instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t lbs_rdbbp_write(struct file *file,
const char __user *userbuf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct lbs_private *priv = file->private_data;
ssize_t res, buf_size;
unsigned long addr = get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
char *buf = (char *)addr;
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
buf_size = min(count, len - 1);
if (copy_from_user(buf, userbuf, buf_size)) {
res = -EFAULT;
goto out_unlock;
}
priv->bbp_offset = simple_strtoul(buf, NULL, 16);
res = count;
out_unlock:
free_page(addr);
return res;
}
Commit Message: libertas: potential oops in debugfs
If we do a zero size allocation then it will oops. Also we can't be
sure the user passes us a NUL terminated string so I've added a
terminator.
This code can only be triggered by root.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dcbw@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 9,947
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniformMatrix2x3fv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
GLboolean transpose,
MaybeShared<DOMFloat32Array> value,
GLuint src_offset,
GLuint src_length) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateUniformMatrixParameters(
"uniformMatrix2x3fv", location, transpose,
value.View(), 6, src_offset, src_length))
return;
ContextGL()->UniformMatrix2x3fv(
location->Location(),
(src_length ? src_length : (value.View()->length() - src_offset)) / 6,
transpose, value.View()->DataMaybeShared() + src_offset);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLvoid StubGLReadPixels(GLint x, GLint y, GLsizei width, GLsizei height,
GLenum format, GLenum type, void* pixels) {
glReadPixels(x, y, width, height, format, type, pixels);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 13,212
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr TIFFReadDirEntrySlongArray(TIFF* tif, TIFFDirEntry* direntry, int32** value)
{
enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr err;
uint32 count;
void* origdata;
int32* data;
switch (direntry->tdir_type)
{
case TIFF_BYTE:
case TIFF_SBYTE:
case TIFF_SHORT:
case TIFF_SSHORT:
case TIFF_LONG:
case TIFF_SLONG:
case TIFF_LONG8:
case TIFF_SLONG8:
break;
default:
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrType);
}
err=TIFFReadDirEntryArray(tif,direntry,&count,4,&origdata);
if ((err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)||(origdata==0))
{
*value=0;
return(err);
}
switch (direntry->tdir_type)
{
case TIFF_LONG:
{
uint32* m;
uint32 n;
m=(uint32*)origdata;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
{
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabLong((uint32*)m);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeSlongLong(*m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
{
_TIFFfree(origdata);
return(err);
}
m++;
}
*value=(int32*)origdata;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
case TIFF_SLONG:
*value=(int32*)origdata;
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabArrayOfLong((uint32*)(*value),count);
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
data=(int32*)_TIFFmalloc(count*4);
if (data==0)
{
_TIFFfree(origdata);
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrAlloc);
}
switch (direntry->tdir_type)
{
case TIFF_BYTE:
{
uint8* ma;
int32* mb;
uint32 n;
ma=(uint8*)origdata;
mb=data;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
*mb++=(int32)(*ma++);
}
break;
case TIFF_SBYTE:
{
int8* ma;
int32* mb;
uint32 n;
ma=(int8*)origdata;
mb=data;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
*mb++=(int32)(*ma++);
}
break;
case TIFF_SHORT:
{
uint16* ma;
int32* mb;
uint32 n;
ma=(uint16*)origdata;
mb=data;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
{
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabShort(ma);
*mb++=(int32)(*ma++);
}
}
break;
case TIFF_SSHORT:
{
int16* ma;
int32* mb;
uint32 n;
ma=(int16*)origdata;
mb=data;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
{
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabShort((uint16*)ma);
*mb++=(int32)(*ma++);
}
}
break;
case TIFF_LONG8:
{
uint64* ma;
int32* mb;
uint32 n;
ma=(uint64*)origdata;
mb=data;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
{
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabLong8(ma);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeSlongLong8(*ma);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
break;
*mb++=(int32)(*ma++);
}
}
break;
case TIFF_SLONG8:
{
int64* ma;
int32* mb;
uint32 n;
ma=(int64*)origdata;
mb=data;
for (n=0; n<count; n++)
{
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
TIFFSwabLong8((uint64*)ma);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeSlongSlong8(*ma);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
break;
*mb++=(int32)(*ma++);
}
}
break;
}
_TIFFfree(origdata);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
{
_TIFFfree(data);
return(err);
}
*value=data;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 24,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandler::OnModifyTransceivers(
std::vector<RtpTransceiverState> transceiver_states,
bool is_remote_description) {
DCHECK_EQ(configuration_.sdp_semantics, webrtc::SdpSemantics::kUnifiedPlan);
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<blink::WebRTCRtpTransceiver>> web_transceivers(
transceiver_states.size());
PeerConnectionTracker::TransceiverUpdatedReason update_reason =
!is_remote_description ? PeerConnectionTracker::TransceiverUpdatedReason::
kSetLocalDescription
: PeerConnectionTracker::TransceiverUpdatedReason::
kSetRemoteDescription;
for (size_t i = 0; i < transceiver_states.size(); ++i) {
uintptr_t transceiver_id = RTCRtpTransceiver::GetId(
transceiver_states[i].webrtc_transceiver().get());
auto it = FindTransceiver(transceiver_id);
bool transceiver_is_new = (it == rtp_transceivers_.end());
bool transceiver_was_modified = false;
if (!transceiver_is_new) {
const auto& previous_state = (*it)->state();
transceiver_was_modified =
previous_state.mid() != transceiver_states[i].mid() ||
previous_state.stopped() != transceiver_states[i].stopped() ||
previous_state.direction() != transceiver_states[i].direction() ||
previous_state.current_direction() !=
transceiver_states[i].current_direction();
}
web_transceivers[i] =
CreateOrUpdateTransceiver(std::move(transceiver_states[i]));
if (peer_connection_tracker_ &&
(transceiver_is_new || transceiver_was_modified)) {
size_t transceiver_index = GetTransceiverIndex(*web_transceivers[i]);
if (transceiver_is_new) {
peer_connection_tracker_->TrackAddTransceiver(
this, update_reason, *web_transceivers[i].get(), transceiver_index);
} else if (transceiver_was_modified) {
peer_connection_tracker_->TrackModifyTransceiver(
this, update_reason, *web_transceivers[i].get(), transceiver_index);
}
}
}
if (!is_closed_) {
client_->DidModifyTransceivers(std::move(web_transceivers),
is_remote_description);
}
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 12,833
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int TabStrip::UpdateIdealBoundsForPinnedTabs(int* first_non_pinned_index) {
layout_helper_->UpdateIdealBoundsForPinnedTabs(&tabs_);
if (first_non_pinned_index)
*first_non_pinned_index = layout_helper_->first_non_pinned_tab_index();
return layout_helper_->first_non_pinned_tab_x();
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gplotSimple1(NUMA *na,
l_int32 outformat,
const char *outroot,
const char *title)
{
return gplotSimpleXY1(NULL, na, GPLOT_LINES, outformat, outroot, title);
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int btrfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
umode_t mode, bool excl)
{
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(dir)->root;
struct inode *inode = NULL;
int drop_inode_on_err = 0;
int err;
u64 objectid;
u64 index = 0;
/*
* 2 for inode item and ref
* 2 for dir items
* 1 for xattr if selinux is on
*/
trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 5);
if (IS_ERR(trans))
return PTR_ERR(trans);
err = btrfs_find_free_ino(root, &objectid);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
inode = btrfs_new_inode(trans, root, dir, dentry->d_name.name,
dentry->d_name.len, btrfs_ino(dir), objectid,
mode, &index);
if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
err = PTR_ERR(inode);
goto out_unlock;
}
drop_inode_on_err = 1;
err = btrfs_init_inode_security(trans, inode, dir, &dentry->d_name);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
err = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, inode);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
/*
* If the active LSM wants to access the inode during
* d_instantiate it needs these. Smack checks to see
* if the filesystem supports xattrs by looking at the
* ops vector.
