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Surprise as the new normal – implications for energy security

We are living in a world of increasing interconnectedness through digitalisation and globalisation, exacerbating environmental conditions, severe economic challenges, uneven distribution of wealth, and geopolitical crises. The world is a complex system and the rapid change among its sub-systems builds up pressure for any efforts to anticipate change and shape the processes of transformation. Surprise is an intrinsic aspect of change, in particular when it takes place at an accelerating pace with high degrees of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity (VUCA) - or within the condition of post-normality as described by Ziauddin Sardar. Emerging technologies such as AI and renewable energy systems add to the complexity of societies, and thus to the world of VUCA and post-normality. In foresight horizon scanning has much focused on the probable or even predictable -surprise-free developments. More emphasis should be paid on systematic anticipation of wild cards and black swans, and on the analysis of weak signals. Foresight should also focus on discontinuities - broader phenomena and developments instead of single events. Energy is a complex issue. Without energy there is no life, neither biological nor economic. Taking into account the huge ecological and social costs of the present energy system, the need for a new emission-free, cost-effective, and democratised energy system is obvious. An energy transformation to reach 100% renewable energy is envisioned in four transformational neo-carbon energy scenarios. Energy is increasingly a societal and even cultural issue - above all a security issue. As regards energy security, various sudden events and surprises could play a major role. New energy systems themselves, with other new technologies, nudge the world into unknown, discontinuous directions. Therefore, we probe the resilience, anti-fragility and discontinuity of these transformational, societal energy scenarios. The results of a futures clinique where the scenarios were tested are presented. Implications of surprises for energy security, as the world increasingly seeks to move towards a renewable energy based society, are explored.

The world is in constant change, and still, it seems that we think in a linear mode. Today’s world is increasingly interconnected through digitalisation and globalisation, exacerbating environmental conditions, severe economic challenges, uneven distribution of wealth, and geopolitical crises. Emerging technologies are expected to transform tomorrow’s world in unforeseen ways [78 Footnote 1]. Change, including that deriving from the emergence of technologies, should be understood beyond risk assessment, but also in terms of the unpredictable [1, 2]. Nation-states claim independence and sovereignty for themselves, but their autonomy is restricted by the tsunami of trans-border flows of trade goods and finance, of information, people, weapons, technology, energy, emissions, and pollution. The world is a complex system and the rapid change among its sub-systems builds up enormous pressure for any efforts to anticipate change and shape the processes of transformation.

Energy plays a central role in enabling change and increasing its pace and complexity. The more energy humans are able to harness, the more complex societies are enabled [3]. The whole human history and its development can be seen as the mastery of new sources of energy [4]. This paper argues that as humanity is anticipating a transition into renewable energy systems – and towards the potential of energy abundance they promise [5, 6] – broad and deep discontinuity developments should be paid more attention to.

Energy itself is a sector facing massive change pressures [7, 8]. Energy is not only an economic or technical issue, but increasingly a societal and even cultural issue – above all a security issue. Risks are conceived to be an intricate part of the energy sector because of economic interests, geopolitics and environmental issues such as nuclear waste. Changes in energy prices alone are enough to shock entire nations. The 2011 Fukushima disaster was not considered possible, because the risk probability of a tsunami and an earthquake combined was judged negligible [9]. Energy security, as security of supply [10, 11], has been applied to conceptualise the complexity of energy in foreign and energy policy [12]. Problematically, conventional energy security analysis, including when looking at unexpected events, has primarily focused on a set-up of fossil fuel and nuclear energy technologies [13].

Many energy security analyses omit potential future changes in the energy mix, the implications that a growing uptake of renewable energy could have [14, 15], and the influence of broader societal transformations. The first attempts to address energy security in a renewable energy world are emerging [16,17,18], but few efforts to date capture the true complexity to reach or sustain such a future society. A growing body of literature examines energy transitions to understand energy landscape changes [19,20,21]. This includes studies on a 100% renewable energy system as a neo-carbon energy system [14, 15]. “Best-guess” future conditions might not be enough, and therefore multiple plausible futures should be considered [22]. Non-linearities, various sudden events and surprises – wild cards and black swans – could play a major role. New energy systems themselves, with other new technologies, nudge the world into unknown, discontinuous directions.

A renewable energy based future may be a desirable one, but in envisioning transformations, renewable energy pathways and futures have to be tested for resilience for both internal and external events [23]. This can enhance the ability of a future system to cope with change. This provides us with the theoretical framework of radical change: exploration of transformational possible futures, built on discontinuities towards the preferred future of renewables. The research question is how to dwell deeper into uncertainties, discontinuities and surprises as preparation for the forthcoming change. The prevalent hypothesis is that by paying more attention to discontinuities and surprises a better understanding of change could be formed. For the purpose, as a part of a foresight research project, a hybrid method experiment was conducted to describe discontinuities and possible black swans on uncertainty “soil”. It consisted of the use of transformative scenarios, ideation of discontinuities and black swans, cross-impact analysis of the imagined black swans on the scenarios, and a Futures Clinique [72], a special type of a futures workshop [24].

Renewable energy driving the VUCA world

This chapter opens up the features of the complexity and change as manifested in the VUCA world concept. The concept of VUCA is relevant when discussing and constructing scenarios for the renewable energy transformation within the context of societal change – renewable energy may further the VUCA world, as the following will claim.

VUCA world

In recent times, companies, governments and international organizations have paid increasing attention to risks and vulnerabilities [80, 81,Footnote 2]. For good reasons, disruption has become one of the key terms in discussions about innovation, economic and societal change. We seem to live in a world of permanent and profound change, driven by technology, by the requirements of sustainability and human development, and by rather unpredictable societal and political processes [25, 26]. Concepts like “megatrends” or “grand challenges” are coined to describe the underlying phenomena with their tensions and contradictions.Footnote 3 Often far reaching characterizations and interpretations are given. From a systems theoretical perspective, dynamic complexity (“dynaxity”) causes rapid, erratic processes with sudden tipping points where a system transgresses its former behavioural boundaries and starts to display completely new traits. Indicators from fields as different as finance, mobility, and lifestyles support the hypothesis that we live in an Age of Acceleration, which means higher frequencies of innovation, faster economic processes, increasing societal fluidity, and faster paced political decisions. Some researchers even speculate that we might approach within the next three decades a “technological singularity” where technological change becomes so rapid and profound that it represents a rupture in the fabric of human history [27]. Even if we do not follow Kurzweil, the main message is quite obvious: the future will not be like the present – and not even resemble the future we have been used to.

On this background, it makes sense to break down the present challenges for decision makers in four main dimensions, for which the acronym VUCA has found wide spread use: V for ‘volatility’, U for ‘uncertainty’, C for ‘complexity’, and A for ‘ambiguity’.Footnote 4

V for ‘volatility’ describes the increased dynamics in many fields characterized by “changing directions of change”, by a high frequency of ups and downs, by more rapid disruptions of trends. The paradigm is given by the stock markets that have become more volatile after the financial crisis of 2007 – with impacts on all economical spheres. In recent years, a rather high volatility can also be observed in political processes, at least in democratic states. Furthermore, PR departments and marketing experts complain about a more erratic behaviour of consumers, quickly shifting demands and preferences. It seems obvious to regard increased connectivity and (social) media at least as one of the main catalysts of volatility. From systems theory we know that the volatility of system parameters increases when it approaches a tipping point [28]. Interestingly, energy markets are also affected by an important volatility, caused in parts by new technologies, but also by lifestyle changes. This creates opportunities for new market entrants – and it makes radical energy scenarios, such as neo-carbon scenarios based on renewable energy [7] more plausible. Is there already a tipping point approaching?

