instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sk_buff *sctp_skb_recv_datagram(struct sock *sk, int flags,
int noblock, int *err)
{
int error;
struct sk_buff *skb;
long timeo;
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, noblock);
pr_debug("%s: timeo:%ld, max:%ld\n", __func__, timeo,
MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT);
do {
/* Again only user level code calls this function,
* so nothing interrupt level
* will suddenly eat the receive_queue.
*
* Look at current nfs client by the way...
* However, this function was correct in any case. 8)
*/
if (flags & MSG_PEEK) {
skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (skb)
refcount_inc(&skb->users);
} else {
skb = __skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
}
if (skb)
return skb;
/* Caller is allowed not to check sk->sk_err before calling. */
error = sock_error(sk);
if (error)
goto no_packet;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
break;
if (sk_can_busy_loop(sk)) {
sk_busy_loop(sk, noblock);
if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue))
continue;
}
/* User doesn't want to wait. */
error = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeo)
goto no_packet;
} while (sctp_wait_for_packet(sk, err, &timeo) == 0);
return NULL;
no_packet:
*err = error;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 60,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: clear_opt_map(OptMap* map)
{
static const OptMap clean_info = {
{0, 0}, {0, 0}, 0,
{
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
}
};
xmemcpy(map, &clean_info, sizeof(OptMap));
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,117
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void impeg2d_dec_pic_data_thread(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
WORD32 i4_continue_decode;
WORD32 i4_cur_row, temp;
UWORD32 u4_bits_read;
WORD32 i4_dequeue_job;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
i4_cur_row = ps_dec->u2_mb_y + 1;
i4_continue_decode = 1;
i4_dequeue_job = 1;
do
{
if(i4_cur_row > ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb)
{
i4_continue_decode = 0;
break;
}
{
if((ps_dec->i4_num_cores> 1) && (i4_dequeue_job))
{
job_t s_job;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T e_ret;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
e_ret = impeg2_jobq_dequeue(ps_dec->pv_jobq, &s_job, sizeof(s_job), 1, 1);
if(e_ret != IV_SUCCESS)
break;
if(CMD_PROCESS == s_job.i4_cmd)
{
pu1_buf = ps_dec->pu1_inp_bits_buf + s_job.i4_bistream_ofst;
impeg2d_bit_stream_init(&(ps_dec->s_bit_stream), pu1_buf,
(ps_dec->u4_num_inp_bytes - s_job.i4_bistream_ofst) + 8);
i4_cur_row = s_job.i2_start_mb_y;
ps_dec->i4_start_mb_y = s_job.i2_start_mb_y;
ps_dec->i4_end_mb_y = s_job.i2_end_mb_y;
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mb_y = ps_dec->i4_start_mb_y;
ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left = (ps_dec->i4_end_mb_y - ps_dec->i4_start_mb_y) * ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb;
}
else
{
WORD32 start_row;
WORD32 num_rows;
start_row = s_job.i2_start_mb_y << 4;
num_rows = MIN((s_job.i2_end_mb_y << 4), ps_dec->u2_vertical_size);
num_rows -= start_row;
impeg2d_format_convert(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_disp_pic,
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf,
start_row, num_rows);
break;
}
}
e_error = impeg2d_dec_slice(ps_dec);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
}
}
/* Detecting next slice start code */
while(1)
{
u4_bits_read = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
temp = u4_bits_read & 0xFF;
i4_continue_decode = (((u4_bits_read >> 8) == 0x01) && (temp) && (temp <= 0xAF));
if (1 == ps_dec->i4_num_cores && 0 == ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left)
{
i4_continue_decode = 0;
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26070014");
}
if(i4_continue_decode)
{
/* If the slice is from the same row, then continue decoding without dequeue */
if((temp - 1) == i4_cur_row)
{
i4_dequeue_job = 0;
break;
}
if(temp < ps_dec->i4_end_mb_y)
{
i4_cur_row = ps_dec->u2_mb_y;
}
else
{
i4_dequeue_job = 1;
}
break;
}
else
break;
}
}while(i4_continue_decode);
if(ps_dec->i4_num_cores > 1)
{
while(1)
{
job_t s_job;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T e_ret;
e_ret = impeg2_jobq_dequeue(ps_dec->pv_jobq, &s_job, sizeof(s_job), 1, 1);
if(e_ret != IV_SUCCESS)
break;
if(CMD_FMTCONV == s_job.i4_cmd)
{
WORD32 start_row;
WORD32 num_rows;
start_row = s_job.i2_start_mb_y << 4;
num_rows = MIN((s_job.i2_end_mb_y << 4), ps_dec->u2_vertical_size);
num_rows -= start_row;
impeg2d_format_convert(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_disp_pic,
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf,
start_row, num_rows);
}
}
}
else
{
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_disp_pic) && ((0 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf) || (IV_YUV_420P != ps_dec->i4_chromaFormat)))
impeg2d_format_convert(ps_dec, ps_dec->ps_disp_pic,
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf,
0, ps_dec->u2_vertical_size);
}
}
Commit Message: Check for Valid Frame Rate in Header
Bug: 34093952
Change-Id: I9f009edda84555e8d14b138684a38114fb888bf8
(cherry picked from commit 3f068a4e66cc972cf798c79a196099bd7d3bfceb)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 162,606
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int filter_iface(char *ifname, char *iflist[], size_t num)
{
size_t i;
if (!num) {
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "No interfaces to filter, using all with an IP address.");
return 0;
}
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "Filter %s? Comparing %zd entries ...", ifname, num);
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
logit(LOG_DEBUG, "Filter %s? Comparing with %s ...", ifname, iflist[i]);
if (!strcmp(ifname, iflist[i]))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 88,794
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: media_status_t AMediaCodec_queueInputBuffer(AMediaCodec *mData,
size_t idx, off_t offset, size_t size, uint64_t time, uint32_t flags) {
AString errorMsg;
status_t ret = mData->mCodec->queueInputBuffer(idx, offset, size, time, flags, &errorMsg);
return translate_error(ret);
}
Commit Message: Check for overflow of crypto size
Bug: 111603051
Test: CTS
Change-Id: Ib5b1802b9b35769a25c16e2b977308cf7a810606
(cherry picked from commit d1fd02761236b35a336434367131f71bef7405c9)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 163,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PixelPacket *GetAuthenticPixelsFromCache(const Image *image)
{
CacheInfo
*restrict cache_info;
const int
id = GetOpenMPThreadId();
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(id < (int) cache_info->number_threads);
return(cache_info->nexus_info[id]->pixels);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 73,619
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebPageSerializerImpl::WebPageSerializerImpl(WebFrame* frame,
WebPageSerializerClient* client,
const WebVector<WebURL>& links,
const WebVector<WebString>& localPaths,
const WebString& localDirectoryName)
: m_client(client)
, m_localDirectoryName(localDirectoryName)
, m_htmlEntities(false)
, m_xmlEntities(true)
{
ASSERT(frame);
m_specifiedWebLocalFrameImpl = toWebLocalFrameImpl(frame);
ASSERT(client);
ASSERT(links.size() == localPaths.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < links.size(); i++) {
KURL url = links[i];
ASSERT(!m_localLinks.contains(url.string()));
m_localLinks.set(url.string(), localPaths[i]);
}
ASSERT(m_dataBuffer.isEmpty());
}
Commit Message: Make WebPageSerializerImpl to escape URL attribute values in result.
This patch makes |WebPageSerializerImpl| to escape URL attribute values rather
than directly output URL attribute values into result.
BUG=542054
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.URLAttributeValues
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1398453005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#353712}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 124,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int checkGamma(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *CIEdict, int numvalues)
{
int code = 0, i;
float value[3];
ref *tempref, valref;
code = dict_find_string(CIEdict, "Gamma", &tempref);
if (code > 0 && !r_has_type(tempref, t_null)) {
if (numvalues > 1) {
/* Array of gammas (RGB) */
if (!r_is_array(tempref))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
if (r_size(tempref) != numvalues)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
for (i=0;i<numvalues;i++) {
code = array_get(imemory, tempref, i, &valref);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (r_has_type(&valref, t_integer))
value[i] = (float)valref.value.intval;
else if (r_has_type(&valref, t_real))
value[i] = (float)valref.value.realval;
else
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
if (value[i] <= 0) return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
}
} else {
/* Single gamma (gray) */
if (r_has_type(tempref, t_real))
value[0] = (float)(tempref->value.realval);
else if (r_has_type(tempref, t_integer))
value[0] = (float)(tempref->value.intval);
else
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
if (value[0] <= 0) return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 3,032
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InputMethodBase::OnInputMethodChanged() const {
TextInputClient* client = GetTextInputClient();
if (client && client->GetTextInputType() != TEXT_INPUT_TYPE_NONE)
client->OnInputMethodChanged();
}
Commit Message: cleanup: Use IsTextInputTypeNone() in OnInputMethodChanged().
BUG=None
TEST=None
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8986010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116461 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 171,062
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RendererSchedulerImpl::UpdatePolicy() {
base::AutoLock lock(any_thread_lock_);
UpdatePolicyLocked(UpdateType::kMayEarlyOutIfPolicyUnchanged);
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 143,488
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OmniboxViewWin::OnRButtonDblClk(UINT /*keys*/, const CPoint& /*point*/) {
gaining_focus_.reset(); // See NOTE in OnMouseActivate().
