first day that Donald J. Trump is held in jail or prison, or is placed under house arrest, for more than 30 days. \n\nIf Donald J. Trump has not spent more than 30 days in confinement before 2030 then this question is annulled. The entirety of the 30 days must be served before 2030 for this question to resolve.", "lower_25": "Sep 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 1.25k Palestinian fatalities in the West Bank will be caused by Israeli forces before July 1, 2024?", "desc": "On October 7, 2023, [Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/martin-indyk-why-hamas-attacked-and-why-israel-was-taken-surprise). While Israel's response and the focus of the conflict have been on Gaza, the West Bank has also seen a [surge in violence and death](https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-west-bank-settler-violence-gaza-war-68debe29dcc2f5a58bd899e1e424911c). The [potential for more violence and escalation in the West Bank](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BEcOve4xpNU) may pose a significant source of uncertainty.\n\nThe United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) maintains an [Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) page](https://www.ochaopt.org/) where information and statistics are reported for the ongoing [Israel-Palestine conflict](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli%E2%80%93Palestinian_conflict). UN OCHA OPT maintains a [data page](https://www.ochaopt.org/data) reporting information on casualties, displacements, and other humanitarian indicators. Following the Hamas attack and Israel's airstrike campaign it has issued [flash updates](https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-23) reporting recent developments and humanitarian needs, as well as casualties reported by the Ministry of Health in Gaza and by Israel, as well as for the West Bank. **Please note that the methodology for deaths that UN OCHA OPT reports on its data page may differ from what is reported in the flash updates**.", "resc": "This question will resolve the number of Palestinian deaths in the West Bank, after October 6, 2023, and before July 1, 2024, that are caused by Israeli forces, according to the [United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)](https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties) casualties data.", "lower_25": "569", "median": "812", "upper_75": "1.25k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an intranasal SARS-CoV-2 vaccine will be approved by the US by Nov 2027?", "desc": "According to an October 2023 [article in Science.org](https://www.science.org/content/article/billions-boost-next-generation-covid-19-vaccine-and-treatments), \"Current COVID-19 vaccines only prevent symptomatic disease for a few months and are even less effective at preventing infection. Among the new awardees [of U.S. government funding] hoping to do better are CastleVax and Codagenix, which have developed vaccine candidates that will be sprayed into the nose. The goal is to stimulate immunity at the mucosal membranes, a strategy that might prove better at thwarting SARS-CoV-2 than current shots.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date the [US government](https://www.fda.gov/) approves a SARS-CoV-2 intranasal vaccine, regardless of any demonstrated efficacy or safety. Any kind of approval, including emergency approval, would count.\n\nNote: This question is similar to [another question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11436/intranasal-sars-cov-2-vaccine-authorized/), but focuses only on the United States (rather than several countries) and is a date-range forecast (rather than a binary yes/no question by a particular date).", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "Nov 2025", "upper_75": "Nov 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Donald Trump will be incarcerated or put under house arrest for over 30 days before Aug 2025?", "desc": "[Trump's current indictments (Wikipeida)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indictments_against_Donald_Trump):\n>In 2023, four criminal indictments were filed against Donald Trump, the president of the United States from 2017 to 2021. Two indictments are on state charges (one in New York and one in Georgia) and two indictments (as well as one superseding indictment) are on federal charges. These indictments amount to a total of 91 felony charges. Trials are scheduled to begin in March and May 2024, while the Georgia trial has not yet been scheduled.\n\n> Trump has pleaded not guilty to all charges against him.\n\n> ####March 2023 indictment in New York:\n> A March 2023 indictment in New York, in which Trump faces 34 criminal charges of falsifying business records in the first degree related to payments made to Stormy Daniels before the 2016 presidential election. The trial is scheduled for March 25, 2024.\n\n> ####June 2023 federal indictment in Florida:\n> A June 2023 federal indictment related to classified government documents, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in which Trump faces 40 criminal charges alleging mishandling of sensitive documents and conspiracy to obstruct the government in retrieving these documents. The trial is scheduled for May 20, 2024.\n\n> ####August 2023 federal indictment in Washington, D.C.:\n> An August 2023 federal indictment related to attempts to overturn the 2020 presidential election, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in which Trump faces four criminal charges of conspiring to defraud the government and disenfranchise voters, and corruptly obstructing an official proceeding. The trial is scheduled for March 4, 2024.\n\n> ####August 2023 indictment in Georgia:\n> An August 2023 indictment in Georgia, in which Trump faces 13 criminal charges related to alleged attempts to overturn Joe Biden's victory in Georgia, alongside 18 accused co-conspirators. The trial is not yet scheduled.", "resc": "This question retroactively resolves as the first day that Donald J. Trump is held in jail or prison, or is placed under house arrest, for more than 30 days. \n\nIf Donald J. Trump has not spent more than 30 days in confinement before 2030 then this question is annulled. The entirety of the 30 days must be served before 2030 for this question to resolve.", "lower_25": "Sep 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "Aug 2025", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 341.0 million in these years?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: _x000D_\n_x000D_\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century._x000D_\n_x000D_\n>..._x000D_\n_x000D_\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100._x000D_\n_x000D_\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100._x000D_\n_x000D_\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate._x000D_\n_x000D_\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. _x000D_\n_x000D_\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. _x000D_\n_x000D_\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**_x000D_\n_x000D_\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "337.8", "median": "341.0", "upper_75": "344.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Benjamin Netanyahu will cease to be Prime Minister of Israel by Sep 2024?", "desc": "[Benjamin Netanyahu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Netanyahu) is the current Prime Minister of Israel, having previously held the office from 1996 to 1999 and again from 2009 to 2021. Netanyahu is the longest-tenured prime minister in the country's history, having served for a total of over 16 years.\n\n[A series of coordinated attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Hamas_attack_on_Israel), conducted by the Palestinian Islamist militant Hamas, from the Gaza Strip onto bordering areas in Israel, commenced on Saturday 7 October 2023. Israel declared war on Hamas on 8 October, and its response to the attack has seen the most significant military escalation in the region since the Yom Kippur War. \n\nWithin Israel, Netanyahu's government has been [widely condemned](https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4282509-netanyahu-failed-and-must-resign/) for failures to prepare for these attacks.", "resc": "The question resolves as the end date of Benjamin Netanyahu's current term as Prime Minister of Israel.", "lower_25": "Sep 2024", "median": "Feb 2025", "upper_75": "Jan 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 341.0 million in these years?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: _x000D_\n_x000D_\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century._x000D_\n_x000D_\n>..._x000D_\n_x000D_\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100._x000D_\n_x000D_\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100._x000D_\n_x000D_\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate._x000D_\n_x000D_\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. _x000D_\n_x000D_\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. _x000D_\n_x000D_\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**_x000D_\n_x000D_\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "337.8", "median": "341.0", "upper_75": "344.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Benjamin Netanyahu will cease to be Prime Minister of Israel by Sep 2024?", "desc": "[Benjamin Netanyahu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Netanyahu) is the current Prime Minister of Israel, having previously held the office from 1996 to 1999 and again from 2009 to 2021. Netanyahu is the longest-tenured prime minister in the country's history, having served for a total of over 16 years.\n\n[A series of coordinated attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Hamas_attack_on_Israel), conducted by the Palestinian Islamist militant Hamas, from the Gaza Strip onto bordering areas in Israel, commenced on Saturday 7 October 2023. Israel declared war on Hamas on 8 October, and its response to the attack has seen the most significant military escalation in the region since the Yom Kippur War. \n\nWithin Israel, Netanyahu's government has been [widely condemned](https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4282509-netanyahu-failed-and-must-resign/) for failures to prepare for these attacks.", "resc": "The question resolves as the end date of Benjamin Netanyahu's current term as Prime Minister of Israel.", "lower_25": "Sep 2024", "median": "Feb 2025", "upper_75": "Jan 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an intranasal SARS-CoV-2 vaccine will be approved by the US by Nov 2027?", "desc": "According to an October 2023 [article in Science.org](https://www.science.org/content/article/billions-boost-next-generation-covid-19-vaccine-and-treatments), \"Current COVID-19 vaccines only prevent symptomatic disease for a few months and are even less effective at preventing infection. Among the new awardees [of U.S. government funding] hoping to do better are CastleVax and Codagenix, which have developed vaccine candidates that will be sprayed into the nose. The goal is to stimulate immunity at the mucosal membranes, a strategy that might prove better at thwarting SARS-CoV-2 than current shots.\"", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date the [US government](https://www.fda.gov/) approves a SARS-CoV-2 intranasal vaccine, regardless of any demonstrated efficacy or safety. Any kind of approval, including emergency approval, would count.\n\nNote: This question is similar to [another question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/11436/intranasal-sars-cov-2-vaccine-authorized/), but focuses only on the United States (rather than several countries) and is a date-range forecast (rather than a binary yes/no question by a particular date).", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "Nov 2025", "upper_75": "Nov 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 2.35% in the United States in the following quarters (2025 Q3)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Economic Analysis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Economic_Analysis) (BEA) provides quarterly estimates of [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) in the United States. The BEA typically releases [three GDP estimates](https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2020-08/quick-guide-gdp.pdf), an advance estimate, a second estimate, and a third and final estimate. The advance estimate is typically released in the month following the end of the quarter.\n\nBelow is a graph of quarter over quarter GDP growth rates in the US, adjusted for inflation and seasonal effects, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BEA, but it updates with each estimate published by the BEA so it does not reflect the advanced estimate in each quarter.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the quarter over quarter GDP growth rate in the US, adjusted for inflation and seasonal effects and using an annual rate, in percent. Resolution will be determined according to the BEA's advance estimate, typically found [here](https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product)", "lower_25": "0.298", "median": "1.38", "upper_75": "2.35", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 337.8 million in the year 2030?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "337.8", "median": "341.0", "upper_75": "344.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 2.35% in the United States in the following quarters (2025 Q3)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Economic Analysis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Economic_Analysis) (BEA) provides quarterly estimates of [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) in the United States. The BEA typically releases [three GDP estimates](https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2020-08/quick-guide-gdp.pdf), an advance estimate, a second estimate, and a third and final estimate. The advance estimate is typically released in the month following the end of the quarter.\n\nBelow is a graph of quarter over quarter GDP growth rates in the US, adjusted for inflation and seasonal effects, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BEA, but it updates with each estimate published by the BEA so it does not reflect the advanced estimate in each quarter.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the quarter over quarter GDP growth rate in the US, adjusted for inflation and seasonal effects and using an annual rate, in percent. Resolution will be determined according to the BEA's advance estimate, typically found [here](https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product)", "lower_25": "0.298", "median": "1.38", "upper_75": "2.35", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 341.0 million in these years?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: _x000D_\n_x000D_\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century._x000D_\n_x000D_\n>..._x000D_\n_x000D_\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100._x000D_\n_x000D_\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100._x000D_\n_x000D_\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate._x000D_\n_x000D_\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. _x000D_\n_x000D_\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. _x000D_\n_x000D_\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**_x000D_\n_x000D_\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900._x000D_\n_x000D_\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "337.8", "median": "341.0", "upper_75": "344.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 337.8 million in the year 2030?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "337.8", "median": "341.0", "upper_75": "344.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 370.1 million in the year 2040?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "345.6", "median": "357.9", "upper_75": "370.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Benjamin Netanyahu will cease to be Prime Minister of Israel by Sep 2024?", "desc": "[Benjamin Netanyahu](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Netanyahu) is the current Prime Minister of Israel, having previously held the office from 1996 to 1999 and again from 2009 to 2021. Netanyahu is the longest-tenured prime minister in the country's history, having served for a total of over 16 years.\n\n[A series of coordinated attacks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Hamas_attack_on_Israel), conducted by the Palestinian Islamist militant Hamas, from the Gaza Strip onto bordering areas in Israel, commenced on Saturday 7 October 2023. Israel declared war on Hamas on 8 October, and its response to the attack has seen the most significant military escalation in the region since the Yom Kippur War. \n\nWithin Israel, Netanyahu's government has been [widely condemned](https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4282509-netanyahu-failed-and-must-resign/) for failures to prepare for these attacks.", "resc": "The question resolves as the end date of Benjamin Netanyahu's current term as Prime Minister of Israel.", "lower_25": "Sep 2024", "median": "Feb 2025", "upper_75": "Jan 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 370.1 million in the year 2040?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "345.6", "median": "357.9", "upper_75": "370.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that real GDP growth (using the seasonally adjusted annual rate) will be 2.35% in the United States in the following quarters (2025 Q3)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Economic Analysis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Economic_Analysis) (BEA) provides quarterly estimates of [gross domestic product](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) (GDP) in the United States. The BEA typically releases [three GDP estimates](https://www.bea.gov/system/files/2020-08/quick-guide-gdp.pdf), an advance estimate, a second estimate, and a third and final estimate. The advance estimate is typically released in the month following the end of the quarter.\n\nBelow is a graph of quarter over quarter GDP growth rates in the US, adjusted for inflation and seasonal effects, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BEA, but it updates with each estimate published by the BEA so it does not reflect the advanced estimate in each quarter.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the quarter over quarter GDP growth rate in the US, adjusted for inflation and seasonal effects and using an annual rate, in percent. Resolution will be determined according to the BEA's advance estimate, typically found [here](https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product)", "lower_25": "0.298", "median": "1.38", "upper_75": "2.35", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 337.8 million in the year 2030?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "337.8", "median": "341.0", "upper_75": "344.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 379 million by the year 2060?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "354", "median": "379", "upper_75": "406", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 368.8 million by the year 2050?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "355.3", "median": "368.8", "upper_75": "382.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 370.1 million in the year 2040?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "345.6", "median": "357.9", "upper_75": "370.1", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 368.8 million by the year 2050?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "355.3", "median": "368.8", "upper_75": "382.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 368.8 million by the year 2050?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "355.3", "median": "368.8", "upper_75": "382.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 353 million in 2070?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "353", "median": "381", "upper_75": "417", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 379 million by the year 2060?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "354", "median": "379", "upper_75": "406", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 439 million by the year 2080?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "357", "median": "385", "upper_75": "439", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 439 million by the year 2080?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "357", "median": "385", "upper_75": "439", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 475 million by the year 2090?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "355", "median": "386", "upper_75": "475", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 379 million by the year 2060?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "354", "median": "379", "upper_75": "406", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 353 million in 2070?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "353", "median": "381", "upper_75": "417", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the European Union will cease to exist by Not ≤ 2200?", "desc": "The European Union is an international organization with 27 members, mixing intergovernmental and supranational aspects. It was founded in 1957, with the Treaty of Rome establishing the then European Economic Community, and took its present legal structure with the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon. Ten additional countries have applied to join and are in various stages of the accession process.\n\nThe EU could, however, end; the member states might agree to end the treaties, or they could just violate their duties and obligations without suffering consequences, rendering the treaties dead letter. If the EU evolves into some sort of \"United States of Europe\", then after this happens states might secede, to such an extent that one could no longer meaningfully speak of an existing European Union.", "resc": "This question resolves at the date in which the EU ceases to exist. It is considered to exist if any of the following hold:\n\n- there are at least two _active_ States Party to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and/or the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in their present or eventually amended forms;\n\n- there are States Party to one or more treaties whose pre-signing negotiations happened between EU members and which is/are intended to replace the TEU and/or the TFEU, as long as the resulting entity is broadly similar to anything the EU has been up to that point;\n\n- there is a State which came into existence as a merger of two or more EU members at the time of the merger, such that the merger was seen as fulfilling the EU's task of European integration; and this merged State controls at least 3/4 of the individual territory of at least two pre-merger states.", "lower_25": "2060", "median": "2112", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2200", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 475 million by the year 2090?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "355", "median": "386", "upper_75": "475", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 478 million by the year 2100?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "346", "median": "380", "upper_75": "478", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 475 million by the year 2090?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "355", "median": "386", "upper_75": "475", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 439 million by the year 2080?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "357", "median": "385", "upper_75": "439", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 353 million in 2070?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "353", "median": "381", "upper_75": "417", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 478 million by the year 2100?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "346", "median": "380", "upper_75": "478", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the European Union will cease to exist by Not ≤ 2200?", "desc": "The European Union is an international organization with 27 members, mixing intergovernmental and supranational aspects. It was founded in 1957, with the Treaty of Rome establishing the then European Economic Community, and took its present legal structure with the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon. Ten additional countries have applied to join and are in various stages of the accession process.\n\nThe EU could, however, end; the member states might agree to end the treaties, or they could just violate their duties and obligations without suffering consequences, rendering the treaties dead letter. If the EU evolves into some sort of \"United States of Europe\", then after this happens states might secede, to such an extent that one could no longer meaningfully speak of an existing European Union.", "resc": "This question resolves at the date in which the EU ceases to exist. It is considered to exist if any of the following hold:\n\n- there are at least two _active_ States Party to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and/or the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in their present or eventually amended forms;\n\n- there are States Party to one or more treaties whose pre-signing negotiations happened between EU members and which is/are intended to replace the TEU and/or the TFEU, as long as the resulting entity is broadly similar to anything the EU has been up to that point;\n\n- there is a State which came into existence as a merger of two or more EU members at the time of the merger, such that the merger was seen as fulfilling the EU's task of European integration; and this merged State controls at least 3/4 of the individual territory of at least two pre-merger states.", "lower_25": "2060", "median": "2112", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2200", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the US population will be 478 million by the year 2100?", "desc": "In November 2023, the U.S. Census Bureau issued [updated projections](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023/population-projections.html) for the future of the US population through the rest of the 21st century, based on the results of the 2020 census: \n\n>The U.S. population is projected to reach a high of nearly 370 million in 2080 before edging downward to 366 million in 2100. By 2100, the total U.S. resident population is only projected to increase 9.7% from 2022, according to the latest U.S. Census Bureau population projections released today. The projections provide possible scenarios of population change for the nation through the end of the century.\n\n>...\n\n>By 2100, the total population in the middle series is projected to reach 366 million compared to the projection for the high-immigration scenario, which puts the population at 435 million. The population for the middle series increases to a peak at 370 million in 2080 and then begins to decline, dropping to 366 million in 2100. The high-immigration scenario increases every year and is projected to reach 435 million by 2100.\n\n>The low-immigration scenario is projected to peak at around 346 million in 2043 and decline thereafter, dropping to 319 million in 2100.\n\n>Though largely illustrative, the zero-immigration scenario projects that population declines would start in 2024 in the complete absence of foreign-born immigration. The population in this scenario is projected to be 226 million in 2100, roughly 107 million lower than the 2022 estimate.\n\nAs of November 9 2023, the US population is [estimated](https://www.census.gov/popclock/) to be 335.7 million.", "resc": "Each sub-question will resolve as the first official measured or estimated value, in millions of biological humans, published for the relevant year by the U.S. Census Bureau; or, if it no longer exists or fails to publish an official estimate of the US population for a listed year, an estimate provided by an alternative agency or department of the US government as selected by Metaculus moderators. \n\nImportantly, this question resolves on the basis of the US population according to the Census Bureau (or other body) as of the listed years according to their methodology for measuring or estimating it, including if the territorial extent of the US has changed significantly by the time each sub-question is due to resolve. This includes any off-world populations that may exist, if they are considered to inhabit United States sovereign territory. \n\nOnly the biological human population counts for this question group; the population of emulated humans, AI systems, or any other digital minds shall not be included. If it is impossible to determine the biological human population for any of the listed years, those sub-questions shall resolve as **ambiguous.**\n\n'Biological humans' are defined for this question as members of a species with enough biological similarity to reproduce with typical 2023 humans with medical assistance which was available in the year 1900.\n\nIf the United States no longer exists as a sovereign state in any of the listed years, the sub-questions for those years shall resolve as **ambiguous.**", "lower_25": "346", "median": "380", "upper_75": "478", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the European Union will cease to exist by Not ≤ 2200?", "desc": "The European Union is an international organization with 27 members, mixing intergovernmental and supranational aspects. It was founded in 1957, with the Treaty of Rome establishing the then European Economic Community, and took its present legal structure with the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon. Ten additional countries have applied to join and are in various stages of the accession process.\n\nThe EU could, however, end; the member states might agree to end the treaties, or they could just violate their duties and obligations without suffering consequences, rendering the treaties dead letter. If the EU evolves into some sort of \"United States of Europe\", then after this happens states might secede, to such an extent that one could no longer meaningfully speak of an existing European Union.", "resc": "This question resolves at the date in which the EU ceases to exist. It is considered to exist if any of the following hold:\n\n- there are at least two _active_ States Party to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and/or the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in their present or eventually amended forms;\n\n- there are States Party to one or more treaties whose pre-signing negotiations happened between EU members and which is/are intended to replace the TEU and/or the TFEU, as long as the resulting entity is broadly similar to anything the EU has been up to that point;\n\n- there is a State which came into existence as a merger of two or more EU members at the time of the merger, such that the merger was seen as fulfilling the EU's task of European integration; and this merged State controls at least 3/4 of the individual territory of at least two pre-merger states.", "lower_25": "2060", "median": "2112", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2200", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly rate of RSV-associated hospitalizations per 100,000 people for the United States will be 0.800 in the following weeks?", "desc": "[According to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/index.html):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>Respiratory syncytial (sin-SISH-uhl) virus, or RSV, is a common respiratory virus that usually causes mild, cold-like symptoms. Most people recover in a week or two, but RSV can be serious. Infants and older adults are more likely to develop severe RSV and need hospitalization._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe CDC's [RSV surveillance page](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/index.html) describes the RSV burden as follows:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>Each year in the United States, RSV leads to approximately:_x000D_\n>_x000D_\n>* 2.1 million outpatient (non-hospitalization) visits among children younger than 5 years old._x000D_\n>* 58,000-80,000 hospitalizations among children younger than 5 years old._x000D_\n>* 60,000-160,000 hospitalizations among adults 65 years and older._x000D_\n>* 6,000-10,000 deaths among adults 65 years and older._x000D_\n>* 100–300 deaths in children younger than 5 years old._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe CDC tracks respiratory virus hospitalization rates for RSV, COVID, and influenza through the [Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html) (RESP-NET). RSV hospitalization rates are tracked via [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/dashboard.html). The underlying source data for the RSV-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Weekly-Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-Hospitali/29hc-w46k).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the weekly rate of RSV-associated hospitalizations per 100,000 people in the United States for the week ending on the respective date, as reported on [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/dashboard.html), maintained by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters._x000D_\n_x000D_\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "0.486", "median": "0.622", "upper_75": "0.800", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly rate of RSV-associated hospitalizations per 100,000 people for the United States will be 0.800 in the following weeks?", "desc": "[According to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/index.html):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>Respiratory syncytial (sin-SISH-uhl) virus, or RSV, is a common respiratory virus that usually causes mild, cold-like symptoms. Most people recover in a week or two, but RSV can be serious. Infants and older adults are more likely to develop severe RSV and need hospitalization._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe CDC's [RSV surveillance page](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/index.html) describes the RSV burden as follows:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>Each year in the United States, RSV leads to approximately:_x000D_\n>_x000D_\n>* 2.1 million outpatient (non-hospitalization) visits among children younger than 5 years old._x000D_\n>* 58,000-80,000 hospitalizations among children younger than 5 years old._x000D_\n>* 60,000-160,000 hospitalizations among adults 65 years and older._x000D_\n>* 6,000-10,000 deaths among adults 65 years and older._x000D_\n>* 100–300 deaths in children younger than 5 years old._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe CDC tracks respiratory virus hospitalization rates for RSV, COVID, and influenza through the [Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html) (RESP-NET). RSV hospitalization rates are tracked via [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/dashboard.html). The underlying source data for the RSV-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Weekly-Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-Hospitali/29hc-w46k).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the weekly rate of RSV-associated hospitalizations per 100,000 people in the United States for the week ending on the respective date, as reported on [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/dashboard.html), maintained by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters._x000D_\n_x000D_\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "0.486", "median": "0.622", "upper_75": "0.800", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 16.6k confirmed COVID-19 hospitalizations in the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "[According to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/your-health/about-covid-19.html):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>COVID-19 (coronavirus disease 2019) is a disease caused by a virus named SARS-CoV-2. It can be very contagious and spreads quickly. Over one million people have died from COVID-19 in the United States._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe CDC maintains a page showing [COVID-19 ensemble hospitalization forecasts](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/science/forecasting/hospitalizations-forecasts.html) which are sourced from individual forecasts submitted to the [COVID-19 Forecast Hub](https://covid19forecasthub.org/doc/ensemble/)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe forecasts are compared to the data [in the COVID-19 Forecast Hub respository](https://github.com/reichlab/covid19-forecast-hub/tree/master/data-truth), compiled from the underlying data [here](https://healthdata.gov/Hospital/COVID-19-Reported-Patient-Impact-and-Hospital-Capa/g62h-syeh). The repository describes the data used as follows:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>The hospitalization truth data is computed as the sum of the columns `previous_day_admission_adult_covid_confirmed` and `previous_day_admission_pediatric_covid_confirmed` which provide the new daily admission for adults and kids, respectively. (Other columns represent “suspected” COVID-19 hospitalizations, however because definitions and implementations of suspected cases vary widely, our public health collaborators have recommended using the above columns only.)_x000D_\n>_x000D_\n>Since these admission data are listed as “previous day” admissions in the raw data, the truth data shifts values in the date column one day earlier so that inc hosp align with the date the admissions occurred._x000D_\n_x000D_\nSee the image below for a plot of the weekly hospitalizations, and additional plots as well as a data table can be found [here](https://www.ryanbeckauthor.com/forecasting/COVIDWeekly.html). *Please note that this plot and the link use the resolution source data but are not the resolution source and therefore may contain errors.*_x000D_\n_x000D_\n![COVID-19 Hospitalizations](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ryooan/ryooan.github.io/master/forecasting/COVIDWeekly/R/us_recent_plot.png)_x000D_\n_x000D_\nA plot of the daily hospitalizations and the ensemble forecast can also be found at the [COVID-19 Forecast Hub](https://viz.covid19forecasthub.org/).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the weekly total number of confirmed COVID-19 hospitalizations in the United States for the week ending on the respective date, as reported in the `truth-Incident Hospitalizations` dataset provided by the COVID-19 Forecast Hub [here](https://github.com/reichlab/covid19-forecast-hub/tree/master/data-truth). The question uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The weekly number will be found by summing the daily hospitalization values for the United States for the Sunday through Saturday of the week in question._x000D_\n_x000D_\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown at the resolution source 4 weeks after the respective end date.", "lower_25": "10.3k", "median": "13.0k", "upper_75": "16.6k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 7.53k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations for the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.24k", "median": "5.06k", "upper_75": "7.53k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 16.6k confirmed COVID-19 hospitalizations in the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "[According to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/your-health/about-covid-19.html):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>COVID-19 (coronavirus disease 2019) is a disease caused by a virus named SARS-CoV-2. It can be very contagious and spreads quickly. Over one million people have died from COVID-19 in the United States._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe CDC maintains a page showing [COVID-19 ensemble hospitalization forecasts](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/science/forecasting/hospitalizations-forecasts.html) which are sourced from individual forecasts submitted to the [COVID-19 Forecast Hub](https://covid19forecasthub.org/doc/ensemble/)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe forecasts are compared to the data [in the COVID-19 Forecast Hub respository](https://github.com/reichlab/covid19-forecast-hub/tree/master/data-truth), compiled from the underlying data [here](https://healthdata.gov/Hospital/COVID-19-Reported-Patient-Impact-and-Hospital-Capa/g62h-syeh). The repository describes the data used as follows:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>The hospitalization truth data is computed as the sum of the columns `previous_day_admission_adult_covid_confirmed` and `previous_day_admission_pediatric_covid_confirmed` which provide the new daily admission for adults and kids, respectively. (Other columns represent “suspected” COVID-19 hospitalizations, however because definitions and implementations of suspected cases vary widely, our public health collaborators have recommended using the above columns only.)_x000D_\n>_x000D_\n>Since these admission data are listed as “previous day” admissions in the raw data, the truth data shifts values in the date column one day earlier so that inc hosp align with the date the admissions occurred._x000D_\n_x000D_\nSee the image below for a plot of the weekly hospitalizations, and additional plots as well as a data table can be found [here](https://www.ryanbeckauthor.com/forecasting/COVIDWeekly.html). *Please note that this plot and the link use the resolution source data but are not the resolution source and therefore may contain errors.*_x000D_\n_x000D_\n![COVID-19 Hospitalizations](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ryooan/ryooan.github.io/master/forecasting/COVIDWeekly/R/us_recent_plot.png)_x000D_\n_x000D_\nA plot of the daily hospitalizations and the ensemble forecast can also be found at the [COVID-19 Forecast Hub](https://viz.covid19forecasthub.org/).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the weekly total number of confirmed COVID-19 hospitalizations in the United States for the week ending on the respective date, as reported in the `truth-Incident Hospitalizations` dataset provided by the COVID-19 Forecast Hub [here](https://github.com/reichlab/covid19-forecast-hub/tree/master/data-truth). The question uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The weekly number will be found by summing the daily hospitalization values for the United States for the Sunday through Saturday of the week in question._x000D_\n_x000D_\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown at the resolution source 4 weeks after the respective end date.", "lower_25": "10.3k", "median": "13.0k", "upper_75": "16.6k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 7.53k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations for the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.24k", "median": "5.06k", "upper_75": "7.53k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 7.53k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations for the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.24k", "median": "5.06k", "upper_75": "7.53k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the end of year unemployment rate in South Africa will be 34.0% according to the Q4 QLFS report in the following years?", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "30.4", "median": "32.4", "upper_75": "34.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly share (in percent) of emergency department visits for combined respiratory illnesses in the United States will be 3.37% for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.04", "median": "2.64", "upper_75": "3.37", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the end of year unemployment rate in South Africa will be 34.0% according to the Q4 QLFS report in the following years?", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "30.4", "median": "32.4", "upper_75": "34.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly rate of RSV-associated hospitalizations per 100,000 people for the United States will be 0.800 in the following weeks?", "desc": "[According to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/index.html):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>Respiratory syncytial (sin-SISH-uhl) virus, or RSV, is a common respiratory virus that usually causes mild, cold-like symptoms. Most people recover in a week or two, but RSV can be serious. Infants and older adults are more likely to develop severe RSV and need hospitalization._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe CDC's [RSV surveillance page](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/index.html) describes the RSV burden as follows:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>Each year in the United States, RSV leads to approximately:_x000D_\n>_x000D_\n>* 2.1 million outpatient (non-hospitalization) visits among children younger than 5 years old._x000D_\n>* 58,000-80,000 hospitalizations among children younger than 5 years old._x000D_\n>* 60,000-160,000 hospitalizations among adults 65 years and older._x000D_\n>* 6,000-10,000 deaths among adults 65 years and older._x000D_\n>* 100–300 deaths in children younger than 5 years old._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe CDC tracks respiratory virus hospitalization rates for RSV, COVID, and influenza through the [Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html) (RESP-NET). RSV hospitalization rates are tracked via [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/dashboard.html). The underlying source data for the RSV-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Weekly-Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-Hospitali/29hc-w46k).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the weekly rate of RSV-associated hospitalizations per 100,000 people in the United States for the week ending on the respective date, as reported on [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/dashboard.html), maintained by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters._x000D_\n_x000D_\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "0.486", "median": "0.622", "upper_75": "0.800", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 16.6k confirmed COVID-19 hospitalizations in the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "[According to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/your-health/about-covid-19.html):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>COVID-19 (coronavirus disease 2019) is a disease caused by a virus named SARS-CoV-2. It can be very contagious and spreads quickly. Over one million people have died from COVID-19 in the United States._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe CDC maintains a page showing [COVID-19 ensemble hospitalization forecasts](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/science/forecasting/hospitalizations-forecasts.html) which are sourced from individual forecasts submitted to the [COVID-19 Forecast Hub](https://covid19forecasthub.org/doc/ensemble/)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe forecasts are compared to the data [in the COVID-19 Forecast Hub respository](https://github.com/reichlab/covid19-forecast-hub/tree/master/data-truth), compiled from the underlying data [here](https://healthdata.gov/Hospital/COVID-19-Reported-Patient-Impact-and-Hospital-Capa/g62h-syeh). The repository describes the data used as follows:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>The hospitalization truth data is computed as the sum of the columns `previous_day_admission_adult_covid_confirmed` and `previous_day_admission_pediatric_covid_confirmed` which provide the new daily admission for adults and kids, respectively. (Other columns represent “suspected” COVID-19 hospitalizations, however because definitions and implementations of suspected cases vary widely, our public health collaborators have recommended using the above columns only.)_x000D_\n>_x000D_\n>Since these admission data are listed as “previous day” admissions in the raw data, the truth data shifts values in the date column one day earlier so that inc hosp align with the date the admissions occurred._x000D_\n_x000D_\nSee the image below for a plot of the weekly hospitalizations, and additional plots as well as a data table can be found [here](https://www.ryanbeckauthor.com/forecasting/COVIDWeekly.html). *Please note that this plot and the link use the resolution source data but are not the resolution source and therefore may contain errors.*_x000D_\n_x000D_\n![COVID-19 Hospitalizations](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ryooan/ryooan.github.io/master/forecasting/COVIDWeekly/R/us_recent_plot.png)_x000D_\n_x000D_\nA plot of the daily hospitalizations and the ensemble forecast can also be found at the [COVID-19 Forecast Hub](https://viz.covid19forecasthub.org/).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the weekly total number of confirmed COVID-19 hospitalizations in the United States for the week ending on the respective date, as reported in the `truth-Incident Hospitalizations` dataset provided by the COVID-19 Forecast Hub [here](https://github.com/reichlab/covid19-forecast-hub/tree/master/data-truth). The question uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The weekly number will be found by summing the daily hospitalization values for the United States for the Sunday through Saturday of the week in question._x000D_\n_x000D_\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown at the resolution source 4 weeks after the respective end date.", "lower_25": "10.3k", "median": "13.0k", "upper_75": "16.6k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the end of year unemployment rate in South Africa will be 32.4% according to the Q4 QLFS report in the following years?", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "30.4", "median": "32.4", "upper_75": "34.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly share (in percent) of emergency department visits for combined respiratory illnesses in the United States will be 3.37% for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.04", "median": "2.64", "upper_75": "3.37", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the end of year unemployment rate in South Africa will be 32.4% according to the Q4 QLFS report in the following years?", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "30.4", "median": "32.4", "upper_75": "34.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly share (in percent) of emergency department visits for combined respiratory illnesses in the United States will be 3.37% for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.04", "median": "2.64", "upper_75": "3.37", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the end of year unemployment rate in South Africa will be 34.0% according to the Q4 QLFS report in the following years?", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "30.4", "median": "32.4", "upper_75": "34.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the end of year unemployment rate in South Africa will be 32.4% according to the Q4 QLFS report in the following years?", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "30.4", "median": "32.4", "upper_75": "34.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the end of year unemployment rate in South Africa will be 50% according to the Q4 QLFS report in the year 2026?", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the end of year unemployment rate in South Africa will be 25% according to the Q4 QLFS report in the following years?", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the end of year unemployment rate in South Africa will be 25% according to the Q4 QLFS report in the following years?", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the end of year unemployment rate in South Africa will be 50% according to the Q4 QLFS report in the year 2027?", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the end of year unemployment rate in South Africa will be 50% according to the Q4 QLFS report in the year 2027?", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the expected end of year unemployment rate in South Africa, according to the Q4 QLFS report, in the following years? (2028)", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the expected end of year unemployment rate in South Africa, according to the Q4 QLFS report, in the following years? (2028)", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the end of year unemployment rate in South Africa will be 50% according to the Q4 QLFS report in the year 2029?", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the end of year unemployment rate in South Africa will be 50% according to the Q4 QLFS report in the year 2026?", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the expected end of year unemployment rate in South Africa, according to the Q4 QLFS report, in the following years? (2028)", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the end of year unemployment rate in South Africa will be 50% according to the Q4 QLFS report in the year 2029?", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that robots will win a game of association football (soccer) against professional human players by 2057?", "desc": "[RoboCup](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RoboCup) is an organization which holds many robotics competitions, the first held in [1997](http://www.robocup.org/a_brief_history_of_robocup). Their stated \"ultimate goal\" is:\n\n>By the middle of the 21st century, a team of fully autonomous humanoid robot soccer players shall win a soccer game, complying with the official rules of FIFA, against the winner of the most recent World Cup.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date in which a team of robots win a game of [association football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football) against professional human football players, according to the officiating body who organizes the game.\n\nIf no such game occurs before 2150, this question will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the end of year unemployment rate in South Africa will be 50% according to the Q4 QLFS report in the year 2027?", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will be 7.994?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the maximum weekly rate of hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024.\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "7.323", "median": "7.656", "upper_75": "7.994", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that robots will win a game of association football (soccer) against professional human players by 2057?", "desc": "[RoboCup](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RoboCup) is an organization which holds many robotics competitions, the first held in [1997](http://www.robocup.org/a_brief_history_of_robocup). Their stated \"ultimate goal\" is:\n\n>By the middle of the 21st century, a team of fully autonomous humanoid robot soccer players shall win a soccer game, complying with the official rules of FIFA, against the winner of the most recent World Cup.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date in which a team of robots win a game of [association football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football) against professional human football players, according to the officiating body who organizes the game.\n\nIf no such game occurs before 2150, this question will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the end of year unemployment rate in South Africa will be 50% according to the Q4 QLFS report in the year 2026?", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the end of year unemployment rate in South Africa will be 25% according to the Q4 QLFS report in the year 2030?", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that robots will win a game of association football (soccer) against professional human players by 2057?", "desc": "[RoboCup](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RoboCup) is an organization which holds many robotics competitions, the first held in [1997](http://www.robocup.org/a_brief_history_of_robocup). Their stated \"ultimate goal\" is:\n\n>By the middle of the 21st century, a team of fully autonomous humanoid robot soccer players shall win a soccer game, complying with the official rules of FIFA, against the winner of the most recent World Cup.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date in which a team of robots win a game of [association football](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_football) against professional human football players, according to the officiating body who organizes the game.\n\nIf no such game occurs before 2150, this question will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "2038", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2057", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the end of year unemployment rate in South Africa will be 25% according to the Q4 QLFS report in the year 2030?", "desc": "[The South African economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_South_Africa) is the 2nd largest in Africa, and the 38th largest in the world. It is also Africa's most industrialised and technologically advanced economy. The total population of South Africa is estimated to be ~63M people as of 2023. The Q3 QLFS report released on the 14th of November 2023 stated that South Africa's unemployment rate was 31.9%.", "resc": "The question resolves according to the number of unemployed persons in the Q4 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) Key Findings announcement by [Stats South Africa](https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1307) in each of the years in question.", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will be 7.994?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the maximum weekly rate of hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024.\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "7.323", "median": "7.656", "upper_75": "7.994", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will be 7.994?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the maximum weekly rate of hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024.\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "7.323", "median": "7.656", "upper_75": "7.994", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will be 7.994?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the maximum weekly rate of hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024.\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "7.323", "median": "7.656", "upper_75": "7.994", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will be 4.227?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the maximum weekly rate of hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024.\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "4.118", "median": "4.178", "upper_75": "4.227", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will be 7.994?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the maximum weekly rate of hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024.\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "7.323", "median": "7.656", "upper_75": "7.994", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will be 8.865?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the maximum weekly rate of hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024.\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "8.772", "median": "8.865", "upper_75": "8.953", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will be 7.994?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the maximum weekly rate of hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024.\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "7.323", "median": "7.656", "upper_75": "7.994", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will be 4.227?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the maximum weekly rate of hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024.\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "4.118", "median": "4.178", "upper_75": "4.227", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will be 8.865?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the maximum weekly rate of hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024.\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "8.772", "median": "8.865", "upper_75": "8.953", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will be 20.67?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the maximum weekly rate of hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024.\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "20.24", "median": "20.67", "upper_75": "21.07", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will be 20.67?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the maximum weekly rate of hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024.\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "20.24", "median": "20.67", "upper_75": "21.07", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will occur on Dec 31, 2023?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the date when the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people occurs for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024. The question will resolve as the week end date of the qualifying week (the Saturday for that week).\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 3, 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will occur on Jan 3, 2024?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the date when the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people occurs for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024. The question will resolve as the week end date of the qualifying week (the Saturday for that week).\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 3, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will occur on Dec 31, 2023?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the date when the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people occurs for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024. The question will resolve as the week end date of the qualifying week (the Saturday for that week).\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 3, 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will be 8.865?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the maximum weekly rate of hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024.\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "8.772", "median": "8.865", "upper_75": "8.953", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will be 4.227?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the maximum weekly rate of hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024.\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "4.118", "median": "4.178", "upper_75": "4.227", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will occur on Jan 3, 2024?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the date when the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people occurs for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024. The question will resolve as the week end date of the qualifying week (the Saturday for that week).\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 3, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will be 20.67?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the maximum weekly rate of hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024.\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "20.24", "median": "20.67", "upper_75": "21.07", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will occur on Dec 31, 2023?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the date when the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people occurs for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024. The question will resolve as the week end date of the qualifying week (the Saturday for that week).\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 3, 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the 2023-2024 respiratory illness season will occur on Jan 2, 2024?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the date when the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people occurs for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024. The question will resolve as the week end date of the qualifying week (the Saturday for that week).\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "Dec 28, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 2, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the 2023-2024 respiratory illness season will occur on Jan 2, 2024?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the date when the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people occurs for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024. The question will resolve as the week end date of the qualifying week (the Saturday for that week).\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "Dec 28, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 2, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will occur on Jan 3, 2024?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the date when the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people occurs for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024. The question will resolve as the week end date of the qualifying week (the Saturday for that week).\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "Dec 29, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 3, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the 2023-2024 respiratory illness season will occur on Jan 2, 2024?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the date when the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people occurs for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024. The question will resolve as the week end date of the qualifying week (the Saturday for that week).\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "Dec 28, 2023", "median": "Dec 31, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 2, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will occur on Jan 2, 2024?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the date when the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people occurs for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024. The question will resolve as the week end date of the qualifying week (the Saturday for that week).\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "Dec 28, 2023", "median": "Dec 30, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 2, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 465 police officers will be murdered in Mexico in the following years?", "desc": "On October 23, 2023, at least 12 police officers were killed in an attack on a security patrol in the Mexican state of Guerrero. The attack represents one of many police killings that have occurred across Mexico in recent years as it faces a wave of gang violence. [According to CBS News](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/police-attacks-mexico-guerrero-michoacan-24-killed/):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>Mexico is plagued by cartel-related bloodshed that has seen more than 420,000 people murdered since the government deployed the military in its war on drugs in 2006._x000D_\n>_x000D_\n>Since then, the country's murder rate has tripled to 25 per 100,000 inhabitants._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe organization [Common Cause](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/somos/) (Causa en Común) advocates for better governance and the rule of law, and as part of their work [publishes a record of murdered police officers](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/). According to their website the number of police murdered annually has been at least:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| Year | Murdered Police |_x000D_\n| --- | --- |_x000D_\n| [2019](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2019/) | 446 |_x000D_\n| [2020](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2020/) | 524 |_x000D_\n| [2021](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2021/) | 401 |_x000D_\n| [2022](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2022/) | 403 |_x000D_\n_x000D_\nThrough November 16, 2023, Common Cause [reports](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2023/) at least 377 police officers murdered in Mexico.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of police officers murdered in Mexico in the following years, according to [Common Cause](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/).", "lower_25": "422", "median": "465", "upper_75": "501", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will occur on Jan 2, 2024?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the date when the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people occurs for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024. The question will resolve as the week end date of the qualifying week (the Saturday for that week).\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "Dec 28, 2023", "median": "Dec 30, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 2, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for respiratory illnesses (RSV) will occur on Jan 2, 2024?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the date when the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people occurs for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024. The question will resolve as the week end date of the qualifying week (the Saturday for that week).\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "Dec 28, 2023", "median": "Dec 30, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 2, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated chance that OpenAI's Annual Recurring Revenue (ARR) will be 3.23B in 2024?", "desc": "From [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/technology/openai-track-generate-more-than-1-bln-revenue-over-12-months-information-2023-08-29/):\n\n> Aug 29 (Reuters) - OpenAI is on track to generate more than $1 billion in revenue over the next \n12 months from the sale of artificial intelligence software and computing capacity that powers it, the Information [reported](https://www.theinformation.com/articles/openai-passes-1-billion-revenue-pace-as-big-companies-boost-ai-spending?rc=wk5xyr) on Tuesday.\n\n> Earlier, the ChatGPT maker [projected](https://www.reuters.com/technology/booming-traffic-openais-chatgpt-posts-first-ever-monthly-dip-june-similarweb-2023-07-05/) $200 million in revenue for this year. The Microsoft-backed company is generating more than $80 million in revenue per month, compared to just $28 million in the entire last year, the report added.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the most recent estimate of OpenAI's Annual Recurring Revenue (ARR) for 2024 according to [Sacra](https://sacra.com/c/openai/).", "lower_25": "3.23B", "median": "4.63B", "upper_75": "7.10B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many weeks at World No. 1 will Novak Djokovic achieve in his career, given that he has already achieved 455.5 weeks?", "desc": "Novak Djokovic is a Serbian male professional tennis player who turned professional in 2003. He holds many records including the most Grand Slam men's singles titles in history (24) and the first and only man to win each Grand Slam event at least 3 times. He has the most end-year championship titles (7) and most years ended at world number one (7).