U for ‘uncertainty’ indicates a fundamental condition that decision makers have met in all ages. The lack of predictability, however, has become more prominent during the last decades, since the impacts of innovations, the outcome of political developments, and shifts in lifestyles have increased. Objective indeterminacy due to internal and external factors that are beyond control is complemented by subjective unpredictability due to a lack of knowledge about the dynamics of large, interconnected economic and societal systems. Chance combines with choice [29]. A multitude of actors with different, often clashing interests attempt to influence the unfolding of events and to get their specific answers about the big challenges of our age. In sum, developments become unpredictable and full of surprises.

Even most advanced prediction tools (e. g. use of big data and deep learning) have revealed fundamental limitations for social phenomena (see e.g. [30, 31]). In technology foresight, more humble approaches are now state of the art: technology forecasting (in the sense of predicting breakthroughs with definite timelines) has been supplanted by scenariosFootnote 5 and recently by hermeneutic approaches, the deconstruction of future images (“vision assessment”) [32]. For most challenges with long time horizons, optimism about “superforecasting” [33] seems not in place. However, one lesson can be drawn from forecasting exercises: one needs to distinguish first the realm of predictable developments, second the realm of black swans (unpredictable outliers), and third the vast space in between of rather well or rather poorly predictable events. In the sphere of intermediate predictability, such as stock market movements or elections, the difficulty of prediction depends tremendously on the details of the task (e.g. per cent margins, time horizons).

It would, however, totally miss the point to regard uncertainty primarily as a problem for decision makers. Uncertainty safeguards the openness of the future, and provides the space for human decisions.

C for ‘complexity’ implies that there is a multitude of qualitatively different factors or elements that interact in many different ways. Complex systems display complex dynamics, often with self-organization and the emergence of novel structures. There are no clear-cut cause-and-effect chains, but intrinsic webs of interaction through which disturbances or disruptions propagate in elusive ways.

When it comes to grand challenges, e. g. the transition to sustainable energy systems, there is always an interplay of many actors with their specific organizational or network structures (from centralized to peer-to-peer). In the last decades, with global networking, with social media, digitalization of the economy, linkages have become much closer, exchange much more rapid. From the decision point of view this produces “wicked problems” [34] without clear, simple, and lasting solutions, from a change-oriented point of view this produces opportunities to break up existing structures and to quickly shift to novel ones.

A for ‘ambiguity’ describes the difficulties to understand and interpret novel, emergent or simply unusual phenomena, to make sense of them, to draw conclusions. Reality becomes opaque and hazy, one might confuse causes and effects, misread weak signals and even strong ones.

According to epistemology, there is a tension between prediction and explanation. Understanding a system, interpreting its behaviour needs simple, straight-forward models, in difference to prediction that is usually based on complex models (mapping a multitude of influencing factors). “It is both possible to make sense of something ex post that cannot be predicted ex ante and to make successful predictions that are not interpretable” [30].

In many cases, ambiguity implies that there are competing haphazard interpretations based not only on diverging perspectives and differing interests (the usual reasons for dissent) but – on a deeper level – on the lack of applicable concepts and terms. Really new, “emergent” phenomena, sometimes heralded by weak signals, escape existing mental models.

Futures research have a long tradition in embracing VUCA developments and in supplementing trend-based thinking by analyses of possible disruptions and corresponding extreme events [35, 36]. Concepts like “black swan” [37] and “wild card” [38, 39] capture in an almost metaphorical way key aspects of sudden changes in the mental landscape of the future. Black swans, wild cards and X-events are used almost synonymously to refer to sudden, surprising, unanticipated events with broad and radical consequences [40, 41], but to elaborate the three concepts, certain distinctions can be drawn.

The concept of black swan refers to a highly improbable event that is difficult to anticipate, but if realised, will have dramatic, global impacts. Black swans may be positive or negative by their impacts. According to Taleb [37], black swans cannot be foreseen, but clusters of weak signals may point out to a possible black swan. The impact of black swans is also difficult to assess. One is to calculate the power of a black swan by a set of criteria: rate of change, reach, vulnerability, outcome, timing, opposition and power factor [42]. Aven [1] claims “near-black swans” to be surprises as a sub-set of black swan conditions, where an event does not result in extreme consequences because the barriers work and extreme outcomes are avoided.

Wild cards are events or developments with a very low probability before they occur and with a very high impact on the system under consideration, e. g. in the business, political, or social sphere. From a methodological point of view, one can distinguish realised (“historical”) and potentially possible, imagined wild cards [43]. Like black swans, they can have either positive or negative impact. Because of the low ex ante probability combined with a broad and often radical impact, they emerge as a strategic surprise and very often provoke inadequate, delayed, badly aimed, sometimes only symbolic responses. While black swans are “unknown unknowns”, things we cannot name or beyond our minds, wild cards are events or developments we can with sufficient effort imagine and at least abstractly identify – so that large collections of wild cards can be established.Footnote 6 Such collection can help to promote “thinking out of the box” in foresight exercises and to extend both the space of envisioned futures and of options for action. Both wild cards and black swans are different from risks because their probability is difficult to assess, as singular events without any precedent. In assessing their impacts, they may be low probability/high impact, but it has to be guessed. Preparedness for surprises is necessary to avoid situations without any prophylactic – or even preventive! – measures or alternative planning [44]).

Extreme events, or X-events, are considered in the short term mostly negative and problematic, whereas in the long-term they open up as opportunities - clearing out existing structures that are no longer serving a useful purpose. In this sense, extreme events are drivers of human progress [35, 36]. The motivation to understand X-events emerges from criticism of concentrating on trends. Trends are based on continuities, and thereby, the trap of linear thinking. It may be more relevant to explore trends in terms of how long they last, how they are going to end, and what can be expected to replace them [45]. Colonomos [25] points out that for anyone looking into the future the distinction between continuity and rupture is the first indication of importance.

Anticipating the impacts of black swans and X-events is difficult because there is no historical precedent [36]. The aspect of surprise may be viewed as a relational one: black swans, X-events or wild cards should be assessed as relative to one’s worldview, knowledge and beliefs [2, 46]. Black swans, X-events or wild cards cannot thus be foreseen, but they can be imagined and described within the context of the observer. One also has to bear in mind that large technological, infrastructural, or economic transitions – like the transition to a neo-carbon economy – imply not only changes in the built landscape but equally deep tectonic shifts in the mental landscape. The most important black swans for renewable energy may possibly emerge from the fields of society and politics [44].

Renewable energy system and the VUCA world

To mitigate climate change, it is evident that the structure of energy production must change. Today’s energy systems are still 80% reliant on fossil fuels [47, 48]. Therefore, humanity is at a historical crossroads, expecting an emerging transition from non-renewable to renewable energy systems.

