instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long hash(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long hashval)
{
unsigned long tmp;
tmp = (hashval * (unsigned long)sb) ^ (GOLDEN_RATIO_PRIME + hashval) /
L1_CACHE_BYTES;
tmp = tmp ^ ((tmp ^ GOLDEN_RATIO_PRIME) >> i_hash_shift);
return tmp & i_hash_mask;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AllSamplesPassedQuery::~AllSamplesPassedQuery() {
}
Commit Message: Add bounds validation to AsyncPixelTransfersCompletedQuery::End
BUG=351852
R=jbauman@chromium.org, jorgelo@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/198253002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256723 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 121,470
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool MemoryMappedFile::MapFileToMemoryInternal() {
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
struct stat file_stat;
if (fstat(file_, &file_stat) == base::kInvalidPlatformFileValue) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't fstat " << file_ << ", errno " << errno;
return false;
}
length_ = file_stat.st_size;
data_ = static_cast<uint8*>(
mmap(NULL, length_, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, file_, 0));
if (data_ == MAP_FAILED)
DLOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't mmap " << file_ << ", errno " << errno;
return data_ != MAP_FAILED;
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 115,403
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL AppCache::GetNamespaceEntryUrl(
const std::vector<AppCacheNamespace>& namespaces,
const GURL& namespace_url) const {
size_t count = namespaces.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
if (namespaces[i].namespace_url == namespace_url)
return namespaces[i].target_url;
}
NOTREACHED();
return GURL();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline void comps_objmrtree_pair_destroy_v(void * pair) {
free(((COMPS_ObjMRTreePair *)pair)->key);
free(pair);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,773
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: short CCITTFaxStream::getTwoDimCode() {
int code;
const CCITTCode *p;
int n;
code = 0; // make gcc happy
if (endOfBlock) {
if ((code = lookBits(7)) != EOF) {
p = &twoDimTab1[code];
if (p->bits > 0) {
eatBits(p->bits);
return p->n;
}
}
} else {
for (n = 1; n <= 7; ++n) {
if ((code = lookBits(n)) == EOF) {
break;
}
if (n < 7) {
code <<= 7 - n;
}
p = &twoDimTab1[code];
if (p->bits == n) {
eatBits(n);
return p->n;
}
}
}
error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
"Bad two dim code ({0:04x}) in CCITTFax stream", code);
return EOF;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cxusb_mxl5003s_tuner_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap)
{
dvb_attach(mxl5005s_attach, adap->fe_adap[0].fe,
&adap->dev->i2c_adap, &aver_a868r_tuner);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 66,740
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *fiin_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(FDItemInformationBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_FIIN);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,120
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChromeContentClient::CanHandleWhileSwappedOut(
const IPC::Message& msg) {
switch (msg.type()) {
case ChromeViewHostMsg_Snapshot::ID:
return true;
default:
break;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void add_assoc_asn1_string(zval * val, char * key, ASN1_STRING * str) /* {{{ */
{
add_assoc_stringl(val, key, (char *)str->data, str->length);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 4,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SSLErrorHandler::ContinueRequest() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SSLErrorHandler::CompleteContinueRequest, this));
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 107,939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ftrace_regex_open(struct ftrace_ops *ops, int flag,
struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct ftrace_iterator *iter;
struct ftrace_hash *hash;
int ret = 0;
if (unlikely(ftrace_disabled))
return -ENODEV;
iter = kzalloc(sizeof(*iter), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iter)
return -ENOMEM;
if (trace_parser_get_init(&iter->parser, FTRACE_BUFF_MAX)) {
kfree(iter);
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (flag & FTRACE_ITER_NOTRACE)
hash = ops->notrace_hash;
else
hash = ops->filter_hash;
iter->ops = ops;
iter->flags = flag;
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
mutex_lock(&ftrace_lock);
iter->hash = alloc_and_copy_ftrace_hash(FTRACE_HASH_DEFAULT_BITS, hash);
mutex_unlock(&ftrace_lock);
if (!iter->hash) {
trace_parser_put(&iter->parser);
kfree(iter);
return -ENOMEM;
}
}
mutex_lock(&ftrace_regex_lock);
if ((file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) &&
(file->f_flags & O_TRUNC))
ftrace_filter_reset(iter->hash);
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
iter->pg = ftrace_pages_start;
ret = seq_open(file, &show_ftrace_seq_ops);
if (!ret) {
struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;
m->private = iter;
} else {
/* Failed */
free_ftrace_hash(iter->hash);
trace_parser_put(&iter->parser);
kfree(iter);
}
} else
file->private_data = iter;
mutex_unlock(&ftrace_regex_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 30,213
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vivid_fb_blank(int blank_mode, struct fb_info *info)
{
struct vivid_dev *dev = (struct vivid_dev *)info->par;
dprintk(dev, 1, "Set blanking mode : %d\n", blank_mode);
switch (blank_mode) {
case FB_BLANK_UNBLANK:
break;
case FB_BLANK_NORMAL:
case FB_BLANK_HSYNC_SUSPEND:
case FB_BLANK_VSYNC_SUSPEND:
case FB_BLANK_POWERDOWN:
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] media/vivid-osd: fix info leak in ioctl
The vivid_fb_ioctl() code fails to initialize the 16 _reserved bytes of
struct fb_vblank after the ->hcount member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speirofr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 41,964
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void tcp_rcv_rtt_measure_ts(struct sock *sk,
const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
if (tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr &&
(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq -
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq >= inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ack.rcv_mss))
tcp_rcv_rtt_update(tp, tcp_time_stamp - tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr, 0);
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 41,189
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: point_construct(double x, double y)
{
Point *result = (Point *) palloc(sizeof(Point));
result->x = x;
result->y = y;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *frame)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
FieldOrderContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
int h, plane, line_step, line_size, line;
uint8_t *data;
if (!frame->interlaced_frame ||
frame->top_field_first == s->dst_tff)
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, frame);
av_dlog(ctx,
"picture will move %s one line\n",
s->dst_tff ? "up" : "down");
h = frame->height;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && frame->data[plane]; plane++) {
line_step = frame->linesize[plane];
line_size = s->line_size[plane];
data = frame->data[plane];
if (s->dst_tff) {
/** Move every line up one line, working from
* the top to the bottom of the frame.
* The original top line is lost.
* The new last line is created as a copy of the
* penultimate line from that field. */
for (line = 0; line < h; line++) {
if (1 + line < frame->height) {
memcpy(data, data + line_step, line_size);
} else {
memcpy(data, data - line_step - line_step, line_size);
}
data += line_step;
}
} else {
/** Move every line down one line, working from
* the bottom to the top of the frame.
* The original bottom line is lost.
* The new first line is created as a copy of the
* second line from that field. */
data += (h - 1) * line_step;
for (line = h - 1; line >= 0 ; line--) {
if (line > 0) {
memcpy(data, data - line_step, line_size);
} else {
memcpy(data, data + line_step + line_step, line_size);
}
data -= line_step;
}
}
}
frame->top_field_first = s->dst_tff;
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, frame);
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 166,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void get_lock_access(struct nfs4_ol_stateid *lock_stp, u32 access)
{
struct nfs4_file *fp = lock_stp->st_stid.sc_file;
lockdep_assert_held(&fp->fi_lock);
if (test_access(access, lock_stp))
return;
__nfs4_file_get_access(fp, access);
set_access(access, lock_stp);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleVertexAttribDivisorANGLE(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::VertexAttribDivisorANGLE& c) {
if (!feature_info_->feature_flags().angle_instanced_arrays) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glVertexAttribDivisorANGLE", "function not available");
}
GLuint index = c.index;
GLuint divisor = c.divisor;
if (index >= group_->max_vertex_attribs()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glVertexAttribDivisorANGLE", "index out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
vertex_attrib_manager_->SetDivisor(
index,
divisor);
glVertexAttribDivisorANGLE(index, divisor);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 103,659
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FrameSelection::ShouldPaintCaret(const LayoutBlock& block) const {
DCHECK_GE(GetDocument().Lifecycle().GetState(),
DocumentLifecycle::kLayoutClean);
bool result = frame_caret_->ShouldPaintCaret(block);
DCHECK(!result ||
(ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().IsCaret() &&
IsEditablePosition(ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().Start())));
return result;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 124,819
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::derefObject(void* object)
{
static_cast<TestSerializedScriptValueInterface*>(object)->deref();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,671
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static filter_pred_fn_t select_comparison_fn(enum filter_op_ids op,
int field_size, int field_is_signed)
{
filter_pred_fn_t fn = NULL;
int pred_func_index = -1;
switch (op) {
case OP_EQ:
case OP_NE:
break;
default:
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(op < PRED_FUNC_START))
return NULL;
pred_func_index = op - PRED_FUNC_START;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(pred_func_index > PRED_FUNC_MAX))
return NULL;
}
switch (field_size) {
case 8:
if (pred_func_index < 0)
fn = filter_pred_64;
else if (field_is_signed)
fn = pred_funcs_s64[pred_func_index];
else
fn = pred_funcs_u64[pred_func_index];
break;
case 4:
if (pred_func_index < 0)
fn = filter_pred_32;
else if (field_is_signed)
fn = pred_funcs_s32[pred_func_index];
else
fn = pred_funcs_u32[pred_func_index];
break;
case 2:
if (pred_func_index < 0)
fn = filter_pred_16;
else if (field_is_signed)
fn = pred_funcs_s16[pred_func_index];
else
fn = pred_funcs_u16[pred_func_index];
break;
case 1:
if (pred_func_index < 0)
fn = filter_pred_8;
else if (field_is_signed)
fn = pred_funcs_s8[pred_func_index];
else
fn = pred_funcs_u8[pred_func_index];
break;
}
return fn;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,604
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ext4_clear_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
invalidate_inode_buffers(inode);
clear_inode(inode);
dquot_drop(inode);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, 0, EXT_MAX_BLOCKS);
if (EXT4_I(inode)->jinode) {
jbd2_journal_release_jbd_inode(EXT4_JOURNAL(inode),
EXT4_I(inode)->jinode);
jbd2_free_inode(EXT4_I(inode)->jinode);
EXT4_I(inode)->jinode = NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
fscrypt_put_encryption_info(inode, NULL);
#endif
}
Commit Message: ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time
Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.
ext4_calculate_overhead():
buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS); <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);
count_overhead():
for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf); <=== buffer overrun
count++;
}
This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:
#!/bin/bash
rm -f fs.img
mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
fallocate -l 16M fs.img
mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4
Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@os-t.de>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,524
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t o2nm_node_local_store(struct config_item *item, const char *page,
size_t count)
{
struct o2nm_node *node = to_o2nm_node(item);
struct o2nm_cluster *cluster = to_o2nm_cluster_from_node(node);
unsigned long tmp;
char *p = (char *)page;
ssize_t ret;
tmp = simple_strtoul(p, &p, 0);
if (!p || (*p && (*p != '\n')))
return -EINVAL;
tmp = !!tmp; /* boolean of whether this node wants to be local */
/* setting local turns on networking rx for now so we require having
* set everything else first */
if (!test_bit(O2NM_NODE_ATTR_ADDRESS, &node->nd_set_attributes) ||
!test_bit(O2NM_NODE_ATTR_NUM, &node->nd_set_attributes) ||
!test_bit(O2NM_NODE_ATTR_PORT, &node->nd_set_attributes))
return -EINVAL; /* XXX */
/* the only failure case is trying to set a new local node
* when a different one is already set */
if (tmp && tmp == cluster->cl_has_local &&
cluster->cl_local_node != node->nd_num)
return -EBUSY;
/* bring up the rx thread if we're setting the new local node. */
if (tmp && !cluster->cl_has_local) {
ret = o2net_start_listening(node);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (!tmp && cluster->cl_has_local &&
cluster->cl_local_node == node->nd_num) {
o2net_stop_listening(node);
cluster->cl_local_node = O2NM_INVALID_NODE_NUM;
}
node->nd_local = tmp;
if (node->nd_local) {
cluster->cl_has_local = tmp;
cluster->cl_local_node = node->nd_num;
}
return count;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EEAA69.9080703@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59E9B36A.10700@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 169,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FoFiType1C::eexecWrite(Type1CEexecBuf *eb, const char *s) {
Guchar *p;
Guchar x;
for (p = (Guchar *)s; *p; ++p) {
x = *p ^ (eb->r1 >> 8);
eb->r1 = (x + eb->r1) * 52845 + 22719;
if (eb->ascii) {
(*eb->outputFunc)(eb->outputStream, &hexChars[x >> 4], 1);
(*eb->outputFunc)(eb->outputStream, &hexChars[x & 0x0f], 1);
eb->line += 2;
if (eb->line == 64) {
(*eb->outputFunc)(eb->outputStream, "\n", 1);
eb->line = 0;
}
} else {
(*eb->outputFunc)(eb->outputStream, (char *)&x, 1);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 2,208
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FakeVoiceInteractionController* voice_interaction_controller() {
return voice_interaction_controller_.get();
}
Commit Message: arc: add test for blocking incognito windows in screenshot
BUG=778852
TEST=ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkServiceUnittest.
