Chanca Piedra – Phyllanthus niruri

Family: Euphorbiaceae

Height: 30-40cm

Phyllanthus niruri is a herb that laboratory tests show may inhibit calcium oxalate crystal formation, protect the liver and have analgesic properties. This plant has a long history of safe use in Amazonian and Ayurvedic herbal medicine.  Also known as Quebra Pedra in the Rainforest and Bhumi Amla in India

Constituents: Alkaloids, astragalin, brevifolin, carboxylic acids, corilagin, cymene, ellagic acid, ellagitannins, gallocatechins, geraniin, hypophyllanthin, lignans, lintetralins, lupeols, methyl salicylate, niranthin, nirtetralin, niruretin, nirurin, nirurine, niruriside, norsecurinines, phyllanthin, phyllanthine, phyllanthenol, phyllochrysine, phyltetralin, repandusinic acids, quercetin, quercetol, quercitrin, rutin, saponins, triacontanal, tricontanol

Actions: Analgesic, antibacterial, antihepatotoxic, anti-inflammatory, antilithic, antimalarial, antimutagenic, antinociceptive, antispasmodic, antiviral, aperitif, carminative,choleretic, deobstruent, digestive, diuretic, febrifuge, hepatotonic, hepatoprotective, hypoglycemic,hypotensive, laxative, stomachic, tonic, vermifuge.


Housesitting – a few tips for beginners

House and pet sitting means moving around, a lot.  It’s probably not the lifestyle for those of you out there who enjoy a slow paced and predictable routine. But if you’re not fazed by the thought of packing all your belongings and moving every few weeks to an entirely different location, then read on! Scheduling…

Travelling light

One hundred CDs, four hundred books, 5 different kitchen tools to stir your soup. It’s a human condition to collect and fill our houses with things. How do we cope, given that we move so often? An insight into the housesitters wardrobe.


Morlaix Lock

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Morlaix, France
48° 35' 18.96'', -3° 50' 8.02''
Morlaix Lock
Morlaix Lock
Morlaix Lock
Partly cloudy starting tomorrow morning.
63℉W at 15 knots
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Welcome back to a feature I’m doing this summer called “The Road to The Defenders.”  The concept is pretty simple.  Between now and August I am going to be watching the Netflix MCU shows a second (or third) time through in the build up to the monumental team up hitting Netflix on August 18th.  I won’t be reviewing the shows per se, more just reflecting on the way the episodes feel with the full scope of the first two and a half years of the project now in view.  In particular, I want to explore what feels different in retrospect from the first viewing.  For those who haven’t watched these shows yet, I will give a SPOILER WARNING that I’ll be talking about the shows without concern for revealing anything that happens in the story lines.  This week we continue with Daredevil.  If you would like to catch up, part one is here and part two is here.

Episodes Watched: Daredevil Season 1, Episodes 9-13

A word on Ben Urich to begin.  Vondie Curtis-Hall is absolutely brilliant in the role.  Many fans and critics alike have lamented his early death, and I too wish he was still around.  (Imagine if he could appear in Spider-Man: Homecoming!)  But ultimately his death gives an important gravitas to the series as a whole.  When Fisk kills him it is an important link in the chain between unethical visionary and crime lord.  This is the point at which fans no longer can sympathize fully with the Kingpin as a character.  His back story is understandable.  To this point, he has largely killed bad people, or at least limited his actions to death via intermediaries or intermediaries of intermediaries.  But this is the murder of a character we love with his bare hands.  This allows us to be fully on team Daredevil for the finale.

Going back a bit, episode nine may be my favorite episode in all of Daredevil.  My personal education background is in theology and I see a lot of bad TV writing with theological (particularly Christian) themes.  Everyone thinks they can throw in an image of a guy with his arms outstretched and meaningfully evoke Christology.  This episode, however, nails so many things.  The discussion of Satan and modern theological thinking on Satan is exquisite.  Peter McRobbie acts like an actual priest may act, instead of the false dichotomy of so many TV pastors between a paragon of virtue and a sadistic abuser.  While that interest may be peculiar to me, it really matters for character development. Matt Murdock as a character functions on the infamous “Catholic guilt” but also on the philosophical nexus between faith, law, and intuition.  Often the righteous thing is not the legal thing nor the thing we want to do.  The war between the Catholic, the lawyer, and the vigilante that rages in Murdock’s head is what makes him a character worth returning to, over and over again.

The Foggy and Matt fighting is something that really is a double edged sword in the series, between seasons.  In season one, it makes sense to me.  Foggy has every right to feel like Matt has been deceptive.  Any person would be upset by the revelation, and the fact that others like Claire are relatively chill with the vigilante thing suggests imbalance on their part, not Foggy’s.  When it gets to Season Two and Foggy is still fussing about things, that’s when I find it boring and repetitive.  The near split of Nelson and Murdock here is dramatic and character driven, but in the next season, it seems like moving pieces in place for The Defenders.  (In fairness to the writers, this is a troupe in the comics I find exhausting as well.)

These episodes are the part of the show where narrative wandering happens.  The first six episodes where a well-defined arc and episodes seven, eight, and nine were careful retellings of the childhoods and young adult years of Matt and Fisk.  By episode nine it feels a bit like the writers said, “How do we fill this out for another five episodes?”  That’s not to say that they aren’t enjoyable or that there aren’t good moments in the episodes.  One can just acutely feel the difference between the laser-like focus of the first half of the season and the more circumlocutious path of that second half.  This distinction is a little sharper on a rewatch, because you can see the elements that really matter and the elements that don’t really matter, either in shows to come or in the final outworking of the season’s plot.

Perhaps the most egregious example of this slowing of the plot is the entire subplot of Mrs. Urich.  Ben’s wife never serves any purpose in this show.  The several scenes of Ben fighting the insurance system are completely tedious.  One could argue that it is her illness that gives Karen an excuse to take Ben to Mama Fisk’s assisted living facility.  The problem, however, is the only reason he wants to give up on the exercise at all is his sick wife.  So she creates the problem that she solves.  All of that unnecessary plot shenanigans does nothing for the show except to make Karen a bit of a monster.  It allows Ben’s death to be her fault, instead of just part of his work.  Ben’s wife eases those feelings, but again they wouldn’t exist if the extra wife plot wasn’t there to begin with!

One thing that saves some of that lack of focus is the way several episodes end with a truly shocking twist.  Both the death of Wesley at the hand of Page and the death of Urich at the hands of Fisk are truly stand out moments of surprise for the viewer.  Most fans likely remember those moments clearly, while not really remembering the other 43 minutes of the episodes.  This is a great technique to encourage the binge watcher.  Each episode feels like it gives you a huge reason to keep going.

Karen Page’s killing of Wesley also further sets up a plot that still dangles unresolved, more than two years later.  What is Karen’s past?  Was her question (“Do you think this is the first time I’ve shot someone?”) mere bravado, or does she have a truly dark past?  This season builds up the question, with Urich finding something that gives even him pause.  Season Two then sort of hints it’s a car accident.  But we still don’t fully know.  That mystery about Page is great, but it needs a major pay off.  Her handling of the gun suggests that Karen has some heavy life experiences.  The reveal of those needs to live up to the build-up.

Madame Gao, Nobu, and the Hand deserve a quick paragraph.  Those in charge clearly saw the long game of these series, leading into The Defenders.  Rewatching the episodes the build up of later reveals are clearly seeded.  The strongest example is when Nobu dies.  Gao mentions that his body is “being prepared for what’s next.”  The first time I watched the show I figured that meant burial and I don’t think I was alone.  Many were shocked when Nobu reappeared in the second season.  The dialogue is clearly an allusion to what they know will come, however.  Often in shows with complicated continuity like with these shows there are little errors and points where it is obvious that no plan for the next steps existed.  This universe is well planned.

The final episode I found far more fulfilling than upon first viewing.  Perhaps the greatest triumph of the show is the way that the story of Murdock and Fisk are interweaved so thoroughly.  One very subtle way is Fisk’s several allusions to Scripture and faith.  He is a foil to Matt in that he is deeply aware of the Bible yet does not believe.  This use of religion is obviously more than coincidence, because of the prominent place his “man of ill intent” speech.  (Also his scenes about not praying play off of Matt’s frequent visits to confession.)  Throughout the show religion, “my city,” plays on eyesight and vision, metaphors of shadows and masks, and other themes are always used for both Daredevil and the Kingpin.  (The two characters even use the same tailor!)  They are dual protagonists in many ways, despite Murdock clearly being the hero of the story.