\n\nOn 20 November 2023, [Novak Djokovic began his historic 400th week at the top of the men world rankings](https://www.atptour.com/en/news/djokovic-400-weeks-at-number-one), 90 weeks more than second place. In the 2023 season, he won four of the five major trophies (and was the finalist in the other one). \n\nHe is considered by many people as the GOAT (Greatest Of All Time) include [Rafael Nadal](https://bleacherreport.com/articles/10090158-rafael-nadal-novak-djokovic-being-tennis-goat-is-indisputable-this-is-the-truth), [Nick Kyrgios](https://www.foxsports.com.au/tennis/alien-from-another-planet-kyrgios-big-djokovic-call-as-goat-does-it-again/news-story/07bf4b09012ca18a75a20a7b711beed5), [Mansour Bahrami](https://www.tennis365.com/tennis-news/respect-unloved-goat-novak-djokovic-atp-finals) amongst others. This is backed up by [Ultimate Tennis Statistics](https://www.ultimatetennisstatistics.com/goatList) which states that Djokovic is the GOAT (statistically 168 points above second place). \n\n[Roger Federer](https://www.skysports.com/tennis/news/32498/12903143/tennis-legend-roger-federer-backs-novak-djokovic-to-continue-winning-grand-slams-following-his-french-open-triumph) and [Andy Murray](https://www.eurosport.com/tennis/andy-murray-backs-novak-djokovic-dominance-to-continue-after-us-open-win-i-don-t-think-he-s-going-to_sto9792372/story.shtml) believe Novak Djokovic will continue to win more major trophies.\n\nAt age 36, [Djokovic remains hungry to continue to win](https://www.tennis365.com/news/novak-djokovic-young-drive-keep-improving). So this question asks how many total weeks will Novak Djokovic accumulate as world number one before he retires.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of total weeks Novak Djokovic has been at world number one in the [Association of Tennis Professionals](https://www.atptour.com/) (ATP) rankings, as of the date at which Djokovic retires or no longer competes.", "lower_25": "438.2", "median": "446.8", "upper_75": "455.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 465 police officers will be murdered in Mexico in the following years?", "desc": "On October 23, 2023, at least 12 police officers were killed in an attack on a security patrol in the Mexican state of Guerrero. The attack represents one of many police killings that have occurred across Mexico in recent years as it faces a wave of gang violence. [According to CBS News](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/police-attacks-mexico-guerrero-michoacan-24-killed/):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>Mexico is plagued by cartel-related bloodshed that has seen more than 420,000 people murdered since the government deployed the military in its war on drugs in 2006._x000D_\n>_x000D_\n>Since then, the country's murder rate has tripled to 25 per 100,000 inhabitants._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe organization [Common Cause](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/somos/) (Causa en Común) advocates for better governance and the rule of law, and as part of their work [publishes a record of murdered police officers](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/). According to their website the number of police murdered annually has been at least:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| Year | Murdered Police |_x000D_\n| --- | --- |_x000D_\n| [2019](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2019/) | 446 |_x000D_\n| [2020](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2020/) | 524 |_x000D_\n| [2021](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2021/) | 401 |_x000D_\n| [2022](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2022/) | 403 |_x000D_\n_x000D_\nThrough November 16, 2023, Common Cause [reports](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2023/) at least 377 police officers murdered in Mexico.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of police officers murdered in Mexico in the following years, according to [Common Cause](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/).", "lower_25": "422", "median": "465", "upper_75": "501", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many weeks at World No. 1 will Novak Djokovic achieve in his career, given that he has already achieved 455.5 weeks?", "desc": "Novak Djokovic is a Serbian male professional tennis player who turned professional in 2003. He holds many records including the most Grand Slam men's singles titles in history (24) and the first and only man to win each Grand Slam event at least 3 times. He has the most end-year championship titles (7) and most years ended at world number one (7).\n\nOn 20 November 2023, [Novak Djokovic began his historic 400th week at the top of the men world rankings](https://www.atptour.com/en/news/djokovic-400-weeks-at-number-one), 90 weeks more than second place. In the 2023 season, he won four of the five major trophies (and was the finalist in the other one). \n\nHe is considered by many people as the GOAT (Greatest Of All Time) include [Rafael Nadal](https://bleacherreport.com/articles/10090158-rafael-nadal-novak-djokovic-being-tennis-goat-is-indisputable-this-is-the-truth), [Nick Kyrgios](https://www.foxsports.com.au/tennis/alien-from-another-planet-kyrgios-big-djokovic-call-as-goat-does-it-again/news-story/07bf4b09012ca18a75a20a7b711beed5), [Mansour Bahrami](https://www.tennis365.com/tennis-news/respect-unloved-goat-novak-djokovic-atp-finals) amongst others. This is backed up by [Ultimate Tennis Statistics](https://www.ultimatetennisstatistics.com/goatList) which states that Djokovic is the GOAT (statistically 168 points above second place). \n\n[Roger Federer](https://www.skysports.com/tennis/news/32498/12903143/tennis-legend-roger-federer-backs-novak-djokovic-to-continue-winning-grand-slams-following-his-french-open-triumph) and [Andy Murray](https://www.eurosport.com/tennis/andy-murray-backs-novak-djokovic-dominance-to-continue-after-us-open-win-i-don-t-think-he-s-going-to_sto9792372/story.shtml) believe Novak Djokovic will continue to win more major trophies.\n\nAt age 36, [Djokovic remains hungry to continue to win](https://www.tennis365.com/news/novak-djokovic-young-drive-keep-improving). So this question asks how many total weeks will Novak Djokovic accumulate as world number one before he retires.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of total weeks Novak Djokovic has been at world number one in the [Association of Tennis Professionals](https://www.atptour.com/) (ATP) rankings, as of the date at which Djokovic retires or no longer competes.", "lower_25": "438.2", "median": "446.8", "upper_75": "455.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for the following respiratory illnesses in the 2023-2024 season will occur on Jan 2, 2024?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the date when the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people occurs for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024. The question will resolve as the week end date of the qualifying week (the Saturday for that week).\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "Dec 28, 2023", "median": "Dec 30, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 2, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for respiratory illnesses (RSV) will occur on Jan 2, 2024?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the date when the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people occurs for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024. The question will resolve as the week end date of the qualifying week (the Saturday for that week).\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "Dec 28, 2023", "median": "Dec 30, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 2, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated chance that OpenAI's Annual Recurring Revenue (ARR) will be 3.23B in 2024?", "desc": "From [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/technology/openai-track-generate-more-than-1-bln-revenue-over-12-months-information-2023-08-29/):\n\n> Aug 29 (Reuters) - OpenAI is on track to generate more than $1 billion in revenue over the next \n12 months from the sale of artificial intelligence software and computing capacity that powers it, the Information [reported](https://www.theinformation.com/articles/openai-passes-1-billion-revenue-pace-as-big-companies-boost-ai-spending?rc=wk5xyr) on Tuesday.\n\n> Earlier, the ChatGPT maker [projected](https://www.reuters.com/technology/booming-traffic-openais-chatgpt-posts-first-ever-monthly-dip-june-similarweb-2023-07-05/) $200 million in revenue for this year. The Microsoft-backed company is generating more than $80 million in revenue per month, compared to just $28 million in the entire last year, the report added.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the most recent estimate of OpenAI's Annual Recurring Revenue (ARR) for 2024 according to [Sacra](https://sacra.com/c/openai/).", "lower_25": "3.23B", "median": "4.63B", "upper_75": "7.10B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many weeks at World No. 1 will Novak Djokovic achieve in his career, given that he has already achieved 455.5 weeks?", "desc": "Novak Djokovic is a Serbian male professional tennis player who turned professional in 2003. He holds many records including the most Grand Slam men's singles titles in history (24) and the first and only man to win each Grand Slam event at least 3 times. He has the most end-year championship titles (7) and most years ended at world number one (7).\n\nOn 20 November 2023, [Novak Djokovic began his historic 400th week at the top of the men world rankings](https://www.atptour.com/en/news/djokovic-400-weeks-at-number-one), 90 weeks more than second place. In the 2023 season, he won four of the five major trophies (and was the finalist in the other one). \n\nHe is considered by many people as the GOAT (Greatest Of All Time) include [Rafael Nadal](https://bleacherreport.com/articles/10090158-rafael-nadal-novak-djokovic-being-tennis-goat-is-indisputable-this-is-the-truth), [Nick Kyrgios](https://www.foxsports.com.au/tennis/alien-from-another-planet-kyrgios-big-djokovic-call-as-goat-does-it-again/news-story/07bf4b09012ca18a75a20a7b711beed5), [Mansour Bahrami](https://www.tennis365.com/tennis-news/respect-unloved-goat-novak-djokovic-atp-finals) amongst others. This is backed up by [Ultimate Tennis Statistics](https://www.ultimatetennisstatistics.com/goatList) which states that Djokovic is the GOAT (statistically 168 points above second place). \n\n[Roger Federer](https://www.skysports.com/tennis/news/32498/12903143/tennis-legend-roger-federer-backs-novak-djokovic-to-continue-winning-grand-slams-following-his-french-open-triumph) and [Andy Murray](https://www.eurosport.com/tennis/andy-murray-backs-novak-djokovic-dominance-to-continue-after-us-open-win-i-don-t-think-he-s-going-to_sto9792372/story.shtml) believe Novak Djokovic will continue to win more major trophies.\n\nAt age 36, [Djokovic remains hungry to continue to win](https://www.tennis365.com/news/novak-djokovic-young-drive-keep-improving). So this question asks how many total weeks will Novak Djokovic accumulate as world number one before he retires.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of total weeks Novak Djokovic has been at world number one in the [Association of Tennis Professionals](https://www.atptour.com/) (ATP) rankings, as of the date at which Djokovic retires or no longer competes.", "lower_25": "438.2", "median": "446.8", "upper_75": "455.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated chance that OpenAI's Annual Recurring Revenue (ARR) will be 3.23B in 2024?", "desc": "From [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/technology/openai-track-generate-more-than-1-bln-revenue-over-12-months-information-2023-08-29/):\n\n> Aug 29 (Reuters) - OpenAI is on track to generate more than $1 billion in revenue over the next \n12 months from the sale of artificial intelligence software and computing capacity that powers it, the Information [reported](https://www.theinformation.com/articles/openai-passes-1-billion-revenue-pace-as-big-companies-boost-ai-spending?rc=wk5xyr) on Tuesday.\n\n> Earlier, the ChatGPT maker [projected](https://www.reuters.com/technology/booming-traffic-openais-chatgpt-posts-first-ever-monthly-dip-june-similarweb-2023-07-05/) $200 million in revenue for this year. The Microsoft-backed company is generating more than $80 million in revenue per month, compared to just $28 million in the entire last year, the report added.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the most recent estimate of OpenAI's Annual Recurring Revenue (ARR) for 2024 according to [Sacra](https://sacra.com/c/openai/).", "lower_25": "3.23B", "median": "4.63B", "upper_75": "7.10B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 465 police officers will be murdered in Mexico in the following years (2024)?", "desc": "On October 23, 2023, at least 12 police officers were killed in an attack on a security patrol in the Mexican state of Guerrero. The attack represents one of many police killings that have occurred across Mexico in recent years as it faces a wave of gang violence. [According to CBS News](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/police-attacks-mexico-guerrero-michoacan-24-killed/):\n\n>Mexico is plagued by cartel-related bloodshed that has seen more than 420,000 people murdered since the government deployed the military in its war on drugs in 2006.\n>\n>Since then, the country's murder rate has tripled to 25 per 100,000 inhabitants.\n\nThe organization [Common Cause](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/somos/) (Causa en Común) advocates for better governance and the rule of law, and as part of their work [publishes a record of murdered police officers](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/). According to their website the number of police murdered annually has been at least:\n\n| Year | Murdered Police |\n| --- | --- |\n| [2019](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2019/) | 446 |\n| [2020](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2020/) | 524 |\n| [2021](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2021/) | 401 |\n| [2022](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2022/) | 403 |\n\nThrough November 16, 2023, Common Cause [reports](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2023/) at least 377 police officers murdered in Mexico.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of police officers murdered in Mexico in the following years, according to [Common Cause](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/).", "lower_25": "422", "median": "465", "upper_75": "501", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 465 police officers will be murdered in Mexico in the following years?", "desc": "On October 23, 2023, at least 12 police officers were killed in an attack on a security patrol in the Mexican state of Guerrero. The attack represents one of many police killings that have occurred across Mexico in recent years as it faces a wave of gang violence. [According to CBS News](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/police-attacks-mexico-guerrero-michoacan-24-killed/):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>Mexico is plagued by cartel-related bloodshed that has seen more than 420,000 people murdered since the government deployed the military in its war on drugs in 2006._x000D_\n>_x000D_\n>Since then, the country's murder rate has tripled to 25 per 100,000 inhabitants._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe organization [Common Cause](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/somos/) (Causa en Común) advocates for better governance and the rule of law, and as part of their work [publishes a record of murdered police officers](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/). According to their website the number of police murdered annually has been at least:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| Year | Murdered Police |_x000D_\n| --- | --- |_x000D_\n| [2019](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2019/) | 446 |_x000D_\n| [2020](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2020/) | 524 |_x000D_\n| [2021](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2021/) | 401 |_x000D_\n| [2022](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2022/) | 403 |_x000D_\n_x000D_\nThrough November 16, 2023, Common Cause [reports](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2023/) at least 377 police officers murdered in Mexico.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of police officers murdered in Mexico in the following years, according to [Common Cause](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/).", "lower_25": "422", "median": "465", "upper_75": "501", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 465 police officers will be murdered in Mexico in the following years (2024)?", "desc": "On October 23, 2023, at least 12 police officers were killed in an attack on a security patrol in the Mexican state of Guerrero. The attack represents one of many police killings that have occurred across Mexico in recent years as it faces a wave of gang violence. [According to CBS News](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/police-attacks-mexico-guerrero-michoacan-24-killed/):\n\n>Mexico is plagued by cartel-related bloodshed that has seen more than 420,000 people murdered since the government deployed the military in its war on drugs in 2006.\n>\n>Since then, the country's murder rate has tripled to 25 per 100,000 inhabitants.\n\nThe organization [Common Cause](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/somos/) (Causa en Común) advocates for better governance and the rule of law, and as part of their work [publishes a record of murdered police officers](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/). According to their website the number of police murdered annually has been at least:\n\n| Year | Murdered Police |\n| --- | --- |\n| [2019](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2019/) | 446 |\n| [2020](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2020/) | 524 |\n| [2021](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2021/) | 401 |\n| [2022](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2022/) | 403 |\n\nThrough November 16, 2023, Common Cause [reports](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2023/) at least 377 police officers murdered in Mexico.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of police officers murdered in Mexico in the following years, according to [Common Cause](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/).", "lower_25": "422", "median": "465", "upper_75": "501", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 465 police officers will be murdered in Mexico in the following years (2024)?", "desc": "On October 23, 2023, at least 12 police officers were killed in an attack on a security patrol in the Mexican state of Guerrero. The attack represents one of many police killings that have occurred across Mexico in recent years as it faces a wave of gang violence. [According to CBS News](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/police-attacks-mexico-guerrero-michoacan-24-killed/):\n\n>Mexico is plagued by cartel-related bloodshed that has seen more than 420,000 people murdered since the government deployed the military in its war on drugs in 2006.\n>\n>Since then, the country's murder rate has tripled to 25 per 100,000 inhabitants.\n\nThe organization [Common Cause](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/somos/) (Causa en Común) advocates for better governance and the rule of law, and as part of their work [publishes a record of murdered police officers](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/). According to their website the number of police murdered annually has been at least:\n\n| Year | Murdered Police |\n| --- | --- |\n| [2019](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2019/) | 446 |\n| [2020](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2020/) | 524 |\n| [2021](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2021/) | 401 |\n| [2022](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2022/) | 403 |\n\nThrough November 16, 2023, Common Cause [reports](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2023/) at least 377 police officers murdered in Mexico.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of police officers murdered in Mexico in the following years, according to [Common Cause](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/).", "lower_25": "422", "median": "465", "upper_75": "501", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that these parties will win 30.0 share of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "24.1", "median": "27.0", "upper_75": "30.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Conservative and Unionist Party will win 27.0 share of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "24.1", "median": "27.0", "upper_75": "30.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 475 police officers will be murdered in Mexico in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "On October 23, 2023, at least 12 police officers were killed in an attack on a security patrol in the Mexican state of Guerrero. The attack represents one of many police killings that have occurred across Mexico in recent years as it faces a wave of gang violence. [According to CBS News](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/police-attacks-mexico-guerrero-michoacan-24-killed/):\n\n>Mexico is plagued by cartel-related bloodshed that has seen more than 420,000 people murdered since the government deployed the military in its war on drugs in 2006.\n>\n>Since then, the country's murder rate has tripled to 25 per 100,000 inhabitants.\n\nThe organization [Common Cause](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/somos/) (Causa en Común) advocates for better governance and the rule of law, and as part of their work [publishes a record of murdered police officers](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/). According to their website the number of police murdered annually has been at least:\n\n| Year | Murdered Police |\n| --- | --- |\n| [2019](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2019/) | 446 |\n| [2020](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2020/) | 524 |\n| [2021](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2021/) | 401 |\n| [2022](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2022/) | 403 |\n\nThrough November 16, 2023, Common Cause [reports](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2023/) at least 377 police officers murdered in Mexico.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of police officers murdered in Mexico in the following years, according to [Common Cause](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/).", "lower_25": "403", "median": "432", "upper_75": "475", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 475 police officers will be murdered in Mexico in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "On October 23, 2023, at least 12 police officers were killed in an attack on a security patrol in the Mexican state of Guerrero. The attack represents one of many police killings that have occurred across Mexico in recent years as it faces a wave of gang violence. [According to CBS News](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/police-attacks-mexico-guerrero-michoacan-24-killed/):\n\n>Mexico is plagued by cartel-related bloodshed that has seen more than 420,000 people murdered since the government deployed the military in its war on drugs in 2006.\n>\n>Since then, the country's murder rate has tripled to 25 per 100,000 inhabitants.\n\nThe organization [Common Cause](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/somos/) (Causa en Común) advocates for better governance and the rule of law, and as part of their work [publishes a record of murdered police officers](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/). According to their website the number of police murdered annually has been at least:\n\n| Year | Murdered Police |\n| --- | --- |\n| [2019](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2019/) | 446 |\n| [2020](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2020/) | 524 |\n| [2021](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2021/) | 401 |\n| [2022](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2022/) | 403 |\n\nThrough November 16, 2023, Common Cause [reports](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2023/) at least 377 police officers murdered in Mexico.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of police officers murdered in Mexico in the following years, according to [Common Cause](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/).", "lower_25": "403", "median": "432", "upper_75": "475", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Labour Party will win 37.3% of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "37.3", "median": "40.6", "upper_75": "44.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Labour Party will win 37.3% of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "37.3", "median": "40.6", "upper_75": "44.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people for respiratory illnesses (RSV) will occur on Jan 2, 2024?", "desc": "The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) closely monitors respiratory illnesses, particularly when these illnesses increase in prevalence during the winter. One monitoring and data sharing tool the CDC uses is [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html), which it describes as follows:\n\n>The Respiratory Virus Hospitalization Surveillance Network (RESP-NET) comprises three networks that conduct population-based surveillance for laboratory-confirmed hospitalizations associated with COVID-19, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), and influenza among children and adults. While RESP-NET does not collect data on all hospitalizations caused by respiratory illnesses, it can describe hospitalizations caused by three viruses that account for a large proportion of these hospitalizations. Surveillance is conducted through a network of acute care hospitals in select counties or county equivalents in 12 states for RSV surveillance, 13 states for COVID-19 surveillance, and 14 states for influenza surveillance. The surveillance platforms for COVID-19, RSV, and influenza (known as [COVID-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covid-net/purpose-methods.html), [RSV-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/rsv/research/rsv-net/overview-methods.html), and [FluSurv-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/influenza-hospitalization-surveillance.htm), respectively) cover more than 30 million people and include an estimated 8-10% of the U.S. population.\n\nThe underlying source data for the RESP-NET dashboard can be found at [this link](https://data.cdc.gov/Public-Health-Surveillance/Rates-of-Laboratory-Confirmed-RSV-COVID-19-and-Flu/kvib-3txy).", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the date when the maximum weekly rate of new hospital admissions per 100,000 people occurs for the listed respiratory illness in the 2023-2024 season, according to the CDC's [RESP-NET](https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/resp-net/dashboard.html). The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday. The rate used will be that for all ages, races, and sexes. See the fine print for the correct filters. For the purposes of this question, the 2023-2024 season will be considered to begin with the week ending on October 7, 2023, and end on the week ending June 1, 2024. The question will resolve as the week end date of the qualifying week (the Saturday for that week).\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown after the reporting delay period, when the figure for June 1, 2024, of the current season is not shown as a dashed line, typically 4 weeks after the week end date.", "lower_25": "Dec 28, 2023", "median": "Dec 30, 2023", "upper_75": "Jan 2, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Labour Party will win 37.3% of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "37.3", "median": "40.6", "upper_75": "44.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Liberal Democrats will win 8.49 share of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.49", "median": "11.0", "upper_75": "13.6", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 475 police officers will be murdered in Mexico in the following years (2025)?", "desc": "On October 23, 2023, at least 12 police officers were killed in an attack on a security patrol in the Mexican state of Guerrero. The attack represents one of many police killings that have occurred across Mexico in recent years as it faces a wave of gang violence. [According to CBS News](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/police-attacks-mexico-guerrero-michoacan-24-killed/):\n\n>Mexico is plagued by cartel-related bloodshed that has seen more than 420,000 people murdered since the government deployed the military in its war on drugs in 2006.\n>\n>Since then, the country's murder rate has tripled to 25 per 100,000 inhabitants.\n\nThe organization [Common Cause](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/somos/) (Causa en Común) advocates for better governance and the rule of law, and as part of their work [publishes a record of murdered police officers](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/). According to their website the number of police murdered annually has been at least:\n\n| Year | Murdered Police |\n| --- | --- |\n| [2019](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2019/) | 446 |\n| [2020](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2020/) | 524 |\n| [2021](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2021/) | 401 |\n| [2022](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2022/) | 403 |\n\nThrough November 16, 2023, Common Cause [reports](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados-2023/) at least 377 police officers murdered in Mexico.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of police officers murdered in Mexico in the following years, according to [Common Cause](https://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/registro-de-policias-asesinados/).", "lower_25": "403", "median": "432", "upper_75": "475", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Conservative and Unionist Party will win 27.0 share of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "24.1", "median": "27.0", "upper_75": "30.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Conservative and Unionist Party will win 27.0 share of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "24.1", "median": "27.0", "upper_75": "30.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that these parties will win 30.0 share of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "24.1", "median": "27.0", "upper_75": "30.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Reform UK will win 11.8 share of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.69", "median": "9.33", "upper_75": "11.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Scottish National Party will win 2.40 share of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.40", "median": "2.79", "upper_75": "3.19", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Liberal Democrats will win 8.49 share of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.49", "median": "11.0", "upper_75": "13.6", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Liberal Democrats will win 8.49 share of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.49", "median": "11.0", "upper_75": "13.6", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that these parties will win 30.0 share of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "24.1", "median": "27.0", "upper_75": "30.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Reform UK will win 11.8 share of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.69", "median": "9.33", "upper_75": "11.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Scottish National Party will win 2.40 share of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.40", "median": "2.79", "upper_75": "3.19", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Green Party of England and Wales will win 5.70 share of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.49", "median": "4.50", "upper_75": "5.70", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated percentage of Nvidia's quarterly 2024 revenue (FY 2025) that will come from the Chinese market?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "10.2", "median": "15.3", "upper_75": "19.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Reform UK will win 11.8 share of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.69", "median": "9.33", "upper_75": "11.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Green Party of England and Wales will win 5.70 share of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.49", "median": "4.50", "upper_75": "5.70", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated percentage of Nvidia's quarterly 2024 revenue (FY 2025) that will come from the Chinese market?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "10.2", "median": "15.3", "upper_75": "19.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Green Party of England and Wales will win 5.70 share of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.49", "median": "4.50", "upper_75": "5.70", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated percentage of Nvidia's quarterly 2024 revenue (FY 2025) that will come from the Chinese market?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "10.2", "median": "15.3", "upper_75": "19.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Scottish National Party will win 2.40 share of the popular vote in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.40", "median": "2.79", "upper_75": "3.19", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated percentage of Nvidia's quarterly 2024 revenue (FY 2025) that will come from the Chinese market? (Q2 (FY2025, ends Jul 2024))", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "10.7", "median": "16.5", "upper_75": "22.6", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated percentage of Nvidia's quarterly 2024 revenue (FY 2025) that will come from the Chinese market? (Q3 (FY2025, ends Oct 2024))", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.34", "median": "14.2", "upper_75": "22.0", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that major electronic design automation (EDA) companies' revenue from the Chinese market will be 27.3% in the last quarter of 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "15.8", "median": "22.4", "upper_75": "27.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated percentage of Nvidia's quarterly 2024 revenue (FY 2025) that will come from the Chinese market? (Q4 (FY2025, ends Jan 2025))", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.51", "median": "16.7", "upper_75": "23.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated percentage of Nvidia's quarterly 2024 revenue (FY 2025) that will come from the Chinese market? (Q4 (FY2025, ends Jan 2025))", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.51", "median": "16.7", "upper_75": "23.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that major electronic design automation (EDA) companies' revenue from the Chinese market will be 27.3% in the last quarter of 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "15.8", "median": "22.4", "upper_75": "27.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the estimated percentage of Nvidia's quarterly 2024 revenue (FY 2025) that will come from the Chinese market? (Q4 (FY2025, ends Jan 2025))", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.51", "median": "16.7", "upper_75": "23.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many 8\"-equivalent wafers will SMIC ship in each quarter of 2024 (Q2, which ends in June 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.51M", "median": "1.70M", "upper_75": "1.87M", "prediction": "75% (1.87M wafers)"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SMIC will ship 1.73M 8\"-equivalent wafers in Q3 (ends Sep 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.55M", "median": "1.73M", "upper_75": "1.93M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many 8\"-equivalent wafers will SMIC ship in each quarter of 2024, and what is the chance that they will ship 1.46M wafers in total?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.10M", "median": "1.46M", "upper_75": "1.69M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that major electronic design automation (EDA) companies' revenue from the Chinese market will be 27.3% in the last quarter of 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "15.8", "median": "22.4", "upper_75": "27.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many 8\"-equivalent wafers will SMIC ship in each quarter of 2024, and what is the chance that they will ship 1.46M wafers in total?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.10M", "median": "1.46M", "upper_75": "1.69M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many 8\"-equivalent wafers will SMIC ship in each quarter of 2024 (Q2, which ends in June 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.51M", "median": "1.70M", "upper_75": "1.87M", "prediction": "75% (1.87M wafers)"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SMIC will ship 1.73M 8\"-equivalent wafers in Q3 (ends Sep 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.55M", "median": "1.73M", "upper_75": "1.93M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many 8\"-equivalent wafers will SMIC ship in each quarter of 2024, and what is the chance that they will ship 1.46M wafers in total?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.10M", "median": "1.46M", "upper_75": "1.69M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SMIC will ship 1.73M 8\"-equivalent wafers in Q3 (ends Sep 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.55M", "median": "1.73M", "upper_75": "1.93M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many 8\"-equivalent wafers will SMIC ship in each quarter of 2024 (Q2, which ends in June 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.51M", "median": "1.70M", "upper_75": "1.87M", "prediction": "75% (1.87M wafers)"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SMIC will earn 801M quarterly revenue from 12\" wafers in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "801M", "median": "1.15B", "upper_75": "1.48B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SMIC will earn 801M quarterly revenue from 12\" wafers in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "801M", "median": "1.15B", "upper_75": "1.48B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many 8\"-equivalent wafers will SMIC ship in each quarter of 2024, with 50% of the total shipments being in Q4 (ending Dec 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.59M", "median": "1.83M", "upper_75": "2.10M", "prediction": "1.83M (50% of total shipments)"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SMIC will earn 1.01B quarterly revenue from 12\" wafers in Q2 (ends Jun 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.01B", "median": "1.26B", "upper_75": "1.52B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SMIC will earn 801M quarterly revenue from 12\" wafers in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "801M", "median": "1.15B", "upper_75": "1.48B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SMIC will earn 1.01B quarterly revenue from 12\" wafers in Q2 (ends Jun 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.01B", "median": "1.26B", "upper_75": "1.52B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many 8\"-equivalent wafers will SMIC ship in each quarter of 2024, with 50% of the total shipments being in Q4 (ending Dec 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.59M", "median": "1.83M", "upper_75": "2.10M", "prediction": "1.83M (50% of total shipments)"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SMIC will earn 1.01B quarterly revenue from 12\" wafers in Q2 (ends Jun 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.01B", "median": "1.26B", "upper_75": "1.52B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many 8\"-equivalent wafers will SMIC ship in each quarter of 2024, with 50% of the total shipments being in Q4 (ending Dec 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.59M", "median": "1.83M", "upper_75": "2.10M", "prediction": "1.83M (50% of total shipments)"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SMIC will earn 1.49B quarterly revenue from 12\" wafers in Q4 (ends Dec 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.24B", "median": "1.49B", "upper_75": "1.75B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SMIC will earn 1.54B quarterly revenue from 12\" wafers in Q3 (ends Sep 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.04B", "median": "1.29B", "upper_75": "1.54B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SMIC will earn 1.54B quarterly revenue from 12\" wafers in Q3 (ends Sep 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.04B", "median": "1.29B", "upper_75": "1.54B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SMIC will earn 1.54B quarterly revenue from 12\" wafers in Q3 (ends Sep 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.04B", "median": "1.29B", "upper_75": "1.54B", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly rate of RSV-associated hospitalizations per 100,000 people for the United States will be 0.331 for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.110", "median": "0.214", "upper_75": "0.331", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly rate of RSV-associated hospitalizations per 100,000 people for the United States will be 0.331 for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.110", "median": "0.214", "upper_75": "0.331", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly rate of RSV-associated hospitalizations per 100,000 people for the United States will be 0.122 for the following weeks (May 4, 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "0.122", "upper_75": "0.207", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly rate of RSV-associated hospitalizations per 100,000 people for the United States will be 0.331 for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.110", "median": "0.214", "upper_75": "0.331", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SMIC will earn 1.49B quarterly revenue from 12\" wafers in Q4 (ends Dec 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.24B", "median": "1.49B", "upper_75": "1.75B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 4.13k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations for the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.26k", "median": "3.08k", "upper_75": "4.13k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 4.13k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations for the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.26k", "median": "3.08k", "upper_75": "4.13k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly rate of RSV-associated hospitalizations per 100,000 people for the United States will be 0.235 for the following weeks (May 18, 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "0.136", "upper_75": "0.235", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly rate of RSV-associated hospitalizations per 100,000 people for the United States will be 0.235 for the following weeks (May 18, 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "0.136", "upper_75": "0.235", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly rate of RSV-associated hospitalizations per 100,000 people for the United States will be 0.122 for the following weeks (May 4, 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "0.122", "upper_75": "0.207", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.06k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations for the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.40k", "median": "2.06k", "upper_75": "3.00k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly rate of RSV-associated hospitalizations per 100,000 people for the United States will be 0.122 for the following weeks (May 4, 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "0.122", "upper_75": "0.207", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SMIC will earn 1.49B quarterly revenue from 12\" wafers in Q4 (ends Dec 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.24B", "median": "1.49B", "upper_75": "1.75B", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 4.13k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations for the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.26k", "median": "3.08k", "upper_75": "4.13k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.06k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations for the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.40k", "median": "2.06k", "upper_75": "3.00k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.84k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations for the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "[According to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/keyfacts.htm):\n\n>[Influenza (flu)] is a contagious respiratory illness caused by influenza viruses that infect the nose, throat, and sometimes the lungs. It can cause mild to severe illness, and at times can lead to death.\n\nThe CDC [says the following](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/burden/index.html) about the annual burden of flu in the US:\n\n>The burden of flu disease in the United States can vary widely and is determined by a number of factors including the characteristics of circulating viruses, the timing of the season, how well the vaccine is working to protect against illness, and how many people got vaccinated. While the effects of flu varies, it places a substantial burden on the health of people in the United States each year.\n>\n>CDC estimates that flu has resulted in 9 million – 41 million illnesses, 140,000 – 710,000 hospitalizations and 12,000 – 52,000 deaths annually between 2010 and 2020.\n\nThe CDC runs an annual [FluSight](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/flusight/index.html) forecasting exercise, producing an [ensemble forecast](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/flusight/flu-forecasts.htm) of weekly influenza hospitalizations compiled from forecasts [submitted](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub) by a number of teams.\n\nThe forecasts are compared to the \"gold standard\" flu hospitalization data, [described by the CDC here](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/tree/main/target-data), compiled from the underlying data [here](https://healthdata.gov/Hospital/COVID-19-Reported-Patient-Impact-and-Hospital-Capa/g62h-syeh). The data used is from `Field 34` of the source data, described in the [guidance](https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/covid-19-faqs-hospitals-hospital-laboratory-acute-care-facility-data-reporting.pdf) as follows:\n\n>**Information Needed:** Previous day's admissions with laboratory confirmed influenza virus infection\n>\n>**Description:** Enter the total number of patients (adult and pediatric) who were admitted to an inpatient bed on the previous calendar day who had laboratory-confirmed influenza virus infection at the time of admission. Include inpatient, overflow, observation, ED, ED awaiting orders for an inpatient bed, active surge/expansion, ICU, NICU, PICU, newborn and nursery\n\nSee the image below for a plot of the weekly hospitalizations, and additional plots as well as a data table can be found [here](https://www.ryanbeckauthor.com/forecasting/FluWeekly.html). *Please note that this plot and the link use the resolution source data but are not the resolution source and therefore may contain errors.*\n\n![Influenza Hospitalizations](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ryooan/ryooan.github.io/master/forecasting/FluWeekly/R/us_recent_plot.png)", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations in the United States for the week ending on the respective date, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday.\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown at the resolution source 4 weeks after the respective end date.", "lower_25": "1.20k", "median": "1.84k", "upper_75": "2.69k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 2.06k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations for the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.40k", "median": "2.06k", "upper_75": "3.00k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.84k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations for the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "[According to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/keyfacts.htm):\n\n>[Influenza (flu)] is a contagious respiratory illness caused by influenza viruses that infect the nose, throat, and sometimes the lungs. It can cause mild to severe illness, and at times can lead to death.\n\nThe CDC [says the following](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/burden/index.html) about the annual burden of flu in the US:\n\n>The burden of flu disease in the United States can vary widely and is determined by a number of factors including the characteristics of circulating viruses, the timing of the season, how well the vaccine is working to protect against illness, and how many people got vaccinated. While the effects of flu varies, it places a substantial burden on the health of people in the United States each year.\n>\n>CDC estimates that flu has resulted in 9 million – 41 million illnesses, 140,000 – 710,000 hospitalizations and 12,000 – 52,000 deaths annually between 2010 and 2020.\n\nThe CDC runs an annual [FluSight](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/flusight/index.html) forecasting exercise, producing an [ensemble forecast](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/flusight/flu-forecasts.htm) of weekly influenza hospitalizations compiled from forecasts [submitted](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub) by a number of teams.\n\nThe forecasts are compared to the \"gold standard\" flu hospitalization data, [described by the CDC here](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/tree/main/target-data), compiled from the underlying data [here](https://healthdata.gov/Hospital/COVID-19-Reported-Patient-Impact-and-Hospital-Capa/g62h-syeh). The data used is from `Field 34` of the source data, described in the [guidance](https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/covid-19-faqs-hospitals-hospital-laboratory-acute-care-facility-data-reporting.pdf) as follows:\n\n>**Information Needed:** Previous day's admissions with laboratory confirmed influenza virus infection\n>\n>**Description:** Enter the total number of patients (adult and pediatric) who were admitted to an inpatient bed on the previous calendar day who had laboratory-confirmed influenza virus infection at the time of admission. Include inpatient, overflow, observation, ED, ED awaiting orders for an inpatient bed, active surge/expansion, ICU, NICU, PICU, newborn and nursery\n\nSee the image below for a plot of the weekly hospitalizations, and additional plots as well as a data table can be found [here](https://www.ryanbeckauthor.com/forecasting/FluWeekly.html). *Please note that this plot and the link use the resolution source data but are not the resolution source and therefore may contain errors.*\n\n![Influenza Hospitalizations](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ryooan/ryooan.github.io/master/forecasting/FluWeekly/R/us_recent_plot.png)", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations in the United States for the week ending on the respective date, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday.\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown at the resolution source 4 weeks after the respective end date.", "lower_25": "1.20k", "median": "1.84k", "upper_75": "2.69k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 8.95k confirmed COVID-19 hospitalizations in the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.09k", "median": "7.34k", "upper_75": "8.95k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 1.84k weekly total number of influenza hospitalizations for the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "[According to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/keyfacts.htm):\n\n>[Influenza (flu)] is a contagious respiratory illness caused by influenza viruses that infect the nose, throat, and sometimes the lungs. It can cause mild to severe illness, and at times can lead to death.\n\nThe CDC [says the following](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/burden/index.html) about the annual burden of flu in the US:\n\n>The burden of flu disease in the United States can vary widely and is determined by a number of factors including the characteristics of circulating viruses, the timing of the season, how well the vaccine is working to protect against illness, and how many people got vaccinated. While the effects of flu varies, it places a substantial burden on the health of people in the United States each year.\n>\n>CDC estimates that flu has resulted in 9 million – 41 million illnesses, 140,000 – 710,000 hospitalizations and 12,000 – 52,000 deaths annually between 2010 and 2020.\n\nThe CDC runs an annual [FluSight](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/flusight/index.html) forecasting exercise, producing an [ensemble forecast](https://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/flusight/flu-forecasts.htm) of weekly influenza hospitalizations compiled from forecasts [submitted](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub) by a number of teams.\n\nThe forecasts are compared to the \"gold standard\" flu hospitalization data, [described by the CDC here](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/tree/main/target-data), compiled from the underlying data [here](https://healthdata.gov/Hospital/COVID-19-Reported-Patient-Impact-and-Hospital-Capa/g62h-syeh). The data used is from `Field 34` of the source data, described in the [guidance](https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/covid-19-faqs-hospitals-hospital-laboratory-acute-care-facility-data-reporting.pdf) as follows:\n\n>**Information Needed:** Previous day's admissions with laboratory confirmed influenza virus infection\n>\n>**Description:** Enter the total number of patients (adult and pediatric) who were admitted to an inpatient bed on the previous calendar day who had laboratory-confirmed influenza virus infection at the time of admission. Include inpatient, overflow, observation, ED, ED awaiting orders for an inpatient bed, active surge/expansion, ICU, NICU, PICU, newborn and nursery\n\nSee the image below for a plot of the weekly hospitalizations, and additional plots as well as a data table can be found [here](https://www.ryanbeckauthor.com/forecasting/FluWeekly.html). *Please note that this plot and the link use the resolution source data but are not the resolution source and therefore may contain errors.*\n\n![Influenza Hospitalizations](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ryooan/ryooan.github.io/master/forecasting/FluWeekly/R/us_recent_plot.png)", "resc": "These questions will resolve as the weekly total number of confirmed influenza hospitalizations in the United States for the week ending on the respective date, as reported in [this data set](https://github.com/cdcepi/FluSight-forecast-hub/blob/main/target-data/target-hospital-admissions.csv) provided by the CDC. The CDC uses \"epidemiological weeks\" which begin on Sunday and end on Saturday.\n\nTo allow for data revisions and reporting delays, each subquestion will resolve according to data shown at the resolution source 4 weeks after the respective end date.", "lower_25": "1.20k", "median": "1.84k", "upper_75": "2.69k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 8.95k confirmed COVID-19 hospitalizations in the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.09k", "median": "7.34k", "upper_75": "8.95k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly share (in percent) of emergency department visits for combined respiratory illnesses in the United States for the following weeks will be 2.54?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.11", "median": "1.78", "upper_75": "2.54", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly rate of RSV-associated hospitalizations per 100,000 people for the United States will be 0.235 for the following weeks (May 18, 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0.1", "median": "0.136", "upper_75": "0.235", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 8.95k confirmed COVID-19 hospitalizations in the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.09k", "median": "7.34k", "upper_75": "8.95k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 8.28k confirmed COVID-19 hospitalizations in the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.48k", "median": "6.70k", "upper_75": "8.28k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 6.41k confirmed COVID-19 hospitalizations in the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.22k", "median": "6.41k", "upper_75": "7.92k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 8.28k confirmed COVID-19 hospitalizations in the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.48k", "median": "6.70k", "upper_75": "8.28k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 6.41k confirmed COVID-19 hospitalizations in the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.22k", "median": "6.41k", "upper_75": "7.92k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 6.41k confirmed COVID-19 hospitalizations in the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.22k", "median": "6.41k", "upper_75": "7.92k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 8.28k confirmed COVID-19 hospitalizations in the United States for the following weeks?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.48k", "median": "6.70k", "upper_75": "8.28k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly share (in percent) of emergency department visits for combined respiratory illnesses in the United States for the following weeks will be 2.54?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.11", "median": "1.78", "upper_75": "2.54", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly share (in percent) of emergency department visits for combined respiratory illnesses in the United States will be 2.12 for the following weeks (May 4, 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.734", "median": "1.39", "upper_75": "2.12", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly share (in percent) of emergency department visits for combined respiratory illnesses in the United States will be 2.12 for the following weeks (May 4, 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.734", "median": "1.39", "upper_75": "2.12", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the expected weekly share (in percent) of emergency department visits for combined respiratory illnesses in the United States for the following weeks, based on a historical average of 1.30?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.572", "median": "1.30", "upper_75": "2.13", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the D.C. federal criminal trial of Donald J. Trump for election subversion will begin by Aug 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Aug 2024", "median": "Dec 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly share (in percent) of emergency department visits for combined respiratory illnesses in the United States will be 2.12 for the following weeks (May 4, 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.734", "median": "1.39", "upper_75": "2.12", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that GTA VI will be officially released in the US by Jan 2026?", "desc": "[Grand Theft Auto VI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Theft_Auto_VI?useskin=vector) is an upcoming action-adventure game, and is expected to be the next major release in the [Grand Theft Auto series](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Theft_Auto?useskin=vector), which has been one of the most [commercially](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_best-selling_video_game_franchises?useskin=vector) and [critically successful](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_video_games_considered_the_best?useskin=vector) video game franchises of all time. \n\nThe latest major instalment in the series, [Grand Theft Auto V](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Theft_Auto_V?useskin=vector), was released in 2013. It was the first main entry in the series since 2008's [Grand Theft Auto IV.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Theft_Auto_IV?useskin=vector)\n\nOn December 4 2023, the first trailer for Grand Theft Auto VI was [released](https://www.theguardian.com/games/2023/dec/05/gta-6-trailer-fast-cars-flamingos-and-a-female-lead-revealed-in-first-look), and it concluded with a 'Coming 2025' release date.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which the next major instalment in the GTA series (i.e. not an expansion pack or handheld game), the successor to GTA V, is officially released for sale to the public in the United States. The game need not necessarily be called 'Grand Theft Auto VI' or 'GTA VI' for a positive resolution; any name will suffice, as long as it is intended as the next major instalment in the series. \n\nThis date is the date on which the game can either be purchased from retailers, or downloaded from an online store in a playable state, not the date on which the game becomes available for pre-order, or pre-release download in an unplayable state.", "lower_25": "Sep 2025", "median": "Nov 2025", "upper_75": "Jan 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that GTA VI will be officially released in the US by Jan 2026?", "desc": "[Grand Theft Auto VI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Theft_Auto_VI?useskin=vector) is an upcoming action-adventure game, and is expected to be the next major release in the [Grand Theft Auto series](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Theft_Auto?useskin=vector), which has been one of the most [commercially](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_best-selling_video_game_franchises?useskin=vector) and [critically successful](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_video_games_considered_the_best?useskin=vector) video game franchises of all time. \n\nThe latest major instalment in the series, [Grand Theft Auto V](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Theft_Auto_V?useskin=vector), was released in 2013. It was the first main entry in the series since 2008's [Grand Theft Auto IV.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Theft_Auto_IV?useskin=vector)\n\nOn December 4 2023, the first trailer for Grand Theft Auto VI was [released](https://www.theguardian.com/games/2023/dec/05/gta-6-trailer-fast-cars-flamingos-and-a-female-lead-revealed-in-first-look), and it concluded with a 'Coming 2025' release date.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which the next major instalment in the GTA series (i.e. not an expansion pack or handheld game), the successor to GTA V, is officially released for sale to the public in the United States. The game need not necessarily be called 'Grand Theft Auto VI' or 'GTA VI' for a positive resolution; any name will suffice, as long as it is intended as the next major instalment in the series. \n\nThis date is the date on which the game can either be purchased from retailers, or downloaded from an online store in a playable state, not the date on which the game becomes available for pre-order, or pre-release download in an unplayable state.", "lower_25": "Sep 2025", "median": "Nov 2025", "upper_75": "Jan 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the weekly share (in percent) of emergency department visits for combined respiratory illnesses in the United States for the following weeks will be 2.54?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.11", "median": "1.78", "upper_75": "2.54", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that these Republicans will not end their 2024 primary campaigns by Jul 19, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 18, 2024", "median": "Not ≤ Jul 19, 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jul 19, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that GTA VI will be officially released in the US by Jan 2026?", "desc": "[Grand Theft Auto VI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Theft_Auto_VI?useskin=vector) is an upcoming action-adventure game, and is expected to be the next major release in the [Grand Theft Auto series](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Theft_Auto?useskin=vector), which has been one of the most [commercially](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_best-selling_video_game_franchises?useskin=vector) and [critically successful](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_video_games_considered_the_best?useskin=vector) video game franchises of all time. \n\nThe latest major instalment in the series, [Grand Theft Auto V](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Theft_Auto_V?useskin=vector), was released in 2013. It was the first main entry in the series since 2008's [Grand Theft Auto IV.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Theft_Auto_IV?useskin=vector)\n\nOn December 4 2023, the first trailer for Grand Theft Auto VI was [released](https://www.theguardian.com/games/2023/dec/05/gta-6-trailer-fast-cars-flamingos-and-a-female-lead-revealed-in-first-look), and it concluded with a 'Coming 2025' release date.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date on which the next major instalment in the GTA series (i.e. not an expansion pack or handheld game), the successor to GTA V, is officially released for sale to the public in the United States. The game need not necessarily be called 'Grand Theft Auto VI' or 'GTA VI' for a positive resolution; any name will suffice, as long as it is intended as the next major instalment in the series. \n\nThis date is the date on which the game can either be purchased from retailers, or downloaded from an online store in a playable state, not the date on which the game becomes available for pre-order, or pre-release download in an unplayable state.", "lower_25": "Sep 2025", "median": "Nov 2025", "upper_75": "Jan 2026", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the expected weekly share (in percent) of emergency department visits for combined respiratory illnesses in the United States for the following weeks, based on a historical average of 1.30?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.572", "median": "1.30", "upper_75": "2.13", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the D.C. federal criminal trial of Donald J. Trump for election subversion will begin by Aug 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Aug 2024", "median": "Dec 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the expected weekly share (in percent) of emergency department visits for combined respiratory illnesses in the United States for the following weeks, based on a historical average of 1.30?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.572", "median": "1.30", "upper_75": "2.13", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that these Republicans will not end their 2024 primary campaigns by Jul 19, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 18, 2024", "median": "Not ≤ Jul 19, 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jul 19, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the D.C. federal criminal trial of Donald J. Trump for election subversion will begin by Aug 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Aug 2024", "median": "Dec 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jan 2026", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that these Republicans will not end their 2024 primary campaigns by Not ≤ Jul 19, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 18, 2024", "median": "Not ≤ Jul 19, 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jul 19, 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that these Republicans will not end their 2024 primary campaigns by Jul 19, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 18, 2024", "median": "Not ≤ Jul 19, 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jul 19, 2024", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that these Republicans will not end their 2024 primary campaigns by Not ≤ Jul 19, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 18, 2024", "median": "Not ≤ Jul 19, 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jul 19, 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many barrels of crude oil will the Strategic Petroleum Reserve hold on September 2024? (380M)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "356M", "median": "380M", "upper_75": "406M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many barrels of crude oil will the Strategic Petroleum Reserve hold on September 2024? (380M)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "356M", "median": "380M", "upper_75": "406M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many barrels of crude oil will the Strategic Petroleum Reserve hold on September 2024? (380M)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "356M", "median": "380M", "upper_75": "406M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that these Republicans will not end their 2024 primary campaigns by Not ≤ Jul 19, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Jul 18, 2024", "median": "Not ≤ Jul 19, 2024", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Jul 19, 2024", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How much of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve's total capacity will be held in barrels of crude oil on December 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "350M", "median": "366M", "upper_75": "387.6M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How much of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve's total capacity will be held in barrels of crude oil on December 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "350M", "median": "366M", "upper_75": "387.6M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Sadiq Khan will win the 2024 London mayoral election with 49.5% of the vote?", "desc": "[Sadiq Aman Khan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sadiq_Khan), born 8 October 1970, is a British politician serving as Mayor of London (UK) since 2016. He previously was Member of Parliament for Tooting from 2005 until 2016. He is a a member of the Labour Party.\n\nThe 2024 London mayoral election will be held on May 2, 2024. \n\nThe Mayor of London was previously [elected using the Supplementary Vote system](https://www.gov.uk/elections-in-the-uk/local-mayors-mayor-of-london-and-london-assembly), but has since changed to [first-past-the-post](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-past-the-post_voting) system. This means the [candidate with the most votes wins](https://www.londonelects.org.uk/im-voter/counting-votes).\n\nIn the 2016 election, Khan's first round first preference vote share was [44.2%](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36303157.amp). In the 2021 election, Khan's first round first preference vote share was [40.0%](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2021/england/mayors/E12000007#mayor-scoreboard).\n\n[Opinion polling in October 2023](https://yougov.co.uk/politics/articles/47662-sadiq-khan-holds-25-point-lead-over-susan-hall-for-mayor) has shown Khan to be heavily favoured to win the election. Whether Khan wins re-election is the subject of [this Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/13809/sadiq-khan-re-elected-in-2024/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the popular vote that Sadiq Khan wins in the 2024 London mayoral election. If the election is not held in May of 2024, this question will be **annulled**.", "lower_25": "46.8", "median": "49.5", "upper_75": "51.93", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact will come into effect by 2055?", "desc": "*Related Question: [Will the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact reach majority in the Electoral college before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3629/will-the-national-popular-vote-interstate-compact-reach-majority-in-the-electoral-college-before-2030/).