CapturingScreenshotBlocksIncognitoWindows
Change-Id: I0bfa5a486759783d7c8926a309c6b5da9b02dcc6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914983
Commit-Queue: Muyuan Li <muyuanli@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Hector Chavez <lhchavez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536438}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 152,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::textNodesMerged(Text* oldNode, unsigned offset)
{
if (!m_ranges.isEmpty()) {
NodeWithIndex oldNodeWithIndex(oldNode);
HashSet<Range*>::const_iterator end = m_ranges.end();
for (HashSet<Range*>::const_iterator it = m_ranges.begin(); it != end; ++it)
(*it)->textNodesMerged(oldNodeWithIndex, offset);
}
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,645
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: service_manager::InterfaceProvider* WebContentsImpl::GetJavaInterfaces() {
if (!java_interfaces_) {
service_manager::mojom::InterfaceProviderPtr provider;
BindInterfaceRegistryForWebContents(mojo::MakeRequest(&provider), this);
java_interfaces_.reset(new service_manager::InterfaceProvider);
java_interfaces_->Bind(std::move(provider));
}
return java_interfaces_.get();
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,719
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void update_noheader_flag(AVFormatContext *s)
{
HLSContext *c = s->priv_data;
int flag_needed = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < c->n_playlists; i++) {
struct playlist *pls = c->playlists[i];
if (pls->has_noheader_flag) {
flag_needed = 1;
break;
}
}
if (flag_needed)
s->ctx_flags |= AVFMTCTX_NOHEADER;
else
s->ctx_flags &= ~AVFMTCTX_NOHEADER;
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 61,821
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SelectorQueryCache& Document::GetSelectorQueryCache() {
if (!selector_query_cache_)
selector_query_cache_ = WTF::MakeUnique<SelectorQueryCache>();
return *selector_query_cache_;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,080
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<Blob> Blob::slice(long long start, long long end, const String& contentType) const
{
long long size;
double modificationTime;
if (isFile()) {
toFile(this)->captureSnapshot(size, modificationTime);
} else {
ASSERT(m_size != -1);
size = m_size;
}
if (start < 0)
start = start + size;
if (end < 0)
end = end + size;
if (start < 0)
start = 0;
if (end < 0)
end = 0;
if (start >= size) {
start = 0;
end = 0;
} else if (end < start)
end = start;
else if (end > size)
end = size;
long long length = end - start;
OwnPtr<BlobData> blobData = BlobData::create();
blobData->setContentType(contentType);
if (isFile()) {
if (!toFile(this)->fileSystemURL().isEmpty())
blobData->appendURL(toFile(this)->fileSystemURL(), start, length, modificationTime);
else
blobData->appendFile(toFile(this)->path(), start, length, modificationTime);
} else
blobData->appendBlob(m_internalURL, start, length);
return Blob::create(blobData.release(), length);
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 102,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void export_array(struct mddev *mddev)
{
struct md_rdev *rdev;
while (!list_empty(&mddev->disks)) {
rdev = list_first_entry(&mddev->disks, struct md_rdev,
same_set);
md_kick_rdev_from_array(rdev);
}
mddev->raid_disks = 0;
mddev->major_version = 0;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,387
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int should_cow_block(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root,
struct extent_buffer *buf)
{
if (btrfs_test_is_dummy_root(root))
return 0;
/* ensure we can see the force_cow */
smp_rmb();
/*
* We do not need to cow a block if
* 1) this block is not created or changed in this transaction;
* 2) this block does not belong to TREE_RELOC tree;
* 3) the root is not forced COW.
*
* What is forced COW:
* when we create snapshot during commiting the transaction,
* after we've finished coping src root, we must COW the shared
* block to ensure the metadata consistency.
*/
if (btrfs_header_generation(buf) == trans->transid &&
!btrfs_header_flag(buf, BTRFS_HEADER_FLAG_WRITTEN) &&
!(root->root_key.objectid != BTRFS_TREE_RELOC_OBJECTID &&
btrfs_header_flag(buf, BTRFS_HEADER_FLAG_RELOC)) &&
!test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_FORCE_COW, &root->state))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 45,354
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static zend_bool php_auto_globals_create_env(const char *name, uint name_len TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval *env_vars = NULL;
ALLOC_ZVAL(env_vars);
array_init(env_vars);
INIT_PZVAL(env_vars);
if (PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_ENV]) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_ENV]);
}
PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_ENV] = env_vars;
if (PG(variables_order) && (strchr(PG(variables_order),'E') || strchr(PG(variables_order),'e'))) {
php_import_environment_variables(PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_ENV] TSRMLS_CC);
}
check_http_proxy(Z_ARRVAL_P(PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_ENV]));
zend_hash_update(&EG(symbol_table), name, name_len + 1, &PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_ENV], sizeof(zval *), NULL);
Z_ADDREF_P(PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_ENV]);
return 0; /* don't rearm */
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73807
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 63,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsRelativeURL(const char* base,
const url_parse::Parsed& base_parsed,
const char* fragment,
int fragment_len,
bool is_base_hierarchical,
bool* is_relative,
url_parse::Component* relative_component) {
return DoIsRelativeURL<char>(
base, base_parsed, fragment, fragment_len, is_base_hierarchical,
is_relative, relative_component);
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB read when parsing protocol-relative URLs
BUG=285742
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23902014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@223735 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 111,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeClientImpl::RegisterPopupOpeningObserver(
PopupOpeningObserver* observer) {
DCHECK(observer);
popup_opening_observers_.push_back(observer);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::FocusLocationBarByDefault() {
NavigationEntryImpl* entry = controller_.GetPendingEntry();
if (controller_.IsInitialNavigation() && entry &&
!entry->is_renderer_initiated() &&
entry->GetURL() == url::kAboutBlankURL) {
return true;
}
return delegate_ && delegate_->ShouldFocusLocationBarByDefault(this);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_buffers(VP8Context *s)
{
int i;
if (s->thread_data)
for (i = 0; i < MAX_THREADS; i++) {
#if HAVE_THREADS
pthread_cond_destroy(&s->thread_data[i].cond);
pthread_mutex_destroy(&s->thread_data[i].lock);
#endif
av_freep(&s->thread_data[i].filter_strength);
}
av_freep(&s->thread_data);
av_freep(&s->macroblocks_base);
av_freep(&s->intra4x4_pred_mode_top);
av_freep(&s->top_nnz);
av_freep(&s->top_border);
s->macroblocks = NULL;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t OMX::storeMetaDataInBuffers(
node_id node, OMX_U32 port_index, OMX_BOOL enable, MetadataBufferType *type) {
return findInstance(node)->storeMetaDataInBuffers(port_index, enable, type);
}
Commit Message: Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 160,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void FramePktHook(const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
file_size_ += pkt->data.frame.sz;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,384
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *BN_options(void)
{
static int init=0;
static char data[16];
if (!init)
{
init++;
#ifdef BN_LLONG
BIO_snprintf(data,sizeof data,"bn(%d,%d)",
(int)sizeof(BN_ULLONG)*8,(int)sizeof(BN_ULONG)*8);
#else
BIO_snprintf(data,sizeof data,"bn(%d,%d)",
(int)sizeof(BN_ULONG)*8,(int)sizeof(BN_ULONG)*8);
#endif
}
return(data);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 14,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void dev_txq_stats_fold(const struct net_device *dev,
struct net_device_stats *stats)
{
unsigned long tx_bytes = 0, tx_packets = 0, tx_dropped = 0;
unsigned int i;
struct netdev_queue *txq;
for (i = 0; i < dev->num_tx_queues; i++) {
txq = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, i);
tx_bytes += txq->tx_bytes;
tx_packets += txq->tx_packets;
tx_dropped += txq->tx_dropped;
}
if (tx_bytes || tx_packets || tx_dropped) {
stats->tx_bytes = tx_bytes;
stats->tx_packets = tx_packets;
stats->tx_dropped = tx_dropped;
}
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_bob_not(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value cv)
{
return mrb_bool_value(!mrb_test(cv));
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 82,064
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_mmu_pages(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
free_page((unsigned long)vcpu->arch.mmu.pae_root);
if (vcpu->arch.mmu.lm_root != NULL)
free_page((unsigned long)vcpu->arch.mmu.lm_root);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,416
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: add_pa_data_element(krb5_context context,
krb5_pa_data *padata,
krb5_pa_data ***inout_padata,
krb5_boolean copy)
{
int i;
krb5_pa_data **p;
if (*inout_padata != NULL) {
for (i = 0; (*inout_padata)[i] != NULL; i++)
;
} else
i = 0;
p = realloc(*inout_padata, (i + 2) * sizeof(krb5_pa_data *));
if (p == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
*inout_padata = p;
p[i] = (krb5_pa_data *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_pa_data));
if (p[i] == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
*(p[i]) = *padata;
p[i + 1] = NULL;
if (copy) {
p[i]->contents = (krb5_octet *)malloc(padata->length);
if (p[i]->contents == NULL) {
free(p[i]);
p[i] = NULL;
return ENOMEM;
}
memcpy(p[i]->contents, padata->contents, padata->length);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix S4U2Self KDC crash when anon is restricted
In validate_as_request(), when enforcing restrict_anonymous_to_tgt,
use client.princ instead of request->client; the latter is NULL when
validating S4U2Self requests.
CVE-2016-3120:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause krb5kdc
to dereference a null pointer if the restrict_anonymous_to_tgt option
is set to true, by making an S4U2Self request.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8458 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 54,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int crc32_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
u32 *mctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
u32 *crcp = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
*crcp = *mctx;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,193
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual int handleResponse(WifiEvent& reply) {
struct nlattr **tb = reply.attributes();
struct genlmsghdr *gnlh = reply.header();
struct nlattr *mcgrp = NULL;
int i;
if (!tb[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GROUPS]) {
ALOGI("No multicast groups found");
return NL_SKIP;
} else {
}
for_each_attr(mcgrp, tb[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GROUPS], i) {
struct nlattr *tb2[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_MAX + 1];
nla_parse(tb2, CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_MAX, (nlattr *)nla_data(mcgrp),
nla_len(mcgrp), NULL);
if (!tb2[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_NAME] || !tb2[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_ID]) {
continue;
}
char *grpName = (char *)nla_data(tb2[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_NAME]);
int grpNameLen = nla_len(tb2[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_NAME]);
if (strncmp(grpName, mGroup, grpNameLen) != 0)
continue;
mId = nla_get_u32(tb2[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_ID]);
break;
}
return NL_SKIP;
}
Commit Message: Fix use-after-free in wifi_cleanup()
Release reference to cmd only after possibly calling getType().
BUG: 25753768
Change-Id: Id2156ce51acec04e8364706cf7eafc7d4adae9eb
(cherry picked from commit d7f3cb9915d9ac514393d0ad7767662958054b8f https://googleplex-android-review.git.corp.google.com/#/c/815223)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,948
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint16_t AVRC_Close(uint8_t handle) {
AVRC_TRACE_DEBUG("%s handle:%d", __func__, handle);
avrc_flush_cmd_q(handle);
return AVCT_RemoveConn(handle);
}
Commit Message: Add missing AVRCP message length checks inside avrc_msg_cback
Explicitly check the length of the received message before
accessing the data.
Bug: 111803925
Bug: 79883824
Test: POC scripts
Change-Id: I00b1c6bd6dd7e18ac2c469ef2032c7ff10dcaecb
Merged-In: I00b1c6bd6dd7e18ac2c469ef2032c7ff10dcaecb
(cherry picked from commit 282deb3e27407aaa88b8ddbdbd7bb7d56ddc635f)
(cherry picked from commit 007868d05f4b761842c7345161aeda6fd40dd245)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 162,870
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void handle_new_msr(struct edgeport_port *edge_port, __u8 msr)
{
struct async_icount *icount;
struct tty_struct *tty;
dev_dbg(&edge_port->port->dev, "%s - %02x\n", __func__, msr);
if (msr & (EDGEPORT_MSR_DELTA_CTS | EDGEPORT_MSR_DELTA_DSR |
EDGEPORT_MSR_DELTA_RI | EDGEPORT_MSR_DELTA_CD)) {
icount = &edge_port->icount;
/* update input line counters */
if (msr & EDGEPORT_MSR_DELTA_CTS)
icount->cts++;
if (msr & EDGEPORT_MSR_DELTA_DSR)
icount->dsr++;
if (msr & EDGEPORT_MSR_DELTA_CD)
icount->dcd++;
if (msr & EDGEPORT_MSR_DELTA_RI)
icount->rng++;
wake_up_interruptible(&edge_port->delta_msr_wait);
}
/* Save the new modem status */
edge_port->shadow_msr = msr & 0xf0;
tty = tty_port_tty_get(&edge_port->port->port);
/* handle CTS flow control */
if (tty && C_CRTSCTS(tty)) {
if (msr & EDGEPORT_MSR_CTS) {
tty->hw_stopped = 0;
tty_wakeup(tty);
} else {
tty->hw_stopped = 1;
}
}
tty_kref_put(tty);
}
Commit Message: USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()
The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.