In the end, this is what makes Daredevil Season One the greatest of the Netflix shows to this day, in my opinion.  The show is “grounded” but not in the ways that make it unfun.  Physics or biology never get in the way of Daredevil’s powers or ability to get a billy club to bounce back to him.  Ninjas are a real part of the universe, no fuss made.  Instead, the grounding is in the real to life writing.  These people talk and think like people.  Their life stories make sense and feel real.  Most importantly, the villains are just as rich as the good guys.  Ben Urich and Karen Page are great characters, but so are Wesley and Owlsley.  That focus on the humanity of characters makes this show stand out above and beyond almost every other superhero TV property, Marvel or otherwise.  The only other comparable show that springs to mind is Jessica Jones, our topic next time.


I'm a 22 year old artist currently residing in Dublin, Ireland with a bunch of pet rats and my cocker spaniel Boss.

I've been painting and drawing for pretty much all of my life, on and off. I try to experiment a lot with different styles and subjects. My first love has always been painting horses, but besides that I do the occasional portrait, still life or horror scene as I see fit for the moment. I find inspiration in the little things, but as I am a perfectionist I don't produce as much art as I should do if I wanted to make a living out of it. Then again, I believe it's about quality - not quantity.

I have decided to sell some of my originals as they are accumulating and taking up space, but at the same time I want to give everyone the option to buy a print of my artworks. Some artworks will only be available for print, as I want the originals to stay in my personal collection.

I also have a good lot of my photographs available for print. Because there are loads of these I will most likely keep updating this bits at a time.


Reconstructing the future: Sustainable Minority Return in Kosovo

Publication Date

The phenomenon of forced migration in response to the violent ethnic conflicts in the 1990’s has given the international community the precarious task of facilitating the return of millions of refugees and IDPs who have voluntarily chosen to return “home.” In the wake of violence, the reintegration of forced migrants into their former villages of mono or multi ethnic makeup has the potential to agitate a relatively calm post conflict period rendering it intractable or conversely, foster conditions aimed at transforming relationships that will engender a sustainable return and lead communities towards reconciliation. Consequently, the presence of IDPs, ex-combatants, and refugees are a threatening daily reminder of the enemy, a past that the present has not reconciled and the communities receiving returnees remain unwilling to share scarce resources to reconstruct an unpredictable future together. With a logical emphasis on the immediate physical needs that comprise physical reconstruction such as security, house construction and preparation of a multi-ethnic market economy, social reconstruction which encompasses the long term psychosocial needs, is often overlooked leaving returning and receiving communities vulnerable once a conflict has lost its appeal to donor countries and funding begins to dwindle. It is at this fragile moment when communities begin to reweave the social fabric that at one time held them together. This paper seeks to explore the role of UNMIK, UNHCR, NGOs and other stakeholders that include national and local leaders, involved in the minority return process in the western region of Kosovo, the methods used to promote sustainable return, the needs of the returning and receiving communities and the efficacy of conflict transformation tools such as inter-communal dialogue to create sustainable conditions for co-existence.

Community Psychology | Human Geography | International and Intercultural Communication

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Scientists Find Evidence of New Super Planet in our Solar System

January 21, 2016

“It’s a bad idea to consistently say we have now reached the end of the solar system” – Batygin

Observation and Discovery

“They were pointing out that there was something funny going on in the solar system, but nobody could really understand what it was. Ever since they pointed it out, we’ve been scratching our heads.” – Brown

SEE ALSO: Wanderers: A futuristic look into interplanetary habitation

What’s it look like?

Through modeling of planetary orbits, Brown and Batygin, predicted that the orbit of this new ‘super earth’ would need to be about 20,000 earth years, equivalent to 6 billion miles away from the sun. Even still, this is enough to affect all of the known planets’ orbits. The biggest question from many surrounding this announcement is ‘why haven’t we seen this yet?’ The only reason we can see other planets is because the sun’s light reflects off of them and back towards earth. The theorized super earth is likely so far away that unless you were looking for it, it would be too faint to find. The amount of light reflected by a planet actually decreases by 16 times when you double the distance.

[Image Source: NPR]

It’s Out There

There is good news however, the astronomers believe that there are telescopes in existence capable of finding the planet. In fact, they are so sure of the 9th planet’s existence that they are willing to bet it’s out there, and are even pointing others in the direction to look. Part of this confidence comes from study of past research. From looking at this work and compiling all the data, all previously unexplained orbital data seem to point towards the existence of a 9th Planet.


Acta Biotheoretica

, Volume 59, Issue 2, pp 185–200

Open Access
Regular Article

As a reflection on recent debates on the value of wild animals we examine the question of the intrinsic value of wild animals in both natural and man-made surroundings. We examine the concepts being wild and domesticated. In our approach we consider animals as dependent on their environment, whether it is a human or a natural environment. Stressing this dependence we argue that a distinction can be made between three different interpretations of a wild animal’s intrinsic value: a species-specific, a naturalistic, and an individualistic interpretation. According to the species-specific approach, the animal is primarily considered as a member of its species; according to the naturalistic interpretation, the animal is seen as dependent on the natural environment; and according to the individualistic approach, the animal is seen in terms of its relationship to humans. In our opinion, the species-specific interpretation, which is the current dominant view, should be supplemented—but not replaced by—naturalistic and individualistic interpretations, which focus attention on the relationship of the animal to the natural and human environments, respectively. Which of these three interpretations is the most suitable in a given case depends on the circumstances and the opportunity for the animal to grow and develop according to its nature and capabilities.

Intrinsic value Wild animals Domestication Specific and non-specific care Capabilities

1 Introduction

In recent decades we have seen growing attention being paid to the moral position of wild animals, as they are increasingly being affected by human activities. Worldwide, their territories are increasingly fragmented, contaminated, and disturbed by for example, transport activities and facilities, tourism, urban development, and agriculture. Between 1970 and 2007, the populations of almost 30 percent of vertebrate species in the world declined with species in tropical areas appearing to be especially vulnerable (WWF 2010).

However, it is not only socioeconomic developments that affect animal wildlife. The increasing meddling of humans in the natural world is also illustrated by the rise of the discipline of conservation medicine, implying human interventions in wildlife populations to reduce zoonotic threats to both human and animal populations (Meffe 1999; Daszak et al. 2000). Also ecological research and nature conservation efforts have an impact on the welfare of wild animals (Putman 1995; Swart 2004; Minteer and Collins 2008). For example, transponders and transmitters are implanted in the wild animal’s body to investigate its physiology and behaviour under natural circumstances (Wilson and McMahon 2006; Casper 2009).

Another development is the re-introduction of wild animals to restore damaged natural areas. Such introductions or reallocations of animals may have negative consequences for their welfare (Minteer and Collins 2008). For example, otters taken from natural areas in Eastern European countries have been introduced into Dutch reserves in order to increase the naturalness or ecological functioning of these areas. However, this may have a negative effect on the welfare of these animals (see e.g. van ‘t Hof and van Langevelde 2004, 2005; van Liere and van Liere 2005).

Not only wild animals that are being brought into such areas; domesticated animals—especially ungulates—have also been introduced into natural areas, with the intention that they will ‘dedomesticate’ and return to a natural way of life in succeeding generations. A well known and widely discussed case is the introduction of Heck cattle and Konik horses into the Oostvaardersplassen reserve in the Netherlands since the early 1990s to increase the naturalness of these areas. Winter is a difficult period for these animals because of the limited availability of food and the weather conditions. Several times it has led to starvation among these animals and subsequently to political and public unrest (ICMO 2006; ICMO2 2010). Supporters of this de-domestication management claim that intervention to prevent starvation will ultimately undermine the self-sufficiency of the population and will inhibit its adaption to the existing circumstances. They argue that high mass starvations also incidentally happen in other natural reserves, for example the Serengeti reserve in Africa (Vera 2009). However, critics argue that humans have bred these animals and introduced them into the reserve. Moreover, their natural habitat has been limited by fencing and natural forces as e.g. predation do not affect their populations. From this standpoint, they should primarily be considered as kept animals that fall under human responsibility (RDA 2005).

Discussions about the moral position of wild, semi-wild animals, or captured wild animals not only involve welfare considerations. When an wild animal’s welfare is not at stake the increased human interference with them may nevertheless be morally questioned, as the moral standing of wild animals is also determined by wildness itself. For example, in several countries there has been a heated public debate on the fate of wild animals in circus. NGOs in several countries have protested against the use of these animals in circus, not only for presumed welfare reasons, but also because they consider this as an infringement on the dignity and intrinsic value of being wild (see also Kiley-Worthington 1990; Radford 2007; Hopster et al. 2009; Keulartz and Swart 2009).