*/
inode->i_fop = &btrfs_file_operations;
inode->i_op = &btrfs_file_inode_operations;
err = btrfs_add_nondir(trans, dir, dentry, inode, 0, index);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &btrfs_aops;
inode->i_mapping->backing_dev_info = &root->fs_info->bdi;
BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree.ops = &btrfs_extent_io_ops;
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
out_unlock:
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
if (err && drop_inode_on_err) {
inode_dec_link_count(inode);
iput(inode);
}
btrfs_btree_balance_dirty(root);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 17,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UserInitiatedInfo CreateUserInitiatedInfo(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle,
PageLoadTracker* committed_load) {
if (!navigation_handle->IsRendererInitiated())
return UserInitiatedInfo::BrowserInitiated();
return UserInitiatedInfo::RenderInitiated(
navigation_handle->HasUserGesture());
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 1
| 26,030
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: store_tabletToolMode(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t count)
{
struct aiptek *aiptek = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
int new_mode = map_str_to_val(tool_mode_map, buf, count);
if (new_mode == AIPTEK_INVALID_VALUE)
return -EINVAL;
aiptek->newSetting.toolMode = new_mode;
return count;
}
Commit Message: Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk)
{
if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL)
return -1;
switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
default:
return -1;
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
#endif
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 17,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::MaybeCopyDisableWebRtcEncryptionSwitch(
base::CommandLine* to_command_line,
const base::CommandLine& from_command_line,
version_info::Channel channel) {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
const version_info::Channel kMaxDisableEncryptionChannel =
version_info::Channel::BETA;
#else
const version_info::Channel kMaxDisableEncryptionChannel =
version_info::Channel::DEV;
#endif
if (channel <= kMaxDisableEncryptionChannel) {
static const char* const kWebRtcDevSwitchNames[] = {
switches::kDisableWebRtcEncryption,
};
to_command_line->CopySwitchesFrom(from_command_line,
kWebRtcDevSwitchNames,
arraysize(kWebRtcDevSwitchNames));
}
}
Commit Message: service worker: Make navigate/openWindow go through more security checks.
WindowClient.navigate() and Clients.openWindow() were implemented in
a way that directly navigated to the URL without going through
some checks that the normal navigation path goes through. This CL
attempts to fix that:
- WindowClient.navigate() now goes through Navigator::RequestOpenURL()
instead of directly through WebContents::OpenURL().
- Clients.openWindow() now calls more ContentBrowserClient functions
for manipulating the navigation before invoking
ContentBrowserClient::OpenURL().
Bug: 904219
Change-Id: Ic38978aee98c09834fdbbc240164068faa3fd4f5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1345686
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610753}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 25,594
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LoadingPredictor::CancelPageLoadHint(const GURL& url) {
if (shutdown_)
return;
CancelActiveHint(active_hints_.find(url));
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int core_pre_config(apr_pool_t *pconf, apr_pool_t *plog, apr_pool_t *ptemp)
{
ap_mutex_init(pconf);
if (!saved_server_config_defines)
init_config_defines(pconf);
apr_pool_cleanup_register(pconf, NULL, reset_config_defines,
apr_pool_cleanup_null);
mpm_common_pre_config(pconf);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,500
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void release_tty(struct tty_struct *tty, int idx)
{
/* This should always be true but check for the moment */
WARN_ON(tty->index != idx);
WARN_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&tty_mutex));
if (tty->ops->shutdown)
tty->ops->shutdown(tty);
tty_free_termios(tty);
tty_driver_remove_tty(tty->driver, tty);
tty->port->itty = NULL;
if (tty->link)
tty->link->port->itty = NULL;
tty_buffer_cancel_work(tty->port);
tty_kref_put(tty->link);
tty_kref_put(tty);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 14,913
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void udp4_hwcsum(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 src, __be32 dst)
{
struct udphdr *uh = udp_hdr(skb);
struct sk_buff *frags = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list;
int offset = skb_transport_offset(skb);
int len = skb->len - offset;
int hlen = len;
__wsum csum = 0;
if (!frags) {
/*
* Only one fragment on the socket.
*/
skb->csum_start = skb_transport_header(skb) - skb->head;
skb->csum_offset = offsetof(struct udphdr, check);
uh->check = ~csum_tcpudp_magic(src, dst, len,
IPPROTO_UDP, 0);
} else {
/*
* HW-checksum won't work as there are two or more
* fragments on the socket so that all csums of sk_buffs
* should be together
*/
do {
csum = csum_add(csum, frags->csum);
hlen -= frags->len;
} while ((frags = frags->next));
csum = skb_checksum(skb, offset, hlen, csum);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
uh->check = csum_tcpudp_magic(src, dst, len, IPPROTO_UDP, csum);
if (uh->check == 0)
uh->check = CSUM_MANGLED_0;
}
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 5,580
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::RendererExited(base::TerminationStatus status,
int exit_code) {
if (!renderer_initialized_)
return;
renderer_initialized_ = false;
waiting_for_screen_rects_ack_ = false;
suppress_next_char_events_ = false;
ResetSizeAndRepaintPendingFlags();
current_size_.SetSize(0, 0);
if (!is_hidden_) {
process_->WidgetHidden();
is_hidden_ = true;
}
in_flight_event_count_ = 0;
StopHangMonitorTimeout();
if (view_) {
view_->RenderProcessGone(status, exit_code);
view_.reset(); // The View should be deleted by RenderProcessGone.
}
input_router_.reset(new InputRouterImpl(
process_, this, this, routing_id_, GetInputRouterConfigForPlatform()));
synthetic_gesture_controller_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,369
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetClipboardText(ui::ClipboardType type, const std::string& text) {
ui::ScopedClipboardWriter(type).WriteText(ASCIIToUTF16(text));
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 16,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void map_page(uint8_t **ptr, uint64_t addr, uint32_t wanted)
{
hwaddr len = wanted;
if (*ptr) {
cpu_physical_memory_unmap(*ptr, len, 1, len);
}
*ptr = cpu_physical_memory_map(addr, &len, 1);
if (len < wanted) {
cpu_physical_memory_unmap(*ptr, len, 1, len);
*ptr = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 104
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: archive_read_support_format_zip_capabilities_seekable(struct archive_read * a)
{
(void)a; /* UNUSED */
return (ARCHIVE_READ_FORMAT_CAPS_ENCRYPT_DATA |
ARCHIVE_READ_FORMAT_CAPS_ENCRYPT_METADATA);
}
Commit Message: Issue #656: Fix CVE-2016-1541, VU#862384
When reading OS X metadata entries in Zip archives that were stored
without compression, libarchive would use the uncompressed entry size
to allocate a buffer but would use the compressed entry size to limit
the amount of data copied into that buffer. Since the compressed
and uncompressed sizes are provided by data in the archive itself,
an attacker could manipulate these values to write data beyond
the end of the allocated buffer.
This fix provides three new checks to guard against such
manipulation and to make libarchive generally more robust when
handling this type of entry:
1. If an OS X metadata entry is stored without compression,
abort the entire archive if the compressed and uncompressed
data sizes do not match.
2. When sanity-checking the size of an OS X metadata entry,
abort this entry if either the compressed or uncompressed
size is larger than 4MB.
3. When copying data into the allocated buffer, check the copy
size against both the compressed entry size and uncompressed
entry size.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::allowObjectFromSource(
const KURL& url,
RedirectStatus redirectStatus,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reportingPolicy) const {
return isAllowedByAll<&CSPDirectiveList::allowObjectFromSource>(
m_policies, url, redirectStatus, reportingPolicy);
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 25,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IW_IMPL(int) iw_is_input_fmt_supported(int fmt)
{
switch(fmt) {
#if IW_SUPPORT_PNG == 1
case IW_FORMAT_PNG:
#endif
#if IW_SUPPORT_JPEG == 1
case IW_FORMAT_JPEG:
#endif
#if IW_SUPPORT_WEBP == 1
case IW_FORMAT_WEBP:
#endif
case IW_FORMAT_MIFF:
case IW_FORMAT_GIF:
case IW_FORMAT_BMP:
case IW_FORMAT_PNM:
case IW_FORMAT_PAM:
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682
| 0
| 4,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dotraplinkage void do_coprocessor_error(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_is_watching(), "entry code didn't wake RCU");
math_error(regs, error_code, X86_TRAP_MF);
}
Commit Message: x86/entry/64: Don't use IST entry for #BP stack
There's nothing IST-worthy about #BP/int3. We don't allow kprobes
in the small handful of places in the kernel that run at CPL0 with
an invalid stack, and 32-bit kernels have used normal interrupt
gates for #BP forever.