*\n\n-----\n\nThe President of the United States is elected by an electoral college, roughly the same size as both houses of Congress combined. States are not mandated, but are incentivized by party dynamics, to allocate all of their electors to the winner of the statewide popular vote, regardless of the margin of victory. In fact, out of the 50 states+DC, only two (Maine and Nebraska) use a different allocation method, which occasionally splits their electoral votes. In two of the last six elections (2000 and 2016), the electors picked a candidate that had lost the popular vote.\n\nThe [National Popular Vote Interstate Compact](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Popular_Vote_Interstate_Compact#:~:text=The%20compact%20is%20designed%20to,and%20the%20District%20of%20Columbia.) is a law passed by individual states (+DC) allocating all their electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote, even if different from the winner in that particular state. It will take effect if and when adopted by enough states to have a majority in the electoral college, with the effect that the President is always the winner of the popular vote.\n\nThe Compact was most recently adopted by Minnesota in August 2023, and it is the law in states controlling 205 electoral votes; given that the current size of the college is 538, a majority corresponds to 270.\n\nSo, the question is: when will the NPVIC be adopted by enough states to be a majority in the electoral college, thus coming into effect?", "resc": "The question resolves as the date at which the final the state law pushing the [National Popular Vote Interstate Compact](https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation) past the threshold of a majority of electoral votes comes into effect.", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2043", "upper_75": "2055", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact will come into effect by 2055?", "desc": "*Related Question: [Will the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact reach majority in the Electoral college before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3629/will-the-national-popular-vote-interstate-compact-reach-majority-in-the-electoral-college-before-2030/).*\n\n-----\n\nThe President of the United States is elected by an electoral college, roughly the same size as both houses of Congress combined. States are not mandated, but are incentivized by party dynamics, to allocate all of their electors to the winner of the statewide popular vote, regardless of the margin of victory. In fact, out of the 50 states+DC, only two (Maine and Nebraska) use a different allocation method, which occasionally splits their electoral votes. In two of the last six elections (2000 and 2016), the electors picked a candidate that had lost the popular vote.\n\nThe [National Popular Vote Interstate Compact](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Popular_Vote_Interstate_Compact#:~:text=The%20compact%20is%20designed%20to,and%20the%20District%20of%20Columbia.) is a law passed by individual states (+DC) allocating all their electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote, even if different from the winner in that particular state. It will take effect if and when adopted by enough states to have a majority in the electoral college, with the effect that the President is always the winner of the popular vote.\n\nThe Compact was most recently adopted by Minnesota in August 2023, and it is the law in states controlling 205 electoral votes; given that the current size of the college is 538, a majority corresponds to 270.\n\nSo, the question is: when will the NPVIC be adopted by enough states to be a majority in the electoral college, thus coming into effect?", "resc": "The question resolves as the date at which the final the state law pushing the [National Popular Vote Interstate Compact](https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation) past the threshold of a majority of electoral votes comes into effect.", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2043", "upper_75": "2055", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact will come into effect by 2055?", "desc": "*Related Question: [Will the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact reach majority in the Electoral college before 2030?](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3629/will-the-national-popular-vote-interstate-compact-reach-majority-in-the-electoral-college-before-2030/).*\n\n-----\n\nThe President of the United States is elected by an electoral college, roughly the same size as both houses of Congress combined. States are not mandated, but are incentivized by party dynamics, to allocate all of their electors to the winner of the statewide popular vote, regardless of the margin of victory. In fact, out of the 50 states+DC, only two (Maine and Nebraska) use a different allocation method, which occasionally splits their electoral votes. In two of the last six elections (2000 and 2016), the electors picked a candidate that had lost the popular vote.\n\nThe [National Popular Vote Interstate Compact](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Popular_Vote_Interstate_Compact#:~:text=The%20compact%20is%20designed%20to,and%20the%20District%20of%20Columbia.) is a law passed by individual states (+DC) allocating all their electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote, even if different from the winner in that particular state. It will take effect if and when adopted by enough states to have a majority in the electoral college, with the effect that the President is always the winner of the popular vote.\n\nThe Compact was most recently adopted by Minnesota in August 2023, and it is the law in states controlling 205 electoral votes; given that the current size of the college is 538, a majority corresponds to 270.\n\nSo, the question is: when will the NPVIC be adopted by enough states to be a majority in the electoral college, thus coming into effect?", "resc": "The question resolves as the date at which the final the state law pushing the [National Popular Vote Interstate Compact](https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation) past the threshold of a majority of electoral votes comes into effect.", "lower_25": "2034", "median": "2043", "upper_75": "2055", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 125% in the following years?", "desc": "A nation's [national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt) is the amount of money its central government owes to creditors. High levels of national debt generally have a negative impact on a nation's economy and level of economic growth due to expectations of higher future taxation, increased interest rates, and inflation when central banks are used to finance deficit spending, among other reasons. The [United States' national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States) has increased considerably in recent years, going from 62.9% of GDP in 2007 to 130.6% of GDP in 2021. Managing and/or reducing the national debt is a frequent topic of political discussion in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage value of the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio at 12:00 AM on January 1 of the given year, according to https://www.usdebtclock.org/", "lower_25": "125", "median": "130.9", "upper_75": "137.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Sadiq Khan will win the 2024 London mayoral election with 49.5% of the vote?", "desc": "[Sadiq Aman Khan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sadiq_Khan), born 8 October 1970, is a British politician serving as Mayor of London (UK) since 2016. He previously was Member of Parliament for Tooting from 2005 until 2016. He is a a member of the Labour Party.\n\nThe 2024 London mayoral election will be held on May 2, 2024. \n\nThe Mayor of London was previously [elected using the Supplementary Vote system](https://www.gov.uk/elections-in-the-uk/local-mayors-mayor-of-london-and-london-assembly), but has since changed to [first-past-the-post](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-past-the-post_voting) system. This means the [candidate with the most votes wins](https://www.londonelects.org.uk/im-voter/counting-votes).\n\nIn the 2016 election, Khan's first round first preference vote share was [44.2%](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36303157.amp). In the 2021 election, Khan's first round first preference vote share was [40.0%](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2021/england/mayors/E12000007#mayor-scoreboard).\n\n[Opinion polling in October 2023](https://yougov.co.uk/politics/articles/47662-sadiq-khan-holds-25-point-lead-over-susan-hall-for-mayor) has shown Khan to be heavily favoured to win the election. Whether Khan wins re-election is the subject of [this Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/13809/sadiq-khan-re-elected-in-2024/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the popular vote that Sadiq Khan wins in the 2024 London mayoral election. If the election is not held in May of 2024, this question will be **annulled**.", "lower_25": "46.8", "median": "49.5", "upper_75": "51.93", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How much of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve's total capacity will be held in barrels of crude oil on December 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "350M", "median": "366M", "upper_75": "387.6M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 125% in the following years?", "desc": "A nation's [national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt) is the amount of money its central government owes to creditors. High levels of national debt generally have a negative impact on a nation's economy and level of economic growth due to expectations of higher future taxation, increased interest rates, and inflation when central banks are used to finance deficit spending, among other reasons. The [United States' national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States) has increased considerably in recent years, going from 62.9% of GDP in 2007 to 130.6% of GDP in 2021. Managing and/or reducing the national debt is a frequent topic of political discussion in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage value of the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio at 12:00 AM on January 1 of the given year, according to https://www.usdebtclock.org/", "lower_25": "125", "median": "130.9", "upper_75": "137.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 130.9% in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "125", "median": "130.9", "upper_75": "137.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 126% in 2026?", "desc": "A nation's [national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt) is the amount of money its central government owes to creditors. High levels of national debt generally have a negative impact on a nation's economy and level of economic growth due to expectations of higher future taxation, increased interest rates, and inflation when central banks are used to finance deficit spending, among other reasons. The [United States' national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States) has increased considerably in recent years, going from 62.9% of GDP in 2007 to 130.6% of GDP in 2021. Managing and/or reducing the national debt is a frequent topic of political discussion in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage value of the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio at 12:00 AM on January 1 of the given year, according to https://www.usdebtclock.org/", "lower_25": "126", "median": "132", "upper_75": "139.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 130.9% in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "125", "median": "130.9", "upper_75": "137.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 125% in the following years?", "desc": "A nation's [national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt) is the amount of money its central government owes to creditors. High levels of national debt generally have a negative impact on a nation's economy and level of economic growth due to expectations of higher future taxation, increased interest rates, and inflation when central banks are used to finance deficit spending, among other reasons. The [United States' national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States) has increased considerably in recent years, going from 62.9% of GDP in 2007 to 130.6% of GDP in 2021. Managing and/or reducing the national debt is a frequent topic of political discussion in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage value of the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio at 12:00 AM on January 1 of the given year, according to https://www.usdebtclock.org/", "lower_25": "125", "median": "130.9", "upper_75": "137.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 143% in 2027?", "desc": "A nation's [national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt) is the amount of money its central government owes to creditors. High levels of national debt generally have a negative impact on a nation's economy and level of economic growth due to expectations of higher future taxation, increased interest rates, and inflation when central banks are used to finance deficit spending, among other reasons. The [United States' national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States) has increased considerably in recent years, going from 62.9% of GDP in 2007 to 130.6% of GDP in 2021. Managing and/or reducing the national debt is a frequent topic of political discussion in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage value of the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio at 12:00 AM on January 1 of the given year, according to https://www.usdebtclock.org/", "lower_25": "126", "median": "134", "upper_75": "143", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Sadiq Khan will win the 2024 London mayoral election with 49.5% of the vote?", "desc": "[Sadiq Aman Khan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sadiq_Khan), born 8 October 1970, is a British politician serving as Mayor of London (UK) since 2016. He previously was Member of Parliament for Tooting from 2005 until 2016. He is a a member of the Labour Party.\n\nThe 2024 London mayoral election will be held on May 2, 2024. \n\nThe Mayor of London was previously [elected using the Supplementary Vote system](https://www.gov.uk/elections-in-the-uk/local-mayors-mayor-of-london-and-london-assembly), but has since changed to [first-past-the-post](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-past-the-post_voting) system. This means the [candidate with the most votes wins](https://www.londonelects.org.uk/im-voter/counting-votes).\n\nIn the 2016 election, Khan's first round first preference vote share was [44.2%](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-36303157.amp). In the 2021 election, Khan's first round first preference vote share was [40.0%](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2021/england/mayors/E12000007#mayor-scoreboard).\n\n[Opinion polling in October 2023](https://yougov.co.uk/politics/articles/47662-sadiq-khan-holds-25-point-lead-over-susan-hall-for-mayor) has shown Khan to be heavily favoured to win the election. Whether Khan wins re-election is the subject of [this Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/13809/sadiq-khan-re-elected-in-2024/).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage of the popular vote that Sadiq Khan wins in the 2024 London mayoral election. If the election is not held in May of 2024, this question will be **annulled**.", "lower_25": "46.8", "median": "49.5", "upper_75": "51.93", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 130.9% in the year 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "125", "median": "130.9", "upper_75": "137.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 126% in 2026?", "desc": "A nation's [national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt) is the amount of money its central government owes to creditors. High levels of national debt generally have a negative impact on a nation's economy and level of economic growth due to expectations of higher future taxation, increased interest rates, and inflation when central banks are used to finance deficit spending, among other reasons. The [United States' national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States) has increased considerably in recent years, going from 62.9% of GDP in 2007 to 130.6% of GDP in 2021. Managing and/or reducing the national debt is a frequent topic of political discussion in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage value of the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio at 12:00 AM on January 1 of the given year, according to https://www.usdebtclock.org/", "lower_25": "126", "median": "132", "upper_75": "139.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 143% in 2027?", "desc": "A nation's [national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt) is the amount of money its central government owes to creditors. High levels of national debt generally have a negative impact on a nation's economy and level of economic growth due to expectations of higher future taxation, increased interest rates, and inflation when central banks are used to finance deficit spending, among other reasons. The [United States' national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States) has increased considerably in recent years, going from 62.9% of GDP in 2007 to 130.6% of GDP in 2021. Managing and/or reducing the national debt is a frequent topic of political discussion in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage value of the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio at 12:00 AM on January 1 of the given year, according to https://www.usdebtclock.org/", "lower_25": "126", "median": "134", "upper_75": "143", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 126% in 2026?", "desc": "A nation's [national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt) is the amount of money its central government owes to creditors. High levels of national debt generally have a negative impact on a nation's economy and level of economic growth due to expectations of higher future taxation, increased interest rates, and inflation when central banks are used to finance deficit spending, among other reasons. The [United States' national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States) has increased considerably in recent years, going from 62.9% of GDP in 2007 to 130.6% of GDP in 2021. Managing and/or reducing the national debt is a frequent topic of political discussion in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage value of the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio at 12:00 AM on January 1 of the given year, according to https://www.usdebtclock.org/", "lower_25": "126", "median": "132", "upper_75": "139.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 140% in the year 2030?", "desc": "A nation's [national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt) is the amount of money its central government owes to creditors. High levels of national debt generally have a negative impact on a nation's economy and level of economic growth due to expectations of higher future taxation, increased interest rates, and inflation when central banks are used to finance deficit spending, among other reasons. The [United States' national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States) has increased considerably in recent years, going from 62.9% of GDP in 2007 to 130.6% of GDP in 2021. Managing and/or reducing the national debt is a frequent topic of political discussion in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage value of the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio at 12:00 AM on January 1 of the given year, according to https://www.usdebtclock.org/", "lower_25": "125", "median": "140", "upper_75": "155", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 156% in the year 2040?", "desc": "A nation's [national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt) is the amount of money its central government owes to creditors. High levels of national debt generally have a negative impact on a nation's economy and level of economic growth due to expectations of higher future taxation, increased interest rates, and inflation when central banks are used to finance deficit spending, among other reasons. The [United States' national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States) has increased considerably in recent years, going from 62.9% of GDP in 2007 to 130.6% of GDP in 2021. Managing and/or reducing the national debt is a frequent topic of political discussion in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage value of the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio at 12:00 AM on January 1 of the given year, according to https://www.usdebtclock.org/", "lower_25": "128", "median": "156", "upper_75": "176", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 140% in the year 2030?", "desc": "A nation's [national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt) is the amount of money its central government owes to creditors. High levels of national debt generally have a negative impact on a nation's economy and level of economic growth due to expectations of higher future taxation, increased interest rates, and inflation when central banks are used to finance deficit spending, among other reasons. The [United States' national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States) has increased considerably in recent years, going from 62.9% of GDP in 2007 to 130.6% of GDP in 2021. Managing and/or reducing the national debt is a frequent topic of political discussion in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage value of the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio at 12:00 AM on January 1 of the given year, according to https://www.usdebtclock.org/", "lower_25": "125", "median": "140", "upper_75": "155", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 143% in 2027?", "desc": "A nation's [national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt) is the amount of money its central government owes to creditors. High levels of national debt generally have a negative impact on a nation's economy and level of economic growth due to expectations of higher future taxation, increased interest rates, and inflation when central banks are used to finance deficit spending, among other reasons. The [United States' national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States) has increased considerably in recent years, going from 62.9% of GDP in 2007 to 130.6% of GDP in 2021. Managing and/or reducing the national debt is a frequent topic of political discussion in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage value of the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio at 12:00 AM on January 1 of the given year, according to https://www.usdebtclock.org/", "lower_25": "126", "median": "134", "upper_75": "143", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 140% in the year 2030?", "desc": "A nation's [national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt) is the amount of money its central government owes to creditors. High levels of national debt generally have a negative impact on a nation's economy and level of economic growth due to expectations of higher future taxation, increased interest rates, and inflation when central banks are used to finance deficit spending, among other reasons. The [United States' national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States) has increased considerably in recent years, going from 62.9% of GDP in 2007 to 130.6% of GDP in 2021. Managing and/or reducing the national debt is a frequent topic of political discussion in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage value of the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio at 12:00 AM on January 1 of the given year, according to https://www.usdebtclock.org/", "lower_25": "125", "median": "140", "upper_75": "155", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 156% in the year 2040?", "desc": "A nation's [national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt) is the amount of money its central government owes to creditors. High levels of national debt generally have a negative impact on a nation's economy and level of economic growth due to expectations of higher future taxation, increased interest rates, and inflation when central banks are used to finance deficit spending, among other reasons. The [United States' national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States) has increased considerably in recent years, going from 62.9% of GDP in 2007 to 130.6% of GDP in 2021. Managing and/or reducing the national debt is a frequent topic of political discussion in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage value of the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio at 12:00 AM on January 1 of the given year, according to https://www.usdebtclock.org/", "lower_25": "128", "median": "156", "upper_75": "176", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 214% in 2050?", "desc": "A nation's [national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt) is the amount of money its central government owes to creditors. High levels of national debt generally have a negative impact on a nation's economy and level of economic growth due to expectations of higher future taxation, increased interest rates, and inflation when central banks are used to finance deficit spending, among other reasons. The [United States' national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States) has increased considerably in recent years, going from 62.9% of GDP in 2007 to 130.6% of GDP in 2021. Managing and/or reducing the national debt is a frequent topic of political discussion in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage value of the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio at 12:00 AM on January 1 of the given year, according to https://www.usdebtclock.org/", "lower_25": "124", "median": "174", "upper_75": "214", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that legal international trade in recreational cannabis will take place by Jan 2028?", "desc": "Starting in 2014, US states and some countries around the world have had legalized sales of non-medical/recreational cannabis. The trade is currently legal in [21 US states](https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/where-is-marijuana-legal-a-guide-to-marijuana-legalization) and [three countries (Uruguay, Canada and Thailand)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legality_of_cannabis#:~:text=Countries%20that%20have%20legalized%20recreational,Australian%20Capital%20Territory%20in%20Australia.).\n\nHowever, the legality applies only to domestic trade; international trade remains illegal except for medical and scientific purposes. Since these jurisdictions allow the growing, sale and purchase domestically, at some point they might decide to allow trade between them. When will that happen?", "resc": "The question resolves as the date when the first legal international shipment of recreational cannabis arrives at the destination country, or to >2033-12-31 if it hasn't happen by that date.", "lower_25": "Jan 2028", "median": "Sep 2029", "upper_75": "Nov 2031", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 214% in 2050?", "desc": "A nation's [national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt) is the amount of money its central government owes to creditors. High levels of national debt generally have a negative impact on a nation's economy and level of economic growth due to expectations of higher future taxation, increased interest rates, and inflation when central banks are used to finance deficit spending, among other reasons. The [United States' national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States) has increased considerably in recent years, going from 62.9% of GDP in 2007 to 130.6% of GDP in 2021. Managing and/or reducing the national debt is a frequent topic of political discussion in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage value of the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio at 12:00 AM on January 1 of the given year, according to https://www.usdebtclock.org/", "lower_25": "124", "median": "174", "upper_75": "214", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 89.43% of the world's population will be literate in 2030?", "desc": "\n\nLiteracy is a fundamental human skill and a critical measure of a population's education. From a historical perspective, literacy levels for the world population have risen drastically in the last couple of centuries. While only 12% of the people in the world could read and write in 1820, today the share has reversed: less than 14% of the world population, in 2020, remained illiterate. Over the last 65 years the global literacy rate increased by 4% every 5 years – from 42% in 1960 to 86% in 2015.\n\nDespite large improvements in the expansion of basic education, and the continuous reduction of education inequalities, there are substantial challenges ahead. The poorest countries in the world, where basic education is most likely to be a binding constraint for development, still have very large segments of the population who are illiterate.\n\nIn 2022, the highest share of adults aged 15 and older who can both read and write globally was achieved (at 87.01%), according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/literacy). This question asks what the percentage of the world's population will be literate for the year 2030.", "resc": "The share of adults aged 15 and older who can both read and write is tracked by [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/literacy). The resolution will be taken from the percentage figure published in the data for the year 2030. \n\nIf for any reason Our World in Data does not exist or significantly changes the dataset this question will be Annulled.", "lower_25": "88.36", "median": "89.43", "upper_75": "91.36", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 89.43% of the world's population will be literate in 2030?", "desc": "\n\nLiteracy is a fundamental human skill and a critical measure of a population's education. From a historical perspective, literacy levels for the world population have risen drastically in the last couple of centuries. While only 12% of the people in the world could read and write in 1820, today the share has reversed: less than 14% of the world population, in 2020, remained illiterate. Over the last 65 years the global literacy rate increased by 4% every 5 years – from 42% in 1960 to 86% in 2015.\n\nDespite large improvements in the expansion of basic education, and the continuous reduction of education inequalities, there are substantial challenges ahead. The poorest countries in the world, where basic education is most likely to be a binding constraint for development, still have very large segments of the population who are illiterate.\n\nIn 2022, the highest share of adults aged 15 and older who can both read and write globally was achieved (at 87.01%), according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/literacy). This question asks what the percentage of the world's population will be literate for the year 2030.", "resc": "The share of adults aged 15 and older who can both read and write is tracked by [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/literacy). The resolution will be taken from the percentage figure published in the data for the year 2030. \n\nIf for any reason Our World in Data does not exist or significantly changes the dataset this question will be Annulled.", "lower_25": "88.36", "median": "89.43", "upper_75": "91.36", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that legal international trade in recreational cannabis will take place by Jan 2028?", "desc": "Starting in 2014, US states and some countries around the world have had legalized sales of non-medical/recreational cannabis. The trade is currently legal in [21 US states](https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/where-is-marijuana-legal-a-guide-to-marijuana-legalization) and [three countries (Uruguay, Canada and Thailand)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legality_of_cannabis#:~:text=Countries%20that%20have%20legalized%20recreational,Australian%20Capital%20Territory%20in%20Australia.).\n\nHowever, the legality applies only to domestic trade; international trade remains illegal except for medical and scientific purposes. Since these jurisdictions allow the growing, sale and purchase domestically, at some point they might decide to allow trade between them. When will that happen?", "resc": "The question resolves as the date when the first legal international shipment of recreational cannabis arrives at the destination country, or to >2033-12-31 if it hasn't happen by that date.", "lower_25": "Jan 2028", "median": "Sep 2029", "upper_75": "Nov 2031", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 89.43% of the world's population will be literate in 2030?", "desc": "\n\nLiteracy is a fundamental human skill and a critical measure of a population's education. From a historical perspective, literacy levels for the world population have risen drastically in the last couple of centuries. While only 12% of the people in the world could read and write in 1820, today the share has reversed: less than 14% of the world population, in 2020, remained illiterate. Over the last 65 years the global literacy rate increased by 4% every 5 years – from 42% in 1960 to 86% in 2015.\n\nDespite large improvements in the expansion of basic education, and the continuous reduction of education inequalities, there are substantial challenges ahead. The poorest countries in the world, where basic education is most likely to be a binding constraint for development, still have very large segments of the population who are illiterate.\n\nIn 2022, the highest share of adults aged 15 and older who can both read and write globally was achieved (at 87.01%), according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/literacy). This question asks what the percentage of the world's population will be literate for the year 2030.", "resc": "The share of adults aged 15 and older who can both read and write is tracked by [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/literacy). The resolution will be taken from the percentage figure published in the data for the year 2030. \n\nIf for any reason Our World in Data does not exist or significantly changes the dataset this question will be Annulled.", "lower_25": "88.36", "median": "89.43", "upper_75": "91.36", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 1 kg of helium-3 from extraterrestrial bodies will be imported to Earth by 2084?", "desc": "Helium-3 can fuse with deuterium to form an alpha particle and a proton, while releasing 18.354 MeV, which that energy becomes the kinetic energy of the products. A major advantage of this reaction is that it produces no neutrons, although deuterium-deuterium side reactions do produce neutrons. \n\nHowever, a major problem with using this reaction to generate power is that supplies of helium-3 are rare on Earth. Helium-3 can be obtained from the beta decay of tritium, but that is also scarce and would likely be bred from lithium by placing that lithium in proximity to a strong neutron flux. Tritium breeding produced from this process is likely to be intended to provide fuel for deuterium-tritium fusion reactors, and the neutron flux is provided by the fusion reaction of deuterium and tritium. Jupiter and the Moon have higher concentrations for helium-3 than Earth. The helium-3 on the Moon is derived from the mass ejections from the solar wind being absorbed by the lunar regolith over billions of years. The specified amount of 1 kg will not sustain a power plant for a long time, so this question can likely resolve through a successful pilot program. \n\n[Sviatoslavsky (1993), pg. 6](https://web.archive.org/web/20190120035522/http://fti.neep.wisc.edu/pdf/wcsar9311-2.pdf) estimates that 150 tonnes of lunar regolith needs to be processed to yield 1 gram of Helium-3. \n\nThe helium-3 reaction requires higher temperatures and pressures than deuterium-tritium and deuterium-deuterium fusion, hence it would likely not be a first-generation fusion technology. Deuterium-deuterium fusion may suffice for the energy needs of Earth, so helium-3-deuterium fusion may not be necessary.\n\nThis fusion reaction and exploitation of helium-3 from Jupiter plays a prominent role in the [Gundam](https://srtmush.fandom.com/wiki/Minovsky) [universe](https://gundam.fandom.com/wiki/Jupiter_Energy_Fleet).", "resc": "Question will resolve positively when [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report a total of 1 kilogram of helium-3 found on extraterrestrial bodies has been recovered and returned to Earth. The amount can be a sum total of helium-3 collected from multiple missions within a 10 year window.\n\nIf there are no such reports by January 1, 2299, then the question will resolve negatively.", "lower_25": "2060", "median": "2070", "upper_75": "2084", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 156% in the year 2040?", "desc": "A nation's [national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt) is the amount of money its central government owes to creditors. High levels of national debt generally have a negative impact on a nation's economy and level of economic growth due to expectations of higher future taxation, increased interest rates, and inflation when central banks are used to finance deficit spending, among other reasons. The [United States' national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States) has increased considerably in recent years, going from 62.9% of GDP in 2007 to 130.6% of GDP in 2021. Managing and/or reducing the national debt is a frequent topic of political discussion in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage value of the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio at 12:00 AM on January 1 of the given year, according to https://www.usdebtclock.org/", "lower_25": "128", "median": "156", "upper_75": "176", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the price of Palladium futures (in $USD) will be 1.24k at the end of 2024?", "desc": "According to [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/palladium.asp):\n\n>Palladium is a shiny, silvery metal used in many types of manufacturing processes, particularly for electronics and industrial products. It can also be used in dentistry, medicine, chemical applications, jewelry, and groundwater treatment.\n\nIn 2023, Palladium [dropped](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/palladiums-slide-accelerates-prospects-surplus-next-year-2023-11-10/) around 38%, making it the worst yearly performance for the metal since 2008, when it dropped around 73%.", "resc": "This question will resolve based on the December 29, 2023 **Close** price of Palladium futures as shown by Yahoo! Finance on their [website](https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/quote/PA=F/) (*see “Historical Data” tab*).", "lower_25": "831", "median": "1.01k", "upper_75": "1.24k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that legal international trade in recreational cannabis will take place by Jan 2028?", "desc": "Starting in 2014, US states and some countries around the world have had legalized sales of non-medical/recreational cannabis. The trade is currently legal in [21 US states](https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/where-is-marijuana-legal-a-guide-to-marijuana-legalization) and [three countries (Uruguay, Canada and Thailand)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legality_of_cannabis#:~:text=Countries%20that%20have%20legalized%20recreational,Australian%20Capital%20Territory%20in%20Australia.).\n\nHowever, the legality applies only to domestic trade; international trade remains illegal except for medical and scientific purposes. Since these jurisdictions allow the growing, sale and purchase domestically, at some point they might decide to allow trade between them. When will that happen?", "resc": "The question resolves as the date when the first legal international shipment of recreational cannabis arrives at the destination country, or to >2033-12-31 if it hasn't happen by that date.", "lower_25": "Jan 2028", "median": "Sep 2029", "upper_75": "Nov 2031", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio will be 214% in 2050?", "desc": "A nation's [national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_debt) is the amount of money its central government owes to creditors. High levels of national debt generally have a negative impact on a nation's economy and level of economic growth due to expectations of higher future taxation, increased interest rates, and inflation when central banks are used to finance deficit spending, among other reasons. The [United States' national debt](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_debt_of_the_United_States) has increased considerably in recent years, going from 62.9% of GDP in 2007 to 130.6% of GDP in 2021. Managing and/or reducing the national debt is a frequent topic of political discussion in the United States.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage value of the United States' federal debt-to-GDP ratio at 12:00 AM on January 1 of the given year, according to https://www.usdebtclock.org/", "lower_25": "124", "median": "174", "upper_75": "214", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the federal funds target range will have an upper limit of 3.08% on December 31, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.14", "median": "3.08", "upper_75": "3.97", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 1 kg of helium-3 from extraterrestrial bodies will be imported to Earth by 2084?", "desc": "Helium-3 can fuse with deuterium to form an alpha particle and a proton, while releasing 18.354 MeV, which that energy becomes the kinetic energy of the products. A major advantage of this reaction is that it produces no neutrons, although deuterium-deuterium side reactions do produce neutrons. \n\nHowever, a major problem with using this reaction to generate power is that supplies of helium-3 are rare on Earth. Helium-3 can be obtained from the beta decay of tritium, but that is also scarce and would likely be bred from lithium by placing that lithium in proximity to a strong neutron flux. Tritium breeding produced from this process is likely to be intended to provide fuel for deuterium-tritium fusion reactors, and the neutron flux is provided by the fusion reaction of deuterium and tritium. Jupiter and the Moon have higher concentrations for helium-3 than Earth. The helium-3 on the Moon is derived from the mass ejections from the solar wind being absorbed by the lunar regolith over billions of years. The specified amount of 1 kg will not sustain a power plant for a long time, so this question can likely resolve through a successful pilot program. \n\n[Sviatoslavsky (1993), pg. 6](https://web.archive.org/web/20190120035522/http://fti.neep.wisc.edu/pdf/wcsar9311-2.pdf) estimates that 150 tonnes of lunar regolith needs to be processed to yield 1 gram of Helium-3. \n\nThe helium-3 reaction requires higher temperatures and pressures than deuterium-tritium and deuterium-deuterium fusion, hence it would likely not be a first-generation fusion technology. Deuterium-deuterium fusion may suffice for the energy needs of Earth, so helium-3-deuterium fusion may not be necessary.\n\nThis fusion reaction and exploitation of helium-3 from Jupiter plays a prominent role in the [Gundam](https://srtmush.fandom.com/wiki/Minovsky) [universe](https://gundam.fandom.com/wiki/Jupiter_Energy_Fleet).", "resc": "Question will resolve positively when [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report a total of 1 kilogram of helium-3 found on extraterrestrial bodies has been recovered and returned to Earth. The amount can be a sum total of helium-3 collected from multiple missions within a 10 year window.\n\nIf there are no such reports by January 1, 2299, then the question will resolve negatively.", "lower_25": "2060", "median": "2070", "upper_75": "2084", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the price of Palladium futures (in $USD) will be 1.24k at the end of 2024?", "desc": "According to [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/palladium.asp):\n\n>Palladium is a shiny, silvery metal used in many types of manufacturing processes, particularly for electronics and industrial products. It can also be used in dentistry, medicine, chemical applications, jewelry, and groundwater treatment.\n\nIn 2023, Palladium [dropped](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/palladiums-slide-accelerates-prospects-surplus-next-year-2023-11-10/) around 38%, making it the worst yearly performance for the metal since 2008, when it dropped around 73%.", "resc": "This question will resolve based on the December 29, 2023 **Close** price of Palladium futures as shown by Yahoo! Finance on their [website](https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/quote/PA=F/) (*see “Historical Data” tab*).", "lower_25": "831", "median": "1.01k", "upper_75": "1.24k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the price of Palladium futures (in $USD) will be 1.24k at the end of 2024?", "desc": "According to [Investopedia](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/palladium.asp):\n\n>Palladium is a shiny, silvery metal used in many types of manufacturing processes, particularly for electronics and industrial products. It can also be used in dentistry, medicine, chemical applications, jewelry, and groundwater treatment.\n\nIn 2023, Palladium [dropped](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/palladiums-slide-accelerates-prospects-surplus-next-year-2023-11-10/) around 38%, making it the worst yearly performance for the metal since 2008, when it dropped around 73%.", "resc": "This question will resolve based on the December 29, 2023 **Close** price of Palladium futures as shown by Yahoo! Finance on their [website](https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/quote/PA=F/) (*see “Historical Data” tab*).", "lower_25": "831", "median": "1.01k", "upper_75": "1.24k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each party will win 82.4 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.9", "median": "82.4", "upper_75": "91.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that at least 1 kg of helium-3 from extraterrestrial bodies will be imported to Earth by 2084?", "desc": "Helium-3 can fuse with deuterium to form an alpha particle and a proton, while releasing 18.354 MeV, which that energy becomes the kinetic energy of the products. A major advantage of this reaction is that it produces no neutrons, although deuterium-deuterium side reactions do produce neutrons. \n\nHowever, a major problem with using this reaction to generate power is that supplies of helium-3 are rare on Earth. Helium-3 can be obtained from the beta decay of tritium, but that is also scarce and would likely be bred from lithium by placing that lithium in proximity to a strong neutron flux. Tritium breeding produced from this process is likely to be intended to provide fuel for deuterium-tritium fusion reactors, and the neutron flux is provided by the fusion reaction of deuterium and tritium. Jupiter and the Moon have higher concentrations for helium-3 than Earth. The helium-3 on the Moon is derived from the mass ejections from the solar wind being absorbed by the lunar regolith over billions of years. The specified amount of 1 kg will not sustain a power plant for a long time, so this question can likely resolve through a successful pilot program. \n\n[Sviatoslavsky (1993), pg. 6](https://web.archive.org/web/20190120035522/http://fti.neep.wisc.edu/pdf/wcsar9311-2.pdf) estimates that 150 tonnes of lunar regolith needs to be processed to yield 1 gram of Helium-3. \n\nThe helium-3 reaction requires higher temperatures and pressures than deuterium-tritium and deuterium-deuterium fusion, hence it would likely not be a first-generation fusion technology. Deuterium-deuterium fusion may suffice for the energy needs of Earth, so helium-3-deuterium fusion may not be necessary.\n\nThis fusion reaction and exploitation of helium-3 from Jupiter plays a prominent role in the [Gundam](https://srtmush.fandom.com/wiki/Minovsky) [universe](https://gundam.fandom.com/wiki/Jupiter_Energy_Fleet).", "resc": "Question will resolve positively when [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) report a total of 1 kilogram of helium-3 found on extraterrestrial bodies has been recovered and returned to Earth. The amount can be a sum total of helium-3 collected from multiple missions within a 10 year window.\n\nIf there are no such reports by January 1, 2299, then the question will resolve negatively.", "lower_25": "2060", "median": "2070", "upper_75": "2084", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that ANO will win 73.9 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.9", "median": "82.4", "upper_75": "91.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the federal funds target range will have an upper limit of 3.08% on December 31, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.14", "median": "3.08", "upper_75": "3.97", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each party will win 82.4 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.9", "median": "82.4", "upper_75": "91.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the federal funds target range will have an upper limit of 3.08% on December 31, 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2.14", "median": "3.08", "upper_75": "3.97", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) will win 11.4 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "11.4", "median": "21.5", "upper_75": "31.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that ANO will win 73.9 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.9", "median": "82.4", "upper_75": "91.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) will win 11.4 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "11.4", "median": "21.5", "upper_75": "31.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) will win 11.4 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "11.4", "median": "21.5", "upper_75": "31.4", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that ANO will win 73.9 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.9", "median": "82.4", "upper_75": "91.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each party will win 82.4 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "73.9", "median": "82.4", "upper_75": "91.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) will win 18.2 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.08", "median": "18.2", "upper_75": "28.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) will win 18.2 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.08", "median": "18.2", "upper_75": "28.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Pirate Party will win 13.1 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.25", "median": "13.1", "upper_75": "23.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each party will win 7.90 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election (Mayors and Independents (STAN))?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.91", "median": "7.90", "upper_75": "16.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Pirate Party will win 13.1 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.25", "median": "13.1", "upper_75": "23.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that TOP 09 will win 11.7 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "4.90", "upper_75": "11.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that TOP 09 will win 11.7 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "4.90", "upper_75": "11.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each party will win 7.90 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election (Mayors and Independents (STAN))?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.91", "median": "7.90", "upper_75": "16.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) will win 18.2 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "9.08", "median": "18.2", "upper_75": "28.3", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that TOP 09 will win 11.7 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "4.90", "upper_75": "11.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Christian Democratic Party (KDU-ČSL) will win 9.4 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "2.91", "upper_75": "9.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Christian Democratic Party (KDU-ČSL) will win 9.4 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "2.91", "upper_75": "9.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Social Democrats (ČSSD) will win 50% of seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "1.73", "upper_75": "5.48", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each party will win 7.90 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election (Mayors and Independents (STAN))?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.91", "median": "7.90", "upper_75": "16.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many seats will each party win in the 2025 Czech legislative election according to Robert Šlachta's Oath (Přísaha)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "0.848", "upper_75": "4.70", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Communist Party (KSČM) will win 75% of seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "< 0", "upper_75": "0.234", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Pirate Party will win 13.1 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "4.25", "median": "13.1", "upper_75": "23.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Social Democrats (ČSSD) will win 50% of seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "1.73", "upper_75": "5.48", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many seats will each party win in the 2025 Czech legislative election according to Robert Šlachta's Oath (Přísaha)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "0.848", "upper_75": "4.70", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Communist Party (KSČM) will win 75% of seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "< 0", "upper_75": "0.234", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many seats will each party win in the 2025 Czech legislative election according to Robert Šlachta's Oath (Přísaha)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "0.848", "upper_75": "4.70", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Christian Democratic Party (KDU-ČSL) will win 9.4 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "2.91", "upper_75": "9.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Social Democrats (ČSSD) will win 50% of seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "1.73", "upper_75": "5.48", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Greens will win 1.01 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "< 0", "upper_75": "1.01", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Greens will win 1.01 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "< 0", "upper_75": "1.01", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average five-year survival rate of all cancers will exceed 95% by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "2060", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 3.26% in the year 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.68", "median": "3.26", "upper_75": "5.23", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Communist Party (KSČM) will win 75% of seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "< 0", "upper_75": "0.234", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Greens will win 1.01 seats in the 2025 Czech legislative election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "< 0", "median": "< 0", "upper_75": "1.01", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 3.26% in the year 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.68", "median": "3.26", "upper_75": "5.23", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NVIDIA's market capitalization will be 2.56k on the last day of the following years (End of 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.73k", "median": "2.13k", "upper_75": "2.56k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NVIDIA's market capitalization will be 2.56k on the last day of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.73k", "median": "2.13k", "upper_75": "2.56k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NVIDIA's market capitalization will be 1.67k on the last day of the following years? (End of 2025)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.67k", "median": "2.29k", "upper_75": "2.80k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average five-year survival rate of all cancers will exceed 95% by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "2060", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average five-year survival rate of all cancers will exceed 95% by 2040?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2040", "median": "2049", "upper_75": "2060", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the annual headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 3.26% in the year 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.68", "median": "3.26", "upper_75": "5.23", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NVIDIA's market capitalization will be 2.56k on the last day of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.73k", "median": "2.13k", "upper_75": "2.56k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NVIDIA's market capitalization will be 2.56k on the last day of the following years (End of 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.73k", "median": "2.13k", "upper_75": "2.56k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NVIDIA's market capitalization will be 2.56k on the last day of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.73k", "median": "2.13k", "upper_75": "2.56k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NVIDIA's market capitalization will be 2.37k on the last day of the following years (End of 2026)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.71k", "median": "2.37k", "upper_75": "3.06k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NVIDIA's market capitalization will be 2.56k on the last day of the following years (End of 2024)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.73k", "median": "2.13k", "upper_75": "2.56k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NVIDIA's market capitalization will be 1.67k on the last day of the following years? (End of 2025)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.67k", "median": "2.29k", "upper_75": "2.80k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NVIDIA's market capitalization will be 2.37k on the last day of the following years (End of 2026)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.71k", "median": "2.37k", "upper_75": "3.06k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NVIDIA's market capitalization will be 2.37k on the last day of the following years (End of 2026)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.71k", "median": "2.37k", "upper_75": "3.06k", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NVIDIA's market capitalization will be 1.82k on the last day of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.82k", "median": "2.54k", "upper_75": "3.34k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Google will be supplanted as the top search engine in the world by market share by 2058?", "desc": "As of December 2021, [Google held a 92%+ share](https://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share) of the global search engine market, a percentage that has been steadily increasing over the last 5 years. As of today there is no alternative and no serious challenger to this dominance, but history tells us there is no reason to expect this to last forever.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date after January 22, 2024 when Google is no longer the most used search engine in the world according to [StatCounter GlobalStats](https://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share).", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2058", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NVIDIA's market capitalization will be 1.67k on the last day of the following years? (End of 2025)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.67k", "median": "2.29k", "upper_75": "2.80k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NVIDIA's market capitalization will be 3.36k on the last day of the following years? (End of 2028)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.81k", "median": "2.57k", "upper_75": "3.36k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NVIDIA's market capitalization will be 3.36k on the last day of the following years? (End of 2028)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.81k", "median": "2.57k", "upper_75": "3.36k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NVIDIA's market capitalization will be 1.82k on the last day of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.82k", "median": "2.54k", "upper_75": "3.34k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Saturday Night Live will end by 2031?", "desc": "*Saturday Night Live* (SNL) is an American variety/comedy show. Its first episode aired on October 11, 1975. As of 2024, [it has won 84 Emmys](https://www.nbc.com/nbc-insider/how-many-emmys-has-saturday-night-live-won). Its ever-changing cast has included many people who later went on to larger stardom, including Eddie Murphy, Bill Murray, Julia Louis-Dreyfus, and Will Ferrell.\n\n[The show has also inspired other variety programs in the Anglophone world](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Saturday-Night-Live), such as *In Living Color* and *MADtv*.\n\nBut nothing lasts forever.", "resc": "The question resolves as the date of the final episode of Saturday Night Live to air, after five years elapse without a new episode airing.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NVIDIA's market capitalization will be 3.36k on the last day of the following years? (End of 2028)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.81k", "median": "2.57k", "upper_75": "3.36k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Saturday Night Live will end by 2031?", "desc": "*Saturday Night Live* (SNL) is an American variety/comedy show. Its first episode aired on October 11, 1975. As of 2024, [it has won 84 Emmys](https://www.nbc.com/nbc-insider/how-many-emmys-has-saturday-night-live-won). Its ever-changing cast has included many people who later went on to larger stardom, including Eddie Murphy, Bill Murray, Julia Louis-Dreyfus, and Will Ferrell.\n\n[The show has also inspired other variety programs in the Anglophone world](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Saturday-Night-Live), such as *In Living Color* and *MADtv*.\n\nBut nothing lasts forever.", "resc": "The question resolves as the date of the final episode of Saturday Night Live to air, after five years elapse without a new episode airing.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that NVIDIA's market capitalization will be 1.82k on the last day of the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.82k", "median": "2.54k", "upper_75": "3.34k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that \"artificial intelligence\" will be mentioned in White House Press Briefings 17.8 times in 2024?", "desc": "The White House releases [Press Briefings](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/) on events or developments it considers important. As such, one measure of how much political saliency AI has in the US is given by the frequency with which the term appears in briefings.\n\nIn 2023, 22 briefings mentioned AI. In 2024 so far, as of February 12, there has only been one mention.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of distinct web pages on the White House Briefing Room page, in the calendar year 2024, which contain the phrase “artificial intelligence”.", "lower_25": "12.2", "median": "17.8", "upper_75": "24.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Saturday Night Live will end by 2031?", "desc": "*Saturday Night Live* (SNL) is an American variety/comedy show. Its first episode aired on October 11, 1975. As of 2024, [it has won 84 Emmys](https://www.nbc.com/nbc-insider/how-many-emmys-has-saturday-night-live-won). Its ever-changing cast has included many people who later went on to larger stardom, including Eddie Murphy, Bill Murray, Julia Louis-Dreyfus, and Will Ferrell.\n\n[The show has also inspired other variety programs in the Anglophone world](https://www.britannica.com/topic/Saturday-Night-Live), such as *In Living Color* and *MADtv*.\n\nBut nothing lasts forever.", "resc": "The question resolves as the date of the final episode of Saturday Night Live to air, after five years elapse without a new episode airing.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that \"artificial intelligence\" will be mentioned in White House Press Briefings 17.8 times in 2024?", "desc": "The White House releases [Press Briefings](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/) on events or developments it considers important. As such, one measure of how much political saliency AI has in the US is given by the frequency with which the term appears in briefings.\n\nIn 2023, 22 briefings mentioned AI. In 2024 so far, as of February 12, there has only been one mention.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of distinct web pages on the White House Briefing Room page, in the calendar year 2024, which contain the phrase “artificial intelligence”.", "lower_25": "12.2", "median": "17.8", "upper_75": "24.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.62M scientific journal articles will be published in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.91M", "median": "4.63M", "upper_75": "5.62M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.62M scientific journal articles will be published in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.91M", "median": "4.63M", "upper_75": "5.62M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that \"artificial intelligence\" will be mentioned in White House Press Briefings 17.8 times in 2024?", "desc": "The White House releases [Press Briefings](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/) on events or developments it considers important. As such, one measure of how much political saliency AI has in the US is given by the frequency with which the term appears in briefings.\n\nIn 2023, 22 briefings mentioned AI. In 2024 so far, as of February 12, there has only been one mention.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of distinct web pages on the White House Briefing Room page, in the calendar year 2024, which contain the phrase “artificial intelligence”.", "lower_25": "12.2", "median": "17.8", "upper_75": "24.5", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Google will be supplanted as the top search engine in the world by market share by 2058?", "desc": "As of December 2021, [Google held a 92%+ share](https://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share) of the global search engine market, a percentage that has been steadily increasing over the last 5 years. As of today there is no alternative and no serious challenger to this dominance, but history tells us there is no reason to expect this to last forever.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date after January 22, 2024 when Google is no longer the most used search engine in the world according to [StatCounter GlobalStats](https://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share).", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2058", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many scientific journal articles will be published in the following years? (2028)\n\nKeyword: 4.63M\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 4.63M scientific journal articles will be published in the following years?", "desc": "The number of articles published in scientific and technical journals is a reasonable proxy for the overall rate of scientific and technological progress. This number went from 1.75 million in 2008 to 2.55 million in 2018, according to [The World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.JRN.ARTC.SCL). Will this number continue to rise, and if so, how fast? Will [the dawn of advanced artificial intelligence (AI)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/) have an impact on this number, either through AI boosting human researchers' productivity, or—more radically—through AI directly making scientific breakthroughs?\n\n", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the number of articles published in scientific and technical journals in the given year, as per [The World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.JRN.ARTC.SC).", "lower_25": "3.91M", "median": "4.63M", "upper_75": "5.62M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Google will be supplanted as the top search engine in the world by market share by 2058?", "desc": "As of December 2021, [Google held a 92%+ share](https://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share) of the global search engine market, a percentage that has been steadily increasing over the last 5 years. As of today there is no alternative and no serious challenger to this dominance, but history tells us there is no reason to expect this to last forever.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date after January 22, 2024 when Google is no longer the most used search engine in the world according to [StatCounter GlobalStats](https://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-market-share).", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2046", "upper_75": "2058", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many scientific journal articles will be published in the following years (2038)? (5.34M)\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 5.34M scientific journal articles will be published in the following years (2038)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "5.34M", "median": "7.13M", "upper_75": "9.88M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 5.62M scientific journal articles will be published in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "3.91M", "median": "4.63M", "upper_75": "5.62M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many scientific journal articles will be published in the following years? (2048)\n\nKeyword: 6.78M\n\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 6.78M scientific journal articles will be published in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.78M", "median": "10.7M", "upper_75": "18.3M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many scientific journal articles will be published in the following years? (2028)\n\nKeyword: 4.63M\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 4.63M scientific journal articles will be published in the following years?", "desc": "The number of articles published in scientific and technical journals is a reasonable proxy for the overall rate of scientific and technological progress. This number went from 1.75 million in 2008 to 2.55 million in 2018, according to [The World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.JRN.ARTC.SCL). Will this number continue to rise, and if so, how fast? Will [the dawn of advanced artificial intelligence (AI)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/) have an impact on this number, either through AI boosting human researchers' productivity, or—more radically—through AI directly making scientific breakthroughs?