SetMsgHandled(false);
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,503
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void init_entity_runnable_average(struct sched_entity *se)
{
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,592
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OTRBrowserContextImpl::OTRBrowserContextImpl(
BrowserContextImpl* original,
BrowserContextIODataImpl* original_io_data)
: BrowserContext(new OTRBrowserContextIODataImpl(original_io_data)),
original_context_(original),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
BrowserContextDependencyManager::GetInstance()
->CreateBrowserContextServices(this);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 165,416
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::SetDiscoverable(
bool discoverable,
const base::Closure& callback,
const ErrorCallback& error_callback) {
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothAdapterClient()->
GetProperties(object_path_)->discoverable.Set(
discoverable,
base::Bind(&BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::OnSetDiscoverable,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
callback,
error_callback));
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,535
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tcp4_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
th->check = ~tcp_v4_check(skb->len - skb_transport_offset(skb),
iph->saddr, iph->daddr, 0);
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV4;
return tcp_gro_complete(skb);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tg3_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
{
struct mii_ioctl_data *data = if_mii(ifr);
struct tg3 *tp = netdev_priv(dev);
int err;
if (tg3_flag(tp, USE_PHYLIB)) {
struct phy_device *phydev;
if (!(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_IS_CONNECTED))
return -EAGAIN;
phydev = tp->mdio_bus->phy_map[TG3_PHY_MII_ADDR];
return phy_mii_ioctl(phydev, ifr, cmd);
}
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCGMIIPHY:
data->phy_id = tp->phy_addr;
/* fallthru */
case SIOCGMIIREG: {
u32 mii_regval;
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_PHY_SERDES)
break; /* We have no PHY */
if (!netif_running(dev))
return -EAGAIN;
spin_lock_bh(&tp->lock);
err = __tg3_readphy(tp, data->phy_id & 0x1f,
data->reg_num & 0x1f, &mii_regval);
spin_unlock_bh(&tp->lock);
data->val_out = mii_regval;
return err;
}
case SIOCSMIIREG:
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_PHY_SERDES)
break; /* We have no PHY */
if (!netif_running(dev))
return -EAGAIN;
spin_lock_bh(&tp->lock);
err = __tg3_writephy(tp, data->phy_id & 0x1f,
data->reg_num & 0x1f, data->val_in);
spin_unlock_bh(&tp->lock);
return err;
case SIOCSHWTSTAMP:
return tg3_hwtstamp_ioctl(dev, ifr, cmd);
default:
/* do nothing */
break;
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: test_mrb_field_write_barrier(void)
{
mrb_state *mrb = mrb_open();
struct RBasic *obj, *value;
mrb_gc *gc = &mrb->gc;
puts("test_mrb_field_write_barrier");
gc->generational = FALSE;
obj = mrb_basic_ptr(mrb_ary_new(mrb));
value = mrb_basic_ptr(mrb_str_new_lit(mrb, "value"));
paint_black(obj);
paint_partial_white(gc, value);
puts(" in MRB_GC_STATE_MARK");
gc->state = MRB_GC_STATE_MARK;
mrb_field_write_barrier(mrb, obj, value);
mrb_assert(is_gray(value));
puts(" in MRB_GC_STATE_SWEEP");
paint_partial_white(gc, value);
gc->state = MRB_GC_STATE_SWEEP;
mrb_field_write_barrier(mrb, obj, value);
mrb_assert(obj->color & gc->current_white_part);
mrb_assert(value->color & gc->current_white_part);
puts(" fail with black");
gc->state = MRB_GC_STATE_MARK;
paint_white(obj);
paint_partial_white(gc, value);
mrb_field_write_barrier(mrb, obj, value);
mrb_assert(obj->color & gc->current_white_part);
puts(" fail with gray");
gc->state = MRB_GC_STATE_MARK;
paint_black(obj);
paint_gray(value);
mrb_field_write_barrier(mrb, obj, value);
mrb_assert(is_gray(value));
{
puts("test_mrb_field_write_barrier_value");
obj = mrb_basic_ptr(mrb_ary_new(mrb));
mrb_value value = mrb_str_new_lit(mrb, "value");
paint_black(obj);
paint_partial_white(gc, mrb_basic_ptr(value));
gc->state = MRB_GC_STATE_MARK;
mrb_field_write_barrier_value(mrb, obj, value);
mrb_assert(is_gray(mrb_basic_ptr(value)));
}
mrb_close(mrb);
}
Commit Message: Clear unused stack region that may refer freed objects; fix #3596
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 64,461
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CLASS simple_coeff (int index)
{
static const float table[][12] = {
/* index 0 -- all Foveon cameras */
{ 1.4032,-0.2231,-0.1016,-0.5263,1.4816,0.017,-0.0112,0.0183,0.9113 },
/* index 1 -- Kodak DC20 and DC25 */
{ 2.25,0.75,-1.75,-0.25,-0.25,0.75,0.75,-0.25,-0.25,-1.75,0.75,2.25 },
/* index 2 -- Logitech Fotoman Pixtura */
{ 1.893,-0.418,-0.476,-0.495,1.773,-0.278,-1.017,-0.655,2.672 },
/* index 3 -- Nikon E880, E900, and E990 */
{ -1.936280, 1.800443, -1.448486, 2.584324,
1.405365, -0.524955, -0.289090, 0.408680,
-1.204965, 1.082304, 2.941367, -1.818705 }
};
int i, c;
for (raw_color = i=0; i < 3; i++)
FORCC rgb_cam[i][c] = table[index][i*colors+c];
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebContentsImpl::WebContentsImpl(BrowserContext* browser_context)
: delegate_(NULL),
controller_(this, browser_context),
render_view_host_delegate_view_(NULL),
created_with_opener_(false),
frame_tree_(new NavigatorImpl(&controller_, this),
this,
this,
this,
this),
node_(this),
is_load_to_different_document_(false),
crashed_status_(base::TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING),
crashed_error_code_(0),
waiting_for_response_(false),
load_state_(net::LOAD_STATE_IDLE, base::string16()),
upload_size_(0),
upload_position_(0),
is_resume_pending_(false),
interstitial_page_(nullptr),
has_accessed_initial_document_(false),
theme_color_(SK_ColorTRANSPARENT),
last_sent_theme_color_(SK_ColorTRANSPARENT),
did_first_visually_non_empty_paint_(false),
capturer_count_(0),
should_normally_be_visible_(true),
should_normally_be_occluded_(false),
did_first_set_visible_(false),
is_being_destroyed_(false),
is_notifying_observers_(false),
notify_disconnection_(false),
dialog_manager_(NULL),
is_showing_before_unload_dialog_(false),
last_active_time_(base::TimeTicks::Now()),
closed_by_user_gesture_(false),
minimum_zoom_percent_(static_cast<int>(kMinimumZoomFactor * 100)),
maximum_zoom_percent_(static_cast<int>(kMaximumZoomFactor * 100)),
zoom_scroll_remainder_(0),
fullscreen_widget_process_id_(ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID),
fullscreen_widget_routing_id_(MSG_ROUTING_NONE),
fullscreen_widget_had_focus_at_shutdown_(false),
is_subframe_(false),
force_disable_overscroll_content_(false),
last_dialog_suppressed_(false),
geolocation_context_(new device::GeolocationContext()),
accessibility_mode_(
BrowserAccessibilityStateImpl::GetInstance()->accessibility_mode()),
audio_stream_monitor_(this),
bluetooth_connected_device_count_(0),
virtual_keyboard_requested_(false),
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
page_scale_factor_is_one_(true),
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
mouse_lock_widget_(nullptr),
is_overlay_content_(false),
showing_context_menu_(false),
loading_weak_factory_(this),
weak_factory_(this) {
frame_tree_.SetFrameRemoveListener(
base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::OnFrameRemoved,
base::Unretained(this)));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
media_web_contents_observer_.reset(new MediaWebContentsObserverAndroid(this));
#else
media_web_contents_observer_.reset(new MediaWebContentsObserver(this));
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
pepper_playback_observer_.reset(new PepperPlaybackObserver(this));
#endif
loader_io_thread_notifier_.reset(new LoaderIOThreadNotifier(this));
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
host_zoom_map_observer_.reset(new HostZoomMapObserver(this));
#endif // !defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 150,913
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void avcodec_align_dimensions2(AVCodecContext *s, int *width, int *height,
int linesize_align[AV_NUM_DATA_POINTERS])
{
int i;
int w_align = 1;
int h_align = 1;
AVPixFmtDescriptor const *desc = av_pix_fmt_desc_get(s->pix_fmt);
if (desc) {
w_align = 1 << desc->log2_chroma_w;
h_align = 1 << desc->log2_chroma_h;
}
switch (s->pix_fmt) {
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUYV422:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YVYU422:
case AV_PIX_FMT_UYVY422:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV440P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRAP:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY8:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY16BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY16LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ420P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ422P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ440P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ444P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P9LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P9BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P10LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P10BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P12LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P12BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P14LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P14BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P16LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P16BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P9LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P9BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P10LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P10BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P16LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P16BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P9LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P9BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P10LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P10BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P12LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P12BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P14LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P14BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P16LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P16BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P9LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P9BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P10LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P10BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P12LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P12BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P16LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P16BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV440P10LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV440P10BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV440P12LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV440P12BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P9LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P9BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P10LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P10BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P12LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P12BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P14LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P14BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P16LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P16BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P9LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P9BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P10LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P10BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P12LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P12BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P16LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P16BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP9LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP9BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP10LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP10BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP12LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP12BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP14LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP14BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP16LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRP16BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRAP12LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRAP12BE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRAP16LE:
case AV_PIX_FMT_GBRAP16BE:
w_align = 16; //FIXME assume 16 pixel per macroblock
h_align = 16 * 2; // interlaced needs 2 macroblocks height
break;
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV411P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ411P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_UYYVYY411:
w_align = 32;
h_align = 16 * 2;
break;
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV410P:
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_SVQ1) {
w_align = 64;
h_align = 64;
}
break;
case AV_PIX_FMT_RGB555:
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_RPZA) {
w_align = 4;
h_align = 4;
}
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO) {
w_align = 8;
h_align = 8;
}
break;
case AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8:
case AV_PIX_FMT_BGR8:
case AV_PIX_FMT_RGB8:
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_SMC ||
s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_CINEPAK) {
w_align = 4;
h_align = 4;
}
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_JV ||
s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO) {
w_align = 8;
h_align = 8;
}
break;
case AV_PIX_FMT_BGR24:
if ((s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MSZH) ||
(s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_ZLIB)) {
w_align = 4;
h_align = 4;
}
break;
case AV_PIX_FMT_RGB24:
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_CINEPAK) {
w_align = 4;
h_align = 4;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_IFF_ILBM) {
w_align = FFMAX(w_align, 8);
}
*width = FFALIGN(*width, w_align);
*height = FFALIGN(*height, h_align);
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264 || s->lowres ||
s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VP5 || s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VP6 ||
s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VP6F || s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VP6A
) {
*height += 2;
*width = FFMAX(*width, 32);
}
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
linesize_align[i] = STRIDE_ALIGN;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: Check close before calling it
Fixes: NULL pointer dereference
Fixes: 15733/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_IDF_fuzzer-5658616977162240
Reviewed-by: Paul B Mahol <onemda@gmail.com>
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 87,326
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cifs_parse_smb_version(char *value, struct smb_vol *vol)
{
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
switch (match_token(value, cifs_smb_version_tokens, args)) {
case Smb_1:
vol->ops = &smb1_operations;
vol->vals = &smb1_values;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_SMB2
case Smb_20:
vol->ops = &smb21_operations; /* currently identical with 2.1 */
vol->vals = &smb20_values;
break;
case Smb_21:
vol->ops = &smb21_operations;
vol->vals = &smb21_values;
break;
case Smb_30:
vol->ops = &smb30_operations;
vol->vals = &smb30_values;
break;
#endif
default:
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Unknown vers= option specified: %s\n", value);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <marcus.moeller@gmx.ch>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <ken.fallon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 29,827
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t SoftHEVC::setFlushMode() {
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T status;
ivd_ctl_flush_ip_t s_video_flush_ip;
ivd_ctl_flush_op_t s_video_flush_op;
s_video_flush_ip.e_cmd = IVD_CMD_VIDEO_CTL;
s_video_flush_ip.e_sub_cmd = IVD_CMD_CTL_FLUSH;
s_video_flush_ip.u4_size = sizeof(ivd_ctl_flush_ip_t);
s_video_flush_op.u4_size = sizeof(ivd_ctl_flush_op_t);
ALOGV("Set the decoder in flush mode ");
/* Set the decoder in Flush mode, subsequent decode() calls will flush */
status = ivdec_api_function(mCodecCtx, (void *)&s_video_flush_ip,
(void *)&s_video_flush_op);
if (status != IV_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Error in setting the decoder in flush mode: (%d) 0x%x", status,
s_video_flush_op.u4_error_code);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
mIsInFlush = true;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: SoftHEVC: Exit gracefully in case of decoder errors
Exit for error in allocation and unsupported resolutions
Bug: 28816956
Change-Id: Ieb830bedeb3a7431d1d21a024927df630f7eda1e
CWE ID: CWE-172
| 0
| 159,420
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit twofish_exit(void)
{
crypto_unregister_algs(twofish_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(twofish_algs));
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,069
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool LiveSyncTest::SetUpLocalTestServer() {
CommandLine* cl = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
CommandLine::StringType server_cmdline_string = cl->GetSwitchValueNative(
switches::kSyncServerCommandLine);
CommandLine::StringVector server_cmdline_vector;
CommandLine::StringType delimiters(FILE_PATH_LITERAL(" "));
Tokenize(server_cmdline_string, delimiters, &server_cmdline_vector);
CommandLine server_cmdline(server_cmdline_vector);
if (!base::LaunchApp(server_cmdline, false, true, &test_server_handle_))
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not launch local test server.";
const int kMaxWaitTime = TestTimeouts::live_operation_timeout_ms();
const int kNumIntervals = 15;
if (WaitForTestServerToStart(kMaxWaitTime, kNumIntervals)) {
VLOG(1) << "Started local test server at "
<< cl->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kSyncServiceURL) << ".";
return true;
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not start local test server at "
<< cl->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kSyncServiceURL) << ".";
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,191
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CMS_EnvelopedData *cms_get0_enveloped(CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
{
if (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_ENVELOPED,
CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA);
return NULL;
}
return cms->d.envelopedData;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 11,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void brcmf_update_vht_cap(struct ieee80211_supported_band *band,
u32 bw_cap[2], u32 nchain, u32 txstreams,
u32 txbf_bfe_cap, u32 txbf_bfr_cap)
{
__le16 mcs_map;
/* not allowed in 2.4G band */
if (band->band == NL80211_BAND_2GHZ)
return;
band->vht_cap.vht_supported = true;
/* 80MHz is mandatory */
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SHORT_GI_80;
if (bw_cap[band->band] & WLC_BW_160MHZ_BIT) {
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SUPP_CHAN_WIDTH_160MHZ;
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SHORT_GI_160;
}
/* all support 256-QAM */
mcs_map = brcmf_get_mcs_map(nchain, IEEE80211_VHT_MCS_SUPPORT_0_9);
band->vht_cap.vht_mcs.rx_mcs_map = mcs_map;
band->vht_cap.vht_mcs.tx_mcs_map = mcs_map;
/* Beamforming support information */
if (txbf_bfe_cap & BRCMF_TXBF_SU_BFE_CAP)
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SU_BEAMFORMEE_CAPABLE;
if (txbf_bfe_cap & BRCMF_TXBF_MU_BFE_CAP)
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_MU_BEAMFORMEE_CAPABLE;
if (txbf_bfr_cap & BRCMF_TXBF_SU_BFR_CAP)
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SU_BEAMFORMER_CAPABLE;
if (txbf_bfr_cap & BRCMF_TXBF_MU_BFR_CAP)
band->vht_cap.cap |= IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_MU_BEAMFORMER_CAPABLE;
if ((txbf_bfe_cap || txbf_bfr_cap) && (txstreams > 1)) {
band->vht_cap.cap |=
(2 << IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_BEAMFORMEE_STS_SHIFT);
band->vht_cap.cap |= ((txstreams - 1) <<
IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_SOUNDING_DIMENSIONS_SHIFT);
band->vht_cap.cap |=
IEEE80211_VHT_CAP_VHT_LINK_ADAPTATION_VHT_MRQ_MFB;
}
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sctp_write_space(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc;
/* Wake up the tasks in each wait queue. */
list_for_each_entry(asoc, &((sctp_sk(sk))->ep->asocs), asocs) {
__sctp_write_space(asoc);
}
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 33,080
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionService::~ExtensionService() {
ProviderCollection::const_iterator i;
for (i = external_extension_providers_.begin();
i != external_extension_providers_.end(); ++i) {
ExternalExtensionProviderInterface* provider = i->get();
provider->ServiceShutdown();
}
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 98,676
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lacks_extension_info (NautilusFile *file)
{
return file->details->pending_info_providers != NULL;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 60,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pfault_interrupt(unsigned int ext_int_code,
unsigned int param32, unsigned long param64)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
__u16 subcode;
pid_t pid;
/*
* Get the external interruption subcode & pfault
* initial/completion signal bit. VM stores this
* in the 'cpu address' field associated with the
* external interrupt.