The Dutch Flora and Fauna Act also recognize the moral state of being wild. It explicitly mentions the intrinsic value of wild animals. Based on this Act the governmental guidelines regarding the hospitalization of seals state ‘that people should respect the inherent individuality of animals living in the wild. This means that interventions involving the intrinsic value of the animal can only be permitted in extraordinary circumstances. Hospitalization of animals that are ill, wounded, or otherwise in need is an intervention affecting their intrinsic value. After all, the inherent individuality of an ill, wounded or dying animal living in the wild must also be respected’. (LNV 2003: p. 7, our translation).

Thus, according to the latter line of reasoning, the intrinsic value of wild animals implies non-intervention even if this leads to the reduced welfare of the animals concerned, whereas the recognition of intrinsic value of animals falling under our direct responsibility, as is the case for kept and domesticated animals, implies taking care of their welfare. The apparent contradiction between the principle of non-intervention for wild animals and the principle of taking care of the animal that falls under our responsibility was usually resolved by excluding wild animals from our circle of responsibility. For example, Verhoog (1999) states, [b]y making an animals survival and well-being dependent on human action, man has become responsible for it, whereas such responsibility does not exist with respect to wild animals (Verhoog 1999, p. 274). Similarly, Norton (1995, p. 105) argues that [b]y deciding to respect their wildness, we have agreed not to interfere in their daily lives or deaths.

However, this way of reasoning seems to fail to take account of the increasing interference of humans with wild animals as described above. Both the principle of non-intervention and that of taking care of their welfare seem both to be applied. The concept of the intrinsic value of wild animals and what is meant by wildness or domestication therefore needs to be elucidated. In this article we aim to analyse both issues. We will begin by examining the concepts of wild and domesticated animals and argue for recognizing several classes of dependence of animals on their environment. On this basis, we explore the meaning of the term ‘intrinsic value’ in more detail. We argue that a distinction can be made between three different interpretations of a wild animal’s intrinsic value: a species-specific, a naturalistic, and an individualistic interpretation. In our opinion, which of these three interpretations is the most suitable in a given case depends on the opportunity for the animal to grow and develop according to its nature and capabilities and also on practical circumstances.

2 Domestication, Wildness and Dependence

According to Dutch law, a wild species is a species that is naturally found in the wild (Staatsblad [Bulletin of Acts and Decrees] 2002).1 Due to the increasing human interference with wild animals in and outside the human sphere and de-domestication experiments this definition is not clear-cut. The concepts of domestication and wildness should therefore be more clearly defined. To begin with, we can distinguish between a biological approach and a ‘sociological’ approach to domestication. According to the biological definition, domestication must be considered as a process by which animals adapt to humans and the environment they provide. As a consequence, the phenotype of the animal will change compared to their wild counterparts. Subsequently, genetic changes may occur over generations (Price 1999). Some species appear easier to domesticate than others because their genetically determined characteristics naturally conform better to human systems. This is sometimes called ‘pre-adaptation’ and it applies in particular to herd animals and social animals with behaviour patterns based on a hierarchy of dominance. When keeping or domesticating these animals, humans take on the role of leader of the herd or group (Smith 1998; Kiley-Worthington 1990; Palmer 1995).

The sociological approach to domestication primarily considers domestication as a process by means of which animals function in or form a part of human social systems and/or practices. In other words, domestication brings animals under human dominion, making them dependent on human society with respect to their social organization, territory, reproduction and food supply (Clutton-Brock 1989; Hettinger and Throop 1999). From this perspective, keeping wild animals in a zoo is a form of domestication, even if it is possible to allow the animal to maintain its original biological characteristics and behaviour. The same can be said, for example, about systematically giving supplementary food to wild animals, as sometimes happens for hunting purposes. Changes in biological characteristics as a result of domestication are according to this sociological view secondary changes, an adaptation to the human environment in which the animal lives (Clutton-Brock 1981, p. 21).

The sociological definition of domestication has a wider scope, as it also includes captive wild animals and feral animals that are more or less dependent on human settlements for their subsistence. However, both approaches share the aspect of dependence. Wild animals are free from human interference and only dependent on a well-functioning relationship with their natural environment, whereas domesticated animals and animals under human dominion are dependent on humans for their subsistence. Thus, in general, domestication implies a shift towards human dependence and de-domestication a shift towards natural dependence.

We have used these two perspectives on domestication to hypothesize a number of classes of dependence of an animal on its environment. Firstly, we distinguished three levels of human dominion over animals: animals that live in the wild and are not or barely dependent on humans; animals that have a medium level of dependency on humans, for example, non-captive animals that depend on humans and therefore live close to human settlements; and animals that live under human dominion, being highly dependent on human care. Secondly, we distinguished between animals that adapt easily or are already well adapted to human environs (and thus domesticated from a biological point of view) and animals that are not adapted or hardly to adapt (and thus still wild according to the biological definition). The combination of these two dimensions produces six hypothetical classes of human dependence, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1

Six hypothetical classes of on the dependence continuum

Wild animals that live in their natural habitat and that do not easily domesticate or adapt to human environs

Wild animals that will domesticate or adapt to the human environs rather easy

Animals that seek out human environs as a result of the decline of their habitat, such as the polar bear

Feral animals and synanthropes (house mice, sparrows)

Wild animals from category I that live in zoos or circuses

Pet animals, livestock, wild animals from category II that live in human environs as zoos and circuses

3 The Species-Specific Interpretation of Intrinsic Value

Animals are increasingly recognized as having intrinsic value, that is, there is a recognition that animals that fall under our responsibility are also part of our moral circle, and whether these animals flourish is also our concern. In general, this concept implies that the animal’s nature and capabilities must be respected and that its interests must be taken into account.2 However, the growing moral attention paid to animals has been often focused only on kept or domesticated animals (Waelbers et al. 2004), thus animals we have considered as class V or VI in Table 1. But even this attention is rather from a rather recent date (Singer 1990; Regan 1983). Arthur Schopenhauer claimed that there was a sign hanging before the door to Western ethics reading, ‘Tiere müssen draußen bleiben’ (‘Animals must remain outside’), and for a long time this was the case. This way of thinking was inspired by the influential ethics of Immanuel Kant who stressed the idea of a rational and autonomous human being. Animals had no place in such a system. Although this opinion was widely shared, it did not mean that all behaviours towards animals were permissible or acceptable. Rather, the moral place of animals was derived from their supposed effects on the interrelationship between humans. The thought was that animal abuse would lead to moral corruption, for ‘who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men’ (Kant 1997, p. 240).

Many modern philosophers are also unclear about the moral position of animals. For example, John Rawls recognizes that animals are part of our moral circle, but he excludes them from his own theory of justice, which, like Kant’s approach, is based on the idea that some kind of rationality is necessary in order to fall under a moral code (Rawls 1971, p. 512). However, utilitarian philosophers as e.g. Singer (1990) avoid the issue of rationality and consider animals to be within our moral circle because they possess the morally relevant ability to suffer. ‘The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but Can they suffer?’, according to the famous and often cites statement by Bentham (1823). According to Peter Singer, an intrinsic value is something that is good or desirable in itself (Singer 1993, p. 274). Thus, avoiding suffering may be considered as an intrinsic value (as it is for humans) but this does not imply the intrinsic value of animals themselves.

Regan (1983), building on Kant’s concepts, does however offer a theoretical foundation for the intrinsic value of animals themselves. The basis for attributing intrinsic value to human beings, according to Regan, is found in their status as autonomous subjects. Regan introduces the term ‘subject-of-a-life’, which is broader than the definition of a person on which Kant based his ethics. According to Regan, animals are, like humans, subjects-of-a-life. They have subjective experiences, can experience the quality of their lives, and enter into and maintain relationships with others. Regan claims that, just like a human being, an animal has an ‘inherent value’, implying that an animal also has moral rights. Thus, an intrinsic value is ascribed to an individual animal on the basis of it being a subject-of-a-life, meaning that it may be considered morally questionable for humans to utilize animals even when there is no suffering involved. If wild animals are seen as subjects-of-a-life, the implication is that we should leave them alone. ‘Let them be’, as Regan says (1983, p. 361). This entails refraining from domesticating wild animals or bringing them into a human environment. For Regan, however, the respect for an animal’s wild state derives from its status as a subject. In his view, animals to which the concept of subject does not apply cannot be ascribed intrinsic value. On this basis, he restricts intrinsic value to mammals that are at least 1 year old. An animal’s wild state—which of course does not depend on species or age—is not by itself a sufficient reason to ascribe intrinsic value to that animal.