Furthermore, we don't allow kprobes in places that have usergs while
in kernel mode, so "paranoid" is also unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 21,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContainerNode::insertBeforeCommon(Node* nextChild, Node* newChild)
{
ASSERT(newChild);
ASSERT(!newChild->parentNode()); // Use insertBefore if you need to handle reparenting (and want DOM mutation events).
ASSERT(!newChild->nextSibling());
ASSERT(!newChild->previousSibling());
ASSERT(!newChild->isShadowRoot());
forbidEventDispatch();
Node* prev = nextChild->previousSibling();
ASSERT(m_lastChild != prev);
nextChild->setPreviousSibling(newChild);
if (prev) {
ASSERT(m_firstChild != nextChild);
ASSERT(prev->nextSibling() == nextChild);
prev->setNextSibling(newChild);
} else {
ASSERT(m_firstChild == nextChild);
m_firstChild = newChild;
}
newChild->setParentOrHostNode(this);
newChild->setPreviousSibling(prev);
newChild->setNextSibling(nextChild);
allowEventDispatch();
}
Commit Message: https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93587
Node::replaceChild() can create bad DOM topology with MutationEvent, Part 2
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
Source/WebCore:
This is a followup of r124156. replaceChild() has yet another hidden
MutationEvent trigger. This change added a guard for it.
Test: fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html
* dom/ContainerNode.cpp:
(WebCore::ContainerNode::replaceChild):
LayoutTests:
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125237 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 15,286
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderView::Close() {
WebView* doomed = webview();
RenderWidget::Close();
g_view_map.Get().erase(doomed);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *AcquireLZMAMemory(void *context,size_t items,size_t size)
{
(void) context;
return((void *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) items,(size_t) size));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,215
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int config_props(AVFilterLink *inlink)
{
FlipContext *s = inlink->dst->priv;
const AVPixFmtDescriptor *pix_desc = av_pix_fmt_desc_get(inlink->format);
av_image_fill_max_pixsteps(s->max_step, NULL, pix_desc);
s->hsub = pix_desc->log2_chroma_w;
s->vsub = pix_desc->log2_chroma_h;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,240
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rollback_registered_many(struct list_head *head)
{
struct net_device *dev, *tmp;
BUG_ON(dev_boot_phase);
ASSERT_RTNL();
list_for_each_entry_safe(dev, tmp, head, unreg_list) {
/* Some devices call without registering
* for initialization unwind. Remove those
* devices and proceed with the remaining.
*/
if (dev->reg_state == NETREG_UNINITIALIZED) {
pr_debug("unregister_netdevice: device %s/%p never "
"was registered\n", dev->name, dev);
WARN_ON(1);
list_del(&dev->unreg_list);
continue;
}
BUG_ON(dev->reg_state != NETREG_REGISTERED);
}
/* If device is running, close it first. */
dev_close_many(head);
list_for_each_entry(dev, head, unreg_list) {
/* And unlink it from device chain. */
unlist_netdevice(dev);
dev->reg_state = NETREG_UNREGISTERING;
}
synchronize_net();
list_for_each_entry(dev, head, unreg_list) {
/* Shutdown queueing discipline. */
dev_shutdown(dev);
/* Notify protocols, that we are about to destroy
this device. They should clean all the things.
*/
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER, dev);
if (!dev->rtnl_link_ops ||
dev->rtnl_link_state == RTNL_LINK_INITIALIZED)
rtmsg_ifinfo(RTM_DELLINK, dev, ~0U);
/*
* Flush the unicast and multicast chains
*/
dev_uc_flush(dev);
dev_mc_flush(dev);
if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_uninit)
dev->netdev_ops->ndo_uninit(dev);
/* Notifier chain MUST detach us from master device. */
WARN_ON(dev->master);
/* Remove entries from kobject tree */
netdev_unregister_kobject(dev);
}
/* Process any work delayed until the end of the batch */
dev = list_first_entry(head, struct net_device, unreg_list);
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_UNREGISTER_BATCH, dev);
rcu_barrier();
list_for_each_entry(dev, head, unreg_list)
dev_put(dev);
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14,096
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isTexture(WebGLTexture* texture) {
if (!texture || isContextLost())
return 0;
if (!texture->HasEverBeenBound())
return 0;
if (texture->IsDeleted())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsTexture(texture->Object());
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int atl2_set_eeprom(struct net_device *netdev,
struct ethtool_eeprom *eeprom, u8 *bytes)
{
struct atl2_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(netdev);
struct atl2_hw *hw = &adapter->hw;
u32 *eeprom_buff;
u32 *ptr;
int max_len, first_dword, last_dword, ret_val = 0;
int i;
if (eeprom->len == 0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (eeprom->magic != (hw->vendor_id | (hw->device_id << 16)))
return -EFAULT;
max_len = 512;
first_dword = eeprom->offset >> 2;
last_dword = (eeprom->offset + eeprom->len - 1) >> 2;
eeprom_buff = kmalloc(max_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!eeprom_buff)
return -ENOMEM;
ptr = eeprom_buff;
if (eeprom->offset & 3) {
/* need read/modify/write of first changed EEPROM word */
/* only the second byte of the word is being modified */
if (!atl2_read_eeprom(hw, first_dword*4, &(eeprom_buff[0]))) {
ret_val = -EIO;
goto out;
}
ptr++;
}
if (((eeprom->offset + eeprom->len) & 3)) {
/*
* need read/modify/write of last changed EEPROM word
* only the first byte of the word is being modified
*/
if (!atl2_read_eeprom(hw, last_dword * 4,
&(eeprom_buff[last_dword - first_dword]))) {
ret_val = -EIO;
goto out;
}
}
/* Device's eeprom is always little-endian, word addressable */
memcpy(ptr, bytes, eeprom->len);
for (i = 0; i < last_dword - first_dword + 1; i++) {
if (!atl2_write_eeprom(hw, ((first_dword+i)*4), eeprom_buff[i])) {
ret_val = -EIO;
goto out;
}
}
out:
kfree(eeprom_buff);
return ret_val;
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 3,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void bio_advance(struct bio *bio, unsigned bytes)
{
if (bio_integrity(bio))
bio_integrity_advance(bio, bytes);
bio_advance_iter(bio, &bio->bi_iter, bytes);
}
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 17,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void file_change_d(const char *p, struct branch *b)
{
static struct strbuf uq = STRBUF_INIT;
const char *endp;
strbuf_reset(&uq);
if (!unquote_c_style(&uq, p, &endp)) {
if (*endp)
die("Garbage after path in: %s", command_buf.buf);
p = uq.buf;
}
tree_content_remove(&b->branch_tree, p, NULL, 1);
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,868
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lzh_decode_huffman(struct huffman *hf, unsigned rbits)
{
int c;
/*
* At first search an index table for a bit pattern.
* If it fails, search a huffman tree for.