\n\n", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the number of articles published in scientific and technical journals in the given year, as per [The World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.JRN.ARTC.SC).", "lower_25": "3.91M", "median": "4.63M", "upper_75": "5.62M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with an order of magnitude more compute than GPT-4 will be downloadable by the general public by Aug 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2026", "median": "Aug 2027", "upper_75": "Nov 2028", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with an order of magnitude more compute than GPT-4 will be downloadable by the general public by Aug 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2026", "median": "Aug 2027", "upper_75": "Nov 2028", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many scientific journal articles will be published in the following years? (2028)\n\nKeyword: 4.63M\n\nPercentage: 50%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 4.63M scientific journal articles will be published in the following years?", "desc": "The number of articles published in scientific and technical journals is a reasonable proxy for the overall rate of scientific and technological progress. This number went from 1.75 million in 2008 to 2.55 million in 2018, according to [The World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.JRN.ARTC.SCL). Will this number continue to rise, and if so, how fast? Will [the dawn of advanced artificial intelligence (AI)](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/) have an impact on this number, either through AI boosting human researchers' productivity, or—more radically—through AI directly making scientific breakthroughs?\n\n", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the number of articles published in scientific and technical journals in the given year, as per [The World Bank](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.JRN.ARTC.SC).", "lower_25": "3.91M", "median": "4.63M", "upper_75": "5.62M", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with an order of magnitude more compute than GPT-4 will be downloadable by the general public by Aug 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2026", "median": "Aug 2027", "upper_75": "Nov 2028", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with an order of magnitude more compute than GPT-4 will be downloadable by the general public by Aug 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2026", "median": "Aug 2027", "upper_75": "Nov 2028", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "How many scientific journal articles will be published in the following years? (2048)\n\nKeyword: 6.78M\n\nPercentage: 25%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 6.78M scientific journal articles will be published in the following years?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "6.78M", "median": "10.7M", "upper_75": "18.3M", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with an order of magnitude more compute than GPT-4 will be downloadable by the general public by Aug 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2026", "median": "Aug 2027", "upper_75": "Nov 2028", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with (4) times more compute than GPT-4 will be downloadable by the general public by Sep 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2028", "median": "Mar 2030", "upper_75": "Aug 2031", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with 6 times more compute than GPT-4 will be downloadable by the general public by Jan 2034?", "desc": "[OpenAI's GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) made waves upon its release in March, 2023, for its [multimodality](https://community.openai.com/t/gpt4-multi-modality-audio-video/316041) and overall [superior performance](https://www.reddit.com/r/singularity/comments/163uk4t/gpt4_might_be_smarter_than_you_think_890_on_mmlu/) to any previous AI model, bringing the world one step closer to [artificial general intelligence](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/) (AGI).\n\nMeanwhile, at least one leading AI lab, [Meta AI](https://ai.meta.com/), is aiming to build AGI and then make it widely downloadable. [This has alarmed experts](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/jan/19/mark-zuckerberg-artificial-general-intelligence-system-alarms-experts-meta-open-source). Comparisons have been drawn to giving every citizen a nuclear weapon.\n\nThis question group aims to shed light on when we might expect publicly downloadable AI models at various high capability levels. Note that, all else equal, a model's capability increases with its training compute, so this question group is asking about models (significantly) more capable than GPT-4.\n\n_This question group is a variant on [this one](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21214/dates-large-ai-models-released/), but with the added constraint of the models needing to be publicly downloadable._", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the earliest date at which a publicly downloadable AI model trained using the given amount of compute—measured in orders of magnitude more than GPT-4's training compute—is released.\n\nThere are a couple of potential pathways, so to give some more detail: If a model that meets the given compute criterium is publicly downloadable from the day it is launched, then the date the question resolves as is simply the date the model is released. If a model is not publicly downloadable when it is released, but becomes publicly downloadable at a later date—either because the developers decided to make it open source, or because of a leak—then the question resolves as the date the model became publicly downloadable.\n\nThe [Epoch Database](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table), which has a “Training Compute (FLOP)” column, will be used to determine a model's training compute. If this database is no longer maintained, then Metaculus admins will attempt to find an alternative resolution source. If none is available, then the relevant subquestion(s) will be annulled.\n\nNote: To date, OpenAI has not revealed how much training compute went into GPT-4. Therefore, for the purposes of this question, GPT-4's training compute is taken to be 2.1e+25 FLOP, which is [Epoch AI's estimate](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table), and which corresponds to training computes of 2.1e+27, 2.1e+29, and 2.1e+31 FLOP for the 2, 4, and 6 subquestions, respectively.", "lower_25": "Aug 2030", "median": "Apr 2032", "upper_75": "Jan 2034", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with (4) times more compute than GPT-4 will be downloadable by the general public by Sep 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2028", "median": "Mar 2030", "upper_75": "Aug 2031", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with an order of magnitude more compute than GPT-4 will be downloadable by the general public by Aug 2027?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "May 2026", "median": "Aug 2027", "upper_75": "Nov 2028", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with an order of magnitude more compute than GPT-4 will be released by April 2025?", "desc": "[OpenAI's GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) made waves upon its release in March, 2023, for its [multimodality](https://community.openai.com/t/gpt4-multi-modality-audio-video/316041) and overall [superior performance](https://www.reddit.com/r/singularity/comments/163uk4t/gpt4_might_be_smarter_than_you_think_890_on_mmlu/) to any previous AI model, bringing the world one step closer to [artificial general intelligence](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/) (AGI).\n\nThis question group aims to shed light on when we might expect future AI models of various high capability levels. Note that, all else equal, a model's capability increases with its training compute, so this question group is asking about models (significantly) more capable than GPT-4.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the earliest date at which an AI model trained using the given amount of compute—measured in orders of magnitude more than GPT-4's training compute—is released.\n\nThe [Epoch Database](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table), which has a “Training Compute (FLOP)” column, will be used to determine a model's training compute. If this database is no longer maintained, then Metaculus admins will attempt to find an alternative resolution source. If none is available, then the relevant subquestion(s) will be annulled.\n\nNote: To date, OpenAI has not revealed how much training compute went into GPT-4. Therefore, for the purposes of this question, GPT-4's training compute is taken to be 2.1 x 10^25 FLOP, which is [Epoch AI's estimate](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table) (Epoch uses exponential notation, so, 2.1e+25 FLOP), and which corresponds to training computes of 2.1e+27, 2.1e+29, 2.1e+31, and 2.1e+33 FLOP for the 2, 4, 6, and 8 subquestions, respectively.", "lower_25": "Apr 2025", "median": "Jan 2026", "upper_75": "Sep 2027", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with (4) times more compute than GPT-4 will be downloadable by the general public by Sep 2028?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Sep 2028", "median": "Mar 2030", "upper_75": "Aug 2031", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with 6 times more compute than GPT-4 will be downloadable by the general public by Jan 2034?", "desc": "[OpenAI's GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) made waves upon its release in March, 2023, for its [multimodality](https://community.openai.com/t/gpt4-multi-modality-audio-video/316041) and overall [superior performance](https://www.reddit.com/r/singularity/comments/163uk4t/gpt4_might_be_smarter_than_you_think_890_on_mmlu/) to any previous AI model, bringing the world one step closer to [artificial general intelligence](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/) (AGI).\n\nMeanwhile, at least one leading AI lab, [Meta AI](https://ai.meta.com/), is aiming to build AGI and then make it widely downloadable. [This has alarmed experts](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/jan/19/mark-zuckerberg-artificial-general-intelligence-system-alarms-experts-meta-open-source). Comparisons have been drawn to giving every citizen a nuclear weapon.\n\nThis question group aims to shed light on when we might expect publicly downloadable AI models at various high capability levels. Note that, all else equal, a model's capability increases with its training compute, so this question group is asking about models (significantly) more capable than GPT-4.\n\n_This question group is a variant on [this one](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21214/dates-large-ai-models-released/), but with the added constraint of the models needing to be publicly downloadable._", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the earliest date at which a publicly downloadable AI model trained using the given amount of compute—measured in orders of magnitude more than GPT-4's training compute—is released.\n\nThere are a couple of potential pathways, so to give some more detail: If a model that meets the given compute criterium is publicly downloadable from the day it is launched, then the date the question resolves as is simply the date the model is released. If a model is not publicly downloadable when it is released, but becomes publicly downloadable at a later date—either because the developers decided to make it open source, or because of a leak—then the question resolves as the date the model became publicly downloadable.\n\nThe [Epoch Database](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table), which has a “Training Compute (FLOP)” column, will be used to determine a model's training compute. If this database is no longer maintained, then Metaculus admins will attempt to find an alternative resolution source. If none is available, then the relevant subquestion(s) will be annulled.\n\nNote: To date, OpenAI has not revealed how much training compute went into GPT-4. Therefore, for the purposes of this question, GPT-4's training compute is taken to be 2.1e+25 FLOP, which is [Epoch AI's estimate](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table), and which corresponds to training computes of 2.1e+27, 2.1e+29, and 2.1e+31 FLOP for the 2, 4, and 6 subquestions, respectively.", "lower_25": "Aug 2030", "median": "Apr 2032", "upper_75": "Jan 2034", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with 2038 times more compute than GPT-4 will be released by 2038?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with an order of magnitude more compute than GPT-4 will be released by April 2025?", "desc": "[OpenAI's GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) made waves upon its release in March, 2023, for its [multimodality](https://community.openai.com/t/gpt4-multi-modality-audio-video/316041) and overall [superior performance](https://www.reddit.com/r/singularity/comments/163uk4t/gpt4_might_be_smarter_than_you_think_890_on_mmlu/) to any previous AI model, bringing the world one step closer to [artificial general intelligence](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/) (AGI).\n\nThis question group aims to shed light on when we might expect future AI models of various high capability levels. Note that, all else equal, a model's capability increases with its training compute, so this question group is asking about models (significantly) more capable than GPT-4.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the earliest date at which an AI model trained using the given amount of compute—measured in orders of magnitude more than GPT-4's training compute—is released.\n\nThe [Epoch Database](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table), which has a “Training Compute (FLOP)” column, will be used to determine a model's training compute. If this database is no longer maintained, then Metaculus admins will attempt to find an alternative resolution source. If none is available, then the relevant subquestion(s) will be annulled.\n\nNote: To date, OpenAI has not revealed how much training compute went into GPT-4. Therefore, for the purposes of this question, GPT-4's training compute is taken to be 2.1 x 10^25 FLOP, which is [Epoch AI's estimate](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table) (Epoch uses exponential notation, so, 2.1e+25 FLOP), and which corresponds to training computes of 2.1e+27, 2.1e+29, 2.1e+31, and 2.1e+33 FLOP for the 2, 4, 6, and 8 subquestions, respectively.", "lower_25": "Apr 2025", "median": "Jan 2026", "upper_75": "Sep 2027", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with an order of magnitude more compute than GPT-4 will be released by April 2025?", "desc": "[OpenAI's GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) made waves upon its release in March, 2023, for its [multimodality](https://community.openai.com/t/gpt4-multi-modality-audio-video/316041) and overall [superior performance](https://www.reddit.com/r/singularity/comments/163uk4t/gpt4_might_be_smarter_than_you_think_890_on_mmlu/) to any previous AI model, bringing the world one step closer to [artificial general intelligence](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/) (AGI).\n\nThis question group aims to shed light on when we might expect future AI models of various high capability levels. Note that, all else equal, a model's capability increases with its training compute, so this question group is asking about models (significantly) more capable than GPT-4.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the earliest date at which an AI model trained using the given amount of compute—measured in orders of magnitude more than GPT-4's training compute—is released.\n\nThe [Epoch Database](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table), which has a “Training Compute (FLOP)” column, will be used to determine a model's training compute. If this database is no longer maintained, then Metaculus admins will attempt to find an alternative resolution source. If none is available, then the relevant subquestion(s) will be annulled.\n\nNote: To date, OpenAI has not revealed how much training compute went into GPT-4. Therefore, for the purposes of this question, GPT-4's training compute is taken to be 2.1 x 10^25 FLOP, which is [Epoch AI's estimate](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table) (Epoch uses exponential notation, so, 2.1e+25 FLOP), and which corresponds to training computes of 2.1e+27, 2.1e+29, 2.1e+31, and 2.1e+33 FLOP for the 2, 4, 6, and 8 subquestions, respectively.", "lower_25": "Apr 2025", "median": "Jan 2026", "upper_75": "Sep 2027", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with an order of magnitude more compute than GPT-4 will be released by Sep 2027?", "desc": "[OpenAI's GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) made waves upon its release in March, 2023, for its [multimodality](https://community.openai.com/t/gpt4-multi-modality-audio-video/316041) and overall [superior performance](https://www.reddit.com/r/singularity/comments/163uk4t/gpt4_might_be_smarter_than_you_think_890_on_mmlu/) to any previous AI model, bringing the world one step closer to [artificial general intelligence](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/) (AGI).\n\nThis question group aims to shed light on when we might expect future AI models of various high capability levels. Note that, all else equal, a model's capability increases with its training compute, so this question group is asking about models (significantly) more capable than GPT-4.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the earliest date at which an AI model trained using the given amount of compute—measured in orders of magnitude more than GPT-4's training compute—is released.\n\nThe [Epoch Database](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table), which has a “Training Compute (FLOP)” column, will be used to determine a model's training compute. If this database is no longer maintained, then Metaculus admins will attempt to find an alternative resolution source. If none is available, then the relevant subquestion(s) will be annulled.\n\nNote: To date, OpenAI has not revealed how much training compute went into GPT-4. Therefore, for the purposes of this question, GPT-4's training compute is taken to be 2.1 x 10^25 FLOP, which is [Epoch AI's estimate](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table) (Epoch uses exponential notation, so, 2.1e+25 FLOP), and which corresponds to training computes of 2.1e+27, 2.1e+29, 2.1e+31, and 2.1e+33 FLOP for the 2, 4, 6, and 8 subquestions, respectively.", "lower_25": "Apr 2025", "median": "Jan 2026", "upper_75": "Sep 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with (4) orders of magnitude more compute than GPT-4 will be released by Sep 2031?", "desc": "[OpenAI's GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) made waves upon its release in March, 2023, for its [multimodality](https://community.openai.com/t/gpt4-multi-modality-audio-video/316041) and overall [superior performance](https://www.reddit.com/r/singularity/comments/163uk4t/gpt4_might_be_smarter_than_you_think_890_on_mmlu/) to any previous AI model, bringing the world one step closer to [artificial general intelligence](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/) (AGI).\n\nThis question group aims to shed light on when we might expect future AI models of various high capability levels. Note that, all else equal, a model's capability increases with its training compute, so this question group is asking about models (significantly) more capable than GPT-4.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the earliest date at which an AI model trained using the given amount of compute—measured in orders of magnitude more than GPT-4's training compute—is released.\n\nThe [Epoch Database](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table), which has a “Training Compute (FLOP)” column, will be used to determine a model's training compute. If this database is no longer maintained, then Metaculus admins will attempt to find an alternative resolution source. If none is available, then the relevant subquestion(s) will be annulled.\n\nNote: To date, OpenAI has not revealed how much training compute went into GPT-4. Therefore, for the purposes of this question, GPT-4's training compute is taken to be 2.1 x 10^25 FLOP, which is [Epoch AI's estimate](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table) (Epoch uses exponential notation, so, 2.1e+25 FLOP), and which corresponds to training computes of 2.1e+27, 2.1e+29, 2.1e+31, and 2.1e+33 FLOP for the 2, 4, 6, and 8 subquestions, respectively.", "lower_25": "Jun 2028", "median": "Oct 2029", "upper_75": "Sep 2031", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with an order of magnitude more compute than GPT-4 will be released by Sep 2027?", "desc": "[OpenAI's GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) made waves upon its release in March, 2023, for its [multimodality](https://community.openai.com/t/gpt4-multi-modality-audio-video/316041) and overall [superior performance](https://www.reddit.com/r/singularity/comments/163uk4t/gpt4_might_be_smarter_than_you_think_890_on_mmlu/) to any previous AI model, bringing the world one step closer to [artificial general intelligence](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/) (AGI).\n\nThis question group aims to shed light on when we might expect future AI models of various high capability levels. Note that, all else equal, a model's capability increases with its training compute, so this question group is asking about models (significantly) more capable than GPT-4.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the earliest date at which an AI model trained using the given amount of compute—measured in orders of magnitude more than GPT-4's training compute—is released.\n\nThe [Epoch Database](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table), which has a “Training Compute (FLOP)” column, will be used to determine a model's training compute. If this database is no longer maintained, then Metaculus admins will attempt to find an alternative resolution source. If none is available, then the relevant subquestion(s) will be annulled.\n\nNote: To date, OpenAI has not revealed how much training compute went into GPT-4. Therefore, for the purposes of this question, GPT-4's training compute is taken to be 2.1 x 10^25 FLOP, which is [Epoch AI's estimate](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table) (Epoch uses exponential notation, so, 2.1e+25 FLOP), and which corresponds to training computes of 2.1e+27, 2.1e+29, 2.1e+31, and 2.1e+33 FLOP for the 2, 4, 6, and 8 subquestions, respectively.", "lower_25": "Apr 2025", "median": "Jan 2026", "upper_75": "Sep 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with an order of magnitude more compute than GPT-4 will be released by Sep 2027?", "desc": "[OpenAI's GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) made waves upon its release in March, 2023, for its [multimodality](https://community.openai.com/t/gpt4-multi-modality-audio-video/316041) and overall [superior performance](https://www.reddit.com/r/singularity/comments/163uk4t/gpt4_might_be_smarter_than_you_think_890_on_mmlu/) to any previous AI model, bringing the world one step closer to [artificial general intelligence](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/) (AGI).\n\nThis question group aims to shed light on when we might expect future AI models of various high capability levels. Note that, all else equal, a model's capability increases with its training compute, so this question group is asking about models (significantly) more capable than GPT-4.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the earliest date at which an AI model trained using the given amount of compute—measured in orders of magnitude more than GPT-4's training compute—is released.\n\nThe [Epoch Database](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table), which has a “Training Compute (FLOP)” column, will be used to determine a model's training compute. If this database is no longer maintained, then Metaculus admins will attempt to find an alternative resolution source. If none is available, then the relevant subquestion(s) will be annulled.\n\nNote: To date, OpenAI has not revealed how much training compute went into GPT-4. Therefore, for the purposes of this question, GPT-4's training compute is taken to be 2.1 x 10^25 FLOP, which is [Epoch AI's estimate](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table) (Epoch uses exponential notation, so, 2.1e+25 FLOP), and which corresponds to training computes of 2.1e+27, 2.1e+29, 2.1e+31, and 2.1e+33 FLOP for the 2, 4, 6, and 8 subquestions, respectively.", "lower_25": "Apr 2025", "median": "Jan 2026", "upper_75": "Sep 2027", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with 6 times more compute than GPT-4 will be downloadable by the general public by Jan 2034?", "desc": "[OpenAI's GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) made waves upon its release in March, 2023, for its [multimodality](https://community.openai.com/t/gpt4-multi-modality-audio-video/316041) and overall [superior performance](https://www.reddit.com/r/singularity/comments/163uk4t/gpt4_might_be_smarter_than_you_think_890_on_mmlu/) to any previous AI model, bringing the world one step closer to [artificial general intelligence](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/) (AGI).\n\nMeanwhile, at least one leading AI lab, [Meta AI](https://ai.meta.com/), is aiming to build AGI and then make it widely downloadable. [This has alarmed experts](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/jan/19/mark-zuckerberg-artificial-general-intelligence-system-alarms-experts-meta-open-source). Comparisons have been drawn to giving every citizen a nuclear weapon.\n\nThis question group aims to shed light on when we might expect publicly downloadable AI models at various high capability levels. Note that, all else equal, a model's capability increases with its training compute, so this question group is asking about models (significantly) more capable than GPT-4.\n\n_This question group is a variant on [this one](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21214/dates-large-ai-models-released/), but with the added constraint of the models needing to be publicly downloadable._", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the earliest date at which a publicly downloadable AI model trained using the given amount of compute—measured in orders of magnitude more than GPT-4's training compute—is released.\n\nThere are a couple of potential pathways, so to give some more detail: If a model that meets the given compute criterium is publicly downloadable from the day it is launched, then the date the question resolves as is simply the date the model is released. If a model is not publicly downloadable when it is released, but becomes publicly downloadable at a later date—either because the developers decided to make it open source, or because of a leak—then the question resolves as the date the model became publicly downloadable.\n\nThe [Epoch Database](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table), which has a “Training Compute (FLOP)” column, will be used to determine a model's training compute. If this database is no longer maintained, then Metaculus admins will attempt to find an alternative resolution source. If none is available, then the relevant subquestion(s) will be annulled.\n\nNote: To date, OpenAI has not revealed how much training compute went into GPT-4. Therefore, for the purposes of this question, GPT-4's training compute is taken to be 2.1e+25 FLOP, which is [Epoch AI's estimate](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table), and which corresponds to training computes of 2.1e+27, 2.1e+29, and 2.1e+31 FLOP for the 2, 4, and 6 subquestions, respectively.", "lower_25": "Aug 2030", "median": "Apr 2032", "upper_75": "Jan 2034", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with (4) orders of magnitude more compute than GPT-4 will be released by Sep 2031?", "desc": "[OpenAI's GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) made waves upon its release in March, 2023, for its [multimodality](https://community.openai.com/t/gpt4-multi-modality-audio-video/316041) and overall [superior performance](https://www.reddit.com/r/singularity/comments/163uk4t/gpt4_might_be_smarter_than_you_think_890_on_mmlu/) to any previous AI model, bringing the world one step closer to [artificial general intelligence](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/) (AGI).\n\nThis question group aims to shed light on when we might expect future AI models of various high capability levels. Note that, all else equal, a model's capability increases with its training compute, so this question group is asking about models (significantly) more capable than GPT-4.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the earliest date at which an AI model trained using the given amount of compute—measured in orders of magnitude more than GPT-4's training compute—is released.\n\nThe [Epoch Database](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table), which has a “Training Compute (FLOP)” column, will be used to determine a model's training compute. If this database is no longer maintained, then Metaculus admins will attempt to find an alternative resolution source. If none is available, then the relevant subquestion(s) will be annulled.\n\nNote: To date, OpenAI has not revealed how much training compute went into GPT-4. Therefore, for the purposes of this question, GPT-4's training compute is taken to be 2.1 x 10^25 FLOP, which is [Epoch AI's estimate](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table) (Epoch uses exponential notation, so, 2.1e+25 FLOP), and which corresponds to training computes of 2.1e+27, 2.1e+29, 2.1e+31, and 2.1e+33 FLOP for the 2, 4, 6, and 8 subquestions, respectively.", "lower_25": "Jun 2028", "median": "Oct 2029", "upper_75": "Sep 2031", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with 2038 times more compute than GPT-4 will be released by 2038?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with (4) orders of magnitude more compute than GPT-4 will be released by Sep 2031?", "desc": "[OpenAI's GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) made waves upon its release in March, 2023, for its [multimodality](https://community.openai.com/t/gpt4-multi-modality-audio-video/316041) and overall [superior performance](https://www.reddit.com/r/singularity/comments/163uk4t/gpt4_might_be_smarter_than_you_think_890_on_mmlu/) to any previous AI model, bringing the world one step closer to [artificial general intelligence](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/) (AGI).\n\nThis question group aims to shed light on when we might expect future AI models of various high capability levels. Note that, all else equal, a model's capability increases with its training compute, so this question group is asking about models (significantly) more capable than GPT-4.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the earliest date at which an AI model trained using the given amount of compute—measured in orders of magnitude more than GPT-4's training compute—is released.\n\nThe [Epoch Database](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table), which has a “Training Compute (FLOP)” column, will be used to determine a model's training compute. If this database is no longer maintained, then Metaculus admins will attempt to find an alternative resolution source. If none is available, then the relevant subquestion(s) will be annulled.\n\nNote: To date, OpenAI has not revealed how much training compute went into GPT-4. Therefore, for the purposes of this question, GPT-4's training compute is taken to be 2.1 x 10^25 FLOP, which is [Epoch AI's estimate](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table) (Epoch uses exponential notation, so, 2.1e+25 FLOP), and which corresponds to training computes of 2.1e+27, 2.1e+29, 2.1e+31, and 2.1e+33 FLOP for the 2, 4, 6, and 8 subquestions, respectively.", "lower_25": "Jun 2028", "median": "Oct 2029", "upper_75": "Sep 2031", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with 2038 times more compute than GPT-4 will be released by 2038?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2038", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with 2036 times more compute than GPT-4 will be released by 2036?", "desc": "[OpenAI's GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) made waves upon its release in March, 2023, for its [multimodality](https://community.openai.com/t/gpt4-multi-modality-audio-video/316041) and overall [superior performance](https://www.reddit.com/r/singularity/comments/163uk4t/gpt4_might_be_smarter_than_you_think_890_on_mmlu/) to any previous AI model, bringing the world one step closer to [artificial general intelligence](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/) (AGI).\n\nThis question group aims to shed light on when we might expect future AI models of various high capability levels. Note that, all else equal, a model's capability increases with its training compute, so this question group is asking about models (significantly) more capable than GPT-4.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the earliest date at which an AI model trained using the given amount of compute—measured in orders of magnitude more than GPT-4's training compute—is released.\n\nThe [Epoch Database](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table), which has a “Training Compute (FLOP)” column, will be used to determine a model's training compute. If this database is no longer maintained, then Metaculus admins will attempt to find an alternative resolution source. If none is available, then the relevant subquestion(s) will be annulled.\n\nNote: To date, OpenAI has not revealed how much training compute went into GPT-4. Therefore, for the purposes of this question, GPT-4's training compute is taken to be 2.1 x 10^25 FLOP, which is [Epoch AI's estimate](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table) (Epoch uses exponential notation, so, 2.1e+25 FLOP), and which corresponds to training computes of 2.1e+27, 2.1e+29, 2.1e+31, and 2.1e+33 FLOP for the 2, 4, 6, and 8 subquestions, respectively.", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "2044", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with 2036 times more compute than GPT-4 will be released by 2036?", "desc": "[OpenAI's GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) made waves upon its release in March, 2023, for its [multimodality](https://community.openai.com/t/gpt4-multi-modality-audio-video/316041) and overall [superior performance](https://www.reddit.com/r/singularity/comments/163uk4t/gpt4_might_be_smarter_than_you_think_890_on_mmlu/) to any previous AI model, bringing the world one step closer to [artificial general intelligence](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/) (AGI).\n\nThis question group aims to shed light on when we might expect future AI models of various high capability levels. Note that, all else equal, a model's capability increases with its training compute, so this question group is asking about models (significantly) more capable than GPT-4.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the earliest date at which an AI model trained using the given amount of compute—measured in orders of magnitude more than GPT-4's training compute—is released.\n\nThe [Epoch Database](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table), which has a “Training Compute (FLOP)” column, will be used to determine a model's training compute. If this database is no longer maintained, then Metaculus admins will attempt to find an alternative resolution source. If none is available, then the relevant subquestion(s) will be annulled.\n\nNote: To date, OpenAI has not revealed how much training compute went into GPT-4. Therefore, for the purposes of this question, GPT-4's training compute is taken to be 2.1 x 10^25 FLOP, which is [Epoch AI's estimate](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table) (Epoch uses exponential notation, so, 2.1e+25 FLOP), and which corresponds to training computes of 2.1e+27, 2.1e+29, 2.1e+31, and 2.1e+33 FLOP for the 2, 4, 6, and 8 subquestions, respectively.", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "2044", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that an AI model trained with 2036 times more compute than GPT-4 will be released by 2036?", "desc": "[OpenAI's GPT-4](https://openai.com/research/gpt-4) made waves upon its release in March, 2023, for its [multimodality](https://community.openai.com/t/gpt4-multi-modality-audio-video/316041) and overall [superior performance](https://www.reddit.com/r/singularity/comments/163uk4t/gpt4_might_be_smarter_than_you_think_890_on_mmlu/) to any previous AI model, bringing the world one step closer to [artificial general intelligence](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/5121/date-of-artificial-general-intelligence/) (AGI).\n\nThis question group aims to shed light on when we might expect future AI models of various high capability levels. Note that, all else equal, a model's capability increases with its training compute, so this question group is asking about models (significantly) more capable than GPT-4.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the earliest date at which an AI model trained using the given amount of compute—measured in orders of magnitude more than GPT-4's training compute—is released.\n\nThe [Epoch Database](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table), which has a “Training Compute (FLOP)” column, will be used to determine a model's training compute. If this database is no longer maintained, then Metaculus admins will attempt to find an alternative resolution source. If none is available, then the relevant subquestion(s) will be annulled.\n\nNote: To date, OpenAI has not revealed how much training compute went into GPT-4. Therefore, for the purposes of this question, GPT-4's training compute is taken to be 2.1 x 10^25 FLOP, which is [Epoch AI's estimate](https://epochai.org/data/epochdb/table) (Epoch uses exponential notation, so, 2.1e+25 FLOP), and which corresponds to training computes of 2.1e+27, 2.1e+29, 2.1e+31, and 2.1e+33 FLOP for the 2, 4, 6, and 8 subquestions, respectively.", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2036", "upper_75": "2044", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first company with a market cap above the given figures will be openly run by an AI CEO by 2041?", "desc": "Generative AI, like [Midjourney](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Midjourney#:~:text=Midjourney%20is%20a%20generative%20artificial,Stability%20AI's%20Stable%20Diffusion.) and [GPT-4](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPT-4#:~:text=Generative%20Pre%2Dtrained%20Transformer%204%20(GPT%2D4)%20is%20a%20multimodal%20large%20language%20model%20created%20by%20OpenAI%2C%20and%20the%20fourth%20in%20its%20series%20of%20GPT%20foundation%20models.%5B1%5D%20It%20was%20launched%20on%20March%2014%2C%202023%2C%5B1%5D), made a splash in 2023. As a result, professionals in fields ranging from art and writing to accounting and software engineering are becoming increasingly worried that their jobs may be taken by AI. [Some jobs have already been automated away](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/16/ai-job-losses-are-rising-but-the-numbers-dont-tell-the-full-story.html).\n\nThis question asks about [when the role of CEO will be automated away](https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/eG3WhHS8CLNxuH6rT/agi-safety-from-first-principles-superintelligence#:~:text=And%20the%20number,useful%20cognitive%20skills.). The date this happens will mark a major milestone, since companies being run by AIs would, in some sense, mean that the world is being run by AI.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the date at which a credible report reports either of the following, whichever comes soonest:\n\n- A company that is openly run by an AI CEO* has surpassed the given market cap.\n- A company that is above the given market cap states that it is run by an AI CEO.^\n\nThe market caps are measured in 2024 US dollars using the [CPI-U to adjust for inflation](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm).\n\n\n*or AI leader with some title other than CEO\n\n^If the company only makes this statement some time after it started being run by an AI CEO, then the resolution date is not the date of the statement, but rather the date at which the AI CEO started, if that date is given.", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2067", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first company with a market cap above the given figures will be openly run by an AI CEO by 2041?", "desc": "Generative AI, like [Midjourney](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Midjourney#:~:text=Midjourney%20is%20a%20generative%20artificial,Stability%20AI's%20Stable%20Diffusion.) and [GPT-4](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPT-4#:~:text=Generative%20Pre%2Dtrained%20Transformer%204%20(GPT%2D4)%20is%20a%20multimodal%20large%20language%20model%20created%20by%20OpenAI%2C%20and%20the%20fourth%20in%20its%20series%20of%20GPT%20foundation%20models.%5B1%5D%20It%20was%20launched%20on%20March%2014%2C%202023%2C%5B1%5D), made a splash in 2023. As a result, professionals in fields ranging from art and writing to accounting and software engineering are becoming increasingly worried that their jobs may be taken by AI. [Some jobs have already been automated away](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/16/ai-job-losses-are-rising-but-the-numbers-dont-tell-the-full-story.html).\n\nThis question asks about [when the role of CEO will be automated away](https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/eG3WhHS8CLNxuH6rT/agi-safety-from-first-principles-superintelligence#:~:text=And%20the%20number,useful%20cognitive%20skills.). The date this happens will mark a major milestone, since companies being run by AIs would, in some sense, mean that the world is being run by AI.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the date at which a credible report reports either of the following, whichever comes soonest:\n\n- A company that is openly run by an AI CEO* has surpassed the given market cap.\n- A company that is above the given market cap states that it is run by an AI CEO.^\n\nThe market caps are measured in 2024 US dollars using the [CPI-U to adjust for inflation](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm).\n\n\n*or AI leader with some title other than CEO\n\n^If the company only makes this statement some time after it started being run by an AI CEO, then the resolution date is not the date of the statement, but rather the date at which the AI CEO started, if that date is given.", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2067", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first company with a market cap above $1 billion will be openly run by an AI CEO before 2100?", "desc": "Generative AI, like [Midjourney](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Midjourney#:~:text=Midjourney%20is%20a%20generative%20artificial,Stability%20AI's%20Stable%20Diffusion.) and [GPT-4](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPT-4#:~:text=Generative%20Pre%2Dtrained%20Transformer%204%20(GPT%2D4)%20is%20a%20multimodal%20large%20language%20model%20created%20by%20OpenAI%2C%20and%20the%20fourth%20in%20its%20series%20of%20GPT%20foundation%20models.%5B1%5D%20It%20was%20launched%20on%20March%2014%2C%202023%2C%5B1%5D), made a splash in 2023. As a result, professionals in fields ranging from art and writing to accounting and software engineering are becoming increasingly worried that their jobs may be taken by AI. [Some jobs have already been automated away](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/16/ai-job-losses-are-rising-but-the-numbers-dont-tell-the-full-story.html).\n\nThis question asks about [when the role of CEO will be automated away](https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/eG3WhHS8CLNxuH6rT/agi-safety-from-first-principles-superintelligence#:~:text=And%20the%20number,useful%20cognitive%20skills.). The date this happens will mark a major milestone, since companies being run by AIs would, in some sense, mean that the world is being run by AI.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the date at which a credible report reports either of the following, whichever comes soonest:\n\n- A company that is openly run by an AI CEO* has surpassed the given market cap.\n- A company that is above the given market cap states that it is run by an AI CEO.^\n\nThe market caps are measured in 2024 US dollars using the [CPI-U to adjust for inflation](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm).\n\n\n*or AI leader with some title other than CEO\n\n^If the company only makes this statement some time after it started being run by an AI CEO, then the resolution date is not the date of the statement, but rather the date at which the AI CEO started, if that date is given.", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2067", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first company with a market cap above $1 trillion will not be openly run by an AI CEO by 2100?", "desc": "Generative AI, like [Midjourney](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Midjourney#:~:text=Midjourney%20is%20a%20generative%20artificial,Stability%20AI's%20Stable%20Diffusion.) and [GPT-4](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPT-4#:~:text=Generative%20Pre%2Dtrained%20Transformer%204%20(GPT%2D4)%20is%20a%20multimodal%20large%20language%20model%20created%20by%20OpenAI%2C%20and%20the%20fourth%20in%20its%20series%20of%20GPT%20foundation%20models.%5B1%5D%20It%20was%20launched%20on%20March%2014%2C%202023%2C%5B1%5D), made a splash in 2023. As a result, professionals in fields ranging from art and writing to accounting and software engineering are becoming increasingly worried that their jobs may be taken by AI. [Some jobs have already been automated away](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/16/ai-job-losses-are-rising-but-the-numbers-dont-tell-the-full-story.html).\n\nThis question asks about [when the role of CEO will be automated away](https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/eG3WhHS8CLNxuH6rT/agi-safety-from-first-principles-superintelligence#:~:text=And%20the%20number,useful%20cognitive%20skills.). The date this happens will mark a major milestone, since companies being run by AIs would, in some sense, mean that the world is being run by AI.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the date at which a credible report reports either of the following, whichever comes soonest:\n\n- A company that is openly run by an AI CEO* has surpassed the given market cap.\n- A company that is above the given market cap states that it is run by an AI CEO.^\n\nThe market caps are measured in 2024 US dollars using the [CPI-U to adjust for inflation](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm).\n\n\n*or AI leader with some title other than CEO\n\n^If the company only makes this statement some time after it started being run by an AI CEO, then the resolution date is not the date of the statement, but rather the date at which the AI CEO started, if that date is given.", "lower_25": "2056", "median": "2087", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first company with a market cap above $1 billion will be openly run by an AI CEO before 2100?", "desc": "Generative AI, like [Midjourney](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Midjourney#:~:text=Midjourney%20is%20a%20generative%20artificial,Stability%20AI's%20Stable%20Diffusion.) and [GPT-4](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPT-4#:~:text=Generative%20Pre%2Dtrained%20Transformer%204%20(GPT%2D4)%20is%20a%20multimodal%20large%20language%20model%20created%20by%20OpenAI%2C%20and%20the%20fourth%20in%20its%20series%20of%20GPT%20foundation%20models.%5B1%5D%20It%20was%20launched%20on%20March%2014%2C%202023%2C%5B1%5D), made a splash in 2023. As a result, professionals in fields ranging from art and writing to accounting and software engineering are becoming increasingly worried that their jobs may be taken by AI. [Some jobs have already been automated away](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/16/ai-job-losses-are-rising-but-the-numbers-dont-tell-the-full-story.html).\n\nThis question asks about [when the role of CEO will be automated away](https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/eG3WhHS8CLNxuH6rT/agi-safety-from-first-principles-superintelligence#:~:text=And%20the%20number,useful%20cognitive%20skills.). The date this happens will mark a major milestone, since companies being run by AIs would, in some sense, mean that the world is being run by AI.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the date at which a credible report reports either of the following, whichever comes soonest:\n\n- A company that is openly run by an AI CEO* has surpassed the given market cap.\n- A company that is above the given market cap states that it is run by an AI CEO.^\n\nThe market caps are measured in 2024 US dollars using the [CPI-U to adjust for inflation](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm).\n\n\n*or AI leader with some title other than CEO\n\n^If the company only makes this statement some time after it started being run by an AI CEO, then the resolution date is not the date of the statement, but rather the date at which the AI CEO started, if that date is given.", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2067", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first company with a market cap above $1 trillion will not be openly run by an AI CEO by 2100?", "desc": "Generative AI, like [Midjourney](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Midjourney#:~:text=Midjourney%20is%20a%20generative%20artificial,Stability%20AI's%20Stable%20Diffusion.) and [GPT-4](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPT-4#:~:text=Generative%20Pre%2Dtrained%20Transformer%204%20(GPT%2D4)%20is%20a%20multimodal%20large%20language%20model%20created%20by%20OpenAI%2C%20and%20the%20fourth%20in%20its%20series%20of%20GPT%20foundation%20models.%5B1%5D%20It%20was%20launched%20on%20March%2014%2C%202023%2C%5B1%5D), made a splash in 2023. As a result, professionals in fields ranging from art and writing to accounting and software engineering are becoming increasingly worried that their jobs may be taken by AI. [Some jobs have already been automated away](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/16/ai-job-losses-are-rising-but-the-numbers-dont-tell-the-full-story.html).\n\nThis question asks about [when the role of CEO will be automated away](https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/eG3WhHS8CLNxuH6rT/agi-safety-from-first-principles-superintelligence#:~:text=And%20the%20number,useful%20cognitive%20skills.). The date this happens will mark a major milestone, since companies being run by AIs would, in some sense, mean that the world is being run by AI.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the date at which a credible report reports either of the following, whichever comes soonest:\n\n- A company that is openly run by an AI CEO* has surpassed the given market cap.\n- A company that is above the given market cap states that it is run by an AI CEO.^\n\nThe market caps are measured in 2024 US dollars using the [CPI-U to adjust for inflation](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm).\n\n\n*or AI leader with some title other than CEO\n\n^If the company only makes this statement some time after it started being run by an AI CEO, then the resolution date is not the date of the statement, but rather the date at which the AI CEO started, if that date is given.", "lower_25": "2056", "median": "2087", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first company with a market cap above the given figures will be openly run by an AI CEO by 2041?", "desc": "Generative AI, like [Midjourney](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Midjourney#:~:text=Midjourney%20is%20a%20generative%20artificial,Stability%20AI's%20Stable%20Diffusion.) and [GPT-4](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPT-4#:~:text=Generative%20Pre%2Dtrained%20Transformer%204%20(GPT%2D4)%20is%20a%20multimodal%20large%20language%20model%20created%20by%20OpenAI%2C%20and%20the%20fourth%20in%20its%20series%20of%20GPT%20foundation%20models.%5B1%5D%20It%20was%20launched%20on%20March%2014%2C%202023%2C%5B1%5D), made a splash in 2023. As a result, professionals in fields ranging from art and writing to accounting and software engineering are becoming increasingly worried that their jobs may be taken by AI. [Some jobs have already been automated away](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/16/ai-job-losses-are-rising-but-the-numbers-dont-tell-the-full-story.html).\n\nThis question asks about [when the role of CEO will be automated away](https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/eG3WhHS8CLNxuH6rT/agi-safety-from-first-principles-superintelligence#:~:text=And%20the%20number,useful%20cognitive%20skills.). The date this happens will mark a major milestone, since companies being run by AIs would, in some sense, mean that the world is being run by AI.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the date at which a credible report reports either of the following, whichever comes soonest:\n\n- A company that is openly run by an AI CEO* has surpassed the given market cap.\n- A company that is above the given market cap states that it is run by an AI CEO.^\n\nThe market caps are measured in 2024 US dollars using the [CPI-U to adjust for inflation](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm).\n\n\n*or AI leader with some title other than CEO\n\n^If the company only makes this statement some time after it started being run by an AI CEO, then the resolution date is not the date of the statement, but rather the date at which the AI CEO started, if that date is given.", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2067", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted annual average U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 6.00% in the year 2028?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual average seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the annual average U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed year. Resolution will be determined when the first estimate is published for December of the listed year by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm), and will resolve as the average unemployment for the 12 months in the year. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "6.00", "median": "8.04", "upper_75": "9.98", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted annual average U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 6.00% in the year 2028?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual average seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the annual average U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed year. Resolution will be determined when the first estimate is published for December of the listed year by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm), and will resolve as the average unemployment for the 12 months in the year. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "6.00", "median": "8.04", "upper_75": "9.98", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first company with a market cap above $1 trillion will not be openly run by an AI CEO by 2100?", "desc": "Generative AI, like [Midjourney](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Midjourney#:~:text=Midjourney%20is%20a%20generative%20artificial,Stability%20AI's%20Stable%20Diffusion.) and [GPT-4](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPT-4#:~:text=Generative%20Pre%2Dtrained%20Transformer%204%20(GPT%2D4)%20is%20a%20multimodal%20large%20language%20model%20created%20by%20OpenAI%2C%20and%20the%20fourth%20in%20its%20series%20of%20GPT%20foundation%20models.%5B1%5D%20It%20was%20launched%20on%20March%2014%2C%202023%2C%5B1%5D), made a splash in 2023. As a result, professionals in fields ranging from art and writing to accounting and software engineering are becoming increasingly worried that their jobs may be taken by AI. [Some jobs have already been automated away](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/16/ai-job-losses-are-rising-but-the-numbers-dont-tell-the-full-story.html).\n\nThis question asks about [when the role of CEO will be automated away](https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/eG3WhHS8CLNxuH6rT/agi-safety-from-first-principles-superintelligence#:~:text=And%20the%20number,useful%20cognitive%20skills.). The date this happens will mark a major milestone, since companies being run by AIs would, in some sense, mean that the world is being run by AI.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the date at which a credible report reports either of the following, whichever comes soonest:\n\n- A company that is openly run by an AI CEO* has surpassed the given market cap.\n- A company that is above the given market cap states that it is run by an AI CEO.^\n\nThe market caps are measured in 2024 US dollars using the [CPI-U to adjust for inflation](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm).\n\n\n*or AI leader with some title other than CEO\n\n^If the company only makes this statement some time after it started being run by an AI CEO, then the resolution date is not the date of the statement, but rather the date at which the AI CEO started, if that date is given.", "lower_25": "2056", "median": "2087", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Identity and Democracy (ID) party will win 99.4 seats in the 2024 European parliamentary elections?", "desc": "*This question was written in partnership with the [Effective Institutions Project](https://effectiveinstitutionsproject.org/).*\n\nThe [2024 European Parliament election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_European_Parliament_election) is scheduled for June 6 to June 9, 2024, to elect the 10th European Parliament. [720](https://elections.europa.eu/en/how-elections-work/7/) Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) will be elected.\n\nIn the European Parliament, parties are formed as officially recognized [political groups](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/organisation-and-rules/organisation/political-groups), which must meet a number of [requirements](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190528BKG53306/faq-about-the-transition-from-the-8th-to-the-9th-european-parliament/11/what-are-the-requirements-to-form-a-political-group) to be recognized. Currently there are [705](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/search/table) MEPs in the EU Parliament; 751 MEPs were elected following the 2019 election, but the 73 MEPs for the United Kingdom were removed when the [UK left the EU in 2020](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impact_of_Brexit_on_the_European_Union#European_Parliament_seats), with 27 of those redistributed to other countries.\n\nLeading up to the election, some analysts [have suggested](https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/eu-election-playbook/a-far-right-european-parliament/) that far right political groups are likely to [make gains in the European Parliament](https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/european-parliament-election/). One such group is [Identity and Democracy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_and_Democracy) (ID), which favors policies [generally characterized as far right](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_and_Democracy#Ideology) and is generally considered to be [Eurosceptic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euroscepticism) (preferring reduced EU control in the affairs of individual EU member states).\n\nA [recent edition of The Observatory](https://effectiveinstitutionsproject.substack.com/p/the-observatory-3-can-the-eu-maintain), a newsletter by the [Effective Institutions Project](https://effectiveinstitutionsproject.org/), discusses the implications of this election on EU climate policy.\n\n>With [far-right parties expected to gain in the European Parliament elections later this year](https://ecfr.eu/publication/a-sharp-right-turn-a-forecast-for-the-2024-european-parliament-elections/), analysts from the European Council on Foreign Relations warn that an anti-climate coalition could well take hold in the Parliament during its next five-year term, with serious implications for whether the EU will be able to make good on its Green Deal commitments.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of seats that the Identity and Democracy (ID) party wins in the 2024 European parliamentary election. Resolution will be determined according to the official results published by the European Union when party groups have formed.", "lower_25": "78.9", "median": "89.3", "upper_75": "99.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Identity and Democracy (ID) party will win 99.4 seats in the 2024 European parliamentary elections?", "desc": "*This question was written in partnership with the [Effective Institutions Project](https://effectiveinstitutionsproject.org/).*\n\nThe [2024 European Parliament election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_European_Parliament_election) is scheduled for June 6 to June 9, 2024, to elect the 10th European Parliament. [720](https://elections.europa.eu/en/how-elections-work/7/) Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) will be elected.\n\nIn the European Parliament, parties are formed as officially recognized [political groups](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/organisation-and-rules/organisation/political-groups), which must meet a number of [requirements](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190528BKG53306/faq-about-the-transition-from-the-8th-to-the-9th-european-parliament/11/what-are-the-requirements-to-form-a-political-group) to be recognized. Currently there are [705](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/search/table) MEPs in the EU Parliament; 751 MEPs were elected following the 2019 election, but the 73 MEPs for the United Kingdom were removed when the [UK left the EU in 2020](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impact_of_Brexit_on_the_European_Union#European_Parliament_seats), with 27 of those redistributed to other countries.\n\nLeading up to the election, some analysts [have suggested](https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/eu-election-playbook/a-far-right-european-parliament/) that far right political groups are likely to [make gains in the European Parliament](https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/european-parliament-election/). One such group is [Identity and Democracy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_and_Democracy) (ID), which favors policies [generally characterized as far right](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_and_Democracy#Ideology) and is generally considered to be [Eurosceptic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euroscepticism) (preferring reduced EU control in the affairs of individual EU member states).\n\nA [recent edition of The Observatory](https://effectiveinstitutionsproject.substack.com/p/the-observatory-3-can-the-eu-maintain), a newsletter by the [Effective Institutions Project](https://effectiveinstitutionsproject.org/), discusses the implications of this election on EU climate policy.\n\n>With [far-right parties expected to gain in the European Parliament elections later this year](https://ecfr.eu/publication/a-sharp-right-turn-a-forecast-for-the-2024-european-parliament-elections/), analysts from the European Council on Foreign Relations warn that an anti-climate coalition could well take hold in the Parliament during its next five-year term, with serious implications for whether the EU will be able to make good on its Green Deal commitments.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of seats that the Identity and Democracy (ID) party wins in the 2024 European parliamentary election. Resolution will be determined according to the official results published by the European Union when party groups have formed.", "lower_25": "78.9", "median": "89.3", "upper_75": "99.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Identity and Democracy (ID) party will win 99.4 seats in the 2024 European parliamentary elections?", "desc": "*This question was written in partnership with the [Effective Institutions Project](https://effectiveinstitutionsproject.org/).*\n\nThe [2024 European Parliament election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_European_Parliament_election) is scheduled for June 6 to June 9, 2024, to elect the 10th European Parliament. [720](https://elections.europa.eu/en/how-elections-work/7/) Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) will be elected.\n\nIn the European Parliament, parties are formed as officially recognized [political groups](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/organisation-and-rules/organisation/political-groups), which must meet a number of [requirements](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190528BKG53306/faq-about-the-transition-from-the-8th-to-the-9th-european-parliament/11/what-are-the-requirements-to-form-a-political-group) to be recognized. Currently there are [705](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/search/table) MEPs in the EU Parliament; 751 MEPs were elected following the 2019 election, but the 73 MEPs for the United Kingdom were removed when the [UK left the EU in 2020](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impact_of_Brexit_on_the_European_Union#European_Parliament_seats), with 27 of those redistributed to other countries.\n\nLeading up to the election, some analysts [have suggested](https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/eu-election-playbook/a-far-right-european-parliament/) that far right political groups are likely to [make gains in the European Parliament](https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/european-parliament-election/). One such group is [Identity and Democracy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_and_Democracy) (ID), which favors policies [generally characterized as far right](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_and_Democracy#Ideology) and is generally considered to be [Eurosceptic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euroscepticism) (preferring reduced EU control in the affairs of individual EU member states).\n\nA [recent edition of The Observatory](https://effectiveinstitutionsproject.substack.com/p/the-observatory-3-can-the-eu-maintain), a newsletter by the [Effective Institutions Project](https://effectiveinstitutionsproject.org/), discusses the implications of this election on EU climate policy.\n\n>With [far-right parties expected to gain in the European Parliament elections later this year](https://ecfr.eu/publication/a-sharp-right-turn-a-forecast-for-the-2024-european-parliament-elections/), analysts from the European Council on Foreign Relations warn that an anti-climate coalition could well take hold in the Parliament during its next five-year term, with serious implications for whether the EU will be able to make good on its Green Deal commitments.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of seats that the Identity and Democracy (ID) party wins in the 2024 European parliamentary election. Resolution will be determined according to the official results published by the European Union when party groups have formed.", "lower_25": "78.9", "median": "89.3", "upper_75": "99.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted annual average U-3 unemployment rate in the United States will be 6.00% in the year 2028?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [unemployment rate](https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/080415/true-unemployment-rate-u6-vs-u3.asp) in the United States. The most commonly cited unemployment figure is U-3 unemployment, which measures the share of people aged 16 and over in the labor force (meaning people employed or seeking employment) who are unemployed. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm) its unemployment estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nBelow is a graph of the annual average seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment rate, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initially published estimates.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the annual average U-3 unemployment figure, in percent, seasonally adjusted, for the listed year. Resolution will be determined when the first estimate is published for December of the listed year by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm), and will resolve as the average unemployment for the 12 months in the year. The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "6.00", "median": "8.04", "upper_75": "9.98", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first company with a market cap above $1 billion will be openly run by an AI CEO before 2100?", "desc": "Generative AI, like [Midjourney](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Midjourney#:~:text=Midjourney%20is%20a%20generative%20artificial,Stability%20AI's%20Stable%20Diffusion.) and [GPT-4](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPT-4#:~:text=Generative%20Pre%2Dtrained%20Transformer%204%20(GPT%2D4)%20is%20a%20multimodal%20large%20language%20model%20created%20by%20OpenAI%2C%20and%20the%20fourth%20in%20its%20series%20of%20GPT%20foundation%20models.%5B1%5D%20It%20was%20launched%20on%20March%2014%2C%202023%2C%5B1%5D), made a splash in 2023. As a result, professionals in fields ranging from art and writing to accounting and software engineering are becoming increasingly worried that their jobs may be taken by AI. [Some jobs have already been automated away](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/12/16/ai-job-losses-are-rising-but-the-numbers-dont-tell-the-full-story.html).\n\nThis question asks about [when the role of CEO will be automated away](https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/eG3WhHS8CLNxuH6rT/agi-safety-from-first-principles-superintelligence#:~:text=And%20the%20number,useful%20cognitive%20skills.). The date this happens will mark a major milestone, since companies being run by AIs would, in some sense, mean that the world is being run by AI.", "resc": "Each subquestion resolves as the date at which a credible report reports either of the following, whichever comes soonest:\n\n- A company that is openly run by an AI CEO* has surpassed the given market cap.\n- A company that is above the given market cap states that it is run by an AI CEO.^\n\nThe market caps are measured in 2024 US dollars using the [CPI-U to adjust for inflation](https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm).\n\n\n*or AI leader with some title other than CEO\n\n^If the company only makes this statement some time after it started being run by an AI CEO, then the resolution date is not the date of the statement, but rather the date at which the AI CEO started, if that date is given.", "lower_25": "2041", "median": "2067", "upper_75": "Not ≤ 2100", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Vanza will be available for Cystic Fibrosis patients in England by Mar 2026?", "desc": "[Vanza](https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/vertexs-triple-combination-cf-drug-meets-main-late-stage-trial-goals-2024-02-05/ ), a combination of vanzacaftor/tezacaftor/deutivacaftor, is a daily, once-a-day, triple-use combination therapy being developed by [Vertex Pharmaceuticals](https://www.vrtx.com/) for cystic fibrosis patients. Cystic fibrosis (CF) is a genetic condition that causes severe damage to the lungs, digestive system, and other organs. [NICE](https://www.nice.org.uk/) is the organization responsible for evaluating drug affordability and effectiveness in the UK and has previously recommended that other CF drugs not be paid for by the NHS. This question is asking when the drug will be available for CF patients in England. \n\nhttps://www.investors.com/news/technology/vrtx-stock-vertex-earnings-q4-2023/", "resc": "The question resolves to the date at which at least 5,535 English cystic fibrosis (CF) patients (slightly more than half of the patients in the country) have access to Vanza via the NHS.", "lower_25": "Mar 2025", "median": "Mar 2026", "upper_75": "Aug 2027", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Vanza will be available for Cystic Fibrosis patients in England by Mar 2026?", "desc": "[Vanza](https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/vertexs-triple-combination-cf-drug-meets-main-late-stage-trial-goals-2024-02-05/ ), a combination of vanzacaftor/tezacaftor/deutivacaftor, is a daily, once-a-day, triple-use combination therapy being developed by [Vertex Pharmaceuticals](https://www.vrtx.com/) for cystic fibrosis patients. Cystic fibrosis (CF) is a genetic condition that causes severe damage to the lungs, digestive system, and other organs. [NICE](https://www.nice.org.uk/) is the organization responsible for evaluating drug affordability and effectiveness in the UK and has previously recommended that other CF drugs not be paid for by the NHS. This question is asking when the drug will be available for CF patients in England. \n\nhttps://www.investors.com/news/technology/vrtx-stock-vertex-earnings-q4-2023/", "resc": "The question resolves to the date at which at least 5,535 English cystic fibrosis (CF) patients (slightly more than half of the patients in the country) have access to Vanza via the NHS.", "lower_25": "Mar 2025", "median": "Mar 2026", "upper_75": "Aug 2027", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 53.0 percentage of Democrats and Republicans will vote-by-mail in 2024?", "desc": "According to the MIT Election Data and Science Lab publication, [How We Voted in 2022](https://electionlab.mit.edu/sites/default/files/2023-05/How-We-Voted-In-2022.pdf) The 2020 election cycle saw the biggest and most dramatic shift in how Americans vote in American history. \n\nBecause of permanent and temporary changes made to state election laws, emergency declarations, and voter concern about public health, the percentage of voters casting ballots by mail in 2020 doubled compared to 2016. \n\nThe 2022 election saw some backing off this surge, mostly by Democrats, but overall, voting by mail in 2022 was well ahead of the trend that had been established over the previous two decades.\n\nFor the past three decades, the percentage of voters casting ballots in person on Election Day has declined, as more have cast ballots either in person before Election Day or by mail. \n\nThese changes, particularly regarding voting by mail, accelerated dramatically in 2020, with the percentage of voters casting votes on Election Day dropping from 60% in 2016 to 31% in 2020. Ballots cast by mail nearly doubled, from 23% to 43%, while votes cast early and in person continued their steady pace upward.\n\nThe 2020 election saw the development of a strong divide between Republicans and Democrats over the use of mail ballots, first at the elite level, and then at the grassroots. Between 2008 and 2016 Democrats were slightly more likely to vote by mail than Republicans. \n\nHowever, this difference was primarily an artifact of which states had chosen to conduct their elections entirely by mail. In 2020, the partisan gap in voting by mail opened up wide. In 2022, the gap closed somewhat, although this was primarily due more to Democrats pulling back than Republicans.", "resc": "The Survey of the Performance of American Elections [SPAE](https://electionlab.mit.edu/articles/new-report-how-we-voted-2022) provides information about how Americans experienced voting in the most recent federal election. The survey has been conducted after federal elections since 2008 and is the only public opinion project in the country that is dedicated explicitly to understanding how voters themselves experience the election process.\n\n10,200 registered voters responded to the 2022 survey—200 observations in each state plus the District of Columbia. \n\nThe sub-question for each party shall resolve as the percentage listed in the SPAE results published in the anticipated “How We Voted in 2024” expected in May or June of 2025.", "lower_25": "47.2", "median": "53.0", "upper_75": "58.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 53.0 percentage of Democrats and Republicans will vote-by-mail in 2024?", "desc": "According to the MIT Election Data and Science Lab publication, [How We Voted in 2022](https://electionlab.mit.edu/sites/default/files/2023-05/How-We-Voted-In-2022.pdf) The 2020 election cycle saw the biggest and most dramatic shift in how Americans vote in American history. \n\nBecause of permanent and temporary changes made to state election laws, emergency declarations, and voter concern about public health, the percentage of voters casting ballots by mail in 2020 doubled compared to 2016. \n\nThe 2022 election saw some backing off this surge, mostly by Democrats, but overall, voting by mail in 2022 was well ahead of the trend that had been established over the previous two decades.\n\nFor the past three decades, the percentage of voters casting ballots in person on Election Day has declined, as more have cast ballots either in person before Election Day or by mail. \n\nThese changes, particularly regarding voting by mail, accelerated dramatically in 2020, with the percentage of voters casting votes on Election Day dropping from 60% in 2016 to 31% in 2020. Ballots cast by mail nearly doubled, from 23% to 43%, while votes cast early and in person continued their steady pace upward.\n\nThe 2020 election saw the development of a strong divide between Republicans and Democrats over the use of mail ballots, first at the elite level, and then at the grassroots. Between 2008 and 2016 Democrats were slightly more likely to vote by mail than Republicans. \n\nHowever, this difference was primarily an artifact of which states had chosen to conduct their elections entirely by mail. In 2020, the partisan gap in voting by mail opened up wide. In 2022, the gap closed somewhat, although this was primarily due more to Democrats pulling back than Republicans.", "resc": "The Survey of the Performance of American Elections [SPAE](https://electionlab.mit.edu/articles/new-report-how-we-voted-2022) provides information about how Americans experienced voting in the most recent federal election. The survey has been conducted after federal elections since 2008 and is the only public opinion project in the country that is dedicated explicitly to understanding how voters themselves experience the election process.\n\n10,200 registered voters responded to the 2022 survey—200 observations in each state plus the District of Columbia. \n\nThe sub-question for each party shall resolve as the percentage listed in the SPAE results published in the anticipated “How We Voted in 2024” expected in May or June of 2025.", "lower_25": "47.2", "median": "53.0", "upper_75": "58.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Vanza will be available for Cystic Fibrosis patients in England by Mar 2026?", "desc": "[Vanza](https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/vertexs-triple-combination-cf-drug-meets-main-late-stage-trial-goals-2024-02-05/ ), a combination of vanzacaftor/tezacaftor/deutivacaftor, is a daily, once-a-day, triple-use combination therapy being developed by [Vertex Pharmaceuticals](https://www.vrtx.com/) for cystic fibrosis patients. Cystic fibrosis (CF) is a genetic condition that causes severe damage to the lungs, digestive system, and other organs. [NICE](https://www.nice.org.uk/) is the organization responsible for evaluating drug affordability and effectiveness in the UK and has previously recommended that other CF drugs not be paid for by the NHS. This question is asking when the drug will be available for CF patients in England. \n\nhttps://www.investors.com/news/technology/vrtx-stock-vertex-earnings-q4-2023/", "resc": "The question resolves to the date at which at least 5,535 English cystic fibrosis (CF) patients (slightly more than half of the patients in the country) have access to Vanza via the NHS.", "lower_25": "Mar 2025", "median": "Mar 2026", "upper_75": "Aug 2027", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that SpaceX will first successfully catch a Starship booster with the tower by Apr 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Dec 2024", "median": "Apr 2025", "upper_75": "Sep 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 53.0 percentage of Democrats and Republicans will vote-by-mail in 2024?", "desc": "According to the MIT Election Data and Science Lab publication, [How We Voted in 2022](https://electionlab.mit.edu/sites/default/files/2023-05/How-We-Voted-In-2022.pdf) The 2020 election cycle saw the biggest and most dramatic shift in how Americans vote in American history. \n\nBecause of permanent and temporary changes made to state election laws, emergency declarations, and voter concern about public health, the percentage of voters casting ballots by mail in 2020 doubled compared to 2016. \n\nThe 2022 election saw some backing off this surge, mostly by Democrats, but overall, voting by mail in 2022 was well ahead of the trend that had been established over the previous two decades.\n\nFor the past three decades, the percentage of voters casting ballots in person on Election Day has declined, as more have cast ballots either in person before Election Day or by mail. \n\nThese changes, particularly regarding voting by mail, accelerated dramatically in 2020, with the percentage of voters casting votes on Election Day dropping from 60% in 2016 to 31% in 2020. Ballots cast by mail nearly doubled, from 23% to 43%, while votes cast early and in person continued their steady pace upward.\n\nThe 2020 election saw the development of a strong divide between Republicans and Democrats over the use of mail ballots, first at the elite level, and then at the grassroots. Between 2008 and 2016 Democrats were slightly more likely to vote by mail than Republicans. \n\nHowever, this difference was primarily an artifact of which states had chosen to conduct their elections entirely by mail. In 2020, the partisan gap in voting by mail opened up wide. In 2022, the gap closed somewhat, although this was primarily due more to Democrats pulling back than Republicans.", "resc": "The Survey of the Performance of American Elections [SPAE](https://electionlab.mit.edu/articles/new-report-how-we-voted-2022) provides information about how Americans experienced voting in the most recent federal election. The survey has been conducted after federal elections since 2008 and is the only public opinion project in the country that is dedicated explicitly to understanding how voters themselves experience the election process.\n\n10,200 registered voters responded to the 2022 survey—200 observations in each state plus the District of Columbia. \n\nThe sub-question for each party shall resolve as the percentage listed in the SPAE results published in the anticipated “How We Voted in 2024” expected in May or June of 2025.", "lower_25": "47.2", "median": "53.0", "upper_75": "58.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that SpaceX will first successfully catch a Starship booster with the tower by Apr 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Dec 2024", "median": "Apr 2025", "upper_75": "Sep 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 30.9% of Democrats and Republicans will vote-by-mail in 2024? (% Republicans Voting-by-Mail)", "desc": "According to the MIT Election Data and Science Lab publication, [How We Voted in 2022](https://electionlab.mit.edu/sites/default/files/2023-05/How-We-Voted-In-2022.pdf) The 2020 election cycle saw the biggest and most dramatic shift in how Americans vote in American history. \n\nBecause of permanent and temporary changes made to state election laws, emergency declarations, and voter concern about public health, the percentage of voters casting ballots by mail in 2020 doubled compared to 2016. \n\nThe 2022 election saw some backing off this surge, mostly by Democrats, but overall, voting by mail in 2022 was well ahead of the trend that had been established over the previous two decades.\n\nFor the past three decades, the percentage of voters casting ballots in person on Election Day has declined, as more have cast ballots either in person before Election Day or by mail. \n\nThese changes, particularly regarding voting by mail, accelerated dramatically in 2020, with the percentage of voters casting votes on Election Day dropping from 60% in 2016 to 31% in 2020. Ballots cast by mail nearly doubled, from 23% to 43%, while votes cast early and in person continued their steady pace upward.\n\nThe 2020 election saw the development of a strong divide between Republicans and Democrats over the use of mail ballots, first at the elite level, and then at the grassroots. Between 2008 and 2016 Democrats were slightly more likely to vote by mail than Republicans. \n\nHowever, this difference was primarily an artifact of which states had chosen to conduct their elections entirely by mail. In 2020, the partisan gap in voting by mail opened up wide. In 2022, the gap closed somewhat, although this was primarily due more to Democrats pulling back than Republicans.", "resc": "The Survey of the Performance of American Elections [SPAE](https://electionlab.mit.edu/articles/new-report-how-we-voted-2022) provides information about how Americans experienced voting in the most recent federal election. The survey has been conducted after federal elections since 2008 and is the only public opinion project in the country that is dedicated explicitly to understanding how voters themselves experience the election process.\n\n10,200 registered voters responded to the 2022 survey—200 observations in each state plus the District of Columbia. \n\nThe sub-question for each party shall resolve as the percentage listed in the SPAE results published in the anticipated “How We Voted in 2024” expected in May or June of 2025.", "lower_25": "23.0", "median": "30.9", "upper_75": "41.9", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a fully-automated closed loop insulin delivery system for Type 1 diabetes will be approved by 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the likelihood that SpaceX will first successfully catch a Starship booster with the tower by Apr 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "Dec 2024", "median": "Apr 2025", "upper_75": "Sep 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 25% in the following months (Oct-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [Consumer Price Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consumer_price_index) (CPI), a measure of inflation, for the United States. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/cpi.htm) its CPI estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nThere are [two versions](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/headline-inflation.asp) of CPI. One is typically known as headline CPI which is the full measure, while the other is typically known as core CPI, which doesn't include food and energy.\n\nBelow is a graph of the month over month change in CPI in the US, seasonally adjusted, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initial estimate from each month.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the US, in percent, for each month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a fully-automated closed loop insulin delivery system for Type 1 diabetes will be approved by 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 369k people will work in these AI-automatable jobs in the US in May 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "282k", "median": "326k", "upper_75": "369k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 369k people will work in these AI-automatable jobs in the US in May 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "282k", "median": "326k", "upper_75": "369k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 25% in the following months (Oct-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [Consumer Price Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consumer_price_index) (CPI), a measure of inflation, for the United States. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/cpi.htm) its CPI estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nThere are [two versions](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/headline-inflation.asp) of CPI. One is typically known as headline CPI which is the full measure, while the other is typically known as core CPI, which doesn't include food and energy.\n\nBelow is a graph of the month over month change in CPI in the US, seasonally adjusted, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initial estimate from each month.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the US, in percent, for each month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 369k people will work in these AI-automatable jobs in the US in May 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "282k", "median": "326k", "upper_75": "369k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 50% in the following months (Nov-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the BJP will win 288 seats in the Lok Sabha in the 2024 Indian election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "288", "median": "316", "upper_75": "351", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 25% in the following months (Oct-24)?", "desc": "The US [Bureau of Labor Statistics](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureau_of_Labor_Statistics) (BLS) provides monthly estimates of the [Consumer Price Index](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consumer_price_index) (CPI), a measure of inflation, for the United States. The BLS [typically releases](https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/cpi.htm) its CPI estimates for a month in the first half of the following month.\n\nThere are [two versions](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/headline-inflation.asp) of CPI. One is typically known as headline CPI which is the full measure, while the other is typically known as core CPI, which doesn't include food and energy.\n\nBelow is a graph of the month over month change in CPI in the US, seasonally adjusted, from the [Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Reserve_Bank_of_St._Louis). **Note that the underlying source is the BLS, though the chart may update with subsequent estimates published by the BLS and may not reflect the initial estimate from each month.**\n", "resc": "This resolves as the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the US, in percent, for each month. Resolution will be determined according to the first estimate published by the BLS, typically found [here](https://www.bls.gov/cpi/). The value will resolve to a precision of one decimal place", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 620 measles cases will be reported in the United States in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "199", "median": "323", "upper_75": "620", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a fully-automated closed loop insulin delivery system for Type 1 diabetes will be approved by 2032?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2032", "upper_75": "2036", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 50% in the following months (Nov-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the BJP will win 288 seats in the Lok Sabha in the 2024 Indian election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "288", "median": "316", "upper_75": "351", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 50% in the following months (Nov-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 620 measles cases will be reported in the United States in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "199", "median": "323", "upper_75": "620", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the BJP will win 288 seats in the Lok Sabha in the 2024 Indian election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "288", "median": "316", "upper_75": "351", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted month over month headline CPI inflation in the United States will be 50% in the following months (Dec-24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 620 measles cases will be reported in the United States in 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "199", "median": "323", "upper_75": "620", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) will be 85.21 for the listed dates?", "desc": "Oil is a commodity of critical importance to the world economy and is used as a raw chemical in the production of energy, materials such as plastics and coatings, fertiliser and fuel for vehicles._x000D_\n_x000D_\nCommodity future contracts play an important role in limiting or reducing the risk of holding the commodity. Risk is limited or reduced by what is known as \"hedging\", whereby an opposite position is taken in the futures market from what is taken in the physical market. (Of course, speculators also use the futures for their own personal gain)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nAside from the critical importance of oil, various factors result in price fluctuations and, at times, large periods of volatility for the commodity such as:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n- The presence of an international cartel of companies such as Aramco, Exxon-Mobil, Royal Dutch-Shell (Shell) and British Petroleum (BP) which dominate the industry._x000D_\n_x000D_\n- The reliance on the seaborne tanker market to move the commodity, which itself is an inelastic market (i.e. if the oil producers need more tankers to transport oil, tankers take a long time to construct) and sensitive to vessel day rate fluctuations._x000D_\n_x000D_\n- The regional domination of oil production primarily centred in regions outside of the U.S. and Europe, most notably the Middle East (and Eurasia, but less so)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nOn the latter point, the Middle East has seen a large amount of conflict which often results in increased volatility for the price of oil. Previously, the [1974 Israeli-Arab war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War) brought about an oil embargo on the US, subsequently resulting in the [1973 Oil Crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_oil_crisis); the price of WTI oil then spiked 300%. The on-going [Israel-Hamas conflict](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel–Hamas_war) is widely expected to [bring volatility to the market](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-08/oil-rallies-by-more-than-3-after-hamas-attacks-against-israel?srnd=premium)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nOutside of the Middle East, the [Russian invasion of Ukraine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Ukrainian_War) resulted in WTI Crude increasing in price to $114 per barrel.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the Close price (in US dollars per barrel) for the listed dates for Crude Oil (ticker: CL=F) according to Yahoo Finance._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe live price can be found on the Yahoo Finance website [here](https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/CL%3DF?p=CL%3DF). Historical price data can be found [here](https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/CL%3DF/history?p=CL%3DF). The historical price data page will be used when resolving this question for each subquestion.", "lower_25": "82.14", "median": "85.21", "upper_75": "88.57", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) will be 85.21 for the listed dates?", "desc": "Oil is a commodity of critical importance to the world economy and is used as a raw chemical in the production of energy, materials such as plastics and coatings, fertiliser and fuel for vehicles._x000D_\n_x000D_\nCommodity future contracts play an important role in limiting or reducing the risk of holding the commodity. Risk is limited or reduced by what is known as \"hedging\", whereby an opposite position is taken in the futures market from what is taken in the physical market. (Of course, speculators also use the futures for their own personal gain)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nAside from the critical importance of oil, various factors result in price fluctuations and, at times, large periods of volatility for the commodity such as:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n- The presence of an international cartel of companies such as Aramco, Exxon-Mobil, Royal Dutch-Shell (Shell) and British Petroleum (BP) which dominate the industry._x000D_\n_x000D_\n- The reliance on the seaborne tanker market to move the commodity, which itself is an inelastic market (i.e. if the oil producers need more tankers to transport oil, tankers take a long time to construct) and sensitive to vessel day rate fluctuations._x000D_\n_x000D_\n- The regional domination of oil production primarily centred in regions outside of the U.S. and Europe, most notably the Middle East (and Eurasia, but less so)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nOn the latter point, the Middle East has seen a large amount of conflict which often results in increased volatility for the price of oil. Previously, the [1974 Israeli-Arab war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War) brought about an oil embargo on the US, subsequently resulting in the [1973 Oil Crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_oil_crisis); the price of WTI oil then spiked 300%. The on-going [Israel-Hamas conflict](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel–Hamas_war) is widely expected to [bring volatility to the market](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-08/oil-rallies-by-more-than-3-after-hamas-attacks-against-israel?srnd=premium)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nOutside of the Middle East, the [Russian invasion of Ukraine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Ukrainian_War) resulted in WTI Crude increasing in price to $114 per barrel.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the Close price (in US dollars per barrel) for the listed dates for Crude Oil (ticker: CL=F) according to Yahoo Finance._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe live price can be found on the Yahoo Finance website [here](https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/CL%3DF?p=CL%3DF). Historical price data can be found [here](https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/CL%3DF/history?p=CL%3DF). The historical price data page will be used when resolving this question for each subquestion.", "lower_25": "82.14", "median": "85.21", "upper_75": "88.57", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) will be 85.21 for the listed dates?", "desc": "Oil is a commodity of critical importance to the world economy and is used as a raw chemical in the production of energy, materials such as plastics and coatings, fertiliser and fuel for vehicles._x000D_\n_x000D_\nCommodity future contracts play an important role in limiting or reducing the risk of holding the commodity. Risk is limited or reduced by what is known as \"hedging\", whereby an opposite position is taken in the futures market from what is taken in the physical market. (Of course, speculators also use the futures for their own personal gain)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nAside from the critical importance of oil, various factors result in price fluctuations and, at times, large periods of volatility for the commodity such as:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n- The presence of an international cartel of companies such as Aramco, Exxon-Mobil, Royal Dutch-Shell (Shell) and British Petroleum (BP) which dominate the industry._x000D_\n_x000D_\n- The reliance on the seaborne tanker market to move the commodity, which itself is an inelastic market (i.e. if the oil producers need more tankers to transport oil, tankers take a long time to construct) and sensitive to vessel day rate fluctuations._x000D_\n_x000D_\n- The regional domination of oil production primarily centred in regions outside of the U.S. and Europe, most notably the Middle East (and Eurasia, but less so)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nOn the latter point, the Middle East has seen a large amount of conflict which often results in increased volatility for the price of oil. Previously, the [1974 Israeli-Arab war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War) brought about an oil embargo on the US, subsequently resulting in the [1973 Oil Crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_oil_crisis); the price of WTI oil then spiked 300%. The on-going [Israel-Hamas conflict](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel–Hamas_war) is widely expected to [bring volatility to the market](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-08/oil-rallies-by-more-than-3-after-hamas-attacks-against-israel?srnd=premium)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nOutside of the Middle East, the [Russian invasion of Ukraine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Ukrainian_War) resulted in WTI Crude increasing in price to $114 per barrel.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the Close price (in US dollars per barrel) for the listed dates for Crude Oil (ticker: CL=F) according to Yahoo Finance._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe live price can be found on the Yahoo Finance website [here](https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/CL%3DF?p=CL%3DF). Historical price data can be found [here](https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/CL%3DF/history?p=CL%3DF). The historical price data page will be used when resolving this question for each subquestion.", "lower_25": "82.14", "median": "85.21", "upper_75": "88.57", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the expected (median) date of deuterium-tritium fusion operations for ITER in its new schedule (2024)?\n\nKeyword: 2046\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that deuterium-tritium fusion operations for ITER in its new schedule (2024) will occur by 2046?", "desc": "\"ITER\" initially stood for \"international thermonuclear experimental reactor\". It was initially christened at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting 1987 at their headquarters in Vienna as \"ITER\" whose acronym refers to the Latin word \"iter\", which means \"the way\". The project aims to advance fusion power by establishing an international organization and a framework for cooperation among participating countries to construct an experimental fusion reactor. In the initial phases, various engineering ideas and concepts were presented to determine a blueprint for the reactor that is to be constructed. \n\nThe allure of fusion power is that it can provided an effectively unlimited supply of carbon emissions-free energy that is only limited by the vast amounts of deuterium in the ocean (which comprises approximately 1 out 6000 hydrogen atoms on Earth). Only a small amount of fuel would be necessary compared to fossil fuels as only 250 kg of deuterium and tritium per year are required for a 1,000 megawatt power station, while 2.7 million tonnes for coal is required for a coal-powered plant.\n\nIts aim is to generate approximately 500 MW of fusion output for 50 MW of input heating of the deuterium-tritium plasma for a sustained period of around 400 seconds. (It will, hence, aim for a Q = 10, which \"Q\" refers to the \"scientific [fusion energy gain factor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_energy_gain_factor)\".) However, more than 50 MWs of energy would be required to generate that 50 MWs to directly heat the plasma. \n\nDeuterium-tritium fusion is the easiest fusion reaction to trigger, requiring the lowest temperature and density for the reaction to proceed. Tritium, however, is practically non-existent on Earth, so it would have to be bred from the operation of the fusion reactor if this were to be a viable means of power generation. That would involve subjecting lithium to the neutron-flux of the reactor, which would convert the lithium into helium-4 and tritium. ITER will also be used to test tritium breeding concepts, but the initial tritium will be provided from the world's tritium inventory.\n\nConstruction for the ITER fusion reactor had started in 2010. \n\nITER was never intended to be a power-station, and will not provide the grid any power as its power output will just be vented off as heat to the environment. Even if ITER is successful, further development of fusion technology will be necessary, but ITER would have demonstrated the feasibility of power generation from nuclear fusion.\n\nIn the 2010s, it had been projected that the reactor would have its first plasma in 2025 and deuterium-tritium fusion operations in 2035. Unfortunately, the reactor has been over-budget and subject to perpetual delays. Recently, [some malformed welds in the vacuum vessel](https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newskey-iter-component-moved-to-workshop-for-repair-11356703) have delayed construction. (The [vacuum vessel](https://www.iter.org/mach/VacuumVessel) is the torus-shaped steel container where the fusion reactions occur within.)\n\nDue to the recent delays, the 2025 deadline will not be met. It is said that ITER will announce a new schedule for the project. This question concerns when an official ITER announcement will estimate when D-T fusion operations are expected to commence. It is said that this announcement would come in [June 2024](https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/ITER-s-proposed-new-timeline-to-be-submitted-in-Ju) or [more generally in the summer of 2024](https://www.researchprofessionalnews.com/rr-news-europe-infrastructure-2024-2-new-schedule-for-iter-fusion-facility-to-be-presented-in-summer/).", "resc": "Question will be resolved on the basis of [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) concerning potential announcements of ITER projecting the beginning of deuterium-tritium fusion operations. \n\nIf a range is provided by ITER, then the resolution would be the median of the range. If the range is large, spanning more than 10 years, the question will be annulled (unless the entirety of that range is beyond 2050 which would resolve as \"beyond 2050\"). \n\nIf there is no provided projected date for D-T fusion operations by the end of 2024, then the question will be annulled. If the announcements are ambiguous, then the question is annulled.", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2041", "upper_75": "2046", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for May 31, '24 will be 85.6?", "desc": "Oil is a commodity of critical importance to the world economy and is used as a raw chemical in the production of energy, materials such as plastics and coatings, fertiliser and fuel for vehicles.\n\nCommodity future contracts play an important role in limiting or reducing the risk of holding the commodity. Risk is limited or reduced by what is known as \"hedging\", whereby an opposite position is taken in the futures market from what is taken in the physical market. (Of course, speculators also use the futures for their own personal gain).\n\nAside from the critical importance of oil, various factors result in price fluctuations and, at times, large periods of volatility for the commodity such as:\n\n- The presence of an international cartel of companies such as Aramco, Exxon-Mobil, Royal Dutch-Shell (Shell) and British Petroleum (BP) which dominate the industry.\n\n- The reliance on the seaborne tanker market to move the commodity, which itself is an inelastic market (i.e. if the oil producers need more tankers to transport oil, tankers take a long time to construct) and sensitive to vessel day rate fluctuations.\n\n- The regional domination of oil production primarily centred in regions outside of the U.S. and Europe, most notably the Middle East (and Eurasia, but less so).\n\nOn the latter point, the Middle East has seen a large amount of conflict which often results in increased volatility for the price of oil. Previously, the [1974 Israeli-Arab war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War) brought about an oil embargo on the US, subsequently resulting in the [1973 Oil Crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_oil_crisis); the price of WTI oil then spiked 300%. The on-going [Israel-Hamas conflict](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel–Hamas_war) is widely expected to [bring volatility to the market](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-08/oil-rallies-by-more-than-3-after-hamas-attacks-against-israel?srnd=premium).\n\nOutside of the Middle East, the [Russian invasion of Ukraine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Ukrainian_War) resulted in WTI Crude increasing in price to $114 per barrel.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the Close price (in US dollars per barrel) for the listed dates for Crude Oil (ticker: CL=F) according to Yahoo Finance.\n\nThe live price can be found on the Yahoo Finance website [here](https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/CL%3DF?p=CL%3DF). Historical price data can be found [here](https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/CL%3DF/history?p=CL%3DF). The historical price data page will be used when resolving this question for each subquestion.", "lower_25": "80.4", "median": "85.6", "upper_75": "91.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Jun. 29, '24) will be 77.1?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "77.1", "median": "84.3", "upper_75": "91.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for May 31, '24 will be 85.6?", "desc": "Oil is a commodity of critical importance to the world economy and is used as a raw chemical in the production of energy, materials such as plastics and coatings, fertiliser and fuel for vehicles.\n\nCommodity future contracts play an important role in limiting or reducing the risk of holding the commodity. Risk is limited or reduced by what is known as \"hedging\", whereby an opposite position is taken in the futures market from what is taken in the physical market. (Of course, speculators also use the futures for their own personal gain).\n\nAside from the critical importance of oil, various factors result in price fluctuations and, at times, large periods of volatility for the commodity such as:\n\n- The presence of an international cartel of companies such as Aramco, Exxon-Mobil, Royal Dutch-Shell (Shell) and British Petroleum (BP) which dominate the industry.\n\n- The reliance on the seaborne tanker market to move the commodity, which itself is an inelastic market (i.e. if the oil producers need more tankers to transport oil, tankers take a long time to construct) and sensitive to vessel day rate fluctuations.\n\n- The regional domination of oil production primarily centred in regions outside of the U.S. and Europe, most notably the Middle East (and Eurasia, but less so).\n\nOn the latter point, the Middle East has seen a large amount of conflict which often results in increased volatility for the price of oil. Previously, the [1974 Israeli-Arab war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War) brought about an oil embargo on the US, subsequently resulting in the [1973 Oil Crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_oil_crisis); the price of WTI oil then spiked 300%. The on-going [Israel-Hamas conflict](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel–Hamas_war) is widely expected to [bring volatility to the market](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-08/oil-rallies-by-more-than-3-after-hamas-attacks-against-israel?srnd=premium).\n\nOutside of the Middle East, the [Russian invasion of Ukraine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Ukrainian_War) resulted in WTI Crude increasing in price to $114 per barrel.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the Close price (in US dollars per barrel) for the listed dates for Crude Oil (ticker: CL=F) according to Yahoo Finance.\n\nThe live price can be found on the Yahoo Finance website [here](https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/CL%3DF?p=CL%3DF). Historical price data can be found [here](https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/CL%3DF/history?p=CL%3DF). The historical price data page will be used when resolving this question for each subquestion.", "lower_25": "80.4", "median": "85.6", "upper_75": "91.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for May 31, '24 will be 85.6?", "desc": "Oil is a commodity of critical importance to the world economy and is used as a raw chemical in the production of energy, materials such as plastics and coatings, fertiliser and fuel for vehicles.\n\nCommodity future contracts play an important role in limiting or reducing the risk of holding the commodity. Risk is limited or reduced by what is known as \"hedging\", whereby an opposite position is taken in the futures market from what is taken in the physical market. (Of course, speculators also use the futures for their own personal gain).\n\nAside from the critical importance of oil, various factors result in price fluctuations and, at times, large periods of volatility for the commodity such as:\n\n- The presence of an international cartel of companies such as Aramco, Exxon-Mobil, Royal Dutch-Shell (Shell) and British Petroleum (BP) which dominate the industry.\n\n- The reliance on the seaborne tanker market to move the commodity, which itself is an inelastic market (i.e. if the oil producers need more tankers to transport oil, tankers take a long time to construct) and sensitive to vessel day rate fluctuations.\n\n- The regional domination of oil production primarily centred in regions outside of the U.S. and Europe, most notably the Middle East (and Eurasia, but less so).\n\nOn the latter point, the Middle East has seen a large amount of conflict which often results in increased volatility for the price of oil. Previously, the [1974 Israeli-Arab war](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War) brought about an oil embargo on the US, subsequently resulting in the [1973 Oil Crisis](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_oil_crisis); the price of WTI oil then spiked 300%. The on-going [Israel-Hamas conflict](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel–Hamas_war) is widely expected to [bring volatility to the market](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-08/oil-rallies-by-more-than-3-after-hamas-attacks-against-israel?srnd=premium).\n\nOutside of the Middle East, the [Russian invasion of Ukraine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Ukrainian_War) resulted in WTI Crude increasing in price to $114 per barrel.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the Close price (in US dollars per barrel) for the listed dates for Crude Oil (ticker: CL=F) according to Yahoo Finance.\n\nThe live price can be found on the Yahoo Finance website [here](https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/CL%3DF?p=CL%3DF). Historical price data can be found [here](https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/CL%3DF/history?p=CL%3DF). The historical price data page will be used when resolving this question for each subquestion.", "lower_25": "80.4", "median": "85.6", "upper_75": "91.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Apr. 30, '24) will be 85.21?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "82.14", "median": "85.21", "upper_75": "88.57", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Apr. 30, '24) will be 85.21?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "82.14", "median": "85.21", "upper_75": "88.57", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Jul. 31, '24) will be 75.8?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "75.8", "median": "83.5", "upper_75": "91.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Jul. 31, '24) will be 75.8?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "75.8", "median": "83.5", "upper_75": "91.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Apr. 30, '24) will be 85.21?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "82.14", "median": "85.21", "upper_75": "88.57", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the expected (median) date of deuterium-tritium fusion operations for ITER in its new schedule (2024)?\n\nKeyword: 2046\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that deuterium-tritium fusion operations for ITER in its new schedule (2024) will occur by 2046?", "desc": "\"ITER\" initially stood for \"international thermonuclear experimental reactor\". It was initially christened at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting 1987 at their headquarters in Vienna as \"ITER\" whose acronym refers to the Latin word \"iter\", which means \"the way\". The project aims to advance fusion power by establishing an international organization and a framework for cooperation among participating countries to construct an experimental fusion reactor. In the initial phases, various engineering ideas and concepts were presented to determine a blueprint for the reactor that is to be constructed. \n\nThe allure of fusion power is that it can provided an effectively unlimited supply of carbon emissions-free energy that is only limited by the vast amounts of deuterium in the ocean (which comprises approximately 1 out 6000 hydrogen atoms on Earth). Only a small amount of fuel would be necessary compared to fossil fuels as only 250 kg of deuterium and tritium per year are required for a 1,000 megawatt power station, while 2.7 million tonnes for coal is required for a coal-powered plant.\n\nIts aim is to generate approximately 500 MW of fusion output for 50 MW of input heating of the deuterium-tritium plasma for a sustained period of around 400 seconds. (It will, hence, aim for a Q = 10, which \"Q\" refers to the \"scientific [fusion energy gain factor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_energy_gain_factor)\".) However, more than 50 MWs of energy would be required to generate that 50 MWs to directly heat the plasma. \n\nDeuterium-tritium fusion is the easiest fusion reaction to trigger, requiring the lowest temperature and density for the reaction to proceed. Tritium, however, is practically non-existent on Earth, so it would have to be bred from the operation of the fusion reactor if this were to be a viable means of power generation. That would involve subjecting lithium to the neutron-flux of the reactor, which would convert the lithium into helium-4 and tritium. ITER will also be used to test tritium breeding concepts, but the initial tritium will be provided from the world's tritium inventory.\n\nConstruction for the ITER fusion reactor had started in 2010. \n\nITER was never intended to be a power-station, and will not provide the grid any power as its power output will just be vented off as heat to the environment. Even if ITER is successful, further development of fusion technology will be necessary, but ITER would have demonstrated the feasibility of power generation from nuclear fusion.\n\nIn the 2010s, it had been projected that the reactor would have its first plasma in 2025 and deuterium-tritium fusion operations in 2035. Unfortunately, the reactor has been over-budget and subject to perpetual delays. Recently, [some malformed welds in the vacuum vessel](https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newskey-iter-component-moved-to-workshop-for-repair-11356703) have delayed construction. (The [vacuum vessel](https://www.iter.org/mach/VacuumVessel) is the torus-shaped steel container where the fusion reactions occur within.)\n\nDue to the recent delays, the 2025 deadline will not be met. It is said that ITER will announce a new schedule for the project. This question concerns when an official ITER announcement will estimate when D-T fusion operations are expected to commence. It is said that this announcement would come in [June 2024](https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/ITER-s-proposed-new-timeline-to-be-submitted-in-Ju) or [more generally in the summer of 2024](https://www.researchprofessionalnews.com/rr-news-europe-infrastructure-2024-2-new-schedule-for-iter-fusion-facility-to-be-presented-in-summer/).", "resc": "Question will be resolved on the basis of [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) concerning potential announcements of ITER projecting the beginning of deuterium-tritium fusion operations. \n\nIf a range is provided by ITER, then the resolution would be the median of the range. If the range is large, spanning more than 10 years, the question will be annulled (unless the entirety of that range is beyond 2050 which would resolve as \"beyond 2050\"). \n\nIf there is no provided projected date for D-T fusion operations by the end of 2024, then the question will be annulled. If the announcements are ambiguous, then the question is annulled.", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2041", "upper_75": "2046", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Jun. 29, '24) will be 77.1?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "77.1", "median": "84.3", "upper_75": "91.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Jun. 29, '24) will be 77.1?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "77.1", "median": "84.3", "upper_75": "91.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Jul. 31, '24) will be 75.8?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "75.8", "median": "83.5", "upper_75": "91.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Aug. 31, '24) will be 74.1?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "74.1", "median": "82.2", "upper_75": "91.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the expected (median) date of deuterium-tritium fusion operations for ITER in its new schedule (2024)?\n\nKeyword: 2046\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that deuterium-tritium fusion operations for ITER in its new schedule (2024) will occur by 2046?", "desc": "\"ITER\" initially stood for \"international thermonuclear experimental reactor\". It was initially christened at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting 1987 at their headquarters in Vienna as \"ITER\" whose acronym refers to the Latin word \"iter\", which means \"the way\". The project aims to advance fusion power by establishing an international organization and a framework for cooperation among participating countries to construct an experimental fusion reactor. In the initial phases, various engineering ideas and concepts were presented to determine a blueprint for the reactor that is to be constructed. \n\nThe allure of fusion power is that it can provided an effectively unlimited supply of carbon emissions-free energy that is only limited by the vast amounts of deuterium in the ocean (which comprises approximately 1 out 6000 hydrogen atoms on Earth). Only a small amount of fuel would be necessary compared to fossil fuels as only 250 kg of deuterium and tritium per year are required for a 1,000 megawatt power station, while 2.7 million tonnes for coal is required for a coal-powered plant.\n\nIts aim is to generate approximately 500 MW of fusion output for 50 MW of input heating of the deuterium-tritium plasma for a sustained period of around 400 seconds. (It will, hence, aim for a Q = 10, which \"Q\" refers to the \"scientific [fusion energy gain factor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusion_energy_gain_factor)\".) However, more than 50 MWs of energy would be required to generate that 50 MWs to directly heat the plasma. \n\nDeuterium-tritium fusion is the easiest fusion reaction to trigger, requiring the lowest temperature and density for the reaction to proceed. Tritium, however, is practically non-existent on Earth, so it would have to be bred from the operation of the fusion reactor if this were to be a viable means of power generation. That would involve subjecting lithium to the neutron-flux of the reactor, which would convert the lithium into helium-4 and tritium. ITER will also be used to test tritium breeding concepts, but the initial tritium will be provided from the world's tritium inventory.\n\nConstruction for the ITER fusion reactor had started in 2010. \n\nITER was never intended to be a power-station, and will not provide the grid any power as its power output will just be vented off as heat to the environment. Even if ITER is successful, further development of fusion technology will be necessary, but ITER would have demonstrated the feasibility of power generation from nuclear fusion.\n\nIn the 2010s, it had been projected that the reactor would have its first plasma in 2025 and deuterium-tritium fusion operations in 2035. Unfortunately, the reactor has been over-budget and subject to perpetual delays. Recently, [some malformed welds in the vacuum vessel](https://www.neimagazine.com/news/newskey-iter-component-moved-to-workshop-for-repair-11356703) have delayed construction. (The [vacuum vessel](https://www.iter.org/mach/VacuumVessel) is the torus-shaped steel container where the fusion reactions occur within.)\n\nDue to the recent delays, the 2025 deadline will not be met. It is said that ITER will announce a new schedule for the project. This question concerns when an official ITER announcement will estimate when D-T fusion operations are expected to commence. It is said that this announcement would come in [June 2024](https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/ITER-s-proposed-new-timeline-to-be-submitted-in-Ju) or [more generally in the summer of 2024](https://www.researchprofessionalnews.com/rr-news-europe-infrastructure-2024-2-new-schedule-for-iter-fusion-facility-to-be-presented-in-summer/).", "resc": "Question will be resolved on the basis of [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) concerning potential announcements of ITER projecting the beginning of deuterium-tritium fusion operations. \n\nIf a range is provided by ITER, then the resolution would be the median of the range. If the range is large, spanning more than 10 years, the question will be annulled (unless the entirety of that range is beyond 2050 which would resolve as \"beyond 2050\"). \n\nIf there is no provided projected date for D-T fusion operations by the end of 2024, then the question will be annulled. If the announcements are ambiguous, then the question is annulled.", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2041", "upper_75": "2046", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Aug. 31, '24) will be 74.1?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "74.1", "median": "82.2", "upper_75": "91.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Sep. 28, '24) will be 80.8?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "71.1", "median": "80.8", "upper_75": "91.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Aug. 31, '24) will be 74.1?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "74.1", "median": "82.2", "upper_75": "91.3", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Sep. 28, '24) will be 80.8?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "71.1", "median": "80.8", "upper_75": "91.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Sep. 28, '24) will be 80.8?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "71.1", "median": "80.8", "upper_75": "91.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) will be 92.4 for the listed dates (Oct. 31, '24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "69.1", "median": "80.2", "upper_75": "92.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Nov. 30, '24) will be 85.8?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "67.5", "median": "76.6", "upper_75": "85.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Nov. 30, '24) will be 85.8?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "67.5", "median": "76.6", "upper_75": "85.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Dec. 29, '24) will be 75.9?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "65.5", "median": "75.9", "upper_75": "86.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) will be 92.4 for the listed dates (Oct. 31, '24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "69.1", "median": "80.2", "upper_75": "92.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many IM and GM account closures will chess.com report for 2024, given that 38.7% of accounts are likely to be closed?", "desc": "Discussions around cheating in the chess world have intensified over the past couple of years, especially regarding online cheating. While cheating over the board is challenging and requires clever planning to avoid anti-cheating measures, preventing cheating online is difficult. Chess engines have surpassed the capabilities of even the best human players and are readily accessed by anyone.\n\nAll online platforms have implemented anti-cheating measures and routinely ban players for cheating violations. However, these efforts have not fully allayed the concerns within the chess community, with various top players alleging that cheating is more prevalent than chess platforms admit or are able to detect. Most prominently, Fabiano Caruana, the world #2, [recently suggested](https://www.youtube.com/clip/UgkxeKBhx2RM_LXZZrKOuxT-gw_e_YC2Be0a) that over 50% of titled players have cheated online and the former World Champion Vladimir Kramnik insinuated that top players such as [Hikaru Nakamura](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/25/crosswords/chess-hikaru-vladmir-kramnik-cheating.html) and [Lê Quang Liêm](https://twitter.com/VBkramnik/status/1750972097982308744) have cheated.\n\nChess.com is the most popular online platform for chess. Recently they started publishing statistics on the number of accounts they have closed due to cheating violations. 29 IM and 20 GM accounts were closed in [2023](https://www.chess.com/fair-play#fair-play-numbers), 3 IM accounts were closed in [January 2024](https://www.chess.com/article/view/chesscom-update-february-2024#FairPlay) and 1 IM account in [February 2024](https://www.chess.com/article/view/chesscom-update-march-2024#FairPlay).", "resc": "The question will resolve according to the total number of IM and GM accounts closed in 2024, according to the yearly chess.com numbers.", "lower_25": "23.8", "median": "31.6", "upper_75": "38.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many IM and GM account closures will chess.com report for 2024, given that 38.7% of accounts are likely to be closed?", "desc": "Discussions around cheating in the chess world have intensified over the past couple of years, especially regarding online cheating. While cheating over the board is challenging and requires clever planning to avoid anti-cheating measures, preventing cheating online is difficult. Chess engines have surpassed the capabilities of even the best human players and are readily accessed by anyone.\n\nAll online platforms have implemented anti-cheating measures and routinely ban players for cheating violations. However, these efforts have not fully allayed the concerns within the chess community, with various top players alleging that cheating is more prevalent than chess platforms admit or are able to detect. Most prominently, Fabiano Caruana, the world #2, [recently suggested](https://www.youtube.com/clip/UgkxeKBhx2RM_LXZZrKOuxT-gw_e_YC2Be0a) that over 50% of titled players have cheated online and the former World Champion Vladimir Kramnik insinuated that top players such as [Hikaru Nakamura](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/25/crosswords/chess-hikaru-vladmir-kramnik-cheating.html) and [Lê Quang Liêm](https://twitter.com/VBkramnik/status/1750972097982308744) have cheated.\n\nChess.com is the most popular online platform for chess. Recently they started publishing statistics on the number of accounts they have closed due to cheating violations. 29 IM and 20 GM accounts were closed in [2023](https://www.chess.com/fair-play#fair-play-numbers), 3 IM accounts were closed in [January 2024](https://www.chess.com/article/view/chesscom-update-february-2024#FairPlay) and 1 IM account in [February 2024](https://www.chess.com/article/view/chesscom-update-march-2024#FairPlay).", "resc": "The question will resolve according to the total number of IM and GM accounts closed in 2024, according to the yearly chess.com numbers.", "lower_25": "23.8", "median": "31.6", "upper_75": "38.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) will be 92.4 for the listed dates (Oct. 31, '24)?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "69.1", "median": "80.2", "upper_75": "92.4", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Dec. 29, '24) will be 75.9?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "65.5", "median": "75.9", "upper_75": "86.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Nov. 30, '24) will be 85.8?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "67.5", "median": "76.6", "upper_75": "85.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the closing price of Crude Oil (in USD per barrel) for the listed dates (Dec. 29, '24) will be 75.9?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "65.5", "median": "75.9", "upper_75": "86.6", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average vaccination rate in US counties that report at least five measles cases in 2024 will be 91.35?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "89.57", "median": "91.35", "upper_75": "93.03", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average vaccination rate in US counties that report at least five measles cases in 2024 will be 91.35?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "89.57", "median": "91.35", "upper_75": "93.03", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that these parties will win 1.020 percent of the popular vote in the 2024 US Presidential Election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.249", "median": "0.498", "upper_75": "1.020", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many IM and GM account closures will chess.com report for 2024, given that 38.7% of accounts are likely to be closed?", "desc": "Discussions around cheating in the chess world have intensified over the past couple of years, especially regarding online cheating. While cheating over the board is challenging and requires clever planning to avoid anti-cheating measures, preventing cheating online is difficult. Chess engines have surpassed the capabilities of even the best human players and are readily accessed by anyone.\n\nAll online platforms have implemented anti-cheating measures and routinely ban players for cheating violations. However, these efforts have not fully allayed the concerns within the chess community, with various top players alleging that cheating is more prevalent than chess platforms admit or are able to detect. Most prominently, Fabiano Caruana, the world #2, [recently suggested](https://www.youtube.com/clip/UgkxeKBhx2RM_LXZZrKOuxT-gw_e_YC2Be0a) that over 50% of titled players have cheated online and the former World Champion Vladimir Kramnik insinuated that top players such as [Hikaru Nakamura](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/25/crosswords/chess-hikaru-vladmir-kramnik-cheating.html) and [Lê Quang Liêm](https://twitter.com/VBkramnik/status/1750972097982308744) have cheated.\n\nChess.com is the most popular online platform for chess. Recently they started publishing statistics on the number of accounts they have closed due to cheating violations. 29 IM and 20 GM accounts were closed in [2023](https://www.chess.com/fair-play#fair-play-numbers), 3 IM accounts were closed in [January 2024](https://www.chess.com/article/view/chesscom-update-february-2024#FairPlay) and 1 IM account in [February 2024](https://www.chess.com/article/view/chesscom-update-march-2024#FairPlay).", "resc": "The question will resolve according to the total number of IM and GM accounts closed in 2024, according to the yearly chess.com numbers.", "lower_25": "23.8", "median": "31.6", "upper_75": "38.7", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average vaccination rate in US counties that report at least five measles cases in 2024 will be 91.35?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "89.57", "median": "91.35", "upper_75": "93.03", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that these parties will win 1.020 percent of the popular vote in the 2024 US Presidential Election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "0.249", "median": "0.498", "upper_75": "1.020", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best score on the GPQA benchmark will be 77.3 before 2025?", "desc": "From [GPQA, Rein et al,](https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.12022)\n> We present GPQA, a challenging dataset of 448 multiple-choice questions written by domain experts in biology, physics, and chemistry. We ensure that the questions are high-quality and extremely difficult: experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are \"Google-proof\").\n\nBest system on March 15th 2024 is Claude-3 Opus based (Maj@32 5-shot CoT) achieving 59.5%.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the state-of-the-art accuracy on the GPQA (Diamond) benchmark by an AI system, including any post-training enhancements but excluding any human assistance. This will be based on credible publicly available results prior to January 1st 2025. Credible sources include but are not limited to blog posts, arXiv preprints, and papers.", "lower_25": "64.8", "median": "70.6", "upper_75": "77.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best score on the GPQA benchmark will be 77.3 before 2025?", "desc": "From [GPQA, Rein et al,](https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.12022)\n> We present GPQA, a challenging dataset of 448 multiple-choice questions written by domain experts in biology, physics, and chemistry. We ensure that the questions are high-quality and extremely difficult: experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are \"Google-proof\").\n\nBest system on March 15th 2024 is Claude-3 Opus based (Maj@32 5-shot CoT) achieving 59.5%.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the state-of-the-art accuracy on the GPQA (Diamond) benchmark by an AI system, including any post-training enhancements but excluding any human assistance. This will be based on credible publicly available results prior to January 1st 2025. Credible sources include but are not limited to blog posts, arXiv preprints, and papers.", "lower_25": "64.8", "median": "70.6", "upper_75": "77.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best score on the InterCode (Bash) benchmark will be 55.1 before 2025?", "desc": "See [InterCode](https://intercode-benchmark.github.io). \n> InterCode is a benchmark for evaluating language models on the interactive coding task. Given a natural language request, an agent is asked to interact with a software system (e.g., database, terminal) with code to resolve the issue. [Paper here](https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.14898). \n\nBest system on March 15th 2024 is GPT-4 based and achieved 48.5%.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the state-of-the-art accuracy on the InterCode Bash benchmark by an AI system, including any post-training enhancements but excluding any human assistance. This will be based on credible publicly available results prior to January 1st 2025. The primary credible source will be the official [leaderboard](https://intercode-benchmark.github.io/#bash), but other sources, including but not limited to arXiv preprints and papers, may also be considered.", "lower_25": "55.1", "median": "60.5", "upper_75": "66.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best score on the GPQA benchmark will be 77.3 before 2025?", "desc": "From [GPQA, Rein et al,](https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.12022)\n> We present GPQA, a challenging dataset of 448 multiple-choice questions written by domain experts in biology, physics, and chemistry. We ensure that the questions are high-quality and extremely difficult: experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are \"Google-proof\").\n\nBest system on March 15th 2024 is Claude-3 Opus based (Maj@32 5-shot CoT) achieving 59.5%.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the state-of-the-art accuracy on the GPQA (Diamond) benchmark by an AI system, including any post-training enhancements but excluding any human assistance. This will be based on credible publicly available results prior to January 1st 2025. Credible sources include but are not limited to blog posts, arXiv preprints, and papers.", "lower_25": "64.8", "median": "70.6", "upper_75": "77.3", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best score on the SWE-Bench (unassisted) benchmark will be 32.0 before 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "15.8", "median": "22.7", "upper_75": "32.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best score on the InterCode (Bash) benchmark will be 55.1 before 2025?", "desc": "See [InterCode](https://intercode-benchmark.github.io). \n> InterCode is a benchmark for evaluating language models on the interactive coding task. Given a natural language request, an agent is asked to interact with a software system (e.g., database, terminal) with code to resolve the issue. [Paper here](https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.14898). \n\nBest system on March 15th 2024 is GPT-4 based and achieved 48.5%.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the state-of-the-art accuracy on the InterCode Bash benchmark by an AI system, including any post-training enhancements but excluding any human assistance. This will be based on credible publicly available results prior to January 1st 2025. The primary credible source will be the official [leaderboard](https://intercode-benchmark.github.io/#bash), but other sources, including but not limited to arXiv preprints and papers, may also be considered.", "lower_25": "55.1", "median": "60.5", "upper_75": "66.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best score on the WebArena benchmark will be 47.5 before 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "19.2", "median": "31.2", "upper_75": "47.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best score on the SWE-Bench (unassisted) benchmark will be 32.0 before 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "15.8", "median": "22.7", "upper_75": "32.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best score on the InterCode (Bash) benchmark will be 55.1 before 2025?", "desc": "See [InterCode](https://intercode-benchmark.github.io). \n> InterCode is a benchmark for evaluating language models on the interactive coding task. Given a natural language request, an agent is asked to interact with a software system (e.g., database, terminal) with code to resolve the issue. [Paper here](https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.14898). \n\nBest system on March 15th 2024 is GPT-4 based and achieved 48.5%.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the state-of-the-art accuracy on the InterCode Bash benchmark by an AI system, including any post-training enhancements but excluding any human assistance. This will be based on credible publicly available results prior to January 1st 2025. The primary credible source will be the official [leaderboard](https://intercode-benchmark.github.io/#bash), but other sources, including but not limited to arXiv preprints and papers, may also be considered.", "lower_25": "55.1", "median": "60.5", "upper_75": "66.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best score on the GAIA benchmark will be 58.8 before 2025?", "desc": "See [GAIA](https://huggingface.co/spaces/gaia-benchmark/leaderboard), \n>GAIA is a benchmark which aims at evaluating next-generation LLMs (LLMs with augmented capabilities due to added tooling, efficient prompting, access to search, etc). (See our [paper](https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.12983) for more details.)\n> GAIA is made of more than 450 non-trivial question with an unambiguous answer, requiring different levels of tooling and autonomy to solve. It is therefore divided in 3 levels, where level 1 should be breakable by very good LLMs, and level 3 indicate a strong jump in model capabilities. Each level is divided into a fully public dev set for validation, and a test set with private answers and metadata.