Regan’s approach was criticized as anthropocentric because it takes the human consciousness paradigm as a starting point (Verhoog 1999). As an alternative, the biocentric approach, which was put forward by Paul Taylor (1986), assumes a different premise on the basis of which to attribute intrinsic value to animals. Taylor states that all organisms have ‘inherent worth’ because, as ‘teleological centres of life’, they have a good of their own. This good consists of fulfilling their capabilities and satisfying their needs in a manner suited to their species. Therefore, they deserve moral consideration without exception.

In answer to the question of why having an individual good is morally relevant, the Dutch bio-ethicists Bart Rutgers and Robert Heeger state that a situation in which the good of animals is realized is better than a situation in which that good is not or only partially realized (Rutgers and Heeger 1999). According to these authors, ‘[t]he term “inherent worth” expresses a substantial claim: the animal’s intactness and its species-specific capacities and functions constitute a value towards which an attitude of moral respect is appropriate’ (Rutgers and Heeger 1999, p. 44). Such respect for animals is expressed, in particular, through respect for an animal’s integrity, which is defined as ‘the wholeness and completeness of the animal and the species-specific balance of the creature, as well as the animal’s capacity to maintain itself independently in an environment suitable to the species’ (Rutgers and Heeger 1999, p. 45).

What does this mean for the wild animal? Just as in Regan’s view, we can posit that a wild animal in its natural environment is probably best served by remaining in that environment. However, it does not automatically follow that wild animals kept in captivity should be placed in a natural environment. The good of wild animals kept in human surroundings may in theory also be served by keeping them in those surroundings. What the good of the creature might be and what the human role is in determining that good remains unclear. For example, the question can be raised whether the introduction of wild or semi-wild animals into nature reserves and their being left to their fate serves the good of those animals, as living a natural life may also lead to suffering due to bad living conditions (Klaver et al. 2002; Swart 2007).

Both the subject approach and the biocentric approach consider the individual animal in terms its species characteristics (or higher biosystematic concepts). Thus, according to Regan’s approach, an animal is considered a subject-of-a-life because of the neuronal capabilities of mammals (older than 1 year), whereas the biocentric approach holds that animals must satisfy their species-specific needs, for example a pig must be able to root, a rodents must be able to gnaw, and dog must be able to form social bonds within a pack, whether with humans or other dogs. Because of this focus on species-specific characteristics and needs we may label these approaches species-specific interpretations of the intrinsic value of animals.

4 The Naturalistic Interpretation of Intrinsic Value

The species-specific approach, described above ignores however the strong dependence of wild or freely moving animals (animals we have put in classes I to IV of Table 1) on their natural or semi natural environment. An alternative is the contextual approach, in which the animal is considered strongly in relation to its environment (Swart 2005, 2007). Animal ecology and animal behavioural sciences show that wild animals have a complex relationship with their environment. Animals are constantly exchanging information and material with their natural environment and are greatly dependent on it. The quality of the environment is essential to the question of whether the animal can subsist. However, we must be careful not to form a romantic idea of this natural state. Animals that live in the wild, free from human interference, can suffer greatly from diseases and harsh circumstances. Nevertheless, for wild animals in general, it is not their individual well-being which indicates the degree to which they can flourish, but the degree to which they are able to lead a natural life in terms of foraging for food, reproducing, avoiding enemies, etc. (Swart 2004).

Unfortunately, as already mentioned in the introduction, this natural condition is increasingly becoming an exception. Wild animals increasingly find themselves adrift in this landscape, not only as a result of the reduction and fragmentation of their natural habitat, but also due to climate change and increased transport and tourism. At the same time, built-up areas and infrastructure increasingly limit the animal’s freedom of movement. Nature reserves are mere islands in an ever-advancing landscape of human civilization.

Assuming that the intrinsic value of wild animals indeed implies non-intervention in their lives and that they are able to flourish in their natural, non-disturbed habitat, we must take measures to protect that habitat and restore it where necessary and possible. The responsibility for carrying out such measures can be seen as considered as the ‘naturalistic interpretation’ of the wild animal’s intrinsic value. The naturalistic interpretation is related but not identical to the ecocentric or holistic approach to intrinsic value (Callicott 1989). The ecocentric approach is also contextual in nature as it stresses the animal’s role in the ecosystem of which the animal is a part; however, the value placed on the animal is instrumental and derived from the intrinsic value of the ecosystem. In contrast, the naturalistic approach is based on the idea that the animal should be viewed in terms of its dependence on nature and thus not in terms of its instrumental relationship to the natural environment.

5 Specific and Non-Specific Care

Swart (2005) introduced the term ‘non-specific care’, for care focused on maintaining and developing the natural environment of the wild animal so that it can lead a natural life. As the counterpart of non-specific care, Swart (2005) suggests ‘specific care’ for animals kept by humans, including domesticated animals. These animals are entrusted to our care or are placed in human environments, and are therefore dependent on us for their welfare and needs. So we may conclude that the naturalistic interpretation of intrinsic value implies non-specific care for wild animals, whereas the species-specific interpretation leads to specific care for kept and or domesticated animals.

The care model of Swart (2005) applies the concept of a continuum between ‘wild’ and ‘domesticated’ that was put forward by Klaver et al. (2002). Accordingly, specific and non-specific care also relates to the level of wildness or domestication by degrees, respectively. Although both types of care exclude each other to a certain extent, they do not rule each other out completely since there may be good reason to provide specific care when an animal happens to find itself in distress. In comparison, non-specific care of domesticated animals is required by legislation to prevent their exaggerated exploitation (Swart 2005, p. 259). For instance, the Dutch Animal Health and Well-being Act (Gezondheidsen welzijnswet voor dieren) lists both species-specific and general requirements pertaining to shelter, hygiene and veterinary care for animals.

The practical applicability of the care model was recently illustrated by a report of the Second International Commission on Management of the Oostvaardersplassen concerning the management of the introduced animals in this nature reserve. The Dutch government had established this committee because of public concern as described in the introduction of this paper. The commission refers to the care model and concludes that the introduced herbivores (especially Heck cattle and Konik horses) must be considered as ‘in between fully wild and domesticated/managed’ and that ‘both specific care (…) and nonspecific (…) cares has to take place to reflect the moral and ethical considerations for these animals’ (ICMO2 2010: 46). See also: Keulartz et al. 1998a, b; Klaver et al. 2002; Vorstenbosch et al. 2001; Waelbers et al. 2004; Swart 2005, 2007; Keulartz 2009; and Gamborg et al. 2010 for reviews and discussions on the case of introduced animals in the Oostvaardersplassen.

Based on the concept of domestication and dependence of animals on their environment, discussed above, we have adapted the care model by using the animal’s dependence as the X axis, rather than the wild-domesticated continuum used in the first version (Swart 2005). Accordingly, we have hypothetically located the various classes of dependence from Table 1 in the model (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1

Non-specific and specific care on the continuum ranging from natural to non-natural habitats for animals. The Roman numerals refer to the classes of dependence or human dominion, given in Table 1. Adapted from Swart (2005)

6 The Capabilities Approach and Individualistic Interpretation of Intrinsic Value

The species-specific approach of intrinsic value emphasizes specific care for domesticate animals. In addition, also wild and semi-wild animals living in non-natural conditions, such as zoo and circus animals, need—as long as they are in the human environment—specific care geared to the animal’s species-specific characteristics and the particular human environment in which it lives. Such animals are more or less dependent on humans to realize their own good in accordance with their species-specific capabilities. This attention to an animal’s capabilities is also found in the philosophy of Martha Nussbaum (2006). She derives her ‘capabilities approach’ from the work of the economist and Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen, who uses the concept of human capabilities in order to study questions of justice and development in society. The core of Sen’s approach is that a just division of goods in a society will give the members of that society the opportunity to realize their essential or basic capabilities (Sen 1979). Nussbaum applies this idea to the question of justice for animals. In her view, individual animals of all species deserve a fair chance to flourish; in other words, to be able to fully develop the capabilities and capacities which are specific both to their species and to their individual characters. According to Nussbaum, to be a living entity, to have a healthy life, to experience pleasure, pain or emotion, or the power to behave in a certain way or to play, all such capacities imply that animals possess a moral worth. Humans have the moral responsibility towards animals that fall under their dominion to ensure that they can actually realize these capabilities.

Nussbaum attaches great importance to the possibility for animals to enjoy a certain measure of sovereignty and to live an autonomous life. As many others she admits that the habitat of wild animals is in increasingly restricted by human activities, meaning that these animals are less able to flourish. Therefore, Nussbaum argues in favour of what we earlier called non-specific care: care for the living environment (habitat) of animals. In addition, she points out that many species have evolved in a long-lasting symbiotic process with humans, resulting in mutual dependence. In these cases, the concept of specific care also applies.