It is often assumed that the transition to renewable energy requires reducing energy consumption, and that the energy abundance provided by oil has come to an end [49]. However, this may well not be the case. Today, global total primary energy demand is approximately 110,000 TWh.Footnote 7 By 2050, we may expect global total primary energy demand to be at least 130,000 TWh with significant increases in energy efficiency [50]. The energy system can be 100% by then [7, 51], and it can provide energy at lower prices than today [52], in some cases – such as in household solar PV systems – even with zero marginal costs [53]. Further, as opposed to the non-renewable energy system, the renewable energy system can be built as, at least partly, decentralised so that energy consumers will become prosumers [54].

Thus, in the relatively near future we may have a sustainable energy system that increases energy supply and energy efficiency, decreases the price of energy, and allows citizens and organisations to become energy producers. These changes, then, enable wide use of new technologies – such as artificial intelligences (AIs), smart cities, internet of things (IoT), robotisation, and ubiquitous virtual realities – and empower new actors, big and small. To meet sustainable criteria, also material production should be designed as sustainable – for instance as circular economy.

Socio-political destabilization and, in the worst case, social collapse are often seen as among the consequences of decrease in energy demand [55] or of severely descending energy supply [56]. However, the opposite may also destabilize societies: an increase in energy supply. More and cheaper energy may promote the VUCA world – increasing volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. If we are reaching sustainable energy abundance, the traits will only strengthen. More and cheaper energy with other new technologies means faster and deeper changes [3, 57] and realignment of power [53].

Complexity can be seen as key here [58], as it is complexity that feeds to volatility, uncertainty and ambiguity. Societal complexity can be defined as differentiation in social structure (more parts and more types of parts to a system) and variation in organisation and ranges of behaviour [3, 59]. If increased energy supply allows for “more parts” (human and technological actors) and variation in organisation and behaviour, it should then also increase complexity, and with it, volatility, uncertainty and ambiguity.

It may therefore be that in the VUCA times, furthered by the renewable energy system, social and cultural stability decreases – which is both good and bad. In any case, we have to see the energy transition to renewables as a much more complex and multifaceted phenomenon than it is often understood. If progress is stable, predictable and controlled development, the VUCA times may render the world a more discontinuous.

Discontinuities and surprises in a world of complexity

Discontinuity is a feature of complex systems [60]. A system is complex, if it is interconnected with numerous other systems and if its cause and effect relations are not linear. The world economy is a complex system (virtually everything that happens in the world affects the global economy), whereas a combustion engine is not. If the world becomes increasingly complex, for instance because of the interconnectedness of nations, so should discontinuities increase, too, and the world becomes more volatile. The energy system is also an apt example of a complex system.

Instead of trends, Futures Research pays increasing attention to black swans and wild cards (see above) and weak signals. Weak signals are signs – such as events, new technologies and novel practices – pointing to possibly emerging issues and phenomena which can either strengthen or wither away as time passes [61, 62]. They are the first symptoms of important discontinuities, warning signs, or new possibilities [63]. This is understandable, as future is about change, and most novel and exciting things emerge from weak signals and black swans. Weak signals are important indicators for upcoming potential change, impending wild cards or black swans. If they are properly identified, they can be used to discover latent processes, potential discontinuities (see below) and to give hints as to the approach of wild cards or black swans [28, 31, 64]. From this point of view, they are of utmost practical advantage as early warning signals [65].

Further, technological developments, increases in (renewable) energy supply and decreases in energy price could steer our world into unknown futures. If we subscribe to the idea that the world is becoming increasingly VUCA-like, imagining weak signals and possible black swans is becoming more and more crucial.

Weak signals and black swans are, however, rather “unpractical” as a method for anticipation. As singular issues, phenomena and events, weak signals and black swans – which are besides by definition very difficult to anticipate – are not very reliable in trying to anticipate how the future will differ from the present. Trends, in turn, are more reliable, not only because they deal with things that are familiar to us, but also because they are constructed by different phenomena. For instance, the trend of increasing life-expectancies is not a singular issue but consist of numerous different factors.

Therefore, in addition to weak signals and black swans, Futures Research should pay more attention to discontinuities. Saritas and Smith define discontinuities as “rapid and significant shifts in trajectories without the aspect of being mostly unanticipated or deeply surprising” which “[extend] beyond single events” and “fundamentally [alter] the previous pathways or expected direction of policies, events and planning regimes” [66].

The key elements in the definition are that discontinuities are not singular issues and events (but consist of different interacting trends, weak signals and black swans), and that they fundamentally alter the linear, known pathways. There is, however, no reason to define discontinuities as exclusively rapid shifts – they can as well be gradual, long-term and deep change processes. Saritas and Smith mention Facebook as one example of a discontinuity, but in fact the rise of Facebook was not a rapid shift [66]. Established in 2004, it took Facebook three years to reach fifty million users and eight years for a billion users.Footnote 8 Furthermore, Facebook was preceded by many other social networking sites and applications such as MySpace and the Finnish Irc-Galleria in the early 2000, Internet Relay Chat (IRC) in the 1980’s and Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) in the 1970’s. Perhaps, then, Computer Mediated Communication (CMC) is the deep, long-term discontinuity here, of which Facebook is only one, albeit the most known, manifestation.

The internet and the First World War are two other illuminating examples of discontinuity. Both are often seen as black swan events, although in reality they are the result of longer discontinuity processes – neither is an event which black swans by definition should be. The internet was invented in the 1960s, but began to spread and influence society in the early 1990s with the invention of the World Wide Web. The development of the internet was a gradual process rather than a single event, a discontinuity in relation to the centralised mass media technologies such as the television. There were also many other discontinuity processes during 1970s and 1980s that laid the groundwork for the spread of the internet, such as globalisation and transition from industrial to information economy. The First World War, in turn, had many underlying processes such as militarism, nationalism, and strategic alliances between nations. Eventually, the war was triggered by the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in 1914, an event that may be claimed to be a black swan. However, numerous other events might have had the same effect (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1

A conceptual map of drivers of change with a view to continuity/discontinuity

From this perspective, black swans and weak signals as single events and phenomena are less relevant than the wider and deeper discontinuity processes underneath them. Black swans and weak signals should be seen as tools to discover hidden discontinuity processes, which in turn help in interpreting the meaning and significance of black swans and weak signals. They should always be related to broader phenomena they are part and signs of. Black swans can thus be seen as the culmination, and weak signals as the “signifiers” [62], of discontinuity processes. According to van Notten et al. “Abrupt discontinuity tends to manifest itself through events but these are usually connected to underlying processes. In such cases, events are often the proverbial last straw that broke the camel’s back.” Along these lines, the fall of the Berlin Wall (a black swan) was preceded by discontinuities in the Soviet system, as for instance by Michael Gorbachev’s rise to power and the politics of glasnost and perestroika (ibid.) [67].

Issues that constitute a discontinuity often emerge from different fields. The iPhone, for instance, is an innovative combination of existing technologies. Machine learning is starting to converge with other technologies in a variety of unexpected ways. Together with patient data and an algorithm, machine learning can predict breast-cancer risk 30 times as fast as a human can [68]. Solar photovoltaics were in use already in the 1990s, but have begun to spread only in recent years [52], especially as China has risen as a mass-manufacturer. Real transformations will come about when low-cost and abundant solar electricity is combined with, for instance, self-driving cars and smart-city technologies.