This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.
Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.
[ 56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[ 56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[ 56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[ 56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[ 56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[ 56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 56.282744] Modules linked in:
[ 56.283512] CPU 1
[ 56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[ 56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>] [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[ 56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[ 56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[ 56.283512] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[ 56.283512] Stack:
[ 56.283512] 0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[ 56.283512] ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[ 56.283512] ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[ 56.283512] Call Trace:
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[ 56.283512] RIP [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <wfpub@roembden.net>
Cc: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 33,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VOID InitializeRSCState(PPARANDIS_ADAPTER pContext)
{
#if PARANDIS_SUPPORT_RSC
pContext->RSC.bIPv4Enabled = FALSE;
pContext->RSC.bIPv6Enabled = FALSE;
if(!pContext->bGuestChecksumSupported)
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] Guest TSO cannot be enabled without guest checksum\n", __FUNCTION__) );
return;
}
if(pContext->RSC.bIPv4SupportedSW)
{
pContext->RSC.bIPv4Enabled =
pContext->RSC.bIPv4SupportedHW =
AckFeature(pContext, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO4);
}
else
{
pContext->RSC.bIPv4SupportedHW =
VirtIOIsFeatureEnabled(pContext->u32HostFeatures, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO4);
}
if(pContext->RSC.bIPv6SupportedSW)
{
pContext->RSC.bIPv6Enabled =
pContext->RSC.bIPv6SupportedHW =
AckFeature(pContext, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO6);
}
else
{
pContext->RSC.bIPv6SupportedHW =
VirtIOIsFeatureEnabled(pContext->u32HostFeatures, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO6);
}
pContext->RSC.bHasDynamicConfig = (pContext->RSC.bIPv4Enabled || pContext->RSC.bIPv6Enabled) &&
AckFeature(pContext, VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_GUEST_OFFLOADS);
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] Guest TSO state: IP4=%d, IP6=%d, Dynamic=%d\n", __FUNCTION__,
pContext->RSC.bIPv4Enabled, pContext->RSC.bIPv6Enabled, pContext->RSC.bHasDynamicConfig) );
#else
UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(pContext);
#endif
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 74,359
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HostDataDeleter(QuotaManager* manager,
const std::string& host,
StorageType type,
int quota_client_mask,
const StatusCallback& callback)
: QuotaTask(manager),
host_(host),
type_(type),
quota_client_mask_(quota_client_mask),
error_count_(0),
remaining_clients_(-1),
remaining_deleters_(-1),
callback_(callback),
weak_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)) {}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,197
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int path_is_under(struct path *path1, struct path *path2)
{
int res;
read_seqlock_excl(&mount_lock);
res = is_path_reachable(real_mount(path1->mnt), path1->dentry, path2);
read_sequnlock_excl(&mount_lock);
return res;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string ContentBrowserClient::GetDefaultDownloadName() {
return std::string();
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: htmlCreateDocParserCtxt(const xmlChar *cur, const char *encoding) {
int len;
htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
if (cur == NULL)
return(NULL);
len = xmlStrlen(cur);
ctxt = htmlCreateMemoryParserCtxt((char *)cur, len);
if (ctxt == NULL)
return(NULL);
if (encoding != NULL) {
xmlCharEncoding enc;
xmlCharEncodingHandlerPtr handler;
if (ctxt->input->encoding != NULL)
xmlFree((xmlChar *) ctxt->input->encoding);
ctxt->input->encoding = xmlStrdup((const xmlChar *) encoding);
enc = xmlParseCharEncoding(encoding);
/*
* registered set of known encodings
*/
if (enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_ERROR) {
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
if (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
htmlParseErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING,
"Unsupported encoding %s\n",
(const xmlChar *) encoding, NULL);
}
} else {
/*
* fallback for unknown encodings
*/
handler = xmlFindCharEncodingHandler((const char *) encoding);
if (handler != NULL) {
xmlSwitchToEncoding(ctxt, handler);
} else {
htmlParseErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING,
"Unsupported encoding %s\n",
(const xmlChar *) encoding, NULL);
}
}
}
return(ctxt);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 150,767
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mask_PaintProc(const gs_client_color * pcolor, gs_gstate * pgs)
{
const pixmap_info *ppmap = gs_getpattern(pcolor)->client_data;
const gs_depth_bitmap *pbitmap = &(ppmap->bitmap);
gs_image_enum *pen =
gs_image_enum_alloc(gs_gstate_memory(pgs), "mask_PaintProc");
gs_image1_t mask;
if (pen == 0)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
gs_image_t_init_mask(&mask, true);
mask.Width = pbitmap->size.x;
mask.Height = pbitmap->size.y;
gs_image_init(pen, &mask, false, false, pgs);
return bitmap_paint(pen, (gs_data_image_t *) & mask, pbitmap, pgs);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 1,696
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned ScriptProfiler::getHeapObjectId(const ScriptValue& value)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::HeapProfiler* profiler = isolate->GetHeapProfiler();
v8::SnapshotObjectId id = profiler->GetObjectId(value.v8Value());
return id;
}
Commit Message: Fix clobbered build issue.
TBR=jochen@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
BUG=269698
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22425005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155711 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 102,529
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_setsockopt_active_key(struct sock *sk,
char __user *optval,
unsigned int optlen)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sctp_authkeyid val;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
if (!net->sctp.auth_enable)
return -EACCES;
if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, val.scact_assoc_id);
if (!asoc && val.scact_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
return sctp_auth_set_active_key(sctp_sk(sk)->ep, asoc,
val.scact_keynumber);
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 33,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> overloadedMethod2Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.overloadedMethod2");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(TestObj*, objArg, V8TestObj::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8TestObj::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
if (args.Length() <= 1) {
imp->overloadedMethod(objArg);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, intArg, toInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined)));
imp->overloadedMethod(objArg, intArg);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,098
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DevToolsAgentFilter::~DevToolsAgentFilter() {
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,848
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const char* RendererSchedulerImpl::ExpensiveTaskPolicyToString(
ExpensiveTaskPolicy expensive_task_policy) {
switch (expensive_task_policy) {
case ExpensiveTaskPolicy::kRun:
return "run";
case ExpensiveTaskPolicy::kBlock:
return "block";
case ExpensiveTaskPolicy::kThrottle:
return "throttle";
default:
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 143,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport const char *GetMagickReleaseDate(void)
{
return(MagickReleaseDate);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 74,042
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Instance::GetPageNumberToDisplay() {
int page = engine_->GetMostVisiblePage();
if (IsPrintPreview() && !print_preview_page_numbers_.empty()) {
page = ClipToRange<int>(page, 0, print_preview_page_numbers_.size() - 1);
return print_preview_page_numbers_[page];
}
return page + 1;
}
Commit Message: Let PDFium handle event when there is not yet a visible page.
Speculative fix for 415307. CF will confirm.
The stack trace for that bug indicates an attempt to index by -1, which is consistent with no visible page.
BUG=415307
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/560133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#295421}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::TestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_testInterfaceEmptyAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::TestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,234
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
int retval = 0;
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p, optname:%d\n", __func__, sk, optname);
/* I can hardly begin to describe how wrong this is. This is
* so broken as to be worse than useless. The API draft
* REALLY is NOT helpful here... I am not convinced that the
* semantics of setsockopt() with a level OTHER THAN SOL_SCTP
* are at all well-founded.
*/
if (level != SOL_SCTP) {
struct sctp_af *af = sctp_sk(sk)->pf->af;
retval = af->setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
goto out_nounlock;
}
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
/* 'optlen' is the size of the addresses buffer. */
retval = sctp_setsockopt_bindx(sk, (struct sockaddr __user *)optval,
optlen, SCTP_BINDX_ADD_ADDR);
break;
case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_REM:
/* 'optlen' is the size of the addresses buffer. */
retval = sctp_setsockopt_bindx(sk, (struct sockaddr __user *)optval,
optlen, SCTP_BINDX_REM_ADDR);
break;
case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX_OLD:
/* 'optlen' is the size of the addresses buffer. */
retval = sctp_setsockopt_connectx_old(sk,
(struct sockaddr __user *)optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
/* 'optlen' is the size of the addresses buffer. */
retval = sctp_setsockopt_connectx(sk,
(struct sockaddr __user *)optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_DISABLE_FRAGMENTS:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_disable_fragments(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_EVENTS:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_events(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_AUTOCLOSE:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_autoclose(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_PEER_ADDR_PARAMS:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_peer_addr_params(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_DELAYED_SACK:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_delayed_ack(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_PARTIAL_DELIVERY_POINT:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_partial_delivery_point(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_INITMSG:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_initmsg(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_DEFAULT_SEND_PARAM:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_default_send_param(sk, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_DEFAULT_SNDINFO:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_default_sndinfo(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_primary_addr(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_peer_primary_addr(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_NODELAY:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_nodelay(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_RTOINFO:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_rtoinfo(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_ASSOCINFO:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_associnfo(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_I_WANT_MAPPED_V4_ADDR:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_mappedv4(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_MAXSEG:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_maxseg(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_ADAPTATION_LAYER:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_adaptation_layer(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_CONTEXT:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_context(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_FRAGMENT_INTERLEAVE:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_fragment_interleave(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_MAX_BURST:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_maxburst(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_AUTH_CHUNK:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_auth_chunk(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_HMAC_IDENT:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_hmac_ident(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_AUTH_KEY:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_active_key(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_AUTH_DELETE_KEY:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_del_key(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_AUTO_ASCONF:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_PEER_ADDR_THLDS:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_paddr_thresholds(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_RECVRCVINFO:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_recvrcvinfo(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_RECVNXTINFO:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_recvnxtinfo(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
default:
retval = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
out_nounlock:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 43,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltTestCompMatchDirect(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xsltCompMatchPtr comp,
xmlNodePtr node, xmlNsPtr *nsList, int nsNr) {
xsltStepOpPtr sel = NULL;
xmlDocPtr prevdoc;
xmlDocPtr doc;
xmlXPathObjectPtr list;
int ix, j;
int nocache = 0;
int isRVT;
doc = node->doc;
if (XSLT_IS_RES_TREE_FRAG(doc))
isRVT = 1;
else
isRVT = 0;
sel = &comp->steps[0]; /* store extra in first step arbitrarily */
prevdoc = (xmlDocPtr)
XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt, sel->previousExtra, ptr);
ix = XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt, sel->indexExtra, ival);
list = (xmlXPathObjectPtr)
XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA_LST(ctxt, sel->lenExtra);
if ((list == NULL) || (prevdoc != doc)) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr newlist;
xmlNodePtr parent = node->parent;
xmlDocPtr olddoc;
xmlNodePtr oldnode;
int oldNsNr;
xmlNsPtr *oldNamespaces;
oldnode = ctxt->xpathCtxt->node;
olddoc = ctxt->xpathCtxt->doc;
oldNsNr = ctxt->xpathCtxt->nsNr;
oldNamespaces = ctxt->xpathCtxt->namespaces;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->node = node;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->doc = doc;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->namespaces = nsList;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->nsNr = nsNr;
newlist = xmlXPathEval(comp->pattern, ctxt->xpathCtxt);
ctxt->xpathCtxt->node = oldnode;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->doc = olddoc;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->namespaces = oldNamespaces;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->nsNr = oldNsNr;
if (newlist == NULL)
return(-1);
if (newlist->type != XPATH_NODESET) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(newlist);
return(-1);
}
ix = 0;
if ((parent == NULL) || (node->doc == NULL) || isRVT)
nocache = 1;
if (nocache == 0) {
if (list != NULL)
xmlXPathFreeObject(list);
list = newlist;
XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA_LST(ctxt, sel->lenExtra) =
(void *) list;
XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt, sel->previousExtra, ptr) =
(void *) doc;
XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA(ctxt, sel->indexExtra, ival) =
0;
XSLT_RUNTIME_EXTRA_FREE(ctxt, sel->lenExtra) =
(xmlFreeFunc) xmlXPathFreeObject;
} else
list = newlist;
}
if ((list->nodesetval == NULL) ||
(list->nodesetval->nodeNr <= 0)) {
if (nocache == 1)
xmlXPathFreeObject(list);
return(0);
}
/* TODO: store the index and use it for the scan */
if (ix == 0) {
for (j = 0;j < list->nodesetval->nodeNr;j++) {
if (list->nodesetval->nodeTab[j] == node) {
if (nocache == 1)
xmlXPathFreeObject(list);
return(1);
}
}
} else {
}
if (nocache == 1)
xmlXPathFreeObject(list);
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Handle a bad XSLT expression better.
BUG=138672
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10830177
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@150123 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 106,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContainerNode::attach(const AttachContext& context)
{
attachChildren(context);
clearChildNeedsStyleRecalc();
Node::attach(context);
}
Commit Message: Notify nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event
This patch changes notifying nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event. In willRemoveChildren(), like willRemoveChild(); r115686 did same change, although it didn't change willRemoveChildren().
The issue 295010, use-after-free, is caused by setting removed node to Selection in mutation event handler.