It is clear, then, that the lives of many animals are variously intertwined with human activities and with the care of animals in a specific or non-specific sense. We cannot casually abandon wild animals to their fate. Nor can we, as many romantics would wish, release kept animals into the wild without any form of human intervention. However, it is indefensible not to allow animals under human dominion to develop their natural capabilities. Nussbaum makes the case for a form of paternalism which is sensitive to the individual nature of the animals entrusted to our care. This would be a kind of care that allows animals to flourish. Zoos and wildlife parks can play a part in this because, unfortunately, an increasing number of animal species are better off in these places than in the wild, simply because their habitats are seriously threatened.

The capabilities approach can do justice to the dynamic character of the interaction between species-specific behaviour and the environment. The intrinsic value of animals implies that the care of animals for which humans are responsible, should not be measured against the ideal of a wild environment but rather by the possibilities that a given environment offers to animals to realize their natural capabilities. Apes, for instance, require the possibility of explorative behaviour, but that need can be met in a variety of ways—by searching for food, for example, but also by playing computer games. In the same way, tigers must be able to express their predation behaviour. In a natural environment this would occur by hunting prey, while in a zoo this could be achieved by providing a ball on a rope which the animal can ‘hunt’.

The capabilities approach suggests, along with care geared towards species-specific needs, attention to the needs and capabilities of the individual animal. In addition, in Nussbaum’s view, care for kept animals does not exclude the idea that animals may be made to do the things which humans require of them. As part of her paternalistic approach, Nussbaum states that domesticated and/or kept animals, like children, can benefit from training and discipline, as long as their species-specific and individual capabilities are taken into account.

This last point is of particular importance in the case of animals connected to humans in a task-related capacity, such as dressage horses, guide dogs, or circus animals. If they are to succeed, the emphasis must be on individual care, a form of specific care that not only focuses on species-specific characteristics, but also and especially on the individual nature of the particular animal. Animals that carry out these sorts of specific tasks usually have a particularly close relationship with humans based on mutual trust (Haraway 2006, 2008). Rather than Jeremy Bentham’s famous question ‘Can animals suffer?’ Donna Haraway prefers to ask the question, ‘Can animals play? Or work?’ In her opinion, training animals is not equivalent to subduing or oppressing them. Haraway bases her ideas in part on the work of the trainer and philosopher Hearne (2007), who emphasizes the reciprocity of working relationships between humans and animals, and the fact that they can both find satisfaction in successfully developing and practising their own capabilities and talents.

Responsibility towards animals in working relationships, according to Haraway, can be seen as ‘response ability’: the ability to listen to animals and to respond to their needs and desires. This reciprocal relationship also implies the animal’s cooperation. Whether a particular situation is morally permissible or reprehensible depends in part on the degree to which animals can ‘protest’ in cases where their individual wants are not met and where they are forced into docility.

The view that the animal should be able to work, in so doing, can develop its capabilities, is supported by recent insights gained through research into stress in animals. The classic view, the so-called ‘homeostatic model’, assumes that the animal’s well-being is guaranteed if challenges and stress factors in the environment are at a minimum. According to the ‘allostatic model’, however, an animal possesses physiological and behavioural characteristics that enable it to deal with and adapt to a range of stresses and challenges. Training and stressful experiences can maintain this range and possibly even extend it. However, both too few and too many challenges decrease this range and create reduced resistance, leading to such issues as stereotypical behaviour, panic behaviour and the related problems of well-being (Korte et al. 2007).

We regard the capabilities approach as a refinement and concretizing of the biocentric idea of an animal’s ‘own good’. In particular, the focus on animals’ individual characters and capabilities, which, just as in humans, can differ noticeably among animals of the same species, avoids the more species-specific perspective of the biocentric approach. This leads to what could be called individual care for animals. We can therefore refer to an individualistic interpretation along with the naturalistic and species-specific interpretations of intrinsic value. This places animals’ flourishing in a broader perspective.

7 A Contextual and Pluralistic Approach to Intrinsic Value

Thus far, various interpretations of the intrinsic value of the animal have been distinguished and placed in context. In our pluralistic approach, the environment, in which the animal lives or matures, and its capability to flourish in that environment determine which interpretation is most suitable and which type of care the animal requires. This contextual approach regards ‘the animal in its environment’ as the analytical unit. This can vary from a natural to a human environment (see also Table 1), in which a distinction can be drawn between a naturalistic, a species-specific, and an individualistic interpretation of intrinsic value.

According to our approach, the animal must be able to anticipate and respond to the demands of its environment and to learn from its experiences. This is reasonably obvious in nature. However, it applies to human environments where the animal can undergo learning experiences and challenges as substitutes for natural learning experiences and challenges. In our opinion, the species-specific interpretation, which views the animal as rather separate from its environment, must be supplemented—and not replaced—by naturalistic and individualistic interpretations which focus attention on the dependence of animal on their natural or human environment and their capacity to live in the natural or human environment.

The naturalistic interpretation of intrinsic value implies a negative obligation to guard the animal against human interference and a positive obligation to protect or improve the wild animal’s environment (see also Wenz 1988). Animals located in classes I and II in Table 1 should therefore only be brought under specific human care for urgent reasons. Regan’s ‘let them be’ is the starting point in this view.3

Urgent reasons for specific care can arise particularly in the case of animals that live freely in proximity to humans but nevertheless show very little adaptation to humans (which we have classified as Class III in Table 1). Often these animals seek out human environs because of a reduction in their natural habitat. The naturalistic interpretation of the intrinsic value of these animals urges us to improve their original living conditions.

The situation may be different for synanthropes, that is, animals which live freely in proximity to humans and which are also adapted to human environs (Class IV, Table 1). Specific to these animals is the fact that they themselves seek out human environs. From the point of view of the species-specific interpretation of intrinsic value, it follows that we must consider the possibilities and limitations of these animals’ capability to adapt to the human environment.

Animals that are insufficiently adapted to human environs but nevertheless kept by humans for example in circuses belong to class V in Table 1. Their moderate or minimal adaptation to human conditions would indicate that there is a large chance that humans fail in allowing them to flourish. Suitable living environments, which will sufficiently meet their species-specific and individual needs, should be sought for these animals. This may be a zoo, a wildlife park, or possibly the wild, depending on the animal’s species-specific and individual characteristics.

The intrinsic value of animals kept by humans and well adapted to human conditions (Class VI in Table 1) seems at first sight not to be a principal issue. This includes house pets, animals used for production, certain domesticated circus animals and animals used in sport, such as dressage horses or dogs which perform obedience trials. These animals can flourish under these circumstances as long as they receive adequate, species-specific and individual care. In general, nature can serve as a source of inspiration for designing environments that will enable the animals to flourish.

However, this group may also include species that are considered wild because the species naturally occurs in the wild (see Staatsblad [Bulletin of Acts and Decrees] 2002). In most cases, this concerns animals whose ancestors were wild but which have been kept by humans, sometimes for generations. This includes e.g. some circus animals and some zoo animals such as camels and elephants. However, the mere fact that animals of the same species live in the wild is not a sufficient reason to place these animals in a more natural environment, as it does not take into account the interests of the individual animal. Nevertheless, in cases where it is proven that these animals are capable of living under more natural conditions, from the point of view of respect for the ‘potential wildness’ of the animal (Keulartz et al. 1998b)—which can be seen as a capability—reintroduction of the animals should be considered, providing that their well-being will not be substantially harmed and the environment is indeed available for such a return. In many cases such conditions are not fulfilled for such a return and we should provide them with proper type of care and the opportunity to flourish under less natural conditions. What that opportunity entails and to what extent it is called for depends on the species-specific and individual characteristics and capabilities of the animals.

Swart (2005, p. 260) argues that the model of specific and non-specific care is neutral with respect to the act of domestication, or de-domestication as it only describes the required types of care as a function of the level of wildness or domestication. However, if we recognize the naturalistic or species-specific and individualistic interpretations of intrinsic value of animals we may ask whether domestication and de-domestication, thus moving an animal along the axis of wild and domesticated, is really neutral. Taming or keeping a wild animal is not in accordance with its naturalistic intrinsic value, whereas introducing a domesticated animal into the wild may offend its species-specific or individualistic intrinsic value. However, as discussed above, re-introduction or de-domestication of captured wild or semi-wild animals may be desirable sometimes. In addition, externally legitimated reasons, for example eco-ethical considerations may overrule considerations based on the recognition of the animal’s intrinsic value we have worked out here.