The issues and trends behind discontinuous development processes are often regarded as unrelated and irrelevant. Because of complex interconnections and apparent insignificance, discontinuities may not be easily recognised and are ignored [69, 70]. For instance, ecological deterioration can have a significant impact on the global economy, and tipping points may only be revealed ex-post, but this is seldom taken into consideration in economic projections. In this light, the rapid emergence of solar photovoltaics (PV) in the 2010s may also be better understood as a discontinuity built over time rather than a black swan event.

Anticipating discontinuities and black swans - implications for energy security

Casti emphasises the role of unexpected events, i.e. surprises for humankind by claiming “…off we go now into the land in which almost nothing is actually known but where much of our future lives will be determined” [14: 33]. If surprise is the new normal, its implications for energy security – our critical life supporter – should be anticipated by using various kinds of foresight tools. This chapter presents the results of a methodological experiment to anticipate and analyse discontinuities and black swans and their implications for renewable energy.

A set of transformations to renewable energy is envisioned by four transformative neo-carbon scenarios 2050. These semi-backcasting scenarios represent energy futures based on renewable energy as radically different from the present, and contextualise such change with emerging societal futures. Instead of addressing the transition to renewable energy as an ecological or techno-economic issue, the scenarios probe alternative possibilities on how the society at large could change under the new energy regime. The scenarios are transformative and discontinuous, as none of them is a business-as-usual scenario and all assume deep societal changes. In all of the scenarios ecological values prevail (either deep ecological or practical). From a socio-cultural perspective, the core assumption of all of the scenarios is that peer-to-peer practices will strengthen – the scenarios map out different possibilities for a “peer-to-peer society” to organize (as centralised or decentralised). Peer-to-peer refers to self-organising individuals and groups. Renewable energy technologies have a potential to promote peer-to-peer, as it allows citizens to become energy producers and thus increase their independence [53]. The core technological driver towards peer-to-peer are, however, information and communication technologies, which have dramatically decreased the costs of information and self-organising [71].

In the Radical Startups 2050 scenario, startups with ‘radical’ approaches become the platform for self-organising citizens and drive the uptake of innovative energy solutions. In the Value-Driven Techemoths 2050 scenario, citizens self-organise within profit-seeking technology giants, where they help them solve energy problems commercially. In the Green DIY Engineers 2050 scenario, energy solutions are low-tech and citizens self-organise as local tribes, as the world faces an environmental catastrophe. New Consciousness 2050 scenario envisions a world where ICT and profound ecological thinking have brought about a thoroughly networked society without traditional organisations and institutions, and a new systemic way of conceptualizing the world [79].

Scenarios can be used as exploratory tools for exploring discontinuities of long-term energy transitions. In a Futures Clinique conducted in May 2017 in Helsinki, Finland, 39 participants in seven groups investigated central themes related to the scenarios to test the resilience of a renewable energy based society. Futures Clinique is a participatory and exploratory futures workshop used to tackle uncertainties, identify disruptions and generate innovations [72]. The aim was to identify different interlinked trends and weak signals to probe how they could shape the energy transformations – to a future renewable energy based world. The participants consisted of energy, innovation, economy and environmental policy experts, working alongside futures researchers and students. After documenting and reporting the results, the key insights are expected to inform further discussions about energy security at a research- and policy-level nationally and internationally.

The Futures Clinique proceeded in phases (Table 1). In the beginning, the scene was set with introductions to megatrends and trends that may enable ‘radical change’. This set the context for exploring future discontinuities and focusing on emerging issues and weak signals of change. There were two broader tasks: first to map out possible discontinuities to think about deep and cross-sectoral changes. After that, to ideate possible black swans and reflect on their impacts on renewable energy world. The discontinuities were anticipated through five pre-selected themes: 1) Politics: nation-states, governments, geopolitics, new ideologies; 2) Corporations and economy; 3) Civil society & peer-to-peer practices; 4) Robotisation & artificial intelligence; and 5) New lifestyles, chosen because of their significance in society and potential for surprises. Subsequent small groups elaborated on these themes.

Table 1 Futures Clinique methodology to explore the implications of discontinuities and black swans for renewable energy and its energy security

The Clinique consisted of two sessions. The objective of the first session was to identify discontinuities related to the allocated theme of the group. The participants started by exploring how their theme is changing – discussing emerging issues, novel characteristics and dimensions. The ideas were noted down on post-its and those resembling each other were clustered. At the end, the participants classified the ideas that resemble each other into clusters, and gave titles for the found ‘discontinuity clusters’. In the second session, the implications of the discontinuities were systematically analysed. The discontinuities deemed as most discontinuous were chosen to elaborate what black swans could emerge from them. At the end of the session, the group considered what implications, either advancing or hindering, these black swans could have on the renewable energy world by 2050.

After a qualitative content analysis on the groups’ results, six categories of discontinuities could be differentiated: 1) new risks, 2) converging technologies, 3) value changes, 4) environmental economy, 5) changes in big companies, and 6) geopolitical changes (Table 2). In the following we accordingly summarise the results in more detail, with the aid of these six categories. In interpreting the themes as results, it has to be borne in mind that, as Gordon warns, the choice of future events to test resilience may not be free of unintended bias [73].

Table 2 Six areas for emerging discontinuities described in a Futures Clinique, with summarising narratives

New risks

As the world changes, new risks emerge, and oftentimes we do not know how to deal with them. Amidst turmoil, we are seeking for sources of trust − from ‘the new’ and ‘the old’. In the years to come, a major cultural issue concerns how the tensions of nationalism versus globalism and liberalism versus conservatism will play out. If nationalism and conservatism begin to strengthen, this could be a major discontinuity globally, and as such pose new risks. In turn, anticipated transformations imply that we have to think in advance of their winners and losers. If we are moving to a predominantly immaterial, creative and automated economy, what kinds of social issues will we have to deal with? New kinds of inequalities can also be a source of discontent, and cause severe risks.

Converging technologies

In terms of technology, convergence may be one of the main factors that disrupts linear developments. In this respect especially the convergence of humans and machines, “the Internet of Everything” (IoE), and autonomous transportation are key. As artificial intelligences (AIs) become more developed, we may begin to think of them as our peers. Biochemical “robots” in our bodies would converge humans and machines in a very concrete way − and even change our consciousness if they had cognitive functions. The Internet of “Everything” refers to a situation where everything − our energy systems, businesses, leisure etc. − are thoroughly networked. Crowdsourcing and crowdfunding would become the prevailing norm, not the exception. If transportation became autonomous, it would not change only how we move but for instance how we socialize and design our cities. Transportation would become much more efficient, which would free city space for other uses and make crossing distances easier than today.

Value changes

Changes in values are fundamental, as value systems guide our behaviour. In terms of production systems, if more goods and services were exchanged peer-to-peer outside established market mechanisms, as already is happening, this could shape how we today perceive the “free market”. This, in turn, would have wide systemic effects. Whether we will live in market economies in the future or not, the rupture of hierarchies could be expected to change the world. Among many other things, it would make cultures more pluralistic, and more prone to change. Values are also connected to identities and how we perceive our place in the world. In times of rapid change and increasing social complexity, developing, searching and realising oneself would become even more important than today. Values could affect how we choose to allocate the use of resources and what we expect to disrupt current trends.

Environmental economy

By 2050 the rise of an environmental economy may have changed societies much more than we can conceive today. Multiple new energy technologies and sources could lead to a situation where energy can be harvested everywhere. As an outcome, China, India and other developing economies, especially in Africa, might prosper in unprecedented ways. On the other hand, keeping the system running sustainably − including how circular economy can be used to deal with waste − is an immensely complex task. Information, big data analysis and artificial intelligences are thus imagined to be an integral part of an environmental economy.