*/
subcode = ext_int_code >> 16;
if ((subcode & 0xff00) != __SUBCODE_MASK)
return;
kstat_cpu(smp_processor_id()).irqs[EXTINT_PFL]++;
if (subcode & 0x0080) {
/* Get the token (= pid of the affected task). */
pid = sizeof(void *) == 4 ? param32 : param64;
rcu_read_lock();
tsk = find_task_by_pid_ns(pid, &init_pid_ns);
if (tsk)
get_task_struct(tsk);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!tsk)
return;
} else {
tsk = current;
}
spin_lock(&pfault_lock);
if (subcode & 0x0080) {
/* signal bit is set -> a page has been swapped in by VM */
if (tsk->thread.pfault_wait == 1) {
/* Initial interrupt was faster than the completion
* interrupt. pfault_wait is valid. Set pfault_wait
* back to zero and wake up the process. This can
* safely be done because the task is still sleeping
* and can't produce new pfaults. */
tsk->thread.pfault_wait = 0;
list_del(&tsk->thread.list);
wake_up_process(tsk);
} else {
/* Completion interrupt was faster than initial
* interrupt. Set pfault_wait to -1 so the initial
* interrupt doesn't put the task to sleep. */
tsk->thread.pfault_wait = -1;
}
put_task_struct(tsk);
} else {
/* signal bit not set -> a real page is missing. */
if (tsk->thread.pfault_wait == -1) {
/* Completion interrupt was faster than the initial
* interrupt (pfault_wait == -1). Set pfault_wait
* back to zero and exit. */
tsk->thread.pfault_wait = 0;
} else {
/* Initial interrupt arrived before completion
* interrupt. Let the task sleep. */
tsk->thread.pfault_wait = 1;
list_add(&tsk->thread.list, &pfault_list);
set_task_state(tsk, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
set_tsk_need_resched(tsk);
}
}
spin_unlock(&pfault_lock);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,522
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AllowAllExtensionLocationsInPublicSessionForTesting(bool value) {
g_allow_all_extension_locations_in_public_session = value;
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 146,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void gdImageFilledArc (gdImagePtr im, int cx, int cy, int w, int h, int s, int e, int color, int style)
{
gdPoint pts[3];
int i;
int lx = 0, ly = 0;
int fx = 0, fy = 0;
if ((s % 360) == (e % 360)) {
s = 0; e = 360;
} else {
if (s > 360) {
s = s % 360;
}
if (e > 360) {
e = e % 360;
}
while (s < 0) {
s += 360;
}
while (e < s) {
e += 360;
}
if (s == e) {
s = 0; e = 360;
}
}
for (i = s; i <= e; i++) {
int x, y;
x = ((long) gdCosT[i % 360] * (long) w / (2 * 1024)) + cx;
y = ((long) gdSinT[i % 360] * (long) h / (2 * 1024)) + cy;
if (i != s) {
if (!(style & gdChord)) {
if (style & gdNoFill) {
gdImageLine(im, lx, ly, x, y, color);
} else {
/* This is expensive! */
pts[0].x = lx;
pts[0].y = ly;
pts[1].x = x;
pts[1].y = y;
pts[2].x = cx;
pts[2].y = cy;
gdImageFilledPolygon(im, pts, 3, color);
}
}
} else {
fx = x;
fy = y;
}
lx = x;
ly = y;
}
if (style & gdChord) {
if (style & gdNoFill) {
if (style & gdEdged) {
gdImageLine(im, cx, cy, lx, ly, color);
gdImageLine(im, cx, cy, fx, fy, color);
}
gdImageLine(im, fx, fy, lx, ly, color);
} else {
pts[0].x = fx;
pts[0].y = fy;
pts[1].x = lx;
pts[1].y = ly;
pts[2].x = cx;
pts[2].y = cy;
gdImageFilledPolygon(im, pts, 3, color);
}
} else {
if (style & gdNoFill) {
if (style & gdEdged) {
gdImageLine(im, cx, cy, lx, ly, color);
gdImageLine(im, cx, cy, fx, fy, color);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 51,437
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Performance::AddPaintTiming(PerformancePaintTiming::PaintType type,
TimeTicks start_time) {
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::PerformancePaintTimingEnabled())
return;
PerformanceEntry* entry = new PerformancePaintTiming(
type, MonotonicTimeToDOMHighResTimeStamp(start_time));
if (type == PerformancePaintTiming::PaintType::kFirstPaint)
first_paint_timing_ = entry;
else if (type == PerformancePaintTiming::PaintType::kFirstContentfulPaint)
first_contentful_paint_timing_ = entry;
NotifyObserversOfEntry(*entry);
}
Commit Message: Fix timing allow check algorithm for service workers
This CL uses the OriginalURLViaServiceWorker() in the timing allow check
algorithm if the response WasFetchedViaServiceWorker(). This way, if a
service worker changes a same origin request to become cross origin,
then the timing allow check algorithm will still fail.
resource-timing-worker.js is changed so it avoids an empty Response,
which is an odd case in terms of same origin checks.