BUG=295010
TEST=LayoutTests/fast/dom/Range/range-created-during-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-mutation-event-by-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-blur-event-by-remove-children.html
R=tkent@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25389004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoFramebufferParameteri(GLenum target,
GLenum pname,
GLint param) {
api()->glFramebufferParameteriFn(target, pname, param);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,964
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8Proxy::evaluateInIsolatedWorld(int worldID, const Vector<ScriptSourceCode>& sources, int extensionGroup, WTF::Vector<v8::Local<v8::Value> >* results)
{
if (!windowShell()->initContextIfNeeded())
return;
v8::HandleScope handleScope;
V8IsolatedContext* isolatedContext = 0;
if (worldID > 0) {
IsolatedWorldMap::iterator iter = m_isolatedWorlds.find(worldID);
if (iter != m_isolatedWorlds.end()) {
isolatedContext = iter->second;
} else {
isolatedContext = new V8IsolatedContext(this, extensionGroup, worldID);
if (isolatedContext->context().IsEmpty()) {
delete isolatedContext;
return;
}
m_isolatedWorlds.set(worldID, isolatedContext);
}
IsolatedWorldSecurityOriginMap::iterator securityOriginIter = m_isolatedWorldSecurityOrigins.find(worldID);
if (securityOriginIter != m_isolatedWorldSecurityOrigins.end())
isolatedContext->setSecurityOrigin(securityOriginIter->second);
} else {
isolatedContext = new V8IsolatedContext(this, extensionGroup, worldID);
if (isolatedContext->context().IsEmpty()) {
delete isolatedContext;
return;
}
}
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = v8::Local<v8::Context>::New(isolatedContext->context());
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context);
if (results) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < sources.size(); ++i)
results->append(evaluate(sources[i], 0));
} else {
for (size_t i = 0; i < sources.size(); ++i)
evaluate(sources[i], 0);
}
if (worldID == 0)
isolatedContext->destroy();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,733
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void update_rq_clock_task(struct rq *rq, s64 delta)
{
rq->clock_task += delta;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,370
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: g_NPN_SetProperty(NPP instance, NPObject *npobj, NPIdentifier propertyName,
const NPVariant *value)
{
if (!thread_check()) {
npw_printf("WARNING: NPN_SetProperty not called from the main thread\n");
return false;
}
if (instance == NULL)
return false;
PluginInstance *plugin = PLUGIN_INSTANCE(instance);
if (plugin == NULL)
return false;
if (!npobj || !npobj->_class || !npobj->_class->setProperty)
return false;
D(bugiI("NPN_SetProperty instance=%p, npobj=%p, propertyName=%p\n", instance, npobj, propertyName));
npw_plugin_instance_ref(plugin);
bool ret = invoke_NPN_SetProperty(plugin, npobj, propertyName, value);
npw_plugin_instance_unref(plugin);
D(bugiD("NPN_SetProperty return: %d\n", ret));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pcnet_init(PCNetState *s)
{
int rlen, tlen;
uint16_t padr[3], ladrf[4], mode;
uint32_t rdra, tdra;
trace_pcnet_init(s, PHYSADDR(s, CSR_IADR(s)));
if (BCR_SSIZE32(s)) {
struct pcnet_initblk32 initblk;
s->phys_mem_read(s->dma_opaque, PHYSADDR(s,CSR_IADR(s)),
(uint8_t *)&initblk, sizeof(initblk), 0);
mode = le16_to_cpu(initblk.mode);
rlen = initblk.rlen >> 4;
tlen = initblk.tlen >> 4;
ladrf[0] = le16_to_cpu(initblk.ladrf[0]);
ladrf[1] = le16_to_cpu(initblk.ladrf[1]);
ladrf[2] = le16_to_cpu(initblk.ladrf[2]);
ladrf[3] = le16_to_cpu(initblk.ladrf[3]);
padr[0] = le16_to_cpu(initblk.padr[0]);
padr[1] = le16_to_cpu(initblk.padr[1]);
padr[2] = le16_to_cpu(initblk.padr[2]);
rdra = le32_to_cpu(initblk.rdra);
tdra = le32_to_cpu(initblk.tdra);
} else {
struct pcnet_initblk16 initblk;
s->phys_mem_read(s->dma_opaque, PHYSADDR(s,CSR_IADR(s)),
(uint8_t *)&initblk, sizeof(initblk), 0);
mode = le16_to_cpu(initblk.mode);
ladrf[0] = le16_to_cpu(initblk.ladrf[0]);
ladrf[1] = le16_to_cpu(initblk.ladrf[1]);
ladrf[2] = le16_to_cpu(initblk.ladrf[2]);
ladrf[3] = le16_to_cpu(initblk.ladrf[3]);
padr[0] = le16_to_cpu(initblk.padr[0]);
padr[1] = le16_to_cpu(initblk.padr[1]);
padr[2] = le16_to_cpu(initblk.padr[2]);
rdra = le32_to_cpu(initblk.rdra);
tdra = le32_to_cpu(initblk.tdra);
rlen = rdra >> 29;
tlen = tdra >> 29;
rdra &= 0x00ffffff;
tdra &= 0x00ffffff;
}
trace_pcnet_rlen_tlen(s, rlen, tlen);
CSR_RCVRL(s) = (rlen < 9) ? (1 << rlen) : 512;
CSR_XMTRL(s) = (tlen < 9) ? (1 << tlen) : 512;
s->csr[ 6] = (tlen << 12) | (rlen << 8);
s->csr[15] = mode;
s->csr[ 8] = ladrf[0];
s->csr[ 9] = ladrf[1];
s->csr[10] = ladrf[2];
s->csr[11] = ladrf[3];
s->csr[12] = padr[0];
s->csr[13] = padr[1];
s->csr[14] = padr[2];
s->rdra = PHYSADDR(s, rdra);
s->tdra = PHYSADDR(s, tdra);
CSR_RCVRC(s) = CSR_RCVRL(s);
CSR_XMTRC(s) = CSR_XMTRL(s);
trace_pcnet_ss32_rdra_tdra(s, BCR_SSIZE32(s),
s->rdra, CSR_RCVRL(s), s->tdra, CSR_XMTRL(s));
s->csr[0] |= 0x0101;
s->csr[0] &= ~0x0004; /* clear STOP bit */
qemu_flush_queued_packets(qemu_get_queue(s->nic));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,518
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::OnStartDownload(TabContents* source, DownloadItem* download) {
TabContentsWrapper* wrapper =
TabContentsWrapper::GetCurrentWrapperForContents(source);
TabContentsWrapper* constrained = GetConstrainingContentsWrapper(wrapper);
if (constrained != wrapper) {
TabContents* constrained_tab = constrained->tab_contents();
constrained_tab->delegate()->OnStartDownload(constrained_tab, download);
return;
}
if (!window())
return;
if (DisplayOldDownloadsUI()) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
ExtensionService* service = profile_->GetExtensionService();
if (!ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::IsExtensionDownload(download) ||
(service == NULL) ||
!service->IsDownloadFromGallery(download->GetURL(),
download->referrer_url())) {
ActiveDownloadsUI::OpenPopup(profile_);
}
#else
DownloadShelf* shelf = window()->GetDownloadShelf();
shelf->AddDownload(new DownloadItemModel(download));
TabContents* shelf_tab = shelf->browser()->GetSelectedTabContents();
if ((download->total_bytes() > 0) &&
(!ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::IsExtensionDownload(download) ||
ExtensionService::IsDownloadFromMiniGallery(download->GetURL())) &&
platform_util::IsVisible(shelf_tab->GetNativeView()) &&
ui::Animation::ShouldRenderRichAnimation()) {
DownloadStartedAnimation::Show(shelf_tab);
}
#endif
}
if (source->controller().IsInitialNavigation() && tab_count() > 1)
CloseContents(source);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void unlinkat_preserve_errno(int dirfd, const char *path, int flags)
{
int serrno = errno;
unlinkat(dirfd, path, flags);
errno = serrno;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 17,885
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t stat_to_v9mode(const struct stat *stbuf)
{
uint32_t mode;
mode = stbuf->st_mode & 0777;
if (S_ISDIR(stbuf->st_mode)) {
mode |= P9_STAT_MODE_DIR;
}
if (S_ISLNK(stbuf->st_mode)) {
mode |= P9_STAT_MODE_SYMLINK;
}
if (S_ISSOCK(stbuf->st_mode)) {
mode |= P9_STAT_MODE_SOCKET;
}
if (S_ISFIFO(stbuf->st_mode)) {
mode |= P9_STAT_MODE_NAMED_PIPE;
}
if (S_ISBLK(stbuf->st_mode) || S_ISCHR(stbuf->st_mode)) {
mode |= P9_STAT_MODE_DEVICE;
}
if (stbuf->st_mode & S_ISUID) {
mode |= P9_STAT_MODE_SETUID;
}
if (stbuf->st_mode & S_ISGID) {
mode |= P9_STAT_MODE_SETGID;
}
if (stbuf->st_mode & S_ISVTX) {
mode |= P9_STAT_MODE_SETVTX;
}
return mode;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 1,475
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _warc_rduri(const char *buf, size_t bsz)
{
static const char _key[] = "\r\nWARC-Target-URI:";
const char *val, *uri, *eol, *p;
warc_string_t res = {0U, NULL};
if ((val = xmemmem(buf, bsz, _key, sizeof(_key) - 1U)) == NULL) {
/* no bother */
return res;
}
/* overread whitespace */
val += sizeof(_key) - 1U;
if ((eol = _warc_find_eol(val, buf + bsz - val)) == NULL) {
/* no end of line */
return res;
}
while (val < eol && (*val == ' ' || *val == '\t'))
++val;
/* overread URL designators */
if ((uri = xmemmem(val, eol - val, "://", 3U)) == NULL) {
/* not touching that! */
return res;
}
/* spaces inside uri are not allowed, CRLF should follow */
for (p = val; p < eol; p++) {
if (isspace((unsigned char)*p))
return res;
}
/* there must be at least space for ftp */
if (uri < (val + 3U))
return res;
/* move uri to point to after :// */
uri += 3U;
/* now then, inspect the URI */
if (memcmp(val, "file", 4U) == 0) {
/* perfect, nothing left to do here */
} else if (memcmp(val, "http", 4U) == 0 ||
memcmp(val, "ftp", 3U) == 0) {
/* overread domain, and the first / */
while (uri < eol && *uri++ != '/');
} else {
/* not sure what to do? best to bugger off */
return res;
}
res.str = uri;
res.len = eol - uri;
return res;
}
Commit Message: warc: consume data once read
The warc decoder only used read ahead, it wouldn't actually consume
data that had previously been printed. This means that if you specify
an invalid content length, it will just reprint the same data over
and over and over again until it hits the desired length.
This means that a WARC resource with e.g.
Content-Length: 666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666665
but only a few hundred bytes of data, causes a quasi-infinite loop.
Consume data in subsequent calls to _warc_read.