Transforming large companies

The Facebooks and Googles of tomorrow may develop as all-encompassing entities that are involved in virtually everything. This would change the nature of such companies as some kind of semi-public actors (which they to some extent are already). This could be a positive thing, if their vast resources are put to good uses, but on the other hand concentration of corporate power is always risky. In any case, it is deeply uncertain how these mega-corporations can change currently established paths. Already, the emergence of platform economy, resulting from technological change and peer-to-peer principles, has raised questions about the justification of profits, and raised proposals about changes in taxation. And, can small, nimble companies that use global networks challenge these giants?

Geopolitical changes

It may well be that the power of ‘the West’ decreases in world politics − and thus its place and significance in steering the global development. However, in place of the current international norms, we fail not imagine what the alternative is. Except for authoritarianism, what would be the guiding values of a post-Western world? Perhaps some kind of religious, national/regional conservatism? Or a mixture of these two? And, if sustainability continues to gain importance, will this change geopolitics? Regarding the future, the core question in geopolitics is not which countries are expected to gain power at the cost of others, but what the cultural consequences of these power shifts will be.

As a follow-up of the futures clinique work the previous day, a small ad hoc group consisting of the research project staff and external experts convened to conduct a further, hybrid methodological experiment: a Post-Futures Clinique cross impact analysis with black swans. Out of the results generated in the futures clinique, black swans (or combinations of different black swans), which could emerge as surprising events from these discontinuities were chosen and refined for a cross impact analysis. Cross impact analysis was then used to examine them [74]. The anticipation of possible black swans was combined with a description of their possible impacts across the four transformative neo-carbon scenarios 2050, described briefly earlier in the chapter, into a cross impact matrix. Adapting from Petersen’s criteria [42] presented earlier (chapter 2.1), a more simplified version of semi-quantitative (QUAN) and qualitative (QUAL) implications was considered to score the black swans. Table 3 summarizes the results.

Table 3 Post-Futures Clinique cross impact analysis with black swans

As presented in Table 3 in a synthesised and simplified form, five black swans altogether were selected for analysis and named: Total industrial revolution; Collapse of the United States of America; Mass deaths due to climate change; Revenge of the fossil fuel industry; and Digital Anarchy. It may also be concluded that the imagined black swans vary in terms of their impact, either positive or negative, impact (large or small), timing effects (first, then), and level of surprise. The chosen black swans are results from the Futures Clinique work. To meet the strict definition of a black swan they should, however, include an event that is now missing in the description. The event can though be imagined for each one of them, for example, the mass deaths due to the climate change could be depicted in specifying the event that will cause the deaths.

The black swans seem to have drastic impacts, several of them, while none seem to entirely collapse a scenario, at least indefinitely. They also have different indirect or direct impacts for energy security: 1) A holistic ‘clean’ industrial revolution likely would improve energy security. 2) The collapse of an influential state and a major energy player would surely induce instability, and consequently also influence energy markets. 3) If climate change effects increase instability and health costs, governments become increasingly strained. 4) An attack by the fossil fuel industry would not be unprecedented, but perhaps the participants anticipated it to find a new way or form. And, finally, 5) the effects of digitalization and self-organising are interpreted to lead in negative outcomes in terms of chaos. Then again, a positive interpretation of the same factors might emphasize localised energy solutions, which actually would have a positive impact for energy security.

Black swans are a useful tool to test scenarios, as they reveal possible need to re-visit the gaps within scenario stories. Instead of aiming to ‘save’ scenarios from black swans, it is more important to critically observe the future presented in it. A black swan event can be timed at any point of each scenario pathway, or at their end point, when it tests the resilience of a scenario as a future image. Do Black Swans advance, postpone or destroy a scenario? Is this change at the core of the scenario or not? An examination of black swans alone may be prone to leave out the richness of the scenarios, as only the main actors of the scenarios are addressed. An examination of discontinuities and black swans jointly can allow an enquiry of factors that can potentially build surprises.

Anticipating discontinuities and black swans of renewable energy can be useful for enhancing the resilience of such possible futures. Resilience explains the resistance of a system to shocks and disasters, recovery ability, recovery times, and costs of recovery [75]. In a Futures Clinique, covering the broad range of discontinuities in detail is an ambitious task; but provides useful grounds for analysing their implications for energy security beyond conventional risk assessment. While feedback was not collected from the participants to evaluate the quality or impact of this process, the workshop participants are key stakeholders for this research question, expected to be able to carry the findings in their own future work. In the post-black swans session, the use of four transformative scenarios for each black swan allowed a differentiation to be made across a range of possible black swans and their contexts, to open up another level of different possible futures. Exploring discontinuities allowed for a depiction of a fairly rich ‘futures map’ [76]. Resilience could be understood a countering dimension for discontinuities and black swans, and rich futures maps may be important for resilience. It may help understanding how energy services can be provided in a future society even in the case of disruptions [77].

The future cannot properly be anticipated in a linear way only. Discontinuities, disruptions, and surprises are the robust building blocks of the future world.

In a VUCA world, anticipating energy futures is important. Not only has energy been narrowly defined, the way it has been analysed has left little room for imagining alternative development pathways. The dilemma of non-linear thinking has ignored multiple developments that, when put together jointly, may over time pose radical shifts in the energy landscape. The emergence of solar energy may be understood as a surprise, but it would be more accurate to conceptualize it as a discontinuity, building over time as an outcome of various developments, eventually intertwining with each other.

In anticipation, it is crucial to pay attention to not only trends but also to weak signals, and black swans as unexpected events. The aim was to overcome an omission of the complexity of the real and future world of forecasting exercises. Furthermore, besides identifying weak signals and anticipating possible black swans, special attention should be paid in probing discontinuities. Discontinuities are not sudden events or individual phenomena. They are long-term change processes which consist of different interlinking trends, weak signals, and black swans. For instance, new events and new policies can make scenarios shift [74], but discontinuities may question their assumptions altogether. It is precisely these broad and deep processes of change that, in the end, change the world.

In thinking of the rapid pace of technological development, one may make the claim that in the present, discontinuities are increasing (e.g. [36]). If this indeed is the case, it has partly to do with energy as well as new energy technologies. When new energy systems provide more energy than their predecessors, additional energy can enable the use of new technologies, to create even more complex societies. As we are preparing to take into use a renewable energy system that is increasingly distributed and can harness the abundance of solar and wind energy, changes could become faster, and even more transformative, than today.

Anticipating discontinuities is helpful for semi-backcasting exercises on possible or desirable futures. This hybrid methodological experiment worked to refine understanding about an anticipated transformation. With the aid of the transformative scenarios and related themes, the Futures Clinique participants were able to explore the interdependencies of renewable energy and a future society. It allowed the participants to develop their understanding about alternative futures and open its implications for energy security. The black swans generated in the workshop and later analysed, exemplify unexpected events that could influence the scenarios and their energy security. The generated insights will be used to refine the final scenarios before their completion. Our scenarios have a socio-cultural element in them, which underscores the point about their societal significance. As the exercise was part of a broader foresight project, the findings are expected to also inform and feed further research and policy work about energy transformations.