Moving an animal along the axis of dependence in Fig. 1 should be done very carefully as it may have negative welfare consequences or offend the animal’s intrinsic value. However, the allostatic model of well-being described above, implies the existence of a range of conditions under which an animal can flourish. This can be utilized when deciding on the acceptability of (re)introduction experiments. Not only does this range enable a change in living conditions, is also possible to train individual animals and extend their resistance within these new living conditions. However, it must be clear that an evolutionary and therefore genetic adaptation to another, more natural environment occurs at the level of populations and often takes generations to complete in cases of domesticated animals. An animal, which is seen as wild and which is under human care does not necessarily need to be placed in a more natural situation—this may even be undesirable. Decisions on these issues should be guided by the practical circumstances and knowledge about the animal and its environment.

  1. 1.

    With the exception of cats, dogs and a list of other species which are allowed to be kept for specific purposes of production.

  2. 2.

    Some authors use a different term for what we here call intrinsic value, such as inherent value or inherent worth. In general we will refer to intrinsic value in this artile, but will indicate the terms as used by other authors.

  3. 3.

    According to a letter from the Dutch Minister of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV), the CITES regulations forbid removing a number of animal species, such as tigers and elephants, from the wild, but this is still possible for other species (Verburg 2009).

This article was prepared as follow-up to a research project on the intrinsic value of circus animals that was funded by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV), The Hague. We thank the editors of the special issue of Acta Biotheoretica and the three anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions, which significantly contributed to our thinking on the complex issue of the intrinsic value of animals.

Open Access

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, Science and Society Group (SSG), Energy and Sustainability Research Institute Groningen (ESRIG)University of GroningenGroningenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Applied Philosophy GroupWageningen UniversityWageningenThe Netherlands
  3. 3.Institute for Science, Innovation and SocietyRadboud UniversityNijmegenThe Netherlands

Personalised recommendations


Until Vijay Seshadri won the Pulitzer for poetry earlier this year for his book 3 Sections, I had never heard of him before. Born in Bangalore, India in 1954, he came to the United States when he was five. He grew up in Columbus, Ohio and currently lives in Brooklyn, New York. He teaches poetry and nonfiction writing at Sarah Lawrence College. I am really glad he won the Pulitzer because otherwise I might never have heard of him and his book, 3 Sections is well worth reading.

It is not a mystery why the book is called 3 Sections because it actually has three sections. The first and longest section is poetry, mostly one to at most two pages long. The second section is a prose essay about salmon fishing called “Pacific Fishes of Canada.” The third section is one long poem called “Personal Essay” which is, perhaps, an essay in the form of a poem. The Pulitzer committee describes the book as a “collection of poems that examine human consciousness, from birth to dementia.” They make it sound as though the book has a progression of some kind beginning with birth and ending with dementia. But this is not the case. I am certain there is some kind of logic behind the arrangement of all the pieces in the book, there generally always is, but it is not something I found especially noticeable. I just liked the poems a lot.

I also like Seshadri’s voice. It is firm, assured, sometimes funny, sometimes sad. His lines have a pleasant pacing, slow, but not so slow they become plodding. The slow movement of his lines serves to soften the firmness of his voice. He is not melodic but he is at times soothing. Seshadri’s language is straightforward, everyday. Though this does not mean that he doesn’t have some fantastic and startling images:

Therefore is he choked in the coils
of his being’s enormous Ponzi scheme
(Yet Another Scandal)

Self-esteem is leaking and oozing
over the concrete floor to pool around the feet.
Its color is the pink color of anti-freeze. The air is stringent
with the smell of anti-freeze.
(The People I Know)

And while Seshadri’s voice is firm and his language plain, one could even say grounded, he manages to write a number of poems that approach the spiritual. Here is the entirety of a short one, “Imaginary Number,” to give you an idea:

The mountain that remains when the universe is destroyed
is not big and is not small.
Big and small are

comparative categories, and to what
could the mountain that remains when the universe is destroyed
be compared?

Consciousness observes and is appeased.
The soul scrambles across the screes.
The soul,

like the square root of minus 1,
is an impossibility that has its uses.

One of my favorites in the collection is called “Memoir.” Here is a taste:

And one October afternoon, under a locust tree
whose blackened pods were falling and making
illuminating patterns on the pathway,
I was seized by joy
and someone saw me there,
and that was the worst of all,
lacerating and unforgettable.

Humiliated by joy. But isn’t it true? Those moments of pure joy when we are and aren’t ourselves, should someone see us in such a moment, we are so very embarrassed by it. I wonder why that is?

I am not quite sure how the second prose section fits into the book. The narrator gets a job on a fishing boat during salmon fishing season. There is one sentence that really stood out for me:

my duties were light enough to give me plenty of time to indulge my invented self, my sea-going fictional self, and wallow in my version of the well-documented affliction that causes people to live in literature rather than life.

And the final section, “Personal Essay,” is a marvelous, somewhat meditative poem on consciousness, identity, and reality. One of my favorite lines in the poem is this:

Clouds oversized, exaggerated in the pale sky, drawn with a crayon by a kid,
which confirms that we are in a fabrication, maybe even in a mistake,
maybe even in a cartoon.

There is a wonderful poem called “Rereading” in which David Copperfield is taken to task for dismantling the lives of the Peggotys in their cozy beached boat upon the strand. And I was also pleased about “Three Urdu Poems.” I love ghazals, a poetic form in which the couplets tend almost towards aphorism at times. I love trying to puzzle out how the seemingly unrelated lines actually do relate and form a whole. It is not a form that those who write in English use very often so they always get my attention when they turn up.

3 Sections is a great collection, full of all sorts of gems. And for those who don’t really consider themselves poetry readers but would like to read poetry now and then, I bet you’d like this one too.


Anyone for Pie?

The pie that is chocolate is missing a piece.
The pie, which is chocolate, is missing a piece.

Besides making you hungry, the two sentences have a lot in common; however, they also have some important but subtle differences. It’s learning the subtle differences that can help you use the words that and which correctly. For example, the first sentence about the chocolate pie implies there is more than one flavor of pie, but only the chocolate pie is missing a piece. The second sentence states that there is only one pie and it has a piece missing. It also offers a side note to let you know that the pie is chocolate, but that fact is not considered as important as the fact that a piece is missing. (Obviously the second sentence wasn’t written by a chocoholic.)

The word that introduces restrictive clauses, or clauses that supply essential information to the intended meaning of the sentence. This is information that the reader needs to know to understand all that the sentence states and implies. However, the word which introduces non-restrictive clauses, or clauses that supply non-essential, supplemental information to the sentence, and if left out won’t change the sentence’s meaning (stated or implied). When trying to decide whether to use that or which, ask yourself these questions:

If I take out the clause, does my sentence’s meaning remain the same? If it does, you should use which; if it doesn’t, then use the word that.

Does the sentence feel as if it needs a comma? If so, this might indicate that you need to use the word which, because the clause it introduces is preceded by a comma. (The pie, which is chocolate, is missing a piece.)

So, when you’re putting together your sentence and wondering if you need to put in a that or a which, you need to think about what the point of the sentence is. What is it that you want the readers to know—do they need to know that a piece of pie is missing, or that a piece of chocolate pie is missing. Now, before you run out and get yourself a piece of chocolate pie, try the short quiz I’ve included below.

The four sentences below need either the word that or which. Determine the word needed based on whether the adjoining information is necessary for the reader to understand the message or whether the information is just nice to know.
Note: Remember to place a comma before any clause introduced by which.

  • The user guide should only contain instructions [that/which] were verified.
  • The application requires a logon and password [that/which] prevents unauthorized access.
  • The report shows every account [that/which] has been closed in the past 30 days.
  • They canceled yesterday’s ABC project meeting [that/which] was already rescheduled twice.

The answers and explanations are below:

  • The user guide should only contain instructions [that/which] were verified. The information “…that were verified” tells us exactly what type of instructions. You need the additional information to clarify the sentence; therefore, you need to use that.
  • The application requires a logon and password, [that/which] prevents unauthorized access. The information that the logon and password prevent unauthorized access is interesting, but it isn’t essential; therefore, you need to use a comma and the word which.
  • The report shows every account [that/which] has been closed in the past 30 days. Because the report is only showing accounts that were closed in the past 30 days, you need to use that; otherwise it would read as if the report were showing every account.
  • They canceled yesterday’s ABC project meeting, [that/which] was already rescheduled twice. The information about the meeting being rescheduled twice is not essential to understanding that the ABC project meeting was canceled; therefore, you need to put in a comma and use which.

So, now go ahead and get that piece of pie.

Telling the Story

escortingcoverDo you know the difference between a novel and a non-fiction book? A non-fiction book is based in truth. However, the biggest mistake that non-fiction authors make is equating truth with a dry recitation of facts rather than the telling of a story. Despite your history teacher’s attempts to bore you with lists of dates and tables of facts, history can (and is) actually interesting. People want to know why something happened or why someone acted or reacted as they did. They want to understand the reason for events, and that’s where your story telling ability comes in. You need to show them why; you need to give them the story surrounding the event.