Bug: 837275
Change-Id: I7e497a6fcc2ee14244121b915ca5f5cceded417a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1038229
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Reviewed-by: Timothy Dresser <tdresser@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#555476}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 153,848
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_inter_slice_data_cabac(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice,
UWORD16 u2_first_mb_in_slice)
{
UWORD32 uc_more_data_flag;
WORD32 i2_cur_mb_addr;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs, u1_num_mbsNby2, u1_mb_idx;
UWORD32 u1_mbaff;
UWORD32 u1_num_mbs_next, u1_end_of_row;
const UWORD16 i2_pic_wdin_mbs = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs;
UWORD32 u1_slice_end = 0;
UWORD32 u1_tfr_n_mb = 0;
UWORD32 u1_decode_nmb = 0;
deblk_mb_t *ps_cur_deblk_mb;
dec_mb_info_t *ps_cur_mb_info;
parse_pmbarams_t *ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
UWORD32 u1_inter_mb_skip_type;
UWORD32 u1_inter_mb_type;
UWORD32 u1_deblk_mb_type;
UWORD32 u1_mb_threshold;
dec_bit_stream_t * const ps_bitstrm = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm;
WORD32 ret = OK;
/******************************************************/
/* Initialisations specific to B or P slice */
/******************************************************/
if(ps_slice->u1_slice_type == P_SLICE)
{
u1_inter_mb_skip_type = CAB_P_SKIP;
u1_inter_mb_type = P_MB;
u1_deblk_mb_type = D_INTER_MB;
u1_mb_threshold = 5;
}
else // B_SLICE
{
u1_inter_mb_skip_type = CAB_B_SKIP;
u1_inter_mb_type = B_MB;
u1_deblk_mb_type = D_B_SLICE;
u1_mb_threshold = 23;
}
/******************************************************/
/* Slice Level Initialisations */
/******************************************************/
i2_cur_mb_addr = u2_first_mb_in_slice;
ps_dec->u1_qp = ps_slice->u1_slice_qp;
ih264d_update_qp(ps_dec, 0);
u1_mb_idx = ps_dec->u1_mb_idx;
u1_num_mbs = u1_mb_idx;
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
u1_mbaff = ps_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
i2_cur_mb_addr = u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff;
uc_more_data_flag = 1;
/* Initialisations specific to cabac */
if(ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst & 0x07)
{
ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst += 8;
ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst &= 0xFFFFFFF8;
}
ret = ih264d_init_cabac_dec_envirnoment(&(ps_dec->s_cab_dec_env), ps_bitstrm);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
while(!u1_slice_end)
{
UWORD8 u1_mb_type;
UWORD32 u4_mb_skip;
ps_dec->pv_prev_mb_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data;
if(i2_cur_mb_addr > ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_max_mb_addr)
{
break;
}
ps_cur_mb_info = ps_dec->ps_nmb_info + u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_Mux = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_pmbair = (u1_num_mbs >> u1_mbaff);
ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + u1_num_mbs;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = 0;
/* Storing Default partition info */
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_num_part = 1;
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_isI_mb = 0;
/***************************************************************/
/* Get the required information for decoding of MB */
/* mb_x, mb_y , neighbour availablity, */
/***************************************************************/
u4_mb_skip = ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info(ps_dec, i2_cur_mb_addr, ps_cur_mb_info, 1);
/*********************************************************************/
/* initialize u1_tran_form8x8 to zero to aviod uninitialized accesses */
/*********************************************************************/
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_tran_form8x8 = 0;
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_tran_form8x8 = 0;
/***************************************************************/
/* Set the deblocking parameters for this MB */
/***************************************************************/
if(ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm == 0)
ih264d_set_deblocking_parameters(ps_cur_deblk_mb, ps_slice,
ps_dec->u1_mb_ngbr_availablity,
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag);
if(u4_mb_skip)
{
/* Set appropriate flags in ps_cur_mb_info and ps_dec */
memset(ps_dec->ps_curr_ctxt_mb_info, 0, sizeof(ctxt_inc_mb_info_t));
ps_dec->ps_curr_ctxt_mb_info->u1_mb_type = u1_inter_mb_skip_type;
MEMSET_16BYTES(&ps_dec->pu1_left_mv_ctxt_inc[0][0], 0);
*((UWORD32 *)ps_dec->pi1_left_ref_idx_ctxt_inc) = 0;
*(ps_dec->pu1_left_yuv_dc_csbp) = 0;
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = MB_SKIP;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_cbp = 0;
{
/* Storing Skip partition info */
parse_part_params_t *ps_part_info = ps_dec->ps_part;
ps_part_info->u1_is_direct = PART_DIRECT_16x16;
ps_part_info->u1_sub_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->ps_part++;
}
/* Update Nnzs */
ih264d_update_nnz_for_skipmb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, CABAC);
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = u1_inter_mb_type;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= u1_deblk_mb_type;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
}
else
{
/* Macroblock Layer Begins */
/* Decode the u1_mb_type */
u1_mb_type = ih264d_parse_mb_type_cabac(ps_dec);
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_mb_type = u1_mb_type;
if(u1_mb_type > (25 + u1_mb_threshold))
return ERROR_MB_TYPE;
/* Parse Macroblock Data */
if(u1_mb_type < u1_mb_threshold)
{
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = u1_inter_mb_type;
*(ps_dec->pu1_left_yuv_dc_csbp) &= 0x6;
ret = ps_dec->pf_parse_inter_mb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbsNby2);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= u1_deblk_mb_type;
}
else
{
/* Storing Intra partition info */
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_num_part = 0;
ps_parse_mb_data->u1_isI_mb = 1;
if((25 + u1_mb_threshold) == u1_mb_type)
{
/* I_PCM_MB */
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = I_PCM_MB;
ret = ih264d_parse_ipcm_mb(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info, u1_num_mbs);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = 0;
}
else
{
if(u1_mb_type == u1_mb_threshold)
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = I_4x4_MB;
else
ps_cur_mb_info->ps_curmb->u1_mb_type = I_16x16_MB;
ret = ih264d_parse_imb_cabac(
ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info,
(UWORD8)(u1_mb_type - u1_mb_threshold));
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_qp = ps_dec->u1_qp;
}
ps_cur_deblk_mb->u1_mb_type |= D_INTRA_MB;
}
}
if(u1_mbaff)
{
ih264d_update_mbaff_left_nnz(ps_dec, ps_cur_mb_info);
}
/* Next macroblock information */
i2_cur_mb_addr++;
if(ps_cur_mb_info->u1_topmb && u1_mbaff)
uc_more_data_flag = 1;
else
{
uc_more_data_flag = ih264d_decode_terminate(&ps_dec->s_cab_dec_env,
ps_bitstrm);
uc_more_data_flag = !uc_more_data_flag;
COPYTHECONTEXT("Decode Sliceterm",!uc_more_data_flag);
}
u1_num_mbs++;
u1_num_mbsNby2++;
ps_parse_mb_data++;
/****************************************************************/
/* Check for End Of Row and other flags that determine when to */
/* do DMA setup for N/2-Mb, Decode for N-Mb, and Transfer for */
/* N-Mb */
/****************************************************************/
u1_num_mbs_next = i2_pic_wdin_mbs - ps_dec->u2_mbx - 1;
u1_end_of_row = (!u1_num_mbs_next) && (!(u1_mbaff && (u1_num_mbs & 0x01)));
u1_slice_end = !uc_more_data_flag;
u1_tfr_n_mb = (u1_num_mbs == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp) || u1_end_of_row
|| u1_slice_end;
u1_decode_nmb = u1_tfr_n_mb || u1_slice_end;
ps_cur_mb_info->u1_end_of_slice = u1_slice_end;
/*u1_dma_nby2mb = u1_decode_nmb ||
(u1_num_mbsNby2 == ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp_pair);*/
if(u1_decode_nmb)
{
ps_dec->pf_mvpred_ref_tfr_nby2mb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs);
u1_num_mbsNby2 = 0;
{
ps_parse_mb_data = ps_dec->ps_parse_mb_data;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
}
}
/*H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("Pic: %d Mb_X=%d Mb_Y=%d",
ps_slice->i4_poc >> ps_slice->u1_field_pic_flag,
ps_dec->u2_mbx,ps_dec->u2_mby + (1 - ps_cur_mb_info->u1_topmb));
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("u1_decode_nmb: %d, u1_num_mbs: %d", u1_decode_nmb, u1_num_mbs);*/
if(u1_decode_nmb)
{
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
ih264d_parse_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb, u1_end_of_row);
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info += u1_num_mbs;
}
else
{
ih264d_decode_recon_tfr_nmb(ps_dec, u1_mb_idx, u1_num_mbs,
u1_num_mbs_next, u1_tfr_n_mb,
u1_end_of_row);
}
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded += u1_num_mbs;
if(u1_tfr_n_mb)
u1_num_mbs = 0;
u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = u1_num_mbs;
}
}
ps_dec->u4_num_mbs_cur_nmb = 0;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u4_mbs_in_slice = i2_cur_mb_addr
- (u2_first_mb_in_slice << u1_mbaff);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fix slice number increment for error clips
Bug: 28673410
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 159,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vc4_wait_bo_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
struct drm_file *file_priv)
{
int ret;
struct drm_vc4_wait_bo *args = data;
struct drm_gem_object *gem_obj;
struct vc4_bo *bo;
if (args->pad != 0)
return -EINVAL;
gem_obj = drm_gem_object_lookup(file_priv, args->handle);
if (!gem_obj) {
DRM_ERROR("Failed to look up GEM BO %d\n", args->handle);
return -EINVAL;
}
bo = to_vc4_bo(gem_obj);
ret = vc4_wait_for_seqno_ioctl_helper(dev, bo->seqno,
&args->timeout_ns);
drm_gem_object_unreference_unlocked(gem_obj);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: drm/vc4: Return -EINVAL on the overflow checks failing.
By failing to set the errno, we'd continue on to trying to set up the
RCL, and then oops on trying to dereference the tile_bo that binning
validation should have set up.
Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
Fixes: d5b1a78a772f ("drm/vc4: Add support for drawing 3D frames.")
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 68,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: simple_flow_mod(struct ofproto *ofproto,
const struct match *match, int priority,
const struct ofpact *ofpacts, size_t ofpacts_len,
enum ofp_flow_mod_command command)
{
struct ofputil_flow_mod fm;
flow_mod_init(&fm, match, priority, ofpacts, ofpacts_len, command);
return handle_flow_mod__(ofproto, &fm, NULL);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,431
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExpectInt64Value(int64 expected_value,
const DictionaryValue& value, const std::string& key) {
std::string int64_str;
EXPECT_TRUE(value.GetString(key, &int64_str));
int64 val = 0;
EXPECT_TRUE(base::StringToInt64(int64_str, &val));
EXPECT_EQ(expected_value, val);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 105,197
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Bool node_in_commands_subtree(GF_Node *node, GF_List *commands)
{
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_VRML
u32 i, j, count, nb_fields;
count = gf_list_count(commands);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
GF_Command *com = gf_list_get(commands, i);
if (com->tag>=GF_SG_LAST_BIFS_COMMAND) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_SCENE, ("[Scene Manager] Command check for LASeR/DIMS not supported\n"));
return 0;
}
if (com->tag==GF_SG_SCENE_REPLACE) {
if (gf_node_parent_of(com->node, node)) return 1;
continue;
}
nb_fields = gf_list_count(com->command_fields);
for (j=0; j<nb_fields; j++) {
GF_CommandField *field = gf_list_get(com->command_fields, j);
switch (field->fieldType) {
case GF_SG_VRML_SFNODE:
if (field->new_node) {
if (gf_node_parent_of(field->new_node, node)) return 1;
}
break;
case GF_SG_VRML_MFNODE:
if (field->field_ptr) {
GF_ChildNodeItem *child;
child = field->node_list;
while (child) {
if (gf_node_parent_of(child->node, node)) return 1;
child = child->next;
}
}
break;
}
}
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,885
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InitEvents(void)
{
int i;
QdEventPtr qe, tmp;
inputInfo.numDevices = 0;
inputInfo.devices = (DeviceIntPtr) NULL;
inputInfo.off_devices = (DeviceIntPtr) NULL;
inputInfo.keyboard = (DeviceIntPtr) NULL;
inputInfo.pointer = (DeviceIntPtr) NULL;
for (i = 0; i < MAXDEVICES; i++) {
DeviceIntRec dummy;
memcpy(&event_filters[i], default_filter, sizeof(default_filter));
dummy.id = i;
NoticeTime(&dummy, currentTime);
LastEventTimeToggleResetFlag(i, FALSE);
}
syncEvents.replayDev = (DeviceIntPtr) NULL;
syncEvents.replayWin = NullWindow;
if (syncEvents.pending.next)
xorg_list_for_each_entry_safe(qe, tmp, &syncEvents.pending, next)
free(qe);
xorg_list_init(&syncEvents.pending);
syncEvents.playingEvents = FALSE;
syncEvents.time.months = 0;
syncEvents.time.milliseconds = 0; /* hardly matters */
currentTime.months = 0;
currentTime.milliseconds = GetTimeInMillis();
for (i = 0; i < DNPMCOUNT; i++) {
DontPropagateMasks[i] = 0;
DontPropagateRefCnts[i] = 0;
}
InputEventList = InitEventList(GetMaximumEventsNum());
if (!InputEventList)
FatalError("[dix] Failed to allocate input event list.\n");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: push_callout(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, const char *callout_name)
{
int code;
check_estack(1);
code = name_enter_string(imemory, callout_name, esp + 1);
if (code < 0)
return code;
++esp;
r_set_attrs(esp, a_executable);
return o_push_estack;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const AtomicString& HTMLButtonElement::value() const
{
return getAttribute(valueAttr);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType InverseFourierTransform(FourierInfo *fourier_info,
fftw_complex *fourier_pixels,Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
double
*source_pixels;
const char
*value;
fftw_plan
fftw_c2r_plan;
MemoryInfo
*source_info;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
ssize_t
y;
source_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) fourier_info->width,
fourier_info->height*sizeof(*source_pixels));
if (source_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
source_pixels=(double *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(source_info);
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"fourier:normalize");
if (LocaleCompare(value,"inverse") == 0)
{
double
gamma;
/*
Normalize inverse transform.