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Heinonen, S., Karjalainen, J., Ruotsalainen, J. et al. Surprise as the new normal – implications for energy security. Eur J Futures Res 5, 12 (2017).

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  • Renewable energy
  • Transformative scenarios
  • Energy security
  • Resilience
  • Complexity
  • Wild cards
  • Black swans
  • Uncertainty
  • Discontinuity
  • Turbulence


How does a Judge Make Child Custody Decisions in Illinois?

How does a Judge Make Child Custody Decisions in Illinois?

The state of Illinois is slightly different than many other states, in that joint custody is not presumed. Custody decisions in the state of Illinois are made by a judge who bases the decision on the child’s best interest, while attempting to maximize the involvement by each parent or guardian.

During a divorce involving children, often one of the most difficult and contentious parts of the process is determining custody of a child. A common assumption is that mothers have an advantage and will be typically given custody. Though the system once may have worked this way decades ago, the court operates much different today. The interest of the court is to determine what is in the best interest of the child.

There are two different types of custody of a child in the state of Illinois. The first is legal custody. This type of custody gives a parent the authority to decide certain matters of a child’s life such as: where they will receive education, what medical treatment they will receive, and what religion (if any) they will practice. The second type of custody is called residential custody. This type of custody determines where a child will live for a majority of the time and for the other parent, who has the obligation of paying child support.

What is the Difference Between ‘Custody’ and ‘Visitation’?

Although ‘custody’ and ‘visitation’ are often used interchangeably, there is distinct different between the two terms. Custody refers to the parent that has the right to make decisions for the child. Custody of the child will include both legal and physical custody, which are defined in the paragraph above. The parent with custody of the child will be the parent who bears the most responsibility for the day-to-day and long-term decisions for the child. The parent who is granted custody is most often granted the right to have the child live with them as well.

Visitation refers to the time the other parent spends with the child. A visitation plan is usually created by the court, or the parties if they are able to agree. In situations where a Judge makes the custody and visitation decision, the decision will be based off what the child’s best interests are.  Generally, a parenting agreement describes the specific custody and visitation arrangement.

What are the Steps to Determining Custody?

The first step taken is to file a Petition for Allocation of Parental responsibilities within 120 days of service. Once this is done, both parents then submit a proposed “parenting plan”. If the parents are able to agree on a parenting plan, the court will in most cases adopt this plan. Very rarely will the court intervein and order something different. In these cases, the court has determined that the plan both parents have agreed upon, despite being chosen by both parents, is not in the best interests of the child and will explain its reasoning.

In the event that two parents cannot agree to a parenting plan, the court will order them to participate in mediation to attempt to come to an agreement. The court could order the costs to be waived, but typically the cost of the mediation is split between the parents.

If the parents are still not able to agree on a parenting plan after mediation, the court will set a date for a hearing or trial. At this hearing or trial, the court considers the parenting plan of each parent and creates one plan in the best interest of the child.

What is in a ‘Parenting Plan’?

The largest parts of a parenting plan are made up of scheduling the parenting time (the time a child spends with a parent) and allocation of significant decision-making responsibilities.

Some information is required such as:

  • - designation of authority to one or both parents as to the decision making for the child’s education, healthcare, religion, and any extra-curricular activities the child may be involved in
  • - each parent’s right of access to the child's medical and school records
  • - designation of a parent to receive tax benefits for the child
  • - designation of a parent’s address for education enrollment purposes
  • - each parent's residence address, phone number and place of employment
  • - notice requirement of sixty (60) days in the event one of the parents moves
  • - transportation arrangements for the child
  • - notice requirement in the event of any emergency, healthcare, or travel involving the child
  • - agreed arrangements for transporting the child between the parents
  • - arrangements for one parent to be able to communicate with the child during the other parent's parenting time
  • - agreement for resolving issues in the event a parent relocates
  • - provisions for future modifications of the parenting plan, if specified events occur

There are two options when designating parenting time. The first is a schedule that designates which of the parent’s home the minor child will reside in on given days or a method for determining such a schedule with enough detail that it could be enforced in a subsequent proceeding.

How Does a Judge Determine my Child’s Best Interests?

Illinois’s courts have adopted the Uniform Child Custody Act (UCCA) which was implemented as a way to minimize conflicts among guardians, while placing an important emphasis on the best interest of the child. When making this decision, a judge will take many factors into consideration. These factors typically include:

  • - the child’s wishes
  • - the financial stability of each guardian
  • - the guardians’ wishes
  • - each guardian’s mental health
  • - any history of domestic violence or threat of domestic violence directed at the child or other guardian
  • - any history of alcohol or drug abuse
  • - the child’s relationship with each guardian
  • - whether the child has other siblings and who those siblings live with
  • - which guardian handles the daily parenting tasks such as bathing, cooking, transportation etc.

Child custody cases are often emotionally difficult and can be in intense process. It is important to speak with an experienced family law attorney before making any decision in a custody battle. Sean Robertson can be reached at 630-780-1034 or via email at

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How do you combine multiple video streams from your event?

The title of this post is a hint at the rest of the story below. Imagine attending or organizing an event (kids athletic event, performance, conference, party, reception, speech, etc.) that is not "professionally" captured on video. However, there are several individuals capturing the event on various video devices from … Keep reading >>>


Faculty Pub Night with Jason Jarvis: What You Missed

This post was written by library student assistant, Carmen Venegas. Carmen is a senior communications studies major with a music minor. She was born and raised in the Bay Area, California. She has an interest in grassroots marketing, community advocacy, and ethical usage of social media.

On November 10, our Faculty Pub Night featured Dr. Jason Jarvis, assistant professor of rhetoric and media in the Communication Studies Department. Jarvis discussed his forthcoming publication, Greenwashing: Visual Politics of Oil in Southern California. Jarvis received his PhD from Georgia State University and his research is centered around the visual politics of images and environmental media in relation to digital culture. He focuses on social media’s ability to influence our perceptions of the world and human behavior. His research is also the focus of an emerging journalism course at LMU called “Immersed in Urban Oil,” which will be co-taught by Jarvis and Tara-Lynn Pixley in the spring of 2021.

Jarvis began with prompting the audience to take count of all of the items made from oil surrounding them. He then explained that the number is a lot higher than we often think. In fact, petroleum products are central to our lives. Jarvis showed a graphic that exemplified the fact that petroleum is in everything from our cosmetic products to our dishware. He expressed that we are all extremely immersed in a petroculture. Jarvis further explained, “Even if we all decided to switch to electric cars, we’re still going to be wrapped up in oil.”

Next, Jarvis explained that there is something strange and unique happening in Los Angeles in relation to petroculture. The first major oil field in LA County was founded in 1880 in Brea-Olinda and is still active today. Now, there are a total of 28 oil fields and 7 refineries in the Los Angeles basin. Jarvis expressed that the Playa del Rey field is closest to LMU; Playa Vista and the Ballona wetlands are on an oil field. Jarvis said, “It is undoubtedly the case that there were LMU graduates up to the 1960s who could stand on the bluff and look longingly out over the ocean and watch oil being pumped every day.”

Another chilling fact Jarvis shared is that oil fields tend to follow the fault lines due to the abundance of oil near them. There is in fact credible research that this is one of the reasons that southern California is so seismically active. Jarvis continued to explain that 4 out of 5 of the largest earthquakes in LA were caused by oil drilling. He said that we should especially care about this as it pertains to us and where we live.