*/
c = hf->tbl[rbits >> hf->shift_bits];
if (c < hf->len_avail || hf->len_avail == 0)
return (c);
/* This bit pattern needs to be found out at a huffman tree. */
return (lzh_decode_huffman_tree(hf, rbits, c));
}
Commit Message: Fail with negative lha->compsize in lha_read_file_header_1()
Fixes a heap buffer overflow reported in Secunia SA74169
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 22,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseEnumerationType(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *name;
xmlEnumerationPtr ret = NULL, last = NULL, cur, tmp;
if (RAW != '(') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTLIST_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
SHRINK;
do {
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
name = xmlParseNmtoken(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NMTOKEN_REQUIRED, NULL);
return(ret);
}
tmp = ret;
while (tmp != NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(name, tmp->name)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_DTD_DUP_TOKEN,
"standalone: attribute enumeration value token %s duplicated\n",
name, NULL);
if (!xmlDictOwns(ctxt->dict, name))
xmlFree(name);
break;
}
tmp = tmp->next;
}
if (tmp == NULL) {
cur = xmlCreateEnumeration(name);
if (!xmlDictOwns(ctxt->dict, name))
xmlFree(name);
if (cur == NULL) {
xmlFreeEnumeration(ret);
return(NULL);
}
if (last == NULL) ret = last = cur;
else {
last->next = cur;
last = cur;
}
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
} while (RAW == '|');
if (RAW != ')') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTLIST_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
return(ret);
}
NEXT;
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 21,672
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetResourceDispatcherHost() {
return g_browser_process->resource_dispatcher_host();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,313
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int rfcomm_dev_ioctl(struct sock *sk, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg)
{
BT_DBG("cmd %d arg %p", cmd, arg);
switch (cmd) {
case RFCOMMCREATEDEV:
return rfcomm_create_dev(sk, arg);
case RFCOMMRELEASEDEV:
return rfcomm_release_dev(arg);
case RFCOMMGETDEVLIST:
return rfcomm_get_dev_list(arg);
case RFCOMMGETDEVINFO:
return rfcomm_get_dev_info(arg);
}
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in ioctl(RFCOMMGETDEVLIST)
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
rfcomm_dev_list_req inserted for alignment before copying it to
userland. Additionally there are two padding bytes in each instance of
struct rfcomm_dev_info. The ioctl() that for disclosures two bytes plus
dev_num times two bytes uninitialized kernel heap memory.
Allocate the memory using kzalloc() to fix this issue.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 9,583
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DeleteServiceObjects(ClientServiceMap<ClientType, ServiceType>* id_map,
bool have_context,
DeleteFunction delete_function) {
if (have_context) {
id_map->ForEach(delete_function);
}
id_map->Clear();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 23,651
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::ReloadIfTerminated(
content::RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
std::string extension_id = GetExtensionId(render_view_host);
if (extension_id.empty())
return;
ExtensionRegistry* registry = ExtensionRegistry::Get(browser_context());
if (registry->GetExtensionById(extension_id, ExtensionRegistry::TERMINATED)) {
ExtensionSystem::Get(browser_context())->
extension_service()->ReloadExtension(extension_id);
}
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 15,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void svm_clear_vintr(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VINTR);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 11,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppCacheGroup::CancelUpdate() {
if (update_job_) {
delete update_job_;
DCHECK(!update_job_);
DCHECK_EQ(IDLE, update_status_);
}
}
Commit Message: Refcount AppCacheGroup correctly.
Bug: 888926
Change-Id: Iab0d82d272e2f24a5e91180d64bc8e2aa8a8238d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1246827
Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594475}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 4,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ServiceWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::WorkerRestarted(int worker_process_id,
int worker_route_id) {
DCHECK_EQ(WORKER_TERMINATED, state_);
state_ = WORKER_NOT_READY;
worker_process_id_ = worker_process_id;
worker_route_id_ = worker_route_id;
RenderProcessHost* host = RenderProcessHost::FromID(worker_process_id_);
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions())
session->SetRenderer(host, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 19,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void spl_array_object_free_storage(void *object TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object *)object;
zend_object_std_dtor(&intern->std TSRMLS_CC);
zval_ptr_dtor(&intern->array);
zval_ptr_dtor(&intern->retval);
if (intern->debug_info != NULL) {
zend_hash_destroy(intern->debug_info);
efree(intern->debug_info);
}
efree(object);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool vm_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(struct kvm *kvm)
{
return flexpriority_enabled && irqchip_in_kernel(kvm);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 3,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~TabStripModelTestIDUserData() {}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void arc4_crypt(struct arc4_ctx *ctx, u8 *out, const u8 *in,
unsigned int len)
{
u32 *const S = ctx->S;
u32 x, y, a, b;
u32 ty, ta, tb;
if (len == 0)
return;
x = ctx->x;
y = ctx->y;
a = S[x];
y = (y + a) & 0xff;
b = S[y];
do {
S[y] = a;
a = (a + b) & 0xff;
S[x] = b;
x = (x + 1) & 0xff;
ta = S[x];
ty = (y + ta) & 0xff;
tb = S[ty];
*out++ = *in++ ^ S[a];
if (--len == 0)
break;
y = ty;
a = ta;
b = tb;
} while (true);
ctx->x = x;
ctx->y = y;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 5,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit atl2_exit_module(void)
{
pci_unregister_driver(&atl2_driver);
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 14,300
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UDPSocketLibevent::Close() {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
if (!is_connected())
return;
read_buf_ = NULL;
read_buf_len_ = 0;
read_callback_.Reset();
recv_from_address_ = NULL;
write_buf_ = NULL;
write_buf_len_ = 0;
write_callback_.Reset();
send_to_address_.reset();
bool ok = read_socket_watcher_.StopWatchingFileDescriptor();
DCHECK(ok);
ok = write_socket_watcher_.StopWatchingFileDescriptor();
DCHECK(ok);
if (IGNORE_EINTR(close(socket_)) < 0)
PLOG(ERROR) << "close";
socket_ = kInvalidSocket;
addr_family_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 17,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutUnit RenderBlockFlow::nextFloatLogicalBottomBelow(LayoutUnit logicalHeight, ShapeOutsideFloatOffsetMode offsetMode) const
{
if (!m_floatingObjects)
return logicalHeight;
LayoutUnit logicalBottom;
const FloatingObjectSet& floatingObjectSet = m_floatingObjects->set();
FloatingObjectSetIterator end = floatingObjectSet.end();
for (FloatingObjectSetIterator it = floatingObjectSet.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
FloatingObject* floatingObject = *it;
LayoutUnit floatLogicalBottom = logicalBottomForFloat(floatingObject);
ShapeOutsideInfo* shapeOutside = floatingObject->renderer()->shapeOutsideInfo();
if (shapeOutside && (offsetMode == ShapeOutsideFloatShapeOffset)) {
LayoutUnit shapeLogicalBottom = logicalTopForFloat(floatingObject) + marginBeforeForChild(floatingObject->renderer()) + shapeOutside->shapeLogicalBottom();
if (shapeLogicalBottom < floatLogicalBottom)
floatLogicalBottom = shapeLogicalBottom;
}
if (floatLogicalBottom > logicalHeight)
logicalBottom = logicalBottom ? min(floatLogicalBottom, logicalBottom) : floatLogicalBottom;
}
return logicalBottom;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,613
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BlobRegistryProxy::BlobRegistryProxy()
: m_webBlobRegistry(WebKit::Platform::current()->blobRegistry())
{
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 8,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ServiceWorkerContextCore::UpdateServiceWorker(
ServiceWorkerRegistration* registration,
bool force_bypass_cache,
bool skip_script_comparison,
UpdateCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
job_coordinator_->Update(
registration, force_bypass_cache, skip_script_comparison,
base::BindOnce(&ServiceWorkerContextCore::UpdateComplete, AsWeakPtr(),
std::move(callback)));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 29,450
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandler::CloseClientPeerConnection() {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
if (!is_closed_)
client_->ClosePeerConnection();
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 5,393
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataFileSystem::OnGetFileCompleteForOpenFile(
const OpenFileCallback& callback,
const GetFileCompleteForOpenParams& entry_proto,
GDataFileError error,
const FilePath& file_path,
const std::string& mime_type,
GDataFileType file_type) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(error, FilePath());
return;
}
DCHECK_EQ(REGULAR_FILE, file_type);
cache_->MarkDirtyOnUIThread(
entry_proto.resource_id,
entry_proto.md5,
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::OnMarkDirtyInCacheCompleteForOpenFile,
ui_weak_ptr_,
callback));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err ccst_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_CodingConstraintsBox *p = (GF_CodingConstraintsBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "CodingConstraintsBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "all_ref_pics_intra=\"%d\" intra_pred_used=\"%d\" max_ref_per_pic=\"%d\" reserved=\"%d\">\n", p->all_ref_pics_intra, p->intra_pred_used, p->max_ref_per_pic, p->reserved);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("CodingConstraintsBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 25,763
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sas_expander_discover(struct domain_device *dev)
{
struct expander_device *ex = &dev->ex_dev;
int res = -ENOMEM;
ex->ex_phy = kzalloc(sizeof(*ex->ex_phy)*ex->num_phys, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ex->ex_phy)
return -ENOMEM;
res = sas_ex_phy_discover(dev, -1);
if (res)
goto out_err;
return 0;
out_err:
kfree(ex->ex_phy);
ex->ex_phy = NULL;
return res;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: fix memory leak in sas_smp_get_phy_events()
We've got a memory leak with the following producer:
while true;
do cat /sys/class/sas_phy/phy-1:0:12/invalid_dword_count >/dev/null;
done
The buffer req is allocated and not freed after we return. Fix it.