*/
i=0L;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal((double) fourier_info->width*
fourier_info->height);
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) fourier_info->height; y++)
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) fourier_info->center; x++)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_COMPLEX_H)
fourier_pixels[i]*=gamma;
#else
fourier_pixels[i][0]*=gamma;
fourier_pixels[i][1]*=gamma;
#endif
i++;
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp critical (MagickCore_InverseFourierTransform)
#endif
fftw_c2r_plan=fftw_plan_dft_c2r_2d(fourier_info->width,fourier_info->height,
fourier_pixels,source_pixels,FFTW_ESTIMATE);
fftw_execute_dft_c2r(fftw_c2r_plan,fourier_pixels,source_pixels);
fftw_destroy_plan(fftw_c2r_plan);
i=0L;
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) fourier_info->height; y++)
{
if (y >= (ssize_t) image->rows)
break;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0L,y,fourier_info->width >
image->columns ? image->columns : fourier_info->width,1UL,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetCacheViewAuthenticIndexQueue(image_view);
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) fourier_info->width; x++)
{
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
switch (fourier_info->channel)
{
case RedChannel:
default:
{
SetPixelRed(q,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*source_pixels[i]));
break;
}
case GreenChannel:
{
SetPixelGreen(q,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*source_pixels[i]));
break;
}
case BlueChannel:
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*source_pixels[i]));
break;
}
case OpacityChannel:
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*source_pixels[i]));
break;
}
case IndexChannel:
{
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
source_pixels[i]));
break;
}
case GrayChannels:
{
SetPixelGray(q,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*source_pixels[i]));
break;
}
}
i++;
q++;
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
source_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(source_info);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1588
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 88,889
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::UpdateEncoding(const std::string& encoding_name) {
delegate_->UpdateEncoding(this, encoding_name);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RequestChromeDump(MemoryDumpType dump_type,
MemoryDumpLevelOfDetail level_of_detail) {
uint64_t req_guid = ++guid_counter_;
MemoryDumpRequestArgs request_args{req_guid, dump_type, level_of_detail};
ClientProcessImpl::RequestChromeMemoryDumpCallback callback = base::Bind(
[](bool success, uint64_t dump_guid,
std::unique_ptr<base::trace_event::ProcessMemoryDump> result) {});
client_process_->RequestChromeMemoryDump(request_args, callback);
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 150,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~Mixin() {}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 153,826
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool venc_dev::venc_set_operatingrate(OMX_U32 rate) {
struct v4l2_control control;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OPERATING_RATE;
control.value = rate;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("venc_set_operating_rate: %d fps", rate >> 16);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Calling IOCTL set control for id=%d, val=%d", control.id, control.value);
if(ioctl(m_nDriver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
hw_overload = errno == EBUSY;
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set operating rate %d fps (%s)",
rate >> 16, hw_overload ? "HW overload" : strerror(errno));
return false;
}
operating_rate = rate;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Operating Rate Set = %d fps", rate >> 16);
return true;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,300
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int udf_symlink_filler(struct file *file, struct page *page)
{
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
unsigned char *symlink;
int err;
unsigned char *p = kmap(page);
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo;
uint32_t pos;
/* We don't support symlinks longer than one block */
if (inode->i_size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize) {
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
goto out_unmap;
}
iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
pos = udf_block_map(inode, 0);
down_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB) {
symlink = iinfo->i_ext.i_data + iinfo->i_lenEAttr;
} else {
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, pos);
if (!bh) {
err = -EIO;
goto out_unlock_inode;
}
symlink = bh->b_data;
}
udf_pc_to_char(inode->i_sb, symlink, inode->i_size, p);
brelse(bh);
up_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
SetPageUptodate(page);
kunmap(page);
unlock_page(page);
return 0;
out_unlock_inode:
up_read(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
SetPageError(page);
out_unmap:
kunmap(page);
unlock_page(page);
return err;
}
Commit Message: udf: Check path length when reading symlink
Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into
the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just
checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we
perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space
in the buffer on the fly.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 1
| 166,758
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::UpdateFocusAppearanceLater() {
if (!update_focus_appearance_timer_.IsActive())
update_focus_appearance_timer_.StartOneShot(0, BLINK_FROM_HERE);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,180
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long long Block::GetDiscardPadding() const
{
return m_discard_padding;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gst_qtdemux_class_init (GstQTDemuxClass * klass)
{
GObjectClass *gobject_class;
GstElementClass *gstelement_class;
gobject_class = (GObjectClass *) klass;
gstelement_class = (GstElementClass *) klass;
parent_class = g_type_class_peek_parent (klass);
gobject_class->dispose = gst_qtdemux_dispose;
gstelement_class->change_state = gst_qtdemux_change_state;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,933
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_interface_retranstimer(const char *iface, uint32_t rettimer)
{
int ret;
if (privsep_enabled())
return privsep_interface_retranstimer(iface, rettimer);
ret = set_interface_var(iface,
PROC_SYS_IP6_RETRANSTIMER_MS,
NULL,
rettimer);
if (ret)
ret = set_interface_var(iface,
PROC_SYS_IP6_RETRANSTIMER,
"RetransTimer",
rettimer / 1000 * USER_HZ); /* XXX user_hz */
return ret;
}
Commit Message: set_interface_var() doesn't check interface name and blindly does
fopen(path "/" ifname, "w") on it. As "ifname" is an untrusted input, it
should be checked for ".." and/or "/" in it. Otherwise, an infected
unprivileged daemon may overwrite contents of file named "mtu",
"hoplimit", etc. in arbitrary location with arbitrary 32-bit value in
decimal representation ("%d"). If an attacker has a local account or
may create arbitrary symlinks with these names in any location (e.g.
/tmp), any file may be overwritten with a decimal value.
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 41,242
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int muscle_init(sc_card_t *card)
{
muscle_private_t *priv;
card->name = "MuscleApplet";
card->drv_data = malloc(sizeof(muscle_private_t));
if(!card->drv_data) {
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
}
memset(card->drv_data, 0, sizeof(muscle_private_t));
priv = MUSCLE_DATA(card);
priv->verifiedPins = 0;
priv->fs = mscfs_new();
if(!priv->fs) {
free(card->drv_data);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
}
priv->fs->udata = card;
priv->fs->listFile = _listFile;
card->cla = 0xB0;
card->flags |= SC_CARD_FLAG_RNG;
card->caps |= SC_CARD_CAP_RNG;
/* Card type detection */
_sc_match_atr(card, muscle_atrs, &card->type);
if(card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_MUSCLE_ETOKEN_72K) {
card->caps |= SC_CARD_CAP_APDU_EXT;
}
if(card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_MUSCLE_JCOP241) {
card->caps |= SC_CARD_CAP_APDU_EXT;
}
if (!(card->caps & SC_CARD_CAP_APDU_EXT)) {
card->max_recv_size = 255;
card->max_send_size = 255;
}
if(card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_MUSCLE_JCOP242R2_NO_EXT_APDU) {
/* Tyfone JCOP v242R2 card that doesn't support extended APDUs */
}
/* FIXME: Card type detection */
if (1) {
unsigned long flags;
flags = SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_RAW;
flags |= SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_NONE;
flags |= SC_ALGORITHM_ONBOARD_KEY_GEN;
_sc_card_add_rsa_alg(card, 1024, flags, 0);
_sc_card_add_rsa_alg(card, 2048, flags, 0);
}
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::updateLayoutTreeForNodeIfNeeded(Node* node)
{
ASSERT(node);
if (!node->canParticipateInComposedTree())
return;
if (!needsLayoutTreeUpdate())
return;
bool needsRecalc = needsFullLayoutTreeUpdate() || node->needsStyleRecalc() || node->needsStyleInvalidation();
if (!needsRecalc) {
for (const ContainerNode* ancestor = LayoutTreeBuilderTraversal::parent(*node); ancestor && !needsRecalc; ancestor = LayoutTreeBuilderTraversal::parent(*ancestor))
needsRecalc = ancestor->needsStyleRecalc() || ancestor->needsStyleInvalidation() || ancestor->needsAdjacentStyleRecalc();
}
if (needsRecalc)
updateLayoutTreeIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,559
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BOOL license_send_valid_client_error_packet(rdpLicense* license)
{
wStream* s;
s = license_send_stream_init(license);
DEBUG_LICENSE("Sending Error Alert Packet");
Stream_Write_UINT32(s, STATUS_VALID_CLIENT); /* dwErrorCode */
Stream_Write_UINT32(s, ST_NO_TRANSITION); /* dwStateTransition */
license_write_binary_blob(s, license->ErrorInfo);
return license_send(license, s, ERROR_ALERT);
}
Commit Message: Fix possible integer overflow in license_read_scope_list()
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 39,575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_send_NPString(rpc_message_t *message, void *p_value)
{
NPString *string = (NPString *)p_value;
if (string == NULL)
return RPC_ERROR_MESSAGE_ARGUMENT_INVALID;
int error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, string->UTF8Length);
if (error < 0)
return error;
if (string->UTF8Length && string->UTF8Characters)
return rpc_message_send_bytes(message, (unsigned char *)string->UTF8Characters, string->UTF8Length);
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AssignGLRectangle(GLint rectangle[4],
GLint x,
GLint y,
GLint width,
GLint height) {
rectangle[0] = x;
rectangle[1] = y;
rectangle[2] = width;
rectangle[3] = height;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,856
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void stdreplace(
std::string &inoutstring,
const std::string& replaceWhat,
const std::string& replaceWithWhat)
{
int pos = 0;
while (std::string::npos != (pos = inoutstring.find(replaceWhat, pos)))
{
inoutstring.replace(pos, replaceWhat.size(), replaceWithWhat);
pos += replaceWithWhat.size();
}
}
Commit Message: Do not allow enters/returns in arguments (thanks to Fabio Carretto)
CWE ID: CWE-93
| 0
| 90,950
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int PDFiumEngine::GetNamedDestinationPage(const std::string& destination) {
FPDF_DEST dest = FPDF_GetNamedDestByName(doc_, destination.c_str());
if (!dest) {
base::string16 destination_wide = base::UTF8ToUTF16(destination);
FPDF_WIDESTRING destination_pdf_wide =
reinterpret_cast<FPDF_WIDESTRING>(destination_wide.c_str());
FPDF_BOOKMARK bookmark = FPDFBookmark_Find(doc_, destination_pdf_wide);
if (bookmark)
dest = FPDFBookmark_GetDest(doc_, bookmark);
}
return dest ? FPDFDest_GetPageIndex(doc_, dest) : -1;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 146,138
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string GenerateGetUserMediaWithMandatorySourceID(
const std::string& function_name,
const std::string& audio_source_id,
const std::string& video_source_id) {
const std::string audio_constraint =
"audio: {mandatory: { sourceId:\"" + audio_source_id + "\"}}, ";
const std::string video_constraint =
"video: {mandatory: { sourceId:\"" + video_source_id + "\"}}";
return function_name + "({" + audio_constraint + video_constraint + "});";
}
Commit Message: Add tests for closing a frame within the scope of a getusermedia callback.
BUG=472617, 474370
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1073783003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#324633}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum lru_status inode_lru_isolate(struct list_head *item,
struct list_lru_one *lru, spinlock_t *lru_lock, void *arg)
{
struct list_head *freeable = arg;
struct inode *inode = container_of(item, struct inode, i_lru);
/*
* we are inverting the lru lock/inode->i_lock here, so use a trylock.
* If we fail to get the lock, just skip it.
*/
if (!spin_trylock(&inode->i_lock))
return LRU_SKIP;
/*
* Referenced or dirty inodes are still in use. Give them another pass
* through the LRU as we canot reclaim them now.