\n\nBest score on March 15th 2024 is GPT-4-turbo based and achieved 32.33%.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the state-of-the-art average score on the GAIA benchmark (on the test set, not validation set) by an AI system, including any post-training enhancements but excluding any human assistance. This will be based on credible publicly available results prior to January 1st 2025. The primary credible source will be the official [leaderboard](https://huggingface.co/spaces/gaia-benchmark/leaderboard), but other sources, including but not limited to arXiv preprints and papers may also be considered.", "lower_25": "41.9", "median": "49.3", "upper_75": "58.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best score on the WebArena benchmark will be 47.5 before 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "19.2", "median": "31.2", "upper_75": "47.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best score on the GAIA benchmark will be 58.8 before 2025?", "desc": "See [GAIA](https://huggingface.co/spaces/gaia-benchmark/leaderboard), \n>GAIA is a benchmark which aims at evaluating next-generation LLMs (LLMs with augmented capabilities due to added tooling, efficient prompting, access to search, etc). (See our [paper](https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.12983) for more details.)\n> GAIA is made of more than 450 non-trivial question with an unambiguous answer, requiring different levels of tooling and autonomy to solve. It is therefore divided in 3 levels, where level 1 should be breakable by very good LLMs, and level 3 indicate a strong jump in model capabilities. Each level is divided into a fully public dev set for validation, and a test set with private answers and metadata.\n\nBest score on March 15th 2024 is GPT-4-turbo based and achieved 32.33%.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the state-of-the-art average score on the GAIA benchmark (on the test set, not validation set) by an AI system, including any post-training enhancements but excluding any human assistance. This will be based on credible publicly available results prior to January 1st 2025. The primary credible source will be the official [leaderboard](https://huggingface.co/spaces/gaia-benchmark/leaderboard), but other sources, including but not limited to arXiv preprints and papers may also be considered.", "lower_25": "41.9", "median": "49.3", "upper_75": "58.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best score on the SWE-Bench (unassisted) benchmark will be 32.0 before 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "15.8", "median": "22.7", "upper_75": "32.0", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best score on the WebArena benchmark will be 47.5 before 2025?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "19.2", "median": "31.2", "upper_75": "47.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total finishing time for the 2024 Boston Marathon winners (male and female combined) will be 267.5 hours?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "265.5", "median": "267.5", "upper_75": "270.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the best score on the GAIA benchmark will be 58.8 before 2025?", "desc": "See [GAIA](https://huggingface.co/spaces/gaia-benchmark/leaderboard), \n>GAIA is a benchmark which aims at evaluating next-generation LLMs (LLMs with augmented capabilities due to added tooling, efficient prompting, access to search, etc). (See our [paper](https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.12983) for more details.)\n> GAIA is made of more than 450 non-trivial question with an unambiguous answer, requiring different levels of tooling and autonomy to solve. It is therefore divided in 3 levels, where level 1 should be breakable by very good LLMs, and level 3 indicate a strong jump in model capabilities. Each level is divided into a fully public dev set for validation, and a test set with private answers and metadata.\n\nBest score on March 15th 2024 is GPT-4-turbo based and achieved 32.33%.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the state-of-the-art average score on the GAIA benchmark (on the test set, not validation set) by an AI system, including any post-training enhancements but excluding any human assistance. This will be based on credible publicly available results prior to January 1st 2025. The primary credible source will be the official [leaderboard](https://huggingface.co/spaces/gaia-benchmark/leaderboard), but other sources, including but not limited to arXiv preprints and papers may also be considered.", "lower_25": "41.9", "median": "49.3", "upper_75": "58.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total finishing time for the 2024 Boston Marathon winners (male and female combined) will be 267.5 hours?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "265.5", "median": "267.5", "upper_75": "270.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the national kindergarten measles vaccination rate in the US will be 93.33% for the 2029-2030 school year?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "89.40", "median": "91.52", "upper_75": "93.33", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the total finishing time for the 2024 Boston Marathon winners (male and female combined) will be 267.5 hours?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "265.5", "median": "267.5", "upper_75": "270.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the national kindergarten measles vaccination rate in the US will be 93.33% for the 2029-2030 school year?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "89.40", "median": "91.52", "upper_75": "93.33", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average annual number of measles cases in the US from 2025 through 2030 will be 216?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "216", "median": "330", "upper_75": "605", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "Before 2026, what is the chance that 23.8 US states will pass legislation regulating deepfakes?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/) and was inspired by [this post](https://www.understandingai.org/p/states-are-racing-ahead-of-congress).\n\nAs of March 2024, at least 15 US states have passed laws concerning [deepfakes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepfake), indicating an active legislative response to the potential abuses of synthetic media technologies, particularly focusing on safeguarding election integrity and combating digital forms of exploitation.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of US states that have passed legislation regulating deepfakes before January 1, 2026.\n\nThe primary resolution source for this question will be MultiState's [State-by-State AI Policy Overviews](https://www.multistate.ai/state-by-state-ai-policy-overviews) page. If the page is removed or ceases to be updated, or in the event of other ambiguity or dispute, additional [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) may be considered.", "lower_25": "23.8", "median": "30.7", "upper_75": "38.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average annual number of measles cases in the US from 2025 through 2030 will be 216?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "216", "median": "330", "upper_75": "605", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average annual number of measles cases in the US from 2025 through 2030 will be 216?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "216", "median": "330", "upper_75": "605", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the national kindergarten measles vaccination rate in the US will be 93.33% for the 2029-2030 school year?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "89.40", "median": "91.52", "upper_75": "93.33", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Before 2026, what is the chance that 23.8 US states will pass legislation regulating deepfakes?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/) and was inspired by [this post](https://www.understandingai.org/p/states-are-racing-ahead-of-congress).\n\nAs of March 2024, at least 15 US states have passed laws concerning [deepfakes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepfake), indicating an active legislative response to the potential abuses of synthetic media technologies, particularly focusing on safeguarding election integrity and combating digital forms of exploitation.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of US states that have passed legislation regulating deepfakes before January 1, 2026.\n\nThe primary resolution source for this question will be MultiState's [State-by-State AI Policy Overviews](https://www.multistate.ai/state-by-state-ai-policy-overviews) page. If the page is removed or ceases to be updated, or in the event of other ambiguity or dispute, additional [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) may be considered.", "lower_25": "23.8", "median": "30.7", "upper_75": "38.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "On January 1, 2026, what is the chance that Waymo's rider-only ride-hailing service will be available to the general public in 1.67 US states?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/) and was inspired by [this post](https://www.understandingai.org/p/new-data-shows-waymo-crashes-a-lot).\n\nWaymo, the Alphabet-owned self-driving technology company, has emerged as a pioneer in the development of autonomous vehicles. Since its inception as Google's self-driving car project in 2009, Waymo's vehicles have logged over 7 million miles of rider-only trips.\n\nAs of early 2024, Waymo operates its rider-only ride-hailing service in California (San Francisco and Los Angeles) and Arizona (Phoenix), and has announced plans to expand operations to Texas (Austin).\n\nIn late 2023, Waymo published a [report](https://waymo.com/blog/2023/12/waymo-significantly-outperforms-comparable-human-benchmarks-over-7-million/) claiming that its autonomous vehicles have achieved an 85% reduction in the rate of injury-causing compared to national rates for human-operated cars, highlighting the potential of self-driving cars to reduce crashes caused by human error.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US states, including Washington, D.C., in which fully rider-only ride-hailing trips operated by Waymo are available to the general public on January 1, 2026.\n\nThe primary resolution source will be Waymo's website, which as of early 2024 includes a [\"Where Can You Go?\"](https://waymo.com/whereyoucango/) page. Other [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) may also be considered in the event of ambiguity or dispute.", "lower_25": "1.67", "median": "2.89", "upper_75": "4.13", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "On January 1, 2026, what is the chance that Waymo's rider-only ride-hailing service will be available to the general public in 1.67 US states?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/) and was inspired by [this post](https://www.understandingai.org/p/new-data-shows-waymo-crashes-a-lot).\n\nWaymo, the Alphabet-owned self-driving technology company, has emerged as a pioneer in the development of autonomous vehicles. Since its inception as Google's self-driving car project in 2009, Waymo's vehicles have logged over 7 million miles of rider-only trips.\n\nAs of early 2024, Waymo operates its rider-only ride-hailing service in California (San Francisco and Los Angeles) and Arizona (Phoenix), and has announced plans to expand operations to Texas (Austin).\n\nIn late 2023, Waymo published a [report](https://waymo.com/blog/2023/12/waymo-significantly-outperforms-comparable-human-benchmarks-over-7-million/) claiming that its autonomous vehicles have achieved an 85% reduction in the rate of injury-causing compared to national rates for human-operated cars, highlighting the potential of self-driving cars to reduce crashes caused by human error.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US states, including Washington, D.C., in which fully rider-only ride-hailing trips operated by Waymo are available to the general public on January 1, 2026.\n\nThe primary resolution source will be Waymo's website, which as of early 2024 includes a [\"Where Can You Go?\"](https://waymo.com/whereyoucango/) page. Other [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) may also be considered in the event of ambiguity or dispute.", "lower_25": "1.67", "median": "2.89", "upper_75": "4.13", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 75% increase in the number of U.S. law school graduates securing full-time, long-term positions that require passing the bar exam, compared to the class of 2022?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/) and was inspired by [this post](https://www.understandingai.org/p/ai-could-be-bad-news-for-young-lawyers)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nAs with other types of “knowledge work,” the [introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) into the legal profession](https://hls.harvard.edu/today/harvard-law-expert-explains-how-ai-may-transform-the-legal-profession-in-2024/) represents a profound shift with implications for legal education, employment, and the nature of legal services. AI's increasing sophistication has [led to its application](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/11/01/ai-is-making-its-way-into-the-courtroom-and-legal-process.html) in various legal tasks, including drafting and reviewing contracts, document analysis, and legal research, where it promises enhanced efficiency, reduced errors, and cost savings for clients (albeit with the [occasional misstep](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/06/22/judge-sanctions-lawyers-whose-ai-written-filing-contained-fake-citations.html))._x000D_\n_x000D_\nWith AI potentially assuming tasks traditionally assigned to entry-level attorneys, there is [growing concern](https://www.lawcrossing.com/article/900054042/The-Impact-Of-Ai-On-The-Legal-Industry-Concerns-Over-Job-Opportunities-For-Law-School-Graduates/) over the effects on employment opportunities for recent law school graduates, with law firms potentially requiring fewer associates for routine tasks that are well-suited to completion by large language models.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage change between the number of graduates employed in long-term/full-time positions for which bar exam passage is required for the class of the respective year, as compared to the same for the class of 2022, all as reported by the American Bar Association (ABA) in their annual [employment data reporting](https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics/)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nFor the avoidance of doubt, the percentage shall be calculated as follows:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n\\[_x000D_\n\\text{Percent Change} = \\left( \\frac{\\text{Class of [YEAR] LT_FT_BAR} - \\text{Class of 2022 LT_FT_BAR}}{\\text{Class of 2022 LT_FT_BAR}} \\right) \\times 100_x000D_\n\\]_x000D_\n_x000D_\nWhere:_x000D_\n_x000D_\nLT_FT_BAR = the number of graduates of the respective year reported as securing full-time/long-term employment that requires passage of the bar exam. _x000D_\n_x000D_\n2022 LT_FT_BAR was [reported](https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/2023/class-2022-online-table.pdf) by the ABA as 27,707.", "lower_25": "−0.657", "median": "3.03", "upper_75": "7.50", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "Before 2026, what is the chance that 23.8 US states will pass legislation regulating deepfakes?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/) and was inspired by [this post](https://www.understandingai.org/p/states-are-racing-ahead-of-congress).\n\nAs of March 2024, at least 15 US states have passed laws concerning [deepfakes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepfake), indicating an active legislative response to the potential abuses of synthetic media technologies, particularly focusing on safeguarding election integrity and combating digital forms of exploitation.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of US states that have passed legislation regulating deepfakes before January 1, 2026.\n\nThe primary resolution source for this question will be MultiState's [State-by-State AI Policy Overviews](https://www.multistate.ai/state-by-state-ai-policy-overviews) page. If the page is removed or ceases to be updated, or in the event of other ambiguity or dispute, additional [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) may be considered.", "lower_25": "23.8", "median": "30.7", "upper_75": "38.0", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "On January 1, 2026, what is the chance that Waymo's rider-only ride-hailing service will be available to the general public in 1.67 US states?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/) and was inspired by [this post](https://www.understandingai.org/p/new-data-shows-waymo-crashes-a-lot).\n\nWaymo, the Alphabet-owned self-driving technology company, has emerged as a pioneer in the development of autonomous vehicles. Since its inception as Google's self-driving car project in 2009, Waymo's vehicles have logged over 7 million miles of rider-only trips.\n\nAs of early 2024, Waymo operates its rider-only ride-hailing service in California (San Francisco and Los Angeles) and Arizona (Phoenix), and has announced plans to expand operations to Texas (Austin).\n\nIn late 2023, Waymo published a [report](https://waymo.com/blog/2023/12/waymo-significantly-outperforms-comparable-human-benchmarks-over-7-million/) claiming that its autonomous vehicles have achieved an 85% reduction in the rate of injury-causing compared to national rates for human-operated cars, highlighting the potential of self-driving cars to reduce crashes caused by human error.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of US states, including Washington, D.C., in which fully rider-only ride-hailing trips operated by Waymo are available to the general public on January 1, 2026.\n\nThe primary resolution source will be Waymo's website, which as of early 2024 includes a [\"Where Can You Go?\"](https://waymo.com/whereyoucango/) page. Other [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions) may also be considered in the event of ambiguity or dispute.", "lower_25": "1.67", "median": "2.89", "upper_75": "4.13", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 25% decrease in the number of U.S. law school graduates securing full-time, long-term positions that require passing the bar exam, compared to the class of 2022?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/) and was inspired by [this post](https://www.understandingai.org/p/ai-could-be-bad-news-for-young-lawyers).\n\nAs with other types of “knowledge work,” the [introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) into the legal profession](https://hls.harvard.edu/today/harvard-law-expert-explains-how-ai-may-transform-the-legal-profession-in-2024/) represents a profound shift with implications for legal education, employment, and the nature of legal services. AI's increasing sophistication has [led to its application](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/11/01/ai-is-making-its-way-into-the-courtroom-and-legal-process.html) in various legal tasks, including drafting and reviewing contracts, document analysis, and legal research, where it promises enhanced efficiency, reduced errors, and cost savings for clients (albeit with the [occasional misstep](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/06/22/judge-sanctions-lawyers-whose-ai-written-filing-contained-fake-citations.html)).\n\nWith AI potentially assuming tasks traditionally assigned to entry-level attorneys, there is [growing concern](https://www.lawcrossing.com/article/900054042/The-Impact-Of-Ai-On-The-Legal-Industry-Concerns-Over-Job-Opportunities-For-Law-School-Graduates/) over the effects on employment opportunities for recent law school graduates, with law firms potentially requiring fewer associates for routine tasks that are well-suited to completion by large language models.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage change between the number of graduates employed in long-term/full-time positions for which bar exam passage is required for the class of the respective year, as compared to the same for the class of 2022, all as reported by the American Bar Association (ABA) in their annual [employment data reporting](https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics/).\n\nFor the avoidance of doubt, the percentage shall be calculated as follows:\n\n\\[\n\\text{Percent Change} = \\left( \\frac{\\text{Class of [YEAR] LT_FT_BAR} - \\text{Class of 2022 LT_FT_BAR}}{\\text{Class of 2022 LT_FT_BAR}} \\right) \\times 100\n\\]\n\nWhere:\n\nLT_FT_BAR = the number of graduates of the respective year reported as securing full-time/long-term employment that requires passage of the bar exam. \n\n2022 LT_FT_BAR was [reported](https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/2023/class-2022-online-table.pdf) by the ABA as 27,707.", "lower_25": "−0.657", "median": "3.03", "upper_75": "7.50", "prediction": "−0.657"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 75% increase in the number of U.S. law school graduates securing full-time, long-term positions that require passing the bar exam, compared to the class of 2022?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/) and was inspired by [this post](https://www.understandingai.org/p/ai-could-be-bad-news-for-young-lawyers)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nAs with other types of “knowledge work,” the [introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) into the legal profession](https://hls.harvard.edu/today/harvard-law-expert-explains-how-ai-may-transform-the-legal-profession-in-2024/) represents a profound shift with implications for legal education, employment, and the nature of legal services. AI's increasing sophistication has [led to its application](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/11/01/ai-is-making-its-way-into-the-courtroom-and-legal-process.html) in various legal tasks, including drafting and reviewing contracts, document analysis, and legal research, where it promises enhanced efficiency, reduced errors, and cost savings for clients (albeit with the [occasional misstep](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/06/22/judge-sanctions-lawyers-whose-ai-written-filing-contained-fake-citations.html))._x000D_\n_x000D_\nWith AI potentially assuming tasks traditionally assigned to entry-level attorneys, there is [growing concern](https://www.lawcrossing.com/article/900054042/The-Impact-Of-Ai-On-The-Legal-Industry-Concerns-Over-Job-Opportunities-For-Law-School-Graduates/) over the effects on employment opportunities for recent law school graduates, with law firms potentially requiring fewer associates for routine tasks that are well-suited to completion by large language models.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage change between the number of graduates employed in long-term/full-time positions for which bar exam passage is required for the class of the respective year, as compared to the same for the class of 2022, all as reported by the American Bar Association (ABA) in their annual [employment data reporting](https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics/)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nFor the avoidance of doubt, the percentage shall be calculated as follows:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n\\[_x000D_\n\\text{Percent Change} = \\left( \\frac{\\text{Class of [YEAR] LT_FT_BAR} - \\text{Class of 2022 LT_FT_BAR}}{\\text{Class of 2022 LT_FT_BAR}} \\right) \\times 100_x000D_\n\\]_x000D_\n_x000D_\nWhere:_x000D_\n_x000D_\nLT_FT_BAR = the number of graduates of the respective year reported as securing full-time/long-term employment that requires passage of the bar exam. _x000D_\n_x000D_\n2022 LT_FT_BAR was [reported](https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/2023/class-2022-online-table.pdf) by the ABA as 27,707.", "lower_25": "−0.657", "median": "3.03", "upper_75": "7.50", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 25% decrease in the number of U.S. law school graduates securing full-time, long-term positions that require passing the bar exam, compared to the class of 2022? (2030)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "−1.44", "median": "5.98", "upper_75": "13.7", "prediction": "-1.44 or 25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 25% decrease in the number of U.S. law school graduates securing full-time, long-term positions that require passing the bar exam, compared to the class of 2022? (2030)", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "−1.44", "median": "5.98", "upper_75": "13.7", "prediction": "-1.44 or 25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 25% decrease in the number of U.S. law school graduates securing full-time, long-term positions that require passing the bar exam, compared to the class of 2022?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/) and was inspired by [this post](https://www.understandingai.org/p/ai-could-be-bad-news-for-young-lawyers).\n\nAs with other types of “knowledge work,” the [introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) into the legal profession](https://hls.harvard.edu/today/harvard-law-expert-explains-how-ai-may-transform-the-legal-profession-in-2024/) represents a profound shift with implications for legal education, employment, and the nature of legal services. AI's increasing sophistication has [led to its application](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/11/01/ai-is-making-its-way-into-the-courtroom-and-legal-process.html) in various legal tasks, including drafting and reviewing contracts, document analysis, and legal research, where it promises enhanced efficiency, reduced errors, and cost savings for clients (albeit with the [occasional misstep](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/06/22/judge-sanctions-lawyers-whose-ai-written-filing-contained-fake-citations.html)).\n\nWith AI potentially assuming tasks traditionally assigned to entry-level attorneys, there is [growing concern](https://www.lawcrossing.com/article/900054042/The-Impact-Of-Ai-On-The-Legal-Industry-Concerns-Over-Job-Opportunities-For-Law-School-Graduates/) over the effects on employment opportunities for recent law school graduates, with law firms potentially requiring fewer associates for routine tasks that are well-suited to completion by large language models.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage change between the number of graduates employed in long-term/full-time positions for which bar exam passage is required for the class of the respective year, as compared to the same for the class of 2022, all as reported by the American Bar Association (ABA) in their annual [employment data reporting](https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics/).\n\nFor the avoidance of doubt, the percentage shall be calculated as follows:\n\n\\[\n\\text{Percent Change} = \\left( \\frac{\\text{Class of [YEAR] LT_FT_BAR} - \\text{Class of 2022 LT_FT_BAR}}{\\text{Class of 2022 LT_FT_BAR}} \\right) \\times 100\n\\]\n\nWhere:\n\nLT_FT_BAR = the number of graduates of the respective year reported as securing full-time/long-term employment that requires passage of the bar exam. \n\n2022 LT_FT_BAR was [reported](https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/2023/class-2022-online-table.pdf) by the ABA as 27,707.", "lower_25": "−0.657", "median": "3.03", "upper_75": "7.50", "prediction": "−0.657"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 75% increase in the number of U.S. law school graduates securing full-time, long-term positions that require passing the bar exam, compared to the class of 2022?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/) and was inspired by [this post](https://www.understandingai.org/p/ai-could-be-bad-news-for-young-lawyers)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nAs with other types of “knowledge work,” the [introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) into the legal profession](https://hls.harvard.edu/today/harvard-law-expert-explains-how-ai-may-transform-the-legal-profession-in-2024/) represents a profound shift with implications for legal education, employment, and the nature of legal services. AI's increasing sophistication has [led to its application](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/11/01/ai-is-making-its-way-into-the-courtroom-and-legal-process.html) in various legal tasks, including drafting and reviewing contracts, document analysis, and legal research, where it promises enhanced efficiency, reduced errors, and cost savings for clients (albeit with the [occasional misstep](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/06/22/judge-sanctions-lawyers-whose-ai-written-filing-contained-fake-citations.html))._x000D_\n_x000D_\nWith AI potentially assuming tasks traditionally assigned to entry-level attorneys, there is [growing concern](https://www.lawcrossing.com/article/900054042/The-Impact-Of-Ai-On-The-Legal-Industry-Concerns-Over-Job-Opportunities-For-Law-School-Graduates/) over the effects on employment opportunities for recent law school graduates, with law firms potentially requiring fewer associates for routine tasks that are well-suited to completion by large language models.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage change between the number of graduates employed in long-term/full-time positions for which bar exam passage is required for the class of the respective year, as compared to the same for the class of 2022, all as reported by the American Bar Association (ABA) in their annual [employment data reporting](https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics/)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nFor the avoidance of doubt, the percentage shall be calculated as follows:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n\\[_x000D_\n\\text{Percent Change} = \\left( \\frac{\\text{Class of [YEAR] LT_FT_BAR} - \\text{Class of 2022 LT_FT_BAR}}{\\text{Class of 2022 LT_FT_BAR}} \\right) \\times 100_x000D_\n\\]_x000D_\n_x000D_\nWhere:_x000D_\n_x000D_\nLT_FT_BAR = the number of graduates of the respective year reported as securing full-time/long-term employment that requires passage of the bar exam. _x000D_\n_x000D_\n2022 LT_FT_BAR was [reported](https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/2023/class-2022-online-table.pdf) by the ABA as 27,707.", "lower_25": "−0.657", "median": "3.03", "upper_75": "7.50", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that GPT-5 will be available to the general public by Jan 2025?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/).\n\nGPT-5, the highly anticipated next generation of OpenAI's powerful language model, is rumored to be released sometime in 2024. Sources familiar with the company have revealed that OpenAI has been providing demos of GPT-5 to select enterprise customers, showcasing improvements that have been described as [\"materially better\"](https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2024/03/openais-gpt-5-may-launch-this-summer-upgrading-chatgpt-along-the-way/) than its predecessor, GPT-4.\n\nOpenAI CEO Sam Altman has remained vague about the specifics of GPT-5, only confirming that the company plans to release an [\"amazing new model\"](https://lexfridman.com/sam-altman-2-transcript/) in 2024.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date that a member of the general public can access OpenAI's GPT-5 model without first joining a waitlist or participating in an early access or testing phase.\n\nIf OpenAI does not release GPT-5 before 2026, this question will resolve \"> December 31, 2025\".", "lower_25": "Sep 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "May 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that GPT-5 will be available to the general public by Jan 2025?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/).\n\nGPT-5, the highly anticipated next generation of OpenAI's powerful language model, is rumored to be released sometime in 2024. Sources familiar with the company have revealed that OpenAI has been providing demos of GPT-5 to select enterprise customers, showcasing improvements that have been described as [\"materially better\"](https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2024/03/openais-gpt-5-may-launch-this-summer-upgrading-chatgpt-along-the-way/) than its predecessor, GPT-4.\n\nOpenAI CEO Sam Altman has remained vague about the specifics of GPT-5, only confirming that the company plans to release an [\"amazing new model\"](https://lexfridman.com/sam-altman-2-transcript/) in 2024.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date that a member of the general public can access OpenAI's GPT-5 model without first joining a waitlist or participating in an early access or testing phase.\n\nIf OpenAI does not release GPT-5 before 2026, this question will resolve \"> December 31, 2025\".", "lower_25": "Sep 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "May 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest LLM scores on the GPQA Diamond benchmark will be 61.5 in the following years?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/).\n\nReleased in late 2023, the [Graduate-Level Google-Proof Q&A Benchmark](https://paperswithcode.com/paper/gpqa-a-graduate-level-google-proof-q-a) (GPQA) represents a significant advancement in the assessment of Large Language Models' (LLMs) capabilities, especially in domains requiring deep understanding and reasoning beyond simple information retrieval. \n\nGPQA is specifically designed to be \"Google-proof,\" meaning that its questions are resistant to straightforward lookup or shallow web searches. This characteristic emphasizes the need for AI systems to demonstrate not just knowledge retrieval, but sophisticated understanding and the ability to reason through complex problems.\n\nThe benchmark's design, featuring questions of expert-level difficulty, aims to mirror the depth of understanding expected at the graduate level in a range of scientific fields. This is evident in the performance gap between current AI models and domain experts, with the latter achieving significantly higher accuracy. Such a gap highlights the challenges current LLMs face when dealing with complex, nuanced questions.\n\nRecent accuracy scores by state-of-the-art models:\n\n| Organization | Model | Diamond Set (198 Questions) |\n|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Opus | 50.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Sonnet | 40.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-4 | 35.7% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Haiku | 33.3% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Meta | Llama-2-70B-chat | 31.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-3.5 | 28.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n\n\nBy way of comparison, according to the [GPQA paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.12022v1.pdf):\n\n>...[human] experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are “Google-proof”).\n\nNote that [another Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21920/gpqa-benchmark-2025/) asks about the highest score, prior to 2025, under *any* GPQA evaluation method, whereas this question specifically asks about the zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation method.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest GPQA Diamond accuracy score (based on zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation) achieved by an artificial intelligence model in the respective calendar year according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), which may include AI lab blog posts, arXiv preprints, or published papers.", "lower_25": "53.1", "median": "56.7", "upper_75": "61.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest LLM scores on the GPQA Diamond benchmark will be 53.1 in the following years?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nReleased in late 2023, the [Graduate-Level Google-Proof Q&A Benchmark](https://paperswithcode.com/paper/gpqa-a-graduate-level-google-proof-q-a) (GPQA) represents a significant advancement in the assessment of Large Language Models' (LLMs) capabilities, especially in domains requiring deep understanding and reasoning beyond simple information retrieval. _x000D_\n_x000D_\nGPQA is specifically designed to be \"Google-proof,\" meaning that its questions are resistant to straightforward lookup or shallow web searches. This characteristic emphasizes the need for AI systems to demonstrate not just knowledge retrieval, but sophisticated understanding and the ability to reason through complex problems._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe benchmark's design, featuring questions of expert-level difficulty, aims to mirror the depth of understanding expected at the graduate level in a range of scientific fields. This is evident in the performance gap between current AI models and domain experts, with the latter achieving significantly higher accuracy. Such a gap highlights the challenges current LLMs face when dealing with complex, nuanced questions._x000D_\n_x000D_\nRecent accuracy scores by state-of-the-art models:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| Organization | Model | Diamond Set (198 Questions) |_x000D_\n|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|_x000D_\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Opus | 50.4% Zero-shot CoT |_x000D_\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Sonnet | 40.4% Zero-shot CoT |_x000D_\n| OpenAI | GPT-4 | 35.7% Zero-shot CoT |_x000D_\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Haiku | 33.3% Zero-shot CoT |_x000D_\n| Meta | Llama-2-70B-chat | 31.1% Zero-shot CoT |_x000D_\n| OpenAI | GPT-3.5 | 28.1% Zero-shot CoT |_x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\nBy way of comparison, according to the [GPQA paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.12022v1.pdf):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>...[human] experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are “Google-proof”)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nNote that [another Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21920/gpqa-benchmark-2025/) asks about the highest score, prior to 2025, under *any* GPQA evaluation method, whereas this question specifically asks about the zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation method.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest GPQA Diamond accuracy score (based on zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation) achieved by an artificial intelligence model in the respective calendar year according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), which may include AI lab blog posts, arXiv preprints, or published papers.", "lower_25": "53.1", "median": "56.7", "upper_75": "61.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest LLM scores on the GPQA Diamond benchmark will be 53.1 in the following years?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nReleased in late 2023, the [Graduate-Level Google-Proof Q&A Benchmark](https://paperswithcode.com/paper/gpqa-a-graduate-level-google-proof-q-a) (GPQA) represents a significant advancement in the assessment of Large Language Models' (LLMs) capabilities, especially in domains requiring deep understanding and reasoning beyond simple information retrieval. _x000D_\n_x000D_\nGPQA is specifically designed to be \"Google-proof,\" meaning that its questions are resistant to straightforward lookup or shallow web searches. This characteristic emphasizes the need for AI systems to demonstrate not just knowledge retrieval, but sophisticated understanding and the ability to reason through complex problems._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe benchmark's design, featuring questions of expert-level difficulty, aims to mirror the depth of understanding expected at the graduate level in a range of scientific fields. This is evident in the performance gap between current AI models and domain experts, with the latter achieving significantly higher accuracy. Such a gap highlights the challenges current LLMs face when dealing with complex, nuanced questions._x000D_\n_x000D_\nRecent accuracy scores by state-of-the-art models:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| Organization | Model | Diamond Set (198 Questions) |_x000D_\n|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|_x000D_\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Opus | 50.4% Zero-shot CoT |_x000D_\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Sonnet | 40.4% Zero-shot CoT |_x000D_\n| OpenAI | GPT-4 | 35.7% Zero-shot CoT |_x000D_\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Haiku | 33.3% Zero-shot CoT |_x000D_\n| Meta | Llama-2-70B-chat | 31.1% Zero-shot CoT |_x000D_\n| OpenAI | GPT-3.5 | 28.1% Zero-shot CoT |_x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\nBy way of comparison, according to the [GPQA paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.12022v1.pdf):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>...[human] experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are “Google-proof”)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nNote that [another Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21920/gpqa-benchmark-2025/) asks about the highest score, prior to 2025, under *any* GPQA evaluation method, whereas this question specifically asks about the zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation method.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest GPQA Diamond accuracy score (based on zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation) achieved by an artificial intelligence model in the respective calendar year according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), which may include AI lab blog posts, arXiv preprints, or published papers.", "lower_25": "53.1", "median": "56.7", "upper_75": "61.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest LLM scores on the GPQA Diamond benchmark will be 53.1 in the following years?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nReleased in late 2023, the [Graduate-Level Google-Proof Q&A Benchmark](https://paperswithcode.com/paper/gpqa-a-graduate-level-google-proof-q-a) (GPQA) represents a significant advancement in the assessment of Large Language Models' (LLMs) capabilities, especially in domains requiring deep understanding and reasoning beyond simple information retrieval. _x000D_\n_x000D_\nGPQA is specifically designed to be \"Google-proof,\" meaning that its questions are resistant to straightforward lookup or shallow web searches. This characteristic emphasizes the need for AI systems to demonstrate not just knowledge retrieval, but sophisticated understanding and the ability to reason through complex problems._x000D_\n_x000D_\nThe benchmark's design, featuring questions of expert-level difficulty, aims to mirror the depth of understanding expected at the graduate level in a range of scientific fields. This is evident in the performance gap between current AI models and domain experts, with the latter achieving significantly higher accuracy. Such a gap highlights the challenges current LLMs face when dealing with complex, nuanced questions._x000D_\n_x000D_\nRecent accuracy scores by state-of-the-art models:_x000D_\n_x000D_\n| Organization | Model | Diamond Set (198 Questions) |_x000D_\n|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|_x000D_\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Opus | 50.4% Zero-shot CoT |_x000D_\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Sonnet | 40.4% Zero-shot CoT |_x000D_\n| OpenAI | GPT-4 | 35.7% Zero-shot CoT |_x000D_\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Haiku | 33.3% Zero-shot CoT |_x000D_\n| Meta | Llama-2-70B-chat | 31.1% Zero-shot CoT |_x000D_\n| OpenAI | GPT-3.5 | 28.1% Zero-shot CoT |_x000D_\n_x000D_\n_x000D_\nBy way of comparison, according to the [GPQA paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.12022v1.pdf):_x000D_\n_x000D_\n>...[human] experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are “Google-proof”)._x000D_\n_x000D_\nNote that [another Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21920/gpqa-benchmark-2025/) asks about the highest score, prior to 2025, under *any* GPQA evaluation method, whereas this question specifically asks about the zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation method.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest GPQA Diamond accuracy score (based on zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation) achieved by an artificial intelligence model in the respective calendar year according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), which may include AI lab blog posts, arXiv preprints, or published papers.", "lower_25": "53.1", "median": "56.7", "upper_75": "61.5", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest LLM scores on the GPQA Diamond benchmark will be 61.5 in the following years?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/).\n\nReleased in late 2023, the [Graduate-Level Google-Proof Q&A Benchmark](https://paperswithcode.com/paper/gpqa-a-graduate-level-google-proof-q-a) (GPQA) represents a significant advancement in the assessment of Large Language Models' (LLMs) capabilities, especially in domains requiring deep understanding and reasoning beyond simple information retrieval. \n\nGPQA is specifically designed to be \"Google-proof,\" meaning that its questions are resistant to straightforward lookup or shallow web searches. This characteristic emphasizes the need for AI systems to demonstrate not just knowledge retrieval, but sophisticated understanding and the ability to reason through complex problems.\n\nThe benchmark's design, featuring questions of expert-level difficulty, aims to mirror the depth of understanding expected at the graduate level in a range of scientific fields. This is evident in the performance gap between current AI models and domain experts, with the latter achieving significantly higher accuracy. Such a gap highlights the challenges current LLMs face when dealing with complex, nuanced questions.\n\nRecent accuracy scores by state-of-the-art models:\n\n| Organization | Model | Diamond Set (198 Questions) |\n|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Opus | 50.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Sonnet | 40.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-4 | 35.7% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Haiku | 33.3% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Meta | Llama-2-70B-chat | 31.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-3.5 | 28.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n\n\nBy way of comparison, according to the [GPQA paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.12022v1.pdf):\n\n>...[human] experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are “Google-proof”).\n\nNote that [another Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21920/gpqa-benchmark-2025/) asks about the highest score, prior to 2025, under *any* GPQA evaluation method, whereas this question specifically asks about the zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation method.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest GPQA Diamond accuracy score (based on zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation) achieved by an artificial intelligence model in the respective calendar year according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), which may include AI lab blog posts, arXiv preprints, or published papers.", "lower_25": "53.1", "median": "56.7", "upper_75": "61.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 19.8% increase in the number of U.S. law school graduates securing full-time, long-term positions that require passing the bar exam, compared to the class of 2022?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "−3.09", "median": "7.37", "upper_75": "19.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 19.8% increase in the number of U.S. law school graduates securing full-time, long-term positions that require passing the bar exam, compared to the class of 2022?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "−3.09", "median": "7.37", "upper_75": "19.8", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a 25% decrease in the number of U.S. law school graduates securing full-time, long-term positions that require passing the bar exam, compared to the class of 2022?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/) and was inspired by [this post](https://www.understandingai.org/p/ai-could-be-bad-news-for-young-lawyers).\n\nAs with other types of “knowledge work,” the [introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) into the legal profession](https://hls.harvard.edu/today/harvard-law-expert-explains-how-ai-may-transform-the-legal-profession-in-2024/) represents a profound shift with implications for legal education, employment, and the nature of legal services. AI's increasing sophistication has [led to its application](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/11/01/ai-is-making-its-way-into-the-courtroom-and-legal-process.html) in various legal tasks, including drafting and reviewing contracts, document analysis, and legal research, where it promises enhanced efficiency, reduced errors, and cost savings for clients (albeit with the [occasional misstep](https://www.cnbc.com/2023/06/22/judge-sanctions-lawyers-whose-ai-written-filing-contained-fake-citations.html)).\n\nWith AI potentially assuming tasks traditionally assigned to entry-level attorneys, there is [growing concern](https://www.lawcrossing.com/article/900054042/The-Impact-Of-Ai-On-The-Legal-Industry-Concerns-Over-Job-Opportunities-For-Law-School-Graduates/) over the effects on employment opportunities for recent law school graduates, with law firms potentially requiring fewer associates for routine tasks that are well-suited to completion by large language models.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the percentage change between the number of graduates employed in long-term/full-time positions for which bar exam passage is required for the class of the respective year, as compared to the same for the class of 2022, all as reported by the American Bar Association (ABA) in their annual [employment data reporting](https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics/).\n\nFor the avoidance of doubt, the percentage shall be calculated as follows:\n\n\\[\n\\text{Percent Change} = \\left( \\frac{\\text{Class of [YEAR] LT_FT_BAR} - \\text{Class of 2022 LT_FT_BAR}}{\\text{Class of 2022 LT_FT_BAR}} \\right) \\times 100\n\\]\n\nWhere:\n\nLT_FT_BAR = the number of graduates of the respective year reported as securing full-time/long-term employment that requires passage of the bar exam. \n\n2022 LT_FT_BAR was [reported](https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/2023/class-2022-online-table.pdf) by the ABA as 27,707.", "lower_25": "−0.657", "median": "3.03", "upper_75": "7.50", "prediction": "−0.657"} -{"title": "What is the chance that GPT-5 will be available to the general public by Jan 2025?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/).\n\nGPT-5, the highly anticipated next generation of OpenAI's powerful language model, is rumored to be released sometime in 2024. Sources familiar with the company have revealed that OpenAI has been providing demos of GPT-5 to select enterprise customers, showcasing improvements that have been described as [\"materially better\"](https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2024/03/openais-gpt-5-may-launch-this-summer-upgrading-chatgpt-along-the-way/) than its predecessor, GPT-4.\n\nOpenAI CEO Sam Altman has remained vague about the specifics of GPT-5, only confirming that the company plans to release an [\"amazing new model\"](https://lexfridman.com/sam-altman-2-transcript/) in 2024.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date that a member of the general public can access OpenAI's GPT-5 model without first joining a waitlist or participating in an early access or testing phase.\n\nIf OpenAI does not release GPT-5 before 2026, this question will resolve \"> December 31, 2025\".", "lower_25": "Sep 2024", "median": "Jan 2025", "upper_75": "May 2025", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest LLM scores on the GPQA Diamond benchmark will be 65.3 in the following years?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/).\n\nReleased in late 2023, the [Graduate-Level Google-Proof Q&A Benchmark](https://paperswithcode.com/paper/gpqa-a-graduate-level-google-proof-q-a) (GPQA) represents a significant advancement in the assessment of Large Language Models' (LLMs) capabilities, especially in domains requiring deep understanding and reasoning beyond simple information retrieval. \n\nGPQA is specifically designed to be \"Google-proof,\" meaning that its questions are resistant to straightforward lookup or shallow web searches. This characteristic emphasizes the need for AI systems to demonstrate not just knowledge retrieval, but sophisticated understanding and the ability to reason through complex problems.\n\nThe benchmark's design, featuring questions of expert-level difficulty, aims to mirror the depth of understanding expected at the graduate level in a range of scientific fields. This is evident in the performance gap between current AI models and domain experts, with the latter achieving significantly higher accuracy. Such a gap highlights the challenges current LLMs face when dealing with complex, nuanced questions.\n\nRecent accuracy scores by state-of-the-art models:\n\n| Organization | Model | Diamond Set (198 Questions) |\n|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Opus | 50.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Sonnet | 40.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-4 | 35.7% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Haiku | 33.3% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Meta | Llama-2-70B-chat | 31.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-3.5 | 28.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n\n\nBy way of comparison, according to the [GPQA paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.12022v1.pdf):\n\n>...[human] experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are “Google-proof”).\n\nNote that [another Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21920/gpqa-benchmark-2025/) asks about the highest score, prior to 2025, under *any* GPQA evaluation method, whereas this question specifically asks about the zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation method.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest GPQA Diamond accuracy score (based on zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation) achieved by an artificial intelligence model in the respective calendar year according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), which may include AI lab blog posts, arXiv preprints, or published papers.", "lower_25": "59.1", "median": "65.3", "upper_75": "72.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest LLM scores on the GPQA Diamond benchmark will be 65.3 in the following years?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/).\n\nReleased in late 2023, the [Graduate-Level Google-Proof Q&A Benchmark](https://paperswithcode.com/paper/gpqa-a-graduate-level-google-proof-q-a) (GPQA) represents a significant advancement in the assessment of Large Language Models' (LLMs) capabilities, especially in domains requiring deep understanding and reasoning beyond simple information retrieval. \n\nGPQA is specifically designed to be \"Google-proof,\" meaning that its questions are resistant to straightforward lookup or shallow web searches. This characteristic emphasizes the need for AI systems to demonstrate not just knowledge retrieval, but sophisticated understanding and the ability to reason through complex problems.\n\nThe benchmark's design, featuring questions of expert-level difficulty, aims to mirror the depth of understanding expected at the graduate level in a range of scientific fields. This is evident in the performance gap between current AI models and domain experts, with the latter achieving significantly higher accuracy. Such a gap highlights the challenges current LLMs face when dealing with complex, nuanced questions.\n\nRecent accuracy scores by state-of-the-art models:\n\n| Organization | Model | Diamond Set (198 Questions) |\n|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Opus | 50.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Sonnet | 40.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-4 | 35.7% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Haiku | 33.3% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Meta | Llama-2-70B-chat | 31.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-3.5 | 28.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n\n\nBy way of comparison, according to the [GPQA paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.12022v1.pdf):\n\n>...[human] experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are “Google-proof”).\n\nNote that [another Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21920/gpqa-benchmark-2025/) asks about the highest score, prior to 2025, under *any* GPQA evaluation method, whereas this question specifically asks about the zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation method.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest GPQA Diamond accuracy score (based on zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation) achieved by an artificial intelligence model in the respective calendar year according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), which may include AI lab blog posts, arXiv preprints, or published papers.", "lower_25": "59.1", "median": "65.3", "upper_75": "72.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest LLM scores on the GPQA Diamond benchmark will be 65.3 in the following years?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/).\n\nReleased in late 2023, the [Graduate-Level Google-Proof Q&A Benchmark](https://paperswithcode.com/paper/gpqa-a-graduate-level-google-proof-q-a) (GPQA) represents a significant advancement in the assessment of Large Language Models' (LLMs) capabilities, especially in domains requiring deep understanding and reasoning beyond simple information retrieval. \n\nGPQA is specifically designed to be \"Google-proof,\" meaning that its questions are resistant to straightforward lookup or shallow web searches. This characteristic emphasizes the need for AI systems to demonstrate not just knowledge retrieval, but sophisticated understanding and the ability to reason through complex problems.\n\nThe benchmark's design, featuring questions of expert-level difficulty, aims to mirror the depth of understanding expected at the graduate level in a range of scientific fields. This is evident in the performance gap between current AI models and domain experts, with the latter achieving significantly higher accuracy. Such a gap highlights the challenges current LLMs face when dealing with complex, nuanced questions.\n\nRecent accuracy scores by state-of-the-art models:\n\n| Organization | Model | Diamond Set (198 Questions) |\n|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Opus | 50.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Sonnet | 40.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-4 | 35.7% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Haiku | 33.3% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Meta | Llama-2-70B-chat | 31.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-3.5 | 28.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n\n\nBy way of comparison, according to the [GPQA paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.12022v1.pdf):\n\n>...[human] experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are “Google-proof”).\n\nNote that [another Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21920/gpqa-benchmark-2025/) asks about the highest score, prior to 2025, under *any* GPQA evaluation method, whereas this question specifically asks about the zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation method.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest GPQA Diamond accuracy score (based on zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation) achieved by an artificial intelligence model in the respective calendar year according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), which may include AI lab blog posts, arXiv preprints, or published papers.", "lower_25": "59.1", "median": "65.3", "upper_75": "72.4", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest LLM scores on the GPQA Diamond benchmark will be 82.3 in the following years?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/).\n\nReleased in late 2023, the [Graduate-Level Google-Proof Q&A Benchmark](https://paperswithcode.com/paper/gpqa-a-graduate-level-google-proof-q-a) (GPQA) represents a significant advancement in the assessment of Large Language Models' (LLMs) capabilities, especially in domains requiring deep understanding and reasoning beyond simple information retrieval. \n\nGPQA is specifically designed to be \"Google-proof,\" meaning that its questions are resistant to straightforward lookup or shallow web searches. This characteristic emphasizes the need for AI systems to demonstrate not just knowledge retrieval, but sophisticated understanding and the ability to reason through complex problems.\n\nThe benchmark's design, featuring questions of expert-level difficulty, aims to mirror the depth of understanding expected at the graduate level in a range of scientific fields. This is evident in the performance gap between current AI models and domain experts, with the latter achieving significantly higher accuracy. Such a gap highlights the challenges current LLMs face when dealing with complex, nuanced questions.\n\nRecent accuracy scores by state-of-the-art models:\n\n| Organization | Model | Diamond Set (198 Questions) |\n|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Opus | 50.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Sonnet | 40.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-4 | 35.7% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Haiku | 33.3% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Meta | Llama-2-70B-chat | 31.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-3.5 | 28.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n\n\nBy way of comparison, according to the [GPQA paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.12022v1.pdf):\n\n>...[human] experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are “Google-proof”).\n\nNote that [another Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21920/gpqa-benchmark-2025/) asks about the highest score, prior to 2025, under *any* GPQA evaluation method, whereas this question specifically asks about the zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation method.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest GPQA Diamond accuracy score (based on zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation) achieved by an artificial intelligence model in the respective calendar year according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), which may include AI lab blog posts, arXiv preprints, or published papers.", "lower_25": "73.7", "median": "82.3", "upper_75": "90.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest LLM scores on the GPQA Diamond benchmark will be 82.3 in the following years?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/).\n\nReleased in late 2023, the [Graduate-Level Google-Proof Q&A Benchmark](https://paperswithcode.com/paper/gpqa-a-graduate-level-google-proof-q-a) (GPQA) represents a significant advancement in the assessment of Large Language Models' (LLMs) capabilities, especially in domains requiring deep understanding and reasoning beyond simple information retrieval. \n\nGPQA is specifically designed to be \"Google-proof,\" meaning that its questions are resistant to straightforward lookup or shallow web searches. This characteristic emphasizes the need for AI systems to demonstrate not just knowledge retrieval, but sophisticated understanding and the ability to reason through complex problems.\n\nThe benchmark's design, featuring questions of expert-level difficulty, aims to mirror the depth of understanding expected at the graduate level in a range of scientific fields. This is evident in the performance gap between current AI models and domain experts, with the latter achieving significantly higher accuracy. Such a gap highlights the challenges current LLMs face when dealing with complex, nuanced questions.\n\nRecent accuracy scores by state-of-the-art models:\n\n| Organization | Model | Diamond Set (198 Questions) |\n|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Opus | 50.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Sonnet | 40.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-4 | 35.7% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Haiku | 33.3% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Meta | Llama-2-70B-chat | 31.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-3.5 | 28.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n\n\nBy way of comparison, according to the [GPQA paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.12022v1.pdf):\n\n>...[human] experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are “Google-proof”).\n\nNote that [another Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21920/gpqa-benchmark-2025/) asks about the highest score, prior to 2025, under *any* GPQA evaluation method, whereas this question specifically asks about the zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation method.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest GPQA Diamond accuracy score (based on zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation) achieved by an artificial intelligence model in the respective calendar year according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), which may include AI lab blog posts, arXiv preprints, or published papers.", "lower_25": "73.7", "median": "82.3", "upper_75": "90.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest LLM scores on the GPQA Diamond benchmark will be 61.5 in the following years?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/).\n\nReleased in late 2023, the [Graduate-Level Google-Proof Q&A Benchmark](https://paperswithcode.com/paper/gpqa-a-graduate-level-google-proof-q-a) (GPQA) represents a significant advancement in the assessment of Large Language Models' (LLMs) capabilities, especially in domains requiring deep understanding and reasoning beyond simple information retrieval. \n\nGPQA is specifically designed to be \"Google-proof,\" meaning that its questions are resistant to straightforward lookup or shallow web searches. This characteristic emphasizes the need for AI systems to demonstrate not just knowledge retrieval, but sophisticated understanding and the ability to reason through complex problems.\n\nThe benchmark's design, featuring questions of expert-level difficulty, aims to mirror the depth of understanding expected at the graduate level in a range of scientific fields. This is evident in the performance gap between current AI models and domain experts, with the latter achieving significantly higher accuracy. Such a gap highlights the challenges current LLMs face when dealing with complex, nuanced questions.\n\nRecent accuracy scores by state-of-the-art models:\n\n| Organization | Model | Diamond Set (198 Questions) |\n|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Opus | 50.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Sonnet | 40.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-4 | 35.7% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Haiku | 33.3% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Meta | Llama-2-70B-chat | 31.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-3.5 | 28.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n\n\nBy way of comparison, according to the [GPQA paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.12022v1.pdf):\n\n>...[human] experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are “Google-proof”).\n\nNote that [another Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21920/gpqa-benchmark-2025/) asks about the highest score, prior to 2025, under *any* GPQA evaluation method, whereas this question specifically asks about the zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation method.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest GPQA Diamond accuracy score (based on zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation) achieved by an artificial intelligence model in the respective calendar year according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), which may include AI lab blog posts, arXiv preprints, or published papers.", "lower_25": "53.1", "median": "56.7", "upper_75": "61.5", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest LLM scores on the GPQA Diamond benchmark will be 67.4 in the following years?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/).\n\nReleased in late 2023, the [Graduate-Level Google-Proof Q&A Benchmark](https://paperswithcode.com/paper/gpqa-a-graduate-level-google-proof-q-a) (GPQA) represents a significant advancement in the assessment of Large Language Models' (LLMs) capabilities, especially in domains requiring deep understanding and reasoning beyond simple information retrieval. \n\nGPQA is specifically designed to be \"Google-proof,\" meaning that its questions are resistant to straightforward lookup or shallow web searches. This characteristic emphasizes the need for AI systems to demonstrate not just knowledge retrieval, but sophisticated understanding and the ability to reason through complex problems.\n\nThe benchmark's design, featuring questions of expert-level difficulty, aims to mirror the depth of understanding expected at the graduate level in a range of scientific fields. This is evident in the performance gap between current AI models and domain experts, with the latter achieving significantly higher accuracy. Such a gap highlights the challenges current LLMs face when dealing with complex, nuanced questions.\n\nRecent accuracy scores by state-of-the-art models:\n\n| Organization | Model | Diamond Set (198 Questions) |\n|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Opus | 50.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Sonnet | 40.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-4 | 35.7% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Haiku | 33.3% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Meta | Llama-2-70B-chat | 31.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-3.5 | 28.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n\n\nBy way of comparison, according to the [GPQA paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.12022v1.pdf):\n\n>...[human] experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are “Google-proof”).\n\nNote that [another Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21920/gpqa-benchmark-2025/) asks about the highest score, prior to 2025, under *any* GPQA evaluation method, whereas this question specifically asks about the zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation method.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest GPQA Diamond accuracy score (based on zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation) achieved by an artificial intelligence model in the respective calendar year according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), which may include AI lab blog posts, arXiv preprints, or published papers.", "lower_25": "67.4", "median": "74.8", "upper_75": "83.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each party will win 1.02 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "There are 650 seats in the UK's House of Commons. In the [2019 general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_United_Kingdom_general_election):\n
  • The Conservative Party won 365 seats
  • \n
  • The Labour Party won 202 seats
  • \n
  • The Scottish National Party won 48 seats
  • \n
  • The Liberal Democrats won 11 seats
  • \n
  • The remaining 24 seats were won by Northern Irish parties (18), Plaid Cymru (4), the Green Party (1) and the Speaker of the House of Commons (1).