In truth, the history of oil in LA is hidden from the public. Jarvis explained this through the origin of Beverly Hills. In 1906, Charlie Canfield bought land hoping to find oil, but was unsuccessful because he did not drill deep enough. The land was then turned into residential plots and sold as Beverly Hills. However in 1908, oil was discovered. And by the 1950s, there were 52 active oil wells that were hidden with plants on the Fox Studio grounds. Jarvis further explained that even now the Beverly Hills mall is on oil grounds.  Moreover, Beverly Hills High School was built on abandoned oil wells, and in the 1950s, drilling was actually permitted at the school; In total, 19 wells were operated there. Due to this, royalties reached $1.5 million a year in the 1970s. Jarvis continued to say that many students and faculty got sick and some even died due to the high rates of cancer. Eventually the company that bought the wells invited children from the local cancer ward at the hospital to paint an extremely visible well. They called it the “Tower of Hope” in an effort to make the derrick look more “child-friendly,” as Jarvis put it. The irony of this was exposed when a large thyroid cancer cluster was discovered at the high school because the pipes were checked for leaks with radioactive iodine and exposure to such radiation directly causes this specific type of cancer.

The “Tower of Hope” is unfortunately just one example of camouflaged wells. Jarvis pointed out that there are wells disguised as office buildings and islands in Long Beach. There are also methane vents that look like street lights in Playa Vista, mainly near playgrounds, and their purpose is to make sure there is not too much build up of chemicals.

For the second half of Jarvis’ presentation, he discussed the importance of social media in regard to oil drilling in Los Angeles. Jarvis began this segment with the question, “How did we get to a place where the most densely populated county in the United States is also the home to some of the most extensive urban oil fields on the planet?” He continued to answer this by analyzing how social media has been utilized by oil companies. He looked to postcards as early social media, which were widely popular among the wealthy and social elites. It was common for people to have displayed collections, but mailed cards were considered more valuable. Due to the social popularity amidst postcard distribution, they were also the focus of social fears and upheaval as they were ways for people to communicate about issues such as gender, race, and colonialism.

Next Jarvis introduced the term greenwashing which he defined as a deceptive PR tactic. Greenwashing is defined as “an attempt to promote the appearance of products and commodity consumption as environmental or ‘green’ while deliberately disavowing environmental impacts” (Pezullo and Cox, 2018). A tremendously helpful resource for Jarvis’s research was the Werner von Boltenstern Postcard Collection offered through the library’s Archives and Special Collections. Through this collection, Jarvis showed many postcards that attempted to greenwash oil infrastructure and naturalize it as a non-threatening part of the landscape in an effort to make drilling seem organic and normal. These postcards consisted of beautiful scenes portraying oil wells among nature and neighborhoods, despite the damage they actually do to the environment and the health of the people surrounding them.

Jarvis’ closing statement and thesis spoke volumes: “California: Greenwashed, but not as ‘green’ as we’d like it to be.”


Talk by Dr. Maryam Bahramipanah (Electrical & Computer Engineering Department, MSU)

1/31/2019   Wilson Hall 1-144   3:10-4:00pm

In the last decades, the massive connection of Distributed Generations (DGs) triggers different operation challenges in Active Distribution Networks (ADNs). Thus, the issue of real-time control of ADNs became more challenging caused by the lack of direct control over stochastic and non-stochastic DGs. In this talk, a real-time decentralized control algorithm in multi-area ADNs relying only on dispersed Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESSs) will be addressed. Firstly, a detailed dynamic model for BESSs accounting for charge redistribution effects will be presented. Then, a zonal control strategy targeting voltage support and line congestion management will be addressed. The presented zonal control relies on the accurate dynamic model of BESSs and it is capable to account for their DC active power limits. The communication among different areas is defined using the concept of multi-agents. The goal is to show that in order to have a feasible voltage and current profile for battery devices, the control algorithm needs to include their detailed dynamic model.


How Much Does It Cost To Get A CCW In California?

What disqualifies you from owning a gun in California?

California’s firearms laws are strict and federal laws are even stricter. If you are convicted of a felony or certain misdemeanors, you will lose your right to possess a gun in California. You also may not own or possess a gun if you are: … prohibited by federal law from possessing a gun.

Is it hard to get a gun permit in California?

Under current California law, it is incredibly difficult to obtain a license to carry a hidden gun in a public place. … An applicant also has to demonstrate “good moral character,” which law enforcement has lots of leeway to determine.

Do you have to tell police you have a gun in the car in California?

First of all, if you are pulled over, you must be honest and upfront with the officer about the presence of any firearm in your vehicle. If have a concealed carry permit, you must disclose that you have a gun on your person or in your vehicle.

Can I carry a gun while hiking in California?

(a) No person shall carry, possess or discharge across, in or into any portion of any unit any weapon, firearm, spear, bow and arrow, trap, net, or device capable of injuring, or killing any person or animal, or capturing any animal, or damaging any public or private property, except in underwater parks or designated …

Hollow-Point-Bullet Ban and Gun Lock Box Law. San Francisco has won a legal victory in a federal appeals court over two ordinances that require handgun owners to lock up their weapons and ban the sale of hollow-point bullets. … Ikuta also wrote that “firearm injuries are the third-leading cause of death in San Francisco. …

What guns are banned in California?

Assault weapons and BMG rifles are also banned in California per Penal Code 30600 PC….Some of these include:short-barreled shotguns and rifles, also illegal per Penal Code 33215 PC,undetectable firearms, also illegal per Penal Code 24610 PC, guns, also illegal per Penal Code 33600 PC.

Where do I apply for a CCW in California?

To apply, contact your county sheriff. You’ll have to fill out an application and complete a firearms safety course. Depending on your county, you may also have to undergo psychological testing. If you already have a CCW license from another state, you must apply for a California CCW license.

Can you have a loaded gun in your house in California?

California makes it a crime to keep a loaded gun somewhere on your property (or property you control) if you know or should know that a minor (under age 18) is likely to get access to it without parental permission.

Can I apply for a gun license online in California?

Convenience– The online application eliminates the need to mail an application and/or forms to the DOJ and saves time. You have the ability to apply, renew or modify your COE as well as report any change in employment with a firearms dealer or ammunition vendor through the online application.

Can I carry an unloaded gun in my backpack in California?

An unloaded firearm sitting on the floor of a locked trunk is completely legal. Yes, you can carry a locked and unloaded gun in your backpack with a loaded mag in the same case or not. You could even use one of those calendar/reminder books if you wanted (locked). You can not use your glove box as a locking container.

What is considered good cause for CCW in CA?

State law allows for a person to be issued a concealed carry permit if: You are of good moral character; Good cause exists for issuance of the license because you or a member of your family is in immediate danger; You meet certain residency requirements; and.

Can I get concealed carry in California?

California generally prohibits a person from carrying a loaded, concealed firearm in public unless the person has been issued a concealed weapons license. … California is a “may-issue” state, meaning that local law enforcement has discretion when issuing carrying concealed weapons (“CCW”) licenses.

How many guns can you carry with a CCW in California?

three gunsMost counties allow up to three guns on the permit.