All stories, both fiction and non-fiction, are just that—stories. When writing a memoir, biography, or other bit of non-fiction, you still need to follow the same guidelines as an author writing a novel; however, you have a major advantage. Your story is already loosely defined for you. You have the timeline, timeframe, characters, major conflicts, and key dramatic elements, all you need to do is add the story components.

You need to develop your characters so that your readers can see them the way you do—are they shy, dynamic, geeky, or ne’er do well? The characters need depth, life, purpose, and motivation to go along with that dramatic moment. Does the moment you’re recording have to do with star-crossed lovers, a robbery gone wrong, a heroic deed, or just a crazy moment that changed the character’s life? You also need to build up the environment. What was the time period like, the culture, and the society? Help your readers understand your character’s perspectives, actions, and reactions. (For instance, the American culture and societal mores are much different today than they were in the 1970’s and understanding that can help the reader connect with the character and their plight.)

Also, just as a fictional character has wants, needs, fears, and motivations, so do your non-fictional characters. By using a first- or third-person point of view, action verbs, and a show-not-tell writing style you can catapult your readers into the story and help them appreciate the little slice of true life that you are sharing with them.

Here’s an example of a memoir that, while historically accurate, is rather dry:

In 1973, Terry got a job for the local newspaper. She did many jobs while there, such as typesetting, layout and design, and bundling (which is the bundling of flyers, ads, and other inserts with the paper). However, her favorite job was junior reporter.

Her first really major story involved the murder of a local schoolteacher. When the body was discovered, Terry was at the school to cover the latest protests.

Here is that same example, but written in a more story-like way:

1973 was a tumultuous year. It was the time of flower power, (Viet Nam) war protests, hippies dropping out, dropping in, and dropping acid, flag and bra burnings, and it was the year that Terry saw her first murder victim.

As a junior reporter for the local paper, she was at the school covering the latest protest when the screams ripped through the air.

Now, which memoir would you rather read?

4 Free Marketing Tools for Authors

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Most authors are not sales people. We tend to be loners and introverts, rather than extroverts and life-of-the-party types. Because of this temperament, many of us find that selling our books doesn’t come easily. Yet, without a bit of marketing, our books and other writings are unnoticed and often overlooked.

For each reader out there, there are at least a 1000 books that “hit the shelves” every day. Yet, without something to entice readers to find them, most of these books may never find a single reader, and many may only be found by the author’s friends and family. Yet, every book has 4 free, built-in sales and marketing points that many of us authors overlook.

Every time you, as the author, publish one of your works, you need to provide:

  1. A book cover

Think about it. What makes potential readers select a book written by an unknown author from an overwhelming list of unknown authors? The cover. Whether at a brick and mortar book store or online, a winning cover can make potential readers stop and check out your book. You need to create a cover that is unique and eye-catching, but the design also has to visually convey what your book is about. If your story is about space exploration, don’t show an image of a haunted house. And if it’s about vampires, don’t use space ships (well…unless it’s a book about space vampires). Worst of all, though, don’t give potential readers a blank cover with just the title and your name on it. That says you don’t care enough about the readers to even try to entice them.

  1. A book synopsis

I remember at a book conference, one of the guest author panelists said, if you can’t summarize your story, then you don’t understand your own plotline. What is the main arc of your story? What is it your characters are trying to do, solve, resolve, or accomplish? But don’t get side-tracked by subplots, just summarize the main idea of your story.

Every distribution site I’ve seen asks authors to provide a summary of the book (some even ask for two summaries—a long summary consisting of 1000 words, and a short summary containing only 200 words). That’s where you can really shine; after all, writing is what you do, right? So, give the reader something great.

If a potential reader has stopped to consider your cover, the next thing that reader will want is an overview of what the book is about. Give your potential readers the high-points of the story; give them a reason to want your book over someone else’s. There are millions of science fiction, romance, and murder mystery stories out there, why should they read yours?

  1. An author write up

Many readers also want to know something about you, the author. They want to know who you are and what makes you tick. They need to know what makes you worthy of their time, or what qualifies you to be an author on a specific topic? However, when you answer these questions, don’t go overboard, yet don’t be too skimpy, either.

Some authors feel that they need to include their whole resume in their author bio; while others feel they don’t need to include any information at all. The truth of it is, many readers of fiction and non-fiction want a way to relate to you as a person; it helps them decide whether they want to give your work a chance. For instance, if you put in your author bio that you love chocolate, potential readers can go, “Ooooh, so do I.” Or perhaps you are a volunteer, a mother, or a person who rescues animals, if it relates to your book topic, tell the reader. It helps them relate to you, and it helps them accept that you just might know something about your book topic.

You especially need to include some biographical information if the book is non-fiction. That’s because potential readers are even more insistent on knowing that the author is someone they can trust to give them information on this particular topic. Potential readers want to know that if the book is about art history that you have the knowledge, background, or credentials to write knowledgably about that topic.

  1. A book sample

Some authors shy away from including book samples. Perhaps they feel they don’t need to give away their hard work. Yet, how else can potential readers gauge whether your writing style and their reading styles will mesh? How do they know they want to travel the story world with you as their guide if they can’t see your writing style? In a brick and mortar store, a reader can always pull the book off the shelf and read a sentence, a paragraph, or even several chapters. If you don’t give them the same chance when shopping online, then you’re tossing away possible sales.

As an author, you need to give the reader every possible chance to find you, find out about you, and to find out about your characters and your story. Personally, as a reader, the above-mentioned 4 items are key to whether I’ll buy your book. So, make sure you include them; because, when you use them, and use them well, you make your book shine.

It’s Now Free on Amazon, too! finally caught up with the other distributors, so now you can get Mastering Meditation free for your Kindle, too. Try some of the different meditations from the book, and see which of them works for you.

Do you wonder what types of lives you might have lived previously, or what lives you might live in the future? Using the regression and progression meditation techniques included in the book can help you find out. The book also contains some examples of past and future life memories.

So, download your free copy today, and happy reading! (Please don’t forget to write up a review and post it ; )

Cover Design by DL-Designs and Digital Art

Mastering Meditation…

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It’s FREE, and it’s coming soon!

Did you ever want to try meditation but didn’t know what type? Or maybe you didn’t know there were different types of meditations? Well, there are. And in my soon-to-be-released FREE book, Mastering Meditation, you can check out the different types of meditation, try some of the different meditations from the book, and see which of them works for you. Do you want to relax? Or are you looking for help or guidance?

Do you wonder what types of lives you might have lived previously, or what lives you might live in the future? Using the regression and progression meditation techniques included in the book can help you find out. The book also contains some examples of past life memories as recalled by me and several others who have used these meditation techniques. So, get ready…this FREE book is coming soon.

It’s how we live; it’s how our realities are created; and it’s the name of the new 2-book set available from most online book retailers.

I’ve combined my near death experiences and death escort experiences with the years of information received regarding relationships of all sorts (spouses, companions, friends, co-workers, and family).

Life is all about the choices we make in our everyday lives. How we choose to act and react to the stimuli around us and the actions and reactions of others. Sometimes we choose to react in love, and sometimes we choose fear. Every choice is a valid one, but each one also has consequences and spawns further actions, reactions, and choices.

Each of my books shows examples of how choices affect our lives–little choices and major choices–and how every day we are constantly making thousands of choices without even realizing it.

If you have enjoyed the articles in this blog, then you will love the books, I’m sure. I hope each of you finds something meaningful and helpful in my writings and I will continue to answer your questions as best I can.

Happy Reading!

(Check it out at Smashwords!)

The 5 Keys to Building a Character

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Mannerisms/Traits: These are the tics or compulsions that a character displays consistently. For example, the character paces when nervous or agitated, chews gum or tobacco, hums to him- or herself, blinks excessively, clicks a pen without realizing it, taps the end of a pencil on the desk all the time, bounces his or her foot, plays with his or her hair or runs his or her fingers through his or her hair, chews his or her fingernails, rubs at a scar on his or her chin, cheek, nose, etc., stutters, or laughs inappropriately.

With all this new information at hand, she again asked us to describe her as if describing a character in one of our stories, and the results were profoundly different. For example:


Woven Network is set up to directly benefit, through a set of membership services, entrepreneurs and researchers working in the role of insects in the human food chain. Indirectly, through supporting its members, the company will also benefit the wider public across the Globe that need sustainable, alternative sources of protein.