*/
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_count) ||
(inode->i_state & ~I_REFERENCED)) {
list_lru_isolate(lru, &inode->i_lru);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
this_cpu_dec(nr_unused);
return LRU_REMOVED;
}
/* recently referenced inodes get one more pass */
if (inode->i_state & I_REFERENCED) {
inode->i_state &= ~I_REFERENCED;
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
return LRU_ROTATE;
}
if (inode_has_buffers(inode) || inode->i_data.nrpages) {
__iget(inode);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
spin_unlock(lru_lock);
if (remove_inode_buffers(inode)) {
unsigned long reap;
reap = invalidate_mapping_pages(&inode->i_data, 0, -1);
if (current_is_kswapd())
__count_vm_events(KSWAPD_INODESTEAL, reap);
else
__count_vm_events(PGINODESTEAL, reap);
if (current->reclaim_state)
current->reclaim_state->reclaimed_slab += reap;
}
iput(inode);
spin_lock(lru_lock);
return LRU_RETRY;
}
WARN_ON(inode->i_state & I_NEW);
inode->i_state |= I_FREEING;
list_lru_isolate_move(lru, &inode->i_lru, freeable);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
this_cpu_dec(nr_unused);
return LRU_REMOVED;
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 79,842
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct rds_mr *rds_mr_tree_walk(struct rb_root *root, u64 key,
struct rds_mr *insert)
{
struct rb_node **p = &root->rb_node;
struct rb_node *parent = NULL;
struct rds_mr *mr;
while (*p) {
parent = *p;
mr = rb_entry(parent, struct rds_mr, r_rb_node);
if (key < mr->r_key)
p = &(*p)->rb_left;
else if (key > mr->r_key)
p = &(*p)->rb_right;
else
return mr;
}
if (insert) {
rb_link_node(&insert->r_rb_node, parent, p);
rb_insert_color(&insert->r_rb_node, root);
refcount_inc(&insert->r_refcount);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: rds: Fix NULL pointer dereference in __rds_rdma_map
This is a fix for syzkaller719569, where memory registration was
attempted without any underlying transport being loaded.
Analysis of the case reveals that it is the setsockopt() RDS_GET_MR
(2) and RDS_GET_MR_FOR_DEST (7) that are vulnerable.
Here is an example stack trace when the bug is hit:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000c0
IP: __rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]
PGD 2f93d03067 P4D 2f93d03067 PUD 2f93d02067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: bridge stp llc tun rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4
dns_resolver nfs fscache rds binfmt_misc sb_edac intel_powerclamp
coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul c rc32_pclmul
ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd
iTCO_wdt mei_me sg iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_si mei ipmi_devintf nfsd
shpchp pcspkr i2c_i801 ioatd ma ipmi_msghandler wmi lpc_ich mfd_core
auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2
mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper ixgbe syscopyarea ahci sysfillrect
sysimgblt libahci mdio fb_sys_fops ttm ptp libata sd_mod mlx4_core drm
crc32c_intel pps_core megaraid_sas i2c_core dca dm_mirror
dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
CPU: 48 PID: 45787 Comm: repro_set2 Not tainted 4.14.2-3.el7uek.x86_64 #2
Hardware name: Oracle Corporation ORACLE SERVER X5-2L/ASM,MOBO TRAY,2U, BIOS 31110000 03/03/2017
task: ffff882f9190db00 task.stack: ffffc9002b994000
RIP: 0010:__rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]
RSP: 0018:ffffc9002b997df0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff882fa2182580 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9002b997e40 RDI: ffff882fa2182580
RBP: ffffc9002b997e30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002
R10: ffff885fb29e3838 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff882fa2182580
R13: ffff882fa2182580 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000020000ffc
FS: 00007fbffa20b700(0000) GS:ffff882fbfb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000002f98a66006 CR4: 00000000001606e0
Call Trace:
rds_get_mr+0x56/0x80 [rds]
rds_setsockopt+0x172/0x340 [rds]
? __fget_light+0x25/0x60
? __fdget+0x13/0x20
SyS_setsockopt+0x80/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x67/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
RIP: 0033:0x7fbff9b117f9
RSP: 002b:00007fbffa20aed8 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000c84a4 RCX: 00007fbff9b117f9
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000400000000114 RDI: 000000000000109b
RBP: 00007fbffa20af10 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: 00007fbff9dd7860
R10: 0000000020000ffc R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fbffa20b9c0 R14: 00007fbffa20b700 R15: 0000000000000021
Code: 41 56 41 55 49 89 fd 41 54 53 48 83 ec 18 8b 87 f0 02 00 00 48
89 55 d0 48 89 4d c8 85 c0 0f 84 2d 03 00 00 48 8b 87 00 03 00 00 <48>
83 b8 c0 00 00 00 00 0f 84 25 03 00 0 0 48 8b 06 48 8b 56 08
The fix is to check the existence of an underlying transport in
__rds_rdma_map().
Signed-off-by: Håkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@oracle.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 84,080
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderLayerScrollableArea::updateAfterOverflowRecalc()
{
computeScrollDimensions();
if (Scrollbar* horizontalScrollbar = this->horizontalScrollbar()) {
int clientWidth = box().pixelSnappedClientWidth();
horizontalScrollbar->setProportion(clientWidth, overflowRect().width());
}
if (Scrollbar* verticalScrollbar = this->verticalScrollbar()) {
int clientHeight = box().pixelSnappedClientHeight();
verticalScrollbar->setProportion(clientHeight, overflowRect().height());
}
bool hasHorizontalOverflow = this->hasHorizontalOverflow();
bool hasVerticalOverflow = this->hasVerticalOverflow();
bool autoHorizontalScrollBarChanged = box().hasAutoHorizontalScrollbar() && (hasHorizontalScrollbar() != hasHorizontalOverflow);
bool autoVerticalScrollBarChanged = box().hasAutoVerticalScrollbar() && (hasVerticalScrollbar() != hasVerticalOverflow);
if (autoHorizontalScrollBarChanged || autoVerticalScrollBarChanged)
box().setNeedsLayoutAndFullPaintInvalidation();
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 120,037
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NTSTATUS cli_cm_open(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
struct cli_state *referring_cli,
const char *server,
const char *share,
const struct user_auth_info *auth_info,
bool show_hdr,
bool force_encrypt,
int max_protocol,
int port,
int name_type,
struct cli_state **pcli)
{
/* Try to reuse an existing connection in this list. */
struct cli_state *c = cli_cm_find(referring_cli, server, share);
NTSTATUS status;
if (c) {
*pcli = c;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
if (auth_info == NULL) {
/* Can't do a new connection
* without auth info. */
d_printf("cli_cm_open() Unable to open connection [\\%s\\%s] "
"without auth info\n",
server, share );
return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
status = cli_cm_connect(ctx,
referring_cli,
server,
share,
auth_info,
show_hdr,
force_encrypt,
max_protocol,
port,
name_type,
&c);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
return status;
}
*pcli = c;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __online_page_set_limits(struct page *page)
{
unsigned long pfn = page_to_pfn(page);
if (pfn >= num_physpages)
num_physpages = pfn + 1;
}
Commit Message: mm/hotplug: correctly add new zone to all other nodes' zone lists
When online_pages() is called to add new memory to an empty zone, it
rebuilds all zone lists by calling build_all_zonelists(). But there's a
bug which prevents the new zone to be added to other nodes' zone lists.
online_pages() {
build_all_zonelists()
.....
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY)
}
Here the node of the zone is put into N_HIGH_MEMORY state after calling
build_all_zonelists(), but build_all_zonelists() only adds zones from
nodes in N_HIGH_MEMORY state to the fallback zone lists.
build_all_zonelists()
->__build_all_zonelists()
->build_zonelists()
->find_next_best_node()
->for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
So memory in the new zone will never be used by other nodes, and it may
cause strange behavor when system is under memory pressure. So put node
into N_HIGH_MEMORY state before calling build_all_zonelists().
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Keping Chen <chenkeping@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,489
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InterstitialPageImpl::DidNavigate(
RenderViewHost* render_view_host,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params) {
if (!enabled()) {
DontProceed();
return;
}
if (ui::PageTransitionCoreTypeIs(params.transition,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_SUBFRAME)) {
return;
}
pause_throbber_ = true;
if (!controller_->delegate()->IsHidden())
render_view_host_->GetWidget()->GetView()->Show();
controller_->delegate()->AttachInterstitialPage(this);
RenderWidgetHostView* rwh_view =
controller_->delegate()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetWidget()->GetView();
if (rwh_view) {
if (rwh_view->HasFocus())
Focus();
rwh_view->Hide();
}
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,087
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZSTD_sizeof_matchState(const ZSTD_compressionParameters* const cParams,
const U32 forCCtx)
{
size_t const chainSize = (cParams->strategy == ZSTD_fast) ? 0 : ((size_t)1 << cParams->chainLog);
size_t const hSize = ((size_t)1) << cParams->hashLog;
U32 const hashLog3 = (forCCtx && cParams->searchLength==3) ? MIN(ZSTD_HASHLOG3_MAX, cParams->windowLog) : 0;
size_t const h3Size = ((size_t)1) << hashLog3;
size_t const tableSpace = (chainSize + hSize + h3Size) * sizeof(U32);
size_t const optPotentialSpace = ((MaxML+1) + (MaxLL+1) + (MaxOff+1) + (1<<Litbits)) * sizeof(U32)
+ (ZSTD_OPT_NUM+1) * (sizeof(ZSTD_match_t)+sizeof(ZSTD_optimal_t));
size_t const optSpace = (forCCtx && ((cParams->strategy == ZSTD_btopt) ||
(cParams->strategy == ZSTD_btultra)))
? optPotentialSpace
: 0;
DEBUGLOG(4, "chainSize: %u - hSize: %u - h3Size: %u",
(U32)chainSize, (U32)hSize, (U32)h3Size);
return tableSpace + optSpace;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const AtomicString& HTMLInputElement::alt() const
{
return fastGetAttribute(altAttr);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,956
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::ViewSource(TabContentsWrapper* contents) {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("ViewSource"), profile_);
DCHECK(contents);
TabContentsWrapper* view_source_contents = contents->Clone();
view_source_contents->controller().PruneAllButActive();
NavigationEntry* active_entry =
view_source_contents->controller().GetActiveEntry();
if (!active_entry)
return;
std::string content_state = webkit_glue::RemoveScrollOffsetFromHistoryState(
active_entry->content_state());
active_entry->set_content_state(content_state);
GURL url = GURL(chrome::kViewSourceScheme + std::string(":") +
active_entry->url().spec());
active_entry->set_virtual_url(url);
active_entry->set_title(string16());
if (CanSupportWindowFeature(FEATURE_TABSTRIP)) {
int index = tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->
GetIndexOfTabContents(contents);
int add_types = TabStripModel::ADD_SELECTED |
TabStripModel::ADD_INHERIT_GROUP;
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->InsertTabContentsAt(index + 1,
view_source_contents,
add_types);
} else {
Browser* browser = Browser::CreateForType(TYPE_NORMAL, profile_);
BrowserWindow* new_window = browser->window();
new_window->SetBounds(gfx::Rect(new_window->GetRestoredBounds().origin(),
window()->GetRestoredBounds().size()));
browser->window()->Show();
browser->AddTab(view_source_contents, PageTransition::LINK);
}
if (profile_->HasSessionService()) {
SessionService* session_service = profile_->GetSessionService();
if (session_service)
session_service->TabRestored(&view_source_contents->controller(), false);
}
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: blink::WebMediaPlayer::NetworkState WebMediaPlayerMS::GetNetworkState() const {
DVLOG(1) << __func__ << ", state:" << network_state_;
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return network_state_;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,147
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void writeImageData(uint32_t width, uint32_t height, const uint8_t* pixelData, uint32_t pixelDataLength)
{
append(ImageDataTag);
doWriteUint32(width);
doWriteUint32(height);
doWriteUint32(pixelDataLength);
append(pixelData, pixelDataLength);
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,565
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct kiocb *lookup_kiocb(struct kioctx *ctx, struct iocb __user *iocb,
u32 key)
{
struct list_head *pos;
assert_spin_locked(&ctx->ctx_lock);
if (key != KIOCB_KEY)
return NULL;
/* TODO: use a hash or array, this sucks. */
list_for_each(pos, &ctx->active_reqs) {
struct kiocb *kiocb = list_kiocb(pos);
if (kiocb->ki_obj.user == iocb)
return kiocb;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: aio: fix kernel memory disclosure in io_getevents() introduced in v3.10
A kernel memory disclosure was introduced in aio_read_events_ring() in v3.10
by commit a31ad380bed817aa25f8830ad23e1a0480fef797. The changes made to
aio_read_events_ring() failed to correctly limit the index into
ctx->ring_pages[], allowing an attacked to cause the subsequent kmap() of
an arbitrary page with a copy_to_user() to copy the contents into userspace.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2014-0206. Thanks to Mateusz and
Petr for disclosing this issue.