Fixes: 2908d778ab3e ("[SCSI] aic94xx: new driver")
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: chenqilin <chenqilin2@huawei.com>
CC: chenxiang <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 16,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lua_ap_is_initial_req(request_rec *r)
{
return ap_is_initial_req(r);
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool subscribe_extranonce(struct pool *pool)
{
json_t *val = NULL, *res_val, *err_val;
char s[RBUFSIZE], *sret = NULL;
json_error_t err;
bool ret = false;
sprintf(s, "{\"id\": %d, \"method\": \"mining.extranonce.subscribe\", \"params\": []}",
swork_id++);
if (!stratum_send(pool, s, strlen(s)))
return ret;
/* Parse all data in the queue and anything left should be the response */
while (42) {
if (!socket_full(pool, DEFAULT_SOCKWAIT / 30)) {
applog(LOG_DEBUG, "Timed out waiting for response extranonce.subscribe");
/* some pool doesnt send anything, so this is normal */
ret = true;
goto out;
}
sret = recv_line(pool);
if (!sret)
return ret;
if (parse_method(pool, sret))
free(sret);
else
break;
}
val = JSON_LOADS(sret, &err);
free(sret);
res_val = json_object_get(val, "result");
err_val = json_object_get(val, "error");
if (!res_val || json_is_false(res_val) || (err_val && !json_is_null(err_val))) {
char *ss;
if (err_val) {
ss = __json_array_string(err_val, 1);
if (!ss)
ss = (char *)json_string_value(err_val);
if (ss && (strcmp(ss, "Method 'subscribe' not found for service 'mining.extranonce'") == 0)) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "Cannot subscribe to mining.extranonce on %s", get_pool_name(pool));
ret = true;
goto out;
}
if (ss && (strcmp(ss, "Unrecognized request provided") == 0)) {
applog(LOG_INFO, "Cannot subscribe to mining.extranonce on %s", get_pool_name(pool));
ret = true;
goto out;
}
ss = json_dumps(err_val, JSON_INDENT(3));
}
else
ss = strdup("(unknown reason)");
applog(LOG_INFO, "%s JSON stratum auth failed: %s", get_pool_name(pool), ss);
free(ss);
goto out;
}
ret = true;
applog(LOG_INFO, "Stratum extranonce subscribe for %s", get_pool_name(pool));
out:
json_decref(val);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,882
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::BoundFramebufferHasDepthAttachment() {
if (bound_draw_framebuffer_) {
return bound_draw_framebuffer_->HasDepthAttachment();
}
if (offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get()) {
return offscreen_target_depth_format_ != 0;
}
return back_buffer_has_depth_;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,187
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vnc_zrle_stop(VncState *vs)
{
/* switch back to normal output/zlib buffers */
vs->zrle.zrle = vs->output;
vs->output = vs->zrle.tmp;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 4,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: evdns_server_request_drop(struct evdns_server_request *req_)
{
struct server_request *req = TO_SERVER_REQUEST(req_);
server_request_free(req);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 11,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int match_server(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct smb_vol *vol)
{
struct sockaddr *addr = (struct sockaddr *)&vol->dstaddr;
if ((server->vals != vol->vals) || (server->ops != vol->ops))
return 0;
if (!net_eq(cifs_net_ns(server), current->nsproxy->net_ns))
return 0;
if (!match_address(server, addr,
(struct sockaddr *)&vol->srcaddr))
return 0;
if (!match_port(server, addr))
return 0;
if (!match_security(server, vol))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <marcus.moeller@gmx.ch>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <ken.fallon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 15,582
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __update_nat_bits(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, nid_t start_nid,
struct page *page)
{
struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i = NM_I(sbi);
unsigned int nat_index = start_nid / NAT_ENTRY_PER_BLOCK;
struct f2fs_nat_block *nat_blk = page_address(page);
int valid = 0;
int i;
if (!enabled_nat_bits(sbi, NULL))
return;
for (i = 0; i < NAT_ENTRY_PER_BLOCK; i++) {
if (start_nid == 0 && i == 0)
valid++;
if (nat_blk->entries[i].block_addr)
valid++;
}
if (valid == 0) {
__set_bit_le(nat_index, nm_i->empty_nat_bits);
__clear_bit_le(nat_index, nm_i->full_nat_bits);
return;
}
__clear_bit_le(nat_index, nm_i->empty_nat_bits);
if (valid == NAT_ENTRY_PER_BLOCK)
__set_bit_le(nat_index, nm_i->full_nat_bits);
else
__clear_bit_le(nat_index, nm_i->full_nat_bits);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 21,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::PrepareFrameForPreviewDocument() {
reset_prep_frame_view_ = false;
if (!print_pages_params_ || CheckForCancel()) {
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PREVIEW);
return;
}
if (prep_frame_view_ && prep_frame_view_->IsLoadingSelection()) {
reset_prep_frame_view_ = true;
return;
}
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& print_params = print_pages_params_->params;
prep_frame_view_.reset(new PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint(
print_params, print_preview_context_.source_frame(),
print_preview_context_.source_node(), ignore_css_margins_));
prep_frame_view_->CopySelectionIfNeeded(
render_view()->GetWebkitPreferences(),
base::Bind(&PrintWebViewHelper::OnFramePreparedForPreviewDocument,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,292
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lzss_emit_match(struct rar *rar, int offset, int length)
{
int dstoffs = lzss_current_offset(&rar->lzss);
int srcoffs = (dstoffs - offset) & lzss_mask(&rar->lzss);
int l, li, remaining;
unsigned char *d, *s;
remaining = length;
while (remaining > 0) {
l = remaining;
if (dstoffs > srcoffs) {
if (l > lzss_size(&rar->lzss) - dstoffs)
l = lzss_size(&rar->lzss) - dstoffs;
} else {
if (l > lzss_size(&rar->lzss) - srcoffs)
l = lzss_size(&rar->lzss) - srcoffs;
}
d = &(rar->lzss.window[dstoffs]);
s = &(rar->lzss.window[srcoffs]);
if ((dstoffs + l < srcoffs) || (srcoffs + l < dstoffs))
memcpy(d, s, l);
else {
for (li = 0; li < l; li++)
d[li] = s[li];
}
remaining -= l;
dstoffs = (dstoffs + l) & lzss_mask(&(rar->lzss));
srcoffs = (srcoffs + l) & lzss_mask(&(rar->lzss));
}
rar->lzss.position += length;
}
Commit Message: Issue 719: Fix for TALOS-CAN-154
A RAR file with an invalid zero dictionary size was not being
rejected, leading to a zero-sized allocation for the dictionary
storage which was then overwritten during the dictionary initialization.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco for
reporting this.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 21,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int close_getadapter_fib(struct aac_dev * dev, void __user *arg)
{
struct aac_fib_context *fibctx;
int status;
unsigned long flags;
struct list_head * entry;
/*
* Verify that the HANDLE passed in was a valid AdapterFibContext
*
* Search the list of AdapterFibContext addresses on the adapter
* to be sure this is a valid address
*/
entry = dev->fib_list.next;
fibctx = NULL;
while(entry != &dev->fib_list) {
fibctx = list_entry(entry, struct aac_fib_context, next);
/*
* Extract the fibctx from the input parameters
*/
if (fibctx->unique == (u32)(uintptr_t)arg) /* We found a winner */
break;
entry = entry->next;
fibctx = NULL;
}
if (!fibctx)
return 0; /* Already gone */
if((fibctx->type != FSAFS_NTC_GET_ADAPTER_FIB_CONTEXT) ||
(fibctx->size != sizeof(struct aac_fib_context)))
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->fib_lock, flags);
status = aac_close_fib_context(dev, fibctx);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->fib_lock, flags);
return status;
}
Commit Message: aacraid: prevent invalid pointer dereference
It appears that driver runs into a problem here if fibsize is too small
because we allocate user_srbcmd with fibsize size only but later we
access it until user_srbcmd->sg.count to copy it over to srbcmd.