Found with an AFL + afl-rb + qsym setup.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 74,913
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cifs_demultiplex_thread(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
{
int length;
unsigned int pdu_length, total_read;
struct smb_hdr *smb_buffer = NULL;
struct smb_hdr *bigbuf = NULL;
struct smb_hdr *smallbuf = NULL;
struct msghdr smb_msg;
struct kvec iov;
struct socket *csocket = server->ssocket;
struct list_head *tmp, *tmp2;
struct task_struct *task_to_wake = NULL;
struct mid_q_entry *mid_entry;
char temp;
bool isLargeBuf = false;
bool isMultiRsp;
int reconnect;
current->flags |= PF_MEMALLOC;
cFYI(1, "Demultiplex PID: %d", task_pid_nr(current));
length = atomic_inc_return(&tcpSesAllocCount);
if (length > 1)
mempool_resize(cifs_req_poolp, length + cifs_min_rcv,
GFP_KERNEL);
set_freezable();
while (server->tcpStatus != CifsExiting) {
if (try_to_freeze())
continue;
if (bigbuf == NULL) {
bigbuf = cifs_buf_get();
if (!bigbuf) {
cERROR(1, "No memory for large SMB response");
msleep(3000);
/* retry will check if exiting */
continue;
}
} else if (isLargeBuf) {
/* we are reusing a dirty large buf, clear its start */
memset(bigbuf, 0, sizeof(struct smb_hdr));
}
if (smallbuf == NULL) {
smallbuf = cifs_small_buf_get();
if (!smallbuf) {
cERROR(1, "No memory for SMB response");
msleep(1000);
/* retry will check if exiting */
continue;
}
/* beginning of smb buffer is cleared in our buf_get */
} else /* if existing small buf clear beginning */
memset(smallbuf, 0, sizeof(struct smb_hdr));
isLargeBuf = false;
isMultiRsp = false;
smb_buffer = smallbuf;
iov.iov_base = smb_buffer;
iov.iov_len = 4;
smb_msg.msg_control = NULL;
smb_msg.msg_controllen = 0;
pdu_length = 4; /* enough to get RFC1001 header */
incomplete_rcv:
if (echo_retries > 0 &&
time_after(jiffies, server->lstrp +
(echo_retries * SMB_ECHO_INTERVAL))) {
cERROR(1, "Server %s has not responded in %d seconds. "
"Reconnecting...", server->hostname,
(echo_retries * SMB_ECHO_INTERVAL / HZ));
cifs_reconnect(server);
csocket = server->ssocket;
wake_up(&server->response_q);
continue;
}
length =
kernel_recvmsg(csocket, &smb_msg,
&iov, 1, pdu_length, 0 /* BB other flags? */);
if (server->tcpStatus == CifsExiting) {
break;
} else if (server->tcpStatus == CifsNeedReconnect) {
cFYI(1, "Reconnect after server stopped responding");
cifs_reconnect(server);
cFYI(1, "call to reconnect done");
csocket = server->ssocket;
continue;
} else if (length == -ERESTARTSYS ||
length == -EAGAIN ||
length == -EINTR) {
msleep(1); /* minimum sleep to prevent looping
allowing socket to clear and app threads to set
tcpStatus CifsNeedReconnect if server hung */
if (pdu_length < 4) {
iov.iov_base = (4 - pdu_length) +
(char *)smb_buffer;
iov.iov_len = pdu_length;
smb_msg.msg_control = NULL;
smb_msg.msg_controllen = 0;
goto incomplete_rcv;
} else
continue;
} else if (length <= 0) {
cFYI(1, "Reconnect after unexpected peek error %d",
length);
cifs_reconnect(server);
csocket = server->ssocket;
wake_up(&server->response_q);
continue;
} else if (length < pdu_length) {
cFYI(1, "requested %d bytes but only got %d bytes",
pdu_length, length);
pdu_length -= length;
msleep(1);
goto incomplete_rcv;
}
/* The right amount was read from socket - 4 bytes */
/* so we can now interpret the length field */
/* the first byte big endian of the length field,
is actually not part of the length but the type
with the most common, zero, as regular data */
temp = *((char *) smb_buffer);
/* Note that FC 1001 length is big endian on the wire,
but we convert it here so it is always manipulated
as host byte order */
pdu_length = be32_to_cpu((__force __be32)smb_buffer->smb_buf_length);
smb_buffer->smb_buf_length = pdu_length;
cFYI(1, "rfc1002 length 0x%x", pdu_length+4);
if (temp == (char) RFC1002_SESSION_KEEP_ALIVE) {
continue;
} else if (temp == (char)RFC1002_POSITIVE_SESSION_RESPONSE) {
cFYI(1, "Good RFC 1002 session rsp");
continue;
} else if (temp == (char)RFC1002_NEGATIVE_SESSION_RESPONSE) {
/* we get this from Windows 98 instead of
an error on SMB negprot response */
cFYI(1, "Negative RFC1002 Session Response Error 0x%x)",
pdu_length);
/* give server a second to clean up */
msleep(1000);
/* always try 445 first on reconnect since we get NACK
* on some if we ever connected to port 139 (the NACK
* is since we do not begin with RFC1001 session
* initialize frame)
*/
cifs_set_port((struct sockaddr *)
&server->dstaddr, CIFS_PORT);
cifs_reconnect(server);
csocket = server->ssocket;
wake_up(&server->response_q);
continue;
} else if (temp != (char) 0) {
cERROR(1, "Unknown RFC 1002 frame");
cifs_dump_mem(" Received Data: ", (char *)smb_buffer,
length);
cifs_reconnect(server);
csocket = server->ssocket;
continue;
}
/* else we have an SMB response */
if ((pdu_length > CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE - 4) ||
(pdu_length < sizeof(struct smb_hdr) - 1 - 4)) {
cERROR(1, "Invalid size SMB length %d pdu_length %d",
length, pdu_length+4);
cifs_reconnect(server);
csocket = server->ssocket;
wake_up(&server->response_q);
continue;
}
/* else length ok */
reconnect = 0;
if (pdu_length > MAX_CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER_SIZE - 4) {
isLargeBuf = true;
memcpy(bigbuf, smallbuf, 4);
smb_buffer = bigbuf;
}
length = 0;
iov.iov_base = 4 + (char *)smb_buffer;
iov.iov_len = pdu_length;
for (total_read = 0; total_read < pdu_length;
total_read += length) {
length = kernel_recvmsg(csocket, &smb_msg, &iov, 1,
pdu_length - total_read, 0);
if (server->tcpStatus == CifsExiting) {
/* then will exit */
reconnect = 2;
break;
} else if (server->tcpStatus == CifsNeedReconnect) {
cifs_reconnect(server);
csocket = server->ssocket;
/* Reconnect wakes up rspns q */
/* Now we will reread sock */
reconnect = 1;
break;
} else if (length == -ERESTARTSYS ||
length == -EAGAIN ||
length == -EINTR) {
msleep(1); /* minimum sleep to prevent looping,
allowing socket to clear and app
threads to set tcpStatus
CifsNeedReconnect if server hung*/
length = 0;
continue;
} else if (length <= 0) {
cERROR(1, "Received no data, expecting %d",
pdu_length - total_read);
cifs_reconnect(server);
csocket = server->ssocket;
reconnect = 1;
break;
}
}
if (reconnect == 2)
break;
else if (reconnect == 1)
continue;
total_read += 4; /* account for rfc1002 hdr */
dump_smb(smb_buffer, total_read);
/*
* We know that we received enough to get to the MID as we
* checked the pdu_length earlier. Now check to see
* if the rest of the header is OK. We borrow the length
* var for the rest of the loop to avoid a new stack var.
*
* 48 bytes is enough to display the header and a little bit
* into the payload for debugging purposes.
*/
length = checkSMB(smb_buffer, smb_buffer->Mid, total_read);
if (length != 0)
cifs_dump_mem("Bad SMB: ", smb_buffer,
min_t(unsigned int, total_read, 48));
mid_entry = NULL;
server->lstrp = jiffies;
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
list_for_each_safe(tmp, tmp2, &server->pending_mid_q) {
mid_entry = list_entry(tmp, struct mid_q_entry, qhead);
if ((mid_entry->mid == smb_buffer->Mid) &&
(mid_entry->midState == MID_REQUEST_SUBMITTED) &&
(mid_entry->command == smb_buffer->Command)) {
if (length == 0 &&
check2ndT2(smb_buffer, server->maxBuf) > 0) {
/* We have a multipart transact2 resp */
isMultiRsp = true;
if (mid_entry->resp_buf) {
/* merge response - fix up 1st*/
if (coalesce_t2(smb_buffer,
mid_entry->resp_buf)) {
mid_entry->multiRsp =
true;
break;
} else {
/* all parts received */
mid_entry->multiEnd =
true;
goto multi_t2_fnd;
}
} else {
if (!isLargeBuf) {
cERROR(1, "1st trans2 resp needs bigbuf");
/* BB maybe we can fix this up, switch
to already allocated large buffer? */
} else {
/* Have first buffer */
mid_entry->resp_buf =
smb_buffer;
mid_entry->largeBuf =
true;
bigbuf = NULL;
}
}
break;
}
mid_entry->resp_buf = smb_buffer;
mid_entry->largeBuf = isLargeBuf;
multi_t2_fnd:
if (length == 0)
mid_entry->midState =
MID_RESPONSE_RECEIVED;
else
mid_entry->midState =
MID_RESPONSE_MALFORMED;
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_STATS2
mid_entry->when_received = jiffies;
#endif
list_del_init(&mid_entry->qhead);
mid_entry->callback(mid_entry);
break;
}
mid_entry = NULL;
}
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
if (mid_entry != NULL) {
/* Was previous buf put in mpx struct for multi-rsp? */
if (!isMultiRsp) {
/* smb buffer will be freed by user thread */
if (isLargeBuf)
bigbuf = NULL;
else
smallbuf = NULL;
}
} else if (length != 0) {
/* response sanity checks failed */
continue;
} else if (!is_valid_oplock_break(smb_buffer, server) &&
!isMultiRsp) {
cERROR(1, "No task to wake, unknown frame received! "
"NumMids %d", atomic_read(&midCount));
cifs_dump_mem("Received Data is: ", (char *)smb_buffer,
sizeof(struct smb_hdr));
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG2
cifs_dump_detail(smb_buffer);
cifs_dump_mids(server);
#endif /* CIFS_DEBUG2 */
}
} /* end while !EXITING */
/* take it off the list, if it's not already */
spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
list_del_init(&server->tcp_ses_list);
spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
server->tcpStatus = CifsExiting;
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
wake_up_all(&server->response_q);
/* check if we have blocked requests that need to free */
/* Note that cifs_max_pending is normally 50, but
can be set at module install time to as little as two */
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
if (atomic_read(&server->inFlight) >= cifs_max_pending)
atomic_set(&server->inFlight, cifs_max_pending - 1);
/* We do not want to set the max_pending too low or we
could end up with the counter going negative */
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
/* Although there should not be any requests blocked on
this queue it can not hurt to be paranoid and try to wake up requests
that may haven been blocked when more than 50 at time were on the wire
to the same server - they now will see the session is in exit state
and get out of SendReceive. */
wake_up_all(&server->request_q);
/* give those requests time to exit */
msleep(125);
if (server->ssocket) {
sock_release(csocket);
server->ssocket = NULL;
}
/* buffer usuallly freed in free_mid - need to free it here on exit */
cifs_buf_release(bigbuf);
if (smallbuf) /* no sense logging a debug message if NULL */
cifs_small_buf_release(smallbuf);
if (!list_empty(&server->pending_mid_q)) {
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
list_for_each_safe(tmp, tmp2, &server->pending_mid_q) {
mid_entry = list_entry(tmp, struct mid_q_entry, qhead);
cFYI(1, "Clearing Mid 0x%x - issuing callback",
mid_entry->mid);
list_del_init(&mid_entry->qhead);
mid_entry->callback(mid_entry);
}
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
/* 1/8th of sec is more than enough time for them to exit */
msleep(125);
}
if (!list_empty(&server->pending_mid_q)) {
/* mpx threads have not exited yet give them
at least the smb send timeout time for long ops */
/* due to delays on oplock break requests, we need
to wait at least 45 seconds before giving up
on a request getting a response and going ahead
and killing cifsd */
cFYI(1, "Wait for exit from demultiplex thread");
msleep(46000);
/* if threads still have not exited they are probably never
coming home not much else we can do but free the memory */
}
kfree(server->hostname);
task_to_wake = xchg(&server->tsk, NULL);
kfree(server);
length = atomic_dec_return(&tcpSesAllocCount);
if (length > 0)
mempool_resize(cifs_req_poolp, length + cifs_min_rcv,
GFP_KERNEL);
/* if server->tsk was NULL then wait for a signal before exiting */
if (!task_to_wake) {
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
while (!signal_pending(current)) {
schedule();
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
}
set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
}
module_put_and_exit(0);
}
Commit Message: cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount
Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.
This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <ysharma@cymer.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ID3::Iterator::findFrame() {
for (;;) {
mFrameData = NULL;
mFrameSize = 0;
if (mParent.mVersion == ID3_V2_2) {
if (mOffset + 6 > mParent.mSize) {
return;
}
if (!memcmp(&mParent.mData[mOffset], "\0\0\0", 3)) {
return;
}
mFrameSize =
(mParent.mData[mOffset + 3] << 16)
| (mParent.mData[mOffset + 4] << 8)
| mParent.mData[mOffset + 5];
if (mFrameSize == 0) {
return;
}
mFrameSize += 6; // add tag id and size field
if (SIZE_MAX - mOffset <= mFrameSize) {
return;
}
if (mOffset + mFrameSize > mParent.mSize) {
ALOGV("partial frame at offset %zu (size = %zu, bytes-remaining = %zu)",
mOffset, mFrameSize, mParent.mSize - mOffset - (size_t)6);
return;
}
mFrameData = &mParent.mData[mOffset + 6];
if (!mID) {
break;
}
char id[4];
memcpy(id, &mParent.mData[mOffset], 3);
id[3] = '\0';
if (!strcmp(id, mID)) {
break;
}
} else if (mParent.mVersion == ID3_V2_3
|| mParent.mVersion == ID3_V2_4) {
if (mOffset + 10 > mParent.mSize) {
return;
}
if (!memcmp(&mParent.mData[mOffset], "\0\0\0\0", 4)) {
return;
}
size_t baseSize = 0;
if (mParent.mVersion == ID3_V2_4) {
if (!ParseSyncsafeInteger(
&mParent.mData[mOffset + 4], &baseSize)) {
return;
}
} else {
baseSize = U32_AT(&mParent.mData[mOffset + 4]);
}
if (baseSize == 0) {
return;
}
if (SIZE_MAX - 10 <= baseSize) {
return;
}
mFrameSize = 10 + baseSize; // add tag id, size field and flags
if (SIZE_MAX - mOffset <= mFrameSize) {
return;
}
if (mOffset + mFrameSize > mParent.mSize) {
ALOGV("partial frame at offset %zu (size = %zu, bytes-remaining = %zu)",
mOffset, mFrameSize, mParent.mSize - mOffset - (size_t)10);
return;
}
uint16_t flags = U16_AT(&mParent.mData[mOffset + 8]);
if ((mParent.mVersion == ID3_V2_4 && (flags & 0x000c))
|| (mParent.mVersion == ID3_V2_3 && (flags & 0x00c0))) {
ALOGV("Skipping unsupported frame (compression, encryption "
"or per-frame unsynchronization flagged");
mOffset += mFrameSize;
continue;
}
mFrameData = &mParent.mData[mOffset + 10];
if (!mID) {
break;
}
char id[5];
memcpy(id, &mParent.mData[mOffset], 4);
id[4] = '\0';
if (!strcmp(id, mID)) {
break;
}
} else {
CHECK(mParent.mVersion == ID3_V1 || mParent.mVersion == ID3_V1_1);
if (mOffset >= mParent.mSize) {
return;
}
mFrameData = &mParent.mData[mOffset];
switch (mOffset) {
case 3:
case 33:
case 63:
mFrameSize = 30;
break;
case 93:
mFrameSize = 4;
break;
case 97:
if (mParent.mVersion == ID3_V1) {
mFrameSize = 30;
} else {
mFrameSize = 29;
}
break;
case 126:
mFrameSize = 1;
break;
case 127:
mFrameSize = 1;
break;
default:
CHECK(!"Should not be here, invalid offset.");
break;
}
if (!mID) {
break;
}
String8 id;
getID(&id);
if (id == mID) {
break;
}
}
mOffset += mFrameSize;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: defensive parsing of mp3 album art information
several points in stagefrights mp3 album art code
used strlen() to parse user-supplied strings that may be
unterminated, resulting in reading beyond the end of a buffer.