\n\nThe [next UK general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_United_Kingdom_general_election) is expected to be held no later than January 24, 2025 (see the relevant Metaculus question [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6368/next-uk-general-election/)).\n\nConstituency boundaries may be altered ahead of the next election. The [independent boundary reviews](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05929/) must be completed by July 1, 2023. One certain impact of these changes (if adopted in time) is that the number of Scottish seats will fall by 2, the Welsh number will fall by 8, and the English number will rise by 10.", "resc": "Each sub-question below will resolve as the number of seats won for the respective party in the next UK general election held after December 12, 2019. This question will use the [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/)'s results of the election, or credible media reports.\n\nThe Speaker of the House of Commons will not be included with their former party's count", "lower_25": "0.353", "median": "1.02", "upper_75": "2.85", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest LLM scores on the GPQA Diamond benchmark will be 67.4 in the following years?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/).\n\nReleased in late 2023, the [Graduate-Level Google-Proof Q&A Benchmark](https://paperswithcode.com/paper/gpqa-a-graduate-level-google-proof-q-a) (GPQA) represents a significant advancement in the assessment of Large Language Models' (LLMs) capabilities, especially in domains requiring deep understanding and reasoning beyond simple information retrieval. \n\nGPQA is specifically designed to be \"Google-proof,\" meaning that its questions are resistant to straightforward lookup or shallow web searches. This characteristic emphasizes the need for AI systems to demonstrate not just knowledge retrieval, but sophisticated understanding and the ability to reason through complex problems.\n\nThe benchmark's design, featuring questions of expert-level difficulty, aims to mirror the depth of understanding expected at the graduate level in a range of scientific fields. This is evident in the performance gap between current AI models and domain experts, with the latter achieving significantly higher accuracy. Such a gap highlights the challenges current LLMs face when dealing with complex, nuanced questions.\n\nRecent accuracy scores by state-of-the-art models:\n\n| Organization | Model | Diamond Set (198 Questions) |\n|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Opus | 50.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Sonnet | 40.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-4 | 35.7% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Haiku | 33.3% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Meta | Llama-2-70B-chat | 31.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-3.5 | 28.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n\n\nBy way of comparison, according to the [GPQA paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.12022v1.pdf):\n\n>...[human] experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are “Google-proof”).\n\nNote that [another Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21920/gpqa-benchmark-2025/) asks about the highest score, prior to 2025, under *any* GPQA evaluation method, whereas this question specifically asks about the zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation method.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest GPQA Diamond accuracy score (based on zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation) achieved by an artificial intelligence model in the respective calendar year according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), which may include AI lab blog posts, arXiv preprints, or published papers.", "lower_25": "67.4", "median": "74.8", "upper_75": "83.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each party will win 1.02 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "There are 650 seats in the UK's House of Commons. In the [2019 general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_United_Kingdom_general_election):\n
  • The Conservative Party won 365 seats
  • \n
  • The Labour Party won 202 seats
  • \n
  • The Scottish National Party won 48 seats
  • \n
  • The Liberal Democrats won 11 seats
  • \n
  • The remaining 24 seats were won by Northern Irish parties (18), Plaid Cymru (4), the Green Party (1) and the Speaker of the House of Commons (1).
\n\nThe [next UK general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_United_Kingdom_general_election) is expected to be held no later than January 24, 2025 (see the relevant Metaculus question [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6368/next-uk-general-election/)).\n\nConstituency boundaries may be altered ahead of the next election. The [independent boundary reviews](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05929/) must be completed by July 1, 2023. One certain impact of these changes (if adopted in time) is that the number of Scottish seats will fall by 2, the Welsh number will fall by 8, and the English number will rise by 10.", "resc": "Each sub-question below will resolve as the number of seats won for the respective party in the next UK general election held after December 12, 2019. This question will use the [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/)'s results of the election, or credible media reports.\n\nThe Speaker of the House of Commons will not be included with their former party's count", "lower_25": "0.353", "median": "1.02", "upper_75": "2.85", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest LLM scores on the GPQA Diamond benchmark will be 67.4 in the following years?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/).\n\nReleased in late 2023, the [Graduate-Level Google-Proof Q&A Benchmark](https://paperswithcode.com/paper/gpqa-a-graduate-level-google-proof-q-a) (GPQA) represents a significant advancement in the assessment of Large Language Models' (LLMs) capabilities, especially in domains requiring deep understanding and reasoning beyond simple information retrieval. \n\nGPQA is specifically designed to be \"Google-proof,\" meaning that its questions are resistant to straightforward lookup or shallow web searches. This characteristic emphasizes the need for AI systems to demonstrate not just knowledge retrieval, but sophisticated understanding and the ability to reason through complex problems.\n\nThe benchmark's design, featuring questions of expert-level difficulty, aims to mirror the depth of understanding expected at the graduate level in a range of scientific fields. This is evident in the performance gap between current AI models and domain experts, with the latter achieving significantly higher accuracy. Such a gap highlights the challenges current LLMs face when dealing with complex, nuanced questions.\n\nRecent accuracy scores by state-of-the-art models:\n\n| Organization | Model | Diamond Set (198 Questions) |\n|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Opus | 50.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Sonnet | 40.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-4 | 35.7% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Haiku | 33.3% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Meta | Llama-2-70B-chat | 31.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-3.5 | 28.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n\n\nBy way of comparison, according to the [GPQA paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.12022v1.pdf):\n\n>...[human] experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are “Google-proof”).\n\nNote that [another Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21920/gpqa-benchmark-2025/) asks about the highest score, prior to 2025, under *any* GPQA evaluation method, whereas this question specifically asks about the zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation method.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest GPQA Diamond accuracy score (based on zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation) achieved by an artificial intelligence model in the respective calendar year according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), which may include AI lab blog posts, arXiv preprints, or published papers.", "lower_25": "67.4", "median": "74.8", "upper_75": "83.2", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Greens will win 2.27 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "There are 650 seats in the UK's House of Commons. In the [2019 general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_United_Kingdom_general_election):\n
  • The Conservative Party won 365 seats
  • \n
  • The Labour Party won 202 seats
  • \n
  • The Scottish National Party won 48 seats
  • \n
  • The Liberal Democrats won 11 seats
  • \n
  • The remaining 24 seats were won by Northern Irish parties (18), Plaid Cymru (4), the Green Party (1) and the Speaker of the House of Commons (1).
\n\nThe [next UK general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_United_Kingdom_general_election) is expected to be held no later than January 24, 2025 (see the relevant Metaculus question [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6368/next-uk-general-election/)).\n\nConstituency boundaries may be altered ahead of the next election. The [independent boundary reviews](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05929/) must be completed by July 1, 2023. One certain impact of these changes (if adopted in time) is that the number of Scottish seats will fall by 2, the Welsh number will fall by 8, and the English number will rise by 10.", "resc": "Each sub-question below will resolve as the number of seats won for the respective party in the next UK general election held after December 12, 2019. This question will use the [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/)'s results of the election, or credible media reports.\n\nThe Speaker of the House of Commons will not be included with their former party's count", "lower_25": "0.533", "median": "1.18", "upper_75": "2.27", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the highest LLM scores on the GPQA Diamond benchmark will be 82.3 in the following years?", "desc": "This question is part of the [Understanding AI Series with Timothy B Lee](https://www.metaculus.com/project/3055/).\n\nReleased in late 2023, the [Graduate-Level Google-Proof Q&A Benchmark](https://paperswithcode.com/paper/gpqa-a-graduate-level-google-proof-q-a) (GPQA) represents a significant advancement in the assessment of Large Language Models' (LLMs) capabilities, especially in domains requiring deep understanding and reasoning beyond simple information retrieval. \n\nGPQA is specifically designed to be \"Google-proof,\" meaning that its questions are resistant to straightforward lookup or shallow web searches. This characteristic emphasizes the need for AI systems to demonstrate not just knowledge retrieval, but sophisticated understanding and the ability to reason through complex problems.\n\nThe benchmark's design, featuring questions of expert-level difficulty, aims to mirror the depth of understanding expected at the graduate level in a range of scientific fields. This is evident in the performance gap between current AI models and domain experts, with the latter achieving significantly higher accuracy. Such a gap highlights the challenges current LLMs face when dealing with complex, nuanced questions.\n\nRecent accuracy scores by state-of-the-art models:\n\n| Organization | Model | Diamond Set (198 Questions) |\n|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Opus | 50.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Sonnet | 40.4% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-4 | 35.7% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Anthropic | Claude 3 Haiku | 33.3% Zero-shot CoT |\n| Meta | Llama-2-70B-chat | 31.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n| OpenAI | GPT-3.5 | 28.1% Zero-shot CoT |\n\n\nBy way of comparison, according to the [GPQA paper](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.12022v1.pdf):\n\n>...[human] experts who have or are pursuing PhDs in the corresponding domains reach 65% accuracy (74% when discounting clear mistakes the experts identified in retrospect), while highly skilled non-expert validators only reach 34% accuracy, despite spending on average over 30 minutes with unrestricted access to the web (i.e., the questions are “Google-proof”).\n\nNote that [another Metaculus question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/21920/gpqa-benchmark-2025/) asks about the highest score, prior to 2025, under *any* GPQA evaluation method, whereas this question specifically asks about the zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation method.", "resc": "This question resolves as the highest GPQA Diamond accuracy score (based on zero-shot chain-of-thought evaluation) achieved by an artificial intelligence model in the respective calendar year according to [credible sources](https://www.metaculus.com/help/faq/#definitions), which may include AI lab blog posts, arXiv preprints, or published papers.", "lower_25": "73.7", "median": "82.3", "upper_75": "90.1", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Greens will win 2.27 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "There are 650 seats in the UK's House of Commons. In the [2019 general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_United_Kingdom_general_election):\n
  • The Conservative Party won 365 seats
  • \n
  • The Labour Party won 202 seats
  • \n
  • The Scottish National Party won 48 seats
  • \n
  • The Liberal Democrats won 11 seats
  • \n
  • The remaining 24 seats were won by Northern Irish parties (18), Plaid Cymru (4), the Green Party (1) and the Speaker of the House of Commons (1).
\n\nThe [next UK general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_United_Kingdom_general_election) is expected to be held no later than January 24, 2025 (see the relevant Metaculus question [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6368/next-uk-general-election/)).\n\nConstituency boundaries may be altered ahead of the next election. The [independent boundary reviews](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05929/) must be completed by July 1, 2023. One certain impact of these changes (if adopted in time) is that the number of Scottish seats will fall by 2, the Welsh number will fall by 8, and the English number will rise by 10.", "resc": "Each sub-question below will resolve as the number of seats won for the respective party in the next UK general election held after December 12, 2019. This question will use the [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/)'s results of the election, or credible media reports.\n\nThe Speaker of the House of Commons will not be included with their former party's count", "lower_25": "0.533", "median": "1.18", "upper_75": "2.27", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in Australia will be 5.52% for the following months?", "desc": "After bottoming out at 3.5% and remaining stable for several months, Australia's unemployment rate has started experiencing significant fluctuations. The Janurary 2024 unemployment rate was reported as a \"quite sharp\" rise, to 4.1% ([ABC News](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-15/unemployment-abs-labour-force-data-january-2024/103470154)), a 2-year high. The February 2024 unemployment rate, which dropped to 3.7%, was regarded as a suprise and the result of \"a larger-than-usual number of people in December and January who had a job that they were waiting to start or return to\" ([ABC News](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-21/unemployment-jobs-february-2024/103614048)).\n\nThe [Australian Bureau of Statistics](https://www.abs.gov.au/) (ABS) collects data on the labour force in Australia, \"the labour market activity of Australia's resident civilian population aged 15 years and over\". This data is released monthly, including the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate. The [methodology](https://www.abs.gov.au/methodologies/labour-force-australia-methodology/), [latest release](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/latest-release), and a [listing of all releases](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/) are published on the ABS website.\n\nIn Feburary 2024, the [Reserve Bank of Australia](https://www.rba.gov.au/) published its quarterly [Statement on Monetary Policy](https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/smp/2024/feb/contents.html), giving an assessment that \"labour market conditions are easing, but are still tight relative to full employment\". Additionally, a panel of 31 economists have forecast that unemployment to rise \"to 4.3% throughout 2024, and then to stay at about that level through 2025\" ([The Conversation](https://theconversation.com/mortgage-and-inflation-pain-to-ease-but-only-slowly-how-31-top-economists-see-2024-218927)).", "resc": "This question resolves by the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for each month, as released by the ABS in its [labour force statistics](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/), in percentages, to one decimal place.", "lower_25": "3.79", "median": "4.65", "upper_75": "5.52", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in Australia will be 5.52% for the following months?", "desc": "After bottoming out at 3.5% and remaining stable for several months, Australia's unemployment rate has started experiencing significant fluctuations. The Janurary 2024 unemployment rate was reported as a \"quite sharp\" rise, to 4.1% ([ABC News](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-15/unemployment-abs-labour-force-data-january-2024/103470154)), a 2-year high. The February 2024 unemployment rate, which dropped to 3.7%, was regarded as a suprise and the result of \"a larger-than-usual number of people in December and January who had a job that they were waiting to start or return to\" ([ABC News](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-21/unemployment-jobs-february-2024/103614048)).\n\nThe [Australian Bureau of Statistics](https://www.abs.gov.au/) (ABS) collects data on the labour force in Australia, \"the labour market activity of Australia's resident civilian population aged 15 years and over\". This data is released monthly, including the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate. The [methodology](https://www.abs.gov.au/methodologies/labour-force-australia-methodology/), [latest release](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/latest-release), and a [listing of all releases](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/) are published on the ABS website.\n\nIn Feburary 2024, the [Reserve Bank of Australia](https://www.rba.gov.au/) published its quarterly [Statement on Monetary Policy](https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/smp/2024/feb/contents.html), giving an assessment that \"labour market conditions are easing, but are still tight relative to full employment\". Additionally, a panel of 31 economists have forecast that unemployment to rise \"to 4.3% throughout 2024, and then to stay at about that level through 2025\" ([The Conversation](https://theconversation.com/mortgage-and-inflation-pain-to-ease-but-only-slowly-how-31-top-economists-see-2024-218927)).", "resc": "This question resolves by the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for each month, as released by the ABS in its [labour force statistics](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/), in percentages, to one decimal place.", "lower_25": "3.79", "median": "4.65", "upper_75": "5.52", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each party will win 1.02 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "There are 650 seats in the UK's House of Commons. In the [2019 general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_United_Kingdom_general_election):\n
  • The Conservative Party won 365 seats
  • \n
  • The Labour Party won 202 seats
  • \n
  • The Scottish National Party won 48 seats
  • \n
  • The Liberal Democrats won 11 seats
  • \n
  • The remaining 24 seats were won by Northern Irish parties (18), Plaid Cymru (4), the Green Party (1) and the Speaker of the House of Commons (1).
\n\nThe [next UK general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_United_Kingdom_general_election) is expected to be held no later than January 24, 2025 (see the relevant Metaculus question [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6368/next-uk-general-election/)).\n\nConstituency boundaries may be altered ahead of the next election. The [independent boundary reviews](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05929/) must be completed by July 1, 2023. One certain impact of these changes (if adopted in time) is that the number of Scottish seats will fall by 2, the Welsh number will fall by 8, and the English number will rise by 10.", "resc": "Each sub-question below will resolve as the number of seats won for the respective party in the next UK general election held after December 12, 2019. This question will use the [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/)'s results of the election, or credible media reports.\n\nThe Speaker of the House of Commons will not be included with their former party's count", "lower_25": "0.353", "median": "1.02", "upper_75": "2.85", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the Greens will win 2.27 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "There are 650 seats in the UK's House of Commons. In the [2019 general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_United_Kingdom_general_election):\n
  • The Conservative Party won 365 seats
  • \n
  • The Labour Party won 202 seats
  • \n
  • The Scottish National Party won 48 seats
  • \n
  • The Liberal Democrats won 11 seats
  • \n
  • The remaining 24 seats were won by Northern Irish parties (18), Plaid Cymru (4), the Green Party (1) and the Speaker of the House of Commons (1).
\n\nThe [next UK general election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_United_Kingdom_general_election) is expected to be held no later than January 24, 2025 (see the relevant Metaculus question [here](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/6368/next-uk-general-election/)).\n\nConstituency boundaries may be altered ahead of the next election. The [independent boundary reviews](https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn05929/) must be completed by July 1, 2023. One certain impact of these changes (if adopted in time) is that the number of Scottish seats will fall by 2, the Welsh number will fall by 8, and the English number will rise by 10.", "resc": "Each sub-question below will resolve as the number of seats won for the respective party in the next UK general election held after December 12, 2019. This question will use the [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/)'s results of the election, or credible media reports.\n\nThe Speaker of the House of Commons will not be included with their former party's count", "lower_25": "0.533", "median": "1.18", "upper_75": "2.27", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Python will still be the most popular programming language at the end of 2030 with an 84.9% chance?", "desc": "There are plenty of programming languages (PLs) being used across various fields of business, science, and more. Some are considered suitable for specific tasks, while others have broader applications. It is essential to understand which PLs are currently relevant so that you can focus on acquiring the skills required in the IT domain and increase your chances of finding a job. \n\nThe question itself is tricky. How can we measure the popularity of a PL? One way is to measure the percentage of PLs used in [GitHub projects](https://octoverse.github.com/2022/top-programming-languages). However, not every company uses GitHub repositories; there are alternatives such as GitLab, GitFlic, etc. Additionally, some companies use their local servers to store their projects, making it challenging to gather such information. \n\nAnother method of measuring PLs' popularity is by calculating ratings based on the hits from popular search engines, similar to what the [TIOBE index](https://www.tiobe.com/tiobe-index/programminglanguages_definition/) does. This approach is more suitable and can provide us with more representative and extensive data because most languages are continually evolving. Even experienced programmers need to stay updated with newly introduced changes. \n\nAs of March 5, 2024, Python is considered the most popular language according to the TIOBE Index. Python is a high-level, general-purpose programming language. Its design philosophy emphasizes code readability through significant indentation. Python is dynamically typed and garbage-collected. It supports multiple programming paradigms, including structured (particularly procedural), object-oriented, and functional programming. Python is widely used in data science, machine learning, web development, etc. \n\nWhile popularity alone is not the sole factor in choosing your future study area, understanding trends can be helpful. Many \"younger\" languages like Rust, Go, Swift, and others are gaining popularity and may potentially dominate in the near future.", "resc": "This question resolves as **Yes** if on December 31, 2030, Python occupies first place of the [TIOBE Index](https://www.tiobe.com/tiobe-index/) rankings. If Python is not in first place on that date, the question resolves as **No**.", "lower_25": "70.4", "median": "84.9", "upper_75": "96.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in Australia will be 5.52% for the following months (April 2024)?", "desc": "After bottoming out at 3.5% and remaining stable for several months, Australia's unemployment rate has started experiencing significant fluctuations. The Janurary 2024 unemployment rate was reported as a \"quite sharp\" rise, to 4.1% ([ABC News](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-15/unemployment-abs-labour-force-data-january-2024/103470154)), a 2-year high. The February 2024 unemployment rate, which dropped to 3.7%, was regarded as a suprise and the result of \"a larger-than-usual number of people in December and January who had a job that they were waiting to start or return to\" ([ABC News](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-21/unemployment-jobs-february-2024/103614048)).\n\nThe [Australian Bureau of Statistics](https://www.abs.gov.au/) (ABS) collects data on the labour force in Australia, \"the labour market activity of Australia's resident civilian population aged 15 years and over\". This data is released monthly, including the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate. The [methodology](https://www.abs.gov.au/methodologies/labour-force-australia-methodology/), [latest release](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/latest-release), and a [listing of all releases](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/) are published on the ABS website.\n\nIn Feburary 2024, the [Reserve Bank of Australia](https://www.rba.gov.au/) published its quarterly [Statement on Monetary Policy](https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/smp/2024/feb/contents.html), giving an assessment that \"labour market conditions are easing, but are still tight relative to full employment\". Additionally, a panel of 31 economists have forecast that unemployment to rise \"to 4.3% throughout 2024, and then to stay at about that level through 2025\" ([The Conversation](https://theconversation.com/mortgage-and-inflation-pain-to-ease-but-only-slowly-how-31-top-economists-see-2024-218927)).", "resc": "This question resolves by the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for each month, as released by the ABS in its [labour force statistics](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/), in percentages, to one decimal place.", "lower_25": "3.79", "median": "4.65", "upper_75": "5.52", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Python will still be the most popular programming language at the end of 2030 with an 84.9% chance?", "desc": "There are plenty of programming languages (PLs) being used across various fields of business, science, and more. Some are considered suitable for specific tasks, while others have broader applications. It is essential to understand which PLs are currently relevant so that you can focus on acquiring the skills required in the IT domain and increase your chances of finding a job. \n\nThe question itself is tricky. How can we measure the popularity of a PL? One way is to measure the percentage of PLs used in [GitHub projects](https://octoverse.github.com/2022/top-programming-languages). However, not every company uses GitHub repositories; there are alternatives such as GitLab, GitFlic, etc. Additionally, some companies use their local servers to store their projects, making it challenging to gather such information. \n\nAnother method of measuring PLs' popularity is by calculating ratings based on the hits from popular search engines, similar to what the [TIOBE index](https://www.tiobe.com/tiobe-index/programminglanguages_definition/) does. This approach is more suitable and can provide us with more representative and extensive data because most languages are continually evolving. Even experienced programmers need to stay updated with newly introduced changes. \n\nAs of March 5, 2024, Python is considered the most popular language according to the TIOBE Index. Python is a high-level, general-purpose programming language. Its design philosophy emphasizes code readability through significant indentation. Python is dynamically typed and garbage-collected. It supports multiple programming paradigms, including structured (particularly procedural), object-oriented, and functional programming. Python is widely used in data science, machine learning, web development, etc. \n\nWhile popularity alone is not the sole factor in choosing your future study area, understanding trends can be helpful. Many \"younger\" languages like Rust, Go, Swift, and others are gaining popularity and may potentially dominate in the near future.", "resc": "This question resolves as **Yes** if on December 31, 2030, Python occupies first place of the [TIOBE Index](https://www.tiobe.com/tiobe-index/) rankings. If Python is not in first place on that date, the question resolves as **No**.", "lower_25": "70.4", "median": "84.9", "upper_75": "96.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the DUP will win 75% of the seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in Australia will be 5.52% for the following months?", "desc": "After bottoming out at 3.5% and remaining stable for several months, Australia's unemployment rate has started experiencing significant fluctuations. The Janurary 2024 unemployment rate was reported as a \"quite sharp\" rise, to 4.1% ([ABC News](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-15/unemployment-abs-labour-force-data-january-2024/103470154)), a 2-year high. The February 2024 unemployment rate, which dropped to 3.7%, was regarded as a suprise and the result of \"a larger-than-usual number of people in December and January who had a job that they were waiting to start or return to\" ([ABC News](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-21/unemployment-jobs-february-2024/103614048)).\n\nThe [Australian Bureau of Statistics](https://www.abs.gov.au/) (ABS) collects data on the labour force in Australia, \"the labour market activity of Australia's resident civilian population aged 15 years and over\". This data is released monthly, including the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate. The [methodology](https://www.abs.gov.au/methodologies/labour-force-australia-methodology/), [latest release](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/latest-release), and a [listing of all releases](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/) are published on the ABS website.\n\nIn Feburary 2024, the [Reserve Bank of Australia](https://www.rba.gov.au/) published its quarterly [Statement on Monetary Policy](https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/smp/2024/feb/contents.html), giving an assessment that \"labour market conditions are easing, but are still tight relative to full employment\". Additionally, a panel of 31 economists have forecast that unemployment to rise \"to 4.3% throughout 2024, and then to stay at about that level through 2025\" ([The Conversation](https://theconversation.com/mortgage-and-inflation-pain-to-ease-but-only-slowly-how-31-top-economists-see-2024-218927)).", "resc": "This question resolves by the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for each month, as released by the ABS in its [labour force statistics](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/), in percentages, to one decimal place.", "lower_25": "3.79", "median": "4.65", "upper_75": "5.52", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the DUP will win 75% of the seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the IMDB rating of the special episode of Bluey titled \"The Sign\" will be 8.37 three days after it airs?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.37", "median": "8.819", "upper_75": "9.216", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Sinn Féin will win 50% of seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Python will still be the most popular programming language at the end of 2030 with an 84.9% chance?", "desc": "There are plenty of programming languages (PLs) being used across various fields of business, science, and more. Some are considered suitable for specific tasks, while others have broader applications. It is essential to understand which PLs are currently relevant so that you can focus on acquiring the skills required in the IT domain and increase your chances of finding a job. \n\nThe question itself is tricky. How can we measure the popularity of a PL? One way is to measure the percentage of PLs used in [GitHub projects](https://octoverse.github.com/2022/top-programming-languages). However, not every company uses GitHub repositories; there are alternatives such as GitLab, GitFlic, etc. Additionally, some companies use their local servers to store their projects, making it challenging to gather such information. \n\nAnother method of measuring PLs' popularity is by calculating ratings based on the hits from popular search engines, similar to what the [TIOBE index](https://www.tiobe.com/tiobe-index/programminglanguages_definition/) does. This approach is more suitable and can provide us with more representative and extensive data because most languages are continually evolving. Even experienced programmers need to stay updated with newly introduced changes. \n\nAs of March 5, 2024, Python is considered the most popular language according to the TIOBE Index. Python is a high-level, general-purpose programming language. Its design philosophy emphasizes code readability through significant indentation. Python is dynamically typed and garbage-collected. It supports multiple programming paradigms, including structured (particularly procedural), object-oriented, and functional programming. Python is widely used in data science, machine learning, web development, etc. \n\nWhile popularity alone is not the sole factor in choosing your future study area, understanding trends can be helpful. Many \"younger\" languages like Rust, Go, Swift, and others are gaining popularity and may potentially dominate in the near future.", "resc": "This question resolves as **Yes** if on December 31, 2030, Python occupies first place of the [TIOBE Index](https://www.tiobe.com/tiobe-index/) rankings. If Python is not in first place on that date, the question resolves as **No**.", "lower_25": "70.4", "median": "84.9", "upper_75": "96.7", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in Australia will be 5.52% for the following months (April 2024)?", "desc": "After bottoming out at 3.5% and remaining stable for several months, Australia's unemployment rate has started experiencing significant fluctuations. The Janurary 2024 unemployment rate was reported as a \"quite sharp\" rise, to 4.1% ([ABC News](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-15/unemployment-abs-labour-force-data-january-2024/103470154)), a 2-year high. The February 2024 unemployment rate, which dropped to 3.7%, was regarded as a suprise and the result of \"a larger-than-usual number of people in December and January who had a job that they were waiting to start or return to\" ([ABC News](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-21/unemployment-jobs-february-2024/103614048)).\n\nThe [Australian Bureau of Statistics](https://www.abs.gov.au/) (ABS) collects data on the labour force in Australia, \"the labour market activity of Australia's resident civilian population aged 15 years and over\". This data is released monthly, including the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate. The [methodology](https://www.abs.gov.au/methodologies/labour-force-australia-methodology/), [latest release](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/latest-release), and a [listing of all releases](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/) are published on the ABS website.\n\nIn Feburary 2024, the [Reserve Bank of Australia](https://www.rba.gov.au/) published its quarterly [Statement on Monetary Policy](https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/smp/2024/feb/contents.html), giving an assessment that \"labour market conditions are easing, but are still tight relative to full employment\". Additionally, a panel of 31 economists have forecast that unemployment to rise \"to 4.3% throughout 2024, and then to stay at about that level through 2025\" ([The Conversation](https://theconversation.com/mortgage-and-inflation-pain-to-ease-but-only-slowly-how-31-top-economists-see-2024-218927)).", "resc": "This question resolves by the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for each month, as released by the ABS in its [labour force statistics](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/), in percentages, to one decimal place.", "lower_25": "3.79", "median": "4.65", "upper_75": "5.52", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the DUP will win 75% of the seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the IMDB rating of the special episode of Bluey titled \"The Sign\" will be 8.37 three days after it airs?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.37", "median": "8.819", "upper_75": "9.216", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the IMDB rating of the special episode of Bluey titled \"The Sign\" will be 8.37 three days after it airs?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "8.37", "median": "8.819", "upper_75": "9.216", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Plaid Cymru will win 4.25 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.80", "median": "3.05", "upper_75": "4.25", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate in Australia will be 5.52% for the following months (April 2024)?", "desc": "After bottoming out at 3.5% and remaining stable for several months, Australia's unemployment rate has started experiencing significant fluctuations. The Janurary 2024 unemployment rate was reported as a \"quite sharp\" rise, to 4.1% ([ABC News](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-15/unemployment-abs-labour-force-data-january-2024/103470154)), a 2-year high. The February 2024 unemployment rate, which dropped to 3.7%, was regarded as a suprise and the result of \"a larger-than-usual number of people in December and January who had a job that they were waiting to start or return to\" ([ABC News](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-03-21/unemployment-jobs-february-2024/103614048)).\n\nThe [Australian Bureau of Statistics](https://www.abs.gov.au/) (ABS) collects data on the labour force in Australia, \"the labour market activity of Australia's resident civilian population aged 15 years and over\". This data is released monthly, including the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate. The [methodology](https://www.abs.gov.au/methodologies/labour-force-australia-methodology/), [latest release](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/latest-release), and a [listing of all releases](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/) are published on the ABS website.\n\nIn Feburary 2024, the [Reserve Bank of Australia](https://www.rba.gov.au/) published its quarterly [Statement on Monetary Policy](https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/smp/2024/feb/contents.html), giving an assessment that \"labour market conditions are easing, but are still tight relative to full employment\". Additionally, a panel of 31 economists have forecast that unemployment to rise \"to 4.3% throughout 2024, and then to stay at about that level through 2025\" ([The Conversation](https://theconversation.com/mortgage-and-inflation-pain-to-ease-but-only-slowly-how-31-top-economists-see-2024-218927)).", "resc": "This question resolves by the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for each month, as released by the ABS in its [labour force statistics](https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/labour/employment-and-unemployment/labour-force-australia/), in percentages, to one decimal place.", "lower_25": "3.79", "median": "4.65", "upper_75": "5.52", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Sinn Féin will win 50% of seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Sinn Féin will win 50% of seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SDLP will win 75% of seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SDLP will win 75% of seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Plaid Cymru will win 4.25 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.80", "median": "3.05", "upper_75": "4.25", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that SDLP will win 75% of seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Plaid Cymru will win 4.25 seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "1.80", "median": "3.05", "upper_75": "4.25", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that each party will win 50% of seats in the next UK general election?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "", "median": "", "upper_75": "", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United Kingdom will apply to rejoin the EU by 2039?", "desc": "Following a UK-wide [referendum in June 2016](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum), in which 52% voted to leave and 48% voted to remain in the EU, the British government formally announced the country's withdrawal in March 2017, beginning the Brexit process. Following a general election, Parliament ratified the [withdrawal agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brexit_withdrawal_agreement), and the UK left the EU at 11 p.m. GMT on 31 January 2020.\n\nThe country is currently in a transition period until at least 31 December 2020, during which the UK remains in the single market, in order to ensure frictionless trade until a long-term relationship is established. If no such agreement is reached by that date and the transition period is not extended, a no-deal Brexit would be the default outcome in 2021.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when the United Kingdom submits a membership application to the European Council to rejoin the European Union. Note that *joining* itself is not required by the given date, only the *application* to join.\n\nIf this does not occur by January 1 2050, this question will resolve as **> January 1, 2050**.", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the settle price for May 2024 Feeder Cattle futures contracts on April 15, 2024 will be 232.2?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "232.2", "median": "236.0", "upper_75": "239.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that US Customs and Border Protection will report 201k southwest land border encounters for the month of April 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "201k", "median": "224k", "upper_75": "243k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that US Customs and Border Protection will report 201k southwest land border encounters for the month of April 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "201k", "median": "224k", "upper_75": "243k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Solar Cycle 25 will end by Oct 2030?", "desc": "The end of Cycle 25 will be coincident with the minimum of Solar Cycle 26. As the baton is passed from one cycle to the next, the Sun will be characterized by depressed surface-associated magnetic activity (such as flares and prominences) and a paucity of sunspots. \n\nThe minimum amplitude of Cycle 26, indicated by the level of sunspots at the minimum, can indicate the expected strength of the cycle and future solar activity levels. As the overall field structure of the Sun is believed to harbor some [long-term memory](https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s41116-020-0022-z.pdf). As a consequence, the decline of Cycle 24, which is expected to continue into Cycle 25, provides a possible influence on Cycle 26. The ongoing minimum has so far been quite deep. According to [Spaceweather.com](http://Spaceweather.com) there have been over 100 days in 2020 on which the Sun has displayed zero sunspots, leading to speculation that the Sun may be entering a period of extended low activity, similar to historical lapses such as the Dalton and Geissman minima. The onset of Solar Cycle 26 will either confirm existence of an extended period of low activity or, alternately, signal the close of what turns out to be merely a relatively brief suppression of cycle strength.\n\nDuring a run of weak cycles and feeble solar activity, [upper atmospheric drag decreases](https://www.swpc.noaa.gov/impacts/satellite-drag#:~:text=In%20addition%20to%20these%20long,density%2C%20increasing%20drag%20on%20satellites). Over time, this will permit an increased amount of “space junk” to accumulate in low Earth orbit, leading to higher collision probabilities for satellites. Weak solar cycles are associated with decreased effectiveness of long-range terrestrial radio communication, and in extreme cases, they can possibly influence Earth's climate, as may have happened with the so-called [Maunder Minimum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maunder_Minimum) from 1645 to 1715, during which the Solar Cycle was suppressed and sunspots were rare.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when the next minimum after Solar Cycle 25's maximum occurs.\n\nThe Sunspot Index and Long-term Solar Observations ([SILSO](http://www.sidc.be/silso/cyclesminmax)) site records the number of sunspots at minimum and maximum points in the solar cycle and is expected to provide a report of Cycle 26's minimum and its date (month) of occurrence. Other reputable sources such as NASA or scientific papers will be used to provide specific dates for the resolution", "lower_25": "Oct 2030", "median": "Aug 2031", "upper_75": "Mar 2032", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Solar Cycle 25 will end by Oct 2030?", "desc": "The end of Cycle 25 will be coincident with the minimum of Solar Cycle 26. As the baton is passed from one cycle to the next, the Sun will be characterized by depressed surface-associated magnetic activity (such as flares and prominences) and a paucity of sunspots. \n\nThe minimum amplitude of Cycle 26, indicated by the level of sunspots at the minimum, can indicate the expected strength of the cycle and future solar activity levels. As the overall field structure of the Sun is believed to harbor some [long-term memory](https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s41116-020-0022-z.pdf). As a consequence, the decline of Cycle 24, which is expected to continue into Cycle 25, provides a possible influence on Cycle 26. The ongoing minimum has so far been quite deep. According to [Spaceweather.com](http://Spaceweather.com) there have been over 100 days in 2020 on which the Sun has displayed zero sunspots, leading to speculation that the Sun may be entering a period of extended low activity, similar to historical lapses such as the Dalton and Geissman minima. The onset of Solar Cycle 26 will either confirm existence of an extended period of low activity or, alternately, signal the close of what turns out to be merely a relatively brief suppression of cycle strength.\n\nDuring a run of weak cycles and feeble solar activity, [upper atmospheric drag decreases](https://www.swpc.noaa.gov/impacts/satellite-drag#:~:text=In%20addition%20to%20these%20long,density%2C%20increasing%20drag%20on%20satellites). Over time, this will permit an increased amount of “space junk” to accumulate in low Earth orbit, leading to higher collision probabilities for satellites. Weak solar cycles are associated with decreased effectiveness of long-range terrestrial radio communication, and in extreme cases, they can possibly influence Earth's climate, as may have happened with the so-called [Maunder Minimum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maunder_Minimum) from 1645 to 1715, during which the Solar Cycle was suppressed and sunspots were rare.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when the next minimum after Solar Cycle 25's maximum occurs.\n\nThe Sunspot Index and Long-term Solar Observations ([SILSO](http://www.sidc.be/silso/cyclesminmax)) site records the number of sunspots at minimum and maximum points in the solar cycle and is expected to provide a report of Cycle 26's minimum and its date (month) of occurrence. Other reputable sources such as NASA or scientific papers will be used to provide specific dates for the resolution", "lower_25": "Oct 2030", "median": "Aug 2031", "upper_75": "Mar 2032", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that US Customs and Border Protection will report 201k southwest land border encounters for the month of April 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "201k", "median": "224k", "upper_75": "243k", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the settle price for May 2024 Feeder Cattle futures contracts on April 15, 2024 will be 232.2?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "232.2", "median": "236.0", "upper_75": "239.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United Kingdom will apply to rejoin the EU by 2039?", "desc": "Following a UK-wide [referendum in June 2016](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum), in which 52% voted to leave and 48% voted to remain in the EU, the British government formally announced the country's withdrawal in March 2017, beginning the Brexit process. Following a general election, Parliament ratified the [withdrawal agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brexit_withdrawal_agreement), and the UK left the EU at 11 p.m. GMT on 31 January 2020.\n\nThe country is currently in a transition period until at least 31 December 2020, during which the UK remains in the single market, in order to ensure frictionless trade until a long-term relationship is established. If no such agreement is reached by that date and the transition period is not extended, a no-deal Brexit would be the default outcome in 2021.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when the United Kingdom submits a membership application to the European Council to rejoin the European Union. Note that *joining* itself is not required by the given date, only the *application* to join.\n\nIf this does not occur by January 1 2050, this question will resolve as **> January 1, 2050**.", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the settle price for May 2024 Feeder Cattle futures contracts on April 15, 2024 will be 232.2?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "232.2", "median": "236.0", "upper_75": "239.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 13.7 Chinese aircraft violating Taiwan's air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in a single day between May 15 and June 15, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "13.7", "median": "24.0", "upper_75": "34.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the United Kingdom will apply to rejoin the EU by 2039?", "desc": "Following a UK-wide [referendum in June 2016](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_United_Kingdom_European_Union_membership_referendum), in which 52% voted to leave and 48% voted to remain in the EU, the British government formally announced the country's withdrawal in March 2017, beginning the Brexit process. Following a general election, Parliament ratified the [withdrawal agreement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brexit_withdrawal_agreement), and the UK left the EU at 11 p.m. GMT on 31 January 2020.\n\nThe country is currently in a transition period until at least 31 December 2020, during which the UK remains in the single market, in order to ensure frictionless trade until a long-term relationship is established. If no such agreement is reached by that date and the transition period is not extended, a no-deal Brexit would be the default outcome in 2021.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the earliest date when the United Kingdom submits a membership application to the European Council to rejoin the European Union. Note that *joining* itself is not required by the given date, only the *application* to join.\n\nIf this does not occur by January 1 2050, this question will resolve as **> January 1, 2050**.", "lower_25": "2032", "median": "2039", "upper_75": "2049", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Solar Cycle 25 will end by Oct 2030?", "desc": "The end of Cycle 25 will be coincident with the minimum of Solar Cycle 26. As the baton is passed from one cycle to the next, the Sun will be characterized by depressed surface-associated magnetic activity (such as flares and prominences) and a paucity of sunspots. \n\nThe minimum amplitude of Cycle 26, indicated by the level of sunspots at the minimum, can indicate the expected strength of the cycle and future solar activity levels. As the overall field structure of the Sun is believed to harbor some [long-term memory](https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s41116-020-0022-z.pdf). As a consequence, the decline of Cycle 24, which is expected to continue into Cycle 25, provides a possible influence on Cycle 26. The ongoing minimum has so far been quite deep. According to [Spaceweather.com](http://Spaceweather.com) there have been over 100 days in 2020 on which the Sun has displayed zero sunspots, leading to speculation that the Sun may be entering a period of extended low activity, similar to historical lapses such as the Dalton and Geissman minima. The onset of Solar Cycle 26 will either confirm existence of an extended period of low activity or, alternately, signal the close of what turns out to be merely a relatively brief suppression of cycle strength.\n\nDuring a run of weak cycles and feeble solar activity, [upper atmospheric drag decreases](https://www.swpc.noaa.gov/impacts/satellite-drag#:~:text=In%20addition%20to%20these%20long,density%2C%20increasing%20drag%20on%20satellites). Over time, this will permit an increased amount of “space junk” to accumulate in low Earth orbit, leading to higher collision probabilities for satellites. Weak solar cycles are associated with decreased effectiveness of long-range terrestrial radio communication, and in extreme cases, they can possibly influence Earth's climate, as may have happened with the so-called [Maunder Minimum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maunder_Minimum) from 1645 to 1715, during which the Solar Cycle was suppressed and sunspots were rare.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the date when the next minimum after Solar Cycle 25's maximum occurs.\n\nThe Sunspot Index and Long-term Solar Observations ([SILSO](http://www.sidc.be/silso/cyclesminmax)) site records the number of sunspots at minimum and maximum points in the solar cycle and is expected to provide a report of Cycle 26's minimum and its date (month) of occurrence. Other reputable sources such as NASA or scientific papers will be used to provide specific dates for the resolution", "lower_25": "Oct 2030", "median": "Aug 2031", "upper_75": "Mar 2032", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 13.7 Chinese aircraft violating Taiwan's air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in a single day between May 15 and June 15, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "13.7", "median": "24.0", "upper_75": "34.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Denmark will rank 50th in GDP per capita (PPP) in 2030 with a GDP per capita (PPP) of 14.0?", "desc": "", "resc": "One of the most widely used metrics for country well-being comparison is the GDP per capita metric, which [intends to capture](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) \"the market value of all the final goods and services produced\". [Wikipedia provides](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28PPP%29_per_capita) a convenient overview of rankings according to different sources.\n\nOne notable thing is that countries tend to keep their relative positions over time, but not entirely so. Some countries that used to be rich are no longer (e.g., [Argentina](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_history_of_Argentina)), and others that were very poor are now rich or quickly becoming rich (e.g. [Asian tigers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_Asian_Tigers), and now China).\n\nDenmark is currently ranked 12 on the World Bank's 2019 estimates, excluding dependent territories. The question is: **What will Denmark's ranking be in 2030?**\n\nResolution will be based on [World Bank, GDP per capita, PPP](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true) estimates corresponding to the year 2030, with the exclusion of all dependent territories listed in [this Wikipedia article](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dependent_territory) at the time the World Bank estimates are released. If the Wikipedia article no longer exists but it is still reasonably clear which countries should be excluded from the criteria spelled out in that article, those will be the countries excluded for resolving the question. Otherwise, the question resolves ambiguously. If the World Bank stops publishing the dataset, the question will also resolve ambiguously.", "lower_25": "11.6", "median": "14.0", "upper_75": "17.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Denmark will rank 50th in GDP per capita (PPP) in 2030 with a GDP per capita (PPP) of 14.0?", "desc": "", "resc": "One of the most widely used metrics for country well-being comparison is the GDP per capita metric, which [intends to capture](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) \"the market value of all the final goods and services produced\". [Wikipedia provides](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28PPP%29_per_capita) a convenient overview of rankings according to different sources.\n\nOne notable thing is that countries tend to keep their relative positions over time, but not entirely so. Some countries that used to be rich are no longer (e.g., [Argentina](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_history_of_Argentina)), and others that were very poor are now rich or quickly becoming rich (e.g. [Asian tigers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_Asian_Tigers), and now China).\n\nDenmark is currently ranked 12 on the World Bank's 2019 estimates, excluding dependent territories. The question is: **What will Denmark's ranking be in 2030?**\n\nResolution will be based on [World Bank, GDP per capita, PPP](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true) estimates corresponding to the year 2030, with the exclusion of all dependent territories listed in [this Wikipedia article](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dependent_territory) at the time the World Bank estimates are released. If the Wikipedia article no longer exists but it is still reasonably clear which countries should be excluded from the criteria spelled out in that article, those will be the countries excluded for resolving the question. Otherwise, the question resolves ambiguously. If the World Bank stops publishing the dataset, the question will also resolve ambiguously.", "lower_25": "11.6", "median": "14.0", "upper_75": "17.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a human with no biological feet will run 100 meters in less than 9.572 seconds by 2041?", "desc": "", "resc": "Blades used by disabled athletes are improving, allowing them to run faster.\n\nThe current world record for the 100 meters is 9.572 seconds, ran by Usain Bolt in 2009. You can see how this record progressed over time on Wikipedia's article [Men's 100 metres world record progression](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Men%27s_100_metres_world_record_progression). Jeremy Richmond, a scientist, predicts the best possible time for a non-augmented human is 9.27 seconds (source: [Ultimate 100-Meter Time: 9.27 Seconds?](https://www.runnersworld.com/races-places/a20791832/ultimate-100-meter-time-9-27-seconds/)).\n\n**This question asks, when will a human with no biological feet run 100 meters in less than 9.572 seconds?**\n\n**If no human without biological feet runs 100 meters in less than 9.572 seconds before January 1st 2100, then this question resolves as >2100.**\n\nLiam Malone thinks it's possible – although not while respecting the rules set by the Paralympics on which artificial legs athletes can wear (source: [Usain Bolt: Para-athlete Liam Malone vows to run faster than Olympic legend](https://www.bbc.com/sport/disability-sport/40677890)).\n\nConditions:\n\n* Genetically modified humans don't count for the purpose of this question.\n\n- The artificial limbs can't have wheels or generate energy, nor have any device that produces energy, and must finish at the same height they started (ie. not convert potential gravitational energy into kinetic energy).\n \n* The run must start from an immobile position.\n\n* The athlete can't start running less than 0.1 seconds after the start signal (source: [5 Rules You Probably Didn't Know About the 100m Sprint](https://tallypress.com/fun/5-rules-you-probably-didnt-know-about-the-100m-sprint/)).\n\n* The wind speed has to be at most 3 m/s in their favor.\n\n* The run must finish before January 1st, 2100, 00:00 UDT+0.\n\n* The run must be on a flat ground.\n\n- Gravitational acceleration and air resistance must be similar to those we currently normally found on Earth.\n\n\nThe source used for resolution will be Guinness World Records, or some other appropriately reputable source as determined by Metaculus admins in communication with the community.", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2041", "upper_75": "2054", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be 13.7 Chinese aircraft violating Taiwan's air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in a single day between May 15 and June 15, 2024?", "desc": "", "resc": "", "lower_25": "13.7", "median": "24.0", "upper_75": "34.8", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a human with no biological feet will run 100 meters in less than 9.572 seconds by 2041?", "desc": "", "resc": "Blades used by disabled athletes are improving, allowing them to run faster.\n\nThe current world record for the 100 meters is 9.572 seconds, ran by Usain Bolt in 2009. You can see how this record progressed over time on Wikipedia's article [Men's 100 metres world record progression](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Men%27s_100_metres_world_record_progression). Jeremy Richmond, a scientist, predicts the best possible time for a non-augmented human is 9.27 seconds (source: [Ultimate 100-Meter Time: 9.27 Seconds?](https://www.runnersworld.com/races-places/a20791832/ultimate-100-meter-time-9-27-seconds/)).\n\n**This question asks, when will a human with no biological feet run 100 meters in less than 9.572 seconds?**\n\n**If no human without biological feet runs 100 meters in less than 9.572 seconds before January 1st 2100, then this question resolves as >2100.**\n\nLiam Malone thinks it's possible – although not while respecting the rules set by the Paralympics on which artificial legs athletes can wear (source: [Usain Bolt: Para-athlete Liam Malone vows to run faster than Olympic legend](https://www.bbc.com/sport/disability-sport/40677890)).\n\nConditions:\n\n* Genetically modified humans don't count for the purpose of this question.\n\n- The artificial limbs can't have wheels or generate energy, nor have any device that produces energy, and must finish at the same height they started (ie. not convert potential gravitational energy into kinetic energy).\n \n* The run must start from an immobile position.\n\n* The athlete can't start running less than 0.1 seconds after the start signal (source: [5 Rules You Probably Didn't Know About the 100m Sprint](https://tallypress.com/fun/5-rules-you-probably-didnt-know-about-the-100m-sprint/)).\n\n* The wind speed has to be at most 3 m/s in their favor.\n\n* The run must finish before January 1st, 2100, 00:00 UDT+0.\n\n* The run must be on a flat ground.\n\n- Gravitational acceleration and air resistance must be similar to those we currently normally found on Earth.\n\n\nThe source used for resolution will be Guinness World Records, or some other appropriately reputable source as determined by Metaculus admins in communication with the community.", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2041", "upper_75": "2054", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Denmark will rank 50th in GDP per capita (PPP) in 2030 with a GDP per capita (PPP) of 14.0?", "desc": "", "resc": "One of the most widely used metrics for country well-being comparison is the GDP per capita metric, which [intends to capture](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product) \"the market value of all the final goods and services produced\". [Wikipedia provides](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28PPP%29_per_capita) a convenient overview of rankings according to different sources.\n\nOne notable thing is that countries tend to keep their relative positions over time, but not entirely so. Some countries that used to be rich are no longer (e.g., [Argentina](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_history_of_Argentina)), and others that were very poor are now rich or quickly becoming rich (e.g. [Asian tigers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_Asian_Tigers), and now China).\n\nDenmark is currently ranked 12 on the World Bank's 2019 estimates, excluding dependent territories. The question is: **What will Denmark's ranking be in 2030?**\n\nResolution will be based on [World Bank, GDP per capita, PPP](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true) estimates corresponding to the year 2030, with the exclusion of all dependent territories listed in [this Wikipedia article](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dependent_territory) at the time the World Bank estimates are released. If the Wikipedia article no longer exists but it is still reasonably clear which countries should be excluded from the criteria spelled out in that article, those will be the countries excluded for resolving the question. Otherwise, the question resolves ambiguously. If the World Bank stops publishing the dataset, the question will also resolve ambiguously.", "lower_25": "11.6", "median": "14.0", "upper_75": "17.2", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that a human with no biological feet will run 100 meters in less than 9.572 seconds by 2041?", "desc": "", "resc": "Blades used by disabled athletes are improving, allowing them to run faster.\n\nThe current world record for the 100 meters is 9.572 seconds, ran by Usain Bolt in 2009. You can see how this record progressed over time on Wikipedia's article [Men's 100 metres world record progression](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Men%27s_100_metres_world_record_progression). Jeremy Richmond, a scientist, predicts the best possible time for a non-augmented human is 9.27 seconds (source: [Ultimate 100-Meter Time: 9.27 Seconds?](https://www.runnersworld.com/races-places/a20791832/ultimate-100-meter-time-9-27-seconds/)).\n\n**This question asks, when will a human with no biological feet run 100 meters in less than 9.572 seconds?**\n\n**If no human without biological feet runs 100 meters in less than 9.572 seconds before January 1st 2100, then this question resolves as >2100.**\n\nLiam Malone thinks it's possible – although not while respecting the rules set by the Paralympics on which artificial legs athletes can wear (source: [Usain Bolt: Para-athlete Liam Malone vows to run faster than Olympic legend](https://www.bbc.com/sport/disability-sport/40677890)).\n\nConditions:\n\n* Genetically modified humans don't count for the purpose of this question.\n\n- The artificial limbs can't have wheels or generate energy, nor have any device that produces energy, and must finish at the same height they started (ie. not convert potential gravitational energy into kinetic energy).\n \n* The run must start from an immobile position.\n\n* The athlete can't start running less than 0.1 seconds after the start signal (source: [5 Rules You Probably Didn't Know About the 100m Sprint](https://tallypress.com/fun/5-rules-you-probably-didnt-know-about-the-100m-sprint/)).\n\n* The wind speed has to be at most 3 m/s in their favor.\n\n* The run must finish before January 1st, 2100, 00:00 UDT+0.\n\n* The run must be on a flat ground.\n\n- Gravitational acceleration and air resistance must be similar to those we currently normally found on Earth.\n\n\nThe source used for resolution will be Guinness World Records, or some other appropriately reputable source as determined by Metaculus admins in communication with the community.", "lower_25": "2033", "median": "2041", "upper_75": "2054", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that outdoor air pollution will cause 75% of DALYs in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "Air pollution is one of the world's [leading risk factors for death](https://ourworldindata.org/air-pollution), and research on air pollution consistently reveals [harmful effects](https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/8/12/21361498/climate-change-air-pollution-us-india-china-deaths). These health risks are concrentrated in middle-income countries like India and China due to pollution from industrialisation.\n\nOverall, the Global Burden of Disease study estimates that outdoor air pollution was resposible for 90 million DALYs in 2017, making up 3.6% of all DALYs in that year.\n\nWhile deaths overall from air pollution have been falling, this is purely because of the [decline in indoor air pollution](https://ourworldindata.org/indoor-air-pollution); the number of deaths from outdoor air pollution has been increasing slowly over the last 20 years.\n\n**How many DALYs will be estimated to be caused by outdoor air pollution in 2030?