This patch applies to v3.12+. A separate backport is needed for 3.10/3.11.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kmo@daterainc.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID:
| 0
| 39,617
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PaintLayerScrollableArea::ClampScrollOffsetAfterOverflowChange() {
if (HasBeenDisposed())
return;
if (DelayScrollOffsetClampScope::ClampingIsDelayed()) {
DelayScrollOffsetClampScope::SetNeedsClamp(this);
return;
}
UpdateScrollDimensions();
if (ScrollOriginChanged())
SetScrollOffsetUnconditionally(ClampScrollOffset(GetScrollOffset()));
else
ScrollableArea::SetScrollOffset(GetScrollOffset(), kClampingScroll);
SetNeedsScrollOffsetClamp(false);
ResetScrollOriginChanged();
scrollbar_manager_.DestroyDetachedScrollbars();
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,017
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_ioapic_reset(struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS; i++)
ioapic->redirtbl[i].fields.mask = 1;
ioapic->base_address = IOAPIC_DEFAULT_BASE_ADDRESS;
ioapic->ioregsel = 0;
ioapic->irr = 0;
ioapic->id = 0;
update_handled_vectors(ioapic);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Fix bounds checking in ioapic indirect register reads (CVE-2013-1798)
If the guest specifies a IOAPIC_REG_SELECT with an invalid value and follows
that with a read of the IOAPIC_REG_WINDOW KVM does not properly validate
that request. ioapic_read_indirect contains an
ASSERT(redir_index < IOAPIC_NUM_PINS), but the ASSERT has no effect in
non-debug builds. In recent kernels this allows a guest to cause a kernel
oops by reading invalid memory. In older kernels (pre-3.3) this allows a
guest to read from large ranges of host memory.
Tested: tested against apic unit tests.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 33,258
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
{
int rc;
struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
cmd.header.in = pcrread_header;
cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
"attempting to read a pcr value");
if (rc == 0)
memcpy(res_buf, cmd.params.pcrread_out.pcr_result,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: char/tpm: Fix unitialized usage of data buffer
This patch fixes information leakage to the userspace by initializing
the data buffer to zero.
Reported-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Selhorst <m.selhorst@sirrix.com>
[ Also removed the silly "* sizeof(u8)". If that isn't 1, we have way
deeper problems than a simple multiplication can fix. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 27,626
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool populate_tabs() {
if (params_->get_info.get() && params_->get_info->populate.get())
return *params_->get_info->populate;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 151,544
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void f2fs_wait_discard_bio(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr)
{
struct discard_cmd_control *dcc = SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info;
struct discard_cmd *dc;
bool need_wait = false;
mutex_lock(&dcc->cmd_lock);
dc = (struct discard_cmd *)__lookup_rb_tree(&dcc->root, NULL, blkaddr);
if (dc) {
if (dc->state == D_PREP) {
__punch_discard_cmd(sbi, dc, blkaddr);
} else {
dc->ref++;
need_wait = true;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&dcc->cmd_lock);
if (need_wait)
__wait_one_discard_bio(sbi, dc);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 86,023
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct dentry *ext2_fh_to_dentry(struct super_block *sb, struct fid *fid,
int fh_len, int fh_type)
{
return generic_fh_to_dentry(sb, fid, fh_len, fh_type,
ext2_nfs_get_inode);
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 94,955
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: horizontalDifference8(unsigned char *ip, int n, int stride,
unsigned short *wp, uint16 *From8)
{
register int r1, g1, b1, a1, r2, g2, b2, a2, mask;
#undef CLAMP
#define CLAMP(v) (From8[(v)])
mask = CODE_MASK;
if (n >= stride) {
if (stride == 3) {
r2 = wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); g2 = wp[1] = CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = CLAMP(ip[2]);
n -= 3;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 3;
r1 = CLAMP(ip[3]); wp[3] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = CLAMP(ip[4]); wp[4] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = CLAMP(ip[5]); wp[5] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
wp += 3;
ip += 3;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
r2 = wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); g2 = wp[1] = CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = CLAMP(ip[2]); a2 = wp[3] = CLAMP(ip[3]);
n -= 4;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 4;
r1 = CLAMP(ip[4]); wp[4] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = CLAMP(ip[5]); wp[5] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = CLAMP(ip[6]); wp[6] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
a1 = CLAMP(ip[7]); wp[7] = (uint16)((a1-a2) & mask); a2 = a1;
wp += 4;
ip += 4;
}
} else {
wp += n + stride - 1; /* point to last one */
ip += n + stride - 1; /* point to last one */
n -= stride;
while (n > 0) {
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]);
wp[stride] -= wp[0];
wp[stride] &= mask;
wp--; ip--)
n -= stride;
}
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp--; ip--)
}
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix potential buffer write overrun in
PixarLogDecode() on corrupted/unexpected images (reported by Mathias Svensson)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 86,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error_returned(char *errstr, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, errstr);
{
TSK_ERROR_INFO *errInfo = tsk_error_get_info();
char *loc_errstr2 = errInfo->errstr2;
if (errInfo->t_errno == 0)
errInfo->t_errno = TSK_ERR_AUX_GENERIC;
if (errstr != NULL) {
size_t sl = strlen(loc_errstr2);
vsnprintf(loc_errstr2 + sl, TSK_ERROR_STRING_MAX_LENGTH - sl,
errstr, args);
}
}
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 75,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: updateDevice(const struct header * headers, time_t t)
{
struct device ** pp = &devlist;
struct device * p = *pp; /* = devlist; */
while(p)
{
if( p->headers[HEADER_NT].l == headers[HEADER_NT].l
&& (0==memcmp(p->headers[HEADER_NT].p, headers[HEADER_NT].p, headers[HEADER_NT].l))
&& p->headers[HEADER_USN].l == headers[HEADER_USN].l
&& (0==memcmp(p->headers[HEADER_USN].p, headers[HEADER_USN].p, headers[HEADER_USN].l)) )
{
/*printf("found! %d\n", (int)(t - p->t));*/
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "device updated : %.*s", headers[HEADER_USN].l, headers[HEADER_USN].p);
p->t = t;
/* update Location ! */
if(headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l > p->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l)
{
p = realloc(p, sizeof(struct device)
+ headers[0].l+headers[1].l+headers[2].l );
if(!p) /* allocation error */
{
syslog(LOG_ERR, "updateDevice() : memory allocation error");
return 0;
}
*pp = p;
}
memcpy(p->data + p->headers[0].l + p->headers[1].l,
headers[2].p, headers[2].l);
return 0;
}
pp = &p->next;
p = *pp; /* p = p->next; */
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "new device discovered : %.*s",
headers[HEADER_USN].l, headers[HEADER_USN].p);
/* add */
{
char * pc;
int i;
p = malloc( sizeof(struct device)
+ headers[0].l+headers[1].l+headers[2].l );
if(!p) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "updateDevice(): cannot allocate memory");
return -1;
}
p->next = devlist;
p->t = t;
pc = p->data;
for(i = 0; i < 3; i++)
{
p->headers[i].p = pc;
p->headers[i].l = headers[i].l;
memcpy(pc, headers[i].p, headers[i].l);
pc += headers[i].l;
}
devlist = p;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: minissdpd.c: Initialize pointers to NULL (fix)
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 73,904
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void param_write_string(AVIOContext *pb, const char *name, const char *value)
{
avio_printf(pb, "<param name=\"%s\" value=\"%s\" valuetype=\"data\"/>\n", name, value);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 79,443
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PermissionsData::SetDefaultPolicyHostRestrictions(
const URLPatternSet& default_policy_blocked_hosts,
const URLPatternSet& default_policy_allowed_hosts) {
default_policy_restrictions.Get().blocked_hosts =
default_policy_blocked_hosts;
default_policy_restrictions.Get().allowed_hosts =
default_policy_allowed_hosts;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 151,597
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tun_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct tun_struct *tun = netdev_priv(dev);
tun->owner = -1;
tun->group = -1;
dev->ethtool_ops = &tun_ethtool_ops;
dev->destructor = tun_free_netdev;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TextureBase* GLES2DecoderImpl::GetTextureBase(uint32_t client_id) {
TextureRef* texture_ref = texture_manager()->GetTexture(client_id);
return texture_ref ? texture_ref->texture() : nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int mlx5_ib_post_recv(struct ib_qp *ibqp, const struct ib_recv_wr *wr,
const struct ib_recv_wr **bad_wr)
{
return _mlx5_ib_post_recv(ibqp, wr, bad_wr, false);
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AXObject::scrollToMakeVisible() const {
IntRect objectRect = pixelSnappedIntRect(getBoundsInFrameCoordinates());
objectRect.setLocation(IntPoint());
scrollToMakeVisibleWithSubFocus(objectRect);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct crypto_instance *pcrypt_alloc(struct rtattr **tb)
{
struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
if (IS_ERR(algt))
return ERR_CAST(algt);
switch (algt->type & algt->mask & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) {
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD:
return pcrypt_alloc_aead(tb, algt->type, algt->mask);
}
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_get_block_write(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock,
struct buffer_head *bh_result, int create)
{
handle_t *handle = NULL;
int ret = 0;
unsigned max_blocks = bh_result->b_size >> inode->i_blkbits;
int dio_credits;
ext4_debug("ext4_get_block_write: inode %lu, create flag %d\n",
inode->i_ino, create);
/*
* ext4_get_block in prepare for a DIO write or buffer write.
* We allocate an uinitialized extent if blocks haven't been allocated.
* The extent will be converted to initialized after IO complete.