This changes the code to use strnlen() for 8-bit encodings and
strengthens the parsing of 16-bit encodings similarly. It also
reworks how we watch for the end-of-buffer to avoid all over-reads.
Bug: 32377688
Test: crafted mp3's w/ good/bad cover art. See what showed in play music
Change-Id: Ia9f526d71b21ef6a61acacf616b573753cd21df6
(cherry picked from commit fa0806b594e98f1aed3ebcfc6a801b4c0056f9eb)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 162,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static TriState StateTextWritingDirectionLeftToRight(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*) {
return StateTextWritingDirection(frame, LeftToRightWritingDirection);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void l2cap_conn_del(struct hci_conn *hcon, int err)
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
struct sock *sk;
if (!conn)
return;
BT_DBG("hcon %p conn %p, err %d", hcon, conn, err);
kfree_skb(conn->rx_skb);
/* Kill channels */
while ((sk = conn->chan_list.head)) {
bh_lock_sock(sk);
l2cap_chan_del(sk, err);
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
l2cap_sock_kill(sk);
}
if (conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_SENT)
del_timer_sync(&conn->info_timer);
hcon->l2cap_data = NULL;
kfree(conn);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <gustavo@las.ic.unicamp.br>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 58,928
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmsBool Type_MPE_Write(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, void* Ptr, cmsUInt32Number nItems)
{
cmsUInt32Number i, BaseOffset, DirectoryPos, CurrentPos;
int inputChan, outputChan;
cmsUInt32Number ElemCount;
cmsUInt32Number *ElementOffsets = NULL, *ElementSizes = NULL, Before;
cmsStageSignature ElementSig;
cmsPipeline* Lut = (cmsPipeline*) Ptr;
cmsStage* Elem = Lut ->Elements;
cmsTagTypeHandler* TypeHandler;
_cmsTagTypePluginChunkType* MPETypePluginChunk = ( _cmsTagTypePluginChunkType*) _cmsContextGetClientChunk(self->ContextID, MPEPlugin);
BaseOffset = io ->Tell(io) - sizeof(_cmsTagBase);
inputChan = cmsPipelineInputChannels(Lut);
outputChan = cmsPipelineOutputChannels(Lut);
ElemCount = cmsPipelineStageCount(Lut);
ElementOffsets = (cmsUInt32Number *) _cmsCalloc(self ->ContextID, ElemCount, sizeof(cmsUInt32Number));
if (ElementOffsets == NULL) goto Error;
ElementSizes = (cmsUInt32Number *) _cmsCalloc(self ->ContextID, ElemCount, sizeof(cmsUInt32Number));
if (ElementSizes == NULL) goto Error;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, (cmsUInt16Number) inputChan)) goto Error;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, (cmsUInt16Number) outputChan)) goto Error;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt32Number(io, (cmsUInt16Number) ElemCount)) goto Error;
DirectoryPos = io ->Tell(io);
for (i=0; i < ElemCount; i++) {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt32Number(io, 0)) goto Error; // Offset
if (!_cmsWriteUInt32Number(io, 0)) goto Error; // size
}
for (i=0; i < ElemCount; i++) {
ElementOffsets[i] = io ->Tell(io) - BaseOffset;
ElementSig = Elem ->Type;
TypeHandler = GetHandler((cmsTagTypeSignature) ElementSig, MPETypePluginChunk->TagTypes, SupportedMPEtypes);
if (TypeHandler == NULL) {
char String[5];
_cmsTagSignature2String(String, (cmsTagSignature) ElementSig);
cmsSignalError(self->ContextID, cmsERROR_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION, "Found unknown MPE type '%s'", String);
goto Error;
}
if (!_cmsWriteUInt32Number(io, ElementSig)) goto Error;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt32Number(io, 0)) goto Error;
Before = io ->Tell(io);
if (!TypeHandler ->WritePtr(self, io, Elem, 1)) goto Error;
if (!_cmsWriteAlignment(io)) goto Error;
ElementSizes[i] = io ->Tell(io) - Before;
Elem = Elem ->Next;
}
CurrentPos = io ->Tell(io);
if (!io ->Seek(io, DirectoryPos)) goto Error;
for (i=0; i < ElemCount; i++) {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt32Number(io, ElementOffsets[i])) goto Error;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt32Number(io, ElementSizes[i])) goto Error;
}
if (!io ->Seek(io, CurrentPos)) goto Error;
if (ElementOffsets != NULL) _cmsFree(self ->ContextID, ElementOffsets);
if (ElementSizes != NULL) _cmsFree(self ->ContextID, ElementSizes);
return TRUE;
Error:
if (ElementOffsets != NULL) _cmsFree(self ->ContextID, ElementOffsets);
if (ElementSizes != NULL) _cmsFree(self ->ContextID, ElementSizes);
return FALSE;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(nItems);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 71,017
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FLAC_API unsigned FLAC__stream_decoder_get_sample_rate(const FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder)
{
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder);
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder->protected_);
return decoder->protected_->sample_rate;
}
Commit Message: Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 161,191
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Direct_Move( EXEC_OPS PGlyph_Zone zone,
Int point,
TT_F26Dot6 distance )
{
TT_F26Dot6 v;
v = CUR.GS.freeVector.x;
if ( v != 0 )
{
zone->cur_x[point] += MulDiv_Round( distance,
v * 0x10000L,
CUR.F_dot_P );
zone->touch[point] |= TT_Flag_Touched_X;
}
v = CUR.GS.freeVector.y;
if ( v != 0 )
{
zone->cur_y[point] += MulDiv_Round( distance,
v * 0x10000L,
CUR.F_dot_P );
zone->touch[point] |= TT_Flag_Touched_Y;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,353
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int init_hdr(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
ut8 magicbytes[4]= {0};
ut8 machohdrbytes[sizeof (struct MACH0_(mach_header))] = {0};
int len;
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, 0, magicbytes, 4) < 1) {
return false;
}
if (r_read_le32(magicbytes) == 0xfeedface) {
bin->big_endian = false;
} else if (r_read_be32(magicbytes) == 0xfeedface) {
bin->big_endian = true;
} else if (r_read_le32(magicbytes) == FAT_MAGIC) {
bin->big_endian = false;
} else if (r_read_be32(magicbytes) == FAT_MAGIC) {
bin->big_endian = true;
} else if (r_read_le32(magicbytes) == 0xfeedfacf) {
bin->big_endian = false;
} else if (r_read_be32(magicbytes) == 0xfeedfacf) {
bin->big_endian = true;
} else {
return false; // object files are magic == 0, but body is different :?
}
len = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, 0, machohdrbytes, sizeof (machohdrbytes));
if (len != sizeof (machohdrbytes)) {
bprintf ("Error: read (hdr)\n");
return false;
}
bin->hdr.magic = r_read_ble (&machohdrbytes[0], bin->big_endian, 32);
bin->hdr.cputype = r_read_ble (&machohdrbytes[4], bin->big_endian, 32);
bin->hdr.cpusubtype = r_read_ble (&machohdrbytes[8], bin->big_endian, 32);
bin->hdr.filetype = r_read_ble (&machohdrbytes[12], bin->big_endian, 32);
bin->hdr.ncmds = r_read_ble (&machohdrbytes[16], bin->big_endian, 32);
bin->hdr.sizeofcmds = r_read_ble (&machohdrbytes[20], bin->big_endian, 32);
bin->hdr.flags = r_read_ble (&machohdrbytes[24], bin->big_endian, 32);
#if R_BIN_MACH064
bin->hdr.reserved = r_read_ble (&machohdrbytes[28], bin->big_endian, 32);
#endif
sdb_set (bin->kv, "mach0_header.format",
"xxxxddx "
"magic cputype cpusubtype filetype ncmds sizeofcmds flags", 0);
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, "mach0_header.offset", 0, 0); // wat about fatmach0?