It is not correct to test (fibsize < sizeof(*user_srbcmd)) because this
structure already includes one sg element and this is not needed for
commands without data. So, we would recommend to add the following
(instead of test for fibsize == 0).
Signed-off-by: Mahesh Rajashekhara <Mahesh.Rajashekhara@pmcs.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,455
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebGLActiveInfo* WebGL2RenderingContextBase::getTransformFeedbackVarying(
WebGLProgram* program,
GLuint index) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateWebGLObject("getTransformFeedbackVarying", program))
return nullptr;
if (!program->LinkStatus(this)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "getTransformFeedbackVarying",
"program not linked");
return nullptr;
}
GLint max_index = 0;
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program),
GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_VARYINGS, &max_index);
if (index >= static_cast<GLuint>(max_index)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "getTransformFeedbackVarying",
"invalid index");
return nullptr;
}
GLint max_name_length = -1;
ContextGL()->GetProgramiv(ObjectOrZero(program),
GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_VARYING_MAX_LENGTH,
&max_name_length);
if (max_name_length <= 0) {
return nullptr;
}
auto name = std::make_unique<GLchar[]>(max_name_length);
GLsizei length = 0;
GLsizei size = 0;
GLenum type = 0;
ContextGL()->GetTransformFeedbackVarying(ObjectOrZero(program), index,
max_name_length, &length, &size,
&type, name.get());
if (length == 0 || size == 0 || type == 0) {
return nullptr;
}
return WebGLActiveInfo::Create(String(name.get(), length), type, size);
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,068
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t dbg_lvl_store(struct device_driver *dd, const char *buf,
size_t count)
{
int retval = count;
if (sscanf(buf, "%u", &megasas_dbg_lvl) < 1) {
printk(KERN_ERR "megasas: could not set dbg_lvl\n");
retval = -EINVAL;
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 8,014
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tsize_t t2p_write_pdf_xobject_icccs_stream(T2P* t2p, TIFF* output){
tsize_t written=0;
written += t2p_write_pdf_stream(
(tdata_t) t2p->tiff_iccprofile,
(tsize_t) t2p->tiff_iccprofilelength,
output);
return(written);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 15,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static HTC_SEND_FULL_ACTION ar6000_tx_queue_full(void *Context, struct htc_packet *pPacket)
{
struct ar6_softc *ar = (struct ar6_softc *)Context;
HTC_SEND_FULL_ACTION action = HTC_SEND_FULL_KEEP;
bool stopNet = false;
HTC_ENDPOINT_ID Endpoint = HTC_GET_ENDPOINT_FROM_PKT(pPacket);
do {
if (bypasswmi) {
int accessClass;
if (HTC_GET_TAG_FROM_PKT(pPacket) == AR6K_CONTROL_PKT_TAG) {
/* don't drop special control packets */
break;
}
accessClass = arEndpoint2Ac(ar,Endpoint);
/* for endpoint ping testing drop Best Effort and Background */
if ((accessClass == WMM_AC_BE) || (accessClass == WMM_AC_BK)) {
action = HTC_SEND_FULL_DROP;
stopNet = false;
} else {
/* keep but stop the netqueues */
stopNet = true;
}
break;
}
if (Endpoint == ar->arControlEp) {
/* under normal WMI if this is getting full, then something is running rampant
* the host should not be exhausting the WMI queue with too many commands
* the only exception to this is during testing using endpointping */
AR6000_SPIN_LOCK(&ar->arLock, 0);
/* set flag to handle subsequent messages */
ar->arWMIControlEpFull = true;
AR6000_SPIN_UNLOCK(&ar->arLock, 0);
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR,("WMI Control Endpoint is FULL!!! \n"));
/* no need to stop the network */
stopNet = false;
break;
}
/* if we get here, we are dealing with data endpoints getting full */
if (HTC_GET_TAG_FROM_PKT(pPacket) == AR6K_CONTROL_PKT_TAG) {
/* don't drop control packets issued on ANY data endpoint */
break;
}
if (ar->arNetworkType == ADHOC_NETWORK) {
/* in adhoc mode, we cannot differentiate traffic priorities so there is no need to
* continue, however we should stop the network */
stopNet = true;
break;
}
/* the last MAX_HI_COOKIE_NUM "batch" of cookies are reserved for the highest
* active stream */
if (ar->arAcStreamPriMap[arEndpoint2Ac(ar,Endpoint)] < ar->arHiAcStreamActivePri &&
ar->arCookieCount <= MAX_HI_COOKIE_NUM) {
/* this stream's priority is less than the highest active priority, we
* give preference to the highest priority stream by directing
* HTC to drop the packet that overflowed */
action = HTC_SEND_FULL_DROP;
/* since we are dropping packets, no need to stop the network */
stopNet = false;
break;
}
} while (false);
if (stopNet) {
AR6000_SPIN_LOCK(&ar->arLock, 0);
ar->arNetQueueStopped = true;
AR6000_SPIN_UNLOCK(&ar->arLock, 0);
/* one of the data endpoints queues is getting full..need to stop network stack
* the queue will resume in ar6000_tx_complete() */
netif_stop_queue(ar->arNetDev);
}
return action;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 16,777
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderLayer* WebPagePrivate::enclosingPositionedAncestorOrSelfIfPositioned(RenderLayer* layer)
{
return findAncestorOrSelfNotMatching(&isPositionedContainer, layer);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dissect_fp_aal2(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void *data)
{
return dissect_fp_common(tvb, pinfo, tree, data);
}
Commit Message: UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,049
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init hugetlb_default_setup(char *s)
{
default_hstate_size = memparse(s, &s);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,776
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int node_match(struct kmem_cache_cpu *c, int node)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
if (node != -1 && c->node != node)
return 0;
#endif
return 1;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 9,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsWindow::ToggleDevToolsWindow(
Browser* browser,
const DevToolsToggleAction& action) {
if (action.type() == DevToolsToggleAction::kToggle &&
browser->is_devtools()) {
browser->tab_strip_model()->CloseAllTabs();
return;
}
ToggleDevToolsWindow(
browser->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents(),
action.type() == DevToolsToggleAction::kInspect,
action, "");
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 5,356
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const LegalMessageLines& SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::GetLegalMessageLines()
const {
return legal_message_lines_;
}
Commit Message: [autofill] Avoid duplicate instances of the SaveCardBubble.
autofill::SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ShowBubble() expects
(via DCHECK) to only be called when the save card bubble is
not already visible. This constraint is violated if the user
clicks multiple times on a submit button.
If the underlying page goes away, the last SaveCardBubbleView
created by the controller will be automatically cleaned up,
but any others are left visible on the screen... holding a
refence to a possibly-deleted controller.
This CL early exits the ShowBubbleFor*** and ReshowBubble logic
if the bubble is already visible.
BUG=708819
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2862933002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#469768}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 15,799
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmxnet3_put_int_state(QEMUFile *f, void *pv, size_t size)
{
Vmxnet3IntState *r = pv;
qemu_put_byte(f, r->is_masked);
qemu_put_byte(f, r->is_pending);
qemu_put_byte(f, r->is_asserted);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 13,115
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void webkitWebViewBaseChildMoveResize(WebKitWebViewBase* webView, GtkWidget* child, const IntRect& childRect)
{
const IntRect& geometry = webView->priv->children.get(child);
if (geometry == childRect)
return;
webView->priv->children.set(child, childRect);
gtk_widget_queue_resize_no_redraw(GTK_WIDGET(webView));
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 23,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int posix_cpu_clock_get(const clockid_t which_clock, struct timespec64 *tp)
{
const pid_t pid = CPUCLOCK_PID(which_clock);
int err = -EINVAL;
if (pid == 0) {
/*
* Special case constant value for our own clocks.