*/
create = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_IO_CREATE_EXT;
if (max_blocks > DIO_MAX_BLOCKS)
max_blocks = DIO_MAX_BLOCKS;
dio_credits = ext4_chunk_trans_blocks(inode, max_blocks);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, dio_credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto out;
}
ret = ext4_get_blocks(handle, inode, iblock, max_blocks, bh_result,
create);
if (ret > 0) {
bh_result->b_size = (ret << inode->i_blkbits);
ret = 0;
}
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
| 1
| 167,545
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Extension::HasAPIPermission(
const std::string& function_name) const {
return permission_set()->HasAccessToFunction(function_name);
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void gen_outs(DisasContext *s, TCGMemOp ot)
{
if (s->tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT) {
gen_io_start();
}
gen_string_movl_A0_ESI(s);
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_regs[R_EDX]);
tcg_gen_andi_i32(cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp2_i32, 0xffff);
tcg_gen_trunc_tl_i32(cpu_tmp3_i32, cpu_T0);
gen_helper_out_func(ot, cpu_tmp2_i32, cpu_tmp3_i32);
gen_op_movl_T0_Dshift(ot);
gen_op_add_reg_T0(s->aflag, R_ESI);
gen_bpt_io(s, cpu_tmp2_i32, ot);
if (s->tb->cflags & CF_USE_ICOUNT) {
gen_io_end();
}
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94
| 0
| 66,386
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::empty_this_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret1 = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned int nBufferIndex = drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount;
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Empty this buffer in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (buffer == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ETB Buffer is NULL");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (!m_inp_bEnabled) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ETB incorrect state operation, input port is disabled.");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
if (buffer->nInputPortIndex != OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ETB invalid port in header %u", (unsigned int)buffer->nInputPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
#ifdef _ANDROID_
if (iDivXDrmDecrypt) {
OMX_ERRORTYPE drmErr = iDivXDrmDecrypt->Decrypt(buffer);
if (drmErr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("ERROR:iDivXDrmDecrypt->Decrypt %d", drmErr);
}
}
#endif //_ANDROID_
if (perf_flag) {
if (!latency) {
dec_time.stop();
latency = dec_time.processing_time_us();
dec_time.start();
}
}
if (arbitrary_bytes) {
nBufferIndex = buffer - m_inp_heap_ptr;
} else {
if (input_use_buffer == true) {
nBufferIndex = buffer - m_inp_heap_ptr;
m_inp_mem_ptr[nBufferIndex].nFilledLen = m_inp_heap_ptr[nBufferIndex].nFilledLen;
m_inp_mem_ptr[nBufferIndex].nTimeStamp = m_inp_heap_ptr[nBufferIndex].nTimeStamp;
m_inp_mem_ptr[nBufferIndex].nFlags = m_inp_heap_ptr[nBufferIndex].nFlags;
buffer = &m_inp_mem_ptr[nBufferIndex];
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Non-Arbitrary mode - buffer address is: malloc %p, pmem%p in Index %d, buffer %p of size %u",
&m_inp_heap_ptr[nBufferIndex], &m_inp_mem_ptr[nBufferIndex],nBufferIndex, buffer, (unsigned int)buffer->nFilledLen);
} else {
nBufferIndex = buffer - m_inp_mem_ptr;
}
}
if (nBufferIndex > drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount ) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ETB nBufferIndex is invalid");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG) {
codec_config_flag = true;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("%s: codec_config buffer", __FUNCTION__);
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("[ETB] BHdr(%p) pBuf(%p) nTS(%lld) nFL(%u)",
buffer, buffer->pBuffer, buffer->nTimeStamp, (unsigned int)buffer->nFilledLen);
if (arbitrary_bytes) {
post_event ((unsigned long)hComp,(unsigned long)buffer,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB_ARBITRARY);
} else {
post_event ((unsigned long)hComp,(unsigned long)buffer,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB);
}
time_stamp_dts.insert_timestamp(buffer);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: add safety checks for freeing buffers
Allow only up to 64 buffers on input/output port (since the
allocation bitmap is only 64-wide).
Do not allow changing theactual buffer count while still
holding allocation (Client can technically negotiate
buffer count on a free/disabled port)
Add safety checks to free only as many buffers were allocated.
Fixes: Security Vulnerability - Heap Overflow and Possible Local
Privilege Escalation in MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #3)
Bug: 27532282 27661749
Change-Id: I06dd680d43feaef3efdc87311e8a6703e234b523
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 160,653
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ikev1_hash_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep _U_, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_HASH)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_HASH)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 167,791
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsViewFocused(ViewID vid) {
return ui_test_utils::IsViewFocused(browser(), vid);
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 139,096
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int xts_fallback_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
const char *name = tfm->__crt_alg->cra_name;
struct s390_xts_ctx *xts_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
xts_ctx->fallback = crypto_alloc_blkcipher(name, 0,
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
if (IS_ERR(xts_ctx->fallback)) {
pr_err("Allocating XTS fallback algorithm %s failed\n",
name);
return PTR_ERR(xts_ctx->fallback);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutRect RenderBlock::rectWithOutlineForRepaint(const RenderLayerModelObject* repaintContainer, LayoutUnit outlineWidth) const
{
LayoutRect r(RenderBox::rectWithOutlineForRepaint(repaintContainer, outlineWidth));
if (isAnonymousBlockContinuation())
r.inflateY(collapsedMarginBefore()); // FIXME: This is wrong for block-flows that are horizontal.
return r;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,276
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::empty_buffer_done(OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* buffer)
{
if (buffer == NULL || ((buffer - m_inp_mem_ptr) > (int)drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("empty_buffer_done: ERROR bufhdr = %p", buffer);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("empty_buffer_done: bufhdr = %p, bufhdr->pBuffer = %p, bufhdr->nFlags = %x",
buffer, buffer->pBuffer, buffer->nFlags);
pending_input_buffers--;
if (arbitrary_bytes) {
if (pdest_frame == NULL && input_flush_progress == false) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Push input from buffer done address of Buffer %p",buffer);
pdest_frame = buffer;
buffer->nFilledLen = 0;
buffer->nTimeStamp = LLONG_MAX;
push_input_buffer (hComp);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Push buffer into freeq address of Buffer %p",buffer);
buffer->nFilledLen = 0;
if (!m_input_free_q.insert_entry((unsigned long)buffer,
(unsigned)NULL, (unsigned)NULL)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:i/p free Queue is FULL Error");
}
}
} else if (m_cb.EmptyBufferDone) {
buffer->nFilledLen = 0;
if (input_use_buffer == true) {
buffer = &m_inp_heap_ptr[buffer-m_inp_mem_ptr];
}
m_cb.EmptyBufferDone(hComp ,m_app_data, buffer);
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gst_asf_demux_send_event_unlocked (GstASFDemux * demux, GstEvent * event)
{
gboolean ret = TRUE;
gint i;
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "sending %s event to all source pads",
GST_EVENT_TYPE_NAME (event));
for (i = 0; i < demux->num_streams; ++i) {
gst_event_ref (event);
ret &= gst_pad_push_event (demux->stream[i].pad, event);
}
gst_event_unref (event);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 68,584
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MediaStreamDispatcherHost::GetMediaStreamDeviceObserver() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
if (media_stream_device_observer_)
return media_stream_device_observer_;
blink::mojom::MediaStreamDeviceObserverPtr observer;
auto dispatcher_request = mojo::MakeRequest(&observer);
observer.set_connection_error_handler(base::BindOnce(
&MediaStreamDispatcherHost::OnMediaStreamDeviceObserverConnectionError,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::UI},
base::BindOnce(&BindMediaStreamDeviceObserverRequest, render_process_id_,
render_frame_id_, std::move(dispatcher_request)));
media_stream_device_observer_ = std::move(observer);
return media_stream_device_observer_;
}
Commit Message: [MediaStream] Pass request ID parameters in the right order for OpenDevice()
Prior to this CL, requester_id and page_request_id parameters were
passed in incorrect order from MediaStreamDispatcherHost to
MediaStreamManager for the OpenDevice() operation, which could lead to
errors.
Bug: 948564
Change-Id: Iadcf3fe26adaac50564102138ce212269cf32d62
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1569113
Reviewed-by: Marina Ciocea <marinaciocea@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651255}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 151,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_sequence(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs4_sequence_res *res,
struct rpc_rqst *rqstp)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_NFS_V4_1)
struct nfs4_sessionid id;
u32 dummy;
int status;
__be32 *p;
if (!res->sr_session)
return 0;
status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_SEQUENCE);
if (!status)
status = decode_sessionid(xdr, &id);
if (unlikely(status))
goto out_err;
/*
* If the server returns different values for sessionID, slotID or
* sequence number, the server is looney tunes.
*/
status = -EREMOTEIO;
if (memcmp(id.data, res->sr_session->sess_id.data,
NFS4_MAX_SESSIONID_LEN)) {
dprintk("%s Invalid session id\n", __func__);
goto out_err;
}
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 20);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
/* seqid */
dummy = be32_to_cpup(p++);
if (dummy != res->sr_slot->seq_nr) {
dprintk("%s Invalid sequence number\n", __func__);
goto out_err;
}
/* slot id */
dummy = be32_to_cpup(p++);
if (dummy != res->sr_slot - res->sr_session->fc_slot_table.slots) {
dprintk("%s Invalid slot id\n", __func__);
goto out_err;
}
/* highest slot id - currently not processed */
dummy = be32_to_cpup(p++);
/* target highest slot id - currently not processed */
dummy = be32_to_cpup(p++);
/* result flags */
res->sr_status_flags = be32_to_cpup(p);
status = 0;
out_err:
res->sr_status = status;
return status;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
status = -EIO;
goto out_err;
#else /* CONFIG_NFS_V4_1 */
return 0;
#endif /* CONFIG_NFS_V4_1 */
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,330
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: php_http_url_t *php_http_url_from_struct(HashTable *ht)
{
zval **e;
php_http_buffer_t buf;
php_http_buffer_init_ex(&buf, MAX(PHP_HTTP_BUFFER_DEFAULT_SIZE, sizeof(php_http_url_t)<<2), PHP_HTTP_BUFFER_INIT_PREALLOC);
php_http_buffer_account(&buf, sizeof(php_http_url_t));
memset(buf.data, 0, buf.used);
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(ht, "scheme", sizeof("scheme"), (void *) &e)) {
zval *cpy = php_http_ztyp(IS_STRING, *e);
url(buf)->scheme = &buf.data[buf.used];
url_append(&buf, php_http_buffer_append(&buf, Z_STRVAL_P(cpy), Z_STRLEN_P(cpy) + 1));
zval_ptr_dtor(&cpy);
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(ht, "user", sizeof("user"), (void *) &e)) {
zval *cpy = php_http_ztyp(IS_STRING, *e);
url(buf)->user = &buf.data[buf.used];
url_append(&buf, php_http_buffer_append(&buf, Z_STRVAL_P(cpy), Z_STRLEN_P(cpy) + 1));
zval_ptr_dtor(&cpy);
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(ht, "pass", sizeof("pass"), (void *) &e)) {
zval *cpy = php_http_ztyp(IS_STRING, *e);
url(buf)->pass = &buf.data[buf.used];
url_append(&buf, php_http_buffer_append(&buf, Z_STRVAL_P(cpy), Z_STRLEN_P(cpy) + 1));
zval_ptr_dtor(&cpy);
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(ht, "host", sizeof("host"), (void *) &e)) {
zval *cpy = php_http_ztyp(IS_STRING, *e);
url(buf)->host = &buf.data[buf.used];
url_append(&buf, php_http_buffer_append(&buf, Z_STRVAL_P(cpy), Z_STRLEN_P(cpy) + 1));
zval_ptr_dtor(&cpy);
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(ht, "port", sizeof("port"), (void *) &e)) {
zval *cpy = php_http_ztyp(IS_LONG, *e);
url(buf)->port = (unsigned short) Z_LVAL_P(cpy);
zval_ptr_dtor(&cpy);
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(ht, "path", sizeof("path"), (void *) &e)) {
zval *cpy = php_http_ztyp(IS_STRING, *e);
url(buf)->path = &buf.data[buf.used];
url_append(&buf, php_http_buffer_append(&buf, Z_STRVAL_P(cpy), Z_STRLEN_P(cpy) + 1));
zval_ptr_dtor(&cpy);
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(ht, "query", sizeof("query"), (void *) &e)) {
zval *cpy = php_http_ztyp(IS_STRING, *e);
url(buf)->query = &buf.data[buf.used];
url_append(&buf, php_http_buffer_append(&buf, Z_STRVAL_P(cpy), Z_STRLEN_P(cpy) + 1));
zval_ptr_dtor(&cpy);
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(ht, "fragment", sizeof("fragment"), (void *) &e)) {
zval *cpy = php_http_ztyp(IS_STRING, *e);
url(buf)->fragment = &buf.data[buf.used];
url_append(&buf, php_http_buffer_append(&buf, Z_STRVAL_P(cpy), Z_STRLEN_P(cpy) + 1));
zval_ptr_dtor(&cpy);
}
return url(buf);
}
Commit Message: fix bug #71719 (Buffer overflow in HTTP url parsing functions)
The parser's offset was not reset when we softfail in scheme
parsing and continue to parse a path.
Thanks to hlt99 at blinkenshell dot org for the report.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,842
|
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