sdb_set (bin->kv, "mach_filetype.cparse", "enum mach_filetype{MH_OBJECT=1,"
"MH_EXECUTE=2, MH_FVMLIB=3, MH_CORE=4, MH_PRELOAD=5, MH_DYLIB=6,"
"MH_DYLINKER=7, MH_BUNDLE=8, MH_DYLIB_STUB=9, MH_DSYM=10,"
"MH_KEXT_BUNDLE=11}"
,0);
sdb_set (bin->kv, "mach_flags.cparse", "enum mach_flags{MH_NOUNDEFS=1,"
"MH_INCRLINK=2,MH_DYLDLINK=4,MH_BINDATLOAD=8,MH_PREBOUND=0x10,"
"MH_SPLIT_SEGS=0x20,MH_LAZY_INIT=0x40,MH_TWOLEVEL=0x80,"
"MH_FORCE_FLAT=0x100,MH_NOMULTIDEFS=0x200,MH_NOFIXPREBINDING=0x400,"
"MH_PREBINDABLE=0x800, MH_ALLMODSBOUND=0x1000,"
"MH_SUBSECTIONS_VIA_SYMBOLS=0x2000,"
"MH_CANONICAL=0x4000,MH_WEAK_DEFINES=0x8000,"
"MH_BINDS_TO_WEAK=0x10000,MH_ALLOW_STACK_EXECUTION=0x20000,"
"MH_ROOT_SAFE=0x40000,MH_SETUID_SAFE=0x80000,"
"MH_NO_REEXPORTED_DYLIBS=0x100000,MH_PIE=0x200000,"
"MH_DEAD_STRIPPABLE_DYLIB=0x400000,"
"MH_HAS_TLV_DESCRIPTORS=0x800000,"
"MH_NO_HEAP_EXECUTION=0x1000000 }",0);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 66,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gpgsm_clear_fd (engine_gpgsm_t gpgsm, fd_type_t fd_type)
{
#if !USE_DESCRIPTOR_PASSING
switch (fd_type)
{
case INPUT_FD:
_gpgme_io_close (gpgsm->input_cb.fd);
break;
case OUTPUT_FD:
_gpgme_io_close (gpgsm->output_cb.fd);
break;
case MESSAGE_FD:
_gpgme_io_close (gpgsm->message_cb.fd);
break;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mxf_absolute_bodysid_offset(MXFContext *mxf, int body_sid, int64_t offset, int64_t *offset_out, MXFPartition **partition_out)
{
MXFPartition *last_p = NULL;
int a, b, m, m0;
if (offset < 0)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
a = -1;
b = mxf->partitions_count;
while (b - a > 1) {
m0 = m = (a + b) >> 1;
while (m < b && mxf->partitions[m].body_sid != body_sid)
m++;
if (m < b && mxf->partitions[m].body_offset <= offset)
a = m;
else
b = m0;
}
if (a >= 0)
last_p = &mxf->partitions[a];
if (last_p && (!last_p->essence_length || last_p->essence_length > (offset - last_p->body_offset))) {
*offset_out = last_p->essence_offset + (offset - last_p->body_offset);
if (partition_out)
*partition_out = last_p;
return 0;
}
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"failed to find absolute offset of %"PRIX64" in BodySID %i - partial file?\n",
offset, body_sid);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix av_log context
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: mxf-crash-1c2e59bf07a34675bfb3ada5e1ec22fa9f38f923
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 74,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MYSQLND_METHOD(mysqlnd_conn_data, free_contents)(MYSQLND_CONN_DATA * conn TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_bool pers = conn->persistent;
DBG_ENTER("mysqlnd_conn_data::free_contents");
mysqlnd_local_infile_default(conn);
if (conn->current_result) {
conn->current_result->m.free_result(conn->current_result, TRUE TSRMLS_CC);
conn->current_result = NULL;
}
if (conn->net) {
conn->net->m.free_contents(conn->net TSRMLS_CC);
}
DBG_INF("Freeing memory of members");
if (conn->host) {
mnd_pefree(conn->host, pers);
conn->host = NULL;
}
if (conn->user) {
mnd_pefree(conn->user, pers);
conn->user = NULL;
}
if (conn->passwd) {
mnd_pefree(conn->passwd, pers);
conn->passwd = NULL;
}
if (conn->connect_or_select_db) {
mnd_pefree(conn->connect_or_select_db, pers);
conn->connect_or_select_db = NULL;
}
if (conn->unix_socket) {
mnd_pefree(conn->unix_socket, pers);
conn->unix_socket = NULL;
}
DBG_INF_FMT("scheme=%s", conn->scheme);
if (conn->scheme) {
mnd_pefree(conn->scheme, pers);
conn->scheme = NULL;
}
if (conn->server_version) {
mnd_pefree(conn->server_version, pers);
conn->server_version = NULL;
}
if (conn->host_info) {
mnd_pefree(conn->host_info, pers);
conn->host_info = NULL;
}
if (conn->auth_plugin_data) {
mnd_pefree(conn->auth_plugin_data, pers);
conn->auth_plugin_data = NULL;
}
if (conn->last_message) {
mnd_pefree(conn->last_message, pers);
conn->last_message = NULL;
}
if (conn->error_info->error_list) {
zend_llist_clean(conn->error_info->error_list);
mnd_pefree(conn->error_info->error_list, pers);
conn->error_info->error_list = NULL;
}
conn->charset = NULL;
conn->greet_charset = NULL;
DBG_VOID_RETURN;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 14,267
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PluginInfoMessageFilter::PluginsLoaded(
const GetPluginInfo_Params& params,
IPC::Message* reply_msg,
const std::vector<WebPluginInfo>& plugins) {
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Output output;
scoped_ptr<PluginMetadata> plugin_metadata;
if (context_.FindEnabledPlugin(params.render_view_id, params.url,
params.top_origin_url, params.mime_type,
&output.status, &output.plugin,
&output.actual_mime_type,
&plugin_metadata)) {
context_.DecidePluginStatus(params, output.plugin, plugin_metadata.get(),
&output.status);
}
if (plugin_metadata) {
output.group_identifier = plugin_metadata->identifier();
output.group_name = plugin_metadata->name();
}
context_.GrantAccess(output.status, output.plugin.path);
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg, output);
Send(reply_msg);
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 1
| 171,473
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsAgentHostImpl::InnerDetachClient(DevToolsAgentHostClient* client) {
std::unique_ptr<DevToolsSession> session =
std::move(session_by_client_[client]);
sessions_.erase(session.get());
session_by_client_.erase(client);
DetachSession(session.get());
DevToolsManager* manager = DevToolsManager::GetInstance();
if (manager->delegate())
manager->delegate()->ClientDetached(this, client);
if (sessions_.empty()) {
io_context_.DiscardAllStreams();
NotifyDetached();
}
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,757
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *dirsection(cmd_parms *cmd, void *mconfig, const char *arg)
{
const char *errmsg;
const char *endp = ap_strrchr_c(arg, '>');
int old_overrides = cmd->override;
char *old_path = cmd->path;
core_dir_config *conf;
ap_conf_vector_t *new_dir_conf = ap_create_per_dir_config(cmd->pool);
ap_regex_t *r = NULL;
const command_rec *thiscmd = cmd->cmd;
const char *err = ap_check_cmd_context(cmd, NOT_IN_DIR_LOC_FILE);
if (err != NULL) {
return err;
}
if (endp == NULL) {
return unclosed_directive(cmd);
}
arg = apr_pstrndup(cmd->temp_pool, arg, endp - arg);
if (!arg[0]) {
return missing_container_arg(cmd);
}
cmd->path = ap_getword_conf(cmd->pool, &arg);
cmd->override = OR_ALL|ACCESS_CONF;
if (!strcmp(cmd->path, "~")) {
cmd->path = ap_getword_conf(cmd->pool, &arg);
if (!cmd->path)
return "<Directory ~ > block must specify a path";
r = ap_pregcomp(cmd->pool, cmd->path, AP_REG_EXTENDED|USE_ICASE);
if (!r) {
return "Regex could not be compiled";
}
}
else if (thiscmd->cmd_data) { /* <DirectoryMatch> */
r = ap_pregcomp(cmd->pool, cmd->path, AP_REG_EXTENDED|USE_ICASE);
if (!r) {
return "Regex could not be compiled";
}
}
else if (strcmp(cmd->path, "/") != 0)
{
char *newpath;
/*
* Ensure that the pathname is canonical, and append the trailing /
*/
apr_status_t rv = apr_filepath_merge(&newpath, NULL, cmd->path,
APR_FILEPATH_TRUENAME, cmd->pool);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS && rv != APR_EPATHWILD) {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "<Directory \"", cmd->path,
"\"> path is invalid.", NULL);
}
cmd->path = newpath;
if (cmd->path[strlen(cmd->path) - 1] != '/')
cmd->path = apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, cmd->path, "/", NULL);
}
/* initialize our config and fetch it */
conf = ap_set_config_vectors(cmd->server, new_dir_conf, cmd->path,
&core_module, cmd->pool);
errmsg = ap_walk_config(cmd->directive->first_child, cmd, new_dir_conf);
if (errmsg != NULL)
return errmsg;
conf->r = r;
conf->d = cmd->path;
conf->d_is_fnmatch = (apr_fnmatch_test(conf->d) != 0);
if (r) {
conf->refs = apr_array_make(cmd->pool, 8, sizeof(char *));
ap_regname(r, conf->refs, AP_REG_MATCH, 1);
}
/* Make this explicit - the "/" root has 0 elements, that is, we
* will always merge it, and it will always sort and merge first.
* All others are sorted and tested by the number of slashes.
*/
if (strcmp(conf->d, "/") == 0)
conf->d_components = 0;
else
conf->d_components = ap_count_dirs(conf->d);
ap_add_per_dir_conf(cmd->server, new_dir_conf);
if (*arg != '\0') {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "Multiple ", thiscmd->name,
"> arguments not (yet) supported.", NULL);
}
cmd->path = old_path;
cmd->override = old_overrides;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 64,238
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ovl_path_lower(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path)
{
struct ovl_fs *ofs = dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info;
struct ovl_entry *oe = dentry->d_fsdata;
path->mnt = ofs->lower_mnt;
path->dentry = oe->lowerdentry;
}
Commit Message: fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 74,597
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: report_broken_symbolic_link (GtkWindow *parent_window,
NautilusFile *file)
{
char *target_path;
char *display_name;
char *prompt;
char *detail;
GtkDialog *dialog;
GList file_as_list;
int response;
gboolean can_trash;
g_assert (nautilus_file_is_broken_symbolic_link (file));
display_name = nautilus_file_get_display_name (file);
can_trash = nautilus_file_can_trash (file) && !nautilus_file_is_in_trash (file);
if (can_trash)
{
prompt = g_strdup_printf (_("The link “%s” is broken. Move it to Trash?"), display_name);
}
else
{
prompt = g_strdup_printf (_("The link “%s” is broken."), display_name);
}
g_free (display_name);
target_path = nautilus_file_get_symbolic_link_target_path (file);
if (target_path == NULL)
{
detail = g_strdup (_("This link cannot be used because it has no target."));
}
else
{
detail = g_strdup_printf (_("This link cannot be used because its target "
"“%s” doesn’t exist."), target_path);
}
if (!can_trash)
{
eel_run_simple_dialog (GTK_WIDGET (parent_window), FALSE, GTK_MESSAGE_WARNING,
prompt, detail, _("_Cancel"), NULL);
goto out;
}
dialog = eel_show_yes_no_dialog (prompt, detail, _("Mo_ve to Trash"), _("_Cancel"),
parent_window);
gtk_dialog_set_default_response (dialog, GTK_RESPONSE_CANCEL);
/* Make this modal to avoid problems with reffing the view & file
* to keep them around in case the view changes, which would then
* cause the old view not to be destroyed, which would cause its
* merged Bonobo items not to be un-merged. Maybe we need to unmerge
* explicitly when disconnecting views instead of relying on the
* unmerge in Destroy. But since BonoboUIHandler is probably going
* to change wildly, I don't want to mess with this now.
*/
response = gtk_dialog_run (dialog);
gtk_widget_destroy (GTK_WIDGET (dialog));
if (response == GTK_RESPONSE_YES)
{
file_as_list.data = file;
file_as_list.next = NULL;
file_as_list.prev = NULL;
trash_or_delete_files (parent_window, &file_as_list, TRUE);
}
out:
g_free (prompt);
g_free (target_path);
g_free (detail);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,215
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dalvik_disassemble (RAsm *a, RAsmOp *op, const ut8 *buf, int len) {
int vA, vB, vC, payload = 0, i = (int) buf[0];
int size = dalvik_opcodes[i].len;
char str[1024], *strasm;
ut64 offset;
const char *flag_str;
op->buf_asm[0] = 0;
if (buf[0] == 0x00) { /* nop */
switch (buf[1]) {
case 0x01: /* packed-switch-payload */
{
unsigned short array_size = buf[2] | (buf[3] << 8);
int first_key = buf[4] | (buf[5] << 8) | (buf[6] << 16) | (buf[7] << 24);
sprintf (op->buf_asm, "packed-switch-payload %d, %d", array_size, first_key);
size = 8;
payload = 2 * (array_size * 2);
len = 0;
}
break;
case 0x02: /* sparse-switch-payload */
{
unsigned short array_size = buf[2] | (buf[3] << 8);
sprintf (op->buf_asm, "sparse-switch-payload %d", array_size);
size = 4;
payload = 2 * (array_size*4);
len = 0;
}
break;
case 0x03: /* fill-array-data-payload */
if (len > 7) {
unsigned short elem_width = buf[2] | (buf[3] << 8);
unsigned int array_size = buf[4] | (buf[5] << 8) | (buf[6] << 16) | (buf[7] << 24);
snprintf (op->buf_asm, sizeof (op->buf_asm),
"fill-array-data-payload %d, %d",
elem_width, array_size);
payload = 2 * ((array_size * elem_width+1)/2);
}
size = 8;
len = 0;
break;
default:
/* nop */
break;
}
}
strasm = NULL;
if (size <= len) {
strncpy (op->buf_asm, dalvik_opcodes[i].name, sizeof (op->buf_asm) - 1);
strasm = strdup (op->buf_asm);
size = dalvik_opcodes[i].len;
switch (dalvik_opcodes[i].fmt) {
case fmtop: break;
case fmtopvAvB:
vA = buf[1] & 0x0f;
vB = (buf[1] & 0xf0) >> 4;
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i", vA, vB);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAAvBBBB:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i", vA, vB);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAAAAvBBBB: // buf[1] seems useless :/
vA = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
vB = (buf[5] << 8) | buf[4];
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i", vA, vB);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAA:
vA = (int) buf[1];
sprintf (str, " v%i", vA);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAcB:
vA = buf[1] & 0x0f;
vB = (buf[1] & 0xf0) >> 4;
sprintf (str, " v%i, %#x", vA, vB);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAAcBBBB:
vA = (int) buf[1];
{
short sB = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
sprintf (str, " v%i, %#04hx", vA, sB);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
}
break;
case fmtopvAAcBBBBBBBB:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = buf[2] | (buf[3] << 8) | (buf[4] << 16) | (buf[5] << 24);
if (buf[0] == 0x17) { //const-wide/32
snprintf (str, sizeof (str), " v%i:v%i, 0x%08x", vA, vA + 1, vB);
} else { //const
snprintf (str, sizeof (str), " v%i, 0x%08x", vA, vB);
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAAcBBBB0000:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = 0 | (buf[2] << 16) | (buf[3] << 24);
if (buf[0] == 0x19) { // const-wide/high16
snprintf (str, sizeof (str), " v%i:v%i, 0x%08x", vA, vA + 1, vB);
} else {
snprintf (str, sizeof (str), " v%i, 0x%08x", vA, vB);
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAAcBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB:
vA = (int) buf[1];
#define llint long long int
llint lB = (llint)buf[2] | ((llint)buf[3] << 8)|
((llint)buf[4] << 16) | ((llint)buf[5] << 24)|
((llint)buf[6] << 32) | ((llint)buf[7] << 40)|
((llint)buf[8] << 48) | ((llint)buf[9] << 56);
#undef llint
sprintf (str, " v%i:v%i, 0x%"PFMT64x, vA, vA + 1, lB);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAAvBBvCC:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (int) buf[2];
vC = (int) buf[3];