California law requires any prospective purchaser (or other transferee) of a firearm to submit an application to purchase the firearm (also known as a “Dealer Record of Sale” or “DROS” form) through a licensed dealer to DOJ. …


Being and Time

Being and Time are maybe two of the most enigmatic concepts in human history. I had seen these two words side by side on a book when I was at high school. The author was Martin Heidegger, “the greatest philosopher” of the 20th century, or even of the “whole” Western thought after Plato and Aristotle according to the introduction. I was struck by these claims, and had borrowed one Turkish translation of the book from our library. However, I couldn’t understand anything. I still remember the disappointment with the book and with myself. Then in a philosophy class last semester, I encountered Heidegger again. This time, in the waters of a different language, I was somewhat able to understand him! And I want to share his understanding of time in this blog post, as much as I understood it and as best as I can.

As we see from the title, time and being are very intertwined concepts in Heidegger’s view. But before delving into time in his thought, I will try to explain briefly his philosophy.

Heidegger’s main question was “What is it to be?”. He was specialized in ontology as well as phenomenology, and he argued that the question above wasn’t asked or thought properly for a long time in the Western thought.

In his view, Being, for humans, is first of all “being in the world”. Secondly, it is “making sense of things”. In other words, the context, history, discourses, experiences that we live in/with are very crucial elements in our incessant process of making sense of things in the world. Humans are “thrown” into this world, and they gradually, by always using references, interpret things. Another crucial factor that affects our hermeneutical journey is our states of mind. Our state of mind, i.e. mood, is the “primary way in which we feel the significance of sense making”. Death is the opposite of being in his philosophy whereby our interpretive journey ends and nullity begins.

Time, in his system, is a characteristic of human being. It occurs only with the human being; it is the primary determinant of our existence. Time is the ground of our interpretive journey where things are present to us and we are embedded in meaning making process. Time is the interface between human being and things where disclosure, openness or unclosedness of things happen. In this respect, it is quite subjective, personal and relative. Past, present and future are all in our minds, and we go back and forth between them. He doesn’t deny the “clock time” which he calls “ordinary time”. But he points out its relativity, and focuses on mostly the aforementioned human temporality where making sense of things happen in our finite lives. In this sense, he reminds me of St.Augustin who had argued also the centrality of present and human experience regarding time. Heidegger’s understanding of time is also close to Bergson’s duration concept where the human experience of time is very subjective.


Question: Do You Have To Prime A Canvas For Acrylic Paint?

How do you prime a canvas for acrylic paint?

A top layer of gesso diluted thinly with water and acrylic gloss medium will help create a smooth painting surface.

Gesso can also be used to prime hardboard or paper, both of which make good supports on which to paint with oil and acrylic..

What happens if you don’t use gesso?

Is gesso really necessary?

Can I use white acrylic paint instead of gesso?

What type of canvas is best for acrylic paint?

Can I use Mod Podge instead of gesso?

Is gesso and primer the same?

Gesso, pronounced ‘jesso’, was traditionally used to prepare or prime a surface so Oil paint would adhere to it. Gesso is the same as a primer, as in ‘pre-primed canvas’. It is made from a combination of paint pigment, chalk and binder.

Can you prime a canvas with white acrylic paint?

Priming is the process of creating a barrier between the canvas and the paint of a painting. Typically this is done by applying layers of acrylic gesso, clear acrylic medium, or traditional hyde glue and oil priming white. … Gesso serves as a waterproof surface that allows your paint to spread evenly across the canvas.

What happens if you don’t prime a canvas?

And yes, you HAVE to use Gesso here. Ordinary white paint doesn’t have the same properties or texture that Gesso has. Priming also makes the canvas easier to paint on. … The Gesso layer will protect them from deteriorating, which can happen when working directly on the canvas.

How do you prep a canvas for acrylic paint without gesso?

Should you wet your canvas before painting?

Why won’t my acrylic paint stick to the canvas?

Then there comes another issue; as you know, acrylic paint consists of pigments that are suspended in a binder. If you very much dilute the acrylic paint with water, then it weakens the binder, and paint does not stick to the canvas properly and can be lift off from the surface any time.

Can I use white paint as a primer?

Do you have to prime a canvas before using acrylic paint?


Question: What Are Literary Terms Examples?

What is a literary term?

Literary terms have a wide range of application, from the poet’s beauty, to the speaker’s persuasion, to the novelist’s story development..

What are 5 literary terms?

While hundreds of literary devices have been created, some of the most common are:Allusion.Diction.Epigraph.Euphemism.Foreshadowing.Imagery.Metaphor/Simile.Personification.More items…•

What are the 20 literary devices?

20 Top Poetic Devices to RememberAllegory. An allegory is a story, poem, or other written work that can be interpreted to have a secondary meaning. … Alliteration. Alliteration is the repetition of a sound or letter at the beginning of multiple words in a series. … Apostrophe. … Assonance. … Blank Verse. … Consonance. … Enjambment. … Meter.More items…•

Is irony a literary term?

What is an example of literary?

Literary Techniques, on the contrary, are structures usually a word s or phrases in literary texts that writers employ to achieve not merely artistic ends but also readers a greater understanding and appreciation of their literary works. Examples are: metaphor, simile, alliteration, hyperbole, allegory etc.

What are the 7 literary elements?

What literary devices does Shakespeare use?

Shakespeare uses three main techniques, or literary devices, in Macbeth: irony, imagery, and symbolism.

What is a literary sentence?

How do you use literary devices?

Tips and Tricks: Using Literary Devices to Enhance Your StorytellingAlliteration. Alliteration is using a sequence of words with the same initial sound. … Irony. Irony lies in a difference between what is expected and what actually occurs. … Metaphor. … Personification. … Simile. … Hyperbole. … Powerful Tools.

Is sarcasm a literary technique?

Sarcasm is a literary device that uses irony to mock someone or something or convey contempt. Sarcasm can also be defined as the use of words that mean the opposite of what the speaker or writer intends, especially to insult or show irritation with someone, or to amuse others.

What are the 10 literary terms?

Here are 10 of the most common literary devices:Simile.Metaphor.Imagery.Symbolism.Flashbacks.Foreshadowing.Motif.Allegory.More items…•

What is a device in writing?

A literary device is a tool used by writers to hint at larger themes, ideas, and meaning in a story or piece of writing. There are many styles of literary devices, each serving a different purpose. Some operate at the sentence level, while others serve the piece of writing as a whole.

What literary device is a saying?

Definition: An aphorism is a concise statement that is made in a matter of fact tone to state a principle or an opinion that is generally understood to be a universal truth. Aphorisms are often adages, wise sayings and maxims aimed at imparting sense and wisdom.

How do you identify a literary device in a poem?

ObjectivesIdentify six poetic devices: alliteration, metaphor, onomatopoeia, personification, rhyme, and simile.Determine the purpose of poetic devices as either emphasizing meaning or the sound of words.Respond to a journal entry.Transfer learning while becoming the “teacher” of an assigned poetic device.

What are literary devices and examples?

Literary devices are various elements and techniques used in writing that construct the whole of your literature to create an intended perception of the writing for the reader. You probably remember learning about literary devices like personification, foreshadowing, and metaphors in school.

Is there a literary language?

A literary language is the form of a language used in its literary writing. It can be either a non-standard dialect or standardized variety of the language. Where there is a strong divergence between a written form and the spoken vernacular, the language is said to exhibit diglossia. …

What literary device is used in this sentence?