* We don't have to do any lookup to find ourselves.
*/
err = posix_cpu_clock_get_task(current, which_clock, tp);
} else {
/*
* Find the given PID, and validate that the caller
* should be able to see it.
*/
struct task_struct *p;
rcu_read_lock();
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (p)
err = posix_cpu_clock_get_task(p, which_clock, tp);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 26,466
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void beforeSleep(struct aeEventLoop *eventLoop) {
UNUSED(eventLoop);
/* Call the Redis Cluster before sleep function. Note that this function
* may change the state of Redis Cluster (from ok to fail or vice versa),
* so it's a good idea to call it before serving the unblocked clients
* later in this function. */
if (server.cluster_enabled) clusterBeforeSleep();
/* Run a fast expire cycle (the called function will return
* ASAP if a fast cycle is not needed). */
if (server.active_expire_enabled && server.masterhost == NULL)
activeExpireCycle(ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_FAST);
/* Send all the slaves an ACK request if at least one client blocked
* during the previous event loop iteration. */
if (server.get_ack_from_slaves) {
robj *argv[3];
argv[0] = createStringObject("REPLCONF",8);
argv[1] = createStringObject("GETACK",6);
argv[2] = createStringObject("*",1); /* Not used argument. */
replicationFeedSlaves(server.slaves, server.slaveseldb, argv, 3);
decrRefCount(argv[0]);
decrRefCount(argv[1]);
decrRefCount(argv[2]);
server.get_ack_from_slaves = 0;
}
/* Unblock all the clients blocked for synchronous replication
* in WAIT. */
if (listLength(server.clients_waiting_acks))
processClientsWaitingReplicas();
/* Try to process pending commands for clients that were just unblocked. */
if (listLength(server.unblocked_clients))
processUnblockedClients();
/* Write the AOF buffer on disk */
flushAppendOnlyFile(0);
/* Handle writes with pending output buffers. */
handleClientsWithPendingWrites();
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 20,034
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int get_numa_group(struct numa_group *grp)
{
return atomic_inc_not_zero(&grp->refcount);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 4,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct smbXcli_session *smbXcli_session_copy(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct smbXcli_session *src)
{
struct smbXcli_session *session;
session = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct smbXcli_session);
if (session == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
session->smb2 = talloc_zero(session, struct smb2cli_session);
if (session->smb2 == NULL) {
talloc_free(session);
return NULL;
}
session->conn = src->conn;
*session->smb2 = *src->smb2;
session->smb2_channel = src->smb2_channel;
session->disconnect_expired = src->disconnect_expired;
DLIST_ADD_END(src->conn->sessions, session, struct smbXcli_session *);
talloc_set_destructor(session, smbXcli_session_destructor);
return session;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: t1_decoder_done( T1_Decoder decoder )
{
t1_builder_done( &decoder->builder );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 20,799
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void netlink_rcv_wake(struct sock *sk)
{
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
if (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue))
clear_bit(NETLINK_CONGESTED, &nlk->state);
if (!test_bit(NETLINK_CONGESTED, &nlk->state))
wake_up_interruptible(&nlk->wait);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,325
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CIFSSMBSetFileDisposition(const int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
bool delete_file, __u16 fid, __u32 pid_of_opener)
{
struct smb_com_transaction2_sfi_req *pSMB = NULL;
char *data_offset;
int rc = 0;
__u16 params, param_offset, offset, byte_count, count;
cFYI(1, "Set File Disposition (via SetFileInfo)");
rc = small_smb_init(SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2, 15, tcon, (void **) &pSMB);
if (rc)
return rc;
pSMB->hdr.Pid = cpu_to_le16((__u16)pid_of_opener);
pSMB->hdr.PidHigh = cpu_to_le16((__u16)(pid_of_opener >> 16));
params = 6;
pSMB->MaxSetupCount = 0;
pSMB->Reserved = 0;
pSMB->Flags = 0;
pSMB->Timeout = 0;
pSMB->Reserved2 = 0;
param_offset = offsetof(struct smb_com_transaction2_sfi_req, Fid) - 4;
offset = param_offset + params;
data_offset = (char *) (&pSMB->hdr.Protocol) + offset;
count = 1;
pSMB->MaxParameterCount = cpu_to_le16(2);
/* BB find max SMB PDU from sess */
pSMB->MaxDataCount = cpu_to_le16(1000);
pSMB->SetupCount = 1;
pSMB->Reserved3 = 0;
pSMB->SubCommand = cpu_to_le16(TRANS2_SET_FILE_INFORMATION);
byte_count = 3 /* pad */ + params + count;
pSMB->DataCount = cpu_to_le16(count);
pSMB->ParameterCount = cpu_to_le16(params);
pSMB->TotalDataCount = pSMB->DataCount;
pSMB->TotalParameterCount = pSMB->ParameterCount;
pSMB->ParameterOffset = cpu_to_le16(param_offset);
pSMB->DataOffset = cpu_to_le16(offset);
pSMB->Fid = fid;
pSMB->InformationLevel = cpu_to_le16(SMB_SET_FILE_DISPOSITION_INFO);
pSMB->Reserved4 = 0;
inc_rfc1001_len(pSMB, byte_count);
pSMB->ByteCount = cpu_to_le16(byte_count);
*data_offset = delete_file ? 1 : 0;
rc = SendReceiveNoRsp(xid, tcon->ses, (struct smb_hdr *) pSMB, 0);
if (rc)
cFYI(1, "Send error in SetFileDisposition = %d", rc);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix possible memory corruption in CIFSFindNext
The name_len variable in CIFSFindNext is a signed int that gets set to
the resume_name_len in the cifs_search_info. The resume_name_len however
is unsigned and for some infolevels is populated directly from a 32 bit
value sent by the server.
If the server sends a very large value for this, then that value could
look negative when converted to a signed int. That would make that
value pass the PATH_MAX check later in CIFSFindNext. The name_len would
then be used as a length value for a memcpy. It would then be treated
as unsigned again, and the memcpy scribbles over a ton of memory.
Fix this by making the name_len an unsigned value in CIFSFindNext.
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Darren Lavender <dcl@hppine99.gbr.hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 16,840
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int espruino_snprintf( char * s, size_t n, const char * fmt, ... ) {
espruino_snprintf_data d;
d.outPtr = s;
d.idx = 0;
d.len = n;
va_list argp;
va_start(argp, fmt);
vcbprintf(espruino_snprintf_cb,&d, fmt, argp);
va_end(argp);
if (d.idx < d.len) d.outPtr[d.idx] = 0;
else d.outPtr[d.len-1] = 0;
return (int)d.idx;
}
Commit Message: Fix stack size detection on Linux (fix #1427)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 13,110
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DevToolsConfirmInfoBarDelegate::~DevToolsConfirmInfoBarDelegate() {
if (!callback_.is_null())
callback_.Run(false);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 5,477
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static rtnl_calcit_func rtnl_get_calcit(int protocol, int msgindex)
{
struct rtnl_link *tab;
if (protocol <= RTNL_FAMILY_MAX)
tab = rtnl_msg_handlers[protocol];
else
tab = NULL;
if (tab == NULL || tab[msgindex].calcit == NULL)
tab = rtnl_msg_handlers[PF_UNSPEC];
return tab[msgindex].calcit;
}
Commit Message: rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 1,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void virtio_queue_set_guest_notifier_fd_handler(VirtQueue *vq, bool assign,
bool with_irqfd)
{
if (assign && !with_irqfd) {
event_notifier_set_handler(&vq->guest_notifier,
virtio_queue_guest_notifier_read);
} else {
event_notifier_set_handler(&vq->guest_notifier, NULL);
}
if (!assign) {
/* Test and clear notifier before closing it,
* in case poll callback didn't have time to run. */
virtio_queue_guest_notifier_read(&vq->guest_notifier);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,934
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct ath_frame_info *get_frame_info(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ieee80211_tx_info *tx_info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct ath_frame_info) >
sizeof(tx_info->rate_driver_data));
return (struct ath_frame_info *) &tx_info->rate_driver_data[0];
}
Commit Message: ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <maxim.stargazer@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 11,178
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBox::paint(PaintInfo& paintInfo, const LayoutPoint& paintOffset)
{
LayoutPoint adjustedPaintOffset = paintOffset + location();
PaintInfo childInfo(paintInfo);
childInfo.updatePaintingRootForChildren(this);
for (RenderObject* child = firstChild(); child; child = child->nextSibling())
child->paint(childInfo, adjustedPaintOffset);
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,404
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ocfs2_grab_pages_for_write(struct address_space *mapping,
struct ocfs2_write_ctxt *wc,
u32 cpos, loff_t user_pos,
unsigned user_len, int new,
struct page *mmap_page)
{
int ret = 0, i;
unsigned long start, target_index, end_index, index;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
loff_t last_byte;
target_index = user_pos >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/*
* Figure out how many pages we'll be manipulating here. For
* non allocating write, we just change the one
* page. Otherwise, we'll need a whole clusters worth. If we're
* writing past i_size, we only need enough pages to cover the
* last page of the write.