**\n\nResolution will be by the [Global Burden of Disease Study](http://ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-results-tool), by adding the figures for the risks 'Ambient ozone pollution' and 'Ambient particulate matter pollution', or a similar reliable dataset if the IHME ceases to publish global disease figures.", "lower_25": "98.3M", "median": "113M", "upper_75": "129M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that outdoor air pollution will cause 75% of DALYs in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "Air pollution is one of the world's [leading risk factors for death](https://ourworldindata.org/air-pollution), and research on air pollution consistently reveals [harmful effects](https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/8/12/21361498/climate-change-air-pollution-us-india-china-deaths). These health risks are concrentrated in middle-income countries like India and China due to pollution from industrialisation.\n\nOverall, the Global Burden of Disease study estimates that outdoor air pollution was resposible for 90 million DALYs in 2017, making up 3.6% of all DALYs in that year.\n\nWhile deaths overall from air pollution have been falling, this is purely because of the [decline in indoor air pollution](https://ourworldindata.org/indoor-air-pollution); the number of deaths from outdoor air pollution has been increasing slowly over the last 20 years.\n\n**How many DALYs will be estimated to be caused by outdoor air pollution in 2030?**\n\nResolution will be by the [Global Burden of Disease Study](http://ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-results-tool), by adding the figures for the risks 'Ambient ozone pollution' and 'Ambient particulate matter pollution', or a similar reliable dataset if the IHME ceases to publish global disease figures.", "lower_25": "98.3M", "median": "113M", "upper_75": "129M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 80.6 proportion of the 20 largest Chinese corporations' revenue will be state-owned in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "According to Forbes, five of the world's ten largest publicly-owned companies are Chinese, including the world's largest bank by total assets, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. Despite promises for economic reform, only 3 out of 20 of the [largest Chinese companies by revenue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_Chinese_companies) are not owned by the government (usually through the SASAC). These are Ping An Insurance, Huawei, and Pacific Construction Group; in 2018, these companies had USD$359B of total revenue out of $3.7T for the top 20, or 9.7%.\n\nThis question aims to act as a barometer for the extent of privatization and restructuring (or lack thereof) occurring between now and 2035. It resolves on the release of Fortune's Global 500 2035 list, presumably mid-2036, as the revenue generated by state-owned enterprises as a percentage of the total revenue of the largest 20 Chinese-based companies. Currently, this percentage is 90.3%.\n\n'Chinese-based' includes mainland China, Hong Kong SAR and the Macau SAR, unless the latter two are not under the administration of the People's Republic of China by question resolution time.\n\n'State-owned' means that the company in question is majority-owned by a State Council institution (e.g China Investment Corporation, the SASAC of the State Council, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education), through a regional government, and/or indirect subsidiaries of any of these. If ownership is ambiguous or unclear due to a lack of information, the company is assumed to be private by default.\n\nIf the Fortune Global 500 list is not available, a credible alternative list of the largest Chinese companies by revenue may be used at the discretion of the moderators.", "lower_25": "80.6", "median": "85.9", "upper_75": "90.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP will first exceed 130% of its highest level from any previous year in 2053?", "desc": "Economic historians have often emphasized the role [economic growth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_growth) plays as perhaps the most important phenomena of human history. In a quite real sense, economic growth is what distinguishes 21st century humanity from our distant ancestors who had no technology or civilization.\n\nBy estimating historical economic growth, economists have [identified](http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/longgrow.html) two crucial events in the history of humanity which greatly accelerated the rate of growth: the agricultural revolution roughly 10,000 years ago, and the industrial revolution roughly 200 years ago.\n\nMany theorists now anticipate that there will be a another crucial event in which economic growth rates greatly accelerate, roughly timed with the development of advanced artificial intelligence. In line with these predictions, economic growth is the [primary specific benchmark](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YgNYA6pj2hPSDQiTE/distinguishing-definitions-of-takeoff) people have used to characterize potential future AI takeoff.\n\nEconomic growth here is measured by real world GDP growth over one year. However, since economic growth can also accelerate following a recession, this question will not ask about economic growth per se, but instead about GDP levels reaching a new height.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first year when world real GDP exceeds 130% of all prior years, as reported by a reputable organization such as the World Bank.\n\nThis question resolves January 1st on the year of resolution. In case the conditions for this questions are not satisfied by the end of 2200, this question resolves above the upper bound.\n\nFor context, see the World Bank's historical world real GDP growth rates [here](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG). For a longer timescale, see [this post](https://aiimpacts.org/historical-growth-trends/) from AI Impacts, and [this one](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/modeling-human-trajectory) from Open Philanthopy.", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2053", "upper_75": "2115", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first general AI system will be devised, tested, and publicly announced by 2026?", "desc": "This question is a duplicate of [this one](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/when-will-the-first-artificial-general-intelligence-system-be-devised-tested-and-publicly-known-of/) with a stronger operationalization for artificial general intelligence, and including robotic capabilities. I will copy relevant parts of that question to this one.\n\nSince the inception of the field, the goal of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research has been to develop a machine-based system that can perform the same general-purpose reasoning and problem-solving tasks humans can. While computers have surpassed humans in many information-processing abilities, this \"general\" intelligence has remained elusive.\n\nAI, and particularly machine learning (ML), is advancing rapidly, with previously human-specific tasks such as image and speech recognition, translation and even driving, now being successfully tackled by narrow AI systems.\n\nBut there is a stunning diversity of opinion about when general AI may arrive, according to published expert surveys. For example this study finds 50% of AI researchers accord a 50% probability to \"High level machine intelligence\" (HLMI) by 2040, while 20% say that 50% probability will not be reached until 2100 or later. Similarly, this survey finds an aggregated probability distribution with a 25%-75% confidence interval (comparable to Metaculus sliders below) ranging from 2040 to well past 2100.\n\nIt would be nice to tighten these probability intervals considerably, so we ask of the Metaculus community:", "resc": "We will thus define \"an AI system\" as a single unified software system that can satisfy the following criteria, all completable by at least some humans.\n\n* Able to reliably pass a 2-hour, adversarial Turing test during which the participants can send text, images, and audio files (as is done in ordinary text messaging applications) during the course of their conversation. An 'adversarial' Turing test is one in which the human judges are instructed to ask interesting and difficult questions, designed to advantage human participants, and to successfully unmask the computer as an impostor. A single demonstration of an AI passing such a Turing test, or one that is sufficiently similar, will be sufficient for this condition, so long as the test is well-designed to the estimation of Metaculus Admins.\n\n* Has general robotic capabilities, of the type able to autonomously, when equipped with appropriate actuators and when given human-readable instructions, satisfactorily assemble a (or the equivalent of a) [circa-2021 Ferrari 312 T4 1:8 scale automobile model](https://www.deagostini.com/uk/assembly-guides/). A single demonstration of this ability, or a sufficiently similar demonstration, will be considered sufficient.\n\n* High competency at a diverse fields of expertise, as measured by achieving at least 75% accuracy in every task and 90% mean accuracy across all tasks in the Q&A dataset developed by [Dan Hendrycks et al.](https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.03300).\n\n* Able to get top-1 strict accuracy of at least 90.0% on interview-level problems found in the APPS benchmark introduced by [Dan Hendrycks, Steven Basart et al](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.09938). Top-1 accuracy is distinguished, as in the paper, from top-k accuracy in which k outputs from the model are generated, and the best output is selected.\n\nBy \"unified\" we mean that the system is integrated enough that it can, for example, explain its reasoning on a Q&A task, or verbally report its progress and identify objects during model assembly. (This is not really meant to be an additional capability of \"introspection\" so much as a provision that the system not simply be cobbled together as a set of sub-systems specialized to tasks like the above, but rather a single system applicable to many problems.)\n\nResolution will come from any of three forms, whichever comes first: (1) direct demonstration of such a system achieving ALL of the above criteria, (2) confident credible statement by its developers that an existing system is able to satisfy these criteria, or (3) judgement by a majority vote in a special committee composed of the question author and two AI experts chosen in good faith by him, for the sole purpose of resolving this question. Resolution date will be the first date at which the system (subsequently judged to satisfy the criteria) and its capabilities are publicly described in a talk, press release, paper, or other report available to the general public.\n\n*[May 16, 2022 - casens: The resolution criteria have been clarified and edited. See the previous criteria in the fine print]*", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2041", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first general AI system will be devised, tested, and publicly announced by 2026?", "desc": "This question is a duplicate of [this one](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/when-will-the-first-artificial-general-intelligence-system-be-devised-tested-and-publicly-known-of/) with a stronger operationalization for artificial general intelligence, and including robotic capabilities. I will copy relevant parts of that question to this one.\n\nSince the inception of the field, the goal of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research has been to develop a machine-based system that can perform the same general-purpose reasoning and problem-solving tasks humans can. While computers have surpassed humans in many information-processing abilities, this \"general\" intelligence has remained elusive.\n\nAI, and particularly machine learning (ML), is advancing rapidly, with previously human-specific tasks such as image and speech recognition, translation and even driving, now being successfully tackled by narrow AI systems.\n\nBut there is a stunning diversity of opinion about when general AI may arrive, according to published expert surveys. For example this study finds 50% of AI researchers accord a 50% probability to \"High level machine intelligence\" (HLMI) by 2040, while 20% say that 50% probability will not be reached until 2100 or later. Similarly, this survey finds an aggregated probability distribution with a 25%-75% confidence interval (comparable to Metaculus sliders below) ranging from 2040 to well past 2100.\n\nIt would be nice to tighten these probability intervals considerably, so we ask of the Metaculus community:", "resc": "We will thus define \"an AI system\" as a single unified software system that can satisfy the following criteria, all completable by at least some humans.\n\n* Able to reliably pass a 2-hour, adversarial Turing test during which the participants can send text, images, and audio files (as is done in ordinary text messaging applications) during the course of their conversation. An 'adversarial' Turing test is one in which the human judges are instructed to ask interesting and difficult questions, designed to advantage human participants, and to successfully unmask the computer as an impostor. A single demonstration of an AI passing such a Turing test, or one that is sufficiently similar, will be sufficient for this condition, so long as the test is well-designed to the estimation of Metaculus Admins.\n\n* Has general robotic capabilities, of the type able to autonomously, when equipped with appropriate actuators and when given human-readable instructions, satisfactorily assemble a (or the equivalent of a) [circa-2021 Ferrari 312 T4 1:8 scale automobile model](https://www.deagostini.com/uk/assembly-guides/). A single demonstration of this ability, or a sufficiently similar demonstration, will be considered sufficient.\n\n* High competency at a diverse fields of expertise, as measured by achieving at least 75% accuracy in every task and 90% mean accuracy across all tasks in the Q&A dataset developed by [Dan Hendrycks et al.](https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.03300).\n\n* Able to get top-1 strict accuracy of at least 90.0% on interview-level problems found in the APPS benchmark introduced by [Dan Hendrycks, Steven Basart et al](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.09938). Top-1 accuracy is distinguished, as in the paper, from top-k accuracy in which k outputs from the model are generated, and the best output is selected.\n\nBy \"unified\" we mean that the system is integrated enough that it can, for example, explain its reasoning on a Q&A task, or verbally report its progress and identify objects during model assembly. (This is not really meant to be an additional capability of \"introspection\" so much as a provision that the system not simply be cobbled together as a set of sub-systems specialized to tasks like the above, but rather a single system applicable to many problems.)\n\nResolution will come from any of three forms, whichever comes first: (1) direct demonstration of such a system achieving ALL of the above criteria, (2) confident credible statement by its developers that an existing system is able to satisfy these criteria, or (3) judgement by a majority vote in a special committee composed of the question author and two AI experts chosen in good faith by him, for the sole purpose of resolving this question. Resolution date will be the first date at which the system (subsequently judged to satisfy the criteria) and its capabilities are publicly described in a talk, press release, paper, or other report available to the general public.\n\n*[May 16, 2022 - casens: The resolution criteria have been clarified and edited. See the previous criteria in the fine print]*", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2041", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first general AI system will be devised, tested, and publicly announced by 2026?", "desc": "This question is a duplicate of [this one](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/3479/when-will-the-first-artificial-general-intelligence-system-be-devised-tested-and-publicly-known-of/) with a stronger operationalization for artificial general intelligence, and including robotic capabilities. I will copy relevant parts of that question to this one.\n\nSince the inception of the field, the goal of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research has been to develop a machine-based system that can perform the same general-purpose reasoning and problem-solving tasks humans can. While computers have surpassed humans in many information-processing abilities, this \"general\" intelligence has remained elusive.\n\nAI, and particularly machine learning (ML), is advancing rapidly, with previously human-specific tasks such as image and speech recognition, translation and even driving, now being successfully tackled by narrow AI systems.\n\nBut there is a stunning diversity of opinion about when general AI may arrive, according to published expert surveys. For example this study finds 50% of AI researchers accord a 50% probability to \"High level machine intelligence\" (HLMI) by 2040, while 20% say that 50% probability will not be reached until 2100 or later. Similarly, this survey finds an aggregated probability distribution with a 25%-75% confidence interval (comparable to Metaculus sliders below) ranging from 2040 to well past 2100.\n\nIt would be nice to tighten these probability intervals considerably, so we ask of the Metaculus community:", "resc": "We will thus define \"an AI system\" as a single unified software system that can satisfy the following criteria, all completable by at least some humans.\n\n* Able to reliably pass a 2-hour, adversarial Turing test during which the participants can send text, images, and audio files (as is done in ordinary text messaging applications) during the course of their conversation. An 'adversarial' Turing test is one in which the human judges are instructed to ask interesting and difficult questions, designed to advantage human participants, and to successfully unmask the computer as an impostor. A single demonstration of an AI passing such a Turing test, or one that is sufficiently similar, will be sufficient for this condition, so long as the test is well-designed to the estimation of Metaculus Admins.\n\n* Has general robotic capabilities, of the type able to autonomously, when equipped with appropriate actuators and when given human-readable instructions, satisfactorily assemble a (or the equivalent of a) [circa-2021 Ferrari 312 T4 1:8 scale automobile model](https://www.deagostini.com/uk/assembly-guides/). A single demonstration of this ability, or a sufficiently similar demonstration, will be considered sufficient.\n\n* High competency at a diverse fields of expertise, as measured by achieving at least 75% accuracy in every task and 90% mean accuracy across all tasks in the Q&A dataset developed by [Dan Hendrycks et al.](https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.03300).\n\n* Able to get top-1 strict accuracy of at least 90.0% on interview-level problems found in the APPS benchmark introduced by [Dan Hendrycks, Steven Basart et al](https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.09938). Top-1 accuracy is distinguished, as in the paper, from top-k accuracy in which k outputs from the model are generated, and the best output is selected.\n\nBy \"unified\" we mean that the system is integrated enough that it can, for example, explain its reasoning on a Q&A task, or verbally report its progress and identify objects during model assembly. (This is not really meant to be an additional capability of \"introspection\" so much as a provision that the system not simply be cobbled together as a set of sub-systems specialized to tasks like the above, but rather a single system applicable to many problems.)\n\nResolution will come from any of three forms, whichever comes first: (1) direct demonstration of such a system achieving ALL of the above criteria, (2) confident credible statement by its developers that an existing system is able to satisfy these criteria, or (3) judgement by a majority vote in a special committee composed of the question author and two AI experts chosen in good faith by him, for the sole purpose of resolving this question. Resolution date will be the first date at which the system (subsequently judged to satisfy the criteria) and its capabilities are publicly described in a talk, press release, paper, or other report available to the general public.\n\n*[May 16, 2022 - casens: The resolution criteria have been clarified and edited. See the previous criteria in the fine print]*", "lower_25": "2026", "median": "2031", "upper_75": "2041", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Bitcoin will lose its position as market dominant cryptocurrency by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "Bitcoin (BTC) is one of hundreds of cryptocurrencies. While [not exactly the first 'digital gold'](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_bitcoin#Pre-history), it is the first successful and enjoys a first mover advantage in the competition in terms of market share (of all money invested in cryptocurrency). In the summer of 2017, Bitcoin seemed poised to lose its position as coin number 1 to Ethereum (ETH), however, it eventually gained back its dominance. Also in early 2018, BTC lost dominance and was down to about 33% of the market, but then again bounced back. It currently has a market share of 57% according to [coinmarketcap.com's estimate](https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/#dominance-percentage).\n\n***When will Bitcoin lose its position as number one cryptocurrency?***\n\nThis question will resolve on the date that Bitcoin no longer has the highest market share of any single cryptocurrency, according to [coinmarketcap](https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/#dominance-percentage).\n\nIf this does not occur by September 5, 2050, this question will resolve as **> September 5, 2050**.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that outdoor air pollution will cause 75% of DALYs in 2030?", "desc": "", "resc": "Air pollution is one of the world's [leading risk factors for death](https://ourworldindata.org/air-pollution), and research on air pollution consistently reveals [harmful effects](https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/8/12/21361498/climate-change-air-pollution-us-india-china-deaths). These health risks are concrentrated in middle-income countries like India and China due to pollution from industrialisation.\n\nOverall, the Global Burden of Disease study estimates that outdoor air pollution was resposible for 90 million DALYs in 2017, making up 3.6% of all DALYs in that year.\n\nWhile deaths overall from air pollution have been falling, this is purely because of the [decline in indoor air pollution](https://ourworldindata.org/indoor-air-pollution); the number of deaths from outdoor air pollution has been increasing slowly over the last 20 years.\n\n**How many DALYs will be estimated to be caused by outdoor air pollution in 2030?**\n\nResolution will be by the [Global Burden of Disease Study](http://ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-results-tool), by adding the figures for the risks 'Ambient ozone pollution' and 'Ambient particulate matter pollution', or a similar reliable dataset if the IHME ceases to publish global disease figures.", "lower_25": "98.3M", "median": "113M", "upper_75": "129M", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Bitcoin will lose its position as market dominant cryptocurrency by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "Bitcoin (BTC) is one of hundreds of cryptocurrencies. While [not exactly the first 'digital gold'](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_bitcoin#Pre-history), it is the first successful and enjoys a first mover advantage in the competition in terms of market share (of all money invested in cryptocurrency). In the summer of 2017, Bitcoin seemed poised to lose its position as coin number 1 to Ethereum (ETH), however, it eventually gained back its dominance. Also in early 2018, BTC lost dominance and was down to about 33% of the market, but then again bounced back. It currently has a market share of 57% according to [coinmarketcap.com's estimate](https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/#dominance-percentage).\n\n***When will Bitcoin lose its position as number one cryptocurrency?***\n\nThis question will resolve on the date that Bitcoin no longer has the highest market share of any single cryptocurrency, according to [coinmarketcap](https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/#dominance-percentage).\n\nIf this does not occur by September 5, 2050, this question will resolve as **> September 5, 2050**.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP will first exceed 130% of its highest level from any previous year in 2053?", "desc": "Economic historians have often emphasized the role [economic growth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_growth) plays as perhaps the most important phenomena of human history. In a quite real sense, economic growth is what distinguishes 21st century humanity from our distant ancestors who had no technology or civilization.\n\nBy estimating historical economic growth, economists have [identified](http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/longgrow.html) two crucial events in the history of humanity which greatly accelerated the rate of growth: the agricultural revolution roughly 10,000 years ago, and the industrial revolution roughly 200 years ago.\n\nMany theorists now anticipate that there will be a another crucial event in which economic growth rates greatly accelerate, roughly timed with the development of advanced artificial intelligence. In line with these predictions, economic growth is the [primary specific benchmark](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YgNYA6pj2hPSDQiTE/distinguishing-definitions-of-takeoff) people have used to characterize potential future AI takeoff.\n\nEconomic growth here is measured by real world GDP growth over one year. However, since economic growth can also accelerate following a recession, this question will not ask about economic growth per se, but instead about GDP levels reaching a new height.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first year when world real GDP exceeds 130% of all prior years, as reported by a reputable organization such as the World Bank.\n\nThis question resolves January 1st on the year of resolution. In case the conditions for this questions are not satisfied by the end of 2200, this question resolves above the upper bound.\n\nFor context, see the World Bank's historical world real GDP growth rates [here](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG). For a longer timescale, see [this post](https://aiimpacts.org/historical-growth-trends/) from AI Impacts, and [this one](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/modeling-human-trajectory) from Open Philanthopy.", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2053", "upper_75": "2115", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the world's real GDP will first exceed 130% of its highest level from any previous year in 2053?", "desc": "Economic historians have often emphasized the role [economic growth](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_growth) plays as perhaps the most important phenomena of human history. In a quite real sense, economic growth is what distinguishes 21st century humanity from our distant ancestors who had no technology or civilization.\n\nBy estimating historical economic growth, economists have [identified](http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/longgrow.html) two crucial events in the history of humanity which greatly accelerated the rate of growth: the agricultural revolution roughly 10,000 years ago, and the industrial revolution roughly 200 years ago.\n\nMany theorists now anticipate that there will be a another crucial event in which economic growth rates greatly accelerate, roughly timed with the development of advanced artificial intelligence. In line with these predictions, economic growth is the [primary specific benchmark](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/YgNYA6pj2hPSDQiTE/distinguishing-definitions-of-takeoff) people have used to characterize potential future AI takeoff.\n\nEconomic growth here is measured by real world GDP growth over one year. However, since economic growth can also accelerate following a recession, this question will not ask about economic growth per se, but instead about GDP levels reaching a new height.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the first year when world real GDP exceeds 130% of all prior years, as reported by a reputable organization such as the World Bank.\n\nThis question resolves January 1st on the year of resolution. In case the conditions for this questions are not satisfied by the end of 2200, this question resolves above the upper bound.\n\nFor context, see the World Bank's historical world real GDP growth rates [here](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG). For a longer timescale, see [this post](https://aiimpacts.org/historical-growth-trends/) from AI Impacts, and [this one](https://www.openphilanthropy.org/blog/modeling-human-trajectory) from Open Philanthopy.", "lower_25": "2036", "median": "2053", "upper_75": "2115", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the probability that Amazon will deliver some products by drone by May 2025?", "desc": "[Amazon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amazon_(company)) is a technology company best known for its online shopping website. It is the [third largest company in the world](https://www.thebalance.com/market-capitalization-3305826) by market cap.\n\n[Amazon Prime Air](https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-Prime-Air) is a program under development that plans to deliver packages to customers using drones, or uncrewed aerial vehicles (quadcopters and the like). The program has suffered substantial delays. When it was revealed in 2013, CEO Jeff Bezos predicted that drone delivery would be available by [2018](https://www.businessinsider.com/jeff-bezos-predicted-amazon-would-be-making-drone-deliveries-by-2018-2018-12). Test deliveries were first made in 2016. In 2019, Amazon stated that drone delivery would be available [within months](https://abcnews.go.com/Business/amazon-promises-drone-delivery-months/story?id=63494811). However, as of September 2020, drone delivery is still apparently under development.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date when, according credible media reports or the Amazon website itself, a consumer in one of the 20 largest U.S. cities can order some product on Amazon.com and have it delivered by an uncrewed aerial vehicle.", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "Sep 2026", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Aug 2027", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that Bitcoin will lose its position as market dominant cryptocurrency by 2050?", "desc": "", "resc": "Bitcoin (BTC) is one of hundreds of cryptocurrencies. While [not exactly the first 'digital gold'](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_bitcoin#Pre-history), it is the first successful and enjoys a first mover advantage in the competition in terms of market share (of all money invested in cryptocurrency). In the summer of 2017, Bitcoin seemed poised to lose its position as coin number 1 to Ethereum (ETH), however, it eventually gained back its dominance. Also in early 2018, BTC lost dominance and was down to about 33% of the market, but then again bounced back. It currently has a market share of 57% according to [coinmarketcap.com's estimate](https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/#dominance-percentage).\n\n***When will Bitcoin lose its position as number one cryptocurrency?***\n\nThis question will resolve on the date that Bitcoin no longer has the highest market share of any single cryptocurrency, according to [coinmarketcap](https://coinmarketcap.com/charts/#dominance-percentage).\n\nIf this does not occur by September 5, 2050, this question will resolve as **> September 5, 2050**.", "lower_25": "2028", "median": "2034", "upper_75": "2050", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 80.6 proportion of the 20 largest Chinese corporations' revenue will be state-owned in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "According to Forbes, five of the world's ten largest publicly-owned companies are Chinese, including the world's largest bank by total assets, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. Despite promises for economic reform, only 3 out of 20 of the [largest Chinese companies by revenue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_Chinese_companies) are not owned by the government (usually through the SASAC). These are Ping An Insurance, Huawei, and Pacific Construction Group; in 2018, these companies had USD$359B of total revenue out of $3.7T for the top 20, or 9.7%.\n\nThis question aims to act as a barometer for the extent of privatization and restructuring (or lack thereof) occurring between now and 2035. It resolves on the release of Fortune's Global 500 2035 list, presumably mid-2036, as the revenue generated by state-owned enterprises as a percentage of the total revenue of the largest 20 Chinese-based companies. Currently, this percentage is 90.3%.\n\n'Chinese-based' includes mainland China, Hong Kong SAR and the Macau SAR, unless the latter two are not under the administration of the People's Republic of China by question resolution time.\n\n'State-owned' means that the company in question is majority-owned by a State Council institution (e.g China Investment Corporation, the SASAC of the State Council, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education), through a regional government, and/or indirect subsidiaries of any of these. If ownership is ambiguous or unclear due to a lack of information, the company is assumed to be private by default.\n\nIf the Fortune Global 500 list is not available, a credible alternative list of the largest Chinese companies by revenue may be used at the discretion of the moderators.", "lower_25": "80.6", "median": "85.9", "upper_75": "90.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the probability that Amazon will deliver some products by drone by May 2025?", "desc": "[Amazon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amazon_(company)) is a technology company best known for its online shopping website. It is the [third largest company in the world](https://www.thebalance.com/market-capitalization-3305826) by market cap.\n\n[Amazon Prime Air](https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-Prime-Air) is a program under development that plans to deliver packages to customers using drones, or uncrewed aerial vehicles (quadcopters and the like). The program has suffered substantial delays. When it was revealed in 2013, CEO Jeff Bezos predicted that drone delivery would be available by [2018](https://www.businessinsider.com/jeff-bezos-predicted-amazon-would-be-making-drone-deliveries-by-2018-2018-12). Test deliveries were first made in 2016. In 2019, Amazon stated that drone delivery would be available [within months](https://abcnews.go.com/Business/amazon-promises-drone-delivery-months/story?id=63494811). However, as of September 2020, drone delivery is still apparently under development.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date when, according credible media reports or the Amazon website itself, a consumer in one of the 20 largest U.S. cities can order some product on Amazon.com and have it delivered by an uncrewed aerial vehicle.", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "Sep 2026", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Aug 2027", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first human head transplant will not occur before Sep 2047?", "desc": "", "resc": "Transplantation of tissue — including organs — from one human (or nonhuman) to another is an amazing advance in medicine that has now saved many lives. Complex organs including the heart and liver are now routinely transplanted, and in many cases even quite complex severed nerves can be reattached.\n\nMuch more audacious is the possibility of transplanting a human head. (Or should it be considered a full-body transplant?) \nThe difficulties are obviously daunting: not just the spine, but major arteries, throat, etc., must all be reattached while keeping the brain alive.\n\nRecently, the media has been abuzz with news that Sergio Canavero and his colleague Xiaoping Ren of China plan to transplant a human head from a living person onto a donor cadaver. The two surgeons — who portray themselves as pioneers defying a stodgy medical establishment but are considered reckless renegades by many peers — say the head donor will be someone with a degenerative disease, whose body is wasting away while his or her mind remains active.\n\nThe body donor, meanwhile, will likely be a someone who died of severe head trauma but whose body was left unscathed. The researchers claim to have been perfecting the technique on mice, a dog, a monkey, and, recently, a human cadaver. Originally, they predicted a fall 2017 transplant but now [just say it is “imminent.”](https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/11/17/italian-doctor-says-worlds-first-human-head-transplant-imminent/847288001/).\n\n**When will will a human head transplant operation be performed**\n\nResolution is positive regardless of the survival of the patient after the operation. Positive resolution requires the patient who provides the donor head to be alive right before the procedure: the patient providing the donor head should not be declared legally dead 48 hours or more before the transplant occurs. Brain-only transplants do not count towards positive resolution.", "lower_25": "Nov 2042", "median": "Not ≤ Sep 2047", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Sep 2047", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that 80.6 proportion of the 20 largest Chinese corporations' revenue will be state-owned in 2035?", "desc": "", "resc": "According to Forbes, five of the world's ten largest publicly-owned companies are Chinese, including the world's largest bank by total assets, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. Despite promises for economic reform, only 3 out of 20 of the [largest Chinese companies by revenue](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_Chinese_companies) are not owned by the government (usually through the SASAC). These are Ping An Insurance, Huawei, and Pacific Construction Group; in 2018, these companies had USD$359B of total revenue out of $3.7T for the top 20, or 9.7%.\n\nThis question aims to act as a barometer for the extent of privatization and restructuring (or lack thereof) occurring between now and 2035. It resolves on the release of Fortune's Global 500 2035 list, presumably mid-2036, as the revenue generated by state-owned enterprises as a percentage of the total revenue of the largest 20 Chinese-based companies. Currently, this percentage is 90.3%.\n\n'Chinese-based' includes mainland China, Hong Kong SAR and the Macau SAR, unless the latter two are not under the administration of the People's Republic of China by question resolution time.\n\n'State-owned' means that the company in question is majority-owned by a State Council institution (e.g China Investment Corporation, the SASAC of the State Council, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education), through a regional government, and/or indirect subsidiaries of any of these. If ownership is ambiguous or unclear due to a lack of information, the company is assumed to be private by default.\n\nIf the Fortune Global 500 list is not available, a credible alternative list of the largest Chinese companies by revenue may be used at the discretion of the moderators.", "lower_25": "80.6", "median": "85.9", "upper_75": "90.7", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first human head transplant will not occur before Sep 2047?", "desc": "", "resc": "Transplantation of tissue — including organs — from one human (or nonhuman) to another is an amazing advance in medicine that has now saved many lives. Complex organs including the heart and liver are now routinely transplanted, and in many cases even quite complex severed nerves can be reattached.\n\nMuch more audacious is the possibility of transplanting a human head. (Or should it be considered a full-body transplant?) \nThe difficulties are obviously daunting: not just the spine, but major arteries, throat, etc., must all be reattached while keeping the brain alive.\n\nRecently, the media has been abuzz with news that Sergio Canavero and his colleague Xiaoping Ren of China plan to transplant a human head from a living person onto a donor cadaver. The two surgeons — who portray themselves as pioneers defying a stodgy medical establishment but are considered reckless renegades by many peers — say the head donor will be someone with a degenerative disease, whose body is wasting away while his or her mind remains active.\n\nThe body donor, meanwhile, will likely be a someone who died of severe head trauma but whose body was left unscathed. The researchers claim to have been perfecting the technique on mice, a dog, a monkey, and, recently, a human cadaver. Originally, they predicted a fall 2017 transplant but now [just say it is “imminent.”](https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/11/17/italian-doctor-says-worlds-first-human-head-transplant-imminent/847288001/).\n\n**When will will a human head transplant operation be performed**\n\nResolution is positive regardless of the survival of the patient after the operation. Positive resolution requires the patient who provides the donor head to be alive right before the procedure: the patient providing the donor head should not be declared legally dead 48 hours or more before the transplant occurs. Brain-only transplants do not count towards positive resolution.", "lower_25": "Nov 2042", "median": "Not ≤ Sep 2047", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Sep 2047", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the first human head transplant will not occur before Sep 2047?", "desc": "", "resc": "Transplantation of tissue — including organs — from one human (or nonhuman) to another is an amazing advance in medicine that has now saved many lives. Complex organs including the heart and liver are now routinely transplanted, and in many cases even quite complex severed nerves can be reattached.\n\nMuch more audacious is the possibility of transplanting a human head. (Or should it be considered a full-body transplant?) \nThe difficulties are obviously daunting: not just the spine, but major arteries, throat, etc., must all be reattached while keeping the brain alive.\n\nRecently, the media has been abuzz with news that Sergio Canavero and his colleague Xiaoping Ren of China plan to transplant a human head from a living person onto a donor cadaver. The two surgeons — who portray themselves as pioneers defying a stodgy medical establishment but are considered reckless renegades by many peers — say the head donor will be someone with a degenerative disease, whose body is wasting away while his or her mind remains active.\n\nThe body donor, meanwhile, will likely be a someone who died of severe head trauma but whose body was left unscathed. The researchers claim to have been perfecting the technique on mice, a dog, a monkey, and, recently, a human cadaver. Originally, they predicted a fall 2017 transplant but now [just say it is “imminent.”](https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/11/17/italian-doctor-says-worlds-first-human-head-transplant-imminent/847288001/).\n\n**When will will a human head transplant operation be performed**\n\nResolution is positive regardless of the survival of the patient after the operation. Positive resolution requires the patient who provides the donor head to be alive right before the procedure: the patient providing the donor head should not be declared legally dead 48 hours or more before the transplant occurs. Brain-only transplants do not count towards positive resolution.", "lower_25": "Nov 2042", "median": "Not ≤ Sep 2047", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Sep 2047", "prediction": "50%"} -{"title": "What is the probability that Amazon will deliver some products by drone by May 2025?", "desc": "[Amazon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amazon_(company)) is a technology company best known for its online shopping website. It is the [third largest company in the world](https://www.thebalance.com/market-capitalization-3305826) by market cap.\n\n[Amazon Prime Air](https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-Prime-Air) is a program under development that plans to deliver packages to customers using drones, or uncrewed aerial vehicles (quadcopters and the like). The program has suffered substantial delays. When it was revealed in 2013, CEO Jeff Bezos predicted that drone delivery would be available by [2018](https://www.businessinsider.com/jeff-bezos-predicted-amazon-would-be-making-drone-deliveries-by-2018-2018-12). Test deliveries were first made in 2016. In 2019, Amazon stated that drone delivery would be available [within months](https://abcnews.go.com/Business/amazon-promises-drone-delivery-months/story?id=63494811). However, as of September 2020, drone delivery is still apparently under development.", "resc": "This question resolves as the date when, according credible media reports or the Amazon website itself, a consumer in one of the 20 largest U.S. cities can order some product on Amazon.com and have it delivered by an uncrewed aerial vehicle.", "lower_25": "May 2025", "median": "Sep 2026", "upper_75": "Not ≤ Aug 2027", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a total of 25.9k fatalities from terrorism in the world by 2025?", "desc": "\n\n[Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism) notes that \"terrorism\" is a difficult term to define:\n\n>The key problem is that terrorism is difficult to distinguish from other forms of political violence and violent crime, such as state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, hate crime, and homicide. The lines between these different forms of violence are often blurry.\n\nTo quantify casualties from global terrorism, OWID uses the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is maintained by the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ([START](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)). GTD uses [this definition](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf) of terrorism:\n\n>The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice this means in order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present:\n>\n> * **The incident must be intentional** – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.\n> * **The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence** -including property violence, as well as violence against people.\n> * **The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.** The database does not include acts of state terrorism.\n>\n>In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD:\n>\n> * **Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.** In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.\n> * **Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.** It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.\n> * **Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.** That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).\n\nOWID discusses some of the limitations of GTD and other sources in [this article](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#data-quality).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of fatalities caused by terrorism in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/incidence-of-terrorism?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2019 the total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in the world was 20,329.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "13.9k", "median": "19.0k", "upper_75": "25.9k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average S&P 500 return in the 2020s will be 9.40?", "desc": "", "resc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%26P_500_Index),\n\n> The S&P 500, or simply the S&P, is a stock market index that measures the stock performance of 500 large companies listed on stock exchanges in the United States. It is one of the most commonly followed equity indices. The average annual total return and compound annual growth rate of the index, including dividends, since inception in 1926 has been approximately 9.8%, or 6% after inflation; however, there were several years where the index declined over 30%. The index has posted annual increases 70% of the time. However, the index has only made new highs on 5% of trading days, meaning that on 95% of trading days, the index has closed below its all-time high.\n\nHistorical total returns for the S&P 500 can be found [here](https://www.slickcharts.com/sp500/returns).\n\n***What will be the 10 year compound annual growth rate for the S&P 500 in the 2020s?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the 10 year [compound annual growth rate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compound_annual_growth_rate) of total returns (*not* adjusted for inflation, and including dividends) for the S&P 500 over the ten years 2020-2029 in percentage points, rounded to the second digit.", "lower_25": "3.79", "median": "6.70", "upper_75": "9.40", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average S&P 500 return in the 2020s will be 9.40?", "desc": "", "resc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%26P_500_Index),\n\n> The S&P 500, or simply the S&P, is a stock market index that measures the stock performance of 500 large companies listed on stock exchanges in the United States. It is one of the most commonly followed equity indices. The average annual total return and compound annual growth rate of the index, including dividends, since inception in 1926 has been approximately 9.8%, or 6% after inflation; however, there were several years where the index declined over 30%. The index has posted annual increases 70% of the time. However, the index has only made new highs on 5% of trading days, meaning that on 95% of trading days, the index has closed below its all-time high.\n\nHistorical total returns for the S&P 500 can be found [here](https://www.slickcharts.com/sp500/returns).\n\n***What will be the 10 year compound annual growth rate for the S&P 500 in the 2020s?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the 10 year [compound annual growth rate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compound_annual_growth_rate) of total returns (*not* adjusted for inflation, and including dividends) for the S&P 500 over the ten years 2020-2029 in percentage points, rounded to the second digit.", "lower_25": "3.79", "median": "6.70", "upper_75": "9.40", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that KARI will launch a crewed mission by 2035?", "desc": "For the majority of time humans have been exploring space, there were only two nations with their own access to space, the United States and the Soviet Union. Following the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation inherited the Soviet space program, which is known today as [Roscosmos](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roscosmos). China has [since joined the ranks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shenzhou_5) of nations with human spaceflight, and now they're building [the nation's first multimodular space station](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiangong_space_station).\n\nThree other government space agencies are well positioned to join the US, Russia, and China as the select few with human spaceflight capabilities. They are: the [European Space Agency (ESA)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Space_Agency), [Japan Aerospace and Exploration Agency (JAXA)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JAXA), and the [Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Space_Research_Organisation) (ISRO). There is also the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI). The first three agencies have independent launch capabilities and the ability to operate space probes. \n\nIn the case of India's ISRO, Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared in 2018 that [\"a son or a daughter of India will go to Space from Indian soil by an Indian vehicle by 2022 (75th year of Indian independence) or sooner](https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=183103)\". ISRO has scheduled its first crewed mission — [Gaganyaan 3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaganyaan#Development) — for sometime in 2024.", "resc": "Each of the following agency-specific questions will resolve as the date when at least one crewed member from that space agency reaches orbit. To qualify, the launch must be independent, meaning: a member of that space agency must be aboard a craft that is launched from that agency's vehicle on that agency's sovereign territory. Any space agency which does not launch a crewed mission before January 1, 2036, will resolve as **\">December 31, 2035\"**.", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that KARI will launch a crewed mission by 2035?", "desc": "For the majority of time humans have been exploring space, there were only two nations with their own access to space, the United States and the Soviet Union. Following the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation inherited the Soviet space program, which is known today as [Roscosmos](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roscosmos). China has [since joined the ranks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shenzhou_5) of nations with human spaceflight, and now they're building [the nation's first multimodular space station](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiangong_space_station).\n\nThree other government space agencies are well positioned to join the US, Russia, and China as the select few with human spaceflight capabilities. They are: the [European Space Agency (ESA)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Space_Agency), [Japan Aerospace and Exploration Agency (JAXA)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JAXA), and the [Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Space_Research_Organisation) (ISRO). There is also the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI). The first three agencies have independent launch capabilities and the ability to operate space probes. \n\nIn the case of India's ISRO, Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared in 2018 that [\"a son or a daughter of India will go to Space from Indian soil by an Indian vehicle by 2022 (75th year of Indian independence) or sooner](https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=183103)\". ISRO has scheduled its first crewed mission — [Gaganyaan 3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaganyaan#Development) — for sometime in 2024.", "resc": "Each of the following agency-specific questions will resolve as the date when at least one crewed member from that space agency reaches orbit. To qualify, the launch must be independent, meaning: a member of that space agency must be aboard a craft that is launched from that agency's vehicle on that agency's sovereign territory. Any space agency which does not launch a crewed mission before January 1, 2036, will resolve as **\">December 31, 2035\"**.", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a total of 25.9k fatalities from terrorism in the world by 2025?", "desc": "\n\n[Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism) notes that \"terrorism\" is a difficult term to define:\n\n>The key problem is that terrorism is difficult to distinguish from other forms of political violence and violent crime, such as state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, hate crime, and homicide. The lines between these different forms of violence are often blurry.\n\nTo quantify casualties from global terrorism, OWID uses the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is maintained by the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ([START](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)). GTD uses [this definition](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf) of terrorism:\n\n>The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice this means in order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present:\n>\n> * **The incident must be intentional** – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.\n> * **The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence** -including property violence, as well as violence against people.\n> * **The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.** The database does not include acts of state terrorism.\n>\n>In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD:\n>\n> * **Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.** In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.\n> * **Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.** It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.\n> * **Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.** That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).\n\nOWID discusses some of the limitations of GTD and other sources in [this article](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#data-quality).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of fatalities caused by terrorism in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/incidence-of-terrorism?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2019 the total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in the world was 20,329.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "13.9k", "median": "19.0k", "upper_75": "25.9k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that there will be a total of 25.9k fatalities from terrorism in the world by 2025?", "desc": "\n\n[Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism) notes that \"terrorism\" is a difficult term to define:\n\n>The key problem is that terrorism is difficult to distinguish from other forms of political violence and violent crime, such as state-based armed conflict, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, hate crime, and homicide. The lines between these different forms of violence are often blurry.\n\nTo quantify casualties from global terrorism, OWID uses the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is maintained by the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism ([START](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)). GTD uses [this definition](https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf) of terrorism:\n\n>The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice this means in order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present:\n>\n> * **The incident must be intentional** – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.\n> * **The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence** -including property violence, as well as violence against people.\n> * **The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.** The database does not include acts of state terrorism.\n>\n>In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD:\n>\n> * **Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.** In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.\n> * **Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.** It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.\n> * **Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.** That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).\n\nOWID discusses some of the limitations of GTD and other sources in [this article](https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#data-quality).", "resc": "This question will resolve as the total number of fatalities caused by terrorism in the world in the respective years, according to [Our World in Data](https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/incidence-of-terrorism?country=~OWID_WRL). For example, in 2019 the total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks in the world was 20,329.\n\nThe resolution for each year will be determined by the earliest credible data reported by Our World in Data; later updates or revisions by OWID will be irrelevant to the question resolution.\n\nIf data reported by OWID contains a significant error (aside from typical adjustments from scheduled data releases), Metaculus may re-resolve the question at their sole discretion. If OWID no longer reports data for a relevant year, Metaculus may use an alternative credible source of data at their discretion, or resolve as **Ambiguous**.\n\nIf humanity goes extinct or ceases to have a developed society prior to a listed year, that sub-question will resolve as **Ambiguous**.", "lower_25": "13.9k", "median": "19.0k", "upper_75": "25.9k", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that the average S&P 500 return in the 2020s will be 9.40?", "desc": "", "resc": "From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%26P_500_Index),\n\n> The S&P 500, or simply the S&P, is a stock market index that measures the stock performance of 500 large companies listed on stock exchanges in the United States. It is one of the most commonly followed equity indices. The average annual total return and compound annual growth rate of the index, including dividends, since inception in 1926 has been approximately 9.8%, or 6% after inflation; however, there were several years where the index declined over 30%. The index has posted annual increases 70% of the time. However, the index has only made new highs on 5% of trading days, meaning that on 95% of trading days, the index has closed below its all-time high.\n\nHistorical total returns for the S&P 500 can be found [here](https://www.slickcharts.com/sp500/returns).\n\n***What will be the 10 year compound annual growth rate for the S&P 500 in the 2020s?***\n\nThis question will resolve as the 10 year [compound annual growth rate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compound_annual_growth_rate) of total returns (*not* adjusted for inflation, and including dividends) for the S&P 500 over the ten years 2020-2029 in percentage points, rounded to the second digit.", "lower_25": "3.79", "median": "6.70", "upper_75": "9.40", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "How many Arab League member states will have normalized relations with Israel in 2027?\n\nKeyword: 8.74\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 8.74 Arab League member states will have normalized relations with Israel by 2027?", "desc": "In the [Khartoum Resolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khartoum_Resolution) of 1967 the members of the Arab League declared what became known as the \"Three Nos\": \"no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it...\"\n\nSince then, two members, [Egypt 1979](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egypt–Israel_peace_treaty) and [Jordan 1987](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel–Jordan_peace_treaty) have made peace with Israel. In August and September [UAE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel–United_Arab_Emirates_peace_agreement) and [Bahrain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bahrain–Israel_normalization_agreement) have declared intent to normalize relations with Israel.\n\nThis brings the total of Arab League members with normalized relations with Israel in 2020 to four.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of states in the Arab League (according to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Member_states_of_the_Arab_League)) which maintain diplomatic relations with Israel and have not suspended relations according to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Israel#List_by_country), as of October 9, 2027.\n\nIn order for the State of Palestine to count towards the resolution, Israel must recognize Palestine as a sovereign state, the recognition of Israel by Palestine as part of the Oslo accords is not enough.", "lower_25": "5.37", "median": "6.93", "upper_75": "8.74", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that KARI will launch a crewed mission by 2035?", "desc": "For the majority of time humans have been exploring space, there were only two nations with their own access to space, the United States and the Soviet Union. Following the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation inherited the Soviet space program, which is known today as [Roscosmos](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roscosmos). China has [since joined the ranks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shenzhou_5) of nations with human spaceflight, and now they're building [the nation's first multimodular space station](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiangong_space_station).\n\nThree other government space agencies are well positioned to join the US, Russia, and China as the select few with human spaceflight capabilities. They are: the [European Space Agency (ESA)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Space_Agency), [Japan Aerospace and Exploration Agency (JAXA)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JAXA), and the [Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Space_Research_Organisation) (ISRO). There is also the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI). The first three agencies have independent launch capabilities and the ability to operate space probes. \n\nIn the case of India's ISRO, Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared in 2018 that [\"a son or a daughter of India will go to Space from Indian soil by an Indian vehicle by 2022 (75th year of Indian independence) or sooner](https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=183103)\". ISRO has scheduled its first crewed mission — [Gaganyaan 3](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaganyaan#Development) — for sometime in 2024.", "resc": "Each of the following agency-specific questions will resolve as the date when at least one crewed member from that space agency reaches orbit. To qualify, the launch must be independent, meaning: a member of that space agency must be aboard a craft that is launched from that agency's vehicle on that agency's sovereign territory. Any space agency which does not launch a crewed mission before January 1, 2036, will resolve as **\">December 31, 2035\"**.", "lower_25": "2030", "median": "2033", "upper_75": "2035", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.398B in 2025?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "1.398B", "median": "1.406B", "upper_75": "1.419B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.398B in 2025?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "1.398B", "median": "1.406B", "upper_75": "1.419B", "prediction": "25%"} -{"title": "How many Arab League member states will have normalized relations with Israel in 2027?\n\nKeyword: 8.74\n\nPercentage: 75%\n\nReframed Question: What is the chance that 8.74 Arab League member states will have normalized relations with Israel by 2027?", "desc": "In the [Khartoum Resolution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khartoum_Resolution) of 1967 the members of the Arab League declared what became known as the \"Three Nos\": \"no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it...\"\n\nSince then, two members, [Egypt 1979](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egypt–Israel_peace_treaty) and [Jordan 1987](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel–Jordan_peace_treaty) have made peace with Israel. In August and September [UAE](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel–United_Arab_Emirates_peace_agreement) and [Bahrain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bahrain–Israel_normalization_agreement) have declared intent to normalize relations with Israel.\n\nThis brings the total of Arab League members with normalized relations with Israel in 2020 to four.", "resc": "This question will resolve as the number of states in the Arab League (according to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Member_states_of_the_Arab_League)) which maintain diplomatic relations with Israel and have not suspended relations according to [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_recognition_of_Israel#List_by_country), as of October 9, 2027.\n\nIn order for the State of Palestine to count towards the resolution, Israel must recognize Palestine as a sovereign state, the recognition of Israel by Palestine as part of the Oslo accords is not enough.", "lower_25": "5.37", "median": "6.93", "upper_75": "8.74", "prediction": "75%"} -{"title": "What is the chance that China's total population will be 1.398B in 2025?", "desc": "\n\nAccording to China's National Bureau of Statistics, China's total population reached [1.412 billion in 2022](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-64300190), a decline of 850,000 from their estimate for 2021. this would be the first year of reported population decline since China's rapid growth [beginning in 1950](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_history_of_China).\n\nThe [UN's Population Division](https://population.un.org/wpp/) forecasts many scenarios in which China's population declines over the next 80 years. Their \"Medium variant\" forecasts a population of 770 million in 2100, with a \"High variant\" of 1,150 million, and a \"Low variant\" of 500 million. Our World In Data have 2 articles covering the UN's population data, one on [historical data](https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth) and one on [future population projections](https://ourworldindata.org/future-population-growth).", "resc": "These sub-questions will resolve as the total population of China (for all sexes and ages) as of January 1 of the respective years, according to the [United Nation's World Population Prospects](https://population.un.org/wpp/). The primary UN office for population statistics will be used; if the UN no longer publishes such data, Metaculus may select an alternative source or **Annul** the question at their discretion.\n\nFor this question, \"humans\" refer to members of a species with sufficient genetic similarity to typical 2020-era humans that would be able to produce healthy offspring with medical assistance that would be available in the year 1900.\n\nFor this question, \"China\" is defined as the state which de-facto controls over 50% of the territory which China controlled as of January 1, 2023, and who has a political capital city in that same territory. If no such state exists for a given year in this question, that question and any future questions will be **Annulled**.", "lower_25": "1.398B", "median": "1.406B", "upper_75": "1.419B", "prediction": "25%"}