The company aims to achieve the following for the UK:

  • To create a voice on behalf of the ‘insects for food and feed’ UK community to speak to the public, UK Government, UK Govt agencies and EU bodies.
  • To demonstrate the scale of the emerging sector and enable collective action to reflect this.
  • To attract more entrepreneurs and businesses into the UK and into the sector by demonstrating the opportunity, and making the UK a strong location from which to operate.


Are you in compliance?

For an Example of a Successful Transition to IFRS, Look North

Robert Herz | October 30, 2012

The Securities and Exchange Commission staff issued a final report this summer on its work plan on International Financial Reporting Standards. While the report provides a thorough and thoughtful discussion of the many areas addressed by the SEC staff in their over two-year examination of whether, when, and how to incorporate IFRS into financial reporting by U.S. issuers, it does not contain any recommendations to the Commission on a potential path forward.

Moreover, the introductory note to the report states that “additional analysis and consideration of this threshold policy question is necessary before any decision by the Commission concerning the incorporation of IFRS into the financial reporting system for U.S. issuers can occur.” With potential changes in leadership of the SEC a distinct possibility following the presidential election, it now seems that any further action by the Commission on this important matter is unlikely to occur until well into 2013 at the earliest.

Although the SEC staff report does not contain any recommendations on a path forward, it does discuss a number of issues and challenges that would be associated with outright adoption of IFRS for U.S. issuers and why some sort of endorsement process under which the Financial Accounting Standards Board would be charged with reviewing IFRS standards for potential incorporation into U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles might help avoid or alleviate many of these issues. In that regard, the SEC had issued a paper in May 2011 on a possible method of incorporation of IFRS into U.S. GAAP involving an endorsement approach, which some have termed “condorsement.”  The Trustees of the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF), which oversees FASB, sent a letter to the SEC in November of 2011 detailing their thoughts and recommendations on such an approach.

A number of countries have already transitioned via an endorsement process from their national accounting standards to IFRS for their listed companies and other “publicly accountable entities.”  Canada provides a recent and interesting example of a country that through careful planning and a lot of hard work was able to successfully make this transition. And while there are certainly very important differences between Canada and the United States—including the size and breadth of their economies and capital markets, and in the legal and regulatory systems surrounding financial reporting—Canada had accounting standards that in many cases were based on or similar to U.S. GAAP, and, as in the United States, its public companies are subject to quarterly reporting requirements.

Through serving as a member of the Accounting Standards Oversight Council of Canada (AcSOC) since early 2011, I have been able to better understand and appreciate how our neighbor to the north made this transition. Like the FAF in the United States, AcSOC has oversight responsibility over the two Canadian accounting standards-setting boards, the Accounting Standards Board of Canada (AcSB) and the Public Sector Accounting Standards Board of Canada (PSAB). For a number of years, AcSB had been pursuing a deliberate policy of trying to converge its accounting standards with U.S. GAAP. That seemed to make sense in light of the significant economic and trade linkages between the two countries. In 2006, however, after extensive consultation with Canadian stakeholders, AcSB, with the support of AcSOC and the Canadian Securities Administrators, decided to change course and transition to IFRS for listed companies, other publicly accountable entities, and certain governmental enterprises. Canadian accounting standard setters cited several reasons for the change in course, including the perception that U.S. GAAP standards were too complex and detailed for the Canadian market, the growing use and acceptance of IFRS around the world, and a belief that moving to IFRS would better enable Canadian companies and capital markets to remain competitive on an international basis.

Accordingly, in 2006, AcSB issued a Strategic Plan that outlined an approach to move to IFRS through a systematic process of convergence and endorsement.  It called for the changeover to occur starting on Jan. 1, 2011, and laid out a number of issues that would need to be addressed and actions by various stakeholder groups that would be needed in order to facilitate a smooth and successful transition.  While the goal was to be able to fully converge to and endorse IFRS as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board without modification, AcSB issued three omnibus exposure drafts covering the body of IFRS, laying out the IFRS requirements, contrasting them with the corresponding existing Canadian standards, and specifically soliciting input into reasons why AcSB should either reject or modify particular provisions of IFRS.  AcSB also conducted significant outreach activities to help constituents understand the issues, challenges, and potential effects of the change to IFRS and to learn about constituents' perspectives and concerns about the process.  And for their part, Canadian listed companies and other affected entities began identifying and working through the data, systems, and other changes they would need to make to implement IFRS in 2011 and auditors, securities regulators, accounting educators, and users also began to plan for the changeover.

While Canada is not the United States and the United States is not Canada, the Canadian process and experience in moving to IFRS may provide some relevant and valuable insights if and when the SEC resumes its consideration of this subject in the U.S. context.

The change occurred as planned starting on Jan. 1, 2011, with most of the affected companies having now reported for more than a year using IFRS.  How did it go? Pretty well, by most accounts.  AcSB and AcSOC have been closely monitoring the process and while there have inevitably been some issues, overall the implementation seems to have gone quite smoothly without any noticeable disruption or impact on the Canadian capital markets.  But that's not to minimize the hard work that was required by the companies and by many other stakeholders in the Canadian reporting system to achieve this outcome.

While AcSB decided not to reject or modify any aspects of IFRS, based on the comments it received on the three omnibus EDs and on other input it received from constituents, it did decide to delay the implementation in Canada of two specific aspects of IFRS to enable Canadian-listed companies and other affected entities to continue to use their current practices pending possible changes to IFRS by IASB. The first of these relates to accounting by investment companies where IASB currently has an ongoing project that would more closely align IFRS with the approach used in Canada and the United States.  The second deferral relates to accounting for rate-regulated activities where the existing Canadian standard is quite similar to U.S. GAAP in allowing for the capitalization of certain costs that are recoverable by an entity subject to rate regulation.  IFRS does not specifically address this subject, but some believe that under the general principles of IFRS such costs are not eligible for capitalization and would therefore need to be written off in implementing IFRS.  However, IASB is currently considering whether to undertake a project on accounting for rate-regulated activities.

I think it is also noteworthy that over three hundred Canadian companies are also foreign registrants that file in the United States with the SEC.  As allowed by the Canadian Securities Administrators, many of those companies had adopted U.S. GAAP in both their Canadian and U.S. filings. While a few of them have now switched to IFRS, most of them have decided, at least for now, to continue to use U.S. GAAP.  So that, together with the two deferrals discussed above, means that not all Canadian-listed companies have adopted IFRS. Nevertheless, the switch to IFRs represented an important and broad-based change in the Canadian reporting system that overall, as noted above, seems to have been successfully accomplished.

So what does AcSB do now in terms of standard-setting activities?  The organization continues to have direct standard-setting responsibility for Canadian private companies and not-for-profit activities. Interestingly, in connection to the planned changeover to IFRS for Canadian-listed companies  and certain other entities, AcSB decided to develop specific  “made in Canada standards” for its private companies and not-for-profits, which were implemented in 2011 and 2012, respectively.

AcSB also continues to have responsibility for reviewing and endorsing new standards being developed by IASB.  That is accomplished  though close monitoring of IASB projects and developments by AcSB and its staff, issuance of “wraparound”  EDs by AcSB for public comment  explaining proposed changes in IFRS and soliciting input on whether  there are unique circumstances in Canada that would warrant AcSB rejecting  or modifying the particular IFRS for use in Canada, extensive ongoing outreach activities with Canadian stakeholders on these matters, and deliberation by AcSB  before endorsing a new IASB standard for use in Canada.  As part of the endorsement process, AcSB also carefully considers the completeness and quality of IASB's due process in developing a standard, including whether  that process has been free from undue political influence  and has given due consideration to stakeholder input.  AcSOC also reviews AcSB's due process, both in establishing standards for Canadian private companies and not-for-profit entities and in evaluating and endorsing new IFRSs for use in Canada, as well as PSAB's due process for setting public-sector accounting standards.

AcSB and AcSOC also provide input to IASB and to the IFRS Foundation on a variety of matters, including on IASB's agenda and on due process enhancements.  Additionally, AcSB and AcSOC provide staff support to Patricia O'Malley, a former member of IASB and former chair of AcSB who currently chairs the International Forum of Accounting Standard Setters that provides input to IASB on technical matters. Paul Cherry, another former chair of ACSB, now chairs the IFRS Advisory Council, which is IASB's main standing advisory group. And both the IFRS Foundation board of trustees and IASB's interpretations committee have a member from Canada.  In short, AcSB, AcSOC, and Canada are active and important participants in the IFRS world.

While Canada is not the United States and the United States is not Canada, the Canadian process and experience in moving to IFRS may provide some relevant and valuable insights if and when the SEC resumes its consideration of this subject in the U.S. context.  In that regard, I hope the United States as the world's largest capital market and national economy will continue to play an important role in the development of the international financial reporting system.