*/
if (new) {
wc->w_num_pages = ocfs2_pages_per_cluster(inode->i_sb);
start = ocfs2_align_clusters_to_page_index(inode->i_sb, cpos);
/*
* We need the index *past* the last page we could possibly
* touch. This is the page past the end of the write or
* i_size, whichever is greater.
*/
last_byte = max(user_pos + user_len, i_size_read(inode));
BUG_ON(last_byte < 1);
end_index = ((last_byte - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1;
if ((start + wc->w_num_pages) > end_index)
wc->w_num_pages = end_index - start;
} else {
wc->w_num_pages = 1;
start = target_index;
}
end_index = (user_pos + user_len - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
for(i = 0; i < wc->w_num_pages; i++) {
index = start + i;
if (index >= target_index && index <= end_index &&
wc->w_type == OCFS2_WRITE_MMAP) {
/*
* ocfs2_pagemkwrite() is a little different
* and wants us to directly use the page
* passed in.
*/
lock_page(mmap_page);
/* Exit and let the caller retry */
if (mmap_page->mapping != mapping) {
WARN_ON(mmap_page->mapping);
unlock_page(mmap_page);
ret = -EAGAIN;
goto out;
}
get_page(mmap_page);
wc->w_pages[i] = mmap_page;
wc->w_target_locked = true;
} else if (index >= target_index && index <= end_index &&
wc->w_type == OCFS2_WRITE_DIRECT) {
/* Direct write has no mapping page. */
wc->w_pages[i] = NULL;
continue;
} else {
wc->w_pages[i] = find_or_create_page(mapping, index,
GFP_NOFS);
if (!wc->w_pages[i]) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
}
wait_for_stable_page(wc->w_pages[i]);
if (index == target_index)
wc->w_target_page = wc->w_pages[i];
}
out:
if (ret)
wc->w_target_locked = false;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block()
ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block() when reading file in
DIRECT mode to prevent concurrent access to extent tree with
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), which may cause BUGON in the following
situation:
read file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A'
vfs_read
__vfs_read
ocfs2_file_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
ocfs2_direct_IO
__blockdev_direct_IO
do_blockdev_direct_IO
do_direct_IO
get_more_blocks
ocfs2_get_block
ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks
ocfs2_get_clusters
ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache()
ocfs2_search_extent_list
return the index of record which
contains the v_cluster, that is
v_cluster > rec[i]->e_cpos.
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
...
--> modify the rec[i]->e_cpos, resulting
in v_cluster < rec[i]->e_cpos.
BUG_ON(v_cluster < le32_to_cpu(rec->e_cpos))
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Fixes: c15471f79506 ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 9,411
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebPage::isEnableLocalAccessToAllCookies() const
{
return cookieManager().canLocalAccessAllCookies();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,103
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool IsAngle() {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
return gfx::GetGLImplementation() == gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2;
#else
return false;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,544
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sctp_cmd_t3_rtx_timers_stop(sctp_cmd_seq_t *cmds,
struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
struct sctp_transport *t;
list_for_each_entry(t, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list,
transports) {
if (del_timer(&t->T3_rtx_timer))
sctp_transport_put(t);
}
}
Commit Message: sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event
A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during
a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since
sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the
bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with
the listening socket but released with the new association socket.
The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening
socket lock.
Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take
the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called.
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0]
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48
RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0
R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0)
Stack:
ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000
<d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00
<d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
...
With lockdep debugging:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at:
[<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp]
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by CslRx/12087:
#0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0
#1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp]
Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by
saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event
critical section.
Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,710
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_vcpu_write_guest_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn,
const void *data, int offset, int len)
{
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gfn);
return __kvm_write_guest_page(slot, gfn, data, offset, len);
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 15,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Part::slotExtractionDone(KJob* job)
{
if (job->error() && job->error() != KJob::KilledJobError) {
KMessageBox::error(widget(), job->errorString());
} else {
ExtractJob *extractJob = qobject_cast<ExtractJob*>(job);
Q_ASSERT(extractJob);
if (ArkSettings::openDestinationFolderAfterExtraction()) {
qCDebug(ARK) << "Shall open" << extractJob->destinationDirectory();
QUrl destinationDirectory = QUrl::fromLocalFile(extractJob->destinationDirectory()).adjusted(QUrl::NormalizePathSegments);
qCDebug(ARK) << "Shall open URL" << destinationDirectory;
KRun::runUrl(destinationDirectory, QStringLiteral("inode/directory"), widget());
}
if (ArkSettings::closeAfterExtraction()) {
emit quit();
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 23,178
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigatorImpl::DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError_Params& params) {
VLOG(1) << "Failed Provisional Load: " << params.url.possibly_invalid_spec()
<< ", error_code: " << params.error_code
<< ", error_description: " << params.error_description
<< ", showing_repost_interstitial: " <<
params.showing_repost_interstitial
<< ", frame_id: " << render_frame_host->GetRoutingID();
GURL validated_url(params.url);
RenderProcessHost* render_process_host = render_frame_host->GetProcess();
render_process_host->FilterURL(false, &validated_url);
if (net::ERR_ABORTED == params.error_code) {
FrameTreeNode* root =
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->frame_tree()->root();
if (root->render_manager()->interstitial_page() != NULL) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Discarding message during interstitial.";
return;
}
}
DiscardPendingEntryIfNeeded(render_frame_host->navigation_handle());
if (delegate_) {
delegate_->DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError(
render_frame_host, validated_url, params.error_code,
params.error_description, params.was_ignored_by_handler);
}
}
Commit Message: Drop navigations to NavigationEntry with invalid virtual URLs.
BUG=657720
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2452443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#428056}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,994
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PostAsyncTask(SkiaOutputSurfaceDependency* dependency,
const base::RepeatingCallback<void(Args...)>& callback,
Args... args) {
dependency->PostTaskToClientThread(base::BindOnce(callback, args...));
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 15,032
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void inspectedViewClosed(WebViewImpl* view)
{
if (s_instance)
s_instance->m_frozenViews.remove(view);
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,434
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void beginTest()
{
postSetNeedsCommitThenRedrawToMainThread();
postSetNeedsCommitThenRedrawToMainThread();
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void netdev_lower_state_changed(struct net_device *lower_dev,
void *lower_state_info)
{
struct netdev_notifier_changelowerstate_info changelowerstate_info;
ASSERT_RTNL();
changelowerstate_info.lower_state_info = lower_state_info;
call_netdevice_notifiers_info(NETDEV_CHANGELOWERSTATE, lower_dev,
&changelowerstate_info.info);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 6,692
|
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