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i, v%i", vA, vB, vC);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAAvBBcCC:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (int) buf[2];
vC = (int) buf[3];
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i, %#x", vA, vB, vC);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAvBcCCCC:
vA = buf[1] & 0x0f;
vB = (buf[1] & 0xf0) >> 4;
vC = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i, %#x", vA, vB, vC);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtoppAA:
vA = (char) buf[1];
snprintf (str, sizeof (str), " 0x%08"PFMT64x, a->pc + (vA * 2)); // vA : word -> byte
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtoppAAAA:
vA = (short) (buf[3] << 8 | buf[2]);
snprintf (str, sizeof (str), " 0x%08"PFMT64x, a->pc + (vA * 2)); // vA : word -> byte
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAApBBBB: // if-*z
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (int) (buf[3] << 8 | buf[2]);
snprintf (str, sizeof (str), " v%i, 0x%08"PFMT64x, vA, a->pc + (vB * 2));
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtoppAAAAAAAA:
vA = (int) (buf[2] | (buf[3] << 8) | (buf[4] << 16) | (buf[5] << 24));
snprintf (str, sizeof (str), " 0x%08"PFMT64x, a->pc + (vA*2)); // vA : word -> byte
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAvBpCCCC: // if-*
vA = buf[1] & 0x0f;
vB = (buf[1] & 0xf0) >> 4;
vC = (int) (buf[3] << 8 | buf[2]);
snprintf (str, sizeof (str)," v%i, v%i, 0x%08"PFMT64x, vA, vB, a->pc + (vC * 2));
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAApBBBBBBBB:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (int) (buf[2] | (buf[3] << 8) | (buf[4] << 16) | (buf[5] << 24));
snprintf (str, sizeof (str), " v%i, 0x%08"PFMT64x, vA, a->pc + vB); // + (vB*2));
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtoptinlineI:
vA = (int) (buf[1] & 0x0f);
vB = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
*str = 0;
switch (vA) {
case 1:
sprintf (str, " {v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f);
break;
case 2:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f, (buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4);
break;
case 3:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f, (buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4, buf[5] & 0x0f);
break;
case 4:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i, v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f,
(buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4, buf[5] & 0x0f, (buf[5] & 0xf0) >> 4);
break;
default:
sprintf (str, " {}");
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
sprintf (str, ", [%04x]", vB);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtoptinlineIR:
case fmtoptinvokeVSR:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
vC = (buf[5] << 8) | buf[4];
sprintf (str, " {v%i..v%i}, [%04x]", vC, vC + vA - 1, vB);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtoptinvokeVS:
vA = (int) (buf[1] & 0xf0) >> 4;
vB = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
switch (vA) {
case 1:
sprintf (str, " {v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f);
break;
case 2:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f, (buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4);
break;
case 3:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f,
(buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4, buf[5] & 0x0f);
break;
case 4:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i, v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f,
(buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4, buf[5] & 0x0f, (buf[5] & 0xf0) >> 4);
break;
default:
sprintf (str, " {}");
break;
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
sprintf (str, ", [%04x]", vB);
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAAtBBBB: // "sput-*"
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
if (buf[0] == 0x1a) {
offset = R_ASM_GET_OFFSET (a, 's', vB);
if (offset == -1) {
sprintf (str, " v%i, string+%i", vA, vB);
} else {
sprintf (str, " v%i, 0x%"PFMT64x, vA, offset);
}
} else if (buf[0] == 0x1c || buf[0] == 0x1f || buf[0] == 0x22) {
flag_str = R_ASM_GET_NAME (a, 'c', vB);
if (!flag_str) {
sprintf (str, " v%i, class+%i", vA, vB);
} else {
sprintf (str, " v%i, %s", vA, flag_str);
}
} else {
flag_str = R_ASM_GET_NAME (a, 'f', vB);
if (!flag_str) {
sprintf (str, " v%i, field+%i", vA, vB);
} else {
sprintf (str, " v%i, %s", vA, flag_str);
}
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtoptopvAvBoCCCC:
vA = (buf[1] & 0x0f);
vB = (buf[1] & 0xf0) >> 4;
vC = (buf[3]<<8) | buf[2];
offset = R_ASM_GET_OFFSET (a, 'o', vC);
if (offset == -1) {
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i, [obj+%04x]", vA, vB, vC);
} else {
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i, [0x%"PFMT64x"]", vA, vB, offset);
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopAAtBBBB:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
offset = R_ASM_GET_OFFSET (a, 't', vB);
if (offset == -1) {
sprintf (str, " v%i, thing+%i", vA, vB);
} else {
sprintf (str, " v%i, 0x%"PFMT64x, vA, offset);
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAvBtCCCC:
vA = (buf[1] & 0x0f);
vB = (buf[1] & 0xf0) >> 4;
vC = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
if (buf[0] == 0x20 || buf[0] == 0x23) { //instance-of & new-array
flag_str = R_ASM_GET_NAME (a, 'c', vC);
if (flag_str) {
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i, %s", vA, vB, flag_str);
}
else {
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i, class+%i", vA, vB, vC);
}
} else {
flag_str = R_ASM_GET_NAME (a, 'f', vC);
if (flag_str) {
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i, %s", vA, vB, flag_str);
}
else {
sprintf (str, " v%i, v%i, field+%i", vA, vB, vC);
}
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvAAtBBBBBBBB:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (int) (buf[5] | (buf[4] << 8) | (buf[3] << 16) | (buf[2] << 24));
offset = R_ASM_GET_OFFSET (a, 's', vB);
if (offset == -1) {
sprintf (str, " v%i, string+%i", vA, vB);
}
else {
sprintf (str, " v%i, 0x%"PFMT64x, vA, offset);
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvCCCCmBBBB:
vA = (int) buf[1];
vB = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
vC = (buf[5] << 8) | buf[4];
if (buf[0] == 0x25) { // filled-new-array/range
flag_str = R_ASM_GET_NAME (a, 'c', vB);
if (flag_str) {
sprintf (str, " {v%i..v%i}, %s", vC, vC + vA - 1, flag_str);
}
else {
sprintf (str, " {v%i..v%i}, class+%i", vC, vC + vA - 1, vB);
}
} else {
flag_str = R_ASM_GET_NAME (a, 'm', vB);
if (flag_str) {
sprintf (str, " {v%i..v%i}, %s", vC, vC + vA - 1, flag_str);
}
else {
sprintf (str, " {v%i..v%i}, method+%i", vC, vC + vA - 1, vB);
}
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtopvXtBBBB:
vA = (int) (buf[1] & 0xf0) >> 4;
vB = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
switch (vA) {
case 1:
sprintf (str, " {v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f);
break;
case 2:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f, (buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4);
break;
case 3:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f,
(buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4, buf[5] & 0x0f);
break;
case 4:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i, v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f,
(buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4, buf[5] & 0x0f, (buf[5] & 0xf0) >> 4);
break;
case 5:
sprintf (str, " {v%i, v%i, v%i, v%i, v%i}", buf[4] & 0x0f,
(buf[4] & 0xf0) >> 4, buf[5] & 0x0f, (buf[5] & 0xf0) >> 4, buf[1] & 0x0f); // TOODO: recheck this
break;
default:
sprintf (str, " {}");
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
if (buf[0] == 0x24) { // filled-new-array
flag_str = R_ASM_GET_NAME (a, 'c', vB);
if (flag_str) {
sprintf (str, ", %s ; 0x%x", flag_str, vB);
} else {
sprintf (str, ", class+%i", vB);
}
} else {
flag_str = R_ASM_GET_NAME (a, 'm', vB);
if (flag_str) {
sprintf (str, ", %s ; 0x%x", flag_str, vB);
} else {
sprintf (str, ", method+%i", vB);
}
}
strasm = r_str_concat (strasm, str);
break;
case fmtoptinvokeI: // Any opcode has this formats
case fmtoptinvokeIR:
case fmt00:
default:
strcpy (op->buf_asm, "invalid ");
free (strasm);
strasm = NULL;
size = 2;
}
if (strasm) {
strncpy (op->buf_asm, strasm, sizeof (op->buf_asm) - 1);
op->buf_asm[sizeof (op->buf_asm) - 1] = 0;
} else {
strcpy (op->buf_asm , "invalid");
}
} else if (len > 0) {
strcpy (op->buf_asm, "invalid ");
op->size = len;
size = len;
}
op->payload = payload;
size += payload; // XXX
op->size = size;
free (strasm);
return size;
}
Commit Message: Fix #6885 - oob write in dalvik_disassemble
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 168,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int rose_validate_nr(struct sock *sk, unsigned short nr)
{
struct rose_sock *rose = rose_sk(sk);
unsigned short vc = rose->va;
while (vc != rose->vs) {
if (nr == vc) return 1;
vc = (vc + 1) % ROSE_MODULUS;
}
return nr == rose->vs;
}
Commit Message: ROSE: prevent heap corruption with bad facilities
When parsing the FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS facilities field, it's possible for
a remote host to provide more digipeaters than expected, resulting in
heap corruption. Check against ROSE_MAX_DIGIS to prevent overflows, and
abort facilities parsing on failure.
Additionally, when parsing the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and
FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP facilities fields, a remote host can provide a length
of less than 10, resulting in an underflow in a memcpy size, causing a
kernel panic due to massive heap corruption. A length of greater than
20 results in a stack overflow of the callsign array. Abort facilities
parsing on these invalid length values.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static VP56Frame ref_to_update(VP8Context *s, int update, VP56Frame ref)
{
VP56RangeCoder *c = &s->c;
if (update)
return VP56_FRAME_CURRENT;
switch (vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 2)) {
case 1:
return VP56_FRAME_PREVIOUS;
case 2:
return (ref == VP56_FRAME_GOLDEN) ? VP56_FRAME_GOLDEN2 : VP56_FRAME_GOLDEN;
}
return VP56_FRAME_NONE;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FrameImpl::FrameImpl(std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> web_contents,
chromium::web::FrameObserverPtr observer)
: web_contents_(std::move(web_contents)), observer_(std::move(observer)) {
Observe(web_contents.get());
}
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 172,152
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RetrieveAllCookiesOnIO(
net::URLRequestContextGetter* context_getter) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
callback_count_ = 1;
net::URLRequestContext* request_context =
context_getter->GetURLRequestContext();
request_context->cookie_store()->GetAllCookiesAsync(
base::BindOnce(&CookieRetriever::GotCookies, this));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,531
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::Size OmniboxViewViews::GetMinimumSize() const {
const int kMinCharacters = 10;
return gfx::Size(
GetFontList().GetExpectedTextWidth(kMinCharacters) + GetInsets().width(),
GetPreferredSize().height());
}
Commit Message: Strip JavaScript schemas on Linux text drop
When dropping text onto the Omnibox, any leading JavaScript schemes
should be stripped to avoid a "self-XSS" attack. This stripping already
occurs in all cases except when plaintext is dropped on Linux. This CL
corrects that oversight.
Bug: 768910
Change-Id: I43af24ace4a13cf61d15a32eb9382dcdd498a062
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/685638
Reviewed-by: Justin Donnelly <jdonnelly@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#504695}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 150,622
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dissect_rpcap_sampling_request (tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_,
proto_tree *parent_tree, gint offset)
{
proto_tree *tree;
proto_item *ti;
guint32 value;
guint8 method;
ti = proto_tree_add_item (parent_tree, hf_sampling_request, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
tree = proto_item_add_subtree (ti, ett_sampling_request);
method = tvb_get_guint8 (tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_sampling_method, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_sampling_dummy1, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_sampling_dummy2, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
value = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_sampling_value, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
switch (method) {
case RPCAP_SAMP_NOSAMP:
proto_item_append_text (ti, ": None");
break;
case RPCAP_SAMP_1_EVERY_N:
proto_item_append_text (ti, ": 1 every %d", value);
break;
case RPCAP_SAMP_FIRST_AFTER_N_MS:
proto_item_append_text (ti, ": First after %d ms", value);
break;
default:
break;
}
return offset;
}
Commit Message: The WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET dissector needs to be passed a struct eth_phdr.
We now require that. Make it so.
Bug: 12440
Change-Id: Iffee520976b013800699bde3c6092a3e86be0d76
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15424
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 51,757
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lua_ap_strcmp_match(lua_State *L)
{
int returnValue;
const char *str;
const char *expected;
int ignoreCase = 0;
luaL_checktype(L, 1, LUA_TSTRING);
str = lua_tostring(L, 1);
luaL_checktype(L, 2, LUA_TSTRING);
expected = lua_tostring(L, 2);
if (lua_isboolean(L, 3))
ignoreCase = lua_toboolean(L, 3);
if (!ignoreCase)
returnValue = ap_strcmp_match(str, expected);
else
returnValue = ap_strcasecmp_match(str, expected);
lua_pushboolean(L, (!returnValue));
return 1;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 45,088
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint64_t GetVint(BitReader* reader) {
if (reader->bits_available() >= 8) {
int num_bits_to_read = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
num_bits_to_read += 7;
if (ReadBits(reader, 1) == 1) {
if (reader->bits_available() < num_bits_to_read)
break;
return ReadBits(reader, num_bits_to_read);
}
}
}
return (reader->bits_available() / 8) + 2;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by adtolbar@microsoft.com.
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <chcunningham@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _dbus_lookup_session_address (dbus_bool_t *supported,
DBusString *address,
DBusError *error)
{
/* Probably fill this in with something based on COM? */
*supported = FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,806
|
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